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
1945⁸

Volume VIII

THE NEAR EAST
AND AFRICA

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The Near East and Africa



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PREFACE

The preparation of this volume was directed and supervised by E. Ralph Perkins, former Chief of the Foreign Relations Division, assisted by the present Chief, S. Everett Gleason, by Rogers P. Churchill and Ralph R. Goodwin.

The compilations on the regional policies of the United States toward the Near East were the work of Herbert A. Fine, Ralph R. Goodwin, and John P. Glennon. Messrs. Fine and Goodwin also selected and edited the documents on American relations with Egypt, Greece, Iran, and Iraq.

Mr. Goodwin was responsible for compiling the documentation of United States policy toward Palestine, Yemen, and Turkey, assisted in the last subject by Mr. Churchill. The compilations on American relations with Saudi Arabia, and with Syria and Lebanon were the work of Mr. Fine.

The compilation on United States policy toward Liberia was done by Laurence Evans, a former member of the staff. Mr. Evans and John P. Glennon were responsible for the documentation on American relations with Morocco, including the International Zone of Tangier.

The Publishing and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of the volume.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office,
Bureau of Public Affairs*

DECEMBER 31, 1968

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the

United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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SELASSIE OF ETHIOPIA, AND KING ABDUL AZIZ AL
SAUD OF SAUDI ARABIA, AT GREAT BITTER LAKE,
EGYPT, ON FEBRUARY 13-14, 1945

883.001 Farouk/2-345: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Truck)

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1945—10 p. m.

300. The President desires to meet King Farouk, King Abdul Aziz and Emperor Haile Selassie on board a United States man of war at Ismailia about February 10.¹ The President wishes to know as soon as possible whether they can accept.²

Appropriate messages are being sent to Addis Ababa and to Jidda³ and the Legations have been instructed to keep you informed urgently of sovereigns' decisions.

Please take up urgently with General Giles⁴ question of suitable air transportation for King Abdul Aziz and Emperor Haile Selassie. Please arrange suitable accommodations in Egypt for sovereigns.

Please keep Department informed of developments.

GREW

¹ The President was returning to the United States from his conference at Yalta with British Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union.

² President Roosevelt's invitations were accepted by the three sovereigns. In despatch 575, February 20, Cairo notified the Department that King Farouk had been received aboard the USS *Quincy* at noon on February 13, and Emperor Haile Selassie at 4 p. m., the same day, and that King Ibn Saud had been received at noon the following day (883.001 Farouk/2-2045). A "Report on the President's Trip Following the Crimea Conference" was released by the White House on February 20 and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1945, p. 289.

³ Telegram 27, February 3, 10 p. m., to Addis Ababa, repeated to Jidda as telegram 30, not printed.

⁴ Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East.

711.90F/2-1445

*Memorandum of Conversation Between the King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz Al Saud) and President Roosevelt, February 14, 1945, Aboard the U.S.S. "Quincy"*⁵

I

The President asked His Majesty for his advice regarding the problem of Jewish refugees driven from their homes in Europe.⁶ His Majesty replied that in his opinion the Jews should return to live in the lands from which they were driven. The Jews whose homes were completely destroyed and who have no chance of livelihood in their homelands should be given living space in the Axis countries which oppressed them. The President remarked that Poland might be considered a case in point. The Germans appear to have killed three million Polish Jews, by which count there should be space in Poland for the resettlement of many homeless Jews.

His Majesty then expounded the case of the Arabs and their legitimate rights in their lands and stated that the Arabs and the Jews could never cooperate, neither in Palestine,⁷ nor in any other country. His Majesty called attention to the increasing threat to the existence of the Arabs and the crisis which has resulted from continued Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by the Jews. His Majesty further stated that the Arabs would choose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews.

His Majesty stated that the hope of the Arabs is based upon the word of honor of the Allies and upon the well-known love of justice of the United States, and upon the expectation that the United States will support them.

The President replied that he wished to assure His Majesty that he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people. He reminded His Majesty

⁵ This memorandum was drawn up in an English and an Arabic version by Col. William A. Eddy, the Minister to Saudi Arabia, and Yusuf Yassin, the Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister. The Arabic text was signed by King Ibn Saud on February 14, and President Roosevelt signed the English text the next day at Alexandria. It was shown later to President Truman for his information.

Colonel Eddy, who accompanied King Ibn Saud on this journey and acted as interpreter during the conversation with President Roosevelt, subsequently wrote a description which was published under the title *F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud* (New York, American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1954).

⁶ For documentation on the concern of the United States over problems involving Jewish refugees in Europe, see vol. II, pp. 1119 ff.

⁷ For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning Palestine and toward the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine, see pp. 678 ff.

that it is impossible to prevent speeches and resolutions in Congress or in the press which may be made on any subject. His reassurance concerned his own future policy as Chief Executive of the United States Government.

His Majesty thanked the President for his statement and mentioned the proposal to send an Arab mission to America and England to expound the case of the Arabs and Palestine. The President stated that he thought this was a very good idea because he thought many people in America and England are misinformed. His Majesty said that such a mission to inform the people was useful, but more important to him was what the President had just told him concerning his own policy toward the Arab people.

II

His Majesty stated that the problem of Syria and the Lebanon⁸ was of deep concern to him and he asked the President what would be the attitude of the United States Government in the event that France should continue to press intolerable demands upon Syria and the Lebanon. The President replied that the French Government had given him in writing their guarantee of the independence of Syria and the Lebanon and that he could at any time write to the French Government to insist that they honor their word. In the event that the French should thwart the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, the United States Government would give to Syria and the Lebanon all possible support short of the use of force.

III

The President spoke of his great interest in farming, stating that he himself was a farmer. He emphasized the need for developing water resources, to increase the land under cultivation as well as to turn the wheels which do the country's work. He expressed special interest in irrigation, tree planting and water power which he hoped would be developed after the war in many countries, including the Arab lands. Stating that he liked Arabs, he reminded His Majesty that to increase land under cultivation would decrease the desert and provide living for a larger population of Arabs. His Majesty thanked the President for promoting agriculture so vigorously, but said that he himself could not engage with any enthusiasm in the development of his country's agriculture and public works if this prosperity would be inherited by the Jews.

⁸ For documentation on the policy of the United States regarding problems affecting the international status of Syria and Lebanon, see pp. 1034 ff.

883.001 Farouk/2-2045

*Extract From Letter of February 20, 1945 From the Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew)*⁹

On the morning of February 13 I rode with General Giles to the Palace in U.S. Army cars. King Farouk was accompanied by my old friend Hassanein Pasha, Chief of the Royal Cabinet, and an Egyptian Naval Aide. We proceeded to Payne Field and flew down to Deversoir in Giles' private plane. The King came over the side on the dot of 12 Noon and greeted the President on the deck. I feel I should tell you that rightly or wrongly I made no attempt to include myself in Farouk's talk with the President. The King had told me on a number of occasions how much it annoyed him that the British Ambassador, Lord Killearn, always insisted on being present at interviews with British statesmen, including Mr. Churchill, and I felt that the young man wanted to pour out his soul to the President and to the President alone. I believe I was right, for the following day Hassanein told me how deeply the King appreciated the fact that he had had a chance to talk privately to the President. However, it has left me with no exact record of what was said.¹⁰

I should perhaps add that on the previous day I had "briefed" the President with regard to King Farouk and had urged him to counsel this young man to practice moderation in the extent of his participation in the conduct of his country's political life. I told the President that the King was showing an ever-increasing tendency to govern and not to rule; that he should not forget that he is a constitutional Monarch and should therefore refrain from immixing himself too deeply in politics. I also put the President thoroughly *au courant* with the deplorable relations which still exist between Farouk and Killearn, and I furnished him brief political and economic résumés in writing of the more important points which he might wish to take up in his talks. Luncheon was a pleasant affair and was followed by a serious talk between the President and Hassanein Pasha, while the King inspected the ship. We went ashore at about 3 p. m. and as time was drawing near for the arrival from Cairo of the Emperor of Ethiopia (hereinafter referred to as the Lion) I bade the King farewell at the Deversoir flying field and sent him back to Cairo with the Naval and Military Attachés of the Legation.

⁹The full text of Mr. Tuck's letter is not found in Department files. On April 6, 1945, Frances E. Willis, Assistant to Mr. Grew, sent this extract to Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

¹⁰On March 3, 1945, President Roosevelt informed Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins, the Adviser on Economic Affairs assigned to the Legation at Cairo and other Missions in the Near East, that during his conversation with King Farouk he had suggested that many of the large landed estates in Egypt be broken up and made available for ownership by the fellaheen who worked them, and that at least 100,000 additional acres be placed under irrigation annually as a continuing program (867N.01/3-545).

890G.001/2-2345 : Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, February 23, 1945—midnight.

[Received February 24—5 : 15 p. m.]

72. For the [American] Minister [to Iraq] from Offie.¹¹ The President has requested that following message be sent to you :

“Please deliver in appropriate form the following message from me to Regent of Iraq :¹²

‘I very much regret that the brief and unplanned nature of my visit to Middle East did not make it possible for me to visit Iraq to see you. I understand reports have reached you concerning a conference on Arab questions which the President of Syria arranged in which I participated. I wish to assure you that there was no such conference and that during my brief stay in Egyptian waters I saw individually and alone the King of Egypt, the Emperor of Abyssinia, and the King of Saudi Arabia. These visits were of a personal and ceremonial nature. I understand that you are considering a visit to the United States sometime this spring and I wish to tell you how much I am looking forward to seeing you in Washington during your visit’ ”.¹³

[Offie]

HENDERSON

884.001 Selassie, Haile/2-2745

The Minister in Ethiopia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

No. 371

ADDIS ABABA, February 27, 1945.

[Received March 13.]

SIR: For record purposes, I have the honor to report as follows regarding the meetings of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I with the President and the Secretary of State¹⁴ of the United States.

[Here follows an account of arrangements for the Emperor’s visit, the composition of his party, and its travel to Egypt.]

On Tuesday afternoon, February 13, the Emperor and his party were flown to Deversoir, where they were met by Admiral Leahy¹⁵

¹¹ Carmel Offie, Deputy United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

¹² Prince Abdul Ilah.

¹³ See bracketed note, p. 586.

¹⁴ For an account by the Secretary of State of his conversation with the Emperor and the remarks made to the Secretary by President Roosevelt concerning his conversations with the three sovereigns, see Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians, The Yalta Conference* (Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 288-289.

¹⁵ Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy; for his account of the Great Bitter Lake conversations, see *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 325-327.

and Minister Tuck and taken by automobile to the pier and thence by launch to a United States warship.

The President received them on deck about 5 p. m., and after a brief conversation between the President and the Emperor, the latter, with most of his retinue, was escorted over the ship, and then met the President in his cabin for tea.

Conversation through tea was conducted between the President and the Emperor in French; after tea conversation was in Amharic and Mr. Deressa¹⁶ acted as interpreter, the only persons present being the President, the Emperor, Mr. Deressa, and (at the request of the President) myself.

The conversation on official business lasted more than an hour and covered, among other matters, Ethiopia's need for a port; in reply to the President's question as to whether this should be Djibouti or in Eritrea, the Emperor said that from a short term point of view Djibouti would be the best port because of the existing railway, but that a long term policy required a port in Eritrea. The President inquired regarding the possibility of building a railway to such a port and was told it could be done; he advised that in case this were undertaken by an American company too much should not be paid for its services, and added that he would give the same advice in regard to petroleum in case that matter should ever come up. The Emperor read from several pages of notes in Amharic, which were translated into English as read, and on some points of which there was very brief discussion. When mention was made of Italian Somaliland, the President asked whether it had been at some time a part of Ethiopia, and the Emperor replied in the affirmative. No English translation of these notes is available, but they covered almost the same ground as the enclosed copies of memoranda in English regarding: "Access to the Sea", (enclosure no. 3); "Franco-Ethiopian Railway", (enclosure no. 4); "Arms", (enclosure no. 5); "Eritrea", (enclosure no. 6); "War Crimes and Reparations", (enclosure no. 7).¹⁷

[Here follow discussion of activities by British officials to arrange a meeting of the Emperor with Prime Minister Churchill and British

¹⁶ Ato Yilma Deressa, Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance.

¹⁷ None printed. Minister Caldwell explained in despatch 377, March 7, 1945, that these documents were rather lengthy, that they were read by the Emperor in Amharic and were translated into English by Mr. Deressa, a procedure which "occupied most of the period of the conversation." As far as the Minister was aware "no commitments, promises or assurances of any kind were given by the President in response to the requests of the Emperor for assistance" made in connection with the five memoranda. The Minister further remarked that "all the important political matters mentioned during the conversation were brought up by the Emperor." (884.001 Selassie I, Haile/3-745)

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden, and a brief account of their meeting at the British Embassy at Cairo at 6 p. m., on February 16.]

J. K. CALDWELL

S90F.001 Abdul Aziz/3-345

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 80

JIDDA, March 3, 1945.

[Received March 13.]

(c) *The Meeting of the President and the King.*

Even the slightest incident of the historic meeting of these two great men deserves to be recorded.¹⁸ During the more informal visit on deck before lunch (11:30 to 1:00 p. m., February 14) a very friendly relationship was quickly established. The King spoke of being the "twin" brother of the President, in years, in responsibility as Chief of State, and in physical disability. The President said, "but you are fortunate to still have the use of your legs to take you wherever you choose to go." The King replied, "It is you, Mr. President, who are fortunate. My legs grow feebler every year; with your more reliable wheel-chair you are assured that you will arrive." The President then said, "I have two of these chairs, which are also twins. Would you accept one as a personal gift from me?" The King said, "Gratefully. I shall use it daily and always recall affectionately the giver, my great and good friend."¹⁹

After lunch, the King made an equally sincere and characteristic gesture in offering Arab coffee to his host, as related in the appendix.²⁰ They talked as friends of the responsibilities of governing, of the encouraging progress of the Allies in the war, of compassion for the multitudes, rendered destitute through oppression or famine. The King smiled in knowing assent to the President's jovial confidence about the English: "We like the English, but we also know the English and the way they insist on doing good themselves. You and I want freedom and prosperity for our people and their neighbors after the

¹⁸ For an account of further observations by President Roosevelt on his conversation with the King, see letter of March 5 by Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins, p. 690.

¹⁹ The wheel chair presented to the King proved not entirely satisfactory because of its size, and the President requested Mrs. Roosevelt to arrange for a shipment of a new one to the King. This was done in August 1945.

²⁰ Not printed.

war. How and by whose hand freedom and prosperity arrive concerns us but little. The English also work and sacrifice to bring freedom and prosperity to the world, but on the condition that it be brought by them and marked 'Made in Britain.' Later in the day the King told me, "Never have I heard the English so accurately described."

More important, the King told me several times, "I have never met the equal of the President in character, wisdom and gentility." At mixed receptions, as at a banquet after his return to Jidda, the King (in the presence of Saudi and British notables) referred to the President in glowing terms not used in referring to other persons met on his voyage. The princes and ministers who accompanied him have made it abundantly clear that the King was captivated by the President. He told Shaikh Hafiz Wahba, "The high point of my entire life is my meeting with President Roosevelt."

When the King told me in private audience February 20 about his conversations with Mr. Churchill (reported in Legation's Despatch No. 74, February 22²¹), he said to me, "The contrast between the President and Mr. Churchill is very great. Mr. Churchill speaks deviously, evades understanding, changes the subject to avoid commitment, forcing me repeatedly to bring him back to the point. The President seeks understanding in conversations; his effort is to make the two minds meet; to dispel darkness and shed light upon the issue."

(d) Spheres of Influence vs. the Open Door.

It is not my place to report on the confidential conversations between the President and the King. An agreed memorandum of conversation on certain specific subjects was preserved by each, and (with the permission of the President) a third copy was transmitted by hand to the Secretary of State. One topic of general interest to our future in Saudi Arabia, discussed in general terms, was not recorded in that memorandum. It has been very much on the mind of the King, who has referred to it since, and I believe his interest in the topic should be a matter of record.

The King never mentioned supply or subsidy to the President except as economic aid is involved in this topic. He inquired, "What am I to believe when the British tell me that my future is with them and not with America? They constantly say, or imply, that America's political interest in Saudi Arabia is a transitory war-interest; her aid as short-lived as Lend-Lease; that Saudi Arabia lies in a path bounded with sterling controls, connected by British communications; defended by the Royal Navy and Army; that my security and economic stability are bound up with British foreign policy; and that America, after the war, will return to her preoccupations in the Western Hemisphere. In short, they tell me that the joint 'partnership' in Saudi Arabia is

²¹ *Post*, p. 689.

temporary, and that Britain alone will continue as my partner in the future as in the early years of my reign. On the strength of this argument they seek a priority for Britain in Saudi Arabia. What am I to believe?"

The President replied that plans for the post-war world envisage a decline of spheres of influence in favor of the Open Door; that the United States hopes the door of Saudi Arabia will be open for her and for other nations, with no monopoly by anyone; for only by free exchange of goods, services and opportunities can prosperity circulate to the advantage of free peoples.

The King expressed gratification over this prospect, but it was evident that he expected British pressure to continue as before to claim a sphere of influence around and over his country. This fear is no doubt well-grounded and will be dispelled when and if the United States gives material substance to plans for long range economic and political accords with Saudi Arabia²² to open up the Open Door.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

[President Roosevelt, aboard the USS *Quincy*, left Great Bitter Lake at 6 p. m., on February 14, 1945, for Alexandria. There during the afternoon of the following day the President conferred with British Prime Minister Churchill for about three and a half hours. At this meeting they discussed the subject of Japan and the war in the Pacific (see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 25, 1945, page 290). After this conversation the President left Alexandria on the *Quincy* on his homeward journey. He reached Washington on the morning of February 28.]

²² For documentation on these matters, see pp. 845 ff.

CONFERENCE OF CHIEFS OF MISSION IN THE NEAR
EAST WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON NOVEMBER 10,
1945 ¹

890.00/11-1045

*The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson) to Brigadier General H. H. Vaughan, Military Aide to
President Truman*

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1945.

MY DEAR GENERAL VAUGHAN: The President has been good enough to consent to receive at 11:30 this morning our Ministers to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria and Lebanon, as well as our Consul General to Jerusalem,² who are in Washington on consultation. I am accompanying them.

I do not know whether you will see the President before he receives them, but I am giving you a little background information which might be helpful to him in talking with them.

These Ministers are very anxious, before returning to their posts, to get the President's ideas with regard to what our overall policy in the Near East is to be in the postwar era. Following the First World War, the United States, to the deep disappointment and disillusionment of the peoples of the Near East, withdrew into isolation, assumed a role of mere observer in that area, and stood idly by while the western victors, particularly Great Britain and France divided the Near East into spheres of influence to suit themselves.

Since 1939 we have gradually developed a more active policy toward the Near East, which might be summarized as follows:

¹ For a brief account of the conference by one of the participants, see William A. Eddy, *F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud* (New York, American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1954), p. 36.

² S. Pinkney Tuck, William A. Eddy, George Wadsworth, and Lowell C. Pinkerton, respectively. The recommendation that these Chiefs of Mission be received by President Truman was first raised by Mr. Henderson in a memorandum of October 16 to the Secretary of State and was endorsed by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson). In a memorandum of October 19 to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Byrnes stated: "If the President should see them it is certain that the newspapers would suspect that the conversations were being held here as a result of the promise of the President as to consultation. Certainly the President is not going to see them before November 6, and I think it would be equally unwise for me to do so." In a subsequent undated memorandum Mr. Byrnes stated: "I will see them Nov 7th and will ask President to see them 8 or 9th." (811.4611/10-1645). On November 9, the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) requested the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of Protocol (Summerlin) to arrange for a Presidential appointment (890.00/11-945). No record has been found in Department files indicating that the Chiefs of Mission met with the Secretary of State. November 6, 1945, was Election Day.

1. The United States considers, in its own interest as well as in that of the maintenance of world peace, that the countries of the Near East which have already attained their independence should continue to be entirely independent. The United States, therefore, takes appropriate steps from time to time with the purpose of strengthening them politically and economically and of supporting them in their refusal to accord a special position to any foreign power or to any group of foreign powers. The United States, furthermore, looks with sympathy upon the efforts of certain countries in the Near East to extricate themselves from commitments which they were forced to make before the beginning of the Second World War to various great powers giving those powers special positions and privileges which detract from the full independence of these countries.

2. It is clear that during the next few years the peoples of the Near East will move forward rapidly politically, economically and socially, and it is felt that it is important that this movement should be in the direction of Western democracies rather than in the direction of some form of autocracy or totalitarianism which would render sympathetic understanding and cooperation between that part of the world and the United States more difficult. Therefore, the United States Government has been taking steps to let the peoples of this part of the world know more about us and about our ways of life, of strengthening American sponsored educational institutions in the Near East, of encouraging Near Eastern students to come to this country, of welcoming to the United States leading personalities from these countries, etc.

3. We have been supporting the policy of the open door in the Near East with regard to investments and commerce. We believe that the policy of the open door is beneficial to us in our commercial relations and in the end will be beneficial to world peace.

Now that the war is over, our representatives in the Near East are anxious to have reassurances that, following the present World War, we shall continue to follow the policies outlined above and that we have no intention of becoming again a mere passive spectator in the Near East. We here in the Department have given such reassurances in this direction as are in our power to give. Anything that the President might say to them on this subject would be of great help to them and would give them more confidence in their dealings with the heads of the states to which they are accredited.

Sincerely yours,

LOY W. HENDERSON

890.00/11-1345

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1945.

Pursuant to your suggestion of November 12, I attach a secret office memorandum, entitled "Replies of the President,"³ recording

³ Annex 2 to this memorandum.

the substance of remarks and comments made by the President, the Ministers and Consul General and myself during this half-hour visit.

Appended to the memorandum is a substantially verbatim transcript of the statement read to the President by Minister Wadsworth,⁴ as spokesman for the group, outlining their common problems in the area.

This statement concludes with four specific basic questions in the policy field with respect to which the Ministers and Consul General would greatly appreciate your directives in elaboration of the general guidance given them by the President.

In brief, the President:

1) Recognized the importance of the Arab countries "in our positive postwar foreign-policy thinking" and the desire of each "to run its own show" applying freely "the principle of equality of opportunity and the Open Door."

2) Indicated his agreement as to the existence of parallelism between our policies and those of Russia in the area.

3) Approved, in principle, the signature with the Arab countries of "the same sort of standard treaty of friendship and commerce as we have signed with other American and European countries."

4) Agreed, in principle, that Arab Governments' requests for "competent American technical experts—be they financial, technical or military—will be sympathetically received."

5) Confirmed his willingness to receive the King of Egypt so soon as mutually agreeable arrangements therefor be concluded.⁵

6) Commented that, for his part, he would be happy to receive during the coming year official visits from the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon.

7) Gave the Ministers and Consul General considerable helpful comment on the thorny problem of Palestine.

I venture, in concluding this memorandum, to ask your special guidance as to whether the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers in Washington may now be told that they may inform their respective Chiefs of State of the President's comment (paragraph 6 above) and ask them respectively to suggest one or two dates on which they might find it convenient to make these visits. Mr. Wadsworth confirms my assumption that each of the two Presidents would wish to make his visit independently of the other but that they would no doubt consult together before suggesting possible dates therefor.⁶

I should also appreciate receiving your approval to my sending to interested offices in the Department and in the field a copy of the

⁴ Annex 1 to this memorandum.

⁵ In telegram 1679, August 31, 1945, 8 p. m., the Secretary of State had informed Cairo of Presidential approval of an official visit by King Farouk, the date fixed tentatively for November 1 (883.001 Farouk/8-3145). The King, however, was unable to make the visit at the suggested time.

⁶ On December 29, 1945, notes were sent to the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers conveying President Truman's invitations to the Presidents of Lebanon and Syria to visit the United States.

group's prepared statement together with a résumé of the ensuing conversation along the lines of the seven numbered paragraphs above.⁷

In the circumstances I venture to suggest that you read the two attached relatively short but important papers. The Ministers and Consul General ask me to say that they would appreciate highly your finding the time to do so at your convenience.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[Annex 1]

SUMMARY OF REMARKS MADE BY MR. WADSWORTH TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON NOVEMBER 10 ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND OF MR TUCK, COLONEL EDDY AND MR. PINKERTON

"Mr. President, there are three things we want most to say and four matters on which we want and most need your guidance.

"Of the three things we wish to say, one is quite simple. The second is a relatively short review of Arab policies, and the third is a bit personal.

"The first is that each one of us appreciates this opportunity to meet and talk with you and to tell you something of our common problems.

"The second is that we believe the countries of the Arab world, especially if taken as a whole, well warrant a more important place in our positive postwar foreign-policy thinking than is normally given to them as a simple counterpoise to Zionist ambitions or because they lie at the strategic center of the British Empire or of the great world air routes of the future, or because they happen to contain the two cradles of civilization and the greatest known undeveloped oil reserves of the world.

"All these we feel are important, but to us it seems vital to recognize that the whole Arab world is in ferment, that its peoples are on the threshold of a new renaissance, that each one of them wants forthrightly to run its own show, as the countries of the Western Hemisphere run theirs, without imperialistic interference, be it British or French, in their internal affairs.

"They say: 'You have your Pan-American Union; we want our Arab Unity.'⁸ Relations between your countries are based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality; that is the principle upon which we wish to base our relations with each other and with all other nations. We need foreign skills and capital and technical experts,

⁷ Copies of the statement and of the résumé were sent to Cairo, Beirut, Jidda, and Jerusalem under cover of letters from Mr. Henderson, according to notes dated February 19, 1946, attached to the two documents.

⁸ For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the question of Arab union, see pp. 25 ff.

but not foreign dictation. We want treaties of friendship with all countries, treaties of alliance and special privilege with none. In our dealings with foreign governments and interests, we want to be free to apply freely the principle of equality of opportunity and the open door'.

"That, Mr. President, we, your representatives, believe is the basic picture. In it the United States can play a leading role. Our moral leadership is recognized today. The governments to which we are accredited want most of all to know whether we are going to implement that leadership, whether we are going to follow through after our great victory or leave the field, as we did at the end of the last war, to others.

"In the latter event, the governments to which we are accredited know from bitter experience and present trends that Britain and France will make every effort to consolidate their pre-war spheres of influence; they look especially to us to support them in their efforts to block any such development. If the United States fails them, they will turn to Russia and will be lost to our civilization; of that we feel certain.

"On the other hand, there need be no conflict between us and Russia in that area. On the contrary, Russian policy has thus far closely paralleled our own. Like ourselves, the Kremlin has accorded unconditional recognition of the full independence of Syria and Lebanon and seeks equality of treatment, now denied us both, in Egypt and in Iraq.⁹ We venture to suggest that if you are looking for a field in which our policy and that of Russia can be made to dovetail with minimum friction, there is none better.

"So much for major Arab policies. The third thing we wish to say is, as I mentioned, on the personal side. In each of the countries to which we are accredited our relations with the Chiefs of State are peculiarly intimate and cordial. It is not that Wadsworth, Eddy, Tuck, or Pinkerton, as an individual, is the personal intimate of the King, President, or Amir, but that the Chief of State in each case has made an intimate of the representative of the United States. They look to us for honest, politically disinterested advice, information and good counsel. It is that which makes us want very especially your personal guidance on four questions.

"First, we should like to be able to tell the governments to which we are accredited that we are prepared to sign with them the same sort

⁹ The reference is to the incorporation in the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 26, 1936, and in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of June 30, 1930, of stipulations that the British Ambassadors in Egypt and Iraq were to have precedence over the diplomatic representatives of other powers. For further information on this subject, see memorandum of October 29, 1945, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, p. 21.

of standard treaty of friendship and commerce as we have signed with other American and European countries.

“Second, we should like to say that we have your personal assurance that their requests for fully competent American technical experts—be they financial, agricultural or military—will be sympathetically received.

“Third, we have already received here the Prince Regent of Iraq and the Prince-Viceroy of Saudi Arabia as official guests of this government.¹⁰ The other three independent Arab Chiefs of State, that is the young King of Egypt and the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon, hope keenly that you will find it convenient to receive them here during the coming year.

“Finally, we want on our return to be able to reply frankly to their questions as to what American policy is toward political Zionism.¹¹

[Annex 2]

REPLIES OF THE PRESIDENT

General Vaughan received the group in the President's office and they were presented to the President. Mr. Henderson stated that the Ministers realized that the President's time was extremely limited and they had decided, if it was agreeable to him, that it might be advantageous for one of their number, as spokesman for the group, to make a brief statement to him outlining their common problems.

Mr. Wadsworth, the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, would speak on behalf of his colleagues.

The President expressed his approval of this procedure, whereupon Mr. Wadsworth read to him the attached statement.¹²

During the reading of the statement, the President made a number of comments. For instance, when Mr. Wadsworth stated: “The countries of the Arab world, especially if taken as a whole, well warrant a more important place in our positive postwar foreign policy thinking,” the President interrupted with the remark that he entirely agreed with that statement.

When Mr. Wadsworth said: “The whole Arab world is in ferment, its peoples are on the threshold of a new renaissance, each one of them wants forthrightly to run its own show,” the President said: “I know that.”

When Mr. Wadsworth concluded his paragraph on Arab policies by saying that the Arab governments “wanted to be free to apply

¹⁰ For information on the visit to the United States by Prince Abdul Ilah in May and June 1945, see footnote 13, p. 5; for documentation on the visit of Amir Faisal July 31–August 1, 1945, see pp. 1000 ff.

¹¹ For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning Palestine and toward the question of Jewish immigration into Palestine, see pp. 678 ff.

¹² *Supra.*

freely the principles of equality of opportunity and the open door," the President said: "So do we; we want this to be the basis of our relations with China and with every country of the world."

When Mr. Wadsworth said: "If the United States fails them, they will turn to Russia and will be lost to our civilization," and added: "There need be no conflict between us and Russia in that area," the President said that he would like these countries to turn toward both Russia and the United States. He agreed that there was no reason for a conflict between Russia and the United States in that area. When Mr. Wadsworth followed with the remark that no better field could be found "in which our policy and that of Russia can be made to dovetail with minimum friction," the President intimated his agreement.

When Mr. Wadsworth reached the four particular questions set forth in the attached statement, the President answered each question individually in substance as follows:

Question 1 (treaties)—In response to this question the President said: "You may tell them that." He added that the United States was prepared to enter into treaties of that character with all countries.

Question 2 (the dispatch of technical experts of a financial, agricultural and military character to the Near East)—In response to this question, the President said: "You may tell them that too."

Question 3 (proposed official visit to the United States of certain Chiefs of State)—The President commented: "The King of Egypt was to visit us this month." Mr. Tuck explained to the President the reasons for which the King of Egypt had not come at the time expected, but added that he was still most anxious to visit the United States and would advise the Cairo Legation at least one month in advance of the proposed date in the hope that it would prove acceptable to the President. The President intimated his consent.¹⁴

Mr. Wadsworth commented with respect to the desire of the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon to visit the United States, that they wished personally to assure Mr. Truman that their countries, which are different from all other countries in that they have no treaty relations with any countries, wish to sign their first treaties with the United States and to use such treaties as models for their treaty relations with other states; also that they wished to assure him that they wished their closest relations with any foreign power to be with

¹⁴ In telegram 2286, December 11, 1945, 8 a. m., Minister Tuck, who had returned to Cairo, advised the Department that he had informed King Farouk the preceding day "of my recent conversation with President Truman with regard to the proposed visit to the United States. I said the President would be happy to receive him officially and any tentative date which the King would propose for a visit would be submitted to the White House and if it worked in with the President's plans an official invitation would be forthcoming.

"The King expressed his sincere pleasure with this arrangement and promised to inform me as soon as he felt he could undertake the journey." (883.001-Farouk/12-1145)

the United States. President Truman replied that he would be glad to see the two Presidents in the United States and he hoped that the visits could be arranged.

Question 4 (political Zionism)—The President smiled and said: "That *is* the sixty-four-dollar question." He said that it is the kind of a question that he simply couldn't answer at the present time. This question had been causing him and Mr. Byrnes more trouble than almost any other question which is facing the United States. The Democratic and Republican parties last year, during the campaign, had made certain pledges with regard to the future of Palestine which did not give consideration to the international political situation in that area. He was working on the matter at the present time and would discuss it with Mr. Attlee.¹⁵ It was hoped that something could be worked out with Mr. Attlee as a result of discussions with the British, with the Jews and with the representatives of the Arab governments to which the Ministers are accredited.

The Ministers told the President that they understood the difficulty of the problem, that what he had just said was of tremendous help to them. There was a fear among the Arabs that an attempt might be made to bring about a solution of the Palestine problem as a surprise without giving them a chance to participate. The President replied that both President Roosevelt and he had given assurances that the Palestine problem would not be disposed of without full prior consultation. He added that, of course, the final solution might not be agreeable to everybody, but that at least all would have an opportunity to state their side of the case.

The President continued that he hoped that the Ministers would return to their posts and would explain that the question was a burning issue in the domestic politics of the United States and that the American Government would try to work out the whole matter on an international plane. He reiterated that no unilateral decision would be attempted. He pointed out that if Palestine could only take some refugees from Europe¹⁶ to relieve the pressure, it would alleviate for the time being the situation in Europe, and it might satisfy some of the demands of the "humanitarian" Zionists and give us an opportunity to turn our attention to a permanent solution of the political problem. In his opinion, there could be no immediate solution. Palestine would probably be an issue during the election campaign of 1946 and 1948 and in future campaigns.

¹⁵ President Truman and British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, in November 1945, held discussions in Washington, primarily on the control of atomic energy; for documentation on these discussions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 61-75, *passim*.

¹⁶ For documentation on interest of the United States in the relief and rescue of Jews in Germany and German-occupied territory, see vol. II, pp. 1119 ff.

Mr. Henderson observed that the arrangement just made with the British for a joint commission to study the Jewish problem and the contribution Palestine can make to its solution might well go far into taking the Palestine problem out of domestic politics, particularly if we were able to obtain the services on the Commission of national figures who would take an objective view of the whole situation in the Near East. The President agreed and said the problem should be put on a high plane above local political issues.

The President then observed that it had been arranged between him and President Roosevelt that he should visit all these countries of the Middle East and other countries on an extended tour as Vice President. He was to have left last April. He regretted immeasurably that this had been impossible.

Mr. Henderson said that he hoped that the President would find it possible before the Ministers said their final farewell to him to assure them that the State Department had been reflecting his policy in instructing them that the Government of the United States had no intention of withdrawing from the Near East as it did after the last war and of becoming a mere passive bystander in that area, but that the United States intended to continue to carry on an active policy in that part of the world. The President said that he could give such assurance, that in spite of campaigns waged in the press by various isolationist publicists with the purpose of discouraging the American people from assuming international responsibilities, so long as he was President of the United States, the Administration would continue in the course he had already outlined. (The President was apparently referring to his recent New York speech.¹⁷)

The President wished the Ministers and Mr. Pinkerton continued success in their work.

¹⁷ Delivered in Central Park, New York City, on October 27, 1945, in connection with the celebration of Navy Day; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 28, 1945, p. 653.

CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE TO ELEVATING LEGATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE NEAR EAST TO THE STATUS OF
EMBASSIES ¹

741.90G/7-545

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and
African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State
(Grew)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1945.

I think that you will be interested in these two airgrams* from Baghdad, which show that the question of revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty ² is again being discussed rather freely in Baghdad.

A change in this treaty, which gives Great Britain a predominant position in Iraq, is of course desired by the Iraqis, and would be welcomed by ourselves. Such an attitude on our part would conform to the position which we assumed recently with regard to Syria and Lebanon, in opposition to the maintenance by any one of the Great Powers of a position in any Near Eastern country which would discriminate against our interests.³

It will be noted that among the subjects under discussion in this general connection is the Iraqi diplomatic representation abroad ⁴ and the precedence accorded the British Ambassador in Baghdad which the Director General of the Foreign Office mentioned to our Chargé, Mr. Moose, as being one of the more offensive provisions of the treaty arrangements. You will recall that our desire to raise our Legation in Baghdad to Embassy rank was the subject of a recent memorandum ⁵ which we sent you.

LOY W. HENDERSON

¹ For previous documentation regarding the status of the diplomatic missions of the United States in Egypt and Iraq, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 3 ff.

*Nos. A-59 (July 5) and A-64 (July 12). [Footnote in the original; neither printed.]

² Treaty of Alliance, signed at Baghdad June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.

³ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1034 ff.

⁴ The head of the Iraqi diplomatic establishment at London was a Minister.

⁵ Memorandum of May 12, not printed.

124.90G/9-1245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, September 12, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received September 12—5 p. m.]

353. British Chargé, G. H. Thompson, told member of my staff today that British Embassy here has strongly recommended amendment of Anglo-Iraqi treaty to enable Iraq to exchange Ambassadors with other countries and that it especially hoped that this change might induce the US to send Ambassador here. This question Thompson stated is being discussed by Stonehewer Bird⁶ in London, and Thompson feels confident treaty will be amended.

He added rather pointedly however that he had "heard" that US was about to appoint an Ambassador to Egypt without having consulted British and intimated that if true it might change British attitude towards desirability of having an American Ambassador at Baghdad. As Thompson explained it, appointment of American Ambassador to Cairo before retirement of present aged British Ambassador there would unnecessarily raise question of precedence and make situation needlessly embarrassing for Britain.

In Iraq he pointed out it was reasonably sure that able, experienced Stonehewer Bird would remain chief of mission for next 5 or 6 years, and thus the arrival of an American Ambassador would present no problem of precedence for some time. In any case Thompson said, he had deduced that US would not appoint another Minister to Iraq. Nothing was said in reply to lead him to believe that his deduction was in error, but he was informed that this Legation had not been advised of any immediate [intention?] on our part to appoint an Ambassador to Cairo.

Repeated to Cairo.⁷

MORELAND

124.90G/9-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moreland)

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1945—8 p. m.

284. Your 353 Sep 12. You may inform your Brit colleague that while the question of raising the rank of our representatives in certain Near Eastern countries has recd our attention from time to time and may come up again for consideration in the not distant future we have no intention of proceeding without prior discussion with the Brit Govt.

Sent Baghdad. Repeated Cairo and London.

ACHESON

⁶ Sir Francis Stonehewer Bird, British Ambassador to Iraq.

⁷ The substance of this telegram was sent to London in telegram 8017, September 14, 1945, 8 p. m.

124.90G6/8-745

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(Merriam)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1945.

PROPOSAL TO ELEVATE LEGATIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES TO EMBASSIES

Recommendation

It is recommended that the American Government take immediate steps looking to the elevation of the American Legations in Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon to Embassies and to the establishment by the Governments of those countries of Embassies in Washington, all on a footing of equality.

Considerations Prompting the Above Recommendation

1. The American Government has been following the practice of establishing and maintaining Embassies in those countries which have become members of the United Nations. On January 1, 1945 United States diplomatic missions to all European and American countries which have joined the United Nations, with the exception of Luxembourg, were Embassies. Iraq at that time was the only Arab country in the United Nations. Recently the other four independent Arab countries have become members of that organization. If the United States should fail to make the suggestions recommended above an impression is sure to be created that the American Government is less interested in the Near East than it is in other world areas. Such an impression would strengthen ideas, already unfortunately prevalent among small powers, that in spite of the lofty principles which the victors of the European war have been enunciating, they still contemplate a division of the world into spheres of influence or spheres of special interest. It may be added that President Roosevelt informed several foreign diplomats in Washington during the past year or two that eventually the American Government's policy would be to eliminate the rank of minister, in keeping with our respect for the sovereign equality of states, a policy which has thus far been carried out with regard to members of the United Nations. United States diplomatic missions in Liberia and Ethiopia are also Legations at the present time. It might be advisable, in the not distant future, to give consideration to the desirability of elevating these missions also to Embassies. In view of a special problem with regard to Liberia this matter is not being raised at this time.

2. The making of the suggestions above recommended would tend to encourage the Arab peoples who are hoping that the United States will continue to maintain an interest in the Near East after the war, and who without this hope are likely to turn away from the West for aid in their struggle to raise the social and economic levels of the Arab peoples.

Possible International Repercussions from the Carrying out of the Recommendations

1. *The Probable Attitude of the Arab Governments*

It is possible that the five Arab states will consider such suggestions on our part as so important that they will desire to discuss them with one another. There is no doubt that all of them will be pleased at receiving these suggestions. Whether or not all of them will feel able, in the face of certain external restraints placed upon them, to accede to these suggestions is not as yet certain. Egyptian and Iraqi governmental and political leaders for some time have been informally expressing the hope that the United States would take the lead in proposing that Ambassadors be exchanged between those countries and the United States. They have pointed out privately that the Egyptian and Iraqi Governments, in view of British pressure, are not in a position to take the initiative. It will be recalled that Great Britain succeeded some time ago in incorporating in treaties with both of these countries⁹ stipulations to the effect that the British Ambassador in each of them is to have precedence over the diplomatic representatives of other powers. At present the Syrian and Lebanese Governments are resisting pressure from the French Government to enter into an agreement with France providing that the French diplomatic representatives in Beirut and Damascus shall have precedence over the diplomatic representatives of other foreign governments. Suggestions to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of the character recommended would tend to strengthen their resistance to French pressure for a special position for a French Ambassador to Syria and Lebanon. The French hope that other countries will maintain only ministers. Ibn Saud¹⁰ will of course be flattered at receiving such a suggestion. Whether or not he accedes to it will depend to an extent upon the British attitude. If the British do not desire to raise their Legation to an Embassy and register serious objection to the establishment of an American Embassy in Saudi Arabia, he may ask us to postpone the elevation of the American Legation in Jidda to an Embassy until he has more assurance that the American Government will back him financially in case British financial support, which he has enjoyed for many years, should be withdrawn. In any event, it is believed that the suggestion should be made to him so that he will feel that American interest in Saudi Arabia is just as great as it is in other Arab countries or in countries of a corresponding size and importance in other parts of the world in which the American Government maintains Embassies.

⁹ For text of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, signed at London, August 26, 1936, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 401.

¹⁰ Abdul Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

2. The Probable Attitude of the British

Certain officials of the British Government will probably be displeased if the suggestions recommended are made, because of their feeling that the Arab countries, with the possible exception of Syria and Lebanon, fall into the British sphere of influence and that, therefore, the American Government should not take measures calculated to emphasize its interest in those countries. Other British officials, however, who believe that an increase of American interest in the Arab countries would be to the benefit of Great Britain, in that it would strengthen the influence of the Western world in the Near East, would undoubtedly welcome suggestions of the character recommended. It will be recalled that when Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Murray were in London last year they suggested that the American Government might raise its Legation in Egypt and Iraq to Embassies.¹¹ The British officials with whom this matter was discussed pointed out that under existing treaties their diplomatic representatives in these two countries were entitled to take precedence over diplomatic representatives of other countries. No decision was reached at the time. The British suggested later, however, that the matter be postponed until the conclusion of the war. It is believed that following the termination of hostilities in Europe the time has come for the American Government to act.

3. The Probable Attitude of the French

The French Government will probably be displeased at the making of such suggestions to Syria and Lebanon, since it hopes to have an Embassy in those countries, while other Governments will maintain only Legations. It is not believed that it would be in American interest or in the interest of world security for France to succeed in its plans of holding a special position in the Levant States, bolstered by such an artificial and outmoded method as the stipulation in a treaty to the effect that the French diplomatic representative is to be given precedence over other representatives.

The Problem of the Stipulations in the British Treaties with Egypt and Iraq Providing that the British Diplomatic Representatives are to be Given Precedence

In view of the strong belief that United States diplomatic representatives should rank as high as those of any other power, the American Government probably would have established Embassies in Egypt and Iraq in 1943 had it not been for the existence of the treaties between those countries and Great Britain which provide that the British diplomatic representatives in them are to take precedence over the diplo-

¹¹ Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs accompanied Under Secretary of State Stettinius on his mission to London in April 1944, to discuss problems of mutual interest with the British.

matic representatives of other countries. As regards the situation in Egypt and Iraq, there seem to be three courses of action open to the American Government in this situation:

(a) Not to suggest that either of the American Legations in Baghdad or Cairo be raised to Embassies.

(b) To urge that the British Government inform the Iraqi and Egyptian Governments that the stipulations of the treaties giving the British Ambassadors precedence are not to be applied to the American Ambassadors in Baghdad and Cairo.

(c) To suggest, regardless of the treaty stipulations, that the American Legations in Cairo and Baghdad be elevated to Embassies.

We have consulted our Chiefs of Mission at Beirut, Cairo and Baghdad, all of whom feel strongly that it would be a serious mistake for the United States Government to appoint Ambassadors to Egypt and Iraq so long as the British Ambassadors to those countries have the right to precedence. They consider that our acquiescence in this present arrangement would be beneath the dignity of this Government and would constitute concrete evidence, in the minds of the Near Eastern peoples, that we are willing for the British to continue to have preferential rights in those countries. Moreover, if we were to acquiesce it would be difficult to prevent the French from securing a similar preferential position for the French representative in Lebanon and Syria.

For the reasons advanced, it is believed that we should immediately take steps looking to the elevation of American Legations in all the Arab countries to Embassies, on a footing of complete equality.

We have received indications to the effect that the British would not be unwilling to yield their preferred diplomatic position in Egypt and Iraq, but they desire to be informed before we move to appoint Ambassadors to those two countries, and we have informed them that we would do so.

It is suggested, therefore, that as a first step we should inform the British: that we desire to exchange Ambassadors with the five countries above mentioned; that we are unwilling to appoint Ambassadors to Egypt and Iraq so long as the British representatives there have a preferred position; that we hope the British will abandon such position; that we desire to appoint Ambassadors to all five countries at the same time, but that, if the British are unwilling to yield the preferred status of their representatives in Egypt and Iraq, then we propose to appoint Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon and leave Ministers in Egypt and Iraq.

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE QUESTION OF ARAB UNION¹

890B.00/8-2945

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1945.

The basis for the American policy toward the newly-founded League of Arab States is to be found in the traditional American attitude of benevolence toward Arab nationalism and toward the recent movement for unity among the Arabs of which the League represents the culmination to date. The Arab national movement, which was at first directed at achieving independence from Turkey, had its origins during the Nineteenth Century and received considerable encouragement from the liberal ideas imparted by American educators in the Near East. American sympathy toward Arab aspirations was set forth in the twelfth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points,² which read in part:

"The other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

This Wilsonian concept was incorporated and even expanded in Article XXII of the League Covenant,³ creating the mandatory regime. The Arabs, however, regarded the mandates as a negation of their hopes for the independent Arab Empire which they believed had been promised to them, and, accordingly, the primary objective of the Arab nationalists in the postwar period was the termination of French and British control. Some progress was achieved in this direction, for Iraq became independent in 1932, and in 1936 France signed an agreement to grant independence to Syria and Lebanon.⁴ (This agreement, however, was not ratified by the French and did not

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 852 ff.; also *ibid.*, 1944, vol. V, p. 660.

² The Fourteen Points were included in an address by President Wilson delivered before a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918; for text, see *ibid.*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

³ For annotated text of the Covenant of the League of Nations, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, p. 69; article XXII is printed on p. 93.

⁴ For documentation on the interest of the United States in these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1932, vol. II, pp. 672 ff., and *ibid.*, 1936, vol. III, pp. 496 ff.

go into effect.) Until such time as the Arabs both in the mandated areas and in the independent states could achieve complete independence, any movement toward some kind of union between the different Arab countries was naturally relegated to the background.

March 4, 1933–September 1, 1939

During the first part of the period under review, as throughout the period between the two wars, there was no occasion for the United States to adopt a positive policy toward the Arabs, although our general attitude of encouragement to Arab aspirations for independence was maintained. Thus, this Government accorded recognition in 1931 to the Kingdom of the Hedjaz and Nejd⁵ (now Saudi Arabia) and in 1932 to Iraq. Our relations with these states, as with the mandated areas, were concerned largely with securing non-discriminatory treatment for American rights, in accordance with fundamental American policy.

September 1, 1939–December 7, 1941

The outbreak of the war in Europe brought the nationalistic aspirations of the Arabs into greater prominence, since Arab friendship was cultivated by both the Allied and the Axis powers, as a part of the struggle for the Middle East. This was particularly true of the Axis, which embarked on an elaborate propaganda campaign through the use of Arabic-language broadcasts and in other ways.⁶ The British, for their part, were also conscious of the need for Arab support, and at a moment when the British strategic position in the Middle East was particularly acute, Foreign Secretary Eden gave recognition to the newly-developing movement for Arab Union in the following statement made at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941:

“The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, yes, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.”⁷

⁵ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1931, vol. II, pp. 547 ff.

⁶ For documentation on the concern of the United States in 1942 at the impact of Axis victories and propaganda on the political stability of the Near East, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. IV, pp. 24 ff.

⁷ The full text of statement is printed in British Cmd. 6289, Misc. No. 2 (1941): *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden . . . delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941*; for documentation on the position of the United States in July 1941 on Arab unity, see exchange of telegrams with Cairo, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 612–616.

American relations with the Arabs remained in general unaffected by these developments, except in so far as there was a crystallization of Arab opinion on the Palestine question, making it necessary for this Government to take such opinion increasingly into account in the formulation of our policy toward Palestine.

December 1941 to date

The Arab union movement was naturally given impetus by Mr. Eden's Mansion House declaration, one of the more important results being the publication early in 1943 by Nuri Pasha, then Prime Minister of Iraq of his "Blue Book" entitled *Arab Independence and Unity*. This work proposed an Arab League to be composed initially of (1) a unified Syrian state comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan; and (2) Iraq, with provision for other Arab states to adhere to this League.

Early in 1943 Mr. Eden made another statement, declaring on February 24 in the House of Commons:

"As they have already made plain His Majesty's Government would view with sympathy any move among the Arabs to promote their economic, cultural or political unity. But clearly the initiative would have to come from the Arabs themselves and so far as I am aware no such scheme which would command general approval has yet been worked out."⁸

This declaration had the direct result of leading Nuri Pasha to write Nahas Pasha, at that time Prime Minister of Egypt, urging the latter to take the initiative in calling an Arab Congress. Shortly thereafter Nahas announced that he was starting a series of individual conferences with representatives of the Arab states for an exchange of views regarding Arab union and with a view to the eventual convening of a full-dress Arab Congress. These talks took place through the remainder of 1943 and the early part of 1944 and were attended in turn by representatives of Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and the Yemen. The inclusion of representatives of the Arabs of Palestine was several times considered, but no agreement could be reached on the composition of a Palestine delegation.

During the discussions between the Saudi Arabian representative and Nahas, the former queried our Minister at Cairo as to the American attitude toward Arab union, and under date of October 26, 1943⁹ the following reply was made:

"The policy of the United States Government toward the Near Eastern nations has not been formally stated, but its general attitude

⁸ For complete text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 387, col. 139.

⁹ See telegram 1605, October 26, 1943, 8 p. m., to Cairo, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 853.

is well known. This Government desires to see the independent countries of the Near East retain their freedom and strengthen their economic and social condition, and fully sympathizes with the aspirations of other Near Eastern countries for complete liberty.

"If the peoples of the Near East should find it advantageous to unite of their own free will, it naturally follows from this Government's basic attitude that such a development would be viewed with sympathy, always on the understanding that it should take place in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter¹⁰ and in harmony with the declarations of Secretary Hull, notably those of July 23, 1942 and September 12, 1943.¹¹

"It is realized that the countries concerned will shape their own decision, but it seems to this Government that the events and problems of the war years have shown that the Near Eastern countries need greater strength in the economic, social and cultural domains, and that first steps toward unity might well have these ends in view."

In July 1944, the Saudi Arab Government again sought an expression of this Government's views, and a reply was made in substantially the same terms as above.

In September and October 1944, a preliminary Arab Conference met at Alexandria and soon developed into a full-dress meeting of the Arab States. A representative of the Arabs of Palestine was present, as were delegates from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, the last two as observers only.

The Conference adopted a protocol¹² providing for the formation of a League of Arab States, in accordance with plans to be drawn up by an interim sub-committee. There were also to be subcommittees on economic, cultural, social and other matters, while in addition the Conference passed resolutions according recognition to the independence of Lebanon and affirming Arab rights in Palestine.

Subsequently, a draft constitution for the Arab League was drawn up and was embodied in a pact signed by delegates of the seven member states on March 22, 1945.¹³ The pact was accompanied by annexes providing respectively for the participation in the work of the League of a representative of the Palestine Arabs and for cooperation with certain Arab territories not members of the League (Presumably such non-independent areas as French North Africa and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms).

In brief, the Pact of the League prohibits any resort to force among member states, provides for consultation and mutual assistance in the

¹⁰ Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

¹¹ For texts, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 25, 1942, p. 639, and *ibid.*, September 18, 1943, p. 173, respectively.

¹² On October 7, 1944; for text of the Alexandria Protocol, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1947, p. 966.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 967. The text transmitted to the Department from Cairo as an enclosure to despatch 641, March 26, 1945, differs in minor language details from the version printed in the *Bulletin*.

event of aggression against a member state, sets up a Council and a Secretary General with headquarters in Cairo, and provides for cooperation between member states in many non-political fields.

At San Francisco¹⁴ the members of the Arab League gave indications of a desire to work together as a definite bloc and to have their group accepted as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter.¹⁵

The establishment of the League was welcomed by a spokesman of the British Government in Parliament on May 9, 1945¹⁶ and was also referred to in the following terms by Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, at a banquet in New York City in honor of the Regent of Iraq on June 2, 1945:

“The determination of the Arab people to reestablish their independence and to play a role in world affairs to which they feel themselves entitled by reason of their brilliant past and their talents and industry, undoubtedly was one of the factors which motivated them during the first world war to fight for their freedom. Unquestionably the same determination contributed to their decision recently to form the League of Arab States. We welcome the development of Arab cooperation and are confident that the strengthening of the ties between the various Arab countries will not only be to their common benefit but will also enable them to make important and constructive contributions to the great tasks awaiting the United Nations.”¹⁷

Present Policy—Summary

The American Government has traditionally viewed with sympathy the attempts of the Arab people to reestablish their independence and play a more prominent role in world affairs. We have thus welcomed such manifestations of Arab cooperation as the establishment of the League of Arab States and the steps which have already been taken toward unity between the Arabs in the economic, social and cultural fields.

LOY W. HENDERSON

¹⁴ Reference is to the United Nations Conference on International Organization which met from April 25 to June 26, 1945.

¹⁵ The United Nations Charter, signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031. For documentation on discussions concerning regional matters at the San Francisco Conference, see index under “Arab League”, vol. I, p. 1571, and in United Nations, *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, San Francisco, 1945, vol. XXI, pp. 338, 346.

¹⁶ For remarks by the British Minister of State (Law), see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 410, col. 1885. For remarks by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) on January 17, 1945, on the “sympathy and interest” of His Majesty’s Government in the efforts of the Arab States to reduce the barriers between them, see *ibid.*, vol. 407, col. 138.

¹⁷ The complete text of Mr. Phillips’ speech is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 3, 1945, p. 1036; for information on the visit of the Iraqi Regent to the United States, see bracketed note, p. 586.

APPROACH TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE LEAGUE
OF ARAB STATES REGARDING THE UPRISING IN
ALGERIA

851R.00/6-2145 : Airgram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, June 21, 1945.

[Received June 26—3 p. m.]

A-331. I received the visit yesterday of Abdul Rahman Azzam Bey, Secretary General of the League of Arab States, who said that he had come to me for advice as to what steps might be taken in obtaining the intervention of our Government with the French in connection with the serious situation now obtaining in North Africa. He had read in the press, and had heard from various other sources, that Arab leaders in North Africa were suffering severe persecution and that French Courts Martial had been set up in Algeria which were engaged in passing death sentences on numerous persons accused of fomenting the recent disorders.

Azzam Bey assured me that he wished, if possible, to avoid calling a meeting of the Council of the League of Arab States to consider the situation, although he reminded me that the Second Annex to the Conference of Arab States held in March, 1945 provides for cooperation with the Arab States not members of the Council of the League. Azzam Bey appeared to consider that a large degree of moral responsibility lay with the United States in the matter, inasmuch as it was the military forces of the United States which had saved the North African possessions for France and had re-established French domination over them. He therefore hoped that our Government might be willing to intervene with the French Government and counsel moderation and humane treatment for the alleged political disturbers. By so doing, he said, the United States could still save the lives of many Arabs in North Africa.

I recalled to Azzam Bey that he had previously stressed to me that the Council of the Arab League considered that the problem which faced it during its recent meeting was confined to the situation in the Levant. I offered the personal opinion that if the Council of the League were to be convened to consider the situation in North Africa, such a step might justify the belief that the Arab League was now disposed to bring up all questions relating to the Middle East which,

incidentally, was precisely what the French Government appeared anxious to do.

It was agreed that Azzam Bey should send me an informal letter setting forth his views which, I said, I would be glad to forward to the Department for its information. The Legation's airgram no. 330 of June 21¹ embodies the text of Azzam Bey's letter to me on this subject.

The Department may wish to give consideration to the possibility of approaching the French Government with a view to securing more lenient treatment by the French authorities in the suppression of the recent disorders in North Africa.

Copies to: Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Aden, Tunis, Algiers, Casablanca, Rabat, Paris and London.

TUCK

851R.00/8-345 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1945.

A-490. For your strictly confidential information the following is a paraphrase of the Department's telegram no. 3551 of July 30, 6 p. m. to Paris² relative to the situation in Algeria as mentioned in your A-330² and A-331 of June 21, 1945, together with a paraphrase of the Embassy's reply (telegram 4684, August 3, 6 p. m.¹):

Begin paraphrase. Cairo Legation has sent us the text of a letter from the Secretary General of the Arab League with respect to the situation in Algeria subsequent to the May 8 native uprisings and the repressive measures instituted by the French authorities thereafter. According to this letter the Arab League cannot in accordance with its pact indefinitely ignore an atrocious state of affairs in which Arabs are suffering from a terrorist regime of martial law, sending the people to jail and to death by hundreds and thousands and killing by thousands. You should orally inform Bidault² of the receipt of this letter and tell him that the existing Algerian situation under reference is a source of anxiety not alone to the Government of the United States but also to public opinion in this country, which is deeply conscious of the sacrifices in American lives and equipment expended in the liberation of North Africa, and the economic aid subsequently made available to that area and envisaged for the future. In this connection you may mention the fact that we have taken note of Tixier's broadcast address³ after investigating the uprisings in which he said that the maximum number of Moslems killed was fifteen hundred.

¹ Not printed.

² Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

³ On June 29. Adrien Tixier was French Minister of the Interior.

The casualties are estimated by the most reliable sources to have been far greater but even if this estimate of Tixier's were accepted it would indicate an excess of repressive measures, as well as the existence of a situation in which the most dangerous possibilities might be found to exist. In conveying this letter to Bidault's attention, you should stress, we are actuated by motives of the most friendly character as well as our anxiety lest there should arise a situation in North Africa which would have the most serious consequences not only to the French but to the relations between the Arab world and all the Western powers. Repeated to Algiers. *End paraphrase.*

Ambassador Caffery's reply was as follows:

Begin paraphrase. The information transmitted with the Department's telegram no. 3551 was at once brought by me to the attention of Bidault, who took note of it, sought to minimize the entire affair, gave the usual explanations, expressed understanding of our motives and so forth. Repeated to Algiers. *End paraphrase.*

In your discretion you may tell Azzam Bey for his strictly confidential information that we have not been inactive with regard to the subject matter of his letter to you and that we trust that our handling of the matter may have been helpful. You should make it clear to him, however, that our having shown an interest in the North African situation, to which he referred, should not be interpreted as acceptance on our part of his contention that the United States has acquired responsibility for developments in North Africa because of our military assistance in liberating the area.⁵

ACHESON

⁵ In airgram A-596, November 13, 1945, the Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) stated that on the previous day "I took the opportunity to communicate to Azzam the gist of the Department's A-490, October 5, on the action taken by the United States Government with respect to the French repression of the Arab uprising in Algeria. He expressed his profound gratitude for our help and interest and indicated his intention of informing the Council of the League . . . with a view to proposing a vote of thanks. In view of possible repercussions, I urged him to exercise restraint and pointed out that the information transmitted by the Department's airgram under reference was for his strictly confidential information only. At his behest I have given him a written confirmation, not forgetting to stress the Department's caveat that our military assistance in the liberation of North Africa should in no wise be interpreted as acceptance of responsibility for subsequent political developments in that area." (890B.00/11-1345)

ASPECTS OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE THINKING ON
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST FOR THE
POSTWAR PERIOD

883.50/3-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1945—7 p. m.

637. For Hoskins.¹ Legation's 648, March 14.² Time is not propitious in opinion of Department for raising question of unified economic setup in Middle East. Department further feels that present *modus vivendi* provides ample opportunity for satisfactory operating results provided good will is applied in full measure.³

Economic policy paper⁴ is moving forward but slowly. Will advise.

STETTINIUS

¹ Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Adviser on Economic Affairs, with the rank of Counselor, at Legation in Egypt; assigned concurrently to Missions in Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.

² Not printed; it inquired whether the Department had taken any action on his memorandum of March 3, 1945, to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William L. Clayton and other Department officers, which suggested establishment of a unified economic authority in the Middle East (883.50/3-1445).

³ Colonel Hoskins once more proposed the advisability of a regional approach to American economic policy in the Middle East in a letter to the Secretary of State on July 31, 1945 (124.836/7-3145). His proposals were given wide discussion, culminating in a meeting of political and economic officers of the Department on August 27, 1945. It was the sense of the meeting that the proposed regional organization would not be a satisfactory arrangement and that the primary problems raised by Colonel Hoskins could be solved by more adequate regional political and economic coordination within the Department and between the Department and the field (800.50 Middle East/8-2945).

⁴ See Report by the Coordinating Committee, May 2, *infra*.

800.50 Middle East/5-245

*Report by the Coordinating Committee of the Department of State*⁵

CC-43a

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1945.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

The Problem

The problem is to formulate an American economic policy for the Middle East which will tend to preserve the peace, further the welfare of the peoples concerned, and will safeguard and promote American economic interests in that area.

Previous Action

The political objectives of the United States in the Middle East, November 1, 1944,⁶ are:

1. Assertion of the independent interests of the United States in equitable arrangements designed to attain peace and security on a basis of good neighborhood.

2. Assurance of the right of peoples to choose and maintain for themselves the types of political, social and economic systems they desire.

3. ~~Creation of an equality of opportunity~~, as against a policy of exclusion, in commerce, transit and trade; and freedom to negotiate either through governmental agencies or private enterprises, irrespective of the type of economic system in operation.

4. General protection of American citizens, protection and furtherance of legitimate American economic rights, existing or potential.

⁵ The original draft of this paper was presented jointly by the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Office of International Trade Policy to the Coordinating Committee, whose members were on the Director-of-Office level. The Committee approved the paper with some minor changes and directed that annex I be added. The paper and annex I were then presented by the Department to the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, an interdepartmental body, which after slight changes, approved them on April 20, 1945, as ECEFP 71/45. CC-43a as printed here embodies the changes called for by the two Committees.

Acting Secretary of State Grew sent copies of the paper and annex I to various Government agencies, expressing his concurrence with their recommendations (611.0031 Executive Committee/5-445). He also transmitted copies of the two papers, as well as two additional annexes, to diplomatic and consular officers in the Near East and to the Ambassadors in the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France between May 22 and June 6, 1945. The transmitting instructions noted that the papers were being sent for the "information and guidance" of these officers and asked for their comments (800.50 Middle East/5-2245 and other dated enclosures). Annexes II and III, both entitled "American Economic Policy in the Middle East" and prepared, respectively, by Gordon P. Merriam, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on January 15, 1945, and by Frederick Winant of the Eastern Hemisphere Division, on August 24, 1944, are not printed.

*Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. [Footnote in the original.]

⁶ These objectives had been set forth in Policy Committee Document PC-8 (2nd revision) of that date, not printed.

More specifically, our policy in the Middle East as stated December 22, 1944,⁷ provides that we should assist the independent countries of the area in maintaining their independence and should encourage in appropriate ways and at appropriate times other countries to obtain their independence. Palestine is recognized as primarily a British responsibility, but we look forward to a just and reasonable solution at the proper time, after consultation with all interested parties.

Since it is almost certain that we shall not maintain substantial bodies of troops in the Middle East, our contribution to a peaceful evolution there, while resulting in large part from our general position in the world order, will have to rely heavily upon an actively implemented economic policy, subject to applicable policies and statutes affecting technical and advisory assistance in developmental financing and expansion of trade (as indicated in Annex I), if our efforts are to have real force and effect.

Recommendations

1. Within the framework of this Government's basic political policy and its general economic policy, appropriate assistance should be given to the countries of the Middle East looking to the improvement of their economies, to the creation of a higher level of living for their people and to consequent increased purchasing power and greater political

⁷ On this date, the Secretary's Staff Committee issued a report (SC-1) entitled "The Foreign Policy of the United States of America: A Summary Statement". On p. 18 begins the section dealing with the Near and Middle East and Africa, which reads as follows:

"In the Near and Middle East, it has been our policy during the war to maintain security and stability, in cooperation with Great Britain and the local Governments, by furnishing the essential supplies, shipping and personnel required to maintain the economy of the area. It is of the utmost importance, from a military viewpoint, that peace and order be maintained throughout the entire area.

"It has long been, and will continue to be, our policy to assist the independent countries of the area to maintain their independence and to encourage, in appropriate ways and at appropriate times, the other countries of the Near and Middle East to obtain their independence as we have done in the case of the Republics of Lebanon and Syria. While recognizing that Palestine is primarily a British responsibility, we favor a just and reasonable solution, at the proper time, after consultation with all interested parties.

"Our policy in Iran is governed by the provisions of the Tripartite Statement of December 1, 1943 in which this Government joined Great Britain and the Soviet Union in expressing their common desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. [For "Declaration Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943", see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 413.]

"In the African colonial area our policy is to discourage harmful exploitation, to encourage the administration of the colonies in the interest of the local inhabitants and to support policies directed toward the orderly preparation of local peoples for eventual self-government."

For documentation on the interest of the United States in Iran, Palestine, and Syria and Lebanon, see pp. 566 ff., 678 ff., and 1034, respectively.

and economic stability. In line with these objectives, we should endeavor:

(a) To make available through governmental and private sources such credit facilities as can be turned to economically productive use in these countries.

(b) To encourage the removal of trade restrictions and controls, and all forms of discriminatory treatment which hamper the movement of goods into and out of the Middle Eastern countries. As most Middle Eastern countries find it difficult to earn dollars, we should, in the realization that imports are not only desirable in themselves but are also an essential counterpart of exports, consider tariff adjustments by trade agreements or other measures of such a nature as will assist these countries to increase their trade with the United States.

(c) To survey the existing commercial treaty network, including trade agreements and other economic understandings, between the United States and Middle Eastern countries, looking to a constructive program of revision and extension.

(d) To provide our diplomatic and consular posts in these countries as soon as possible with sufficient trained staff, to appraise and report upon developments and trends in agriculture, industry, and trade, to facilitate technical and advisory assistance, and to give constructive aid to traders engaged in commerce between these countries and the United States.

(e) To encourage the creation and the efficient operation of a regional institution which should be initiated, supported and operated by the local Middle Eastern governments for the purpose of improving the standards of agriculture, transportation, communications, public health and related matters. Such encouragement would be in accordance with our experience with coordinated economic operations in the Middle East during the war, which suggests the advantages to be gained from a peacetime cooperative program in the region.

(f) To participate in the development of local economic life by responding in full measure to requests for technical and advisory assistance. There is reason to believe that the Middle Eastern countries in realization of their deficiencies will in an increasing degree turn to the United States for such assistance. Compliance with these requests may be expected to further our prestige in the area and would, therefore, be in the public interest of the United States.

2. Mutual coordination should be sought as a fundamental objective between our economic policy and the respective policies of other outside powers interested in the area, particularly Great Britain, the USSR and France. In general, we should seek economic liberty without inequality, in all matters of trade, transit and other economic activities in accordance with the broad objectives of our commercial policy as expressed in Article VII of our mutual aid agreement⁸ and in the Joint Declaration of 1941.⁹

⁸ With the United Kingdom, signed at Washington February 23, 1942; Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

⁹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

The end in view would be the creation of conditions favorable to the orderly development of the area's resources, free from the exploitative, discriminatory and restrictive practices that have caused friction in undeveloped areas in the past. A positive role assumed by the United States in furthering economic coordination with other powers would be a means of removing the causes of difficulties which otherwise might arise among interested outside powers, due to their competitive interests along ideological, political and economic lines. Attempting such coordination should not, however, be an occasion for seeking aggressively to disturb long established commercial and economic relations between any country and the Middle East, so long as these relations result in efficient and adequate service and rest on valid economic bases rather than on hampering controls.

Discussion

The Middle East is and will remain one of the principal testing grounds of the ideals for which the war is being fought and of the world security system now being constituted. The countries of the Middle East are weak and in a state of intense readjustment—political, social and economic.

Throughout most of this region the western democratic, free enterprise system, represented in the main by the British, is now in competition with the authoritarian, closed economic system represented by Soviet Russia. British and Soviet strategic interests also meet in the area. The British seek to maintain their strategic oil resources and the security of their imperial communications. The policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East appears to possess two direct objectives; achievement of security along its Middle East frontiers and the prevention of a coalition of the capitalistic countries in the Middle East against the Soviet Union. An indirect policy of the Union may be the extension of its social and economic systems throughout the Middle East. Consequently, the area is a fertile field for friction and activities which may threaten Middle East security and world peace.

Adoption of the recommended economic policy through the resulting improvement of economic conditions and raising of standards of living, will assist in removing economic discontents and thereby lessen the possibility that these countries will be hauled and pulled by the USSR on the one hand and by Great Britain on the other.

It is recognized that the successful implementation of our general economic policy in the Middle East is closely related to the success which we achieve in the political field. Of all the political problems which call for solution in this area the Palestine question is probably the most important and urgent at the present time. Unless our attitude in regard to it be clarified in a manner which will command

the respect and as far as possible the approval of the peoples of the Middle East, our Middle East policy will be beset with the gravest difficulties.

It is further recognized that the success of our economic policy in the Middle East is closely related to the attainment of agreement among the nations of the world to reduce barriers to international trade and to eliminate discriminatory measures. Vigorous leadership by the United States in fostering means looking toward this objective, such as a multilateral commercial policy convention, and cooperative participation by the Middle East countries in such a program are accordingly held to be of the utmost importance.

In formulating an economic policy for the Middle East, it must also be recognized that these countries are jealous of their political independence. They are cynical regarding western imperialism and are dubious about the long-run intentions of the Soviet Union. They are eager for economic development and opportunities to stand on their own feet. Our policy, as recommended above, should meet these attitudes by fostering the economic advancement of the Middle East peoples and by facilitating freedom from external interference and exploitation.

[Annex I]

The following interpretative notes relate to the recommendations set forth in "American Policy in the Middle East":

Recommendation 1(a)—An increase in the lending capacity of the Export-Import Bank will soon be recommended to Congress. The Bretton Woods plan for an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development¹⁰ has also been presented to Congress for its approval. Pending favorable action by Congress on one or both of these proposals, the foreign credit facilities of the United States Government will necessarily be limited.

Recommendation 1(f)—A major deterrent to the provision of technical and advisory assistance will be removed if Congress accepts the recommendation of the Department of State that the provisions of Public 63,¹¹ now applicable only to the other American Republics, Liberia and the Philippines, be extended to the rest of the world. This law authorized the United States Government to accept partial or complete reimbursement from a foreign government for salaries and expenses paid to United States Government employees assigned to duty with the foreign government. Where this law is applicable, the reluctance of United States Government agencies to assign employees

¹⁰ Adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference which met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944; for documentation on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. II, pp. 106 ff. The text of the agreement on the International Bank is published in Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1502*, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1440.

¹¹ Approved May 3, 1939, 53 Stat. (pt. 2) 652.

on their pay rolls to foreign duty can be at least partially overcome, since the agencies can be reimbursed from funds paid into the United States Treasury's General Fund by foreign governments. Employees are more willing to go abroad at moderate salaries if they can retain their civil service status with their own agency.

Recommendations 1(a) and 1(b)—It must be recognized that the dollar exchange available to Middle East countries for purchase of American goods or for paying interest and amortization on dollar credits will be severely limited unless the exports of Middle East countries to the United States can be increased substantially over pre-war levels. To the extent that broad multilateral trade can be developed, this strictly bilateral statement can be modified, but in any event it will be necessary for the Middle East to increase its exports to the rest of the world and for the United States to increase its imports from the rest of the world before dollar exchange will be available in sufficient quantity to finance increased American exports to the Middle East, or repayment of American dollar credits advanced to Middle East countries. Dollar credits in themselves, even if used to purchase American capital goods and thus to increase the productive capacity of the Middle East, will not necessarily provide either a permanent increase in Middle East capacity to absorb American exports or the means of repayment of dollar credits. Local standards of living can be raised by the intelligent use of American capital goods for local production but only an increase in exports and in American imports can provide the dollar exchange necessary for the return of the dollar credits with which the capital goods were acquired. Both the Export-Import Bank and the prospective International Bank will perforce consider these factors when advancing dollar credits. Hence the realization of economic development plans predicated upon dollar credits and the achievement by Middle Eastern countries of an independent position with reference to foreign exchange will depend in large part upon the revival of multilateral trade on a worldwide basis and on an expanding scale, an essential prerequisite of which will be a constructive American economic policy facilitating a substantial increase in American imports.

800.50/5-1245 : Airgram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, May 12, 1945.

[Received May 24—8 p. m.]

A-245. From Hoskins.

"1. I recommend that as a step in formulating an American post-war economic policy in the Middle East, the United States Government

hold a regional conference in this area as soon as practicable. Such a conference under the sponsorship of the State Department could consider local as well as various regional problems. It would be expected to come to specific decisions and make recommendations for consideration by appropriate authorities in the development of plans for trade and general economic matters. Changing conditions due to progress of war and consequent likelihood of early improvement in supplies and shipping make decisions on many points of increasing urgency. Such a conference would also have a sound psychological effect throughout this area as indicative of America's continued interest in the Middle East. As the Department may recall, the dissolution of AEMME and Landis' ¹² press release on his departure were interpreted by many elements in the area as a first American step toward another period of economic isolationism.

"2. British recognized necessity for such a meeting on their side and recently held near Cairo an economic conference attended by their chief diplomatic and economic representatives throughout the area, as well as by several officials sent especially out from London. I understand this conference was considered to have been worth the expense and effort involved. The conference was freely publicized after the event as exemplified in article and photograph from local paper being sent by letter to Fred Winant. Public reaction appears to have been excellent since it emphasized to the people of the Middle East the keen and continued economic interest of the British.

"3. I have discussed the holding of such an economic conference informally with several Ministers in the area including Tuck and Wadsworth,¹³ as well as with Henderson ¹⁴ before his departure and all have expressed their keen interest and approval. While attending such a conference, no official would be more than a few hours' flying time away from his post.

"4. It is I believe important to hold such a conference at the earliest possible date. Its convening should not be postponed for the 'perfect' moment which in actual fact will never occur since no movement chosen is likely to be equally satisfactory to everyone involved. At the same time the Department may feel it necessary to delay such a

¹² Mr. James M. Landis, who left his position as Director of the American Economic Mission in the Middle East on January 3, 1945. In telegram 29, January 2, 1945, 9 p. m., to the Minister in Egypt, the Department stated: "In view of imminent departure of Landis and present unresolved status of relationship of economic personnel at Cairo, you are hereby instructed as Senior Diplomatic Representative in Egypt to take charge of all American civilian personnel of AEMME in Egypt and to assume the responsibility of broad local direction and overall general coordination of their activities to the end that American participation in MESC and other appropriate American economic functions may be carried on without interruption." (123-Tuck S. Pinkney)

¹³ George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon.

¹⁴ Loy W. Henderson, who was appointed Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on April 17, 1945. Previously, he had been Minister to Iraq.

conference until the new heads of missions to several of the countries in this area have arrived at their posts.

"5. I suggest that this, the first conference of its kind, be held in Cairo as the most convenient post to a majority of the proposed delegates. Similar conferences which might be arranged in the future could be held in rotation at other convenient posts in the area. Minister Tuck has stated that he will be glad to act as host to the delegates if it is decided that Cairo is to be the first place of meeting.

"6. Some items which might usefully be considered by the conference are:

(a) The pressing problem of dollar exchange which is universal throughout the area.

(b) Policy and plans regarding disposals of surplus materials and military installations.¹⁵

(c) The size, type and functions of American Government economic organization needed in the Middle East.

(d) Problems dealing with the sound promotion of American trade with the Middle East, both imports and exports, including such problems as our attitude toward the operation of import licensing in the several countries.

(e) American attitude toward continuation of MESC.¹⁶

(f) Our economic relations with Pan-Arab Union.

(g) American petroleum problems in the area.¹⁷

(h) Civil air matters¹⁸ including such items as sales of planes, landing rights, etc.

"7. It would be most desirable if the Merriam-Winant paper on Middle East economic policy¹⁹ could be presented to the conference as this would be the ideal place to bring it before those people who are responsible for its implementation.

"8. To insure greatest usefulness of conference, several representatives should come out from Washington. Since it would be the first of its kind, I hope Mr. Clayton can attend and serve as Chairman. I suggest that the newly appointed deputy director of NEA²⁰ attend as well as at least two other officers from the Department such for example as Taft,²¹ Winant, Merriam or Allen, or any other Department officers working in this field. FEA and/or Department of Commerce also might wish to send delegates. Delegates from Middle East should include the chief of each mission and the senior economic personnel attached to his staff, as well as principal FEA representatives in the field offices. From Egypt we would have all senior eco-

¹⁵ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 82 ff.

¹⁶ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 85 ff.

¹⁷ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 49 ff.

¹⁸ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 64 ff.

¹⁹ See Report by the Coordinating Committee, May 2, and footnote, p. 5.

²⁰ Presumably, reference is to newly appointed Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy W. Henderson.

²¹ Charles P. Taft, Director of the Office of Transportation and Communications.

conomic representatives including the Petroleum Attachés, Civil Air Attaché, Treasury Representative, Principal FEA Representative, War Shipping Administration Representative, Commanding General of AMET²² or an Army economic specialist. OWI²³ representative, who could be helpful in obtaining such publicity for the conference as might seem advisable, would also be invited to attend.

"9. Although Turkey is not included within the framework of the unified Middle East economic organization, it does have a variety of problems in common with other countries of the area which will be represented at the conference. It is suggested therefore that representatives from the American Embassy in Ankara be invited to attend, and we would appreciate your decision on this point.

"10. Agenda and arrangements for conference can be made by staff here which also can serve as secretariat. I believe small auditorium of American University can be obtained for official meetings.

"11. If this project is approved in principle, detailed plans will be prepared in accordance with any departmental suggestions or instructions you may give. I shall appreciate being advised of the Department's approval for holding such a conference as well as its suggestion of the earliest practical date at which the Department believes the conference can be held. Mr. Tuck suggests it be held not earlier than September or October.["]

TUCK

800.50 Middle East/6-645 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1945.

A-298. For Hoskins. The Department believes that it is inadvisable at the present to plan for an economic conference, on a scale and of the type described in your A-245, May 12, 1945, since such a conference might be interpreted as indicative of promotional ambitions on the part of this Government quite out of line with the realities of the situation, cause unnecessary apprehension on the part of the British, and create unfounded expectations on the part of local governments and traders generally. So long as joint Anglo-American controls exist,²⁴ and our broad economic relations with Great Britain are under discussion,²⁵ it is believed wiser not to have our trade efforts publicized dramatically in one particular area.

The Department feels that its interest in the area has been well demonstrated in a number of ways, including the sending of the

²² Africa-Middle East Theater.

²³ Office of War Information.

²⁴ Through the Middle East Supply Center.

²⁵ For documentation on this subject, see vol. VI, p. 1 ff.

Culbertson Mission whose recommendations are still under active consideration. Furthermore, the Department is awaiting receipt of comments and suggestions from the field on "American Economic Policy in the Middle East" dated May 2, 1945 which has been sent to each Mission in the area. The Department also hopes that pending legislation concerning Bretton Woods proposals, reciprocal trade agreements and technical advisers may be passed in the near future, thus enabling us more effectively to implement our economic policy.

The Department believes, however, that the basic idea of discussions between appropriate officials in Washington and the staffs of the Missions engaged in implementing our economic policy is of distinct merit and would, in addition to improving the mutual understanding of the work and requirements of the respective officers, serve as a means of clarifying the principles embodied in the economic policy paper referred to above. More specifically, such discussions should be useful:

(1) To assist in promoting sound long-range trading practices looking toward maximum opportunities for private traders in this area;

(2) To discuss with field officers the Department's present thinking and aims concerning commercial treaties and trade agreements;

(3) To discuss long-range trade possibilities between the United States and the Middle East, considering in this connection the full implications of existent hindrances, such as the dollar-sterling bloc problem, and the possibilities of constructive action in this connection.

The Department is therefore considering the desirability of sending a selected group of officers to the area to meet unostentatiously with the principal economic officers at the various Missions and possibly with local officials, anticipating that the discussions would center chiefly on commercial policy, finance, trade and related matters, including perhaps transportation and petroleum problems.

GREW

890.50/10-945

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] 9 October, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: The attached file concerns the need of creating some sort of fund to be used for carrying out United States political and strategic objectives in the Middle East.

The Department has repeatedly come up against situations involving basic objectives of American policy, with which our Government is not prepared to deal except on the basis of obtaining specific Congressional authorization in each case. In several instances it would

be embarrassing and difficult to justify publicly an appropriation for the particular purpose. One example is our inability to comply with the desire of the King of Saudi Arabia for loans of about ten million dollars per annum, to meet government expenditures until revenues begin to accrue from petroleum development projects. Similarly American economic officers in the Middle East such as Dean Landis and Colonel Harold Hoskins, have repeatedly complained that it is impossible to execute any consistent long-range economic program on which the local governments can rely unless the authority of the executive branch extends further than writing diplomatic notes and making loans on a strictly commercial basis.

The Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Colonel Hoskins (in his letter of resignation²⁶) have suggested substantially similar proposals to meet this need. The substance of the proposals is that the Congress should create a fund (amounting roughly to 100 million dollars per annum) to be used in the discretion of the President upon the joint recommendation of the State, War and Navy Departments for the purpose of furthering the political and strategic interests of the United States in the Middle East. Loans from the fund would not be made on a commercial basis.

I believe that something along this line is important to enable us to maintain an effective voice in the dynamic and difficult problems of the Middle East. If you have time I recommend that you read the admirable presentation by Mr. Merriam, Chief of the Near Eastern Division, contained in a draft memorandum for the President which he prepared some time ago and is attached hereto.

I should appreciate receiving your views as to whether there would be any possibility of obtaining this type of authority from Congress and accordingly whether the Department should make a concerted effort at this time to prepare and back such legislation.²⁷

DEAN ACHESON

²⁶ To the Secretary of State on September 5, 1945, not printed. Colonel Hoskins had made a similar suggestion in an undated memorandum, a copy of which he had transmitted to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) on July 23, 1945 (890F.001 Abdul Aziz/7-2345).

With the departure of Colonel Hoskins from Cairo, the Department designated John P. Dawson as Acting Economic Counselor there, as of September 26, with the same concurrent assignments as those previously held by Colonel Hoskins. Finally, in telegram 334, February 25, 1946, the Department informed Cairo that the Office of Regional Economic Counselor was being temporarily discontinued "in view of the curtailment of its activities through elimination of supply and other wartime controls" by the Middle East Supply Center (800.50-Middle East/2-2546).

²⁷ In an undated memorandum to Mr. Henderson, Mr. Acheson stated: "I have talked with the Secretary who believes that this cannot be done at present." (890.50/10-945) The memorandum was received in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on October 18, 1945.

[Annex]

*Draft Memorandum to President Truman*²⁸

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

From the various memoranda which have reached you from this Department, and from other sources, I feel sure you are aware that the Near East is a highly dangerous trouble-spot. We feel in the Department that this Government is inadequately provided with the means for exerting its influence for peace and security in that area. Among recent developments indicative of the unstable situation in the Near East, the following may be mentioned:

1. Soviet Russia has informed the Turkish Government of its desires with respect to Turkey which, if granted, would mean the impairment of Turkey's sovereignty and freedom of action.²⁹

2. In Iran, a friendly, independent country, Soviet troops have occupied the northern part of the country, British troops the southern part. Britain and Russia are under obligation to remove their troops not later than six months after the end of the Japanese war,³⁰ but each mistrusts the other and Iran mistrusts both.

3. In Syria and Lebanon, the French failed, as a result of British action, in an attempt to thwart by force the exercise of effective independence by those countries. The French are now using other forms of pressure, including financial pressure, to accomplish their purpose.

4. Both Arabs and Jews are becoming more restive in Palestine and disorder may break out at any time which might spread throughout the Arab World.

5. In Saudi Arabia, where the oil resources constitute a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history, a concession covering this oil is nominally in American control. It will undoubtedly be lost to the United States unless this Government is able to demonstrate in a practical way its recognition of this concession as of national interest by acceding to the reasonable requests of King Ibn Saud that he be assisted temporarily in his economic and financial difficulties until the exploitation of the concession, on a practical commercial basis, begins to bring substantial royalties to Saudi Arabia.

6. Great Britain and France, which since the last war have exercised spheres of influence in most of the Near East have failed to

²⁸ Prepared by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) and submitted to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) early in August 1945.

²⁹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1219 ff.

³⁰ For documentation on the evacuation of foreign troops from Iran, see pp. 526 ff., *passim*.

take adequate steps to look after the welfare of the masses. The peoples of the region remain for the most part ignorant, poverty-stricken and diseased.

Moreover, the position of the British and French in the Near East has been greatly weakened as the result of the two world wars. Soviet Russia is showing marked interest in the area and is proceeding along its customary cautious but firm and calculating lines, to move into the picture. Hence, there is danger that the Near Eastern peoples in the absence of any indication of a tangible nature that the United States is prepared to play an active role in raising their economic and cultural levels will look to Soviet Russia for a cure of their economic and social ills and as the mainspring of power in the Near East.

It seems to us to be important that this area, because of its resources and geographical position athwart the sea and air routes between East and West, should be in the hands of a people following the paths of democratic civilization rather than those of Eastern dictatorships. The British publicly and officially admit that they are no longer able to keep the Middle East in order without our help. We are inclined to believe that a policy of inactivity or "drift" on our part will result in a progressive deterioration of the influence of democratic civilization in the Near East.

In view of certain characteristic British failings, we must, however, lend our assistance in a manner which would be in accord with the principles to which we have publicly adhered. If we are to serve our higher long-range political, economic and strategic purposes, our activities in the Near Eastern area must be based upon the political, educational and economic development of the native peoples and not merely upon the narrow immediate interests of British or American economy.

At the present moment, this Government has but three non-military tools with which to work in the Near East and to place sufficient American impress on the region to win and hold it for the Western World. Those tools are:

- (a) Note-writing by the Department of State;
- (b) Propaganda regarding the high principles to which we claim to adhere;
- (c) Government loans made on a commercial basis and repayable in dollars.

These tools are hopelessly inadequate.

It is clear that unless the situation is handled firmly and adequately, a situation might well develop in the Near East which would result in another World War. This is said with all due respect for the United Nations Organization. The development of such a situation could not be prevented merely by the reaching of temporary

understandings among the Great Powers at the expense of the Near Eastern peoples. Any cooperation among the Great Powers based upon a policy of joint exploitation of the population of the Near East cannot be permanent. Long range policy and planning looking to the political independence and the development of these areas, together with adequate means of implementation of such policy are essential.

The blunt fact is that, in the existing circumstances, we have sore need for funds to be used in political and strategic situations in which repayment with interest, in dollars, cannot be guaranteed because currency exchange and trade do not happen to run in the right direction.

Three specific cases might serve to illustrate our difficulties.

1. *Saudi Arabia*. For nearly a year we have known that some money—about ten million a year for the next five years—would be necessary to obtain an economic stability in that country sufficient to give a reasonable security to American interest in the vast Arabian oil fields. This project, together with subsidiary projects, has been shunted around month after month in the Government departments while the interested officers were trying to determine whether the Export-Import Bank could safely make a loan, or whether legislation should be sought, involving the risk that it might become a football for special, short-sighted interests. We have attempted to work through the Army, but the King of Saudi Arabia has now stated flatly that he wants us to work through the civilian agencies.

This is an outstanding example of the fact that we lack money for long-range, general political and strategic use for the purpose of winning the peace in that crucial part of the world. The official in the Department directly responsible for Saudi Arabia has just resigned after fourteen years service abroad and in Washington,³¹ because of his feeling that he is unable to do anything constructive and of his unwillingness longer to assume responsibility for the protection of American interests in that country.

2. *Palestine*. It is not necessary to stress the dangers of this situation. Whatever short or long-range solution is put forward, unless it is associated with the expenditures of large sums in connection with the carrying out of a far-reaching development plan applied not only to Palestine, but also to neighboring countries, will surely result in bitter altercation and bloodshed. It will also result in domestic political repercussions, and heavy pressure from the Near Eastern countries.

3. In the case of Syria and Lebanon, where our policy has been to assist these countries in attaining their independence, some financial assistance is required to help them get on their feet economically.

³¹ W. Leonard Parker, who resigned as Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on June 30, 1945.

Otherwise the French through their control of the bank of issue and of financial resources, may by economic means succeed in compromising the political independence of the Levant States to such an extent as to cause uprisings in the whole Arab world. The Levant Governments are aware of the situation and have appealed to us for a Training Mission and for equipment for their *gendarmeries* in order to maintain internal order.³² We have no way to meet this request.

Under existing conditions our policies in these situations are not worth the paper they are written on because we have no prompt and effective means of carrying them out. These are all cases in which for want of a nail, the shoe may be lost, and for want of a shoe the horse may be lost. It would not be going too far, in the opinion of this Department, for this Government, in the interest of peace and security, to spend up to \$100,000,000 a year for several years until the Near East is safely stabilized politically and strategically.

Obviously, we can no more win the peace than we could win the war if we must go to Congress to justify and obtain piecemeal appropriations for political and strategic purposes. Would it be politically possible to prevail upon Congress to provide a discretionary Presidential fund for such purposes, to be administered jointly by State, War, and Navy, which should also be in a position to recommend to the President by joint action, the expenditure of money for these purposes which may be available in other appropriations.

We plan to discuss with the War and Navy Departments, either by means of the existing State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee or otherwise, the ways and means for planning and carrying out our long-term political and strategic objectives abroad and particularly in the Near East. The conclusions reached will, of course, be placed before you for your consideration and concurrence.

³² For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1199 ff.

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ENSURING
AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES IN THE NEAR EAST ¹

890G.6363/5-2945

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
(Grew)*²

[WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1945.

Participants: Nuri Pasha, former Prime Minister of Iraq.
Iraqi Minister ³ Mr. Ralph A. Bard, Under
Mr. Grew Secretary of the Navy
Mr. Phillips ⁴ Mr. Charles P. Taft ⁵
Mr. Acheson ⁵ Mr. Henderson
Mr. Clayton ⁶
Mr. MacLeish ⁷

The Iraqi Minister and Nuri Pasha as-Said, former Prime Minister of Iraq and at present adviser to the Regent of Iraq, called upon Mr. Grew this afternoon in order to meet senior officers of the Department and to discuss several matters of interest both to the American Government and to the Iraqi Government.

Nuri Pasha stated that he hoped that the American Government would do everything possible in order to bring about an increase in the extraction of petroleum in Iraq. He pointed out that of the three great Iraqi petroleum fields, namely Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra, only the Kirkuk field was being exploited at the present time; that American interests owned approximately 23¾% of the Iraq Petroleum Company, which had concessions in all three fields; that unless the American shareholders were energetic in pushing the matter, he feared that the Iraq Petroleum Company would not endeavor to open

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 8 ff. An article entitled "Petroleum in International Relations" by John A. Loftus, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of International Trade Policy, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 5, 1945, p. 173.

² Drafted by Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

³ Ali Jawdat.

⁴ William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

⁵ Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

⁶ William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

⁷ Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations.

⁸ Director of the Office of Transportation and Communications.

up the Mosul and Basra fields since other shareholders of the company would not like Iraqi oil to compete with that of other companies in which they were interested, and that he hoped that the American shareholders, backed by the American Government, would take steps to bring about the opening of the Basra and Mosul fields, and also to increase the production of the Kirkuk field.

Nuri said that the Iraqi Government was particularly anxious for the construction of an additional pipeline from Kirkuk—that this pipeline should be 24 inches; that the British could not manufacture a pipe of so great a diameter; that the only country where such type of pipe could be purchased was the United States, and that he hoped the appropriate American authorities would agree to the export of the necessary 24-inch pipe to the Near East. He insisted that the American shareholders of the Iraq Petroleum Company, namely Socony Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey, had told him that they could find the dollars for purchasing this pipe in case the American Government would be willing to permit its exportation.

After some discussion of Nuri Pasha's statements, the officers present told him that they would transfer his request to the appropriate authorities of the American Government.

Nuri Pasha also expressed his hope that the Government of the United States would show more interest than it has in the past in the industrial development of Iraq and in trade with Iraq. He said that Iraq was anxious to strengthen its economic relations with the United States. It wanted to buy American equipment and materials and to obtain the services of American technicians. One of the difficulties involved, of course, was that of the lack of dollars at the disposal of Iraq. He hoped that means could be found to increase the purchasing power of Iraq in dollars; he added that it was his understanding that Great Britain was placing \$14,000,000 at the disposal of Iraq to be used in making purchases in the United States during the remainder of the current year.

Mr. Grew expressed gratification at the desire of Iraq to strengthen its economic relations with the United States. He pointed out that one of the best ways to strengthen economic relations was to improve economic facilities. The United States shared Iraq's desire for closer American-Iraqi economic relations; it therefore hoped that the Iraqi Government would look with favor upon proposals which the American Government had made that direct radio-telegraphic communications be established in the immediate future between Iraq and the United States⁹ and that Iraq grant the United States licensing privileges which would permit the operation of airlines from the

⁹ For documentation on this subject, see footnote 6, p. 1016; letter of August 22 from the Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, p. 1023; telegram 11003, October 20, noon, from London; and footnote 33, p. 1027.

United States to and through Iraq. Nuri Pasha stated that he was certain that arrangements would eventually be worked out which would make possible direct radio-telegraphic communications between Iraq and the United States and the operation of American airlines between those countries. He said that he hoped that the American Government would have patience with the Iraqi Government in the matter since there were certain problems which must be solved before the proposals made by the United States could be agreed to. He stated that upon his return to Iraq he would take a personal interest in the matter.

Nuri Pasha thanked the Acting Secretary and the other officers present for the consideration and courtesy which had been shown to the Regent and to members of the Regent's party while they were in Washington. After the conversation in the Acting Secretary's office, Nuri Pasha was escorted to the office of Mr. Stettinius where he talked in greater detail with regard to American-Iraqi economic relations with officers of the Department intimately acquainted with various aspects of this situation.¹⁰

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

841.6363/5-3145

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Petroleum Division (Loftus)
to Mr. John D. Linebaugh of the Division of British Commonwealth
Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1945.

In accordance with our conversation of May 30, I am suggesting a few of the intangible benefits which this Government might wish to obtain from the British Government in the field of petroleum with, in each case, comment upon the applicability to these desiderata of the theory of *quid pro quo* bargaining:

(1) We want a cessation of British political interventionism in the process of obtaining petroleum concessions in areas directly or indirectly dependent upon British sovereignty. This political interventionism in the past has taken the form of interposing the innumerable and ingenious obstructions of administrative procedure in the path of efforts by United States nationals to obtain concessions in areas within the British sphere of political influence. It required some five years of negotiation for the Gulf to obtain any petroleum

¹⁰ Memorandum of May 29 by Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs covering conversation by political and economic officers of the Department with Nuri Pasha and the Iraqi Minister, not printed; it stated that Nuri Pasha emphasized "the need for the exploiting of the Basra and Mosul concessions, particularly the former," and that "Mr. Henderson and Mr. Loftus assured Nuri Pasha that the Department would bear in mind his remarks regarding the Basra concession." (711.90G/5-2945) John A. Loftus was Acting Chief of the Petroleum Division.

rights in Kuwait and in the end the Gulf was required to accept a fifty percent participation with Anglo-Iranian,¹¹ which participation was further conditioned by a marketing clause which largely nullified Gulf's theoretical rights to exploit. This is the most extreme illustration, but numerous others could be adduced.

Since, however, what we want in this regard is not only an intangible, but a negative objective—that is, we want the British *not* to do a certain something which cannot be exactly or satisfactorily defined—it does not seem practicable to attain our objective except by securing the agreement of the British Government to certain positive principles governing the process of obtaining petroleum rights in the hope that these governing principles will condition the conduct of British nationals, as well as of British public officials. We have obtained British agreement to such principles in the Anglo-American Oil Agreement¹² and as soon as it becomes possible for our Government to put that Agreement into force it will be possible to determine whether the mechanism of negotiating agreement on principles can produce any substantial results. No other mechanism, in any case, seems useful.

(2) We want the operating policies of British private petroleum companies to be in reasonable conformity with our general policy objective of effecting a relative increase in the rate of exploitation in the Eastern Hemisphere (particularly Middle Eastern) petroleum reserves, and a relative decrease in the rate of exploitation in the Western Hemisphere.¹³ This is an objective which probably cannot be stated in precise or quantitative terms without provoking acute internal political controversy here; and even if precision were possible a quantitative agreement on petroleum production would sufficiently approximate a cartelization of the petroleum industry as to be subject to serious criticism in terms of our general economic foreign policy. Therefore, as in connection with point (1) above, the best, if not the only, approach appears to be to obtain from the British an agreement upon certain broad principles governing petroleum development. In this case the principles would be of such a character as to permit and facilitate the expansion of Eastern Hemisphere (Middle Eastern) oil production. Such agreement, it is believed, has been obtained in the Anglo-American Oil accord and, it

¹¹ The Gulf Oil Company obtained petroleum rights in Kuwait on December 14, 1933, as a result of agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. For documentation on the inability of the Gulf Oil Company to obtain such rights prior to that date, see *Foreign Relations*, 1932, vol. II, pp. 1 ff.

¹² Signed at Washington, August 8, 1944; see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 13, 1944, p. 153. For documentation on negotiations leading to this unperfected agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 94 ff.

¹³ This was one of the basic objectives of United States foreign oil policy as formulated by the Department of State on April 11, 1944; see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. V, p. 8.

is believed, is preserved in the redraft¹⁴ which will constitute the basis for renegotiation with the British.

(3) I believe it can be stated (although this point should be confirmed by conversation with officers of NEA¹⁵) that this Government wants to further the desire of the Iraqi Government to see a development of petroleum production in the Basra area of Iraq, with outlets to the Persian Gulf and/or the Mediterranean. The views of the Iraqi Government on this matter were stated strongly to officers of the Department on May 29, 1945 by Nuri Pasha, Prime Minister of Iraq, and were taken under advisement. The stated policy position of this Government that petroleum developments should be conducive to the economic advancement and well-being of producing countries has been accepted in principle by the British. The exploitation of the Iraqi oil resources covered by the Basra concession, which would spread more widely the benefits of industrialization and employment throughout Iraq, would be entirely in harmony with this agreed principle. The Basra development had been opposed in the prewar period by the British (controlling) interests in the Iraq Petroleum Company because, from the point of view of the Anglo-Iranian Company, oil from Iraq would be uncomfortably competitive with Anglo-Iranian output from Southwestern Iran, and from the point of view of Shell, development in Basra would have involved investment of substantial additional funds before the Mosul fields had been paid out. The American participants in the IPC probably favored slightly the point of view of the Shell Company but were in the main neutral. In documents prepared and discussed widely throughout the Department in connection with preparations for Anglo-American oil conversations in 1944 it was argued that the broad policies of the IPC should be subject to international control at the government level. I believe it can be stated that this proposition is agreed departmental policy, although the record is ambiguous and the proposition was not embodied in any discernible way in any draft of the Anglo-American Agreement.

I believe that an immediate effort should be made to ascertain whether the Department as a whole concurs in the proposition stated above. If it does, discussions should be held among the United States, United Kingdom, and French Governments about the policies to be followed in the postwar period by the IPC management, and in such conversations the interests of the Iraqi Government should be pressed. Since, however, the problem is one of persuading two other governments that the interests of their respective nationals should be sub-

¹⁴ A renegotiated petroleum agreement was signed at London with the United Kingdom on September 24, 1945, Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, p. 481; for information on this agreement, see vol. VI, bracketed note, p. 244.

¹⁵ Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

ordinated to an internationally-agreed policy, and then of persuading the several corporate interests involved to agree upon a program reasonably consistent with the interests of the Iraqi Government, it is not easy to see how our objective in this regard can be obtained on any *quid pro quo* basis from the British Government alone.

I am not aware of any other respect in which, in the field of petroleum, we have anything definite that we want to obtain from the British Government, although issues may arise in relation to the disposition of fixed petroleum installations constructed abroad for war purposes either by the United States Government direct or through lend leased funds or with lend leased materials. I suggest that you check with Mr. Robertson, of PED,¹⁶ on this latter point.

JOHN A. LOFTUS

841.6363/6-145

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Petroleum Division (Loftus) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Pool)

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1945.

In accordance with your request, I undertake to set out below the petroleum policy of the United States toward the United Kingdom and to add a brief supplementary comment on our petroleum policy as it relates to British Dominion and Colonial possessions.

Our petroleum policy toward the United Kingdom is predicated on a mutual recognition of a very extensive joint interest and upon a control, at least for the moment, of the great bulk of the free petroleum resources of the world. After allowance is made for the tremendous indigenous production locally consumed of both the United States and the USSR, it appears that the overwhelming bulk of the remaining petroleum resources of the world are controlled either by U.S. nationals, by U.K. nationals, by U.S.-U.K. joint-interest companies, or by British-Dutch interests in which British policy appears to predominate.

Recognizing these realities, it is the view of the United States Government that U.S.-U.K. agreement upon a broad, forward-looking pattern for the development and utilization of petroleum resources under the control of nationals of the two countries is of the highest strategic and commercial importance. Such an agreement in a framework of extremely broad and general principles has been reached in the Anglo-American Oil Agreement negotiated last August. Although this Agreement has not yet entered into force because of

¹⁶ David A. Robertson of the Petroleum Division.

certain political difficulties within this country, a redraft acceptable to various conflicting interests within the United States has been prepared and will be used as the basis for renegotiation with the British. There seems little reason to believe that a definitive agreement cannot be consummated which will be substantially similar to the Agreement negotiated last August. One of the principal differences will be that the revised draft will be open to immediate accession by other nations, thus recognizing the legitimate interest of other countries in the pattern of petroleum development to be followed in the post-war period, while at the same time continuing to recognize the *de facto* control of most free petroleum by U.S. and U.K. nationals.

While the Agreement, both in its original form and in revised draft, is quite broad and general, it provides a framework within which, as the political, strategic, and economic situation evolves, specific decisions can be taken and programs planned. I believe that in view of all of the background discussion within the Department the provisions and intentions of the Oil Agreement are either known or self-evident. I am accordingly attaching a copy of the Agreement as negotiated in August 1944 and a copy of the latest revised draft;¹⁷ and will be available to discuss in detail the implications of specific provisions if this is desired.

As for the British Dominions and Colonial possessions, we have no specific petroleum policy other than what is comprehended under such general propositions as that there should be access on equal terms to the raw materials and trade of the world and that American nationals should have rights of doing business within the British Dominions upon terms no more discriminatory than those applicable to nationals of any other country.

There are certain petroleum difficulties in the case of India, the exact significance of which in the postwar period is yet to be ascertained. In the prewar period, American petroleum companies were certainly discriminated against, ordinarily not by general or specific provisions of law, but by the interposition of administrative delays and by the erection of technical barriers to the free operation of U.S. commercial enterprise. The British Government, of course, disavows responsibility for these discriminations and peculiarities. There is some reason to believe that they will not be so acutely in evidence in the postwar period. What diplomatic action can be taken to forestall or minimize them will naturally depend upon the ostensible, as well as upon the actual, status of India after the war.

JOHN A. LOFTUS

¹⁷ Neither attached to file copy. With regard to the agreement negotiated in August 1944, see footnote 12, p. 52.

890G.6363/6-1945

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Petroleum Division (Darlington)
to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1945.

This is a belated acknowledgment of your memorandum of June 19 addressed to Mr. Loftus.¹⁸ Its purpose is merely to complete your records so far as they can be completed at this time.

Officers of the Division have inquired into the points raised by Nuri Pasha on the occasion of his visit in May of this year. It appears that at the time of Nuri Pasha's visit the contract had already been let with British suppliers for sixteen-inch pipe for the new Iraq petroleum line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. This issue appears to be foreclosed, since under the exchange control arrangements obtaining in Iraq it would not be possible to finance the construction of a line involving use of American pipe. (The total cost of the line would be in the neighborhood of sixty million dollars, of which a very large fraction would be material cost; and no such supply of dollars is available for importation into Iraq.)

With reference to the initiation of development operations in the Basra concession area, the representatives of the American interests participating in the Iraq Petroleum Company have been consulted. They are favorable to such operations but believe that no concrete steps will be taken by their partners until the global petroleum supply-demand situation has clarified. The Petroleum Division will continue to give close attention to developments in this regard and will report to you thereon.

C. F. DARLINGTON

800.6363/9-2745

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

No. 25714

LONDON, September 27, 1945.

[Received October 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to report the following matters of interest regarding petroleum which were touched upon by Sir Norman Duke, Secretary of the Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, during a conversation on September 26th, two days after the conclusion of the petroleum negotiations with the signing of the revised petroleum agreement.

¹⁸ Not printed.

Sir Norman referred to American participation in Middle Eastern petroleum development. He said first that he could not see how American interests could be admitted to a share in concessions already held by British interests in the Middle East, but went on to indicate the view that it would be desirable if American interests were to obtain additional concessions in non-concessioned areas in the Middle East. In this connection, he said that possibly an arrangement could be made between the Shell Group and American interests concerning Southern Iran. He added, however, that the Shell group would not be happy if they were told to make such an arrangement since, before the Iranian Government had decided not to grant any new concessions at this time in Iran,¹⁹ Shell had felt that its chances to secure a concession in Southern Iran were good.

[Here follows discussion on petroleum questions in Latin America.]

Sir Norman spoke of the British Government's participation in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He said that he felt that the British Government's direct ownership of a majority of that company has sometimes been a disadvantage. He referred again to the negotiations of last year in Iran, and said that when the Iranians had informed the Russian officials that they did not wish to deal on a government to government basis regarding a concession, the Russian officials had pointed to the British Government's ownership in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Relative to the general question of the development of Middle Eastern oil, Sir Norman indicated views concerning the utilization of oil from that area which closely parallel, but from the British standpoint, the thinking within the Department on the desirable objectives of United States foreign oil policy, with particular reference to the Middle East. Sir Norman expressed the opinion that Middle Eastern oil should be utilised for economic requirements and should not be depended upon by British for strategic purposes.

[Here follows a general discussion on the composition of the Anglo-American Petroleum Commission, called for in the agreement signed on September 24.]

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
JAMES C. SAPPINGTON 3d
Second Secretary of Embassy

¹⁹ For documentation on the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone all petroleum development negotiations and on representations by the United States to the Soviet Union regarding unfavorable Soviet reaction, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 445 ff.

800.6363/11-1945

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 26875

LONDON, November 19, 1945.

[Received November 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch No. 25714 of September 27, 1945 which reported comments by Sir Norman Duke, Secretary of the Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Fuel and Power, concerning the development of Middle Eastern oil and American participation therein. There is given below the substance of a further conversation with Sir Norman Duke, who, as the Department is aware, headed for the British Government the discussions which took place at the official level during the recent petroleum negotiations with the United Kingdom in September.

The two points which emerged from Sir Norman's conversation were these:

1. Britain in future can not depend upon Middle Eastern oil for strategic purposes, and
2. Britain's interest is increased, therefore, in Latin American oil resources.

With respect to the first point, Sir Norman said that, although the Middle Eastern oil resources could not be relied upon for security purposes, they would have to be developed so oil would be available there if necessary for those purposes and if obtainable. In the latter regard, he said that this war had shown that, in the event of another large scale war, the Mediterranean would be closed, and while oil could be hauled around the Cape of Good Hope, that of course would not meet British war requirements. The desire of the British Foreign Office and of the British Military that the Arabian-American Oil Company's project for a pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean²⁰ go forward, coincides with Sir Norman's statement that Middle Eastern oil must be developed for strategic reasons even though it cannot be depended upon for strategic purposes.

Sir Norman indicated that the above views are shared by other officials in the British Government. This points to the existence of an opinion in the British Government concerning the strategic aspects of the development of Middle Eastern and Latin American petroleum resources which approaches basic objectives of the United States foreign oil policy as formulated within the Department prior to the oil discussions with the United Kingdom in 1944. If this opinion within the British Government should determine a British foreign oil policy

²⁰ For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 8 ff.

substantially in accord in important respects with our own objectives, it seems to the Embassy that the result as a practical matter would be of the greatest importance to the work of the Anglo-American Petroleum Commission to be established under the Petroleum Agreement. The Commission could then proceed to its tasks from an important area of general Anglo-American agreement. However, while there might be general agreement as to the need for cooperative development of Middle Eastern oil with its effect upon the development of Latin American oil, differences of course may exist concerning the extent and tempo of such development.

Speaking in further detail regarding the development of Middle Eastern oil resources, Sir Norman indicated that, so far as Britain is concerned, not only is there no bar to American participation in that development but additional American participation would be desirable. As in the conversation reported in despatch No. 25714, Sir Norman referred specifically to the concession negotiations in Iran last year which were terminated by the Iranian Government, and said that the Shell group had felt, before the negotiations had been brought to an end, that it had a good chance of obtaining a concession. Sir Norman then again suggested, as he had done in the previous conversation, that, if negotiations should be opened again in Iran, the British Government might tell Shell either to withdraw from the negotiations or seek an Iranian concession on the basis of sharing it with American interests. Sir Norman then further suggested, both from the viewpoint of compensating Shell and in line with the heightened interest of Britain in Latin American oil development, that Shell be given increased participation in Latin American resources.

[Here follows discussion on petroleum questions in Latin America.]

On the other hand, concerning the position of American oil companies in the Middle East, mention was made of the Kuwait marketing restrictions. It was gathered that no solution has been reached regarding this matter between the Gulf and Anglo-Iranian Oil Companies. Sir Norman said that a representative of the Gulf Oil Company had asked the Minister of Fuel and Power whether there would be any objection to that Company building a refinery in Britain to refine its Kuwait oil and that Mr. Shinwell²¹ had informed the Gulf Company that there would be no objection. Sir Norman also referred to the Red Line Agreement²² and remarked that he supposed the only

²¹ Emanuel Shinwell, British Minister of Fuel and Power.

²² The text of the Group (Red Line) Agreement between private American and European oil interests on July 31, 1928, is printed in *Current Antitrust Problems: Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, pp. 1004 ff.*; for further information on the agreement and events leading to the agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. iv, p. 943, footnote 42.

ones who might object to its abandonment would be the French and Gulbenkian.²³

It was suggested that the mere weight of the position of the United States as regards Latin America and of Britain in the Middle East might constitute a part of the basis for the feeling of British and American companies concerning their relative positions in those areas.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
JAMES C. SAPPINGTON 3d
Second Secretary of Embassy

800.6363/11-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 27, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

12390. According Lenahan²⁴ Colonial Office officials concerned have approved wording draft Arabian-American pipe line conventions Palestine and Trans-Jordan (Embassy's telegram No. 12301 November 23²⁵).

Embassy inquired of Ronald²⁶ FonOff concerning status matter. Ronald said that FonOff endorsed view British military who, for strategic reasons, want see pipe line completed to Mediterranean soon possible. FonOff looked into status and advised Embassy matter progressing perfectly satisfactorily. Draft conventions were sent Palestine about November 17 with favorable transmittal from Colonial Office.

Negotiations started year ago [in] Palestine. First meeting London March 21 this year. Question amount payment Trans-Jordan, only pending point on which agreement not yet reached, first raised April 25.

Company representatives and Embassy have been repeatedly assured British Government favors project and explanations given for delays in concluding negotiations seemed reasonable at time. British officials have indicated Palestine authorities preoccupation with situa-

²³ The Compagnie Française des Pétroles owned 23.75% and Sarkis Colouste Gulbenkian 5% of the capital stock of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

²⁴ William J. Lenahan, representative of the Arabian American Oil Company at London in connection with concluding a convention to sanction construction of a pipeline by the company from Saudi Arabia to an outlet in Palestine in Transjordan.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ Sir Nigel Bruce Ronald, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

tion there²⁷ may occasion further delay in concluding conventions. FonOff has asked Colonial Office to send follow-up to expedite matter Palestine. However, Lenahan now feels length negotiations already unjustifiable and Palestine situation no basis for further delay since officials there need only note draft conventions contain amendments, to existing pipe line conventions, those officials proposed after long deliberation.

Embassy has kept in continuous touch with company representatives and British officials regarding matter and has taken every action deemed appropriate to expedite negotiations. However, in light of foregoing, Dept may wish to instruct Embassy further as well as Consulate General Jerusalem.²⁸

FonOff has advised British Embassy Washington of status of negotiations.

Sent to Dept as No. 12390, repeated Jerusalem as No. 24.

WINANT

800.6363/12-545

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

No. 27254

LONDON, December 5, 1945.

[Received December 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that the subject of the development by the Iraq Petroleum Company of the Basra and BOD²⁹ fields in Iraq was touched upon in a recent conversation with Mr. David Shepard of the Anglo-American Oil Company, the British subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

Mr. Shepard said that the question of the development of the above-mentioned fields had been discussed in principle in the IPC. He indicated that all of the IPC groups appeared favorable in principle to the development of those fields, and he said that the budget of expenditures contain items for drilling equipment for use in the fields. Mr. Shepard expressed his view that the Basra and BOD fields should be developed. He referred to the existing two-year moratorium on operations in the fields, and indicated that, to his knowledge, the Iraq officials had not approached the IPC concerning operations in the fields.

²⁷ For documentation on the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the status of Palestine, see pp. 678 ff.

²⁸ In telegram 10588, December 6, 1945, 6 p. m., to London, repeated to Jerusalem, the Department stated it saw "no reason for further instruction to Embassy regarding matter discussed in urtel 12390." (800.6363/11-2745)

²⁹ British Oil Development (Company).

The Red Line Agreement and its purpose, with particular reference to the question of its possible elimination which was raised in passing by Secretary Ickes³⁰ during the Anglo-American oil negotiations in September,³¹ was discussed at some length. Mr. Shepard pointed out that the purpose of the Red Line Agreement was to prevent an individual IPC group from obtaining a concession in the Red Line area with which that group could compete with the IPC. In this connection, Mr. Shepard also referred to the IPC Group Agreement providing that no member should purchase oil from an outside company within the Red Line area for sale anywhere without the approval of the other IPC groups. It was remarked that this had the same purpose as the Red Line Agreement, i.e. the prevention of competition by an IPC group with the IPC. It was mentioned, however, that the area of the Red Line Agreement was inadequate to accomplish the purpose indicated: the non-inclusion of Iran in the Red Line area permits the Anglo-Iranian, with its concession in that country, to conduct precisely the kind of competition with the IPC which the Red Line Agreement was designed to prevent.

Mr. Shepard said that the Department was informed concerning revisions in the IPC Group Agreements now under consideration. With respect to the above-mentioned Group Agreement, Mr. Shepard said that the contemplated revision in that Agreement would provide that if one of the groups of IPC wished to purchase oil from any outside source (for example, the American group might wish to purchase from the Arabian-American Oil Company), that group would have to offer a part of the oil to be purchased to the other IPC groups. If, however, the other groups did not wish to buy, the group desiring to make the purchase could go forward with it. Mr. Shepard pointed out that the Shell Company and the Standard of New Jersey and Socony-Vacuum groups were in the same position in the Middle East in that both had insufficient crude in that area.

With respect to the question of whether the Red Line Agreement has outlived such usefulness as it may have had, Mr. Shepard ex-

³⁰ Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes.

³¹ In the Minutes of Plenary Session No. 3 of the Anglo-American Conversations on Petroleum, held on September 22, 1945, 10 a. m., appear the following two paragraphs:

"Secretary Ickes said he considered one of the important objectives of the proposed Oil Agreement to be the removal of inequalities arising from unpublished agreements such as the 'Red Line' Agreement and the Agreement between the Gulf Oil Company and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in respect of operations in Kuwait.

"The Minister of Fuel and Power replied that the principle of equal opportunity for all was fully accepted by the British Delegation. It would, of course, be of mutual effect and he agreed that it was implicit in the terms of the proposed Agreement." (841.6363/9-1845)

pressed his opinion that from the viewpoint of the American companies concerned the Agreement could be abolished. He indicated, however, that since the Agreement was part of the arrangements concluded after the last war as a result of government action to permit the participation of American companies in Middle East oil development, steps looking to the elimination of the Agreement should originate at the governmental level. On the subject of the various IPC groups reaction to the elimination of the Red Line Agreement, Mr. Shepard referred to the probable adverse reaction of Anglo-Iranian, with its Iranian production, but expressed agreement with the view of Sir Norman Duke, as reported in the Embassy's despatch No. 26875 of November 19, 1945, that Gulbenkian and Compagnie Française des Pétroles undoubtedly would be the only ones really opposed, because of their fear that the abolition of the Agreement would lessen the pressure for as great a development of Irakian oil as they would like to see.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador :

JAMES C. SAPPINGTON, 3D
Second Secretary of Embassy

ASSURANCES SOUGHT BY THE UNITED STATES THAT
THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD NOT OPPOSE EFFORTS
BY THE UNITED STATES TO CONCLUDE BILATERAL
CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS WITH VARIOUS
GOVERNMENTS IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST¹

883.248/2-1645

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Acting Secretary of
State (Grew)*

No. 73

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1945.

SIR: I have the honour to invite reference to Mr. Hull's note of October 19, 1944,² concerning the possible use by United States civil aircraft of airports constructed in the Near and Middle East by the United States Government for military purposes.

2. The question of the use of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's field at Abadan has, of course, already been settled³ but, in general, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government recognize that questions relating to the use of the airfields are a matter for discussion between the United States Government and the Near and Middle Eastern Governments concerned.

3. I am further directed to explain that a reply to Mr. Hull's note was delayed pending the outcome of the Chicago Conference.

I have [etc.]

HALIFAX

¹ Draft bilateral civil air transport agreements were submitted by the United States to several governments of the Near and Middle East in 1945. Documentation regarding discussions with Saudi Arabia is printed on pp. 845 ff., *passim*. For information on discussions with Iran and India, see p. 584 and vol. vi, p. 289, respectively. No separate documentation on discussions with Egypt, Greece, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and Turkey is included in this volume except as found in this compilation. The proposals by the United States were in furtherance of gaining acceptance of the principles established in the International Air Transport Agreement, frequently referred to as the "Five Freedoms" Agreement, concluded on December 7, 1944, at the International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944; for text of agreement, see *Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, November 1-December 7, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vol. i, p. 179. Documentation on the Chicago Conference is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. ii, pp. 355 ff. For documentation on the efforts of the United States in 1945 to implement its international aviation policy, see vol. ii, pp. 1455 ff.

² *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, p. 490.

³ See bracketed note, *ibid.*, p. 496.

841.796/3-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 22, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received March 23—9: 57 a. m.]

3003. From Satterthwaite.⁴ ReDepts 2006, March 15, midnight.⁵ It can be expected that the British Government, utilizing British Overseas Airways when desirable, will attempt to restrict the spread of the Fifth Freedom privilege⁶ wherever possible and will execute this policy partly by encouraging the formation of either regional companies or regional cabotage areas. While United States companies would probably not be excluded the operation of regional cabotage through the local companies in which the British, through BOAC or other means, had a hand might place American airlines at a serious disadvantage.

The emergence of the White Paper,⁷ even though it has not yet been approved by Parliament, has given impetus to translating into action British civil aviation plans.

We feel that it might be wise, regardless of and without reference necessarily to specific case of Egypt, to notify the British Government on a high level that we would not expect the British to enter into any agreements, either on a governmental level or through companies influenced or controlled by British Overseas Airways or other British airlines, which would restrict the right of the United States to conclude "Fifth Freedom" air agreements with these countries. In effect this would be an extension of the non-exclusive and non-discriminatory understanding arrived at in 1942.⁸ [Satterthwaite.]

WINANT

800.796/4-1845

The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)⁹ to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: It will be recalled that the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of May 27, 1942 proposed that neither of our Governments

⁴ Livingston L. Satterthwaite, Civil Air Attaché at the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ The picking up and discharging of traffic at intermediate points along a route rather than merely at terminal points (but not carrying local traffic within a country).

⁷ British Cmd. 6605, British Air Transport (1945).

⁸ See Department's *aide-mémoire* of May 27, 1942, and the British Embassy's reply of July 28, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 21 and 23, respectively.

⁹ William L. Clayton was Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

would enter into arrangements in Africa and the Middle East which would exclude the air transport lines of the other, and the Embassy's reply of July 28, 1942 concurred not only in this proposal but added that such principle should be applicable throughout the world.

Under date of August 31, 1944 Your Excellency's Government offered a draft agreement¹⁰ with the object of implementing the 1942 exchange of correspondence referred to above, to be effective until such time as an international aviation conference might be held. This proposal was acceptable with minor modifications to the United States Government, which on October 2, 1944 submitted a memorandum with a suggested draft exchange of notes¹¹ providing that the aforementioned understanding would be continued until both our Governments became bound by a future international agreement on this subject, or until terminated on sixty days notice.

In a note dated October 19, 1944, this Government referred to the foreign airports which it had constructed or improved in connection with the prosecution of the war, and expressed confidence that the British Government would interpose no objection to the efforts of the United States to obtain general landing rights for its civil aircraft and the right to use suitable airports, including those which this Government has constructed or improved in the Near and Middle East. Your Excellency's reply of February 16, 1945 merely stated that the British Government recognized that questions relating to the use of airfields were a matter for discussion between the United States Government and the Near and Middle Eastern Governments concerned.

The United States Government naturally proceeded on that basis, and recently proposed the negotiation of bilateral air transport agreements with a number of the Near and Middle Eastern Governments. These draft agreements, which are based on the standard form¹² drawn up at the Chicago Aviation Conference, provide for the use of suitable airports on a non-discriminatory basis.

However, since Your Excellency's note of February 16, 1945 refers exclusively to airfields and refrains from mentioning general landing rights, and in the absence of a reply to the Department's memorandum of October 2, 1944, the United States Government believes it an opportune time to make inquiry on the overall subject. Specifically, this Government would welcome assurances that the British Government will not oppose the efforts of the United States to acquire landing rights at this time in the Near and Middle East for United States commercial air services.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 163.

¹¹ *Ibid.* pp. 164-167

¹² The text of the "Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes" is printed in *Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference*, vol. I, pp. 127-129.

Inasmuch as discussions are in progress with several governments in that area, I would be grateful for an early reply.

Accept [etc.]

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON

800.796/4-1945 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1945—1 p. m.

3048. In a separate telegram¹³ you have been furnished the text of a note dated April 18, 1945 which was handed to a representative of the British Embassy, inviting assurances that the British will not oppose our efforts to acquire aviation landing rights in the Near and Middle East.

For your own information, the Iraq Foreign Minister has advised our Ambassador¹⁴ that while his Government wishes to conclude bilateral air transport agreement with us, he was confident that the British would object and he inquired confidentially if we could obtain an undertaking from the British Government not to bring pressure on the Iraq Government to reply unfavorably. This situation probably applies to other countries as well.

Since we are anxious to conclude arrangements for our projected commercial airlines without further delay, it is hoped that you can find an early opportunity to request the Foreign Office to make a prompt and favorable reply to our note under reference.

STETTINIUS

800.796/4-2645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, April 26, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received April 26—11:40 a. m.]

4239. We have just received an informal communication from Sir Ronald Campbell¹⁵ referring to our conversation mentioned in our 4169, April 24, 6 p. m.¹⁶ The substance of this communication is as follows:

“Having looked into the question of air transport agreements which you raised with me on the 24th of April, I find that our Embassy in

¹³ Telegram 3052, April 19, 1945, not printed.

¹⁴ Telegram 137, April 3, 1945, 6 p. m., from Baghdad, not printed.

¹⁵ Superintending Under Secretary of State for the Middle East in the British Foreign Office.

¹⁶ Not printed.

Washington has forwarded a copy of the note of April 18 which we have already received. This note is being carefully studied and will receive a reply as soon as possible. In the meantime, I can assure you that no significance attached to the term 'air fields' as distinct from 'general landing rights' in Lord Halifax's note of February 16. Our Government have no desire whatsoever to exclude the United States from acquiring landing rights for their services in the Middle and Near East, or anywhere else. However, when, as has occurred in a number of cases, foreign governments invite our views on proposals made to them by the United States Government, we respond naturally with a statement of our views based on the principles which we upheld at the Chicago Conference which, among other things, advocated the grant of conditional as opposed to unconditional Fifth Freedom rights."

It will be observed that Sir Ronald's letter is not intended as a final reply to the Department's note of April 18 but that that note is being studied and will be answered as soon as possible.

WINANT

711.90G27/5-845 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State*¹⁷

BAGHDAD, May 8, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received May 8—2: 35 p. m.]

180. From Curren¹⁸ to Aviation Division. Despite assurances given to the Department by Lord Halifax mentioned in your cable 164 May 3, 7 p. m.¹⁹ there are many indications that British diplomatic personnel in the Middle East countries and British Air Ministry representatives have and still do exert every possible influence on local governments to refuse American airlines fifth freedom privileges and delay acceptances of bilateral air transport agreements. These governments are definitely unable to take action regarding acceptance until sanctioned by British approval.

My file in Cairo contains a copy of a letter dated early April addressed by British Ambassador²⁰ to Minister for Foreign Affairs, received through highly confidential source, definitely requesting

¹⁷ The Department repeated the substance of this telegram to London in telegram 3754, May 12, 1945, 6 p. m., with an instruction that the appropriate British authorities should be asked "when a final reply may be expected to Department's April 18 note . . . pointing out that we consider the matter to be of an urgent nature." (711.90G27/5-845)

¹⁸ Ralph B. Curren, Civil Air Attaché in Egypt; assigned concurrently to Missions in Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

¹⁹ Not printed (711.90G27/5-345); it summarized the informal communication from Sir Ronald Campbell contained in telegram 4239, April 26, from London, p. 67.

²⁰ To Egypt, Lord Killearn.

Egyptian Government to take no action regarding acceptance of proposed American bilateral air transport agreement until British Government reaches decision regarding commercial aviation policy in Middle East. Will forward upon my return.

Viscount Swinton²¹ during his visit to Cairo personally officially warned Egyptians against fifth freedom privileges and endeavored create fear regarding American aviation policy and ultimate desires in Middle East. Recently British Air Ministry representative and aviation and financial advisors to Egyptian Government were so incensed over our satisfactory conclusion of MISR airplane transaction²² that they definitely told Roushdy Bey²³ that absolutely no dollar exchange would be approved for maintenance by American personnel and that instead BOAC²⁴ would service and maintain.

British Minister to Lebanon²⁵ made definite statement last week to Wadsworth²⁶ that British do not want American airlines to operate in Middle East. Camille Chamoun²⁷ was given free passage on boat and sent from London to Beirut by British Government for purpose of preventing Lebanese Government from granting Fifth Freedom privilege and blocking El-Hoss²⁸ purchase of American planes and technical assistance. British Air Ministry representative from Cairo arrived in Beirut same day I arrived to endeavor counteract my activities. He used unbelievable pressure against Lebanese as regards air transport agreement and purchase of American planes, warning that if they cooperate with Americans they will lose considerable British support and assistance generally.

In Iraq, copies of proposed air transport agreement were distributed by Foreign Office to RAF Air Vice Marshal in charge this theater, British Embassy and two other British aviation advisors for study and consultation, which is causing delay. It is apparent Iraq Government is unable to act definitively without absolute approval of British authorities who do not want to see Baghdad made a crossroads for American international air service. End of message. [Curren.]

MORELAND

²¹ Chairman of the British delegation to the Chicago International Aviation Conference.

²² In April, three surplus Douglas DC-2½ aircraft were sold by the United States (Foreign Economic Administration) to the MISR Airworks.

²³ Mohamed Roushdy, Director General of Civil Aviation in the Egyptian Ministry of Defense.

²⁴ British Overseas Airways Corporation.

²⁵ Terence A. Shone.

²⁶ George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon.

²⁷ Lebanese Minister to the United Kingdom and delegate to the Chicago International Aviation Conference.

²⁸ Fawzi el-Hoss, Director of Civil Aviation in the Lebanese Government.

800.796/6-2145

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Aviation Division
(Morgan)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1945.

Mr. Underwood²⁹ called and left the attached note No. 312, June 21,³⁰ answering ours of April 18, 1945 concerning United States commercial air services in the Near and Middle East. Mr. Underwood apologized for the delay in answering, said the text had just been received from London, and asked if I considered it satisfactory.

I told him that while I could not say the note was unsatisfactory, to me personally it was rather disappointing as it was very vague in its terms and did not definitely set forth what we thought should be made plain, namely, that the British would refrain from trying to influence the other countries in any way in connection with our negotiations. The note referred generally to landing rights, but this might be interpreted in a variety of ways, for instance, they might advise these nations to limit these landing rights to a very considerable extent; and in fact we knew that they were doing so. Mr. Underwood stated that landing rights was the expression used in our note (which was true), and therefore they had used the same expression.

I said that I did not understand the necessity for the references in the second paragraph to the Interim Agreement, which did not seem to have any bearing on the present case. Mr. Underwood said that he also did not understand why that paragraph was included. I said if it was meant in any way to imply there was any limitation on our freedom to negotiate with the countries concerned regarding the ultimate disposition and use of airfields constructed by our military authorities, I thought that we would view it with some concern, but it did not clearly say anything of the kind. Mr. Underwood agreed and said he did not put any such interpretation on it, but admitted there must be some reason for its being included.

Mr. Underwood asked if there would be any reply, and I told him that so far as I personally was concerned I did not think I should recommend any reply as being necessary. We would now see how matters developed.

Mr. Underwood then went on to say that he thought the reports we might have received concerning activities of the British representatives in the Near East in connection with our efforts to obtain landing rights were greatly exaggerated, and asked if I could give him any instances. I told him I was not prepared on my own responsibility to give him confidential information of this nature, but I could assure him that

²⁹ J. O. T. Underwood, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

³⁰ *Infra.*

the reports were so widespread and so definite that while they might be exaggerated there must be a great deal of substance to them.

I then asked Mr. Underwood whether if I read him a report which had just reached my desk he could remember the substance and forget where he heard it. He said that he could. I then read him the following excerpt from a report³¹ just received from Mr. Curren, Civil Air Attaché in the Near East, without divulging the source:

“I found that in each country the British Government officials have definitely been instrumental in causing delays in the acceptances of the Chicago Agreements and the bilateral Agreements. This may or may not be a policy laid down from London but in any case, individual British officials, members of British Legations and Embassy Staffs, aviation advisors, representatives of the British Air Ministry and even local British businessmen have taken it upon themselves to do everything they personally can to keep American aviation out of the Middle East scene.[”]

Mr. Underwood seemed somewhat stunned at the frankness of this language, and repeated that he hoped the report was exaggerated. I told him that it might be but asked him if he did not think that under the circumstances we had grounds for concern. He admitted that in our place he would feel as we did about it.

800.796/6-2145

*The British Minister (Balfour) to the Assistant Secretary
of State (Clayton)*

779/-/45
No. 312

WASHINGTON, 21 June, 1945.

SIR: I have the honour to refer to your Note of April 18th concerning the negotiations being conducted by the United States Government for landing rights for United States commercial air services in the Near and Middle East, and in reply to inform you, on the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,³² that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have no intention of opposing the United States Government or any other Government in the acquisition of landing rights for civil aircraft in any country. In negotiating with Governments for civil aviation landing rights, His Majesty's Government are bound by the agreements reached at Chicago and would of course follow the practice there contemplated and they assume that the United States Government would propose to follow the same procedure.

³¹ Report 128, dated June 1, 1945, not printed.

³² Anthony Eden.

2. It will be recalled that Article VIII Section 9 of the Interim Agreement on Civil Aviation³³ provides that each member state may: (i) designate the route to be followed within its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use, and (ii) impose on any such service just and reasonable charges for the use of such airports and other facilities; these charges not to be higher than would be paid for the use of such airports and facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services. His Majesty's Government conceive the intention of this article to be that each member state should provide, in its territory, the airfields required for international air services (with the right to apply to the Interim Council if it requires assistance) and that all states entitled to operate air services to, or through, such states, would use the national airfields designated by the member states.

I have [etc.]

JOHN BALFOUR

800.796/6-2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Aviation Division (Morgan)

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

Mr. Underwood called to discuss aviation matters and particularly the Embassy's note of June 21st on the subject of landing rights for United States planes in the Near and Middle East. He said they were not too happy about the language of the note, as they felt it was unsatisfactory to us. I said I would not characterize it as unsatisfactory, it did not go as far as we had hoped, but if that was as far as they were willing to go I did not think that we were disposed to pursue the matter further, at least at this time; we could wait and see how things worked out.

Mr. Underwood then said that part of their trouble was due to the fact that they had had numerous reports from the Near East to the effect that the United States was really seeking exclusive rights at some of these airports and that was giving them very real concern. I told him that there was not a word of truth in such a rumor, that not only had we not asked for exclusive rights at any of the airports but that such action would be at total variance with our established and well publicized policy. We believed in a reasonable freedom for international operations with a minimum of restrictions on frequencies and the rights to pick up and discharge traffic. We had shown by accepting the five freedoms document³⁴ that we were ready to give

³³ The Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation was opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 469, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1516.

³⁴ The International Air Transport Agreement.

the same treatment to all other nations. We thought that international aviation should be conducted in this spirit without exclusivity and without discrimination.

Mr. Underwood said that this was his understanding, but they had repeated reports to the contrary and he wondered if we could not give them some formal assurances.

I suggested that if the Embassy wished to write us a note saying that they had understood from informal conversations that that was our attitude but would like to have a formal confirmation thereof, I thought the note could be answered in a manner which would completely allay their suspicions.³⁵

800.796/7-2645

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In the Embassy's note No. 312 of June 21 it was stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had no intention of opposing the United States Government or any other Government in the acquisition of landing rights for civil aircraft in any country. It has become evident, however, that some misunderstanding exists over the interpretation of the phrase "landing rights"³⁶ and the Foreign Office think it desirable that a comprehensive statement of the present British position in regard to international civil aviation should be given to the Department.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the proposals which they put forward at the Chicago Conference. There they readily accepted the proposal that Freedoms 1 and 2 should be freely given and received and they will be ready to extend those Freedoms, under the Transit Agreement,³⁷ to every country which is, or becomes, a party to it.

3. His Majesty's Government hoped that Freedoms 3 and 4 might be included in an international convention. While they believed

³⁵ There is no record in Department files of a communication from the British Embassy on this matter.

³⁶ In telegram 274, September 6, 1945, 8 p. m., to Baghdad, the Department stated: "The term landing rights is subject to flexible interpretation. Before the war landing rights generally permitted an airline to pick up and discharge traffic at at least one airport in a given country and in most countries there were no restrictions on such traffic. It may be said that the so-called Five Freedoms drawn up at the Chicago Conference divided the general concept of landing rights into various components, and the Brit have so far endeavored to curtail the broadest interpretation of landing rights by making reservations on the so-called Fifth Freedom." (711.90G27/8-3045)

³⁷ The International Air Services Transit Agreement was opened for signature at Chicago on December 7, 1944; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 487, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1693.

that Freedom 5 would more properly be the subject of bilateral or collateral agreements negotiated between the countries concerned, they were prepared to deal with this privilege also in a multilateral convention, provided that agreement could be reached on the governing conditions.

4. Those matters on which it proved impossible to reach agreement at Chicago stand referred for further consideration and report by the Council of the Interim Civil Aviation Organization about to be set up at Montreal. It is the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government that a solution satisfactory to the United States Government, His Majesty's Government and the other interested Governments may be found.

5. In the meantime, the only alternative course in the view of His Majesty's Government is to proceed by way of bilateral agreements for the exchange on equitable terms of the privileges in question. In entering into any such agreements His Majesty's Government propose to provide for the following matters, which they hope to see incorporated in a multilateral convention :

(a) In order to avoid uneconomic competition and reduce, and ultimately eliminate, subsidies, capacity should be settled and varied by agreement, so as to provide a reasonable equilibrium between the aggregate of services and the amount of traffic offering on a particular route and that capacity should be fairly divided between the countries concerned. His Majesty's Government also consider that any agreement should contain convenient machinery for the fixing of rates: and should provide for reference of matters in dispute to the arbitration of a well-qualified independent body.

(b) His Majesty's Government in any agreement would, where appropriate, propose the insertion of a provision on the line of the "United Nations Clause"³⁸ which the United States Delegation in common with other Delegations accepted in principle at the Chicago Conference.

(c) His Majesty's Government would also, in any agreement, propose to deal with Freedom 5, in so far as it is relevant. In dealing with this Freedom they still consider that the criteria which they propose in the final British plan at Chicago (Conference Document 429³⁹) are the most practical and flexible that have yet been suggested. These criteria were substantially as follows:—

(1) The capacity to which a through airline operator would be entitled in order to carry traffic embarked in or for his own country;

(2) The air transport needs of the area through which he passes judged in relation to public convenience and necessity;

³⁸ For United States proposal in connection with United Nations participation (article XII), see *Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference*, vol. I, p. 609. The British proposal is printed *ibid.*, pp. 600, 603.

³⁹ Dated November 29, 1944; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 519.

(3) The position of regional and local air transport development;

(4) Economy of through airlines operation.

6. His Majesty's Government propose to be guided by the above considerations when concluding agreements with other Governments and to give advice in accordance with these considerations when their advice is sought by other Governments.

7. In this connection it may be appropriate to draw attention to the second paragraph of the Embassy's note under reference which sets out the views of His Majesty's Government on the provision of airports for international services. Since these views are based on the Chicago Agreements it is assumed that they are held equally by the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1945.

711.41/10-2945

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁴⁰

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are much distressed to learn that Senator Pepper⁴¹ and Mr. McCloy,⁴² during their recent visit to the Middle East, have gained impressions of lack of co-operation on the part of certain British Officials in the Middle East where United States interests are concerned.

2. His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how these impressions could have been derived and regard the matter as of such importance that they wish to examine any such allegations immediately with great care. For this purpose they would be grateful if Senator Pepper and Mr. McCloy would be good enough to advance

⁴⁰ Handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador (Halifax); an interim reply was made on November 8.

⁴¹ Senator Claude Pepper of Florida requested the Legation in Egypt to convey to President Truman his views that the British were undermining United States interests and good will in the Middle East. His message was sent to the Department by Cairo as part of telegram 1904, October 11, 1945, 7 p. m., not printed (711.41/10-1145). The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), in a letter of October 25 to Cairo, stated: "Mr. Clayton sent a copy of Senator Pepper's telegram to the British Ambassador for his confidential information, and I immediately received a call from Wright, the Secretary of the British Embassy who handles Near Eastern affairs. We had a frank conversation on the subject which, I believe, was mutually helpful. In the end Senator Pepper's telegram has helped to clarify the atmosphere and may result in more good than harm, provided we shall be successful in keeping it out of the press." (711.41/10-1245)

⁴² The views of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, on British obstructionism in the Middle East, were conveyed to the War Department in a telegram of October 12 from Karachi (611.4131/11-845). A paraphrased copy of the telegram was shown to Lord Halifax by Mr. Clayton.

specific instances of the kind of obstruction on the part of British authorities to which they refer.⁴³ On receipt of this evidence His Majesty's Government will at once institute the most careful inquiries. They feel that if these allegations are proved to be well founded, corrective action on their part is immediately desirable.

3. His Majesty's Government wish to recall that in 1944 the whole question of contacts between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government in the Middle East were reviewed, with special reference to economic matters, and that identical instructions were issued to all British and American officials in the Middle East to co-operate closely.⁴⁴ Every official complaint of lack of co-operation has at once been examined by His Majesty's Government with a view to ensuring that the instructions issued by the two Governments to their officials are carried out.

4. At the same time His Majesty's Government wish to point out that in matters of civil aviation there is a difference of approach between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government over the question of Fifth Freedom, which is at present under discussion between the two Governments, but which has unfortunately not yet been resolved. It is natural and inevitable that the two Governments should meanwhile wish to conclude agreements with third countries embodying their respective points of view. This difference extends to civil aviation affairs everywhere and has no special connection with Middle East countries. That each Government should adhere to its own point of view until agreement has been reached between them is no more evidence of lack of co-operation on one side than on the other.

5. His Majesty's Government wish to add that as regards telecommunications the question of the wireless communication between the United States and Dhahran has, it is understood, now been settled,⁴⁵ and that other telecommunication questions are about to be discussed at the Conference which is to open at Bermuda on November 19th, and to be attended by the Governments of the British Commonwealth and of the United States.

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1945.

⁴³ Copies of the British *aide-mémoire* were sent by Mr. Clayton to Senator Pepper and Mr. McCloy on November 8, 1945, with requests for further information. There is no record of reply by Senator Pepper in Department files. Mr. McCloy's acknowledgement of November 16 stated that the detailed information sought by the Department was being developed for transmittal to Mr. Clayton (611.4131/11-845). There is no record in Department files of a further communication from Mr. McCloy on this matter.

⁴⁴ The reference is to discussions on Middle East matters which took place during the mission of Under Secretary of State Stettinius to London in April 1944; *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1 ff. For instruction to the Legation in Egypt, see telegram 1167, May 17, 1944, 10 p. m., *ibid.*, vol. v, p. 6.

⁴⁵ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1009 ff.

811.79600/11-2145

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Aviation Division (Walstrom) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 21, 1945.

AV ⁴⁶ understands that the Secretary wishes a memorandum citing specific instances where the British have opposed our plans for operating United States international air services in various countries, particularly the Middle East.

For background, the Department had received various reports to this effect and in April of this year a note was sent to the British Government stating that we would "welcome assurances that the British Government will not oppose the efforts of the United States to acquire landing rights at this time in the Near and Middle East for United States commercial air services". The British replied to the effect that they had no desire to exclude us from acquiring landing rights but when friendly nations requested the advice and the opinion of the British Government the latter was compelled to state its views, which are in opposition to the so-called Fifth Freedom rights. The Fifth Freedom rights would permit an American airline to carry traffic between intermediate countries, but not to engage in traffic within each country. This Government strongly feels that such Fifth Freedom privileges are essential to the sound economic operation of its international airlines.

The following specific instances of British opposition have come to the attention of the Department:

Egypt: While the War Department has requested that the following information not be divulged, it is nevertheless pertinent. On March 30, 1945 Lord Killearn, British Ambassador to Egypt, addressed a letter to the Egyptian Prime Minister stating the British opposition to the "Fifth Freedom" which the United States Government wished to incorporate in its air transport agreements. Lord Killearn said he felt sure the Egyptian Government would wish to consult the British authorities before reaching any decision on granting such privileges to United States airlines. In a further letter of September 2, 1945, Lord Killearn told the Egyptian Prime Minister that Great Britain was anxious to conclude an agreement on civil aviation "in order to safeguard her interest not only in Egypt, but in all the countries of the Middle East". The letter further said that it would be necessary for Great Britain to see that the aviation rights granted by Egypt to American airlines should not injure British aviation interests as provided for in an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on civil aviation.

⁴⁶ The Aviation Division.

When Lord Swinton (former British Minister of Civil Aviation) visited Cairo in April of this year, he is reported to have told the Egyptian officials that "the United States wants to control all civil aviation and that if Egypt signs the Fifth Freedom they will find the United States coming in to take over aviation and the entire world, and that the British are going to prevent them from doing so". Lord Swinton also is reported to have made a number of derogatory remarks concerning American aviation in general.

A telegram from the Legation at Cairo dated July 20, 1945 reports conversations between our Civil Air Attaché and the representative of the British Ministry of Air to the Middle East. The latter official admitted advising the Middle Eastern countries along the lines of the British position at Chicago, advocating restrictions on traffic rights as protection for local airlines, and restricting frequencies. A report from the Legation at Cairo dated July 31, 1945 says "the British Air Ministry has continued its efforts to obstruct the acceptance of our bilateral Agreement through their own advisor in the Civil Aviation Department in that they have assured the Department that they will give them advice on the effect of the American trunk service between Egypt and Lydda on the Egyptian and other eventual Arab airlines and also on the adequacy of Almaza Airport as compared with Payne Field for American commercial operation." A further report from the Legation at Cairo dated October 5, 1945 includes the following reference: "The Egyptians seem to desire to postpone acceptance of the Agreement as long as possible upon the assurance by the British that the matter of the Fifth Freedom traffic will eventually be changed through their influence. There has been definite evidence that on more than one occasion Lord Killearn and other British Government officials in Egypt have definitely "instructed" the Egyptian Government not to accept the American Air Transport Agreement until the entire matter of air traffic rights and international operation can be given further consideration and discussions held in England and in the Middle East."

Recent reports from the Legation at Cairo indicate that prospects for the conclusion of our bilateral air transport agreement are more encouraging, but certainly no thanks are due to the British.

Greece: A report from the Embassy at Athens dated April 7, 1945 quoted a Greek official as stating that his Government's reply concerning our draft bilateral air transport agreement had been delayed at the request of the British Embassy. Further information from Athens indicates that the British have continued to persuade the Greeks against the conclusion of a Fifth Freedom aviation agreement, and a more recent telegram has reported that the Greeks are unwilling to commit themselves to a final policy on this matter until the British and American viewpoints are reconciled.

Iraq: On April 3, 1945 the Iraqi Foreign Minister told Mr. Henderson, then Minister at Baghdad, that it would be helpful and would save embarrassment for the Iraq Government if we could first obtain an undertaking from the British Government that it would not press the Iraqi Government to reply unfavorably to our proposals for air transport rights in Iraq. While the Foreign Minister personally was in favor of an agreement for American air rights, he was confident that the British would object. The Foreign Minister asked, however, that his remarks on this subject be treated in the utmost confidence, for which reason it probably would be unwise to cite this specific instance to the British.

Our Civil Air Attaché at Cairo reported on May 8, 1945 that British diplomatic personnel and air ministry representatives in the Middle East continued to exert every possible influence on local governments to refuse Fifth Freedom rights to American airlines and to delay acceptances of the bilateral agreements. He further said that these Governments were unable to take action regarding acceptance until British sanction was obtained.

The Legation at Baghdad reported on July 31, 1945 that the British Chargé d'Affaires said that, acting under instructions, he had advised Iraqi Government to be cautious in giving air rights for Fifth Freedom traffic, and to guard against granting any rights which might later prove embarrassing "to Iraq, its neighbors or friends".

On July 25, 1945 the Legation at Baghdad reported that "a usually reliable Iraqi source" had stated that the draft Pan-Arab civil aviation agreement was obviously drafted by British aviation experts, and was calculated, among other things, to hinder the entrance of American airlines into Iraq.

Iran: The Embassy at Tehran has recently reported that information regarding British efforts to block conclusion of an American-Iranian air transport agreement had been abundantly confirmed from another confidential source, which had reported the British to be exerting continued and relentless pressure in this connection.

On October 24, 1945 the American Ambassador had an audience with the Shah and the latter himself mentioned the possibility that delays in the negotiations for the air transport agreement might have been caused by British pressure in certain quarters of his Government.

Lebanon: On May 28, 1945 our Civil Air Attaché at Cairo reported that the British and French in Beirut had completely blocked dollar exchange for the purchase of American aircraft by Mr. El Hoss, who had planned to start a local airline with American planes and technical advice. The Civil Air Attaché reported that the British commercial secretary had offered El Hoss the distributorship for the Morris automobile if he would give up the idea of operating an airline. [However, this approach does not seem to be particularly repre-

hensible on the part of any foreign representative desiring to promote his own country's commercial interest.]^{46a}

The British Minister to Lebanon is reported to have definitely stated to the American Minister that the British do not want American airlines to operate in the Middle East.

It is further reported that the British sent the Lebanese Ambassador in London to Beirut for the purpose of persuading the Lebanese Government not to grant Fifth Freedom privileges to American airlines, and to block the purchase of American planes by El Hoss. Our Civil Air Attaché in Cairo also reports that when he arrived in Beirut the British Air Ministry representative arrived the same day and "used unbelievable pressure against the Lebanese as regards the air transport agreement and the purchase of American aircraft, warning that if they cooperated with Americans they would lose considerable British support and assistance generally."

Belgium: While not pertinent to the above discussion of Middle Eastern countries, this Government has been endeavoring to negotiate a bilateral air transport agreement with Belgium, so far without success. On October 12, 1945 Brussels reported that the Belgian Foreign Minister had referred to the British, who have endeavored to dissuade Belgium from concluding a Fifth Freedom agreement with this country.

Over the past year aviation representatives of Sweden and the Netherlands have also informed the Department that the British have made known their displeasure with the acceptance of the Five Freedoms concept by these two countries.⁴⁷

890F.248/11-2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 28, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 28—11:33 a. m.]

12421. [For first two paragraphs of this telegram, see page 970.]

Howe's⁴⁸ comment was that it was the strong wish of Foreign Office to cooperate with US in Saudi Arabia and Middle East in general

^{46a} Brackets appear in the original memorandum.

⁴⁷ This memorandum by Mr. Walstrom, together with a report by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on aspects of United States aviation problems in Saudi Arabia, not printed, was sent to the Secretary of State by Mr. Henderson on November 23. Mr. Henderson's transmitting memorandum, after quoting paragraph numbered 4 of the British *aide-mémoire* of October 29, p. 75, concluded: "It is highly questionable, however, whether it justifies the types of pressure brought by the British Government on certain third countries to obstruct our legitimate aviation objectives." (811.79600/11-2345) There is no record in Department files of a substantive reply to the *aide-mémoire*. The *aide-mémoire* contains the marginal notation "File for reasons indicated in NE's memo" but this memorandum has not been identified.

⁴⁸ Robert George Howe, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

to the fullest possible extent. No one in the Foreign Office questioned the benefits that would flow from such cooperation. He added that complaints had been made on various occasions by American officials against "British obstruction" in the Middle East. Recently, he continued, an official of the British Embassy asked an official of Dept. for specific instances of obstruction.⁴⁹ After some discussion⁵⁰ British Embassy representative was told that no specific instances of importance of this kind could be cited except in the field of aviation and telecommunications.⁵¹

British action in these fields that we objected to, Howe observed, no doubt came about because up to now London and Washington had not reached agreement on aviation and telecommunications essentials. He hoped, therefore, that in the interests of British and American cooperation in the Middle East, agreement in these fields would soon be reached.

WINANT

[No civil air transport agreement was concluded in 1945 with any of the governments in the Near and Middle East.]

⁴⁹ See *aide-mémoire* of October 29, p. 75.

⁵⁰ No record of this discussion found in Department files.

⁵¹ For documentation on discussions with the British regarding telecommunications problems, see pp. 1009 ff.

AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNING
DISPOSITION OF UNITED STATES SURPLUS PROP-
ERTY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ¹

890.24/8-1645

*Sir Wilfrid G. Eady to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)*²

LONDON, 16 August, 1945.

DEAR MR. CLAYTON: I enclose a copy of the interim arrangements agreed upon to govern disposals in the Middle East. If you will confirm that this is satisfactory to you, as I understand it is, we shall make arrangements to instruct our people in the Middle East accordingly and no doubt you will be doing the same. It will be a mercy to get this piece of grit out of our shoes!

Yours sincerely,

W[ILFRID] EADY

[Enclosure]

INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS ON DISPOSALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. These interim arrangements will apply to the sterling area countries in the Middle East (i.e. Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Aden, Cyprus and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan).

2. All United States surpluses (including surpluses of identifiable Lend/Lease origin) will be sold for local currency without distinction between "essential" and "non-essential" and, subject to the concurrence of the local governments concerned, without import license or other impediments. Except by agreement, such surpluses shall not be transferred between sterling area countries or imported from outside the sterling area.

3. Local currencies from such sales will be paid into separate local currency accounts which will be freely expendable in the country of sale for the purpose only of U.S. military or other U.S. Government expenditures, except the purchase of goods for export.

4. British surpluses (excluding surpluses of identifiable L/L origin) will be freely disposed of. Proceeds of sale of "unidentifiables" will be carried to suspense pending determination of the appropriate U.S. and U.K. shares in such proceeds. It is understood that the United

¹ Documentation on the negotiation of this agreement is found in Department of State files, Nos. 103.9169, 800.24, and 841.24.

² Sir Wilfrid Eady was Joint Second Secretary of the British Treasury; William L. Clayton was Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Kingdom Government will not institute any special recording procedure in respect of disposals of British surpluses which may be "similar" to items received on Lend/Lease.

The above interim arrangements are without prejudice to any agreement which may be reached respecting points of difference between the proposals in Mr. F. G. Lee's letter of June 12th,³ Mr. Clayton's letter of July 9th⁴ and the State Department's Memorandum of April 21st⁵ as regards:-

- (a) convertibility and exchange guarantee in respect of residual balances;
- (b) questions which may arise from the disposal of "similar" goods.

These outstanding questions will be taken up at an early opportunity.

Either Government is entitled to ask for the termination of these arrangements on due notice.

[LONDON,] 14 August, 1945.

890.24/8-1645

The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to Sir Wilfrid G. Eady

LONDON, August 17, 1945.

MY DEAR SIR WILFRID: The memorandum attached to your letter of August 16 satisfactorily reflects the interim arrangements to govern surplus disposals in the Middle East which our people have agreed upon. Of course paragraph 2 relates only to those supplies which we decide to sell as surplus in the particular areas involved.

As you know, we have undertaken these interim arrangements only because of the extreme urgency of disposing of these goods to prevent deterioration, and we wish to emphasize our strong desire to make final arrangements for the disposition of the proceeds within the very near future.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. CLAYTON

[Under the terms of the Financial Agreement signed at Washington on December 6, 1945, by the United States and the United Kingdom (Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) 1545, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1841), the United Kingdom committed itself to complete arrangements within one year of the effective

³ To the Chief of the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs (Fetter), not printed. Frank G. Lee was attached to the United Kingdom Treasury delegation in the United States.

⁴ Addressed to Mr. Lee, not printed.

⁵ Text incorporated in telegram 1000, May 10, 1945, 6 p. m., to Cairo, not printed.

date of the agreement under which "the sterling receipts from current transactions of all sterling area countries . . . will be freely available for current transactions in any currency area without discrimination; with the result that any discrimination arising from the so-called sterling area dollar pool will be entirely removed and that each member of the sterling area will have its current sterling and dollar receipts at its free disposition for current transactions anywhere." The effective date of the agreement was later determined to be July 15, 1946; see letter of July 15, 1946, from the Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel), printed as part of TIAS 1545. In telegram 1035, July 14, 1947, 11 a. m., the Department notified Cairo that "It has been decided to make no approach to British on termination of Eady-Clayton Agreement in desire to avoid raising unnecessary issues and possible political reaction from Middle East Countries. Department concurs, however, in position that provisions of E-C Agreement inconsistent with overall financial agreement are automatically inoperative as of July 15." (883.24 FLC/7-1447)]

TERMINATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTER BY JOINT ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ¹

800.24/9-1845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As the State Department is aware, Colonel Hoskins,² during a recent visit to London, strongly urged that the date for the liquidation of the Middle East Supply Centre, set for the 1st of January, 1946, should be advanced to the 1st of November 1945.³

2. In view of the termination of world hostilities, His Majesty's Government are able to agree to the earlier date and they propose that a formal joint announcement should now be made by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom concerning this decision. His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn whether the United States Government agrees to this proposal. If so, His Majesty's Government will be glad to propose

¹For previous documentation regarding the relaxation of import controls administered by the Middle East Supply Center, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 41 ff. An article on this subject, written by Frederick Winant of the War Areas Economic Division, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 25, 1945, p. 80. A further article, "Civilian Requirements from War to Peace: The Middle East Supply Center", by Francis Boardman of the Division of Commercial Policy, is printed *ibid.*, December 23, 1945, p. 994.

²Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Adviser on Economic Affairs, with rank of Counselor, at Legation in Egypt; assigned concurrently to Missions in Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.

³In telegram 1530, August 3, 1945, 9 p. m., the Minister in Egypt reported that United States spokesmen at the Middle East Supply Center (MESC), in lengthy discussions with their British counterparts, had pressed for dissolution of the MESC at the earliest possible date "in view of declared United States policy of eliminating wartime controls." Their proposal that October 1, 1945, be set as the date of dissolution had been regarded as too early by the British, "in part because of administrative difficulties in organizing British supply controls after the termination of MESC and in part because of necessity for informing Parliament prior to publication of decision." The British had countered with a proposal to liquidate the MESC on December 31, 1945, "with purely British Supply Mission continuing MESC functions on the British side for all commodities requiring control particularly food." (800.24/8-345)

In its reply, in telegram 1591, August 20, 1945, 3 p. m., the Department noted that the "End of Japanese war in our opinion warrants earliest possible transition to new framework expected to continue well into post-war period" and instructed Cairo to "continue to press for agreement on earliest feasible date for termination in your conversations with British". The Department also underscored its belief "that an agreed US-UK position on termination date is essential and that withdrawal of U.S. from MESC must coincide with formal dissolution of that agency." (103.9169/8-2045)

a draft of an announcement. Meanwhile, they are anxious that the proposed change of date should be kept confidential.

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1945.

800.24/9-1845

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the memorandum of September 6, 1945, from the British Embassy expressing the willingness of His Majesty's Government, pursuant to the request of Colonel Hoskins during his recent visit to London, to accept the date of November 1, 1945, for the liquidation of the Middle East Supply Center and inquiring if the United States Government agrees to a formal joint announcement by the two Governments of this action.

The United States Government agrees to the proposal for a formal joint announcement to that effect, keeping the proposed change confidential prior to such announcement.

It is clear that the elimination of the Middle East Supply Center will require the revision of certain existing Middle East import procedures. With respect to those heavy-tonnage commodities (cereals, coal, sugar, fertilizers and so forth) whose importation into the Middle East has been largely through centralized channels, it is assumed by this Government that normal commercial channels will be reopened at the earliest practicable moment. In the event that the British Government considers it necessary to continue centralized importation of these commodities into British Middle East territories for a short period of transition, it should be understood that this Government would not consider it practicable to shape United States export controls toward the end of assisting in the implementation of such centralized procurement, since it is the intention of this Government to permit the export of all commodities within the limits of available supply.

The United States Government recognizes that the Middle East Supply Center has been an indispensable aid in the common war effort and a working example of practical international economic cooperation, and appreciates the opportunity of participating with the British Government in this cooperative effort. This Government wishes to give assurance of its desire for continued cooperation between the two Governments with respect not only to the transition questions growing out of the termination of the Middle East Supply Center but also to the longer-range economic problems facing the Middle East.

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1945.

[A joint statement by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom announcing the dissolution of the Middle East Supply Center on November 1, 1945, was released to the press in Washington and London on September 26. On the same day, the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration released a statement entitled "Review of the Work of the Middle East Supply Center". Both statements are printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, page 493. For views of the Department, released on October 30, on the nature of United States supply arrangements for the Middle East to be put into effect with the dissolution of the Middle East Supply Center, see *ibid.*, November 4, 1945, page 727.]

EGYPT

UNPERFECTED LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EGYPT, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, APRIL 17, 1945¹

[Talks on the proposed Lend-Lease agreement were resumed by the Legation in Egypt and the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs in January 1945. On February 28, the Legation was informed that the Egyptian Minister at Washington, Mahmoud Hassan, would be authorized to sign the agreement, with an exchange of notes covering various points. Discussions on the wording of the notes were held at Cairo in March and April; and on April 3, the Egyptian Chargé notified the Department that subject to the rewording of two paragraphs of the proposed exchange, he was authorized to effect agreement. The agreement was signed on April 17 by the Secretary of State and the Egyptian Minister. The introduction and eight articles are virtually identical, *mutatis mutandis*, with the agreement entered into with the United Kingdom on February 23, 1942 (Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433), except that the following paragraph has been inserted after paragraph 1:

“And whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Egypt, as signatories of the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942 [*Foreign Relations*, 1942, volume I, page 25], have subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter made on August 14, 1941 [*ibid.*, 1941, volume I, page 367], by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;”]

883.24/4-1745

*The Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan)*²

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the conversations that have occurred between the representatives of our two Governments in connection with the agreement signed at Washington on this day, between the

¹ For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 64-65.

² A virtually identical note was sent to the Secretary of State by the Egyptian Minister on April 17, 1945.

Government of the United States of America and the Government of Egypt on the principles applying to aid under the Lend-Lease Act,³ and to set forth my understanding of the accord reached as to the application of certain provisions of the said agreement, as follows:

1. In general, foodstuffs and other supplies for the civilian population of Egypt shall continue to be furnished through regular commercial channels. However, such foodstuffs and other supplies as may be provided for the civilian population of Egypt under the Lend-Lease Act shall be furnished on the basis of current payment by the Egyptian Government, and other goods and services may be furnished on that basis by agreement from time to time. Payments shall be made in United States dollars or as agreed mutually between the two Governments prior to delivery. Articles obtained by the Egyptian Government in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph become the property of that Government and are therefore excluded from the provisions of Article V of the agreement.

2. Such payments as may be made in Egyptian pounds shall be deposited to the credit of the Government of the United States in a depository in Egypt to be selected by the United States Government. These deposits may be freely drawn upon and used by the Government of the United States. The Government of Egypt will permit the exportation to any destination desired by the United States of any materials and products purchased by the United States with such deposits. In any transaction envisaged in this paragraph the United States Government would, of course, conform to the applicable Egyptian laws or regulations with respect to internal prices or supply programs.

3. With particular reference to Articles V and VII of the agreement, it is agreed that if substantial amounts of materials or assistance furnished or to be furnished under the Lend-Lease Act or otherwise, by any Agency of the United States Government without current payments by the Government of Egypt have been or shall be employed by either of our two Governments, during the present war, in the construction of any installations on Egyptian territory, the disposition of such installations remaining on Egyptian territory after the present war shall be governed by an agreement or agreements to which both our Governments shall be parties. Such agreement or agreements shall make appropriate provision for the future ownership and operation of the installation or installations in question, and for the payments or other benefits to be received by the Government of the United States on account of its contribution to their cost. The governing

³ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

purpose of such agreement or agreements shall be to carry out in practice, in whatever way may then appear to be the most effective, the principles of the Joint Declaration of August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter, and in particular the fourth point thereof relating to the enjoyment by all States of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world. If such agreement in the case of any installation is not reached within a reasonable time after the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President of the United States of America, the Government of the United States may withdraw that installation, or the parts thereof which it shall have contributed, whether located on private or on public land, doing no unnecessary damage in the process, and leaving the land involved in a safe condition. However, with respect to such installations or parts thereof which in the view of the United States, it may not be feasible or worthwhile to remove from Egypt, the disposition of any such installations or parts not dealt with under the foregoing provisions will be left to future negotiations.

4. The other obligations of our two Governments in respect to mutual aid will be satisfied in accordance with the provisions of the agreement signed this day. It is of course understood that in the implementation of the agreement, each government will act in accordance with its own constitutional procedures.

Accept [etc.]

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

[In a memorandum of June 8, 1945, the Assistant Chief of the Treaty Section of the Division of Research and Publications (Bevans) stated that spokesmen for the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus Property Affairs took the position that the Lend-Lease Agreement with Egypt was not in force, notwithstanding its provisions, and that it would become effective as of the date of signature only after approval by the Egyptian Parliament (883.24/9-2546). On October 4, 1946, a note was sent to the Egyptian Minister, inquiring whether the Egyptian Parliament had approved the agreement (883.24/9-2546). The Minister's reply of November 13, 1946, stated that while competent committees of Parliament had been studying the agreement, the United States had announced discontinuance of lend-lease operations (see White House release of August 21, 1945, volume VI, page 109) and that no further action by Parliament had taken place (883.24/11-1346). The agreement is considered by the Department of State to be unperfected (883.24/9-2546).]

**PROBLEMS REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES ARMY
FORCES IN EGYPT**

811.24583/1-1045

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

No. 464

CAIRO, January 10, 1945.

[Received March 1.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum, together with enclosures mentioned therein, entitled "Position of the United States Army [*Armed*] Forces in Egypt", which has been prepared by Counselor J. E. Jacobs for reference purposes as problems arise in the future concerning our Armed Forces here.

Mr. Jacobs has not attempted to go into hypothetical problems that might arise out of the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Egypt; he has merely attempted to set forth in a brief, concise manner the various activities of the Army in Egypt, which have been the subject of negotiations and discussions with the Egyptian authorities, citing in his memorandum the various notes exchanged with those authorities [and?] the despatches already submitted to the Department. In some instances communications with the Foreign Office have never been submitted to the Department. For this and other reasons, it is believed that it might be helpful for the Department to have this memorandum in its files.

Respectfully yours,

S. PINKNEY TUCK

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Counselor of Legation in Egypt (Jacobs)

CAIRO, January 10, 1945.

The establishment of the United States Army in Egypt under its present title, "United States Armed [*Army*] Forces in the Middle East" (USAFIME), was the result of the attack of Japan upon the United States in December 1941. At that time the United States had a small group of officers and technicians in Cairo who had arrived about six weeks previously to assist the British Army in the operation, maintenance and repair of airplanes, tanks and cars and other military equipment being delivered through Lend-Lease. As the Maxwell⁴ Mission came more or less under British auspices before the United States entered the war, no permission was sought of the Egyptian

⁴ Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, Chief of the United States Military North African Mission, who established headquarters at Cairo on November 22, 1941.

Government for the entry of the Mission into Egypt. Such permission was not actually necessary in as much as these officers were in a sense attached to the British Army, which enjoyed special rights under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 26, 1936,⁵ and already had various contingents in its forces—(Czech, Greek, etc.). In the light of later developments it would have been preferable to have obtained the prior approval of the Egyptian Government, which probably could have been easily obtained. However, no opportunity was given to consider the question, as the first information the Legation had of the arrival of the Mission was the Department's telegram no. 603 of October 25, 1941,⁶ which contained no instructions with regard to obtaining the approval of the Egyptian Government, and the members of the Mission actually arrived shortly afterwards.

After the entry of the United States into the war in December 1941, the complexion of General Maxwell's Mission was changed overnight and his mission began to expand its activities, not only as an advisory group to the British Army but for the purpose of setting up its own maintenance and repair shops and the handling by air of the enormous military traffic that followed. Events happened so rapidly, with the German Army menacing the borders of Egypt several times within the ensuing year,⁷ that no thought was given to the question of regularizing the position of the American forces with the Egyptian Government.

At the end of 1942, however, and at the beginning of 1943, due to the large increase in the personnel of the Army Command, various incidents involving soldiers began to focus attention on the necessity of having some arrangement with the Egyptian Government for regularizing the position of these armed forces in Egypt, particularly in connection with criminal jurisdiction. As a result several agreements were reached as follows:

1. In connection with the entry into Egypt of military matériel for the United States Army, it became necessary to work out some arrangement for the exemption of this matériel from the payment of Egyptian customs and excise duties. There were considerable correspondence and various interviews with the officials on this subject and finally, on April 23, 1942, the Foreign Office in its Note No. P.55.9/102 bis (7) informed the Legation that the Council of Ministers had decided to exempt American military matériel from the payment

⁵ Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed at London, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, p. 401.

⁶ *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. III, p. 314.

⁷ For documentation on the concern of the United States regarding the effect of axis military advance into Egypt, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. IV, pp. 71 ff., *passim*.

of Egyptian customs and excise duties.⁸ The aforementioned note will be found in the Legation's file no. 624.1 for 1942. After the general permission was granted there was a conference at Alexandria on April 25, 1942, at which the same privilege was granted to the Quartermaster's Department of the Army, the Post Exchange, the Pan American Airways, the Transcontinental Western Airways, and the Air Corps Ferrying Command. Correspondence regarding that meeting will be found in the Legation's file no. 624.1 for 1942. Subsequently the Pan American Airways and the Transcontinental Western Airways withdrew their operations from Egypt and the Air Ferrying Command became what is now known as the Air Transport Command (ATC). In order to obtain free entry for shipments of these military agencies the Army from time to time must provide facsimiles of signatures of the appropriate officers who sign on behalf of the agencies. These facsimiles are sent through the Legation to the Director General of the Egyptian Customs at Alexandria.

2. With regard to the question of criminal jurisdiction, an exchange of notes, dated March 2, 1943,⁹ was effected which conferred upon American Military Courts criminal jurisdiction over uniformed personnel of the United States Army and American civilians actually attached to the American Army. While there was some difficulty in getting the Egyptian authorities to grant this concession, these difficulties arose out of technical questions involved in the application and administration of this privilege. At no time did the Egyptian Government question the right of the United States armed forces to be in Egypt. The text of this exchange of notes and other pertinent information was reported to the Department in the Legation's despatch no. 897 of March 6, 1943.¹⁰

3. In order to facilitate the entry and departure of uniformed military personnel and civilians attached to the Army without compliance with Egyptian laws and regulations governing entry and exit visas, an arrangement was worked out with the Ministry of the Interior in

⁸ Of further concern to the United States was the levying of taxes by the Egyptian Government on electricity used by United States Army Forces and on real estate improvements made by military authorities on leased real property. In telegram 400, February 15, 1945, 5 p. m., the Department authorized Cairo "to request of the Egyptian Foreign Office that if an Act of Parliament is necessary to exempt United States military authorities from payment of real estate taxes all payment be held in abeyance until such time as this question, the question of electricity taxes, and any similar present or future taxes can be taken up in general discussions or when negotiations concerning United States military establishments and the lend-lease agreement are entered into." Cairo was further advised "it would not be desirable at the present time to attempt to have the Egyptian Parliament consider legislation exempting the United States Army from payment." (883.5122/2-1545) For documentation on the unperfected Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Egypt, signed at Washington on April 17, 1945, see pp. 88 ff.

⁹ Signed at Cairo, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 356, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1197; for documentation on this agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 73 ff.

¹⁰ Not printed.

March 1941 which permitted the American military authorities to issue certain special passes which have since come to be recognized in nearly every Middle East country as a travel document and which permits the above-mentioned Army personnel to move freely across Egyptian borders. A full report on this subject was made by Consul Albert W. Scott in despatch no. 1142 of July 3, 1943.¹⁰ That despatch lists the various citations to notes and letters exchanged with the Egyptian authorities.

4. In August and September of 1942 the American authorities raised the question of asking the Egyptian authorities to accord to the Army similar privileges accorded to the British Army with respect to the maintenance in Egypt of an Army Post Office. Discussions and exchanges of notes took place, extending over a number of months, and the Post Office was actually in operation before the Egyptian authorities finally agreed. The agreement was contained in Foreign Office Note no. P. 1.-55.9/102 (12), dated June 19, 1943, which provided for the payment by the Army of \$50 per month to the Egyptian Post Office for this privilege.

5. Also, during the summer of 1943, the United States Army authorities raised the question of the installation of a radio station at its Heliopolis Service Commandant Camp for the purpose of sending messages to the United States, and of constructing a telephone line between Heliopolis and Headquarters in Cairo. The Heliopolis Service Commandant Camp was later removed to what is now known as Camp Huckstep, where the radio station has been established. Negotiations in regards to this matter also dragged on for some time and the installations were actually in operation before the agreement was reached. This agreement is contained in Foreign Office Note no. P.I. [1], (17), dated July 25, 1943.

6. In 1944 the Army also raised the question of installing at Camp Huckstep a small broadcasting station to reach American military personnel in Egypt and nearby areas. The Egyptian Government, in a note no. 55.9/137 (10), dated September 12, 1944, agreed to the establishment of this broadcasting station, which in fact had already been and still is in operation, but there was attached as a condition precedent to this permission that the American Army sell the station to the Egyptian Government when it is no longer needed. This phase of the question is still under discussion, as the Army is only prepared to agree to this condition on the further condition that the Army will only sell the radio equipment if, when the Army moves from Egypt, the equipment is no longer needed. The Army's position is that this equipment is portable and the Army may wish to remove it to other scenes of military operations at some later date. The Foreign Office has stated orally that the Egyptian Government will probably agree

¹⁰ Not printed.

to the Army's condition but in the interim the station is functioning without difficulty.*

Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing agreements, the Egyptian Government can be said to have recognized the presence and the position of United States armed forces in Egypt.

J. E. JACOBS

**REPRESENTATIONS BY EGYPT REGARDING THE COTTON EXPORT
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES¹¹**

883.24/12-3044

The Egyptian Minister (Hassan) to the Secretary of State

The Egyptian Minister presents his compliments to the honourable the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that the Egyptian Government, after having carefully studied the Surplus Property Act of October 3, 1944¹² which provides that surplus farm commodities shall not be sold in the United States at prices less than those applicable with respect to sales of such commodities by the Commodity Credit Corporation and authorizes the latter to dispose of any farm products for export without regard to price restrictions, has instructed the Minister to manifest to the American Government Egypt's apprehension over the ruinous repercussions to the Egyptian cotton prices as a result of exports of United States cotton at prices below those in the United States.

Egypt depends almost exclusively on her cotton and its price is now considerably lower than the corresponding grades in the United States. Sales of United States cotton at lower prices to meet the competitive prices of cotton outside the United States would be tantamount to a subsidy. Such artificial means was provided in 1939 when subsidies were established. As that was so harmful to all other cotton producing countries these subsidies were reduced and finally stopped. Such methods as subsidies and other artificial measures, prevalent before this war, were hindrances to world trade and have now been disclaimed by the spokesmen of the United Nations in all the Conferences which lately took place under the sponsorship of the United States Government.

The avowed policy of the United Nations championed by the United States Government is free trade. The provision of subsidies runs counter to this principle. It is contradictory to the liberal principles

*Since the above was written, the Egyptian Government has granted permission for the radio station without condition. See Foreign Office Note #2 of February 5, 1945. [Footnote in the original.]

¹¹ For previous documentation on discussions with the Egyptian Government regarding cotton, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 705 ff., *ibid.*, 1939, vol. IV, pp. 486 ff., and *ibid.*, 1942, vol. IV, pp. 95 ff.

¹² 58 Stat. 765.

on which the Atlantic Charter¹³ is based and is not of a nature to assure success of the work of International Conferences and the discussions undertaken by the United States Economic Missions¹⁴ to increase trade between the different nations.

The Egyptian Government is therefore confident that the United States Government in the application of the Surplus Property Act will not deviate from the lofty liberal economic principles which the State Department has championed and the United Nations have bound themselves to follow.

The Egyptian Minister avails [etc.]

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1944.

883.24/12-3044

The Acting Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan)

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Egypt and has the honor to refer again¹⁵ to the Minister's communication of December 30, 1944 in which he refers to the Surplus Property Act of October 3, 1944 and expresses the apprehension of his Government with respect to possible repercussions on Egyptian cotton prices as a result of exports of United States cotton at prices below those in the United States.

The cotton-export program of the United States is a corollary of the present domestic program of assistance to American cotton growers. The occasion for the export program arises from the fact that the United States maintains, through crop loans and other price supporting measures, domestic prices for cotton substantially higher than those prevailing in other producing countries. With a domestic cotton price above the general world level few, if any, exports could take place in the absence of an export program. This export program is intended only to permit United States cotton to maintain a reasonable share of the world cotton market.

It will be recalled that the War Food Administration in an announcement of November 11, 1944 (a copy of this announcement and a copy of a release of the War Food Administration on "Terms and Conditions of Cotton Sales for Export Program" are enclosed¹⁶) stated that it was not the intention of the Government of the United States to enter into a competitive price war. It is believed that the

¹³ Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

¹⁴ Apparently a reference to the Special Economic Mission to the Middle East; for documentation regarding this subject, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. V, pp. 38 ff.

¹⁵ There had been a note of acknowledgment dated January 13, 1945, not printed.

¹⁶ Neither found attached to file copy.

actual operation of the cotton program substantiates this statement, and it is expected that actual operations in the future will continue to bear it out.

The Government of the United States considers it highly desirable that the problems involved in the present cotton situation be dealt with on the basis of international cooperation. In this connection Mr. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, made the following statement on December 5 before a Special Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture meeting to consider and recommend future programs and policy with regard to cotton :

“Burdensome commodity surpluses should be dealt with on a basis of international cooperation in such a way as to avoid the development of unfair trade practices and unhealthy international rivalry. If provision is made for the orderly liquidation of world surplus stocks no one country will dispose of its surplus in a fashion detrimental to the interests of other countries who are also burdened with large accumulations. Furthermore the fear of disorderly world markets will be removed and trade will be carried on in an atmosphere of mutual respect for the rights of other exporting countries. In such an atmosphere there will be hope for the expanded world trade which is so necessary for the attainment of high levels of employment and income.”¹⁷

The forthcoming meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee is primarily for the purpose of drawing up a recommendation to governments in regard to possible international collaboration in respect of cotton.

For the further information of the Minister of Egypt there are enclosed copies of recent statements by The Honorable Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture,¹⁸ and Mr. Acheson before the Special Subcommittee referred to above, which discuss the cotton problems, domestic and international, facing the United States.

The Department of State welcomes the sympathetic interest of the Government of Egypt in the liberal economic principles which the United States Government advocates, and wishes to assure the Government of Egypt that everything possible will be done to reach agreement with the other countries of the world on long-term policy for the elimination of burdensome agricultural surpluses and trade restrictions.

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1945.

¹⁷ For full text of statement, see *Cotton: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Agriculture, 78th Cong., 2d sess.* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 211 or Department of State *Bulletin*, December 10, 1944, p. 700.

¹⁸ See *Cotton*, p. 94.

GREECE

DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE, WITH OTHER YALTA POWERS AND FRANCE, IN THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN GREECE; ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED MISSION¹

868.00/1-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 3, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received January 4—8:30 a. m.]

9. See my No. 6 of January 2, 2 p. m.² General Plastiras³ has undertaken to form a government⁴ and if he is successful it seems likely that some clarification of obscure questions here will not delay to follow. With the King⁵ removed from immediate picture and with the Archbishop⁶ and Plastiras at the head of affairs some practical proof will have been supplied in addition to Churchill's⁷ repeated verbal assurances that no danger of a forced return of royalty and possible reestablishment of a Fascist dictatorship menaces the Greek people and it will then remain to be seen whether Republican Greece will (1) be satisfied that a continuance of hostilities can be of advantage only to the Communists and (2) can express such satisfaction, this last depending on how far the Communist leadership

¹ For previous documentation regarding the political situation in Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 84 ff. For the meeting at Yalta between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) Stalin, held February 4-February 11, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945.

² Not printed.

³ Gen. Nicholas Plastiras, republican general, who in 1922 (then a colonel) led the Army revolt which led to the abdication of King Constantine and ultimately, in 1924, to the abolition of the monarchy; in 1935 General Plastiras left Greece following the restoration of George II. For documentation regarding these events, see *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 409 ff., *ibid.*, 1924, vol. II, pp. 262 ff., and *ibid.*, 1935, vol. II, pp. 500 ff. General Plastiras returned to Greece in December 1944 at the end of the German occupation.

⁴ The Plastiras government was formed and took office January 3, 1945; John Sofianopoulos became Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ George II, King of the Hellenes.

⁶ Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens and Primate of Greece who became Regent of Greece on December 31, 1944; for documentation regarding the formation of the Regency, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 146-179.

⁷ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

of the revolt has been able to make a genuine Red Army out of ELAS.⁸ Archbishop's plan is so to administer the cleared territory and such islands as have remained loyal to the government that Republican Greeks hitherto fighting on the insurgent side for Greek liberty and independence will gradually gravitate to the government leaving only the relatively few Communists supposed to exist in Greece to get here with such irresponsible banditti as have been inevitably produced by the times to carry on the struggle for the breakdown of the country's social and economic life. In this plan British Ambassador⁹ tells me that the Archbishop will have full support of the British as it seems the only alternative to an undertaking on the latter's part to clear the entire country after the fashion now being employed in Athens. Considerable speculation would appear to be involved but Department will realize that there is room for little else in Greek politics at present.

MACVEAGH

868.00/1-645

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1945.

THE SITUATION IN GREECE

1. *The Problem:*

The most immediate aims are the termination of hostilities and the formation of a government sufficiently representative of all factions to ensure stability for the distribution of relief supplies. Long-term aims include the holding, under fair and free conditions, of a plebiscite and elections on the return of the King and the future government.

2. *Basic Factors:*

The present crisis appears to have arisen from the profound distrust among various Greek factions. The resistance groups suspected that the Papandreou Government,¹⁰ with British backing, desired to restore the King and a conservative regime. Such distrust came to a head over the disarming of the resistance forces without similar

⁸ *Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos* (National People's Liberation Army), the guerrilla arm of EAM (*Ethnikon Apelftherotikon Metopon*, National Liberation Front); EAM, one of several Greek resistance groups, was controlled by the KKE (*Kommunistikon Komma Ellados*, Communist Party of Greece).

⁹ Reginald W. A. Leeper.

¹⁰ George Papandreou, President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) of Greece, April 26, 1944 to December 31, 1944.

treatment for the Government forces, which had been purged of EAM sympathizers in Egypt last spring.¹¹ Civil strife was precipitated after the resignation of six Leftist ministers and the British decision to support Papandreou and to attempt to control the Athens-Piraeus area until ELAS could be neutralized and free elections held. Notwithstanding the creation of a Regency under Damaskinos and the announcement on January 4 of the formation of the Plastiras Government, a truce has not yet been achieved.

3. *Action Taken to Date:*

This Government has made increasingly clear, particularly by statements of the Secretary on December 5 and 7,¹² its policy that the form of government to be established in Greece after liberation should be one chosen freely by the Greek people themselves, democratically representing the wishes of the majority of the nation. On December 13 a telegram from the President to Mr. Churchill¹³ recommended that the King consent to a Regency, that elections be fixed for a specific date no matter how far in the future, and that all armed groups in Greece be disarmed under a new coalition government, order meanwhile being maintained by British troops. Later, on December 28, a message embodying the same suggestions was despatched to King George II,¹⁴ and a statement approving the King's subsequent action was made to the press by the Secretary on January 1.¹⁵

4. *Possible Future Action:*

The United States Government may be requested by the Greek Government, with British backing, to participate in an Anglo-American-Russian commission to supervise a free and secret plebiscite in Greece on the question of the regime (monarchy or republic) and subsequent elections for a constituent assembly. The Staff Commit-

¹¹ This refers to the mutinies which occurred in April 1944, in Greek Middle East Army in Egypt and units of the Greek Navy in Alexandria harbor. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in this crisis and its dénouement, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v., pp. 90-104, *passim*.

¹² See *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, p. 149, footnote 48a.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁵ In lieu of a press and radio news conference on January 1, two questions were submitted to the Secretary of State, one of which dealt with the political situation in Greece:

"Q. What is the attitude of the United States toward the newly-created Regency in Greece?"

"A. This is an important step that would appear to pave the way for a solution of the present difficult situation in Greece and as such, it is welcomed by this Government." (*Verbatim Reports Press Conferences, 1945*, No. 1, January 1).

tee on December 26 advised the Secretary that the United States, if requested, should be prepared to consider sympathetically sharing responsibility in the administration of an impartial plebiscite.¹⁶ This course was also advocated in a memorandum prepared for the Secretary, January 1, 1945,¹⁷ in which it was further suggested that such a commission might be a military commission headed by a special representative other than its Ambassador to Greece. The commission should be provided with sufficient military civil affairs personnel to enable our Commissioner to keep fully informed. The memorandum expressed the view that such personnel would be needed in Greece probably not longer than six weeks and could presumably be obtained from Italy or Germany.

The memorandum to the Secretary also stated that should the EAM-ELAS oppose by arms the efforts of the Archbishop-Regent to find a reasonable political solution in Greece, it would then be clear that the extreme left minority was seeking to gain power by force. In such an event the memorandum suggested that this Government should make clear its support of the Archbishop-Regent and the duly constituted authorities.

WALLACE MURRAY

868.00/1-945 : Telegram

*The Greek Prime Minister (Plastiras) to President Roosevelt*¹⁸

[ATHENS, undated.]

In assuming the heavy task which my Government has undertaken I wish to express to you, Mr. President, and to the Government and people of the United States of America the profound gratitude of the Greek Government and people for the friendship and solicitude always displayed by your great country towards our sorely tried nation. In the defense of the liberties so recently restored to this ancient cradle of democracy and so dear to them the Greek people place their faith in the noble principles of the great American democracy and hope that in her effort to reconstruct the ruins accumulated by the long enemy occupation of the country Greece will be able to rely on the full and so precious support of Your Excellency and the United States.

NICOLAS PLASTIRAS

¹⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 165, footnote 61a.

¹⁷ Not found in Department files.

¹⁸ Copy forwarded to the Secretary of State by President Roosevelt on January 9, 1945. On January 10 the Secretary forwarded to the President a copy of a telegram of January 8 which he had received from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sofianopoulos), together with his reply (neither printed).

868.00/1-1045: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*¹⁹

[Extract]

LONDON, January 10, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received January 10—5:29 p. m.]

357. Personal to the Secretary. Today Eden told me that he hoped that the situation in Greece would be cleared within the next 48 hours.²⁰

WINANT

868.00/1-1145: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,^{20a} *to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, January 11, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 11:48 p. m.]

111. Macmillan²¹ who returned yesterday from Athens was in a very confident mood. He recounted in some detail recent events in Greece and stated that situation had improved considerably. Scobie²² had cleaned up the Athens Piraeus area and ELAS forces were withdrawing very rapidly from the whole of Attica. He said that situation in Patras was still tense but that there had been some improvement. He added that British had made it clear to ELAS that they were ready to fight in Patras and this had had a very salutary effect on local ELAS leaders. The British Resident Minister went on to say that British policy would be to clean up the whole of Attica and Peloponnesus and then establish the authority of Plastiras Government firmly in "old Greece". He said that Damaskinos had taken hold of situation very well and that General Plastiras was cooperating fully with the British. It was felt now that things would work

¹⁹ A copy of this telegram was forwarded to President Roosevelt by the Acting Secretary of State on January 11. In telegram 218 to Ambassador Winant, January 11, 1945, 2 p. m., the Secretary of State said, "Please tell Eden for me that I much appreciate his encouraging word about the situation in Greece." (868.00/1-1045)

²⁰ In his telegram 155, January 5, 1945, 6 p. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom had reported: "We were told at the Foreign Office today that according to the most recent reports received from the British Embassy at Athens the military position of British forces in Greece is steadily becoming more favorable." (868.00/1-545)

^{20a} Mr. Kirk was also Ambassador in Italy.

²¹ Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident, Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater (at Caserta).

²² Lt. Gen. Ronald M. Scobie, British General Officer Commanding in Greece.

out satisfactorily. He presumably had complete confidence in Plastiras and said that Plastiras was just as determined as Churchill not to permit the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) to gain control of the country. The real moving force in the government, however, would be Sophianopolous, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Macmillan stated further that British would be obliged to retain considerable forces in Greece for an indefinite period in order to give the government a chance to build itself up and to organize the Greek national army. Only when this was done could British begin to give consideration to reduction of their strength in Greece.

He went on to say that he was considerably relieved that there had been an improvement in the Greek situation as Churchill would be in a better position when he met Stalin at the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three.²³ Macmillan concluded his remarks with statement that Field Marshal Alexander²⁴ had just received word from Scobie that ELAS had requested Scobie to receive representatives in order to negotiate a new truce.

KIRK

868.00/1-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 13, 1945.

[Received January 13—10:50 a. m.]

451. Following is text of a statement issued from 10 Downing Street last night, as carried by the press this morning, concerning the truce Greece:²⁵

“The terms signed by the British and ELAS representatives for a truce are endorsed by H M Government. The taking and holding of hostages is however a barbarous custom condemned by international law. H M Government must make it clear therefore that no truce can be enduring or ripen into peace unless or until the hostages taken by ELAS have been effectively safeguarded and released.”

WINANT

²³ This is a reference to the forthcoming meeting at Yalta.

²⁴ Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

²⁵ In telegram 46, January 12, 1945, the Ambassador in Greece had reported, in part: “Renewed negotiations between General Scobie and ELAS representatives resulted in the issuance late last night of communiqué by British headquarters stating that ‘in order that discussions may take place between the Greek Government and representatives of ELAS/EAM for settlement of outstanding questions . . . hostilities will cease at 1 AM on January 15, 1945.’” (868.00/1-1245)

868.00/1-1545 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, January 15, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received January 16—8:50 a. m.]

161. Macmillan stated last evening that he and Field Marshal Alexander would proceed to Athens on January 16 in order to bring about a final solution of Greek problem. He said that on arrival in Greek capital he [and SAC? ²⁷] would draft a joint telegram to Churchill giving present military and political situation and then make recommendations for a final settlement. He stated that he would counsel Damaskinos and Plastiras to remain firm vis-à-vis ELAS and to make no concessions to them. He added that ELAS morale is getting low and considerable desertions from their forces are taking place. He stated that British Military Intelligence is reliably informed that ELAS leaders are inclined to believe that struggle is futile but that certain Communist elements are in favor of continuing fighting. He said that while he would do everything he could in order to persuade ELAS leaders to revise their decision on hostages the most important thing to be done in Greece was to persuade ELAS to lay down their arms. He was not quite certain as to how this could be done but he intended to advise Damaskinos to offer full amnesty to everyone who agreed to lay down his arms. He said that when and if each ELAS turned in his rifle he should be given a certificate signed by Damaskinos with a cross on top and an inverted miter on the bottom showing that holder of such certificate would not be prosecuted for any role he may have played in recent Greek trouble.

British Resident Minister went on to say that now that ELAS were on the run he was confident they would be only too glad to reach settlement with British. He asserted Churchill had given him full powers to deal with situation and that while he had no illusions he was prepared to tackle it and thought there was more than a fair chance of success.

KIRK

868.00/1-1545 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1945.

43. Please transmit the following message:

“His Excellency Nicolas Plastiras, Prime Minister of Greece. Thank you for your friendly message.²⁸ I speak for the American

²⁷ Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Alexander).

²⁸ *Ante*, p. 101.

people as well as for myself when I say that the recent tragic bloodshed in Greece has been a cause of profound sorrow. In assuming the leadership of the Greek Government at this critical time you are faced with problems the solution of which is of great importance to the future of your country and the successful conclusion of the Allied struggle against a common enemy. I have been reassured by your recent statements that the cessation of hostilities will not be followed by reprisals but will be the prelude to early decisions, by means of free democratic processes, on the vexed questions which led to civil strife. This Government, in collaboration with our Allies, stands ready to assist wherever practicable in the rehabilitation of your long suffering nation. I wish you all success in the patriotic duties you have undertaken. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

GREW

868.00/1-1645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1945.

48. ReDeptel 43, January 15. Plastiras telegram to President and latter's reply released to press on January 16. Please inform Greek Government.

GREW

868.00/1-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 18, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received January 19—9:30 a. m.]

67. See my 21 of January 6.²⁹ I had a conversation yesterday evening with General Plastiras. He said that since armistice no approach has been made to Government by insurgent leaders and that Government's attitude remains as heretofore, namely, that insurgents must lay down their arms as first condition of any further parleys. If they will not do so he said Government will continue to pursue them until all Greece is liberated from what he described as an "international menace" not confined to Greece alone but threatening all countries and he added it should be to the interests of the United States as well as other powers to help avert this menace here in Greece where it is "first showing itself." He repeatedly emphasized that movement here is not Greek in character though it has up to now received allegiance from many enthusiastic young Greeks misled by false propaganda

²⁹ Not printed.

and spoke bitterly of the hostages (see my 188 December 26³⁰) who are apparently causing him his chief anxiety at this time. He said that he considers the present revolt "nine-tenths finished", that serious military resistance by ELAS cannot last longer than "a week or ten days" more in view of the many defections now taking place in their ranks and the control now established by the Government over the main centers of population and that if the Communists keep on fighting as they may he has sufficient Greek forces now under his command to deal with their small numbers whether or not the British retire. He stated that he has no knowledge of the intentions of the British in this connection though obviously it would be easier for him should they continue to lend their assistance here but the foreign aid which he most desires has to do with equipment particularly mechanized equipment for his army. Regarding the size of the latter he said 50,000 or 60,000 men would be enough for Greece's local security but spoke also of raising as many as 300,000 with the idea that these might be helpful to the Allies in active theatres such as the Far East.

The General showed himself very anxious over foreign reactions to his Government and perplexed as to how to proceed to make it better understood abroad that his purposes are purely democratic and not dictatorial. He said he thought that if the foreign correspondents would advise their papers of the facts as they are this would do the most good and talked at length of his intentions to give Greece the regime it wants by the method of popular elections. Specifically as regards America in this matter, he said it was the duty of "his Embassy" there to make clear the policy of his Government but that he had not yet had time to form an estimate of that Embassy's ability. British Ambassador has told me that General Plastiras ever since taking up position as Premier has shown a desire to bring his old friend and collaborator General Gonatas³¹ into the Government against British advice which has pointed out the extreme dislike and distrust which Gonatas has incurred among Liberal as well as Leftist elements through his support of the security battalions under the German occupation. The press this morning announces "probable" appointment of Gonatas as Governor General of Macedonia and if this appointment takes place it may be regarded as showing not only that the Prime Minister is determined to run his own show here but also that he is prepared to take considerable risks with public opinion.

MACVEAGH

³⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 169.

³¹ Gen. Stylianos Gonatas; General Gonatas had participated with General Plastiras in anti-royalist revolts in 1922 and 1935.

868.00/1-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 19, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received January 20—8:30 p. m.]

70. Reliable reports indicate that the insurgents have evacuated both Salonika and Patras without serious incident and are withdrawing to the lines laid down in the armistice terms (see my 46, January 12³²) while defections from their ranks are occurring in many parts of Greece (see my 67, January 18, 5 p. m., section 1). According to . . . observers opposition to Plastiras and the British remains strongest in eastern Macedonia and Thrace. An . . . observer also says that the ELAS central committee has met at Trikkala in Thessaly and passed a proclamation declaring that all hostages will be released but there is so far no confirmation of this here. Efforts in this connection on the part of the IRC³³ and UNRRA³⁴ to secure such release have so far had only minimum results. According to escapees reaching Athens the sufferings of the Greek hostages of whom the number is variously placed at between ten and twenty thousand have been extreme both from exposure and maltreatment. There are also witnesses to many "executions" having taken place among them while prisoners as well as hostages of British nationality have likewise received atrocious handling on the basis of propaganda charging similar action by British forces. The picture of this situation as painted by Mr. Churchill in his speech to the Commons yesterday³⁵ does not appear to be exaggerated.

MACVEAGH

868.00/1-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 20, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received January 21—4:20 p. m.]

73. See my 70, January 19, 11 a. m. According to General Plastiras with whom I have just talked word has been received from

³² See footnote 25, p. 103.

³³ International Red Cross.

³⁴ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; for documentation regarding UNRRA activities in Greece, see pp. 193 ff., *passim*.

³⁵ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 407, cols. 399-415. For White Paper issued by the British Government on the subject at this time, see British Cmd. 6592, Greece No. 1 (1945): *Documents regarding the Situation in Greece, January 1945*.

Insurgent Hqs. that the hostages will be released and the IRC, ML³⁶ and UNRRA are sending trucks immediately to bring them in. Their total number gathered in such places in north central Greece as Lamia and Lavadia is said to total 12,000 and it is estimated that 1,000 per day can be brought back by transport now available.

This development should facilitate considerably the coming peace talks which the Prime Minister confirmed to me are tentatively set to start January 25.³⁷ He added that the great question now remaining to be settled is the laying down of arms by the ELAS and in this connection he again expressed the belief that the insurgent movement is collapsing (see my 67, January 18, 5 p. m., (section 1). He regards Mr. Churchill's recent speech in the Commons as a great contribution to the decision to give up the hostages and also spoke enthusiastically of President Roosevelt's message to him not only in general but in this connection as well. It is his perhaps optimistic belief that all Greece will be speedily pacified once ELAS agrees to lay down its arms since the people, he said, are tired of fighting and want peace above all things. However, for the resumption of anything like normal conditions here he emphasized that Greece needs immediate financial as well as material assistance.³⁸ He said no more about raising an army of 300,000 to fight by the side of the Allies in the Far East (see my 67 above referred to) possibly because as he told me Field Marshal Alexander has explained to him within the last few days that the sending of sufficient Allied equipment even for the moderate army necessary for Greece's home security must necessarily take some time. Doubtless also his talk about helping the Allies militarily has been due to a feeling on his part that he might make a favorable effect and his remark that what the Greeks want most is peace represents his real view of the situation.

Repeated to Caserta as 13.

MACVEAGH

³⁶ Military Liaison (Greece); this was the Anglo-American military establishment charged with functions regarding civil administration, jurisdiction, and relief arising out of military operations in Greek territory, in association with the Greek Government. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the establishment of Military Liaison (Greece) in 1944, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, pp. 183-210, *passim*; adherence by the United States to this military program was carefully limited by this Government to include participation for relief and rehabilitation purposes only.

³⁷ The meetings between representatives of the Greek Government and EAM began on February 3 and were to last until February 12. The conferences were held at a villa outside Athens near the village of Varkiza.

³⁸ For documentation regarding this subject, see pp. 193 ff.

868.00/2-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, February 12, 1945.

[Received February 12—10:45 a. m.]

166. See my 150 of February 7.³⁹ A Government communiqué published in this morning's papers announces that after a session which lasted all night agreement was reached between the Government and EAM at 4:30 this morning. Messrs. Macmillan and Leeper were present. The members of the respective deputations and the Secretary of the Conference signed a protocol in which they "declare that they have reached complete agreement on all the matters discussed during the Conference, and that a detailed text of the agreement is to be signed today at 1400 hours".⁴⁰

MACVEAGH

868.00/3-645

*Agreement Between the Greek Government and EAM*⁴¹

[Translation]

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, Messrs. John Sofianopoulos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pericles Rallis, Minister of the Interior, and John Macropoulos, Minister of Agriculture, acting as the authorized delegation of the Hellenic Government, on the one part, and Messrs. George Siantos, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party, Demetrios Partsalides, Secretary of the Central Committee of EAM, and Elias Tsirimokos, Secretary General of the Union of Popular Republicans (ELD), acting as the duly authorized delegation of the Central Committee of EAM, on the other part, have met in conference at Varkiza and having examined in common the means by which the civil war may cease and the Greek people be reconciliated, have concluded the following agreement.

The Government Delegation expressed during this conference, the firm desire of the Government to put an end to the unfortunate inter-

³⁹ Not printed.

⁴⁰ For English translation, see *infra*.

⁴¹ Greek text was given to the Embassy by the Greek Foreign Office on February 12, and English translation was sent to the Department as enclosure to despatch 635, March 6, 1945, not printed. While the agreement was officially signed at Athens, the terms of the agreement were reached at Varkiza and it is known as the Varkiza Agreement.

nal crisis without further bloodshed, establish the unity of the State and restore internal peace and normal political life in the country. Thus only would the Greek people be able to undertake the creative effort for the rehabilitation of the country from the ruins heaped from the hard struggle with the enemy from abroad and the civil war.

In order that the agreement reached may be an indestructible moral accord, expressing the demands of the political conscience of the Greek people, the Government Delegation wished thereby to proclaim the firm desire of the Greek people for the development of a free and normal political life, of which the main characteristic would be to respect the political conscience of the citizens, peaceful enlightenment and the spreading of political ideas, and to respect the liberties proclaimed by the Atlantic Charter ⁴² and the decisions taken at Teheran ⁴³ which were accepted in the conscience of the free people striving for those liberties.

During the conference complete agreement was reached by the EAM Delegation on these principles.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ROYAL HELLENIC GOVERNMENT AND EAM

ARTICLE I—*Liberties*

The Government will secure in accordance with the Constitution and the democratic principles everywhere recognised, the free expression of the political and social opinions of the citizens, repealing any existing illiberal law. It will also secure the unhindered functioning of individual liberties such as those of assembly, association and expression of views in the press. More especially, the Government will fully restore Trade Union liberties.

ARTICLE II—*Raising of Martial Law*

Martial law will be raised immediately after the signature of the present agreement. Simultaneously with this action there will be brought into force a Constitutional Act similar in all respects to Constitutional Act No. 24, whereby the suspension of those articles of the Constitution to which reference is made in Act 24 shall be permitted.

Articles 5, 10, 12, 20 and 95 of the Constitution shall be suspended forthwith throughout the country. This suspension shall continue until the completion of disarmament, and the establishment of administrative, judicial and military authorities throughout the country. As regards Article 5 in particular, this suspension shall not take effect

⁴² Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 367.

⁴³ Conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin, at Tehran, November 27–December 1, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 1943.

in the cities of Athens and Piraeus and their suburbs. Especially, however, as regards persons arrested up to the present day it is agreed that Article 5 of the Constitution is not in force, and that they will be liberated within the shortest possible period of time, the necessary orders to this effect being given to the competent authorities.

Followers of EAM who may be held in captivity by other organisations shall be set free as soon as possible.

ARTICLE III—*Amnesty*

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December, 1944, and the publication of the Law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded common law crimes against life and property which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crime concerned. The necessary Law will be published immediately after the signature of the present agreement. From this amnesty will be excluded any persons who, being under obligation to surrender their arms as being members of the organisations of ELAS, the National Civil Guard or ELAN, shall not have handed them over by the 15th March, 1945. This last provision concerning exclusion from the amnesty shall be annulled after verification of the fact that the disarmament of ELAS has been effected, since there will then be no further cause and justification for it. Guarantees and details of the amnesty to be provided are contained in the draft law attached to the present agreement.⁴⁴

ARTICLE IV—*Hostages*

All civilians who have been arrested by ELAS or by the National Civil Guard (E.P.), irrespective of the date on which they were arrested, shall be set at liberty immediately. Any who may be held on the charge of collaboration with the enemy or of commission of any crime shall be handed over to the justice of the State for trial by the competent Courts according to law. (See draft law of amnesty attached).

ARTICLE V—*National Army*

The National Army, apart from the professional officers and N.C.O.'s, shall consist of the soldiers of the classes which shall from time to time be called up. Reserve officers, N.C.O.'s and other ranks, who have been specially trained in modern weapons shall remain in service so long as there is a formation requiring them. The Sacred Squadron shall remain as at present, since it is under the immediate orders of the Allied High Command, and shall thereafter be merged in the united National Army in accordance with the above principle. The effort will be made to extend regular conscription to the whole

⁴⁴ Not printed.

of Greece in accordance with the technical facilities existing and the necessities which may arise. After the demobilisation of ELAS those men who belong to classes which are to be called up in accordance with the attached protocol shall report for enrolment in the units already existing. All men who have been enrolled in the units now existing, without belonging to the classes being called up, shall be discharged. All members of the permanent cadres of the National Army shall be considered by the Councils for which provision is made in Constitutional Act No. VII. The political and social views of citizens serving in the Army shall be respected.

ARTICLE VI—*Demobilisation*

Immediately on the publication of the present agreement the armed forces of resistance shall be demobilised and in particular the ELAS, both Regular and Reserve, the ELAN and the National Civil Guard. The demobilisation and surrender of arms shall take place according to the detailed provisions of the protocol drawn up by the Committee of Experts, which, duly initialled, is attached hereto.

The State will settle all questions arising out of requisitioning carried out by ELAS. The goods requisitioned by ELAS, including beasts, motor vehicles etc., which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached hereto, will be regarded thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

ARTICLE VII—*Purge of Civil Service*

The Government will proceed, by means of Committees or Councils to be established by a special Law, to the purging of the personnel of the public services, officials of public companies, local Government officials, and those of other services dependent on the State or paid by it. The criteria of which the purge will take account will be either professional competence, or character and personality, or collaboration with enemy or the utilisation of the official as an instrument of the dictatorship. Officials of the above services who, during the occupation, joined the forces of resistance will return to their positions and will be considered in the same manner as other officials. The above-mentioned Councils will also consider the cases of officials who have taken part or collaborated in the manifestations which have taken place between the 3rd December, 1944, and the date of signature of the present agreement. Those of them who are found to have been concerned may be placed at the disposal of the State as provided by Law. The final disposal of such officials will be decided by the Government which shall result from the elections to the Constituent As-

sembly. Officials who have already been placed *en disponibilité* by decisions of Ministers will be submitted to the decision of the Council above-mentioned. No official will be dismissed solely on account of his political opinion.

ARTICLE VIII—*Purge of Security Services*

The purge of the Security Services, the *Gendarmerie* and City Police will be carried out as soon as possible by special purge committees on the same basis as the purge of the Civil Service. All officers and other ranks of the above Corps who fall under the provisions of the Amnesty Law, who, during the period of the occupation, joined the ranks of ELAS, ELAN or the National Civil Guard, will return to their positions and will be considered by the purge Councils in the same manner as the rest of their colleagues. All the officers and other ranks of the above Corps who left their positions between the 3rd December, 1944, and the date of signature of the present document shall be placed *en disponibilité*, their final disposal being left for the decision of Councils to be constituted by the Government arising from the elections.

ARTICLE IX—*Plebiscite and elections*

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

Of this present agreement two similar copies have been made, whereof the one has been received by the Government Delegation and the other by the Delegation of EAM.

In ATHENS, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12th February, 1945.

The Delegation of the
Central Committee of EAM

G. SIANTOS
D. PARTSALIDES
E. TSIRIMOKOS

The Delegation of the
Hellenic Government

J. SOFIANOPOULOS
J. MACROPOULOS
P. RALLIS

The Secretary of the Conference
G. VARSAMIS

868.00/2-1345 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, February 13, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 7:25 p. m.]

525. Macmillan has telegraphed to the Foreign Office his reactions to the signing of the agreement in Athens yesterday. He stated that conclusion of this accord should be recorded as a victory for the forces of moderation. He recommended that the Foreign Office should use its influence with the press to play up this step as not a victory for either side in Greece or for the British but as a victory for Greece. The theme of the publicity on this matter, he stated, should be "Long Live Greece."

KIRK

868.00/2-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, February 14, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received February 15—1:35 p. m.]

180. See my No. 175 of February 13.^{44a} In a brief public statement following the signing of the peace agreement Plastiras said that he was sure that the agreement would bring a sense of relief to everyone because the civil war is over and the country will be united. This appears to have been the reaction of the greater part of the press and the public in Athens, which on the whole have welcomed the agreement, though somewhat tempering the warmth of their welcome by an attitude of "wait and see" with regard to the carrying out of its obligations by EAM. The extreme Rightist papers, however, continue bitterly to attack the Government for its policy of yielding and deplore the agreement as a victory for the Leftists. *Elefthere Eliada*, the official organ of EAM, which appeared on the streets yesterday for the first time since ELAS left Athens (and whose vendors are reported in several cases to have been mobbed and beaten), on the other hand, stated that EAM had made "every possible concession in order to reach an agreement".

While it is perhaps too early to judge, it may be observed that the hostility of the extreme Rightists on the one hand and, on the other, the feeling of the Leftists that it is they who have conceded all along the line, are perhaps indications that the two delegations may have found a workable solution.

The crux of the matter would appear to be, as Sofianopoulos pointed out in his opening statement to the Conference (see my No. 136 of

^{44a} Not printed.

February 3⁴⁵) the question of ELAS disarmament. Here, if anywhere, the sincerity of EAM's adherence to the agreement will be put to the test. It is worth noting therefore in this connection that the number of weapons which EAM has agreed to surrender is considerably in excess according to my information of what the British military had hoped for; and that the 14-day limit set for collection of those weapons will, in effect, oblige EAM to declare its intentions with regard to the whole agreement, before the end of February.

MACVEAGH

868.00/2-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, February 15, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received February 15—4: 30 p. m.]

182. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden arrived in Athens yesterday afternoon⁴⁶ and together with the Regent, the members of the Greek Government and the British diplomatic and military authorities, appeared before a large public gathering in Constitution Square. The Regent and Messrs. Churchill, Plastiras and Eden made brief addresses. Mr. Churchill expressed his pride in the role played by British troops in "saving this great and immortal city from violence and anarchy", emphasized Britain's determination to support Greece until she "reaches the heights of justice and peace", and concluded with an expression of his hope for Greece's future. The crowd received Mr. Churchill with enthusiasm, and no "incidents" appear to have taken place. Mr. Churchill left last night but according to the British Ambassador, Mr. Eden is remaining for conferences today.

MACVEAGH

868.00/2-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, February 16, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received February 17—8: 58 a. m.]

185. See my No. 182 of February 15, 6 p. m. It is stated in today's press that on the occasion of Churchill's brief visit here the other day Central Committee of EAM sent him greetings reaffirming the decision of the Greek people to fight alongside the Allies until the enemy is totally destroyed. The message is further quoted as saying "we shall do all we can to bring peace to our country and we are sure your

⁴⁵ Not printed.

⁴⁶ They were returning from the Crimea Conference at Yalta between President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin, and their advisers, February 4-11, 1945.

arrival here will greatly help to this end. Counting on Great Britain's aid we shall struggle for our country's immediate and complete restoration".

In contrast to the above . . . reports indicate that while Communist controlled EAM may now be expected to collaborate ostensibly with the Government under the peace terms the Communist Party is not only endeavoring to reform its cell system in Athens but has already "some sort of organization in operation" for "subversion of the Greek Armed Forces, the obstruction of Greek Government authority and preservation of the revolutionary machine in all its aspects political and military".

MACVEAGH

868.00/3-845 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 8, 1945—midnight.

[Received March 8—9 : 17 p. m.]

882. Macmillan stated on his return from Athens yesterday that Greek situation was going not so well. He said that Plastiras government and Damaskinos were veering more and more to the right and that he had had to "crack them on the head". He said that while neither Plastiras nor Damaskinos were particularly pleased with his intervention nevertheless he thought they would go along with the ideas of British Government. Macmillan added that EAM were not turning in their arms in the quantities that British had expected and the British intelligence had learned that a certain number of arms were being concealed. He felt that on the whole the situation would be worked out satisfactorily in due course and he did not feel particularly disturbed at this time.

KIRK

868.00/3-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Athens (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, March 10, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received March 12—8 : 20 p. m.]

256. Messrs. Siantos, Partsalides and Tsirimokos who signed the Varkiza Agreement for EAM called on me this morning after having previously visited the Regent and British Ambassador to protest alleged violations of agreement on part of Government and to ask me as representative of one of the powers participating in Yalta

Conference to support immediate formation here of a "representative government in the spirit of the Yalta Agreement".⁴⁷

After reviewing events leading up to revolution which he described as an attack on EAM when it was simply trying to resist "the Papandreou Government's *coup d'état*" Siantos said that EAM has more than fulfilled its basic obligation under the terms of the Varkiza Agreement namely the disarmament of ELAS. He then went on to say that while the Government undertook, under that agreement, to protect the civil rights of the people and the freedom of the press, and to form a truly national army, it has failed to do any of these things. It has used its armed forces and organized bands to institute a reign of terror, and while permitting the publication of Leftist newspapers, has deliberately interfered with their circulation. In connection with the national army he said that EAMites and EAM sympathizers among the mobilized classes are being rejected on one pretext or another, so that the new army is being built up as a strictly one party body, armed against EAM at the moment when EAM has been deprived of arms. He expressed it as his view that Greece is clearly moving toward a "dictatorial police state governed by collaboration[ist]s". He said that EAM sees no solution except the formation of a genuinely representative government and that this is what he and his colleagues have urged on the Regent and the British Ambassador.

I pointed out to the Leftist leaders that violence must be expected as the result of violence, and that care and restraint on both sides are now necessary if the country is to get back on its feet. I told them that American opinion will never support tyranny of any kind but that my Government is not creating governments in liberated countries, and that what it hopes is that the Greeks may get together to insure America's chief interest here namely the freedom and welfare of the Greek people.

It would appear from the above that the Leftists, who waited in vain for Russia to support them in their revolt, are now looking to "Yalta" to put them back where they started from. In regard to their charges against the Government I am informed that the Regent's reply to similar representations was to declare his firm determination to abide

⁴⁷ This refers to the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" which was embodied in the "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference" as Section II; for the text of the Yalta Protocol, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 975. The pertinent lines of Section II read: ". . . the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state . . . where in their judgment conditions require . . . to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and . . . to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. . . ."

by the terms of the Varkiza Agreement, and it would seem that real efforts are being made in this direction against great natural difficulties in the present state of public feeling. However, officials civil and military are human and retaliation for ELAS offenses is unquestionably widespread, as is also provocation on the part of ELAS, made possible by the liberal terms of the peace. Meanwhile, the complaints of the conquered make better "news" than the assurances of the victors and it is evident that the activity now being employed by the Leftist leaders in this connection has already had some effect on the Russian and Liberal press.

MACVEAGH

868.00/3-1245: Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 12, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received March 13—9:55 a. m.]

946. For the Acting Secretary. In reply to a message from SAC to Scobie requesting him to release certain troops in Greece for use elsewhere Scobie has informed Alexander that the reoccupation of Greece in stage 1 has proceeded far better than he had hoped and he has now collected the majority of the arms surrendered by ELAS in the stage 1 area. The authority of the Greek Government is not by any means yet reestablished but the Greek Government provincial civil officials are now reinstated. At least half the population remains uncooperative but the atmosphere is cold, and until it thaws completely, the machinery of the Greek Government will not be able to operate. At present the entire situation is extremely delicately balanced. Without another upheaval it will only be balanced British way if confidence in the British and confidence in the Greek Government and its ability to govern in reality in the provinces is retained. Any withdrawal of British troops would immediately be noticed and would seriously shake public confidence and thus set things back. This must be accepted as a fact and taken under advisement. A tremendous risk would be run and irreparable harm may well be done if this should happen before the national guard and provincial government are firmly in seat in area of stage 1 and British have reentered the areas of stage 2.

Scobie held a meeting with his divisional commanders in order that the degree of risk to be run at the beginning of stage 2 could be judged and for purpose of getting their personal opinions at the stability in their respective areas. They unanimously agreed that the situation would be stabilized only if the British troops, not counting

those who are needed for advancing into stage [2], should until April 15 remain undisturbed. If steady progress is made in present situation, Scobie stated, he felt justified in recommending to SAC on March 17 that on April 7 certain troops could start to withdraw. If the withdrawal were made earlier it would be such a blow to confidence that it might result in the area of stage which has forces remaining under Scobie's command, never being entered and therefore only mockery would result in the area in stage 1 controlled by the Greek Government.

Scobie stated he realized fully the urgent necessity for withdrawing certain troops which he would recommend as soon as possible but pointed out that if this attempted before April 7 British would be running a very grave risk. He strongly recommended that SAC not withdraw troops prematurely as it might result in a major commitment in Greece.

For security reasons we are not reporting numbers or identity of troops involved or for what purpose SAC wishes to withdraw forces from Greece.

KIRK

868.00/3-1445 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 14, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

2630. The Foreign Office official dealing directly with Greek affairs today told us the following:

It is common gossip in Athens that there may be a change of government. Although it had been believed by the British Foreign Office that Plastiras might be out within a few days it now seems more likely that he will last for 2 or 3 weeks.

It would be idle, he said, to pretend that the British Government could not force Plastiras out if it so wished, but the British do not desire to be placed in any such position, which would amount to direct interference in the Greek political regime—as, he remarked, the Russians have done in Rumania.⁴⁸ The most that the British could do would be to back up the Regent if and when he had another quarrel with Plastiras.

It is evident that Plastiras is not capable of running a conciliatory government. His temperament is not suited to such a course. However, his presence as the head of the government until recently was

⁴⁸ For documentation regarding the Soviet intervention in the Rumanian political situation, see vol. v, pp. 464 ff.

probably necessary because of his reputation throughout Greece as a man of character who would be in a position to keep order.

Leeper reports that the Greek people of the right and center are fearful that if Plastiras goes out the Communists will gain much more power, and this is the basis for the probable postponement for a brief period of any change in government.

The Foreign Office official said that the tragic side of this instability in Greece is that the essential, financial and economic measures for the restoration of the Greek economy will not be taken by a government which realizes its shaky position.⁴⁹ The British are none too confident that another financial crisis can be avoided.⁵⁰

WINANT

868.00/3-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, March 15, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received March 16—2:20 p. m.]

268. As a culmination to his latest visit here, Macmillan was offered a large luncheon today by the Prime Minister, to which American as well as British and Greek officials were invited. In his speech which, beginning lightly, assumed a notably serious tone, Macmillan promised British support to the Plastiras government "with the assistance of America in economic and other matters" (the latter being left unspecified), but cautioned that that Government should follow the middle of the road, swerving neither to the right nor [nor] to the left. He also expressed his admiration of the Varkiza Agreement, which he said he is "sure" the Government intends to implement to the full both in the letter and in the spirit, and praised a recent proclamation by General Plastiras urging the army to eschew politics.

Well informed press circles here opine that Plastiras' position has "become firmer" as a result of Macmillan's present visit, but it would also seem clear that the British, who have never believed him politically apt, intend watching him closely in the complex circumstances now developing (see my 261 of March 13, 9 a. m.⁵¹).

MACVEAGH

⁴⁹ For documentation regarding the financing situation in Greece, see pp. 193 ff.
⁵⁰ This is a reference to the severe inflation which had taken place at the end of the German occupation; for documentation regarding the economic problems facing the Greek Government on its return to Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 216 ff.

⁵¹ Not printed; the Ambassador, reporting that "the political situation continues to develop in the direction of complexity," described in some detail intra-party and inter-party differences dominating the Greek political scene at that moment. In summation, he observed: "Meanwhile, the EAM blandly reentering the political field after its recent military defeat, as if nothing had happened, is actively exploiting these dissensions among its opponents and charging that the Government is tending under the influence of Macmillan and Leeper to restore a dictatorship of the right. . . ." (868.00/3-1345)

868.00/3-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, March 15, 1945—8 p. m.
 [Received March 18—4:45 a. m.]

269. Continuing to make spectacular bids to influence foreign opinion the EAM yesterday forwarded to this Embassy a long memorandum addressed to the Governments of Great Britain, the USA, the USSR and the French Republic "through their Ambassadors in Athens" and signed on behalf of the Central Committee by Siantos, Partsalides and Tsirimokos. Much of this document is substantially a repetition of the protest which these same gentlemen made to me verbally when they called last week (see my 256 of March 10, 4 p. m.) but, like the much more vituperative appeal reported in my 102 of January 28, 4 p. m.,⁵² it ends with a request for an Inter-Allied Commission to settle Greek affairs.

Asserting that EAM alone has faithfully carried out its obligations under the Varkiza Agreement the memorandum accuses the Government of (1) persecuting and terrorizing the national resistance movement throughout the country, (2) rejecting ELASites for the national army while retaining traitors and keeping the mountain brigade intact, (3) purging the civil service and police of members of the National Resistance movement instead of collaborationists and Metaxists⁵³ and (4) permitting public expressions of hatred for the USSR which is dangerous not only for Greece but for the Allies. The memorandum continues saying that the present state of affairs justifies the December uprising and threatens to lead to new chaos; and that only a representative Government can save the situation. It concludes with the request "that there be established in conformity with the appropriate article of the Yalta Agreement an Inter-Allied Commission to study the situation in Greece and to make [take] those measures which will assure the Greek people the democratic liberties which are an essential and urgent preliminary to a genuine plebescite and elections".

According to this morning's papers the delegation yesterday called on Macmillan who is at present in Athens and gave him a copy of the memorandum. He is reported to have replied that the British Government has a moral obligation to see that the Varkiza Agreement is faithfully observed and that he would study the matter and see the delegation again before leaving. In this connection the Department may find interesting his remarks at today's luncheon offered him by the Prime Minister (see my 268 of March 15, 7 p. m.)

MACVEAGH

⁵² Telegram 102 not printed.⁵³ Name attached to the adherents of Gen. John Metaxas, Greek Prime Minister and Dictator, 1936-1941.

868.00/3-2245 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, March 22, 1945—midnight.

[Received March 23—7:34 a. m.]

1085. Macmillan informed us today that he was somewhat exasperated with Greek situation. He said that British were constantly obliged to step in to see to it that Greek Government kept their side of Varkiza Agreement. He stated that a wave of reaction was sweeping country and now that the Right felt the Government was firmly installed with British backing they were out for revenge. Macmillan added that Plastiras "would not do" and in about a month's time will have to resign. When asked who would replace Plastiras, he stated that he was not quite certain as yet but that he personally would support the candidacy of Varvaressos⁵⁴ who was by far the most able Greek he knew.

KIRK

868.01/4-845 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, April 8, 1945—midnight.

[Received April 8—8:56 p. m.]

1408. Re our 1085, March 22. Macmillan informed us this afternoon that he would leave for Athens tomorrow morning at Churchill's request in order to assist the British Ambassador there in "advising" the Regent on the formation of a new government.⁵⁵ He added that he would counsel Damaskinos to form a "gouvernement de service"; that is, a Ministry consisting of a small number of portfolios to be taken over by one army man, some business men and some trade union people. He said that he would endeavor to combine all the Ministries having to do with finance, commerce, trade, reconstruction, et cetera, into one Ministry under Varvaressos who would be the strong man of the new government. . . . Macmillan concluded his remarks on this subject with the statement that he felt confident he could put the aforementioned program through and insisted that Greece should have a "gouvernement de service" until elections could be held.⁵⁶

KIRK

⁵⁴ Kyriakos Varvaressos, wartime Governor of the Bank of Greece at London.

⁵⁵ The Plastiras government resigned on April 7.

⁵⁶ The Ambassador in Greece reported in his telegram 362, April 9, 1945, that a new cabinet under Adm. Petros Voulgaris had been sworn into office April 8 (868.002/4-945). Admiral Voulgaris had been Commander in Chief of the Greek Navy from the time of the Greek naval mutiny at Alexandria, Egypt, in April 1944.

868.00/4-1145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 11, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received April 11—5:55 p. m.]

375. The newspapers here published yesterday a report from Washington to the effect that the Secretary had made a statement as follows: "I know that the Regent did not consult the Ambassador of the United States concerning the change in the Greek Government. According to the information I have, the Archbishop consulted the British Ambassador." No official confirmation of this report is at hand but it has created a furore in Athens being privately interpreted on all sides to mean that, had I been consulted, I would have advised the Regent against the change. Publicly the Liberal organ, *Athenaikanea*, said yesterday, "The statement is a sufficient expression, we think, of American displeasure at events which have taken place in Greece", and the EAM paper, *Elefthere Ellada* says "The American Foreign Minister in language not so usual in diplomacy stated his disapproval of the change in the government." In addition today's Communist *Rizospástis* declares that "The Lackeys of Glücksburg⁵⁷ and the foreign elements involved are panicstricken by the American-made bomb which exploded yesterday".

In these circumstances, the Regent instructed the Chief of his Political Bureau to call on me urgently this morning. Mr. Georgakis said that the Regent would have asked me to come to him, if it were not that such a visit, which would inevitably become known, would increase the present embarrassing flood of rumor. He then proceeded to explain the Regent's action in requesting Plastiras to resign. He said the publication of the Plastiras letter by the Royalist press (see my No. 345 of April 6, 4 p. m.⁵⁸) which he described as a piece of political chicanery, was not the cause though it "unfortunately" coincided with the taking of a decision which the Regent had felt to be inevitable for some time. The Plastiras government he said had not been observing the "neutral" political attitude desirable in Greece's present situation. On the contrary it had become increasingly a government of "the Liberals", and more than that, a government of General Plastiras' own personal henchmen (see my telegram No. 324 of April 2, 6 p. m. and the final paragraph of my No. 239 of March 3, 5 p. m.⁵⁹). The Regent had he said pointed this out repeatedly to the General requesting a change in policy but without success. His

⁵⁷ The founder of the reigning Greek royal house, George I (King, 1863-1913), was a Prince of Denmark, of the House of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg.

⁵⁸ Not printed. The immediate occasion for the fall of General Plastiras was the publication in the Royalist press of a letter written by the General to the Greek Ambassador at Vichy in 1941.

⁵⁹ Neither printed.

resignation was requested not in the interest of any one party but of all parties and of the country as a whole, the Regent desiring to bring about a genuinely democratic solution of Greece's problems rather than a republican one in the narrow political sense.

Mr. Georgakis then went on to say that the choice of Admiral Voulgaris as the new Premier was dictated by a desire to have a "dynamic personality" at the head of the NGS, to insure confidence in public order. The Regent feels however that the composition of the Cabinet should indicate clearly enough that there is an [*no?*] intention to truckle to the forces of the Right, and he has every confidence that its actions will prove its purpose to be to advance the general interest as a purely service government. In this connection Mr. Georgakis emphasized that there has been no promise by the new government to hold an early plebiscite, which is now the chief demand of the Royalists, but that on the contrary the Minister of the Press has stated that a plebiscite can not be held until the country is properly prepared for it. And he added that the new Ministers appointed today (see my No. 374 of April 11⁶⁰) were all personal friends of the late Mr. Papanastassiou, "the father of the Republic".⁶¹

In conclusion Mr. Georgakis said that in view of the report from Washington, the Regent hoped I would communicate the above to my Government, and also that I would explain that if he did not consult the American Ambassador before making his decision it was because he felt that the matter in question was of purely internal character. I replied to Mr. Georgakis that I would certainly make the communication desired, and asked him, in conveying my respects to His Beatitude, to assure the latter that while I have no confirmation of the report, I feel confident that there could be no intention on the part of the Secretary to criticize him for having failed to consult the United States, but rather that, if the report is correct, the wish was to emphasize the very point which the Regent himself has made, namely that the question at issue was one of those purely internal matters in which it is the policy of the United States not to interfere.

In regard to the Regent's explanations as above given, I feel there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. However, the forcing of Plastiras to resign immediately after the publication of the Royalist charges against him would appear to have created in the public mind here a confusion regarding the issues involved which might well have been avoided by the exercise of a little restraint and patience and which seems likely to complicate considerably the task ahead of the new government. In addition that somewhat tortuous career of the unquestionably "dynamic" new Prime Minister, which includes relations

⁶⁰ Not printed.

⁶¹ Alexandros Papanastasiou, who, as Prime Minister in 1924, set in motion the train of events which led to the end of the monarchy in Greece at that time and the proclamation of a republic on March 25, 1924.

with Bodossakis,⁶² the arms manufacturer, as well as repeated intriguing in the Middle East during the exile, fails to inspire the same confidence in his integrity as that enjoyed on all sides by his less intelligent, if also more definitely partisan, predecessor.

MACVEAGH

868.00/4-1145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1945—3 p. m.

322. Reurtel 375, April 11. Quoted remark attributed to Secretary is erroneous. Newspaper correspondent, in Secretary's press conference of April 9, stating that Athens government radio mentioned Leeper as one of various persons consulted by Regent in connection with recent cabinet crisis, asked whether you had also been consulted. Answer given was that Department had no information to indicate that you had been consulted. See Radio Bulletin No. 85 for April 9.

This reply was a statement of fact and not an implication that the United States Government should have been consulted or has any objection to changes in the internal government in Greece that may be effected constitutionally and in accordance with the Varkiza agreement, which provides for the continuance of a "nonpolitical" or "service" government until arrangements can be made for a plebiscite and free elections for a constituent assembly.

You should inform the Regent of Department's attitude,⁶³ and may, in your discretion, issue a statement embodying the foregoing views and the explanation already suggested informally by you to Mr. Georgakis. Department contemplates no statement here, as any official press release would only serve to give credence to misinterpretation suggested by Athens newspapers.

STETTINIUS

868.00/4-1545 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, April 15, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received April 15—5 : 55 p. m.]

1556. British military authorities AFHQ⁶⁴ have been planning on the basis that present Greek Government will have established

⁶² Bodossakis Athanassiades, generally known by his first name.

⁶³ The Ambassador in Greece in despatch 928, April 24, 1945, reported that he had explained to the Regent on April 20 the Department's position in accordance with this telegram (868.00/4-2445).

⁶⁴ Allied Force Headquarters.

fairly well its authority over entire country by June 1 and consequently wish to withdraw British forces from Greece beginning July 1.

We understand Macmillan has protested strongly against this proposal and has sent an urgent recommendation to Churchill that British troops for political reasons should not be removed from Greece before end of this year.

KIRK

868.00/6-1645

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁶⁵

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

It is clear that Allied supervision of the Greek plebiscite and elections will be an extremely difficult and complicated task. The losing side, whether they are Communists of [or] Royalists, will certainly criticise the arrangements made for supervision and will claim that the results have been falsified. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office feel that they cannot go back on the pledges already given in Parliament and elsewhere as regards supervision but should go ahead with this commitment. It is the Foreign Office's opinion that even if the results are only partially successful, they will probably be a great deal more satisfactory than if elections are held without any Allied supervision.

The Foreign Office had previously envisaged that the three major Allies would exercise joint supervision, but, in a message addressed to the Prime Minister on May 5th [4th], Marshal Stalin said that he was unable to share the British view that the three powers should supervise the Greek elections.⁶⁶ Such supervision, Marshal Stalin said, in relation to a people of an Allied state, could not be regarded otherwise than as an insult to that people and a flagrant interference with its internal life. He went on to say that such supervision was unnecessary in relation to the former satellite States which had subsequently declared war on Germany and joined the Allies, as was shown by the experience of Finland, where elections had already been held without any outside intervention and had led to constructive results. It therefore appears likely that the Soviet Government would refuse any invitation from the Greek Government to participate in supervision of the Greek elections.

⁶⁵ Handed to Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Pares) on June 16; copy forwarded to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) with instruction 295, July 6, not printed.

⁶⁶ For the exchange of messages between Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin concerning Poland, which occurred between April 24 and May 4, and in which were made statements regarding British and Russian policy with respect to the situation in Greece, see vol. v, pp. 262-284, *passim*.

In addition to the United States and British Governments the French Government might also be asked to participate. There appears, however, to be little advantage in French participation, and it is doubtful whether the French Government would agree since they have not so far shown much inclination to assume responsibility in Greece. Since the operation of supervising the elections will be difficult and complicated, there would be great advantage in restricting the team of observers to British and Americans.

His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens has pointed out that the Greek election would be carried out in three stages, viz, (a) the preparation of electoral rolls; (b) polling on the election day; and (c) the operation of the returning machinery. Sir R. Leeper has recommended that attention should be concentrated on the third stage; the Foreign Office, on the other hand, are inclined to feel that an attempt should also be made to supervise the second stage, i.e. the actual polling on the election day. Public opinion, both in the United Kingdom and in the United States would, it is felt, be likely, whether justifiably or not, to regard this second stage as the most critical part of the whole election. It appears possible that there may be as many as 10,000 polling booths, and in this event it is quite clear that adequate supervision could not be undertaken over all of them. If, however, there are about 150 Allied observers in the country they would probably be able to visit most of the polling booths in the larger towns and ensure against flagrant violations of the regulations, or intimidation of voters.

It will probably be undesirable to use the Greek National Guard to supervise the polling booths, but they might be reserved to deal with disturbances. It might, on the other hand, be advisable that some British troops should supervise the polling. It seems highly desirable that armed sentries should be posted on as many polling booths as possible. Whilst a reserve of British troops must of course be retained to support the Greek forces in the event of serious trouble arising, it may be hoped that a considerable number could be spared for guard duty on the polling booths. The extent to which this would be possible can no doubt be settled by further consideration.

In communicating the above views to the Department of State, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to say that His Majesty's Government would welcome the comments of the United States Government. His Majesty's Government are most anxious to do their best to ensure that the Greek plebiscite and elections are conducted as fairly as possible, and they very much hope that the United States Government will assist them in this task. Pending receipt of the United States Government's views Sir R. Leeper has been instructed not to begin discussions with the Greek Government. If the United States Government agree in principle on American

participation, the best course would probably be for Sir R. Leeper to work out details in close consultation with his American colleague.

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1945.

868.00/6-2945

The British Embassy to the Department of State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON
DATED JUNE 27TH, 1945

It is extremely satisfactory that the State Department agree to share responsibility for supervision with us and we are in general agreement with their preliminary views.⁶⁷ Greek Government should clearly be pressed to issue an invitation to the Soviet Government as well as to ourselves and the Americans, and we agree that this matter might also be taken up at the forthcoming three power meeting. If, however, the Soviet Government decline the invitation we do not feel that we need go to great pains to bring them in. If the Greek Government invite them and if we and the Americans express the hope that they will join us in the task, they could hardly accuse us of "ganging up against them". Tripartite supervision in Greece would establish a good precedent for similar supervision in Soviet-controlled countries, but for this very reason we think it inevitable that the Soviet Government will refuse.

2. I should be grateful if you would confirm that State Department adhere to views expressed in your telegram under reference.

3. We should see no objection to the United States Contingent being of the size indicated in your paragraph 6. Exact number of observers could no doubt be fixed after further discussion in Athens.

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1945.

868.00/6-2945

Minutes of Meeting of the Secretary's Staff Committee

MINUTES SECRETARY'S STAFF COMMITTEE FRIDAY MORNING, JUNE 29,
1945 IN THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE

[Here follows a lengthy list of participants; and discussion of certain items of business.]

United States Participation in Supervision of Greek Elections

The Committee discussed a proposal that this Government participate with the British Government in supervising fair and free elec-

⁶⁷ No record has been found in Department files to indicate that the Department's views on this question had been conveyed to the British Government by this time. It is possible that the tentative views of the Department were transmitted orally to the British Embassy.

tions in Greece. Such supervision was contemplated in the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe in which the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union undertook jointly to assist liberated states and to facilitate the holding of free elections. Furthermore, when the present Greek Government was established the Varkiza Agreement between EAM and the Government provided for Allied supervision of Greek elections.

The matter has been raised at the present time by the British Government. The British have consulted the Russians regarding the matter and have received the reply that for the Allies to supervise the Greek Elections would be interference in Greek domestic affairs. The British consider it is necessary to exercise the supervision nevertheless and wish the American Government to join them. Mr. Henderson,⁶⁸ who presented the matter to the Committee, said it was proposed to reply to the British recommending that the British and American Ambassadors in Athens suggest to the Greek Government that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union be invited to supervise the elections. The matter could then be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the three Chiefs of State.

Mr. MacLeish⁶⁹ pointed out that under the Yalta Declaration the United States had a responsibility toward the people of the liberated areas to see that fair and free elections took place. He said this obligation had been widely publicized and that we should not take any action which would weaken it. Specifically, he thought we should not establish a precedent whereby assistance in holding elections would be given only after such assistance had been invited by the country concerned. Mr. Matthews⁷⁰ and Mr. Henderson said they did not believe that present proposal would preclude Allied assistance to Greece in the event the suggestion that the Greeks invite such assistance should not be accepted. Mr. Acheson⁷¹ suggested that such possibility could be avoided if the United States and British Governments instead of suggesting that the Greek Government invite our assistance should call the Greek Government's attention to the provisions of the Varkiza Agreement providing for Allied supervision and inform the Greek Government that we are prepared to furnish the necessary supervision. The Committee agreed with this proposed approach and Mr. Henderson undertook to redraft the proposed *aide-mémoire* to the British Embassy accordingly. Mr. Henderson said that the Soviet Union could be informed of this proposed action at the forthcoming meeting of the three Chiefs of State.

The Committee agreed that a proposed memorandum to the President to inform him of the proposed action and asking his approval for

⁶⁸ Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁶⁹ Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State.

⁷⁰ H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

⁷¹ Dean G. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

requesting the War Department to provide about 500 supervisory personnel should be redrafted to include an introductory paragraph pointing out the great importance of the proposed action as a part of our general policy.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

868.00/7-445

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman ⁷²

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

The question of American participation in the supervision of Greek elections raises an issue of the first importance. This Government has repeatedly affirmed its purpose, as stated by President Roosevelt in his Message on the State of the Union of January 6, 1945,⁷³ "to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them".

We have further asserted an obligation to see to it that the right of the peoples of the liberated areas to choose their own government and institutions should not be defeated by interim governmental authorities. President Roosevelt stated this obligation, in the same speech, in the following words:

"Until conditions permit a genuine expression of the peoples' will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples' right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live".

This general obligation on the part of the Allies was specifically formulated at the Crimea Conference. In his report of March 1, 1945,⁷⁴ on that Conference, President Roosevelt stated that the three powers had agreed that the political and economic problem "of any area liberated from the Nazi conquest, or of any former Axis satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three governments". The three powers, he continued, would endeavor to see that interim governing authorities were "as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population", and specifically to see to it "that free elections are held as soon as possible". This purpose to assure to the peoples of the liberated and satellite areas an opportunity to determine their own forms of government through free elections has provided the

⁷² Copy forwarded to the Ambassador in Greece with instruction 295, July 6, not printed.

⁷³ *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 1, p. 65.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1618.

moral basis of our political policy with reference to the peoples of areas overrun by the Axis. The question of the implementation of this policy is now urgently raised by the still unfulfilled agreement made in February between the Greek Government and EAM that elections to determine the will of the Greek people be held with Allied assistance. Furthermore, the decision made and the procedures employed as to the Greek elections will have a controlling effect upon the policy and procedures to be adopted in other liberated areas and former satellite states.

In view of these facts, it is considered essential that this Government should participate, preferably in association with the other Yalta powers, in the supervision of the approaching Greek elections. It is believed, further, that the participation of this Government should not be conditional upon the invitation of the interim governing authorities in Greece, since its obligation in this respect is an undertaking not so much to the interim authorities as to the Greek people themselves. It was specifically stated by the President in his Message on the State of the Union on January 6, 1945, that the peoples' right to choose the government and institutions under which they wish to live should not be blocked by temporary or provisional authorities.

It is recommended, therefore, that the American and British Ambassadors in Athens, who are the only diplomatic representatives in Greece of the Yalta powers, should call the Yalta undertaking to the attention of the Greek Government, and should inform the Greek Government that their Governments are prepared to participate in the supervision of Greek elections and that they assume the Greek Government will wish them to do so. It is anticipated that the Greek Government would thereupon express its desire for Allied participation, requesting the three Yalta Powers, and, conceivably, France, to supervise Greek elections. It is believed important also that our willingness to fulfill the obligation we have assumed with reference to the areas in question should be made explicit and public.

In order that any Allied assistance with elections should be on a scale sufficiently large to be effective, it is suggested that the War Department be asked to furnish five hundred American personnel. Such a mission should be headed by someone other than our Ambassador to Greece, who might find the duties of supervision of elections prejudicial to his diplomatic status.

If you agree, the War Department will be requested to make the required personnel available for temporary duty in Greece.⁷⁵

JAMES F. BYRNES

⁷⁵ Marginal notation: "I agree Harry S. Truman". A letter to this effect was sent on July 13 by the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of War (Stimson), who responded favorably in a letter of August 13 (868.00/7-1345, 8-1345). A number of working-level talks between the two Departments followed in the ensuing months.

868.00/6-1645

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*⁷⁶

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has received the *aide-mémoire* of June 16, 1945, from the British Embassy requesting the views of this Government on the Allied supervision of a plebiscite and elections in Greece in accordance with Article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945.

The Department is in agreement with the Foreign Office that chances for the success of elections in Greece would be enhanced by Allied supervision.

The signatories of the Crimea Communiqué expressed their willingness jointly to assist the liberated countries of Europe in establishing stable governments by democratic processes expressive of the will of the people. In the case of Greece we cannot consider the responsibility of the United States discharged until the Greek people are assured fair elections under circumstances in which the voters will not be subjected to undue pressure from embittered factions.

The Department does not believe that the presence of friendly observers at elections could justifiably be considered a violation of Greek sovereignty. In this connection, it will be recalled that Allied supervision of elections was explicitly authorized in an agreement signed by representatives of both the Greek Government and EAM, and that the political coalition of EAM has repeatedly since that time urged the Greek Government to give evidence of its intention to honor this mutually agreed stipulation.

The Department suggests that, with the concurrence of the British Government, the British and American Ambassadors in Athens, who are the only diplomatic representatives in Greece of the Governments present at Yalta, inform the Greek Government that in view of their obligations to the people of Greece and of their undertakings at Yalta, the British and American Governments feel that the Greek elections should take place under the supervision of the Allies, namely, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and, if agreeable to the Greek and French Governments, France. They may at the same time refer to Article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement providing for Allied supervision of Greek elections. In case the Greek Government agrees to Allied supervision, the Ambassadors will inform it that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain will take up the matter with the Soviet Government and, if desired, with the French, in the immediate future.

⁷⁶ Handed to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Pares) by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on July 5, 1945; copy forwarded to the Ambassador in Greece with instruction 295, July 6, not printed.

The Department is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the British and American Ambassadors to make the suggested approaches to the Greek Government within the next few days so that the matter may be discussed at the meeting of the Big Three, scheduled early in July.⁷⁷

If agreeable to the British Government, it might also be suggested to the Greek Government that it give favorable consideration to the idea, which has been gaining popular approval in Greece and which has recently been subscribed to by the three EAM signers of the Varkiza Agreement, that elections for a constituent assembly precede the plebiscite. This order of events appears to offer a better solution to Greek problems in that it would at an early date give Greece a representative political government which would then be in a position to make plans for a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy. It may also be considered desirable that an approximate date be set for the plebiscite, preferably some six months after the convening of a duly elected constituent assembly. Thus the democratically elected government would be given a brief period in which to establish itself.

It is the opinion of this Government that, if Allied assistance is to be offered in the hope of accomplishing fair and free elections in Greece, Allied observers should assist both at the polls on election day and in the operation of the returning machinery. The number of observers mentioned in the British *aide-mémoire* seems somewhat low, and this Government is now exploring the possibility of making available several hundred personnel for the purpose.

In the absence of extensive information on the Greek National Guard and *Gendarmerie* the Department is inclined to agree that the use of some British troops to supervise the polling would be advisable. A final decision on this matter, however, might await discussion between the British and the American Ambassadors in Athens.

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945.

[The Conference of Berlin between the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union was held July 16–August 2, 1945. For further documentation regarding negotiations for the supervision of Greek elections for the period in July preceding the Conference, and for documentation during the Conference itself, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, volume I, pages 651 ff. and *ibid.*, volume II, pages 1041 ff.]

⁷⁷ Reference is to the impending meeting at Potsdam between President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin.

868.00/8-945: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945—1 p. m.

6704. Potsdam proposal for supervision Greek elections by US, UK, Soviet and French Govts was unacceptable to Russians. We now propose acting on previous US and UK agreement that supervision should be undertaken on tripartite basis in spite of Russian refusal to participate, and hope that this basis will be agreeable to both French and Greek Govts.

Following is Depts suggested text for public release at date to be decided upon after consultation with British, French and Greek Govts:

"The US Govt, in accordance with responsibilities which it accepted at the Crimea Conference to assist the peoples of European countries formerly occupied or dominated by Nazi Germany in solving their political problems by democratic means and in creating democratic institutions of their own choice, is prepared to send to Greece, at such time in the near future as is decided in consultation with the Greek Govt, a commission to aid in securing the free expression, by secret ballot, of the will of the Greek people. In this disinterested duty, undertaken with the sincere desire of demonstrating friendly interest in the Greek people who have suffered so cruelly at the hands of Axis aggressors, the US Govt will share the responsibility on an equal basis with representatives of the British and French Govts. This decision has received the willing concurrence of the Greek authorities as an implementation of the Varkiza Agreement of February 12, 1945, Article 9 of which provides for Allied assistance in the holding of a plebiscite and elections. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which finds itself unable to accept an invitation to participate in this task, will be kept fully informed of all developments in Greece."

London please transmit above text to Brit FonOff with following suggested procedure. After British concurrence, French FonOff will be approached by Brit and US Ambs with same suggestion. If French are agreeable to tripartite action, Greek concurrence will be requested by Brit, French and US Ambs in Athens. On date later to be agreed, simultaneous similar but not identical announcements will be made in London, Paris, Washington, and Athens. Moscow will inform Soviet Govt of developments shortly before public announcements.

In order save time, on receipt Brit FonOff concurrence in principle London should inform Paris, citing this telegram and repeating to Dept, Moscow, and Athens. US Amb in Paris should then concert with Brit colleague in approach to French Govt without awaiting

further instruction from Dept. If French concur, Paris should inform Athens, repeating to Dept, London, and Moscow.

US Amb in Athens will then concert with Brit and French colleagues to consult Greek Govt without further instructions from Dept, reporting date agreeable to Greek Govt. After final clearance Dept will authorize release date of public announcements.

Sent to London as Depts no. 6704, to Paris as no. 3754, to Athens as no. 799, repeated to Moscow as no. 1777 of even date.

BYRNES

868.00/8-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 9, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received August 10—4:40 p. m.]

823. My telegram 810, August 6.⁷⁸ Regent issued statement last night saying his hopes for political government able reconcile opposing views and thus assure internal order and united front on national claims have not been justified. Feels therefore service government is only form possible and has again entrusted Voulgaris with formation. Announcement new cabinet members expected shortly.⁷⁹

2. [Telegram] from Attlee⁸⁰ to Regent released yesterday stating British Government desires help reconstruct country and "hold elections under conditions of freedom and [tranquility?]" Also hopes Varkiza Agreement fully carried out and is "disturbed at reports concerning misconduct of the faction of the right in contravention of this Agreement". Also attributes importance to execution by Voulgaris Government on measures if established prevent transgression Agreement "by extremists of either right or left". Finally hopes "law and order will be established in all Greece so that Greek people may express its will as soon as possible." [Regent] replied agreeing absolutely with spirit of views expressed.

MACVEAGH

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ This closed a period of governmental crisis which had begun late in July, and which was marked by demands on the part of Centrist and Leftist groups for a political government, and in the course of which the Regent engaged in extensive consultations with the party leaders.

Earlier in the summer there had been numerous and widespread rumors of a projected royalist *coup d'état*, the persistence of which impelled Ambassador MacVeagh on July 23 to inform the Greek Prime Minister that "it is my impression" that the United States would probably refrain from recognizing any government so installed.

⁸⁰ The Labor Government headed by Clement R. Attlee took office in Great Britain on July 26.

868.00/8-1145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 11, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received August 11—2 p. m.]

836. My telegram 823, Aug. 9. Following Regent's confirmation service Govt Communist Party has carried out first part of threat reported my telegram 817, Aug 8⁸¹ and ordered all representatives on committees for compilation and review electoral registers to abstain from these committees and "to cease participating in this comedy, the aim of which is to falsify the will and the sentiment of the people".

Highly advisable Greek Left play ball if proposed elections are to secure results generally acceptable to country and foreign opinion. However, present obstruction is that "party line" not [now?] unlikely change without some indication Moscow. Hence possibly worth while seek expression Russian sympathetic interest Allies' effort even though active participation refused.

MACVEAGH

868.00/8-1145

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁸²

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE DATED AUGUST 11, 1945

I⁸³ shall probably make a statement about Greece in Parliament on about August 16th and I should like to include in this the announcement about Allied supervision of the Greek plebiscite and elections, provided agreement can be reached by that date between the Governments concerned and arrangements made for simultaneous publication in Washington, Paris, Athens.

2. Since we have not received draft text from the Americans we have ourselves prepared a draft, the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram.⁸⁴ I hope you will be able to secure very early agreement of the State Department with this draft or with something on similar lines in order that the question may be taken up with the French and Greek Governments in the manner suggested in my telegram under reference.

3. I still feel that as regards timing of plebiscite and elections, we should give no indication in public of any preference. I am inclined to think however that the elections should precede the plebiscite

⁸¹ Not printed.⁸² Handed to Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy) on August 11.⁸³ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.⁸⁴ *Infra.*

though I should be opposed to a six-month gap as suggested by the United States Government. If there is such a long hiatus I do not think it would be possible to maintain an *ad referendum* Greek Government. I attach considerable importance to maintaining the Varkiza Agreement and if this is to be amended in such an important respect it seems to me essential that the change should be made by the Greeks themselves and that they should accept the full responsibility for it. I suggest therefore that the British and American representatives in Athens should inform the Regent in strict confidence that we incline to the view that the elections should be held first and that the plebiscite should follow within a very short period not more than two months. The Regent should be told that we do not intend to make any Parliamentary statement on these lines and that we regard the matter as one essentially for the Greeks themselves to settle.

4. The text of the announcement contained in my immediately following telegram has been drafted in such a way as to avoid showing any preference for holding the elections or the plebiscite first. I hope however that whatever the ultimate decision may be about this the United States Government will agree that Allied supervision must be exercised over both operations. It would be unintelligible to the Greeks and to the world in general for us to supervise the elections but to leave the Greeks to run the plebiscite themselves.

5. His Majesty's Government would wish to reserve the right to include Dominion representatives in the British Delegation if so desired.

6. Please discuss above with the State Department.

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1945.

868.00/8-1145

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁸⁵

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE DATED
AUGUST 11, 1945

My immediately preceding telegram.⁸⁶

Following is Text.

Article 9 of Agreement signed at Varkiza on February 12th between representatives of the Greek Government and representatives of E.A.M. provides for a plebiscite and elections will be held in Greece as soon as possible and in any case during 1945. The Agreement goes on to state that representatives of both sides agree that Great Allied

⁸⁵ Handed to Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy) on August 11.

⁸⁶ Telegram from Mr. Bevin, *supra*.

Powers shall be requested to send observers. In answer to this request and in view of their obligations to Greece and undertakings assumed at Yalta, the United States Government and His Majesty's Government suggest[ed] to the Greek Government that supervision should be exercised by themselves, the Soviet Government and the French Government. The Greek Government expressed entire agreement and the United States Government therefore sought the views of the Soviet Government and the Provisional Government of France. The Provisional Government of France agreed to participate in supervision but the Soviet Government stated that they were opposed in principle to supervision of National Elections by foreign states. Allied supervision in Greece will therefore be exercised by representatives of the American, British and French Governments. Detailed arrangements are being worked out between the Three Governments concerned and Greek Government.

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1945.

868.00/8-1345

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1945.

Mr. Tandy of the British Embassy called this afternoon at his request in order to discuss two telegrams from the British Foreign Office requesting the views of the Department on questions relating to the proposed Allied supervision of elections in Greece. This matter was considered urgent as Mr. Bevin has indicated that he wishes if possible to include some statement on Greece when he addresses Parliament on August 16.

I told Mr. Tandy that the Department had no objection to discussing informally with the Greek Regent the possibility that the terms of the Varkiza Agreement be modified to allow the elections to precede a plebiscite provided that the initiative for such modification is undertaken by the Greek Government itself. I also suggested that since the proposed supervision is to be tripartite, the French Ambassador in Athens should be asked to concert with the British and American Ambassadors in their informal talk with the Regent.

The proposed British text for public announcement concerning Greek elections is completely acceptable to the Department, which proposes that the simultaneous public statements in London, Athens, Paris, and Washington should agree in fundamentals but need not be worded identically. It is of course understood that the Soviet Government will be informed at least a day in advance of our proposed action.

The Department also has no objection to the possible inclusion of Dominion representatives in the British supervisory delegation.

The Department is in agreement with the British Foreign Office that it would be preferable for Allied supervision to be exercised both in the elections and in the plebiscite. However, the timing of the plebiscite, if it should not follow the elections closely, raises some questions concerning the length of time for which American personnel is available. I told Mr. Tandy that it is impossible at this time to give him a definite answer on this question but that the possibilities would be explored at once.

868.00/8-1645

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁸⁷

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM H. M. REPRESENTATIVE, ATHENS, TO
FOREIGN OFFICE, DATED AUGUST 13, 1945

The Regent asked me to call this morning to talk about the new Government.

2. In his opinion it was about as good a Government as could be got at present. But criticism was developing along the lines anticipated and the Regent himself was being attacked for having misrepresented the wishes of His Majesty's Government. He said he did not mind that very much on his own account, for who would not want to get out of his present unenviable role? It was rather for us to judge. He said this only half-seriously but it remains a fact that he has recently acquired the habit of saying flatly that if he were not wanted he would go.

3. As the conversation was leading back to the question of some clear outward indication of His Majesty's Government policy towards Greece I told His Beatitude for his personal and confidential information of the possibility of your making a statement in Parliament in the near future. He was clearly pleased at this and suggested that if you were willing to bear the following points in mind it would in his opinion be most helpful for Greece:

(a) Changes in Government every few months could not but set back recovery and until a vote had been taken no Government could claim to be the proper representative. It was therefore essential that there should be at the earliest possible moment a Government based on the expression of popular will.

(b) Such expression of the popular will must be fair and to this end order must be established on an impartial basis.

(c) After years of dictatorship, occupation and revolt this might not be easy but you have noted the firm intention of the new Government

⁸⁷ Transmitted by Mr. Tandy to Mr. Baxter on August 16.

to put down excesses by extremists on either side and to ensure that all Government forces in future acted equally vigorously against direct acts by the Right as well as by the Left.

(d) Since the question of whether the plebiscite or the elections should come first, whether they should be nearly simultaneous or widely separated and whether the elections should be for an ordinary Parliament or for a Constituent Assembly were all matters for party controversy, he hoped that anything His Majesty's Government said publicly would not prejudge these issues. He would like to know whenever convenient on what lines His Majesty's Government were thinking. These were most delicate questions and would need their united wisdom and tact if Greece were not to founder on them. Consequently it would in his opinion be most beneficial in Greece if at this stage His Majesty's Government could restrict themselves to showing that they had an open mind and that so far as they were concerned were only interested to see a solution which had the most chance of being truly representative and thus of enduring.

4. He felt sure that you would understand the spirit in which his remarks were made. His habit was frankness and he knew that he could assume your friendliness.

5. From a Greek point of view his judgment is as usual as sound as it is honest. I would only add this. It is by no means certain that Greece will succeed without further grave set-backs in struggling to her feet economically, financially and administratively. Such chances as she has will be dashed if she cannot find some measure of continuous and stable Government in the months before the vote. This in turn depends to a very large degree upon the steadying and enlightened influence of His Majesty's Government. Given this there is reasonable if not excessive ground for hope. Without it economic and political collapse is as good as certain.

868.00/8-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 13, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received August 15—10:10 a. m.]

846. My telegram 843, August 13.⁸⁸ While reaction other parties to new Cabinet being awaited extreme Left continuing hostile attitude has now begun extend attacks Govt to include Regent. *Rizospastis*⁸⁹ August 8 questioned constitutionality his position both as Archbishop and Regent on grounds appointed during occupation, and on August 11 published long editorial warning him that only Royalists and Col-

⁸⁸ Not printed; in this telegram the Ambassador reported the assumption of office by the second Voulgaris government on the night of August 11 (868.002/-8-1345).

⁸⁹ Greek Communist newspaper.

laborationists now support Govt and stating he must realize Voulgaris govt unable carry out honest elections. Following this lead, Central Committee published communiqué August 11 which describes entrusting formation of govt to Voulgaris for second time as "unconstitutional act and provocative toward Greek people". Accuses Regent of tolerating violation Varkiza Agreement, "fact confirmed by message of British Prime Minister" (my telegram 823, August 9) and continues "in entrusting the formation of a govt to Admiral Voulgaris, the protector and supporter of Monarcho-Fascist organizations and military leagues, he places himself definitely with the extreme Right and assumes the heaviest responsibility for the abnormal situation which is being created".

MACVEAGH

868.00/8-1545

The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy) to Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1945.

DEAR MR. BAXTER: I enclose herewith a paraphrase of a telegram received from the Foreign Office on the subject of the Greek elections.

We are informing London that the appropriate United States representatives have their instructions and that the Department approve the date of the announcement, August 20th, with notification of the Soviet Government on August 19th.

I understand that, since the possibility of associating the French in any advice given to the Regent about the timing of the plebiscite and the election has not been raised with United States representatives abroad, there is no danger of action being taken on these lines. I look forward to receiving your considered views on this question, concerning which there is less immediate urgency.

Yours sincerely,

A. H. TANDY

[Enclosure]

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
DATED AUGUST 14, 1945

The United States Embassy have shown us the American text. We recommend and also agree to public statement by the four governments though they should not be identical. Statement in Parliament will probably be made on August 20th and I shall use text given in my telegram of August 11th.

The United States Embassy are being informed accordingly and are being asked to recommend to the United States Government that an

approach should now be made without delay to the French and Greek Governments. I trust that the State Department will be able to send the United States representatives in Paris and Athens immediate instructions so that action can be taken in both places at the latest by August 16th. I suggest that the Soviet Government should be informed about the forthcoming announcement on August 19th.

I should prefer not to associate the French in any advice we may give to the Regent about the timing of the plebiscite and the election. If we had to discuss this with the French it would inevitably be the cause of some delay and might also increase risk of our approach becoming known in public. I am anxious that our advice should be given in a marked manner and in strict confidence and that it should be confined to the Regent and should not be passed to the Greek [Prime?] Minister or [any?] Political leader. You will have seen from paragraph 3 of Athens telegram⁹⁰ that this attitude accords with the Regent's own views.

868.00/8-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 16, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

8297. Deptel 6704, August 9, rptd to Paris as 3754, Athens as 799 and Moscow as 1777. We have received communication from FonOff stating it agrees to text of US announcement regarding supervision of Greek elections and it also agrees that similar but not identical announcements should be made simultaneously in Washington, London, Paris and Athens. FonOff encloses text of announcement it proposes to issue which it says has already been cleared with Dept.

According to FonOff note Foreign Secretary will probably make statement in Parliament on Greek affairs about August 20 and he is anxious that his statement should contain the British announcement about supervision if necessary arrangements can be made in time. FonOff, therefore, expresses hope that immediate instructions can be issued to US representatives in Paris and Athens to seek agreement of French and Greek Govts to this procedure. Instructions are being sent at once to British representatives in Paris and Athens to act in concert with their US colleagues as soon as latter are ready.

⁹⁰ Reference apparently is to a telegram of August 13, 1945, from the British Chargé in Greece (Caccia) to the Foreign Office, a paraphrase of which was forwarded by the British Embassy to the Department on August 16; for paraphrase, see p. 139.

FonOff also agrees that Soviet Govt should be informed of developments shortly before public announcements are made and it suggests this might be done on August 19 if present time table is adhered to. FonOff hopes by that date to have received acceptance of French Govt and approach to Soviet Govt could then be made in Moscow by representatives of US, UK and France.

Sent to Paris as 53, repeated to Dept as 8297, to Moscow as 296 and to Athens as 43.

WINANT

868.00/8-1845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—3 p. m.

827. Please inform Moscow by direct telegram of Greek Govts approval of Allied supervision of elections as soon as conveyed to you by Greek Govt.

Sent to Athens. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London.

BYRNES

868.00/8-1845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*⁹¹

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—3 p. m.

1861. Immediately upon information from Athens that Greek Govt concurs in proposal for tripartite Allied supervision Greek elections please inform Soviet FonOff developments along lines Deptel 1777 Aug. 9.⁹² Make clear that US Govt by signing Crimea communiqué undertook responsibility to Greek people in contradistinction to present Greek Govt in assisting them to express their will freely at the polls. Express US Govt regret that Soviet Govt could not see its way clear to participate and clearly state US Govts hope that Soviet Govt though not represented will adopt friendly attitude toward this duty being undertaken by three of its Allies. Assure Soviet FonOff that it will be kept fully informed of all developments in Greece.

Sent Moscow. Repeated to Athens, Paris, London.

BYRNES

⁹¹ Repeated to Athens, Paris, and London, as telegrams 828, 3886, and 7007, respectively.

⁹² Same as telegram 6704, August 9, 1 p. m., to London, p. 134.

868.00/8-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 18, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 7:11 p. m.]

5003. Bidault told me last night orally that the French Govt was agreeable to the Tripartite action mentioned in paragraph 4 Dept's 3754, August 9, 1 p. m.⁹³

CAFFERY

868.00/8-1845

The British Chargé (Balfour) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to a previous communication from this Embassy dated August 10th, stating that the policy of the United Kingdom Government towards Greece was under consideration in the light of the accession to power of a new Government in London.

2. Mr. Balfour is now informed that His Majesty's Government's policy towards Greece may be summarized as follows:

a) It is desirable that Greece should have a stable Government as soon as possible, since lack of certainty in this matter encourages the continuation of political strife. His Majesty's Government will press for elections and a plebiscite to be held in Greece as soon as possible. If it can be arranged, elections should precede the plebiscite but the Greeks themselves must take the initiative and responsibility on this point.

b) There are the strongest grounds for maintaining the Voulgaris Service Government in power until the elections have been held. Otherwise the holding of the elections will be subjected to delays, which will seriously affect the financial and economic position in Greece and require the maintenance of British troops in the country for a further period. All reasonable steps should be taken to meet justifiable criticism by the left-wing parties and to ensure that law and order are maintained on an impartial basis.

c) It will give confidence to world opinion if elections are held under Allied supervision. His Majesty's Government attach importance to associating Dominion representatives with those of the United Kingdom as British observers for this purpose.

d) His Majesty's Government are desirous of acting in the closest cooperation with the United States in all steps taken.

e) These proposals are framed in the conviction that the political stability of Greece is vital to the general stability of the whole Middle Eastern area and to the contribution of that area to the future working of the World Security Organisation.

⁹³ Same as telegram 6704 on same date to London, p. 134.

3. Mr. Balfour is also instructed to notify the Secretary of State, for his confidential information, that it is proposed to extend an invitation to the Regent to pay a short visit to London to confer with His Majesty's Government. It is hoped that this visit will take place in the first few days of September to coincide with the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers⁹⁴ and to afford His Majesty's Government an opportunity of associating the Secretary of State in the discussions and of ascertaining the United States Government's views on the general Greek situation. It is understood that, while this invitation to the Regent has been extended, it has not yet been accepted, and in any event it is hoped that the matter will be kept confidential until Mr. Bevin's statement in the House of Commons on foreign affairs, now scheduled for August 20th.⁹⁵

4. The United States Government are aware that His Majesty's Government are concerned at the continuing Soviet press propaganda on the Greek situation. His Majesty's Government take the view, that, should this propaganda persist, it will be necessary to make their position clear to the Government of the Soviet Union.

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945.

868.00/8-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1945—2 p. m.

833. Dept informed by Paris of French Govts oral agreement to tripartite Allied supervision Greek elections. Dept assumes that Paris has so informed Athens by direct telegram in answer to Athens telegram no. 2 Aug 7 [17] to Paris, repeated to Dept as 852.⁹⁶ In view information from Brit Emb that Bevin intends to make announcement in Parliament Aug 20 and that Greek Govt has already given its agreement to Brit Emb in Athens, Dept authorizes Moscow to inform Soviet FonOff (reDeptel 1861 Aug 18, repeated to Athens, Paris, and London). Dept authorizes Athens to approach Greek Govt, if it has not already done so, and also to express regret that events beyond control of Dept have prevented prior notification of **Greek Govt**.

Dept intends to release to press tomorrow Aug 20 statement contained in Deptel of Aug 9.⁹⁷

Sent to Athens as Depts no. 833, to Moscow as no. 1868; repeated to London as no. 7024, to Paris as no. 3899, of even date.

BYRNES

⁹⁴ For documentation regarding the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, September 11–October 2, 1945, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

⁹⁵ For the section relating to Greece, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 413, cols. 289–290.

⁹⁶ Not printed.

⁹⁷ Telegram 6704 to London, repeated to Athens as telegram 799, p. 134. The statement was released on August 20.

868.00/8-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 19, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received August 19—7 p. m.]

5024. My 5003, August 18, 4 p. m. I saw Bidault this morning who promised an official written reply before this evening to our note regarding French participation in the Greek election.

He has just sent me a formal note which while regretting the absence of a Soviet representative in the Electoral Control Commission states that the French Govt agrees to participate with British and US Govts. The note also states that the French concur that the agreement of the Greek Govt should be sought by the British, US and French representatives in Athens and in the event of a favorable Greek reply that similar but not identical communiqués be published in London, Washington and Paris "about August 20". (The text of the proposed French communiqué follows our proposed text in phraseology although the paragraphs are in different order.) I am cabling the text in a separate telegram.⁹⁸

The note concluded that the necessary instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Moscow so that concerting action with his British and American colleagues the Soviet Govt will be informed of the issuing of the communiqué.

Sent Dept as 5024, repeated to Moscow as 284, London 607, Athens 18.

CAFFERY

• 868.00/8-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 19, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received August 29—8:42 a. m.]

870. Department's telegram 3754 to Paris, repeated Athens as 799, August 9, and my telegram 852, August 17.⁹⁹ No word yet received from Paris and French colleague here uninstructed. However, Prime Minister assured British colleague and me today Greek Govt gladly accepts idea of tripartite supervision and even Anglo-United States supervision if France now feels unable participate. Moscow informed in accord your telegram 827, August 18 by repeat this message.

Prime Minister promised continue take no initiative publicity but to await official statements London Washington and be guided by any alterations these may necessitate (e.g. as regards the French) in the

⁹⁸ Telegram 5025, August 19, 1945, 9 p. m., not printed.

⁹⁹ Telegram 852 not printed.

proposed British-United States press announcements, copies of which were handed him.

Sent Dept as 870; repeated Moscow as 5; London as 90 and Paris as 3.

MACVEAGH

868.00/8-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 20, 1945.

[Received August 23—4:10 a. m.]

875. Following is translation of Greek announcement today regarding tripartite Allied Supervision Greek plebiscite and elections:

1. "Article 9 Varkiza Agreement.

2. The present Government, from the moment when it assumed office, officially declared that the Varkiza Agreement constitutes an essential part of its program.

3. Since then the Prime Minister, in interviews which he has had with official representatives of the great powers and with representatives of the world press, has repeatedly had the opportunity to reaffirm the declaration that before the final amendments were made for the appeal to the popular verdict, the Government would in good time extend to the great Allied Powers the invitation to send observers.

4. In the declarations the Prime Minister has on occasions made it clear that this decision was not the result solely of the obligations undertaken by the Greek Govt under article 9 of the Varkiza Agreement, but also of the conviction that the presence of foreign observers during the period of the voting would constitute a real guarantee that the absolute genuineness of the popular verdict concern of the Govt could not be disputed by any honest judge.

5. Consequently, when the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America, through their representatives in Athens, recently proposed that they should be entrusted with the task of approaching the Governments of Soviet Russia and France, with view to the joint despatch of observers by the four Great Powers acting together, at the appropriate moment, to guarantee the genuineness of the popular verdict, the President of [the Council of Ministers of?] the Greek Govt gladly accepted this proposal.

6. Today the Greek Govt finds itself in the happy position of being able to announce that the negotiations with the Allied Govts have led to the acceptance of Great Britain, the USA and France of the proposal that they should send observers. At the same time the Government regrets that the Govt of the USSR has not accepted the proposal on the grounds that it is opposed in principle to the supervision of national elections by foreign states. Nevertheless if at any time the Soviet Govt should feel able to reconsider this decision the Greek Govt would very gladly accept the participation of their representative along with those of the three Allies."

Sent Dept as No. 875 repeated Moscow as 6, Paris as 6, London as No. 92.

MACVEAGH

868.00/8-2045

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*¹

Moscow, August 20, 1945—noon.

[Received August 20—4:10 a. m.]

2960. Dept's 1777, Aug 9 and 1868, Aug 19. Substance of communiqué on supervision Greek elections and reassuring observations contained in Dept's 1861 Aug 18 have been communicated to Molotov in letter this morning.

To Dept 2960, rptd Athens 42, London 415, Paris 315.

HARRIMAN

868.00/8-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 23, 1945.

[Received August 23—3:35 p. m.]

3015. *Izvestiya* August 22 carries two-column article "Elections in Greece and Foreign Observers".

Question of observation of Greek elections by representatives of certain powers, states editorial, has serious political significance. Soviet Government took negative attitude toward proposal made by Anglo-Americans at Berlin to send observers not only to Greece but to other countries, as inconsistent, "with principle of state independence and sovereignty of country in relation to which such observation is set up".

Article hammers this point, declaring that "observation" actually amounts to control by foreign states. It makes no difference whether such "control" is voluntary or not. Such control "indisputably is one form of direct interference in internal affairs" of state to which it is applied.

Editorial repeatedly asserts that Soviet attitude toward this proposal was dictated by principles of Soviet foreign policy "based on respect for other states, large and small", and flowing from "faith in democratic forces and rights of people, whether they be small or large".

Editorial rejects position of British Govt "taking upon itself role of observer" on basis of its obligations to Greece and obligations assumed at Yalta. Regarding "private English obligations" *Izvestiya* cites statement by *New York Times* correspondent Sulzberger to effect

¹ In telegram 3020, August 23, 1945, 2 p. m., Ambassador Harriman reported that "Vyshinski under date of August 21 acknowledged my letter of August 20 but offered no comments." (868.00/8-2345) Andrey Yanuaryevich Vishinsky was First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

that Britain's obligations to Greece are both moral and imperialistic, since Greece controls Eastern Mediterranean and Suez Canal Zone. Regarding Yalta obligations *Izvestiya* argues that anyone can see that necessary conditions referred to in Yalta communiqué for establishment of democratic institutions do not exist and that under these conditions observation of elections corresponds neither in letter nor in spirit to Crimea declaration.

Chief task of Allies, concludes editorial, is to assure conditions for genuinely democratic elections. When this is assured, there will be no need for special observers. Appointment of observers indicates that election conditions in Greece do not inspire confidence of Allies. But in that case observers will not help.

"In that case this problem demands other methods for its solution."

Sent to Dept 3015; repeated to Athens 43; Sofia 89; Bucharest 116; London 421.

[HARRIMAN]

868.00/8-2645 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, August 26, 1945—noon.

[Received 4:40 p. m.]

3398. We have seen a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Athens to FonOff in which he suggests that British Govt should not give any advice to Damaskinos on Greek elections before latter's visit to London next week. Caccia stated that Regent was a "wise old fox" who knew more about Greek politics than anyone else and that it would be preferable from any point of view to have Damaskinos visit with Secretary Byrnes in London in order to give the latter a first-hand picture of the Greek situation, after which Bevin, Byrnes and Damaskinos could sit down and work out a common program of action in connection with forthcoming Greek elections.²

KIRK

² In a memorandum of September 4 William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs wrote to the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Hare), temporarily in Washington, in part: "According to recent information from the British Foreign Office, the Regent has expressed his hope that no advice will be given him on this subject prior to his visit to London, and the British add their hope that the Department will delay an approach to the Regent. We pointed out to the British that we had no intention of 'advising' the Regent about this matter but that we did feel it necessary to have some indication of the date and the length of time for which they would be needed. The Department therefore despatched the attached telegram to Athens on September 1. A last minute check with the British Embassy indicated no contradiction in this step, as the British Chargé in Athens has been instructed to request the views of the Regent on the timing of elections before the Regent departs for London, but to give no indication of British preferences." (868.00/9-445) For the telegram of September 1 to the Ambassador in Greece, see p. 150.

868.00/8-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 28, 1945.

[Received August 29—7: 58 p. m.]

3090. Press August 24 published following statement:

In connection with decision taken by Governments of US, UK and France to send representatives to Greece to "control" forthcoming national elections, Tass is authorized to state that position of leading Soviet circles in this question is as follows: Soviet Government is opposed to practice of control by foreign states of national elections in any country in view of fact that such practice violates principles of democracy and impairs sovereignty of country where it is desired to apply above control. On basis of foregoing, Soviet Government rejected proposal for participation Soviet Union in control of national elections in Greece.

Sent Department 3090, repeated Athens 47, Bucharest 122, Sofia 94.

[HARRIMAN]

868.00/9-145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1945—noon.

898. If at all possible please discuss most confidentially with Regent before his departure for London possibility of modification through Greek initiative of plebiscite and election formula outlined in Varkiza Agreement. For some time Dept has been inclined to feel that perhaps better method of assuring Greek political stability in future would be for elections to precede plebiscite in order that there might be installed as soon as possible representative govt which could in turn prepare questions for submission to Greek people in plebiscite (paragraph 7 Depts *aide-mémoire* under cover instruction 295 (Jul 6).³ Another possibility is that elections might be held for constitutional assembly empowered to work out solution of regime question.

Depts only wish in this instance is to encourage Greeks to reach solution offering them best possible early tranquillization unsettled conditions obtaining since liberation. We do not mean to dictate or offer gratuitous advice to Greek Govt but realize this subject under active discussion by Greek press and political figures and confidential

³ For *aide-mémoire*, see p. 132; instruction not printed.

friendly talk with Regent might offer him encouragement to crystallize Greek thinking into some formula acceptable to most political factions.

Suggestion in US *aide-mémoire* referred to above did not meet Brit approval at that time as Brit FonOff was anxious not to tamper with Varkiza Agreement and felt any change in it should be completely in hands of Greeks. Since then however Brit have indicated their desire US concert with them in confidential discussions with Regent. Brit idea that talks be postponed until Regent's London visit. Dept however could not agree to such postponement as it is felt necessary for administrative and budgetary reasons to begin almost immediately to make plans for US personnel. Any long interval between elections and plebiscite would complicate arrangements as it would involve either keeping US personnel in Greece for idle period or sending a second commission if feasible. This problem might of course be avoided if elections held first and solidly based constitutional govt established capable of itself handling question of regime effectively and convincingly, either through plebiscite or revision of constitution. Depts original request to War for personnel mentioned duty of month to 6 weeks in Greece during autumn 1945. Recent War information is that personnel available if requirement arises before Dec 1st.

Would appreciate complete report on Regent's ideas and your own recommendations.

Sent Athens, repeated to London.⁴

BYRNES

868.001/9-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 3, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received September 4—6:30 a. m.]

963. Your telegram 898, September 1. Regent has already given my British colleague preliminary views very similar to Dept's and arranged to see me today but postponed this because slightly indisposed. However, I have communicated Dept's suggestions by personal note to him today and will telegraph again after audience now set for tomorrow evening. Have also privately advised him of "my suggestion" that he be invited Washington and Dept's reply (your tele-

⁴ Repeated to London in telegram 7529.

gram 899, September 1⁵) which I am sure he will understand as well as find welcome in connection with his recent decision to continue serving Govt.

MACVEAGH

868.00/9-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 5, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received September 5—6:24 a. m.]

3167. Soviet press shows no signs of relaxing its unremitting campaign of attacks against present regime in Greece. Belgrade dispatches published September 1 and 2, reporting "orgy of Monarchist-Fascist terror", Greek, Macedonia and Yugoslav official complaints concerning alleged Greek-incited incidents on Greek-Yugoslav border,⁶ are typical of materials which continue to appear in press with monotonous persistence. *Trud* for September 2 devotes section of editorial article on trade union developments abroad to denunciation of annulment by Greek Government of recent elections to Athenian City Three Union Council. Article maintains that Ergas'⁷ victory in these elections was authentic reflection of sympathies of Greek working masses, who are being terrorized by Monarchist-Fascist circles.

Sent Department, repeated to Athens 48.

HARRIMAN

868.00/9-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 5, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received September 5—6:15 p. m.]

974. My telegram 963, September 3. British colleague and I had long talk last evening with Regent who acknowledged receipt my letter and gave his final views prior London visit as follows:

⁵ Not printed. In his telegram 932, August 28, 1945, 7 p. m., the Ambassador in Greece had commented favorably in reporting that he had "received indirect intimation" from the Regent to the effect that the latter would welcome an invitation to visit Washington after the projected London visit (868.00/8-2845). In replying the Secretary of State said in telegram 899, September 1, 1945, noon: "In spite of our esteem for Regent and appreciation of his leadership during critical period, Dept see no practical purpose to be served by visit to US at this time. Regent will undoubtedly see me and Dept representatives in London so that little further could be accomplished here. No convincing reason for his presence here could be announced and ensuing speculation linking his London and Washington visits would tend to emphasize present unfortunate cleavage between Western Allies and Russia on Greek problems. In addition we doubt wisdom of Regent's prolonged absence from Greece at this critical juncture. Consequently I hope you will seek suitable opportunities tactfully to discourage this idea." (868.00/8-2845)

⁶ For documentation regarding this subject, see pp. 300 ff.

⁷ Workers' Anti-Fascist League.

Regent said will propose in country's best interests that plebiscite be postponed for considerable period and elections held soonest and that if this proposal found acceptable it be backed up by public recommendation from British and US Governments.

In elucidation Regent added

(1) As regards postponing plebiscite unless and until country has had time to settle down under properly elected government no vote on monarchy question, which has been bane of Greece for 30 years, is likely to be considered final by Greek people. This specially true as country has recently been inflamed by rebellion and as long as any doubt remains whether Communists constitute numerical menace, many would vote for monarchy as insurance against Communism rather than from their own political convictions, to which however they would reveal [*revert?*] later thus continuing problem plebiscite designed to solve.

(2) As regards elections these should be by majority vote and not on proportional basis. This latter apt give minorities undue representation (e.g. the Communist Party in last elections before war). Elections should also be for a so-called revisionary assembly rather than ordinary legislature or constituent assembly. Constituent assembly would in effect provide only a preview of plebiscite and be subject to similar objection. The advantage of a revisionary over a purely legislative assembly under Greek constitution is that it can be larger and thus give more insurance of including all important political figures, while it can modify minor constitutional provisions such as the manner of voting though not major ones like the right of every qualified citizen to vote or the form of regime.

(3) As to desired public announcement by Allies, this would give no offense and would preserve Greek initiative if it were made as friendly recommendation to Greek people on basis full exposition Greek situation by Greek Regent. Moreover latter feels it absolutely necessary in order safeguard his position for whatever time he remains Regent by making clear that decision not personal or taken in interests any party.

(4) As regards his personal position, this would appear benefited by postponement of plebiscite only if he should continue serve as Regent, and he clearly indicated that if proposed solution obtained would wish retire, Regency being taken over by another individual or by a regency council.

In conclusion Regent said has reason believe after consulting party leaders that royalists likely accommodate themselves proposed solution despite present desire early plebiscite especially if Kernered [*sic*] recommendation included, but in this event specially urged that British and US Governments instruct diplomatic representatives Athens use their influence thereafter to keep party leaders cooperative. Said

believes elections can be used end December or early January (which would seem necessitate observers being made available at least from December 1st in view practical problems, your telegram 898, September 1), but emphasized presence observers of less importance than major party cooperation, since without latter widespread individual abstentions or official boycotts might result in voiding validity of tests in Greek eyes.

Regent's proposal for considerable postponement plebiscites, while certainly agreeing largely with demands republican party to which he has in past belonged, would appear independently based on broad general view. In addition, "republicans" in Greece constitute country's one large middle of the road and "democratic" faction in our sense. Finally in my opinion Regent's political wisdom, tolerant vision and sagacity and his devotion to interests of Greek people at large regardless of party are unapproached by any other public man in Greece today. I therefore believe his judgement in this difficult matter involving country's future should receive utmost consideration. Caccia agrees and is advising British Government substantially as above. He has been assigned Foreign Office and will accompany Regent London.

Sent Department as 974, repeated London as 94.

MACVEAGH

868.00/9-745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 7, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received September 7—4: 45 p. m.]

9163. We talked today with Sir Orme Sargent⁸ about visit here of Greek Regent Damaskinos who arrived in London yesterday.

Sir Orme told us that it was thought both in Athens and London that it would be well for the Regent personally to meet leaders of British Government and at same time talk over here in London situation now prevailing in Greece. It would not be well to involve Soviets in these talks. Consequently the talks would be carried on separately outside the field of the Council of Foreign Ministers' talks. It was hoped however, Sir Orme added, that during the Regent's stay in London a meeting with Mr. Byrnes could be arranged.

The Greek Government, Sir Orme continued, now favors postponing the plebiscite until after the elections. Greek officials have been vague about how long the plebiscite should be postponed. In his view, Sir Orme then said, the plebiscite should not be put off

⁸ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

for any protracted period. That would run counter to the agreement reached with King George and might call into question the whole arrangement under which the Regency is functioning. The King of Greece is now in Scotland. A meeting between him and the Regent at some stage during the Regent's stay seemed desirable and necessary.

The Regent plans to be here about a week.

Sent Dept as 9163, repeated Athens as 51.

WINANT

CFM Files—Lot M 88, Box 31

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal (Cannon) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)*⁹

[LONDON,] September 11, 1945.

After my conversation with Sir Maurice Petersen¹⁰ at the Foreign Office this afternoon, Mr. Hayter¹¹ asked me to stay on to discuss certain Balkan problems (See also separate memoranda).

He referred to the proposal of the Greek Regent, made to Ambassador MacVeagh, before the Regent's departure from Athens, to the effect that elections under British, American and French supervision be held at an early date, *without* the plebiscite which, under the existing agreement, should be held before the end of the year. Under the Regent's plan it would be postponed for about three years. Presumably Mr. MacVeagh asked for instructions on the matter. The British position is still undecided. They find the proposal thoroughly reasonable, because it seems that neither the Greek Government nor the "communists" really want the plebiscite which, in existing circumstances, could not be a fair one, hence the engagement to hold the plebiscite now could be dissolved by common accord. On the other hand, the Greek Royalists, hoping to win out now but doubtful of their prospects as time goes on, would be bitterly disappointed if the plebiscite is postponed. The Foreign Office would like to know how we feel about the proposal.

In this connection Mr. Hayter conveyed informally the Greek Regent's desire to meet the Secretary.¹² The Regent did not wish to risk a rejection to a formal request made directly. Mr. Hayter said that the Regent's purpose was to "pay his respects" before leaving London, but he, Hayter, thought we should like to have the back-

⁹ Mr. Dunn and Mr. Cannon were at this time serving as members of the U.S. delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

¹⁰ British Ambassador to Turkey.

¹¹ William G. Hayter, Acting Head of the Southern Department of the British Foreign Office.

¹² The Greek Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aghnides) had proposed in a letter of September 1, 1945, to the American Ambassador a meeting of the Greek Regent with the Secretary of State when the latter came to London (London Embassy Files).

ground outlined above in the event that we have not yet sent instructions to MacVeagh on the matter, since the Regent may refer to it, if the Secretary receives him.

CFM Files—Lot M88, Box 31

*Memorandum by the Soviet Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers*¹³

[Translation]

THE SITUATION IN GREECE

Reports received from Greece show that the internal political situation in that country continues to remain extremely tense and fraught with grave consequences both for the Greek people and for the peace and security of the countries which are Greece's neighbours.

Under the conditions at present prevailing in Greece free democratic elections are impossible. As regards the proposed despatch to Greece of observers of the Allied Powers to supervise the course of the forthcoming elections, obviously, under present conditions in Greece, the observers will not be able to ensure free expression of the popular will at the elections but will merely serve to obscure the abnormal situation created by the present Greek Government's violation of the Varkisa Agreement of 12th February, 1945, concluded between the Greek Government and representatives of democratic trends of opinion in Greece.

The Soviet Government accordingly consider themselves compelled to declare that they cannot accept any moral responsibility whatsoever for the political situation that has arisen in Greece. In the opinion of the Soviet Government this situation can be met by the immediate adoption of such measures with regard to the composition

¹³ This memorandum was presented on the second day of the meeting (September 12). The previous day, at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers, in a discussion to determine the agenda, the following exchange had taken place (based on the minutes of the United States delegation):

"Molotov said he would like to add the question of the political situation in Greece.

"Bevin said he declined to discuss this.

"Molotov asked if Mr. Bevin was content with the situation in Greece.

"Bevin pointed out that Mr. Molotov had objected to discussing the situation in Rumania and he found it strange that he proposed to discuss the situation in Greece.

"Molotov proposed submitting these questions in writing.

"Bevin rejoined that Greece was an Allied country and he was not prepared to discuss it.

"Byrnes said he did not think the questions on which papers were to be submitted should be placed on the agenda until the papers had been presented."

Although Greece was never put on the agenda, and never formally discussed, there was from time to time occasional passing reference to the Greek political situation in connection with other questions.

of the Greek Government as will assure the fulfillment of the Agreement concluded at Varkisa between the representatives of the then Greek Government and representatives of Greek democracy.

LONDON, 12 September, 1945.

CFM Files—Lot M 88, Box 31

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) ¹⁴

LONDON, September 13, 1945.

As to the attached memoranda,¹⁵ I think I would go along with the Archbishop and agree that the plebiscite be postponed. The Regent suggests three years. That may be too long a period.¹⁶

J[AMES] F. B[YRNES]

London Embassy Files, 1945: 800 Greece, Sept.—Dec.

The British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sargent) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

[LONDON,] September 17, 1945.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: AS you will be aware, the Foreign Secretary hopes to discuss the situation in Greece with Mr. Byrnes tomorrow, September 18th. As a result of his conversations with the Regent of Greece, Mr. Bevin has undertaken to consult the United States and French Governments about the issue of a joint statement by the three Governments giving their views on the question of the Greek elections and plebiscite. I enclose a draft¹⁷ of such a statement which might form a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. This draft has been prepared in accordance with the Regent's views and, for his part, Mr. Bevin would be willing to accept it on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

I am sending a similar letter to Monsieur Massigli.¹⁸

Yours sincerely,

O. G. SARGENT

¹⁴ The Secretary of State received the Greek Archbishop-Regent (Damaskinos) at the U.S. Embassy in London on the morning of September 13 at 10:30 a. m.; presumably this memorandum was written after the meeting.

¹⁵ Memorandum of September 11 by Mr. Cannon to Mr. Dunn, p. 155, and memorandum of September 12 by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Hare) to Mr. Dunn, not printed.

¹⁶ Notation by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), addressed to Messrs. Cannon and Hare, September 14: "The Secretary said he told the Regent he thought one year was enough."

¹⁷ Not printed; for text, see telegram 9644, September 19, from London, *infra*.

¹⁸ René Massigli, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

740.00119 Council/9-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

[LONDON,] September 19, 1945.

9644. Delsec 33.¹⁹ For McDermott from Walter Brown.²⁰ The following statement is to be released simultaneously in London, Paris and Washington at 10 p. m. today, September 19, London time, 5 p. m., Washington time.²¹ You can make it available upon receipt subject, of course, to holding for release stipulation.

Begin text.

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS ²²

During his visit to London the Regent of Greece had consultations on all the subjects which concern Greece with the representatives of the United Kingdom, United States, and French Governments, the three Governments which have agreed to send observers to Greece for the elections which are to be held there.

The three Governments hold the firm opinion that elections for a revisionary assembly should be held as soon as possible. They hope that it will be possible to arrange the elections before the end of the year.

Thus a government would be formed which would be based on the wishes of people and Parliament. The formation of such a government would facilitate the restoration of conditions of stable tranquility in Greece. Only when these conditions are in due course firmly established will it become possible to hold a free and genuine plebiscite to decide on the future regime in Greece.

The three Governments in full agreement hope and recommend that all parties in Greece with the interests of their country before them will collaborate sincerely and willingly in the execution of this programme which in their judgment represents the best hope of orderly and democratic development. *End Text.*

[Walter Brown]
WINANT

¹⁹ Numbered telegram in the series sent by the Secretary of State from London.

²⁰ Messrs. McDermott and Brown were Special Assistants to the Secretary of State, the former functioning as the Department's Press Relations Officer.

²¹ This schedule was not adhered to; due to developments in London, Mr. Brown cabled in telegram 9656, September 19, 1945, ". . . suggest you release immediately." (868.00/9-1945)

²² Incorporated in Department of State Press Release No. 691, September 19, 1945, Department of State *Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, p. 429.

868.00/9-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, September 19, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 11 : 59 p. m.]

9693. FonOff official today said following about Greek Regent's visit to London :

Damaskinos' conversations with British officials were almost entirely confined to question of elections. The announcement to be made very shortly on this subject is eminently satisfactory because FonOff feels that to have held the plebiscite before the elections would have been dangerous and that the plebiscite should be held some time in the future when tranquillity has been restored. The elections should take place in December but "in practice" a delay of a month or two may ensue.

The first meeting of the Regent with the King of Greece was stormy and the latter refused to agree to the plebiscite following the election stating (quite rightly remarked the FonOff official) that the Varkiza Agreement had declared that the plebiscite should take precedence. Another meeting between the King and Regent took place last night and "under pressure" the King finally agreed that the elections should come first.

Sent to Dept as 9693 ; repeated to Athens as 56.

WINANT

868.00/9-2045

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State*²³

LONDON, 20 September, 1945.

DEAR MR. BYRNES: Before he left England, the Regent of Greece emphasised to me the great importance which he attaches to the influence which our three Ambassadors in Athens can exercise on the Greek political leaders. He is most anxious that our representatives in Greece should impress upon the Greek politicians the need for them to cooperate over the forthcoming elections. The Regent is confident that the political leaders will listen to advice from our three Govern-

²³ The Secretary of State replied to this letter on September 24 as follows: "I fully agree with the views expressed in your letter of September 20, 1945, suggesting that the British, French, and American Ambassadors in Athens impress upon the Greek politicians the need for cooperation over the forthcoming elections, and have been glad to instruct our Ambassador in this sense". (868.00/9-2045) For the Secretary's telegraphic instruction to the Ambassador in Greece, see telegram 9875, September 24, from London, p. 161.

ments and will form a united front which would give some promise of a stable government being formed in Greece. I very much hope, therefore, that you will ask the United States Ambassador in Athens to concert action with his British and French colleagues in this sense. Such action is, as you know, provided for in the joint statement about the elections in Greece, which has just been issued by our three Governments. Appropriate instructions are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Athens.

I am sending a similar letter to M. Bidault.

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

CFM Files—Lot M 88, Box 31

The King of the Hellenes (George II) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, 22 September, 1945.

SIR: I would like to bring the following to your knowledge with regard to the Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France on the Greek question published on the 19th September 1945, the text of which was submitted to me by His Beatitude the Regent Archbishop Damaskinos:

1. The communication of this Statement of the three Powers only a few hours before its publication did not permit either myself or the Regent Archbishop to offer in time any comments we may have had to make on the subject. I regret, therefore, that we were not able to draw your attention to the great difficulties and dangers involved in this new procedure for the solution of the Greek problem both in regard to the confronting of subversive tendencies and also in so far as the final establishment of constitutional order in Greece is concerned.

2. In my desire to place no obstacle in the policy of the Allied Powers I do not propose, so far as I am concerned, to create any difficulties whatever in this new policy of the Allies.

3. I feel it my duty, nevertheless, to draw your serious attention to the fact that the reversal of the procedure laid down in the Varkiza Agreement will create new difficulties in a situation that is already considerably complicated. Any co-operation among the political parties before the regime question has been settled will be more difficult and precarious, while the Parliament that will be formed under these conditions will not be in a position to give the country the political stability that is so urgently needed. If, in addition, the existing electoral system is not changed in time by the adoption of the majority system, the threat of subversive tendencies will grow even more and the country will inevitably be led to an acute political crisis.

4. In so far as my own position as constitutional Sovereign of the country is concerned, the postponement of the plebiscite until a date not specifically fixed, in complete contradiction to the Varkiza Agreement and the Royal Act of 29th December 1944 which was drafted on the advice of the British Government, fundamentally upsets the conditions under which my absence from my country at the moment of its liberation was considered necessary.

In the certainty that it cannot possibly be the wish of the three Allied Powers that a constitutional Sovereign who has fought by their side from the very first moment of the struggle should be forced to remain outside his country against the desires of his people as daily becoming more manifest, I wish to make it clear, with this opportunity, that I consider it imperative that the opinion of the Greek people on this subject should be ascertained as soon as possible.

I remain,

Yours truly,

GEORGE II R.

740.00119 Council/9-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Acting Secretary of State

LONDON, September 24, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 4:45 p. m.]

9875. Delsec 53. Sent to AmEmb Athens as 59, for the Ambassador from the Secretary; repeated to Dept as 9875, September 24. You are requested to concert with your British and French colleagues with respect to impressing upon the Greek politicians the need for them to cooperate over the forthcoming elections with a view to the eventual establishment of a stable govt. Your colleagues will receive similar instructions. [Byrnes.]

WINANT

868.00/9-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 25, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received September 26—3:04 p. m.]

1077. Mytel 1076, September 25.²⁴ Before giving interview to press yesterday Regent received British colleague,²⁵ myself and French

²⁴ Not printed; the telegram as received in the Department was dated September 26, but it was apparently drafted on September 25 which was the day following the Regent's press interview.

²⁵ That is, the British Ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper.

Chargé in order named and made to each a plea for support in securing collaboration among chief political leaders in forthcoming elections (mytel 992, September 9²⁶). In outlining his ideas to me talked of uniting as many parties as possible in concerted effort secure thoroughly national democratic parliament, obviating Communist menace as first requirement present situation. Proposed persuading party leaders agree on single national ticket. Admitted differences along party lines certain declare themselves promptly in any chamber so formed, also that resulting government necessarily only coalition and probably impermanent, but emphasized all other problems even that of regime now secondary in comparison with that of eliminating threat to democracy itself. Stated intends throw full weight his influence behind this proposal and while realizes partisan proclivities of political leaders may be difficult overcome, feels can win if Allies back him sufficiently.

I told Regent have no instructions regarding support desired but thanked him for exposition and expressed my understanding. French colleague also told him no instructions and is wiring Paris. This morning I saw British colleague and he informed me that he has been personally instructed by Mr. Bevin to support Regent in urging politicians work together, but interprets this in general terms and feels can only urge collaboration to extent outlined in tripartite London statement. Said Regent told him he hoped he would use his influence on leaders of all parties except EAM (Greek Liberation Front) naming specifically John Thmotokis (Royalist), Kaphanaaris (Progressive), Papandreou (Socialist Democratic) and Sophoulis (Liberal).

Sent Dept as No. 1077; repeated London as 103.

MACVEAGH

868.00/9-2545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 25, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received September 26—2: 25 p. m.]

1078. In conversation with British colleague reported in my telegram 1077, September 25 latter said feels Regent has lately lost full touch with conditions here and has also developed personal tendency autocracy while allowing growing fear of communism to blind him to rightist influences in supposedly service govt. Will attempt apply correction. Speculated on possibility replacing Voulgaris with Tsouderos²⁷ or Varvaressos²⁸ but said rather inclined to avoid an-

²⁶ Not printed.

²⁷ Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, Greek Prime Minister, April 1941 to April 1944.

²⁸ Kyriakos Varvaressos, former Vice Premier and Minister of Finance, who had resigned from the Government in early September.

other change of govt before elections and merely to urge on Regent necessity of liberalizing Cabinet by replacing Minister Interior and Minister Press and perhaps adding some well-known liberal as Vice President Council. Emphasized he personally now hard-pressed by Mr. Bevin to secure further substantial release of prisoners under amnesty on account Leftist questions certain be asked soon in Parliament and said will urge my Govt to see to it that at least all persons still incarcerated merely for their political differences or beliefs be now set free. Finally spoke of date of elections and expressed hope I would say something to Prime Minister not only about holding these before end of year but about advisability announcing date soonest in order enable observing powers proceed arrangements. This connection said Prime Minister has already told him such announcement may be possible within 2 weeks, but urged matter not be lost sight of. Feels as I do that as soon as date fixed heads of commission together with their immediate staffs should come at once Greece to acquaint themselves with conditions and also solve practical problems billeting, transportation, etc. Incidentally remarked finds much easier discuss matters Regent as conversations with Prime Minister always formal and officially transcribed. Obviously feels increased impatience with local Rightist manoeuvres since making contact with new Labor Govt London.

Following above conversation I called on Prime Minister at his request to talk informally general situation. He explained his personal position some length, saying willing to serve till after elections as long as principal parties unable get together form another interim govt. Emphasized his "democratic" sentiments and expressed acquiescence in allied recommendation for elections first despite personal preference priority plebiscite. I took this occasion mention date elections and urged this be set soonest because present availability our observers not likely continue. Also because of desirability disarming criticism that Greece lacks democratic govt. He replied that he is "99% sure" that elections can be held by December 15. Discussion then turned supervision elections, and as this Embassy in possession positive proof election booklets (certifying registration and entitling persons vote) now being widely duplicated Athens, advised Prime Minister "my belief" United States Govt especially interested in seeing that coming tests are "democratic elections democratically carried out", while also "my impression" that one of first things observers likely desire determine is whether duplicate voting possible. We then reminisced concerning plebiscite 1935 in which he laughingly said "1,000 men produced 100,000 votes" and he assured me this question very much on his mind and law will shortly be promulgated making penal offense possess more than one booklet. (However believe our observers will be well-advised insist some such

sure system as stamping voters hand with indelible ink after balloting.) In conclusion Prime Minister referred Greece's foreign affairs. Said cannot support follies of Greek press which would appear want Allies go war Russia for sake Greece but does feel latter's just claims may be in process neglect among many present difficulties United Nations. I assured him United States great friend Greece not losing sight just dues but pointed out that events here since liberation have contributed no small share to international anxieties and advised best thing for Greece now would be set house in order and by prompt elections make clear true position as member of democratic world.

MACVEAGH

868.00/9-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 26, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received September 27—8:30 a. m.]

1082. In reply urtel 59, Sept. 24.²⁹ Matter being concerted with British, French colleagues in accordance your wishes but Frenchman still awaiting instructions (mytel 103 Sept. 25).³⁰

Sent London as 105 repeated Dept as 1082.

MACVEAGH

868.01/9-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 27, 1945—12 a. m.

[Received September 27—11:14 a. m.]

1085. Winant's telegram September 19, repeated here as No. 56. Both Regent and British colleague have confirmed London FonOff information that in Regent's last conversation with King latter "accepted" idea of priority of elections in view Allied statement (urtel 1002, September 24³¹). Leeper added statement came as complete surprise to King. I asked Regent if he thinks King will now urge his supporters here collaborate other parties over elections and he said would be desirable but considers doubtful.

MACVEAGH

²⁹ Same as telegram 9875, September 24, 4 p. m., p. 161.

³⁰ Same as telegram 1077, September 25, 7 p. m., p. 161.

³¹ Telegram 1002 not printed; for the statement of September 19, see telegram 9644, September 19, from London, p. 158.

Athens Embassy Files, 1945, 800 Elections

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to Archbishop Damaskinos,
Regent of Greece*

ATHENS, September 27, 1945.

YOUR BEATITUDE: I have the honor to inform Your Beatitude that I have now received a message from the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Byrnes, instructing me to concert with my colleagues of Great Britain and France in regard to impressing upon the Greek political leaders the need for them to cooperate over the forthcoming elections with a view to the eventual establishment of a stable government in this country.

I am communicating this to Your Beatitude because of Your Beatitude's request to Mr. Byrnes and the promise which he gave Your Beatitude in this connection. As I informed Your Beatitude last Monday I was not then in receipt of instructions, but since receiving them I have already started to confer with my colleagues, and I feel it is unnecessary to assure Your Beatitude that I shall carry out the Secretary's instructions to the best of my ability.

I beg Your Beatitude to accept my highest expressions of respect.

[LINCOLN MACVEAGH]

868.00/9-2945

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the
Secretary of State*

No. R 16589/4/19

[LONDON,] 29 September, 1945.

MR. J. BYRNES: I have received a letter from the King of the Hellenes about the joint statement on Greece issued by the British, United States and French Governments on 19th September.

In this letter the King expresses his regret that he was not consulted about the statement before it was issued and draws attention to the difficulties and dangers which, in his view, are involved in the procedure set out in the statement. At the same time he gives an assurance that he does not wish to place any obstacles in the way of the Allied Powers and does not therefore propose to create any difficulties for them in the execution of this policy. Referring to his own position, the King says that he considers it imperative that the opinion of the Greek people on the constitutional issue should be ascertained as soon as possible.

I understand that His Majesty has addressed a similar letter to you and Monsieur Bidault and I should be most grateful if you felt able to inform me of the line you are taking in reply. For my part, I

propose to say that I have taken note of the views expressed by the King about the course of action recommended in the joint statement and that I am grateful for his assurance that he does not propose to create any difficulties in the way of the execution of the policy decided upon by the three Governments. I am assuring the King that this decision has only been taken after a careful study of the information available to us about the situation in Greece and that although I do not underestimate the difficulties which have still to be overcome, I am sure that if this programme is loyally executed it will offer the best prospects of establishing a stable and democratic government in Greece and of enabling the Greek people to repair the ravages of war and to decide for themselves on the future regime of their country in conditions of normal tranquillity.

I am sending a similar letter to Monsieur Bidault.

Yours sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

868.00/9-2945

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)

LONDON, October 1, 1945.

DEAR MR. BEVIN: I received your letter of September 29th with regard to the letter you have received from the King of Greece. I received a letter from the King of Greece also, which is quite similar to the one you described.

I think you will understand that, in view of the pressure the last day or so, I have been unable to give much thought to this subject and I hope you will forgive me if I wait until my return to Washington to send you an answer.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

CFM Files—Lot M 88, Box 31

The Secretary of State to the King of the Hellenes (George II)

[LONDON,] October 1, 1945.

YOUR MAJESTY: I have read with close attention your letter of September 22, and I thank you for the observations you have made with regard to the statement recently released by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the matter of elections in Greece.

The complexity of the problems which have beset the Greek people since their liberation is apparent, but I feel sure that the procedures recommended are those best calculated to create conditions under

which they can utilize their fine aptitudes in the rehabilitation of their country and in the restoration of the institutions of democratic government.

I sincerely appreciate the attitude of which you have given me assurance, with regard to the policy which the three Governments have found best suited to promote the welfare of the Greek people.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

868.00/10-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 4, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 5—9 : 36 p. m.]

1121. French colleague informed me this morning now authorized hold conversations political leaders subject elections along same lines this Embassy. Said saw Mylonas, Agrarian leader yesterday and expects see EAM Central Committee tomorrow. British colleague saw Executive Committee Populist Party and Sophoulis³² leader Liberal Party yesterday. I saw Mylonas yesterday and EAM Central Committee this morning expecting Populist Committee tomorrow. Both colleagues and I laid emphasis tripartite Allied London statement and stressed need all parties cooperate over forthcoming elections with view establish stable govt (Secretary's instructions referred Dept's telegram 1027 [1024], Sept 28³³). No advice given as to mechanics collaboration which wholly Greek affair. Leeper went so far with both Populists and Sophoulis as to suggest "older and larger parties get down on paper social programme corresponding present requirements reconstruction Greece"; but told Populists his advice was not "to form block against any other party (viz Communists) but to secure widest measure unity." Nevertheless EAM paper *Eleftheri Ellada* yesterday afternoon expressed suspicion Allied intervention going further than London communiqué with aim strengthening Greek center and forming coalition with the Right against the Left. "Such intervention means nothing more than intervention British Govt and British diplomacy seeking solution Greek political crisis at expense people. Means solidifying forces monarchy and conservative democracy against EAM. Means the Scobie-Leeper policy, i.e., civil war." Simultaneously both Leftist and Nationalist papers speculate as to whether or not dissolution of Foreign Ministers Conference London means tripartite communiqué Greek affairs obsolete.

³² Themistocles Sophoulis, Liberal Party leader.

³³ Not printed.

Leeper and I feel continued concerted pressure may produce some useful results securing more national attitude party leaders but so far reaction only lengthy exposition of partisan viewpoints as already known Dept. Populists want elections soonest minimizing all difficulties involved because they feel sure victory now. Liberals think will lose early elections and therefore magnify difficulties and want postpone. Small anti-royalist parties (example Mylonas) urge proportional system elections under which may hope elect some representatives and also want postponement same reason Liberals. EAM likewise wants "proportional" and postponement emphasizing widespread intimidation Leftist sympathizers by existing officials largely Rightist in sentiment; demands as prerequisite participation elections that registration be recommenced under conditions permitting all qualified voters register without fear reprisals; claims 200,000 persons now effectively disqualified this reason; reiterates previous demands general amnesty and formation of "political" govt to hold elections.

Further information attitude parties will be telegraphed promptly as conversations continue. Meanwhile agree with British colleague who telegraphed London "We are at present in the state of party maneuvers and cannot get much further until date of elections announced".

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 5, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 5—3 p. m.]

1124. My telegram 1121 October 4. The Executive Committee Populist Party assured me today willing collaborate other parties for establishment stable government and said already established basis agreement with former Liberals Papandreou, Gonatas, Alexandris. Said EAM statement thousands fear register untrue and claimed registration certain top 1936³⁴ figures. Regard all arguments postponement final registration date untenable and due same motives causing demand postponement elections namely fear Royalist victory. Urged early fixing election date as certain help ease popular tension which said likely cause incidents. Made much of willingness expressed to Prime Minister see pre-election period prolonged (their view unnecessarily) as late as January 6.

Following this interview which along expected lines was confidentially informed by Lambrinopoulos assistant to Prime Minister that election date has been fixed January 20 and will be announced to-

³⁴The last previous general election was held January 26, 1936.

night with promulgation electoral law to follow completion registration. His view also registration likely top 1936 figures. However continue believe this phase operations too important not be subject careful review and hence would again urge early arrival foreign observers. Expect see Sophoulis Liberal leader tomorrow.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 6, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received October 7—12:10 p. m.]

1128. My telegram 1124, October 5 and previous. Saw Liberal leader Sophoulis today and urged he collaborate in general effort establish stable government on same terms employed with others. In reply he affirmed his party's earnest desire hold genuine elections soonest but emphasized considers present conditions unfavorable alleging current falsification electoral lists, continue Rightist terror and communication difficulties. Expressed doubt Voulgaris Government able restore suitable conditions, claiming Prime Minister's good intentions frustrated by "invisible Government" of "X" and other Rightist organizations. Stressed methods of holding elections "even more important" than elections themselves. Argued at length for proportional system, pointing out majority system likely result in Republican, Royalist chamber and bourgeois coalition government to complete exclusion Left which considers unhealthy. Faced such possibility younger voters untrained democratic process likely join Communists creating unmanageable unrepresented opposition in country. On other hand, proportional system would bring Communists into Parliament where feels his party "would know how to disarm them" by adopting best parts their social economic program. Expect see Kaphandaris,³⁵ Tsougelos [*Tsouderos?*] ³⁶ possibly Monday.

MACVEAGH

103.9166 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

ATHENS, October 7, 1945.
[Received October 7—12:46 p. m.]

1129. For Hunt Carroll OWI from Dickson as Astra 6. . . . Morning papers October 6 announced decision Govt hold elections

³⁵ George Kaphandaris, long-time Republican, briefly Prime Minister in 1924, several times Minister of Finance, leader of the Progressive Party.

³⁶ Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, Greek Prime Minister from April 1941 to April 1944.

January 20. First press reactions Populists jubilant, Liberals, EAM, Communists bitterly critical. Abstention from elections threatened by Liberals, Progressives, Agrarians and Socialists in addition Communists already committed this stand. Nationalist parties of ex-Liberal Gonatas, Papandreou, Alexandris supporting Populists.

[Dickson]
MACVEAGH

868.00/10-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 7, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

1133. Following Government announcement election date (my telegram 1129, October 7) and despite apparent sympathetic reception my urging all leaders collaborate to achieve greatest possible measure national unity (my telegram 1128, October 6), Sophoulis held Liberal Party conference yesterday afternoon and later joined Progressive Agrarian and Socialist Parties in issuing statements this morning's press threatening abstention elections unless certain conditions secured, principally formation of new government inspiring more general confidence. Sophoulis' statement insists Voulgaris Government unable prepare quick and honest elections. "Only political government of center with participation moderate elements will be adequate" to do this and deal with economic problem. "If necessary conditions are not achieved Liberal Party (which on principle opposed to abstention) is not inclined share responsibility for pitiful electoral comedy which will result in national tragedy." Supporting this point of view Kaphandaris (Progressive) calls Government decision "*coup d'état* which will lead Greek people to civil war and Greece to destruction". Mylonas (Agrarian) says only Governmental change can create proper conditions for elections and failing this only defense democratic parties is abstention. Svolos (Socialist) speaks of "destructive game" being played at expense of Greek people and says "no one can believe that any consistently democratic party would agree to participate in such a comedy". In addition Tsouderos (Independent) urging Government withdraw its decree echoes "dangerous division" and Communist *Rizospastis* speaks of "legalized *coup d'état* against people by collaborationist—Regent, and Leeper".

Faced with above situation British colleague told me this morning he has sent word to Regent who is out of town over Sunday that he should act promptly and that "what would be best with House of Commons" now scheduled convene shortly would be announcement of

formation new government of Left Center. Suggested Tsouderos as possibly best chance head such government on account republicanism and understanding economics finance.

Leeper added his experience in talks with political leaders agrees with mine in showing latter polite but uninterested our appeals national unity in comparison partisan aims. Believes with me fundamental cause failure collaborate is complete absorption politicians in problem of monarchy and persistent widespread suspicion Britain intending bring back King all costs and backing Rightist elements this connection. Said this suspicion must be obviated and desirable either British Government issue clear statement real attitude or perhaps more feasible support Republican forces here as method likely achieve greatest measure unity. Would include in proposed Left Center Government one or two non-Communist members resistance movement. Realizes difficulty likely arise with Army and National Guard now chiefly Royalist but feels Extreme Right unlikely attempt coup in view certain lack all foreign support and "anyway must risk something".

Apparently Republican Democratic Greece (aided this instance by Communists) is coming close to forcing showdown from British on their attitude toward King which I indicated in my last Greek report in 1941 as certain become critical after liberation but which never yet openly clarified.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 8, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received October 9—4: 45 p. m.]

1138. No developments in the Greek political situation since yesterday (my telegram 1133 October 7). However Papandreou called this afternoon and confirmed his present stand alongside Populists (my telegram 1124 October 5). Emphasized that he is Socialist but nevertheless willing collaborate over elections with any party putting National ahead purely partisan interests which characterized as of "secondary importance". Said sees "Russia demanding Africa and finding Greece insupportable" and feels only possible answer voice of Greek people saying wants National and not Communist state. Severely scored threat Liberal Party abstain elections as "manoeuvre" on part Sophoulis secure premiership but added "knows" liberal rank and file opposing this "anti-National" stand and believes Venizelos³⁷

³⁷ Sophocles Venizelos, prominent Liberal Party member (a son of the statesman, and founder of the Liberal Party, Eleftherios Venizelos), who, briefly, had been Prime Minister in April 1944.

will head up opposition. Therefore thinks present interim government should by all means remain and if stands firm and goes ahead preparing elections Liberals will participate. Said view Government unable hold fair elections untenable and mere mask for Partisan fear Royalist victory if tests held soon. Claimed security and order in country now well established and registration effected with every effort fairness pointing out guarantees provided by presence British Police Mission and coming of foreign observers. Finally emphasized "Left Center" government no more likely than other governments to avoid Communist opposition despite present promises since KKE tactics are regularly to render any government unviable but one under own domination.

During conversation Papandreou expressed wish foreign Ambassadors' influence keep Voulgaris in power to which I replied my instructions urge party leaders collaborate in interests formation stable government not intervene local affairs. However pointed out British colleague regularly engaged such intervention and advised him see Leeper soonest as latter might find view Liberals unsatisfied Sophoulis' stand of some interest in connection advices being wired Bevin on eve Parliament session.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 9, 1945.

[Received October 9—4: 45 p. m.]

1139. Regent accepted resignation Voulgaris Cabinet noon today.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-1145 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 11, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 7: 30 p. m.]

10627. My telegram 10515, Oct. 9.³⁸ In discussing resignation of Voulgaris' Cabinet Hayter head of Southern Dept of FonOff told us today that British are maintaining attitude that it is up to Greeks to work out their own salvation, and that British Ambassador in Athens had been instructed to say as much to Regent. Asked whether Ambassador had indicated nature of Cabinet which British would favor Hayter replied in negative but said he thought Regent

³⁸ Not printed.

had quite a clear idea of British thinking in that regard. Hayter then added as afterthought that occasion had in fact been taken to observe to Greeks that British had heard mention made of Tsouderos as possible PriMin and to say that such an appointment would be viewed with misgiving not so much because of any strong feelings of British Govt in the matter but because name of Tsouderos linked with events³⁹ which would make his appointment unpopular in eyes of British public.

Speaking generally of Greek political situation Hayter deplored lack of able leadership and difficulty of reconciling British standards of Govt with Greek political concepts. It was in realization of these irreconcilable points of view he said that British are increasingly stressing necessity of Greek assuming respect [*responsibility?*] for their domestic affairs.

Sent to Dept as 10627 rptd to Athens as 65.

GALLMAN

868.00/10-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 16, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received October 16—3 : 37 p. m.]

1169. Mytel 1167, October 15.⁴⁰ Regent's latest move abortive attempt persuade Dimitracopoulos, Minister Communication under Voulgaris, form service govt. Is continuing talks political personalities and expected again appeal all leaders collaborate.

British colleague told me last night has wired London Greek crisis reached impasse and disturbances possible if continues another 48 hours. Has also asked release from present new policy nonintervention which has been strictly following [*followed*] past few days (Deptel 65, October 11⁴¹) and during our conversation special messenger arrived from Regent begging him consult further. Leeper feels Left Center political govt still best solution long run, but only possible form such govt now if Regent clearly assured of British backing against continuing Royalist intransigence and possible violence. Meanwhile economic situation further deteriorating. Employees five biggest banks Athens striking today with likelihood spreading civil servants.

MACVEAGH

³⁹ A reference to the mutinies in the Greek Army and Navy in April 1944.

⁴⁰ Not printed (868.00/10-1545). This was one of several telegrams in which the Ambassador in Greece reported in detail the efforts of the Regent to end the political impasse, and the reaction of the political parties and leaders thereto, during the first week of the governmental crisis.

⁴¹ Same as telegram 10627, *supra*.

868.00/10-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 17, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7:39 p. m.]

1174. My telegram 1169, October 16. In present impasse Regent has decided to assume Premiership temporarily and is forming govt this morning. Told my British colleague unwilling form political govt of Left Center because his conviction these groups now minority and is personally not "a revolutionist". Govt will be of service character. Intends use old Voulgaris Cabinet as starting point and attempt strengthen immediately on financial and economic sides.

British colleague informed from London policy remain aloof remains unchanged but explained to me this morning practically impossible avoid having influence in view Regent's constant reference his opinions. Thinks British Govt whose unwillingness officially state not intending bring back King continues encourage partisan split between Royalists and Republicans (thereby giving Communists undue political importance over-all situation), should now accord Regent full support in courageous exertion leadership. Has told Regent he "thinks he is doing right thing" but cautioned him action very risky since Regency itself will be discredited if new govt ineffective.

MACVEAGH

868.00/10-2045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1945—1 p. m.

9292. Please inform the appropriate Brit. authorities that the President has today appointed Dr. Henry F. Grady as his representative with personal rank of Ambassador to head the American group which will cooperate with representatives of the Brit. and French Govts in observing the forthcoming Greek elections.⁴²

You may add that we believe that the three Govts who have accepted responsibility in connection with these elections should begin to make plans for carrying out these responsibilities without further delay. Dr. Grady is prepared to proceed to London within the next 10 days to discuss this matter with the appropriate representatives of the Brit. Govt if in the opinion of the Brit. Govt such a visit would be helpful. If the Brit. authorities agree it is suggested that they may wish at the same time to invite the French Govt to send a repre-

⁴² For statement by the Secretary of State on October 20, announcing the appointment of Mr. Grady, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 21, 1945, p. 611.

sentative to London to participate in these discussions. Our thought is that following these discussions it might be found advisable for the representatives of the three Govts to proceed at once to Greece in order to obtain a clear picture of the situation on the spot and to coordinate plans with the Greek Govt before returning to their respective countries to complete preparations.

Sent to London, repeated to Paris and Athens.

BYRNES

868.00/10-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 22, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 22—5:55 p. m.]

11050. Foreign Office official expressed gratification at Dr. Grady's appointment and said that ideas contained in Department's 9292, October 20 seemed practicable. Official remarked however that British had not selected appropriate representative but matter was under active discussion and that it was hoped that appointment would be made within next fortnight. Official believed however that British would not be able discuss question of Greek elections with Grady "before 2 or 3 weeks".

Sent to Department as 11050; repeated to Paris as 679 and Athens as 71.

GALLMAN

868.00/10-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1945—7 p. m.

9562. Reurtel 11050, Oct. 22, 6 p. m. In view magnitude of arrangements to be completed following proposed discussions in London and subsequent preliminary survey in Greece, we are anxious that Dr. Grady get started earliest possible moment. Please endeavor to expedite Brit decisions. We hope London talks can take place not later than November 15.

For your info Dr. Grady will be accompanied by FSO⁴³ Foy D. Kohler, who will act as Secretary General American delegation.

Sent London. Repeated Paris and Athens.⁴⁴

BYRNES

⁴³ Foreign Service Officer; Mr. Kohler was Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁴⁴ As telegrams 5055 and 1124, respectively.

868.00/10-3145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 31, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received October 31—10 a. m.]

11380. Embassy has received letter from Foreign Office regarding Allied observers for forthcoming Greek elections. This states that British are in entire agreement with program outlined in Embassy's letter based on Dept's 9292, October 20; see also Embassy's 11050, October 22. Letter continues that British regard it as most important that heads of Allied Missions should proceed to Greece as soon as possible to examine on spot detailed arrangements which must be made.

British still considering appointment of British Mission head and it is hoped that decision will be reached in few days. Letter adds that possibly British will not be able discuss matter with Dr. Grady if he comes here during first days of November and British hope he may agree to postpone journey "for a few days" until British head has been definitely selected.

Sent Department as 11380 repeated Athens as 73.

WINANT

868.00/11-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 2, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received November 3—5:24 p. m.]

1239. My telegram 1233, November 2.⁴⁵ Rapid formation new government took press and political world by surprise. First reaction Royalist-Nationalist press reserved, Republican papers pessimistic or hostile indicating fear ostensibly democratic appearance simply mask for Royalism and pointing out Regent's responsibility. Socialists and Extreme Left bitterly attack Regent and Government professing see Papandreou behind new development. Populist and Liberal leaders

⁴⁵ Not printed; Ambassador MacVeagh had reported the formation of a government on the evening of November 1 by Panayotis Kanellopoulos, a former university professor, who had been in and out of Greek politics since 1935 (868.00/11-245).

During the week preceding the formation of the Kanellopoulos government—the third week of the Greek governmental crisis—the Ambassador in Greece continued to report in detail by telegram the Regent's unsuccessful search for a political leader capable of forming a government amidst the political and economic confusion then prevailing. The most prominent and active political figure of the period was Sophocles Venizelos, who, failing in private efforts to effect a coalition of Liberals and Populists, was commissioned by the Regent on October 28 to form a "government of personalities"; in this, too, Mr. Venizelos was unsuccessful, ending his efforts on October 29.

withhold comment awaiting Prime Minister's promised statement, while Papandreou quoted saying, "We extend esteem and sympathy new government and pray its success, but persons must be judged by programs".

British colleague equally surprised with others. Was notified only after government formed last night. Says cannot regard Cabinet as "strong team" but perhaps "not too bad if Greeks will give it chance". Thinks it essentially a Kanellopoulos-Tsatsos⁴⁶ construction believing latter exercises strong influence Regent. Despite Right-Center as opposed to Left-Center complexion hitherto favored by British, considers only course give it all support in view possibly disastrous consequences another failure.

Right-Center complexion recalls Regent's former stipulation that government must include elements of Right (my telegram 1150, Part 1, October 11⁴⁷) and is perhaps indication essential fear his part directed Communism. Behind his solicitude for state undoubtedly lies concern for church which recently attacked by Zachariades⁴⁸ (my despatch 1539, September 18⁴⁹). British colleague feels he also swayed by conviction majority elements country lie Right rather than Left and regards duty not place minority in power winning elections (my telegram 1174, October 17).

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-945

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] November 9, 1945.

M. Lacoste⁵⁰ called this morning and, referring to our recent conversations regarding the forthcoming Greek elections, said the Embassy had now received a telegram from Paris stating that:

1) General Laparra, former Chief of the French Military Liaison Mission at AFHQ in Italy, had been appointed to head the French group which would observe the Greek elections;

2) The Foreign Minister would authorize General Laparra to proceed to London for discussions with the British and ourselves as soon as the British had designated their own man for the purpose and extended an invitation;

3) The Foreign Ministry was prepared to authorize General Laparra to accompany American and British representatives to Greece for a preliminary survey.

⁴⁶ The brothers Tsatsos, Themistocles and Costa, were both close friends of the Regent; the former had been a minister in the Papandreou government.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ Nicholas Zachariades, leader of the Greek Communist Party, imprisoned by the Germans at Dachau until the end of the war.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Minister at the French Embassy in the United States.

In reply to my inquiry, M. Lacoste confirmed that the French had not yet been approached by the British in connection with this question.

Note: Mr. Baxter informed Mr. Pares of the British Embassy about the foregoing conversation and expressed our surprise that the British had not yet approached the French. Pares said the Embassy would telegraph London on the subject.

868.00/11-1045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 10, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 10—11:50 a. m.]

11820. See Embtel 11522, November 2; repeated Paris as 713 and Athens as 74.⁵¹ FonOff official has informed us that R. T. Windle has been appointed British representative on Greek Elections Mission. Windle is not in *Who's Who* nor is he known to Embassy. FonOff official says Windle is about 55 years of age; that in 1921 he became member of Labor Party staff; from 1921 to 1929 he was a labor organizer in the London districts; and that since 1929 he has been assistant national agent at Labor Party Headquarters. FonOff official stated that Windle certainly knows all there is to know about British elections and that he seems a "sensible" man.

French Embassy has just phoned FonOff that General Laparra has been appointed French representative and that he will come to London as soon as Dr. Grady arrives.

Sent Dept as 11820; repeated Paris as 725 and Athens as 78.

WINANT

868.00/11-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 20, 1945—midnight.

[Received November 22—4:15 a. m.]

1331. Govt resigned this morning. Gave no reasons but opinion tends ascribe action to failure obtain assurance effective British support financial economic measures.⁵² However, British colleague informed me this afternoon that faced with what Sir Reginald calls

⁵¹ Not printed.

⁵² The 20 days which marked the life of the Kanellopoulos government were notable for developments in Athens, Caserta, London, and Washington with respect to the problem embodied in the steady deterioration in Greek economic and financial affairs; for documentation regarding this subject, see pp. 255-275, *passim*.

[garble] McNeil proposals⁵³ Regent recently wired Bevin for latter's views, expressing belief political issues, especially issue of the regime, cannot be divorced from economic problems if satisfactory stability expected. This also Leeper's opinion, but not in accord policy followed Kanellopoulos Govt which has attempted attack economic problems separately to begin with. Bevin replied British Govt willing give all possible political economic support to Greek Govt established on wide political basis which should hold elections by March 1946 at latest, defer plebiscite until 1948, and accept British Economic Mission with serious aim implement constructive economic program according its advice. This exchange views communicated by Regent to Kanellopoulos caused latter step aside allow Regent free hand. Attempt being made form new Govt tonight with Regent intending entrust Govt to Greece's eldest statesman (Sophoulis) with Tsouderos likely take over directing functions economic finance, and Sophianopoulos Foreign Affairs. British colleague unable say whether Populists will collaborate immediately but feel British support, which now offered only to Left Center, will attract them later as also perhaps some elements from Left. This connection, Populist source told Embassy this morning his party now prepared participate any coalition govt which receives advance unconditional guarantee Allied economic support and British colleague told me feels such support by British eventually likely include further "scraping of barrel" if Greece shows genuine intention follow advice in putting house in order.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 22, 1945.

[Received November 22—12:48 p. m.]

12244. The following is text of public statement issued by King of Greece yesterday:

"The postponement of the plebiscite in Greece for 3 years accompanied by the formation of a one-party government creates a completely new situation. When Greece was liberated I agreed at the suggestion of my Government and on the advice of the British Government to return to my country only after the freely expressed

⁵³ Reference is to the visit made to Athens at this time by Hector McNeil, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and proposals made by him to the Greek Government that the latter invite a British economic mission to Greece. For documentation regarding these developments, see pp. 262-272, *passim*.

consent of the Greek people. For this reason I entrusted to the Archbishop Regent the exercise of my royal duties for the time of emergency resulting from the civil war.

The Varkiza Agreement which put an end to the civil war specifically laid down that the plebiscite would be held before the end of the current year and that it would precede the elections in September of this year. However, it was decided that elections should precede the plebiscite which was to be held at a future unspecified date. Now it is unilaterally decided that the plebiscite should once again be postponed for 3 years and in the meantime a government has been formed, made up exclusively of Republicans. This solution is no more applicable than the proposal that elections should precede the plebiscite because since the Greek people are to be called upon to go to the polls sooner or later it is obvious that the question of the regime either explicitly or implicitly will automatically be put before the electorate. Such a solution is also harmful to the economic and political recovery of the country as it would lead to the perpetuation of a state of uncertainty that would aggravate the present political tension and prevent economic rehabilitation. The lack of stable government for some months now through the succession of temporary administrations which speedily lose control of the situation has shown beyond all possible doubt that the imperative collaboration among the Greek people cannot be achieved unless recourse is taken honestly and frankly to the will of the Greek people.

Finally this solution and especially the manner in which it has been linked with the continuation of financial assistance constitutes an insult to the Greek people who have no less than any other people the right to express their opinion regarding their regime and government. The postponement of the plebiscite for 3 years would amount to the stifling of the sentiment of the Greek people which as is known to all is being expressed clearly in my favour at every opportunity. So as far as I am concerned the repudiation of every decision that has so far been taken compels me to regulate my future attitude without any reservation other than the interests of my people and the respect of its sovereign will."

Repeated to Athens.

WINANT

868.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 22, 1945—12 a. m.

[Received 7:44 p. m.]

1334. Mytel 1331 November 20. Sophoulis yesterday presented Regent with Cabinet list including Kaphandaris, Vice President of

Council without Portfolio, Tsouderos, also Vice President and Minister of Coordination Sophianopoulos Foreign Affairs and temporarily Press and Information, Mylonas Finance and Rendis Interior. This, however found unacceptable to Regent (despite Sophoulis understanding he previously given *carte blanche*) who urged Papandreou and Kanellopoulos be included. During following consultations in effort effect compromise no alternative solution found practical and finally McNeil advised Regent that unless Govt formed during day would be forced return London. Meanwhile during evening BBC⁵⁴ broadcast statement by King condemning postponement of plebiscite and formation of exclusively Republican Govt as creating new situation prejudicial to economic and political reconstruction country. Said this solution and notably manner in which connected with continued financial aid is insult to Greek people and concluded "to adjourn plebiscite 3 years will result in strangling Greek sentiment which publicly known to have expressed itself in my favor upon every occasion offered". Faced with above situation, Regent swore in Sophoulis Cabinet at 3:15 a. m. today and stated he would resign. Further developments and comment later.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 22—3:35 p. m.]

12253. Foreign Office officials said following to us regarding Greek situation:

Foreign Office has little information other than what has appeared in the press. It is still hoped that Regent will not resign. Leeper's telegram of 3 a. m. this morning stated only that Regent was "bent on resigning".

King's official note to British govt was substantially same as public statement (Embassy's 12244), particularly with respect to concluding statement as to his freedom of action. The King was "hasty" in issuing his statement which was based on incomplete information regarding suggestion for postponement of plebiscite until 1948.

We are advised *Manchester Guardian* statement (Embassy's 12252, 22d⁵⁵) substantially accurate. Foreign Office officials state talk of loan is being dragged in unnecessarily and greatly exaggerated. They point out that Greeks think of money first and always. They said Britain cannot consider loan to Greece at present but that McNeil

⁵⁴ British Broadcasting Corporation.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

was authorized to promise maximum British assistance through advice and general help towards rehabilitation.

It is expected that Bevin will make a statement in Commons tomorrow afternoon on Greek situation as Foreign Office expects full reports before then.

Sent Dept 12253, repeated to Athens 87.

WINANT

868.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 22, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received November 23—6:15 p. m.]

1338. See mytel 1334, November 22. British Ambassador stressed to me this afternoon that new Cabinet not formed along party lines but composed of political personalities prepared carry out such a program as British willing support. Pointed out fairly wide range including Kaphandaris, Mylonas, Sophianopoulos, Kartalis. Believes Kanellopoulos may also join and Papandreou give approval though remaining outside. Said Regent's decision resign was due his desire Papandreou be included which not acceptable majority others. Has urged entire Cabinet unite request Regent remain in order avoid possible serious complication constitutional question. Added Regent now highly nervous state.

Press reactions so far: (1) Rightist: Bitterly opposed "unwarranted British interference" which "abolishing independence Greece;" (2) Republican: Jubilant describes Govt as "best which political world could provide;" (3) Leftists: Willing support Govt if carries out radical Democratic program.

Left and Center circles much concerned over King's statement which regarded as incitement civil war. However, Leeper advised by both military and police authorities army *gendarmerie* unlikely attempt coup against Govt supported by British in absence likelihood support other Allies. Feels much depends on immediate financial economic measures and encouraged by talks Tsouderos, McNeil this connection.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 23, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 24—9:38 p. m.]

1343. Mytel 1338, November 22. According British colleague all efforts induce Regent remain office so far unavailing and written resignation sent King in charge McNeil who left for London as per

schedule this afternoon. However Leeper feels matter still open as "we shall see what can be done at other end", possibly through persuading King not accept.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 26, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 4:50 p. m.]

1354. Regent last night issued communiqué stating that following personal appeal from US Ambassador and renewed urging by British Ambassador and Bevin he had decided withdraw resignation but would remain office only until forthcoming elections.

In this connection British Ambassador came to me urgently yesterday and said Regent persisting refusal withdraw resignation despite repeated appeals Bevin, Greek Govt and self but had expressed willingness reconsider if I made personal request. Begged me see Regent immediately which I did. Ascertained situation as he described it. Told Regent had no instructions or desire intervene in purely Greek matter but as old friend Greece perhaps might offer personal opinion. Said had reasons believe resignation would produce unhappy effect US at moment when all hoping Greek difficulties solved soon and Allies sending Missions observe elections. Expressed friendly hope would not increase difficulties by removing precious overall element stability. Urged example Lincoln ignoring Partisan attacks with eyes only on good of country as whole.

Regent replied his view of situation altered by my visit and asked what might say publicly regarding it. Statement dictated by me and given him incorporated verbally in above-mentioned communiqué. Text communicated my next following telegram.⁵⁶ Hope Dept will approve in view undeniably increased chaos if Regency question again thrown open.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 26, 1945.

[Received November 26—8:30 p. m.]

1355. The following communiqué was issued from the Regency last night:

His Excellency, the Ambassador of the United States, saw the Regent today, and told him that he has reasons to believe that it

⁵⁶ *Infra.*

would have the most unhappy effect on public opinion in the US regarding Greece if, particularly at this moment, when the Allies are preparing to assist Greece by sending observers for her forthcoming elections, the Regent should insist upon resigning, thus contributing further to the difficult problems which all Greece's friends are so eager to see resolved at the earliest possible date.

Therefore His Excellency made a personal and friendly appeal to His Beatitude for the sake of Greece's interests to withdraw his resignation without any delay.

His Excellency, the Ambassador of Great Britain, also called on His Beatitude and repeated to him the earnest recommendation of his Govt to withdraw his resignation without delay.

And last, His Beatitude received another message from Mr. Bevin, transmitted by the Great [*Greek*] Ambassador in London in which Mr. Bevin draws His Beatitude's attention to the consequences, which insistence on his resignation would have on Greece and to the terrible disappointment which the British people and the British Houses of Parliament would feel, should the suspense resulting from His Beatitude's resignation be prolonged even for one more day.

Appreciating the situation and convinced that all hesitation in the matter would damage vital national interests, His Beatitude accepted to withdraw his resignation, especially as the period during which he will continue bearing the burden of his duties as Regent will be, according to his irrevocable decision, brief and more specifically will last till the time of the coming elections, already announced.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-2645: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1945—7 p. m.

1204. Reurtel 1354 Nov. 26. Dept in full agreement your action and wishes to compliment you on taking initiative at critical juncture in Greek governmental crisis. You may assure the Regent that US Govt appreciates the unselfish patriotism which prompts him, in spite of his personal desires, to retain the Regency at a time when his authority and prestige may be the deciding factor in preventing the collapse of the Greek Government.

BYRNES

868.00/11-2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 28, 1945.

[Received November 29—6:30 a. m.]

1367. From Amb Grady.⁵⁷ Issued following statement Grk press today.

⁵⁷ Ambassador Henry F. Grady had arrived in Athens on November 27, accompanied by two of the ranking officers of the United States contingent of the Allied Mission: Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony, U.S. Army, commanding officer of the American military component, and Foy D. Kohler, Secretary General.

The President and the SecState have asked me to come to Greece, in response to the invitation of the Grk Govt, to join with other Allied reps in observing the forthcoming elections in this country.

It is a mission which I have been glad to undertake. We Americans have every confidence in the devotion of the Grk people to the ideals of liberty and democracy. We have also a keen sense of our responsibility to help them restore their sorely tried nation to political and economic health and well being.

It is for the Grk people to decide what kind of govt they want. I hope that our presence here will help reassure them that they can do so freely and fairly and without fear.

[Grady]
MACVEAGH

868.00/12-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 4, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received December 5—9:58 a. m.]

1404. From Grady Mission. Since arrival and after friendly courtesy calls on Regent US, British and French Missions have had repeated joint conferences with Prime Minister, Deputy Premier Kaphandaris, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Public Safety. We are now awaiting promised official confirmation election date March 31 reportedly announced by Prime Minister last night. Talks have revealed disheartening lack resolute determined leadership present Govt and apparent hope maintain power and postpone elections indefinitely or at least until firmly in control armed forces, *gendarmerie* and civil services.

All Greek Ministers alleged continuing "terror" in provinces and royalist complexion army and *gendarmerie* and necessity for revision electoral lists, precautions against rural [*plural?*] voting and possible census urban population prior to elections. Despite pertinent queries and observations from us, they showed little disposition to realize that these were problems which a govt pledged to political stabilization must accept as its responsibility.

Premier and Kaphandaris repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted by devious verbal maneuvers: (1) To force Allied missions into position of undertaking to press British military and police missions to allow Govt a "free hand" in making personnel changes in army and *gendarmerie*; and (2) to place upon Allied mission instead of Greek Govt responsibility for fixing definite date for elections. They claimed "five or six changes" in high command of army and *gendarmerie* would suffice but that Govt's hands are tied by Voulgaris Agreement with British military and police missions whereby Dutch [*such*] changes must be concurred in by those missions. Exploration developed Govt had so far made specific request only for removal of

Assistant Chief Staff General Vendiris (apparently at time described to British as only change necessary) to which British had agreed. They would obviously like much wider voice than admitted to us. As regards date we made objective presentation of relevant factors favoring elections as early as adequate and careful preparations could be made and explained at length our position as observers. However, it seems clear that Govt will spread impression decision was made only under Allied pressure. Prime Minister is quoted in morning press as declaring: "Even if catastrophe befalls, elections will take place on that date without fail."

Sent to Dept as 1404; repeated to London as 121 and AmPolAd⁵⁸ as 95. [Grady Mission.]

MACVEAGH

868.00/12-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 4, 1945.

[Received December 5—1:03 p. m.]

1405. From Grady Mission. Following joint statement Allied missions issued Greek press December 3:

"The advance party of the Allied Mission to observe Greek elections which arrived in Greece last week has been planning its work for the forthcoming elections. It is arranging for teams of observers to visit all parts of the country for the purpose of securing information as to the existing state of the register and the preparations that are being made for the conduct of the election and it hopes also to be able adequately to observe the election itself. It is the desire of the mission to retain a strictly independent and neutral position throughout and to render any services that may be desired in securing the establishment of a democratically elected Greek Parliament. Realizing the necessity for the earliest possible reestablishment of normal political and economic conditions in Greece the mission earnestly hopes that there will be no delays in connection with the holding of the election."

[Grady Mission]

MACVEAGH

868.00/12-645

The Greek Embassy to the Department of State

No. 4770

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1945.

The Greek Embassy has been instructed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to bring the following to the attention of the Secretary of State.

⁵⁸ American Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

The Greek Government, acquiescing in the strong recommendations of the Allied observers to fix a date for the elections not later than March, has designated the last Sunday of March for that purpose. However, the Greek Government deems it necessary to draw the attention of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France that no change has taken place in the internal situation of Greece and that the revision with a view to bringing up to date the election lists has not yet begun.

As it is not certain that the essential conditions for a fair balloting could exist by that date, the fixing of a definite time is extremely inadvisable, for without a genuine popular vote the internal troubles could be aggravated.

Nevertheless, believing that a short postponement would facilitate in the normal evolution of the situation, the Greek Government, barring any further postponements, suggests that the elections be held in April. Thus a greater opportunity would be afforded for the purification of the public services, of the election lists, enlightenment of the people and the instillment in their conscience of the feeling that they are really free to vote as they please. Furthermore, with the passing of winter, which is very severe in the mountain areas of Greece the communication with the voters and their going to the polls, problematic during the winter months, would then be easier.

In making the above suggestion the Greek Government does not expect any political advantage. It simply believes that this postponement would strengthen somewhat the hope of a more general expression of public sentiment and would give to the Government greater opportunity to make some necessary changes in some main places of the public services, presently under the control of the extreme right wing.

The Greek Government deeply imbued with democratic feelings, abhors the subversion of the popular will and regards as unworthy of it a deliberate delay of its expression.

The above has been brought to the knowledge of the Soviet Government.

868.00/12-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 7, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 8—12: 52 p. m.]

1421. From Grady Mission. Without consulting either Allied Observation Missions or Diplomatic Missions at Athens, Greek Government on December 4 instructed its representatives at Washington, London and Paris to approach Allied Governments regarding

election date. Telegram perhaps already presented Department stated Greek Government on insistence of observers had "accepted" March 31 but objected fixing any definite date and specifically requested Allied agreement to postponing to April.

Rumors having reached us Kohler today visited FonMin and received copy message. In long frank talk FonMin explained PriMin announced March 31 without consulting Cabinet. Kaphandaris strongly opposed but finally agreed (obviously on basis PriMin's allegation pressure from observers) on condition despatch above referred telegram drafted by himself.

Kohler protested complete misrepresentation our attitude and incorrectness and discourtesy action to Chiefs Allied Observer Missions. He explained again as we have repeatedly but apparently unsuccessfully explained to all Greek Ministers that (1) we are here in response to Greek invitation to ascertain not fix or impose date and make preliminary arrangements for observers; (2) date is solely matter for decision Greek Government, our only reservation being that long delay might necessitate reconsideration by US Government whether physically possible organize adequate observation in view redeployment; (3) any Anglo-Greek understanding as regards election date is matter between two Governments and unconnected US or French Governments or Allied missions.

FonMin professed understanding and sincere regret. To suggestion telegram best withdrawn at least Washington and Paris he replied communication probably already made but promised send immediate telegram of rectification and explain matters his Cabinet colleagues. To FonMin's earnest request his personal opinion as friend Greece Kohler replied:

- (1) April probably possible as regards US physical arrangements.
- (2) Any postponement would disrupt physical arrangements unless made promptly and preferably prior mission's departure for Caserta and US to initiate definite preparations.
- (3) Even with March date Government had nearly 4 months to prepare and postponement 15-20 days seemed absurd.
- (4) Following PriMin's categoric declarations announcement postponement likely to shake public confidence and create impression Government weakness and indecision.

FonMin opined date should remain March 31 as announced.

If any reply made Greek Ambassador suggest follow foregoing lines.

Substance communicated British and French Missions here. Sent Department as 1421; rptd London as 124, Paris 25 and AmPolAd Caserta 100. [Grady Mission.]

MACVEAGH

868.00/12-445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1945—8 p. m.

1243. For Grady Mission. Following summarizes note presented Dept Dec 6 by Greek Amb.

[Here follows summary of note from the Greek Embassy printed on page 186.]

It is Depts understanding that Allied observers did not strongly recommend date not later than March. Joint statement released in Athens (urtel 1405 Dec 4) mentions hopes that there will be "no delays in connection with holding of elections" but was presumably released after Govts official announcement of March 31.

Dept feels it essential that Greek Govt publicly acknowledge responsibility for selection of date, and requests your comment on arguments contained in reference note.

BYRNES

868.00/12-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 8, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received December 9—12:13 p. m.]

1424. From Grady Mission. Allied Missions this morning received and heard representatives all political groups not included in Govt.

1. KKE-EAM: Claimed electoral lists fraudulent and insisted thorough revision under conditions public order and security necessary prerequisite their participation elections. Desired proportional system.

2. Republican Socialist-Papandreou: Asserted lists well done, with little abstention and public order satisfactory. Cited particularly prevailing press freedom. Favored election date prior March 31 and majority system.

3. Populists: Claimed lack complaints to courts proved lists well done. Asserted only in Greece, Communist⁵⁹ and Govt could fully establish public order in 5 days. Considered majority system necessary for establishment responsible Govt citing results proportional system in 1932 and 1936. Would accept any result elections and never resort to force.

⁵⁹ Apparent omissions in preceding part of sentence. Report of conversation forwarded as enclosure 15 to despatch from Ambassador Grady, December 20, stated that Populist Party representatives contended that the only terrorism in Greece was on the part of the Communist Party and that the Greek Government could "finish" the terrorist groups in a few days if there was the will to do it (868.00/12-2045).

4. National Union-Kanellopoulos: Sure electoral lists "best in Greek history" with few abstentions and only one concrete case falsification. Refuting terrorism charges pointed out village registration practically automatic and order prevailing urban areas. Cited freedom speech press assembly unparalleled in Balkans as proof satisfactory public security. Believed psychological pressure Extremists diminishing despite Royalist exploitation and likely disappear in presence Allied observers. Considered some changes army *gendarmerie* necessary. Favored revised "mixed" electoral system with half deputies by majority and half proportional.

5. ELD-Socialist: Stated elections undesirable until public passions calmed and adequate preparations made probably in May. Claimed local authorities tolerating if not favoring Royalist terror, but supporting present Govt in efforts take measures correct this condition and restore order. Will decide in light developments whether able participate registration and elections. Favored proportional system. States following parallel policy EAM though no longer associated.

6. National Liberal-Gonatas-Zervas: Favored earlier but accepted March elections. Considered electoral lists well done and public order satisfactory. Strongly desired majority system.

[Grady Mission]
MACVEAGH

868.00/12-845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 8, 1945—noon.
[Received December 8—10:01 a. m.]

1425. From Grady Mission. ReEmbtel December 7.⁶⁰ FonMin last night handed us Government's telegram same date to Washington correcting message December 4. States demand for March date attributable to British Government not observers but repeats reference to "request" for postponement.

Suggest any reply to Greek Ambassador state date entirely for Greek Government to decide as far as we concerned but early firm decision necessary if they wish us observe.

Sent Department as 1425 repeated London as 125 Paris as 26 and AmPolAd as 102. [Grady Mission.]

MACVEAGH

⁶⁰ Telegram 1421, p. 187.

868.00/12-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 9, 1945.

[Received December 10—12: 58 p. m.]

1426. From Grady Mission. Following announcement issued Greek press occasion departure Allied Missions today:

“The Allied Missions which arrived in Athens last week have consulted with the Greek Government respecting arrangements for the conduct of their observation. They have also visited Salonika and Patras and have consulted with the Governor and Secretary General of Crete. They have met representatives of the main political parties and received from them their views.

The Missions have prepared preliminary plans to organize the observation, and are leaving Athens on Sunday, the 9th of December. They wish to express their keen appreciation of the kindly reception which they have received and for the helpfulness shown them by the ministers and officers with whom they have consulted. They look forward to their return, when they hope that the observation work which they are able to perform will be of assistance to the Greek Nation in carrying through the very important elections which are due to take place.”

[Grady Mission]

MACVEAGH

868.00/12-1045

The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I must tell you that a telegram received yesterday from Athens shows that the remark you made to me, during my last visit, in relation to the date of elections in Greece is correct. In fact the observers of the three Allied powers now in Athens did not press for a fixed date. They merely asked for a date to be indicated.

As, on the other hand, the British Government had already made it known that according to their view the elections should take place not later than March, the Greek Government thought it advisable to fix the precise date on the last Sunday of March. The Greek Government is still in the hope that the short postponement asked for, as I communicated to you the other day, would be taken into consideration.

With highest regards

Very sincerely yours,

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

868.00/12-645

The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Greece and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note no. 4770 of December 6, 1945, which states that "the Greek Government, acquiescing in the strong recommendations of the Allied observers to fix a date for the elections not later than March, has designated the last Sunday of March for that purpose" but that the Greek Government considers the fixing of a definite date extremely inadvisable and suggests a postponement of elections until some time in April.

It must be pointed out that the Chiefs of the Allied Mission for Observation of Greek Elections, recently conferring with Greek officials in Athens, have at no time recommended to the Greek Government a definite date for Greek elections. Such a decision is considered to be the exclusive prerogative of the Greek Government, at whose invitation the United States, British and French Governments have agreed to offer friendly assistance as impartial observers. Any postponement of the date already officially announced by the Greek Government is appropriately a concern of the Greek Government.

It must be added that the offer of the United States Government to assist in observing Greek elections was made when it was envisaged that such elections would be held within the time limitation set forth in the Varkiza Agreement. Any postponement to a date in the indefinite future would make it necessary for this Government to reconsider its undertaking in the light of possible difficulties in the physical arrangements for an organization deemed adequate for the successful observation of elections on a nationwide scale.

The Greek Government is requested to bring the foregoing views to the attention of the other Governments to which its note was addressed and to take the necessary steps to correct any erroneous impression on the part of the public in Greece that the date for elections was set at the insistence of the Chiefs of the Allied Mission for the Observation of Greek Elections.

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1945.

868.00/12-1045

The Secretary of State to the Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos)

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1946.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your note of December 10, 1945, containing the information that the Chiefs of the Allied Mission for the Observation of Greek Elections did not, during their

recent visit in Athens, indicate their preference for a specific date for the national elections in Greece.

In connection with the reiterated hope of your Government that a short postponement in the date could be made, the Department's note of December 11 indicated this Government's view that the fixing of a date for Greek elections is solely the concern of the Greek Government.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

REQUEST OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT FOR FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES; ⁶¹ PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN ARRANGING FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR LIBERATED GREECE ⁶²

868.48/1-645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1945—7 p. m.

20. Please deliver the following message to General Sadler ⁶³ for his eyes only personal from General Hilldring ⁶⁴ on the responsibility for Greek relief distribution. It is desired that this message should not be discussed with any British official.

"The following is for your information: Discussions have now been initiated with British here looking toward relinquishment to UNRRA ⁶⁵ of responsibility for Greek relief distribution. U.S. view is that change-over should take place as soon as possible, with 1 March 1945 as target date.

UNRRA appears anxious to take over as soon as present hostilities terminate and they feel they are in a position to do so provided combined relief supplies are sold to them in adequate amounts and they receive some assurance of continued shipping. Neither point poses too difficult a problem to U.S. since UNRRA's anxiety to get into business in Greece disposes them to insist on less tight commitments than they formerly asked. It will probably be necessary to lend assistance to UNRRA for some period after they take over in order to ease the transition. For this purpose it is likely that you and at least some of your staff will stay on until it is felt that UNRRA can carry on without military help.

The real problem will be to obtain British agreement to relinquish and their initial reaction is to oppose discussing a fixed date at this time. Reasons advanced by them are (1) unsettled conditions in Greece, (2) presence of a large British military force, and (3) ques-

⁶¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 216 ff.

⁶² Continued from *ibid.*, pp. 179 ff.

⁶³ Brig. Gen. Percy L. Sadler, Deputy Commander for Combined Operations with the British for relief and rehabilitation in Balkan countries.

⁶⁴ Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Director of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department Special Staff.

⁶⁵ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

tion of UNRRA ability to perform. As to point 3 the British express some doubt whether UNRRA has in the field personnel adequate in skill or number to estimate supply requirements, process requisitions and handle other technical supply matters. Your views on this will be appreciated since it is desired to satisfy ourselves as well as the British that UNRRA really can do the supply job.

Related to this is the question of reintegrating UNRRA into MLHQ.⁶⁶ British here appear to regard this as a prerequisite and U.S. is inclined to agree. However UNRRA Washington is informed by Archer⁶⁷ that the UNRRA Greek Mission did not react favorably to integration as a matter of principle. Please give your viewpoint urgently for consideration of the U.S. in formulating a definite position on this.

Constant pressure upon the British to agree to early turn-over of Greek relief responsibility is intended to be exerted here. We will keep you currently advised."

STETTINIUS

840.50 UNRRA/1-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 8, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received January 9—12:40 p. m.]

26. To AGWAR⁶⁸ for Hilldring from Sadler. Attention invited to my radio January⁶⁹ reur radio subject UNRRA. Am in entire agreement that UNRRA should take over as soon as possible. Recommendations have gone forward through AFHQ⁷⁰ that UNRRA take over April 1, 1945 which I feel is earliest date they would be ready. This can be done provided UNRRA get immediately qualified personnel as referred to in my last cable. Believe they can take over some districts and regions sooner. UNRRA has some qualified technical supply people. Needs a head distribution man badly. Agree that Sadler and some supply and technical men should remain to help and advise UNRRA getting started.

Political situation here improving. Military situation greatly improved, Athens, Piraeus, now entirely clear of rebels.⁷¹ Have big relief job in this area, situation Salonika and Patras tense.

Am leaving today for Bari via Caserta re Yugoslav and Albanian missions. Will radio from there on Yugoslav and Albanian situation. [Sadler.]

MACVEAGH

⁶⁶ Military Liaison Headquarters at Athens; for description of functions, see footnote 36, p. 108.

⁶⁷ Laird Archer, Chief of UNRRA Mission to Greece.

⁶⁸ Adjutant General's Office of the War Department.

⁶⁹ Telegram 16, January 4, 1945, 3 p. m., from Athens, not printed.

⁷⁰ Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta.

⁷¹ For documentation on the revolution that began at Athens on December 3, 1944, and the intervention by British military forces, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 141-179, *passim*, and *ante*, pp. 98-193, *passim*.

868.51/1-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 26, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received January 29—4:30 p. m.]

98. For Department and Secretary of Treasury ⁷² from Embassy and Patterson.⁷³ Re 483 [83] of January 22.⁷⁴ At a meeting today with General Scobie,⁷⁵ Finance Minister Sideris said that he could not meet the necessary internal expenses of Greece without financial help from the United States and United Kingdom. He said that such expenses could not be met from his own resources because tax receipts would be very small for many months, there was not enough cover in the form of foreign exchange to permit the needed issues of drachmas, and such disbursements by the Government without any tax receipts would result in uncontrolled inflation and the complete depreciation of the drachma. In particular he asked that the United States and/or United Kingdom Government pay all the expenses of the Ministries of War, Navy and Air. He is proposing that the rates of pay for the armed forces be at a rate equal to two-thirds the rate paid by the British to Greek armed forces in the Middle East before the liberation of Greece. This is over 10 times larger than the wages paid the Greek soldier before the war. Details of the budget for the above three Ministries are promised us in the very near future.

The financial advisers to General Scobie advised that a decision on this request could be taken only in Washington and London, but that they failed to see the economic justification for the aid Sideris was requesting.

They reported that the sub-governor of the Bank of Greece ⁷⁶ had informed them only yesterday that the foreign exchange holdings of Greece are not pledged as backing for the drachma and therefore there was no legal problem of scarcity of cover. Further they suggested that the inflationary effects of paying the armed forces would be the same whether they were paid by the United Kingdom or United States or by the Greek Government. They added that there might well be psychological reasons for having these expenses met by the Allies, but this point was not considered important by Sideris.

General Scobie told Sideris that he was not prepared to give an answer at this time to his request and that in view of the disagreement between his financial advisers on the one hand and the Minister of

⁷² Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

⁷³ Gardner Patterson, Treasury Representative in Greece.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

⁷⁵ Lt. Gen. Ronald M. Scobie, General Officer Commanding British Forces in Greece.

⁷⁶ George Mantzavinos, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece.

Finance on the other as to the economic justification of such advances the problems should be studied further.

Sideris reported that Prime Minister Plastiras was going to send a formal request to General Scobie requesting financial aid to pay the armed forces as well as foreign loans for other purposes.

After the meeting Sbarounis⁷⁷ stated confidentially that in his opinion what Sideris really wants is a foreign advance to pay troops so that the foreign exchange would be available to import needed goods when shipping permitted. However, Sideris had earlier been specifically asked if this was what he had in mind and he had replied that it was not.

Sent to Department, repeated to London as 13 for Embassy and Treasury Representative.⁷⁸ [Embassy and Patterson.]

MACVEAGH

868.51/1-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, January 30, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received February 2—12:03 p. m.]

125. For Department and Secretary of Treasury from Embassy and Patterson, following my No. 98 of January 26, 7 p. m. See my No. 72 of January 19, 1 p. m.⁷⁹ Mr. Varvaressos has now returned⁸⁰ and taken up his duties as Governor of the Bank of Greece. At meetings with Hill⁸¹ and Patterson, yesterday and today, he expressed grave concern over the financial and economic developments here, though cautioning that his remarks were not only confidential but necessarily tentative in view of the short time he has been in the country.

He said the Government and the people of Greece must be made to realize at once that Greece is a very poor country, and that permitting the current high prices and wages will not make it any richer but will, in fact, result in economic chaos. Varvaressos believes strongly that in both the outlying areas and in the capital the Government must begin at once to sell ML⁸² supplies at "economic" prices to all but those actually indigent, and must abandon the now widespread practice of issuing them free or at prices designed to cover only distribution costs. He also believes it is imperative that prices of certain locally produced essential goods be controlled, and that wages be firmly fixed on the basis of the prices of ML goods and the controlled prices of local goods and not be related to the Black

⁷⁷ Athanassios Sbarounis, Greek Under Secretary of Finance.

⁷⁸ William H. Taylor, Treasury Representative in the United Kingdom.

⁷⁹ Not printed.

⁸⁰ From London, where he had engaged in conversations with British officials on Greece's financial problems.

⁸¹ Henry A. Hill, Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Greece.

⁸² Military Liaison.

Market prices. He is disturbed at the apparent attitude of many of the Government officials that their problems are so difficult that only foreign aid can solve them and that what they can do is so small it is not worth doing.

Varvaressos believes Greece must raise an army no larger than the country itself can hope to support. For the immediate future he thinks it essential that the Allies clothe, equip and provide rations for this army, but he regards as ridiculous the request that the Allies pay the salaries and wages of the Greek armed forces. He regards the proposal that these forces be paid the Middle East rates of pay as very unsound and said its result would be another full-scale inflation. He said further that if the Government insists on paying the armed forces at this rate he will refuse to accept any responsibility for what happens here.

Varvaressos said the drachma is over-valued by at least 100 percent but he believes that political and psychological factors make it impossible to alter the rate at this time.

He reported that it is being proposed to charge 11 percent interest on loans by banks to industrial firms. In his opinion this must also be changed. He sees the important problem as one of getting the local factories back into operation, and said the banks must loan only to firms who can actually produce and that the rates of interest must be very low and the firms must be made to sell their products at fixed prices. He feels strongly that now is not the time for either the banks or industrial and commercial firms to attempt to recoup quickly their losses of recent years.

He regards the past policy of the Bank of Greece in selling gold to the public as most undesirable.

The US economic and financial advisors to General Scobie are in agreement with Varvaressos on these matters and his views are in fact the same as those they have been expressing to me and in turn to the Greek Government, except that they have not discussed the problem of altering the exchange rate.

Repeated to London as 17 for Embassy and Treasury Representatives. [Embassy and Patterson.]

MACVEAGH

868.48/2-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, February 24, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 1:30 p. m.]

698. Swedish Foreign Office February 21 sent us German text of *note verbale* from Wilhelmstrasse⁸³ to Swedish Legation dated Feb-

⁸³ The German Foreign Office.

ruary 3 but not received at Legation's temporary residence at Altdoebern until February 13. We quote verbatim translation of this note.

"In *note verbale* from German Foreign Office of April 28, 1942⁸⁴ addressed to Royal Swedish Legation Government of Reich agreed to relief work being carried out for benefit of Greek civil population with foodstuffs from abroad. At end of communication it was stated that German Government assumed this activity would continue for indefinite period until one of parties concerned found it necessary to terminate it on account of eventual new circumstances. A change of circumstances has in meantime taken place inasmuch as German troops now no longer occupy Greece. Relief Commission composed of Spanish citizens and officials of International Red Cross which has hitherto been authorized solely to distribute to civilian population consignments of food received from abroad has already in part of Greece handed over its task to occupying power and Greek authorities. As it considers that task hitherto assigned to it is now discharged it has according to report received decided to remain in Athens only until February 15th in order to wind up its administration.

As a result of this development such change has occurred in circumstances which prevailed when relief work was instituted that government of Reich considers that agreed basic conditions of relief scheme no longer obtain. It can therefore no longer maintain safe conducts which it has granted hitherto to Swedish ships engaged in Greek relief traffic and requests Royal Swedish Government to order recall of Swedish ships if [*in?*] this traffic to Swedish ports which they originally left with agreement of Government of Reich. Government of Reich would be prepared to consider proposals whereby withdrawal of ships would take place at any given time after conclusion of present voyages from Greece and of such voyages [which] might in addition still prove necessary in order to enable distressed Greek civilian population continue to receive supplies of urgently needed foodstuffs in present circumstances. However, it would involve no hardship if Swedish ships were withdrawn from relief work on scale proportionate to extent to which responsibility for provisioning of Greece has been transferred to Greek authorities and occupying power.

German Foreign Office looks forward to early intimation of decision of Royal Swedish Government in this matter."

Swedish Foreign Office has orally assured British Legation and Greek Chargé d'Affaires that it has no intention of complying with German request for withdrawal of vessels in Greek relief traffic.⁸⁵ Although Swedish reply to German *note verbale* has not yet been formulated, we are orally informed that it will urge argument that

⁸⁴ For draft translation, see telegram 1019, April 30, 1942, 8 p. m., from Stockholm, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 756.

⁸⁵ In memorandum 503, February 20, 1945, the Greek Embassy requested the Department of State to utilize its good offices to ensure continuance of Swedish shipping in the Greek Relief traffic. The matter was discussed with the Greek Ambassador on February 26, and on March 10 the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) wrote to the Ambassador: "You may assure the Greek Government of the good offices of the Department in this matter." (868.48/2-2045)

Red Cross relief is still very much needed in Greece and therefore no reason is perceived for discontinuing Greek relief traffic. Swedish note will also mention in an incidental manner that there is no truth in the report that Greek Relief Commission contemplates terminating its activities at present. Foreign Office will provide us with text of its note when it has been delivered. Meanwhile Foreign Office considers it essential that Allied authorities continue as usual vis-à-vis activities of Greek Relief Commission and continue to grant safe conducts.

British Legation has sent telegram in similar terms to London.

JOHNSON

868.48/3-1045 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, March 10, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received March 11—3:57 a. m.]

953. Swedish Foreign Office in informal conversation states that on February 28 an instruction was sent to Swedish Legation in Berlin with reference to German memorandum of February 3, whose translation was submitted in Legation's 698, February 24, 10 a. m., setting forth substance of oral reply to be made by Swedish Legation to Wilhelmstrasse. We quote in translation text of this instruction:

“Referring to telegram 12 dated February 3, 1945, and memorandum 153B of same date regarding German Government cancellation of safe conduct for Swedish Red Cross vessels operating in Greek relief traffic, I beg request that Legation inform German authorities as follows:

Swedish Government intends permit Swedish vessels to continue Greek relief traffic as long as this is warranted for humanitarian reasons with regard to Greek civil population. For present it is not possible supply Greece with necessary quantities of foodstuffs by any other means than Swedish vessels.

One of German reasons for cancelling safe conduct for Swedish Greek relief vessels is that German authorities have learned that Greek Relief Commission's activities were supposedly to cease on February 15th, 1945. In December last year different dates for cessation of operation of Greek Relief Commission were discussed at which time February 15 was mentioned. However, it was later realized that date on which Commission's administrative and distributive duties should be turned over to Greek authorities could not be set as early as February 15. Therefore work of Commission will continue for time being. Even if Commission's above-mentioned tasks will later be taken over by other authorities intention is that neutral commission will be maintained for carrying out control tasks which were originally its main duty (compared [apparent garble])

German enclosed with letter Grafstrom-Richert⁸⁶ dated December 27, 1944).

I recall that *Fenris* will arrive in western part of Crete occupied by Germans in a few days with foodstuffs which in usual manner will be distributed under auspices of Red Cross delegates.

It is our intention that points mentioned in second paragraph above shall be set forth as main argument. In our opinion question of date which commission will cease its activities is secondary."

However, Swedish Legation Berlin on March 6 informed Foreign Office Stockholm that Wilhelmstrasse did not wish oral reply but demanded written statement. This was construed by Foreign Office here as indicating that Germans did not feel question was urgent one but rather for record.

Accordingly on March 8 Swedish Foreign Office telegraphed to its Legation in Berlin text of following memorandum in reply to German communication of February 3 (we quote in translation from German):

"In answer to *note verbale* of Foreign Office dated February 3, 1945—R. 19782 August 1—Swedish Royal Legation has honor transmit following message.

Royal Swedish Government has intention to maintain traffic of Swedish ships engaged in supply of foodstuffs to Greek civilian population as long as this relief action may be considered necessary from humanitarian point of view with respect to Greek civilian population. Transportation of food supplies necessary for Greece otherwise than with these Swedish ships is on other hand not possible for moment.

As far as question of maintenance of 'Commission de Gestion'⁸⁷ is concerned Swedish Legation begs to state that this Commission will probably on March 15th terminate its activities and will transfer its administrative and distributive duties to local authorities. Particular control functions for which Commission had originally been established will then be transferred under Swedish leadership to new neutral (Swedish or possibly Swedish Swiss) institution which will exercise its activities as long as Swedish ships participate in supplying Greek civilian population within limits of humanitarian relief action."⁸⁸

Foregoing documents have been given us on strictly informal basis.

Foreign Office adds that it received telegram on March 6 from its Legation in Athens that Greek Relief Commission would on March 15 cease its activities so far as administrative and distributive functions

⁸⁶ Sven H. Grafström, Deputy Chief of the Political Division of the Swedish Foreign Office, and Arvid Richert, Swedish Minister in Germany.

⁸⁷ Commission de Gestion pour les Secours en Grèce (Administrative Commission for Relief in Greece) under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Commission was also known as the Joint Relief Commission, the Swedish-Swiss Commission, and the Greek Relief Commission.

⁸⁸ In telegram 493, March 16, 1945, 1 p. m., to Stockholm, the Department referred to telegram 953 and stated: "Action of Swedes is gratifying to Department and interested agencies." (868.48/3-1045)

were concerned, handing these over to local Greek authorities. However, it was expected that control functions would continue in hands of new body largely composed of Swedes.

JOHNSON

840.50 UNRRA/3-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, March 12, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received March 13—2:50 p. m.]

259. Reference your 134 of February 14, 2 p. m., and my 232 of March 1, 2 p. m.⁸⁹ Hendrickson⁹⁰ and his party are to meet on March 16 with the military in Caserta and complete arrangements for the assumption of responsibility here by UNRRA.

It is now expected here that by March 15 Greek Government organizations will have assumed responsibility for the receipt, clearance, warehousing and distribution of JRC,⁹¹ ML and UNRRA supplies, the supervision and running of medical centers and the distribution of medical supplies and clothing. The remaining supply and relief functions which are at present being carried out by ML will become a responsibility of UNRRA from April 1. UNRRA's responsibilities in Greece will thus be limited to requisitioning supplies, accepting overseas shipments, turning such shipments over to Greek Government on board ships, and serving as observers and consultants as well as coordinators of voluntary agencies.

While it has been agreed that UNRRA is not to be an operating organization it may in the beginning have to operate in some areas, owing to unreadiness on the part of the Greek Government to undertake this function. ML is planning to remain in the background after April 1 for 1 or 2 months so as to give all possible aid to UNRRA during the transition period. Some officers of ML will be released to serve with UNRRA as civilians. In addition ML is already beginning to turn over district by district to UNRRA and is insisting that UNRRA become familiar with all ML operations. Thus, for instance, UNRRA representatives now attend General Scobie's advisors' meetings and are members of the Joint Coordinating Committee. Detailed plans are being made for the sale to UNRRA of such ML organizational stores and equipment as army vehicles, office equipment, et cetera. Meanwhile Palmer⁹² has refused the post of

⁸⁹ Neither printed.

⁹⁰ Roy F. Hendrickson, Deputy Director General, Bureau of Supply, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

⁹¹ Joint Relief Commission.

⁹² Brig. G. V. Palmer, in charge of Supplies and Relief, British Forces in Greece.

chief of the UNRRA Greek mission and Maben continues as acting chief.

The Greek Government and the Greek people have approved the signing of the agreement⁹³ with great satisfaction, although there seems to be a widespread feeling that direct control by UNRRA of the distribution of supplies and the specific earmarking of the proceeds of the sales for relief and rehabilitation purposes would in the long run have more effectively aided Greece.

Sadler requests Hilldring be informed. Also please inform Treasury.

MACVEAGH

840.50 UNRRA/3-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, March 14, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received March 15—4: 33 p. m.]

264. See my telegram No. 259, March 12, 5 p. m. Since ML is to turn over to UNRRA on April 1 the problem arises here with some urgency as to the disposal to be made of the economic and financial advisers detailed by the British and American Embassies to the ML Advisory Committee. My British colleague tells me he is waiting for word from London in this connection but that he personally feels that his advisers should remain after April 1 attached to his Embassy for the purpose of advising the Greek Government if the latter so desires. He also feels that the joint committee method of advising ML has worked so satisfactorily that a similar procedure might be adopted in connection with the Government from April 1st onward.

It will not escape the Department that to advise a foreign government is a very different thing from advising an Anglo-American organization such as the ML and before deciding on its course in this matter it will doubtless wish to consider whether it desires to share with the British (already deeply involved in internal Greek affairs) the responsibility for the success or failure of a Greek reconstruction program which cannot fail to become involved in local politics. Should the decision be to start newly (for us) in such responsibility here I believe that the departure from our former policy

⁹³ Signed at Athens on March 1, 1945; for text, see George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, vol. III, p. 289. In telegram 285, March 21, 1945, noon, transmitted by the Ambassador in Greece on behalf of James A. Stillwell of the War Areas Economic Division for the special attention of Assistant Secretary of State Clayton and other Department officers, it is stated that the agreement "in effect gives to the Greek officials unlimited, uncontrolled and unaccountable jurisdiction over UNRRA supplies from shipside to consumer." (840.50 UNRRA Personnel/3-2145)

will be less sharp and apparent the more informally it is effected while our resulting tie-up with any particular Greek Government in the coming months will present less possibilities of embarrassment if our advice is given independently and occasionally as asked for and not in joint committee sitting regularly at the right hand of authority. Our advisers could keep in contact with their British counterparts without forming any special body with them. Hill may not wish to remain much longer⁹⁴ but while his services to date have been most valuable his functions after April 1st would perhaps be more appropriately performed by the Economic Counselor, the Greek Government taking over on that date all supply problems outside the jurisdiction of UNRRA. On the other hand even if the Department's decision is not to take on the responsibility of advising the Greek Government, Treasury Representative Patterson could still be useful here in connection with financial reporting and I hope he will stay.⁹⁵

MACVEAGH

840.50 UNRRA/3-1445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1945—7 p. m.

242. Department is in agreement with recommendation in ur 264, March 14, that we should not establish a joint committee with the British to advise the Greek Government with respect to economic and financial matters. Representatives of the Embassy should of course keep in close touch with both the British representatives and the Greek Government concerning such matters and may informally offer such information and advice as may seem appropriate.

GREW

868.51/3-2145 : Telegram

President Roosevelt to British Prime Minister Churchill

WASHINGTON, 21 March, 1945.

723. What would you think of sending a special mission for developing the productive power of Greece rapidly by concerted, non-political action? Such a mission could consist of people like Lyttelton,⁹⁶ Mikoyan, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of U.S.S.R. and Donald Nelson, who is back after a very successful similar mission in

⁹⁴ Mr. Hill left Athens on May 4.

⁹⁵ Mr. Patterson continued to serve as Treasury Representative after the departure of Mr. Hill.

⁹⁶ Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production.

China.⁹⁷ It would not take them long and might have a highly constructive effect on world opinion at this time.

I take it that they could meet in Greece in about a month's time.

I am not taking it up with the Soviet Government until I get your slant.

ROOSEVELT

868.50/3-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, March 24, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received March 25—1:05 p. m.]

300. For Department and Secretary of Treasury from Embassy and Patterson. Varvaressos told this Embassy this morning that he plans to leave for London and Washington within a week. He said that the Greek Government feels that the plight and needs of Greece have not been completely realized abroad and the major purpose of his visit is to ask for additional non-food supplies. He will go first to London where he will ask for increased shipping and raw material allocations. In addition we understand from the Financial Adviser of the British Embassy,⁹⁸ that he will ask that the provision of equipment for the Greek Army be expedited. A properly equipped army is regarded as of major importance here to preserve internal stability necessary to reconstruction.

In Washington Varvaressos said he will investigate the possibility of increasing the flow of industrial and raw materials to Greece from the United States. In this connection he will try to increase the effectiveness of the Greek Supply Mission in Washington. We believe that the various agencies and organizations in the United States which are prepared to help Greece have not been properly utilized by the Greek Government. Although Varvaressos was not specific about requesting a foreign loan in the United States, he did say he proposed to investigate the possibility of getting aid from the Export-Import Bank.

Varvaressos said that before he leaves Athens he hopes to be able to provide us with more detailed agenda of the problems he wishes to discuss in the United States. He said he had been "asked" to attend the San Francisco Conference⁹⁹ as one of the Greek delegates (see my

⁹⁷ Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board until September 30, 1944; for documentation on his mission to China as Personal Representative of President Roosevelt, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vi, pp. 247 ff.

⁹⁸ Sir Thomas St. Quintin Hill.

⁹⁹ The United Nations Conference on International Organization met at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945.

No. 279 of March 19, 3 p. m.¹) but that he feels his presence there is "unnecessary". The composition of the delegation has not yet been announced pending discussions with the political parties (see my No. 298 of March 24 [23], 10 p. m. [*a. m.*]¹).

While Varvaressos seems the best qualified Greek to speak for his country abroad on financial and economic questions it is possible that the Minister of Finance and other persons in the Government who do not agree with his policies of rigorous government control would be glad to see him out of Greece at this time and for as long as possible.

Sent Department, repeated London as 31 for Embassy and Treasury Representatives. [Embassy and Patterson.]

MACVEAGH

868.51/4-345 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

LONDON, 3 April, 1945.

932. I am attracted [by] the suggestion in your No. 723² that a high-powered economic mission should visit Greece, but I am rather doubtful whether this is an appropriate moment to bring the Russians in. We cannot expect any help from the Russians in the economic sphere, and to include them in the mission would be a purely political gesture. As such, it might be valuable if we could be sure that the Russian representative would behave correctly and make a public demonstration of his solidarity with our policy, but this assumption seems very doubtful. There is the further disadvantage that at a time when the Russians are firmly excluding both you and us from any say in the affairs of Roumania,³ it would be rather odd to invite them unsolicited to assume some degree of responsibility in Greek affairs.

2. We have ourselves been giving some thought to the future Allied organization in Greece. I am, of course, most anxious to reduce the number of British troops in the country at the earliest possible moment, but it is clear that this will not be the end of our responsibility there. In fact the Greek Government must for some time be given advice and guidance in many spheres of the administration if they are to govern the country effectively. Without this help, they will be unable to resume control throughout the country, and the withdrawal of our forces may be seriously delayed.

3. Advice for the Greek Government has hitherto been provided mainly under the authority of General Scobie as General Officer Commanding British troops in Greece. We hope, however, that the

¹ Not printed.

² Dated March 21, p. 203.

³ For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, pp. 464 ff.

“operational phase” is now over and it therefore seems appropriate that Scobie should be relieved of many of the responsibilities which he has so far borne, and that these should be transferred to our two Embassies where they more properly belong. As you will know, it is proposed that UNRRA should take over relief work from the military on April 1, and this seemed to be a convenient date on which the other changes could be made. The War Cabinet have therefore agreed that on the British side the Embassy will be responsible as from April 1 for tendering advice to the Greek Government. This advice will be particularly important on economic and financial questions, and I much hope that we can count on the continued collaboration of the United States Embassy in Athens. If you agree, I suggest that a joint Anglo-American committee should be established, comprising the appropriate British and American experts and responsible to our two Embassies. Although members of this committee have not been invited by the Greek Government to advise, I have no doubt that they will in fact exercise great influence over the economic and financial policies of the Greek Government.

4. I feel that this committee should be set in motion before we consider sending a mission on the lines you suggest. A further reason for postponement would be in order to see how the transference of relief from the military authorities to UNRRA works out. Once all this new machinery has begun to work, a high-powered mission on the lines you suggest might do great good by smoothing out difficulties and getting things moving. By that time we might also have resolved the troubles in Roumania and be in a position to invite the Russians to join the mission.

5. We should, of course, welcome the assistance of Donald Nelson at any time, and if it [is] convenient for him to visit Greece now, I would certainly not suggest that he should delay his journey until a full Allied mission can be sent. The problems to be overcome in Greece are so formidable and urgent that his presence there even for a short visit would be of the greatest value.

PRIME

868.48/3-2445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1945.

301. Reurtel 297, March 24.⁴ Total contributions by various donors for distribution by Commission of Administration for Greek Relief August 1942 through March 1945 with exception Canadian Government figures which run only through February 1945.

⁴ Not printed.

Canadian Government: 446 tons salt cod; 420,978 tons wheat; total value \$15,888,927.

Canadian Red Cross: no statistics yet received; will be telegraphed as soon as available.

Greek War Relief Fund of Canada; 429 tons food; 80,843 gallons cod liver oil; 112 tons medical supplies; 400 tons clothing and shoes; 3 trucks; 164,752 gallons gasoline and oil; 2,400 pounds grease; 10 tons miscellaneous equipment; 110,400 food parcels; total value \$1,496,612.

Foreign Economic Administration, USA lend-leased to Greek Government: 157,023 tons food; 160 trucks; 147 tons clothing; charter-hire ships \$11,801,500; total value lend-leased \$52,906,214.

American Red Cross: 474 tons medicines and food parcels; 162 tons clothing; total value \$1,990,758.

Greek War Relief Association of U. S.: 587 tons food; 65,557 gallons cod liver oil; 15 tons medical supplies; 2,045 tons clothing; 20 motorcars; 111 trucks; 59 bicycles; 16 motorcycles; 73,223 gallons gasoline and oil; 4 tons grease; 162 tons miscellaneous equipment; ships expenses \$2,052,740; 334,000 food parcels; total value \$3,245,415.

Near East Foundation: 4,560 gallons cod liver oil; value \$15,960.

Argentina Government: 50,000 tons wheat; value \$1,835,000.

Greek colony in Buenos Aires: 66 tons food.

English firm Baker and May: 244,000 sulfapyridine tablets.

Greek Government: charterhire vessels \$1,781,357.

Total value all contributions except Canadian Red Cross, Buenos Aires colony, and Baker and May \$79,160,245.

ACHESON

868.51/4-845: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁵

WASHINGTON, undated.

737. 1) I recognize the force of the observations on the Russian angle in your 932⁶ and agree that it might be better not to go forward with a tripartite economic mission at the present time. On the other hand I think it would be a mistake to set up a bilateral mission. This would look as though we, for our part, were disregarding the Yalta decision for tripartite action in liberated areas⁷ and might easily be

⁵ Drafted by the Department of State; on April 8, the White House notified the Acting Secretary of State, by memorandum, that the message had been approved and sent to the Prime Minister.

⁶ Dated April 3, p. 205.

⁷ A Declaration on Liberated Europe was included in the communiqué issued at the end of the Yalta Conference on February 11, 1945; for text, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 968, 971-973.

interpreted as indicating that we consider the Yalta decisions as no longer valid. Such is certainly not the case, as you know, and I therefore feel that we must be careful not to do anything that would weaken the effectiveness of our efforts to get the Russians to honor these decisions on their side.

2) Our Ambassador at Athens recently put up to us, at the instance of Mr. Leeper,⁸ the suggestion of a joint Anglo-American committee of experts, responsible to our two Embassies, to advise the Greek Government on financial and economic policies. Having the above considerations in mind, we told him we could not approve a formal set-up of this kind, but that the Embassy experts should of course continue to keep in close touch with their British colleagues and the Greek authorities and offer the latter such informal advice and assistance as might be called for. We have agreed with your people to accept the Greek Government's invitations to you and to us to send transportation experts to Greece.⁹ This is a very specific situation where a coordinated recommendation is essential, since there will be a joint interest in the supply of any equipment necessary to get transportation going again in Greece. Our people are also doing all they can to help UNRRA to do a good job in Greece.

3) The Greeks have approached us informally for help and we are anxious to give them what economic support we can. We have suggested that they send a competent supply mission to Washington to present their claims to our supply agencies. While it seems impracticable at the moment to set up an economic mission in Greece on a tripartite or bilateral basis, I think it might be helpful if I send Donald Nelson out anyway, with a few assistants, to make a survey of the needs and possibilities for me. I shall discuss this with him and keep you informed of any developments.

[ROOSEVELT]

⁸ Sir Reginald W. A. Leeper, British Ambassador in Greece.

⁹ In note 5658, February 17, 1945, to the Embassy in Greece, the Greek Foreign Office requested the United States Government to send a mission to study the railway and road system and port facilities of Greece, which had suffered almost total destruction during enemy occupation, and the synchronization of land communications with sea and air navigation. An identical note was sent to the British Embassy in Greece. The request was agreed to by the American and British Governments and on May 23, 1945, the Joint Transportation Facilities Mission to Greece (called the Greek Transportation Facilities Mission by the British) held its first meeting at Athens. Brig. F. J. Biddulph was Chief of the Mission and Col. Douglas H. Gillette, Deputy Chief, as well as Chief of the American Section. The preliminary conclusions of the Greek Transportation Facilities Mission were submitted to the American and British Ambassadors in Greece in a *First Report*, August 1945. *The Report covering Interim Conclusions* of the American Section of the Mission was prepared by Colonel Gillette in Washington on February 1, 1946. Neither report is printed.

840.50 UNRRA/4-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 12, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received 2:02 p. m.]

377. Urgent for Lehman,¹⁰ UNRRA, for personal and immediate attention, [from] Maben UNRRA, Athens. UNRRA's No. 76.

1. By agreement with Greek Government, Greek Mission is not an operating mission. It advises, observes and provides technical assistance. Success under these conditions presupposes government of sufficient power and competence to carry out agreed UNRRA Greek Government policies. In action successful relief and rehabilitation program requires ability of government to organize and utilize its own resources so that UNRRA aid implements and supplements productivity of Greek economy.

2. Considered view of Greek Mission that none of above minimum conditions for successful action exist in Greece today nor likely to exist in foreseeable future. We realize that solution lies outside of UNRRA responsibilities, but all rehabilitation activities doomed to failure until Greek Government is in position to fulfill obligations set forth in above paragraph.

3. Since mission activities will be greatly restricted and it may be necessary for mission to assume operational control of allocation and distribution of relief goods at any time, you may wish to bring facts to attention of Council¹¹ members and make it clear that UNRRA cannot be held responsible for failure of rehabilitation program.

4. Our position made clear to British and American Ambassadors. Assume each will comment through appropriate channels. Cannot emphasize too strongly necessity for advising Council members that under present conditions UNRRA Greek program will be reduced to feeding activities and restricted health and sanitation operations. Urgent you keep mission continuously advised of actions taken or contemplated. Confirm receipt of this wire. [Maben.]

MACVEAGH

840.50 UNRRA/4-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 13, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received April 16—10:50 a. m.]

391. The Department's attention will doubtless have been attracted by the telegram from UNRRA, Athens to Governor Lehman which

¹⁰ Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

¹¹ Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

I forwarded as my No. 377 of April 12, 11 a. m., at Maben's earnest request and it may be interested in such confidential comment as this Embassy can provide.

While it is understandable that its officials here, who are all now of a minor calibre, should be somewhat appalled by the practical difficulties inseparable from their assumption of full responsibility on April 1 and the political crisis which has since supervened,¹² it would seem that UNRRA should have been aware before this of the poor prospects for a really strong and efficient central government in post-liberation Greece. I believe that such higher officials as Hendrickson have been so aware, and certainly they have been appropriately advised on many occasions. Furthermore, I believe that it cannot yet be said with certainty that Greek administration will in the long run fail to accomplish distribution of supplies in a fashion acceptable to the Greek people, provided the country's main needs are now adequately determined and imports are brought forward promptly within the limits of supply and shipping availabilities. In this connection, there has not yet been time for a fair trial, and the Greeks are notably apt in getting things done to their own advantage in one way or another. Accordingly, I feel that the telegram under reference may be chiefly significant as reinforcing my previous opinion (see my No. 289 of March 21, 3 p. m.¹³) that UNRRA's chief need here at present is the appointment of a director capable of not losing sight of the larger issues in the maze of minor problems, no matter how difficult. For success here, the local UNRRA must show at least as much comprehension and confidence in dealing with the Government as Hendrickson displayed in signing the agreement,¹⁴ and as regards practical problems there must be courage and decision. Specifically, it would seem advisable at this time to reexamine Greece's general requirements to determine whether too much emphasis is being placed on the importation of food and not enough on stimulating Greece's own production by importing raw materials, transport, fertilizers, pesticides and seeds. It might also perhaps be considered whether UNRRA in Greece has become top-heavy as a nonoperational body, owing largely to the presence of several hundred persons from volunteer societies whose lack of specific duties is reported as causing confusion and friction within the organization; and as a corollary to this, whether the principal UNRRA officials in Athens are being forced to spend a disproportionate amount of time in looking after the welfare of their own somewhat demoralized staff.

MACVEAGH

¹² A reference to the replacement of the Plastiras government by the Cabinet of Adm. Petros Voulgaris, which was sworn in on April 8; see telegram 1408, April 8, midnight, from Caserta, and footnotes 55 and 56, p. 122.

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ Of March 1; see footnote 93, p. 202.

868.51/4-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 21, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received April 25—7:30 a. m.]

412. I have been informed that Ambassador Leeper and the British Financial Advisor yesterday had a meeting with Prime Minister Voulgaris and Finance Minister Mantzavinis during which my British colleague recommended that the Prime Minister instruct Mr. Varvaressos to return to Athens as soon as possible in order that his advice on meeting the internal financial problems might be avoidable [*available?*] to the Greek Government.¹⁵ It is understood that both the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister agreed that this should be done and that Mr. Varvaressos should not attend the San Francisco Conference.

The British Ambassador left with the Prime Minister an informal note pointing out that the British Government is anxious that the present Greek Government remain in power until the plebiscite¹⁶ but that its ability to do so would be prejudiced if the internal financial situation deteriorated. The note went on to suggest that the Minister of Finance be instructed, "in his discussions with the United States and British financial advisors," to consider the possibilities of increasing the tax revenues of the State and reducing Government expenditures.

The Finance Minister issued a statement to the press yesterday in which he said the financial position of Greece is not one to cause alarm and that the exchange rate will not be altered. (Reference Embassy's 401, April 19, noon).¹⁷ Yesterday the price of the gold sovereign fell to 8,200 drachmas and dollar currency to 350 drachmas per dollar.

Patterson requests the Secretary of the Treasury be informed of the above.

Needless to say, in compliance with the Department's 242 of March 20, 7 p. m., this Embassy has not established a joint committee with the British to advise the Greek Government on financial matters, but is offering only informal information and advice as may seem in its own judgement to be appropriate. Nevertheless the British are locally losing no opportunity to create the impression of joint re-

¹⁵ In telegram 398, April 17, 1945, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Greece reported that Mr. Varvaressos had agreed to accept the post of Minister of Coordination to coordinate the activities of the economic ministries (868.002/4-1745).

¹⁶ For documentation concerning the political situation in Greece, see pp. 98 ff.

¹⁷ Not printed.

sponsibility and the above gratuitous reference to American advisors in a British note would seem a part of this effort.

MACVEAGH

868.50/4-2145

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 909

ATHENS, April 21, 1945.

[Received May 8.]

SIR: With reference to my Despatch No. 835 of April 11, 1945¹⁸ transmitting copies of the minutes of the 9th, 10th and 11th Meetings of the Joint Co-ordinating Committee, dated March 22, March 29, and April 5, 1945 respectively, I have the honor to enclose for the Department's records, one copy of the minutes of the 1st Meeting of April 16, 1945 of a new committee known as the Joint Policy Committee,¹⁹ which is to replace the Joint Co-ordinating Committee, together with papers referred to in these minutes.

The Department will note that it is stated in paragraph (e) of paper JPC (45)1²⁰ that: "the Greek Government should invite such British and American Political, Economic and Financial Advisers to attend these meetings as they think fit for the purpose of assisting by their advice and experience, the workings of the Committee", and that the Joint Price and Wage Fixing Sub-Committee is shown as being composed amongst others of the American Financial and Economic Advisers. However, while the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs did formally communicate a request of the Governor of the Bank of Greece, Mr. Varvareσσos, for American participation in such committees, I have followed the instructions contained in the Department's telegram, No. 242 of March 20, 7 p. m. and have not allowed representatives of this Embassy to participate in a committee with the British to advise the Greek Government on economic and financial matters but have instructed them merely to offer information and advice as may seem appropriate.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ Minutes of meeting not printed. The Greek Minister of Finance (Mantzavinos) served as chairman. The meeting was attended by 9 Greek officials, 4 members of the UNRRA Mission to Greece, 4 British officials including the Political Adviser (Caccia), the Financial Adviser (Hill), and the Economic Adviser to General Scobie (Lingeman), and a representative of the Joint Relief Commission.

²⁰ The minutes of the April 16 meeting.

868.51/5-345

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter
of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1945.

The Greek Ambassador²¹ telephoned today to inform me that he and Mr. Varvaressos²² are to see the President of the Export-Import Bank²³ tomorrow afternoon and to ask that the memorandum of a conversation last fall²⁴ along the same lines be made available to Mr. Wayne Chatfield Taylor before the interview tomorrow afternoon.

At the same time the Ambassador told me that recent conversations with the Export-Import Bank had been most encouraging. Bank officials indicated the strong probability that a credit could be established in the near future for the purchase in this country of materials to revive Greek industry; that the Bank would be willing to send two experts to Greece to study the situation; and that credits might be opened for certain Greek banking institutions in Greece, not to the Greek Government.

840.50 UNRRA/5-445

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Greek Ambassador
(Diamantopoulos)*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: This refers to the "Statement on the Greek Economic Situation and on the Need for Immediate Outside Assistance" which Mr. Varvaressos left with me on April 17.²⁵ I am deeply concerned with the economic situation which he describes in Greece and assure you that the United States Government earnestly desires to cooperate to the extent that it can in finding solutions to your country's problems.

In the coming months Greece will undoubtedly receive a substantial part of its supplies through UNRRA. I understand that within the next month or two these supplies will surpass the minimum of 200,000 tons mentioned in your statement. Presumably the specific items

²¹ Cimon P. Diamantopoulos.

²² Mr. Varvaressos, en route to the San Francisco Conference, called on Assistant Secretary of State Clayton on April 17 to pay his respects; he also had talks with Treasury officials (868.51/4-2545).

²³ Wayne Chatfield Taylor.

²⁴ Apparently memorandum of conversation of November 2, 1944 by the Associate Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Luthringer), not printed; for summary of conversation, see telegram 4, November 7, 1944, 6 p. m., to Athens, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 224.

²⁵ Not found in Department files.

included in the UNRRA program are as well adjusted as possible, within the tight supply situation, to the relief needs of Greece. Within the framework of UNRRA's directives this program might, if desirable, be amended in consultations between UNRRA and Greek Government officials, in order to meet more of the emergency needs for clothing, medical supplies and industrial raw materials and equipment.

It is my understanding that at the present time the chief limitations on the UNRRA program in Greece are the reception capacity of Greek ports and the availability of shipping space. As port reconstruction proceeds and if the end of the war in Europe eases the shipping shortage, this situation should be improved.

It is our firm conviction as we are sure that it is yours that Greece will benefit from as rapid as possible a revival of private trade. Many of the obstacles to communication and commercial intercourse have recently been removed; the hindrances remaining are related to the shortages described above. The United States Government is encouraging the visit of American commercial representatives to Greece, as for example tobacco buyers, to stimulate Greek exports and the industries associated with them, as well as to renew long standing commercial ties between our countries. The resumption of private Greek import trade, necessarily on a limited scale for the present, is also being encouraged in the hope that as shortages are eased this trade will speedily be revived.

As regards imports into Greece outside the UNRRA program, the question of financing immediately arises. There will be available for financing such imports the assets in the United States of the Greek Government and the Bank of Greece and ultimately of other Greek entities which can be utilized under appropriate arrangements subject to U.S. Treasury license. These assets have been augmented since the liberation of Greece by the proceeds of remittances from the United States. With the resumption of Greek trade, the proceeds of exports from Greece to the United States will also be available.

Imports for full scale reconstruction of the damage suffered by Greece will obviously have to await easing of the situation with respect both to shipping and supplies of necessary materials and equipment. I believe that you understand the legal barriers to American loans to Greece at the present time.²⁶ It is our hope that

²⁶ Reference is to Public Law No. 151, approved April 13, 1934, which prohibited loans to foreign governments in default of their obligations to the United States Government, 48 Stat. 574; for documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1934, vol. I, pp. 525 ff. The question of Greek debts to the United States Government was regulated by the loan agreements of May 10, 1929, and May 24, 1932; for documentation on this subject, see *ibid.*, 1932, vol. I, pp. 626 ff.; *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 384 and 396 ff.; *ibid.*, 1933, vol. II, pp. 544 ff.; *ibid.*, 1934, vol. II, pp. 533 ff.; *ibid.*, 1935, vol. II, pp. 506 ff.; *ibid.*, 1936, vol. II, pp. 308 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 612 ff.

these barriers will be removed by action of the Congress²⁷ and that it will become possible for the United States Government to consider making reconstruction loans to Greece. Such loans would be made for specific projects and it would be necessary for the Government of the United States to have detailed information as to the projects contemplated and the expected sources of funds for the repayment of the loans. External financial assistance of this type would not, of course, provide the solution to the inflation and general financial breakdown threatening Greece. Only stringent internal measures by the Greek Government plus whatever supplies are available from the outside can be expected to contribute to the solution of this problem.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM L. CLAYTON

868.50/5-445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Cimon P. Diamantopoulos, Greek Ambassador
Mr. Kyriacos Varvaessos, Governor, Bank of Greece
Mr. Alexander Argyropoulos, Economic Section,
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Wayne C. Taylor, President, Export-Import Bank
Mr. Lincoln (FN)²⁸
Mr. Baxter (NE)

At a meeting today in the office of Mr. Taylor, President of the Export-Import Bank, Mr. Varvaessos sketched in the background of the almost total destruction of Greek economic life and requested any information or advice that could be offered toward means whereby financial assistance might be extended to Greece for the restoration of normal economic and industrial conditions. He pointed out that, although the UNRRA program for Greece is an extensive one for which the country is deeply grateful, there exists an urgent need for production goods and sufficient industrial equipment beyond the UNRRA program in order that inflation and unemployment may be combatted at once.

²⁷ The loan prohibitions of the Act of April 13, 1934 were made not applicable to governments which were members of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development under the terms of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, approved July 31, 1945; 59 Stat. 512, 516.

²⁸ Francis F. Lincoln, of the Division of Financial Affairs.

Mr. Taylor said that all present were doubtless familiar with the current limitations of the Export-Import Bank but that contemplated legislation would, it is hoped, remove many of those limitations in the near future. He stressed his belief that, as most projected developments in Greece would ultimately be the concern of private industrial firms, it would be better in the first instance to discuss such projects with the appropriate firms with the idea that the Export-Import Bank might later be interested in the financing of any developments decided upon. Mr. Taylor also made it clear that if any financial assistance were possible it would take the form of dollar credits for the purchase of materials in this country. The Bank could not extend loans for budgetary purposes of a foreign government or for the administrative expenses of any government-owned development.

Mr. Varvaressos thanked Mr. Taylor and hoped that he would consider sympathetically certain projects which may be outlined specifically in the near future. Mr. Argyropoulos will remain for some weeks or months in Washington as the head of a small official Greek supply mission which will be authorized to present detailed needs decided upon by the Greek Government.

840.50 UNRRA/5-545

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1945.

Mr. Maben ²⁹ called briefly today to discuss the current situation in Greece, particularly in relation to UNRRA. He left Greece only about a week ago and is returning tomorrow. His hurried visit to Washington was for the purpose of impressing upon all authorities the urgent need of raw materials and small quantities of industrial equipment which will start industry moving and offer employment to the many idle workers in Greece.

Mr. Maben reports optimistically on the port capacity, which he thinks no longer presents a great problem. Conditions are improving so rapidly in that respect that he has no fears of being unable to receive greatly increased cargoes by the time they can be shipped from this country.

Mr. Maben feels very strongly that the Allies have a heavy moral responsibility toward Greece as one of the most staunchly friendly of the liberated areas. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Yalta declared their active participation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of liberated areas. Greece, where American prestige is

²⁹ Designated Chief of the UNRRA Mission to Greece on May 17, 1945.

high, looks to us, justifiably Mr. Maben thinks, for generous assistance. It is one of the purposes of Mr. Maben's visit to urge all agencies of the Government and the Department to recognize the first priority status of Greek needs—not merely for relief items but for those commodities which can contribute to the resumption of normal economic life. Specifically he urged the Department to consider the possibility of a more active participation in the UNRRA activities in Greece. Previous to the first of April, financial and economic representatives attached to our Embassy were regular members of General Scobie's Advisory Committee. All American participation in such committee ceased on April 1st when UNRRA took over. There is the feeling among many Greeks and British that this has been a mistake since it implies that though we were willing to cooperate with the British military we are not willing to do the same for UNRRA, an international organization in which we have a large stake. It is Mr. Maben's desire that representatives from the American Embassy should again attend the meetings of the policy committees which are advisory to UNRRA.³⁰ These committees, he pointed out, have no legislative authority; their members are advisers and observers to UNRRA which is in turn an adviser to the Greek Government.

Mr. Maben had nothing but praise for the competence and ability of the Embassy personnel, and feels the lack of their assistance at the present time. He sincerely hopes that the Embassy will adopt a less standoffish policy toward the very urgent Greek problems, confident that such a policy would pay large dividends to our Government.

840.50 UNRRA/3-1445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1945—8 p. m.

385. Department understands that an informal group meets to consult with and offer advice to UNRRA respecting its operations in Greece and that pursuant to Department's 242, March 20, American representatives do not attend such meetings. Participation of our

³⁰ Marginal notation by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam): "I think this should be done". In a memorandum of May 9, Dallas W. Dort of the War Areas Economic Division stated: "Mr. Maben and Mr. Hill both felt that our previous No. 242 [of March 20, p. 203] had been too strictly interpreted by MacVeagh as a result of which there is an impression that we are not concerned with UNRRA's problems in Greece. There appears to be no objection to clarifying our original telegram as I am sure it was not our intention to prohibit U.S. representatives from participating in meetings with UNRRA where UNRRA desired their advice." (840.50 UNRRA/5-545) Henry A. Hill was on consultation in the Department, prior to the termination of his services.

representatives in regular meetings with UNRRA with British and Greek representatives present would appear unobjectionable if it is clearly understood that such meetings are informal and are to provide assistance to UNRRA at its request. It is realized that UNRRA's operations affect the whole economic life and structure of the country and that the problems on which it will desire assistance will therefore involve matters about which in normal times we would not tender advice. However it is believed that failure of our representatives to be of all possible help to UNRRA's operation in Greece may be interpreted as a lack of interest on the part of this Government in the relief and rehabilitation of Greece. We should do everything possible to have our representatives render advice and assistance wherever they can be most effective in contributing to the success of the UNRRA program.

GREW

840.50 UNRRA/5-1445 : Airgram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, May 14, 1945.

[Received May 26—5 p. m.]

A-184. The following may be of interest to the Department in connection with its telegram No. 385 of May 11, 8 p. m., concerning the desired relationship between this Embassy and UNRRA.

At the close of the Military Period, during which mutually satisfactory relations on a purely informal basis had been enjoyed with UNRRA under Mr. Archer's direction, I was requested by his successor, Mr. Maben, on March 31st, to allow representatives of this Embassy to give assistance to UNRRA "similar" to that which they had been giving to ML, which was a joint agency of the British and American Governments. In reply, on April 1, and in view of the Department's caveat against treating an international organization "on the same basis as in the case of another agency of our Government" (see the Department's Airgram No. A-15 of March 11, 1944²¹), I advised

²¹ Not printed; it set forth the Department's views as to "the relationship between the United States Government and the diplomatic missions on the one hand and UNRRA and its field staff on the other". The Ambassador was informed that "while the Department maintains, and wishes the missions to maintain, close working relationships with UNRRA and its personnel and to accord UNRRA all appropriate facilities, it should be constantly borne in mind that UNRRA is an international organization and that, therefore, it cannot be dealt with on the same basis as in the case of another agency of our Government. This applies likewise to American personnel of UNRRA. . . . The Department has also noted that in certain recent communications from Archer to Lehman, Archer may consider himself as working subject to your directions. This, of course, cannot be the case as the Department is most anxious to avoid any indication of United States domination of UNRRA, its personnel or its policies." (840.50 UNRRA/320)

Mr. Maben that this Embassy could not presume to offer UNRRA any "official advice", but I added that it would "always be at the service of UNRRA for informal discussions and exchange of views, and that on this basis I and my advisers would be glad to continue to see and talk with UNRRA officials at any time, as we have, under the Department's instructions, in the past".

No direct answer was received to my letter to Mr. Maben, but I am now informed that UNRRA is holding "informal discussions", which may represent the "informal committee" to which the Department refers, and the first meeting to which members of this Embassy have been invited will take place this Saturday, May 19, and will be attended by them. The meetings so far have included British advisers but, as I understand it, no Greeks. In the formal "advisory committees" set up by the Greek Government with both UNRRA and British Embassy membership (see Report No. 74 of May 10³² entitled "UNRRA advisory committees in Greece") this Embassy is not participating.

MACVEAGH

868.515/5-2445

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 1079

ATHENS, May 24, 1945.

[Received June 7.]

SIR: As of possible interest to the Department in connection with my many recent messages dealing with the financial situation in Greece, and also with those setting forth the great and growing difficulties created thereby for the personnel of this Embassy, I have the honor to submit below certain observations concerning the present drachma and its relation to the dollar.

It would be natural for anyone unfamiliar with the financial situation in this country to take it for granted that drachma currency partakes of the same nature as dollar or sterling currency, although it would be understood to be "weaker". But the real difference goes much deeper.

The fantastic inflation which reached its culmination in Greece during 1944 is well-known. One of the most obvious steps to meet such a situation was that taken last November, when an entirely new paper currency was issued in place of the old.³³ It was decided to call the new unit a "drachma", as before, and to fix its exchange rate in relation to the dollar and the pound at substantially the same levels as ob-

³² Not printed.

³³ See note 4111, November 14, 1944, from the Greek Ambassador, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 227.

tained during the year prior to the German occupation. At the same time it was decided virtually to wipe out the old drachma currency in circulation when Greece was liberated by making it redeemable at the rate of 50 billion old for one new drachma, thereby reducing the nominal exchange value of all the paper currency then circulating in Greece to approximately \$1,000,000 as against a corresponding figure for August 1939 of over \$80,000,000. The first of these decisions seemed logical enough; the second was perhaps questionable. But giving the old currency only a negligible value made the selection of a dollar exchange rate purely arbitrary.

Whatever the psychological advantages of reintroducing the prewar exchange rate, from an economic standpoint the price of the dollar could just as logically have been fixed at 1,000 drachmas as at the arbitrarily selected figure of 150. In any event, no official provision was made for converting the new drachma into foreign currencies with which to purchase goods for import or to make remittances abroad. Today's official exchange rate constitutes strictly a non-commercial one-way affair, used chiefly in connection with official expenditures of the United States Government and for cashing support remittances. The official rate is in no way affected by price levels or by other normal factors of supply and demand. On the other hand, several steps have been taken which, in contrast to the fixing of an arbitrary exchange rate, have had an immediate effect upon commodity prices. The most important of these steps involved a series of measures establishing wage rates for a variety of occupations, both among private workmen and employees and for those employed by the Greek Government and the British military authorities. Other actions influencing price levels were the establishment of prices for rationed foodstuffs issued from relief supplies, and the short-lived experiment of the Bank of Greece in selling a limited amount of gold coins to the public. As applied in Greece, these three economic controls had one basic feature in common: they provided for wages and prices approximately three times prewar levels in terms of drachmas.

For reasons too obvious to need recital here, liberated Greece must for some years endure a living standard appreciably below that of 1939. This must be reflected in real wages lower than prewar. Greece has never had a comprehensive system of rationing and price control, and present plans for introducing one appear unlikely to produce effective results on a broad scale in the foreseeable future. Lower real wages, therefore, probably will continue to be reflected more in high commodity prices than in strict rationing. And since an excess of demand over supply tends to increase prices in geometrical proportion, it is not surprising that increases over prewar have not been limited to the three-fold rise apparently justified by the factors men-

tioned in the preceding paragraph. In actual fact commodity prices in May 1945 average about ten times 1939 levels.

Contributing to this impressive rise in commodity prices is the fact that the new drachma is not a full-fledged currency. Practically no one deposits it in the bank or otherwise retains possession or title to this currency any longer than absolutely necessary. It has no value abroad and even in the case of domestic transactions its use is limited principally to day-to-day purchases of necessities. A sale involving the equivalent of \$25 or more is almost invariably calculated in gold. It would not be quite fair to liken the present drachma notes to cigar-store coupons or premium stamps, but it would be reasonably accurate to compare them to a token good for purchases at a company store charging high prices. When the United States Government discharges obligations in Greece today (May 24), it pays good dollars. But the beneficiary receives for one of these dollars simply 150 tokens with a total purchasing power of about 10 prewar cents. In terms of present (1945) price levels in the United States the dollar converted in Greece may be worth as much as 15 cents, but it must be spent at once since no one considers the tokens received as safe to hold.

Some day Greece may be expected to have a full-fledged currency again, but in the meantime the standard of value, as indicated above, is not the token drachma but the gold sovereign, which was supplied liberally by the Allies to self-styled resistance movements during the German occupation. Commodity prices in terms of gold sovereigns have been comparatively stable and reasonable. Today the sovereign sells for 25,000 drachmas in Athens as against \$8.40 in New York; the cross-rate is, therefore, nearly 3,000 drachmas per dollar in contrast to the official rate of 150. A large part of the premium on gold is, of course, due to its value for hoarding, but the dollar is worth perhaps 1,000 drachmas today in terms of current commodity prices in Greece, and it is only in such terms that the drachma has any value whatever.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

868.00/6-245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945—7 p. m.

449. Greek situation causing Dept grave concern. In absence any Allied body specifically organized to deal with over-all Greek problems this Govt anxious show interest and assist constructively wherever feasible. Dept would appreciate urgently your suggestions and

recommendations as to what we can do most effectively to make plain our policy and at same time give more than stop-gap aid to Greece.

One suggestion now under consideration by Dept is to send small group of well-known industrial experts to advise on ways of reviving production and increasing productive efficiency. Group would probably be sponsored by Dept and FEA³⁴ and would work in close cooperation with Embassy. Dept does not desire such mission to be joint Anglo-American. If you agree that such mission is advisable you might informally feel out attitude of Greek Govt and Brit Embassy without making any firm commitments. No steps to implement project will be taken until Dept receives your recommendations.

GREW

868.5151/6-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, June 4, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received June 6—2:22 p. m.]

515. For Dept, Treasury from Embassy, Patterson. My tel 500, May 30.³⁵ DePriMin Varvaressos³⁶ outlined Patterson today economic program publicly announced tomorrow. Involves heavy taxation especially commercial and industrial profits; strict control over prices essential items with penal sanctions, fines and requisitioning; control processing imported raw materials; quick distribution UNRRA clothing; new drive against gold speculation. Also reorganize Ministry Supply. In effort obtain popular support, process [*price?*] UNRRA ration lowered this month; hoping charge "economic" prices later and legal wages raised 50% to 70% over February. Latter largely recognizes existing situation. Govt soon also preparing [*partially*] valorize bank savings accounts existing April 1941 in effort to encourage public again deposit funds.

Drachma devalued tomorrow, new rate was not disclosed.³⁷ Army Finance Officer informed. He was present Saturday when Varvaressos verbally agreed any surplus drachmas resold at same rate required [*acquired?*]. Govt may make some adjustment later to those who received support remittances 149 rate but this not yet final and

³⁴ Foreign Economic Administration.

³⁵ Not printed.

³⁶ Kyriakos Varvaressos took his oath as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Supply in the Voulgaris government on June 2. He continued simultaneously as Governor of the Bank of Greece.

³⁷ In telegram 518, June 5, 1945, noon, the Ambassador in Greece reported that the new exchange rate was 500 drachmas to the dollar and 2,000 to the pound (868.5151/6-545).

similar privilege definitely not be extended to drachmas purchased and spent by foreign agencies.

Varvaessos anticipates strong opposition industrial and merchant classes but seeking support public opinion generally. Will make strong fight and optimistic. We believe reasonable chance arresting situation.

Rptd London as 619 for Embassy, Taylor. [Embassy, Patterson.]
MACVEAGH

868.50/6-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, June 7, 1945—1 a. m.

[Received June 9—1:30 p. m.]

556. Urtel 449 of June 2. To help effectively with overall problem of Greece's economic recovery I feel any contemplated clarification of policy should take into account political and psychological conditions beyond competence of industrial experts. Such factors as dynamic Communist movement under Moscow-trained leaders and widespread belief in non-Communist circles that Anglo-Russian conflict is inevitable, placing Greece in jeopardy to Soviet-supported northern neighbors, are largely responsible for local stresses preventing resumption normal activities. Meanwhile US prestige, high due to war, but traditional policy, restricted to general benevolence and trade promotion combined with strict nonintervention internal matters, seems ill-adapted present world situation in which local upheavals even in small countries capable causing wide repercussions. Furthermore, this policy actually enabling both Left, Right claim US sympathy while continuing extremist activities. Realize difficulties of reorienting policy maintained many years, but suggest clear statement of firm determination discountenance all unilateral solutions whatever in Greek external, internal affairs from now on might provide useful warning to troublemakers and assist restore necessary calm.

Leaving aside larger aspects, purely economic causes of local unrest can perhaps best be dealt with by supplying raw materials and fuel to reactivate industry through existing agencies and, particularly, normal channels of trade. Proposed advisory mission of industrial experts could not affect present situation appreciably, but might possibly be useful later in connection development relatively simple industries after elementary needs supplied.

MACVEAGH

840.50 UNRRA/6-1845

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 1192

ATHENS, June 18, 1945.

[Received June 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the UNRRA Chief of Mission in Greece, Mr. Buell F. Maben, has again raised the question of participation by members of this Embassy's staff in the Joint Policy Committee described on pages 2-3 of the Embassy's Report 74 of May 10, 1945, entitled "UNRRA Advisory Committees in Greece".³⁸

Mr. Maben, who is an American, stated that while in Washington recently he discussed this question in the Department.³⁹ (It appears probable that there was some connection between his visit and the Department's telegram 385 of May 11, to which I replied by airgram 184 of May 14.) Mr. Maben also stated that Governor Lehman intended to take up the same matter with high officials of the Department. As of possible assistance in replying to the Governor, and in connection with general policy affecting UNRRA, the following paragraphs are submitted.

As the Department is aware, the British predilection for committees yielded a heavy crop in the Military Liaison period which ended on March 31. These committees were of two general classes, Anglo-American and Anglo-Greco-American. Of the latter the most important in the final stages of ML was the Joint Coordinating Committee. Attendance at the meetings of this committee varied from time to time, but its constitution at the final gathering in the military period, on March 29, was typical. It included six Greek cabinet ministers, one Under Secretary, two Secretaries General, the Governor of the Bank of Greece, the Senior British Naval Officer in Greece, the British Brigadier in charge of Supply and Relief at ML, his Deputy in the person of an American Colonel, Mr. H. A. Hill, Special Assistant to the American Ambassador, Mr. Gardner Patterson, Treasury Representative attached to this Embassy, the British Financial Adviser to HQ Land Forces Greece, the Labor Attaché of the British Embassy, the Delegate of the International Red Cross, the President of the Joint (Swedish-Swiss) Relief Commission, his Swiss Assistant, four members of the UNRRA Mission to Greece, a Greek Secretary and a British Secretary. The American advisers named were allowed by me to serve on this Committee because of the direct participation of the American Government in ML through AFHQ and the War Department, and the Department's instructions to assist General Scobie with

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ See memorandum by William O. Baxter, May 5, p. 216.

appropriate advice in his strictly relief functions (see the Department's telegram No. 27 of November 16, 1944).⁴⁰

When ML handed over to UNRRA on April 1st of this year, the cumbersome "Joint Coordinating" Committee was discontinued, but a somewhat similar committee, the Joint Policy Committee, was immediately set up. This was composed of six Greek cabinet ministers and three other high Greek officials, the Chief of the UNRRA Mission to Greece and three of his staff, the British Political Adviser, the British Financial Adviser, the British Economic Adviser, the British Labor Attaché, the Assistant to the President of the Joint Relief Commission and three Secretaries. The Joint Policy Committee has been described in a British document as an "advisory body. . . . the vehicle through which UNRRA offers advice to the Greek Government at the highest level. All matters in which UNRRA is interested are within its competence. The British and American Political, Economic and Financial Advisers, who took part in the meetings of the Joint Coordinating Committee, have been invited by the Greek Government to be members of the new Committee, which is, therefore, in effect, a tripartite body." This British description is of course quite incorrect, since no American "political adviser" attended the Joint Coordinating Committee meetings and the invitation to members of the Embassy staff to serve on the new Committee was declined in compliance with the Department's telegram No. 242 of March 20. However, it shows the intention behind the Committee's formation.

Since April 14 this Embassy, in accordance with the Department's instructions, has been giving advice both to UNRRA and to the Greek Government informally when asked and as seemed appropriate, but the Joint Policy Committee has been no more "in effect" than in reality "a tri-partite body", unless one counts in the participation of the Secretary of the Joint Relief Commission, which was not intended in the above description. Actually the Committee is Anglo-Greek despite attempts to make it look otherwise. The same office building in Athens houses British Military Headquarters, the administrative offices of UNRRA and the four British advisers who serve on the Joint Policy Committee. The latter officials are attached both to the British Embassy and to the Commander of Land Forces Greece, Lt. General Scobie, but in practice they and their staffs have had little other work to do and have devoted almost their full time to advising UNRRA and the Greek Government. The meetings of the Joint Policy Committee are, therefore, simply the outward manifestation of a continuous process by which UNRRA and Greek Government

⁴⁰ *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v., p. 205.

activities are directed to a very considerable extent by a group of able British officials. The fact that the Political Adviser with the rank of Minister who heads the group has now become temporarily Chargé d'Affaires of Great Britain hardly alters this situation.

The most recent development in this connection was a meeting of June 14 at the Bank of Greece under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Varvaressos, and attended by the Under Secretary of Supply, three UNRRA and three British officials. The Chairman proposed that the Joint Policy Committee should become the Economic Advisory Committee, which would hold weekly meetings at the Bank of Greece. It was agreed that the new Committee would be purely advisory and not responsible for decisions or executive action taken by the Greek Government. Both the British Financial Adviser and the UNRRA Chief of Mission approved of this clarification, which constitutes a step in the right direction. In actual practice, however, comparatively little change may be anticipated except in so far as Mr. Varvaressos may dominate the Committee by his personality. An interesting side light is the fact that the minutes of the June 14 meeting were drafted by a British Lieutenant Colonel, mimeographed at British Military Headquarters and distributed in envelopes marked "On His Majesty's Service".

Without criticizing in detail the activities of the British advisers described above, American UNRRA representatives here have sometimes expressed the feeling that they are being "pushed around" by the British. Not unnaturally, they look to the American Embassy for support, but in the circumstances it is not apparent how such support can be extended beyond the informal advice always available outside the framework of the Committee, which is of course not what these harassed individuals want. Should the Department revise its policy and instruct this Embassy to participate in the Committee, the British would doubtless profess satisfaction, but the consequences might very well be regrettable owing to a fundamental divergence in the British and American conceptions of UNRRA, at least locally. Thus some time ago the British Ambassador to Greece told the former UNRRA Chief of Mission here that UNRRA in Greece ought to be an Anglo-American undertaking, and that no Russian participation was desired, and it has become more and more clear as time has gone on that the British look upon UNRRA here rather as an extension of ML than as a joint enterprise of the United Nations. To participate in their Joint Policy Committee under such circumstances would either expose us to misunderstanding of our views as to UNRRA's proper functions or involve us in opposition within the Committee which could not fail to be deleterious to UNRRA operations.

This whole question would appear to be one for clarification on higher levels. From the standpoint of practical economics, the present British direction of UNRRA here is probably at least as competent as would result from broader international participation, but politically the effect is unfortunate, and the Department may well wish to consider it from the point of view of high policy. The objection to the present situation is, of course, that it represents frank sphere-of-interest politics, in the same manner as recent British action in influencing the making and breaking of Greek Governments. Whether or not such action happens to be for the best short-term interests of Greece, it furnishes the perfect excuse for unilateral action by other powers elsewhere, and to that degree may be considered prejudicial to a world-situation of which Greece forms a part. What can be done to solve the problem created, short of persuading the British to take a different stand, is another question. It has been suggested that it might improve the present local situation of UNRRA if our Government were to set up an independent advisory body in Athens which would be equivalent in every way to the British. But this would fall short of the United Nations conception and, in any event, would involve serious personnel and organizational problems. Anything less than such an effort, on the other hand, could have little effect on the situation as it exists. Hill and Patterson performed useful service on the former Joint Coordinating Committee, but they were quite impotent (and this is no reflection on them) to exert any appreciable influence over policies introduced by senior British officials and supported by personal visits from Messrs. Churchill, Alexander,⁴¹ Macmillan⁴² and a series of other outstanding figures in British public life. In over-all effect, their minority presence on a policy-determining committee merely supplied U.S. association with British activities without the possibility of influencing these activities to any important degree.

In conclusion, I would stress that while, in line with the Department's instructions as set forth in its telegram 385 of May 11, and practically ever since ML turned over, the Embassy has had an officer assigned to liaison duties with UNRRA, which involves daily contacts and detailed reports to the Department, and in addition, this officer and the Economic Counselor⁴³ attend weekly staff meetings at UNRRA where the British advisers also are present, to go further at present seems undesirable as a matter of policy as well as impracticable from the standpoint of available personnel. I sympathize with

⁴¹ Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

⁴² British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater.

⁴³ Karl L. Rankin.

the inferior position of the Americans in UNRRA, but I am convinced that a fundamental solution of their problem is beyond the competence of anyone in Athens. With the shifting of various UNRRA functions from Washington to London, and particularly with Commander Jackson⁴⁴ in his present influential position, UNRRA in Greece seems likely to become more and more an instrument of British policy, in a manner similar to the Middle East Supply Center.⁴⁵ That it is British-controlled at present is undeniable, and the whole conception of what UNRRA is and stands for is accordingly at stake. Should the United States parallel British action here with a more aggressive independent policy of its own in supplying official advice and guidance, it would only duplicate grounds for objection by other UNRRA members, and in addition create the impression of competition between the Anglo-Saxon powers for benefits to accrue from an enterprise shared in by over forty other nations. What would seem possibly necessary at this time, therefore, is the discovery and institution of practical and effective methods for bringing the UNRRA effort (not only in London and Washington, but here in Greece as well) on to the broadest possible international basis, to save UNRRA's own credit and make clear beyond any question the disinterestedness in this great project of both Great Britain and the United States.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

868.00/7-945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Cimon P. Diamantopoulos, Greek Ambassador
 Mr. John Sofianopoulos, Greek Foreign Minister⁴⁶
 Mr. Grew, Acting Secretary

The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sofianopoulos, called on me this afternoon with the Greek Ambassador and discussed various problems of interest to Greece.

(1) *Greece's need for economic assistance.* This question was discussed at length and I pointed out our desire to be of the greatest possible aid to Greece in helping her to get back to a stable economic life, but I also explained our problems in this connection, which ap-

⁴⁴ R. G. A. Jackson, an Australian, Senior Deputy Director of UNRRA and Acting Personal Representative of the Director General of UNRRA in charge of the European Regional Office at London.

⁴⁵ For documentation on the dissolution of the Middle East Supply Center, see pp. 85 ff.

⁴⁶ Mr. Sofianopoulos arrived in Washington July 4, after the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference where he had headed the Greek delegation.

plied to many of the countries in Europe, notably the needs of our Army and the difficulty of finding available supplies and the shipping to move them.

[Here follows a general and brief discussion of Greek territorial problems involving Bulgaria and Albania,⁴⁷ the question of the recognition by the United States of the Government of Albania,⁴⁸ and Soviet-Turkish relations.⁴⁹]

JOSEPH C. GREW

840.50 UNRRA/6-1845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1945—6 p. m.

663. Department has informed Lehman personally substance of your despatch 1192 of June 18th on British influence over UNRRA in Greece and has urged Director General to discuss this problem with you while he is in Athens between July 13th and 20th. You are requested to discuss your views and conclusions frankly with Lehman and it is hoped that corrective measures will be taken by him.⁵⁰

GREW

⁴⁷ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 300 ff.

⁴⁸ For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

⁴⁹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1219 ff.

⁵⁰ Governor Lehman arrived at Athens on July 13 and departed on July 22 for Belgrade. The Ambassador in Greece transmitted an account of the visit in despatch 1348, July 25, 1945, which stated in part: "With me he [Governor Lehman] showed himself particularly interested in the top management of his local organization, and while he seemed anxious at first to argue the advisability of this Embassy's joining the British Embassy in advising the Greek Government in connection with UNRRA affairs, appeared later to understand the point of view developed in my despatch No. 1192 above referred to. I explained to him at length the superior position enjoyed by the British here in consequence of their political and military tutelage over the country, and emphasized that American advice can, in my opinion (and in accord with the Department's instructions,) be most effectively rendered if given independently of an association inevitably overshadowing in Greek eyes. I assured him that the Embassy is ready to support UNRRA unofficially but directly with Mr. Varvaressos or other Greek Government officials whenever asked, the amount of such support being entirely in UNRRA's hands. With a man of the calibre of Colonel Hoskins at the head of the local organization, I said I would have no anxieties whatever on this score, but I pointed out that hitherto, while the Embassy has been instructed not to offer advice unasked, lest it give the impression that the United States was attempting to control a strictly international organization, the successive directors of UNRRA have taken a passive attitude, expecting the Embassy to take the initiative in guiding them. Consequently I begged him to tell Mr. Maben to come freely to me in the future, and this he did in my presence, though so far without result. (840.50 UNRRA/6-1845) Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins was Adviser on Economic Affairs, assigned to Missions in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; resident at Cairo. For further data on his proposed appointment as head of the UNRRA Mission to Greece, see footnote 77, p. 240.

868.50/7-1145

*The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sofianopoulos) to Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.*⁵¹

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: I am leaving this afternoon for New York on my way to Greece. But before leaving, I would like to thank you most warmly for your kind promise to exert your influence in obtaining for Greece the economic assistance which she so badly needs in the present difficult circumstances. I very much appreciate your courteous attention and attach a great importance to your personal interest.

As you know, President Truman kindly promised that the United States Government would assist in any feasible way in Greece's reconstruction over and above what will be done by UNRRA.⁵² I should be deeply grateful to you if you would be so kind as to talk over this matter with Mr. Grew, the Under-secretary of State, and with the Foreign Economic Administration and see that steps be taken immediately to cover Greece's most urgent needs. This can be done by Art. 3c of the Lend-Lease Act.⁵³ Your personal intervention will, I know, help enormously to expedite the matter.

Before leaving, I should like to express to you once more my profound admiration for your outstanding personal contribution to the success of the Conference. I will always retain most vividly the memory of my association with you.

With my warmest regards

Yours devotedly,

J. SOFIANOPOULOS

868.24/7-2545

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)*⁵⁴

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1945.

Participants: The Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henderson⁵⁵
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador telephoned Mr. Kohler this morning and in reply to the latter's inquiry informed him that Mr. Oscar Cox of FEA⁵⁶ had now cancelled three successive appointments. The Am-

⁵¹ Mr. Stettinius' resignation as Secretary of State had been accepted by President Truman on June 27, 1945. Mr. Byrnes, his successor, took the oath of office on July 3.

⁵² For statement by President Truman on his conversation with Mr. Sofiano-

bassador feared that Mr. Cox might be trying to "dodge" inquiries about the \$100,000,000 lend-lease program for Italy announced in the press.

During his call this afternoon the Ambassador told us however that he had subsequently been in touch with Mr. Cox and had been informed that while it was not true that lend-lease was being extended to Italy, it was true that FEA was undertaking to provide various supplies and equipment for Italy in an aggregate value of approximately \$100,000,000 required to keep Italian economy in the reasonable state of repair required by military considerations. The Ambassador added that while FEA had been unwilling to extend lend-lease to Greece for her urgent reconstruction needs it had undertaken to arrange for procurement and short-term financing of the more urgent items of Greek requirements subject to later repayment from the Export-Import Bank credits which Greece was expected to obtain. The Ambassador expressed his personal understanding of the considerations underlying our supply program for Italy and his appreciation of the facilities FEA was offering in connection with Greek requirements. However he emphasized that the material supplied to Italy would in fact result in a considerable rehabilitation and reconstruction of Italian industries and general economy and it would be impossible for Greek public opinion to understand why we should do this for Italy and not do as much for Greece the faithful ally whose entire economy had been wrecked as a result of her participation in the war. The Ambassador therefore felt that it was not enough that the United States should simply extend repayable Export-Import Bank credits to the Greek Government, necessary as these were. The suffering of the Greek people in the war, the aggressive attitude of her northern neighbors toward Greece and the suspicion that Greece was being abandoned by her great western friends had created a state of public despair which could only be overcome by a positive and generous offer of economic assistance. He therefore hoped that the responsible officers of the State Department and other Government agencies would immediately give serious consideration to the prompt preparation and announcement of such a program of assistance.

poulos, released by the White House on July 5, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 8, 1945, p. 69.

⁵³ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

⁵⁴ On July 21, 1945, Mr. Kohler prepared a memorandum of a conversation with the Greek Ambassador the same morning, in which the Ambassador cited press reports regarding allocation of \$100,000,000 worth of lend-lease goods to Italy (see President Truman's letter of July 2, 1945, to Acting Secretary of State Grew, vol. iv, p. 1265) and stated that the Greek Supply Mission in the United States had submitted a list of urgently needed reconstruction goods but had not been encouraged by the FEA (868.24/7-2145).

⁵⁵ Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁵⁶ Mr. Cox was Deputy Administrator of the FEA.

868.51/7-2845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)*⁵⁷

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Mr. Merriam (NE)
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called on Mr. Merriam this morning to discuss various matters.

He told us that the members of the Greek Supply Mission had had a meeting with FEA officials and that FEA had arranged to extend short-term credits to enable the Greek Government to proceed with its urgent purchase in this country on a 120-day renewable basis and up to a maximum of 20 million dollars. The Ambassador seemed very pleased with this specific development.

868.51/8-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 18, 1945.

[Received August 18—1:50 p. m.]

866. In broadcast speech Aug 17 Deputy Prime Minister Varvaressos reviewed progress his economic program. Following is literal translation portion speech:

"Today I am in the fortunate position of being able to announce that the question of foreign aid has been settled.

The American Govt itself invited us to submit an official request for the granting of credits by the Import-Export Bank. The request has already been submitted for 250 million dollars and we are certain that it will be accepted. These credits will be used for the purchase in the United States of all items indispensable to the restoration of our economy. We have requested machines and materials for the reestablishment of our ports, of the Corinth Canal, of the railway network, of roads, of structures, of materials for the reconstruction of cities and devastated villages, of rolling stock and other means of transport, of animals for agriculture, in other words everything which we need for our economic recovery."

Varvaressos added UNRRA will spend nearly 300 million dollars aiding Greece by end of 1945 and will continue 6 months beyond that. For purposes comparison he stated:

⁵⁷ Marginal notation by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs: "Please note Ambassador's statements on page 2 of attached memo. They seem to us to make sense." The memorandum is not attached to file copy. The reference is presumably to the latter part of the second paragraph of the memorandum of July 25, *supra*.

“If we realize that the total of our public debt does not exceed 300 million dollars we will understand the extent of the assistance granted our country. In the space of a single year, we shall have received more than we have borrowed under onerous conditions and with so much difficulty during a full century.”

He also said Greece can obtain still further aid from International Bank for Reconstruction soon to be constituted.

MACVEAGH

868.51/8-2045

The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the President of the Export-Import Bank (Taylor) ⁵⁸

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1945.

DEAR MR. TAYLOR: The magnitude of the devastation caused by the enemy during their occupation of my country is not unknown to you. Greece has repeatedly made public, and particularly to the Allies, the extent of the disaster which overwhelmed her during that period. This is especially true of her physical assets which has greatly impaired her productive capacity. Her railway networks and rolling stock are nonexistent; her roads are destroyed. The enemy, during the invasion, took possession of all passenger cars and trucks in the country, and communications in Greece, when possible, are now conducted in a large measure by primitive means. Of our coastal vessels none remain, and of our fishing fleet and sailing ships, but few. The harbor works and installations of our chief ports have been destroyed. The Corinth Canal has been completely blocked and the only bridge over it, the sole means of communication between the mainland and the Peloponnesus, no longer exists. A hundred and ten thousand rural buildings have been razed and six hundred thousand persons remain without shelter. The livestock for food and agricultural requirements has been depleted to less than half its original number. The greater part of agricultural machinery and tools which Greece had before the war have been looted. Irrigation and land reclamation works have been abandoned and are in ruin, and the machinery employed on them has been plundered by the enemy. Mining equipment has been rendered useless, and industrial installations have been seriously damaged. Under such conditions our national economy has been gravely undermined and our national revenue has fallen to a very low level.

Facing this situation my Government is sparing no effort and care for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country's economy; as long, however, as the physical assets which were lost are not

⁵⁸ Received in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on August 27; copy transmitted to Athens in Department's instruction 408, September 4, 1945.

replaced and the country is not equipped with the essential technical productive means, these efforts can meet with no success.

If Greece is to enter into a normal economic life and to achieve a proper level of production, it is an imperative necessity for her to acquire with the least possible delay those essential technical assets which she lacks. Therefore, and following our recent conversation, I beg to inform you that I have been authorized by my Government to submit a request for credits from the Export-Import Bank amounting to two hundred and fifty million dollars. My Government has, moreover, instructed me to convey to you that the above amount was reached after very careful and detailed consideration; that it corresponds to only the actual and imperative needs for the reconstruction of Greece, not provided for under the UNRRA program, and that my Government is fully conscious of its obligation to assure that the funds so acquired be employed as efficiently as possible so that the materials and equipment to be obtained through them shall enable the productive capabilities of the country to be increased and thus create the necessary resources for the repayment of the credits to be negotiated. The industry of my countrymen and their ingeniousness in conjunction with the modern mechanical equipment perfected to such a high degree in the U.S.A., constitute, we are confident, an excellent guarantee for the substantial increase in the returns of Greek production which will facilitate the gradual meeting of the obligations to be incurred.

In this regard and in accordance with my instructions, I have the honor to submit the enclosed list of the main Greek requirements according to categories.⁵⁹ Further, my Government informs me that the competent services in Athens are in the process of preparing detailed descriptions of the items in the above mentioned list; these will be submitted as soon as they are received from Athens.

Please accept [etc.]

C. DIAMANTOPOULOS

868.51/8-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 21, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received August 22—8:40 a. m.]

883. Mytel 867, Aug. 18.⁶⁰ Replying my queries regarding his statement re loan \$250,000,000 Varvaressos said yesterday he realized

⁵⁹ Not printed; 18 categories were listed including machinery and equipment in connection with harbors, roads, hydraulic and water supply works, the Corinth Canal, bridges, and agriculture; railway rolling stock, trucks, buses, and coastal ships; shipbuilding installations; materials and mechanical equipment for sailing ships; timber and other building materials; and livestock. No dollar amounts for the 18 categories were given. (868.51/8-2045)

⁶⁰ Not printed; it requested the basis for the "astronomical expectation" in connection with the proposed Export-Import Bank credit (868.51/8-1845).

sum large one but Greek needs also large, local devastation this war being many times that caused by World War I. Greek Govt aware it cannot expect even so much as tenth of \$3,500,000,000 which Export-Import Bank authorized loan liberated countries but feels has right to ask assistance approaching that proportion and made request accordingly. His confident statement regarding acceptance really expression hope (probably for political effect here). He added Bank in taking request under consideration indicated willingness advance \$20,000,000 on short term.

MACVEAGH

868.51/8-1845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1945—2 p. m.

869. Your 866 and 867.⁶¹ While the Export-Import Bank may make moderate loans to aid in the reconstruction of Greece there is no basis for astronomical expectations. The figure named by Varvaessos, 250 million dollars, represents official request presented to the Export-Import Bank Aug 20; but Greek Embassy has been informed by the Bank that question must be presented to full Bank Board and no indication can be given as to when Board will act or what amount if any may be approved.

BYRNES

868.00/9-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 3, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received September 4—12:25 p. m.]

962. Varvaessos submitted resignation as Vice Prime Minister Sept 1 and despite efforts Regent⁶² and British colleague persuade him reconsider remains adamant. Has made no public statement explaining step but according British colleague is personally very bitter, charging he has been "ganged up on" chiefly by industrialists, later joined by Leftists in opportunist effort to exploit situation (see my telegram 941, Aug 30⁶³). Thinks his resignation will be "severe shock" resulting economic chaos and subsequent recall his services.

⁶¹ Latter not printed; for summary, see footnote 60, p. 234.

⁶² Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens and Primate of Greece.

⁶³ Not printed.

Govt undertaking to stabilize situation so as not to prevent Regent's going London.⁶⁴ Has given statement to press that economic policy remains unchanged. Plans appoint new men supply and broaden Advisory Economic Committee perhaps with additional Leftist members, meanwhile trusting to assurances by industrialists that objections to Varvaressos not against policy but against method by which applied.

[MACVEAGH].

868.51/9-2045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1945—1 p. m.

998. Dept despatch 408, September 4,⁶⁵ and Deptel 869, August 25, 1945. Greeks expected to submit request immediately Eximbank loan 25 million to meet pressing needs pending Bank action on 250 million request. Chairman Eximbank Board views smaller loan favorably but Bank unable to act until Greeks submit concrete program of contemplated expenditures including details on items and expected uses. Program should reflect first priority Greek reconstruction and rehabilitation requirements. Department suggests you impress Greek Government with urgency of preparing and submitting program as necessary preliminary to consideration by Bank. Diamantopoulos and Argyropoulos appear unable to prepare program. They or successors may also need authority to negotiate with Bank after program submitted by Athens.

Fact that loan of 250 million not approved nor being given serious consideration in total by Bank officials should be impressed upon Greek officials (urtel 1051, September 20⁶⁶). This amount would be entirely unjustified share of Bank's loaning availabilities even if loan justified by repayment capacity. All appropriate measures should be taken to forestall further unfortunate publicity.

ACHESON

⁶⁴ The Regent arrived at London on September 6; see telegram 9163, September 7, 7 p. m., from London, p. 154.

⁶⁵ Not printed; it transmitted to Athens a copy of the letter of August 20 by the Greek Ambassador to the President of the Export-Import Bank, p. 233.

⁶⁶ Not printed; in reporting almost daily references in the press to the anticipated \$250,000,000 Export-Import Bank credit, it gave the Ambassador's views that the Greek Government's action in inviting applications for industrial equipment to be purchased with part of the credit were convincing the public the credit would be forthcoming and that eventual denial by the United States Government would be bound to have unfortunate repercussions (868.51/9-2045).

868.51/9-2545

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Leonard Unger of the War Areas Economic Division

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Kohler, NE
 Mr. Satterthwaite, NE ⁶⁷
 Mr. Lincoln, ED ⁶⁸
 Mr. Kaufman, FEA ⁶⁹
 Mr. Rips, FEA ⁷⁰
 Mr. Unger, LA

In Mr. Kohler's office, State Building, Wednesday,
 September 19, 1945.

A résumé was made of conversations held on September 18, the preceding day, between Ambassador Diamantopoulos and Mr. Argyropoulos and officers of FEA and the Department of State ⁷¹ which emphasized the urgent need of Greece for financial assistance in view of the abandonment of the proposed twenty-million-dollar, one-hundred-twenty-day nonrenewable FEA loan.⁷² During these conversations FEA proposed that, pending action on the request for a two-hundred-and-fifty-million-dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank, the Greek Government request at once a twenty-five-million-dollar loan.⁷³ Mr. Crowley ⁷⁴ had indicated that this could be expected to receive favorable consideration. The Greek representatives regretted, however, that they could not present at once a detailed program for the expenditure of the twenty-five million dollars on the basis of which the Export-Import Bank would have to make its decision.

Mr. Kaufman said that he hoped to learn the State Department's attitude on the twenty-five-million-dollar loan and the Department's opinion of the ability of the present representatives of the Greek Government in Washington to negotiate on this matter. Mr. Kohler indicated the Department's support of the loan. He believed this to

⁶⁷ Joseph C. Satterthwaite of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁶⁸ Francis F. Lincoln of the Division of Foreign Economic Development.

⁶⁹ Frank A. Kaufman of the Office of the General Counsel, FEA, Acting Counsel for the Far East and Special Territories Branch of the Bureau of Areas.

⁷⁰ Serge Rips of the Bureau of Areas, FEA.

⁷¹ The memorandum of September 18 prepared by Mr. Kaufman gives no indication that officers of the Department of State were present. This memorandum was found in the records of the FEA.

⁷² The request for the \$20,000,000 loan, to be made through the United States Commercial Company, had been sent to Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator, in letter No. 3348, September 4, 1945, by the Greek Ambassador. This letter was found in the records of the FEA.

⁷³ From the Export-Import Bank.

⁷⁴ Mr. Crowley was Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Export-Import Bank.

be a minimum emergency requirement of the Greek Government for its essential reconstruction program. He added that Messrs. Diamantopoulos and Argyropoulos are unquestionably in good standing at home but it appears that they have not been afforded sufficient information from Athens to negotiate any of the several loan arrangements which have been proposed, as well as on other economic arrangements. It was decided to inform the American Ambassador in Athens of the situation and suggest that he bring to the Greek Government's attention the need for a concrete and detailed program if any action on its request for a loan is to be expected. Mr. Unger agreed to draft a telegram to this effect.

840.50 UNRRA/9-2945

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State*⁷⁵

[LONDON,] 29 September, 1945.

DEAR MR. BYRNES: We have received from Athens the text of a letter addressed to Mr. Maben, the head of the U.N.R.R.A. Mission, by the Greek Prime Minister on the 14th September. In this letter Admiral Voulgaris explains the economic policy which the Greek Government propose to pursue consequent on the resignation of Monsieur Varvaressos⁷⁶ and expresses the hope that U.N.R.R.A. will furnish the Greek Government with advice on the plan itself and on the organisation which should be established in order to give it effect.

Mr. Maben has interpreted this request to mean that the Greek Government recognise their inability to cope with the economic problems facing the country without a very wide measure of foreign advice and assistance. He feels that a major question of policy is involved, since if U.N.R.R.A. accept the request they may lay themselves open to charges of interfering in Greek internal affairs and of infringing Greek sovereignty. They would also require additional and highly qualified experts. On the other hand, if they fail to reply or if they decline to render assistance they will be accused of standing idly by while Greek economy progressively deteriorates.

I can well understand that U.N.R.R.A. may hesitate before taking on this additional responsibility which would inevitably involve them closely in the internal economy of Greece. I think it would be most valuable if we were to give them the advice of our two Governments and were to press U.N.R.R.A. to accept the Greek Government's

⁷⁵ The Secretary of State was attending the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which was held at London from September 11 to October 2, 1945.

⁷⁶ On September 1, 1945.

request if we feel that this would in fact be in the best interests both of U.N.R.R.A. and of Greece.

The Greek Government's request is a direct consequence of Monsieur Varvaressos' resignation. Admiral Voulgaris has always recognised his own inability to deal with economic matters and it is clear that he despairs of finding any Greek with sufficient ability to replace Monsieur Varvaressos. He has therefore appealed to U.N.R.R.A. for one or more experts whose status might in theory be purely advisory but who would undoubtedly influence and to some extent direct the whole of Greek economy by reason of the fact that Greece is dependent on U.N.R.R.A. for all her essential imports.

I am convinced that something will have to be done without delay if Greek economy is not to collapse. One course would be to induce Monsieur Varvaressos to reenter the Greek Government, but I am very doubtful whether he would agree to do so and I am not sure that it would be possible at this stage for him to resume his economic programme where he left it off on his resignation. I doubt therefore whether we can count on him, at least in the immediate future. Another possibility is that the Greek Government will be reformed on the Regent's return to Greece and that a strong team will be appointed, capable of dealing with the country's economic problems. It is doubtful, however, whether any available Greek has the necessary ability, and there is the obvious danger of delay even if a solution on these lines could eventually be reached.

I am inclined to think therefore that the only practical course is for U.N.R.R.A. to accept the Greek Government's request. The danger that they will be accused of excessive interference in Greek affairs certainly exists, but I think that this could be accepted. The change in their position would not be too drastic, for so long as they are supplying almost the whole of Greece's import needs they must inevitably exercise immense influence over the Greek Government's internal economic policy.

I should be very glad to learn whether you agree with this conclusion. If so, I think that we might both of us inform U.N.R.R.A. of our views and press them to undertake this task. They would certainly need one or more first-class men, who would probably have to come from outside the present U.N.R.R.A. organization. In particular I am convinced that a really strong man is required for the head of the U.N.R.R.A. Mission in Greece if this Mission is to take on new responsibilities. Though we have one or two men who might do, it would probably cause difficulties if an Englishman replaced Mr. Maben. For this reason I think we must look to you to find a man and see that Governor Lehman appoints him. We for our part will try to support your nominee with other good men to strengthen the

Mission. As perhaps you know, U.N.R.R.A. did try to get Colonel Hoskins from the United States Army to be the head of the Greek Mission, but Colonel Hoskins' employer in civil life felt unable to release him; I have wondered if a personal appeal from you would induce him to change his mind. I am sure Colonel Hoskins is exactly the man who is needed for the job, and, in view of the gravity of the issues involved, I am very reluctant to abandon my hope that his services may be obtained.⁷⁷

Yours Sincerely,

ERNEST BEVIN

668.0011/10-145

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 1614

ATHENS, October 1, 1945.

[Received October 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the resumption of private trade between the United States and Greece, as announced by the Department on September 20 [19],⁷⁸ is being hampered by artificial barriers requiring the urgent attention both of the Department and of UNRRA. The matter is all the more pressing in view of the extensive overlapping of the UNRRA program for Greece and the preliminary list of requirements submitted by the Greek Ambassador to the Export-Import Bank,⁷⁹ which accompanied the Department's instruction No. 408 of September 4, 1945.⁸⁰

The danger of creating a virtual monopoly of imports in Greece, as a result of Allied military and UNRRA procurement, has materialized substantially as predicted in my despatch No. 663 of March 13, 1945.⁸⁰ The long and perhaps unavoidable delay in reestablishing procedures for commercial orders, together with the methods of UNRRA pro-

⁷⁷ In a letter of June 30, 1945, to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, the Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Hendrickson) reiterated an earlier request by Governor Lehman for the appointment of Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins as Chief of the UNRRA Mission to Greece (840.50 UNRRA Personnel/6-3045). Colonel Hoskins was informed in telegram 1339, July 6, 1945, 7 p. m., to Cairo, that the Department regarded him as the "outstanding and logical US candidate for this assignment." (840.50 UNRRA Personnel/7-645) Col. Hoskins did not take the UNRRA position.

⁷⁸ The question of the resumption of private trade between the United States and Greece was under consideration by the Department at least as early as April 1945. Assistant Secretary of State Clayton commented on the matter in his letter of May 4 to the Greek Ambassador, p. 213. Discussions were undertaken with interested Government departments and with Greek spokesmen at Washington and Athens, and on September 19 the Department stated that "the resumption of private trade between the United States and Greece, effective immediately and subject to certain limitations and requirements, has been announced by the respective Governments"; for text of statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 23, 1945, p. 440.

⁷⁹ On August 20, see p. 233.

⁸⁰ Not printed.

gramming and procurement now in effect, have been the chief contributing causes. Efforts to remedy this condition should, therefore, center upon a modification of present UNRRA methods in Washington, London and Athens.

As mentioned in my despatch of March 13, the original military relief supply program for Greece consisted of 45 items on a single mimeographed sheet. The UNRRA program has since grown into a monumental affair of some 1,500 pages. Such expansion was inevitable as long as UNRRA was the sole procurement agency for civilian requirements, but the result is that the UNRRA program now embraces almost everything really essential to Greek economy for the near future. And as long as there is a prospect of obtaining all of the country's needs free of charge, through UNRRA, the Greek Government obviously will not encourage imports through commercial channels involving payment in foreign exchange. Both for this reason and to avoid duplication of requirements, the Ministry of National Economy has announced that commodities programmed by UNRRA may not be imported privately for the time being (Embassy's telegram No. 989 of September 8⁸¹). In effect, this ruling limits commercial orders to a comparatively few items such as steamships, cosmetics and certain types of machinery. For example, practically all automotive products, which represented a major part of American exports to Greece, are excluded by reason of the fact that they are provided for in some degree under the UNRRA program. The same is true of most other normal items of trade.

The UNRRA program for Greece consists of items which the Greeks have asked for and which local UNRRA screening officials have found to fall within the general scope of UNRRA procurement. The 1,500-page program is the result. But no one here in Athens knows what it would cost to obtain all of these items, or how many of them are available, or what portion of those available can be covered by UNRRA financial resources available for the relief of Greece. In fact, no figure appears to have been set for the amount of money UNRRA intends to spend on behalf of Greece, either in total or for any given period. In other words, the Greeks have asked for everything they could think of, without regard to cost, and UNRRA has forwarded most of these requests to Washington and London. That a request will be filled is usually not known until a ship arrives in a Greek port many months later, and in the meantime private trade is effectively throttled.

It would seem desirable that UNRRA allocate a specific sum of money for procurement on behalf of Greece during a given period of time, and that officials of the Administration in Athens be kept

⁸¹ Not printed.

informed currently as to the availability and cost of the items Greece will actually receive as a result of the requests submitted. These two steps should contribute greatly to the intelligent planning of relief operations in this country. Some clarifications also would result as to the field remaining for private trade, but it is doubtful whether the above measures would be sufficient in themselves to give normal trade a reasonable opportunity of reestablishing itself. The reason for this is, of course, that the two steps proposed would involve considerable delays at best, with a corresponding handicap to the placing of commercial orders contingent upon UNRRA's final refusal to supply the merchandise in question. The fact that no action appears to have been taken in Washington on the initial effort of UNRRA (Greece) to reopen commercial channels (Embassy's report No. 59 of April 16, 1945⁸²) is not encouraging in this connection.

The question then arises as to whether UNRRA's future programming and procurement might not be simplified and limited to commodities more or less directly associated with relief activities. It seems probable that the Administration's financial resources available for Greece could be very largely if not completely absorbed in this manner, leaving most of the broader and all but indefinable field of "rehabilitation" to be supplied through commercial channels. The latter would be paid for in foreign exchange provided either from Greece's own resources or from credits such as may be made available by the Export-Import Bank. Probably it would be undesirable to announce formally that UNRRA is to forego further rehabilitation work in Greece, but a fairly definite line will have to be drawn somewhere and a decision on this point should not be delayed.

I feel certain that the Department will appreciate the outstanding importance of this question, economically and politically for Greece, as well as financially for the United States. I would therefore request that it be taken up with UNRRA in all urgency.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

840.50 UNRRA/9-2945

The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)

LONDON, October 1, 1945.

DEAR MR. BEVIN: I received your letter of September 29th on the subject of the relationship of UNRRA to the Greek Government. I am rather inclined to think that it would not be well for UNRRA to step out of its role to the extent of advising the Greek Government

⁸² Entitled "UNRRA Undertakes Certain Commercial Orders in Greece," not printed.

with regard to its financial plans. However, I shall take your letter along with me to Washington and I hope to give you an early reply after my return.⁸³

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

868.51/10-245

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 1623

ATHENS, October 2, 1945.

[Received October 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's instruction No. 408 of September 4, 1945,⁸⁴ and its telegram No. 998 of September 22, regarding the request of the Greek Government for a loan from the Export-Import Bank.

As instructed in the Department's telegram under reference, the unfortunate effect of the publicity given to the original request has been brought to the attention of various Greek officials, including the Ministers of Finance and National Economy. All deny that any authoritative statement was made to the effect that a loan actually had been concluded. The fact remains that most persons in the country consider the \$250 million loan as assured, and refer to the \$25 million list of requirements just prepared as relating to the "first installment". A denial circulated to the press by OWI,⁸⁵ in the form of a quotation from Ambassador Diamantopoulos in Washington, was ignored by all local newspapers. Moreover, the British Embassy was informed by officials of the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones that certain telephone equipment ordered from the United Kingdom was no longer wanted, since the \$250 million loan from the United States would take care of all such needs.

It is understood that the new \$25 million list of requirements prepared by the Greek Government for the Export-Import Bank is being forwarded to Washington through UNRRA channels. It has been prepared hurriedly and UNRRA has not been consulted; the proposals were handed over in a sealed envelope addressed to the Greek Ambassador in Washington. As a result, the list probably involves much of the same general overlapping with the present UNRRA program as occurred in the earlier list,⁸⁶ of which a copy accompanied the Department's instruction of September 4.

The indefinite status of present UNRRA programs, as described in my despatch No. 1614 of October 1, necessitates particular care

⁸³ No further reply to Mr. Bevin found in Department files.

⁸⁴ See footnote 58, p. 233.

⁸⁵ Office of War Information.

⁸⁶ See footnote 59, p. 234.

in the preparation of supplementary programs such as the present. For example, UNRRA has obtained large quantities of material for extending the Athens water supply, while nothing has been ordered to assist in reopening the Corinth Canal. Rolling stock and maintenance machinery for the railroads have been programmed by UNRRA on a considerable scale, while street car and bus requirements have received comparatively little attention. Similarly, agricultural machinery has been ordered on a large scale, while spare parts and other essential items for the textile industry have been excluded from UNRRA plans.

It is most unfortunate that the question of a credit from the Export-Import Bank has been handled by the Greek Government in a manner which can only be described as careless. Greece needs almost everything that can be obtained from abroad, but there is little evidence of any sense of responsibility in arriving at a proper balance of requirements within reasonable limits of cost. Many of the requests submitted to UNRRA are frankly extravagant, and the Eximbank list may well contain items of the same character.

I am informed that UNRRA intends to ask the Greek Government for a copy of the Eximbank list for study and discussion with the Embassy. The outcome will be reported to the Department in due course.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

492.00R/10-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Under Secretary ⁸⁷
Mr. Kohler (NE)

The Greek Ambassador called at his request. He handed to Mr. Acheson the attached note no. 3795, dated October 17, 1945,⁸⁸ addressed to the Secretary, containing a list of Greek demands for reparations from Germany (totaling \$10,449,506,908) in response to the Department's request of August 25, 1945.⁸⁸ The Ambassador expressed regret concerning the delay in submitting this information (due October 1), which he attributed to difficulties in assembling the figures in the desired form and delays in communications and in translation. He added that it was almost impossible for the Greek Government

⁸⁷ Dean Acheson.

⁸⁸ Not printed.

to draw up separate lists of specific claims against Germany and Italy, as Greece had been simultaneously occupied by intermingled forces of both enemies, as well as by the Bulgarians.

Mr. Acheson thanked the Ambassador for his communication, which would have the prompt attention of the proper officers, and assured him the delay was not serious.

740.00119 EW/10-1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON] October 19, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Under Secretary
Mr. Kohler (NE)

The Greek Ambassador called at his request. During his visit he made an impassioned speech regarding the devastation wrought by the enemy in Greece and the problem of Greek reconstruction. He said that Greece was unique in having been subjected to the merciless occupation of not one, but three, enemies—Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. The economy of the country had been completely destroyed. While the Greek Government understood our attitude toward the payment of reparations by Italy, the problem still remained with Italian reparations ruled out and reparations from Germany and Bulgaria problematical. The question still had to be answered as to who would pay for the reconstruction of Greece. UNRRA did not provide the answer. Greece appreciated the effective relief they were getting from UNRRA, but reconstruction was by definition outside the scope of that organization.

The Ambassador was particularly perturbed by the remarks made to him in an interview earlier this morning with Mr. Wayne C. Taylor of the Export-Import Bank. He felt that Greece was deprived of hope of real assistance from the United States by Mr. Taylor's insistence that a request for further credits beyond the 25 million dollars now in course of approval must be considered as an entirely new proposition.

Mr. Acheson thought the Ambassador was taking Mr. Taylor's remarks too seriously and that they should not be interpreted as cutting off any "hope" of further aid. He said that the policy of the American Government toward assisting in the reconstruction of liberated areas is well known and felt certain that Mr. Taylor had simply been trying to make it quite clear to the Ambassador that no advance commitment could be given. Future requests for loans to the

Greek Government would be considered in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time, including the situation in Greece and the effectiveness with which the Greek Government was proceeding to get its own house in order.

Athens Post Files : 1945 : 848-UNRRA : Telegram

*The Senior Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Jackson) to the Director General of UNRRA (Lehman)*⁸⁹

ATHENS, 27 October, 1945.

A. 1. [Here follows reference to a telegram of the UNRRA Office at London.] We have now had an opportunity of discussing the situation here with Maben and the other authorities concerned, including the Regent and the United States, British and Canadian Ambassadors. Our views are set out in this and the two immediately following telegrams.

2. From April 1 to September 30 UNRRA imported into Greece 1,200,000 tons of civil supplies. As a result we have succeeded in keeping the people alive and we have also achieved reasonable results in the fields of agriculture, transport, health and welfare which, if followed up, should be of permanent value to Greece. In spite of much effort on the part of the UNRRA Mission, however, it has not been possible to achieve much in the major field of reviving Greek industry owing to initial late arrival of raw materials, the attitude of most factory owners and incompetence and lack of will on the part of the Government. It is true that if UNRRA ceased importing supplies into Greece now, the basic economic condition of the country would be little better than it would have been if we had not come here.

3. There are present in the situation here all the signs of an approaching economic breakdown. The currency is again rapidly falling in value and prices are soaring. This economic situation cannot be separated from the political position since in almost every case the action of the Greek authorities in economic matters, or their failure to take action, is based on internal political considerations, and this in turn again affects political developments.

4. Broadly speaking all the Governments which have been in power here since the German withdrawal have been unable to put through a proper programme of economic reconstruction. Two major and continuing factors controlling this have been :

⁸⁹ This telegram and the two that immediately follow were sent through facilities of the British Embassies at Athens and Washington and were repeated to the UNRRA London Office; Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey Gale, a British national, Personal Representative of the Director General of UNRRA in charge of the European Regional Office at London, was associated with Commander Jackson in the sending of these messages.

(a) the absence of a competent and effective administrative machine.

(b) the decisive influence on these Governments of a number of people, usually behind the scenes, whose main object is to make money quickly at the expense of the country.

No real improvement can be achieved unless these factors can be eliminated.

5. The immediate situation is that the Regent is trying to produce a new "middle of the road" Government. Opinions differ as to whether he is likely to succeed. Maben's view, which we share, is that whether or not the Regent succeeds in making a new Government, there is no chance of such a Government proving effective and able to surmount the difficulties mentioned in paragraph 4 above, unless he has direct support from at least one of the major Governments. In the meantime it is quite impossible to get the Greek Government to take any effective action to deal with the situation and indeed the Government's policy is aggravating the situation daily.

6. UNRRA has unavoidably become a major factor in Greek politics today. The whole country knows that it depends upon the continuation of the UNRRA supply programme and anything which was said by UNRRA about the handling of their supplies by the Greek Government, would immediately have internal political repercussions of the first importance. Moreover, the Greek authorities continue to request the most elementary advice from UNRRA on a variety of subjects, simply because the UNRRA Mission is at present the best equipped organization to deal with the economic problems of the country and knows far more about what is happening here than does the Greek Government.

See my immediately following telegram.⁹⁰

[JACKSON]

Athens Post Files : 1945 : 848-UNRRA : Telegram

The Senior Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Jackson) to the Director General of UNRRA (Lehman)

ATHENS, 28 October, 1945.

B. 1. My immediately preceding telegram A. In present circumstances, the policy of UNRRA in this country is so completely bound up with the general economic and political future of Greece and the policies of the major allies towards Greece, that it is useless to consider the policy of UNRRA by itself. We have to think in terms of the action to be taken by the major powers in Greece and where UNRRA

⁹⁰ *Infra.*

fits into this picture. As we see it, the possible ways of approaching the existing situation in Greece are as follows:—

(*a*) To pursue a policy of “hands off” and leave the Greeks to work out their own salvation.

(*b*) To extend the functions of UNRRA in Greece so that it virtually becomes the controlling authority in the economic field.

(*c*) For the major powers to establish some kind of advisory mission to advise on the reconstruction of the governmental machine and the economy of the country and to see that its advice is carried through by the Government.

(*d*) For the major powers, pending the establishment of such a mission, to ensure that the Regent of Greece succeeds in his efforts to create a new “middle of the road” Government and to continue to give such support to the new Government in its policy.

2. We are uncertain how far policy (*a*) above represents the present policy of the major Governments. We believe, however, that such a policy would involve a continuation of the present lack of political leadership by the Government and make an economic breakdown inevitable in a matter of weeks, this in turn causing further political disintegration. Quite apart from the results of this for Greece, we believe that such a development would make it impossible to secure the additional funds required from the major Governments supporting UNRRA, and would thus mean the winding-up of UNRRA early in the new year. We are, therefore, in a position in which the future of UNRRA may well depend upon a quick solution being found to the present economic and political problems of this country. It is also worth emphasizing that if a new breakdown occurred here and UNRRA went out of business because of it, the major Governments concerned would be faced with the necessity of reconstructing the supply line to Greece, which we doubt they are at present equipped to do. For these reasons we feel policy (*a*) would lead to chaos affecting all parties concerned.

3. Policy (*b*) in paragraph 1 above has been suggested on more than one occasion by the Regent and members of the Greek Government. It would lead, however, to UNRRA becoming openly involved in day to day politics here and would also lead to UNRRA being made a scapegoat, since any economic shortcomings would be immediately blamed on UNRRA. This would be essentially an unstable compromise so that it would do Greece no good even if it were acceptable to UNRRA. We do not believe this alternative, therefore, provides a way out.

4. Policy (*c*) in paragraph 1 above is in the end undoubtedly the only solution which has a chance of cutting through the difficulties here. There is in the country at the moment no civil service at all as

we know it in western countries. The disorganization of the Metaxas⁹¹ regime and the German occupation⁹² together have destroyed whatever machine existed before and we believe that this country cannot get back on to its feet unless a new governmental machine is built up under the guidance of the major allies. It is not of course for us to say whether the major allies would be prepared to accept this solution or the Greeks to tolerate it. As technicians, however, we consider that Greece cannot be rescued without some measure of this sort. If this policy were adopted we believe that a workable basis could be found for the UNRRA programme in this country. UNRRA would not itself necessarily be directly associated with the advisory mission, but through the existence of these advisors we could have some assurance that the Greek Government would carry out the measures necessary to take advantage of UNRRA's work here and to take sufficient responsibility itself to permit UNRRA to withdraw at the proper time.

5. While in our view the advisory mission idea offers the only way of getting at the root of the trouble here, it must be recognized that some time must elapse before arrangements on these lines could be effective since the necessary staff to do this kind of job does not exist here now.

We feel, therefore, that as a short term measure policy (*d*) is necessary. What is required is to give the Regent sufficient public support from the outside to enable him to form a reliable "middle of the road" government and for this support to be maintained while the necessary reforms are instituted so that the new government is strong enough to deal with those persons who are interested financially in preventing a general resumption of trade and industry. If the major governments announced this support we feel that this might check the present deterioration and enable UNRRA to continue its work pending the more fundamental measures referred to in paragraph 4 above.

6. If the analysis above is agreed, it will be necessary for you to take the matter up with the State Department and the President and also, we suggest, with the British Minister of State⁹³ who is, we understand, in North America in connection with F.A.O., and the British and Canadian Embassies. It will also be necessary for Gale to report personally on the situation to the Foreign Secretary on his

⁹¹ Gen. John Metaxas, Prime Minister and dictator of Greece from August 1936 until his death on January 29, 1941.

⁹² For documentation on the German invasion and occupation of Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 714 ff.

⁹³ Philip J. Noel-Baker who was attending the First Session of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, held at Quebec from October 16 to November 1, 1945.

return to London, and to stress the urgency of immediate and realistic action. We believe that in these approaches to the United States, British and Canadian Governments, we should emphasize that action on the lines of paragraph 4 and 5 above is necessary:—

- (a) if Greece is not to go into chaos and
- (b) if UNRRA is not to fail

It appears to us that the British Government at any rate, are politically committed both to the maintenance of order in Greece and to the success of UNRRA. The United States and Canadian Governments are also politically committed to the second objective, if not to the first.

7. We realize that we are suggesting that you should approach governments on matters which are outside UNRRA's immediate sphere of responsibility. Nevertheless we believe that the policy we are advocating is the only one which can prevent an economic collapse in Greece which will destroy all the work which UNRRA has done in and for Greece and probably affect the general future of UNRRA. It is therefore necessary in our own interests to request our major supporting governments, in their interests as well as ours, to see that conditions are created in which the contributions which they have made to UNRRA are not thrown away. It is from this angle that we have approached the problem.

See my immediately following telegram.⁹⁴

[JACKSON]

Athens Post Files : 1945 : 848—UNRRA : Telegram

The Senior Deputy Director General of UNRRA (Jackson) to the Director General of UNRRA (Lehman)

ATHENS, 27 October, 1945.

C. 1. My two immediately preceding telegrams Nos. A and B. The following general reflections on the situation here may be of use to you.

2. It would be very much easier if in accordance with our general policy UNRRA could stand aside and allow the Greeks to get on with reconstructing their country, or to fail in doing so, as the case may be. Unfortunately, through no fault of UNRRA's we cannot do this. If UNRRA and the major contributing Governments stand aside now, we believe that not only will Greece collapse, but UNRRA will be involved in her ruin, since it will be argued that we have failed in the one country in which we have had the best opportunity to show what we can do. This would be an unfair argument. If we fail here it will be because of the conditions which have prevailed in this country for

⁹⁴ *Infra.*

the last 10 years and because of the present inability of the Greeks by themselves to set about the rehabilitation of their country in a determined fashion. The fact that the argument is unfair, however, is not likely to be easily understood in Congress and Parliament, and our strong feeling is that a collapse here in the next 8 weeks would prove so embarrassing to you in your endeavor to get further financial support as to make your task well nigh impossible. This is why we venture to suggest that you should approach the Governments concerned on the broadest political front, and with great urgency.

3. The situation here demands some Allied intervention both to save Greece and to save UNRRA. We believe that economic intervention now will be necessary if military intervention later on is to be avoided, but UNRRA itself cannot be the authority to intervene. The major Governments must make the running if intervention is to be effective. If UNRRA intervenes by itself we do not think that this could provide more than a very temporary solution, even if it were not ruled out on general policy grounds. If, however, the major Governments are prepared to take a strong line here, we think that conditions can be brought about under which the UNRRA Mission could make a great contribution both in advising the Greek Government and the U.S. and British representatives, and in maintaining the supply programme which is an essential basis of life in Greece.

4. Finally, we must stress the time factor. Action must be taken in the next 4 or 5 weeks if the internal situation in Greece is not to deteriorate beyond the point at which a fresh collapse can be prevented. Quite apart from this, UNRRA will itself pass through the crisis of its existence during the next 8 weeks when the case for further funds must be made, and for this reason alone, it is essential that action should be taken immediately to avert the return of economic and political chaos in Greece. Jackson will be able to give you further background but in view of the great urgency of the situation we believe that you should yourself take this matter up in Washington without waiting for Jackson's return.

[GALE and JACKSON]

868.00/11-245 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, November 2, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 10:46 a. m.]

4015. SAC (Supreme Allied Commander)⁹⁵ requested us to call on him this a. m. in order to discuss his visit to Greece where he has

⁹⁵ Lt. Gen. William D. Morgan, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

just spent 5 days. He stated that Field Marshal Brooke, IGS,⁹⁶ had also visited Greece and that together they have reached certain conclusions on conditions there.

General Morgan then went on to say that he had just written telegram to London that the Greek problem was more desperate than ever and that in his opinion it would be impossible for the British to cope with it alone. He said that the drachma was beginning to fall again, rehabilitation was proceeding extremely slowly, unemployment was increasing and the forthcoming winter would be most difficult for the Greek people. He said that UNRRA unfortunately had not done a good job in Greece, the country was menaced by the "Red Tide" in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania and that he would state bluntly to the British Chiefs of Staff that in his opinion as a soldier Great Britain could not carry on alone and that unless the United States decided to play a more active role in Greece the British should get out of Greece completely and take their losses. He added that he personally would like to see the US in Greece on a fifty-fifty basis just as they were in Venezia Giulia.⁹⁷ He said that Greece was no less a danger point than Venezia Giulia. In any event if the US could not put troops in Greece perhaps it could station substantial air forces there. He stated that the British Government could not go on carrying the financial burden involved in Greece and he hoped the US could take some of this load.

Throughout the conversation SAC manifested great perturbation with situation in Greece and we have no reason to doubt that he has reported in foregoing sense to London. He also indicated that he would urge Attlee to discuss Greece with President Truman during former's forthcoming visit to Washington.⁹⁸

KIRK

840.50 UNRRA/11-245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1945—6 p. m.

1136. Dept urgently wishes your comments on UNRRA series three connected telegrams dispatched Oct 28⁹⁹ through Brit Emb to Washington and London. Assume you have seen these but if not please request copies.

Your regular reports on deteriorating political and economic situation, now forcefully corroborated by UNRRA messages under refer-

⁹⁶ Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

⁹⁷ For documentation on the concern of the United States over the control of Venezia Giulia, see vol. iv, pp. 1103 ff.

⁹⁸ See footnote 15, p. 17. There is no documentation in the Department files to indicate that President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee discussed Greece.

⁹⁹ See the three telegrams dated October 27 and October 28, pp. 246-250.

ence, have made Dept increasingly apprehensive possible breakdown Greek Govt machinery. Dept deeply concerned of late at unwillingness or inability Greek leaders to work together for urgent needs their country. Impression gaining ground abroad that selfishness and cupidity of Greek public figures are blinding them to all broader issues and that perhaps Greece incapable of running herself and solving immediate economic problems. Under these circumstances may be impossible obtain additional funds for UNRRA's work in Greece. In such event there is no other machinery for further support from outside. At least no US assistance possible by any other method. Although US prepared give sympathetic consideration Greek request for loans these must be made on sound economic basis. Little likelihood credits being made available to country offering as little financial and economic stability as Greece at this time.

Essential Greek leaders be made aware of these facts and would like your views as to how best accomplish this purpose. Gravity situation such that Dept giving serious consideration to UNRRA's suggestions in reference telegrams and to idea of strong action to help Greece save herself and avert financial and economic chaos.

BYRNES

868.00/11-445 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, November 4, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3 p. m.]

4042. Reference our number 4015 of November 2, 10 a. m. We now have seen SAC's message to British Chiefs of Staff on this subject. He stated that the military, financial and political situations in Greece are bound together inextricably. He said that he understands British policy to be one of continuing to provide advice, military support and encouragement until such time as a Government is formed in Greece sufficiently strong to bring about drastic reforms necessary for return of stability in economic and financial fields. He added that the prospects are remote for formation of such a Government. From military point of view meanwhile British are drifting into a perilous situation which can be put right only by British Govt deciding on a clear long-term policy.

General Morgan's message then went on to say that the following considerations were applicable:

(a) Greek *gendarmerie*, Air Force and Army are making excellent progress under guidance of British. With support of British Armed Forces at present in Greece, they are maintaining very fair standard of order and law throughout Greece including frontier points.

(b) Pending completion of reorganization and training of *gendarmerie* and army, it would be necessary for Allied troops to maintain law and order particularly in frontier districts.

(c) Next spring Four[th] Indian Division will probably be repatriated. By withdrawal this division from Macedonia without replacement by Allied troops, Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Albanian efforts to foment disorder in frontier districts¹ would be encouraged with inevitable repercussions throughout Greece. Situation might result therefore which would give excuse for one or more of these countries to intervene in Greece.

(d) Brit Govt has recently informed Greek Government that from Jan 1, 1946 it must pay for maintenance of its own armed forces. Cost involved annually is approximately 12 million pounds. However conversations with British Ambassador and his financial adviser indicate that it is not practical for Greek Govt to assume this financial burden in full during 1946, whatever Greek inclinations on proposal may be. Any substantial reduction of Greek Army below strength already proposed will render it incapable of performing essential duties.

(e) By being on individual instead of Allied effort, British effort to assist Greeks to reestablish their State on a sound basis is grievously handicapped. US participation on equal basis would not only lighten burden but would for the future give added confidence and prestige. The same reasons for US Government recently agreeing to share British responsibilities in Venezia Giulia would seem to apply in Greece; also there are extensive American business interests throughout Greece while in Venezia Giulia such do not exist.

(f) Activities of UNRRA in Greece cause of another American interest there. UNRRA assistance is only stable factor in Greek economy at present. American taxpayer provides considerable portion of this assistance. Two hundred Americans at present included in UNRRA Mission in Greece and are increasing in numbers. Women compose half of these and their activities through the country are widely spread. Should internal disorder develop, British armed forces would be responsible for their protection and withdrawal.

(g) Withdrawal or serious weakening of British Armed Forces before at least end of 1946, whatever political future of Greece may be, might in Greece itself and Balkans generally have incalculable results on situation. Insistence that an early date Greece shall accept full responsibility for maintenance and equipment of her armed forces or failure to provide the necessary equipment for Greek army may well mean even if withdrawal of British forces is delayed that Greek Armed Forces will be incapable of carrying out essential tasks.

SAC concluded with recommendations: (1) American Govt should be approached with view to [sharing burden?] now being borne by UK alone. (2) Greece in bearing financial burden of her armed forces should be given very sympathetic consideration. (3) A long-term Allied policy be laid down towards Greece.

(h) If British assistance, both military and financial, is withdrawn too early, it is probable that the men they have expended, money and

¹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 300 ff.

material to bring Greece from anarchy of the days of ELAS² rebellion to present comparatively ordered state will be in vain.

KIRK

868.51/11-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 5, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received November 7—12: 56 a. m.]

1248. Minister Finance Kassimatis³ in press statement Friday promised present complete program within few days adding that his first act would be to convoke economic council (described my despatch 1021, May 15,⁴ for wide discussion problems. He outlined four principal aims:

- (1) Increased assistance from Allies;
- (2) More rapid and equitable distribution goods;
- (3) Tax revision according capacity to pay and manner in which wealth acquired;
- (4) Prompt betterment condition poorer classes.

In response questions, Minister said he favored stabilization by Bank Greece of gold price using its stock 385,000 sovereigns, freedom for foreign exchange transactions, abandonment pegged rate drachma to sterling and utilization country's foreign exchange reserves for productive purposes.

At invitation Minister Finance representatives American and British Embassies and UNRRA attended 24[th?] meeting his office Sunday morning discuss above questions. Ministries Supply and National Economy also represented. Kassimatis read lengthy statement his projects which already discussed economic council. He proposed balance budget by increased taxes notably on tobacco, war profits, luxuries and by levy on all who imported from Germany during occupation. Also favored early sale enemy property in Greece obtain revenue and a substantial increase selling price UNRRA relief supplies. Minister advocated realistic exchange rate for drachma

² The National People's Liberation Army was the military arm of the National Liberation Front (EAM), the resistance group controlled by the Communist Party of Greece which led the revolution that began at Athens on December 3, 1944.

³ Gregory Kassimatis, Minister of Finance in the Panayotis Canellopoulos government formed on November 2, 1945.

⁴ This despatch and telegram 439, May 2, 1945, 6 p. m., advised of the formation on May 1 of an Advisory Committee on Finance consisting of Kyriakos Varvaresos, Michael Pasmazoglu, and George Sideris, in the capacities as Governors of the Bank of Greece, the National Bank, and the Agricultural Bank, respectively, and three former bank governors and cabinet ministers (868.00/5-1545, 868.51/-5-245).

about 1,250 to dollar especially no [to?] permit exports tobacco other products currently impossible and to encourage remittances lately declining due artificial valuation drachma. Kassimatis laid particular stress necessity fresh Allied aid for psychological reasons and for treatment Greek "gold neurosis". Wants credits purchase goods through private trade channels supplement UNRRA program and loan short-term basis minimum 650,000 gold pounds in actual coin which he estimates sufficient with present holdings Bank Greece to control local gold market by purchases and sales. Available gold coins would then equal about 75% note circulation at present open market rate 44,000 drachmas per sovereign.

Sir Quintin Hill as financial representative British Embassy had obtained British Treasury views from London in response telegram sent previous day and stated Treasury considers budget balancing primary importance and should come before anything else. Until such action taken persuade Greek public inflation under control, British Treasury believes making gold and foreign exchange available only lead further speculation, that extent drachma rate out of line is uncertain and that unpegging immediately would upset plans budget balancing. Hill instructed by Treasury to "press" for budget action and stated his personal opinion there would be neither gold nor credits, certainly not until budget in order. Hill remarked that suggestion announce freeing exchanges next few days as part Government's program would "precipitate first class financial disaster". Lippincott and Coombs,⁵ two Americans representing UNRRA, assured Kassimatis UNRRA Mission fully supports Hill's views.

Minister Finance inquired whether Hill's instructions from British Treasury must be taken as a "decision". Hill replied affirmative but on further question whether "irrevocable", he said "nothing is irrevocable". Minister will prepare memo outlining views which Hill promised communicate British Treasury. Meanwhile Minister public statement policy postponed, but Kassimatis felt little hope success his program without "psychological" help in form credits and gold. He hinted stability new government at stake.

MACVEAGH

868.51/11-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 5, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received November 6—7 : 50 p. m.]

1250. Rankin attended Sunday meeting described mytel 1248, November 5th but limited his participation to questions intended clarify

⁵ Richard E. Lippincott, Special Assistant to the Chief of the UNRRA Mission to Greece, and Charles A. Coombs, financial adviser to the Mission.

certain points raised. Kassimatis' proposals mostly sound and differ from British ideas only on such points as exchange and government control. New Greek Government feels urgent need psychological support Allies which would be dramatized by public announcement new credits purchase goods normal trade channels and by supply additional gold. Latter involving outlay under 6 million dollars might have reassuring influence Greek public sentiment far greater than same amount in other form but may be open overriding practical objectives. In any event Eximbank credit reasonable sum would be taken as much stronger evidence continuing US support Greece than equal contribution through UNRRA.

Admittedly present Greek Government temporary but represents effort bring country up to elections under stable conditions which believe worthwhile encouraging in lack of anything better. Certainly desirable not allow present conditions deteriorate further. Psychological effect now announcement Eximbank credit (if such were possible) would be largely vitiated by premature publicity last summer, but appointment small high level mission one to three persons to visit Greece soon on Bank's behalf would have both moral and practical value; therefore, suggest and strongly recommend early appointment such mission as US contribution psychological support present or succeeding interim governments. Mission also would be most useful in assessing Greece's real credit needs in light Eximbank policies and in clarifying points raised my despatches 1614, October 1, and 1623, October 2.

MACVEAGH

840.50 UNRRA/11-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 5, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received November 7—12: 57 a. m.]

1251. Three UNRRA messages mentioned your telegram 1136, November 2 drafted and sent by Jackson after only brief conversation with me and Rankin and slightly longer ones with my British colleague. None of us saw messages till after sent. Last named is entire agreement this Embassy's point of view that conditions indicate desirability of greater UNRRA control of distribution. However, Rankin and I feel this should be possible without any such extensive involvement of UNRRA in local government as Jackson fears. Necessary would be only more effective integration UNRRA with Ministry of Supply and willingness ability exert guidance informally which not excluded present agreement. This combined with judicious

US British support to local efforts stabilize political structure with "middle of the road government" (which we all feel of top importance at this time) should constitute all "drastic action" required.

Specifically as regards four possible ways approaching situation mentioned paragraph 1 Jackson's second telegram:

(a) UNRRA has not pursued consistent hands-off policy but has made certain exceptions under conditions described with some exaggerations in paragraph 6 first telegram. Nor would extension of UNRRA functions (b) into actual supply distribution on basis proven needs make it appreciably more of controlling authority economic field than it already could be with its virtual monopoly imports. Constitution Allied Advisory Mission (c) would represent simply extension and confirmation policy pursued from first with British Government advisers physically located same building UNRRA headquarters as described my despatch 1192, June 18. On other hand, final course (d) appears most desirable whether pursued until establishment Advisory Mission or until creation stable Greek Government based on elections. However, would point out if announced Allied policy favoring early elections followed firmly, establishment Advisory Mission perhaps unnecessary and could hardly be accomplished before elections any event. Therefore since British already have staff advisers here Department might prefer consider announcement sending soonest small high level US Mission on behalf Eximbank to report on best method extending reasonable credits Greece (my telegram 1250, November 5). Believe such step more immediately effective present situation without involving us in semi-permanent scheme economic tutelage this country.

Have already taken opportunity numerous occasions advise principal Greek leaders of unfortunate impressions abroad (as described by Department) and of effect on possible future financial other assistance. Pending outcome present well-meant effort achieve viable government perhaps nothing more overt this connection desirable. Partisan strife has so far certainly impeded economic recovery by preventing consistent development necessary government machinery which not "breaking down" but itself still seeking reestablishment after enemy occupation. However, lack of UNRRA leadership also contributing factor this situation and considerable betterment psychological conditions necessary to Greek recovery obtainable if such supplied. Hence would again recommend appointment top flight man for top flight job with authority ability to press and guide Ministry of Supply to secure onward movement UNRRA goods from warehouses and quick local distribution.

MACVEAGH

868.51/11-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 6, 1945—2 p. m.
 [Received November 7—1: 50 p. m.]

1255. Mytels 1248, 1250, Nov 5. Finance Minister Kassimatis invited Rankin to his office again this morning. Representative of Greek Ministry Supply present but no British. Kassimatis produced figures show determined effort being made balance budget. Instructions issued all Govt depts prepare new estimates minimum needs. Supplementary tax legislation already drafted in part. Allowing 50% increase pensions as unavoidable Minister believes new taxes and increased prices UNRRA supplies will cover 93% expenditures. Hopes improve this figure.

Minister raised again supreme importance psychological factors and particularly new tangible evidence Allied support. His discussions with Economic Council, Minister of Supply and others convinced him more than ever of vital part played by gold in present Greek monetary situation with majority money in hands public consisting gold coins and consequent importance limiting fluctuations drachma-sovereign rate as prerequisite budget balancing. Minister confident gold requested would accomplish this end and stated Greece willing pay dollar value and undertake not actually sell without prior approval Govt furnishing gold. Much prefers sovereigns but other coins or bars acceptable if actually shipped this country for deposit vaults Bank Greece. Minister firmly believes psychological effect arrival this gold if accompanied by budget balancing and reasonable credit Eximbank would change entire Greek financial picture but that all three steps essential.

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 6, 1945—4 p. m.
 [Received November 7—10: 45 a. m.]

1257. Mytel 1255 Nov. 6. While Rankin saw Finance Minister this morning Prime Minister called on me expressing optimism regarding financial program which said adopted after lengthy conversations Economic Committee with cooperation also Tsouderos.⁶

Described program as primarily balancing budget and restoring confidence drachma by increased taxation, higher charges UNRRA

⁶ Emmanuel Tsouderos, Governor of the Bank of Greece from 1931 to 1939 and Prime Minister of Greece (in Crete, London, and Cairo) from 1941 to 1944.

products and release foreign exchange under strict control for business abroad. Omitted talks with British or gold proposals opposed by them (mytel 1250, November 5) and described possible foreign loans as secondary though still essential.

In connection loans I warned continued political dissension likely obstruct efforts obtain credits (urtel 1136, November 2) and he replied has good hopes bringing all parties but Communist-EAM into accord his efforts. Said planning electoral compromise between majority and proportional systems which already has confidential support Populists, Nationalist Papandreou, Republican Plastiras, as well as Liberal Venizelos though not yet Sophoulis. Insists intends follow middle-road policy politically, mentioning plans liquidate "X" organization^{6a} of extreme Right as well as similar Leftist groupments and outlaw membership youth under university age in political organizations. Expressed self undisturbed by attack launched by Kaphandaris (Progressive) this morning holding Regent and not politicians responsible for political chaos and charging he maneuvering against Liberals and lending self to "insolent exigencies of Populists in order to arrive at unilateral solution".

However, though Progressive Party numerically weak, chief still enjoys personal prestige and charges present Government "verging on neo-monarchism and dictatorship" may help consolidate Leftist and intransigent Liberal opposition to Cannelopoulos solution.

MACVEAGH

868.51/11-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 7, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received November 8—10:23 p. m.]

1263. Mytel 1248, November 5. Minister Finance yielded Brit Treasury pressure last night and agreed postpone changing drachma rate until results new tax measures apparent perhaps after 1 month. Minister very reluctant delay change which he stated favored by all leading Grk financial experts. Meanwhile at Brit suggestion foreign exchange will be sold importers at official rates plus surcharges varying with commodities. UNRRA representatives supported all Brit proposals.

New financial measures include approximate doubling cigarette tax and 150% increase selling price UNRRA rations. Rise living costs 38% during October brought index to 20 times prewar in drachmas

^{6a} X, or X-ite, a Greek royalist terrorist organization.

and general increase salaries Government employees scheduled 127% to 150% above September scales. Minister Finance has provided these increases new budget claimed nearly balanced.

Gold pound reached new high 48,000 drachmas Monday, reacted to 45,000 and today 47,000. Wage increases general past month. However, commodity prices fairly stable last 2 weeks and economic activity little affected price inflation.

Minister Finance intends publish summary new economic program as described my immediately following telegram.⁷

MACVEAGH

868.50/11-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 7, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received November 8—9 : 14 p. m.]

1262. Foreign Minister⁸ intends issue following statement new economic program :

1. Readjustment of taxation and the augmentation of the prices of UNRRA supplies in order to balance the budget on a strong foundation.

2. Increase of imports. Foreign currency will be definitely allotted without obstruction for the import of every item considered useful and permitted to be imported by the State. The price and use of imported goods will be controlled.

3. Foreign exchange will be sold to importers at the official rates but subject to surcharges varying with the types of goods in order to absorb the difference between world and domestic price levels.

4. Credit will be granted under control in order to develop production and internal trade.

5. An application for financial assistance from Allied sources on a broader basis will be made and if granted will be used mainly for the immediate rehabilitation of the country.

6. UNRRA supplies will be distributed and valorized quickly.

7. Effective price control with regard to the particular peculiarities of the country will be organized.

The proposals have been fully discussed with representatives of the British Embassy and UNRRA who are in general agreement.

The representative of the US Embassy was also present at the discussions.

MACVEAGH

⁷ *Infra.*

⁸ Panayotis Kanellopoulos was Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

868.00/11-745: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 7, 1945—6 p. m.
 [Received November 7—2: 35 p. m.]

11700. We spoke to Sargent⁹ today about FonOff announcement that Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hector McNeil would be leaving shortly for Athens.

Sargent told us that McNeil was planning to leave London for Athens on November 12. He would be accompanied by Hayter, head of the Southern Dept. The two plan on spending about a week in Greece.

Sargent said the primary purpose of the visit was to "give some strength and encouragement" to the new Greek Govt. The Greeks he continued had been encouraged to act freely and entirely on their own in forming a new Govt. This they had done. The results were, to quote Sargent, "a poor Govt but their own".

FonOff, Sargent then said, was concerned about the deterioration of the economic and financial position of Greece. McNeil would try to give some advice to Greek officials on how to meet the most immediate and pressing problems in this field. He would also try to give some guidance on closer cooperation between Greek Govt officials and UNRRA. Jackson, Deputy Director of UNRRA, Sargent added in this connection, had recently complained to FonOff about failure of Greek officials effectively to assist UNRRA representatives.

McNeil would also during his stay in Athens, according to Sargent, see what guidance he could give Greek officials in getting the Greek Civil Service properly reestablished and functioning once more.

Sent Dept as 11700; repeated Athens as 77.

WINANT

868.50/11-945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 9, 1945—8 p. m.
 [Received 9: 45 p. m.]

11799. 1. Woodbridge (UNRRA)¹⁰ has just returned from visit to Athens with General Gale, where he talked with Damaskinos, Scobie and US, UK and Canadian Ambassadors.¹¹ In conversation with the

⁹ Sir Orme G. Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰ George Woodbridge, American, Special Assistant to Lieutenant General Gale.

¹¹ Maj. Gen. L. R. LaFleche was Canadian Ambassador in Greece.

Penroses and Amende,¹² Woodbridge said economic position of Greece is deteriorating rapidly and competent observers predict collapse, possibly within 4 or 5 weeks. Inflation is getting out of hand and Govt is unable to enforce production controls. Damaskinos told UNRRA representatives that he hoped Britain and US would intervene to reestablish economic order, which he felt could not be accomplished by Greeks themselves. Alternatively he asked UNRRA to appoint advisers who would have full power to act through dummy Ministers of Finance and Supply whom he would appoint. UNRRA felt it could not do this and suggested as alternative that Damaskinos obtain assurances of full backing of Britain and US to support his program of controls.

WINANT

868.00/11-1045

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*¹³

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1945.

Subject: Deteriorating Conditions in Greece and Proposed U.S. Action

Present conditions in Greece are so alarming that British military authorities in the theatre have recommended to London that the United States Government be requested to "share British responsibility in Greece."¹⁴ It is not known how the British Foreign Office has reacted to these recommendations, but it is possible that Prime Minister Attlee may bring up the question of Greece with the President during his current visit. Although it is considered undesirable to reverse our policy of undertaking no military responsibility in Greece, the situation seems critical enough to justify active steps on our part to improve conditions. If the economic situation there continues to worsen, it may seriously prejudice the successful holding of the

¹² Ernest F. Penrose, Edith T. Penrose, and Ruth Amende, Special Assistants at the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

¹³ Attached to this memorandum and to the memorandum to President Truman, *infra*, is a memorandum of November 17, 1945, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) which stated:

"You will recall that the Secretary was disturbed by recent telegrams from Athens concerning the deteriorating conditions in Greece and by the indication that General Morgan intended to recommend to the British Foreign Office that this Government be requested to share British responsibilities in Greece—by which he obviously meant military assistance.

In view of the urgency of the situation and the possibility that Mr. Attlee might bring up the subject of Greece with the President over the weekend, the attached memoranda were prepared and given to the Secretary late Saturday afternoon November 10 without an opportunity of sending them through your office."

¹⁴ See telegrams 4015, November 2, 10 a. m., and 4042, November 4, 1 p. m., from Caserta, pp. 251 and 253, respectively.

forthcoming elections, which this Government is committed to observe.¹⁵ The present situation also jeopardizes the chances of long run economic recovery in Greece which the United States is trying to promote through UNRRA and other assistance. A weak and chaotic Greece is a constant invitation to its already unfriendly neighbors on the north to take aggressive action and constitutes a menace to international peace and security.

Since the failure in August of economic stabilization measures undertaken by Vice Premier Varvaressos, the value of the drachma has continued to drop, prices have risen rapidly, government expenditures have continued at a high level and receipts to cover these expenditures have been entirely inadequate. The recovery of industrial production has been extremely slow, the export and import trade and the flow of remittances are practically at a standstill, and there is wide-spread unemployment. The UNRRA program is feeding, clothing and helping to provide shelter to the people of Greece, but under the conditions outlined above, it cannot start them on the road to the self-sufficiency which they must have achieved when UNRRA operations will cease, as scheduled, approximately one year hence. Loans and other assistance would probably also have only a temporary palliative effect, and without ultimate recovery in sight, the prospects of repayment are obviously poor.

It is the Department's conviction that the following measures must be vigorously undertaken in Greece if the present economic deterioration is to be halted and the country started on the road to recovery:

(1) Rigid price and wage control, the latter after adjustment has been made to the increased cost of living.

(2) Monetary controls, following a realistic revaluation of the drachma.

(3) More effective and carefully supervised distribution of UNRRA supplies in close cooperation with UNRRA officials, including rationing where required. Reexamination of the present price policy for relief goods.

(4) Stringent taxation to increase government revenue.

(5) Review of government activities to eliminate all but essential expenditures, especially in the civil services.

(6) Revamping of the civil service to handle wisely and efficiently present Greek economic problems with a minimum of personnel.

(7) Positive action by the Greek Government to restore agricultural and industrial production by insuring the provision of necessary raw materials and the cooperation of management and labor.

(8) A clear definition by the Greek Government of commodity fields in which the private importing trade may again begin to operate.

¹⁵ For documentation on the decision of the United States to participate in the supervision of elections in Greece, see pp. 98 ff.

(9) Direct encouragement to export trade after a revaluation of the drachma again makes the revival of exports possible.

It is clear in the present situation that we must determine either to abandon Greece entirely to work out its own economic salvation without the assistance of the United States or that we must insist on internal economic reforms in Greece. This is essential if the assistance which the United States is now providing through UNRRA or may provide through credits is to have any long run benefit and if it is to come to an end in a reasonable period with Greece any better off than it is today. I hope you agree that it should be the policy of the United States to follow the second alternative. Some British officials suggest that such a policy would entail active intervention, including the possible use of United States military forces in Greece, but it is our belief that this is not required. The Department suggests on the other hand that the United States in concert with the United Kingdom and, possibly France make it clear that further assistance to Greece is conditional on the enforcement by the Greek Government of measures along the lines of those suggested above.

It is encouraging that the newly formed Canellopoulos Government has already expressed its intention of putting many of these measures into effect. Since the beginning of 1945, however, no Greek Government, whether for reasons of its political representation or other causes, has been able to enforce the rigid kind of economic measures which are essential to Greek recovery. While it is hoped that the present government will be more successful, fear of repercussions in the coming elections and resistance of powerful groups which brought earlier programs to ruin make the outcome doubtful. It appears, therefore, that some measure of responsibility and firmness must come from outside Greece and it is thought that making known the existence of this source of pressure might provide the present government with an added bulwark in embarking on the essential economic program which will inevitably be unpalatable to influential groups in Greece.

I suggest, therefore, that a note covering the four points outlined in the attached memorandum for the President¹⁶ be presented to the Greek Government by the United States and at the same time be released to the press. It is desirable, I believe, that such a note be presented in concert with some similar communication from the United Kingdom, and perhaps other governments. If you approve, the attached memorandum will be transmitted to the President.

LOY W. HENDERSON

¹⁶ *Infra.*

868.00/11-1045

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman*¹⁷

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1945.

It is reported that Prime Minister Attlee may wish to discuss the Greek situation with you and may propose that this Government cooperate with the British Government in the latter's military and other responsibilities in Greece. It is the conviction of the Department that military responsibilities in Greece should not be undertaken by this Government since such cooperation would contribute nothing to the solution of present problems in that country. However, the rapidly deteriorating Greek economic situation seems to require definite action on the part of this Government if Greece is not to enter into another period of disastrous inflation and economic collapse. The country is making little progress towards economic stability but is primarily subsisting on the aid which the United States and other nations are supplying, chiefly through UNRRA.

By the time of the projected elections, which this Government is committed to observe, the internal situation in Greece may have reached a state in which it will not be possible for the true wishes of the population to be expressed by ballot. A weak, chaotic Greece is a constant temptation to aggressive actions by its northern neighbors, which are none too friendly in any event, and constitutes a serious menace to international peace and security.

The lack of a firm program of economic stabilization in Greece since its liberation from German occupation is now resulting in severe inflation, high governmental expenditure and low revenue, disrupted Civil Service, stagnant industry and trade, and widespread unemployment. The Greek Cabinet recently formed by Canellopoulos has expressed its intention of undertaking measures to combat these problems, but the experience of Greece in the past year indicates that strong forces have heretofore prevented the successful accomplishment of such measures. It is felt that the strong support of such measures by the United States, as well as Great Britain, if made known to the Greek public, would help to give the present Greek Government, or any succeeding interim government between now and elections, the necessary backing to carry out successfully a program of economic stabilization.

¹⁷ In a chronological report, dated January 10, 1946 (868.51/1-1046) William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs discussed this memorandum and stated: "British Embassy informally apprised of our intentions—including hope that approval might be given for offering technical advisers to Greek Govt." Mr. Baxter's report also referred to a "Brit. telegram expressing satisfaction in attitude of US Govt. as given informally to Brit. Embassy". This telegram, apparently dated November 14, 1945, is not found in Department files.

It is therefore proposed that this Government present to the Greek Government, and at the same time release to the press, a note embodying the following points:¹⁸

(1) The United States, deeply concerned with the present situation in Greece, urges the Greek Government to undertake a stringent internal program of economic stabilization in order to start Greece on the path toward economic recovery;

(2) The extent of economic assistance which the United States Government could offer to Greece in the form of loans or other aids would necessarily be influenced by the effectiveness with which the Greek Government itself pursues a sound program of economic stabilization;

(3) The United States Government would be prepared to make available the assistance of technical economic experts, if requested by the Greek Government, to consult on Greek financial and economic programs.

Legislation whereby American technical advisers may be sent to foreign governments is now receiving favorable consideration by the Congress, but it is not yet in force. In view of the urgency of the Greek situation, you may wish to authorize an allotment from your emergency funds, in an amount to be agreed upon by the Department and the Bureau of the Budget, to provide for a small group of technical experts to be sent to Greece for a limited period.

In view of the heavy British responsibilities in Greece no action on this proposal will be taken without the concurrence of the British Government. If you approve,¹⁹ the Department is prepared to undertake discussions with the British and the preparation of a note to the Greek Government along the foregoing lines.

868.50/11-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 15, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 16—12: 50 p. m.]

1300. Mytel 1291, Nov 13.²⁰ McNeil yesterday sent brief note to Prime Minister with lengthy memo proposing British despatch

¹⁸ As drafted, there were four numbered paragraphs in the section that follows. Paragraph originally numbered (2) read: "The United States believes that, if such a program is not undertaken, further UNRRA assistance would be largely ineffective and the United States would find it increasingly difficult to support continued assistance of that organization to Greece". This paragraph was deleted at the request of Assistant Secretary of State Clayton and paragraphs originally numbered (3) and (4) were renumbered (2) and (3).

¹⁹ Undated marginal note by President Truman: "I approve discussions. Would like to see the agreed proposal."

²⁰ Not printed.

Economic Mission Greece. Text both documents being forwarded airmail.²¹

Note states British would gladly consent if US willing participate Mission. Memo refers with satisfaction to Allied arrangements supervise elections and to progress Greek *Gendarmerie* and Army under British Missions but emphasizes British Govt's opinion that results economic reconstruction to date not commensurate large UNRRA expenditures. Then proposes sending (1) railway expert to plan reconstruction and possibly direct operations; (2) road expert and "expert assistance" for coastal shipping; (3) industrial productions expert and factory supervisors if desired; (4) advisers on manufacture clothing, footwear; and (5) advisers on labor and retail distribution. Reference also made to need financial reforms and marketing schemes for agricultural products. Concludes with summary as follows:

(Paraphrase): British Govt willing despatch Economic Mission which Greek Govt would depend on in task economic reconstruction. Mission would withdraw upon completion task [and] "hand over to the Greek Govt a going concern". While Mission remains Greece British would expect Greek Govt assume any powers necessary implement operate programs devised by Mission. British Govt unwilling send such Mission in absence prior undertaking this nature by Greek Govt. (End paraphrase.)

Comment follows.²²

MACVEAGH

868.00/11-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 16, 1945—noon.

[Received 6:28 p. m.]

1304. Mytel 1300 November 15. To reject McNeil proposals would seem very difficult for Greek Govt desiring continue British support and if attendant publicity well handled acceptance might not immediately cause Greek or foreign opinion see any marked change in present situation in which British control Greek economy commonly assumed more absolute than really is. Furthermore, acceptance might have momentary result strengthen hand present Greek Govt while actual technical assistance backed by authority to carry out plan would be certain produce some constructive results. However, long term effects more dubious since Greek people accustomed foreign advisers but detest dictation any form, particularly from outside. Drastic measures adopted at foreign instigation to enforce foreign program only

²¹ Despatch 1854, November 16, not printed.

²² *Infra.*

too likely stir nationwide resentment against "mandate" (as plan described privately by British official). Existing British involvement Greek political situation may justify risking such reaction but unless we willing become equally involved believe US participation unwise. Sympathetic consideration could be given to any requests British Mission might make for US aid in specific problems without our sharing responsibility total program conceived and sure to be implemented under predominant influence British imperial policy.

As regards details of plan, these would seem indicate British contemplate control Greek economic life to even greater extent than Germans attempted during occupation when rationing [took?] place and similar control far less drastic than in Britain today. Labor Govt bias possibly reflected in memo's reference to Greek manufacturers obstructing Govt's designs, taxation of rich needing resolute action, and suggestion introducing organization such as Scottish Co-operative Movement if Greek retailers unprepared cooperate. In this respect British Govt seems associating itself with position frequently taken UNRRA and local Leftist circles, to effect present difficulties largely fault Greek business men. However, this Embassy's belief these last form with peasants most virile forward-looking sections Greek population and current economic troubles due at least as much to impractical advice from UNRRA and British sources as to failure Greek business cooperate.

MACVEAGH

868.51/11-1645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1945—8 p. m.

1159. Greek Ambassador and Argyropoulos have submitted to Eximbank detailed program for use of proposed \$25,000,000 credit. Program consists in order of priority of following: (1) Equipment for reconstruction of destroyed harbors \$1,650,000. (2) Equipment and materials for road repair \$5,300,000. (3) Main outfit machinery and tools for extension of waterworks supplying Athens and Piraeus \$700,000. (4) Railway equipment \$2,100,000. (5) Salvaging equipment and machinery \$1,500,000. (6) Pilot ships and motor boats \$80,000. (7) Machinery and material required for conversion of six corvettes to postal ships \$450,000. (8) Floating docks and equipment \$800,000. (9) Materials for repair of merchant ships \$400,000. (10) Instruments and clothing for Merchant Marine \$100,000. (11) Passenger motor vehicles for urgent needs \$120,000. (12) Tires and tubes \$500,000. (13) Passenger ships \$2,000,000. (14) Materials and equipment for maintenance and completion of hydraulic works of

Macedonia \$150,000 (see also items 17, 25 and 26). (15) Materials and equipment for restoration of urban telephone systems, \$2,500,000 (see also item 24). (16) Materials and equipment for maintenance and operation of Athens water purifying plant \$30,000. (17) Machinery and equipment for maintenance and repair of hydraulic works \$2,000,000 (see also items 14, 25 and 26). (18) Machinery and equipment for state-controlled electric power utilities \$1,000,000. (19) Wire netting for use in flooded areas of Macedonia Thrace Messinia etc. \$50,000. (20) Instruments and equipment for hydrological research \$100,000. (21) Life belts \$20,000. (22) Spares and material for repair and maintenance of gas works \$30,000. (23) Agricultural machinery and equipment \$600,000. (24) Equipment and materials for telecommunications \$1,800,000 (see also item 15). (25) Machinery and equipment for hydraulic works \$40,000 (see also items 14, 17 and 26). (26) Excavating equipment \$500,000 (see also items 14, 17 and 25). (27) Machinery and spares for industrial installations \$360,000. (28) US services in connection with purchases \$120,000. Total \$25,000,000 plus estimated freight and insurance \$1,750,000.

With minor exceptions each numbered element of program is supported by detailed list of items to be purchased. Eximbank has checked with UNRRA headquarters here and has found no material overlap with UNRRA Greek program. Please inform UNRRA in Greece.

Eximbank is proceeding with negotiations on basis of program as submitted. Your comments requested.

BYRNES

868.50/11-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 17, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received November 19—10 : 31 a. m.]

1317. Mytels 1300, November 15 and 1304, November 16. Prime Minister and Finance Minister called on me at noon today in considerable embarrassment re British proposal send economic mission Greece. Said Greek public "very sensitive" and expressed fear disastrous political effect placing foreigners in Greek Ministries with such powers as British apparently envisage (also said felt have no right as interim regime to commit future Greek Government constituted on basis elections). Therefore consider proposal as put forward unaccept-

able though would favor joint mission experts attached United States and British Embassies acting advisory capacity to Greek Government. Asked my opinion and I advised they give British full benefit their ideas with view finding solution mutually acceptable. In connection this discussion, Cassimatis said has suggested McNeil creation semi-governmental consortium with United States, British and Greek banking participation to finance and direct country's reconstruction.

Both Ministers disturbed by McNeil's speech Government dinner Thursday night²³ which widely interpreted as indication British willingness extend further "moral" but not financial aid.²⁴ Held speech directly responsible skyrocketing gold pound yesterday today from 53,000 to 63,000 drachmas. Prime Minister called McNeil's statement "Greece still has 26 million" of 1941 British loan 46 million sterling "untrue". Actually statement perhaps misleading since unexpended portion loan is in effect only bookkeeping entry London against which various outlays chiefly for war purposes expected charged. Finance Minister referred proposals United States credit for supply goods and sale gold as described mytels 1250, November 4 [5] and 1255, November 6. Said obvious British inability extend financial help renders all more urgent tangible evidence increased United States interest and aid. Again emphasized gold's peculiar psychological importance present Greek situation which believes unique and insisted mere announcement 650,000 sovereigns made available to Bank Greece would change entire trend. Inquired whether reply received mytel 1255. Keenly interested possibility Eximbank credit as are also McNeil, Leeper with particular reference suggestion small exploratory Eximbank mission mytel 1250.

Faced with the necessity rejecting only proposal so far made by widely-heralded McNeil Mission, both Ministers betrayed discouragement, and this likely reflected even more sharply in popular feeling when facts known. Psychological factor of tremendous importance especially in connection stability insure desired elections. Consequently pending consideration strictly advisory joint mission if this proposed by Greeks and accepted British would urge immediate attention given suggestions mytels 1250 and 1255 as possible inexpensive means bridge over serious situation.

Department's views urgently requested.

MACVEAGH

²³ November 15.

²⁴ The Greek Cabinet resigned on November 20, apparently because of failure to obtain assurances of effective British support for its financial and economic measures; see telegram 1331, November 20, midnight, from Athens, p. 178.

868.50/11-2845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)*²⁵

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1945—5 p. m.

1200. Urtel 1250, November 5 and following.

(1) Dept concerned with Greek economic conditions, failure to make more progress toward recovery, importance preventing further economic deterioration before elections. Dept wishes to give Greece tangible evidence US support of constructive efforts to improve conditions.

(2) In general Dept feels that principal US contributions to Greek recovery should be provision of credits and support of Greek Govt efforts toward internal economic stabilization. To implement these Dept expects, simultaneously with signature of \$25 million Eximbank loan, to submit note to Greek Govt announcing loan, expressing US concern over economic situation, indicating that extent of further economic assistance from US necessarily influenced by effectiveness of Greek Govt's economic stabilization program, and expressing Dept's willingness make available technical advisory assistance if requested by Greek Govt. Dept recognizes, however, that basic need not so much US technical advice as more resolute administration and revival of production and exports. President has indicated tentative approval submission such a note.

(3) Note to Greek Govt would be made public to announce loan and indicate continuing concern of US for Greek recovery and US support of necessary measures for internal economic stabilization.

(4) If, as expected, Greek Govt requests technical advisers Dept would suggest group to handle currency and finance, agricultural rehabilitation and development, industrial rehabilitation, civil administration, price control and rationing. Group should be independent of any British advisers but instructed to cooperate closely with them and, where appropriate, take parallel action in dealing with Greek Govt. Dept intends discuss proposal informally with British here after receiving your comments.

(5) Your comments on subject proposals urgently requested. Suggest you discuss with UNRRA and, if you deem advisable, with British, indicating Dept does not favor attempt place foreigners in Greek ministries with direct administrative responsibility. Urtel 1317, November 17.

BYRNES

²⁵ In an undated memorandum attached to this telegram, William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs stated: "This is the result and first implementing step following our memorandum of November 10 to the President suggesting methods to halt deteriorating economic conditions in Greece. Pending a reply, discussions in the Department are continuing and a proposed note to the Greek Government is being drafted."

868.51/11-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 29, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received November 30—6:15 p. m.]

1376. Deptel 1159, November 16. Program for use proposed Export Import Bank credit discussed Greek officials, UNRRA, Joint Transportation [Facilities] Mission²⁶ and trade circles. In general seems excellent but following comments may prove useful:

1. Program includes relatively minor items numbered in Deptel as 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 16, 19 through 23, 25. Bank Greece has ample dollar assets cover such imports through normal trade channels and Export Import Bank financing behalf Greek Government liable interfere revival private trade already gravely handicapped by restrictions, formalities, red tape. Figures for agricultural machinery and tires probably exaggerated due large UNRRA procurement.

2. Items 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 14, 17, 18, 26 all relate construction or similar work in which maximum benefit both to Greece and US requires that American contracting engineering firms should have every opportunity to bid with provision in Export-Import Bank credit for payment their services in dollars. No organizations exist in Greece qualified execute large construction programs utilizing amount equipment requested. Six million pound road construction project handled by Greeks prewar period was failure and other large prewar work almost invariably let foreign contractors chiefly American while one British firm has already resumed operations drainage projects. Unless US firms receive support connection Export Import Bank credit, latter probably wasted large extent or utilized benefit other foreign contractors.

3. Railway equipment (item 4) and ship repair material (item 9) needed but former case raises question economic future various Greek railroad lines some of which probably should be abandoned and their work performed by sea, highway and air transport. Current studies Joint Transportation Mission pertinent this subject. Passenger ships (item 13) reportedly attended [*intended?*] international trade while small coastal steamers combination passenger cargo most urgently needed.

4. Large orders urban telephone and telecommunications equipment (items 15 and 24) beyond present needs and include new exchanges non-existent prewar plus 125 circuit underground cable Athens-Salonika. Latter discussed prewar but not started due estimated cost dollars 4 million including labor. British AuTelCo²⁷

²⁶ See footnote 9, p. 208.

²⁷ Automatic Telephone & Electric Company Limited, the parent company of a world-wide organization offering to Governments telecommunications services embracing consultation, finance, research, engineering, and manufacturing.

negotiating sew up Greek telephone system and British Marconi local radio broadcasting and telegraph facilities with long term contracts. US firms should have opportunity study possibilities on ground before Export Import Bank extends any large credits this connection.

5. Spare parts industrial and other mechanical equipment urgently needed many times figure quoted item 27 particularly since UNRRA procuring almost nothing this line. Credit this purpose up to \$3 million recommended involving procurement private Greek-US channels subject only Government approval.

6. In summary suggest modification Greek proposals on basis elimination items first numbered paragraph above and allocation \$13,600,000 for group items paragraph 2 substantially as requested but with provision up to \$2 million additional for US contracting or other technical services. Requests totalling \$4,500,000 in paragraph 3 probably justified but require consideration in light economic possibilities and policies. Paragraph 4 items should be reduced to perhaps \$2 million with US firms given opportunity investigate. Paragraph 5 item could be increased to \$2,900,000 making grand total \$25 million.

Finally for psychological reasons would urge most strongly that any favorable decision involving Export Import Bank credit be announced as tangible evidence US desire help insure progressive economic improvement in advance elections (mytels 1250, November 5; 1317, November 17; 1331, November 20²⁹). Recent financial crisis culminating in fall Kanellopoulos government largely due misapprehension as to what might be expected this connection.

MACVEAGH

868.51/12-145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 1, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 2—2:20 p. m.]

1383. Mytels 1248, November 5 and 1255, November 6. Deputy Prime Minister Tsouderos³⁰ addressed letters to me and British Ambassador dated November 29 requesting substantially same kinds economic support sought by Kanellopoulos Govt.

On my instructions Rankin called on Tsouderos yesterday to discuss various points raised his letter and to suggest Greek Ambassador Washington present requests for aid directly to Dept which Tsouderos said would be done.

²⁹ For telegram 1331, see p. 178.

³⁰ Emmanuel Tsouderos, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Coordination in the Themistocles Sophoulis government formed on November 22, 1945.

Letter refers open market price gold pound 65,000 drachmas (price declined from peak 78,000 November 20 to 55,000 November 27 and subsequently rose again) as evidence urgency action reassure public. Mentions one of measures which might favorably influence situation as "public announcement" soonest that Allies will support Greek exports in "positive manner and particularly by means of credits". More specifically Tsouderos considers necessary Greek Govt should be able announce following:

1. That sterling equivalent of Greek currency advances to British troops in Greece can be utilized purchase goods abroad.

2. That Allies will "discount" portion reparations due Greece to extent of forced loans obtained during occupation by Germans and Italians totaling 90 million dollars.

3. That out of above sum (2) Allies will turn over Greece share of gold confiscated in Germany.

Tsouderos letter continues with opinion that if above could be announced at early date together with well thought out economic financial program prepared in collaboration with "Allied" experts expected arrive soon the people's psychology would change and "courage" would return.

In conversation Rankin inquired how Greek Govt intended use 90 million dollars requested. Tsouderos replied immediate purpose psychological but might be urgently needed next year depending extent UNRRA operations. Gold also desired psychological reasons but indicated no intention local purchases and sales, adding bars bullion satisfactory. When questioned whether intending alter exchange rates currently preventing Greek exports and reducing remittances, replied he prefers announce action simultaneously rest program.

MACVEAGH

868.50/12-145: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*³¹

ATHENS, December 1, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 2—12:30 p. m.]

1384. Mytel 1376, November 29. Proposals first three numbered paragraphs Deptel 1200, November 28 heartily welcomed. As to paragraph 4 would say present Greek Govt has so far not approached this Embassy regarding possibility US sending technical advisers but appears expecting British Economic Mission in accordance McNeil proposals and subsequent Bevin statement (mytels 1300, Nov 15 and 1331, November 20³²). Should Greeks raise question US advisers

³¹ Marginal notation: "Reply deferred pending policy decisions and situation covered in later cables".

³² For latter, see p. 178.

believe preferable avoid duplicating British Mission as liable result not only more confusion than assistance but also undesirable involvement explained mytel 1304, November 16. In this connection British Ambassador assures me no intention giving British advisers administrative responsibility in Greek Ministries but presence such advisers in Greek Govt offices with aggressive British backing likely amount to same thing and certain be so interpreted by local opinion.

Suggest Dept's desire give Greeks fuller economic guidance might best be implemented through offer send selected American technicians to act as individuals for specific duties rather than as group or "Mission" and be directly responsible to Greek Govt. In addition Embassy staff might be strengthened on economic side with an additional FSO³³ preferably senior grade under Rankin (mytel 1146, October 10³⁴) and a Treasury Attaché qualified to parallel Sir Quintin Hill. Policy questions would thus remain Dept's and Embassy's hands while Greek Govt would benefit advice upper technical level where most needed without objection undue foreign control.

MACVEAGH

868.00/12-345

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*³⁵

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Mr. Bevin in his speech in Parliament on November 23rd,³⁶ referred to His Majesty's Government's concern at the deterioration in the economic and financial situation of Greece and to His Majesty's Government's willingness to help by providing technical assistance and advice. Before he left Greece, Mr. McNeil discussed these proposals with M. Tsouderos, who agreed that there were many subjects in the field of economics and finance on which the Greek Government would welcome the advice of foreign experts.

His Majesty's Government are therefore considering the possibility of setting up an Advisory Economic Mission for Greece. Speed is clearly essential and it has therefore been tentatively arranged that Major General P. G. W. Clark, C. B. M. C. should act as head of the Mission and should go to Athens in about a week's time on a short exploratory visit. Major General Clark has had wide administrative experience throughout the war and was recently head of the SHAEF³⁷ Mission in the Netherlands where he made an outstanding success of the military relief scheme.

³³ Foreign Service Officer.

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁵ Handed to Samuel Reber of the Office of European Affairs on December 4.

³⁶ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 416, col. 767.

³⁷ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces.

His Majesty's Government very much hope that the United States Government may be willing to co-operate with them in assisting Greece to restore her shattered economy. Mr. Bevin therefore enquires whether the United States Government would agree that the Advisory Mission would be a joint Anglo-American Mission. His Majesty's Government's thought is that the Mission would not have executive powers but would plan the various phases of reconstruction with appropriate Greek officials and would then use its influence to see that the decisions reached were put into effect. M. Tsouderous has made it clear this is the only basis on which the Greek Government could accept a foreign mission, since Greek public opinion would never tolerate any arrangement which infringed Greek sovereignty.

In informing the Department of State of the foregoing, His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to express Mr. Bevin's hope that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government may act together in this matter and agree to make it a joint venture.

The Department of State have doubtless heard already of this proposal from Mr. MacVeagh, who was kept informed of His Majesty's Government's intentions by Mr. McNeil. In view of the great urgency of the matter, Mr. Bevin has gone ahead with the selection of Major General Clark but the detailed composition of the Mission has in no way been fixed and His Majesty's Government's final views on this will depend to a large extent on Major General Clark's report after his preliminary visit, and on the views of the United States Government, since His Majesty's Government would welcome the appointment of United States experts in any or all of the fields to be covered by the proposed Mission.³⁸

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1945.

868.51/12-545

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

As the Department of State are aware, the Greek Minister of Co-ordination, M. Tsouderos, has written to His Majesty's Ambassador at Athens urging the necessity of extending financial credits to the Greek Government in addition to the assistance in goods and supplies which was promised by Mr. Hector McNeil, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, during his recent visit to

³⁸ The British Minister (Makins) sent to Mr. Reber on December 13 the text of an announcement to be made at London on the Clark Mission to Greece and reiterated the desire of the British Foreign Office that the Mission be a joint venture (868.50 Porter/12-1345).

Athens. M. Tsouderos affirms that without such an assurance the Greek Government cannot make a public declaration on Greece's economic position since, unless such a declaration were specific on the subject of credits, it would cause uncertainty among the Greek population and lead to speculation resulting in a serious depreciation of the drachma.

2. M. Tsouderos considers that any announcement should indicate,

a) that the Bank of Greece's credit at the Bank of England arising out of the expenditure of the British forces in Greece will not be subject to any restrictions but may be utilised for the purchase of goods;

b) that the Allied governments agree to discount a part of the total amount due to Greece by way of reparations, in particular the amount due to Greece from a loan which was granted to the Germans and Italians during the period of enemy occupation;

c) that a proportion of the German gold captured by the Allied governments in Germany will be ceded to Greece against German reparations liabilities to Greece.

3. In the view of His Majesty's Government, it may well be that rise in the price of the gold sovereign is partly due, as M. Tsouderos states, to a campaign by industrialists who are opposed to the Government on political grounds. There can, however, be no doubt that part of the responsibility rests on the Greek Government, who have been more than a week in office without announcing any financial or economic programme which might allay public anxiety. Even if His Majesty's Government and the United States Government were able to give the most ample promises of assistance, it is clear that the Greek Government's political opponents would not be prevented from trying to bring down the Government by means of the gold market, and the effect of any announcement would therefore be very short-lived unless the Government took adequate steps against speculators and also announced measures which would restore public confidence in their ability to achieve economic stability.

4. A foreign loan would be of no immediate value to Greece, but the proposal has been so played up in the Greek press that most Greeks believe that a foreign loan is essential to Greek reconstruction. An early announcement that Greece will be granted a foreign loan might, therefore, contribute to the restoration of confidence provided that it were coupled with strong measures on the part of the Greek Government. His Majesty's Government are, however, not in a position to grant a loan. In any case the Greek Government now hold 25,000,000 pounds sterling which is the balance of the 46,000,000 pounds sterling lent them in 1941, none of which has been repaid.

5. His Majesty's Government consider that it would be very difficult to meet M. Tsouderos' points (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) in paragraph 2 above.

They would be quite prepared to put the proceeds of British Army expenditure at the disposal of the Greek Government within the sterling area, but the total sum due to the Greek Government under this head will be much less than the Greeks suppose, since it is intended to set off against it considerable debts owed to His Majesty's Government by the Greek Government. An announcement on this point might therefore be more of a disappointment than an encouragement. As regards German reparations, it is clear that any arrangement must await the decision of the Reparations Committee in Paris.³⁹ It looks, however, as though all the gold seized in Germany will be required for restitution to countries which have been robbed of gold by Germany, and Greece does not come in this category. As regards M. Tsouderos' point (b), reparations receipts will be related to the total claims put forward by each country and not to individual items in these claims. The receipts will moreover be infinitely small as compared with the claims. Apart from these considerations there is the further point that the bulk of reparations receipts will take the form of capital goods. There would be no advantage in trying to raise a loan on these, since Greece needs commodities and not money.

6. His Majesty's Government consider however, that an adequate measure of confidence could be secured by an announcement issued in London and Washington by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government, and they have prepared a draft text which is annexed as Annex A.

7. His Majesty's Government would be grateful for the views of the United States Government on this proposal and on the text of the suggested announcement.

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1945.

ANNEX "A"

The Greek Government have approached the British and United States Governments for assistance in dealing with the continued deterioration in the economic and financial situation in Greece and with the speculation which is forcing up the price of the gold sovereign. In their opinion there can be no excuse for such speculation since there is no reason why Greek economy and finances should not be placed on a secure footing. The measures which the Greek Government now propose to take to deal with this speculation should in the opinion of the two Governments go far to remedy the situation. U.N.R.R.A. has imported into Greece during the past nine months over 1,500,000 tons

³⁹ The reference is to the meeting of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency which met in Paris, November 9–December 21, 1945; for documentation on the subject of German reparations, see vol. III, pp. 1169 ff.

of goods valued at some \$300,000,000. Both in quantity and in value these supplies are substantially above the total Greek imports before the war and should be fully sufficient to enable the reconstruction of the country's economy to get under way. In addition the Greek Government have substantial reserves of sterling and dollars with which to supplement the U.N.R.R.A. programme. By this assistance the Allied Governments have given practical proof that they are not asking Greece to stand alone and unaided. Nevertheless the value of this assistance in rehabilitating Greek economy will be wasted unless the present rapid increase in the note issue is halted by heavy taxation, which can only be imposed by the Greeks on themselves. The British and United States Governments realise that when U.N.R.R.A. supplies cease Greece will have difficulty in obtaining her essential imports, and they will therefore consider what assistance they can give in order that the progress of Greek reconstruction should not be held up. Meanwhile, U.N.R.R.A. supplies are continuing, and the British and United States Governments will examine sympathetically the possibility of providing materials for the reconstruction of Greece over and above the U.N.R.R.A. programme or for projects which U.N.R.R.A. is not in a position to undertake. Greece is therefore in an exceptionally favourable position and there is no reason why there should not be a rapid and lasting improvement in the economic and financial situation provided that all sections of the Greek people unite their efforts to achieve this end.

740.00119 E.W./12-545

*The Greek Embassy to the Department of State*⁴⁰

No. 4733

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1945.

The Vice President of the Greek Government and Minister of Economic Coordination, Mr. E. Tsouderos, has addressed to the Ambassadors of the United States and of Great Britain in Athens a letter submitting a plan for substantial assistance to Greece in order to meet and alleviate its most difficult economic and financial present problem.

This Embassy has received instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs urgently to contact the State Department and to stress that, considering the existing psychological outlook of the Greek people, the only escape from the present economic and financial impasse is the granting of the assistance asked for, and its public announcement as an integral part of the general program of the Greek Government.

⁴⁰ Handed to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) by the Greek Ambassador on December 7.

This Embassy hopes that the aforesaid letter of Mr. Tsouderos has already reached the Department of State⁴¹ and that owing to its importance it will be given prompt and favorable consideration.

740.00119 E.W./12-545

*The Greek Embassy to the Department of State*⁴²

(No. 4733)

Translation from the Greek text of a letter addressed by Mr. Emmanuel Tsouderos to the Ambassadors of the United States and Great Britain, as received by cable at the Greek Embassy in Washington, D. C.

"Following a conversation with the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, which took place in the British Embassy on the 21st and 22nd of November, and referring to the views expressed to him in my memorandum of November 17th,⁴³ I should like to communicate to Your Excellency the following considerations and suggestions.

"We are facing an emergency, which though it has not developed recently, should be dealt with immediately. Our currency which in the first days of the new Government showed a trend towards steady improvement, begins to show again signs of instability. The rate of the golden sovereign is fluctuating today around 65,000 drachmas, due obviously to speculation. If this upward trend and the prevailing instability in the value of the gold sovereign continues, any attempt towards reconstruction of the country's economy will be in vain. This factor will destroy the equilibrium of the budget in spite of steps being taken. The prices of bare necessities will be increased and salaries will again become inadequate to cover the needs of the working people. Thus the crisis will become more acute, resulting ultimately in panic and further lack of confidence in the drachma.

"If conditions are allowed to deteriorate, the assistance which will be required later for the economic reconstruction of the country will have to be greater and the situation will be more difficult. It is, therefore, necessary to consider in time what steps should be taken. In this connection a step that may have favorable effect upon the present situation would be a public statement by the Greek Govern-

⁴¹ In a memorandum of December 7, 1945, William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs stated that he had informed the Greek Ambassador that the Department had received only a telegraphic summary of the letter and that the Ambassador had promised to supply a full translation (740.00119 EW/12-745). For telegraphic summary, see telegram 1383, December 1, 4 p. m., from Athens, p. 274; for translation of text, see memorandum from the Greek Embassy, *infra*.

⁴² Handed to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on December 8 by the Counselor of the Greek Embassy (Economou-Gouras).

⁴³ Not printed; copy sent by Mr. Tsouderos to Ambassador MacVeagh on November 19 (Athens Post Files: 851, Financial Conditions).

ment, to be made at the earliest possible time, announcing that the allies will positively back up our efforts and more specifically by means of credits, apart from the assistance in the form of commodities promised by Mr. McNeil. Without such assurance we are unable to make any public pronouncement regarding the economic situation, because if the pronouncement were to be vague on this particular point it would cause disappointment and speculators would be given the opportunity to bring about a sharp depreciation of the drachma. Many people, especially those connected with the Stock Exchange and the Banks, are aware of the fact that our reserves in gold and foreign exchange are small compared with the great needs of our country. By depreciating the drachma they are anticipating that we will soon find ourselves in a state of total poverty, which means economic disaster. This explains the psychological factors, if not the facts, that are helping speculators to boost the price of the sovereign to which businessmen are resorting daily as a means of investing the proceeds of their transactions.

"In our view the assistance which, when announced, will save the situation may be summarized as follows.

"Besides the allied assistance discussed with Mr. McNeil with respect to the indispensable continuation of British help in the general field of our military expenditures, as well as other assistance to be given us for the rebuilding of roads, railways, harbors, farms etc., it is necessary that we be placed in a position to announce to the Greek people the following.

"1) That the credit account of the Bank of Greece with the Bank of England accruing from expenditures of the British armed forces in Greece is not subject to any restrictions and can be used for the purchase of goods in accordance with an agreement reached by the Governments of Greece and Great Britain.

"2) That the allies are ready to make partial advance payments on account of the total sum due Greece for reparations, especially of the sum due Greece for loans made to the Germans and the Italians during the occupation. On the basis of estimates known to your economic and financial counselors, this latter sum amounts to \$90,124,520.

"3) That on account of said German debt the allies agree to turn over to Greece an equal amount of German gold from that seized by them in Germany and that this gold will be used for the country's needs.^{43a}

^{43a} In connection with paragraphs numbered 2 and 3 of this communication, the Department in a memorandum of January 11, 1946, to the Greek Embassy, stated, in part: "While keenly aware of the economic plight of Greece and of the necessity for remedial measures, the United States Government must inform the Greek Government with regret that it cannot accede to the proposal that the Allies make a partial advance payment on the total sum due Greece on reparation account and allot to Greece a portion of the gold uncovered in Germany." (740.00119 EW/12-545)

"If all the above points could be made public soon and concurrently with an economic and financial program carefully prepared in co-operation with your experts whose arrival we are expecting, we would then be certain of improved conditions. The people's outlook will change. The public will recover its courage and speculation will be defeated. Otherwise the perspective of economic developments does not appear very encouraging indeed.

"We beg Your Excellency to communicate the foregoing urgently to Your Government etc."

868.51/11-2945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1945—8 p. m.

1263. Urtel 1376 November 29. Eximbank arranging changes in use proposed credit. Following your suggestion allocation to telecommunications reduced, allocation to spare parts industrial and other mechanical equipment increased, provision also made for \$2 million for U.S. contracting or other technical services.

Passenger ship allocation \$2 million deleted as it conflicts with provisions of ship sales bill now before Congress to which all sales U.S. war-built ships must conform. Bill contains credit provisions as to ship sales which presumably will be available to Greece.

Items listed in your paragraph 1 not changed, Department and UNRRA doubt exaggeration tires or tractors. Bank has advised Greeks that where private trade can handle imports as effectively as through bulk purchase by Greek Government, Bank prefers items handled privately. Department believes this not inconsistent with financing purchase these items Eximbank credit.

BYRNES

868.51/12-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State ⁴⁴

ATHENS, December 14, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 16—10:56 a. m.]

1447. Finance Minister Mylonas called on me this morning regarding financial situation. This rapidly becoming very serious, today's rate gold pound reaching around 100,000 drachmas with dollar currency about 3,700. Stressed practical efforts he is making to close inflationary gap but stated present rapid rise both gold and commodity

⁴⁴ Marginal notation: "Reply deferred for more info on questions of policy and situation covered in later cables".

prices with consequent necessity continually increasing salaries other expenses makes balanced budget impossible. Said had seen "advance guard" of British Economic Mission arrived yesterday but feels serious political disaster possible unless prompt measures taken give this country other support than mere advice. Pointed out unbridled speculation certain continue otherwise, based on lack public confidence. Feels psychological approach prerequisite any other steps calculated bring about stability and repeated requests described mytel 1383, Dec 1, for credit and gold representing advance on Greek share German reparations. In absence gold Mylonas suggested loan actual dollar currency for use by Bank Greece in controlling local market.

British colleague agrees situation critical for present govt and possibly for whole Allied policy helping Greece over elections. Therefore if nothing more can be done urge moment opportune for release statement described Deptel 1200, Nov 28 regarding Export Import Bank credit, if possible indicating assurance US intends see Greece through until country again on its feet conditioned upon Greeks doing their part.

MACVEAGH

868.50/12-1545

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 2002

ATHENS, December 15, 1945.

[Received January 4, 1945.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that certain misapprehensions appear to exist in British, UNRRA and other circles as to the motivating factors behind the economic policies of the several Greek Governments which have held office during 1945. As a result, these governments have been subjected to severe and almost continuous criticism for policies which have been followed quite consistently ever since the Communist revolt was crushed last winter and which, in essentials, are not only logical but inevitable.

Two of the Four Freedoms⁴⁵ are taken for granted in liberated Greece—the only Balkan country where such is the case—but the remaining two, involving Fear and Want, are in the mind of every Greek. Fear is inspired by the traditional Slav menace from the north, now far more frightening than ever before, with three of Greece's immediate neighbors almost completely under Soviet domination and a dynamic Communist movement within the country under Moscow-trained and directed leadership. In the meantime

⁴⁵ See address by President Roosevelt to Congress on January 6, 1941, *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44, or Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 608.

the specter of Want, due largely to the country's catastrophic shortage of foodstuffs, is an ever-present reminder that only UNRRA stands between Greece and starvation.

The remark has been heard on frequent occasions that Greece is failing to make good use of the huge shipments of relief supplies furnished first through military and later through UNRRA channels, and that the country is no better off today after receiving foreign aid to the value of some \$300 million in the course of the past year than it was at the time of liberation in October 1944. The speech of Foreign Secretary Bevin in the House of Commons on November 23 indicated that he shared this view. Careful examination of various pertinent facts, however, appears to support a very different evaluation of Greece's position. All but a small portion of the relief supplies sent to Greece have gone toward filling the gap between available stocks of consumers' goods within the country and the minimum requirements to sustain life. A combination of war damage, losses caused by the civil strife of December 1944 and the almost unprecedented drought of 1945, reduced Greece's farm and factory production during the past year to less than 50 percent of prewar levels; of these factors the drought was probably the most serious in immediate effect. Virtually nothing came into the country from abroad for industrial rehabilitation until the middle of 1945, and then only in small quantities, while the effect of military and UNRRA assistance to Greek agriculture will become apparent only after many months.

The preceding paragraph should make clear the unfairness of expecting Greece to show really substantial and visible economic recovery until after the 1946 harvest; also how enormous a quantity of relief supplies is required simply to provide some measure of Freedom from Want under present circumstances. With UNRRA aid Greece may not yet show great improvement, but without such help there would be appalling starvation. Such is the country's dependence upon a relief program which the public has been told might cease at any time during 1946 and which is unlikely to extend beyond the close of that year in any event. Can so predominantly agricultural a country, with a normal deficit in foodstuffs, carry on unaided within a few short months after the 1946 harvest, even if crop yields are satisfactory?

In the meantime, estimates of the area planted to crops this fall and winter are in the neighborhood of 80 percent of the country's total arable land, and spring planting should add to this figure. Industry is reviving more slowly, but textile factories in the Athens area—the most important group of manufacturing enterprises in the country—are operating above 50 percent of prewar rates. Other

industries are in a somewhat less satisfactory position, but factory production as a whole is said to compare more than favorably with that in most parts of Europe. Does this indicate that the Greeks are failing entirely to do their part? It is only natural, however, that they should be deeply concerned over the country's food supply for 1947 and subsequent years, notably the large quantity of wheat which must be imported even when domestic crops are good. With the best will in the world Greece cannot expect to bring total agricultural and industrial production back to prewar levels in less than three or four years, not to mention the difficulties of replacing the country's merchant marine and reviving its tourist traffic and export trade, all of which are essential to restoring the balance of payments. How are imports of food and other absolute necessities to be paid for during the interim period after UNRRA leaves. To the Greek mind there is only one answer: foreign financial assistance.

Most Greeks are not interested in Communism as an economic theory, and all of them have found it associated, in their recent experience, with looting and murder. Fear of what the future may hold for them in this regard is with them an obsession; for what assurance have they that British Labor Party preoccupation with Socialist dogma, or an American lapse of interest in Balkan affairs, may not deliver Greece to Communism in much the same way as Yugoslavia? Therefore, it is scarcely to be wondered at if they are hesitant to take a long-term view in utilizing what liquid capital remains to them in efforts to expand production. A small bag of gold, jewelry or foreign currency, held in readiness for sudden flight, would be worth far more than a large factory under conditions which many Greeks and others regard as by no means unlikely.

The Greek also realizes that the traditional safeguards of military alliances or pacts of mutual assistance are of doubtful value, even in the improbable event that the United States and Britain would extend such guaranties under present circumstances. The country's northern frontiers could no more be held against a Russian-supported invasion than was the case against the Germans in 1941. Freedom from Fear can not be looked for until the United Nations Organization has become an effective reality. In the meantime Greece must strive to retain the interest and support of her Western Allies during a period of uncertain duration and manifold difficulties. Fear will not be allayed during that period, but hope will remain until it becomes clear whether Greece is to be a sovereign member of a full-fledged United Nations Organization or simply a Soviet puppet.

During the past year Greece has learned that foreign sympathy may be unreasonably fickle. As a reward for maintaining freedom of its press, at the same time permitting foreign correspondents to circulate about the country and report as they see fit, Greece has been

misrepresented and maligned in the American and British press in a most undeserved fashion. This flood of abuse from supposed friends, all having the effect of supporting the Communist thesis, has made it even more evident that some tangible guaranties must be sought from America and Britain. Direct financial support is again the most obvious answer.

It may be pointed out that the Allies are already extending help to Greece of unprecedented scope in the current UNRRA program, under which this country is expected to receive supplies valued at \$462 million, including ocean freight. The Greeks are aware of the benefits they are gaining in this connection, as well as of the fact that this help is financed chiefly by the United States. But they are also conscious that the indirect, United Nations character of this assistance, which is being extended as well to Greece's Communist neighbors, does not imply political support. Its contribution toward Freedom from Fear is in no way comparable to that of direct loans, investments or the extension of commercial credits by the United States and Britain, which would be taken as the best evidence of intention to support the Government in power and to preserve Greece as a sovereign state based upon a free society.

Against this background it is not difficult to understand Deputy Prime Minister Varvaressos' emphasis on his application for a \$250 million credit from the Export-Import Bank in a radio broadcast on August 17 reviewing his economic program (my telegram no. 866 of August 18). The fact that he overreached himself in seeking a much larger sum than Greece had any immediate need for, at the same time indulging in wishful thinking by expressing publicly his confidence that this sum would be approved by the United States, is evidence of Varvaressos' far greater interest in psychological than in purely economic factors.

When the Kanellopoulos Government took office on November 1 Finance Minister Kassimatis placed very particular emphasis upon psychological considerations (my telegrams no. 1248 of November 5 and no. 1255 of November 6). He tried a slightly different tack from that of Varvaressos by not asking for a larger loan but simply for credits sufficient to supplement UNRRA procurement together with a comparatively small shipment of gold. When it became clear that nothing would be immediately forthcoming beyond an unwanted British Economic Mission, the Kanellopoulos Government resigned (my telegram no. 1331 of November 20⁴⁶).

The advent of the Sofoulis Government on November 22 was welcomed in various quarters as bringing into power Greece's nearest political equivalent to Britain's Labor Party. Its economic program was awaited anxiously in British and UNRRA circles with some

⁴⁶ *Ante*, p. 178.

expectation of an orthodox approach to budget balancing through government economy and increased taxation. But the first step again was a request for foreign credits and gold, this time disguised as an advance on Greece's expected share in German reparations (my telegram no. 1383 of December 1). Disillusionment followed quickly among the British, with their orderly ideas of finance, rationing and price control, as well as among Anglo-American UNRRA officials, whose somewhat Leftist sympathies tend to favor dictatorial methods of government abhorrent to the Greeks.

All of the foregoing is not to say that the Greeks have put forth their best efforts to reestablish the country's financial structure, or that they should not have done more in the way of rationing and price control. But to the quick Greek mind, impatient of detail often to the point of being superficial, there is little purpose in undertaking drastic and locally unpopular measures, as advocated by the British and UNRRA, against a background of fear which is more than likely to render such measures stillborn. With unassailable logic the Greeks persist in their desire for Freedom from Fear and Want. Financial aid from the United States and Britain appears to them as the only practicable road.

Through Lend-Lease, UNRRA and private American channels Greece will have cost the United States in the neighborhood of \$400 million between 1941 and 1947. Most of this money has been or will be used for relief or for war purposes; none of it to date has been invested in the reconstruction of Greek economy under direct American guidance which would take into account not only the interests of Greece but also of the United States. A comparatively few millions applied in this manner might easily have more far-reaching effects than much larger contributions through UNRRA. The proposed Export-Import Bank credit of \$25 million is a step in the right direction; there remains to be found a longer term approach which, while not dissipating American money or neglecting American business interests, would advance Greece toward the attainment of all four Freedoms.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

868.50/12-145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1945—8 p. m.

1275. 1. Brit *aide-mémoire*⁴⁷ presented Dept Dec 4 outlines plans for Advisory Economic Mission for Greece probably headed by Major

⁴⁷ Dated December 3, p. 276.

General J. G. W. Clark and inquires whether US willing to cooperate on joint basis. Depts reply will follow lines urtel 1384, Dec 1. Dept favors closest cooperation between Brit and US technical advisers, if latter requested by Greek Govt, but considers joint mission would not be so efficacious in arousing favorable Greek public opinion as parallel offer of assistance by means specific US technical experts not organized as a "Mission". Meanwhile, you may discuss US views informally with Major General Clark who will reach Athens soon on exploratory trip accompanied by two or three British experts.

2. Note to Greek Govt (paragraph 2, Deptel 1200 ^{47a}) now being drafted for submission to President for approval. After approval, note will be telegraphed you for delivery and release to press soon as \$25 million loan formally approved by Eximbank Board and signed. Board approval of loan temporarily held up until appointments its two remaining members confirmed by Senate.

3. Dept's note will make reference to receipt of letter from Tsouderos to you ⁴⁸ requesting economic assistance and is regarded as answer to major points in that letter. Separate note will make formal answer to letter and dispose of points not answered in first note.

ACHESON

868.51/12-2145

The Greek Embassy to the Department of State ⁴⁹

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Greek Embassy's note No. 4733, dated December 5, 1945.

The value of the gold sovereign in Greece has now reached 95,000 drachmas. This situation is due to the circumstances related in Mr. Tsouderos' letter to the Ambassadors of the United States and Great Britain. There is no doubt that the lack of confidence towards the drachma has been further accentuated by the attitude of open warfare adopted by the extreme left.

It has now become more evident than ever before that unless Greece receives from her Allies the economic assistance discussed with Mr.

^{47a} Dated November 28, p. 272.

⁴⁸ Dated November 29; for text received from the Greek Embassy on December 8, see p. 281.

⁴⁹ Handed to Willard L. Thorp, Deputy to Assistant Secretary of State Clayton on December 21.

McNeil, the country will experience a new disastrous inflation with all the destructive political, economic and financial effects connected with it.

It is, therefore, of the utmost urgency that appropriate steps be taken in the light of the suggestions submitted by the Greek Government, and be made public forthwith.

If this situation were to continue, the present administration's position would become hopeless.

868.50/12-2245

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945.

PROPOSED NOTE TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO BE TELEGRAPHED TO
AMBASSADOR MACVEAGH FOR PRESENTATION

On November 10,^{49a} you indicated your general concurrence that a note be sent to the Greek Government setting forth the views of this Government on the present disturbed economic situation in Greece. In accordance with your suggestion, the draft of the proposed note is submitted herewith for your approval. Both Ambassador MacVeagh and the British have indicated their agreement in principle with the proposed action. With your approval,⁵⁰ the note will be submitted to the Greek Government at once and at the same time released to the press. If the Greek Government should then request the assistance of a few technical experts from the United States, I understand that funds for this purpose will be available from your emergency fund.

DEAN ACHESON

^{49a} See footnote 19, p. 267.

⁵⁰ Marginal notation by President Truman on December 21, 1945: "Note approved with suggestions that more liberal policy be implemented." However, in a memorandum of December 22 to Acting Secretary of State Acheson, President Truman stated:

"I am returning the proposed note to the Greek Government.

It is all right but it does seem to me that it is rather harsh, in view of the fact that the Greeks were almost annihilated fighting our common enemy, the Germans, and while they have had some severe internal difficulty and some difficulty with the British, I can't help but feel extremely friendly to the Greeks.

This note to me seems to be rather harshly worded. While I am not an expert in the matter, can't we say the same things and implement the same policy in a little more friendly way." (868.50/12-2245)

[Annex]

DRAFT OF PROPOSED NOTE TO BE TELEGRAPHED TO AMERICAN
AMBASSADOR, ATHENS, FOR PRESENTATION ⁵¹

The United States Government acknowledges receipt of the letter addressed by Mr. Tsouderos to the Ambassador of the United States in Athens, submitting suggestions for economic aid to Greece.

The United States Government is mindful of the important contributions made by Greece to the successful conclusion of the war and is sympathetically aware of the tremendous devastation visited on Greece during the period of hostilities. [*In the face of overwhelming odds Greece exhibited a courage in resistance which served as an example to the liberators who eventually were able to release Europe from enemy domination.*] The ~~immediate~~ relief provided to Greece ~~last winter~~ through Military Liaison and the current operations of UNRRA ~~represent efforts~~ [*is an effort*] on the part of the United States along with other Allied countries to ~~repay Greece in part for~~ [*demonstrate their grateful recognition of*] the tremendous sacrifices ~~she~~ [*Greece*] has made. Further assistance toward reconstruction will be afforded through a [\$] 25 million dollar Export-Import Bank loan. By means of this loan Greece will be able to acquire certain essential supplies ~~as well as~~ [*and*] equipment.

There is a danger, which should not be ignored, that if energetic steps are not taken to improve the present internal economic situation, ~~Greece will realize no lasting benefit from the financial and material assistance which the United States is rendering~~ [*the assistance from the U.S. will not produce the lasting benefits that are hoped for.*] An immediate improvement in the economic situation in Greece should ~~also~~ create an atmosphere favorable to the successful holding of national elections. ~~Successful~~ Elections accurately reflecting the wishes of the Greek people should bring about an improved political situation which is, ~~of course, essential~~ [*should contribute substantially*] to long-run economic recovery and to future stability.

~~The difficulties which Greece has encountered since liberation in carrying out under emergency conditions the stringent internal economic stabilization program now required are in part responsible for the slowness of economic recovery.~~ [*The severe difficulties which Greece has encountered since liberation can be traced in large part to*

⁵¹ The draft as transmitted to President Truman on December 20 included the portions shown here in canceled type but excluded the italicized portions shown in brackets. As a result of the President's memorandum of December 22 to Mr. Acheson, the Department revised the draft by deleting the portions shown in canceled type and inserting the italicized portions. The revised note was returned to the President in a memorandum of January 3, 1946, p. 299.

the self-sacrificing heroism with which the Greek people resisted the common foe. The resulting emergency conditions have prevented successive Greek governments from carrying out effectively the stringent kind of internal economic stability program that is required.] The Government of the United States is aware that Greece's burden is a heavy one [,] ~~and that the causes of the present distress are numerous.~~ It [*but it*] is convinced, ~~however,~~ that the assistance being extended to Greece can accomplish little toward economic recovery unless the Greek Government itself undertakes [*rigorous*] ~~such a stringent program, which to be effective would probably include~~ measures to control inflation and to stabilize the currency, to reduce Government expenditures and to augment revenue, to increase the efficiency of the Civil Service Administration, and to revive industry and trade.

The execution of such a program has been the announced intention of several Ministries which have been in power in Greece during recent months but in no case has it been possible for them to pursue such a program to a successful conclusion. It is assumed that the present Government also has under consideration a [*similar*] program ~~along this line.~~ The extent of possible further American economic assistance to Greece will necessarily be influenced by the effectiveness with which the Greek Government ~~pursues a firm program~~ [*deals with the problem*] of economic stabilization.

The United States Government has been advised by the British Government of the latter's proposal now under discussion with the Greek Government to send an Advisory Economic Mission to Greece. In view of the interest which this Government has in the success of the economic stabilization and recovery of Greece, it welcomes this evidence of the desire of the British Government to extend advisory aid to Greece. If Greece should need additional technical assistance, the United States Government would be prepared, upon request of the Greek Government, to make available American technical economic experts to consult on Greek financial and economic programs. The particular qualifications of any experts which might be desired could be determined in consultation between the two Governments, so that they would be best equipped to assist on those problems which are now most urgent in Greece.

The Greek Government can be assured that the United States Government is fully aware of the ~~overwhelming~~ [*grave*] difficulties which beset Greece. It hopes, however, that the Greek Government, by taking firm action and at the same time being confident of outside assistance, will be able to lead Greece on the road toward economic recovery.

868.51/12-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 20, 1945-7 p. m.
[Received December 22-1 : 10 p. m.]

1467. Minister Finance called on me again yesterday to repeat with increased urgency his requests transmitted mytel 1447, Dec 14.

Gold sovereign reached 120,000 drachmas yesterday with commodity prices up 25% during first half Dec.

Under such circumstances, Mylonas considers further wage salary increases unavoidable with resulting acceleration inflationary movement. He particularly fears exploitation labor situation for political ends.

Meanwhile General Clark's arrival delayed by illness, but first two members British Economic Mission to reach Athens have completed preliminary survey and expect return London tomorrow to report findings and endeavor obtain approval their recommendations. Edward Grove, financial expert formerly with Lazard Frères has prepared excellent memorandum monetary situation revealing thorough comprehension peculiarities present Greek situation. Regards position paper drachma hopeless and emphasizes difficulty using any unconvertible paper currency while country effectively on gold coin basis. Believes laws and police measures against use gold impracticable and restoration confidence only solution. Grove expects recommend British Treasury make available to bank Greece 1,000,000 sovereigns actual gold coin charging Greek gold reserves abroad for use redemption entire drachma note issue at realistic rate. Amounts equivalent one sovereign or more would be paid out in actual gold coin and existing notes surcharged "blank gold drachmas payable in gold on demand". If such operation had been possible last few days, Grove would have suggested rate 20 paper drachmas to 1 gold drachma and 5,000 gold drachmas to 1 sovereign with total bank note circulation about 80 billion drachmas. Step would act as automatic control Greek expenditures by eliminating further issues flat [*flat*] currency.

Grove also recommends new British loan to Greece 5 million sterling for purchase capital goods and that British waive Greek 20 million sterling debt incurred war purposes and fund expended balance 26 million credit obtained same connection. Also would fund 8 million due under Angelopoulos agreement⁵² for maintenance Greek

⁵²Data in the Department records is not entirely clear as to the nature of this agreement and the date of its signature. Probably, it was the agreement signed at London by the British and Greek Governments regarding the emergency use of British Military Authority notes in Greece. The text of this agreement was sent to the Department in airgram 37, October 24, 1944, 12 m., from Caserta (868.515/10-2444).

armed forces [and] refugees in Africa; also sterling expenditures of Greek armed forces next 3 years estimated 39 million pounds as amounts fall due. On entire amount recommends interest and sinking fund at rate equal or lower than accorded by US to UK. Grove would have US and UK assure Greeks they will not be allowed to starve after end UNRRA period. To obtain maximum benefit above measures Grove would expect Greeks create small financial committee with full powers over Govt revenues and expenditures and including one British adviser who would be expected play decisive if inconspicuous role.

Sir Vyvyan Board, industrial control expert with considerable British Govt experience, favors Greeks inviting prominent foreign firm chartered accountants become official Govt agents on cost questions as means obtaining reliable data on profits to justify commodity prices. Board would also have Greek Govt request a foreign expert "coordinator" for each branch industry to act as buffer between latter and Greek Govt. Coordinators would be under general supervision of "senior British civil servant" attached to British Economic Mission. Board states his conversations with Greek Govt officials and industrialists indicate latter would welcome scheme and only some members Govt hesitant for political reasons.

In latter connection British Ambassador emphasized to Grove and Board great importance saving face of Greek Govt in connection imposition financial industrial controls and they agreed advisability stress scheme as answer to Greek Govt's requests and expression willingness extend help. Otherwise Extreme Left and Right almost certain raise issue of interference Greek independence resulting possible fall present Govt which most undesirable before elections. Proposals appear sound this Embassy from economic standpoint but will require most careful selection advisers and coordinators to insure both competence and qualities of tact and patience.

Reference Deptel 1275, Dec 17 hope loan announcement can be made soonest.

British Embassy requests above points should not be discussed with British in Washington and London until latter bring up matter since experts are carrying details with them to London and prefer no action be taken until they can present case personally.

MACVEAGH

868.51/12-2145

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Thorp (A-C)
Greek Ambassador
Mr. Baxter (NE)

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to discuss the very grave economic and financial situation in Greece. He summarized briefly the proposals recently advanced to the British and United States governments by Mr. Tsouderos, Greek Minister of Coordination,⁵³ and stated that a recent talk with Mr. deWilde⁵⁴ had indicated that the U.S. Government could not give a favorable reply to the Greek request that the Allies make a partial advance payment on the total sum due Greece from reparations or allot to Greece a portion of the gold uncovered in Germany. In view of the almost disastrous inflationary tendency of the drachma, the Greek Ambassador wished to explore personally, and not on instructions from his Government, the possibility that the United States might be willing to make to Greece an outright loan in gold.

Mr. Thorp said that, as he did not pretend to be an authority on financial matters, he was unable to give the Ambassador a positive answer on this question. He considered it extremely unlikely, however, that such a request could be acceded to, as the instrument most capable in making loans available to foreign governments, the Export-Import Bank, would be prohibited by its terms of reference from making gold available to bolster a foreign currency.

The Ambassador left the attached memorandum⁵⁵ stressing again the urgency of measures to halt economic and financial deterioration in Greece. Mr. Thorp assured the Ambassador of our warm interest in Greek economic recovery and our desire to help in any practicable ways.

868.50 Porter/12-2145

*The British Minister (Makins) to Mr. Samuel Reber of the Office of
European Affairs*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945.

MY DEAR SAM: We have received an urgent telegram from the Foreign Office enquiring whether the State Department are now able

⁵³ See memorandum from the Greek Embassy, p. 281.

⁵⁴ John C. deWilde, Acting Associate Chief of the Division of German and Austrian Affairs.

⁵⁵ Dated December 18, p. 290.

to give us their reply to the questions raised in the Embassy's memorandum of December 3rd about the proposed economic mission to Greece, and in the memorandum enclosed with my letter of December 5th.⁵⁶

The Foreign Office have received a further appeal from the Greek Government through the Greek Embassy in London for the immediate grant of Allied aid in view of the continued depreciation of the drachma. The Greek Embassy have been told that the Foreign Office must await the report of the British experts who have just arrived in Greece and that His Majesty's Government consider that the main responsibility for restoring economic and financial stability must rest with the Greek Government. The Foreign Office feel that they cannot go further than this until they have learned your Government's views on the Embassy's two memoranda.

I should be grateful, therefore, if you could let us have your views as soon as possible.⁵⁷

Yours ever,

ROGER MAKINS

868.51/12-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, December 22, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 24—8:45 p. m.]

1471. Mytel 1467, December 20. Tsouderos (Vice Pres Council) and Kartalis (Minister Supply) called on British Ambassador last night with urgent advices Govt finding almost impossible continue with gold pound still rising rapidly, foodstuffs going into hiding, civil servants striking and this movement threatening extend all branches labor. Both urged most strongly advisability immediate announcement they visiting London in connection plans submitted by Grove and Board. Leeper convinced such announcement would help situation psychologically by bolstering prestige Govt and therefore telegraphed this morning requesting promptest issuance invitation. Also wiring today stating his [*our?*] joint opinion that if Mr. Byrnes could briefly stop over London on return US to take cognizance British-Greek discussions and enable announcement US Secretary of

⁵⁶ Letter not printed; for memorandum, see p. 277.

⁵⁷ In a memorandum of January 10, 1946, William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs reviewed the Greek economic and financial situation for the period November 2, 1945, to January 10, 1946, and stated: "Throughout this procedure neither the British nor the Greek Ambassador have received any official replies to their urgent requests for our views. If I had not informally indicated the trend of our thinking, they would still be in the dark. Also, our representatives in London have been taking part in conversations for the better part of two weeks without any advice from Washington or an inkling of our thinking here—unless Brit. Foreign Office have told them what I've told the Brit. Embassy here." (868.51/1-1046) With regard to conversations of American representatives at London, see telegram 11089, December 27, 7 p.m., *infra*.

State also present that capital while these in progress this certain have great additional bolstering effect.

Words "take cognizance" my suggestion. Leeper wanted say "take part in discussions". He most anxious leave no stone unturned keep Govt in power till elections and coming few weeks till economic financial plans can be drawn up and put into operation offer critical problem this connection. Should present Left-Center Govt fall Dept will realize that under existing conditions in Britain, any succeeding Greek Govt would almost certainly be still further Left and in such eventuality violent reaction from strong Rightist elements in armed forces is by no means unlikely.

Sent Dept as 1471, repeated London as 127 and to Moscow.

MACVEAGH

868.50/12-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1945—7 p. m.

11089. Brit Emb informs Dept that Tsouderos and Cartalis flying London soonest discuss Greek economic-financial situation and requests US participation in forthcoming conversations. Hawkins⁵⁸ hereby authorized to participate in discussions. Treasury cabling similar authorization for Taylor.⁵⁹ Other members of Emb staff such as Coe⁶⁰ or Hare⁶¹ might also participate if advisable. Please report negotiations and recommendations to Dept, repeating to Athens. For your info \$25-million Eximbank loan to Greece will probably be favorably acted upon within few days, at which time proposed note to Greek Govt will be made public. Substance aforementioned note being sent you by infotel.⁶²

President recently approved economic assistance to Greece and in addition expressed warm and sympathetic personal interest in that country. The Secretary has also recently expressed especial desire for strenuous measures to assist Greece in its economic difficulties. Hawkins should make it clear that US Govt, although unwilling to take joint action with Brit, is anxious to cooperate in all practicable ways to ameliorate Greek economic difficulties.

Sent London as Depts. no. 11089 repeated to Athens as Depts. no. 1297.

ACHESON

⁵⁸ Harry C. Hawkins, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs at London.

⁵⁹ Telegram 11085, December 27, 1945, 7 p. m., to London, not printed; it instructed Mr. Taylor to attend as observer (868.50/12-2745).

⁶⁰ Robert D. Coe, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁶¹ Raymond A. Hare, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁶² Information telegram 11107, December 28, 1945, 5 p. m., not printed; it summarized telegram 1200, November 28, 5 p. m., to Athens, p. 272.

868.51/1-146 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*⁶³

ATHENS, January 1, 1946—10 a. m.
[Received January 3—12:33 p. m.]

1497. For Hawkins and Taylor. I agree with my British colleague that in view unstable political situation here financial economic discussions mentioned Deptel 11089, December 27, to London should be expedited every possible way. Presumably these will be in effect simply continuation talks in Athens recent weeks particularly during and since McNeil visit [apparent garble] not all reported in detail to Department. Assume Department supplied you with copies mytels which at time deemed unnecessary repeat London especially 1467, December 20, and 1472, December 23,⁶⁴ also despatch 2002 December 15.

Delays in reaching agreement between London and Athens and in taking appropriate action based on such agreement have allowed inflation to go well into explosive stage. Gold pound currently quoted around 190,000 drachmas and paper dollar nearly 8,000 making total open market value entire drachma note issues less than \$12,000,000 thus illustrating primary importance psychological factors.

Grove plan for reestablishing Greek currency shows remarkably clear insight local situation and this or something equivalent seems absolutely essential deal with present crisis however old-fashioned gold standard may be regarded certain circles. Matters have been allowed go so far due in part to unwillingness British Treasury accept plans Kanellopoulos Government in November that serious disturbances quite likely urban areas due inability salaried and wage earning classes buy food present prices. At official rate reasonably good meal in restaurant costs \$50, eggs are \$17 per dozen, cheese \$11 per pound.

Virtually all observers agree that stable currency essential Greek economic revival and Embassy doubts that fiat currency issued by any Greek Government likely remain stable until after country has enjoyed substantial degree economic recovery. Cannot stress too strongly that Greece only Balkan country attempting retain orthodox ideas private property and free enterprise along American lines. Money therefore plays far greater role than totalitarian dictatorships.

Would urge again that time and stability are of the essence and hope you can help.

MACVEAGH

⁶³ This telegram was sent to London as No. 128 and repeated to the Department as 1497.

⁶⁴ Telegram 1472 not printed.

868.50/1-346

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1946.

In accordance with your suggestion of December 22,⁶⁵ certain changes have been made in the proposed text of a note to the Greek Government in the direction of making more evident our friendliness toward the Greek people and our admiration for their resistance to Axis aggression. Although certain phrases may still seem somewhat harsh, it is our belief that the Greek Government will be assisted by this public statement in its attempt to carry out a stringent program of economic stabilization which it hesitates to announce without some indication of Allied approval.

In confidential talks the Greek Ambassador has expressed the desire that any statement by this Government on the Greek economic situation will contain some fairly plain speaking concerning the measures which the Greek Government should institute to save a dangerous situation.

If you approve,⁶⁶ the attached text⁶⁷ will be telegraphed to Ambassador MacVeagh for simultaneous release in Athens and Washington after the approval of the Import-Export Bank loan to Greece and notification to the British of our intentions.

DEAN ACHESON

868.50/1-546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1946—6 p. m.

11. Note to Greek Govt outlined Deptel 1200 Nov 28 now in final form for release when Greek loan receives Eximbank approval which is expected almost immediately after Jan 1. In approving note President expressed personal feeling of extreme friendliness to Greek people.

When Dept telegraphs instructions please deliver note to FonOff with information that it is being released to press in US and request that it be made available in its entirety to press in Greece. Text of note in immediately following telegram.⁶⁸

Sent to Athens as Depts no. 11; to London as Depts no. 118.

BYRNES

⁶⁵ See footnotes 50 and 51, pp. 290 and 291, respectively.

⁶⁶ Marginal notation by President Truman: "I think it much better."

⁶⁷ See draft note, p. 291.

⁶⁸ No. 12, January 5, 1946, 6 p. m. (repeated to London as No. 119), not printed. In telegram 30, January 9, 1946, 7 p. m. (repeated to London as No. 253), the Department notified the Ambassador in Greece that the Export-Import Bank had approved the loan to Greece the same morning and authorized the Ambassador to present the note to the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs the morning of January 12 (868.50/1-946). The note was released by the Department on January 12; the text, as given in draft, is printed on p. 291, with changes there indicated.

GREEK TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS
BETWEEN GREECE AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF INTEREST
TO THE UNITED STATES

868.014/9-944

*The Ambassador to the Greek Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to
the Secretary of State*

Greek Series 217

CAIRO, September 9, 1944.

[Received September 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose, as of probable interest to the Department, a translation of a memorandum regarding Greek territorial claims⁶⁹ together with a map⁷⁰ showing a proposed northern boundary for Greece. The originals of both were prepared in the Greek Foreign Office; the memorandum was written by Mr. Philip Dragoumis, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, while the map was made by officials of his Ministry. The translation was made in the office of the Embassy's Military Attaché, which also furnished the map from which the enclosed was copied.

Mr. Dragoumis has divided his memorandum into three parts:

First, he argues for the northward revision of the frontiers toward Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, as indicated on the map, on the grounds that security demands that Greece control the main passes leading from these countries toward the south. He claims that the territory is "relatively small", is mountainous and that the population is "of doubtful nationality". Second, he urges Greece's claims, on ethnic and historical grounds, to Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese and Cyprus. With regard to the two former he lists the relevant international treaties and agreements from the time of the Balkan wars to the present, but in connection with Cyprus he states only that it is a matter to be settled between Greece and Britain. Finally he pleads the impossibility of Greece's economic restoration except with Allied help in a world where the economic interdependence of nations is recognized; and he concludes with the suggestion that Greece's population problem might be solved by facilitating immigration to other Near Eastern areas, particularly Cyrenaica.

I am informed that these documents have not been submitted to the Greek Cabinet for its approval and are not to be regarded as necessarily representing the official point of view of the Government. They express simply what officials of the Greek Foreign Office feel the Government should demand at the time of postwar settlements.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

⁶⁹ Not printed; substantially the same proposals were embodied in memoranda dated June 12, 1942, handed by the Greek King (George II) to President Roosevelt and by the Greek Prime Minister (Tsouderos) to the Secretary of State (Hull) during King George's visit to the United States in the summer of 1942; see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, bracketed note on p. 797, and p. 822.

⁷⁰ Not reproduced.

711.00/11-144

*Memorandum for the Department of State Policy Committee*⁷¹

[WASHINGTON,] October 23, 1944.

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO GREECE

The Greek people have always been devoted to democratic principles and have been a bastion for the democratic powers in the Near East. They are likely to be receptive to the liberal general principles of American policy, provided only that this is made economically possible for them, and to maintain close relations with the British and ourselves. They are realistic enough to know that they must be on friendly terms with Russia as well and are probably supple enough to accomplish this at the same time. They are less likely, however, to appreciate the potential power interests which would be involved in a conflict with their immediate northern neighbors, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia.

We should accordingly be prepared, in the case of Greece:

1) To assist actively in the economic reconstruction and development of the country and its resources, including its merchant marine, and in the revival of its foreign trade.

2) To take a sympathetic attitude toward Greece's claims to contiguous territories and islands to which she has valid ethnic and historical claims. The most serious issue, in this connection, will arise in respect of Northern Epirus (Southern Albania). In this case, we should favor an impartial investigation on the spot by an international commission and should encourage a just and agreed settlement which would not permanently embitter the relations between Greece and Albania. Until such investigation becomes possible, we should not take action prejudicial to a just settlement; specifically, we should not approve the request of the Greek Government that Albania be declared an enemy state and that Greek forces be permitted to occupy the disputed area.⁷²

⁷¹This paper was submitted to the Policy Committee of the Department on October 23, 1944, as one of a series of papers for consideration under the general subject of interests and policy of the United States in Eastern and South-eastern Europe and the Near East. Although there is no clear indication of the drafting origins of this document, problems such as were herein considered were constantly under study in the Department of State in 1943 and 1944 by specialists in the Division of Political Studies and later in the Office of Special Political Affairs (particularly in its Division of Territorial Studies); these studies after consideration and evaluation by the appropriate area Interdivisional Committee (consisting both of specialists and operating officers of the geographic areas) ultimately, if the subject-matter were of sufficient timeliness and urgency, went to the Policy Committee of the Department for final study and policy determination. This particular paper, along with others concerning the areas noted above, was approved by the Policy Committee on November 8 for submission to President Roosevelt.

⁷²These views of the Greek Government had been communicated to the Department of State in two Greek Embassy memoranda, No. 2898, August 15, 1944, and addendum to No. 2898, September 1, 1944 (neither printed).

3) To encourage Greece to an early reconciliation and the development of good relations with her neighbors, by encouraging the reduction or removal of commercial, financial, social and cultural barriers. A situation in which British-dominated Greece and Turkey (and perhaps Albania) would become isolated economically and politically from a group of Russian-dominated Slavic neighbors on the North would be dangerously menacing to world peace.

4) To oppose any revival of the Macedonian issue as relates to Greece, as already seems threatened by the formation in Russian-occupied Bulgaria of a Macedonian Army. The Greek section of Macedonia is largely inhabited by Greeks, partly as a result of population exchanges after the first World War. The Greek people are unanimously opposed to the creation of a Macedonian State and allegations of a serious Greek participation can be assumed to be false. We should hold the Bulgarian and Soviet Governments responsible, despite any disclaimers or misleading propaganda they may issue, for any menacing or aggressive acts of "Macedonian" forces or a "Macedonian State" against Greece, and should not hesitate to make our views clear to Moscow and to the public if the occasion arises.⁷³

868.014/12-2644 : Circular airgram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*⁷⁴

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1944—10:00 a. m.

The following is for your information and general guidance, but not for any positive action at this time.

The Department has noted with considerable apprehension increasing propaganda rumors and semi-official statements in favor of an autonomous Macedonia, emanating principally from Bulgaria, but also from Yugoslav Partisan and other sources, with the implication that Greek territory would be included in the projected state. This Government considers talk of Macedonian "nation," Macedonian "Fatherland," or Macedonian "national consciousness" to be unjustified demagoguery representing no ethnic nor political reality, and sees in its present revival a possible cloak for aggressive intentions against Greece.

⁷³ For documentation regarding the insistence of the United States that Bulgaria should end its occupation of Greek territory (Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace) as a condition for armistice negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 300 ff.

⁷⁴ The diplomatic officers at Sofia, Caserta, Bucharest, London, Athens, Moscow, and Ankara, the Consul-General at Istanbul, and Gardner Patterson at London, on a Treasury mission to Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

The approved policy of this Government is to oppose any revival of the Macedonian issue as related to Greece. The Greek section of Macedonia is largely inhabited by Greeks, and the Greek people are almost unanimously opposed to the creation of a Macedonian state. Allegations of serious Greek participation in any such agitation can be assumed to be false. This Government would regard as responsible any Government or group of Governments tolerating or encouraging menacing or aggressive acts of "Macedonian forces" against Greece.

The Department would appreciate any information pertinent to this subject which may come to your attention.

STETTINIUS

[The Greek Embassy sent a memorandum dated February 20, 1945, to the Department of State wherein attention was again called to the deplorable conditions caused in Northern Epirus for the Greek population by the mistreatment and attacks of various Albanian governments during the war.

The group under Enver Hoxha,⁷⁵ whom the Greek government characterized as an obedient follower of Tito,⁷⁶ appeared to be eager for the elimination of the Greek character of this region.⁷⁷ The Greek government had heard that Hoxha had sent an agent to the Allied Command in Italy with the object of gaining recognition as the provisional government of Albania for his group.⁷⁸

The Greek government felt certain that no consideration would be given to this attempt, because it could lend encouragement to Hoxha's efforts to destroy the Greek people in Northern Epirus who were counting upon the Allies to rescue them from the persecutions they had suffered during a quarter century under Albanian rule.⁷⁹]

⁷⁵ Enver Hoxha (Hodja), Colonel General and Leader of the Albanian National Liberation Army (ANLA); on October 22 (Congress of Berat) he became Prime Minister and Minister of War and National Defense of the Provisional Government of Albania.

⁷⁶ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.

⁷⁷ Other memoranda outlining in some detail alleged cases of violence by the Albanian partisans were submitted to the Department by the Greek Embassy on March 23 (No. 1013, 768.75/3-2345), June 1 (No. 1833, 868.00/6-145), June 8 (No. 1862, 868.00/6-845), and June 27 (No. 2080, 768.75/6-2745); and on May 22 the First Secretary of the Greek Embassy (Christopoulos) made oral representations on this subject and on the Macedonian situation. The Department repeated the May 22 memorandum of conversation, p. 314, to Tirana in airgram 4, June 12 (868.014/6-1245) and the texts of the Greek Embassy memoranda of June 1 and June 8 in airgrams 3 and 5, respectively, to Tirana, dated June 12 (868.00/6-145, 6-1245), asking for comment.

⁷⁸ For documentation regarding this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

⁷⁹ This subject was developed at considerable length in Greek Embassy memorandum 581, March 2 (868.014/3-245).

868.00/3-245: Telegram

The Consul General at Salonika (Gwynn) to the Secretary of State

SALONIKA, March 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received March 3—10:25 a. m.]

26. The Regent^{s1} completed today a 3 days' visit to Salonika which appears to have been highly successful. His chief purpose was to assert publicly and solemnly that Macedonia is an integral part of Greece and must so remain. He also stressed Anglo-Greek ties. Enormous crowds evidenced great enthusiasm and no untoward incident marred the occasion. Everyone seems pleased and even the Communists find little to criticize.

GWYNN

868.014/3-245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1945.

The Ambassador of Greece^{s2} called today and left with me two memoranda dated March 2d^{s3} on the following subjects:

a) Greek Embassy No. 581, March 2, 1945, memorandum on the subject of Albania's tendency to come under the influence of the Yugoslav Government;

b) Greek Embassy No. 771, March 2, 1945, Greek Government's concern regarding possible Yugoslav and Bulgarian designs upon Greek Macedonia, and Greek Government's desire to improve its strategic frontier between eastern Macedonia and western Thrace and Bulgaria.^{s4}

Regarding the first memorandum the Ambassador pointed out that Albania had for many years depended upon Italian subsidies for existence and that there were indications now that the Albanian authorities were tending to come under the influence of the Yugoslav authorities, whether by federation or other means of connection with Yugoslavia. He pointed out that the Greek Government expected to claim transfer to Greece of the northern Epirus area now in Albania adjoining the northern frontier of Greece.

^{s1} Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens.

^{s2} Cimon P. Diamontopoulos.

^{s3} Neither printed; the Department was informed that the contents of both memoranda had been communicated also to the British Government.

^{s4} In June there was an oral exchange between the Department of State and the British Embassy concerning this memorandum, and the Department was told that the British Foreign Office entertained serious doubts concerning the validity of the Greek claims against Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania (868.014/3-245).

With regard to *b*) the Ambassador mentioned the apprehensions the Greek Government had with respect to the setting up of an autonomous Macedonia in the new federated form of Yugoslav Government and the possibilities of Bulgarian Macedonia being joined with this new autonomous state⁸⁵ thus presenting some question of whether activities might not then be set on foot with a view to having Greek Macedonia also joined with this new State for the purpose of having the new entity include Salonika as its outlet to the sea.

Mr. Diamantopoulos also pointed out the desire of the Greek Government to improve its strategic frontier between its two eastern provinces and Bulgaria.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

760H.68/4-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, April 5, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received April 7—12:42 p. m.]

342. According to the Under Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁸⁶ who has called on me urgently and apparently in some alarm, the Yugoslav Government has begun pressing the Greek Government for the early reconditioning of the Yugoslav free zone in Salonika and the repair of the Greek railways servicing that port from the Yugoslav border. In view of the manifest inability of Greece at the present time to undertake reconstruction work of this magnitude, Mr. Melas said he feels that this Yugoslav pressure is not only inopportune but may betoken an "unsatisfactory" response which could then be used as a grievance for political purposes in connection with Slavic designs on the north of Greece.

Though he has only recently arrived from Cairo and has not yet presented his credentials, the new Yugoslav Minister to Greece, Mirkovich, was called the other day to Belgrade to discuss, as he told me himself, "the possibility of early resumption of commercial and economic relations" with this country.

Before leaving, he called on Mr. Melas and presented him with memorandum,⁸⁷ which the latter read me after first describing the Minister's *démarche* as most unusual in diplomatic practice. This memorandum expressed the Yugoslav Government's desire for prompt information as to the date of which the Greek reconstruction, par-

⁸⁵ For documentation regarding the attitude of the United States concerning the idea of federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and an exchange of views with the British Government on this subject, see vol. v, pp. 1304 ff.

⁸⁶ George Melas.

⁸⁷ A verbatim French text of the memorandum was included by the Ambassador in Greece in an enclosure to his despatch 827, April 9, 1945.

ticularly the railway reconstruction, can be completed. It would appear that the Yugoslavs claim to have already completed the necessary work on the line from Belgrade to Skoplje and to be able to extend it to the Greek border within 3 months.

Mr. Melas expressed the hope that the Allies might give favorable consideration to orders for steel and other supplies to enable Greece to respond acceptably to this unexpected pressure on the part of her "friends" though he admitted that such orders had not yet been placed. He thought that favorable consideration might be justified in connection with the war effort, as Yugoslavia is still within the war zone. I assured him I would not fail to communicate his remarks to the Department, but it seems possible that he or the Foreign Minister may bring the matter up when they are in the United States.⁸⁸ Mr. Sofianopoulos is disturbed, though seemingly not to the same extent as his . . . junior. Meanwhile I shall not fail to advise the Department of any further light I may be able to gather from my Yugoslav colleague when he returns from Belgrade.

MACVEAGH

868.014/4-1745

The British Embassy to the Department of State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO LORD HALIFAX,⁸⁹
DATED APRIL 15/45

Plans have been made for a British Military administration to govern the Dodecanese as soon as the Islands fall into our hands. The administration will have a difficult task so long as it has to maintain officially a completely impartial attitude, since it will be obliged to resist demands for union with Greece and to prevent political demonstrations in the Islands. British Military authorities have therefore asked that His Majesty's Government should now make a statement indicating that we shall support the Greek claims when the time comes to decide the future status of the Islands.

⁸⁸ To participate in the United Nations Conference on International Organization, which met at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945; for documentation on this Conference, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff. The Greek Ambassador handed a memorandum on this subject to Departmental officers on April 6 (not printed). Foreign Minister Sofianopoulos, scheduled to call on the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) on April 17, was, in a last minute change, received by the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn); before he talked with Mr. Sofianopoulos the Assistant Secretary read a memorandum which stated that the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and the Office of European Affairs "Although . . . inclined to favorable consideration of this Greek request" had deemed it necessary to get further information from the Greek Ambassador and from Ambassador MacVeagh; Mr. Dunn may have passed this information on to Mr. Sofianopoulos (868.00/4-1745). Detailed historical and statistical information on the Salonika free zone was submitted by Ambassador MacVeagh in despatch 1043, May 19 (not printed).

⁸⁹ British Ambassador.

2. It has always been our intention that all the Islands, with the possible exception of Castellorizo, should go to Greece after the war. We have been concerned, however, lest the settlement should impair relations between Greece and Turkey and have considered whether we should try to promote immediate discussions between Greek and Turkish Governments to decide such questions as Turkish minority, demilitarization, etc. His Majesty's Ambassadors in Athens and Angora have advised that such discussions should not be initiated before the attitude of His Majesty's Government has been made clear by means of a statement on the lines suggested in paragraph 1 above.

3. We are strongly in favor of making such a statement, the most appropriate moment for which would be when the rest of the Islands fall into our hands. In view of developments in the war situation this may occur in the near future. Please therefore take an early opportunity of informing the United States Government of the proposed action which we strongly advocate, and which we hope will meet with their approval.

4. A statement of this sort will at once ease the task of British Military administration, and also make it possible for the Islands to be handed over to Greece at a fairly early date, thus relieving forthwith a military commitment. It will also assist the Greek Government who are under strong pressure to take effective action for the promotion of Greek territorial claims.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1945.

868.014/4-1745

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*⁹⁰

MEMORANDUM

The Department has read the paraphrase of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador, copy of which has been received from the British Embassy, concerning plans for British military administration in the Dodecanese Islands and a proposal that the British Government make a statement indicating that it will support Greek claims to the Islands. The Foreign Office has expressed the

⁹⁰ In telegram 732, April 28, 1945, 6 p. m., to Rome, the Department informed Alexander C. Kirk, American Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, of the contents of this memorandum (868.014/4-2845). The Ambassador in the Soviet Union was likewise informed in telegram 1050, May 10, 1945, 4 p. m., with the instruction that, "If opportunity presents itself, you may make clear to the Soviets the foregoing position concerning the Dodecanese, which applies equally to the other disputed areas. We maintain that any unilateral action prejudicing a fair and reasoned settlement of territorial disputes will inevitably diminish the prospects for lasting peace." (868.014/4-1945)

hope that the proposal will meet with the approval of the United States Government.

Careful consideration has been given to the British proposal to make an early statement with respect to its position on the future status of the Dodecanese Islands and to the various reasons advanced by the Foreign Office for making such a statement. In the opinion of the Government of the United States the Dodecanese Islands comprise another disputed area of Italian national territory and should be administered effectively and impartially by Allied (or in this case British) Military Government during the interim period until they may be disposed of permanently in the general peace settlement. Military administration similar to that which is envisaged for the Venezia Giulia and for the province of Bolzano⁹¹ would seem to be appropriate for the Dodecanese Islands until their final disposition in the general peace settlement or until the Italian and Greek Governments may come to a direct understanding with respect to their future status. For these reasons the Government of the United States is unable to give its approval to the proposed statement by the British Government.

In view of public and private statements by various responsible Italian officials the British Government might be able to extract a public statement from the Italian Government reflecting its official position with respect to the future disposition of the Dodecanese Islands. An appropriate Italian statement on this subject might serve the purpose which the British Government has in mind.

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1945.

868.00/5-145

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 965

ATHENS, May 1, 1945.

[Received May 22.]

[Extract]

Subject: Political Developments in Greece: April 15-May 1, 1945.

SIR: . . .

. . . Partly, of course, present territorial demands are a carry-over of the old idea of a "Greater Greece" and, so far as the Dodecanese,

⁹¹ See memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, May 4, 1945, vol. IV, p. 1136.

Cyprus, and Northern Epirus are concerned, undoubtedly represent a sincere and earnest desire to incorporate all Greek peoples into the national territory. On the other hand, exaggerated claims, such as those put forward in 1944 by Mr. Philip Dragoumis, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs (see my despatch No. 217 of September 9, 1944), may be regarded somewhat as tub-thumping designed to distract public opinion. It is difficult to see how additional territory could be of any real strategic value to Greece under conditions of modern warfare and in view of prevailing political circumstances in the Balkans. Such demands may also be put forward as bargaining points to counterbalance possible territorial claims by neighboring states against Greece. Thus it might be hoped that the suggested partitioning of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia would, if effected, not only result in the annexation of Northern Epirus to Greece but would also satisfy Yugoslav territorial ambitions which, it is feared, may now be directed towards Greek Macedonia and Salonika.

Greek Claims and Tito's Macedonian Statement

While repeated, exaggerated expressions on the subject of Greek claims are characteristic of the Greek rightist press and political circles as a whole, I feel that they may represent the clamor of a clique rather than any deep-rooted demand for expansion on the part of the whole population. More responsible Greek political circles, moreover, taking cognizance of the threats against Greece's own territorial integrity, are beginning to realize that the diplomatic weapon referred to above is a double-edged sword, that too much stress laid on Greek claims against Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria might provide the Soviet-dominated Governments of those countries with precisely the justification they require for counteraction against Greece. On April 24, indeed, Mr. Zakythinos, Undersecretary for Press and Information, warned the press to soft-pedal territorial claims and to avoid chauvinistic slogans "as these can damage our national cause." The Greeks presumably have not learned of General Biryuzov's⁹² statement in Sofia to General Crane⁹³ that Russia will support Bulgaria in resisting so-called British-backed Greek territorial claims on Bulgaria (Department's telegram No. 337 of April 21⁹⁴), but they have heard of Russian troop movements near the frontier of Bulgaria and Thrace. They are aware also of the possible implications behind the hospitality extended by Yugoslavia to the "Free Macedonian" Regiment of Gen-

⁹² Col. Gen. Sergey Semenovitch Biryuzov, President, Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria.

⁹³ Maj. Gen. John A. Crane, chief U.S. military representative on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria.

⁹⁴ Not printed.

eral Gotsi (Gotchev)⁹⁵ and behind Yugoslav queries regarding Greece's ability to reconstruct rapidly the Djevdjeli-Salonika railroad (see my telegram No. 342 of April 5 and my despatches No. 827 and No. 845 of April 9⁹⁶). Most recently, they have been seriously alarmed by Marshal Tito's reported statement to the Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times* that "if Macedonians of the Greek areas express their wish to unite with the remaining Macedonians, Yugoslavia will not refuse to comply with their desires". The subsequent reassuring declarations in New York of Mr. Gabrilovitch, Yugoslav Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, have in no way stemmed the storm of protest provoked in the Greek nationalist press by the Tito statement. Even EAM has been obliged to bow to the force of public opinion⁹⁷ in this instance and "to state once more that the parties of EAM consider Macedonia and Thrace as inseparable parts of Greece" (April 21).

One may conclude, therefore, that all eyes in Greece are turned towards the north, and, although they do not see the situation in the same light, the general preoccupation of Greece with the problems of her northern frontier will continue to dominate Greek thinking on foreign policy to the practical exclusion of broader considerations of global security.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

⁹⁵ The Gotsi band was originally raised from among the Slavs of Greek Macedonia about the summer of 1943. EAM (*Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon*, the National Liberation Front, one of several resistance organizations operating in Greece during the period of the German occupation and controlled by the KKE, *Kommunistikon Komma Ellados*, the Communist Party of Greece) had by early 1944 secured the incorporation of the Gotsi group into ELAS (*Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos*, the National People's Liberation Army, the guerrilla arm of EAM). However, as reported by the Assistant Military Attaché in Greece (McNeill) in despatch 1453, August 28, 1945, "A series of jurisdictional disputes between Gotsi and Higher ELAS Hq ensued. Gotsi refused to hand over surplus arms in his possession, and instead started to increase the size of the unit under his command and to speak openly of his plan to make an autonomous Macedonia, separate from Greece. In November 1944 a final break developed between Gotsi and ELAS; and superior ELAS forces compelled Gotsi to retreat across the Yugoslav frontier. His force has since remained somewhere in southern Yugoslavia. . . ." (868.4016/8-2845). The Gotsi band came eventually to be known as the Slav-Macedonian Liberation Front (*Slaviomakedonski Nacionalny Osvo-boditelen Front*, or SNOF).

⁹⁶ Neither printed.

⁹⁷ By the time of the liberation of Greece in October 1944, EAM had secured a predominant position among the resistance organizations operating in Greece and actually challenged the authority of the restored Greek Government at Athens in December 1944; see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, pp. 141 ff.; for documentation regarding the role of EAM in Greek political life in 1945, see pp. 98 ff.

868.00/5-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, May 12, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received May 12—2: 15 p. m.]

456. The Athens newspapers announce under large headlines this morning that the Regent accompanied by elements of the Greek fleet and air forces will leave this afternoon for the Dodecanese where he will address the people and celebrate mass in the Cathedral of Rhodes.

This visit appears to have been decided on by the Regent individually with the consent of the British Ambassador⁹⁸ but without prior reference elsewhere except to London where Sir Reginald tells me he had to clear the matter "because the Dodecanese is in another military theatre than Greece and comes under the Middle East Command". He says he does not think Washington was consulted and I certainly was not advised. The Political Director of the Foreign Office says he learned of the visit only yesterday afternoon, and the Prime Minister's Office, in a statement welcoming the event, ascribes it to the Regent's "direct negotiations and personal activities".

During my talk with my British colleague he said he does not regard the visit as of any great importance in connection with the question of the disposal of the islands, since the Greeks "know very well" that this must await the peace conference. However, the fact that it has been permitted is being generally and enthusiastically hailed here as an indication of Allied intentions to honor Greek claims [apparent omission] a result the gesture is likely to raise the local prestige of the present regime, which is possibly its primary aim.

MACVEAGH

868.001/5-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, May 16, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received May 18—1: 17 p. m.]

466. See my No. 456 of May 12, 5 p. m. The Regent sailed for Rhodes Sunday afternoon after telegraphing the King in London to announce his departure and to request His Majesty's prayers for the country. In a press interview on board ship he is reported to have said: "I am going now not as Archbishop but as Regent. It is not a question of an engagement with the Dodecanese but of a marriage from which no divorce will be possible."

⁹⁸ Sir Reginald W. A. Leeper.

At Rhodes where he reputedly was received with a tremendous ovation, the Regent attended a *Te Deum* at the Cathedral and subsequently addressed the people in the open, saying that he came to bring the first heartfelt greeting of Mother Greece and the free Greek people and to congratulate the Dodecanesians on their liberation. Urging them to forget the bitter past, he promised a new period of national integration and social well-being and concluded substantially as follows: "Greece desires only her undoubted national rights. Her sacrifices cannot remain unrewarded. My salutation to Rhodes is the official seal on the spiritual bond between Greece and the Dodecanese. The justice of our great Allies guarantees that the Dodecanese may await with unshakable faith the formal declaration of her return to her mother. This official recognition will inevitably come."⁹⁹

The Athens press has continued to view the Regent's visit as indicative of a future certainty of the return of the Dodecanese to Greece. It treats this matter as a purely domestic one unassociated with and unparalleled by other international territorial questions.

MACVEAGH

868.014/5-1645

The British Embassy to the Department of State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO H. M. AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, DATED MAY 14, 1945

His Majesty's Ambassador Ankara reports that Turkish Government as a result of recent press reports regarding Greek claims to the Dodecanese have expressed informally their wish to be consulted about disposal of these islands in view of their importance to Turkey.

2. Acting Secretary General told Counsellor that though Turkey was greatly concerned about the disposal of all the Dodecanese, they were chiefly concerned with the group of five Lervis [*Leros?*], Calymnes, Cos, Nisiros and Symi) which were more or less in Turkish territorial waters and which bore strongly on Turkish security. There were Turkish populations in Rhodes and other islands but these were not of the same importance. Castellorizo really belonged to Turkey

⁹⁹ In his dispatch 1072, May 25, 1945, Ambassador MacVeagh commented, in part, "The Department will note that the speech [at Rhodes] is of a religious and patriotic nature and that the Archbishop . . . carefully refrained from making any statement which might be interpreted as constituting a proclamation of *de facto* annexation of the islands to Greece . . . Meeting the press on his return to the Piraeus on May 18, the Archbishop is quoted by the leftist *Eleftheri Ellada* as stating . . . when questioned about Cyprus . . . that he understood the keen interest of the Greek people in the subject but that 'it is not advisable to touch this matter at present.'

Altogether, it would appear that the Archbishop has been careful to observe the diplomatic proprieties in connection with the Dodecanese and Cyprus. . . ." (868.001/5-2545)

who had handed it over to Italy in 1923.¹ He hoped the whole question could be discussed and settled on basis of close Anglo-Turkish and Anglo-Greek friendship.

3. You may inform State Department in confidence.

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1945.

760H.68/5-2145 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, May 21, 1945—midnight.

[Received May 21—7: 16 p. m.]

2280. Brit authorities Athens report that Yugos are said to be evacuating civilians from frontier villages in Monastir Gap area and moving in troops and equipment.

Rumors of Yugo troop movements towards frontier add [*and?*] southwards generally continue unconfirmed. Brit intelligence estimate Yugo strength now on or near frontier at two divs. In event of major concentration of Yugo troops in or near Greek frontiers Brit Fourth Indian Div are not now tactically disposed and Scobie² has requested AFHQ^{2a} directive on action of Brit troops and troops under Brit command should Yugos take action across Greek frontier.

KIRK

760H.68/5-2245 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, May 22, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 5: 50 p. m.]

2295. Our 2280, May 21. Brit military authorities Athens have been informed by SAC³ that rumored Yugo troop movements toward Greek frontier are not confirmed by any specific evidence but some general deployment is to be expected after surrender German troops north Yugo. Tito forces have for some time operated against anti-Communist Serbs and Albanians in south Yugo and reinforcements Yugo forces this area may be connected with intensified operations. SAC does not consider present Yugo troop movements south Yugo as evidence of hostile intentions. However, Macedonians definitely

¹ See article 15, Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, pp. 13, 23. For documentation regarding the Lausanne Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, pp. 879 ff.

² Lt. Gen. Ronald M. Scobie, General Officer Commanding British Forces in Greece.

^{2a} Allied Force Headquarters (Caserta).

³ Supreme Allied Commander.

in disturbed state and there may well be frontier incidents on Greek Yugo border.

Scobie is to continue collect info and report but Brit troops are on no account to become implicated in any frontier affair with Yugos.

KIRK

740.0011 EW/5-2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1945.

Participants: Mr. George Christopoulos, First Secretary, Greek Embassy,
Mr. C. W. Cannon, SE,⁴
Mr. W. O. Baxter, NE.

Mr. Christopoulos, First Secretary of the Greek Embassy, called today at his request to advise the Department that the Greek Government had received reports which it believes to be reliable that Yugoslav troops are being massed in Southern Yugoslavia near the Greek frontier. This information, coupled with indications that Albanian forces are concentrated in Southern Albania, causes the Greek Government great alarm. It is feared that Marshal Tito and General Hoxha may have come to some secret understanding for a surprise attack across the Greek border to seize territory in northwestern Greece, which is admittedly not under strong control of the Greek Government.

Mr. Christopoulos said that his Government wishes to know what would be our attitude if a formal Greek request should be made for British and American troops to be sent to this section of Greece to forestall any coup on the part of Albania and Yugoslavia. The same question, he indicated, is being asked of the British Government.

Mr. Cannon replied that we had heard rumors, as yet unconfirmed, of certain troop movements in this section and that we would make further inquiries.⁵ He thought it unlikely, however, that Hoxha would indulge in any aggressive acts at a time when he is seeking Allied recognition for his Government. On the matter of the use of American or British troops, Mr. Cannon pointed out that any military decision of that sort would need to be made by consultation among the

⁴ Cavendish W. Cannon, Chief of the Division of South European Affairs.

⁵ For communications on this subject subsequently received by the Department, see despatch 1213, June 23, 1945, from Athens; telegram 201, June 25, from Belgrade; telegram 2814, June 29, 5 p. m., from Caserta; telegram 2823, June 23, 5 p. m., from Caserta; telegram 251, July 9, from Belgrade; telegram 695, July 10, 8 p. m., from Athens, in *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, vol. I, pp. 666-679, *passim*. See telegram 192, July 11, 7 p. m., to Belgrade, p. 320, for Departmental instruction to the Chargé in Yugoslavia concerning the developments of this period.

great powers within the framework of the Yalta Agreement.⁶ He ventured to hope that no overt action might be needed; the mere raising of such a question on a high level would probably be sufficient to ease the situation.

Mr. Cannon assured Mr. Christopoulos that the Department will inform him of any information which it receives as the result of further inquiries.⁷

756.68/5-1845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, at Caserta

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1945—9 p. m.

874. For Kirk from Dunn.⁸ Reurtel 1336, May 18, 5 p. m.:⁹

"Greek Foreign Minister Sofianopoulos mentioned this subject to me casually in conversation at Department prior to departure for conference. He indicated that Greece in principle desired eventual reestablishment of normal relations, but that it was holding off because (1) it felt such action would displease the Yugoslavs; and (2) admission of Greece and Yugoslavia to Allied Commission was under consideration. In response to request for American views, I said this was of course a question for decision solely by the Greek Government. I expressed the personal feeling that in view of recent history the Greeks might well expect the Italians to take the initiative in this matter, but added that we should be glad if the Greeks should show a receptive attitude toward an eventual Italian proposal."

GREW

865.014/5-2845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM H.M. AMBASSADOR, ANGORA, TO FOREIGN OFFICE, DATED MAY 14TH, 1945

Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs¹⁰ told me tonight that Turkish Prime Minister¹¹ and he were somewhat exercised over developments in regard to Dodecanese.

⁶ Signed at Yalta, February 11, 1945; see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 966 ff.

⁷ See footnote 77, p. 303.

⁸ James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, at this time at the San Francisco Conference.

⁹ In this telegram Mr. Kirk had cabled: "Greek representative here [on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy] tells me that Greek delegate to San Francisco discussed with you matter of establishing relations between Italy and Greece . . . Could you inform me?" (765.68/5-1845)

¹⁰ Nurullah Esat Sumer.

¹¹ Sukru Saraçoğlu.

Monsieur Sumer said that he hoped it would be realized that the future of these islands was a [of?] great importance to Turkey from point of view of her security. A glance at the map sufficed to show this. Turkey had nothing but friendliest sentiments towards Greece but would welcome an opportunity of expressing her own views on this question of the Dodecanese. Turkey would be willing to discuss directly with Greece but hoped she would have support of His Majesty's Government.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1945.

865.014/5-2845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO H. M. AMBASSADOR,
ANKARA, DATED MAY 17TH, 1945

You may inform the Turkish Government that we have no intention of reaching an immediate decision about the future status of the islands or of handing them over to the Greeks. Our attitude was made clear in answer to a question in parliament on May 16th.¹²

For your own information owing to the position which has arisen in North-East Italy it has been decided that the principle must be maintained that the future of the Dodecanese, like that of other disputed territories, should be held over until the peace settlement. Consequently no statement can be issued by His Majesty's Government in the immediate future pledging us to support Greek Claim to the Islands.

I do not think that there would be any advantage in encouraging the Turkish Government to discuss the future status of the islands with ourselves. There might be advantage, however, in promoting Greco-Turkish discussions provided that the Turkish Government do not open their mouths too wide. If they are ready to assume that all the islands except Castellorizo will eventually pass under Greek Sovereignty, discussions might well lead to a useful agreement.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1945.

¹² *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 410, col. 2442.

868.00/5-3145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1945—6 p. m.

437. From Sofia Barnes¹³ reports¹⁴ seeing May 12 issue Greek newspaper *To Phos* in hands Bulgarian MinFonAff on way to cabinet meeting with red printed headlines announcing 40 to 50 kilometer penetration of Bulgaria by Greek and Brit troops and that "Greek occupation of Bulgaria has begun". Despite later official denial such false news, uncontrolled Greek expansionist temper contributes to misunderstanding between Brit and Greek on one hand and Russia and Balkan Slavs on other. In face of such Greek attitude Barnes finds no sympathetic reception for arguments justifying relief shipments Bulgaria to Greece.

Numerous current reports indicate that Greek claims for territorial revision, whether official or unofficial, strengthen alleged belief of Greece's northern neighbors that Greece with Brit backing has aggressive intentions and offer pretext for threatened countermeasures. Dept feels Greek Govt under present circumstances might be well advised to attempt restraint of belligerent expansionist claims. Perhaps you can occasionally and informally indicate this view in appropriate quarters.

Sent to Athens. Repeated to Salonika and Sofia.

GREW

868.00/6-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, June 8, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received June 10—9 a. m.]

565. Urtl 437, May 31. Have strongly presented Dept's views to UndMin FonOff¹⁵ who expressed understanding. However, fear informal approach unlikely produce effect in view weakness Govt and highly excited state local political world (though apparently not public at large) over question national claims. Original efforts by Rightists to appropriate such claims with view to posing as only true patriots in coming elections have now stampeded Leftists into following suit and each camp appears trying to outdo other. Thus outrageous paper mentioned by Barnes is Rightist organ, while Zacharides, Com-

¹³ Maynard B. Barnes, American Representative in Bulgaria.

¹⁴ Telegram 265, May 23, 1945, 4 p. m., not printed.

¹⁵ Michael Tsamados.

unist leader, has completely reversed reported Paris interview (my tel 501, May 30¹⁶) and said that if "the Republican Parties" desire have Greece regain northern Epirus by force arms, he will not oppose. He has also revived old demand for Cyprus, taunting Rightists with ignoring this claim out of deference to their Brit "masters", and EAM has raised question eastern Thrace. Finally, weakness of Govt in face this double agitation shown in statement by Press Minister yesterday: "Greece has no aim of conquest, but she will fight for her national rights on the unredeemed land of Epirus with which the blood of her heroes has created new bonds." Possibly Allied official condemnation this kind of talk as prejudicial best interests of nation in advance of peace settlement might prove salutary.

MACVEAGH

760H.68/6-2245 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, June 22, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

2713. Our 2634, June 15.¹⁶ The view is now held at AFHQ that concentration of troops under Yugo Army at Skolpje is not altogether alarming as resources of this area are adequate for provisioning and quartering of these forces as opposed to obvious difficulties which would be encountered if all Yugo formations had been assembled in NW Yugo.

A certain amt of pol and nationalistic agitation has, however, occurred in which demands for annexation of territory within Greek Macedonia and protection against Zervas¹⁷ terrorist forces have been expressed. It is felt by competent authorities at AFHQ that Yugo concentration in Macedonia should not be regarded for present as sinister. The availability of these considerable forces for action against Greece should not be altogether discounted in view of complexities of confusing pol situation in that area and it is likewise felt that in Albania where main locus of friction appears to be the Greek claims for Epirus, there presumably seems to be no basis for likelihood of imminent hostilities. No definite info has been received at AFHQ as to where first

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ Gen. Napoleon Zervas, commander of EDES (*Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos*, the National Republican Greek League), a Greek resistance organization operating in northwest Greece during the years of the German occupation, and which had successfully resisted ELAS penetration into that area.

Bulgarian Army will concentrate but at present only Bulgarian guards are reported on Macedonian frontier with six Russian divisions south of Balkan mountains.

KIRK

[Mr. John Sofianopoulos, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Washington upon his departure from the San Francisco Conference. On July 5 he called on President Truman; for the statement issued by the President concerning their conversation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 8, 1945, page 69. Acting Secretary of State Grew received Mr. Sofianopoulos on July 9; the Greek Foreign Minister talked "at length about Greece's territorial problems" and about the hope of the Greek Government that the United States would not recognize the Hoxha regime in Albania. For another aspect of this conversation concerning Greek economic problems, see page 228.]

768.75/7-845 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Albania (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State*¹⁸

TIRANA, July 8, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received July 9—2:25 p. m.]

73. Lengthy despatch¹⁹ with enclosures²⁰ concerning Greek Albanian relations compliance Dept's airgrams 3, 4 and 5 June 9 and 12,²¹ but in view Big Three²² discussion Balkan problems and fact Albanian and Yugo press and radio have started propaganda war following provocative statements and broadcasts by Greek authorities believed Dept might be interested following. Unable find evidence recent past or present persecution Greek minority by Albanian authorities. During recent trip thru southern Albania heard nothing, and various members that minority who saw me could have mentioned matter if they had desired.

. . . sources unable confirm Greek claims. In this connection Kotoko, now at Janjina [*Ioannina?*], who claims to be Archbishop of Gjinokaster and around whom Greek claims seem to center, fled from Albania because his pro-German and pro-Italian collaboration and is no longer recognized by Albanian Orthodox Church. Concerning in-

¹⁸ The gist of this telegram was repeated to Athens in telegram 671, July 11, 7 p. m.

¹⁹ Despatch 47, July 7, 1945, not printed.

²⁰ None printed.

²¹ See footnote 77, p. 303.

²² Reference is to the impending conference at Potsdam between President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin.

dividuals named Dept's airgram 3, June 9, have ascertained that such persons fled or have been arrested because their failure pay war profit taxes which while drastic are being levied upon all merchants in Korce and elsewhere in Albania without discrimination.

Concerning southern boundary problems authorities here feel Gr Brit and US especially former, should compel Greek authorities desist agitating this question as Albania authorities did not initiate agitation and as Western Allies, especially US, have taken position that boundaries should remain as in 1939 until disputes can be settled peaceful means.

Regardless possible pro-Italian, pro-Germans, and pro-ELAS activities on part some Chamerians, Greek authorities have far more to explain in uprooting and driving into Albania some 200,000 men, women and children to become charge upon Albanian people ill equipped to take care of them.²³ I met such refugees during my trip south and reports Brig Hodgson²⁴ and his staff which did not exonerate Greeks were submitted by AmPolAd²⁵ as enclosures Caserta despatch May 4 (sent Dept; as rptd Caserta as 80).²⁶ My thoughts resolution this problem are that for future safety refugees should remain Albania, that cost settling them on vacant Albanian lands should be borne by Greece and any dissatisfied members Greek minority in Albania should be sent to Greece.

JACOBS

860H.01/7-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz)

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1945—7 p. m.

192. Dept has noted widely quoted press reports of statement attributed to Marshal Tito on July 8 accusing Greek forces of firing across Greek-Yugoslav border "to provoke us". Similar accusations published previously in Belgrade have also come to Dept's attention.

Please inform FonOff that no information from other sources has

²³ In an enclosure to despatch 1377, August 3, 1945, from Athens, the Assistant Military Attaché in Greece (McNeil) reported substantially as follows regarding the Chamerians or "Chams": A small Moslem minority, perhaps 200,000, of Epirus, and discontented with their Greek nationality, the Chamerians had urged incorporation of their districts into Albania at the time of the Italian occupation; additionally they alienated the Greeks by their service in a special *gendarmérie* which at times perpetrated brutal acts upon the subject Greek population. At the time of the German withdrawal from Greece in 1944 most of the Chamerians fled into Albania, the German Army even providing motor transport for their removal. The few who remained behind were subsequently severely harried by Greek nationalist bands and nearly all of the Chamerian villages were burned to the ground. (768.75/8-345)

²⁴ Brig. D. E. P. Hodgson, commander of the British Military Mission to Albania.

²⁵ American Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters.

²⁶ Not printed.

been received by Dept to substantiate these statements and this Govt will appreciate any data Yugoslav authorities can furnish.

Sent to Belgrade, repeated to London, Moscow and Athens.

GREW

868.014/7-1345 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, July 13, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

2940. Our 2280, May 21. SAC has now informed Greek Military Mission²⁷ of following policy to be adopted re violations of Greek frontiers.

It is improbable that large-scale incursions into Greece by Bulgarian, Albanian or Yugoslav forces will occur, but possible there may be small-scale incursions. It is unlikely they would be backed by govts concerned but in order test our reactions and as part of general war of nerves may have their unofficial backing.

SAC also informed Greek Military Mission its primary task in Greece is support of Greek Govt in maintaining law and order and that British forces should be disposed accordingly. Greek forces should be entirely responsible for guarding of own frontiers but Greek [*British?*] military should be prepared support Greek Govt in event frontiers are violated by concentrating maximum force in affected area to extent existing forces will allow. All precautionary steps are to be taken, however, to avoid hostilities with any Yugoslav, Bulgarian or Albanian forces which may penetrate into Greece and force will not be used except in event direct attack without prior consultation AFHQ.

KIRK

868.00/7-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, July 14, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received July 15—12:50 p. m.]

707. My despatch 1279, July 6.²⁸ FonOff has presented memorandum of Committee Foreign Affairs proposing Allied military occupation northern Epirus, including participation Greek forces, to end "intolerable persecution Greek minority" pending final consideration Greek claim to area peace conference. In covering note Greek Govt does not ask action, but states shares Committee's views and invites

²⁷ That is, the British Military Mission in Greece.

²⁸ Not printed.

serious attention US Govt urgency proposed solution. Am forwarding complete text airmail.²⁹

Similar note sent British and USSR. British Chargé and I feel Greek Govt fully aware proposal unrealistic present time, but obliged take cognizance local pressure. Terrorized refugees undoubtedly crossing Greek border recent months. Cromie³⁰ interviewed claimants to American citizenship among them early April this year (my despatch 891, April 18³¹). Actual situation southern Albania would seem need on-spot investigation. Connection urtel 671, July 11,³² Albanian refusal free circulation Allied observers possibly significant. No hindrance placed by Greek Govt to circulation observers investigating alleged analogous situation Greek Macedonia.

MACVEAGH

[The Greek Ambassador handed a memorandum of July 16 to Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, on July 25, 1945. In this memorandum the Greek government recalled that it had brought to the attention of Allied governments the suspicious actions of Marshal Tito, and now wished to mention his unjustified attack upon Greece in his speech of July 8, broadcast over the Belgrade radio.

In this speech Tito had accused the Greek government of being reactionary, had sought to interfere in Greek internal affairs, and had attempted to promote a policy of creating a Greek Macedonia problem which might lead to the eventual annexation of the port of Salonika. This in turn aroused Greek feelings of distrust against Yugoslavia. This action by Tito seemed to be encouraged by the recent signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav treaty,³⁴ and appeared to be related to other disturbing events such as renewed persecutions of Greeks in Northern Epirus, and with the revival of the question of the reopening of the Turkish Straits.³⁵ The Greek government saw in these simultaneous happenings the possibility of the revival of an expansion of Slavdom to the Aegean Sea as had been embodied in the Treaty of San

²⁹ Despatch 1327, July 14, not printed.

³⁰ Leonard J. Cromie, Third Secretary of Embassy in Greece.

³¹ Not printed.

³² See footnote 18, p. 319.

³⁴ Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Regency Council of Yugoslavia, signed at Moscow, April 11, 1945, Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. i, no. 4 (July 1948), p. 231; for interpretation of this treaty by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), see telegrams 1099, April 9, 8 p. m., and 1156, April 13, 6 p. m., from Moscow, vol. v, pp. 1218 and 1223, respectively.

³⁵ For documentation regarding interest of the United States concerning the Straits question, see pp. 1219 ff.

Stefano,³⁶ but it trusted that the United States and the United Kingdom would be aware of Tito's activities and would do whatever was necessary in the circumstances.]

768.75/7-1945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1945—7 p. m.

711. Please convey informally to appropriate Greek authorities substance of those portions of Jacobs' report on treatment of Greek minority in Albania (infotel 671 July 11⁴⁰) of which, in your judgment, Greek officials should be made aware.

Since all reports received to date by Dept from American observers in Albania fail to support Greek allegations of persecution by Albanian authorities, Dept believes that communication of such first-hand information to Greek authorities might have salutary effect in discouraging further extravagant charges and claims.

Sent to Athens; repeated to Amrep Tirana.

GREW

740.0011 EW/7-2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, July 20, 1945.

[Received July 21—4:03 a. m.]

295. Note number 1907, July 18 from Foreign Office begins as follows:

"The Yugoslav Government deem necessary to inform the Government of the United States of America of numerous and reckless violations of the principles of international law laid down in the Atlantic Charter⁴¹ in connection with the Declaration of the United Nations⁴² and in the Charter of the United Nations⁴³ regarding the respect of the fundamental respects [*rights?*] of man, particularly the freedom from fear,—violations committed by the Greek Government, themselves a signatory to the Declaration of the United Nations as well

³⁶ Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano, March 3, 1878; for original French text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXIX, p. 732; for English translation of text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 866.

⁴⁰ See footnote 18, p. 319.

⁴¹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

⁴² Signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

⁴³ Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

as to the Charter of the United Nations, to the detriment of Macedonians, our conationals, inhabitants of the Aegean Macedonia (the Greek portion of Macedonia).

The violations of these principles are committed not only by the Greek Government refraining from doing anything to stop the terrorism of unofficial organized gangs of Fascists, earlier collaborators of the [conqueror], but also by support given by official authorities to these gangs and by the part taken in the persecutions by Greek regular forces, the latter also joined by many ancient collaborators of the German conqueror, such as members of the dissolved National Defense (Tagmata Asfalias), an organization of Tsolakoglu's.⁴⁴

The way in which terrorism is being performed and the purpose of the same will most clearly be seen from a few short excerpts from statements of officially interrogated refugees from the above mentioned country."

Note continues with three pages of details concerning alleged looting, torture, arrests and killing of Macedonians in Greece by soldiers and "other terrorists".

Note concludes:

"Statements of refugees from various districts all over Aegean Macedonia have been quoted above. The striking likeness of the proceedings described in the statements of witness from various districts, the fact that all others, officially interrogated and thousands of officially not yet interrogated, but informatively questioned refugees state conformly, as to ascertain contents, with the above statement, further the fact that up to date about 20,000 Macedonian peasants had to escape from Aegean Macedonia on account of terrorism, mostly women and children—for the men often arrested, interned, earlier mobilized, hiding in the forests or surroundings, or even killed—and that is still persisting the fleeing of these men who often arrive in our midst robbed of their last shirt, allows no doubt whatever that in Aegean Macedonia an organized, systematic terrorism of Fascist pattern is going on by means of threats, prohibition of using the native language, arrests, deportation to unknown places, beating, killing, violation of women, against our Macedonian conationals with the purpose of compelling them to emigrate from Aegean Macedonia, or, if they were to oppose, to extirpate them.

In transmitting the above communication the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have the honor of informing the Embassy, that at the same time notes of similar content are transmitted to the British and Soviet Embassies, and that instructions have been given to the Yugoslav representative at Athens to draw the attention of the Greek Government to the necessity of elimination this situation which is not in accordance with the principles of international law."

Copy of note follows by airgram.⁴⁵

SHANTZ

⁴⁴ Gen. George Tsolakoglu, puppet premier of German-occupied Greece, April 1941 to December 1942.

⁴⁵ Airgram A-89, July 21, not printed.

760H.68/7-2145: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, July 21, 1945.

[Received July 21—2: 26 p. m.]

300. Following is text of FonOff note of July 19:

“With reference to a memoranda of the United States Embassy of July 13,⁴⁶ the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia have the honour to communicate the following facts:

Things which are regretted by the Government of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia as liable to endanger good relations between Yugoslavia and Greece, have been happening for one month already.

Besides persecutions of the population of Macedonian nationality which is in consequence fleeing over border and seeking for refuge in over [apparent omission] of writing in the Greek press, and besides manifestations against Yugoslavia, Greek forces have also been making excesses by using firearms thus endangering security at our southern frontier.

1. On June 2, 1945 at 10 hours, at the frontier point Bogorodica Greek soldiers fired from rifles and light machine guns at our personnel. The shooting lasted 5 minutes without interruption.

2. Person on the same day and the same place, at 16 hours rifles and light machine guns were again discharged from Greek side.

3. June 9, 1945 at 11 hours at Macukovo, a border village, Greek soldiers fired at our frontier guards. Shooting was repeated at 14 hours.

4. On June 27, 1945 at Balarge, on Bulgarian soil, just on the triple frontier point an incident occurred between two British tanks and Bulgarian forces. During this incident bullets which were shot from rifles on the Greek side started falling into our territory, while shots from machine guns covered our area along the border. The shooting lasted for several minutes.

5. On the same day, June 27, on the Yugoslav-Greek border at Kajmakalan, Greek guards fired shots at our frontier guards.

At Gradska, a village near Djevdjelija, shots were fired from mine throwers and machine guns on the Greek side into our territory. Splinters were falling close to the village.

6. In July 8, 1945 at Djevdjelija, shots were fired on the Greek side into our territory. The villages Stojavt and Gradiska were within the range of shots from rifles. At latter and near to the frontier a splinter from a mine thrower fell.

Strictly following their orders received from their superiors our frontier guards answered in none of the above cases.

The repeating of such excess committed by Greek forces against our territory, the persecution of our co-nationals, the often and sometimes noisy manifestations against Yugoslavia make one believe that there are elements in Greece who do want that Yugoslav-Greek relations be all but such ones of correct neighbourhood.”

SHANTZ

⁴⁶ See telegram 192, July 11, 7 p. m., to Belgrade, p. 320.

765.68/7-2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henderson
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to read us a telegram from his Government regarding the Greek attitude towards a possible resumption of relations with the Italian Government, which may be summarized as follows:

Mr. Bonomi⁴⁷ had spoken with Mr. Exindaris, Greek representative of the Advisory Council, regarding the desire of the Italian Government to reestablish friendly relations with the Greek Government, and these statements had recently been reiterated to Mr. Exindaris by the Italian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Kirk and Mr. Macmillan had likewise encouraged Greece to resume relations with Italy. Previous Greek governments had been unwilling to accept this Italian proposal because:

1. They questioned the sincerity of the Italian proposal;
2. The Greek public, which had suffered so severely as a result of Italian aggression and occupation, would be opposed; and
3. The Greeks were anxious not to take any action which would displease Tito and cause him to close ranks with Bulgaria and Albania.

However, Tito had shown no appreciation of the Greek attitude on this subject and there consequently remained no reason why the Greek Government should not now go ahead with the proposal. Furthermore, if Greek recognition of the Italian Government were to have any political value for the latter, action should be taken without delay since the Italians were actively trying to arrange better relations with all of the Allied powers, including Yugoslavia. However, in the view of the Greek Government favorable action must be premised on the following considerations:

1. It must be understood that Greek claims for reparations from Italy would be entirely unaffected;
2. Italy should make a statement regarding the Dodecanese (i.e. cession to Greece);
3. Italy should undertake to support Greek annexation of northern Epirus (southern Albania). In this connection the Greek Government said it was superfluous for it to comment on Italian declarations regarding the independence of Albania which indicated the Italian intention to oppose cession of northern Epirus to Greece.

⁴⁷ Ivanoe Bonomi, Italian Prime Minister from June 1944 to June 1945.

The Greek Ambassador explained that the international position of Greece had drastically altered as a result of the war. While Greece had formerly enjoyed the closest relations with the old Yugoslavia, Tito had shown a definitely hostile attitude which the Greeks considered to be dictated from Moscow. It was therefore necessary for Greece to readjust and strengthen her diplomatic position. This had already been done as respects Turkey but they were being careful not to make a public show of it since the Russians would be antagonistic.

Mr. Henderson said that he fully appreciated the reasons for the Greek initiative and that he would consult with the appropriate officers of the Department and give him a reply early next week. Speaking personally, Mr. Henderson commented that Italy was a defeated nation and that he thought it might well be the view of this Government that the Italian Government would have no right to make a statement as regard the postwar disposition of territories.

768.74/7-2345 : Telegram

The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, July 23, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 6:28 p. m.]

376. For past several weeks anti-Greek tone which has formed a noticeable undercurrent in the Bulgarian press since last September has reached a new pitch. While extremist Greek claims against Bulgaria including a reported desire to occupy Plovdiv and Sofia, have frequently been aired in the Bulgarian press, present campaign is concerned primarily with alleged Greek persecution of Bulgarians in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace which is reported to have resulted in flight of an unknown number of refugees from Greece to Bulgaria.

This campaign reached a climax on July 19 with appeal published in all Bulgarian papers and signed by "Citizens Relief Committee" composed of veteran Macedonian leaders and editors of leading Bulgarian papers. Appeal asserts that current events in Greece are "in complete contradiction" to principles of United Nations and claims that ["]mad terrorism of Greek chauvinist circles" is driving many Slavs out of Greece. Bulgarian Govt is urged to inform "makers of international peace" of this state of affairs and ask for a prompt investigation. Instructions are also given for formation of local relief committees in south Bulgaria and suggestion is made former refugees from Thrace and Macedonia assume leadership this movement.

Nature of this appeal and position of its signers are such as to make it little less than an official statement of policy. By this fishing in troubled waters the Bulgarian press and particularly *Izgreva* the organ of Zveno⁴⁸ seeks to bolster an insecure internal political situation and at same time mask the fact that today pan-Slavism represents far more of a menace to Greece than does Greece to Bulgaria. The campaign also ignores completely Bulgarian atrocities perpetrated on Greek territory until less than a year ago. A similar use although in a more moderate degree has been made of various anti-Soviet statements appearing in Turkish press over signature of Yalçın⁴⁹ and other commentators. It is significant this type of nationalist propaganda is quite successful in Bulgaria and that many other wise moderate persons are convinced that were it not for Russia's protection and the benevolent rule of Tito in Yugo Bulgaria would now be a helpless victim of its traditional Greek and Serb enemies.

Repeated to Moscow as 195, to Ankara and Athens.

BARNES

760H.68/7-2345

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, July 23, 1945—midnight.

[Received July 24—4 a. m.]

742. Prime Minister called this evening with following remarkable note received from Yugoslav Legation (Embassy's translation from French).

"The Legation of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and, acting on instructions from its Government, has the honor to call the attention of the Hellenic Government to the necessity of putting an end to the persecution being directed against Macedonians—our compatriots—in Aegean Macedonia by irregular bands, often with the participation of regular troops and the support of organs of the state, viz.: privations of liberty, mistreatment, pillaging, murders, violation of women and proscription of the use of the national tongue. Further tolerance of such acts on the part of the Hellenic Government would not serve friendly relations between our two countries.

The Yugoslav Government expects that the Hellenic Govt will give the appropriate orders to bring to an end all terror and persecution directed against the population of Yugoslav origin in Aegean Macedonia and to respect the rights of our minority that the crimes of which it is the object shall cease and that all the refugees shall have the opportunity of returning without hinderance to their homes, that pillaged property shall be restituted to them and that they shall be

⁴⁸ A political combination of military officers, intellectuals, and politicians, known as the Zveno group.

⁴⁹ Huseyin Cahit Yalçın, eminent Turkish publicist.

compensated for damages suffered, in other words that order shall be reestablished in conformity with the prescriptions of international law established in the Declaration of the United Nations with reference to the Atlantic Charter and with the principles consecrated by the Charter of the United Nations which have been accepted by the Hellenic Government.

The Legation of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia avails itself of this occasion to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurances of its high consideration.

Athens, July 23, 1945."

Prime Minister asked me send text immediately Washington Potsdam. British colleague doing same London Potsdam. Prime Minister said would neither reply nor give publicity until advised by British Government and he hopes also US Government. He commented wholesale allegations persecution unsupported and devoid foundations also Macedonians mentioned not Yugoslav "compatriots" but Greek citizens and reference Atlantic Charter inapplicable unless to Greek national rights now threatened and said feels note intended lay basis invasion Yugoslav Army or possibly irregular bands and places, hopes Big Three prevent this.

Sent Department repeated to Potsdam.

MACVEAGH

765.68/7-2145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1945.

Participants: The Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henderson
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to discuss pending matters.

We took occasion to refer to our conversation of July 21 regarding the possible reestablishment of relations between Greece and Italy and to communicate to him the substance of the following portions of the Department's memorandum of July 24⁵⁰ on this subject:

- "(1 We would welcome the reestablishment of friendly relations between Greece and Italy;
(2 We understand and agree that Greek reparations claims would be unaffected by such action;
(3 We cannot encourage the Greek Government to secure prior assurances from the Italian Government as regards the Dodecanese

⁵⁰ Not printed: its contents were substantially the same as set forth here. This information was transmitted also to Rome and Athens on July 28 in telegrams 1265 and 753, respectively.

Islands and Northern Epirus. These matters will require settlement during the peace discussions at which time all interested parties will be given full opportunity to present their legitimate claims. Any present approach to the Italian Government on the lines proposed with respect to Northern Epirus would, in the opinion of this Government, be inappropriate and should be discouraged."

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the statement of our views.

760H.68/7-2745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1945.

The Greek Ambassador called on me this afternoon and said that he wished to discuss with me the matter about which he had talked with Mr. Henderson yesterday,⁵¹ namely, the Yugoslav note protesting against the alleged persecution of the Yugoslav "minority" in "Aegean Macedonia". I said to the Ambassador that Mr. Henderson had reported to me his conversation fully and in detail, and that I had carefully studied the pertinent documents. The Ambassador said that he did not like to use strong language, but that the interference of the Yugoslav Government in Greek affairs was absolutely inadmissible, and that the use by the Yugoslav Government of the term "Aegean Macedonia" seemed especially significant and disturbing. The Ambassador said that he had been instructed to call on me and to ask my advice as to the position the Greek Government should take in this situation. A similar request was being addressed to the British Government and the Greek Foreign Minister had indicated that no answer would be made to the Yugoslav note until the advice of both the American and British Governments had been received.

I said to the Ambassador that I had referred this question to the Secretary of State in Potsdam⁵² as it might well be considered in connection with the discussion of similar problems which were likely to arise at that meeting, and that, in view of this action, I did not feel that for the present I should attempt to advise the Greek Government. I, therefore, hoped that the Ambassador would understand my withholding any comment for the present. The Ambassador said that he fully understood.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

⁵¹ For memorandum of conversations, actually held July 25, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1071.

⁵² Reported in telegram 117, July 24, *ibid.*, p. 1065; see *ibid.*, p. 1073, for telegram Victory 392, July 28, from Babelsberg, Germany, in which the Secretary of State endorsed, with qualifications, certain proposals advanced by the Department in its telegram 117. The new policy was set forth in telegram 220, July 28, 10 p. m., to Belgrade, *infra*.

740.0011 EW/7-2045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz)*⁵³

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1945—10 p. m.

220. Your tels 295 and 300, July 20 and 21. Please inform Foreign Office, with reference to its communications of July 18 and 19, that the United States Government has given most urgent consideration to the views of the Yugoslav Government in regard to the situation described in those communications and welcomes the implication contained in the communication from the Yugoslav Government of July 18 that the matter should be resolved on an amicable basis in accordance with the principles of international law. The United States Government is prepared to recommend the appointment of a commission composed of military and political representatives drawn from the present staffs of the American, British and Soviet missions in Belgrade and the American and British missions in Athens to investigate charges of violations by the Greek Government in Greek Macedonia of the principles of international law laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration by United Nations and the Charter of the United Nations and to submit recommendations for acceptance by the two governments concerned. It would be necessary for the Soviet Government to appoint a special group to collaborate with the group drawn from the American and British missions in Athens. The Government of the United States is consequently inquiring of the British and Soviet Governments whether they would be disposed to join with the United States in this manner and will communicate further with the Yugoslav Government in the premises in due course.

Meanwhile, the United States Government expects that neither the Yugoslav Government nor the Greek Government, which is being similarly informed, will take any unilateral action which might further complicate the situation.

Sent to Belgrade and repeated to Athens.

GREW

⁵³ Repeated to Athens as telegram 755. In telegram 754, July 28, 1945, the Department instructed the Ambassador in Greece to inform the Greek Government of the contents of this note (760H.68/7-2345). Repeated in substance on July 31 in telegrams 1710 to Moscow and 6375 to London, with instruction that "US Govt will accordingly appreciate indication by Govt to which you are accredited as to whether that Govt is prepared to collaborate with US Govt in conducting such investigation and making recommendations to Yugo and Greek Govts. It would, of course, be necessary for Soviet Govt to appoint special group to collaborate with group drawn from US and Brit missions in Athens. . . . For your info this matter was submitted to SecState at Potsdam and he concurs in this course of action . . ." (868.00/7-3145) The Secretary of State was informed of this course of action in telegram 167, July 31, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1076.

760H.68/8-145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 1, 1945— 6 p. m.

[Received August 2—9:30 a. m.]

781. Your telegram 754, July 28.⁵⁴ I communicated to Prime Minister yesterday Dept's reply Yugoslav Govt. He made no comment pending possible direct reply my telegram 742, July 23. Meanwhile, according Caccia British Chargé Affaires, no reply that connection received yet from London. However Caccia reports conversation with Tsamados Greek Under Minister Foreign Office according to which Greek Govt anxious not raise "Macedonian question" and believes Yugoslav Athens note probably due instructions following Tito-Stevenson⁵⁵ conversation (Belgrade's telegram 305, July 21⁵⁶) and "unorthodox style" possible result inexperience Yugo Secretary now Acting Chief Mission here. If these beliefs correct Tsamados said would be inclined suggest Greek Yugo Govts settle matter between selves possibly after arrival here new Yugo Minister who should be briefed with full details allegations his Govt desires make. However, while ready investigate alleged border incidents and discuss disposal Greek nationals who may have fled Yugo, Greek Govt would wish make clear in advance impossible agree any foreign Govt has right intervene concerning Greek nationals.

Above appears indicate may be unnecessary place present question high international level at least so far as concerns Greece. Regarding alleged border incidents British investigating and British Acting Consul Gen Salonika reports only three of six places mentioned Yugo's note July 21 addressed Allied Missions Belgrade can be identified and seriousness can be judged by "the fact that no tank can approach within five miles junction Bulgar Yugo Greek frontiers and that only Greek detachment near Jevdjeli is stationed at Evzonio (Metsikovon) and not issued with mortars".

Regarding accusations persecution Slavophiles in Greek Macedonia and exodus refugees Yugo, Caccia states "facts as known to us are that the numbers do not exceed about 5,000 including elements ELAS. Owing absence strict Greek frontier control due shortage Greek troops and *Gendarmerie* there has been no check individual movements into Yugo and difficult arrive correct figure. On other hand there is evidence armed bands crossing into Greece from Yugo and the two main bands so far identified are reported about 100 strong". Recommend Dept refer enclosure my despatch 1346, July

⁵⁴ See footnote 53, p. 331.⁵⁵ Sir Ralph C. S. Stevenson, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ Not printed.

24⁵⁷ made by American officer on spot. This officer now again Greek Macedonia with instructions continue reporting this subject.

MACVEAGH

760H.68/8-245

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)*⁵⁸

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Mr. Kohler (NE)
Mr. Baxter (NE)

Under instructions from Mr. Henderson, who was occupied with the Saudi Arabs, I asked the Greek Ambassador to call this morning in order that I might bring him up to date on developments resulting from recent Yugoslav notes of protest to the U.S. Government and the Greek Government charging violations of international law by the Greek Government in Macedonia.

I informed the Ambassador of the two Yugoslav notes, dated July 18 and July 19, presented to our Embassy in Belgrade, protesting the persecution by the Greek Government of "Yugoslav conationals in Aegean Macedonia." This whole question had been brought to the attention of the Secretary of State at Potsdam but had not been taken up there for discussion. Yesterday, however, the American Ambassadors in London and Moscow were instructed to approach the British and Russian Foreign Offices with the suggestion that a tripartite mission made up of American, British and Russian personnel from the diplomatic missions in Belgrade and Athens be empowered to conduct investigations in Greek Macedonia to discover whether, as alleged, there had been violations of the "principles of international law as laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration, and the Charter of the United Nations." Simultaneously the Yugoslav and Greek Governments are being informed of the action taken and are being told that until answers are forthcoming from the British and Soviet Governments we hope no further steps will be taken to complicate the situation.

I pointed out to the Greek Ambassador that our action had been prompted by a desire to promote international order and to assist whenever possible in alleviating situations which might result in breaches of the peace. Our willingness to investigate charges relating to Greek Macedonia (which we noted had been referred to as "Aegean

⁵⁷ *Conference of Berlin (Postdam)*, vol. II, p. 1068.

⁵⁸ Drafted by William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

Macedonia" by the Yugoslavs) does not imply that we think that section of the country any less a part of the Greek nation than other sections; nor does it imply that this Government considers that Yugoslavia has any more legitimate right to interest itself in Greek nationals of Slavic blood than in Greek nationals of purely Hellenic descent.

The Ambassador said that he appreciated our attitude, realizing that our interest was one of maintaining international peace and not dictated by a preconceived notion that the Greek Government had in fact been guilty of any irregularities. He pointed out that any answer which the Greek Government might make to the Yugoslav note would of necessity take cognizance of and protest against the Yugoslav use of the phrases "Aegean Macedonia" and "Yugoslav conationals"—terminology which implies a special Yugoslav interest in Greek territory and Greek citizens incompatible with the sovereignty of the Greek nation. In view of the fact that the Greek reply, even though it expressed complete willingness to have an investigation of conditions in Macedonia, would include elements which might be considered contentious and which might aggravate the situation, the Ambassador felt that he must insist again on a definite reply to the request of his Government for our advice as to whether and how the Yugoslav note should be answered.

I told the Ambassador that I could give him no recommendation at this time but would see that the repetition of his request was referred to the proper quarters.

768.75/8-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 2, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received August 3—7: 15 a. m.]

791. Assistant Military Attaché sent Jannina by me for objective investigation situation Albanian border reports as follows:

1. Greek authorities Jannina state 150 Greeks imprisoned northern Epirus, 220 families obliged abandon homes move northward, 27 individuals killed, 2,850 refugees Greece. Last figure can be regarded approximately correct.

2. Reliable reports state Enver Hodja visited Argyrokastron July 15 instructing local officials propagandize against annexation Greece. Meanwhile Albanian military units moved southward and all males conscripted (British military report July 26 states 2 battalions Albanian partisans advanced into areas Argyrokastron, Delvino, Libohova and all men ages 16 to 60 being conscripted regardless religion or race).

3. Evidence Greek side frontier indicates reported persecution Greeks by Albanians is on political rather than racial basis and Greek Communists in Albania unmolested. (This may be particular interest Department) Indiscriminate conscription all males including Greeks and subsequent transfer interior Albania also partly responsible these reports.

4. No Greek troops allowed within 5 miles Albanian frontier without extraordinary permission. No recent Greek-Albanian border clashes; only reported incidents occasional exchange shots Greek territory with Albanian irregular bands apparently seeking plunder. Responsible British military sources confident Greeks will take no unilateral action and regard Albanian military movements as purely defensive. Complete report follows air mail.⁵⁹

MACVEAGH

868.00/8-845

The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Gore-Booth) to the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Barbour)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1945.

DEAR MR. BARBOUR: I enclose herewith a paraphrase of a telegram dated August 6th from the Foreign Office to this Embassy, suggesting that the proposed Three Power Commission of investigation into alleged persecution of Slavs in Greek Macedonia be widened to a Four Power Commission to include the French.⁶⁰

I shall be glad to learn whether this suggestion commends itself to the Department, and also your views regarding a clear definition of the terms of reference, the necessity of which is mentioned in paragraph 3.

Yours sincerely,

P. H. GORE-BOOTH

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
DATED AUGUST 6, 1945

I agree that we need not insist on procedure suggested by which an appeal would be made to the five Great Powers under Moscow declaration⁶¹ and United Nations' Charter. I feel strongly however

⁵⁹ Copy transmitted in despatch 1377, August 3; not printed.

⁶⁰ The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) reported the gist of this suggestion by the British Government, in his telegram 7970, August 8, 7 p. m. (868.00/8-845).

⁶¹ Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, Annex I to Secret Protocol, signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 755.

that any Allied Commission should include the French as well as the Americans, ourselves and the Russians. This is a matter with which the French should be concerned and it would moreover be anomalous if we did not consult them on this question after they have agreed to share in supervising of the Greek elections.⁶² I hope therefore that the United States Government will agree to extend their proposed Three Power Commission to include the French. Although their proposal has already been put to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments, I see no reason why it should not be revised in this sense.

If the United States Government agree with this view, instructions could then be sent to His Majesty's Representative in Athens to concert an approach to the Greek Government with his United States colleague on the lines suggested in your telegram of August 2nd substituting Four Power for Three Power Commission of investigation.

If the Soviet Government agree to take part in the Commission, it is essential that the Commission's terms of reference should be clearly defined. The Soviet Representative may otherwise try to bring in such questions as the character of the present Greek Regime and the territorial issues, i.e. the Yugoslav claims on Greek Macedonia. I suggest that the terms of reference proposed in paragraph 5 of our telegram of July 25th might be suitable. The Commission would thus be instructed to ascertain the facts and to enquire into the allegations that Greek citizens had fled into Yugoslavia and to arrange for their return. If necessary it might discuss exchange of populations so as to eliminate "minorities" in both countries.

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1945.

868.00/8-1045

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Ref. 1610/ /45

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On August 8th His Majesty's Embassy transmitted to the State Department a paraphrase of a telegram dated August 6th from the Foreign Office to Washington suggesting that the proposed Three-Power Commission of investigation into alleged persecution of Slavs in Greek Macedonia should be widened to a Four-Power Commission to include the French. In the covering letter the observations of the Department were invited.

⁶² See pp. 98 ff.

2. A telegram has now been received from the Foreign Office expressing the hope that an early reply from the State Department will be forthcoming as Mr. Bevin would like to be able to refer to this step when Parliament meets. He therefore hopes that by August 16th or thereabouts the procedure will have been agreed upon and an invitation issued to the French.

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1945.

868.00/8-1045

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

With reference to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of August 10, 1945 (reference 1610/ /45) and previous correspondence referred to therein suggesting that the proposed Three-Power Commission to investigate alleged Greek violations in Macedonia of the principles of international law laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration by United Nations and the Charter of United Nations and to submit recommendations for acceptance by the Yugoslav and Greek Governments be widened to a Four-Power Commission to include the French, the Department of State is now instructing the United States Embassy in Paris to inquire whether the French Government is prepared to join in this proposed undertaking.⁶³ At the same time the Department of State is instructing the American Embassies at Moscow, Belgrade, and Athens⁶⁴ to inform the Soviet, Yugoslav and Greek Governments of the approach it is making to the French Government in the matter.

As regards the British Government's further suggestion that the Commission's terms of reference should be clearly defined, the Department of State is in accord with this view but believes that specific definition beyond the limitation that the Commission's work would be confined to investigating violations of the three documents above mentioned and to making recommendations to the two governments concerned might well await agreement by the powers to participate in principle.

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1945.

⁶³ Telegram 3829, August 13, 1945, 7 p. m., to Paris, not printed. It conveyed substantially the same message as that to London and Moscow on July 31; see footnote 53, p. 331.

⁶⁴ Telegrams 1818, 243, and 814, August 13, 1945, respectively; none printed; Ambassador Winant was similarly informed in telegram 6865, August 13, 1945, 7 p. m., to London, not printed.

740.00119 Council/8-1445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Mr. Henderson
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to discuss current matters.

He read to us a telegram from his Government expressing its "painful surprise and profound disappointment on the exclusion of Greece from taking part in the peace negotiations for Italy." (At our request the Ambassador incorporated the contents of this telegram in the attached memorandum).⁶⁵

The Ambassador said that he had fully reported to his Government the information given him by Mr. George Allen⁶⁶ and that contained in President Truman's radio address on August 9⁶⁷ to the effect that interested Governments other than the members of the Five Power Council of Foreign Ministers would be fully consulted in connection with the work of the Council.⁶⁸ He therefore wished to emphasize that his Government's position was that in the case of drawing up of the peace treaty with Italy Greece was entitled to participate fully from the very beginning.

Mr. Henderson said that he would communicate these views of the Greek Government to the appropriate higher officers of the Department.

⁶⁵ Not printed. In this memorandum 2755/3, the Greek Government believed that its contribution in the war against Italy fully justified its participation in these negotiations. (For documentation regarding the Italian invasion of Greece in 1940, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 542 ff.) The Greek victories and later enormous sacrifices and destruction were recalled, and the hope was expressed that the high ideals fought for by all the United Nations would not become meaningless words or that their sacrifices would be in vain.

⁶⁶ George V. Allen, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. Mr. Allen had also served as Political Adviser on the United States delegation to the just-terminated Potsdam Conference.

⁶⁷ Text in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 12, 1945, p. 208.

⁶⁸ In a memorandum of August 27, 1945, the Division of Southern European Affairs informed the Division of Near Eastern Affairs that "We have assumed that the decision taken at Potsdam to refer the drafting of the Italian peace treaty to the Council of Foreign Ministers and to provide full consultation with the smaller powers on questions of direct interest to them was reached after consideration was also given to the possibility of a conference with the full participation of all interested powers. In fact, it can be assumed that the American proposal for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers was made to avoid general conferences on European peace treaties". (740.00119-Council/8-1445) The newly-established Council of Foreign Ministers was to have its first session at London in September. For documentation regarding this meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff. For decision at Potsdam referring preparation of a peace treaty with Italy to the Council of Foreign Ministers, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1509.

768.75/8-1445

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
 Mr. Henderson
 Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called at his request to discuss current matters.

The Ambassador said that he had received a telegram from his Government stating that it had been very hurt by the communication that Mr. Jacobs, American Political Representative in Albania, had questioned the accuracy of the information supplied by the Greek Government regarding the persecution of the Greek population in northern Epirus (southern Albania).⁶⁹ The Greek Government felt that it was evident that Mr. Jacobs had made a most cursory examination of the question, without investigating the specific cases cited by the Greek Government and that he had been tricked by Hoxha. It seemed clear to the Greek Government that Hoxha would not have allowed anything to happen during a tour of the American Political Representative, whatever may have happened before and after that tour. The Greek Government also felt impelled to recall that it had previously drawn our attention to a public statement of Mr. Jacobs evidencing a pro-Albanian bias.⁷⁰

868.00/8-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 22, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 2: 14 p. m.]

5075. Reference to Department's telegram number 3829 August 13.⁷¹ The following note has been received from the Foreign Office:

"In answer to note 712 regarding the grievances set forth by the Yugoslav Government against the Hellenic Government in reason of the latter's attitude in the Greek regions of Macedonia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has the honor to state that the French Govern-

⁶⁹ See telegram 711, July 19, 7 p. m., to Athens, p. 323.

⁷⁰ The Greek Embassy on August 22 transmitted to the Department note 2803 (not printed) in further pursuance of this subject (768.75/8-2245).

⁷¹ See footnote 63, p. 337.

ment is disposed to participate for the purposes according to the procedure, indicated in a commission of inquiry which the Government of the United States proposes to form, and which would comprise political and military representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union.

The chiefs of the French [missions?] at Belgrade and Athens are receiving instructions to enter into contact with their American colleagues and at the appropriate time with the British and Soviet representatives."

Sent to Department, repeated to Athens 20 London 612 and Moscow 290.

FULLERTON

860H.00/8-2645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, August 26, 1945.

[Received 2:30 p. m.]

403. Following note received from Foreign Office dated August 25:

"The Govt of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia accept the proposal of the Govt of the United States of America as in the above-mentioned notes.

The Govt of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia consider it necessary to point out that all the four great Allies—the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France—should participate in the investigation, as it is in their unanimous conclusions that the Govt of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia would see full guarantee for an objective dealing with the problem.

Owing to the fact that the incidents in question represent part of concrete expressions of the Greek monarcho-fascist terror upon the Slav population in Aegean Macedonia, the Govt of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia are able to accept the proposed investigation if as its main task is fixed the investigation into the terror of Greek monarcho-fascists upon the Slav population in Aegean Macedonia."

SHANTZ

760H.68/8-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, August 28, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received August 29—12:30 p. m.]

933. My telegram 781, August 1. Report on conditions Slav population Greek Macedonia prepared by Assistant Military Attaché sent

area specially to investigate this subject being forwarded airmail.⁷² Conclusions this report emphatically do not substantiate "fascist terror" exerted against Slav population which Yugoslav Govt now treating as fact to be investigated instead of allegation to be proved (Belgrade's unnumbered telegram August 25).⁷³

MACVEAGH

868.00/9-245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

BELGRADE, September 2, 1945.

[Received September 3—12: 10 a. m.]

427. Following statement was issued by Tanjug August 30 and published in *Politica* August 31:

"The reign of terror imposed upon the Slavic inhabitants of Aegean Macedonia by Greek Monarcho-Fascists and incidents on the Yugoslav Greek border which were provoked by Greek soldiers and Fascists bands, former collaborationists of the occupier, have left a deep impression on our entire public. This impression became deeper as the incidents became more numerous and as the reign of terror increased in intensity and grew wider in scope.

It is understandable that our Government could not remain indifferent to the events occurring on the border and the suffering which our compatriots on the other side of the border are still enduring. For this reason it informed our great Allies regarding this matter and at the same time called these disturbing conditions to the attention of the Greek Government.

That our great Allies correctly understand the concern of our Government may be seen from the fact that the Government of the United

⁷² Despatch 1453, August 28, 1945, from Athens, not printed. The report by Captain William McNeill gave a lengthy historical review and report on racial conflicts in Macedonia and concluded:

"Yugoslav accusations of 'Fascist terror' in Greek Macedonia seem hardly to be borne out by the facts. There is bad feeling between Greeks and Slavs, and the peasants of Western Macedonia are apprehensive and generally unwilling or afraid to cooperate with Greek Government authorities. But it appears that the local Greek officials are, for the moment at least, pursuing an inoffensive policy toward the Slavs; whereas it is the Slavic population who are rather taking the offensive by means of the armed bands.

The counter measures taken by Greek and British forces will perhaps hamper the free movement of guerilla bands; but from the wild and mountainous nature of the country, it will certainly not be possible to eradicate them. As long as Yugoslavia wishes to stir up trouble in Greek Macedonia, and Yugoslav officials are willing to give occasional shelter and succor to the bands, they will continue to be able to operate in the hills of Greek Macedonia, and one may expect continued nervousness among the peasants, occasional murders, sudden ambushes, and petty sabotage in the countryside."

⁷³ Probably a reference to telegram 403, August 26, from Belgrade, *supra*.

States proposed the creation of two committees of investigation which would include Allied representatives in Belgrade and Athens and which would have the duty of investigating both the border incidents and our charges regarding all forms of violence perpetrated against the Slavic inhabitants of Aegean Macedonia. Certain that the facts it has cited to the Allies are irrefutable, our Government has expressed the desire to have all the four great Allies—the Soviet Union, America, Great Britain and France—represented on these commissions because it regards their resulting opinion as the greatest guarantee for the objective investigation of this problem. It has particularly emphasized that it can agree to an investigation only if the main purpose of such an investigation were the question of the reign of terror which the Greek Monarcho-Fascists are still imposing on our compatriots in Aegean Macedonia.”

SHANTZ

760H.68/9-845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, September 8, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received September 10—3:25 p. m.]

990. Mytel 781, August 1, and despatch 1380, August 3.⁷⁴ Replying my note re Dept's proposals to Yugoslav Govt for international investigation latter's charges anti-Slav persecution Greek Macedonia Foreign Minister ⁷⁵ has now stated in formal note dated September 3, but received yesterday, that Greek Govt "ready subscribe initiative US Govt" but adds "considers that it goes without saying that mandate of commission in question will not be limited to Greek Macedonia but will equally extend to Serbian Macedonia. It is evident that without this extension the inquiry could not be complete and its conclusions would risk being defective".

On my inquiring this morning what this means, Politis explained verbally Greek Govt, bearing in mind Yugoslav allegations re thousands Greek refugees fleeing persecution, feels investigation should include who these thousands Greeks are (if they exist) and true reasons their migration. Said Greek Govt also has information hostages taken by EAM now in camps Serbian Macedonia and this added reason investigation that region desirable. Promised send me confirming letter repeating to Greek Ambassador Washington who already sent

⁷⁴ Despatch 1380 not printed.

⁷⁵ John Politis.

substance note in question.⁷⁶ Despatch will follow with full texts.⁷⁷ Politis emphasized matter one of interpretation and not opposition our friendly proposals.

Sent Dept as No. 990, repeated Moscow as No. 7, London as No. 95, Paris as No. 10 and Belgrade.

MACVEAGH

868.00/8-845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1945—5 p. m.

1988. Deptels 1710, July 31 and 1818, Aug. 13.⁷⁸ Please inform FonOff that Dept has now received replies from French and Brit Govts agreeing to participate in appointing proposed commission and that Dept will appreciate an early expression of Soviet views in matter.

ACHESON

768.75/9-1845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the American Acting Representative in Albania (Fultz)

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1945—8 p. m.

85. Greek Ambassador Diamantopoulos interviewed Jacobs concerning alleged mistreatment of Greek minority in Albania. Jacobs stated in substance that during his stay in Albania neither he nor Brigadier Hodgson, who made special trip to investigate situation of Greek minority, found anything to substantiate such allegations. Jacobs mentioned meeting with many Chamerian refugees driven

⁷⁶ Memorandum 3430, dated September 12, 1945, from the Greek Embassy, not printed, contained these points: 1. The Commission which might be sent to inquire into the situation prevailing in the boundary area between Greece and Yugoslavia should surely include an investigation of the border in Yugoslavia and not only in Greece. 2. The Commission should verify Tito's assertion that the flight of refugees was because of terror in Greece by interrogation by refugees and by finding out from them why they had crossed the boundary. 3. The Greek government had information that hostages taken by Greek Communists in the December uprising were being held in three concentration camps in Yugoslavia and Albania. The Commission must necessarily find out that these persons were not in reality refugees, and it should obtain their release and freedom.

⁷⁷ Copy forwarded with despatch 1518, September 12, 1945, from Athens, not printed.

⁷⁸ See footnote 53, p. 331, and footnote 64, p. 337, respectively.

from Greece, to which the Ambassador replied that they were Moslems who had collaborated with Italians and Germans and Greece had got rid of them. If Greek radio should publicize interview in any way at variance with foregoing you are authorized to inform Hoxha what Jacobs told the Ambassador as indicated above.

Sent to Tirana, repeated to Athens.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/9-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1945—7 p. m.

8253. Secdel 87.⁸⁰ Greek Amb called Dept Sept 18 presenting note⁸¹ bitterly protesting Greek exclusion from Italian peace discussions. Note points out Greek Govts previously expressed dissatisfaction with Potsdam decision limiting participants to Five Powers, and states invitations to all states engaged in operations against Italy, except Greece and Ethiopia, have deepened Greek disillusionment and resentment. Explanations given in the press do not justify exclusion of Greece, which was at one time only ally victorious against Italy and which both as belligerent and as Adriatic power has stronger interest in Italian settlement than attaches merely to Dodecanese question. Instead of protesting directly to Council, Greek Govt prefers application to US and UK Govts, hoping they will take "initiative to restore Greece to its rightful place among her Allies". The Ambassador stated orally that the Greeks could not understand why Greece had not been invited at least to submit to Great Powers a memorandum setting forth Greek views on subject of Italian peace.

Any pertinent information you care to transmit, either for Depts confidential background or for communication to Greek Amb, concerning reasons for non-inclusion at this time of Greece will be appreciated. Also indications of methods by which Greek interests in Italian settlement will be taken care of in future.

Full text Greek note being forwarded airmail. Sent to London: Repeated to Athens.

ACHESON

⁸⁰ Telegram 87 for Secretary Byrnes, at London for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting.

⁸¹ Note 3505, not printed.

740.00119 Council/9-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 23, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received September 23—8: 16 p. m.]

9869. For Acheson from Secretary Byrnes. Reference your 8253 Sept 20 (Secdel 87, Sept 20). You can inform Greek Ambassadors that no Govt had a representative participating in the discussions as to Italian treaty except the Govts represented on the Council. A hearing was granted to Govts that claim an interest in the settlement of the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia but these witnesses were not permitted to participate in any discussion of the Council. Greece will be invited to file a statement in writing setting forth any views it may have as to all parts of the Italian treaty. [Byrnes.]

WINANT

760H.68/10-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 3, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received October 4—5: 34 p. m.]

1119. See my despatch 1518, Sept 12.⁸² In strictly confidential note, Foreign Office states that according recent information 700 Greek hostages taken by EAM are now in Albanian concentration camp at Lesh (Alessio) 20 kilometers from Skutari. Note requests US Mission Tirana undertake rapid and secret investigation to uncover this camp which Hoxha has been able conceal till now and would immediately move elsewhere at first alert exposing inmates grave dangers. Note concludes: "The Royal Minister deems that this question is so closely related to the basic moral principles of the United Nations that nothing should be neglected which might aid in finding traces of those who have disappeared and putting an end to an intolerable abuse."

Sent Dept as 1119 for such instructions as deemed advisable to Tirana and repeated Tirana for information.

MACVEAGH

⁸² Not printed.

868.00/10-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, October 10, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received October 11—5 p. m.]

1147. Department's telegram 989 September 23 [20].⁸³ Note received today from Foreign Office stating that Greek Government while appreciating friendly interest Allies is not yet in position make decision re Allied desire some form resumption diplomatic relations Greece-Italy.

Briefly summarized, note:

(1) Emphasizes vivid Greek memories brutal Italian aggression; (2) points out Greece showed generosity towards Italian occupation forces at time Italy's collapse, but only relief from moral and material hardship can now assuage Greek people and this not yet forthcoming; (3) adds Foreign Minister Council in London⁸⁴ settled neither of territorial problems (Dodecanese and Epirus) for which Greece holds Italy responsible and adds reasons for holding such settlement in abeyance "hard for Greek people to understand"; (4) calls attention enormous property damage inflicted Greece by Italians and alleges reports Greece would present account caused "storm of protest" not only from Italy but Allies as well; (5) ends by stating Italy continues to enforce war measures on Greeks in Italy while demanding improved living conditions for Italians in Greece which still bleeding from Italian-inflicted wounds.

Copy of text forwarded airmail.⁸⁵

MACVEAGH

760H.68/10-345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Albania (Jacobs)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1945—3 p. m.

100. Athens' 1119 Oct 3 sent to Dept and repeated to Tirana for information. Reference is made to Greek FonOff note regarding Greek hostages allegedly held in Albanian concentration camp at Lesh. Dept would like you to report in this connection any further informa-

⁸³ Not printed. Reporting, at the request of the Department, on the problem of Italians being deported from Greece, Ambassador MacVeagh in his telegram 884, August 21, 1945, 7 p. m., recommended that "In view current discussions resumption Greek-Italian relations best solution might be joint Allied recommendation to Greece and Italy for direct settlement, suggesting desirability observe humanitarian principles and avoid added rancors prejudicial future relations." (868.00/8-2145) The Department had undertaken such a *démarche* to the Greek and Italian Governments in the telegraphic instruction under reference (repeated to Rome as telegram 1627) (868.00/9-745).

⁸⁴ For documentation regarding the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, September 11-October 2, see vol. II, p. 99 ff.

⁸⁵ Copy transmitted in despatch 1689, October 11, not printed.

tion which may have come to your attention since your last report (your despatch 87 Sep 7⁸⁶) and any pertinent evidence which you may be able to obtain by investigation or through trustworthy sources without embarrassing Mission in any way.⁸⁷

Sent to Tirana; repeated to Athens.

BYRNES

875.01/10-1745

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1945.

I called the Greek Ambassador and, with reference to our conversation yesterday on the above subject,⁸⁸ told him that I had consulted the appropriate officers of the Department with the result that we planned to notify him in advance of public announcement regarding any decision we might reach concerning the extension of recognition to the Hoxha regime in Albania. I added that all I could say at the moment was that the question was under serious consideration in consultation with the Allied Powers.

The Ambassador thanked me for this action and information.

868.014/10-1945

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

The Greek Ambassador called this morning and said he had been informed by an Allied Diplomatic Mission here (obviously British) that the prospective recognition of the Hoxha Régime in Albania would not in any sense involve any question of Albania's frontiers.⁸⁹ The Ambassador was drafting a telegram on this subject and desired to be assured that this Government took the same position.

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ In his telegram 218, December 7, 1945, 4 p. m., Mr. Jacobs reported: "Deptel 100, October 17, 3 p. m. Unable obtain additional information concerning Greek hostages allegedly held Albanian concentration camp but will continue efforts. Repeated to Athens as 7." (760H.68/12-745)

⁸⁸ On the previous day the Greek Ambassador had called at his request to inform the Department of his hope that he would be given ample prior notification of any decision taken by the United States Government to recognize the Hoxha regime in Albania, expressing his opinion "that Greece as an Ally with a special interest in Albania was entitled to ask for and to receive such prior notice"; memorandum of conversation of October 17 not printed (875.01/10-1745).

⁸⁹ For exchange between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding this subject, within the context of the over-all question of the recognition of the Hoxha regime, see vol. iv, pp. 67-69.

After checking with SE, I told him that if the Hoxha Régime were recognized, no question of frontiers would be involved in any way.

865.014/10-1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Under Secretary
Mr. Kohler (NE)

The Greek Ambassador called at his request. He handed to Mr. Acheson the attached undated memorandum⁹⁰ setting forth the claim of the Greek Government for the return of the Island of Saseno to Greek sovereignty and its argumentation that the allocation of the island should not be considered a part of the Italian settlement but should be considered as a Greek claim against Albania to be considered in connection with the question of Northern Epirus.

In this connection the Ambassador referred to a report from London published in the *New York Times* of Sunday, September 23, 1945, purporting to contain instructions to the American delegation in London stating, *inter alia*, that the Island of Saseno should go to Albania.⁹¹

740.00119 EW/10-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Under Secretary
Mr. Kohler

The Greek Ambassador called at his request. He referred to the press despatch from Sofia published in the *Washington Daily News* of October 16 purporting to give the terms of the U.S. peace proposals for Bulgaria about which the Secretary was questioned in his press conference on October 17. The Ambassador said that the Secretary's reply on that occasion made it clear that certain U.S. proposals

⁹⁰ Not printed.

⁹¹ For documentation concerning this subject, see vol. IV, pp. 55-60, *passim*.

were put forward at London.⁹² Emphasizing the vital importance of this question for Greece, he said he felt that he was entitled to ask, in the name, though not under the specific instructions, of his Government, that a copy of these American proposals be made available to the Greek Government. He added that they would of course be kept as confidential as we might desire.

Mr. Acheson told the Ambassador that he could give him no information on this subject but would see that his request came to the attention of the Secretary.⁹³

768.75/10-2645

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

No. 1735

ATHENS, October 26, 1945.

[Received November 19.]

SIR: Pursuant to my despatches Nos. 1279 and 1327 of July 6 and 14⁹⁴ transmitting memoranda from the Hellenic Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the alleged persecution of the Greek population of southern Albania and requesting Allied intervention in this area, I now have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a further note from the Foreign Ministry on this subject.⁹⁵

The note is accompanied by a list of 109 families, including over 393 persons, who have allegedly been deported under cruel conditions to concentration camps at Krouya, Kouksi, Alession and elsewhere in northern Albania from 45 different southern Albanian villages. The note concludes with a pressing appeal for American intervention

⁹²At its 16th meeting, September 21, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the provisions for a peace treaty with Bulgaria proposed by the Soviet Union on September 12, by the United Kingdom on September 17, and by the United States on September 19, and certain decisions of principle were reached. For the agreed record of decisions of the Council at this meeting, see vol. II, p. 298; see also the American minutes of this meeting, *ibid.*, pp. 300-310.

⁹³The Under Secretary of State did this in a memorandum of October 20, not printed. The Under Secretary on November 1 approved the course of action proposed in a memorandum of November 1, 1945, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) which recommended: "Since it has been decided not to make available to the Greek Ambassador a copy of the United States proposal for a peaceful settlement with Bulgaria, I would suggest the following line in replying to the Ambassador's request of October 20 [19?]. It might be explained to him that these proposals were of a preliminary and exploratory character and that, as they were tabled at the Council of Foreign Ministers and are therefore a matter for further consideration by the Allied Governments represented at the Council, no useful purpose would appear to be served in giving them wider distribution during their present inconclusive status." (740.00119 EW/10-1745)

⁹⁴Neither printed; but see telegram 707, July 14, 1 p. m., from Athens, p. 321.

⁹⁵Memoranda and note not printed.

to effect the liberation of these persons and to put an end to such "intolerable abuse".

In this connection, the Department may consider that the mass of "evidence" progressively collected by the Greek authorities has become too imposing to be lightly considered, and that a motor trip by an American official along the Greek border several months ago and the assurances of the Hoxha "Government" that there is no persecution of the Greek element in Albania are hardly sufficient to warrant a summary dismissal of charges to which a little knowledge of Balkan history and psychology would give plenty of *prima facie* support.

Respectfully yours,

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

875.01/11-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 1, 1945.

The Greek Ambassador left me the attached memorandum⁹⁶ this afternoon expressing the astonishment and concern of the Greek Government at information received by it to the effect that the American Government is planning to recognize the Albanian Government of Enver Hoxza. The Ambassador stated orally that Greece has never been in so much danger as a nation as it is at the present time. The present Albanian Government, he says, is merely a tool of Tito and the recognition of that Government would serve to strengthen the framework built around Greece by Tito which is threatening the life of that country.

He asked me if I could tell him whether the United States is actually planning to recognize the Hoxza Government and if so what, if any, are the conditions being imposed for the granting of recognition. Is the Hoxza Government, for instance, permitted to hold free elections?

I told the Ambassador that I was not in a position to answer his questions; it was my understanding that the question of the recognition of the Hoxza regime was being given consideration; that I would inquire whether there was more information with regard to this matter which I might let him have and would give him the result of my inquiries in the immediate future.

The Ambassador said that any information which I could give him would be deeply appreciated since the Greek Government is anxiously awaiting news regarding the American attitude.

⁹⁶ Not printed. See bracketed note printed *infra*.

[The memorandum of November 1, 1945, from the Greek Embassy made it plain that the Greek Government failed to understand why the Allies showed sympathy for Albania to the point of considering recognition of the Hoxha regime. It was severely critical of the violence and terrorism of Hoxha's rule, and asserted that he was a prisoner and blind instrument of Tito. The encouragement that recognition would give Hoxha would only make him more arrogant, and would cause him to continue his policy so harmful to Greece. Such indication of favoritism to a belligerent would increase public indignation in Greece, and the Greek Government called the attention of the United States and the United Kingdom to the many unfortunate consequences that could result. The Greek people, who had given so much to the Allied cause, ought not to be made to feel that their enemies were faring better than themselves, and the Greek Government urged that the possibility of the recognition of Hoxha would be reconsidered in the light of these views.]

875.01/11-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 10, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 11—12: 40 p. m.]

1280. Press today reports Foreign Affairs Committee meeting at which Prime Minister ⁹⁷ communicated British Embassy note officially informing Govt proposed Allied recognition Albanian Govt. According reports Prime Minister drew particular attention British assurance such recognition would not "prejudice solution of pending questions" which concern Greece. Committee reportedly approved Govt decision lodge strong protest with Allies.

Press and public all shades opinion except extreme left, for once united. General note bitterness and indignation toward western Allies, most papers contrasting Albanian treachery with Greek sacrifices for Allied ideals, emphasizing Hellenism northern Epirus and protesting continued persecution Greek population by "pseudo govt of bandit Enver Hodja".

[Here follows report of comments in various Greek newspapers.]

MACVEAGH

⁹⁷ Panayotis Kanellopoulos.

875.01/11-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 12, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received November 14—2: 09 p. m.]

1287. Prime Minister called on me this morning. Said was receiving all yesterday angry delegations protesting provisional recognition Albania. Was able resist demands public meetings but said feels language American note⁹⁹ when known here sure excite increased bitterness. This connection read me contents note as received by him this morning praising alleged Albanian resistance Italy and part played by Albanians in expulsion Germans. Said every Greek who fought in Albania (including self) knows that whole battalions Albanians sided Italy against Greece and that it was not local resistance which forced Germans to retire. [Apparent garble] though he unadvised, can understand possible international reasons for recognition but indicated likelihood wave anti-US feeling this country already deeply disillusioned by preferences shown Italy and lack interest in claimed sufferings of Greek minority Albania. Said feels some good effect Greek opinion possible if US should add to prerequisites of recognition that must be satisfied not by assurances only that minorities properly treated.

MACVEAGH

[The Greek Government instructed its Embassy in Washington to report to the Department of State in a memorandum of November 17, 1945, the deep grief of both the Greek Government and nation over the United States note of November 10, which had indicated the readiness of the United States to commence diplomatic relations with the Hoxha regime in Albania. The oppressions and molestations of this regime against the Greek populace in Northern Epirus had already been given detailed description in many recent communications, and the Greek Government felt apprehensive especially now if the approaching elections in Northern Epirus should result in a false impression gaining ground of the true sentiments of the population there. Other points in the United States note had also aroused concern. The Greek Government in consequence would welcome receiving assurance from the United States that the proposed recognition, and the holding of elections, would in no way prejudice the claims of Greece to the territory of Northern Epirus.]

⁹⁹ Reference apparently is to note to Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha, published November 10, regarding the proposal of the United States to recognize his regime as the provisional government of Albania, vol. iv, p. 67. For statement to the Press by the Department of State on November 10, with text of note to the Hoxha government, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 11, 1945, p. 767.

868.00/11-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

ATHENS, November 19, 1945.

[Received November 19—11 : 20 p. m.]

1321. Crowds estimated by police at 30,000 participated yesterday mass meeting protesting recognition Albanian Govt and demanding Northern Epirus. Govt did not sponsor and was not officially represented at meeting which organized by North Epirote societies with support veterans and many other organizations. Chief speaker was Bishop of Argyrocastro who ended long fiery address with slogan: "Union or death". Other speakers represented Athens bar, veterans and nationalist workers organizations. Extreme Left officially abstained and extreme Right made no apparent effort exploit occasion. Crowd representing all classes society was orderly but appeared warmly sympathetic aims of demonstration and enthusiastically applauded speakers. Later small group 200 to 300 chiefly students demonstrated at this and British Embassies but without incident.

MACVEAGH

800.4016 DP/11-1445 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh)*¹

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1945—8 p. m.

1190. Pls inform FonOff that this Govt regrets that Greek Govt appears (urtel 1294, Nov 14²) to have given so little consideration to our recommendations re repatriation of Ital residents in Greece (Deptel 989, Sept 20³) and say that we would be grateful if FonOff could clarify present situation.

If situation outlined urtel under reference is confirmed you should say to FonOff that, while we are fully conscious of justified Greek feelings in this matter, it is this Govt's considered view that no lasting advantage will accrue to Greece if humanitarian principles are not observed and added rancors avoided. You should point out impossibility of UNRRA assuming burden of caring for deportees under existing regulations as well as difficulties which Allied officials in Italy would be called upon to meet, and state that this Govt hopes, if Greek Govt is determined to proceed with deportation of all Ital residents, to

¹ Reported in substance in airgram A-547, December 12, to Rome.

² Not printed; in it the Department had been informed of the steady deportation to Italy of pre-1940 Italian residents during the "past fortnight", and of reported Greek Foreign Office hostility to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Italy while the deportee question remained unsettled (800.4016-D.P./11-1445).

³ See footnote 83, p. 346.

have orderly procedure worked out in advance which would facilitate transfers and mitigate serious hardships arising from present procedure.

BYRNES

800.4016 DP/12-345 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*⁴

ATHENS, December 3, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 1:25 p. m.]

1399. Points raised Deptel 1190, November 26 taken up with Director General Foreign Office Melas who already advised by Exindaris, Rome of hostile Italian press comments and of note from Prunas Secretary General Italian Foreign Office, protesting deportations. Melas said Prunas fully aware his structures [*strictures?*] unfounded and charged his attitude characteristic of that Italian "bad faith" of which Greece has had such long and bitter experience.

Replying specific charges Melas said:

1. Greece does not propose mass expulsion all Italians but merely deport those here since January 1, 1938 (hence DPS (Displaced Persons) deportable by UNRRA) plus designated list about 3,600 previous residents guilty of anti-Greek activities during war and occupation.

2. This decision long since communicated Italian Government (Prunas) and Swiss Legation here (which informed listed persons) with warning measure would be executed first available transport and advance notice specific date impossible due lack shipping schedules. Prunas raised no objections.

3. Nevertheless local affected Italians made no preparations depart with result that of 300 rounded up Athens October 31 for November 1 sailing 144 pleaded unpreparedness and were not obliged depart by Greeks. Thus also illustrating falseness charge Greek callousness.

4. Deportees were treated with utmost consideration (though isolated "mistakes" always possible) and were allowed take all movable goods remaining effects being inventoried and sequestered but not "confiscated". Deportees were not searched despite Greek knowledge some carrying smuggled gold.

5. Deportees departed willingly convinced repatriation Italy best way avoid consequences war and build better future.

6. Deportees this month total about 1,400 ex-Patras and 156 ex-Athens.

Comment: Point 6 confirmed by Swiss and UNRRA. On remainder would say 3,600 "objectionable" pre-1938 Italians is in fact

⁴ Reported in substance in airgram A-547, December 12, to Rome.

very high percentage all Italian residents, estimated something over 4,800 (mytel 884, August 21.⁵) However, majority Italians here undoubtedly sided with their countrymen during unprovoked and brutal occupation. Embassy reliably informed police limitation on personal effects was one suitcase but two or three were often tolerated in fact. Controversy over details were [*will?*] doubtless continue but believe expressions interest by this Embassy and UNRRA may help insure humane attitude in future.

MACVEAGH

875.01/11-1745

The Department of State to the Greek Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Embassy's Memoranda no. 4082 of November 1 and no. 4418 of November 17, 1945,^{5a} communicating the views of the Greek Government regarding the proposal of the United States Government to recognize the existing Albanian regime as the provisional Government of Albania and requesting assurance that the contemplated recognition of the present Albanian administration by this Government does not in any way prejudice consideration of Greek claims to Southern Albania (Northern Epirus).

In connection with the statement by the Greek Government that it had "learned with astonishment of the impending recognition of the regime of Enver Hoxha, contrary to previous assurances", the United States Government has at no time given the Greek Government assurances in the sense implied above with regard to recognition of the existing Albanian authorities. The United States Government has never considered Albania an enemy state. As evidenced in the statements of the Secretary of State on December 10, 1942, and subsequent occasions,⁶ this Government recognized and supported the struggle of the Albanian people against the Axis forces of occupation and for the establishment of their independence. The decision of this Government with respect to recognition of the present Albanian regime was made after extensive and careful study of the question and after consultation with the other Governments signatory to the Crimea

⁵ See footnote 83, p. 346.

^{5a} Neither printed; but see bracketed notes, pp. 351 and 352, respectively.

⁶ Statements regarding Albania were made by the Secretary of State or the Department of State, as follows: December 10, 1942, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1942, p. 998; April 6, 1944, *ibid.*, April 8, 1944, p. 315; June 2, 1944, *ibid.*, June 3, 1944, p. 510; November 15, 1944, *ibid.*, November 19, 1944, p. 591; November 28, 1944, *ibid.*, December 3, 1944, p. 676. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in Albania, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 271 ff.

Declaration on Liberated Europe⁷ in a manner consistent with obligations assumed under that Declaration.

In response to the inquiry of the Greek Government regarding territorial issues, the United States Government assures the Greek Government that the United States proposal looking to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Albania in no way prejudices consideration of Greek claims in Southern Albania (Northern Epirus), claims which are considered as included among the "questions of an international character" referred to in the penultimate paragraph of the United States note to General Hoxha published on November 10, 1945. The United States Government also considers that the elections which were held in Albania on December 2, 1945, do not in any way prejudice consideration of Greek claims to this territory.

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1945.

[In its memorandum of December 15, 1945, the Greek Embassy carried out the instructions of the Greek Government by stating the desire of the Greek Government that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would reach any decision regarding Greek questions at the coming meeting in Moscow⁸ without a prior understanding with the Greek Government. This would be in accord with the assurances often given during the war. The Greek Government hoped to have the complete support of the United States and the United Kingdom for the rightful national claims of Greece; but it was now compelled to state that it could not feel itself bound by any decisions taken at Moscow which might not conform to the vital interests of Greece, nor would it be able to sign peace treaties which did not give full satisfaction of its just national claims.]

875.01/12-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1945.

Participants: Greek Ambassador
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Baxter (NE)

The Greek Ambassador called this afternoon, at his request and under urgent instructions from the Greek Government, to discuss

⁷ This refers to Section II of the "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference"; for text of the Yalta Protocol, February 11, 1945, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 975.

⁸ For documentation regarding the Conference at Moscow of the Secretary of State and the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, December 16-December 26, 1945, see vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

with Mr. Dunn Greek views on the serious consequences to Greece of the contemplated recognition of the Hoxha regime in Albania.

The Ambassador referred to previous memoranda on this subject, protesting against the contemplated recognition of a regime which the Greek Government considers unrepresentative and responsible for repressive measures against the Greek minority in Albania. Spontaneous public reaction in Greece has been most unfortunate and is causing the Greek Government a great deal of anxiety, particularly because it makes the Greek people feel that they are not being given proper consideration by the Great Powers.

According to information considered reliable by the Greek Government, the recent elections in Albania took place under conditions of violence and intimidation and for this reason the Greek Government feels compelled to declare once again that it is unable to recognize the results of Albanian elections, at least in so far as the district of Northern Epirus is concerned.

Mr. Dunn pointed out to the Ambassador that we had had a Mission in Albania for some months observing conditions and that according to their reports the recent elections were carried out in a manner satisfactory to us.

The Ambassador continued discussion of the Albanian question by stating that confidential information made it appear likely that the Albanian National Assembly soon after convening will pass a resolution which will in effect make Albania a part of the Federated Yugoslav Republic. If this should take place, the Greek Government will no longer feel constrained to follow the policy of the Great Powers, which aims at the restoration of Albanian independence. In 1944 Greece refused to discuss with Albanian leaders a proposal for union between Greece and Albania, considering that such action would be inimical to Allied policy. The Ambassador implied, however, that any formal confederation between Yugoslavia and Albania would result in a Greek demand for the partition of Albania and a union of Southern Albania with Greece.

In this connection the Ambassador further stated his personal feeling that Greece was being badly treated of late, mentioning the refusal of the Department to make available to the Greek Government its proposals for a peace settlement with Bulgaria, which, as reported in the press, contained decisions disposing of Greek territory. Mr. Dunn said he could understand the Greek feeling on this point but that on the other hand he was sure that Greek fears were unfounded. It has always been and still is the view of this Government that peace treaties should not be drawn up by the Great Powers and imposed upon the other Allied nations vitally concerned. It was on the question of procedure in drawing up peace treaties that the London Conference of Foreign Ministers broke down. The Secretary is now in

Moscow with the hope of working out, among other things, the procedural arrangements for European peace settlements. It has always been our idea that the drafting of peace settlements as envisaged in the Potsdam decisions was for the purpose of reaching an area of agreement between the Great Powers and of presenting a working draft to the other nations concerned for modification and revision. If this cannot be done there would seem to be little hope for an eventual United Nations Organization. Mr. Dunn assured the Ambassador of his confidence in the eventual plans of a procedure that would satisfy all parties concerned.

The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for this reassuring explanation and stated that he would inform his Government immediately of our views.

[Upon the instruction of the Greek Government its Embassy in Washington presented a memorandum dated December 19, 1945, to the Department of State in order to bring to the Department's notice that the Greek Government had knowledge, which it considered to be trustworthy, that the recently elected National Assembly of Albania was soon expected to pass a resolution which would have the effect of establishing a virtual union with Yugoslavia. Any such happening would compel the Greek Government to reconsider its policy toward the entire Albanian problem. Hitherto Greece had followed the policy of the Great powers which had been in favor of the reestablishment of the independence of Albania, despite doubts that this would work successfully. The Greek Government explained that in 1944 it had even declined to discuss proposals advanced by some Albanian political leaders which had contemplated a personal union with Greece, because this might be looked upon as upsetting the *status quo* in which Yugoslavia was seriously concerned.

At present, however, if the proposal for a union between Albania and Yugoslavia were to gain momentum, the Greek Government could not continue its support of the Albanian policy of the United States and the United Kingdom. Instead the Greek Government would have to make most explicit reservations, and to look for a new solution of the Albanian problem along the lines of a partition in harmony with the national security of Greece. It could never agree to any territorial arrangement which could put the Corfu Straits even indirectly in the control of Yugoslavia.]

IRAN

CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES FOR EFFECTING FULFILLMENT OF ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION REGARDING IRAN OF DECEMBER 1, 1943¹

CHAPTER I: JANUARY 1 TO NOVEMBER 18, 1945

Soviet Army interference with the movement of Iranian security forces in northern Iran; discussions at the Malta and Yalta Conferences on the presence of foreign troops in Iran; identic Iranian notes of May 19, 1945, requesting withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran; Three Power agreement at the Potsdam Conference to evacuate Tehran; further Soviet interference with attempted Iranian security measures in northern Iran; Anglo-Soviet exchanges on troop withdrawal during the London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers

761.91/1-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 4, 1945—5 p.m.

[Received January 5—4: 20 p. m.]

6. Colonel Schwarzkopf head of American Military Mission to Iran *Gendarmerie*² yesterday informed me that on December 20 a clash occurred at Shahi in Mazanderan between striking workers in Iranian Government textile mill and gendarmes assigned as guards for factory. Gendarmes fired over heads of crowd without injuring anyone. Immediately afterward Soviet troops entered factory, arrested gendarme commander and disarmed gendarmes and marched them on foot from Shahi to Sari during which gendarmes were exposed to insults and missiles of civilians. Reason given for this Soviet action was asserted wounding of Soviet soldier by fire of gendarmes which Schwarzkopf says was impossible under circumstances.³

Soviet Embassy has protested to Iranian Foreign Office against alleged unfriendly action of gendarmes to which Iranians have replied with counter protest against interference by Soviet troops with Iranian forces. Commission has been sent to make investigation jointly with Soviet authorities.

¹ Declaration made at Tehran by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier). For documentation on the Declaration and on efforts of the United States in 1944 to implement it, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 646 ff., and *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 306 ff.

² For documentation on this mission, see pp. 526-538, *passim*.

³ For further instances of Soviet interference with the work of the Iranian *gendarmerie*, see despatch 292, May 12, from Tehran, p. 527.

Schwarzkopf considers Russian action as interference with accomplishment of his mission. I offered to go with him to see Soviet Ambassador⁴ to sound out Russian attitude but Minister of Interior⁵ has since informed him that Iranian Government is taking matter up strongly and prefers that no outside action be taken at this time.

Full text of Schwarzkopf report to me being forwarded by mail.⁶
Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow.

MORRIS

761.91/1-1845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*⁷

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

The Iranian Minister called upon me at his request today. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to call upon me and to call to my attention the great concern that the Persian people had relative to the attitude and actions of Russia toward their country. They were very apprehensive and hoped that the United States would take a firm hand in insisting on a strong independent Iran at the forthcoming Conference.

I assured the Minister that we had constantly in mind the welfare of the Persian people and that I was confident that the President in his forthcoming conversations with Churchill and Stalin would constantly keep their interests in mind.

The Minister then stated that he had been instructed by his Government to offer the facilities of his Government for the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three. I told the Minister that we greatly appreciated this gesture of friendship and I would immediately pass on this kind offer to the President.

The Minister seemed very pleasant and cooperative.

⁴ Mikhail Alexeyvich Maximov.

⁵ Mohammad Soruri.

⁶ Copy of report of January 1, 1945, transmitted to the Department in despatch 171, January 5, from Tehran. The despatch stated: "Colonel Schwarzkopf's information, of course, is derived entirely from Iranian sources, which leaves some possibility that the facts may have suffered distortion in transmission. However, on its face the incident appears to be a serious instance of unwarranted Soviet interference in a purely internal Iranian affair." (761.91/1-545)

⁷ In a memorandum of January 18, 1945, to the Secretary of State, the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen) stated: "The Iranian Minister wants to emphasize to you his Government's fear that Russia will use forceful methods to obtain concessions and political control in the northern part of his country. Iran hopes the United States and Great Britain will support Iran's independence at the forthcoming high level conversations. We have already assured the Minister that you and the President are well aware of the situation." (767.91/1-1845) Mohammed Shāyesteh was the Iranian Minister. The conversations referred to took place at the Crimea Conference (the Yalta Conference), which was held from February 4 to 11, 1945, by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin. For references to Iran in connection with the Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, index, p. 1007.

891.00/1-1845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1945.

The Iranian Minister called on me today, after he had seen the Secretary.

The purpose of Mr. Shayesteh's call was to impress upon me the desperate situation in which he said his Government finds itself by reason of the attitude of the Russian military authorities in occupation of northern Iran.⁸ According to the Minister, the Russians do not permit the Iranian Government to despatch troops to the northern part of the country, and are in fact acting in such a way that all Iranian administration in the north may soon become impossible.

The Minister said he has been instructed by his Government to urge that particular attention be given to the desperate situation in Iran at the forthcoming high-level conference. He said he hoped we would not merely lump his country in with other small countries, with an expression on the part of this Government of our interest in the right of little countries to have governments of their own choosing and to enjoy the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.⁹

I assured the Minister that we were bearing the Iranian situation in mind in connection with the high-level conversations, and I was certain that it would be fully discussed at that time.

The Minister then informed me that the Shah of Iran¹⁰ would be delighted to offer one of his palaces to the President in case the meeting of the Big Three takes place in Tehran. I informed the Minister that we had already received this information from our Embassy in Tehran, and had instructed the Ambassador to express the deep appreciation of this Government for the courteous offer of the Shah and to state that the matter was being referred to the President. I told the Minister that I was not informed as to where the meeting would take place, but that in any case he might assure his Government of our deep appreciation of this courteous gesture on their part.

891.00/2-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, February 22, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received February 22—9:50 a. m.]

112. At personal request of Shah, Belgian Minister Graeffe last night spoke to me about two recent incidents on which Kurdish raid-

⁸ For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the British-Soviet military occupation of Iran, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 383 ff.

⁹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 367.

¹⁰ Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

ers¹¹ have pillaged towns in southern environs Lake Rezaieh and killed police stationed in them. Although area is within Russian zone there were no Soviet troops in vicinity and Russians have refused Iranian request for punitive action against Kurds stating they are unable intervene in internal matter this kind. Shah wishes send Iranian troops and battalion has already been despatched but with orders to halt before entering Soviet zone. Foregoing substantially confirmed to me by War Minister Zand, in part by Court Minister Ala, both of whom seem greatly disturbed.

Graeffe was charged by Shah to approach British Ambassador¹² and me to ascertain whether our Governments would approve if Iranian troops were sent in to Soviet zone in pursuit of raiders. I gathered he is prepared to order them forward¹³ if given slightest encouragement. He is reluctant to ask Russian permission and I suspect may be disposed to create incident which would force British and Americans to take stand with respect to Soviet interference with Iranian forces. I declined to express any opinion to Graeffe and do not know whether he has yet talked to Sir Reader Bullard.

This approach to me is undoubtedly related to keen interest being displayed by high officials including Ala in outcome of discussions on Iran which may have taken place at Crimean meeting. I have been queried repeatedly on that score but have, of course, replied that I have no information.

Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow and Baghdad.

MORRIS

740.0011 EW/2-2745

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Matthews)*¹⁴

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1945.

I attach a copy of a proposal with regard to Iran which Mr. Eden filed at one of the later meetings of the Foreign Secretaries at Yalta.¹⁵ Iran did not come up for discussion at any of the Big Three meetings.

¹¹ For documentation on the concern of the United States in 1942 regarding Kurdish disorders in Soviet-occupied Azerbaijan, see *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. iv, pp. 318 ff.

¹² Sir Reader Bullard.

¹³ In telegram 118, February 24, 1945, the Ambassador in Iran reported information from the Belgian Minister that the Shah had ordered Iranian troops to continue into the Soviet zone but with instructions to halt and request new orders if Soviet opposition materialized (891.00/2-2445).

¹⁴ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn), the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling), and the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Allen).

¹⁵ This proposal, presented by Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on February 11, 1945, stated that "a commencement of the withdrawal of [Allied] forces [from Persian territory] need not await the termi-

The Russians declined to discuss the situation in Iran on the grounds: 1) that there was not sufficient time, and 2) that the period of tension in Iran was over and that consequently there was no real problem to discuss. The Secretary supported the attached British draft and urged that prompt consideration be given to the problem of Iran following the meeting. The official protocol of the proceedings of the Conference (to which the Russians agreed) contained the following brief statement on Iran:

"Mr. Molotov,¹⁶ Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius exchanged views on the situation in Persia. It was agreed that the matter be pursued further through diplomatic channels."¹⁷

The British had an additional paragraph which they held in reserve to be added if the Soviet Government showed a willingness to discuss Iran and also to have some further statement with regard to the question of oil concessions.¹⁸ That paragraph reads as follows:

"After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Tehran Declaration of December 1st, 1943 and to which the Persian Government would be a party."

891.00/2-2245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1945—8 p. m.

106. Your 112, February 22. In the view of this Government, the treaty of alliance between Great Britain, Russia, and Iran signed January 29, 1942¹⁹ clearly indicates that Iranian forces remain re-

nation of hostilities, but should begin *pari passu* in stages as military considerations, including the use of the Persian supply route, may allow." The full text of the proposal is printed in *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 819.

At the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their staffs at Malta, January 30 to February 2, 1945, Mr. Eden, on February 1, had raised with Secretary of State Stettinius the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran and agreement had been reached on the importance of getting Soviet concurrence on the principle of gradual *pari passu* withdrawal; *ibid.*, pp. 500, 501. For further references to documentation on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, see *ibid.*, index, p. 1007.

¹⁶ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

¹⁷ For actual wording of the Protocol, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 982.

¹⁸ Mr. Eden's proposal recommended also that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union not press "any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran." For documentation on the decision of the Iranian Government in 1944 to postpone negotiations with foreign interests for oil concessions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 445 ff.

¹⁹ Signed at Tehran, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249; for documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.

sponsible for maintenance of internal security in the country. In order to carry out this responsibility, these forces must naturally be permitted to operate in areas of tribal disturbance such as Rezaieh.

It would be difficult for the Russians to justify a refusal to permit the contemplated troop transfer, in view of the clear statement in Article 4 of the tripartite treaty that the presence of allied troops in Iran does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and security forces of Iran.

However, whenever the Iranian Government finds it necessary to move troops within the country for internal security reasons, consultation between the Iranian military authorities and the British or Russian commands concerned would seem appropriate, in the interest of amicable relations and proper coordination of effort. The Shah's reluctance to request Soviet *permission* to move Iranian troops is understandable, but action by him without any consultation or prior notification would be unwise in our view.

If requested you should advise the Iranian authorities to proceed in this matter in a forthright and friendly manner, informing the Soviet authorities, in a formal communication, of their need for sending forces to Rezaieh and of their intentions in this regard. The note might point out that the contemplated movement is in conformity with the Tripartite Pact and might state that the notification is being given the Russians in order that the Russians may facilitate the movement of the Iranian forces.

In reply to your last paragraph, Dept's information concerning brief discussions regarding Iran which took place at Crimean Conference indicates latter is not pertinent to this question. You will be informed with regard to nature of discussion.

GREW

761.91/3-645: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, March 6, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received March 6—3:21 p. m.]

154. Foreign Minister Entezam, who seemed much worried, told me last night that Molotov in his latest interview with Iranian Ambassador Ahy, had pointedly renewed Soviet complaint against asserted anti-Russian attitude of Iranian Government. Molotov made special reference to law forbidding oil concessions and said Soviets were holding it against Iran. This interview was subsequent to Yalta Conference.

MORRIS

740.0011 E.W./3-1545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1945—midnight.

129. Iranian affairs were not discussed by President Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the Crimean Conference but were touched on briefly during meetings between Eden, Molotov and Stettinius.²⁰ Eden introduced a paper²¹ suggesting that the three Powers agree not to seek oil concessions in Iran while foreign troops remained on Iranian soil. Stettinius supported Eden, but Molotov declared that the tension had eased in Iran and there was consequently no necessity for the three Powers to enter into the Iranian question at Yalta. Molotov added that Russia reserved the right to reopen the question of a concession direct with the Iranian Government whenever the Soviet Government considered appropriate.

If you are approached on the subject by the Iranian authorities, you are authorized to say that Iranian affairs were discussed briefly by the foreign ministers and that while there was no indication that the Soviet Government had abandoned its hope of obtaining an oil concession, there was no question of any disagreement on the maintenance of integrity and independence of Iran as set forth in the Declaration of Tehran.

Dept understands that British Ambassador²² is being instructed in a similar vein.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow and London.

STETTINIUS

891.00/3-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, March 17, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received March 19—10:55 a. m.]

188. ReEmb's 112 February 22 and 160 March 7.²³ Iranian Army Chief of Staff General Arfa today gave Military Attaché²⁴ following picture of situation with respect to security measures in Lake Rezaieh area.

²⁰ For record of this discussion on February 8, 1945, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 738-740.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 819.

²² The British Ambassador in Iran, Sir Reader Bullard.

²³ Latter not printed; in it the Ambassador gave a preliminary account of the Iranian attempt to move troops into the province of Azerbaijan and stated: "If I am directly approached by appropriate Iranian official I shall outline Department's position as stated its telegram under reference [No. 106, February 27, 8 p. m., p. 363]. Otherwise I do not plan to offer advice or suggestions." (891.00/3-745)

²⁴ Col. Joseph K. Baker.

1. Soviet military authorities from the beginning agreed to movement one battalion Iranian infantry from Tabriz to Mahabad but refused consent to movement of troops from outside Soviet zone. Nevertheless as previously reported force of infantry cavalry and light artillery was ordered to proceed from Saqqiz in Iranian Kurdistan to Mahabad.

2. This force was delayed by snow. When it reached Bukan at edge of Soviet zone, Russians protested against further advance and War Minister Zand decided to halt it pending further negotiation (however before orders could reach it the column continued to Miandoab where it has halted).

3. Soviets appear to have accepted this *fait accompli* but still insist that no more than one infantry battalion shall proceed at Mahabad. (At the same time, Arfa says Russian Military Attaché has promised to try to obtain modification of this position.)

4. Arfa considers single battalion inadequate to meet potential demands on it. He thinks Soviets would like to see small Iranian force overwhelmed by Kurds as it would be evident Iranians unable maintain order in own country. Therefore, he intends to leave column at Miandoab and throw on Soviets onus of preventing establishment of proper garrison at Mahabad.

Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow and Baghdad.

MORRIS

891.00/3-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, March 19, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received March 20—11:30 a. m.]

194. Re Embassy's 112, February 22; 160, March 7;²⁵ and 188, March 17. Foreign Minister Entezam told me today he was seriously disturbed by question of Iranian security forces in Azerbaijan. According to his version of story Iranian force from Saqqiz which entered Soviet zone has been withdrawn from zone in response to Russian protest. Reason advanced by Russian Military Attaché to Chief of Staff for objecting is that introduction of fresh forces from outside might cause friction with Soviet military forces. Entezam reiterated General Arfa's statement that it was impracticable to accept Russian suggestion that detachment be sent to Mahabad from Tabriz saying available force of 450 men would be entirely inadequate.

He asked me about the attitude of my Government toward this situation. I outlined views set forth in Department's 106, February 27, to which he replied that knowledge of this attitude had been brought to his attention by his Minister in Washington.

²⁵ Telegram 160 not printed, but see footnote 23, p. 365.

Entezam was to see Soviet Ambassador Maximov this afternoon but admitted he had little hope of obtaining satisfaction from him. Failing this he wished to present a statement of the case simultaneously to Russian, British and American Governments emphasizing that Iranian Government considered Soviet attitude as breach of tripartite treaty and contrary to Declaration of Tehran. I suggested it would be better to make this approach first to the Russians alone; then if they rejected it he might put the problem up to the British and American Governments for such consideration as they might be able to give it. He agreed. It remains to be seen of course whether this plan of action will be adopted as it has yet to receive a Cabinet sanction.

I urged on Entezam importance of avoiding any armed clash and of settling matter through diplomatic channels.

Sent to Department as 194, repeated to Moscow as 57, Baghdad as 24 and London as 12.

MORRIS

891.00/5-545

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

No. 289

TEHRAN, May 5, 1945.

[Received May 24.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the raid by Kurdish tribesmen on Mahabad (Saujbulagh), south of Lake Rezaieh, and to the efforts of the Iranian authorities to send a military garrison to that place, which were the subject of my telegram of March 19, 1945²⁶ and other telegrams.

Information with respect to this affair, as obtained from different sources in Tehran, is even more contradictory and unsatisfactory than usual, but it seems clear that, for the moment, a stalemate has been reached. The Soviet authorities have declined to give ground, while the Iranians insist that they are still trying to carry out their original plan of sending a special force from Saqqiz (outside the Russian zone) to Mahabad.

So far as can be made out, developments since March 19 have been approximately as follows:

1. Foreign Minister Entezam discussed the question with the Soviet Ambassador and in due course advised the Iranian Ministry of War that agreement had been reached whereby a portion of the Saqqiz column would be permitted to proceed to Mahabad, together with a force from the existing Iranian garrison at Tabriz. The force drawn from Tabriz could then be replaced there by new troops from outside the Soviet zone.

²⁶ No. 194, *supra*.

2. The Iranian Chief of Staff, General Arfa, was skeptical about this agreement and instructed one of his officers to confirm it by inquiry of the Soviet commander at Miandoab, the Russian garrison point nearest to Mahabad. The Soviet commander denied knowledge of any agreement and said his instructions were to prevent the movement of Iranian troops of any kind to Mahabad.

3. Arfa then referred the matter back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where it apparently rests. I do not know whether the Foreign Office has taken any further action vis-à-vis the Russians; it has not mentioned the matter to me in the past six weeks, but the Chief of Staff says he understands negotiations are going on.

4. At some stage in the proceedings, the Saqqiz column was withdrawn from the Soviet zone, after having reached the vicinity of Miandoab, and the Deputy Chief of Staff says it is now waiting at some point between Saqqiz and the ill-defined border of the Russian zone, which is believed to run near Bukan.

The Kurds, as well as the Russians, have expressed opposition to the despatch of Iranian troops to Mahabad, and I understand one of the Soviet arguments in this dispute is that the troops would simply provoke trouble from the Kurds. This thesis is made the more plausible by the fact that the Kurds have been tranquil for some time now, no further incidents being reported from the area in question.

It is possible that the Iranian authorities, on more mature consideration, are not overly anxious to risk a clash with the Kurds and are using the Soviet attitude as an excuse for remaining inactive. General Derakhshani, commander of Iranian forces in Tabriz, recently remarked to Major Kennedy, assistant military attaché of the Embassy, that the Kurds could, if they wished, throw out of Mahabad any Iranian army force which could be sent there. He estimated that there were some 6,000 armed Kurds in and near Mahabad.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, General Ansari, recently brought to light what may be a significant new aspect of the situation. In conversation with the Military Attaché, Colonel Baker, General Ansari remarked that the solution of the problem must be governed by the terms of "our agreement with the Soviets" whereby, he said, Iranian troops may not be sent into the Russian zone without prior Soviet permission. Although this has been Soviet policy all along, the Embassy had never before heard that there was any agreement between the Russians and Iranians on the subject. Colonel Baker was unable to learn whether a written understanding exists or whether the "agreement" mentioned is simply a working arrangement having no formal basis. If General Ansari's statement is correct, it is obvious that the Iranian position is considerably weakened.

Respectfully yours,

LELAND MORRIS

Tehran Post Files : 710 : Allied Troops in Iran

*Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization*²⁷

[SAN FRANCISCO,] May 10, 1945.

Participants: Mostafa Adl, Minister of Justice of Iran and Chairman
of the Iranian delegation to the UNCIO
Mohammed Shayesteh, Iranian Minister to the United
States
The Secretary of State
Mr. Alling²⁸
Mr. Kohler²⁹

After the exchange of the usual initial amenities, the chairman of the Iranian delegation said that he wished to mention the question of the retirement of Russian and British troops from Iran now that Germany had unconditionally surrendered. He explained that the treaty contained a somewhat ambiguous phrase which would allow the British to retain troops in Iran until six months after the termination of hostilities with Japan, but this phrase did not apply to the Russians since they are not at war with Japan. However, in a conversation which he had had yesterday with the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden had made the categorical statement that the British would not seek to take advantage of the treaty to retain troops in Iran until after the termination of hostilities with Japan, but that they were prepared immediately to start withdrawing their troops step by step, on condition, of course, that the Russians should likewise simultaneously withdraw their troops. Mr. Eden suggested that it might be possible for the United States to take the initiative in proposing to both the British and the Russians that their troops be withdrawn from Iran, but Mr. Adl had replied that he felt it might be difficult for the United States to initiate such action. He felt rather that the Iranian Government should call on the Russians and the British in Tehran to withdraw their troops. He expected that this would be done in the near future; the United States Embassy in Tehran would be given copies of the Iranian

²⁷ Record copy missing from Department files; copy transmitted to Tehran in instruction 193, June 15, not printed. Drafting officer not indicated on post copy. The United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO) met at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945; for documentation, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

²⁸ Paul H. Alling, Political and Liaison Officer, United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

²⁹ Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and Political and Liaison Officer, United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

demands, and he hoped that they could count on United States support. Mr. Adl added that Mr. Eden had suggested to him that he inform the Secretary of their conversation on this subject.

The Secretary thanked Mr. Adl for this information. He said it would be carefully considered by the appropriate officials of the Government, and he hoped that it would be possible for Mr. Adl to pursue the discussion of this matter in Washington after the Conference. Mr. Adl replied that he, too, hoped that he could do so, but if not the Iranian Minister in Washington would continue the discussions.

Turning to the Conference, Mr. Adl said that the Iranian delegation desired to collaborate closely with the United States, not just in words, but by their vote, as they had already shown. The Secretary replied that we greatly appreciated the friendly support which we were receiving from the Iranian delegation.

740.0011 E.W./5-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, May 18, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received May 18—12:38 p. m.]

333. When I called to take leave of Shah this morning he told me Iran Govt had decided send notes to British and Soviet Govts asking them to indicate promptly when they would withdraw their troops from Iran under provisions tripartite Treaty of 1942 which calls for withdrawal within 6 months after suspension hostilities with Germany and associates.

According to Shah Iran Govt considers this 6-month period began V-E Day³⁰ since Russians no longer engaged hostilities with anyone and Japan has denounced treaties with Germany and has ceased to be German associate. Iranian intention is to seek Allied departure before expiration of 6 months if possible.

Shah's interpretation of treaty does not coincide with my understanding of English text of article 5 as shown in Embassy's copy and I think it possible planned notes may be withheld or modified if officials familiar with treaty give closer consideration to matter.

Shah did not mention withdrawal of American forces.

Sent to Dept as 333, repeated Moscow as 103, London as 21.

MORRIS

³⁰ May 8, 1945.

811.24591/5-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, May 21, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received May 21—1:06 p. m.]

341. Embassy has received note from MinFonAff³¹ dated May 19 reading in substance as follows:

Sepahbodi extends congratulations on end of war. Since there is no further need for war operations in Iran and it is necessary to restore conditions to normal and so satisfy long cherished hope of Iranian people "Imperial Iranian Govt requests that the military forces of that (American) Govt evacuate Iranian soil". Same request has been made of British and Soviet Ambassadors.

When he called on Ambassador Morris May 19, MinFonAff spoke of this note and said request for withdrawal was being sent to us primarily to avoid criticism by British and Russians who otherwise might complain of discrimination. He agreed with Morris remark that there was no need to worry about American troops departure as it had already begun.

Sepahbodi told Ambassador Iran Govt does not base its request for evacuation on letter of tripartite treaty and admitted article 5 of treaty entitled Allied Forces to remain until 6 months after end of Japanese war. He said, however, Iran feels spirit of treaty calls for withdrawal now because Allied Armies in Iran can contribute nothing to war against Japan.

Text of note follows by mail.³²

Sent to Dept as 341 repeated to Moscow as 108 and London as 23.

WARD

800.24591/5-1245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Davallou, First Secretary of Iranian Legation
Mr. George V. Allen, NEA³³
Mr. Harold B. Minor, ME

Mr. Davallou called to say that the Iranian Government delivered identical notes on May 19, 1945, to the Russian, British, and American

³¹ Anushiravan Sepahbodi, who became Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Hakimi Cabinet on May 10 and retained the position in the Sadr Cabinet of June 14.

³² A copy of note 1118 was transmitted in despatch 309, May 22, 1945, from Tehran, neither printed; received June 1.

³³ Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) since April 19, 1945.

Embassies in Tehran requesting that, in view of the end of the war in Europe, Allied forces be withdrawn from Iran. He stated further that he was directed by his Government to ask for American support of this proposal, not only in approving withdrawal of the American forces in Iran, but also in informing the British and Russian Governments of the action we have taken.

Mr. Allen assured Mr. Davallou that the Department would give the proposal its sympathetic consideration. He suggested that Mr. Davallou follow up this conversation with an *aide-mémoire*, to which Mr. Davallou agreed.³⁴

800.24591/5-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 25, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received May 25—5: 18 p. m.]

5240. In discussing situation created by Iranian demand for evacuation of Allied Military Forces acting head of Eastern Dept said that Brit are anxious to consult us with view to following common policy and are cabling their Emb in Washington to take matter up with Dept. He said that he had not yet seen telegram in final form and did not know exactly how matter would be presented but that he had no hesitancy in saying that the Brit want very much to withdraw their troops from Iran provided the Russians do likewise. Should the latter not consent to leave the Brit might reluctantly be impelled to remain but in that event they would want to make certain that no room is left for doubt as to where the responsibility lies.

Official observed however that situation is slightly complicated by security problem presented by necessity of protecting Abadan oil installation which is absolutely vital for prosecution of Far Eastern War. Consequently although Brit desire to withdraw from entire Iranian plateau they would doubtless for some time feel it necessary to maintain a certain force in the Abadan area.

Sent Dept 5240 repeated to Tehran as 8 and Moscow as 170.

WINANT

³⁴ In a telephone conversation on May 22, 1945, Mr. Davallou informed Mr. Minor that an *aide-mémoire* would not be furnished since the Iranian Government had made a direct approach to the American Embassy at Tehran (800.24591/5-2245).

811.24591/5-2645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, May 26, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received May 26—6 : 25 a. m.]

347. In letter received today General Booth³⁵ informs me he has received orders from War terminating PGC mission as of June 1 and directing return of operational control of transportation facilities to British.³⁶

Embassy has further learned informally that orders direct winding up of all PGC affairs by July 1 by which date entire force is supposed to be ready to leave Iran. I assume this does not apply to custodial units which may be left to look after installations. However it emphasizes importance of early disposal surplus property.³⁷

I am also told informally that both PGC and PAI Force³⁸ have received orders to stop immediately all movement petroleum products from Abadan to USSR. Small quantities other supplies for Russia now en route expected to be moved over railroad next month but it appears no further large shipments over this route are anticipated.

WARD

891.77/5-2945 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, May 29, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 11 : 35 a. m.]

356. Embassy's 347, May 26. Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned me to Foreign Office this morning and requested that American personnel now engaged in operating railway continue its work for "2 to 3 months" for purpose of acquainting Iranian replacements with their duties. He stated that progress of Iranian replacements would be appraised towards end of this period and if they are then found insufficiently acquainted with duties matter of continuance of American personnel will be discussed at that time. Sepahbodi added that it is his hope that American troops will not leave Iran prior to departure of other foreign troops.

³⁵ Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Commanding General of the Persian Gulf Command (PGC).

³⁶ For documentation on representations by the United Kingdom for the assumption by the United States of financial obligations in the operation of the Trans-Iranian Railroad, see pp. 563 ff.

³⁷ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 566 ff.

³⁸ Persia and Iraq Force (British).

Should Army be disposed to accede to this request Embassy suggests that in order record may be perfectly clear it be instructed to request written confirmation.

Commanding General PGC is being informed of Minister's request.³⁹

WARD

800.24591/6-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1945.

I received the Iranian Minister at his request this afternoon. He referred to the recent suggestion of the Iranian Government that British, Russian, and American troops evacuate Iran now that the war in Europe has terminated. He said that of course this suggestion was not directed at the American troops but it was necessary to include them in order not to offend the Soviet and British Governments.

The Minister said that several days ago some of the Iranian delegates to the San Francisco conference, including himself, approached Mr. Eden on the subject of the withdrawal of British troops. Eden had informed them that the British troops would be called upon to withdraw at once provided that Soviet troops would also withdraw. Eden made it clear that Great Britain did not desire to maintain troops in Iran one day longer.

The Minister added that it was his understanding that Mr. Eden expected to make a formal statement within the next few days to Parliament⁴⁰ on the subject of British troops in Iran. He hoped that before this statement was made the American Government would find it possible to suggest to Russia and Great Britain that all foreign troops be withdrawn immediately from the country. Under the

³⁹ In telegram 373, June 2, 1945, 10 a. m., the Chargé in Iran advised that the Persian Gulf Command would assign approximately 200 officers and men to act in an advisory capacity on the Iranian State Railway for about 60 days on written request by the Iranian Government (891.77/6-245). In telegram 424, June 22, 1945, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that the offer of railway personnel was transmitted orally to the Iranian Government on June 13 (891.77/6-2245). In telegram 502, July 16, 1945, 5 p. m., he reported that the offer was withdrawn on July 13 by the Persian Gulf Command after failure to receive a formal request from the Iranian Foreign Office. The Ambassador concluded: "Commonly stated that Iranians withheld making formal request for American personnel because of apprehension Russians would insist on similar request for Soviet personnel." (891.77/7-1645)

⁴⁰ No formal statement made; for questions by Members of Parliament addressed to Mr. Eden on the evacuation of foreign troops from Iran and the reply for the Government by Richard K. Law, Minister of Education, on June 6, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 411, col. 858.

agreement existing between Iran, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union,⁴¹ British and Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from Iran within six months after the termination of the war with Germany and with the allies of Germany. Russia was not at present at war with any ally of Germany and Eden made it clear during the course of conversation at San Francisco that Great Britain had no intention of using its war with Japan as a pretext for keeping British troops in Iran.

I told the Minister that I would bring his request to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.⁴²

800.24591/6-145

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1945.

Before determining what action may be taken to persuade the British and Russians to withdraw their forces from Iran, it is necessary to clarify the position with regard to the evacuation of American forces from that country. This Division strongly favors the withdrawal of American forces from Iran both because of the Iranian request that this be done and because the American Army has formally announced the termination as of June 1 of the supply mission through Iran.

There are, however, two complicating factors which will have to be examined and clarified. First of these is the position of the War Department, which has indicated informally⁴³ that it will be some months before transports become available to remove the remaining 11,000 American troops from Iran. The War Department further states that even after this troop withdrawal it desires to leave about 1,000 men in Iran, half as caretakers to guard installations until they are disposed of and the other half as ATC⁴⁴ forces to service the airfield at Abadan, Iran, which is important to the line of communications

⁴¹ The Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942.

⁴² A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Acting Secretary of State Grew by Mr. Henderson the same day.

⁴³ During conversation on May 25, 1945, of Lt. Col. S. W. Connelly of the Missions Section, Operations Division, War Department, with the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) and Mr. Minor; memorandum of May 25 by Mr. Minor not printed. For formal views of the War Department on the evacuation of foreign troops from Iran, see letter of June 19 from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 956.

⁴⁴ Air Transport Command.

to the Far East. It is unfortunate that the Persian Gulf Command announced publicly the termination of its mission when the War Department has not had in mind the immediate evacuation of our forces from Iran. This may conceivably be construed as an indication of bad faith or seized upon by one or both of our allies as an excuse to delay the withdrawal of their own forces from Iran.

A second factor requiring clarification is the attitude of the Iranians themselves. As indicated by the Iranian Minister, the Iranians are little perturbed about the presence of our forces. The Foreign Minister went so far as to request our Embassy in Tehran to delay the withdrawal of our troops until the forces of our allies depart. Furthermore, the Iranians have requested this Government to leave part of our railway troops in Iran for several months in order to train Iranians and effect an orderly turnover of the railway. Thus, Iran, while requesting immediately withdrawal of forces on one hand, urges, on the other, that we retain them in Iran. In addition, the speed with which our forces can withdraw from Iran will depend to a great extent upon Iranian cooperation in taking over responsibility for and operation of the railway, ports and other technical services.

For your information, it should be pointed out that Russian and British forces are in Iran by virtue of the Iranian-British-Russian Treaty of January 29, 1942. Under strict interpretation of the terms of this treaty it is believed that both the British and Russians have the right to remain in Iran until six months after the termination of the war against Japan. The Iranian Foreign Minister, in a conversation with our Ambassador to Iran, declared that this request for withdrawal is based on the spirit and not the letter of the treaty.

Further and immediate consultation will be had with the War Department and with the Iranians. The British have also expressed their desire to consult with us on this question. In the meantime, it is felt that your press statement of May 31 covers the situation adequately.⁴⁵

HAROLD B. MINOR

⁴⁵ Mr. Grew was asked, at his press and radio news conference on May 31, whether the Iranian Government had asked the United States to take its troops out of Iran. Mr. Grew's reply in full was: "I will give you a statement for attribution on this question. I understand that the Iranians have made such a request, but the formal text of such request has not yet been received in the State Department. This Government naturally understands and sympathizes with the point of view of the Iranian Government, and I believe that it is well known that the number of American troops in Iran is already being rapidly reduced."

800.24591/6-345

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁴⁶

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Ref: 335/-/45

His Majesty's Government have been considering the approach made to them by the Iranian Government about the withdrawal of Allied Forces from Iran.

2. His Majesty's Ambassador at Teheran was instructed on May 30th to inform the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply that although His Majesty's Government cannot accept the argument that the Allied Powers are not entitled by the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty to keep troops in Iran until six months after the end of the Japanese war they are nevertheless prepared to consider sympathetically the request of the Iranian Government that the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran should begin before the final date fixed by the Treaty. His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to add that His Majesty's Government are discussing the question with the United States and Soviet Governments.

3. His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow was instructed on the same date to inform the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the reply which His Majesty's Government are making to the Iranian Government. Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr was instructed to add that His Majesty's Government now wish formally to propose that Allied troops should start withdrawing from Iran *pari passu* and in stages before the final Treaty date and that military talks should be held to discuss the stages in which such withdrawals may take place.

4. In informing the State Department of the action which His Majesty's Government have taken, His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to explain that His Majesty's Government had intended to consult the State Department before taking this action, but that they had just learned that the intention of the United States Government is to withdraw American troops from Iran and to hand over operation of the railway by July 1st. Taking into account the attitude of the State Department at the time of the Crimean Conference,⁴⁷ His Ma-

⁴⁶ Delivered to the Department on June 4, 1945, by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright). In a memorandum of the same date, the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs stated: "Mr. Wright said orally and in the strictest confidence that the British will withdraw from Iran only *pari passu* with the Russians and in any event will insist on leaving a garrison in southwest Iran to protect oil installations and lines of communications which are essential to the prosecution of the Far Eastern war." (800.24591/6-445)

⁴⁷ For summary of Department's views at that time, see memorandum of February 27 by the Director of the Office of European Affairs and telegram 129, March 15 to Tehran, pp. 362 and 365, respectively.

jesty's Government felt that there was unlikely to be any serious difference of view between the two Governments and therefore went ahead. At the same time His Majesty's Government would be very glad if the United States Government, to whom it is understood that a similar note has been addressed by the Iranian Government, felt able to represent to the Soviet Government that they regard it as desirable that the evacuation of Iran should start at an early date.

5. His Majesty's Embassy attach a copy of a telegram received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Teheran on the 31st of May.⁴⁸

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1945.

811.24591/6-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1945—7 p. m.

293. Please deliver the following note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"I have been directed by my Government to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note number 1118 of May 19, 1945, regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Iran.

The American Government views the Iranian Government's request with sympathy, and I have pleasure in informing Your Excellency that arrangements for the rapid reduction in the number of American troops in Iran have already been made. As Your Excellency is aware, the task of the Persian Gulf Command is considered to have been completed as of June 1, 1945. Withdrawal of American forces from Iran has been in progress for some months, and will continue as rapidly as the exigencies of the military situation permit."

You may inform the Foreign Minister verbally that the British and Soviet Governments are being informed of the nature of the reply being made by this Government to the Iranian request.⁴⁹

GREW

811.24591/6-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1945—7 p. m.

296. Dept is considering possibility of requesting War to accelerate withdrawal of American forces from Iran and would appreciate

⁴⁸ Dated May 31, 1945, not printed; it stated that the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs had expressed satisfaction with the British position.

⁴⁹ The substance of the reply to the Iranian note was sent to London and Moscow in telegrams 4733 and 1283, respectively, both dated June 12, 1945, 7 p. m., for transmittal to the British and Soviet Foreign Offices.

receiving your views and recommendations in light of following factors. While we have informed Iranian, British and Soviet Govts that we have been and are continuing to withdraw our forces, it appears that this process will be slow and in stages. War's program on withdrawal is as follows: (1) redeployment of major part of remaining 11,000 troops will take several months (2) some 3,000 troops will be left indefinitely to care for installations until disposed of and (3) about 1,500 ATC men will be left at Abadan until end of war to operate and service military airfield. Brit have informally signified firm intention of retaining garrison in southwestern Iran until end of war. Thus with both American and Brit forces in southern Iran it seems unlikely that Russians will consent to any large scale withdrawal of their forces.

While continued presence of almost 5,000 American troops in Iran may expose us to future criticism and contribute to situation wherein Brit and Russians refuse Iranian request to withdraw, it is difficult to devise formula consistent with war effort which will avoid this. Evacuation of caretaking troops might be accelerated by speeding up surplus property disposal or by some alternative scheme of guarding installations. However airport at Abadan is essential to war effort and cannot be abandoned until a suitable replacement field is available. Even should War consent to proposal to construct military field at Dhahran⁵⁰ this would not be ready for better part of year and thus would contribute little to solution of withdrawal problem.

Consideration should also be given to whether we should seek formal Iranian consent to plan to leave these forces in Iran or whether it would at present be advisable not to precipitate issue but rather rest on informal Iranian assurances that they do not desire withdrawal of our forces until departure of Brit and Russians. Your views on this subject will be helpful.

The Dept has some doubt as to the correctness of leaving armed forces at various points in Iran merely for the purpose of safeguarding American installations pending their sale or export, particularly if the Iranian authorities insist that they are in a position to give them adequate protection. The airfield at Abadan of course presents a different problem in view of strategic factors.

GREW

⁵⁰ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 845 ff.

800.24591/6-1845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1945.

Participants: The Iranian Minister
Mr. Loy Henderson ⁵¹
Mr. Harold Minor

The Iranian Minister called today at his request to discuss the question of the withdrawal of allied forces from Iran. The Minister began by giving a résumé of a telegram he had just received from his foreign office instructing him to take this matter up again with the Department of State. The Foreign Minister described the unfortunate situation of Iran, a condition of confusion and disruption in which there was no tenure of Government and in which he, himself, did not know how long he would remain Foreign Minister. He was therefore speaking as an Iranian citizen and expressing the viewpoint of Iranians. The Foreign Minister attributed this unfortunate condition of Iran to the presence of foreign troops on Iranian soil and stated that Iran's situation cannot improve until these forces are withdrawn.

The Iranian Minister elaborated on this theme and urged that the Department do everything possible to bring about the withdrawal of these forces. He further stated that the Iranians are not worried about the presence of American troops on Iranian soil but are very much concerned about the presence of the British and Russians. He believed that the first step must be a declaration, on the part of the British, that they are now ready to depart and suggesting that the Russians take the same course. His view was that as long as there is one British soldier left on Iranian soil, the Russians will not withdraw. In reply to the Minister's question, Mr. Henderson said that the British have not approached us formally on the subject of withdrawal so that we have no official knowledge of their viewpoint. Mr. Henderson, however, conjectured that the British might desire to remain in Southwestern Iran for the protection of the oil fields and the refinery at Abadan which are essential to the allied war effort. The Minister replied that keeping these troops there is not necessary because the British need have no fear of the Iranians and because the British have troops very near by in Iraq and have their battleships in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Henderson remarked that the American Army continues to operate the air field at Abadan, a vital link in communications to the Far East, and inquired what view the Iranians might take of this operation.⁵² The Minister replied that there would be no dif-

⁵¹ Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁵² For documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, pp. 486 ff.

faculty on this score and that "one way or another" this matter can be arranged.

The Minister inquired pointedly in closing as to what attitude the Department would take in this matter which, he understood, will be brought up at the next Big Three meeting. Mr. Henderson replied that we are not yet in a position to speak for the Department or for the United States Government in this matter. However, we can state that we view the Iranian request with the greatest of sympathy and wish to do whatever we can to alleviate the situation in Iran.⁵³

HAROLD B. MINOR

811.24591/6-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 19, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received June 19—11:50 a. m.]

412. Deptstel 296, June 15. Question of accelerated withdrawal American troops from Iran has been discussed with General Booth and carefully considered by Embassy.

I judge Dept has two objectives in mind: To encourage early withdrawal British and Soviet forces and to avoid Iranian criticism.

It appears, however, that British are even more anxious than we are to see foreign troops leave. Therefore they need no encouragement from us. But military situation requires that they maintain force in southwestern Iran to protect oil fields and Abadan refinery which are vital to Japanese war.

Similarly we must keep estimated 1,500 men at Abadan airfield so long as that is needed for transit of military aircraft to and from Far East.

Consequently neither British nor ourselves can effect complete evacuation of Iran for some time to come.

So far as Russians are concerned it remains to be seen whether they will insist upon retaining troops in force in Iran. I think it within bounds of possibility they might decide to steal a march on us and having no further military ends to serve here withdraw all troops overnight. This would enable them to gain political credit by pointing out contrast of their action with that of British and Americans.

⁵³ The Iranian Minister reiterated his request for the support of the United States at the forthcoming Big Three meeting, in a conversation with the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs on July 5. He was assured that "we have this situation prominently in mind and that the Iranians may depend upon a sympathetic attitude on the part of the Department". (891.24/7-545) The Big Three meeting refers to the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, participated in by President Truman, British Prime Ministers Churchill and Attlee, and Generalissimo Stalin, which met at Potsdam from July 17 to August 2, 1945.

Their political and strategic position is such that they would still be able to exert pressure on Iran whenever desired.

If they do not adopt this policy I think it doubtful any steps on our part short of complete withdrawal British and American forces would influence Soviet action. Gen Booth concurs in this. Russians could argue that quantity of our troops is immaterial, fact of their presence in Iran being important point; and they may be expected to ignore military necessity governing continued stay our troops. Soviet treaty position, of course, is unassailable. Most we could hope for in my opinion is *pari passu* withdrawal of Soviet troops along with British and American down to point at which Russian forces in north would roughly balance Anglo-American in south. This raises question our detachments guarding fixed installations and moveable equipment for which 3,000 men believed required. Both Gen Booth and I agree it would be disastrous to entrust custody of American property to Iranians, whether Army *gendarmierie* or civilian, who could not be expected to protect it properly and might further use fact of physical possession to reinforce their arguments for gratis delivery of installations. Neither Booth nor I feel Iranians have grounds for insisting on their ability to undertake custodial responsibility in light of their poor record during war in preventing theft of Allied property.

Only way I can see to expedite departure of American custodial detachments is to work for early disposal of all installations and equipment. Negotiations for this are being held up by failure Treasury to reply to Glendinning⁵⁴ telegram reported Embstel 343 [bis], May 24⁵⁵ regarding text of agreement to be negotiated with Iran Govt on terms of payment. It would be most helpful if Dept would press for quick action. Early decision on quantity and types of railroad equipment to be sold to Iran would also be of great assistance. (Embstel 381, June 6.⁵⁵) Another question needing settlement is British desire for certain American camps (Deptstel 294, June 13⁵⁵) regarding which separate telegram will be sent.

Certain amount irresponsible Iranian criticism may be inevitable if stay of American troops is prolonged. In view of military needs, however, I fail to see how this can be avoided. Any complaints by Iran Govt can be met both by referring to informal Iranian request that we remain until British and Russians leave (this request was orally reiterated to me by MinFonAff on June 16 when I delivered note contained in Deptstel 293, June 12) and by pointing out that Iran has declared war on Japan⁵⁶ and should be willing to make some contribution to the war effort.

⁵⁴ C. Dillon Glendinning, Treasury Representative in the Middle East, residing at Cairo.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ On February 28, 1945; see bracketed note, p. 526.

Booth and I are agreed it would be inadvisable to seek formal Iranian consent to continuance American troops in Iran. They have been here nearly 3 years on informal basis which we can always assert to rest upon British treaty rights and it might well weaken our position to give Iranians idea we think it necessary now to obtain renewed consent. In any case I am convinced that however much Iranians may desire continued presence of our troops pending withdrawal of British and Russians it is impossible to believe they would dare put such a request in writing.

In light of foregoing analysis of situation I hardly think it worth while to urge War at this time to accelerate withdrawal. Results to be anticipated do not in my judgment warrant disruption of plans and extra effort involved.

MURRAY

891.00/6-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 20, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received June 20—6:45 a. m.]

416. Prime Minister Sadr yesterday spoke to me about what he called serious if not disastrous Iranian political situation. He asserted majority in Majlis⁵⁷ is under British influence while Soviets dominate minority group with result that Iranians are battered between the two outside forces and unable manage own affairs or even set up govt that will last. In effect, he said, British and Russians each seeking to further own ends and using Iranians as tools and whipping boys.

Sadr said he feared failure to remedy this situation would produce disaster here and serious repercussions abroad. He expressed strong hope US Govt would feel able in expected conversations with British and Soviets to urge policy of leaving Iran completely free to handle internal affairs without foreign interference. He stressed that Iran Govt even though imperfect in functioning is nevertheless democratic and should be allowed work out own salvation.

Although not all Iranian political difficulties can be attributed to foreign interference I am inclined agree with Prime Minister and suggest consideration be given to raising this question at Big Three meeting or other early appropriate occasion. Time may have arrived at which it would be helpful to make clear we are aware of foreign intrigues within Iranian political machinery and express our disapproval.

Sent to Dept as 416 rptd to London as 32, Moscow as 128.

MURRAY

⁵⁷ The Iranian Parliament.

891.00/6-2645: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, June 26, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received June 26—6:35 a. m.]

428. Dept's instruction of Feb 28, 1945.⁵⁸ In view of unavoidable delay in reporting sooner by written despatch on the delivery to the Shah on June 5 last of my letters of credence and the audience I had with him following the ceremonies of presentation, I believe the Dept may be interested in the following résumé of the more important observations the Shah had to make on that occasion.

The Shah spoke earnestly of the present relations between Iran and Great Britain and said he sensed a very distinct change of late in British policy toward his country. Whereas the British Minister had demanded of him at the time of the furthest advance of the Germans into the Caucasus that he close the Majlis and retain in power the then reportedly pro-British Prime Minister Ghavam-Os Saltaneh⁵⁹ and had declared he was speaking for the American as well as the British Govt, His Majesty was convinced from recent indications that the British now realized the vital importance to their empire and to their very existence of doing all in their power to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. Such being the case, His Majesty expressed the earnest hope that we would work in close collaboration with the British to that end.

In reply to the Shah's appeal, I pointed out the part which the American Govt had played in bringing about the American-British-Soviet Declaration on Iran of Dec. 11 [7], 1943, and added that while I was, of course, grateful to him for his helpful suggestion and would naturally wish to work closely with the British for the purpose to which he had referred, I would be equally desirous of collaborating also with the Russians who are likewise parties to the Tehran Declaration.

I learned in later conversation with Hossein Ala, Minister of the Court, that he was at least partly instrumental in suggesting to the Shah the line he should take with regard to American-British collaboration. The suggestion is of considerable interest coming from Hossein Ala in view of his long-standing reputation of being anti-British. The suggestion is also of interest in the light of the past strong resentment of the Iranians at any indication of close Anglo-American collaboration in matters affecting Iran.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ See especially telegrams 362, November 7, 1942, 1 a. m., and 428, December 9, 1942, 11 p. m., from Tehran, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 180 and 211, respectively.

The only other observation of importance made by the Shah during the audience related to the problem of democratic govt in Iran. He said his experience in dealing with the problem led him to the discouraging view that it would take "40 years" for the people of his country to learn to govern themselves. He referred in this connection to the remark he understood Palmerston or Gladstone to have made the [*that*] "British democracy is not for export" and wondered whether the British parliamentary system could ever be made to work successfully here.

Sensing that the Shah might be endeavoring to elicit from me some words that might encourage him to resort to personal rule without benefit of parliamentary restraints in case the situation might, in his opinion, eventually warrant such action, I took the occasion to point out that in my considered opinion based on long years of dealing with Iranian affairs, the Iranian Majlis, whatever its defects—and what parliamentary body is without defects?—has more than once in recent times served to protect the vital interests of the country against unwarranted foreign demands when the Govt itself or the Crown had proved unequal to the task. The Shah declared himself in agreement with this view and referred again to his refusal to accede to the earlier British demand referred to above that he close the Majlis; he added, however, a remark which he said he had made to the British Minister at the time, namely, that if the Majlis were ever closed it would be because the Iranians desired it and never on foreign demand.

A word in conclusion about the personality of the young Shah: I had been accustomed during my previous tour of duty here to dealing with his father, old Reza Khan, who was then the man of destiny in Iran but had not yet seized supreme power. He brought great reforms in Iran including the unveiling of women which is remarkable considering the fact that he was almost illiterate. However, although of humble origin himself, he had little if any interest in bettering living and health conditions among his unhappy people. A brutal, avaricious, and inscrutable despot in his later years, his fall from power when the country was occupied in 1941 by British and Russian forces and his death later in exile⁶⁰ were regretted by no one.

With such a heritage on his paternal side one cannot but be surprised at the type and character of the son who succeed[ed] him in difficult days of foreign occupation. While he has had some schooling in Switzerland it was cut short in 1935 when his father ordered him to return to Iran. Nevertheless, and whatever the reason, he is today of a mental maturity that belies his 25 years. He is deeply distressed over the poverty and disease among his people, their low standard of living and bad working conditions and appreciative of the fact that if Iranian

⁶⁰ The deposed Shah died in South Africa in 1944.

patriotism is to be revitalized in order to stem the tide and appeal of communism, drastic and urgent steps must be taken to relieve the misery in his country. It is not true, he says, that Islam can be counted on to be immune to communism when hunger, disease and misery are left unchecked. He added that he earnestly hopes the United States will lend him every possible assistance toward solving the grave problems with which he is faced.

MURRAY

891.00/7-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 5, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received July 5—6:44 a. m.]

459. Embstel 416, June 20. On instructions of Cabinet MinFonAff has expressed to me strong Iran Govt hope that at Big Three meeting US Govt would work to stop foreign interference in internal Iranian affairs with special reference to parliamentary elections to be held next fall or winter. In effect he reiterated Prime Minister's statement to me of June 19 but this time with full Cabinet sanction.

MinFonAff also again spoke of Iran Govt desire for early withdrawal of British and Soviet troops.

Sent to Dept as 459, repeated to London as 35 and Moscow as 146.

MURRAY

891.00/7-1645 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State*⁶¹

TEHRAN, July 16, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received July 16—1:45 p. m.]

501. During private dinner with Shah on July 13, Minister of Court, Ala, being only other person present Shah talked at length and with great frankness of his fears for Iran's future. Essence of his remarks was as follows:

1. Constant changing of weak governments brought about by present Majlis is disastrous. Shah greatly regrets he lacks constitutional power to dissolve Majlis and in fact has even less authority than European constitutional monarchs.

2. Iran needs strong Prime Minister but if he (Shah) were to take steps to place good man in office he would be attacked violently by Soviets as Fascist reactionary.

⁶¹ In telegram 366, July 20, 1945, 8 p. m., to Tehran, Acting Secretary of State Grew stated: "Information contained in urtel 501 July 16 extremely useful and a summary has been telegraphed to the SecState at the Conference." (800.24/7-1645) For the telegraphic summary, see Document 1327, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1389.

3. Whole question of Soviet policy toward Iran is gravely disturbing him. When I suggested San Francisco Conference indicated trend toward fair dealing and better understanding among nations with consequent hope for improved Irano-Soviet relations, he replied: "Yes, if Russia wants peace." His thought seemed to be that Russia, like Nazi Germany up to 1939, is winning series of bloodless political victories and that test of her real intentions will come when these easy triumphs are no longer possible.

Although Ala has several times stated to me his own opinion that man like Qavam-es-Saltaneh is needed, Shah did not indicate his preference for Premiership and showed little enthusiasm when Qavam's name was mentioned. He seemed strongly opposed to Seyid Zia.⁶²

British Ambassador has shown me telegram he sent his Foreign Office July 11 expressing view that Soviets appear to be making great effort to achieve position of dominance over Iran before withdrawal of troops takes place. Sir Reader is evidently much disturbed. His telegram cited increasing Soviet support of Tudeh⁶³ activities, (which are themselves increasing in scope), use of Tehran radio for political propaganda (mytel 492, July 14,⁶⁴), growing virulent anti-British attitude of pro-Russian newspapers and *Pravda* article (reported Moscow's telegram July 12 [11]⁶⁵), said there is no doubt Kurdish independence movement being encouraged by Russians. Concluded Soviets probably not planning violent coup, although this would be conceivable, but rather aiming at domination of next Majlis through manipulation of coming elections.

As possible remedies for situation Bullard suggests wider publicity through visit of party of independent journalists, admission of foreign observers to all parts of Iran at time of elections, and withdrawal of British and Soviet troops from considerable area of country. (Even

⁶² Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, prominent Iranian politician and member of the Majlis.

⁶³ Iranian Communist Party.

⁶⁴ Not printed; it gave a summary of a Persian language broadcast by the Soviet Embassy in Iran over the Iranian Government radio station at Tehran on July 2. The broadcast denounced an alleged small but influential group in the United States which was said to consider victory over Nazi Germany cause for mourning and to be working for lenient treatment of Germany. The telegram concluded: "Although this broadcast was careful to avoid criticism of American Government or people as whole it seems to me in questionable taste for official Soviet representatives to direct such talk at Iranian audience over Iranian station on Iranian soil. In my view this is not comparable to Soviet criticisms of United States published and broadcast within USSR. British Ambassador also disturbed by this and other recent Soviet programs here which have strayed from line which would ordinarily be expected in building friendly relations between Iran and USSR.

If it does not itself desire to take matter up, Department may wish to instruct me to ask Soviet Embassy to avoid future criticism of United States or American individuals in its official broadcasts and publications here." (861-20291/7-1445)

⁶⁵ No. 2510, not printed.

if withdrawal were only from Tehran, he thinks it would have heartening effect on Iranian Govt.)

Although I think Bullard is sometimes inclined to be alarmist, it is impossible not to be concerned at present state of affairs and ruthlessness of Soviet tactics. *Pravda's* blast at Sadr Cabinet is exactly like attacks made on Saed ⁶⁶ last fall and attempt made to broadcast article over Tehran radio (mytel July 15 ⁶⁷) is certainly astounding. I understand Soviet Ambassador declines to deal with Sadr or MinFonAff Sepahbodi, which is also reminiscent of Saed episode. Indications seem to be that Russians are determined to have at least reasonably favorable cabinet in power during elections, since Prime Minister and Interior Minister can exercise great influence in choice of deputies. Weakness of present Majlis plays into Soviet hands.

Sent to Dept as 501 repeated to Moscow as 162.

MURRAY

[Questions concerning Iran were discussed at the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, particularly the withdrawal of foreign troops from that country. The agreement of the participants on this matter was set forth in article XV of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Conference dated August 1, 1945, which stated: "It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945." This Protocol is printed in *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, volume II, page 1477. For references to discussions on Iran at the Conference, see *ibid.*, volume I, index, page 1071, and *ibid.*, volume II, index, page 1622.]

861.20291/7-1445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1945—2 p. m.

371. Information contained in urtel 492, July 14 ⁷⁰ (repeated to Moscow as 159), of interest. Please continue to keep us informed of developments and of any other Soviet propaganda in Iran relating to

⁶⁶ Mohammed Saed; his resignation as Iranian Prime Minister on November 9, 1944, was reported in telegram 832, November 9, 1944, 3 p. m., from Tehran, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 472.

⁶⁷ Telegram 497, not printed; it stated: "*Pravda* article subject of Moscow's telegram 2510, July 12 [11] was included in Soviet Embassy program over Radio Tehran July 13 and Director Iranian Propaganda Department cut it off the air before completion." (891.00/7-1545)

⁷⁰ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 64, p. 387.

the United States which may come to your attention. In our opinion it would serve no useful purpose for the matter to be taken up at this time in Iran. We are however suggesting to Ambassador Harriman ⁷¹ that he may be able to use it during conversations which he may have in Moscow on the subject of American-Soviet relations.

Repeated to Moscow.⁷²

GREW

811.24591/8-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 3, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received August 3—11: 52 a. m.]

583. Under instructions from London British Chargé Lascelles last night informed MinFonAff agreement had been reached at Potsdam that British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn at once from Tehran. In reply to Minister's query he said British would probably make Qum about 100 miles south their nearest military post and hoped Soviets would withdraw as far as Kazvin roughly same distance west of capital.

According to Lascelles, Sepahbodi expressed deep disappointment at this saying he had hoped for much more sweeping change in situation. He added Iranian people would assume evacuation of Tehran was maximum concession British and American Govts would ever be able to wring from Soviets. Lascelles today advised Soviet Ambassador of his action. Maximov said he still had no official word on subject from his Govt. He inquired regarding American plans and remarked that "of course" Russians would not withdraw unless Americans did likewise.

Lascelles says British are prepared to begin retirement as soon as Russians but not before. He anticipates military will be leisurely about movement unless prodded but says his Embassy will do all it can to hasten things. In any case he thinks shift will require some weeks to complete after it starts.

Both Soviet and British Embassies appear to think arrangements should be concerted by mixed commission composed of representatives of American, Soviet and British Armies and Embassies here.

Sent Dept 583, repeated London 41, Moscow 178.

MURRAY

⁷¹ W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

⁷² As telegram 1661, July 21, 1945, 2 p. m., with the following sentence added: "You may in your discretion when a suitable opportunity presents itself take up this question with FonOff." (861.20291/7-1445)

811.24591/8-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 6, 1945—2 p. m.
 [Received August 6—9 : 05 a. m.]

590. My telegrams 554, July 28; 560, July 30;⁷³ and 583, August 3. I should greatly appreciate any information and guidance Department can give me regarding agreement apparently reached at Potsdam on withdrawal Allied troops from Tehran especially as it may concern relation of American troop movements to those of British and Soviet forces.

British Ambassador today asked whether American authorities in Tehran would be prepared to participate in mixed Anglo-Soviet-American Commission to schedule evacuation (my telegram 583, August 3). Please instruct.

MURRAY

800.24591/8-745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Shayesteh, Minister of Iran
 Mr. Loy W. Henderson, NEA
 Mr. George V. Allen, NEA
 Mr. Harold B. Minor, ME

The Iranian Minister called today on instructions from his Government to express disappointment and regret at the action of the Potsdam Conference in limiting withdrawal of Allied forces to evacuation of the city of Tehran. He said his Government had hoped for complete withdrawal of Allied forces or at least evacuation of a large part of the country.

Mr. Allen said that while it is true the agreement is for evacuation only from the city of Tehran it was also agreed that further discussions will take place with regard to withdrawal from additional areas. He told the Minister that the subject of evacuation of foreign troops from Iran has been placed on the agenda of the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London.⁷⁴ There is therefore still hope that more substantial withdrawal can be made. Both he and Mr. Henderson informed the Minister that he may inform his Government that

⁷³ For Nos. 554 and 560, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, pp. 1395 and 1397, respectively.

⁷⁴ This meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, September 11–October 2, 1945, was attended by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

the viewpoint of the United States Government has not changed. This Government continues to favor the withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran as soon as possible, and will lend its effort toward this end.

The Minister said he appreciated this attitude and would inform his Government. He said while they will still be disappointed at the action taken at least the situation still offers some hope.

811.24591/8-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 8, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received August 8—6:40 a. m.]

594. My telegram 590, August 6. Booth states his orders give no indication movements his troops out of Tehran are conditioned upon or in any way related to withdrawal British and Russians from city. Therefore he thinks PGC (Persian Gulf Command) should not participate in Mixed Evacuation Commission except as observer.

I concur in Booth's view and think Embassy representation should likewise be limited to an observer, unless Potsdam Agreement in some way makes British and Russian withdrawal conditional upon departure of Americans.

MURRAY

811.24591/8-845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)*⁷⁵

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945—4 p. m.

418. Urtels 583, 590 and 594. While withdrawal of American troops from Tehran is not conditioned upon withdrawal of Russian or British forces, the three Governments have agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn from Iran and that further stages of the withdrawal should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign

⁷⁵ In a memorandum of August 9, 1945, to Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) stated: "Wallace Murray had no report on what happened at Potsdam and was consequently cautious about our joining with the British and the Russians. However, we can now correct the impression which the British gave the Iranian Govt (that only the British and Russians agreed to withdraw from Tehran). NEA feels that since the U.S. was a party to the agreement to withdraw, it might seem strange if we refused to consult on an evacuation schedule.

Wallace Murray naturally would like to find some way to keep our troops in Tehran as long as possible but Pres. Truman has committed us and we must go along without any show of hesitation. We think the telegram No. 418 should go, if you concur in the above reasoning." (811.24591/8-845) The Assistant Secretary initialed the telegram. For President Truman's directive that United States troops be withdrawn from Tehran within 60 days, see his memorandum of July 27 to the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Marshall), *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1394.

Ministers to be held in London in September 1945. It would consequently seem natural and appropriate for representatives of the three powers in Tehran to consult together to schedule evacuation. Consequently, American participation in an Anglo-Soviet-American Commission for this purpose, as suggested by the British, is approved.

BYRNES

800.24591/8-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 10, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received August 10—6:10 a. m.]

607. My telegram 583, August 3. Soviet Ambassador has received instructions from Moscow on evacuation troops from Tehran.⁷⁶ FonOff (Foreign Office) announces he has stated that Potsdam Conference decided on immediate withdrawal Allied Forces from city.

British Ambassador expresses concern lest Russians, who have fewer troops and little or no equipment or installations in Tehran, should withdraw more quickly than British and so get greater credit with Iranians.

Repeated to Moscow as 187 and London as 44.

MURRAY

800.24591/8-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 11, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received August 11—7:04 a. m.]

612. Mytel 594, August 8 and Deptstel 418, August 9. General Booth remains firmly opposed to American participation in Mixed Evacuation Commission at this juncture. He fears British and Soviets might try to use such body to alter schedule already in effect for withdrawal American forces. In particular he fears effort would be made to eliminate ATC (Air Transport Command) detachment at Tehran whose retention here he considers essential for communications with USSR at least so long as Jap war lasts. (I agree with this view since British and Russians would doubtless be glad to have field clear for BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation) and Intourist Air Services.) Booth further points out main British interest is probably to use us as buffer or cat's-paw with Russians. It is, however, my

⁷⁶ In telegram 3072, August 27, 1945, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union stated: "Writing to British Ambassador under date of August 17 Molotov stated that instructions would soon be issued to Soviet military command regarding details of withdrawal of troops from Iranian capital." (861.24591/8-2745)

understanding he would be prepared to join in consultation with Allies after they have prepared their own general schedules.

Although I do not think Booth's arguments are necessarily conclusive I do recognize their validity and am inclined to reiterate original recommendation that our participation should be limited to role of observers. It could be explained to Soviets and British that our own evacuation is already scheduled and in full swing and will be carried out as fast as practicable. We would naturally exchange full information with our Allies on progress.

In any case it is obvious PGC (Persian Gulf Command) will refuse even to act in capacity of observer unless instructed by War. If Department wishes Embassy to participate I suggest Department consult with War and make sure appropriate orders are sent direct to PGC since Embassy participation without PGC would be worse than useless.

Foregoing is based on assumption Jap war continues. British Ambassador seems to feel that immediate Jap surrender would solve evacuation problem and perhaps make Mixed Commission unnecessary.

MURRAY

891.00/8-2345

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1945.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN

I. *The Background*

Historically, relations between the United States and Iran were of minor importance, both from the American and the Iranian viewpoints, until 1941. During the entire course of Iran's modern history, its foreign relations have been influenced principally by Russia and Great Britain, which have been engaged in a continuous struggle for political and economic ascendancy in Iran. The steady increase in Germany's interest in Iran, beginning in the 1920's, introduced a complicating factor into Iranian foreign affairs. The extension of German influence, and the failure of Reza Shah Pahlevi to reply satisfactorily to repeated Anglo-Soviet demands for the expulsion of German fifth-columnists, finally resulted in a coordinated invasion of Iran by Russian and British forces in August 1941.

A. *Effects of Allied occupation of Iran.* Iran's occupation by British and Russian troops, subsequently augmented by United States Army service forces, had far-reaching economic and political consequences. The authoritarian government of Reza Shah Pahlevi was replaced, under his young son, by a weak, constitutional regime for

which Iran was ill prepared by tradition or experience. Iran's internal security forces collapsed, semi-autonomous conditions prevailed in the provinces, tribal security deteriorated, the administrative machinery of the government was disrupted, the morale of the population was badly shaken, foreign and domestic commerce were drastically curtailed, and an inflationary trend began.

Faced with this critical internal situation, the Iranians turned for advice and assistance to the United States, which had maintained a traditional policy of disinterested friendship toward Iran. This period, beginning in the autumn of 1941, marks the turning point in Irano-American relations, and the beginning of a trend toward ever deeper American interest in Iran.

B. *American advisory assistance.*⁷⁷ The American response to Iran's need was sympathetic. Since 1942, the principal expression of the closer relations prevailing between the two countries has been the provision of American advisers in various fields of governmental activity, upon specific Iranian request. The largest of these advisory groups is the economic and financial mission, charged with supervision of finance, internal revenue, customs, price control and stabilization, rationing, collection and distribution of food and commodities, public domains, et cetera. A military mission is charged with the reorganization of the Iranian Army's services of supply. A second military mission has for its task the reorganization and administration of the Iranian *gendarmarie* (rural police). Other Americans serve or have recently served as advisers in public health, pharmacy, municipal police administration, and irrigation.

C. *American economic and military assistance.* In addition to the adviser program, assistance has been extended to Iran in the form of goods essential to the maintenance of the economy and internal security of the country. Civilian goods, such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, motor transport, and tires, have been furnished through the machinery of the Middle East Supply Centre. Military goods in some volume have been supplied under Lend-Lease, as a result of recommendations from the American military missions.

This policy of assistance to Iran, from the American point of view, had for its immediate objective the desire to respond sympathetically to the appeals of a friendly nation. Its long-range objectives, however, were to contribute to the reconstruction of Iran as a sound member of the international body politic, and thereby to remove a future threat to Allied solidarity and international security.

D. *Declaration on Iran.* American interest in Iran was publicly acknowledged by our participation in the Declaration on Iran, signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt in conjunc-

⁷⁷ See documentation on the Millspaugh, Ridley, and Schwarzkopf Missions, pp. 526-538.

tion with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. This declaration acknowledged Iran's contribution to the common war effort, recognized the special economic problems created for Iran by the war, pledged Iran such economic assistance as might be possible within the limits imposed by the war, promised consideration of Iran's economic problems in the postwar period, and expressed the desire for the maintenance of Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

II. *Current Status of American Policy*

The basic objectives of the American policy of assistance to Iran still obtain.

A. *Current status of advisory program.* Therefore the Department is continuing to extend its political and moral support to the two military missions and is endeavoring to find means of making available to the Iranian Government the supplies and equipment necessary to the implementation of the missions' tasks. At the same time we are pressing the Iranian Government to give to the missions more effective administrative and legislative support, in the interests of internal security.

With respect to the Financial Mission, the Department is aware that its economic benefit is steadily diminishing, and that the present weak Iranian Government is unable and perhaps unwilling to afford it the support and authority necessary to the accomplishment of its objectives. The Department, therefore, is currently giving consideration to the withdrawal of the mission, provided this can be accomplished without contributing to the political and economic instability of Iran. It should be emphasized, however, that the Financial Mission is not an official United States Government mission, each of the American advisers having been employed individually by the Iranian Government. The Department's role in regard to this mission has been to advise both the members and the Iranian Government when appropriate.

B. *Economic assistance to Iran.* In the meantime, other forms of economic assistance are being provided. With the termination of the mission of the Persian Gulf Command for supply to Russia, large quantities of American installations and equipment are being or will soon be declared surplus.⁷⁸ In conjunction with the surplus disposal authorities, the Department is undertaking to make available for purchase by the Iranian Government such equipment and installations as may be necessary to facilitate restoration of Iran's economy and to augment the capacity of the Trans-Iranian Railway in a manner consistent with Iran's expanded postwar needs. In this connection, the

⁷⁸ For documentation on the disposition of American fixed installations and other surplus property in Iran, see pp. 566 ff.

Department is requesting other American Government agencies, which have priority rights to such surpluses, to re-examine their needs with a view to waiving their claims to specified surpluses in favor of the Government of Iran. Moreover, the Department is undertaking interdepartmental discussions directed towards insuring the operational stability of the Iranian railroad system, by endeavoring to obtain for the Iranian Government remuneration for the services which it extended to the Allies in transporting supplies to Russia.

C. *Attitude toward evacuation of Iran.* Political assistance is being rendered with respect to the Iranian Government's request for evacuation of foreign troops. The Department's attitude towards this request has been sympathetic, since the withdrawal of foreign forces is regarded as an essential preliminary to the restoration of Iran's administrative stability and economy. Accordingly the Department has indicated to the British and Soviet Governments its attitude of sympathy towards the Iranian request, and, through consultation with the War Department, has endeavored to expedite the departure of American forces. These efforts have been furthered in the Potsdam commitment calling for evacuation of Tehran, and the Department has recommended American participation on the Mixed Evacuation Commission in Tehran, which is designed to implement that commitment. It is hoped that the Council of Foreign Ministers will be able to expedite the complete evacuation of foreign troops from Iran.

D. *Attitude toward Allied censorship in Iran.* The Department has endeavored on a number of occasions to effect the relaxation or abolition of Anglo-Soviet political censorship controls in Iran,⁷⁹ which also constitute a limitation on Iran's sovereignty. These controls, chiefly exercised by the Russian authorities, prevent the dissemination of unbiased news to and from Iran. In accordance with its general interest in free access to news and its desire to assist Iran in recovering its independence, the Department will continue to urge the Soviet and British Governments to effect the immediate abolition of all censorship controls in Iran.

E. *Results of American aid policy.* This policy of political and economic assistance to Iran has had beneficial results. During the war, the provision of economic advice and essential commodities contributed to the tranquilization of the country and thereby helped to insure the uninterrupted flow of supplies to Russia. The efforts of the military missions in some measure restored the organizational stability and the morale of Iran's internal security forces. The presence of American missions to the Iranian Government, as an expression of the United States' interest in preserving the latter as an entity,

⁷⁹ For information on the termination of Anglo-Soviet censorship in Iran, see bracketed note, p. 583.

had a stabilizing effect upon the population and perhaps served as a moderating influence upon the British and Russians.

F. American commercial, aviation, and petroleum interests. American national interests in Iran are not being disregarded.

It is desired that American trade with Iran be restored and expanded as rapidly as possible. In this connection, the Department is endeavoring to indicate to the Iranian Government the desirability of relaxing its monopolistic controls, which extend to foreign trade, raw materials, the major part of Iranian industry, and foreign exchange. American business interests are already reopening trade channels with Iran, and have expressed interest in participating in development projects. At present American interests are bidding on a large municipal power project in Tehran, and it is probable that American companies will endeavor to construct certain irrigation projects for the Iranian Government.

The Department, in accordance with its policy of assisting in the development of commercial aviation, is pressing the Iranian Government to sign the Chicago aviation agreements⁸⁰ and the proposed bilateral agreement.⁸¹ Because of the present weakness of the Iranian Government, it is doubtful whether it will undertake to sign the agreements in the near future. However, the Iranian Government has given informal assurances that it will extend to American commercial aviation temporary landing and traffic rights in Iran, regardless of whether the Iranian Government signs the air transport agreement in the immediate future. From the Iranian point of view, the recently formed Iranian Airways Company has indicated its desire to obtain American equipment and operating personnel, and the Department is endeavoring to assist the company in this respect.

With regard to the possibility of assisting in the development of American petroleum reserves outside the Western Hemisphere, the attitude of the Iranian Government towards the granting of further oil concessions to any foreign interest is somewhat uncertain, since the Soviet Government has made it clear that it desires to acquire petroleum concessions if they are granted to any other foreign power. However, the Iranian Government has given the Department assurances that, in the event that it decides in the future to reopen negotia-

⁸⁰ The International Civil Aviation Conference met at Chicago from November 1 to December 7, 1944. A General Air Convention, an Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, an International Air Services Transit Agreement and an International Air Transport Agreement were opened for signature on December 7, 1944. For text of the Convention, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1591, or 61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1180; for texts of the Agreements, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series Nos. 469, 487, and 488, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1516, 1693, and 1701.

⁸¹ For information on this subject, see bracketed note, p. 584.

tions for concessions in Iran, American applications will be given consideration.⁸²

III. *Future Policy*

A. *Deterioration of Iran's internal and international position.* In the course of the past year, certain modifications in Iran's internal and international position have occurred, which directly or indirectly affect the application of American policy to Iran. Of these modifications, the most important is the intensification of the traditional Anglo-Soviet conflict for supremacy in Iran, which had been subordinated temporarily to a policy of outward cooperation in the interests of military expediency. Apart from the obvious effects of this conflict upon Anglo-Soviet relations and upon Allied solidarity, it is reflected in Iranian internal affairs in the form of a steadily widening politico-social schism between leftist and conservative forces, which makes impossible the maintenance of governmental stability and administrative continuity in Iran. With the progressive weakening of the Iranian Government, a political vacuum is being created in which continued foreign interference is inevitable. Because of the weakening of the Iranian Government, moreover, the American advisers' tasks of strengthening and stabilizing the Government have been rendered difficult through lack of adequate support and authority.

With the termination of supply to Russia through the Iranian corridor, the Government is also faced with critical economic problems with which it is unable to cope, such as resettlement of labor, reconversion of industry, transition from an inflated to a rapidly deflating economy, and the general problems arising out of the relaxation of war-time economic controls.

The disturbing developments which are taking place in Iran make it increasingly clear that Iran threatens to become one of the major security problems of the future, and one of the great threats to Allied solidarity, unless there can be achieved both the reconciliation of British and Soviet interests and the stabilization of Iran's internal affairs. The formulation of American policy towards Iran, therefore, will be governed in the future, as at present, primarily by the requirements of international security.

It would appear, however, that the present means of implementing American policy require re-examination.

B. *American policy toward Iran as an international problem.* Although the Department has for some time been considering the possibility of reorganizing the American advisory program on an

⁸² For documentation on advice by the Department of State that oil companies postpone the sending of representatives to Iran to discuss concessions, see pp. 581 ff.

inter-governmental basis through an amendment of Public Law No. 63,⁸³ the advisability of attempting to continue a unilateral American aid program on a long-range basis is now open to question. The ideal solution would be the formation of a tripartite advisory commission, on which the two great powers which have enduring interests in Iran would also share the responsibility for and participate in the stabilization of Iran and its reconstitution as a strong nation. While the Department is fully aware of the obstacles which stand in the way of the achievement of this goal, it will continue to take the initiative in seeking to attain this objective, and in seeking to impress upon the British and Soviet Governments the multilateral character of the obligation towards Iran.

C. *American policy toward Iran's internal problems.* As a corollary, this Government will also attempt to encourage the Iranian Government to assume the responsibilities and functions of a sovereign state, and to establish a legitimate and strong government which will be representative of the population and effectively responsive to its needs. It will also urge the Iranian Government to reconcile the political and separatist differences which now threaten to produce a fragmentation of Iran.

D. *Implementation of American policy.* In pursuit of these objectives, consideration should be given to the initiation of conversations in the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Iran's economic problems in the postwar period. Should such conversations give promise of effecting any real cooperation for the betterment of Iran, the Department would consider the advisability of offering to replace its unilateral advisory program by an Anglo-Soviet-American program or a broader United Nations program dedicated to the reconstruction of Iran. This would constitute an effective implementation of the economic guarantees of the Declaration of Tehran.

In implementation of the Tehran Declaration's guarantees of Iranian sovereignty and independence, the Department will continue to press for the rapid abolition of Allied censorship controls, evacuation of all foreign forces from Iran, and restoration to Iran of those communications facilities which still remain under Allied control. Once these are restored, it will endeavor to assist Iran in the maintenance of their operational stability, so as to prevent any power from having a pretext for assuming their operation or control. From a broader point of view, moreover, it will make every effort to prevent the development of any situation which might constitute a limitation on Iranian sovereignty, such as the situation implicit in the Russian desire for access to the Persian Gulf, or any attempt by a third power to

⁸³ Approved May 3, 1939, 53 Stat. 652.

exploit the internal difficulties of Iran for its own expansionist purposes or in pursuit of a policy of regionalism.

[In telegram 649, August 24, 1945, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that on August 14 Iranian gendarmes overpowered a party of five Kurds and seized various papers including a map of a proposed independent Kurdistan embracing parts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. He also stated that the "Iranians are firmly convinced whole program is Soviet inspired and directed and they take very serious view of matter." (891.00/8-2445)]

In several telegrams beginning August 19, 1945, the Ambassador reported desertion of 37 Iranian army officers and enlisted men from the garrison at Meshed and their interception by Iranian *gendarmerie*, with several of the deserters being killed or captured, at Gunbad in the Soviet zone. Soviet authorities thereupon informed the Iranian commander at Meshed that no activity by his forces would be permitted inside or outside Meshed, and prevented two Iranian army planes from landing at Meshed. They also refused to permit reinforcement of gendarmes at Gunbad, forbade the gendarmes there to use their arms under any circumstances, and forbade the gendarmes at Sari to move about. In telegram 670, August 30, 1945, 10 a. m., the Ambassador reported:

"General situation in Iran is tense with Iranian authorities obviously highly nervous. They apparently fear serious outbreaks of rioting, if not worse, under Soviet inspiration and are greatly disturbed by Russian attitude. . . . MinFonAff yesterday sent FonOff official to see me to express Govt's grave concern. He said in addition to incidents already reported Govt was disturbed by refusal of Soviets to permit dispatch 100 gendarmes to Shabsavar, where trouble threatens between farmers and town workers.

FonOff says it has been trying for 3 days to discuss matters with Soviet Embassy, but Ambassador Maximov is away and Chargé d'Affaires⁸⁴ apparently deliberately evades invitation to call at FonOff. . . . Sepahbodi says Russian obstruction nullifies Iran Govt's efforts to maintain security." (891.00/8-3045)

In telegram 679, September 1, 1945, 10 a. m., the Ambassador stated that "200 gendarmes were despatched from Tehran for Shahi on August 20, but were stopped at Firuzkuh by Russians and ordered to return Tehran. Force is now encamped between Tehran and Firuzkuh while Iranian authorities are trying, so far unsuccessfully, to negotiate clearance from Soviet Embassy here." (891.00/9-145)]

⁸⁴ Akhad Alekper-ogly Yakubov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Iran.

800.24591/8-1145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)*⁸⁵

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1945—6 p. m.

468. Urtel 612, Aug. 11. Since Potsdam commitment on withdrawal of troops is not contingent upon coordinated action by three participating nations, and since our evacuation is already scheduled and under way, formal American participation on Evacuation Commission seems unnecessary. However, you are authorized to participate in role of observer.

War is instructing Colonel Anderson⁸⁶ to participate only as observer, and is informing him that no action to alter present evacuation schedule will be authorized.

BYRNES

891.00/9-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

TEHRAN, September 5, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received September 6—7 : 28 a. m.]

693. . . .

Prime Minister Sadr yesterday made declaration in Majlis regarding recent incidents in north reading official reports from Minister Interior. He said Soviet authorities in certain regions had prevented action by security forces to maintain order and Minister Foreign Office had sent note to Soviet Embassy on this subject. Added that no

⁸⁵ A draft telegram to Tehran was handed by Mr. Minor to Col. R. L. Vittrup of the Operations Division of the War Department on an undisclosed date. It stated: "Both State and War Depts are of view that we have no justifiable grounds for declining to participate in discussions with British and Russian authorities (urtel 612, August 11) regarding a scheduled evacuation of Tehran, in view of President Truman's agreement in Potsdam that the three powers be withdrawn from Tehran immediately. It is felt that our attitude towards participation in Mixed Evacuation Commission should be governed by objective of implementing Potsdam commitment, rather than by considerations which suit our own convenience. War Department is sending appropriate instructions to PGC.

End of Japanese war would not appear to eliminate necessity for continuing with plans for immediate evacuation of Tehran. Remaining evacuation steps, which will take place during next six months, will be discussed by Foreign Ministers' Council in September but we are pledged to evacuate Tehran now."

The War Department expressed its disagreement with this approach in a memorandum to the Department on August 21, 1945 (800.24591/8-2145). The wording of telegram 468 indicates Departmental acceptance of the views of the War Department.

⁸⁶ Col. Gustav A. M. Anderson, Commanding Officer, Persian Gulf Command.

result had been achieved as Russian authorities apparently must await orders from Moscow. Terminated by saying Iran Govt was maintaining balanced policy towards Russia, had done nothing contrary to Russian interests and given no cause for Soviet complaint.

MURRAY

891.00/9-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 7, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 1:14 p. m.]

701. Following is summary of formal statement on Iranian foreign policy made in Majlis yesterday by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sepahbodi:

Begin summary. Difficulties placed in way of despatch of security forces to maintain order in different parts of Iran are source of all recent disturbances and unfortunate events. Such difficulties should never have arisen. In accordance Tripartite Treaty, presence of Allied troops on Iranian territory does not constitute occupation.

Iran has fulfilled its engagements and Minister of Foreign Affairs does not understand why Iran Govt should not have been free from beginning to send troops or police to any part of country. Allied Forces are in Iran with Iranian permission. They are furthermore forces of friendly powers. Why then should despatch of Iranian troops to the regions in question (northern provinces where there has been rioting and threatened tribal attack) require special authorization or prior advice?

Even if war conditions made such prior advice necessary, end of war has removed reason for it. Minister of Foreign Affairs has instructed Iran Ambassadors Moscow and London to point out clearly lack of necessity for such state of affairs. He is certain that this action will not only remove present difficulties but also lay basis for better understanding among nations concerned. This better understanding should have influence on general relations of Iran's two powerful friends.

During conversations of Minister of Foreign Affairs with Soviet Ambassador 2 weeks ago, Sepahbodi received certain assurances which were to his entire satisfaction. One of these concerned censorship which has now been virtually abolished. If actions in other fields have not been in accordance with expectations, Minister of Foreign Affairs is sure this should not be construed as lack of sincerity between the two friendly countries but rather imputed to delay in receipt of necessary instructions.

Sooner these questions are adjusted, more friendly relations between the two nations will be encouraged. Iran Ambassador at Moscow has reported he has had lengthy and useful discussions with Soviets with view to strengthening relations.

Iran has asked to be represented in discussions at London regarding manner of evacuation of foreign troops from Iran⁸⁷ basing this request on article 6 and annex 1 of Tripartite Treaty. Evacuation itself is certain since treaty provides it must take place within 6 months after end of hostilities with Japan. Minister of Foreign Affairs hopes it will be completed sooner but Iranian interests must be safeguarded in connection manner of withdrawal of troops. Although Iran has no treaty with United States, United States Govt has been informed of request made to British and Russians in view of great interest it has in such questions and fact it will participate in London meeting.

Sent Dept as 701; repeated Moscow as 216 and London as 55.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/9-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 7, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received September 7—11:50 a. m.]

702. Minister Foreign Affairs last night asked me to transmit following message to Dept.

Iranian Minister Foreign Affairs has called to attention of Govts at London and Moscow provisions of article 6 and annex 1 of Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of January 29, 1942 whereby, when direct interest of Iran is discussed at an international post-war conference no decision should be taken before consultation with Iran. Now that the question of evacuation of Iran is on agenda of Conference (of Foreign Ministers) at London, Iran requests that an Iranian representative participate in discussion. Iran's interest in this question is obvious and it requests execution of article 6 and annex 1 of its treaty with Britain and Soviets. *End message.*

Sepahbodi made statement to Majlis yesterday⁸⁸ substantially identical with foregoing, adding that US Govt had been informed.

He asks our support of request, which seems to me entirely justified in light of provisions of treaty taken together with Berlin decision that Council of Foreign Ministers could provide for representation of other nations when matters of interest to them are discussed.

Sent to Dept as 702; repeated Moscow as 217 and London as 56.

MURRAY

⁸⁷ See telegram 702, September 7, 2 p. m., *infra*.

⁸⁸ See telegram 701, September 7, 1 p. m., *supra*.

740.00119 E.W./9-745 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*⁸⁹

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1945—8 p. m.

7715. For Secretary Byrnes on arrival.⁹⁰ Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of January 29, 1942 contains following provision:

“The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than 6 months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.”

It would be helpful in connection with question of withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran to obtain agreement among U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. Govts re date of suspension of hostilities as referred to in foregoing provision. Dept assumes that for this purpose date would be Sept. 1, 1945.

It would be reassuring to Iranians if public statement could now be made by Council of Foreign Ministers announcing the date from which 6-month period for evacuation of Iran will begin to run.

ACHESON

740.00119 Council/9-845 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*⁹¹

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1945—5 p. m.

Secdel⁹² 12. The Iranian Chargé d’Affaires⁹³ called on me today, on urgent instructions from his government, to point out that the Tripartite Agreement between Great Britain, Russia, and Iran of January 29, 1942 provides that Iran shall be consulted in discussions concerning it in post-war conferences such as meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers.

He requested that the U.S. support actively at the London meeting Iran’s claim to be heard on the question of the evacuation of troops and on any other question of concern to Iran. I replied that I would transmit his government’s representations to you immediately.

ACHESON

⁸⁹ Repeated to Moscow as No. 1975 and to Tehran as No. 504.

⁹⁰ The Secretary was aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*, en route to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London.

⁹¹ Aboard the *Queen Elizabeth* en route to London.

⁹² Code designation of telegrams sent to the delegation of the Secretary of State at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

⁹³ A. A. Daftary.

701.9111/11-3045

*The Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) to
President Truman*⁹⁴

PALACE OF SAADABAD,⁹⁵ September 10, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On appointing the first Ambassador to your country, I seize the welcome opportunity to send Your Excellency my warmest greetings and express the cordial sentiments of the Iranian people.

The choice of Hussein Ala, my Minister of the Imperial Court, for the important position of Iranian Ambassador to Washington is sufficient proof of my keen desire for the closest understanding based on mutual trust and cooperation with America.

It is over sixty years since regular diplomatic relations were established between my country and yours,⁹⁶ and some forty years ago Iran first sought expert financial advice from the United States of America⁹⁷ as the country best indicated to help her.

The good understanding and friendly relationship existing between the two countries have been daily extended and strengthened ever since, and we have at all times looked upon your envoys to this country as the symbols of justice and goodwill.

The crowning event in our relations was the historic visit of the late President Roosevelt who honoured the capital of this country by his stay in 1943.⁹⁸ To that eminent personality and his fortitude and farsightedness much is owed by the United Nations. His death which was a shock to us in this country was a great loss to the world. We shall always remember the days he spent amongst us in order, with the help of the other Allied Nations, to plan the victory in Europe.

We also remember with gratitude that the document acknowledging the contributions and sacrifices made by Iran in this war,⁹⁹ which by God's Providence has ended in the complete victory of those who stood for justice and freedom, bears his signature, and that he established the policy of the United States of America to maintain and confirm the independence and integrity of Iran.

⁹⁴ Handed to President Truman on November 29, 1945, by Hussein Ala at the time he presented his letters of credence as first Iranian Ambassador to the United States; see bracketed note, p. 461.

⁹⁵ Royal summer palace at Shimran, a suburb of Tehran.

⁹⁶ The first Minister Resident of the United States to Iran arrived at Tehran on June 9, 1883; see *Foreign Relations*, 1883, p. 702.

⁹⁷ For documentation on the employment by Iran of American experts as financial assistants in 1911, see *ibid.*, 1911, pp. 679 ff.

⁹⁸ In connection with his conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Tehran from November 28 to December 1, 1943; for documentation on this Conference, see *Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*.

⁹⁹ The Declaration Regarding Iran.

As Your Excellency already knows, during this world conflict, Iran helped her Allies with determination and all the means at her disposal. In her services to the cause of victory over tyranny and injustice, she sustained her share of hardships and privations. Now that victory has been gained, the Iranian people look forward to see a better day dawn for them as well as for all the nations of the world; they expect to have opportunity to live undisturbed within their frontiers and to lay the foundations of a life conducive to prosperity and peace. In order to achieve this, Mr. President, Iran expects that her sufferings and sacrifices shall not have been in vain, and that the assistance she needs for that purpose will be forthcoming from her great Allies and in particular from the United States of America.

Let me assure you, Mr. President, that the sincere friendship felt by the people of Iran and myself for you and the people of the United States is deep-seated in our hearts.

I wish particularly to stress the fact that the clear-sighted and high-minded policy which Your Excellency has pursued with such distinction, ability and success in the short period of the leadership of the United States of America is a source of real gratification and of confidence for the future peace of the world.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Mr. President, to express to Your Excellency my best wishes for your personal health and happiness and the prosperity of the steadfast and freedom-loving people of the United States.

Yours Sincerely,

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI

761.91/9-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 13, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received September 13—11:15 a. m.]

725. Tehran press says FonOff has sent two notes to Soviet Embassy regarding Russian refusal to permit dispatch of gendarmes from Tehran to Gorgan and Mazanderan. Second note sent Sept 11, reportedly stated rebel Iranian Army officers are propagandizing Turkomans and that if obstacles are interposed to dispatch of forces against them regrettable incidents are to be feared. Ministry has requested early reply.

Sent Dept as 725, rptd to Moscow as 222, and London as 57.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/9-745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1945—7 p. m.

521. Urtel 702, Sept 7. Dept has communicated Iranian Govt's views to Secretary in London, on basis of similar representations made by Iranian Legation in Washington.

ACHESON

891.00/9-1445: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1945.

[Received September 14—3: 50 p. m.]

3269. Soviet press September 14 devotes three-quarters column to appeal issued in Tabriz by newly organized Iranian Democratic Party "Azerbaidjan". Preamble of appeal states that Democratic authority must take account of peculiarities of peoples and tribes populating Iran, their customs, languages, etc. In this event federation does not weaken centralism but on contrary strengthens it since the more rights citizens have, greater is their attachment to motherland. Appeal further states that not a trace of democracy remains in Iran and that under such a regime Iranian people can never take road of progress. In Iranian Azerbaidjan, emphasizes appeal, there are 4½ million Azerbaidjanians who are distinguished from inhabitants of other parts of Iran by their language and special traditions. In this case demand for autonomy in sphere of culture and organization of their homeland is not an act which violates centralization. As consequence of infamous policy of center, Azerbaidjan is deprived of its rights. Its sons do not feel free in their own home. They do not have right to be instructed in native tongue. Azerbaidjan intelligentsia cannot work for prosperity of homeland. Such a situation is insufferable and cannot continue. Tehran, appeal further declares, is persecuting culture of Azerbaidjan. However they are not severing ties with it: "We will submit to common and just laws, will participate in Majlis and in central administration. We favor teaching of Persian language in schools along with our native language as a state language but we reserve right to be masters in our own home and to manage it at our own discretion."

[Here follow remaining details of the appeal.]

Sent Department 3269, repeated Baghdad [*Tehran*] 136, London 451, Ankara 53.

[KENNAN]

841.24591/9-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 14, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received September 14—11 a. m.]

729. Colonel Pybus, British Military Attaché, informs Colonel Baker schedule for evacuation British troops from Tehran has been completed. First units will move September 15 and shift will be completed by about October 1 except for some 25 officers and 50 men who will remain to wind up leases and other administrative matters. Headquarters British forces in Iran will be established Ahwaz.

This decision by British is apparently unrelated to any Russian plans and it is evident British have decided to move in hopes of forcing Russians to follow suit. Pybus told Baker they hoped to get Soviets entirely out of Iran in 3 months because they feared longer Russian occupation would result in secession of northern provinces.

Rptd London as 58 and Moscow as 224.

MURRAY

800.24591/9-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 14, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received September 14—1:20 p. m.]

730. Note from Minister Foreign Affairs Sepahbodi dated September 9 but received September 12 conveys Iran Government's congratulations on defeat of Japan and states: "The war being now entirely over in the interest of our victorious Allies it goes without saying that the Imperial Government awaits and expects the U S Government to agree to expedite the departure of its last soldier from Iranian soil."

Note encloses copies of communications of same date sent to British and Soviet Ambassadors essential portions of which are identical and read as follows:

"I now wish to remind you that on the date Germany surrendered and the European War came to an end a note was written under No. 1119 dated May 19, 1945 stating that the presence in Iran of the forces of our Allies was no longer necessary and that it was suitable that they should evacuate Iranian territory in order that normal conditions could be restored in Iran. That note still remains without reply. In view of the great friendship and cordiality existing the Iran Government and people expected that this proposal would have been welcome and carried out by this time.

I wish to point out at this time that according to the tripartite pact the 6 months period after armistice during which Allied forces must have left Iran begins on Sunday September 2, 1945 the day war ceased with Japan.

The Foreign Ministry, therefore, in the name of the Imperial Government and the people of Iran who sincerely and cordially helped the war effort of their Allies with all the means in their hands except that Iranian soil should in conformity with article 5 of the tripartite pact be completely evacuated on March 2, 1946 when not even one person attached to Allied Army Air and Naval Forces should remain on Iranian soil and waters. This is the definitive date on which Iran should be evacuated according to the provisions of the tripartite pact and any action that might be taken in accordance with note No. 1119 for the evacuation of Iran before that date would be more greatly appreciated by the Iranian people."

Substance of the notes was published Tehran yesterday. Full text follows by mail.¹

Sent Department as 730, repeated Moscow as 225, London as 59.

MURRAY

761.91/9-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 15 1945—8 a. m.

[Received September 15—7:10 a. m.]

731. [Here follows account of incidents of Soviet interference in Northern Iran.]

In recent conversation with Prime Minister, Schwarzkopf, to get reaction, suggested withdrawal of all gendarmes from northern area as they could not accomplish their job against constant Russian interference. Sadr said Iranians could never give in supinely in such a fashion but told Schwarzkopf gendarmes should not resist Soviet orders and care should be taken to avoid all incidents. He added he hoped to solve whole problem by negotiations and looked to United States for help.

MURRAY

811.24591/9-1545

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Miss Mary E. Crane of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1945.

Col. Connelly² telephoned this morning to discuss the question of the continued presence of Air Transport Command troops in Tehran.

He stated that the War Department had originally regarded their continued presence as desirable as a means of securing our post-war

¹ Copies of note 3084 to the American Ambassador and the notes to the British and Soviet Ambassadors were transmitted to the Department in despatch 104, October 3, 1945; none printed.

² Lt. Col. S. W. Connelly, of the Operations Division, War Department.

civil air rights. However, the War Department now considers that the acquisition of such rights will be determined by broad political considerations. He stated that, unless the State Department objected, the War Department would consider the ATC troops in Tehran solely from the point of view of military considerations, and they would probably be withdrawn within a few weeks.

I said that, while I could not speak officially for Mr. Henderson, I thought it most probable that he would approve of the War Department's attitude, since he regards the evacuation of Tehran as highly desirable.

Col. Connelly said he understood that the British plan to leave 70-80 liquidation personnel in Tehran after September 15.

Mr. Henderson subsequently stated that the Department concurred in desiring the withdrawal of ATC troops from Tehran, and that, in principle, withdrawal of American forces should be governed only by military considerations and not by political or aviation considerations.³ I have conveyed Mr. Henderson's statement to Col. Connelly.

891.00/7-1445

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁴

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1945.

The contents of this telegram⁵ assists in making more clear present Soviet policies with regard to Iran and serves to emphasize the gravity of the problems which face Iran and which may eventually affect the relations of various great powers in the Middle East. The publication of the appeal of the Tabriz Azerbaidjani nationalists in the Moscow press is significant because it shows that Moscow is now beginning openly to show its sympathy for and support of the Azerbaidjani movement in Iran. The strengthening of Azerbaidjani nationalism in northern Iran would do much to weaken the effectiveness of the Iranian central government, and a nationalistic slogan would probably be more helpful in winning the support for Soviet policies of the northern population of Iran than Communist propaganda. It is our understanding that the Soviet propagandists are accompanying their attacks upon the Iranian treatment of the Azerbaidjanians by words

³ In telegram 811, October 8, 1945, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that the Air Transport Command was discontinuing operations into Tehran "as of today". (811.79600/10-845)

⁴ Addressed to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson), the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), and the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow). In marginal notes, Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Durbrow indicated their agreement and Mr. Acheson stated: "I agree but don't see where it gets us."

⁵ Reference is to No. 3269, September 14, from Moscow, p. 407.

of praise of Moscow's treatment of the Azerbaidjanians in the Caucasus, most of whom, as you know, live in the Azerbaidjani Socialist Soviet Republic, the capital of which is Baku.

It is not as yet entirely clear whether the Russians hope to use aroused Azerbaidjani nationalist feelings in northern Iran to strengthen a movement for the annexation of the Azerbaidjani portions of Iran into Soviet Azerbaidjan in the not distant future or whether they hope to make use of Azerbaidjani nationalists in strengthening Soviet influence over all Iran.

It is possible that if the Russians can gain control of the leadership of the Azerbaidjani nationalist movement, they may endeavor to ally that movement with other political or racial groups, including Armenians, Kurds and the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, in an effort to gain the ascendancy over the central Iranian government.

Analysis of this situation strengthens our belief that we should do everything possible, even though we may suffer certain inconveniences and may have to sell our equipment and installations in Iran⁶ at lower prices, to draw all of our military forces out of Iran as rapidly as possible and that we should earnestly endeavor to prevail upon the British and the Russians also to effect complete withdrawal of their armed forces from Iran.

LOY W. HENDERSON

761.91/9-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 18, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received September 18—6:27 a. m.]

741. My telegrams 626, August 19; 649, August 24; 669, August 30; 670, August 30; 679, September 1; ⁷ 693, September 5; 701, September 7; 725, September 13; and 731, September 15. In conversation with me September 15, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sepahbodi indicated grave concern over Russian attitude and referred especially to numerous incidents in northern provinces.

He said he had addressed any number of notes to Soviet Embassy here but had not received even an acknowledgment. He had, therefore, instructed Iranian Ambassador at Moscow, Ahy, to express hope that Soviets would refrain from interference with movement of Iranian security forces. Only reply received by Ahy was reference to a note delivered to Iranians by Soviets some time ago (possibly late last year) renewing demand for the granting of an oil concession.

⁶ This refers to the question of the disposition of United States surplus property in Iran; for documentation on this subject, see pp. 566 ff.

⁷ None printed; but for substance of these five telegrams, see bracketed note, p. 400.

Sepahbodi said Soviet attitude all along has been that Iranian requests could expect little or no consideration until oil question is settled.

He added that Russians have taken position in interchanges on this subject that Iranian desire to have detailed terms and conditions set forth prior to granting concession is insulting since Soviet Government, unlike private companies, should be trusted to deal fairly.

Sent Department as 741; repeated Moscow as 141 and London as 60.

MURRAY

811.24591/9-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 19, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:37 p. m.]

745. Following events have occurred in evacuation of Tehran area by Allied Forces:

1. As of today Persian Gulf Command has transferred headquarters to Khorramshahr and in few days only American troops in Tehran area will be security detachments, Liquidation Commission⁸ personnel and Air Transport Command.

2. Russians have evacuated Ghaleh Morghi Airport except for In-tourist personnel and may thus be able to claim they have evacuated all "troops" from Tehran area. Tehran area administrative headquarters is still here.

3. General Lochner⁹ has informed Persian Gulf Command that all British troops will be withdrawn to point as far away as Hamadan, Kermanshah and Andimeshk within immediate future and that Hamadan will be evacuated shortly thereafter. Lochner expects that all 18,000 British troops may soon leave country entirely going, possibly, to Iraq.

Sent to Dept as 745; repeated to Moscow as 234 and London as 61.

MURRAY

761.91/9-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 19, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

746. Schwarzkopf says gendarme commander Tabriz District reports constant and increasing interference by Soviet Military Commander who insists no gendarmes may be moved without his advance

⁸ Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner (OANLC), the agency handling the disposition of surplus American property abroad.

⁹ Brig. Rupert G. Lochner, in command of British troops in Iran.

permission. Soviet Commander further issues directions as to placement and replacement of gendarmes, has ordered *gendarmerie* to collect arms previously distributed by Iranian Army to some 1,200 civilians in Azerbaijan and has prevented recruiting of detachment of 200 Kurdish gendarmes which had been requested by group of 9 Kurdish chiefs. This interference is aggravated by fact he reportedly ignores Iranian administrative organization and demands action by *gendarmerie* which should be handled by army or other branch of Government.

According to Schwarzkopf only explanation ever offered by Russians for interference with gendarmes is that latter create trouble by attempting to suppress popular demonstrations.

Iranian Deputy Chief of Staff has told Baker that Iranian army commander at Maragheh declared martial law in town but was informed by Russian Army Commander that he had no authority to do so and his proclamation would not be recognized. Russians thereupon proclaimed martial law themselves.

Sent to Department, repeated London 62, Moscow 235, Tabriz 37.

MURRAY

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*¹⁰

[LONDON, September 19, 1945.]

Since it was decided at Potsdam that the question of further stages in the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should be placed on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers the situation has been changed by the ending of the Japanese war. Our two Governments will now be completing the withdrawal of their forces from Persia by 2nd March, 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and, as far as the end of our withdrawal is concerned, all that we need do is to ask the Council to take note of the 2nd March, 1946, as the date fixed.

It seems to me, however, that since our respective forces in Persia have completed the war-time tasks for which they were sent to Persia, our Governments might well see if they could not do something to satisfy the Persian Government's natural desire to see as much of its territory as possible freed as soon as possible from the presence of foreign forces.

I therefore propose to suggest, when the question comes up at the Council of Foreign Ministers, that our two Governments shall agree

¹⁰ Reprinted from *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 414, col. 246.

that by the middle of December, 1945, their respective forces shall be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British forces may remain until the 2nd March, 1946, in the southern oil area to the south of, and including, Andimishk, and that Soviet forces may remain until the 2nd March, 1946, in Azarbaijan. I should propose excepting from this arrangement the minimum administrative staffs necessary for disposing of military installations; these staffs could remain where there are such installations until they had arranged for their disposal; they would, of course, be withdrawn like our other forces by the 2nd March, 1946. I have thought it well to let you know in advance of my intention to put forward this proposal, when the matter comes up at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)*¹¹

[LONDON, September 20, 1945.]

Thank you for informing me in your letter of 19th September of the British Government's attitude on the question of the withdrawal of British and Soviet troops from Iran. I must in turn inform you that the decision of the Berlin Three Power Conference regarding the withdrawal of troops from Teheran has already been put into effect from the Soviet side. As regards the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the Soviet Government, as you are aware, take the view that this withdrawal of troops should be effected within the period laid down in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty. If necessary, the plan for the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops from Iran could be discussed between us towards the end of the said period. The Soviet Government, accordingly, see no need for this question to be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*¹²

[LONDON, undated.]

I am glad that we have reached so cordial understanding on the question of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia, about which

¹¹ Reprinted from *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 414, col. 246.

¹² Reprinted from *ibid.*, col. 247.

I wrote to you on September 19th and you replied on September 20th. I am sorry that, owing to a doubt in the translation, there was some misunderstanding about the intention of your letter. The difference in language certainly creates problems for us.*

My colleagues were pleased to learn from me of the complete agreement between us as to the date by which Allied troops should be withdrawn, that is, by March 2nd, 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese surrender on September 2nd, 1945.¹³ His Majesty's Government are issuing a direction to the British military authorities accordingly.

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)*¹⁴

[LONDON, undated.]

I am glad that the letter which I sent you on 20th September has given you satisfaction. I would like to tell you once again that in the case of the Soviet Government the question of withdrawing troops from Iran did not in general constitute a special problem, inasmuch as there is a treaty which makes provision for it. I would ask you to bear in mind that the Soviet Government attach exceptional importance to the strict fulfilment of obligations undertaken.

861.24591/9-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 21, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received September 21—11:30 a. m.]

752. Minister of Foreign Affairs announced in Majlis yesterday results his conversation with Maximov that morning at which latter stated all Soviet troops were in process of evacuating Tehran and en-

*There was a misunderstanding owing to the Russian text of M. Molotov's first letter being translated to read "on the expiry," whereas the correct translation was "towards the end." [Footnote in the original.]

¹³At its seventeenth meeting on September 22, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers took note of statements by the British Foreign Secretary and the Soviet Foreign Commissar that British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Iran within 6 months after the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945. The Council agreed, in view of those statements, to withdraw the Iranian item from the agenda of the Conference. Regarding this Council decision, see the Record of Decisions of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, September 22, 1945, and the American Minutes of the same meeting, vol. II, pp. 315 and 316, respectively.

¹⁴Reprinted from *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 414, col. 247.

viros, particularly Ghaleh Morghi Airport and that these troops would go directly to the Soviet Union. Sepahbodi also reported result of subsequent telephone call from Maximov announcing final termination Soviet censorship in Iran.

President of Majlis following Sepahbodi's speech thanked Soviet Government in name of Majlis for setting example for evacuation of Tehran.

Sent Department as 752 repeated London as 64 Moscow as 240.

MURRAY

811.24591/9-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1945—8 p. m.

550. On September 9 the Secretary telegraphed General Marshall,¹⁵ reminding him that in July at Potsdam President Truman had stated American troops would be evacuated from Iran within 60 days of that date.¹⁶ Unless good reasons were advanced by Marshall for modification of that schedule, the Secretary stated he would adhere to above statement during London conference.

Marshall replied September 11¹⁷ as follows: at Potsdam President Truman understood necessity for not undertaking precipitous overall withdrawal, and recognized need for protection of U.S. interests and property in Iran. The President approved retention at Tehran of minimum security and maintenance personnel and ANLC, and indicated that it was not intended that ATC personnel or Ridley or Schwarzkopf missions be withdrawn from Iran at present time.¹⁸ However, he desires evacuation of American forces from Iran to be effected without unnecessary delay. Marshall stated that total U.S. strength in Tehran October 1 will be 650 (including Ridley and Schwarzkopf missions¹⁹). U.S. strength throughout Iran (including Tehran) will total 4,800 on November 1. This total will be reduced as soon as surplus disposal and ATC traffic to India and Burma permit.

ACHESON

¹⁵ In Delsec 8 to General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, not printed; message sent by the Secretary while aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*. Delsec was the code designation for telegrams sent by the Secretary's delegation at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

¹⁶ For summary of the President's statement on July 23, 1945, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 309. For further information on this subject, see paragraph numbered 5 in the memorandum of July 25, 1945, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and telegram 534, July 28, 1945, from Tehran, *ibid.*, pp. 1393 and 1395, respectively.

¹⁷ War Department telegram 62524 to London, not printed.

¹⁸ See telegram Victory 391, July 28, from Babelsberg, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1396.

¹⁹ General Marshall's telegram gave the strength of these missions as 27 and 24 persons, respectively.

891.00/9-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 24, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received September 24—11:30 a. m.]

758. Moscow telegrams 136, September 14 to Tehran²⁰ and 3315, September 18 to Department²¹ and Tabriz mail report September 6 to Department.²² At this early date after its formation which appears to have occurred about August 30 it is difficult to evaluate exactly new "Democratic Party of Azerbaijan".

In its leadership and avowed aims it seems designed to strike middle course between reactionary landlord class and extremists of Tudeh Party. First impression is that emphasis is laid upon Azerbaijan regionalism first and social reform second.

Most significant piece of evidence as to character however seems to be furnished by publicity given party by Moscow press and by Russian language daily published Tehran by Soviet Embassy both of which published party manifesto. This is taken to imply definite Soviet blessing and many people here including British Embassy take it for granted new party is merely Tudeh Party under another name. In [my view it is more likely that²³] party is intended as Ebling suggests to increase respectability of Liberal movement in Iran and to serve in case of need as replacement for Tudeh Party if latter is outlawed or falls into such disrepute as to be no longer useful. (General Staff communiqué on Meshed desertions reported my telegram 749, September 20²⁴ indicates Iran Government has decided on drive to discredit and perhaps abolish Tudeh.) Regional aspect of democratic party would of course lend itself to furtherance of any Soviet policy to weaken central Government and bring about ultimate secession of Azerbaijan.

Sent Department as 758; repeated Moscow 242, Tabriz 38.

MURRAY

891.00/9-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 25, 1945—noon.
[Received 5 p. m.]

768. Despite final abolition foreign censorship and evacuation of Tehran by Soviet forces with British evacuation in progress this Embassy regards situation in Iran with grave concern.

²⁰ Same as No. 3269 from Moscow, p. 407.

²¹ Not printed; in giving a survey of the Soviet press, it stated: "A determined Soviet effort to consolidate its influence in northern Iran was implied in formation of new democratic party 'Azerbaijan'." (861.9111 RR/9-1845)

²² Despatch 213 from Tabriz, not printed.

²³ Bracketed insertion based on copy of telegram in Moscow Embassy files.

²⁴ Not printed.

Internal political, economic and social conditions are deplorable and present ruling class shows little evidence of either will or ability to improve them. Danger however lies in temptation, opportunity and excuse this offers for intervention by British and Russians.

Both powers are undoubtedly guilty of such intervention at present but I believe British objectives are purely defensive to prevent further Soviet penetration to the south and that British sincerely desire independence and stability of Iran as being in their own interests. They show every evidence of wishing to expedite evacuation of country and of willingness to relinquish special rights acquired during war. Their activity in my opinion is not to be feared except as counter measure to Soviet moves.

Soviet attitude therefore is crux of matter. Based on accumulated external evidence I have come to following conclusions this regard:

1. Ultimate Russian objectives may include access to Persian Gulf and penetration into other regions of Near East but present aims are probably limited to maintenance of buffer zone in Iran as protection against attack from south. To accomplish this they are determined to have predominant influence in northern provinces at least.

2. Since Anglo-Russian entry into Iran 1941, presence their troops in northern Iran has assured Soviets of dominant position that area which they have utilized fully. They are probably now seeking means to perpetuate that state of affairs after final withdrawal of forces which should occur by March 1946.

3. Various alternative means suggest themselves and I assume Soviet policy is sufficiently flexible and opportunistic to use whichever seems most promising at any given moment. Recent events in Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces seem to indicate that promotion of regional consciousness and dissatisfaction with central Govt leading to separatism and eventual incorporation in ranks of Soviet Republics is one of tactics being employed. However, I suspect this is merely second string to bow and think it likely their principal aim at present is establishment in power in Tehran of so-called "popular" govt like Groza regime in Rumania which would be led by men under Soviet influence amenable to Russian demands and hostile to other foreign nations (general trend of Soviet propaganda endeavoring to discredit Iranian ruling class as "reactionary" and "fascist" and exaggerating strength and popular character of leftist elements indicates Soviets may be paving way for *coup d'état* which they would support and defend against outside criticism on grounds it represented will of people. Known corruption and inefficiency of Iranian Cabinets and Majlis would make contention the more plausible.

In addition to being clear and unjustifiable interference in Iranian affairs, such development would be most serious in its effect on Anglo-

Russian relations which are already badly strained in this country. British would undoubtedly react violently to threat it would constitute to vital oil fields and refinery, to India, and to Empire communications.

Moreover, Soviet dominance of Iran Govt would be definitely harmful to American interests for following reasons:

1. It would mean exclusion of American airlines from Iran.
2. It would orient Iranian trade toward Russian to detriment of our commercial interests.
3. It would end all possibility of an American oil concession in Iran.
4. Most important of all it would mean extension of Soviet influence to shores of Persian Gulf creating potential threat to our immensely rich oil holdings in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, and Kuwait.

However much we may deplore present conditions in Iran, a cure administered by a minority group under Russian direction would be worse than the disease for United States, for the Iranians and for world peace.

I am strongly of opinion time has come for us to take positive stand against continuance present Soviet activities. First and most important step should be immediate withdrawal British and Russian military forces and abrogation Tripartite Treaty of 1942. I can see no excuse for continued presence here of troops of either nation, save possibly for small units as caretakers for installations constructed by Allies. (Russians have built none.) Further interference by Soviet military with Iranian civil and military administrations and Soviet control of movements of Iranians and foreigners in northern zone based on asserted treaty rights is intolerable. Russians must not be allowed to rest on letter of treaty when reason for its existence has disappeared.

I assume Dept agrees with my belief that British support is assured for any stand we may take along this line.

Sent Dept as 768, repeated to Moscow as 244 and London for Secdel as 65.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/9-2645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1945—8 p. m.

8507. Secdel 124. The Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington has seen press reports indicating that in the discussions at London concerning withdrawal of troops from Iran, the US has taken the position that the question is largely a British-Russian one. He has expressed most energetically his disappointment, saying that the only

hope of obtaining agreement on removal of troops is for the US to press for it actively. He alleges that Iran depends entirely on the US in this matter and earnestly hopes we will carry out the promises of President Roosevelt to aid Iran in maintaining its sovereignty.²⁶

ACHESON

891.00/9-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 27, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 4: 15 p. m.]

773. Soviet Ambassador Maximov who has just returned after several weeks in Moscow called on me September 25 accompanied by his interpreter and remained 2 hours discussing situation in Iran. I had Captain Gagarine, Assistant Military Attaché, as my interpreter.

Burden of Ambassador's observations regarding Iran was to effect that forces of reaction are in saddle here, that they are persecuting "liberal" elements, that there has been no response on part of Iran govts to friendly efforts of Soviets during past 4 years to bring about an "improvement" in situation, that present Govt. does not appreciate efforts of American advisers and does nothing to assist them and that he had noticed recent articles in 11 Iranian newspapers against our surplus property disposal policy demanding delivery such property to Iran without compensation. Maximov felt all this proved ungrateful and unregenerate attitude of Iranians toward United States as well as toward Soviet Govt. Finally to illustrate duplicity of Iranians he said Seyid Zia ed-Din, political protégé of British in Iran while posing as great friend and defender of Dr. Millspaugh, former American Administrator General of Finances here, had in fact worked secretly to bring about Millspaugh's failure and departure from Iran.²⁷

My observations in reply were along following lines: While reforms along liberal lines in Iran were of course greatly to be desired Maximov would doubtless wish to bear in mind that the country had only just emerged from ruthless and undemocratic regime of Reza Shah during which liberal elements in country were brutally suppressed, that development or revival of liberal institutions and democratic process here would require patience and sympathetic assistance from us both and that I was sure progress along those lines could be made if we worked loyally together to that end.

²⁶ This is a reference to the Declaration Regarding Iran of December 1, 1943.

²⁷ For documentation on the termination of the American Financial (Millspaugh) Mission in Iran, see pp. 538 ff.

As for "ingratitude" and "lack of cooperation" of Iran Govt. to which Ambassador referred, I thought Maximov might wish to bear in mind our own experience in Latin America before Mr. Roosevelt came into office. The smaller nations of Latin America, whether justifiably or not, evinced great fear of United States, their northern neighbor, because of our size and power. Roosevelt addressed himself at once to problem of improving our relations with all powers of our hemisphere and established good neighbor policy. That policy has been pursued faithfully by United States Govt. to mutual advantage of all of us in Western Hemisphere.

I then told him I was sure he would wish me to speak to him quite frankly and as a friend and that I could not properly refrain from mentioning the mortal fear of Soviet Russia which I had observed in widespread circles here. I was sure he would agree with me that there can be no satisfactory relations among nations in future where fear and suspicion have not been dispelled. (He was inclined to play down Iranian fear as mere pretense.) I then recalled great period of Soviet-Iranian friendship after last war culminating in treaty of 1921²⁸ which was conceived and executed in spirit of our own good neighbor policy to which I had referred. I earnestly hoped spirit of that liberal instrument which had so heartened all little nations of Near East at the time might once again animate relations between Soviet Union and Iran.

Referring to American advisers, I said Maximov must be aware of manner in which they had come to Iran and I wished to assure him most emphatically and sincerely that no one of them would ever have Embassy's acquiescence of [*or?*] permission in any action which might be contrary to legitimate Soviet interests in Iran.

As for Seyid Zia I personally considered him a highly undesirable influence in Iran and one whose attitude was harmful to good Soviet-Iran relations. I had taken occasion to say it to a number of govt. officials including the Shah. Maximov could be sure I would be happy to see Seyid Zia and all his works disappear from local scene. At same time I felt I must point out on other side that it was generally believed here that Russians were supporting Tudeh Party which could not help but have undesirable effect on political situation.

Finally I expressed belief that unsatisfactory political situation in Iran would be greatly improved if economic conditions were bettered and I recalled that Declaration Regarding Iran signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill envisaged economic assistance to Iran by our two countries. I felt that Declaration not only showed mutual agreement and understanding between heads of the three Govts but also provided basis in which he and I could work together to benefit of

²⁸ Treaty of friendship signed at Moscow on February 26, 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 384.

Iran and our own national interests. It was my greatest wish that at end of my service here, I should be able to look back on record of concrete accomplishment in this country as a result of closest friendly cooperation with Soviet Ambassador.

Whole conversation was conducted on friendly terms and we parted with cordiality.

Sent to Dept as 773, repeated to Moscow 246, London 67, SecdelAm.²⁹

MURRAY

891.00/9-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 27, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received September 27—1 : 15 p. m.]

777. Call of Ambassador Maximov reported mytel 773, Sept. 27 is remarkable because it is first time in more than 2 years that any Soviet representative has taken initiative in discussing general questions of policy with this Embassy. Since Maximov had just returned from consultation in Moscow, I feel sure call was made on instructions his Govt.

I judge his purpose was to instill in me a distrust of Iran Govt and ruling class as well as of British policy in Iran and so produce an attitude of at least passive acquiescence in Soviet policy toward present regime here. His statements about "reactionary" character, "ingratitude", and "uncooperative" attitude of Iran Govt's follow line taken by Soviet press and Iranian Leftist group ever since oil crisis in fall of 1944³⁰ and could only be intended to justify Soviet hostility to regime. His interest in difficulties of American advisers, however, is new development and was obviously designed to show me that present Iranian situation is unfavorable to US interests as well as to Russian, while reference to Seyid Zia ed-Din was probably indirect way of suggesting British too are working against America here.

Although I think I made it clear we were not opposed in any way to legitimate Russian interests, I am quite sure Maximov could not have received any impression that I might be sympathetic toward a policy of bludgeoning Iran into submission to Soviet wishes, much less that the United States might join with Russians in putting pressure on Iranians.

Sent Dept as 777, repeated London for SecdelAm as 68 and Moscow as 247.

MURRAY

²⁹ The Secretary of State.

³⁰ For documentation on the decision of Iran not to enter negotiations for oil concessions and the Soviet reaction, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, pp. 445 ff.

Tehran Post Files : 710 : Allied Troops in Iran

*The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson) to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)*

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1945.

DEAR WALLACE: I have read with interest your telegram no. 768, September 25, 1945, and fully agree with your analysis of the situation described in it and with your suggestions.

In this connection, you may be interested in reading the attached memorandum which I sent to Mr. Acheson several days ago.³¹

I may add that we here are extremely anxious to have *all* American armed forces evacuated from Iran at the earliest possible moment. We do not believe that we would be justified in detaining any of them merely for the purposes of our convenience or to guard American property. We doubt the justification for keeping armed forces in a country with which we maintain friendly relations in order to guard American government property. It seems to us that if it would be proper to maintain soldiers in a foreign country to protect American property, it would be just as proper to send them into a country for that purpose. We are inclined to agree that the withdrawal of our forces should be carried out in an orderly manner and that until our forces are withdrawn, they should be charged with the protection of American government property. We cannot, however, support an idea of maintaining American troops for months in Iran or elsewhere for the sole purpose of protecting American government property. If we try to do this, we are giving the Russians, it seems to us, an excuse to keep a certain number of Russian troops in northern Iran for any purpose which might meet the convenience of the Soviet Union.

Similarly, we are not happy at the thought of maintaining American armed forces for any long period in Abadan in order to operate the airfield there. It seems to us that the Army should, regardless of the inconvenience which it might cause us, make arrangements at Abadan, with the consent of the Iranian and British authorities, to convert it into a civilian-operated airfield until such time as it can be closed down altogether.

We are afraid that if we do not exercise care, we, rather than the Russians or the British, will be most vulnerable to the accusation that we are maintaining armed forces in Iran after the purpose for which these forces entered the country has ceased to exist.

I would appreciate any comments which you might have to make with regard to our line of thinking as summarized above.

I hope that by the time this letter reaches you the vexatious problem of the Schwarzkopf mission will have been decided favorably.

³¹ See memorandum of September 17, p. 410.

We would certainly dislike to see that mission terminated. Nevertheless, we do not feel that we can insist upon its remaining there if you and Colonel Schwarzkopf feel that in the circumstances it cannot carry on effectively.

With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,

Loy

891.00/10-145 : Airgram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 1, 1945.

[Received October 12—7 p. m.]

A-264. Tehran's 242 September 24.³² Agreeing with Tehran's analysis of Democratic Party of Azerbaijan we might, however, add that we feel regional nature of movement probably far outweighs its social reformist character.

Azerbaijan Party appears to conform to "Nationality" pattern previously observed in Bessarabia, Ruthenia and Eastern Poland and currently evident with respect to Sinkiang and Turkish Armenia. As in these other areas, Soviet fissionist technique seems to be based on racial affinities transcending Soviet border. Tempo and form of separatist action in Azerbaijan are impossible to predict as they will be opportunistically adapted to whole complex of Middle Eastern developments. Reassurances of respect for central authority (third sentence of our 3269 September 14) may be viewed with considerable skepticism. USSR demonstrated over many years in case of Outer Mongolia how other sovereignty (Chinese) could be recognized in an adjacent area without seriously impeding either Soviet program for real domination of that area or eventual realization of its "autonomy" through orderly processes of friendly negotiations.

KENNAN

811.24591/10-1645

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1945.

We learned recently, with considerable surprise, that the War Department intended to send 2,200 new American troops to Iran as replacements for high-point men being withdrawn. We were aware that if it should become known that we were sending in these new troops, in spite of President Truman's announcement at Potsdam that

³² Same as No. 758 from Tehran, p. 417.

all American troops would be out of Iran by October 1, accusations of bad faith would be levied against us and the withdrawal plans of other foreign troops might be halted. We pointed out these considerations to officials of the War Department.

I have just been informed by General Barker, Deputy Chief, OPD,³³ that while the 2,200 troops will embark during the next few days, the War Department is today sending a telegram to Iran asking whether the duties intended for these new troops (guarding installations and dismantling of property) might be performed by private contractors and by the local *Gendarmerie*.

We think that it would be a mistake to send these new troops to Iran, in view of the President's undertaking at Potsdam, and of the unfortunate effect which their arrival might have. I hope that the reply to the War Department's telegram will be satisfactory and that these troops may be diverted en route. The War Department states that they can be used in Germany, Egypt and elsewhere. In view of the Potsdam commitment, you may consider it desirable to bring the matter to the Secretary's attention.³⁴

LOY W. HENDERSON

891.00/10-1645

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TEHRAN, October 16, 1945.

DEAR LOY: I have your letter of September 27th with its enclosed memorandum³⁵ to the Under Secretary. (Just in passing, I am very grateful to NEA and ME for sending us copies of memoranda affecting Iran.)

In general, I am wholly in agreement with the thoughts set forth in your letter and in the memorandum. It is certainly most desirable that foreign troops of all sorts be withdrawn from Iran at the earliest possible moment, and I concur that some monetary sacrifices on our part would be worth while if they contribute toward this end. Judging by the information we receive from Colonel Anderson, commanding the Persian Gulf Service Command,³⁶ the Army is in accord so far as withdrawal of American troops is concerned, although probably for different reasons. Just a few days ago we learned that the neces-

³³ Brig. Gen. J. DeF. Barker, Deputy Chief (Air) of the Theater (Operations) Group in the Operations Division, War Department.

³⁴ Marginal notation by Mr. Acheson: "Let's await reply to the cable."

³⁵ Memorandum of September 17, p. 410.

³⁶ On August 3, 1945, the War Department ordered consolidation of the Persian Gulf Command under the Africa-Middle East Theater, effective October 1. The Africa-Middle East Theater issued a general order on September 21 establishing a Persian Gulf Service Command as an AMET subcommand.

sity of shipping high-point men home for discharge is forcing PGSC to pull out its security detachments at 12 of the small road camps between Kazvin and Andimeshk, and the big camps at Hamadan and Khorramabad will likewise have to be abandoned in another two months, if they are not sold first. (We are arranging for Iranian Gendarme guards for the abandoned camps, but that is another story.)

My only qualification on the point of view you express is that we should not hasten our withdrawal to such an extent that it results in the loss of large quantities of movable property which could profitably be shipped out of Iran if not disposed of to local purchasers. Specifically, there are some thousands of railroad cars and a number of locomotives which the Iranians do not need and could not pay for in any case. PGSC is in process of preparing these for shipment, but I understand it will take some time and require perhaps 25 vessels. To leave this material behind would mean a heavy loss to our government, and only PGSC could conceivably handle its packing and loading.

To my mind, therefore, our policy should be as follows :

1. To sell off our surplus property here as rapidly as possible, if necessary at less than maximum potential prices ;
2. To proceed as fast as possible with the shipment elsewhere, of all movable equipment for which there is no ready market in Iran ;
3. To withdraw PGSC troops as fast as they are no longer needed in connection with shipment of American property or other winding-up tasks.
4. To retain American security detachments in our major installations (such as Amirabad, Hamadan, Khorramabad, Andimeshk, Ahwaz, and Khorramshahr) until they are sold or until all major shipments of movable property out of Iran have been completed. As the port of embarkation, Khorramshahr will necessarily be the last post to be evacuated, and so long as we have any sizable force there, it will make little difference politically whether or not small detachments are stationed at the other main camps.
5. To do everything possible to sell the fixed installations prior to the complete withdrawal of the moveable property but not to abandon them prematurely. Only in the event that they are unsold by the March 2 deadline should be given serious consideration to abandonment.
6. To withdraw completely from Abadan just as soon as the Army can possibly dispense with it as a base for repatriation of troops in India and Iran.

I am hopeful that the fixed installations will have been disposed of by the time PGSC can move out the unsold moveable items plus its own impedimenta and personnel and from present indications I believe the chances for accomplishing this are not at all bad. While I would be most reluctant to see American troops left in Iran after the departure of the bulk of the Command solely for the purpose of

guarding the camps, I cannot but view premature abandonment with considerable concern.

From the international point of view, I realize it might be well to advocate immediate withdrawal of all American troops, regardless of what property might have to be sacrificed. If the Department is prepared to make a real fight with the Russians to get them out of Iran quickly, this would be the ideal policy. I do not advocate it because, first, I have had no indication that the Department intends to go to the mat with the Soviets on this issue, and second, because I am afraid it would result in substantial financial loss, arouse strong Congressional criticism, and might prove, in the end, to have little effect on Soviet actions.

Sincerely yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

811.24591/10-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 18, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 10:57 a. m.]

851. Africa-Middle East Theater and Persian Gulf Service command have received telegram from War saying Dept has expressed concern over political implications of despatch of 2,200 troops to Persian Gulf Service Command as replacement for high point men to be released. They are instructed report when the replacements can be dispensed with and plan send reply in teletype conference with War from Cairo Oct 19.

Embassy does not feel political repercussions in Iran of arrival replacements need be serious especially in view Iran Govt's request that American troops stay as long as British and Russians. Iranians have hitherto shown little interest in specific movements American troops and could hardly object officially to moves designed solely to expedite liquidation of American interests here.

Whether arrival replacements or exact time departure our troops from Iran would have any bearing on Soviet or British policy seems questionable. According to press, Molotov has clearly indicated Russians have no intention of leaving before March 2. Unless Dept plans forceful approach to Moscow to effect earlier withdrawal I doubt that anything we may do will matter in this respect so long as our forces do not overstay March deadline.

Therefore unless Dept has information unknown to me or unless policy decisions have been taken of which I am ignorant, I would not recommend any move which would handicap withdrawal American movable property or prematurely cause abandonment of fixed installations here. I assume Dept does not contemplate abandon-

ment here of any substantial quantity movable equipment bulk of which is railroad rolling stock and Persian Gulf Service Command states it is physically impossible complete shipment of this before February 1. So long as any sizable force must remain to handle this shipment I think it will make little difference if other small units are left to guard major fixed installations. Past experience has shown use of civilians as guards is impracticable and delivery of all camps into gendarme custody would give Iran Govt whiphand in further sales negotiations.

I should make clear however I fully agree with policy of withdrawing our forces entirely from Iran as soon as that can be done without serious financial loss of US Govt and in any case by March 2, 1946.³⁷

MURRAY

861.24591/10-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 18, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 5:25 p. m.]

10907. In commenting on exchange of correspondence between Bevin and Molotov regarding troop withdrawal from Iran, Baxter of Eastern Department³⁸ told us that Soviet attitude regarding full observance of treaty naturally satisfactory but that difficult to understand refusal of Russians to commit themselves regarding date by which withdrawal should be completed. British cannot see any reason which would justify uncertainty on that point. Baxter saw possible explanation in fact that Molotov was working in strict accordance with his brief, while Bevin on his side was concentrating on relatively more important matters and did not feel justified in forcing issue. Baxter said, however, that Foreign Office is not inclined to read too much into this angle of matter and hopes that apparent Russian evasiveness will not be borne out in actual implementation of agreement.

Sent Department as 10907, repeated Tehran as 26.

GALLMAN

³⁷ The Department replied to this telegram in telegram 598, October 24, 1945, 8 p. m., which stated in part: "In view of concerted judgment Emb, OANLC, and War that troop replacements are desirable and necessary (urtel 851, Oct. 18), Army is prepared to send appropriate number in near future. Army system of release for high-point men does not permit suspension of withdrawals from Iran pending arrival replacements from US (urtel 818, Oct. 9 [not printed]). Number American troops in Iran should be progressively reduced to lowest level consistent with efficient disposal operation and, in any event, all must be withdrawn by March 2." (811.24591/10-1845).

³⁸ Charles W. Baxter, Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office.

861.24591/10-2545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1945—7 p. m.

601. Although Russian withdrawal from Tehran was advertised, it has not actually taken place, British have informed American Military Attaché London. Emb's comments on this statement would be appreciated.

BYRNES

800.24591/9-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1945—1 p. m.

606. Urtel 730, Sept. 14 and urdes 104, Oct. 3³⁹ If you consider formal reply to Iranian Govt's note of Sept. 9 advisable, you are authorized to say that American Govt looks with sympathy on request for withdrawal of American forces from Iran, as expressed in For-Off note of Sept. 9, 1945, and desires to assure Iranian Govt of this Govt's intention of effecting the complete withdrawal of all American military personnel from Iranian territory at earliest feasible moment. You may add any further pertinent observations considered advisable in the circumstances.

BYRNES

841.24591/11-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 1, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received November 3—9 a. m.]

900. British Embassy yesterday publicly announced that withdrawal British troops from Hamadan and Khorramabad is to be completed today and Kermanshah will be evacuated by Nov 21. Announcement says by beginning Dec only British troops in Iran will be detachments Andimeshk. Ahwaz, Abadan and Khorramshahr and few individuals at Tehran, Hamadan, Khorramabad and Kermanshah. Adds that British authorities are ready to hand over security in oil-fields to Iranian forces and assume transfer will be complete by end Nov.⁴⁰

Sent Dept as 900, repeated Moscow as 262 and London as 71.

MURRAY

³⁹ Latter not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 409.

⁴⁰ For statement made by Mr. Bevin on November 21, 1945, regarding the progress of withdrawing British troops from Iran, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 416, col. 546.

CHAPTER II: NOVEMBER 19 TO DECEMBER 31, 1945

Armed uprisings against the Iranian Central Government in Soviet-occupied Azerbaijan; continued Soviet Army interference with the movement of Iranian security forces in northern Iran; United States note of November 23 to the Soviet Union proposing withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran by January 1, 1946; Soviet rejection of the note; attempts by American Embassy officers to visit Azerbaijan; discussions on Iran during the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers; evacuation of American troops from Iran on December 30

891.00/11-1945

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1945.

Press and radio reports, quoting Iranian Government spokesmen, state that a large-scale uprising has broken out in Azerbaijan province in northwestern Iran. These reports have already been partially confirmed by the Embassy and the Iranian Chief of Staff.

Azerbaijan province, as well as the remainder of northern Iran, has been occupied by Russian forces since 1941. During this period, political agitation, including demands for electoral and social reforms by the Iranian Government and even demands for autonomy for Azerbaijan province, has been in evidence. The development of this agitation has been aided by the fact that the Russian authorities have treated the northern zone as a closed area, to which they permit access by foreigners and Iranian officials only with special permission. They have refused to permit movement by or reinforcement of the Iranian *Gendarmerie* and Army in the legitimate pursuit of their security enforcement duties, and have interfered with the administration of the province by Iranian Government officials. The newly formed Democratic Party, to which press reports attribute a major role in the present disturbances, has unquestioned Soviet support.

Russian and British forces invaded Iran in August, 1941, after failure of Reza Shah Pahlevi to respond satisfactorily to demands for the expulsion of German fifth columnists. On January 29, 1942, a treaty of alliance was concluded between the British, Soviet and Iranian Governments. With respect to the presence of British and Soviet forces in Iran, this treaty specifically states, "It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations" (art. 4 (i)). Moreover, the British and Soviet Governments pledged themselves jointly and severally "to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence

of Iran" (art. 1). This pledge was reiterated in the Anglo-Soviet-American Declaration on Iran, signed in Tehran December 1, 1943 by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill. This declaration stated "The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."

Should an autonomy movement in Azerbaijan meet with success, the loss of the province would adversely affect Iran's economy and might lead to further fragmentation of the country. The population of the province is approximately one-fourth of the total population of Iran. It is the major food-producing province and one of the major industrial areas.

Apart from its serious internal aspects, the situation has broader implications. It is fraught with dangerous possibilities, since it inevitably affects the British line of communications and the empire position of Great Britain throughout the area. In recognition of the possibility of such a situation arising, this Government has taken an increasing interest in Iran in the last few years. Our policy of assistance to the Iranian Government has been based not only on desire to assist a friendly nation but also has been designed to prevent Iran from becoming a threat to Allied solidarity and international security. To decrease the danger of an inspired uprising, we have consistently pressed for the complete withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran at the earliest possible date.

Apart from our interest in the international security aspect, this country has a direct interest in this problem because of our oil, economic, and strategic interests in this area.

LOY W. HENDERSON

891.00/11-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 19, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 1:10 p. m.]

959. Iranian Army and *gendarmerie* reports say members of Democratic Party of Azerbaijan have seized control of Ardabil, Sarab, Mianeh, Maragheh and Miandoab all in Azerbaijan (if correct this means they control all major routes entering province).

Reports add large group is moving on Zenjan and another in direction of Tehran. Today's press says two representatives of party have been arrested in Tehran and are suspected of plotting disturbances here. Rumour says uprising Tehran scheduled November 22.

Gendarmerie and Army reports state Russians accompanied Democrat groups in Azerbaijan and shot down anyone offering opposition. Several gendarmes and civilians reported killed at Mianeh and elsewhere.

Telegraphic communications north of Zenjan still cut.

Following council of Generals yesterday morning Shah ordered column of about 1,500 troops and gendarmes to move from Tehran immediately for Azerbaijan. Soviet Military Attaché has been informed of this and press says he has arranged with Russian headquarters Qazvin to permit troop movement. Shah reported to have told Soviet Military Attaché that state of rebellion exists and troops were being sent to put it down.

Other Army units ordered to take up posts on roads leading into Tehran and at railroad installations here.

Foreign Office official last night delivered to me body of note ⁴¹ which was sent yesterday ⁴² to Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Iakoubov listing numerous recent and less recent incidents which Foreign Office asserted had occurred in Azerbaijan in which Russians were directly or indirectly involved. Note spoke of threat of Kurdish revolt and interference by Russians with movement Iranian forces and enforcement of laws. Note specifically stated Democratic Party had cut telegraph lines and had occupied Govt offices and disarmed gendarmes and railroad police at Mianeh. Also said Russian officially had recently instituted strict control of all persons traveling into northern Iran. (Foreign Office official said this control includes search of baggage and seizure of all papers.) Note said to have ended with protest against situation and request for permission to send Iranian forces to restore order. Official said it was hoped reply would be received today but that troops might move forward regardless.

Situation was discussed in Majlis yesterday and Minister of War Riazi asserted Soviet military authorities had promised measures would be taken to stop disturbances in Azerbaijan.

Foreign Office says cutting of telegraph lines plus Soviet and Democratic Party road control has isolated Govt from communication with Azerbaijan. Embassy of course is also cut off from communication with Consulate Tabriz and I propose to send an officer by car as soon as possible to investigate developments and make contact with Ebling.

Sent Dept as 959, repeated Moscow 273, London 78.

MURRAY

⁴¹ A copy of this note, in French, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 151, November 19, 1945, from Tehran, not printed.

⁴² The note was delivered on the evening of November 17, 1945; see last paragraph of telegram 971, November 21, 8 a. m., from Tehran, p. 438.

891.00/11-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 19, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received November 20—8: 50 a. m.]

961. Arfa today told me General Derakshani, Iranian Garrison Commander Tabriz, has issued proclamation saying certain elements were threatening public order and he (Derakshani) had instructions from military authorities Tehran to defend its post and public buildings to last man. Proclamation warned any foreign elements against interference saying Iranian forces would not be responsible if bloodshed resulted.

Arfa likewise said 6,000 Russian troops in civilian clothes are in Tabriz and threatening Iranian garrison (which numbers about 1,000). He believes similar situation exists at Ardabil.

I am inclined to accept his statement regarding issuance proclamation but reserve judgment on report about Russian troops in civilian clothes.

Arfa has report Tudeh Party in Gilan and Mazandaran is preparing coup along lines of events now said to be transpiring in Azerbaijan.

Unofficial sources say telegraph line from Azerbaijan to Sannandaj has been cut.

In past 2 days Russian Embassy has informed both British Embassy and our Military Attaché that it is at present inopportune for any foreigner to visit northern Iran.

Iran Govt is obviously seeking wide publicity for present developments and last night called in local AP-Reuters correspondent to give him substantially same information as that furnished Embassy.

Sent Dept as 961 ; repeated Moscow 274 ; London 79.

MURRAY

891.00/11-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1945—8 p. m.

634. For your information, Iranian situation is receiving prominent treatment in press. UP reports that widespread revolution led by Democratic Party has broken out in Azerbaijan ; that Russian trucks are distributing weapons to rebels ; that insurgents have captured Ahar, Sarab, Maragheh, Mianeh and surrounded garrisons in Tabriz, Ardebil, Rezaiyeh, Astara ; that insurgents are marching on Tehran.

Dept is awaiting your report and would appreciate information concerning measures if any which Iranian Govt has taken or contemplates.

BYRNES

891.00/11-1945

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Hussein Ala, [Appointed] Iranian Ambassador
Dr. Daftary, Counselor, Iranian Embassy
Mr. Henderson
Mr. Allen
Mr. Minor

The new Iranian Ambassador to the United States called today after having paid his first visit to the Secretary. Mr. Ala expressed his deep concern over the turn of events in Iran, where the morning press had indicated that a large-scale rebellion had taken place. The Ambassador expressed himself as shocked at the scale of the reported rebellion, even though his Government had long anticipated that something of this kind might take place. He said that it was to avoid this very kind of happening that the Iranians had been so insistent upon the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iran before March 2. He asked the support of the State Department in bringing about withdrawal of these forces at once.

Mr. Henderson inquired whether the Russians might be using the Kurds in northern Iran for political purposes in connection with some kind of move for autonomy or independence. The Ambassador said that the Russians were undoubtedly using the Kurds, as well as the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan.

In reply to a question from Mr. Allen, the Ambassador said that he thinks the Iranian Government is capable of handling the security situation in northern Iran and elsewhere in the country if all foreign troops were to withdraw. He insisted strongly that the people of Azerbaijan are loyal Iranians. He denied the allegations made by the Russians that the people of this province desire autonomy or independence. He stated that some of Iran's leading patriots come from this province, which is known as the cradle of democracy in Iran. He made it clear that his Government believes that the movement is artificially stimulated by the Russians.

In closing the conversation, the Ambassador stated that Iran is anxious to obtain one of the temporary seats on the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. He expressed the belief that Iran is entitled to such a seat because of the part it played in the war and because of its strategic location in the Middle East. He asked the support of the State Department in obtaining such a seat.

891.00/11-2045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1945.

Dr. Daftary, who is still Iranian Chargé d'Affaires since the newly arrived Iranian Ambassador has not been able to present his credentials, called upon me this morning and with much emotion handed me the attached summary of a note⁴³ which he said had been forwarded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iran to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. It will be observed that this note contains what amounts to charges that the Soviet forces in occupation of northern Iran have been following a policy which has resulted in the encouraging of disorder and rebellion against the Central Iranian Government.

The Chargé d'Affaires said that his Ambassador is anxious to know what the American Government intends to do in this situation; the American Government affixed its signature to the Tehran Declaration, which assures the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. If the United States Government remains quiescent while the Soviet Union carries out what seems to be a carefully laid plan to deprive Iran of its independence or to infringe upon its integrity, no small country in the world can in the future have any confidence in promises made by the Great Powers. There is no small country which has been given more assurances with regard to its independence by responsible Great Powers than Iran. If these promises are not lived up to, there can be little hope for world stability.

I told the Chargé d'Affaires that we had taken no action as yet since we were not yet in possession of the facts. He replied that in the opinion of his Ambassador the note which he was handing to me contained sufficient facts to justify action of some kind. Continued delay in taking action in order to establish more facts might result in the establishment of Soviet-supported rebels in all of northern Iran and perhaps even the occupation of Tehran before any move would be taken by the United States. Every day and every hour is important. The people of Iran could look with confidence only to the United States. They have some hope of support from Great Britain, but if the United States should fail them, they would be lost.

⁴³ Not printed; it summarized a note sent by the Iranian Foreign Office to the Embassy of the Soviet Union at Tehran on November 17, 1945. For contents of this note, see telegram 959, November 19, 10 a. m., from Tehran, p. 431.

891.00/11-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 20, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 2:05 p. m.]

965. Communications difficulties plus unreliability of even official Iranians as factual reporters make it impossible for Embassy to vouch for absolute accuracy of reports forwarded my telegrams 959 and 961, November 19. Nevertheless situation in Azerbaijan is unquestionably serious and may constitute open rebellion which is what it is now termed by Tehran press. There is no question that telegraph communication with Tabriz is cut and it seems definitely established that an uprising has occurred in Mianeh whatever may be facts regarding events in other towns.

Although Russian Chargé and Military Attaché plead ignorance it is obvious that Soviets hold key to situation and could easily put stop to all disturbances either by using their own troops or by permitting free movement of Iranian forces. One test will come when and if Iranian column from Tehran reaches Qazvin first main Russian garrison post on road to Tabriz.

However, no one here expects Soviet assistance in restoring order will be forthcoming. On contrary universal moral opinion is that Soviets are directly responsible for actions of Democratic Party Azerbaijan and there is great body of evidence to sustain this view.

Whatever the facts of Russian implication or innocence in present affair I want once more to call strongly to Dept's attention grave danger presented by continued presence in Iran of Soviet troops. (mytel 768, September 25). Even when they do not interfere directly in internal affairs their mere existence in force constitutes powerful moral support for all dissatisfied elements in northern provinces and serious deterrent to Govt agencies in performing their duties.

I should like to renew urgently my recommendation that Russians (and British also) be asked to withdraw entirely from Iran at once. If Russians decline I think they should be called upon in plainest terms to show cause for remaining in the absence of any military necessity whatever. One argument which they might raise, namely that presence their forces is necessary to maintain order, is completely false. It is clear enough now that they promote rather than prevent disorder. I feel we should also be prepared to reject out of hand any contention that Russia must maintain forces in Iran to check "Fascist" Tehran Govt. Apart from fact Persian Conservatives are far cry from German Nazis it is inadmissible that USSR should be arbiter of internal politics of independent members United Nations especially since Iran was neither an enemy nor a theater of enemy operations.

Secondarily I think we should ask Russians why they consistently interfere with operations of Iranian security forces even to extent of forcing release of persons arrested for offences against public order. There is no question that this interference is constant and serious and in most cases it does not have even the nominal justification that security of Soviet troops might be involved.

As I envisage it we should take our stand on ground that conditions created in Iran by Soviet occupation are cause of international discord which is automatically of concern to all United Nations and which is of particular concern to US because we are signatory of Tehran Declaration. Technical interpretations of tripartite treaty and special agreement between Bevin and Molotov⁴⁴ on date of withdrawal of troops should be overridden by higher considerations of world interest plus ordinary logic and justice.

Sent Dept as 965, repeated Moscow 276, London 82.

MURRAY

121.5491/11-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 20, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received November 20—11:38 a. m.]

967. Mytel 959 November 19 last paragraph. I am endeavoring obtain Soviet pass for Captain Gagarine Assistant Military Attaché to travel by car to Tabriz and shall also try to send Air Attaché Garver and another officer of my staff by Garver's plane if weather permits.

Soviet Military Attaché here has requested that we not apply for passes saying conditions are disturbed and moment inopportune for travel of foreigners in northern Iran. However, he is consulting Soviet headquarters at Qazvin and has promised further word this afternoon. I intend to press matter strongly.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 20, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received November 21—8:56 a. m.]

970. Iranian Chief of Staff Arfa has confirmed to our Military Attaché that column of troops bound for Tabriz was stopped by Russian forces at eastern edge of Kazvin on evening of November 19. Soviet officer threatened to fire if stop order not obeyed. Column

⁴⁴ See pp. 413-416.

has halted and Arfa says Prime Minister ⁴⁵ has ordered it not to move until he has had opportunity to clarify matters with Soviet Chargé whom he is to see this evening.

A delayed company which was to form part of column was stopped by Soviets at Karaj yesterday afternoon and is still there.

Arfa says commander this latter company has sent word Russian garrison Karaj has been increased in past few days to five or six thousand men.

Sent Dept as 970 repeated Moscow as 273 and London as 84.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 21, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received 9:27 a. m.]

971. During informal conversation yesterday evening with Embassy officer, Under Secretary of FonOff Homayunjah, who seemed much disturbed and spoke with unaccustomed bitterness made following statements:

1. Russians have been encouraging arming and lending military support to small groups of dissatisfied people in Azerbaijan which has resulted in present troubles.

2. It is for this purpose that Soviets have insisted in keeping troops in Iran after end of war contrary to spirit of Tripartite Treaty.

3. It is unjust that Soviets should interfere in Iranian internal affairs and repay Iran in this way for sacrifices she made for Allied victory. Russians have no right to prevent move of Iranian troops to put down disorders.

4. Iran Govt takes courage from thought Iran has other Allies for whose moral and material support she hopes.

5. Iran Govt is determined to maintain friendly relations with Soviet Union and will do everything possible to this end so long as independence and integrity of Iran are not affected. (Prime Minister and Homayunjah were to see Soviet Chargé last night in effort to clarify situation.)

6. If Iran is in fact faced with Soviet hostility she can do nothing except throw her case before the world and let world decide issue. Although Iran Govt is ready at any moment to discuss any Russian grievances Iranian attempts so far to open negotiations have herewith no Russian response. It is even very difficult for FonOff to make contact with Soviet Embassy here.

7. No one in Iran Govt has slightest idea of provoking armed class [*clash*] with Russia and it would be absurd to think of Iranian forces as threat to Russian security.

8. Former Premier Bayat recently appointed Governor General Azerbaijan is ready to leave for his post as soon as weather permits

⁴⁵ Ibrahim Hakimi, who once more became Iranian Prime Minister on October 24, 1945.

flying but there is doubt as to reception he will meet from Russians at Tabriz.

Homayunjah seemed vague as to details of events in Azerbaijan during past few days and would not express definite opinion as to whether reported uprisings constitute real revolution or have some other objective. He emphasized, however, that regardless of character of disturbances Iran Govt should be left free to deal with them.

He said no reply had yet been received to note presented Soviet Embassy regarding recent disturbances and instances of Russian intervention. Mytel 659 [959] November 19 said note was delivered evening of November 17. (Not November 18 as I had been originally informed.)

Sent Dept as 971; repeated Moscow 279 London 85.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 20 [21], 1945—9 a. m.

[Received November 21—9:07 a. m.]

974. Press today reports fighting still in progress at Mianeh and says rioters have disarmed gendarmes at Sarab, Ajabshir and Banab, but continued [*calm said*] to reign at Tabriz, Rezaieh, Ardebil, Astara and Miandoab with Iranian garrisons at those points in full control.

Prime Minister yesterday made general statement in Majlis in which he asserted Govt would not permit rebellion and would punish those responsible for creating trouble. Said sole request of Iran Govt to Allied Govts signatories of Tripartite Treaty is that they refrain from air [*any?*] intervention in internal affairs and respect liberty of action of Iranian Security forces and official agencies. Expressed confidence in friendship of neighboring states and in good will and patriotism of Azerbaijanian population.

Sent Dept as 974 repeated Moscow as 280 and London as 87.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 21, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received November 21—1:27 p. m.]

977. *Gendarmerie* sources say Soviets have turned back at Kabak two successive gendarme convoys with supplies destined for troop column now encamped outside Qazvin. Also report no one permitted pass Karaj en route Qazvin regardless of reason for travel.

Understood Iranian Army has opened radio communication with Tabriz and reports all quiet there. However, despite this and press reports of calm in major towns of Azarbaijan, general area still takes most serious view of conditions. He says information given press is partly designed to calm public excitement.

Having as yet received no answer to request for [Russian] passes for trip to Tabriz by Embassy officers, I am seeing Soviet Chargé this evening on that subject and will also try to elicit some expression of his views and information on Azerbaijan affairs.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2145: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 21, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received November 21—7:20 p. m.]

12224. In discussing Iranian situation with us today Baxter, Head of Eastern Department of Foreign Office, said no confirmation had yet been received of reported stopping of Iranian troops by Russians but that in any event situation was obviously serious and British perturbed. There was no doubt, he said, that in view of development of affair Russians are behind present agitation but concrete evidence to that effect adequate to serve as a basis for representations to Moscow is still lacking.

On other hand, Baxter expressed view that it might be erroneous to attribute these difficulties entirely to Russians since there has been long historic precedent for special treatment of mixed population of Azerbaijan area by central authority in Tehran as for instance during Kajar regime⁴⁶ when Crown Prince was often made governor of area. Recent evidence of this lack of homogeneity has been afforded when certain dissident elements in Azerbaijan had welcomed Russian occupation in 1941 and seems probable that these persons may well view with dismay prospect of Russian troop withdrawal.

Baxter observed difficult to assess ultimate Russian intentions but he suggested that Russian support of both Azerbaijan and Kurd agitation might have as at least one of its objectives bringing pressure to bear on Turkey as well as Iran.

Baxter said British had recommended to Iranians that their best weapon in circumstances would seem to be publicity and he remarked that Iranian Ambassador in Washington apparently needed no coaching in that regard judging by press reports. Concerning Iranian

⁴⁶ The Kajar dynasty was established in Iran in 1779. It lasted until 1925 when the Majlis deposed Shah Ahmed and proclaimed Reza Khan his successor.

note advising Russians of intended sending of troops into Azerbaijan, Baxtor said British questioned whether it might not have been better tactics to move troops without prior notifications on assumption that Russians would not interfere. Since such notification had in fact been given however, British had thought that publicity should be given to it in order to prepare ground for possible release of subsequent material as situation developed. Regarding call of Iranian Ambassador⁴⁷ on Bevin yesterday, as reported in press, Bevin said Ambassador had called under instructions in order to outline situation but that he had contributed nothing of interest which British did not already know.

Asked regarding possible effect of these developments on British troop withdrawal Baxter said British proceeding as planned and that they had no reason to believe Russians not likewise intending to complete evacuation by agreed date. In Commons today Foreign Secretary was asked whether, in view of latest developments, he would reaffirm assurances given by his predecessor that it was Government's intention in all circumstances to safeguard British imperial interest in Southern Persia and Persian Gulf. Bevin reported to have replied that it was Government's intention to safeguard British interests in whatever part of world they may be found.⁴⁸

Sent Department as 12224, repeated Tehran as 30.

WINANT

S91.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1945.

641. Following is substance of Secretary's statement at press conference Nov. 21, in reply to correspondent's query whether this Govt is taking any action in view of its participation in Declaration on Iran:

No action has yet been taken. Iranian authorities have presented to us a statement in which they complained that Soviet military commanders have refused to permit Iranian armed forces to reinforce garrisons and have obstructed their moving troops to the Soviet occupied area in which this trouble has occurred. Iranian

⁴⁷ Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh.

⁴⁸ For texts of question and of reply by Mr. Bevin, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 416, col. 441. For further statement on November 21 by Mr. Bevin, on the situation in Persia and the withdrawal of British troops from that country, see *ibid.*, col. 545. The "assurances given by his predecessor" refer, presumably, to the statement made in the House of Commons on June 6, 1945, by Richard K. Law, Minister of Education in the "caretaker" government which took office on May 25, 1945, and, prior to that, Minister of State, *ibid.*, vol. 411, col. 858.

authorities express great fear that they will be unable to preserve order in northern Iran and they consider Iranian Govt is charged with the duty of preserving order under Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty. U.S. Govt was a party to Tehran Declaration of December 1943, signed by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, in which we gave assurances with regard to the maintenance of Iran's territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. We have received no definite information from our representative as to the facts which have been presented to us by Iranian Govt. We are advised that communications have been severed between Tehran and Consulate in Tabriz from which we ordinarily would have received that information. Until we do receive further information from our own representative as to the facts, no decision will be made by us.

Sent to Tehran. Repeated to Moscow and London.

BYRNES

891.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 22, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received November 22—8:58 a. m.]

978. Both Homayunjah and Arfa last night separately informed Embassy Iranian troops still held outside Qazvin by Russians. Arfa added Soviet Commander in Chief General Sovyetnikov had told column commander any attempt to advance would be regarded as attack on Soviet Union. Homayunjah said small delayed unit which had been retained at Karaj has been permitted proceed to join main body but at same time permanent Iranian post at Karaj had been forced to evacuate which leads Iran Minister War to fear Russians want to isolate column.

Homayunjah said he would send note to Russian Embassy last night or this morning demanding reason for Soviet interference with troop movements. He said his conversation evening of November 21 with Soviet Chargé d'Affaires was unsatisfactory as latter asserted action had been taken by Russian military authorities on military grounds and he did not know reasons. Chargé promised to communicate with commanding general but Iran Govt had received no answer up to last night.

Homayunjah said Cabinet has decided to send special mission to Moscow if it can get any indication Soviets would be willing deal with such mission on proper basis. He said Iran Govt has already made tentative approaches on this line but had gotten no encouragement so far. His own opinion is Russians would expect envoys to go prepared to offer "gifts" or concessions whereas Iran Govt's objective is to learn reasons for Russian hostility.

Today's press says Majlis is considering despatch of Parliamentary missions to Washington, London and Moscow.

Press also publishes proclamation issued by Azerbaijanians resident Tehran denouncing those responsible for uprisings and declaring their own loyalty to Iran Govt. Large group Azerbaijanians demonstrated at Majlis November 20 in same sense.

There is no news today of any new developments in Azerbaijan but Arfa said he received message yesterday noon from Iran commander Tabriz saying situation that city was grave and unless reinforcements received soon "all would be lost". Arfa gave no details except that Tabriz commander said Russians had distributed 10,000 rifles to "civilians". I am still undecided how to evaluate such reports.

During my conversation last night with Soviet Chargé Iakoubov he denied that there were any disturbances in Azerbaijan (denial that hardly checks with prior statements his subordinates that conditions were upset and it was inadvisable for foreigners to travel in north). He further denied that permission had been refused Iranian troops to move to Tabriz saying Soviet authorities were simply awaiting instructions in premise.

To Dept as 978, Moscow 282, London 89.

MURRAY

125.9156/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 22, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received November 22—7 : 40 a. m.]

980. We are trying [to] communicate with Tabriz by Iranian Army radio which has made contact with its garrison there and I hope to have word from Ebling in next day or two.

Still awaiting Russian passes for travel by car and plane to Tabriz. (Apart from pass question weather has prevented flying past several days and continues.) Soviet Chargé has assured me he has done all he could to obtain action but approval must come from Soviet military commander Qazvin who Chargé says has not yet replied to telegram sent afternoon November 20.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1945—noon.

642. Your telegrams are coming in promptly and are most helpful. Your 978 Nov. 22 just received.

We are particularly anxious to have as authentic information as it is possible to obtain concerning refusal of Soviet authorities to permit Iranian troops to enter northern zone or to allow those already there to function.

When reports are received that quiet has been restored in individual cities and towns in northern zone, does this mean those localities are in control of insurgents or of central Govt? Can you ascertain what areas are in control of Iranians who do not recognize full authority of Tehran Govt?

First-hand report of American official would naturally be useful.

BYRNES

891.00/11-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 23, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received 8:45 a. m.]

981. Desire of Iran Govt to send mission to Moscow as reported mytel 978 Nov. 22 may be outcome of informal suggestions I have made during past several months to various officials and political leaders including Shah, Court Minister Ala and Allahyar Saleh⁴⁹ as to advisability of attempting to settle difficulties with Soviet Union by means of special envoy of mission. Pointing to relative success of our Govt in dealing with Stalin through special emissaries such as Hopkins,⁵⁰ I have advanced thought that Iran Govt should be able find some individual whose qualities, experience and possibly knowledge of language would make him especially apt for discussions with Soviets outside ordinary diplomatic channels. This seemed the more indicated since Iran Ambassador Moscow appears to have great difficulty in making satisfactory contact with Soviet FonOff and Iranian FonOff here has similar difficulty with Soviet Embassy.

As alternative I once suggested to Ala it might be good idea for Shah himself to make official visit Moscow. In this way Iran Govt could take advantage his pleasing personality and intelligence and follow up initial personal contact between Shah and Stalin made when latter was here Nov 1943.⁵¹ (Ala felt this presented grave difficulties because it would arouse British suspicion but I do not think this an insuperable obstacle.)

⁴⁹ Minister Without Portfolio in the Hakimi Cabinet.

⁵⁰ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt; for documentation on his mission to Moscow in May and June 1945, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, pp. 21 ff.

⁵¹ In connection with the Tehran Conference which met from November 28 to December 1, 1943.

My thought in making these informal suggestions was that experience has shown it is easier to settle matters with Russians when conversations take place on highest levels. Furthermore I think Iran should make extraordinary efforts to arrive at amicable adjustment in its strained relations with USSR if only to strengthen its case with world public opinion. Unless it is shown that Iranians are completely willing to negotiate in friendly fashion, critics, whether friendly or hostile, might say that lack of Iranian good will was cause of tension. Even if an Iranian approach is completely rebuffed as it might well be or if impossible Soviet demands are presented, Iran would at least have made clear where responsibility lay. Idea of sending mission is evidently under active consideration not only by Cabinet but also by Majlis and political circles generally. It was proposed few days ago by Deputy Shafagh in speech in Majlis and has been echoed in press. One rumor states mission composed of [apparent omission], Minister Roads Firuz and Minister State Saleh is to go while another story lists Qavam es Saltaneh, Sadegh Sadegh⁵² and Ali Mansur.⁵³ Latter trio would probably be much more acceptable to Russians.

Dept may wish to consider advisability of suggesting to Moscow that despatch of an Iranian mission be encouraged on clear understanding however that conversations would be conducted on basis of complete equality.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 23, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received November 24—6:38 a. m.]

982. I have called on Yakubov Soviet Chargé who has assured me Embassy request for travel passes for Major Garver by plane and Capt Gagarine by car to Tabriz and return has been transmitted to Soviet Commander at Qazvin for action which latter may not be able to decide before referring matter to higher military authority. Despite his statement that present is "inopportune time" for travel in Azerbaijan, Yakubov insists that "complete calm" reigns throughout area notwithstanding "lies" in Tehran press to contrary.

In discussing "democratic elements" in Azerbaijan, Yakubov stated their action has been orderly and not unlawful and violent as commonly reported. I took pains to stress mere dubbing some group or process as "democratic" does not *ipso facto* vest it with democratic

⁵² President of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society and prominent Iranian politician.

⁵³ Governor General of Khorasan.

character and added that growth of true democracy is long process from within which cannot be accelerated by force from without. Yakubov holds that present upsurge in "democracy" in Soviet-occupied northern Iran represents true democratic development upon which I pointed out that democratic thought in Iran is not monopoly of Azerbaijan and that it is most unusual that "democratic processes" of past several months in that area are not accompanied by similar trends in other parts of Iran. When I stated that true democracies are always interested in trends toward democracy in other countries, Yakubov asserted that any "democratic process" in Iran is matter concerning Iran Govt and subjects only.

He contends that 98% Iranian people regard Soviet Union as good neighbor and that remaining 2% are reactionaries and persons under influences hostile to Soviet Union. According to Yakubov basis of Soviet policy toward Iran is spirit of friendship and desire to foster well-being of Iran which motivated Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 and this basis has continued unmodified throughout intervening years and has guided Soviet Union in all subsequent treaties and relations with Iran.

I mentioned to Yakubov widespread interest in United States in Iran and its well-being and reiterated to him my previous statement to Ambassador Maximov that I stand prepared at all times to work with any and all of my colleagues towards promoting common wealth of Iran. Yakubov assured me that best interests Iran are constant aim Soviet Union.

Toward end of interview I inquired whether he could enlighten me with reasons for Soviet refusal to permit Iranian public security forces (specifically army column halted at Qazvin) move within Soviet-occupied Iran against which Yakubov at first parried with statement Soviet Union has not interfered with public security of Iran. Later he stated that column at Qazvin has not been refused permission to proceed adding that Iranians have applied for permission to proceed through and beyond Qazvin and application is being studied by Russians "in accordance with procedure stipulated in Tripartite Treaty which procedure governs movement all Iranian public security forces in northern area" (of which stipulation I have no knowledge). I invited to his attention [article] 4 (1) of Tripartite Treaty which provides that British and Russian military forces in Iran will disturb as little as possible security forces of Iran. Yakubov then asserted that Soviet authorities have interfered at no time with movement Iranian public security forces upon which I recited earlier instances in which attempted movements of army and *gendarmerie* forces have been thwarted by Russians. He modified his assertion by statement that since arrival of gendarmes in any northern area is always ac-

accompanied by "widespread unrest", it has been necessary in some instances to prevent movement of gendarmes. When asked why movements of gendarmes in southern areas Iran do not cause unrest, Yakubov replied that he knows nothing about the southern areas.

Yakubov took pains to sum up our interview with following points: (1) Movement of Iranian Armed Forces in northern area is matter for concern of these armed forces and Red Army only (2) "democratic movement" in north is matter for concern of Iran Govt only. (3) Soviet Govt has no interest in Iran that is not for common good of country and people.

Throughout our interview Yakubov showed no inclination to discuss the points at hand. Instead his conduct and utterances were those of bureaucrat or party underling concealing himself being [*beneath?*] dialectic and mouthing of "party line". It is of obvious significance that Soviet Union should have withdrawn its Ambassador from Iran at such a critical time (which action is, however not with [*without?*] precedent in Soviet diplomacy such for instance as the withdrawal of its Ambassadors from Washington and London during critical period 2 years ago)⁵⁴ thereby leaving Iran Govt and foreign diplomatic representatives without any Soviet representative of stature to whom they may address themselves.

Sent Dept as 982; repeated Moscow as 284, London as 91.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2345: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 23, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received November 23—12:50 p. m.]

983. Iranian FonOff has sent further note to Soviet Embassy as forecast mytel 978, November 22.

Prime Minister has asked Majlis to refrain from debating Azerbaijan situation so that Iran Government may pursue its negotiations in calm atmosphere. He stated conversations were proceeding satisfactorily and he hoped to arrive at a solution. (I have no reason to believe this assertion is correct. It was probably motivated by desire of Prime Minister to avoid further provocation of Soviets by inflammatory speeches.)

There are strong rumors Cabinet will resign and be replaced by new Cabinet including such elder statesmen as Qavam-es-Saltaneh,

⁵⁴ See memorandum of April 24, 1943, by Under Secretary Welles; telegram 275, to Moscow, May 1; memorandum of May 7, by Welles; and telegram 1098, from Moscow, August 16; *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 516, 519, 522, and 564, respectively. See also *ibid.*, p. 564, footnote 63.

Sadegh Sadegh and Mostafa Adl.⁵⁵ Reason for such move would be to introduce stronger personalities and men *persona grata* to Russians in order to cope with crisis.

FonOff has unconfirmed report that rebels at Mianeh captured and then executed 14 Govt Partisans. Otherwise no reports of new developments in Azerbaijan have reached me.

Assistant Military Attaché Captain Gagarine yesterday traveled to Qazvin via Karaj and found traffic including Iranian Army supply trucks was being permitted to pass along highway although all cars were halted and searched at Soviet check post in Karaj. Gagarine talked to Commander Iranian column halted outside Qazvin who confirmed Arfa's statements that Russians had ordered force to turn back. Commander said he was awaiting orders from Tehran before making any move in either direction. Gagarine saw two Soviet armored cars and small infantry detachment apparently guarding eastern entrance to Qazvin against Iranian advance.

Colonel Baker visited Karaj yesterday morning and observed usual gendarme and police posts there together with Iranian Army detachment of 4 or 5 men engaged in guarding telegraph line. He was unable estimate number Soviet troops Karaj and saw nothing to indicate arrival any large reinforcements such as Iranians had previously reported but cannot state positively such reinforcements had not arrived.

Although these investigations were necessarily superficial and inconclusive they show that alarmist Iranian reports of Soviet actions in expelling Iranian post and establishing force of 5 or 6000 troops in Karaj are probably unfounded. This illustrates difficulty of ascertaining true facts any situation when only Iranian sources of information are available. It should be emphasized however that Gagarine confirmed halting of Iranian column which is central point in present controversy.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2345 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1945—5 p. m.

2386. Please deliver the following communication urgently to the Soviet Govt: ⁵⁶

"The Government of Iran has informed the Government of the United States that armed uprisings have taken place in areas of

⁵⁵ Chairman of the Iranian delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and Minister Without Portfolio in the Hakimi and Sadr governments from May to October 1945.

⁵⁶ In telegram 3954, November 25, 1945, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that this communication had been "delivered by letter to Molotov about 2 p. m., November 24, Moscow time." (891.00/11-2545)

northern Iran where Soviet troops are stationed; that the Iranian Government has directed certain of its armed forces to enter those areas for the purpose of reestablishing internal security and its own authority; that Soviet military commanders have refused to permit these forces to proceed; and that consequently the Iranian Government has not been able to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in Iranian territory.

It will be recalled that on December 1, 1943, Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt signed in Tehran a declaration in which they stated that their Governments were 'at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran'. This Government has entire confidence that the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain are just as zealous as the Government of the United States meticulously to abide by the assurances contained in this declaration. In the view of this Government the fulfillment of these assurances requires that the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British, or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security.

The Government of the United States realizes that any Soviet commanders in the areas concerned who may have prevented the free movement of Iranian forces may have been acting without the sanction of the Soviet Government. If the Soviet commanders have been acting without instructions in this matter, it is assumed that the Soviet Government is issuing to them instructions in keeping with the declaration referred to above. In any event the situation which has arisen has convinced the American Government that it would be in the common interest for all Soviet, British, and American troops to be withdrawn immediately from Iran. As long as any of these troops remain in the territory of a friendly government, incidents and misunderstandings are likely to occur. The Government of the United States has already reduced its forces in Iran during the present year from a maximum strength of approximately 28,000 to less than 6,000. There are no American combat troops in Iran. Those who remain are engaged in activities exclusively of a service nature connected with the liquidation and disposal of military supplies and the operation of certain important communications connected with demobilization. While the immediate withdrawal of these troops will cause considerable inconvenience to this Government, nevertheless instructions are being issued to the American military authorities in Iran to take immediate steps to effect the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Iran by January 1, 1946. This Government proposes that the British and Soviet Governments issue similar instructions to their commanders and that arrangements be made immediately for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran by January 1, 1946. Immediate steps to effect such withdrawal would dispel any doubt regarding the intentions of the three Governments to carry out the assurances given by them. In making this suggestion the Government of the United States is aware that no undertaking has been given that these troops are to be removed from Iran before March 2, 1946. On the other hand, now that hostilities have ceased, it sees no compelling reason for them to remain until that date. It is of the opinion

that immediate steps to effect withdrawal by January 1 not only would obviate possible misunderstandings but would also be a fitting recognition of the notable contributions which Iran, a member in good standing of the United Nations, has made to the common war effort.

Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced.

Similar proposals are being made to the British Government.”

BYRNES

891.00/11-2345 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the
United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1945—5 p. m.

10209. The American Ambassador at Moscow is being instructed today to deliver the following communication to the Soviet Government:

[Here follows text of telegram 2386 to Moscow, *supra*.]

Please deliver a copy of the text of this communication to the British Government, inviting particular attention to the American Govt's proposal for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran. Please express the hope that the British Govt will find it possible to agree to this proposal. An urgent reply from the British Govt would be welcome.

Sent to London, repeated to Tehran.⁵⁷

BYRNES

891.00/11-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 24, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 2:37 p. m.]

988. Deptel 642, November 22. Unless otherwise specified when towns are reported quiet they are believed still in control Iran Government authorities.

We have only Iran Government reports as to what towns are under control of insurgents and cannot be sure whether these are based on

⁵⁷ As telegram 644. Text of telegram 2386 was sent to Ankara for information in telegram 1111, November 24, noon.

direct official information from affected areas or on stories from unofficial travelers and the like. So far as our information goes Zenjan is still certainly under Iran Government control and it is virtually certain this is true of Tabriz, Ardabil, Astara and Rezaieh. Mianeh, Sarab and Bonap (near Maragheh) have been repeatedly reported in insurgent hands and these reports have not been denied. Situation in Miandoab, Maragheh and other towns that section is unclear. Traveler who left Tabriz several days ago says "democrats" seemed in control from Bostanabad (between Tabriz and Mianeh) to point on highway southeast of Mianeh.

When using term "insurgents" or "rebels" I am simply following local press and officialdom for reasons of convenience. I have still to obtain clear information as to causes of disturbances and to determine unmistakably whether participants formally deny authority of Central Government. We are not even sure of identity of groups concerned who may well be Turkish speaking Soviets infiltrated into Iran. There have been many reports of such infiltration.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 24, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received November 24—7:40 a. m.]

989. Mytel 983, November 23. I consider Capt Gagarine's visit to Qazvin established beyond any shadow of doubt (reurtel 642, November 22) fact that Iranian column has been halted by Soviet authorities. Even Soviet Chargé in conversation with me (mytel 982, November 23) did not assert that column had been allowed to proceed. Apart from this direct evidence plus circumstantial information previously received from Iranian Chief of Staff and FonOff I would refer Dept to numerous earlier instances Embassy has reported in which Iranian Army and *gendarmerie* units have been prevented from moving into or within Soviet zone. (See especially Embstel 188, March 17, and others on same incident.) Every week since my arrival here I have been receiving official Iranian reports of this kind . . . and I think past Russian record in this respect is such that we need have no hesitation in accepting evidence our own officers and other sources in present case.

I should point out further that I am still without reply from Soviet authorities to my urgently presented request for passes for American diplomatic officers to travel to Tabriz. Russian reluctance this regard is highly suspicious to say the least.

MURRAY

124.91/11-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 24, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 11:30 a. m.]

990. Although our first approach was made November 19, I have not yet even received reply to my request of Soviets here for passes for Embassy officers to travel to Tabriz. Evening of November 21 I called personally on Soviet Chargé and emphasized importance of matter. Having heard nothing from him last night, I delivered strong note expressing surprise at delay and saying I considered restrictions placed on movement American officials in Iran as unwarranted. Concluded by saying I expected issuance of passes immediately.

It is obvious Soviets are deliberately stalling, first pleading they must have authority from Qazvin and then intimating matter might have to be referred Moscow. I suggest Dept instruct Embassy Moscow take this up in strongest fashion and insist Soviet Embassy here be directed issue passes at once.

Persons involved are Embassy Counselor Ward, Air Attaché Garver, Second Secretary Jernegan, Assistant Military Attaché Gagarine and Sergeant Livingston (Garver's mechanic). Either Ward or Jernegan is to accompany Garver and Livingston in Garver's plane while Gagarine will proceed by car with Iranian driver. I regard both trips as essential because air trip although much faster may provide little or no information on developments at intermediate points while overland trip will shed light on events at Mianeh, et cetera, but may take 5 or 6 days to complete.

Sent Dept as 990; repeated Moscow 287.

MURRAY

811.24591/11-2445

The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the discussions in the cabinet yesterday morning on the removal of the approximately 5,500 United States Army troops now in Iran. This is in connection with a message which you intend to send to the Russians.⁵⁸

We will direct that all remaining American Forces evacuate Iran by January 1st. This is in accordance with the policy of the State Department. This action may result in the loss of substantial quantities of U.S. property and of U.S. interests in fixed installations under

⁵⁸ See telegram 2386, November 23, 5 p. m., to Moscow, p. 448.

the jurisdiction of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, although we understand that the Commissioner will make every effort to dispose of the property prior to January 1st and the Army will do what it can to remove property that is portable and not disposed of.

Abadan airport is desirable to an uninterrupted operation of our Army Air Transport Command route across North Africa to India. It is understood informally that it is agreeable to the State Department for the Air Transport Command to turn over the operations of the airport with necessary communications and weather facilities to TWA⁵⁹ under a War Department contract. Confirmation of this understanding is requested.⁶⁰ Should this proposition not prove feasible, it will be necessary to interrupt operations for an extended period until the necessary alternate rights and facilities could be provided. Such alternate rights would involve the securing from the British of full operating rights and use of housing and shop facilities at Habbaniyah together with rights and possible construction of housing and shop facilities at Bahrein and Sharjah.

Appropriate orders will be sent out directing that all of our troops will be evacuated by 1 January except for those on Attaché functions, General Ridley's U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army and Colonel Schwarzkopf's U.S. Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian *Gendarmerie*.⁶¹

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

891.00/11-2545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 25, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 3:13 p. m.]

996. Homayunjah last night told Embassy officer Foreign Office had sent two additional notes to Soviet Embassy on November 23.⁶² One stated reports had been received from Zenjan that "unknown" persons, some armed, were filtering into that city and it was feared disturbances were planned. Note therefore renewed request that Iranian troops be allowed proceed beyond Qazvin.

⁵⁹ Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.

⁶⁰ In reply, on November 24, 1945, the Secretary of State wrote: "It is entirely agreeable to the State Department for the Army Air Transport Command to transfer the operations of the airport at Abadan with necessary communications and facilities to TWA." (811.24591/11-2445) For further information on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, bracketed note on p. 496.

⁶¹ This was done in telegram Warx 85023, November 24, 1945, to the Commanding General of the Africa-Middle East Theater at Cairo (811.24591/11-2445).

⁶² Copies of these notes in French, dated November 22 and November 23, 1945, were transmitted to the Department in despatch 162, November 26, from Tehran, not printed; see note 2313, November 27, from the Iranian Ambassador, p. 459.

Second note complained against asserted continued maintenance Soviet military offices Tehran and coming and going of Soviet troops here after announced Russian evacuation of city. Homayunjah said this second note was motivated by reports that Soviets had stocks of arms in Tehran and were preparing disturbances here.

He said no reply has been received from Soviets to any of notes sent during past week on these subjects and he claimed to know however that Soviet Embassy had telegraphed texts of all four to Moscow.

Although he said Iran Govt still had little news of events Azerbaijan he believed conditions were quieter there. Emphasized that Govt would proceed calmly and avoid raising complications for its friends US and Britain. Declared belief all nations of world realized justice in present case lay on side of Iran. Expressed confidence that if Soviets ceased encouraging dissatisfied elements and Iran Govt left free to act order would be restored without use of force. Said Iran Govt prepared to consider Azerbaijan in complaints. Said he was relieved to hear "Democratic Party" was not demanding separation from Iran but only local autonomy.

Weather permitting Governor General Bayat expects to leave today for Tabriz in plane Soviets have put at his disposal. Homayunjah said he was encouraged by this evidence Russian good will.

To Dept as 996, repeated London 94, Moscow 289.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 25, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received November 25—8:55 a. m.]

998. British Vice Consul Lang arrived Tehran yesterday by In-tourist plane from Tabriz and brought pouch from Ebling including his telegram No. 9 to Dept⁶³ which we despatched last night. Summary of situation as derived from Ebling's written reports and Lang's oral statements follows:

"Democratic Party" is in control most towns and rural districts comprised in rough triangle formed by Sarab, Mianeh and Bukan (south of Miandoab). Govt offices generally are functioning but under party direction. Party patrols control main roads, search passengers and occasionally requisition vehicles but there has been relatively little bloodshed. Lang guesses perhaps 20 persons have been killed. Chief party hostility directed against gendarmes who have been largely disarmed and disbanded in districts under party control. British Consul visited Mianeh November 22 and found all quiet there.

⁶³ Dated November 20, not printed.

No disturbances Tabriz and none reported western Azerbaijan.

Soviets taking no open part in movement but reported to have discouraged Iranian Commander Tabriz from making any move to put down party groups.

Central Committee of Democratic Party calling itself "National Congress of Azerbaijan" established Tabriz and is more or less directing activities in outlying areas although disclaiming responsibility for any extreme acts. On November 23 Congress presented to American, British and Soviet Consuls declaration setting forth policies and aims of party. Salient points are:

1. Azerbaijan claims right of self-determination under Atlantic Charter and is determined to have Democratic regime and full cultural autonomy.

2. With this aim people of Azerbaijan want to form own "national govt" within framework of Iranian State electing at same time their representatives to Tehran Majlis.

3. Deny wish to separate from Iran.

4. "National Congress" is composed of 20 delegates and supported by signatures of 150,000 people.

5. Congress has appointed governing board of 30 persons which has been authorized to take steps to assure the "national aims" conduct elections for Govt of Azerbaijan and deputies to Tehran Majlis and negotiate with central Govt for peaceable realization of Azerbaijan self-administration.

6. Congress desires avoid conflict but if central Govt attempts to defeat its aids [*aims*] by force Congress and people Azerbaijan will fight to last. Governing board has no authority to relinquish power of self administration of Azerbaijan.

Lang says Congress is expected to hold elections about December 3. Full text declaration by mail.⁶⁴

To Dept as 998, repeated Moscow 290, London 95.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 26, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received November 27—1 : 05 p. m.]

1001. I understand Reuters reports from Moscow that Soviet Govt expects an Iranian mission to be sent to Moscow.

⁶⁴ Despatch 164, November 26, 1945. In this message, the Ambassador stated: "I think the Department will agree that the most interesting feature of the declaration is that it presents what amounts to a demand for complete autonomy. Although any intention to separate from Iran is specifically denied, the effect of the announced platform, if realized, would be scarcely less than the independence of Azerbaijan, subject to the merest shadow of Iranian authority. It is particularly interesting that the local bodies which have been set up or whose creation is proposed are referred to as 'national' organizations and that the local 'National Government of Azerbaijan' is to be elected from the members of the local legislature and to be responsible to it." (891.00/11-2645)

In past 2 days both Homayunjah and Nabil⁶⁵ of FonOff have said Iranian Govt has put aside idea of dispatching special mission at least until after present crisis ends. Govt said to feel mission would be useless now unless it were authorized make concessions to Russians which Iranian Govt not yet prepared to do.

Nabil yesterday outlined items which Russians have indicated they want as follows:

1. Oil concession northern Iran.
2. Air transport rights not only between Russia and Tehran but also for internal transport between Tehran, Tabriz and Meshed. (He said Iranian Govt prepared to grant international rights to Soviets on same terms as to U.S. but not prepared to grant internal rights.)
3. Some sort of special position at port of Pahlavi on Caspian (Nabil thinks they ultimately hope to regain full control of this port which was in Russian hands prior to treaty of 1921⁶⁶).
4. Agreement on maintenance of Astara-Resht-Qazvin highway. (Nabil considers this presents little difficulty.)

He said Iranian Govt had expected early return of Soviet Ambassador Maximov but Iranian Ambassador Moscow has now been told Maximov will not return. Soviet FonOff, however, has promised new Ambassador will be sent shortly.

To Dept as 1001; Moscow 291; London 96.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2645: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 26, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received November 26—12:48 p. m.]

12346. Communication contained in Deptel 10209⁶⁷ was delivered to Undersecretary Howe⁶⁸ who said it would be given urgent consideration as requested. He observed, however, that fixing of January 1 as date for completion of withdrawal introduced new element in situation which would probably require reference to military authorities who conceivably might find it difficult to make practical arrangements for effecting withdrawal at such an early date. He assumed, however, the British would do their utmost to hasten withdrawal of their troops provided that Russians should consent to our proposal.

Howe said status of matter as far as British are concerned is that British Embassy in Moscow has been instructed to tell Russians that

⁶⁵ Fazlullah Nabil, Head of the Third Political Division of the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁶ At that time the port was known as Enzeli.

⁶⁷ Dated November 23, p. 450.

⁶⁸ Robert G. Howe, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

it is British view that under Anglo-Russian-Iranian treaty and Tehran declaration no restraint should be placed on the Iranian Govt's maintaining order with its territory.⁶⁹ Howe added, however, that British had been endeavoring to keep matter as much as possible on plane of direct negotiation between Iranians and Russians in effort to avoid charge that British were meddling unduly in Russian affairs.

Sent Department as 12346, repeated Tehran as 36.

WINANT

891.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1945—4 p. m.

649. Please give the Iranian Government a copy of the note to the Soviet Government contained in the Department's telegram No. 644, November 23, 5 p. m.⁷⁰ The text is being released to the press here today.

BYRNES

891.00/11-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 26, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received November 26—12: 45 p. m.]

3961. [Re] action by Soviet military authorities in stopping Iranian troops proceeding from Tehran to Azerbaijan.

British Ambassador⁷¹ on November 25 wrote Molotov saying British Government felt it entirely reasonable that Iranian Government should wish to maintain order in its own territory and legitimate that Iranian Government should have its security forces within its own territory for purpose of maintaining order. Clark Kerr referred to articles 1 and 4 of Anglo-Soviet Iranian treaty of January 29, 1942 and to Declaration of Tehran. He said his Government felt action by Soviet military authorities must have been due to "some misunderstanding of the position" and trusted that Soviet Government would feel able to direct Soviet Commanders in Iran not to obstruct Iranian military movements or efforts of Iranian Government to maintain internal order.

To Department 3961 repeated Tehran 158, London 600.

HARRIMAN

⁶⁹ The British Government released its note of November 25 to the Soviet Foreign Office on November 27; for text, see the *Times* (London) of November 28, 1945. The Soviet reply to the British note is printed in *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 416, col. 2313. The date of the Soviet reply is not indicated.

⁷⁰ Same as No. 10209 to London, p. 450.

⁷¹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

124.91/11-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 27, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received November 27—12: 47 p. m.]

1007. Embtel 990, November 24. Soviet Embassy yesterday issued passes to Embassy personnel to proceed to Tabriz. Capt Gagarine departed yesterday afternoon by car and Major Garver and Jernegan this morning by air.

Sent Dept as 1007, repeated Moscow as 295.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 27, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received November 28—8: 33 a. m.]

1008. ReEmbtel 1000, November 26.⁷² During long audience with Shah yesterday afternoon he informed me he had received word from Mr. Ala that Department had addressed note to Soviet Government regarding present situation in Iran. Mr. Ala's telegram to his Government appears to have stated further that American note asked Soviet Government for "information" on situation. Shah apparently had no knowledge of any proposal with regard to withdrawal of foreign troops now in the country.

Shah informed me at same time he had been seriously considering addressing appeal to principal members of Security Council and asked for my advice as to whether he should proceed with such action prior to response by Soviet Government to American note. I told Shah in my personal opinion it would be desirable not to complicate situation by taking at this juncture action which he had had in mind.

Shah then requested me earnestly to advise him at earliest possible moment of receipt of reply from Soviet Government in this matter.

In light of Shah's request I trust Department will reply as soon as possible to my reference telegram.

MURRAY

⁷² Not printed; it inquired whether the Department desired that the existence or substance of the United States note to the Soviet Government be made known to the Iranian Government (891.00/11-2645). This telegram crossed the Department's No. 649, November 26, 4 p. m., to Tehran, p. 457.

891.00/11-2745 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the
Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 27, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received 11:10 p. m.]

3978. Yesterday afternoon I called on the Iranian Amb to ask what communications he had had with the Sov FonOff. He told me that he had seen Dekanosov⁷³ three times during the last few days requesting Sov authorization for Iranian troops to proceed to northwest Iran. Dekanosov contended that this was not necessary and that if additional Iranian forces went to that area it would require an increase in the Sov forces. Dekanosov said that troops were not required to settle the situation and told the Amb that the Iranian Govt should know what to do. Dekanosov declined to be specific but the Amb got the impression that he referred to earlier conversations some months ago in which it had been suggested that the Iranian Govt should make a friendly gesture toward the Sov Union. The Amb assumed that this related to granting of oil concessions. The Amb said that Dekanosov had recently made no demands on the Iranian Govt and had feigned ignorance of evidence the Amb had given him that stimulus to the "democratic" movement had come from the Sov Union. This referred not only to the Azerbaijanians but also to the encouragement of the Kurds.

The Amb said further that some months ago when he had seen Molotov the latter had stated to him that Sov troops would be withdrawn from Iran in accordance with the agreement.

Sent Dept as 3978; repeated Tehran as 161 and London as 602.

HARRIMAN

891.00/11-2745

*The Appointed Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Secretary of State*⁷⁴

No. 2313

[WASHINGTON], November 27, 1945.

SIR: The Department of State informed me yesterday morning that a note had been addressed by Your Excellency to the Soviet Government, on November 24, concerning the situation in Iran. Later in the day I received copies of the communication in question which impressed me as being couched in appropriate and forceful language.

⁷³ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁴ Handed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on November 28, 1945.

I hasten to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your good offices and valuable cooperation at a critical juncture in the destinies of my country. The friendly manner in which you have taken into consideration the representations I had the honor of making to you on November 19th and 21st,⁷⁵ regarding the anxious situation created in Iran by the armed revolt and violence of a so-called "Democratic party", encouraged by disruptive extraneous elements and emboldened by the presence of foreign forces, is very highly appreciated. Indeed I am convinced that all liberty and peace-loving nations are grateful to you, for they see in your statesmanlike action a determination on the part of the United States to uphold the high principles for which they entered the war and to exercise their leadership for justice and for peace.

In connection with the first paragraph of Your Excellency's note, in which reference is made to the refusal of the Soviet military commanders to permit the armed forces of my Government to carry out their responsibility in the maintenance of peace and order in Iranian territory, I have received the text of a further protest addressed on this subject by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy on November 23rd.⁷⁶ In this note it is alleged that whilst the Persian detachment is held up near Kazvin, the wave of lawlessness is daily increasing in strength in Azerbaijan and spreading to Zandjan, where on the 21st of November, some unknown individuals who had received firearms were proceeding to create trouble on the same lines as at Mianeh. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs earnestly requested the Soviet Embassy to take urgent steps for the removal of obstacles placed in the way of the Persian reinforcements reaching their destination. We have since heard that Zandjan has been occupied and that the insurgents are rapidly marching on Teheran, where the situation appears to be critical.

In another communication of the same date, the Minister for Foreign Affairs⁷⁷ draws the attention of the Soviet Embassy to the fact that in spite of the official Soviet announcement that Teheran had been evacuated, elements of the Red Army were constantly coming and going; in some centers of Teheran where Soviet forces are assembled they continued their activities as in the past. Moreover, individuals in civil dress riding on Soviet lorries come to Teheran and leave the city at intervals. The Soviet authorities are asked to issue immediate instructions for the complete withdrawal of Red Army troops from Teheran and its suburbs pending the evacuation of the whole of Iran.

⁷⁵ There is no evidence in Department files that memoranda covering these conversations were prepared. For an account of the conversation on November 19, see the *New York Times*, November 20, 1945, p. 1, col. 4.

⁷⁶ See also telegram 996, November 25, 10 a. m., from Tehran, p. 453.

⁷⁷ Abol Ghasem Nadjm.

The continued presence of Soviet military elements in the Capital in conjunction with the rapid advance of the armed "Democrats" and the inability of Government forces to deal with the agitators, owing to Red Army opposition, has created a very tense situation in Teheran.

Firmly convinced that Your Excellency will continue to watch the situation closely and exercise your influence in the interests of appeasement and security, which can only be brought about by the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from Iran, I have the honor to renew the expression of my highest consideration.

HUSSEIN ALA

[On November 29, Hussein Ala presented his letters of credence to President Truman and stated: "It is the confident expectation of Iran that the Declaration of Teheran will be implemented and her territory completely evacuated by the occupying foreign forces whose continued presence within the borders of an Allied country has no justification." (Department of State Press Release 896, November 29, 1945). Mr. Ala also made various additional remarks to President Truman which analyzed the nature of the Soviet menace to Iran, somewhat along the lines of note 2313, and expressed the high appreciation of his country for the American note of November 24 to the Soviet Foreign Office. He concluded by stating: "In this critical situation, I earnestly beg you, Mr. President, to continue to stand up for the rights of Iran, whose independence and integrity are being trampled underfoot. Your country alone can save us, for you have always defended moral ideas and principles and your hands are clean. I know you will not shirk your responsibility to the world. The only solution to the problem is the one you have suggested, i.e., immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from Iran and insistence on allowing Iran to have a free hand in her own territory. Another way of helping Iran, is to support her candidature for a seat on the Security Council. This will strengthen her hands in the efforts she is making to uphold her independence and integrity." (701.9111/11-3045) At this time, Mr. Ala handed to President Truman a letter of September 10 addressed to him by the Shah; for text, see page 405.]

891.00/11-2845

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1945.

The [appointed] Iranian Ambassador urgently requested an appointment with you this morning to discuss the situation in his coun-

try. I felt confident that he had nothing particularly new to report and consequently took the liberty of telling him that you were fully occupied this morning and suggested that he come to see me.

He left with me the attached communication⁷⁸ addressed to you, expressing his full appreciation for the note which we sent to the Soviet Government and reiterating reports of Soviet obstruction.

The Ambassador was highly alarmed by present reports that the rebels are advancing on Teheran. He pointed out that the Soviet authorities have leased a large number of important buildings and houses in Teheran during the past three years and still retain possession of them, despite Soviet claims of having evacuated Teheran. The Ambassador feels confident that these houses are serving as depots for arms and ammunition, and that the Soviets have prepared a well-organized fifth column movement inside the city, to be supplied with arms at the proper moment from these Soviet depots. He is afraid that the capital may be lost to the rebels and the Shah, high Government officials, and members of the Parliament are in great physical danger. The Ambassador thinks that most energetic measures are necessary, and wondered whether it might be possible for American forces in Iran to make some kind of demonstration in Teheran in support of the central Government, "somewhat similar to the support you are giving the central Government in China".

We told the Ambassador that while we would of course bring his views to the attention of the appropriate authorities, we felt it necessary to point out immediately that any movement of American forces toward Teheran would be directly contrary to the sense of our proposals to Russia and Great Britain for the withdrawal of all foreign troops. I pointed out that since we have no combat troops in Iran any demonstration by service forces might appear ridiculous. I expressed sympathy for the difficulties of the Iranian Government and said that the most effective action it could take, in my view, would be to take every step to maintain its authority within the capital.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BC/11-2845

The Appointed Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Secretary of State

No. 2316

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1945.

SIR: As Your Excellency is aware, Iran is a candidate for one of the two-year non-permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations Organization.

The matter was brought to the attention of the State Department

⁷⁸ *Infra.*

a month ago by the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of Iran,⁷⁹ who handed a memorandum on this subject to the Middle Eastern Division.⁸⁰

I have now received further instructions to approach Your Excellency with the request that, in accordance with the provisions of Article 23, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter, attention may be given to my Government's desire to be represented on the Council and the friendly influence of the United States be exerted in Iran's favor.

The arguments advanced by my Government to substantiate their claim are to be found in the fact that Iran contributed very considerably during the war to the triumph of allied arms which were seeking the destruction of the powers of aggression and the reestablishment of peace and security on a surer foundation. My country will be able in the future, as in the past, owing to her strategic position in the Middle East, to render further service to the maintenance of concord and good understanding in a very important region of the world.

Moreover, if geographical distribution is to be considered, the Middle East is certainly entitled to representation as a unit and the country in that area which made the greatest sacrifices in the war and rendered the most notable assistance to the purposes of the Allied victory is Iran.

Again, if the Asiatic continent be taken into account, Persia is the only country that played an important part in the world struggle, leaving out China which has a permanent seat.

The record of Persia in the old League of Nations was a good one. She always stood up for the fundamental principles underlying the Covenant, and never sought by compromise or interested motives to advance any selfish aims.

The election of Iran to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, with the friendly and valuable cooperation of America, will strengthen her political standing at a time when she needs all the power she can muster to maintain her independence and integrity.

If Iran's candidature receives approbation, Islam will be appropriately represented on the Council by an independent country which has always enjoyed great prestige in the Mohammedan world.

Relying upon the genuine friendship of the United States for Iran and their clear understanding of the situation in the Middle East, I beg to request Your Excellency's good offices in securing favorable consideration of our candidature for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations Organization.

I have the honor [etc.]

HUSSEIN ALA

⁷⁹ This refers, presumably, to the conversation on November 1 between the Iranian Chargé (Daftary) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) on this subject; memorandum of conversation by Mr. Allen not printed.

⁸⁰ Not found in Department files.

891.00/11-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 28, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received November 30—6:40 a. m.]

1009. Schwarzkopf reports Zenjan has definitely been taken by insurgents who have now passed Takestan en route to Kazvin. At Zenjan police *gendarmarie* and 30 soldiers were ready to defend city but were ordered by Russians not to resist and to lay down their arms which they did. Iranian War Council expects 2,000 armed insurgents to move on Tehran following fall of Kazvin and they estimate that 10,000 sympathizers within city will rise to assist marchers when moment comes. These consist of Soviet immigrants who have filtered into country, Tudeh Party members and ordinary hoodlums. There are reports from Jabon near Firuzkuh that crowds have gathered from that area and from Mazanderan and are ready to march from that direction.

General Arfa, Army Chief of Staff, has been placed in complete charge of all Iranian Armed Forces including police and *gendarmarie* and plans have been formed for defense of city contemplating only delaying actions in provinces with bulk of security forces concentrated on the capital. Orders have gone out that Tehran-Qum Road must be kept open at all costs so that reinforcements may be brought up from south and capital may be evacuated to Isfahan if necessary. This is especially important as in last war Russians took back road from Karaj to Qum Road and approached Tehran from south rather than west as expected. Delaying forces have therefore been despatched to Hassanabad and Ali-Abad about 20 kilometers south of Tehran.

There is no question but that Russians are interfering with all defense measures taken by Iranians in north and it seems reasonable supposition that they are actually directing planned military campaign. Movement has gone far beyond any ordinary mob action since it has lasted this long and since every move shows sound knowledge of military tactics and leadership. While Schwarzkopf believes it is possible deserting officers of Meshed garrison may be directing campaign he feels Soviets are more likely leaders. Campaign at moment shows two main lines of march, one from Astara (which has been taken) to Pahlavi and the other from Zenjan to Kazvin to Tehran. No reports to date of activity from Maragheh to Sanandaj in west martial law area has been extended from 6 miles around city of Tehran to 40.

Iranian Army has plans laid to blow up railroad at proper moment should rebels arrive by train. Situation is unquestionably serious and

confusion and panic in high Iranian military circles do not give any reason for confidence. At moment city is calm but it appears likely very few Iranians realize seriousness of crisis.

Sent Dept as 1009; rptd Moscow 296; London 98.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 28, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 1—10:48 p. m.]

1011. Garver and Jernegan flew to Tabriz yesterday and returned today. They report as follows:

Elections for "National Assembly of Azerbaijan" were scheduled to begin today with total of 56 Deputies to be elected from the province. Anticipated completion of elections might require week or 10 days or more. Iranian officials Tabriz regard these elections as completely faked saying victorious candidates have already been designated. Inasmuch as they are being held without any proper delay for campaigning or presentation of issues, have no legal basis and are solely under the auspices of the "National Congress of Azerbaijan" I think there can be no doubt that this view is substantially correct.

Iranian officials Tabriz assert "Democratic Party" has no real popular support and would collapse overnight if Soviet encouragement were withdrawn. Our Consul and British Consul Tabriz agree movement would probably collapse if Russian support disappeared but also agree there is fairly substantial popular sympathy for movement and feel population Azerbaijan has real grievances against central govt. Ebling says however "Democrats" seem to have little idea of how to carry out reforms demanded even if they should be given opportunity and furthermore seem to lack confidence in success their efforts.

Iranian General Derakhshani proposes put down uprising by force if reinforcements sent him and if Soviets permit. He estimates he could accomplish task with column halted outside Qazvin plus one additional battalion tanks. He says he asked use this force first to restore order in area between Zenjan and Tabriz would then send it south from Tabriz to Maragheh and Miandoab and finally eastward from Tabriz to Sarab, Ardabil and Astara. He estimates total "Democrat" forces under arms at not more than 4,000 but says without reinforcements he can do nothing except defend Tabriz, Rezaieh and perhaps Ardabil. His communications to Ardabil are cut.

"Democrats" appear to be in control of Maragheh, Mianeh, Sarab and all areas between those towns and Tabriz. They probably con-

trol Zenjan also. Gendarme commander Tabriz today informed Jernegan 12 truckloads of Kurds were threatening Miandoab and gendarme commander that town had requested permission evacuate and retire eastward to more friendly territory. Also said attacks were threatened by "Democrat" forces on Ahar (north of Sarab) and Marand. Stated since November 16 no gendarmes permitted by Russians leave Tabriz.

Outward situation Tabriz remains calm with no disturbances.

Iranian military sources Tabriz state there have been no notable increases Soviet forces Azerbaijan.

To Dept as 1011 repeated Moscow 297 and London 99.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 29, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 2—1:30 p. m.]

1020. Full summary of note received by Embassy from Foreign Office under date November 26⁸¹ follows:

Certain limited group in Azerbaijan has engaged in unconstitutional activities disruptive of public security. Range of disorders is increasing. Security officers have been attacked and many localities have been seized. Communications are interrupted and Central Government is unable receive regular information or issue instructions and make sure of their execution.

Government considers any individuals or groups having statements to make should do so in constitutional and orderly manner. Such statements would be studied and steps taken to promote public welfare in each locality. But Government is forced take fundamental steps against elements engaged in activities contrary to national dignity and prestige, to maintain power of Central Government throughout country in interest of all the people.

In view of Tehran Declaration signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, Iranian Government expects Allied Governments having troops in Iran will look with favor on measures taken by Central Government and will make any suggestions they (Allied Governments) may have with regard to reestablishment security in Azerbaijan. Allied Governments will realize Iran must be able to send security forces to any locality where they may be needed.

⁸¹ The text of note 5624 was transmitted to the Department in despatch 169, December 1, 1945, from Tehran; neither printed.

Matter is important and urgent and Foreign Office requests appropriate authorities of Allied Governments to issue orders as soon as possible, in whatever quarters they think suitable, that necessary assistance be rendered and good will shown.

Identical notes sent Soviet and British Embassies here and copies to Chinese and French Embassies.

To Department 1020; repeated London 101, Moscow 299.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 29, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 2—11:15 a. m.]

1022. In reply to our oral inquiry Nabil of Foreign Office says note summarized in mytel 1020, November 29, was directed primarily at Soviets and that Iranian Government did not have in mind any specific affirmative assistance to be rendered by US Government agencies in restoring order in Azerbaijan.

He says however Iranian Government has been considering idea of requesting establishment of sort of supervisory commission composed of representatives of United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, France and China whose function would be to watch over matters connected with presence foreign troops until they are all withdrawn March 2. He is uncertain whether this thought will be followed up.

Pending instructions from Department I am confining myself to simple acknowledgment of note under reference.

MURRAY

891.00/11-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 29, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received November 30—8:26 a. m.]

1023. Nabil says Governor General Bayat has gone to Tabriz with instructions to follow policy of conciliation toward dissident elements most of whose leaders he knows personally. He is to urge them to present their complaints direct to Central Gov and assure them they will be given full consideration.

Nabil asserts that although Bayat is *persona grata* to Russians he is not pro-Russian.

MURRAY

861.24591/11-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 30, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:21 p. m.]

4015. Referring to my letter of November 24⁸² proposing withdrawal of all Allied troops from Iran, Molotov, on November 29, wrote me as follows:

[“]The statement made in that communication concerning the armed uprising in northern Iran does not, according to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, correspond to reality. The events which have taken place in recent days in [northern]⁸³ Iran not only do not constitute an armed uprising but also are not directed against the Shahanshah Government of Iran. Now that the declaration of the Popular Assembly of northern Iran has been published, it is evident that this is a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of Azerbaidjanian population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State and which has its own particular language, different from the Persian language. It is also apparent from the contents of the above-mentioned declaration of the Popular Assembly which took place in Tabriz November 20 to 21 that the Popular Assembly addressed the expression of its wishes to the Shah, the Majlis and the Government of Iran, basing itself in this on the Iranian Constitution. The undesirable incidents which have taken place in conjunction with these recent events at various points of northern Iran have been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the populations of northern Iran, although there is nothing in these desires of the local population which is unusual for a democratic state.

As far as the Soviet military command is concerned it has not hindered, and is not hindering, the movements of the Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are in the districts of northern Iran. According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government there are in these districts of Iran one infantry regiment, two infantry brigades, two regiments of gendarme police units, the presence of which can assure order and calm in these parts. The Soviet Government opposed the despatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts of Iran and informed the Iranian Government that the despatch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the increase of the disorders, and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of Soviet garrison. Inasmuch as the Soviet Government considers the further introduction of Soviet forces into Iran undesirable, it took the position that the introduction of

⁸² See footnote 56, p. 448.

⁸³ Insertion based on copy of this telegram in Moscow Embassy files.

new Iranian forces into the northern province of Iran at the present time would serve no useful purpose.

As to the reference in the communication of the Government of the United States to the Three-Power Declaration concerning Iran December 1, 1943, the Soviet Government as far as it is concerned must state that it adheres unwaveringly to the principles of that declaration. The Declaration in question, however, does not affect questions of the number of Soviet armed forces on Iranian territory just as it does not affect the question of the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran.⁸⁴ This latter is determined by another document, namely the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and in connection with the stationing of its troops in Iran notwithstanding the fact that the right of introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran was envisaged by the Soviet Iranian treaty of February 26, 1941 [1921]. Furthermore, as the Government of the United States is aware, the question of the time for the removal of Soviet and British troops from Iran was subject of consideration at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London as little as 2 months ago and was decided by exchange of letters between the Soviet and British representatives which was brought to the attention of the above-mentioned Council of Ministers and which did not find objection in any quarters. In connection with the above it should also be noted that the British Government, in its note on the Iranian question, received by the Soviet Government on November 25, does not raise the question of the removal of Soviet troops from Iran.

On the strength of the consideration set forth above with relations to Soviet troops, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not see grounds for renewed consideration of the question of the time limit for the removal of these forces from Iran."

To Dept 4015; repeated to London 610; Tehran 165.

HARRIMAN

891.00/11-3045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1945—8 p. m.

663. Bullard's suggestions concerning possible advisability of provincial elections throughout Iran have come to Dept's attention. Your views would be appreciated.

BYRNES

⁸⁴ In telegrams 531 and 538, dated March 23, 1946, the Department requested the Embassy in the Soviet Union to send the most literal and careful translation for purposes of verification of the Soviet note of November 29, 1945 (861.24591/3-2346). The Chargé in the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan, sent "a most literal rendition" of the Soviet note in telegram 926, March 24, 1946, 4 p. m. The only significant change concerned this sentence, which was corrected to read: "The declaration in question, however, does not touch upon questions of the movement of Iranian armed forces on Iranian territory just as it does not touch upon the question of the period of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran." (861.24591/3-2446) The unquoted parts of the revised translation contained only minor language alterations which did not affect the sense of the original translation.

891.00/12-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 2, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received December 2—8:50 a. m.]

1038. Captain Gagarine returned yesterday from trip by car to Tabriz and reports adherents of "Democratic Party" in full control roads and towns including Zenjan between Qazvin and point 40 miles southeast Tabriz. He saw many "Democrats" (identified by special armband) in Qazvin itself and some he talked to said they would probably take over city today.

Being taken for Russian officer, Gagarine had little difficulty at Democrat road posts but says they exercise strict control over all traffic except Soviet military.

He found elections for local legislature in progress at Tabriz and Quenjan [*Zenjan?*] with no attempt by Iran Govt authorities to interfere.

Democrats actively recruiting. Most of people to whom Gagarine talked, including party members themselves, said majority members joined only through fear. Mayor of Mianeh, who was obviously afraid for his life, said he regretted having joined but saw no other course.

Saw no evidence open Soviet intervention but Russians he talked to all clearly favored Democrats and latter obviously regarded Russians as their friends. Many party members spoke Russian. (See Military Attaché telegram No. M60457 December 1 to Military Intelligence Service⁸⁵ for further details Gagarine trip.)

Iranian column was still halted east of Qazvin yesterday and was alerted against possible Democrat attack.

Sent Dept as 1038; repeated Moscow as 305, London as 107.

MURRAY

891.00/12-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 2, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received December 2—9:20 a. m.]

1040. Final paragraph of Soviet note of November 26 to Iranian Government follows:

"In connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement concerning the entry of military reinforcements to the northern provinces, the Soviet Embassy would draw that Ministry's attention to the following points. Taking into consideration the fact that any unde-

⁸⁵ Copy not found in Department files.

sirable incidents must be avoided in the interest of both the Persian and the Russian Governments and the fact that this question is connected with the entry of new Persian troops into the northern provinces of Persia, the Soviet Government does not deem the entry of such troops at the present moment to be expedient, and it must be taken into consideration that if any new forces in addition to the regular Persian Army and *gendarmerie* stationed in these districts should enter these areas, then such action would lead to disturbances and bloodshed in the northern provinces of Persia. The Soviet Government would than be obliged, for the maintenance of the security of the Soviet garrison, to bring in new reinforcements of their own. As the Soviet Government does not desire to bring reinforcements into Persia it does not therefore deem it expedient for Persian military reinforcements to enter the northern provinces of Persia."

[Sent to Department] as 1040, repeated to Moscow 307, London 109.

MURRAY

891.00/12-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 2, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received December 3—7 : 25 p. m.]

1041. Foreign Office has confirmed report published yesterday that all Soviet military units still in Tehran have been withdrawn from city proper but says they are encamped only few miles outside.

Sent to Dept as 1041, repeated to Moscow 308, London 110.

MURRAY

891.00/12-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 2, 1945—noon.

[Received December 2—9 : 20 a. m.]

1039. Text of Soviet note of November 26 was released to press here yesterday afternoon. Since I assume Iranian Ambassador Washington has it, full text is not being telegraphed. Body of note consists of denials of various assertions made in Iran Govt's note to Soviets of November 17 transmitted my dispatch 151, November 13 [19].⁸⁶ Final paragraph however seems so important it is being sent in full in my following telegram⁸⁷ to make sure Dept receives it accurately.

Sent Dept as 1039, repeated Moscow as 306, London as 108.

MURRAY

⁸⁶ Not printed; but see footnote 41, p. 432, and last paragraph of telegram 971, November 21, 8 a. m., from Tehran, p. 438.

⁸⁷ No. 1040, p. 470.

891.00/12-345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1945—6 p. m.

669. Moscow telegram 165 of Nov. 30 to Tehran.⁸⁸ In your discretion please bring at once to the attention of the Iranian Govt the text of the Soviet reply to Ambassador Harriman's note of Nov. 24. You should stress the fact that this note is not being made public in Washington until we receive Soviet authorization, which is being requested, and that it should not be made public in Iran until it has been published in the U.S. or the Soviet Union. You might add that the American Govt would welcome any comments which the Govt of Iran might care to make with regard to the various statements contained in the Soviet reply.

Any information which you may be able to give us with regard to the following points would be particularly helpful :

1. Has the Soviet military command hindered in any way the movement of the Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are in the districts of northern Iran? If so, an account of specific instances would be helpful.

2. In the opinion of the Govt of Iran, are the Iranian military forces and gendarme units already in northern Iran capable of insuring order and calm in that area?

3. Has the Govt of Iran issued orders to these forces and these units to take steps to insure order and calm? If so, have such steps been taken? If not, why not?

4. Was the meeting of the Popular Assembly in Tabriz on Nov. 20-21 in contravention of any Iranian law? If not, do the acts of that body have legal status? If not, did the Iranian governmental authorities take any steps to prevent the Assembly from taking place?

5. Are officials legally appointed by the Iranian Govt to posts in northern Iran being replaced by officials who do not have the legal sanction of the Iranian Govt? If so, with which set of officials are the Soviet commanders maintaining relations?

It is hoped that the members of the Embassy who have been sent to northern Iran will be able to obtain information which will assist us in evaluating any comments which the Iranian Govt may make. We would be appreciative of information from them regarding the extent to which the Iranian Governmental officials in northern Iran have been and are reporting developments to their superiors in Tehran, and if not, whether their failure to do so has been due to duress from any quarter or from the severance of means of communication.

BYRNES

⁸⁸ Same as telegram 4015 from Moscow, p. 468.

891.00/12-345 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1945—6 p. m.

10474. Moscow's telegram 610, Nov. 30, to London.⁸⁹ You are authorized to bring at once to the attention of the British Govt the text of the Soviet reply to Ambassador Harriman's note of Nov 24. You should stress the fact that this note is not being made public in Washington until we receive Soviet authorization, which is being requested,⁹⁰ and that it should not be made public in UK until it has been published in the US or the Soviet Union. You might add that the American Govt would welcome any comments which the British Govt might care to make with regard to the various statements contained in the Soviet reply.

BYRNES

891.00/12-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 3, 1945.

[Received December 4—8:47 a.m.]

1054. Following is translated text of Foreign Office note of December 1 to Soviet Embassy in reply to Soviet note of November 26. (Text was published in Tehran press last night).

"The Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in reply to note No 526 dated November 26, 1945 (AZAR 5, 1324) has the honor to bring the following to the attention of the Embassy:

With respect to the statement made by the Embassy in its note of reply to the effect that the interference of Soviet officials in the internal affairs of Iran in the northern provinces is untrue, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not at present wish to furnish any further explanations in this connection or fully clarify the precedents of the case, and in as much as it appears from the Embassy's reply that the said measures will not be repeated, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its pleasure. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hopes that with the help of the Embassy, during the prompt and complete

⁸⁹ Same as telegram 4015 from Moscow, p. 468.

⁹⁰ In telegram 2446, December 3, 1945, 6 p.m., to Moscow, not printed. Soviet authorization was conveyed to the Embassy in the Soviet Union by Mr. Molotov in a letter of December 6 and reported by Moscow in telegram 4082 the following day (891.00/12-745). The Soviet note of November 29 was released by the Department of State on December 8 and was printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 9, 1945, p. 934.

evacuation of Iranian territory by the Soviet troops, the same thing being expected of the other two friendly and Allied powers, no such actions will ever again be taken by the Soviet Military authorities in the northern provinces, so that the unbreakable friendship of Iran with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics may increase daily.

As to the statement that the Govt of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not responsible for the grave consequences of the absence of Iranian officials from localities where they are needed in the northern provinces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finds it necessary to inform the Embassy that the presence of officials is useful and effective only when security forces are available in the provinces and districts and when the movement of said forces from places where they may not be needed to the places where they are needed is possible. If Government officials are blocked in a state of siege and their hands are tied, while those who are planning disorder are free, and the security forces of the country have no freedom of action and no communication with the capital, naturally the people are deprived of security and govt officials like the people of northern provinces are in danger of invasion, encroachment, injury and death. There have been many instances of deplorable incidents which have happened as a result of such conditions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hopes that, as the Embassy has written, interference in the affairs of the northern provinces have stopped, and that the security forces of the country will be free in their movements to the end that order and security may be established in those regions. In this connection the Ministry wished to inform the Embassy that there is no room for any misgivings, such as have been indicated, over the reinforcement of the security forces of the country in the provinces, and this should in no way cause the dispatch of new forces of the Union of Soviet Republics to Iran, for the Imperial Govt requests that the existing Govt forces that have remained in Iran, as well as the forces of our other Allies, evacuate Iran as soon as possible and return to their own countries in order that the Iranian Govt may be able to provide for the peace and comfort of all the people of Iran. It is not and it has not been the purpose of the Imperial Govt security or Army forces to fight the people. The object in reinforcing the security forces in the provinces is only to prevent disorder, encroachment and invasion and to see to it that the well-being of the people is safeguarded. In this manner alone could tranquility be restored in the northern regions of the country and Govt officials enabled to examine anyone's reasonable statements in accordance with the constitution and other laws of the country.

It is therefore requested that the Embassy inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible of the Embassy's prompt measures to ensure liberty of action by Iranian Civil and Military officials in the northern provinces and for the movement of the country's security and army forces in general and the troops proceeding to the third and fourth provinces in particular, which troops are at present held in suspense at Sharifabad."

891.00/12-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 4, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 5—6 : 55 a. m.]

1062. Depstel 663, November 30. Bullard says he has made suggestion regarding general provincial elections to Shah, PriMin and Allahyar Saleh all of whom were favorably disposed and said question was already under active consideration. I understand Saleh has been charged with making study of matter. He favors putting into effect a law of 1907-8 which established regulations for implementation of constitutional provisions regarding Provincial Council. Although he says law is very poor, he thinks it better to make use of it in present juncture rather than attempt prepare and pass new legislation.

Since Iran Govt seems already well on the way to action in this regard I think it unnecessary for us to express any formal official opinion. However my own reaction is entirely favorable since I think move would help to destroy fiction that Azerbaijan is the only distinctively individual province in Iran and would reduce effect of "democrat" and Russian propaganda with regard to grievances and unique character of that province. In the larger picture also establishment of local governmental units should be beneficial through reducing cumbersome machinery of govt and turning into constructive channels national local pride and interest of inhabitants of each province.

British Embassy bulletin yesterday cited "many loyal Iranians" as saying establishment of provincial councils could help to eliminate administrative confusion and enlist local ability and enterprise in matters such as roads and hygiene. I gather from this that Sir Reader intends actively to pursue his proposal which he first made to British Foreign Office in June 1943.

MURRAY

701.9111/12-345

*President Truman to the Shahanshah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi)*⁹¹

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1945.

YOUR MAJESTY: I am deeply grateful to Your Majesty for your gracious letter of September 10, 1945, and I take pleasure in extending to you on behalf of the American people friendly greetings and best wishes for Your Majesty's personal well-being and for the happiness and welfare of the Iranian people.

⁹¹ Enclosed with instruction 303, December 7, to Tehran, for transmittal to the Shah.

It was a source of considerable gratification to me to welcome His Excellency Hussein Ala as the first Iranian Ambassador to the United States, since I recognize the special position of trust in which Your Majesty has long held him. I am confident that the traditional bonds of friendship and cooperation between our two countries will be further strengthened by his efforts.

The considerable sacrifices which Iran has made in pursuit of the victory of the United Nations have not gone unrecognized in the United States, and the American people join with me in expressing the hopes that Iran's recovery and reconstruction will be effected rapidly and completely, with Your Majesty's guidance and leadership, and with the assistance and support of the United Nations.

I wish to convey to Your Majesty my deep appreciation for the friendly sentiments which you have expressed, and to reaffirm to you my desire for ever closer relations between our two countries.

Very sincerely yours,

[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

891.00/12-545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 5, 1945.

[Received December 6—8:23 a. m.]

1068. Press today publishes further exchange of notes between Soviet Embassy and Iranian Govt.

In note of December 2 Soviet Embassy acknowledged two of more recent Iranian notes reiterating request that troops be permitted proceed Azerbaijan and referred Iran Govt to Soviet note of November 26⁹² on this point.

Iran Govt replied December 4 as follows:

"The Imperial Govt, considering the existing bonds of friendship, reciprocal engagements and the interest shown by the Embassy toward the note of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 5775 of Dec 1 in reply to that bearing the number 526 of Nov 26, 1945 from the Soviet Embassy, is absolutely certain that not only will the Soviet authorities not hinder the passage of the expeditionary forces stopped at Sharifabad in the neighborhood of Kazvin but that these authorities and particularly the military authorities of this friendly and Allied Govt will give proof of their understanding of all efforts made by the governmental authorities in northern provinces to restore the general welfare. In consequence beg you to send prompt instructions for the departure of the expeditionary forces stopped at Sharifabad so that existing difficulties may be removed as quickly as possible".

MURRAY

⁹² See telegrams 1040, December 2, 10 a. m., and 1039, December 2, noon, from Tehran, pp. 470 and 471, respectively.

891.00/12-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 5, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 5—9: 40 a. m.]

1069. Text of Molotov note November 29⁶³ (which reached us only yesterday although sent by Moscow November 30) was delivered PriMin's office last night and I gave copy to Shah while dining with him later in evening.

Embassy will try to obtain from official and other sources information requested Dept's telegram 669, December 3. Meanwhile following provisional answers are submitted:

1. Information received from Iranian Army and gendarme sources as reported numerous earlier telegrams leave no doubt my mind that Russians have repeatedly interfered with movements Iranian security forces stationed in northern provinces.

2. Iranian military commander Azerbaijan told Garver and Jernegan last week his forces were not sufficient restore order in province (mytel 1011, November 28). Unless reinforcements of approximately 4 battalions received he felt he could only defend Rezaieh, Tabriz and Ardabil.

3. From all information so far received Iranian security forces Azerbaijan and elsewhere in north have been almost exclusively on defensive. Where positive steps have been attempted, Soviets have frequently interposed obstacles and in many cases, however, Iranian officials seem to be so intimidated that they do not even attempt to take affirmative action.

4. I assume Dept merely wants official confirmation that actions of "National Congress of Azerbaijan" are not recognized by Iran Govt as having any legal validity. So far as I know Iranian officials made no attempt to prevent meeting of "Congress".

5. Reports by Capt Gagarine and others show clearly many legally appointed officials are still at their posts in localities occupied by insurgents but are working under control of "Democrats" rather than Central Govt. I have no specific reports regarding replacement of legally designated officers by others although all information makes clear this must have occurred in number of cases.

But so far as Tabriz is concerned lack of regular reports to Central Govt has unquestionably been due to cutting of telegraph lines and "Democrat" interference with postal service. Except in towns occupied by insurgents where they are necessarily cut off from all contact with Central Govt, I have heard nothing to indicate officials have been subjected to duress to prevent sending of reports.

MURRAY

⁶³ See telegram 4015, November 30, 1 p. m., from Moscow, p. 468.

891.00/12-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 5, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 6:29 p. m.]

12741. In discussing Iranian situation with us today Baxter, head of Eastern Dept of Foreign Office, said British Govt regretted that Russians had not taken advantage of opening afforded by British note to take position that local Soviet authorities in northern Iran had gone beyond instructions and that there would be no further intervention. However, British note, together with that sent by American Govt, should serve at least to put Russians on notice that their actions are being followed with real concern and it is possible that they may be more cautious in future.

Question now arises regarding what next step should be and British haven't yet made up minds, except to extent of deciding to keep light of publicity focused on matter and in this latter connection Baxter again suggested that sending a first rate American correspondent to report facts of case on spot might be useful.

Regarding current thinking in Foreign Office, Baxter said attitude might be taken that any further "returning to the charge" would be unavailing and that only thing to do is to accept prospect of continued Russian occupation until March in hope that Iranians will then be able to settle matter by direct negotiation with dissident elements in Azerbaijan. Foreign Office has been casting about however for some means of maintaining diplomatic pressure on Russians and a plan was only yesterday submitted to the Foreign Secretary suggesting a renewed approach to the Russians on the basis of the passage in Molotov's letter to Bevin of September 20, 1945, in which observation had been made that if necessary plans for final withdrawal might be discussed between British and Russians toward end of occupation period. Baxter observed that actually less than 3 months remain before agreed evacuation date (as British at least understand it and as they assume the Russians agree, although latter still "skate around" specific commitment on exact date) and that in view of complexities involved in making necessary departure arrangements it could hardly be claimed that the British were forcing pace unduly by suggesting early discussions.

Baxter said that another thought in this regard had been to refer matter to UNO⁹⁴ or in advance of its being set up to the Big Five in accordance with Article 106 of UNO Charter⁹⁵ but after considera-

⁹⁴ United Nations Organization.

⁹⁵ Department of State *Bulletin*, June 24, 1945, pp. 1119, 1133.

tion it had been decided that action under this provision would hardly seem to be appropriate at the present stage.

Regarding our proposal for withdrawal by January 1, Baxter said it was hardly surprising that the Russians had failed to agree in view of fact that a similar British offer for withdrawal by mid-December had been made in September and turned down by Russians. As far as British are concerned, Foreign Office had favored accepting our proposal in event Russians agreed, but had also found it necessary to consult British military who had observed that, aside from inconvenience, proposal would involve abandoning material with consequent financial loss and this in turn necessitated Treasury approval. While these factors were under consideration British had learned of Russian reply and told British military unnecessary to proceed further. As matter now stands British reply to our proposal has been drafted and awaits imminent signature.

Sent Dept as 12741; repeated Tehran as 37.

WINANT

811.24591/12-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 6, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received 6:18 p. m.]

1075. Deptel 660, November 29.⁹⁶ For my own guidance I should very much like to know reasons for Department's decision to issue irrevocable orders for withdrawal American troops from Iran by January 1 instead of making such evacuation conditional upon similar action by Russians and British.⁹⁷ This acceleration will cost us very heavy losses in disposal of surplus property and has alarmed Iranians who have never wanted to see American troops depart until those of other Allies did likewise. (Shah told me at time of delivery of our note to Moscow⁹⁸ that, if it appeared our forces were to leave by January 1 and others were to remain Iran Govt might decide to ask us to remain also.)

It appears even British are not going to follow our lead with result that instead of isolating Russians and holding them up as sole interventionists we seem to have isolated ourselves.

British attitude this matter together with certain utterances of British press and officials has led many Iranians (and myself as well)

⁹⁶ Not printed; it set forth the anticipated difficulties of evacuating American troops from Iran by January 1, 1946 (811.24591/11-2945).

⁹⁷ No record of a reply to this request found in Department files.

⁹⁸ For note, see telegram 2386, November 23, to Moscow, p. 448. The conversation with the Shah took place presumably on November 26; see telegram 1008, November 27, from Tehran, p. 458.

to fear new division of Iran into zones of influence is in progress. I note questions in Parliament seem to pertain primarily to "protection of British interests in Persia" rather than redemption of British pledges to Iran. 1945 version of 1907 agreement⁹⁹ might easily be taking place, not by sitting down around a table but simply by a British decision to consolidate in southern Iran. British may be preparing to offer plea that they did their best to protect Iran but found it impossible and that they must therefore do whatever is necessary to salvage own interests from wreckage.

To Department as 1075, repeated London as 117.

MURRAY

891.00/12-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 6, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 9—9:33 a. m.]

1082. Following are my thoughts on Molotov note of November 29 in reply to American note of November 24:

1. To say that events Azerbaijan do not constitute armed uprising directed against Central Government is obviously false. Armed bands have disarmed police, gendarmes and soldiers of Central Government, taken over effective control of towns and means of communication, and refuse permit passage government officials on government business. Declaration issued November 23 by "National Congress, Azerbaijan", itself states unless its demands are met it will oppose Central Government by force.

2. Soviet assumption that "Popular Assembly" is authorized to speak for population Azerbaijan is untenable. In its own declaration "National Congress" claims only 150,000 supporters. It is extremely improbable that it has one-tenth that many genuine adherents who are aware what they are doing but even if we accepted the claimed figure it would still be far from representative majority of a province which Democratic Party itself asserts to have population of 4 million. It is absurd to suppose that in country like Iran a party created only 3 months ago could already have become true designated organ of 4 million people.

3. A movement which openly defies constitutional Central Government of Iran can hardly base itself on constitution. Although it is true constitution provides for provincial councils, it also spe-

⁹⁹ Convention between Great Britain and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, signed at St. Petersburg on August 31, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. I, p. 550, or *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1906-1907, vol. C, p. 555; for a detailed analysis of the Convention, see Rogers Platt Churchill, *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907* (Cedar Rapids, The Torch Press, 1939).

cifically provides that these are to be established in accordance with a special law of national Majlis and that they must act within limits of national legislation. Law governing election and operation of provincial councils was passed 1907-1908 session of Majlis and lays down detailed rules for elections of members, duties, etc. Clearly says councils to have no legislative authority and "have no right to to debate political questions" empowers Shah to dismiss councils with approval of Minister Interior. Apart from fact any elections to be legal must be ordered by Shah and conducted under direction Central Government, it is clear from foregoing that "National Congress" is by no means acting accordance constitution or Majlis law. Declaration of November 23 obviously envisages far wider sphere of local self government than was contemplated in constitution or supplementary legislation. Among other points attention is called to repeated use of word "nationalist" rather than "provincial" and assertion that Azerbaijan is a "nation".

4. It may not be "unusual" for "Democratic states" to seek self government, but it is equally not unusual for a government to desire to prevent forcible removal of part of its territory from its jurisdiction. "Democratic states" such as US have had occasion to put down secession by force of arms.

5. Although it is possible some of disturbances may have been provoked by landlords or government officials, all reports reaching us indicate that in most cases "Democrats" have been aggressors. In any case it is not the armed conflicts (which have been relatively minor) that are important. Essential fact is that authority of central government has been and continues to be denied.

6. In one breath Soviet note asserts Iranian forces already in Azerbaijan could maintain order while in next breath it says introduction of additional forces would create trouble and endanger Soviet security. I fail to see how these two statements can be sustained except by assuming that additional forces would attempt to do their duty in reasserting authority of government and so come into conflict with rebels, whereas present units are unable venture forth from their stations. In any case, by Molotov's own statement, Iranian troops in area plus column halted Qazvin cannot number more than 6,500 while Soviet forces Azerbaijan are vastly more numerous. (Our best estimate is one corps of 3 divisions about 30,000 men.) Iranian troops poorly armed and equipped by comparison with Russians and are scattered in detachments around province.

It is inconceivable that handful of Iranian troops or few thousand undisciplined civilians could constitute any threat to such a Soviet force even if we assume rebels would oppose real resistance to government troops. (It is likewise inconceivable that Iran Govern-

ment would expect Iranian force of the small size involved to put down uprising if it really represented popular mass movement.) Furthermore, it must be as obvious to Soviets as it is to us that neither Iranian troops nor "Democrats" would have slightest thought of attacking Soviet forces.

7. If Soviets sincerely wish to avoid sending more troops into Iran easiest solution would be to withdraw troops now here.

8. Soviet refusal to permit free movement Iranian forces is clear infringement on Iranian sovereignty and, therefore, does raise question of observance of principles of Tehran Declaration. While such infringements may have had some justification during war under terms Tripartite Treaty (although this is doubtful), they cannot be justified on moral or military grounds at present.

9. Tripartite Treaty permits but does not require that Allied troops remain in Iran until expiration of treaty. I am at loss to see what useful purpose Soviets could assert to be served by continuance their forces here.

10. Iran-Soviet treaty of 1921 permits entry Soviet troops only when there is armed intervention by third powers in Iran or when there is danger that Iran will be made base of operations against Russia. Does Soviet Government contend it is endangered by third powers operating in Iran?

I suggest Department consider releasing discreetly information paragraph 6 above regarding comparative size Soviet and Iran forces Azerbaijan in order avoid giving public impression there is any substance in Russian statement despatch of additional Iranian troops might endanger security Soviet forces. Department might also let it be known total Soviet combat forces in all Northern Iran estimated at 75,000 as compared with about 5,000 British and less than 6,000 non-combat Americans in southwestern Iran. Public attention should be directed to question of why such large Soviet force is still needed in Iran and in fact why any force is needed at all since Russians have no installations here to dispose of and are so close to their own country. This might be contrasted with fact few American troops still here are merely trying salvage something for American taxpayers out of huge sums spent on equipment and installations in Iran in connection aid to Russia.

Public might also be reminded that Iran's [*Trans-*] Iranian Railroad was taken over by Allies during war solely for purpose of sending supplies to Russia but that whereas British and Americans turned back section south of Tehran to Iranians on July 1, Russians have insisted on continuing their military control and operation of northern section. Point to be emphasized is that neither British nor ourselves have considered it necessary to retain control of railroad even though our troops must still rely on it for supplies and for transport-

tation in connection with withdrawal. Russians, therefore, cannot properly claim they must keep control in order to supply or evacuate their forces.

Sent Department as 1082; repeated Moscow 318.

MURRAY

891.00/12-145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1945.

693. Please deliver following personal message from Byrnes to Nadjm:

"I acknowledge with pleasure your telegram of December 1,¹ occasioned by the second anniversary of the historic Conference of Tehran. I note particularly your expression of the Iranian people's confidence in the continued fulfillment by the signatory nations of the pledges embodied in the Declaration Regarding Iran. I welcome this opportunity of expressing again the recognition by the Govt of the US of the assistance rendered by Iran in the recent victory over our common enemy and of assuring you that the interest of the Govt of the US in the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran, as set forth in that Declaration, has not changed in any respect."

Nadjm message and Byrnes reply are being released to press today.

BYRNES

891.00/12-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 7, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received December 8—12:45 p. m.]

1089. I wish to remind Dept that lack of sensational new developments in Azerbaijan during past several days does not mean situation is improving. Looking at broad picture it [may mean?] "Democratic Party" has achieved first objectives including effective isolation most of province from rest of Iran and is in process of consolidating its position. "Elections" for local legislature may by now have been completed and we may anticipate that it will meet quickly and proceed to establish some form of local "govt" which will claim to be representative of people. This would give Russians strong propaganda basis for their stand and make it much more difficult for Iran Govt to deal with situation even if Soviets later allow it freedom of action.

¹ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 9, 1945, p. 941.

Therefore time is working on side of "Democrats" and we should govern ourselves accordingly. I realize Dept wants additional factual information and am doing everything possible to obtain it quickly. Foreign Minister assured me December 5 he had given orders to provide answers to questions contained Dept's telegram 669, December 3. Press Attaché Young left this morning by Intourist plane for Tabriz and will spend three or four days there in effort to get full information on spot.

There are recurrent rumors of Cabinet change with Qavam es Saltaneh usually mentioned for PriMin. Although he is undoubtedly much stronger man than Haikimi, change at this moment might be unfortunate for settlement our own numerous pending questions since new ministers would need time to familiarize themselves with matters and might reverse lines of action being followed in different cases by present Cabinet. I urge Dept take quickest possible action on all questions Embassy has offered to it such as Abadan airport² and surplus property windup³ in order that we may settle them here before Cabinet falls.

MURRAY

891.00/12-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 7, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received December 8—6: 31 a. m.]

12856. Embassy today received communication from Foreign Office dated December 5 requesting that following reply be conveyed to message transmitted in Dept's 10209⁴ suggesting withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran by January 1:

"The US Govt will remember that at the time of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers His Majesty's Govt suggested to the Soviet Govt that the two Govts should agree to withdraw by the middle of December their respective forces with the exception of small disposals parties from the whole of Persia with the exception of certain defined zones. The Soviet Govt were not however able to accept this proposal. His Majesty's Govt have nevertheless for their part proceeded with the withdrawal arrangements which were suggested in their proposal to the Soviet Govt and except for small administrative parties such of their troops as now remain in Persia are concentrated in the extreme southwest.

His Majesty's Govt take the view that the Allied troops were in Persia only for purposes connected with the war and now that the war is over they should be withdrawn as soon as possible. Accordingly,

² For information on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 496.

³ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 566 ff.

⁴ Dated November 23, p. 450.

on receipt of the US Govt's proposal His Majesty's Govt at once began to examine urgently the practicability of withdrawing their forces before the 1st January. They have, however, now been informed that the Soviet Govt have replied to the similar proposal put to them by the US Govt to the effect that they are not prepared to withdraw their forces before the 1st January 1946.

A complete withdrawal by the 1st January would have been a matter of considerable difficulty and would have involved serious financial loss as a result of the abandonment or hasty sale of military stores and installations and, in view of the Soviet Govt's reply, the British military authorities are no longer investigating the detailed implications of a withdrawal by the 1st January 1946. His Majesty's Govt have decided instead to refer the Soviet Govt to the suggestion in Mr. Molotov's letter of the 20th September 1945 to Mr. Bevin that, if necessary, the plan for the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops from Persia could be discussed between the two countries towards the end of the treaty period for withdrawal. They will suggest to the Soviet Govt that discussion should now be held between the British and Soviet Govts with the object of coordinating their plans for the British and Soviet withdrawal at the earliest possible date.

His Majesty's Govt entirely agree with the view that the fulfillment of the assurances contained in the Declaration of Tehran of 1st December 1943 requires that the Govt of Iran should have full freedom to move its armed forces in such a manner as it considers necessary in order to preserve its authority and maintain internal security."

Sent Dept as 12856, repeated Tehran as 39, Moscow as 407.

WINANT

891.00/12-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 7, 1945.

[Received December 8—12: 34 p. m.]

1090. Press today prints text of proclamation issued Tabriz December 3 by Governor General Bayat expressing his conviction that social conditions, public health, security, education and administration in all Iran and especially Azerbaijan requires series of urgent reforms which should be begun immediately. Proclamation declares Bayat's willingness to enter into conversations this subject with all parties and groups of population, says he will intervene when necessary with Central Government in order to realize legitimate aspirations of population and is sure they will be given sympathetic attention. Concludes by saying he has given orders to police to maintain order against certain element who wish to take advantage of situation and have disturbed security through attempts at assassination and the like.

Press reports two members Democratic Party murdered Chief Code Officer of Tabriz Police on December 2. That same day group of Democrats attempted seize motor transport belonging Tabriz gar-

ri son; in exchange of shots which followed, one party member said to have been killed.

Other press stories say Marand was occupied December 4 by insurgents and communications from that town to Tabriz cut, gendarme commander wounded, also assert rebels executed 21 gendarmes and 2 gendarme officers when they captured Serab.

Sent to Department as 1090, repeated Moscow 320, London 118.

MURRAY

891.00/12-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 8, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 8:48 p. m.]

1096. I have just learned that on December 6 Iranian Government requested Soviets to permit Iranian column now halted outside Qazvin to proceed to Hamadan. Reasons for this move as given Embassy by General Arfa are that at Hamadan troops would have shelter and would still be in position to move to Azarbaijan via Kurdistan if Russian consent is obtained. Also says Hamadan which has no Iranian garrison at present is strategic location for defense against any southward move by "democrats". Column could more easily return to Tehran than go to Hamadan but Arfa says withdrawal to capital would have bad effect on army morale especially troops in Azerbaijan.

I regret this Iranian action since it implies submission to Soviet refusal of permission for advance to Tabriz.

In talking to Colonel Baker yesterday Arfa expressed extremely pessimistic view of situation. Said he considers Tehran is now on northern frontier of Iran. Anticipates attempt by "democrats" with Russian help to cut off food supplies to capital. General staff is maintaining 24-hour watch against possible sudden move on Tehran by "democrat" forces. Arfa believes real civil war is almost inevitable since even if central government acquiesces in Azerbaijan autonomy, he says rebels will attempt extend their control southward and Government will be forced to fight.

We can not wholly discount this gloomy outlook in view of real weakness Iranian Army. . . . This meager force must be spread over area one-fifth that of U S having poor communications and peopled in many sections by large and well-armed tribal groups. In northern sections it is virtually immobilized by Soviets whose combat strength in Iran alone is at least three times that of Iranian Army.

To Department as 1096, repeated Moscow 321, London 119.

MURRAY

891.00/12-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 10, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 6 : 12 p. m.]

4126. Proposal to initiate discussions between British and Soviet Governments with object of coordinating plans for withdrawal of Soviet and British troops from Iran at earliest possible date made in letter to Molotov on December 8 by British Ambassador Moscow.

Proposal based on exchange of correspondence between Bevin and Molotov at London ForMin meeting and specific reference made to Molotov's letter to Bevin of September 20 agreeing to discuss if necessary toward end of period specified in treaty of alliance between Soviet Union, Great Britain and Iran plan for final withdrawal of British and Soviet troops.

Sent Department 4126. Repeated Tehran 174. Repeated London 628.

HARRIMAN

891.00/12-645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1945—6 p. m.

709. Appreciate comments contained in 1082, Dec 6 which are extremely helpful. Our communications with you continue to be hampered by slowness in transmission of messages. Your 1082 arrived in Washington only on morning Dec 9. We are following suggestion made in penultimate paragraph of your 1082. Suggest that all telegrams of any urgency be marked urgent.

BYRNES

891.00/12-1045

The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Secretary of State

No. 2418

[WASHINGTON,] December 10, 1945.

SIR: I have just received a cable from my Government conveying the following urgent message:

"At this time when the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the three allied governments are about to meet in Moscow,⁵ it is imperative that we exert every effort to the end that the important and difficult ques-

⁵ The Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union was held from December 16 to 26, 1945; for documentation on discussions at this meeting, see vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

tion relating to Iran be put on the agenda of their deliberations. The steps that we consider extremely pressing are: (1) the immediate evacuation of Iran by foreign troops and (2) pending such rapid withdrawal, absolute and complete freedom of action of the Persian Government in its own territory. This will enable us to restore order and restrain the mischief-makers, undesirable immigrants and unknown individuals who, having come into Azerbaijan from over the border, are murdering officials of the Government and pillaging Government buildings and offices. If our efforts continue to be paralyzed and obstacles are still placed in our way, the security forces of Iran in Azerbaijan and the northern provinces will gradually be overpowered for lack of reinforcements and obliged to surrender to the mob and the seditious elements."

It is my duty to beg Your Excellency, at this very grave hour in the destinies of my country, to take up the cause of Iran at Moscow urging that our freedom of action within our own territory for the repression of sedition and the maintenance of law and order be no longer hampered or interfered with. Whilst the right of free passage of our reinforcements is denied to us by the Government of the Soviet Union and our forces are halted at Kazvin, the irresponsible, turbulent elements in Azerbaijan are being encouraged in every way to establish themselves securely and to supplant the lawful representatives of the central government in Tabriz.

I would also appeal to Your Excellency to continue to press for the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet and British forces still stationed in Iran without any justification.

My Government relies upon the friendship of the United States at this critical juncture when Iran is menaced with dismemberment, and asks Your Excellency to use your influence and good offices to the end that the Atlantic Charter, the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1942 and the Declaration of Teheran of December 1st, 1943 be respected.

Please accept [etc.]

HUSSEIN ALA

891.00/12-1145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1945.

Subject: Iran—Suggested Approach During the Moscow Discussions

The United States is in a better position than either Great Britain or the Soviet Union to take the lead in the discussions concerning Iran because we are freer from suspicion of having selfish interests in that country than either of the other two Powers and because the American case is based on an important principle of international conduct.

You may wish to point out to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin that we view the present situation in Iran as of importance not merely as

regards Iran, but more significantly as a test of the ability of the permanent members of the Security Council to cooperate with each other on a basis of respect for the sovereignty of smaller members of the United Nations.

We should emphasize, at the outset, that we are not concerned with the maintenance of any particular social or economic system in Iran. Our view that the Iranian Government should be permitted to move its troops freely throughout the country is based squarely on our understanding of the meaning of the word "sovereignty". Those who respect the sovereignty of a nation must permit the armed forces of that nation to move freely throughout its own territory.

As regards foreign troops in Iran, the American Government sees no adequate justification for their continued presence there. We believe earnestly that it would be most helpful, in removing the suspicion of small countries everywhere regarding the motives of the Great Powers, for all foreign troops to be withdrawn from Iran promptly. Nothing would build up confidence in the Great Powers more quickly than such action, inconvenient though it may be to us.

It has been suggested that one of the motives for Soviet interests in northern Iran is to obtain oil concessions there. Whether this is true or not, we readily recognize the legitimate desire of Soviet Russia to obtain oil concessions outside its territory. Northern Iran is a logical area for the development of petroleum for exportation to the Soviet Union. Neither the American Government nor American commercial firms, as far as we are aware, have any interest in obtaining petroleum concessions in the northern part of Iran. If the Soviet authorities desire to enter into friendly negotiations with the Iranian Government for an oil concession, the American Government would view the discussions with all good will. However, an important attribute of sovereignty is the right of a government to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory, in terms which it finds satisfactory. Either direct or indirect pressure to obtain a concession is an infringement of sovereignty. A repetition of the events of last year, when a Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs demanded the ousting of an Iranian Prime Minister who refused such a concession to the U.S.S.R., would be most unfortunate.

It would be helpful if an agreed policy by the Three Powers toward Iran along the following lines might be reached at Moscow :

(1) The three Foreign Ministers are agreed that the presence of foreign troops in Iran is no longer required, and these troops will be withdrawn as rapidly as transportation conditions permit; (2) the Foreign Ministers concur that the Iranian Government is entitled, as a sovereign government, to move its armed forces throughout its territory without hindrance; and (3) they concur that the Government

of Iran, as an attribute of its sovereignty, is entirely free to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory, on terms agreeable to that Government, and without external pressure.

LOY W. HENDERSON

891.00/12-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 12, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 13—7 a. m.]

1113. Press Attaché Young returned this morning by air after 5 days in Tabriz during which time he talked with all classes of people including Iran Government officials, "Democrat" leaders, foreign consuls, religious leaders and private citizens. Preliminary report which is based on indisputable evidence collected first hand follows:

1. Successful "Democrat" occupation Tabriz expected today (Young himself saw one armed band about 40 men advancing on city as he drove to airport this morning).

2. Governor General Bayat and Iranian Commanding General Derakhshaki both informed Young they could not and would not defend city and would confine efforts to protecting Governor General's residence and troop barracks.

3. "Governmental Assembly of Azerbaijan" composed of members chosen in recent "elections"⁶ is to hold first meeting in Tabriz today. It will proceed to select "cabinet" of 10 "ministers" from own membership all portfolios of Iran Government being represented except War and Foreign Affairs.

4. Bayat has had two meetings with "Democrat" leaders and has offered to compromise. They, however, insist on outright grant of "autonomy" without being willing define in advance scope of this grant and Bayat says he is unable meet this demand.

5. Without exception everyone in Tabriz says Soviets have distributed large amounts arms to "Democrats" and are assisting movement every way including manpower. Democrat leaders themselves admitted to Young they were receiving Russian help. Democrat headquarters and meetings Tabriz guarded by armed Soviet soldiers in uniform.

6. Young personally saw truckload Iranian troops turned back by Soviet control post when they attempted leave Tabriz. He further saw official Iranian Army report just received from Ardabil saying Soviet troops there had prevented despatch of aid to gendarme post which was under attack and Soviet Commander had ordered Iranian Commander Ardabil not make any move with his forces.

7. Iranian Commander Tabriz has received official report Democrats have taken over control of Ardabil. Only major town left in Azerbaijan not under *de facto* Democrat control is Rezaieh. Iran

⁶ In despatch 183, December 10, 1945, the Ambassador in Iran transmitted a translation of an article appearing in a Tehran newspaper which stated that the elections had been held from November 27 to December 3 (891.00/12-1045).

Government officials Tabriz admitted to Young they no longer controlled city except in name.

8. Iranian officials Tabriz say recent moves of Democrats have been faster than anticipated and indicate Democrats want to present Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow with *fait accompli*.

9. Iran Government officials and others have been murdered on streets of Tabriz and state of abject though concealed terror reigns in city. Young had to arrange meetings in secret to get people to speak freely.

Fuller report follows soonest possible.⁷

To Department as 1113; repeated Moscow 330; London 126.

MURRAY

891.00/12-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 13, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 4:45 p. m.]

1115. Having had report that Iranian Minister War was planning withdraw troops from Sharifabad and announce that it was no longer considered necessary send reinforcements Azerbaijan we asked MinFonAff today about present Iran Govt policy toward Azerbaijan crisis.

He said report of troop withdrawal was incorrect, that Minister War and General Arfa had asked him if it would be permissible bring column back to Tehran but he had taken position this politically impossible. He went on to say Iran Govt is determined to stand firm on position it has already adopted so long as it can count on American and British support. We emphasized it was necessary be sure of Iran Govt policy since question would probably be discussed at Moscow and Najm reiterated his statement that Govt attitude had not changed.

MinFonAff said recent conversations with Russians have been without result as Russians give only vague answers and make complaints against Iranian press and gov't for spreading "propaganda" against USSR.

Colonel Baker has learned Iranians were told by Soviet Embassy to refer to Soviet Military Attaché their request for Iranian column to proceed through Qazvin to Hamadan (mytel 1096, Dec. 8). Iran Govt however decided to drop matter and column remains at Sharifabad east of Qazvin.

To Dept as 1115 repeated Moscow 332 London 127.

MURRAY

⁷ The text of Mr. Young's report of December 12, 1945, to the Ambassador in Iran was transmitted in despatch 192, December 18, from Tehran, not printed; the despatch noted that telegrams 1113, December 12, and 1134, December 15, "were largely based" on the report (891.00/12-1845).

891.00/12-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 13, 1945.

[Received December 13—6:30 p. m.]

1118. In speech before Majlis yesterday, Prime Minister Hakimi made following points:

1. Iran Govt considers as null and void all activities of group in Azerbaijan which has been acting contrary to law and order.

2. Although conversations so far held regarding Azerbaijan crisis have not been fully successful, results have been sufficient to encourage him to pursue them further. Through Iranian Ambassador Moscow, he has sent word to Soviet Govt that he proposes soon to go to Moscow^s accompanied by Foreign Minister to engage in direct conversations with Russian authorities.

3. Because of disturbances in Azerbaijan his Cabinet has had no time to put into effect reforms it had in mind. However, he has always strongly wished to see all articles of constitution put into practice and is determined to implement those which have hitherto remained without effect. He wishes to enlist interest and responsibility of population in achieving social reforms and he is sure great part of such problems can be resolved in provinces and local units themselves by means of the provincial councils foreseen in constitution.

4. Therefore his Cabinet had decided from beginning to create provincial councils as soon as proper elections could be insured. Government will do everything possible to see that these elections are held legally in all parts of nation and without intervention of irresponsible elements.

Sent to Dept as 1118, repeated Moscow 333, London 128.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/12-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 13, 1945.

[Received December 15—10:33 p. m.]

1120. Following is text of note received from the Foreign Office under date of December 13:

“Whereas the presence of foreign troops in Persia has been the cause of confusion in all the affairs of the country and has prevented the Government from taking effective measures to repair the losses suf-

^s In telegram 13097, December 13, 1945, 7 p. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom reported that the British Foreign Office was “horrified” at the news that the Iranian Prime Minister would visit Moscow but hoped that the matter would work out for the best (891.00/12-1345).

ferred by Persia as a result of the world war and has also deprived the Government of freedom of action in carrying out its programme and plan drawn up with the object of securing the tranquillity of the nation; and whereas the discussion of this problem at the Foreign Ministers Conference which is shortly to be convened in Moscow is essential and right; and whereas all discussions and decisions in respect of any matter connected directly with the interests of Persia must, in accordance with article VI of the Tripartite Pact dated the 29th January, 1942, be adopted in consultation with and with the consent of the Persian Government, it is therefore the opinion of the Imperial Government that, with due regard to the purport of the joint declaration of the three Governments about Persia dated December 1, 1943, it is imperative that in this Conference the question should be discussed and a decision taken that the forces of the three Allied and friendly Governments should immediately evacuate the whole country since the presence of foreign troops in Persia has shaken the sovereignty of Persia, has led to regrettable incidents and innumerable hardships, has created anxiety for the Persian public and has completely upset order in the country and deprived the public of security. The regrettable incidents of Azerbaijan provide the most outstanding example of the sinister effect of the presence of foreign troops in this country. In addition there is no military or civil justification for the troops of the three Allied and friendly Governments to remain even one more day in Persia.

Pending the concession by the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow of this rightful demand on the part of the Persian Government and the immediate and complete evacuation of the whole of Persia by foreign troops, it is obvious that in order that no further delay should occur in the emergency measures taken by the Persian Government or the establishment of order and tranquillity throughout the country, and in order that disturbances should not be more widespread, foreign military authorities who are still in Persia should not obstruct the freedom of action or the movement of Persian service forces. Confidential communications have been sent to British and Soviet Embassies.[""]

We are told frequent notes will be sent containing specific request for Iranian participation in Moscow meeting when Iran is discussed.

Sent Department as 1120 repeated to London 129, Moscow 334.

MURRAY

891.00/12-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 13, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 13—3:29 p. m.]

1123. Mytel 1118, Dec 13. Prime Minister told me this afternoon his suggestion that he visit Moscow for direct conversations was made some time ago and has never been answered by Soviets. He has no present intention of making trip unless invited to participate in For-

eign Ministers Conference (mytel 1120, Dec 13). Even then he thinks probably Ambassador Ahy would be designated to represent Iran.

Governor General Bayat arrived Tehran from Tabriz at noon today. He reports armed rebels have entered Tabriz, seized National Bank branch and police headquarters and are calling upon General Darakhshani to surrender Iranian Army garrison. Says garrison unable defend city.⁹ It seems evident Bayat considers situation hopeless or he would not have left his post at such moment.

To Dept 1123; repeated Moscow 335, London 130.

MURRAY

501.BC/11-2845

The Acting Secretary of State to the Iranian Ambassador (Ala)

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of November 28 in which you state that your Government is seeking election to the first Security Council of the United Nations. You set forth the reasons which support the Iranian candidacy, among them the valuable contribution which Iran has made to the United Nations victory; and you ask that the friendly influence of the United States Government be exerted on behalf of Iran's candidacy.

It is contemplated by Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations¹⁰ that one of the factors to be taken into account in the designation of the non-permanent members of the Security Council is equitable geographical distribution. In this connection, this Government is of the opinion that the Middle East, the Near East, and Northern Africa constitute an appropriate regional group. This Government will attach importance to any choice which the states of this particular region may make among themselves as to a candidate for election to the Security Council.

Because of the complex nature of the elections to the various organs of the United Nations, this Government believes that it is highly desirable to centralize the necessary negotiations in London. The United States delegation to the Preparatory Commission now meeting in London has been fully informed¹¹ concerning Iran's candidacy for the Security Council and of the position of this Government expressed in the foregoing paragraph.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

⁹ In telegram 1129, December 14, 1945, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran cited an unconfirmed report that the Iranian Army garrison at Tabriz had surrendered (891.00/12-1445).

¹⁰ Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

¹¹ In telegram 10823 (Preco 396), December 15, 1945, 11 a. m., to London, not printed.

891.00/12-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 15, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 7:26 p. m.]

13159. Department's 10474, December 3. Embassy has now received communication from Foreign Office replying to our invitation for comment on Soviet reply of November 29 to American Government's note on Iran. Only point on which Foreign Office comments is reference in penultimate paragraph of Soviet note to Soviet-Iranian treaty of which Foreign Office assumes correct date to be February 26, 1921 (not 1941¹² as given in text of translation received here from Moscow and published in Radio Bulletin No. 291) and concerning implications of which Foreign Office makes following observations:

"There is one point in the Soviet reply to which we would like to draw your particular attention and that is the reference to the Soviet-Persian treaty of the 26th February 1921. Article VI of that treaty provides, as you know, that if a third country attempts by means of armed intervention to realize a rapacious policy in the territory of Persia or to turn the territory of Persia into a base for military action against the Soviet Union and if the Persian Government after warning by the Soviet Government shall prove itself to be not strong enough to prevent this danger the Soviet Government shall have the right to take its troops into Persian territory in order to take the necessary military measures in the interests of self defense. The article concludes that when the danger has been removed the Soviet Government promises immediately to withdraw its troops beyond the frontiers of Persia.

"We find it very difficult to see what relevance this clause of the 1921 treaty can have to the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops in present circumstances. And if it has any relevance then it would appear to justify by implication the retention of Soviet troops not only after the first of January but after the expiry of the treaty period for their withdrawal."

The Foreign Office apparently overlooking fact that Soviet note had already been made public suggested that "the State Department may care to consider when the text of the Soviet reply has been made public either in Washington or Moscow the desirability of drawing attention to the rather ominous implications of this part of the Soviet reply".

Sent to Department as 13159, repeated to Moscow as 416, repeated to Tehran as 43.

WINANT

¹² Concerning this point, see telegram 4015, November 30, 1 p. m., from Moscow, p. 468.

740.00119 Council/12-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 15, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received December 16—8:56 a. m.]

1132. Following is gist of note¹³ Embassy has just received from FonOff:

1. Before news of Conference of Foreign Ministers at Moscow was announced Iran Govt had proposed to Soviet Govt that Iranian Prime and Foreign Ministers proceed to Moscow for discussions with Soviet officials. When news of Moscow Conference was made public Iranian Ambassador at Moscow was urgently instructed to obtain immediate consent of Soviets to this visit.

2. What Iran Govt "urges and insists" on being "definitely raised and urgently decided" at Moscow Conference is immediate evacuation of all foreign troops from Iran.

3. Should matters concerning Iran other than withdrawal of foreign troops be discussed at Conference such discussions should only take place in consultation with Iran Govt as provided by article VI of Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942.

To Dept as 1132, repeated Moscow 339, London 133.

MURRAY

891.00/12-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 15, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 16—11:41 a. m.]

1134. It appears opportune moment to summarize Iranian situation at end of one month of disturbances in northern provinces:

1. "Democrat" forces appear firmly entrenched in Azerbaijan controlling roads, villages and cities, including Tabriz and Ardabil. They have held elections, organized a "Parliament" and appointed "Cabinet."

2. Iran Govt had been powerless to quell rebellion either by force, negotiation with rebels or by diplomatic approaches to Soviets. The four battalions sent from Tehran remain encamped outside of Qazvin with little prospects of forward movement. Security forces in troubled area have either been ordered by Soviets not to resist or have been so terrified by threat of Soviet retaliation that they have been rendered impotent.

3. Principal stated demand of rebels is for local autonomy leaving only conduct of foreign relations and war to Central Govt. While

¹³ No. 6332, December 14, 1945; copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 198, December 22, 1945, not printed.

probably few of "Democrats" are actual Communists there appears to be no doubt but that they are under Soviet control and follow Soviet propaganda line.

4. While Democratic movement still has little popular support it is gathering momentum in face of Iran Govt's inability to interfere and through sheer terrorism. Unless checked soon it may reach out and include most of population including tribes.

5. There is no doubt that Soviets while being extremely careful not to participate in movement in military sense have planned and organized the rebellion. Iranian FonOff has just furnished Embassy with voluminous document citing very many instances of Soviet interference with Iranian security forces in troubled area.

6. Ability of Central Govt to restore its authority with Soviet troops still in country is impossible and may be difficult even after withdrawal. It seems entirely reasonable to assume movement was carefully scheduled to take place well in advance of Mar 2 deadline for withdrawal of Soviet troops.

7. Feeling is widespread that only hope for Iranians is American assistance. Impression is growing that British are not particularly interested and may be content to fall back on 1907 spheres of influence.¹⁴ Alternative is [*to*]¹⁵ forthright American aid in [*is*] appeasement and there are signs such as desire of Prime and Foreign Ministers to visit Moscow that the Iranians may eventually give in all along the line. They have failed completely in all negotiations with Soviets locally and have fallen back on device of writing repeated notes which are simultaneously released to press.

8. Matter is complicated by fact that rebels have some just causes for complaint against Central Govt. Even opponents admit administration in Azerbaijan has been oppressive and concerned primarily with protecting interests of wealthy landlords. On top of this, provincial administrations particularly in Azerbaijan have been notoriously corrupt and inefficient.

9. Unless movement is soon checked similar disturbances may be expected in other parts of area. It should be pointed out that local autonomy does in fact exist in some parts of Iran at moment particularly in region of south controlled by Qashqai tribe.

10. If solution is not found we may expect early dismemberment of country with northern provinces eventually becoming integral parts of Soviet Union.

To Dept as 1134 repeated Moscow 340, London 134.

MURRAY

¹⁴ The reference is to the Anglo-Russian Convention of August 31, 1907.

¹⁵ Bracketed changes in this sentence based on copy of telegram in the Moscow Embassy files.

891.00/12-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 15, 1945—3 p. m.
 [Received December 16—4: 53 a. m.]

1135. Foreign Office has replied to questions raised in Dept's 669, Dec. 3 with voluminous document¹⁶ which constitutes a thorough indictment of Soviet activities in Northern Iran since the Soviet occupation in Aug 1941. While a great deal of space has been wasted in dealing with petty instances of isolated cases of interference by Soviet officials, document on whole is first thorough presentation of Iranian case Embassy has seen on part of Iran Govt. Briefly to Dept's numbered questions answers are as follow :

1. Yes, there has been open and repeated Soviet interference with movement of Iranian security forces in northern Iran.

2. Present Iranian security forces in northwestern Iran are not capable of insuring order in Kurdistan or Azerbaijan. In Khorasan, Mazanderan, and Gilan *gendarmerie* is capable of maintaining order.

3. Yes, orders have been issued to Iranian forces in northern Iran to take steps to put down rebellion but have been thwarted by Soviet continuously. (This part of note is extremely lengthy and well documented with specific instances.)

4. The meeting of the Popular Assembly at Tabriz on Nov. 20-21 has no sanction in Iranian law and since it resulted in disorder in Azerbaijan, it is a direct infringement of the security of the state and a violation of article 21 of the Constitution. Public security officials are duty bound to stop such meetings but interference of Soviet officials has prevented them from discharging their duties.

5. While information on subject is not good, it appears legally appointed officials in north are being replaced by persons whose appointments do not have legal sanction of Iran Govt. Foreign Office is uninformed as to whether Soviets have entered into official relations with democrat appointed authorities.

Foreign Office has handed copy of this document to British Embassy who desire to release it to press. Embassy has replied it cannot authorize release without clearance of Dept and Iran Govt.¹⁷

Sent Department 1135, repeated Moscow 341 and London 135.

MURRAY

¹⁶ Sent to the Embassy by the Iranian Foreign Office on December 13; copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 189, December 17, 1945, not printed.

¹⁷ In telegram 737, December 19, 1945, 8 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran was informed: "Dept considers it would be inadvisable for any document to be made public just now by the Iranian Govt or by the Brit Emb which would contain any indication of the type of information which we have been seeking to obtain with regard to the situation in Iran. (Deptel 669, Dec. 3 [see p. 472].) If it is considered advisable by the Iranian Govt to have published any of the information which it has given to us, the release should contain no reference to any expressions of interest on our part in obtaining such information." (891.00/12-1545)

111.752/12-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 16, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 17—11:24 a. m.]

1136. For the Ambassador.¹⁸ On December 11 Embassy requested of Soviet Embassy travel passes valid for period December 14 to 24, for Harold Minor, Chief Middle East Division of Department State,¹⁹ and Captain Gagarine, Assistant Military Attaché of Embassy, to proceed by automobile to Tabriz and return for purpose of maintaining communication with our Consulate there, which has been isolated for weeks and unable communicate with Embassy through normal postal and telegraphic channels. Travel passes have not been issued and no reason given for nonissuance. Embassy has been consistently rebuffed in repeated attempts past few days to confer with Soviet Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran or his subordinates.

Failure Soviet officials issue passes to Minor and Gagarine constitutes Soviet action preventing American officials from carrying our instructions from US Government in territory of country with which US Govt enjoys friendly relations.

I suggest that, in your discretion, you bring this most unsatisfactory situation, both as regards travel passes and attitude of Soviet Embassy officials, to attention Soviet Government on highest practicable level. Secretary of State may consider action of sufficient importance to warrant representations by him to Molotov since if uncorrected it will in all likelihood lend encouragement to further Soviet hindrance in functioning this Embassy.

Sent Moscow 342, repeated Dept 1136.

MURRAY

¹⁸ In the Soviet Union.

¹⁹ Mr. Minor was designated Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs on December 3, 1945. In telegrams 666, December 3, 1945, 4 p. m., and 677, December 5, 1945, 6 p. m., the Department informed the Ambassador in Iran that Mr. Minor was accompanying Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Deputy Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, on his mission to Iran in connection with the disposition of American surplus property in that country and that his visit would present "a good opportunity for him to acquaint you personally with any developments as seen from this end to gain from conversations with you ideas of a character which may be difficult to transmit in telegrams and despatches." (811.24591/12-345, 12-545) In telegram 1111, December 12, 1945, 9 a. m., the Ambassador reported that Mr. Minor was planning a short trip to Azerbaijan about December 14 (811-24591/12-1245).

891.00/12-1745

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*²⁰

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Acheson
Mr. Hussein Ala, Iranian Ambassador
Mr. Henderson

At the request of the Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Acheson received him this afternoon. Mr. Henderson was also present. The Ambassador handed to Mr. Acheson a copy of the note which his Government gave to Ambassador Murray on December 13²¹ in which the hope was expressed that the American delegation in Moscow would take up the question of the evacuation of troops from Iran.

The following are some of the points made by the Ambassador in the course of the conversation :

1. The Iranian Government cannot recognize any kind of an autonomous or separatist government or any other kind of government which might be established in Azerbaijan in a manner not in accordance with the Iranian constitution and law.

2. It is the hope of the Government of Iran that the Government of the United States will play the leading role in supporting the integrity of Iran during the conversations in Moscow. Since Great Britain considers itself an interested party, that Government, it is understood, feels that American leadership on the basis of principle would be more effective than British leadership.

3. The Iranian Government has complete faith in the determination of the United States to maintain the principles involved in the Iranian problem, a problem which is much greater than merely the preservation of the sovereignty of Iran. The effectiveness and prestige of the United Nations Organization is certain to be affected by what happens to Iran at this time. If a permanent member of the Security Council should be permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of another member of the United Nations in good standing and to pursue a policy which deprives the latter of sovereignty over its territory or any portion of its territory, the whole United Nations Organization will be affected.

4. The Iranian Government does not have the confidence in Great Britain that it possesses in the United States. It is fearful that Great Britain, in view of the importance which it ascribes to its position in southern Iran, may, in case it finds that the Soviet Union is determined to establish itself firmly in northern Iran, make arrangements with the Soviet Union which would result in Iran again being divided into spheres of British and Soviet influence.

5. The Iranian Government insists, in case there should be a discussion in Moscow of questions relating to Iran other than those involving the evacuation of foreign troops and the free movement on

²⁰ Approved by the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson).

²¹ See telegram 1120, December 13, from Tehran, p. 492.

Iranian territory of Iranian security forces, that the Government of Iran participate in the conversations in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-Iranian-Soviet agreement.

6. Iran, as a member of the Security Council, would be able to participate in discussions which might virtually affect its future. It hopes, therefore, that the American Government will support it as a temporary member of the Security Council.

Mr. Acheson assured the Ambassador that the United States continued as before to be interested in the maintenance of Iranian sovereignty. He added that he would send a telegram at once to Moscow informing the Secretary of State of the substance of the statements made to him by the Ambassador.²²

891.00/12-1745

The Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TEHRAN, December 17, 1945.

[Extract]

DEAR LOY: . . . When it is all boiled down it seems to me that the Iranians will find it difficult, if not impossible, ever to re-establish the *status quo ante*. Colonel Schwarzkopf and many others believe that the Iranian army is a broken reed. Iranian morale is shattered and it would not take much to send the government along the rocky road to appeasement, which opens wide before them. Bayat's action in fleeing from Tabriz is typical. Also typical is the Prime Minister's statement that he and the Foreign Minister would be glad to go to Moscow if invited. Almost everyone expresses the view that Iran's only hope now lies in the United States. It is becoming ever more common to hear people say that the British are not interested in saving Iran, but are merely desirous of protecting their interests in the South.

HAROLD B. MINOR

891.00/12-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 18, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 4:32 p. m.]

1146. Embtel 1115, Dec. 13. Iranian forces have been withdrawn from Sharifabad despite positive statement of Foreign Minister that

²² This was done in telegram 2553, December 17, 1945, 10 p. m., to Moscow. (891.00/12-1745)

this would not be done. This decision was undoubtedly taken since presence of troops at Sharifabad accomplished nothing politically and since they were enduring extreme hardship camped in the open in bitter weather, improperly supplied and equipped. This withdrawal together with return of Bayat from Tabriz and loss of that city has had depressing effect in city and most Iranians are fast losing hope of any solution to present situation.

To Dept, rptd Moscow 344, London 137.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/12-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, December 18, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received December 18—7:40 a. m.]

4209. From the Secretary [of State to the Ambassador in Iran].²³ Reference Tehran's telegram to Moscow 339, December 15.²⁴ You may tell Foreign Office withdrawal of troops from Iran will be discussed here. You may also say informally it is improbable any other Iranian question will be raised.

I do not think it desirable to express my view regarding proposed visit to Moscow of Iranian Prime and Foreign Ministers.

To Tehran as 181; repeated Dept as 4209. [Byrnes.]

[HARRIMAN]

891.00/12-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 18, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received 11:08 p. m.]

1149. I have received lengthy communication from Prime Minister²⁵ giving official Iranian reaction to Soviet reply to US note of November 24. Brief summary follows:

1. Recent events in northern Iran most certainly do constitute an "armed uprising". Hakimi here recites in detail record of rebel activities during past month and half.

2. The people of Azerbaijan already enjoy "democratic rights" as provided by the Iranian Constitution and the supplementary laws.

²³ The Secretary of State was in Moscow attending the Conference of Foreign Ministers, December 16-26, 1945.

²⁴ Same as telegram 1132, December 15, 11 a. m., from Tehran, p. 496.

²⁵ The text of the Prime Minister's note, dated December 14, 1945, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 247, January 25, 1946, from Tehran.

3. The "Azerbaijani population" is not involved in the disturbance, the leader of the Democrat movement being a person unknown in Azerbaijan until 2 years ago having spent most of his life in Baku. His collaborators cannot be considered representatives of the people.

4. People of Azerbaijan have never considered Turkish their national or permanent language but merely a tongue imposed on them by the [aggressions of the Mongols.]

5. Whether the activities of the Popular Assembly at Tabriz on November 20-21 are in accordance with the Iranian Constitution Iran Government alone is competent to decide.

6. Iran Government categorically denies that the "undesirable incidents" have been caused by "reactionary elements".

7. Insurgents have no popular support but have so terrorized populace as to make local opposition difficult. Azerbaijan population has shown its patriotism and loyalty to Central Government on numerous occasions as evidenced by rousing receptions always given arriving troops.

8. Soviet statement that Soviet military has not and is not hindering movements of Iranian military is not true. Specific incidents are cited. Note points out that if Iranian forces in Azerbaijan had enjoyed freedom of movement uprising would have been easily suppressed and Soviet interference in movement of Iranian security forces is violation of Tripartite Treaty.

9. Soviet opposition to despatch of further Iranian troops into north is violation of rights of jurisdiction of Iran, is contrary to Irano-Soviet treaty of 1921, is violation of Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and arrival of troops will not only not cause further bloodshed but will be welcomed by population. Soviet action in blocking troops is in direct contravention of pledge of Iranian integrity in Tehran Declaration.

10. Time limits for evacuation of British and Soviet troops as established by Tripartite Treaty do not mean such troops are obliged to remain in Iran until six months after end of hostilities. The spirit and purport of treaty indicate that evacuation should take place during not at end of six months period. Soviet Government's reasoning in this is entirely contradictory to provisions of United Nations Charter.

11. Citing of 1921 treaty providing for Soviet intervention if Iran was threatened by third power has no application in present instance and in any event such intervention was overridden subsequently by Kellogg-Briand Pact²⁶ and entry of Soviets into League of Nations.²⁷

²⁶ Treaty between the United States and other powers for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris August 27, 1928, *Foreign Relations*, 1928, vol. 1, p. 153.

²⁷ On September 18, 1934.

12. While discussing 1921 treaty it is worth mentioning that article IV provides neither party shall intervene in internal affairs of the other.

13. In view of all above cited treaties, declarations etc. Iran Government expects its Soviet ally to act in conformity with them and to refrain from interfering in internal affairs of Iran and also to withdraw its forces from the country.

Sent Department 1149; repeated Moscow 355; London 138.

MURRAY

S91.00/12-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 19, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 20—4:33 p. m.]

1155. Prime Minister made fiery speech in Majlis yesterday denouncing democrats as infamous group of intriguers and vowing his Govt would take every possible step to put down rebellion. He pointed out that garrisons in north had not been ordered to resist in order to avoid useless bloodshed and that all officials and security forces had been powerless to resist rebels since Govt had not been allowed to send reinforcements. He called on Allies to aid in solving problem by withdrawing their forces immediately. He denied categorically that movement had any popular support and pointed out that methods of Democrats consisted of terror, force and assassination. While he was most careful not to criticize Soviets by name he made it definitely clear that they were responsible for inability of Govt to restore order.

While speech contained little that was new, its boldness of tone and fiery phrases indicate at least publicly that Iranian Govt has no intention of giving up without a struggle.

Full text by airmail.²⁸

Sent to Dept, repeated Moscow 356, London 139.

MURRAY

S91.00/12-2045: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, December 20, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received 2:50 p. m.]

4229. From the Secretary [to the Ambassador in Iran]. Please tell Prime Minister informally and confidentially that you feel it

²⁸ Full text apparently not sent.

would be advisable for Iranian Govt to make at an early date such concessions as it considers feasible to the demands originally formulated by the Azerbaijanians. Specifically I have in mind their request for the right to use Turkish in the schools along with Persian and the creation of provincial councils as provided in Iranian Constitution.

You may say you understand Iranian Govt has already indicated willingness to take these steps and that you believe any other steps which do not impair sovereignty of Iranian Govt but which would remove grounds of complaint should also be taken as soon as possible. Such measures could of course be applied throughout Iran to avoid setting Azerbaijan apart as distinct unit.

Explain to Prime Minister that you are not suggesting that he in any way recognize or acquiesce in formation of "autonomous govt" in Azerbaijan. Point out that thought behind suggestion is that Iranian case before UNO and world public opinion will be much stronger if Iran leaves no grounds for charge that people of any part of country are being deprived of constitutional rights or otherwise unjustly treated by Central Govt.

Sent Tehran as 183, rptd Dept as 4229. [Byrnes.]

[HARRIMAN]

891.00/12-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 20, 1945—noon.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

1158. Colonel Homayun, Commander of *Gendarmerie* in Tabriz, has returned to Tehran and reported as follows:

1. A total of 23,000 votes was cast in recent election for popular assembly but not more than 1,500 to 2,000 persons actually voted, voters being hauled from one polling place to another in Soviet trucks.

2. Democrat rebellion was carefully planned in advance with full military surveys made in each town and village. In each settlement groups of up to 50 conscriptees who had finished military service were rounded up and by cajolery and terror were induced to join movement. These men became troops of rebellion. In each locality they were under leadership of Soviet official in civilian clothes.

3. Democrats have deluged province with propaganda which follows usual Soviet line and shows definite Soviet inspiration.

4. Army barracks in Tabriz have been abandoned. There were many desertions in garrison prior to surrender. General Derakshani,

Tabriz Commander, has gone over to Democrats²⁹ and may become Minister of War in autonomous govt. Prior to actual surrender, he advised his men to make terms with rebels and many have done so; officers keeping same ranks and receiving same pay in Azerbaijan army as previously. Officers and men declining offer are supposedly permitted to return to Tehran.

5. Azerbaijan Parliament has met and proposed [to] the Central Govt, that it collect all taxes in region 75% of which would be retained for needs of province and remainder remitted to Central Govt. If this and other proposals of assembly are refused Azerbaijan will proclaim complete autonomy and appoint Minister of Foreign Affairs. (It will be recalled that only last week Democrats claimed they would leave both War and Foreign Affairs in hands of Central Govt but have already reneged on former.)

6. Whole movement originated as defense against plots of British secret agents. While not much reliance can be placed in Homayun in view of nature of his arrival here (Soviets facilitated air passage), I believe most of above points except No. 6 may have considerable basis in fact and they are in accord with information previously reported to Embassy. Homayun has not confirmed Reuter's report that Tabriz garrison was surrounded by Soviet machine gunners before surrender.

Northern area is reported comparatively free from bloodshed at moment with Democrats almost in entire control of Azerbaijan. Kurds, however, are reported increasingly reluctant to obey Russian orders and some including influential Chieftain Granai Agha Mahmash have openly proclaimed loyalty to Iranian Govt. Influence of this Chieftain is considerable and it may be that Democrat movement will encounter considerable opposition on part of Kurds.

Shahsevand Tribe is reported divided with one chief favoring Central Govt and his brother supporting rebels in order that Tribe may stand well with whichever party finally gains upper hand.

Tribes in Ahar Region along Soviet border are reported blocking passes in area and causing considerable trouble to Soviet military movements.³⁰

Sent Dept 1158, repeated Moscow 358, London 141.

MURRAY

²⁹ In telegram 1161, December 20, 1945, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that General Derakshani had returned to Tehran and had been placed in military custody (891.00/12-2045).

³⁰ In telegram 1164, December 20, 1945, 3 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that the Soviet Consul at Tabriz and several members of his staff had been transferred to Meshed and "are reported organizing activities in Khorasan similar to thus far successful Democrat movement in Azerbaijan." (761.91/12-2045)

111.752/12-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 20, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

1159. For the Ambassador.³¹ Mytel 342 (1136 to Dept) December 16. Travel passes not yet received although Soviet Embassy states it has made three telegraphic inquiries in matter of Red Army headquarters at Qazvin. I shall appreciate being informed whether any action has been taken in this matter in Moscow and if so results thereof.

Embassy has assumed that Dept would wish to have one of its own officials visit Azerbaijan and has for that reason been pressing Soviet Embassy for necessary travel permission. In view, however, of delay 1 week which has already occurred, Embassy would appreciate receiving Secretary's views as to whether, unless immediate assurance received that travel pass will be forthcoming without further delay, he desires Minor remain here until travel pass obtained.

Sent Moscow 359, repeated Dept 1159 for its views.

MURRAY

891.00/12-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 20, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 21—6:10 a. m.]

1165. Embtel 1062, Dec 4. Prime Minister today ordered steps taken for establishment of local councils in provinces and towns throughout Iran except in Azerbaijan. Unless there is Majlis objection, Govt contemplates early elections to put this plan into effect.

Embassy understands this is work of Interior Minister Saleh³² who was known to favor such councils and who apparently lost no time in putting ideas into effect upon assuming Interior portfolio.

Sent Dept 1165, repeated Moscow 363, London 144.

MURRAY

891.00/12-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945—3 p.m.

742. For your information in discharging Secretary's instructions of Dec 20 from Moscow, Dept on Dec 8 made informal representations

³¹ In the Soviet Union.

³² The Ambassador reported in telegram 1160, December 20, 1945, 2 p. m., the appointment of Mr. Saleh as Minister of Interior as part of a reshuffling of the Hakimi Cabinet. His predecessor, Khalil Fahimi, was described in the telegram as "anathema to Russians and pro-Russian elements here." (891.002/12-2045)

to Iranian Ambassador similar to substance of Embtel 4229, Moscow, Dec 20. In frank and friendly terms, Henderson emphasized apparently urgent need for social and economic reforms in Iran, particularly creation of provincial councils. Representations were based upon desirability of strengthening international position of Iran as enlightened sovereign state. From reaction of Ambassador, Dept assumes that Ala has forwarded Dept views to Iranian Govt.

Sent to Tehran, repeated to Moscow.

ACHESON

891.00/12-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945—5 p. m.

2611. Seedel³³ 31. Iranian Ambassador called at Dept last night and said with great emotion and earnestness that his Govt looked solely to US to save rest of Soviet zone from same fate that has befallen Azerbaijan. He added that Iran simply could not survive if it lost that portion under Soviet control.

Ambassador said he was speaking not only in interest of Iran but of world security since Azerbaijan was only first move in a series which would include Turkey and other countries in Near East. He went on to say that if strong stand were not taken now, the United Nations Organization would lose all significance as an instrument for preserving a peace based on justice, history of Manchuria, Abyssinia, and Munich would be repeated and Azerbaijan would prove to have been first shot fired in third world war.

ACHESON

891.00/12-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 22, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 23—9:45 a. m.]

1171. Increasing number reports reaching here of imminent outbreak in Gilan province of rebellion similar that in Azerbaijan. While movement identical with "Democrat" uprising and same elements are involved it is reported using old "Jangali" designation to make it appear purely Gilani in character. This was name used by

³³ Code designation of telegrams sent to the delegation of the Secretary of State at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

rebels in that province when autonomous state was set up after last war but present movement has no connection therewith and title is probably being used both as rallying cry and to make it appear movement has no connection with Democrats of Azerbaijan.

To Dept 1171, rptd Moscow 364, London 145.

MURRAY

891.00/12-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 22, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

1172. For the Secretary. Urtel 183, Dec 20.⁸⁴ I brought your views to the attention of Prime Minister this morning. He stated he was in complete agreement concerning concessions suggested and that he had previously given orders to put them into effect. When Governor General Bayat went to Tabriz last month he made offer of introducing Turkish language into primary schools on orders from Hakimi. As regards provincial councils, he and all Iranian officials are in agreement that they should be formed at earliest possible date and steps have already been taken to this end (Embtel 1165, Dec 20).

Hakimi states, however, that under no circumstances can he or his Govt ever accept "parliament" and "government" that have been formed in Azerbaijan, which have no shred of legality and which were organized largely by aliens who had illicitly entered country from the Caucasus. He reaffirmed his Govt's intention to put down Azerbaijan rebellion by force if necessary once Soviet troops have withdrawn. Hakimi informed me that he had intended, when assuming office, to put into effect many badly needed reforms but rebels had not given him opportunity. He pointed out that throughout his life he has been known as a Democrat and Liberal and, being an Azerbaijani himself, population there would know he could be relied on to give them liberal and honest administration. I have repeatedly urged both Shah and Prime Minister to settle Azerbaijan problem without bloodshed and have recommended as possible solution appointment of commission of prominent Azerbaijanis to negotiate with rebels.

When discussing reforms, I believe it is well to remember that Iranians have only been free from brutal dictatorship for 4 years and that foreign troops have been in occupation ever since abdication of Reza Shah. British are not without responsibility for lack of reforms in Iran in view of their constant interference in internal politics and

⁸⁴ Same as telegram 4229, from Moscow, p. 504.

their support of reactionary and corrupt politicians. While it is by no means certain that Iranians would put house in order if left to themselves, it seems only fair that they should have the chance. I feel Hakimi is entirely sincere and is anxious to put all possible reforms into effect and also to make every concession to dissident elements consistent with Iranian sovereignty.

To Moscow 365, repeated Dept 1172, London 146.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/12-2345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 23, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received December 23—3:30 a. m.]

4261. Tehran's 342, Dec 16³⁵ and 359, Dec 20.³⁶ Note³⁷ sent Foreign Commissariat urging immediate issuance passes for Minor and Gagarine. Secretary prefers not take up this question in Foreign Ministers Conference.

Sent Tehran 186, repeated Dept 4261.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Council/12-2345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, December 23, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received 3:30 p. m.]

4262. This is Delsec 23. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary for your information only. During separate conversations with Stalin on Dec 19 both Bevin and I raised question of withdrawal of troops from Iran.³⁸

Substance of Stalin's remarks to me on this point was as follows:

1. Iran Govt is hostile to Soviet Union and there is danger that this hostility will manifest itself in sabotage of Baku oil fields. It is for this reason that Russia continues to maintain troops in Iran.

2. Treaty of 1921 gives Russia right to send troops into Iran if conditions become disturbed in that country. In light of Iranian hostility which creates danger to Russia it will be necessary for Soviet

³⁵ Same as telegram 1136, from Tehran, p. 499.

³⁶ Same as telegram 1159, from Tehran, p. 507.

³⁷ Dated December 22, 1945.

³⁸ See memorandum of conversation by the United States delegation of the Byrnes-Stalin meeting and the record by the United Kingdom delegation of the Bevin-Stalin meeting, vol. II, pp. 680 and 688, respectively.

Union to consider later whether Soviet troops can be withdrawn in accordance Tripartite Treaty of 1942 or must be retained under terms of 1921 treaty.

3. Soviet forces are not interfering in Iranian internal disturbances. Reason they are refusing permit entry additional Iranian forces into Azerbaijan is that they fear clashes between local population and Iranian troops and incidents involving Soviet troops as well. Even now, his troops are suffering and several Russian soldiers have been killed by Iranian detachments.

4. Iranian Govt is trying to stir up trouble between Russia and Anglo-Saxon powers. We must be skeptical of Iranian complaints.

5. We may rest assured Soviet Union has no territorial or other designs against Iran. Once it feels secure about Baku oil fields USSR will withdraw forces and take no interest whatever in internal affairs of Iran.

I expressed surprise that Stalin considered Iranian Govt hostile to Russia and reiterated my belief it was important that great powers should always be able to show they were living up to agreements and behaving correctly toward small nations.

Stalin's statements to Bevin on Iran were along same lines as those to me. Bevin said British Government had suggested to Iranians that they put into practice constitutional provisions regarding provincial councils and he thought it would be well for Russia, US and Britain to work together to assist Iranian Govt in this. Stalin said he would consider suggestion and indicated it might be acceptable.

It has been agreed that I shall see Stalin again before departure.

Sent to Dept as 4262, repeated Tehran as 187. [Byrnes.]

[HARRIMAN]

111.752/12-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 24, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 2: 34 p. m.]

1176. Embtels 1136, December 16 and 1159, December 20. It is in my opinion entirely inadmissible that Russians are permitted to delay or refuse permission for American officials to visit northern Iran. Iran is not only fully independent but Tripartite Pact states that presence of Soviet forces does not constitute military occupation. Minor has been marking time for 13 days receiving unconvincing and evasive replies such as that Soviet Chargé is absent or ill or that a reply is being awaited from the Soviet Commander at Qazvin. This is typical of the embarrassing and indeed highly irregular situation which Embassy has had to contend with since Soviet occupation. Since Russians are now giving permits to visit Tabriz with only usual

routine delays one can only assume that they are anxious to prevent Minor and also Young from visiting Gilan where it is rumored a movement similar to that of Democrats in Azerbaijan is about to be launched. Two American journalists have also tried unsuccessfully to obtain travel permits.

I strongly recommend that Department approach Soviet Government with demand that American officials and journalists in Iran be granted permits to visit northern Iran within 24 hours of application. Department may wish to consider granting visas etc. to Russians on basis of reciprocal treatment of American officials in matters of this kind.

Sent to Department, repeated Moscow 366.

MURRAY

740.00119 Council/12-2445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1945—3 p. m.

2630. Secdel 41. Inasmuch as Iran may present charges against the Soviet Union at the meeting of the General Assembly of UNO in Jan, or in the Security Council as soon as it is set up, we have been working on instructions for the American Delegate with regard to the attitude which this Govt should assume. In the preparation of these instructions, we have made a careful analysis of the issues involved in the Iranian-Soviet dispute from the point of view of the Charter adopted in San Francisco.

We do not see how, without undermining world confidence in UNO, our Delegate in view of the facts already known could pursue any course other than to agree that a careful investigation be made of Iranian charges to the effect that the Soviet Union had infringed upon the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran. Furthermore, if an investigation by UNO should convince this Govt of the validity of the Iranian charges, this Govt would be obliged to concur in a finding unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Such a finding, if made, might confront UNO with a situation similar to that which the League of Nations faced when presented with the problems of Manchuria and Ethiopia, with the result that the effectiveness of UNO as a factor in the preservation of world peace based upon the principles outlined in the Charter would be seriously undermined.

We are bringing this matter to your attention in the hope that in your second interview with Stalin (Moscow's tel 4262, Dec 23) you will find it possible to impress him with our anxiety in this respect in all frankness so that the Soviet Govt may fully realize the world

significance of the policies which it appears to be pursuing in northern Iran may not later charge us with lack of frankness in case it should learn only in London that we cannot ignore the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations in order to avoid taking before all of the United Nations an attitude critical of the Soviet Union.

The US note of Nov 24 was based upon the principles of the UNO Charter. The Charter has been endorsed by the large section of the American public, which places its hope for future peace on international cooperation. We feel, therefore, that the granting of any concessions to the Soviet Union which would compromise the principles involved would not only seriously impair the future effectiveness of UNO but would also be a severe blow to those in this country who are supporting UNO and the principles on which UNO is based.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Tehran.³⁹

ACHESON

111.752/12-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 24, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received December 24—8:27 p. m.]

4266. From the Secretary [to the Ambassador in Iran]. Reurtel 359, December 20, 1 p. m.⁴⁰ Unless travel passes already received Minor should not delay his return Washington merely in order to make Tabriz trip.⁴¹

Sent to Tehran as 187, repeated to Dept. [Byrnes.]

[HARRIMAN]

891.00/12-2645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1945.

The Iranian Ambassador called to say that although he had been advising his Government for several weeks that Iran should present her case to the General Assembly Meeting of UNO in January, he had now received a telegram from Tehran stating that his Government was somewhat undecided whether to present its case in the absence of

³⁹ As No. 748.

⁴⁰ Same as telegram 1159, from Tehran, p. 507.

⁴¹ In telegram 1193, December 28, 1945, 9 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported Mr. Minor's departure from Tehran "today", en route to the United States (811.24591/12-2845).

fairly definite assurance that Iran would be supported in the Assembly by some of the major Powers, notably the United States.

I said that while I could appreciate Iran's desire to have such assurance in advance, I also thought the Ambassador would appreciate our inability to give him such assurance. I said that our attitude would naturally depend, in any case presented to the United Nations, upon the facts as presented or as determined.

The Ambassador then wanted to know whether there had been any change of American policy toward Iran as a result of Mr. Byrnes' conversations in Moscow, or for any other reason. I recalled that American policy towards Iran, as stated in our note to the Soviet Government regarding events in Azerbaijan, was based primarily on the Declaration regarding Iran and the United Nations Charter. I had no reason to think that our policy had changed in any respect.

The Ambassador expressed confidence that our policy had not changed, but wanted to know whether we would declare our continued adherence to this policy openly and vigorously before the United Nations Assembly, if Iran presented its case there. In reply I reminded the Ambassador that the United States had not only followed a consistent policy in support of Iranian sovereignty on two conspicuous occasions during the past two years (the oil controversy of 1944 and the present Azerbaijan case), but that we had made known our support openly and publicly. I left it to the Ambassador to judge from these recent examples whether we would again speak out or remain silent if occasion should arise for the expression of our views.

The Ambassador said that in spite of his inability to obtain a firm commitment from us of support before UNO, he would strongly advise his Government to present its case at the London meeting next month for the judgment of world opinion. If Iran did not do so, he realized that Iran would weaken its claim for world support in a matter involving a violation of Iranian sovereignty.

891.00/12-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 27, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received December 29—2:29 a. m.]

1185. Both Prime and Foreign Ministers have asked my opinion of their making direct personal appeal to Stalin in effort to solve present crises. Their approach was informal and off the record

and I replied in same manner to the effect that it was my personal opinion that contacts between men often succeed where note writing between governments fails. I added that since note writing in the present crisis had brought no results, such a personal appeal could do no harm and in any event would add to Iranian case by having it on record. They appeared to be in agreement and it is probable that some sort of personal appeal will be forthcoming. Foreign Minister informed me he would also ask opinion of British Embassy.

Repeated Moscow 368, London 148.

MURRAY

811.24591/12-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 27, 1945—9 a. m.
[Received December 29—2:18 a. m.]

1186. Moscow's 4161 to Department.⁴² In my opinion part of *Pravda* article dealing with presence of American troops in Iran should call for prompt and emphatic protest to Soviet Government.⁴³ To me it is intolerable Soviets should continue this line when they know very well that American troops entered Iran for sole purpose of saving Soviet Union from defeat and destruction. I believe we should tell Soviet flatly and emphatically that we consider such criticism grossly insulting to the gallant officers and men of the PGC who truly wrought miracles to bring sorely needed aid to the Soviet Union in its darkest hour. We should point out furthermore that Iranians have never objected to presence of US troops in Iran and that in any event they will all be gone by January 1st.^{43a}

Repeated Moscow 369.

MURRAY

⁴² Dated December 14, not printed.

⁴³ The *Pravda* article is dated December 14, 1945. It severely criticized remarks made by Iranian Prime Minister Hakimi in a recent conversation with press correspondents, stating: "Third of Allied powers about which Mr. Ibrahim Khakimi spoke is USA. However, if you please, United States, as far as is known, has no treaty with Iran concerning presence there of American troops. But if Ibrahim Khakimi says that American troops must be withdrawn this means that they were brought there. There is no treaty but there are troops! When did they appear, for what purpose did they appear, where are they located, how many are there? For what purpose do they remain in Iran? When do they intend to leave and do they so intend? There is no direct answer to these questions. There is pure fog. This is artificial fog." (841.9111RR/12-1445)

^{43a} A notation was made on this telegram in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs: "No action taken."

891.00/12-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 27, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:24 p. m.]

1188. Sov Consul Krasnov at Tabriz and several members of his staff have been transferred to Meshed and are reported organizing activities in Khorasan similar to thus far successful Democrat movement in Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept as 1188, rptd Moscow 370; London 149.

MURRAY

891.00/12-2745 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

TABRIZ, December 27, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 29—6:22 a. m.]

12. Fighting in Azerbaijan ceased last week with fall of Rezaieh, with Democrats in full control throughout.

Earlier fervid protestations of Azerbaijan's desire to remain within Iranian nation now replaced with open threats of declaration outright independence if demands are not met by Tehran Govt. Most acute issue is payment by Tehran of salaries of their former employees now absorbed by local govt. No definite action will be taken, however, till results of Moscow Conference are known and Tehran's intentions clearer. Will report further after Saturday conference with Peshavari, the local Prime Minister.

Tehran Govt must realize danger of giving Azerbaijan even nominal excuse for independence, which would play directly into Soviet hands. Soviet Consul General showed great happiness yesterday over recent events referring to Tabriz as "a new national capital."

Please inform me of all Tehran measures to mollify Azerbaijan.

Sent Dept as 12; Tehran as 32.

ROSSOW

761.91/12-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 28, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received December 29—11:30 p. m.]

1195. Moscow's 4262, Dec 23 to Dept received here yesterday on relay from Cairo. Following are my views on Stalin's remarks to Secretary on Iranian situation.

1. Suggestion that Iranians constitute danger to Baku oil fields is so patently absurd that it is difficult to see how Soviets would expect it to be given any serious consideration.

2. Emb's interpretation of article VI of 1921 Irano-Soviet treaty is that Soviet intervention is permissible only in cases involving third powers, such intervention to be exercised only after Soviets have given due notice and Iranians have been unable to cope with situation themselves. No notice has to date been given. Treaty specifically mentions aggressive policies in Iran on part of third powers and use of Iranian territory as center of military operations against Soviet Union.

Since Stalin has pointed out that Soviets may invoke this treaty it might be well to ask Soviet Govt exactly what third power it has in mind. Surely Stalin cannot mean the British with whom Soviets have 20 year treaty of alliance⁴⁴ and who came strongly to assistance of Soviet Union when latter was attacked. Does he mean the US who poured billions of dollars worth of lend-lease aid into Soviet Union⁴⁵ and whose soldiers laid down their lives in the common cause. Surely he could not maintain that entry of American forces into Iran during the war in an effort to save the Soviet Union constituted a threat to that country—forces that labored so valiantly under appalling conditions to bring desperately needed aid to Soviets.

3. Statement that Soviet forces are not interfering in Iranian internal disturbances is of course not true.

Sent Dept repeated Moscow 373.

MURRAY

761.91/12-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 28, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received December 28—7 p. m.]

4311. For Ambassador⁴⁶ from Jernegan.⁴⁷ Following summary of Moscow conversation on Iran is being telegraphed in view of possibility bad weather may delay my return :

Begin summary. At first meeting December 16 FonMins agreed remove Iran from formal agenda but also agreed it could be discussed informally.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Signed at London, May 26, 1942, Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1942, p. 781.

⁴⁵ For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, pp. 937 ff.

⁴⁶ In Iran.

⁴⁷ John D. Jernegan, Second Secretary of Embassy and Vice Consul at Tehran, detailed to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

⁴⁸ See the United States delegation minutes of the first formal session of the Conference, December 16, vol. II, p. 610.

On December 18 Bevin spoke to Molotov re deep sympathy and interest felt by Brit public with respect to Iran. Asked for frank and friendly exchange of views on difficulties which has arisen that country. Molotov replied that Russians were not intervening in Azerbaijan affair which he termed National Democratic move directed neither against Iran Govt nor Sovt Union. Said it was purely internal matter. As to withdrawal of foreign troops, Molotov said that question had been discussed at Potsdam and London and agreement reached. He saw no reason to revive subject.

Both Byrnes and Bevin raised question with Stalin December 19 (see Embtel 187, December 13 [23]⁵⁰)

On December 13 [23] Byrnes again spoke to Stalin saying he feared dispute would be raised at January meeting of UNO and hoped measures could be taken to avoid this. Secretary stressed that American concern arose out of Tehran Declaration of 1943 and said in view of appreciation expressed in that document for Iranian aid to war effort it would be hard to assert that Iran was hostile to Soviets. Remarked that American press had written much about presence foreign troops in Iran and American Govt had decided to eliminate any grounds for suspicion by removing last American troops. Stalin replied Sov Union was not afraid of having Iran question raised at UNO meeting and no one need blush if it should come up. Pledges given in Tehran Declaration still held good and would be observed by Sov Govt. However, expression of appreciation had been made to previous Iran Govt whereas present Govt had become hostile to Russia and was seeking people to act against USSR. What was needed was for Iran Govt to live up to obligations and reverse policy of hostility. Sovs had never asked US to remove troops from Iran and had no objection to their remaining or withdrawing, whichever we preferred.⁵¹

After consulting Byrnes and accepting his suggested changes, Bevin on December 24 submitted to informal meeting of three FonMins draft agreement for creation of Anglo-American-Soviet Commission⁵² to advise and assist Iran Govt in reestablishing satisfactory relations with provinces through establishment of provincial councils as provided in Iranian Constitution. Commission would also make recommendations to Iran Govt on use of minority languages such as Kurdish, Turki and Arabic and would supervise first provincial council elections. It would investigate question of troop withdrawal and make

⁵⁰ Same as telegram 4262 from Moscow, p. 510.

⁵¹ See the United States delegation memorandum for the record of the Byrnes-Stalin conversation, December 23, vol. II, p. 750.

⁵² In telegram 1071, December 5, 1945, the Ambassador in Iran quoted a British Embassy news bulletin that the highest Iranian authorities were considering a request that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union send a commission to investigate the situation in Azerbaijan (891.00/12-545). The Ambassador reported further in telegram 1110, December 11, 1945, 9 a. m., that the Iranian Cabinet had taken no action on the matter and that the Prime Minister was still hopeful of resolving the impasse with the Soviet Union by direct negotiation (891.00/12-1145). For the text of Mr. Bevin's draft agreement, see enclosure 3 to the United States delegation minutes of the informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers, December 24, 1945, 3:15 p. m., vol. II, p. 771.

recommendations to three participating Govts for acceleration of withdrawal. (Purpose of Brit in presenting this was to enlist Sov cooperation in reducing scope of Azerbaijan autonomy and bringing province back under *de facto* authority of Iran Govt. Section on troop withdrawal was suggested by Byrnes to give recognition to Iranian complaints and avoid appearance of considering only matters of internal Iranian administration. Proposal was made as a last resort in face of unyielding attitude of Stalin and Molotov toward previous American and Brit representations.)

Evening of December 24 Stalin told Bevin he thought agreement might be reached on basis of his draft and following day Russians presented certain minor amendments which were discussed at length by three FonMins. On December 26 Bevin offered to accept all Sov amendments if this were necessary to reach agreement but Molotov displayed complete change attitude and refused continue discussion.⁵³ Despite repeated attempts by Bevin to reopen question, Molotov persisted in negative position. His general line of argument was that there had been sufficient discussion of Iranian question, that Sov Govt had made its position clear and that there was no need to take any decision, especially since Iran was not on formal agenda. He also asserted to Bevin that commission could not be formed without Iranian consent (Brit had already proposed that Iranian approval be sought), but that Sov Govt could not consider dealing with present hostile Iran Govt on such a question. *End summary.*⁵⁴

Bevin has instructed Amb Bullard to inform Iranian PriMin of general course of conversations especially Brit proposal to form commission and to urge Hakimi to express his willingness to accept such a scheme. If Iran Govt adopts suggestion, Bevin says he will lend support by press and other means. Byrnes agreed with Bevin he would instruct American representative Tehran also to inform Iran Govt in general way of conversations and proposal and you may expect appropriate instructions from Washington in next few days.⁵⁵ [Jernegan.]

[HARRIMAN]

⁵³ See the United Kingdom delegation record of the Stalin-Bevin meeting of December 24 and of the Bevin-Molotov meeting of December 26, vol. II, pp. 774 and 811, respectively.

⁵⁴ In telegram 4306, December 28, 1945, 6 p. m., Moscow transmitted text of a letter dated the previous day sent to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bevin in which he expressed his great disappointment that the Moscow meeting had been unable to come to final agreement regarding Iran (891.00/12-2845).

⁵⁵ Accounts by the Secretary of State of conversations on Iranian matters at the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers are given in his *Speaking Frankly* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 118-122; his *All in One Lifetime* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 332-334, 337-338, 343; and in a radio report to the nation on December 30, Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, pp. 1033, 1047. For President Truman's view of the discussion at Moscow of Iranian matters, see his *Memoirs*, vol. I (Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 549-552.

891.00/12-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 29, 1945—10 a. m.
 [Received January 1, 1946—7:16 a. m.]

1198. Following is gist of Iranian reply to Embassy, a note transmitting to Iran Govt text of US note on November 24 to Soviets on Iranian situation:

We respectfully express the appreciation and gratitude of the Imperial Govt for the action of US Govt and sincerely hope that with the good will and respectful sentiments toward Iranian independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity shown by the US, Iran being a member of the United Nations and having rendered considerable assistance to the final victory, hopes to be able to "carry out her ardent desires and aspirations".

MURRAY

891.00/12-2945 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Tabriz (Rossow) to the Secretary of State

TABRIZ, December 29, 1945—2 p. m.
 [Received December 31—7:38 p. m.]

14. At interview this morning Peshavari, PriMin of Azerbaijan Province, reiterated his desires to keep Azerbaijan within Iranian nation. However he stated he has no confidence in Central Govt and felt he must maintain and develop his militia fearing invasion by Iranian Army and subsequent nullification of all the reforms of his new Govt. He said he had proved his desire to remain within Iran by refraining from appointing a Foreign Minister. But he would have to have a substantiating guarantee of Azerbaijan's right to self-govt and one which the Central Govt could not subsequently disregard as he said it had so often in the past. A guarantee from the Shah with a view to later general reforms would not suffice he said since Shah is young and inexperienced and might change his mind overnight. Similarly a guarantee by the present Majlis would not be satisfactory since all but a few deputies are land owners, religious men—little Shahs—and not dependable either (emphasis, however, appeared to imply receptivity to newly elected Majlis). He said he would welcome and participate in any general constitutional convention intended to guarantee regional rights throughout Iran. Asked what form of guarantee he would require he replied emphatically he was keeping the way open for negotiation. He repeated this several times.

He said Tehran had sent one emissary (presumably General Moqadam)⁵⁶ but entirely without powers. He eventually told him to

⁵⁶ Maj. Gen. Hassan Moqadam, Governor-General of Azerbaijan.

go. He said it was up to Central Govt to send to him someone with real authority. But he said instead of trying to reach agreement Tehran was ignoring Azerbaijan's demands; they were spreading lies about conditions here and saying the Democratic movement was not supported by the people which he said I could see for myself was false. However he repeated he would welcome a sincere negotiator with adequate powers to make a substantial agreement. Further he promised earnestly he would not act hastily and declared he would consult me before taking any decisive action. Generally speaking he was more pliable than expected and seemed very anxious to impress me with his sincerity and lofty intentions.

Unless Soviet position can be altered, Iran Govt must accept situation in Azerbaijan as *fait accompli*. It is faced with alternative of bending fast and at least attempting some sort of serious negotiation and general reform, or being dismembered. It is patently Soviet desire to be called upon to "protect" Azerbaijan and other provinces from "despotic aggressive Tehran", at the same time continuing and extending its military occupation. Thus it would appear essential that US in endeavoring to maintain established national pattern, attempt by only means now open to maintain Iran intact so that Soviet must either abide by evacuation agreement or declare aggressive intentions to entire world. To do this it is recommended that Embassy make very clear to Central Govt the alternatives it faces and persuade it at least to attempt serious negotiation with Azerbaijan. Such action would materially weaken Azerbaijan position regarding necessity for outright independence; otherwise it will certainly declare itself independent and seek a "protector".

Please keep me thoroughly informed as to any action taken by Embassy in this regard and as to intentions of Central Govt.

Sent Dept as 14; to Tehran as 33.

Rossow

761.91/12-2845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1945—5 p. m.

759. You were furnished an outline of the conversations which took place in Moscow with regard to Iran in Moscow's telegram to you of Dec 28 which was repeated to Dept in Moscow's 4311 of Dec 28.

You are authorized to inform Prime Minister of Iran in strict confidence of the general course of the conversations and particularly of proposal to form an Anglo-American-Soviet Commission to advise and assist the Iranian Govt in re-establishing satisfactory re-

lations with provinces through establishment of provincial councils as provided in Iranian Constitution and to make recommendations to the three powers in respect to the acceleration so far as possible of the withdrawal of Allied troops in Iran. Please inform Prime Minister that American Govt would appreciate learning at once whether Iranian Govt would be disposed to cooperate with such a commission in case it would still be found possible to create it. You may add that in our opinion it would be in the interest of Iran to cooperate with such a commission in case its creation should be found possible.

Please keep in touch with regard to this matter with British Embassy which it is understood is receiving similar instructions from Bevin.

ACHESON

[The final evacuation of American troops from Iran, except for the three groups mentioned in the last paragraph of the letter of November 24 from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, page 452, took place on December 30, 1945; see T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952), pages 426 and 499.]

111.752/1-246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 2, 1946—10 a. m.

[Received January 3—12:47 a. m.]

3. Embtel 1176, December 24. I do not wish to permit Soviet authorities in Iran to block travel of US Government officials in any part of country. I intend to continue pressing for pass for Capt. Gagarine and for either Jernegan or Ferguson⁶⁰ now that Minor has departed. I am firmly convinced that we should not allow Soviets to construe Minor's departure as any weakening in our resolve to send properly accredited American officials into any part of Iran at any time. While pressure of work at this office may not permit any of above named officers to make trip, I see no reason why we should not insist Soviets issue the passes we have repeatedly requested.

MURRAY

⁶⁰ C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., Third Secretary and Vice Consul of Embassy in Iran.

SUGGESTION BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP TO OPERATE THE TRANS-IRANIAN RAILROAD AND A FREE PORT ON THE PERSIAN GULF

761.91/1-1145

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1944.

Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations; Free Port and Railway Trusteeship

I did not have an opportunity to discuss this with the President at our meeting yesterday.

I still feel it would be preferable for me to take this up in person rather than to send over a memorandum, and unless you feel otherwise, I will plan to bring it up the next time I am with the President.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

761.91/1-1145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1944.

I concur fully that it would be preferable for the matter of the Iranian Railway and free port to be discussed with the President, and I hope you will have an early opportunity to do so. I am afraid, if the matter is delayed, that the President may feel that adequate attention is not being paid to his suggestion that Harriman take up the matter with Stalin.

WALLACE MURRAY

761.91/1-1145

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray)

[WASHINGTON,] January 2, 1945.

Subject: Iranian Free Port and Railroad Trusteeship

Thank you for your memorandum of the 20th [30th?]. When I was with the President on Saturday ⁶¹ I raised this question and he indicated that he felt there was no urgency about the matter. He did, however, ask for a memorandum which he could study. I think this must be most carefully drawn up and if George Allen,⁶² whom I pre-

⁶¹ December 30, 1944.

⁶² Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs.

sume will prepare this for you, will check with Hayden Raynor⁶³ he will give him some ideas which I have on the manner in which the problem should be presented.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

761.91/1-1145

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President
Roosevelt*⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1945.

Subject: Iranian Free Port and Railway Trusteeship

When the Secretary discussed the above subject on December 30, you requested a memorandum of the Department's views.

The proposal offers several excellent advantages. Many Soviet officials undoubtedly believe that Russia must have an assured outlet to the Persian Gulf, to be obtained by forceful means if necessary, in the interests of Soviet security. An international trusteeship to operate the trans-Iranian railway and a free port on the Gulf might render less likely a more exigent demand by Russia.

The trusteeship would assure to Russia an unhampered trade outlet to the Persian Gulf and would at the same time assist Iran economically by developing an important transit trade through the country and by improving Iranian transport facilities for its internal trade.

Perhaps more important than any of the above, the trusteeship proposal would be in the direction of British-Soviet-American cooperation rather than rivalry in Iran.

In spite of the advantages of the proposal, certain difficulties are foreseen which, in the Department's view, make it unlikely that the proposal would be acceptable either to Iran, Russia, or Great Britain.

No matter how drawn up or proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and old-world-imperialism. Iranians are highly suspicious of foreign influence in the country and would unquestionably resent any extension of foreign control there. The railway, built by their own strenuous efforts at a cost of some \$150,000,000, without foreign borrowing, is a source of especial and intense patriotic pride. The Department's judgment is that the trusteeship could only be imposed on Iran, a sovereign, allied nation, by force of arms.

⁶³ G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

⁶⁴ In an attached memorandum of January 16, 1945, to the Secretary of State, President Roosevelt stated: "Please speak to me about this." There is no record in the Department files of further discussion by President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State on this subject and it was not discussed with the United Kingdom or the Soviet Union at the Conferences which took place at Malta and Yalta in January and February, 1945.

There is little reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in participating in an international trusteeship in Iran in the genuine manner contemplated, particularly if it included an element of non-Russian control in northern Iran.⁶⁵

The British, we feel, would almost certainly raise equally strenuous objections. British policy for more than a hundred years has been pointed toward preventing any other great power, and especially Russia, from gaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. There is no indication that this policy has been altered. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States, it might be considered wise, in protection of vital British communications in this important area, to discourage such a trusteeship. The British also will probably continue to endeavor to keep the Russians away from the vital South Iranian oil fields.

The laudable ends contemplated by the proposal might be accomplished in some measure through the employment by Iran of foreign technicians to assist them in operating the railway and port. The Iranians would prefer to employ Americans or the nationals of small European countries (Sweden or Switzerland) for this purpose, if they should agree to the idea.

JOSEPH C. GREW

691.0024/7-945

*Memorandum by the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs*⁶⁶

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1945.

Subject: Russian Access to the Persian Gulf

Mr. Richard Sanger (NE)⁶⁷ has informed ME of a conversation which he had with Mr. Houghteling, former Immigration Commissioner⁶⁸ and a personal friend of the late President Roosevelt.

Shortly before the President's death, he discussed with Mr. Houghteling the problems of the Middle East, with special reference to Russia. Mr. Roosevelt informed him that the subject had been raised at the Tehran Conference, and that Mr. Roosevelt had proposed to Marshal Stalin at that time the establishment of an Iranian free port on the Persian Gulf, at Bandar Shapur. Mr. Roosevelt stated that Mar-

⁶⁵ For documentation on the fostering of dissident movements in northern Iran by the Soviet Union, see pp. 359 ff.

⁶⁶ Drafted by Mary E. Crane of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (ME).

⁶⁷ Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁶⁸ James L. Houghteling had been Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization from July 1937 to July 1940.

shal Stalin expressed interest in this proposal, and asked Mr. Roosevelt if it was a serious suggestion. When Mr. Roosevelt stated that it was so intended, Stalin excused himself and conferred briefly with Foreign Commissar Molotov. Upon his return, Stalin stated that he was agreeable to this proposal.

ME note: The general substance of this conversation was reported to the Department by President Roosevelt.⁶⁹ However, Mr. Roosevelt stated that the proposal also included a plan for an international trusteeship over the Trans-Iranian Railway. Mr. Roosevelt informed the Department that Marshal Stalin merely commented that the proposal was an interesting idea, and offered no objection. The version given by Mr. Houghteling, however, would suggest that some kind of understanding was reached.

DECLARATION OF WAR BY IRAN ON JAPAN⁷⁰

[There was no discussion by the United States with Iran regarding the question of an Iranian declaration of war on Japan. However, in note 5276, March 1, 1945, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Entezam) notified the Ambassador in Iran (Morris) that the Imperial Iranian Government had made such a declaration on February 28, 1945. In his acknowledgment (note 198) of March 8, 1945, the Ambassador stated: "It is hardly necessary to assure you that the American Government welcomes this step, whereby Iran once again associates herself with the nations fighting aggression and working for liberty in a peaceful world. Permit me to express also my personal gratification at this further proof of the common purpose of our two governments." (740.0011PW/3-845)]

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN CONTINUATION OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSIONS TO THE IRANIAN ARMY AND THE IRANIAN GENDARMERIE⁷¹

891.20 Mission/1-1745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1945—8 p. m.

24. War has agreed to continue Military Mission to Iranian Army for an indefinite period beyond March 1. War recognizes that pro-

⁶⁹ In a memorandum of December 8, 1944, to the Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 483; see also memorandum of December 19, 1944, by Mr. Murray to the Secretary of State, *ibid.*, p. 485.

⁷⁰ See also documentation on the declaration of war by Iran on Germany on September 9, 1943, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 428 ff.

⁷¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 390 ff., *passim*.

tection and advancement of American interests in Iran require strengthening of Iranian security forces and consequently will present to Joint Chiefs of Staff request for priority for military supplies which General Ridley ⁷² has requisitioned.

You may inform Iranian Government that War has agreed to continue mission which consequently will not be withdrawn on March 1. You should add that this Government will of course expect that the Iranian Ministry of War and Iranian officials continue to give General Ridley the fullest of cooperation and that this Government must reserve the right to withdraw the mission should such cooperation not be forthcoming at some future date.

General Ridley desires that we avoid suggesting an expiration date for the mission but rather limit ourselves to a statement that the mission will not be withdrawn on March 1. He desires that Dept and Embassy avoid stating or suggesting to Iranian officials at any time that he has not received full cooperation in the past from Iranian officials and requests that phrase similar to "continue to receive cooperation" be used. Dept in informing Iranian Minister ⁷³ of continuance of the mission has complied with General Ridley's two requests.

STETTINIUS

891.105A/5-1245

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

No. 292

TEHRAN, May 12, 1945.

[Received May 24.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the officers in charge of the American military mission working with the Iranian *Gendarmerie* have recently brought to my attention certain incidents which they feel represent serious obstacles in the carrying out of the mission's work.

From the point of view of the mission's own program, the most serious of these incidents are those involving interference by Iranian politicians, for purely political reasons, in the operation of the *Gendarmerie*.

[Here follow details of such interference.]

Another form of interference with the work of the mission, and one which is more serious from the international standpoint, comes

⁷² Maj. Gen. Clarence S. Ridley, Chief of the United States Military Mission to the Iranian Army.

⁷³ Note of January 18, 1945, to Mohammed Shayesteh not printed. This was in reply to the Minister's note 1707, October 19, 1944; for reference to latter note, see letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, October 25, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 433.

from the Soviet authorities. As the Department knows, the American officers of the mission have always had difficulty in obtaining Russian permission to visit the areas of Iran in which the Soviets exercise security control. In addition, the Russians have repeatedly interfered with Iranian officers of the *Gendarmerie* in those areas and have obstructed the movement of Gendarme units. Three incidents which occurred in the past two months have been reported to me:

1. A company composed of five officers and one hundred and forty gendarmes was ordered to Sari, in Mazanderan, for special work. The detachment, traveling by truck, was halted at Firuzkuh by Russian soldiers and delayed three hours. From that point it was accompanied by a Russian officer to Shirgah (not far short of Sari) where it was detained until a report could be made to the Soviet commander at Shahi. The following day at noon, after the convoy had been held at Shirgah for more than twenty hours, a Soviet lieutenant ordered it to leave for Tehran within five minutes.

2. The commander of the Gendarme regiment at Rezaieh, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal, who is considered one of the best officers of the force, was a spectator at a New Year's celebration and parade in Tabriz. After the parade, the Soviet General commanding in Tabriz told the district Gendarme commander that Colonel Kemal had made a demonstration while the parade was passing, that he considered him a pro-Hitler fascist, and demanded that he be removed at once from the area. After discussing the matter with the Iranian Governor General, the district commander ordered Colonel Kemal to Tehran.

3. The commander of the third district, which includes Mazanderan, was ordered to proceed from Tehran to Mazanderan to look into a bad security and administrative situation. This officer, a brigadier general, was stopped by the Soviet post at Firuzkuh on May 5 and was only allowed to proceed late the following day after the chief of staff of the *Gendarmerie* had interceded with the Soviet military attaché in Tehran.

The foregoing, of course, does not exhaust the list of incidents of this kind. The Department will recall the affair at Shahi reported in my telegram No. 6 of January 4⁷⁴ and despatch No. 171 of January 5, 1945,⁷⁵ "Reported Soviet Interference with Iranian Gendarmes at Shahi."

Although prepared to intervene whenever it seems proper, the Embassy has taken no action with respect to the difficulties experienced with the Soviet authorities, primarily because the Iranian Government apparently prefers to overlook them and has not desired our intervention. It is apparent, however, that arbitrary Russian inter-

⁷⁴ *Ante*, p. 359.

⁷⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 360.

ference with the activities of Iranian security forces is, in effect, a negation of Iranian sovereignty over a substantial part of the country and violates the spirit, at least, of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1942. It is also to some extent an affront to the American mission which directs the *Gendarmerie* and an obstacle to the work of that mission.

So far as purely Iranian political interference is concerned, I have not judged the moment ripe as yet for any *démarche* on the part of the Embassy. However, if the case of the district commander of Kerman should be reopened and another order for his removal issued, I feel the Embassy might well discuss it with the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister and point out that the American Government does not wish its officers to be used as political cat's-paws and can find better uses for them elsewhere if they are not to be allowed to do their technical job in a technical, non-political, fashion.

[Here follows further discussion of political interference.]

Respectfully yours,

LELAND MORRIS

891.105A/5-2445 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, May 24, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received May 24—11 : 55 a. m.]

344. Agreement covering American Military Mission to Iranian *gendarmerie* expires Oct 2 and Colonel Boone Acting Chief of Mission feels decision regarding renewal should be made by early July to give time for necessary arrangements in case Mission is terminated.

Boone has informed Embassy he considers it useless to continue another year unless adequate cooperation obtained from Iran Govt. Program for full reorganization of *gendarmerie* was drawn up long ago and approved by proper administrative authorities but has come to standstill because basic legislation required has not been enacted by Majlis. Specifically Boone says 5 laws are essential.

[Here follows discussion of proposed legislative program.]

Besides legislative problems Mission is faced with increasing interference by Iranian politicians with personal ends to serve (Emb's despatch 292, May 12).

In view of foregoing Boone suggests Iran Govt be told agreement cannot be renewed and all supplies will be stopped unless definite assurances given legislative program will be passed and political interference stopped. He appreciates such assurances may be entirely

worthless since Govt unable control Majlis and subject to change without notice but feels this would give US Govt grounds for later withdrawal of Mission at any time if conditions fail to improve.

I concur in this and suggest Dept discuss it with Schwarzkopf who is in U.S.

WARD

891.105A/5-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iran (Ward)

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1945—6 p. m.

272. Urtel 344 May 24 and despatch 292 May 12. Question of renewal of *gendarmérie* agreement has been discussed with Schwarzkopf.⁷⁶

While Schwarzkopf favors renewal of agreement in spite of difficulties being encountered, he believes we should take advantage of apparent strong Iranian desire that mission continue to obtain assurances from Iranian Govt of more effective cooperation and of discontinuance of harmful political interference in *gendarmérie* affairs.

Dept agrees with this view and desires, subject to approval of Ambassador Murray on arrival,⁷⁷ that Embassy make it clear to Iranian Govt that agreement will be renewed only upon direct Iranian request and then only if satisfactory assurances are given that there will be more effective cooperation and less political interference.⁷⁸ Both Dept and Schwarzkopf believe War will concur in renewal if Dept recommends.

GREW

891.20 Missions/9-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1945—7 p. m.

510. Urtel 685, Sept. 4.⁷⁹ Termination of national emergency cannot be predicted at this time but Dept. has no reason to suppose that such a declaration is imminent.

⁷⁶ Discussion with Col. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Chief of the United States Military Mission to the Iranian *Gendarmerie*, took place on May 28.

⁷⁷ Ambassador Murray assumed charge of the Embassy in Iran on June 5. In telegram 465, July 6, 1945, 4 p. m., he reported that the Iranian Government had approved the addition of two officers to the Schwarzkopf Mission, thereby increasing its strength to eight officers and two enlisted men (891.105A/7-645).

⁷⁸ For further expression of Department's views on this matter, see telegram 379, July 25, 7 p. m., to Tehran, p. 553.

⁷⁹ Not printed; it inquired whether the termination of the Ridley and Schwarzkopf Missions, whose authorization by Congress was for the "duration of the war or declared national emergency", was imminent (891.20 Mission/9-445).

Dept. desires to retain U.S. military missions in Iran ⁸⁰ and is considering means by which this can be accomplished.

ACHESON

891.105A/9-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 24, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received September 24—10:23 a. m.]

756. As Schwarzkopf feels the continued work of his mission could not be successful without definite assurances of cooperation on part of Iran Govt he and I in interview with PriMin and MinFonAff ⁸¹ on Sept. 6 requested written assurances on a number of specific points including protection of the *gendarmerie* against political interferences, cooperation of army, adequate finances and passage of necessary legislation. Assurances were readily given on all these points and promise was made they would be confirmed by writing. To date this has not been done despite repeated requests by Embassy. I mentioned matter to Shah in interview Sept. 21 and hope action will be forthcoming within next few days. However, should Oct. 1 (date contract expires) pass without definite action, we must give urgent consideration to question of continuing mission.

MURRAY

891.105A/9-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 26, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received 1:35 p. m.]

770. Embtel 756, September 24. Foreign Office has replied to my request for written assurances of cooperation with *Gendarmerie* on specific points in following sense:

After referring to conference at which requests were made, note states Iranian Government agrees to reemployment of mission and this agreement necessarily involves according mission assistance necessary for success of its work. Iranian Government has consistently and in each case borne this matter in mind and in view of its interest

⁸⁰ In a memorandum of July 4, 1945, to Assistant Secretary of State (Holmes), the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) stated: "These missions are regarded by the Department as an important means of stabilizing Iranian internal affairs and restoring Iran's internal security forces. . . . The missions therefore play an important role in maintaining Iran's governmental authority and, accordingly, in safeguarding the country's sovereignty." (891.105A/7-445)

⁸¹ Anushiravan Sepahbodi.

in the establishment of the *Gendarmerie* and its use of Schwarzkopf's experience, it will not lose sight of matter.

Schwarzkopf considers this unsatisfactory and I agree that it is not what was desired. However, I have grave doubts on chances of getting more definite commitment and if Department wishes to continue mission despite personal views of Schwarzkopf it may wish to instruct me to renew agreement regardless of receipt of more satisfactory assurances. I consider continuation of mission of vital importance. I am seeing Prime Minister this evening and will again request desired commitment.

MURRAY

891.105A/9-2445: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray) ⁵²

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1945—8 p. m.

558. Urtel 756 Sept. 24. Unless you receive satisfactory Iranian assurances of support for *gendarmerie* mission and unless you and Schwarzkopf are fully satisfied with immediate and energetic steps taken in implementation of these assurances you are authorized, in your discretion, to inform Iranian Govt. that this Govt. has decided to terminate the *gendarmerie* mission forthwith.⁵³ War concurs.

Dept. regrets necessity of suggesting this action at this critical time in Iran but feels strongly that it is futile and undignified to permit the mission to continue under circumstances which give little hope of positive accomplishment or reflection of credit on this country.

ACHESON

⁵² In memorandum of September 26 to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson), the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) stated: "The attached telegram to Tehran suggests the advisability of withdrawing the *Gendarmerie* Mission, headed by Colonel Schwarzkopf, unless satisfactory assurances of support are received from the Iranians.

The Schwarzkopf Mission has been a good one, has contributed in a limited sense to Iranian stability and has reflected credit on this country. However, Iranian support has been so limited and Iranian political interference so objectionable that both Ambassador Murray and Schwarzkopf have come increasingly to feel that unless better cooperation and support are received there is no dignified or feasible course but to withdraw. The matter has become critical at this moment because the time for renewal of the contract expires on October 1.

We should regret seeing this mission withdrawn but feel there is no alternative unless the Iranians are willing to cooperate. However, there is a good chance that the Iranians, who keenly desire to have the mission remain, will give the assurances we desire and take action to put them into effect. Thus, this telegram may spur the Iranians into action. If not, we feel the mission should be terminated." (891.105A/9-2445)

⁵³ For expression of opinion on this matter by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, see his letter of September 27 to the Ambassador in Iran, p. 423.

891.105A/9-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 27, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received September 27—12: 17 p. m.]

775. Embtel 770 September 26. In conversation with Prime Minister last night I informed him assurances given on work of Schwarzkopf Mission were unsatisfactory. He agreed to prepare new reply and today Embassy received from FonOff communication in following sense:

The Prime Minister has written FonOff that the *aide-mémoire*,⁸⁴ outlining Schwarzkopf's conditions for the full success of his work and the steps necessary for the removal of his difficulties, has been accepted. The Prime Minister also writes that Iran Govt is greatly interested in success of work of *Gendarmerie* and perfection of its organization and will afford Schwarzkopf its utmost assistance in fulfillment of his duties.

While future Govts might conceivably claim this committed only present Prime Minister, I consider note satisfactory and unless instructed to contrary shall proceed with renewal of agreement for engagement of the mission.⁸⁵

MURRAY

891.20 Missions/10-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 1, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received October 1—10: 48 a. m.]

788. Embassy has exchanged notes with Foreign Office agreeing to one year's extension of agreement covering engagement of *gendarmerie* mission.⁸⁶

Schwarzkopf on September 29 had most satisfactory interview with Shah, details of which will be reported later.⁸⁷

MURRAY

⁸⁴ This refers to an undated *aide-mémoire* sent to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which summarized the conversation of the American Ambassador, Colonel Schwarzkopf and Colonel Boone with the Iranian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 6 and set forth Colonel Schwarzkopf's conditions for continuation of his mission. A copy was transmitted to the Department in despatch 359, April 25, 1946, not printed. (891.105A/4-2546)

⁸⁵ There is no evidence in Department files that a reply was sent to telegram 775.

⁸⁶ For texts of Iranian Foreign Office note 3619, September 27, 1945, and Embassy note 140, September 29, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 31, pp. 472 and 473, respectively.

⁸⁷ No record of report found in Department files. However, in telegram 817, October 9, 1945, 1 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran, in reporting discussions with the Shah on various questions on October 6, stated that the Shah "intended to make sure Schwarzkopf, whom he praised highly, should have free hand with *Gendarmerie* and would prevent any interference by Interior Ministry, Army or other agencies." (891.002/10-945)

891.20 Missions/8-2945

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The State Department has given extended and serious consideration, in consultation with representatives of the War Department, to the question of continuing and the problem of supplying the American Military Missions to the Iranian Army and *Gendarmerie*, referred to in your letter of August 29, 1945⁸⁸ and in Colonel Reid's memorandum of September 26, 1945.⁸⁹

The question of continuing indefinitely the Military Missions to Iran, as well as instituting similar missions to other countries, turns upon two factors: first, the authority, in terms of Congressional legislation, for the detail of such missions; and second, the desirability, in terms of national interests, of sending military missions to a specific country at a particular time.

Authority for the Missions to Iran derives from Section 540 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which contains the limiting phrase "during war or a declared national emergency." In view of the end of the war and the imminent termination of the declared national emergency, and the increasingly recognized need for American military missions to the Eastern Hemisphere in peacetime, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has recently approved amendatory legislation which will be presented for Congressional enactment in the near future. Such legislation would permit continuance of the Military Missions to Iran beyond the declared national emergency.

Continuance of the Military Missions to Iran, at the request of the Iranian Government, is considered to be in the national interest of the United States. Strengthening of Iran's internal security forces by the American Missions contributes to the stabilization of Iran and, thereby, to its reconstruction as a sound member of the international community. By increasing the ability of the Iranian Government to maintain order and security, it is hoped to remove any pretext for British or Soviet intervention in Iran's internal affairs and, accordingly, to remove such future threat to Allied solidarity and international security. The stabilization of Iran, moreover, will serve to lay a sound foundation for the development of American commercial, petroleum, and aviation interests in the Middle East.

The American Military Missions to Iran have, as the War Department indicated, experienced considerable difficulty in achieving their objectives. This has been due, principally, to the unwillingness or inability of the Iranian Government to provide the Missions with the

⁸⁸ Not printed; the letter was written by Mr. Patterson while he was Acting Secretary of War.

⁸⁹ Not printed; Col. A. D. Reid was Chief of the Liaison Section, Operations Division, War Department.

authority and support necessary to the accomplishment of their tasks. The Russian occupation of northern Iran has also added materially to the difficulties of the Missions.

Recent assurances given by the Iranian Government, together with the imminent evacuation of all foreign troops from Iran,⁹⁰ should permit the more complete accomplishment of the objectives of the Missions. On September 29, 1945, Colonel Schwarzkopf in Tehran informed Colonel Starbird⁹¹ in Washington that the American Ambassador "has obtained completely satisfactory documents from the Iranian Government, thus opening the way for renewal of the contract. Under these circumstances, additional instructions are unnecessary and the Mission will proceed as heretofore." On October 1, 1945, the Embassy advised the Department that Colonel Schwarzkopf had had "a most satisfactory interview with the Shah" and that notes had been exchanged with the Iranian Foreign Office agreeing to one year's extension of the contract covering the *Gendarmerie* Mission. This favorable situation will, however, be subject to constant reassessment by this Government, with the view to withdrawal of the Missions in the event that their presence in Iran no longer serves American national interests.

While the contracts controlling the two Missions can be terminated by this Government if it is considered desirable "in the public interest" of the United States, the Missions are presently committed to the following duration: The Schwarzkopf Mission, for one year beginning October 1, 1945, but not exceeding the declared national emergency; the Ridley Mission, for the period of the declared national emergency. As indicated above, proposed legislation would permit the continuation of the Missions in peacetime.

The problem of supplying both the Ridley and the Schwarzkopf Missions, now that their lend-lease source has been stopped, has reached the point of solution. Discussions between representatives of the War Department, the U.S. Commercial Company, and the State Department, have resulted in a tentative arrangement whereby the Iranian Government would purchase necessary supplies through the U.S. Commercial Company for dollars, cash in advance. Details of the arrangement are embodied in a message, copy attached, to the American Embassy in Tehran⁹² requesting the approval of Major General Ridley, Colonel Schwarzkopf, and appropriate Iranian authorities. You will note that, in the case of both present and prospective supply proposals, requirements will be initiated by the Missions, presented by

⁹⁰ For documentation on the desire of the United States to have all foreign troops evacuated from Iran, see pp. 359 ff.

⁹¹ Col. Alfred D. Starbird, Chief, European Section, Theater Group, Operations Division, War Department.

⁹² Telegram 576, October 11, 1945, 5 p. m., not printed.

the Iranian Government to the American Embassy in Tehran, and transmitted to the State Department for presentation to the U.S. Commercial Company. The only role of the War Department will be to assess the military appropriateness of the requirements and to supply such matériel as may be requested by USCC and available from Army stocks. On the basis of Tehran's reply to the attached message, the tentative arrangement will be formalized and implemented.

The State Department appreciates the great assistance provided by the War Department, in the detail of personnel and the supply of matériel, which has made the Military Missions effective instruments of American national policy in Iran.⁹³

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

891.105A/12-345

The Acting Secretary of State to Representative Karl E. Mundt, of South Dakota

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1945.

DEAR MR. MUNDT: I have received and examined with interest your letter of December 3, 1945,⁹⁴ concerning two American military missions, headed by Major General Clarence S. Ridley and Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, which are now assisting the Iranian Government in the organization of its army and *gendarmérie*.

The following information is in response to the specific inquiries contained in your letter:

(1) General Ridley and Colonel Schwarzkopf, with their respective staffs, are presently in Iran, continuing functions which they have been performing for the past two years or more. The missions which these two officers are directing are being maintained in accordance with agreements entered into between the Government of Iran and the Government of the United States. Copies of these agreements are attached.⁹⁵

(2) The *Gendarmerie* Mission became effective on October 2, 1942, for a minimum of two years. At the expiration of this period on October 2, 1944, the agreement was extended and is at present valid until

⁹³ The reply by the Secretary of War on October 24 reads: "I have your letter of 17 October 1945 concerning the continuance of the American Military Missions to the Iranian Army and the *Gendarmerie*, and their supply. The War Department concurs in the continuance of these Missions during the declared national emergency, in view of their desirability in the national interest of the United States. I agree that constant reassessment of their value will be necessary.

If the active support and cooperation recently promised by the Iranians is forthcoming, it is to be expected that the Missions will be able to achieve the objectives desired." (891.20 Missions/10-2445)

⁹⁴ Not printed; for text, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 91, pt. 9, p. 11364.

⁹⁵ Agreement signed at Tehran on November 3, 1943, not published; for text of agreement on *gendarmérie* mission, signed at Tehran on November 27, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 361, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1262.

October 2, 1946, unless the termination of the national emergency brings an end to the mission earlier. The Military Mission became effective on March 22, 1943, for the duration of the war or declared national emergency. Both of the agreements are subject to termination at any time by either Government on three months' notice. Under existing United States legislation, both agreements will terminate automatically with the end of the national emergency. Consequently, existing arrangements do not project the functions of the missions into the normal peace-time era.

The agreements for these two missions were made at the instigation and initiative of the Government of Iran, not of any agency of the American Government. The Department of State, however, considered it appropriate to support the efforts of the Iranian Government to obtain competent advisers to assist in improving the Iranian army and *gendarmarie*, and consequently recommended to the War Department that the Iranian request for these missions be granted.

(3) The Department of State has been considering, in consultation with the War and Navy Departments, a suggested amendment to existing legislation which would enable the President of the United States, whenever he considers it to be in the national interest, to enter into an agreement with any foreign government for the establishment and maintenance of American military missions similar to those which have been maintained in other countries in the Western Hemisphere during recent years and which are at present maintained in Iran under the direction of General Ridley and Colonel Schwarzkopf. It is expected that the considered views of the Departments of State, War and Navy in this matter will be sent to Congress in the near future.

There has been no consultation with other Powers to determine whether they would approve of the maintenance of American military missions in countries adjacent to them. As regards the missions in Iran, we have no reason to believe that there has been any objection to their maintenance or their activities.

(4) Any American republic is free on its own initiative to request from any country in the world such assistance as the Government of Iran requested of the United States. In this connection, it should be noted that, while for a number of years the United States, in response to requests of most of the American republics, has provided military advisers and missions under contract for terms of service, various American countries have, in the past, requested and received military advisers and missions from European countries. This Government has consistently taken the position that such requests are entirely the responsibility of each of the American states that might be concerned, and for this Government to take an adverse position respecting such decisions would be contrary to the principles both of the United Nations and of the inter-American system.

The Department is convinced that one of the effective contributions which the United States can make to world peace is through the granting of professional assistance to friendly countries which request our help in improving the organization and efficiency of their agencies charged with the maintenance of law and order. With particular reference to Iran, the technical assistance which we are giving to the Iranian Government is in accord with that policy. With particular reference to the American republics, which as is well known have close bonds of collaboration in all fields, this Government in the future will, as it has in the past, consider most sympathetically requests from such republics for any technical assistance designed to facilitate the military collaboration fundamental to the reciprocal assistance measures of the kind envisaged by the Act of Chapultepec.⁹⁶

(5) As regards your suggestion that various Great Powers might agree to establish joint military missions to give smaller countries the counsel and military leadership they require, the policy of this Government has been, and continues to be, that no country should be urged against its will to receive foreign military advisers which the country itself has not sought. If Iran or any other country which felt itself in need of a military mission should request a joint mission made up of American personnel and the personnel of any foreign Power or group of Powers, the Department of State would be glad to give sympathetic consideration to any such request which might be received.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

TERMINATION OF THE MILLSPAUGH MISSION⁹⁷

891.51A/1-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 8, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received January 9—5:30 p. m.]

18. Medjliss⁹⁸ today passed bill⁹⁹ canceling as of this date the special economic powers granted Millspaugh¹ by the law of 13 Ord-

⁹⁶ This agreement between the United States and other American Republics, contained in the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, was signed at Mexico City on March 8, 1945. For text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1543, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1831.

⁹⁷ For previous documentation on the activities of this mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 510 ff., *passim*.

⁹⁸ The Iranian Parliament.

⁹⁹ Text transmitted to the Department in despatch 177, January 12, 1945, from Tehran, not printed.

¹ Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh, American Administrator General of the Finances in the Iranian Government.

behesht.² Council of Ministers is authorized to dissolve or reallocate the economic organizations which were under Millspaugh administration by virtue of that law and to annul change or retain all regulations issued thereunder.

Cabinet is directed to create high consultative committee for economic affairs to prepare within 3 months an economic plan in conformity with the needs of the country.

Vote on bill was 69 to 6.

Repeated to Cairo for AEMME³ and Hoskins.⁴

MORRIS

891.51A/1-1145: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 11, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received January 12—2:10 p. m.]

22. Reference Embassy's telegram, No. 18, January 8. As an interim arrangement Prime Minister⁵ has stated he will designate Black⁶ to assume administrative control under Council of Ministers of all economic powers abrogated by recent law. Under Black's supervision each administration will be headed by an Iranian with an American advisor to assist in operation appointed by Prime Minister. This is purely a stop-gap measure to meet the situation resulting from abrogation of Millspaugh's powers and the early establishment of a new ministry variously termed Ministry of Economy, Ministry of National Economy, et cetera within which would be incorporated the economic functions taken away from Millspaugh.

With the establishment of this new Ministry the Prime Minister states new contracts will be drawn up covering services of any Americans who may be included in such Ministry. While foregoing has thus far only been made orally by Prime Minister, he has promised to incorporate each of these measures in a letter today to Dr. Black.

Black states he has accepted this interim responsibility subject to receipt of Prime Minister's letter, but that for any subsequent long

² For substance of the law of 13 Ordibehesht, 1322 (May 4, 1943), see telegram 386, April 14, 1943, 5 p. m., from Tehran, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 522. The text was transmitted to the Department in despatch 556, May 20, 1943, from Tehran (not printed), and has been published by Dr. Millspaugh in his *Americans in Persia* (Brookings Institution, 1946), p. 273.

³ American Economic Mission in the Middle East.

⁴ Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Adviser on Economic Affairs, with the rank of Counselor, at Legation in Egypt; assigned concurrently to Missions in Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.

⁵ Morteza Qoli Bayat.

⁶ Albert G. Black, Deputy Administrator of the Finances and Chief Administrator of the Cereals and Bread Section of the American Financial Mission to Iran.

range appointment he will only be satisfied with a clear cut strongly worded contract. He states that during an interview this afternoon with Millspaugh the Doctor interposed no objection to the new arrangement.

Black further states that at Prime Minister's request he is submitting on or before January 14 a plan of organization covering all economic functions of the Government.

MORRIS

891.51A/1-1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 17, 1945—10 a. m.
[Received January 18—12:40 p. m.]

30. In a letter to Prime Minister dated January 13, 1945⁷ Millspaugh has stated that unless Iranian Government acts on dismissal of Ebtelahaj⁸ from Bank Melli on or before January 23, 1945 he, Millspaugh, will consider that his contract has been broken by the Government and that such breach of contract has terminated his employment in Iran. He adds that in event of such termination he hopes that the Government will agree to a prompt and equitable settlement of his contract in accordance with article 7 of the law of 21 Aban, 1321.⁹

MORRIS

891.51A/1-1945: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 19, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received 4:40 p. m.]

37. ReEmbs 22, January 11. Prime Minister has failed to fulfill informal understanding with Black regarding latter's interim position as Supervisor of Economic Organizations. Instead of delivering letter of confirmation which he promised, Bayat has attempted to persuade him to act in purely advisory capacity without any authority at all. Black has refused and submitted his resignation. This leaves economic side of Millspaugh group without a head.

⁷ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Iran in despatch 181, January 17, 1945; not printed.

⁸ Abol Hassan Ebtelahaj, Director General of the Banque Mellie Iran, the National Bank of Iran.

⁹ With regard to the passage of this law on November 12, 1942, see telegram 372, November 12, 1942, 4 p. m., from Tehran, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, p. 261. The text of the law is printed in Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia*, p. 269.

Shields, Hurst and Breitenbach¹⁰ have left Road Transport Administration in protest against appointment of Iranian as chief of organization. Shields says Prime Minister assured him he would be left in charge for the time being. All three are preparing to return to United States although Shields says he is willing to return to work and help out for a time if so requested by Bayat.

LeCount has resigned as Treasurer General primarily because he considers attitude of Ebtehaj makes it impossible for him to do effective work but also for reasons of health.

Vivian and Murray¹¹ have also resigned and other members of mission are debating whether to follow suit.

Bayat is holding conference after conference with so-called economic experts mostly ex-Cabinet Ministers to devise formula for continuation economic activities of government but there is no sign that he is nearing decision or that whatever plan emerges will give satisfactory positions of authority to the Americans.

Since situation is developing contrary to assurances given me by Bayat and Entezam¹² that action against Millspaugh would not affect mission as a whole I am seeking first opportunity to discuss it with them and shall report results.

MORRIS

891.51A/1-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 19, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received January 19—5:20 p. m.]

39. ReEmbs 30, January 17. Bayat has written Millspaugh sharp reply¹³ to his letter regarding Ebtehaj dispute. Prime Minister flatly rejects Millspaugh demand that Ebtehaj be removed or at least suspended and suggests that if Millspaugh still insists he should have matter referred to Majlis through Finance Minister.¹⁴

As yet Millspaugh who has been ill for several days has said nothing to me regarding his plans in light of this development.

MORRIS

¹⁰ Floyd F. Shields, Director General of the Road Transport Administration of the American Financial Mission to Iran; John L. Hurst, Director of the Division of Transportation and Maintenance; and Edward V. Breitenbach, Director of the Division of Administration.

¹¹ Rex Vivian, Director General of the Administration of General Inspection, and Bradley Murray, Assistant to Rex A. Pixley, Deputy Administrator General of the Finances and Director General of Accounts and Audits, of the American Financial Mission in Iran.

¹² Nasrollah Entezam, Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹³ Dated January 18. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Iran in despatch 185, January 24, 1945; neither printed.

¹⁴ Amanollah Ardalan.

891.51A/1-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, January 24, 1945—noon.

[Received 1:45 p. m.]

50. I had a long conversation with the Foreign Minister and with reference to the last paragraph of my No. 37 of January 19, insistently requested that he clarify, together with the Prime Minister, the situation of the American advisers who have been working in the economic field. I reminded him of the previous assurances given by the Prime Minister and by himself to me that the mission per se would not be destroyed. I told him that I was unable to understand the delay in issuing the necessary letters of authority to Dr. Black and his colleagues which the Prime Minister had agreed to. I derived the impression that Entezam was also nonplussed as to the failure of the Prime Minister to carry out his promises to Dr. Black and the other advisers to arm them with proper authority. He promised immediate consultation with Prime Minister and an endeavor to settle the matter along the lines desired by Dr. Black and his colleagues and supported by me.

Parliament is going to be asked to take a decision on the Ebtehaj-Millspaugh controversy. The necessary steps are being taken by the Minister of Finance and it may be expected that the matter will reach Parliament in a day or two. The submission of this question to Parliament is being done at the instance of Prime Minister Bayat. It appears to be in accordance with a clause in Millspaugh's contract which provides for the reference to Parliament for decision of disputes between Millspaugh and the Government. The Foreign Minister at my request has said that the discussion in the Majlis would be held in secret. The Department, of course, understands that this is to avoid undesirable publicity and newspaper controversy.

I have had several lengthy conversations with Dr. Millspaugh in the last few days, but he blows hot and he blows cold and I do not know what he intends to do. My personal impression is that he is considerably beaten down by all his difficulties and disputes and he is certainly not in a state of vigor. I am talking to him again right away.

Entezam told me that the Government had requested Millspaugh several days ago verbally to remain in his functions as Administrator General of Finance. However, he added that Millspaugh's attitude was noncommittal.

MORRIS

891.51A/2-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, February 3, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 9:14 p. m.]

70. On January 27 Millspaugh made oral statement to Council of Ministers that he would leave Iran unless 1) Ebtehaj were dismissed from National Bank 2) All economic organizations created under law of 13 Ordibehesht and now under control of Cabinet were placed unchanged under Minister of Finance 3) Cabinet would give firm assurances of cooperation in a long list of matters including improvement of efficiency in Ministries of Justice, Commerce and Agriculture. Millspaugh expects Cabinet make decision on this within week as time allotted by Majlis for reorganization of economic affairs expires February 8.

In a letter to me dated January 29, Millspaugh makes following assertions.

1. Recent policy of Iranian Government has virtually halted all emergency economic operations and has seriously affected financial work of American Mission.

2. Efforts of various elements to eliminate Millspaugh and disrupt mission have been partially successful and threaten to be wholly so. These efforts are not motivated by dissatisfaction with Millspaugh personally but by selfish desire to profit through removal of mission's power to enforce honest, sound and impartial administration.

3. If Millspaugh himself is forced out rest of mission will lose its authority and unity and will be helpless.

Even if an American successor is appointed with same financial powers he will be in weaker position.

4. In view of Iranian mentality the deterioration in the position of the mission cannot be remedied by yielding, by compromise nor by an exchange of general assurances. Therefore it is desirable that American Government make strong representations to Iranian Government to have Millspaugh's conditions accepted or at least to block action which might prevent ultimate acceptance of those conditions pending study of question by Embassy.

5. Millspaugh complains that he has not had adequate indications in recent months regarding Department's purposes with respect to mission. He considers attempt to distinguish between himself and mission as a whole is harmful and lends encouragement to mission's opponents. He likewise deplors and considers harmful our position that his differences with Iranians are an internal affair and not proper subject for American intervention. *End summary.*

Text of letter follows by dispatch.¹⁵

¹⁵ Text of letter and of memorandum of statement made by Dr. Millspaugh to the Iranian Council of Ministers on January 27 transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Iran in despatch 192, February 3, 1945; none printed.

I believe this letter provides both an opportunity and a reason for Department to take a positive stand one way or the other with regard to continuance of American Financial Mission. Department's 623, October 17,¹⁶ envisaged possible notification to Millspaugh of withdrawal of our support but left matter open pending anticipated action by Iranians. I have withheld action because it appeared Iranian Government would itself resolve difficulty on reasonably satisfactory basis. However, trend of recent events strongly indicates that whatever steps Iranians may take will neither satisfy Millspaugh nor enable mission to carry on effectively without him. My conversation with Entezam reported my 50, January 24, has proven as barren of results as previous and subsequent talks with other leaders. I have little hope that Cabinet will take any decision acceptable to advisers.

It seems most probable that Cabinet will reject Millspaugh demands summarized in first paragraph this telegram. If he carries out his threat to depart, which is doubtful, that will settle his personal problem but will leave rest of mission in air. Prime Minister's recent actions contrary to his earlier assurances give no grounds to think that he would make satisfactory offer to Pixley or any one else who might be available to replace Millspaugh and I would expect a more or less rapid disintegration of the group.

(As Department is aware such disintegration has already begun. Pixley himself has given notice of resignation effective in 4 months.) If Millspaugh stays without gaining his demands present impossible situation will merely be prolonged. State of tension between Millspaugh and Government is such that little or nothing is being accomplished and prospects for improvement are dim. I do not think Millspaugh can reestablish situation in face of repeated rebuffs, the violent opposition which has manifested itself and his own shortcomings. Continuation of present controversy would be harmful to everyone concerned and United States would suffer loss in reputation without even satisfaction of accomplishing anything for the good of Iran.

As I see it we have two alternatives as follows :

1. We can take a strong line with Iranian Government and insist upon retention of an American mission with adequate powers and full Iranian cooperation making it clear that disregard of our wishes would result in loss of interest on our part in Iran affairs. If this course were adopted we should offer to provide a top flight replacement for Millspaugh if the Iranians wished.

2. We can advise Millspaugh and other members of mission we are not prepared to support his demands and furthermore we feel no useful purpose will be served by continuance of mission as a unit in view

¹⁶ Not printed ; but see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 430, footnote 36.

of attitude of Iranian Government. Simultaneously we can advise Iranian Government that its actions as distinguished from its words indicate that it no longer desires an effective American mission and we think it best that the mission as such be dissolved. Therefore we will no longer lend assistance in connection with recruiting transportation or other matters affecting it (this need not exclude continued employment by Iranian Government of such individuals as might be willing to stay on under whatever arrangements they could make personally). I am inclined to favor second alternative. To adopt the first would mean a reversal of our consistent policy of refusing to force advisers upon Iran and would unquestionably be seized upon by press and public as evidence of American imperialism at its worst. I am convinced that no influential group in Iran at present sincerely desires foreign financial or economic advisers. Those who still give half-hearted support to the mission such as Seyid Zia ed-Din¹⁷ do so because they want American political support for Iran not because they want Americans to help with internal difficulties. If there exists any inarticulate mass which really wants advisers it is so deeply buried that it cannot be counted as a factor in practical politics.

Unless situation clarifies itself which I think unlikely I feel we should be prepared to act within 2 weeks. May I ask therefore that Department give this urgent consideration. If an affirmative decision is taken either way I hope Department will instruct me to communicate it to Millspaugh as coming from Department.

MORRIS

891.51A/2-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, February 6, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received February 6—12: 44 p. m.]

73. Prime Minister has refused to accept Millspaugh demands reported my 70, February 3, and states if Millspaugh insists upon them as condition for continuing work, Government will regard this as constituting resignation and will take steps to terminate his contract.

Millspaugh is undecided regarding course to follow. He is on leave and says his only present plan is to delay final action by extending his leave. Contrary to press reports he has not resigned. He feels, however, that Government's action leaves him almost no alternative to resignation unless there is change of Cabinet or strong support is forthcoming from Department. He hopes for latter but says he is willing to cooperate in any line of action Department thinks desirable. Department will recall, however, that Millspaugh often says one thing and does another.

¹⁷ Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai, prominent Iranian politician and member of the Majlis.

The Doctor appears discouraged and apparently realizes magnitude of obstacles facing him. Among them he cites anti-foreign feeling among Iranians on which point I emphatically agree so far as it relates to foreign advisers. This feeling is growing and finding open expression even among Iranians friendly to America.

Millspaugh today suggested that if Department is not prepared to make strong *démarche* on his behalf, it might be best for entire Mission to withdraw [apparent garble] believes as do I that his own removal will be followed by Iranian action to reduce remainder of Mission to impotence. Bayat has indicated that if the Doctor leaves, he will ask one of other Americans to take his place but I think it unlikely in view of present Iranian attitude that any satisfactory agreement as to powers could be reached or that sufficient cooperation would be extended even if agreement were arrived at between the advisers and the Cabinet. I think this development makes early reply to my 70 doubly urgent. Millspaugh conveys impression he is primarily awaiting statement of Department's attitude.

MORRIS

891.51A/2-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, February 8, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 12:46 p. m.]

79. Following message from Millspaugh is transmitted at his urgent request for attention of Secretary and Wallace Murray:¹⁸

"It has been understood that the Department is interested in extending assistance to Iran through American missions equipped to function effectively. If this understanding is still permissible it would seem to be extremely advisable to take the necessary measures to maintain the *status quo* and to prevent serious changes to and in the mission until the new Ambassador¹⁹ has had time to study the situation. If it is desired to alter the legal basis, the set-up or the composition of [the Mission, such alterations] will be difficult to introduce or control when the mission has already lost its authority, prestige and unity. The situation of the mission has now reached a critical and perhaps final stage. As conditions for my staying I asked the Iranian Government to take certain actions and to give assurances regarding its policies and attitudes in the future. These proposals have been rejected. I consider them essential to the future prestige and success of the mission. If the Iranian Government does not change its stand I can see no possibility or use of our re-

¹⁸ Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

¹⁹ Wallace Murray was appointed Ambassador to Iran on February 20, 1945, but did not present his credentials and assume charge of the Embassy until June 5.

maining. It is barely possible that a satisfactory adjustment permitting the reestablishment of the mission at least temporarily may be reflected through a change of cabinet or by action of the Majlis. But without strong representations by the American Government a temporary adjustment is improbable. Will the Department make such representations? This information is essential for determining my future action and should in all events reach me within 10 days. If I am not informed, I shall be compelled to assume that the question of my leaving or remaining with its important bearing on the future of the mission, is not considered to be any longer a matter of interest to the Department.”²⁰

MORRIS

891.51A/2-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, February 9, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received February 10—1:45 p. m.]

85. Millspaugh today belatedly admitted to me what I had previously seen stated in local press, namely, that on February 5 he wrote Prime Minister saying he was preparing to depart and asking Government to terminate contract by payment of salary through third year of his employment. (Incredibly Millspaugh maintained to me that this did not constitute resignation.) Last night Bayat sent word to Millspaugh that Finance Minister had been instructed to let him write his own terms of settlement.

Yesterday Bayat gave Majlis full account of his recent correspondence with Millspaugh which has been voluminous. In substance he stated Government had refused to grant Millspaugh demands, had accepted his resignation and would choose a successor from among Americans now in Iran. Although no formal bill or resolution was presented and no vote was taken Majlis made its emphatic approval of Government's course entirely clear.

When he came to see me this morning, Millspaugh was evidently shaken by fact that no voice had been raised in his defense in Majlis. Main points of our conversation were

(1) He asked me to go to the Shah²¹ and request that all action regarding his position be postponed temporarily on ground that it was essential to arrange for transfer of his powers to a successor before his departure. I refused saying transfer of powers required Majlis action and if it wished Majlis could act just as well in his absence.

²⁰ In telegram 82, February 9, 1945, 9 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran stated; "I do not share the view implied in Millspaugh's message that a change in Cabinet or Majlis action may improve his position. A Cabinet change is improbable and in any case it is most doubtful that new Cabinet would be more favorably disposed. Majlis now appears definitely hostile." (891.51A/2-945)

²¹ Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.

(2) He wanted to know whether Department would back him up. I said I knew Department was not prepared to give him personally the kind of support he had in mind. The Embassy had already advised Iranian Government that decision regarding his employment was one for Iranians alone to make and I had no reason to think there would be any change in this attitude. Millspaugh said that if this was the case he could see nothing to do except settle his contract and depart.

(3) He said various members of mission had been asking his advice regarding their own course of action and he had been advising them to get out if he himself left. He felt he had a duty to warn his subordinates against dangers they might run by remaining in view of uncertain conditions and unfavorable Iranian attitude. I said I disagreed entirely with this point of view. Department had expressed definite wish that mission as a whole should not depart even though Millspaugh should leave. Members of mission were capable of making their own decisions. I spoke emphatically because I had distinct impression Millspaugh was motivated by desire to destroy whole structure since he was himself being forced out.

I gave Millspaugh no encouragement to hope for assistance from the American Government so far as he personally was concerned and I expressed myself perhaps more plainly than on previous occasions. In doing so I of course had in mind Department's earlier instructions especially telegrams Nos. 604 and 623 of October 5 and 17.²² I believed it unnecessary and inadvisable to await further instructions since Millspaugh's personal position is hopeless. Whatever else may happen it will be best for all parties to have him withdraw immediately.

MORRIS

891.51A/2-345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1945—6 p. m.

65. Dept agrees that it is advisable to make clear its attitude with regard to the position of our civilian advisers in Iran in the light of recent developments and to seek clarification of Iranian Government's intentions. First alternative given in urtel 70, February 3 is

²² Neither printed; No. 604 gave the Department's analysis of difficulties encountered by the American Financial Mission in Iran and concluded: "The Department is inclined to believe that it would be remiss if it did not inform Dr. Millspaugh now, in all frankness, that should any occasion arise for requesting the Department's support in connection with his employment by the Iranian Government, the Department would not feel justified in lending such support. The Department would make it clear that this policy, which it has adopted reluctantly but definitely, in no way implied a lack of appreciation for his devotion to duty and sincerity of purpose." (891.51A/10-544) No. 623 stated: "It might be preferable for the question of Dr. Millspaugh's continued employment by the Iranian Government to be acted on by the Iranian authorities without any action by Dept which might be alleged as interference." (891.51A/10-1144)

inconsistent with our policy of providing assistance only upon request and would be interpreted as an attempt to force a program upon Iran. Your second alternative is contrary to the controlling reasons for American participation in the advisory program. We should neither attempt to force a course of action upon the Iranian Government nor precipitate the withdrawal of Iran's request for advisory assistance. Our objective should be twofold: (1) to demonstrate to the Iranian Government the economic and political desirability of a continuance of an advisory program; and (2) to obtain a clarification of Iranian purposes and specific guarantees of their fulfillment.

In view of your impression that Millspaugh is awaiting statement of Department's attitude (urtel 73, February 6), and in reply to Millspaugh's message contained in urtel 79, February 8, you are instructed to inform him substantially as follows:

Begin message to Millspaugh. Dept recognizes the magnitude of the task which he undertook as Administrator-General of the Finances of Iran and appreciates his considerable efforts in this connection. We regret the recurring difficulties which have arisen between him and his staff on the one hand and between him and the Iranian Government on the other. His demonstrated inability to concert his efforts with those of his associates and to maintain good relations with the Iranian Government makes it impracticable for Dept to support him in his current controversy, particularly in view of our belief that the instant difficulty is an internal matter which is within the exclusive competence of the Iranian Government to resolve. Since the Prime Minister has refused to accept the conditions under which Millspaugh would agree to retain his position, as stated to the Council of Ministers on January 27, it is assumed that Millspaugh is prepared to resign. *End of message to Millspaugh.*

In pursuance of the objectives indicated above, you are instructed to inform the Foreign Minister substantially as follows: Dept views with concern the recent deterioration of conditions under which the work of the American financial advisers to the Iranian Government is carried on and the consequent anomalous situation. Dept does not question the considerations which led the Prime Minister to refuse the conditions proposed by Dr. Millspaugh to the Council of Ministers on January 27, and believes that the points in dispute are internal matters within the competence of the Iranian Government to resolve. At the same time, Dept observes a regrettable lack of clarity in the policy presently being pursued by the Iranian Government with regard to the financial and economic advisory program as a whole. It is especially unfortunate that certain general assurances given Ambassador Morris with regard to the continuance of the adviser program and certain specific assurances given Dr. Black

and other advisers have not been implemented with specific action by the Iranian Government. Conditions have become so confused and program so uncertain as to have caused the resignation of a number of the advisers and the threat of resignation by others. It is hoped that the Iranian Government will take immediate action, in case it sincerely desires to retain an American advisory program, to clarify the status of the various advisers and to give them and this Government assurances that conditions will be created which will permit their continuance on a basis which will give hope of success.

In formulating its policy with regard to the advisers, the Iranian Government will be aware that this Government is actuated solely by desire to be of assistance to Iran in fulfillment of the pledges given at the time of the Tehran Conference²³ and in keeping with the unbroken traditional friendship existing between our two countries.²⁴

GREW

891.51A/2-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, February 15, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received February 16—1:38 p. m.]

102. The expression of the Department's views on the financial mission has been very helpful. I am obliged to have received its telegram No. 65 of February 10.

Just prior to the receipt of the Department's instruction, things took a turn somewhat for the better. I had continued to talk both to the active officials and to those persons of influence not for the moment in the Government. On February 11 the Council of Ministers finally authorized in writing the appointment Mr. Rex Pixley and Dr. Black as administrators of the Ministry of Finance directly respon-

²³ For text of Declaration Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943, by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 413; for documentation regarding efforts by the United States in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 306 ff.

²⁴ In telegram 101, February 15, 1945, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran stated: "In accordance with the Department's wishes I delivered to Dr. Millspaugh a letter containing the Department's comments to him as contained in its No. 65 of February 10. I have received no acknowledgment and no reaction from Millspaugh to this letter." The Ambassador also reported that the Iranian Government had offered a settlement to Dr. Millspaugh which "is reasonable and in substantial accord with the settlement requested by Dr. Millspaugh. In fact, it is somewhat more generous than that. I am also satisfied that this settlement is in keeping with my frequently reiterated request that if the government decided to dispense with Millspaugh's services that he be treated personally on an equitable basis." (891.51A/2-1545) There is no indication in the Department files of the exact date of Dr. Millspaugh's resignation. In his *Americans in Persia*, Dr. Millspaugh states his resignation took effect on February 15, 1945 (pp. 151-152). In telegram 132, February 28, 1945, 4 p. m., the Ambassador in Iran reported that Dr. Millspaugh left Tehran "this morning". (891.51A/2-2845)

sible to the Minister of Finance. The financial administration has been divided into two sections, one under Dr. Black and the other under Mr. Pixley.²⁵ Pixley is charged principally with accounts and audits, exchange, internal revenue, personnel, bank administration and customs. Dr. Black is charged with monopolies, public domains, industrial supervision, general inspection and some subordinate duties. The respective administrators are charged with the signature of correspondence to directors general, provincial finance directors and to subordinate departments and establishments of the Ministry of Finance. Letters to the court, to the Majlis and to members of the Majlis will be signed by the Minister or Under Minister of Finance. Correspondence pertaining to the foreign relationship of Iran, policy letters and letters to banks dealing with general credits are to be signed by the Minister of Finance or the Under Secretary. All other correspondence is to be signed by one of the administrators on behalf of the Minister of Finance. Provision is made for the two administrators to initial minutes recommending the issuance of correspondence over the signature of the Minister of Finance. The operation of this provision will show very quickly just to what extent the American administrators are going to be given authority. It enables them to make recommendations directly to the Minister of Finance and his action thereon will show how far the administrators are really being consulted in the carrying out of the work with which they have been officially charged.

Black and Pixley have accepted in principle to serve under the appointments offered them. The other members of the mission show a disposition to remain here. I hope to obtain their full recognition and cooperation for Black and Pixley.

I left with the Foreign Minister an *aide-mémoire* in the sense of the instruction contained in the Department's No. 65 of February 10. The Foreign Minister expressed his great satisfaction with the general tone of the Department's communication. He was particularly gratified to be informed that the Department considered the dispute between the Government of Iran and Dr. Millspaugh as a domestic matter within the sole competence of the Iranian authorities and that the Department did not question the reasons which brought the Iranian Government to reject Dr. Millspaugh's demands submitted to the Cabinet on January 27.

The Foreign Minister admitted readily enough that the assurances given me had not been carried out and that the whole program had fallen into a state of confusion after the Parliament had rescinded the economic powers of Dr. Millspaugh. He asserted that the delay in

²⁵ Mr. Pixley was appointed Chief Administrator of section 1 and Dr. Black Chief Administrator of section 2 of the Iranian Ministry of Finance.

straightening out matters had been principally due to the legal obstacles involved. It was for such reasons that the Prime Minister found he could not pass on to Dr. Black the economic authorities which he had proposed to give the latter. After legal study it was found that the Council of Ministers did possess the authority to delegate through the Minister of Finance the financial administrative powers to Dr. Black and to Mr. Pixley which have been mentioned above.

I had a lengthy and earnest talk with the Foreign Minister who reiterated once more that it had been the intention of the Prime Minister and his associates to continue an effective adviser program and that at no time had the intention of the Government been otherwise. He admitted that the procedure had been badly bungled but said that they were doing their best within their legal limitations to preserve the entity of the mission as such and hoped for the cooperation of the advisers and the influence of the Embassy to that end. I assured him that the Embassy and the State Department desired wholeheartedly to be of assistance in this respect and I felt reasonably confident that the American members of the Mission would lend their best efforts if they felt confident of support and reasonable elbow room in the carrying out of their duties. He accepted my suggestion that Pixley and Black should be given an oral expression of confidence by the Minister of Finance and by other appropriate members of the Cabinet.

I pointed out to him in as much detail as I possess the deterioration which has set in in the economic aspects of the Iranian Government's business due to the sudden withdrawal of Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers and the failure to provide promptly and efficiently for the continuance of these powers in some form or other. The Foreign Minister agreed with my viewpoint that it was impracticable to divorce the financial and economic fields entirely. He pointed out that nevertheless it was quite certain that the Parliament would never again vote to an individual the extensive economic powers granted to Dr. Millspaugh, whether that individual be Iranian or a foreigner. I advanced the suggestion that the economic controls might possibly be maintained administratively by the Minister of Finance. The Foreign Minister said he thought this idea had practical value and he would urge it upon the Council of Ministers. I pointed out that if the Cabinet and the Minister of Finance would allow Pixley and Black to maintain their men on economic controls as hitherto that effective exercise of these controls might be continued to the advantage of the Ministry of Finance and the collection of revenues. The Foreign Minister thought the justification for this administrative control could be found within the general scope of the powers of the Cabinet of Ministers and of specific powers of the Minister of Finance.

If this course is carried out with good will, I believe it offers a chance to keep the Financial Mission going in a manner helpful to the Iranian state. The Foreign Minister shared my view that form and procedure was less of a stumbling block than the spirit in which the work of the advisers was accepted. It is of course too early to say whether anything effective can be accomplished but I am at least hopeful that an adhesion by the Iranian officials to the administrative program outlined above offers some chance of success.

The letter of appointment of Black and Pixley and related documents follow by mail.²⁶

MORRIS

891.51A/7-345: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 3, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received July 3—8:45 a. m.]

452. Mytel 382, June 7.²⁷ I have continued to have conversations with members of American financial advisory group and am also sounding out leading Iranians regarding general attitude toward continuance and strengthening of mission. Among these latter is Finance Minister Bader, and I hope to have further talk with him and with others before making definite recommendations. In all conversations I have made clear my opinion that success of American Mission in rehabilitating economy of Iran is more important now than ever before because of grave effect collapse of Iran into chaos could have on its international position. I have also mentioned desire of United States to implement section of Tehran Declaration dealing with economic assistance to Iran.

[Here follow account of a schism within the ranks of the advisers, and Mr. Murray's request that consideration be given "to secure services of outstanding executive and leader for perhaps 3 to 6 months work in Iran to put mission on its feet."]

MURRAY

891.51A/7-945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1945—7 p. m.

379. Urtel 473 July 9.²⁷ We have given careful consideration to your suggestion of bringing in from abroad some disinterested and

²⁶ Despatch 208, February 17, not printed.

²⁷ Not printed.

highly qualified man such as Landis²⁹ to survey the Mission and to make suggestions for its reorganization. We are inclined to believe however that in view of what has occurred during the last 2 years it would be impossible to erect an effective advisory structure on what remains of this Mission.

It seems to us that for the last year at least the Mission has drifted aimlessly and futilely. The basic factor which has militated against its success has been the failure of the Iranian Government to implement its repeated assurances (Deptel 65, February 10, 1945 and urtels 37, Jan. 19; 50, Jan. 24; 102, Feb. 16 [15]) that the Mission would be accorded full cooperation and support. We are inclined to agree with the statements made by prominent Iranians that so long as Iran is occupied by foreign troops and so long as the representatives of great powers interfere in Iranian internal affairs, it will not be possible for a strong central government to exist in Iran. No weak government would have the character or the courage in the face of certain opposition to give unqualified support to the Mission. However, we feel that even with the full support and cooperation of the Iranian Government the Mission would not be able in the future to function effectively in view of the irreparable damage which has already been done to its prestige. The fact should also not be overlooked that certain members of the Mission, by their pettiness, incapacity, and sometimes even by their misbehavior, have contributed to the discrediting of the Mission.

We feel that the time has come to inform the Iranian Government that in our opinion the Mission will not be able in the future to be of effective assistance to Iran and to suggest that the Iranian Government take steps at once to bring about its complete withdrawal. In making such an approach it may be pointed out it is our belief that the presence of the Mission in Iran under prevailing circumstances would be prejudicial rather than beneficial to American-Iranian relations, and should be made clear that the dissolution of the Mission would in no way diminish this Government's interest in Iran's welfare or its desire to contribute thereto within the means at its disposal, nor would it affect Dept's attitude towards any future requests by Iranian Government for American aid or advice. It might be added that we hope that the Iranian Government will accord all possible support to the Ridley and Schwarzkopf Missions³⁰ since the American Government would deeply regret the necessity of suggesting that they also be withdrawn.

We would appreciate a frank statement of your views. We do not contemplate taking action in this regard until after the return of

²⁹ James M. Landis, Director of American Economic Operations in the Middle East until his resignation, effective January 23, 1945.

³⁰ For documentation on the interest of the United States in the continuation of these missions, see pp. 526 ff.

American Delegation to Potsdam³¹ since developments may have taken place there which would influence our final decision.

GREW

891.51A/8-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 10, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received August 10—4:30 a. m.]

603. My telegram 473, July 9.³² After most careful consideration of Department's telegram 379 July 25 and further study of whole situation here, I have come to conclusion withdrawal American financial advisory group is not advisable at this moment. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows:

1. Present Iranian Minister Finance, Mahmoud Bader, is probably most competent man to hold that office since Mission began work and has additional advantage that he speaks fluent English and so eliminates serious language barrier which has handicapped cooperation in past. Although he was at one time reported hostile to Americans nothing in his conversations with me nor in actions that have so far come to my direct attention indicates anything but a desire to make best possible use of advisers. Like any capable executive he wishes to decide for himself how this should be accomplished, but we can hardly take exception to this, especially since he is setting up machinery for consultation with the Americans on this point. He has shown every intention of cooperating. Therefore if Bader remains in office, I feel there is hope of working out satisfactory relationship between him and the advisers.

2. Advisers have this week advanced a step toward unity among themselves by unanimously approving, with minor modifications, draft program for future operations.³³ (Embassy's despatch 311, May 22, and my telegram 451, July 3³⁴) By vote of 18 to 11 Brownrigg Drafting Committee was chosen to make presentation to Finance Minister, and this decision appears to have [been] accepted, though reluctantly, by Pixley and Black. Bader has already expressed to me his desire

³¹ The reference is to the Tripartite Conference of Berlin which was held from July 17 to August 2, 1945.

³² Not printed.

³³ In despatch 295, May 17, 1945, Ambassador Morris reported that the Mission had designated a committee to prepare a draft program for future operations and that two reports had been prepared. The report by Dr. Black called for a program requiring powers greater than those formerly held by Dr. Millspaugh; that by William Brownrigg, Director General of Personnel, emphasized administrative reform and confined itself to activities falling strictly within the authority of the Ministry of Finance. (891.51A/5-2645)

³⁴ Neither printed.

to give full consideration to program, which should be in his hands this week.

3. On positive side therefore I think there is still possibility that Mission can render useful, if unspectacular, service to Iran, and in its current desperate state Iran unquestionably needs all the help it can get. In light of developments of past several months I need hardly emphasize disastrous consequences, international as well as internal, which would almost certainly follow collapse of Iranian administration.

4. From more negative point of view I think sudden withdrawal of whole group on our initiative would constitute in a sense a betrayal of Bader, whom we have encouraged to work toward rehabilitation of American Mission, and of the Americans themselves, whom we have urged to work to same end. This is especially true right now when advisers have finally settled knotty problem of program presentation. Some of them place high hopes on program and we should at least allow them opportunity to see whether they can work out something mutually satisfactory with Iranian authorities.

5. Mass departure of Americans from Ministry Finance would probably be taken by public as indication of American displeasure with Iran Government and might well bring about fall of Sadr Cabinet. It would be unfortunate for any act on our part to contribute to already disturbed conditions here.

6. Real test of future prospects will come when Bader carries out intention of naming Pixley sole head of Mission and when discussions on program get under way. If Pixley is accepted by group as a whole and if favorable progress is made on program, I think we should continue our support. If large group of members reject Pixley and program discussions go badly, we may expect group to break up of its own accord, which I think would have less undesirable effect politically than affirmative action by us to have it withdrawn as a body.

I do not exclude possibility that it may prove necessary to terminate mission if developments are unfavorable, either in respect to attitude of Iranians or activities of Americans themselves. However for the moment I should prefer to await developments.

MURRAY

891.51A/8-2045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)*⁸⁵

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1945—8 p. m.

447. In view of recommendations in urtel 603, Aug 10, especially your belief that financial mission may still render useful service to Iran, Dept will await your additional study and recommendations before taking any further steps with regard to withdrawal of entire mission.

BYRNES

891.51A/9-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, September 5, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received September 10—6:50 a. m.]

694. At meeting with American Advisers Program Committee Aug 30, Minister of Finance Bader outlined reorganization plan he said he contemplates putting into effect in Ministry. Main point, as related to me by Brownrigg, is abolition of present sections 1 and 2 of Ministry, under respective supervision of Pixley and Black, and elimination any general supervision by Americans of work of Ministry as whole or work of American advisers as group. Director General of each administration of [or] Ministry (such as Treasury, Accounts and Audits, Personnel, Inspection, Cereals and Bread, etc.) would report direct either to Committee or Iranian Under Secretary. Bader would be willing to recognize one American as spokesman for group in matters affecting individual interests of Americans, such as settlement of contracts or similar personal matters, but this spokesman would have no authority in administration.

Both Pixley and Brownrigg have advised Embassy they believe organization of this kind would destroy usefulness of American Mission, (an opinion with which I am inclined to agree) and that most serious members of group will probably resign if it is installed. They themselves appear on verge of resignation, as does Dr. Black. Pixley has been trying without success for three days to see Bader to determine whether he intends to go through with plan.

⁸⁵ Prior to the sending of this telegram, Mr. Minor, in a memorandum of August 13, 1945, stated that the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs could not concur with Mr. Murray's recommendation that the mission be maintained. However, the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) declared, in a marginal notation: "I hesitate to overrule the Ambassador in a matter of this kind. He is on the ground and unless there are strong or compelling reasons to the contrary, I would let him work out the problems (with any help we can give him, of course)." (891.51A/8-1045)

Since this development changes situation which apparently existed when mytel 603, Aug 10, was drafted, I think we should now be prepared at least to acquiesce in any desire expressed by mission members themselves to depart. If Bader's own acts make it impossible for group to furnish effective assistance to Iran, now that he has had opportunity to study recommendations of advisers themselves and to offer proper cooperation, I see no hope of successful rehabilitation of mission's position.

I propose to await further clarification of Bader's intention and clearer expression of advisers' reaction. However, I request Dept authorize me to tell Americans that if they, or important section of their membership, think useful work will be impossible under new plan, Dept would have no objection to their departure from Iran and would not urge them to remain.

MURRAY

891.51A/9-1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1945—1 p. m.

522. Developments outlined in urtel 694, Sept 5, strengthen Depts belief expressed in Deptel 379, July 25, that continued presence of American Financial Mission in Iran under prevailing circumstances would be prejudicial rather than beneficial to American-Iranian relations. We are convinced that American prestige in Middle East is suffering from continued presence in Iran of a number of American employees of Iranian Govt who draw large salaries and are of comparatively little value to Iran.

We are inclined to believe no useful purpose would be served by awaiting further clarification of Bader's intentions, since actions of successive Iranian Govts have made it clear that Iran has no real desire to give mission members authority necessary for effective functioning.

Dept therefore suggests that you inform members of financial mission in such a manner as you consider appropriate that Dept can understand that they must feel that their continued presence in Iran is not likely to be of material assistance to that country or of professional advantage to themselves. Consequently, if they desire to return to US, Dept would not object to their taking appropriate steps to terminate their services with Iranian Govt in a friendly and legal manner.

It is also suggested that you simultaneously inform Iranian Govt that American Govt is inclined to agree with many members of financial mission that mission will not be able in future to be of effective

assistance to Iran and that American Govt hopes that Iranian Govt will endeavor to effect mutually satisfactory and equitable arrangements with those members of mission who express desire to return to US. In making this approach to Iranian Govt, you might appropriately make the other comments suggested in Deptel 379, July 25.

You should of course make it clear both to Iranian Govt and to mission members³⁶ that American Govt assumes that termination of employment will be effected in accordance with Iranian Govts contractual agreements with each member of mission.

ACHESON

891.51A/9-1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, September 25, 1945—11 a. m.

553. A summary of the Dept's telegram No. 522, Sept. 14, to Tehran was included in one of our daily information telegrams to London for the Secretary. I have now received the following message from him: ³⁷ "I believe that the American Financial Mission should leave Iran immediately".

If you have not already done so, please take appropriate steps to expedite the departure of the mission. The Dept. is, of course, aware that the members of the mission are employees of the Iran Govt. under contract, and hopes that means can be found of effecting termination with minimum of friction or unpleasantness.

ACHESON

891.51A/10-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 3, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received October 3—12: 28 p. m.]

796. In accordance with Department's instructions and with wishes expressed by senior members American financial group, I intend to deliver following note tomorrow ³⁸ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs with copy to Minister of Finance:

"As Your Excellency is aware, the American Government has taken a great interest in the work of the American officials in the Iranian

³⁶ In telegram 757, September 24, 1945, 1 p. m., Mr. Murray notified the Department that he had outlined the Department's views to the members of the mission (891.51A/9-2445).

³⁷ Telegram 9825 (Delsec 47), September 22, 1945, 1 p. m., from London, not printed. "Delsec" was the code designation for messages emanating from the Secretary's delegation at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London from September 11 to October 2, 1945.

³⁸ The note was dated October 3.

Ministry of Finance and has sincerely hoped that they would be able to render substantial assistance to Iran. Because of this the Department of State has used its good offices in the recruiting of personnel and in other ways and this Embassy has collaborated with the Iranian Government in endeavoring to see that the mission should be of maximum utility to the Iranian nation.

With the departure of Dr. Millspaugh, however, the legal bases upon which the Mission was originally constituted ceased to exist and it has become apparent that the Iranian Government does not feel itself in a position to establish any substitute arrangement which would provide adequate foundations for the mission to continue its work with benefit to Iran. Therefore I am instructed by the Department of State to inform you that the conditions created by the Iranian Government are so different from those existing at the time the mission was established and the possibilities of success of a financial mission under these conditions are so remote that the Government of the United States can no longer continue its interest in the work of the Americans in question. The American Government believes that no useful purpose would be served by the continued presence in Iran of these Americans.

In these circumstances the American Government assumes that the Iranian Government will wish to effect a prompt and mutually satisfactory settlement with the members of the financial group, such settlement to be in accordance with the relative provisions of their contracts calling for equitable treatment in cases of termination [apparent omission] other than those specifically set forth in the engagement laws or agreements.

I am informing the members of the Financial Mission of the contents of this note."

MURRAY

891.51A/10-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1945—4 p. m.

588. Urtel 817, Oct. 9.³⁹ Despite Shah's desire to retain American financial mission Dept adheres to its original position (Deptels 553, Sept. 25 and 522, Sept. 14) that mission's withdrawal is in best interests of United States.

It is hoped that termination of each contract will be effected in manner satisfactory to parties concerned and will be accepted as full and final settlement. This might also be appropriate time to endeavor

³⁹ Not printed; it stated in pertinent part: "Shah very much desired to retain American financial group. He had informed cabinet satisfactory adjustment to group's status, including appointment of American head, must be made." (891.-002/10-945) In telegram 829, October 10, 1945, 6 p. m., the Ambassador stated that the local press in general was urging that the advisers be retained and utilized by the Iranian Government and that this represented fairly widespread Majlis and public sentiment. These sentiments, he continued, "should be discounted because most people are ignorant of conditions involved and are primarily interested in having mission as evidence of good relations with America." (891.51A/10-1045)

obtain settlement of standing claims of former mission members against Iranian Govt. In particular it is hoped that Iranian Govt will give sympathetic consideration to making equitable and final settlement of claim of George Hudson.

BYRNES

891.51A/11-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 9, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received November 10—3:15 p. m.]

932. Minister Finance Hajir⁴⁰ has agreed to terms of settlement for American Financial Mission members which are substantially those requested by group and which I consider equitable. However, he asked group to defer final action on resignation until he could discuss with me possibility of retaining mission in some form.

At his request I called on Minister November 7 and we talked over question in presence of Prime Minister Hakimi. Substance of Hajir's remarks was following:

1. It is impossible reconstruct an authoritarian American Mission on Millspaugh pattern.

2. Americans should not be used to handle details of administration and many men here are now not needed.

3. Nevertheless, he considers there is great need for perhaps 10 or 12 men in key spots and he would like to retain a hand-picked group of this size. (I gathered he envisaged their functions as largely advisory.)

4. He thinks it most important that a program be drawn up for these men and he would be prepared to have bases of their work laid down in Majlis [legislation?] if desired although he believes decree of Cabinet would be sufficient for all concerned.

5. He would like our agreement to this suggestion and consequent modification of language used in Embassy's note of October 3.⁴¹ Having obtained this he would work out agreement with men chosen to remain.

Prime Minister concurred in foregoing.

I replied I could make no commitment without consultation with Department and would probably have to have another conversation with him before giving definite reply.

Pending further consideration of all aspects I am unprepared make recommendations to Department. In view of Iran's desperate need for expert help I hesitate to adopt entirely unyielding attitude since I think there is possibility small group of Americans could render useful service. In any case I feel we should give Hajir's views which

⁴⁰ Abdol Hosein Hajir became Minister of Finance in the Hakimi government on November 3, 1945.

⁴¹ See telegram 796, October 3, 1 p. m., from Tehran, p. 559.

were well stated and impressed me not unfavorably benefit of full study. I plan to see him again within week to clarify certain points and will keep Department posted.

MURRAY

891.51A/11-945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1945—1 p. m.

627. Reurtel no. 932, Nov. 9, 3 p. m. The Dept is of the view that the contracts of all the Millspaugh mission members should be definitely terminated and the mission come to a clean cut end. Following this, the Iran Govt would be entirely free to make any new arrangements with any of the members of the mission it may desire to retain in the Govt's employ. Tacit understandings could be reached beforehand, but there should be no connection, in our view, between the Millspaugh mission and any subsequent arrangements.

BYRNES

891.51A/11-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 20, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received November 21—8:12 a. m.]

966. Dept's telegram 627, Nov 14. On Nov 18, I informed Minister Finance Hajir of Dept's views regarding termination of contracts of financial mission members at same time sending formal note to FonOff and informing American group.⁴² I stressed to Hajir desirability of making clean break especially since any men who remain will be in strictly advisory capacity with no administrative authority or responsibility. He appeared to agree and said he would anticipate no difficulty in obtaining passage by Majlis of law authorizing new contracts. He remarked that number to be retained would probably be only four or five.

Present status is that Minister is to ascertain which members of mission are willing to discuss new contract on advisory basis after which he will select those he wishes to retain and endeavor to reach agreement with them as to terms of contract. Unless there are unforeseen developments I do not intend to intervene in these negotiations and will leave it to individuals concerned to work out contracts which will safeguard their interests. In communicating Dept views to advisers

⁴² Copies of note 222 to Mohammad Ali Homayunjah, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and joint letter to Messrs. Pixley and Black, both dated November 17, 1945, were transmitted to the Department in despatch 149, November 17, 1945, from Tehran, not printed.

I made it plain that any who wished to stay would have to negotiate with Iran Govt as individuals rather than as mission recognized by American Govt and could count on no help from Embassy in their future work other than such protection of their contractual and personal rights as would be accorded any American abroad.

During our conversation Nov 18 Hajir said he wished to keep small group of advisers partly as link with American Govt which he said would be political asset for Iran Govt. He also expressed view this would dispose American Govt favorably toward his desire to have outstanding American economist make survey of Iran economic situation. I hastened to emphasize again that he must not expect to keep advisers here as mere window dressing but must make full use of their abilities. He assured me he would utilize them to fullest extent but I am dubious of his sincerity in this.

MURRAY

[In a memorandum of conversation with Mr. Pixley at the American Embassy at Tehran, dated December 13, 1945,⁴³ the Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs (Minor) wrote: "Mr. Pixley said that the contracts had been terminated in the cases of 25 members of the mission, with salary for four months beyond December 31, 1945. Work was stopped by members of the mission on December 11th. He said that he and all the members of the mission he had talked to, believe this is a generous settlement." Mr. Minor's memorandum also set forth Mr. Pixley's understanding that five named individuals had been invited to stay on and that their contracts had not been terminated.]

QUESTION WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ASSUME THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS INVOLVED IN OPERATING THE SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE TRANS-IRANIAN RAILROAD⁴⁴

891.77/10-845

Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs ⁴⁵

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1945.

[Here follow "Background Facts" to be considered in making a decision regarding American responsibilities with respect to the Iranian State Railway, and "Summary Comments".]

⁴³ Copy transmitted to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs by Mr. Minor in a letter of December 17, 1945, not printed. Mr. Minor became Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs on December 3, 1945.

⁴⁴ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 373 ff.

⁴⁵ Drafted by J. Harold De Veau and William C. Dunn of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs and initialed by Harold B. Minor, Acting Chief of that Division.

III. *Recommendations.*

a. The Department may wish to consider discussing the over-all matter of financial responsibility for the ISR with the British in the course of the current financial conversations. It is understood that the British may wish to include this matter on the agenda of unsettled US-UK financial enterprises. Since the Russians have paid nothing for its war-time benefits from ISR operations, an approach by one or both of its Allies in Iran may be in order.

If the matter is discussed with the British, there should be emphasized the urgent political considerations which require that the ISR receive such compensation for war-time use of the Railway as to assure its financial solvency and operational stability.⁴⁶ In this connection, this Government may wish to propose a joint plan by the United States and the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union if it sees fit, which might guarantee efficient transportation through Iran in the future.

b. The Department may wish to point out to the War Department that the military nature of the American operations in Iran suggests that this Government might appropriately absorb all operational expenses already made by the PGC, as an American contribution to the over-all war effort. In anticipation of the possible assumption by this Government of freight charges, the Department may wish to explore with War the possibility of using War Department appropriations for this purpose.

891.77/10-1245

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1945.

The War Department is anxious to close its books on the Persian Gulf Command, which has completed its mission of aid-to-Russia operation of the Iran State Railway.⁴⁷ It is necessary to determine whether certain expenses incident to PGC operations should be borne by the British or by this Government. The British have insisted to War, FEA,⁴⁸ and State on separate occasions that this

⁴⁶ In telegram 287, June 8, 1945, 6 p. m., to Tehran, the Department stated: "War [Department] states that P[ersian] G[ulf] C[ommand] is turning railway back to British who apparently are turning it over immediately to Iranians. British have informed War that they will accept no individual responsibility for finances of railway after June 30 but will consider any such problems which arise as allied rather than British." (891.77/5-2945)

⁴⁷ See telegram 347, May 26, 10 a. m., from Tehran, p. 373.

⁴⁸ Foreign Economic Administration.

Government's assumption of operational responsibility carried with it financial responsibility for the ISR, a position which has been consistently denied by American agencies. The Department should now make a definitive determination of United States policy in this matter.

The attached memorandum⁴⁹ sets forth the facts in the case, together with recommendations agreed to by LP and ME.⁵⁰ On legal grounds, it appears that this Government at no time assumed any financial responsibility vis-à-vis the Railway. On grounds of equity, however, it might be argued that this Government should absorb the expenses in question as a part of its overall contribution to the war effort.

I appreciate the difficult financial position of the British which has occasioned the current Anglo-American conversations.⁵¹ It may be appropriate to add this matter to the agenda for those conversations. On the basis of any decision reached there, in the light of global US-UK financial relations, the Department may explore the availability of funds from War or FEA to meet all or part of the expenses in question.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[In a Joint Statement issued at Washington on December 6, 1945, the United States and the United Kingdom announced they had reached an understanding for the settlement of lend-lease, reciprocal aid and surplus property matters, and for final settlement of financial claims against each other arising out of the conduct of World War II. During the course of negotiations leading to the Joint Statement, representatives of the two Governments discussed a claim of \$25,000,000 presented by the United Kingdom for freight payable to the Iranian Railways in respect of goods supplied by the Government of the United States under lend-lease to the Soviet Union. No agreement was reached and under the terms of paragraph 6 of the Agreement in Settlement of Intergovernmental Claims, signed at Washington on March 27, 1946, these claims were waived. For texts of agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom of March 27, 1946, and the Joint Statement of December 6, 1945, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1509, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1525.]

⁴⁹ Dated October 8, *supra*.

⁵⁰ The Division of Lend-Lease and Surplus War Property Affairs and the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs.

⁵¹ For documentation on these financial conversations, see vol. VI, pp. 1 ff.

AGREEMENTS WITH IRAN REGARDING THE DISPOSITION OF AMERICAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER SURPLUS PROPERTY IN IRAN⁵² AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE IRANIAN LEND-LEASE DEBT

S11.24591/1-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Morris)

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1945—4 p. m.

57. Dept is forwarding by mail copies of exchange of correspondence with War⁵³ which lays down an agreed basis for disposal of surplus military installations in Iran. The agreement provides that: (1) War will be guided in this matter by policy of Dept (2) Dept is prepared to conduct negotiations with Government of Iran (3) War will prepare an inventory of installations (4) parallel action with the British and Russians is encouraged, and no joint action with either ally should be undertaken which conspicuously excludes the other. We should keep the British and Russians informed, wherever appropriate, of independent American plans as they develop. (5) Dept recognizes priority of military needs in disposal of surpluses. However, special consideration should be given Iranian needs for any particular item especially when its removal would render valueless an otherwise useful installation. (6) Installations not needed by military should in principle be offered first to Iranian Government. War reserves right to offer certain oil installations to Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. There may be other exceptions to principle of first offer to Iranian Government but Dept would wish to be informed before they are agreed to. (7) Where an allied Government shows the Theater Commander that any particular installation is needed in the war effort, this installation should be sold to Iranian Government only on understanding that it will be made available rent-free to the allied Government for period of such war use or for duration plus 6 months, whichever is shorter. (8) While it is desirable to obtain maximum financial return for surplus property, political considerations may have a bearing on this principle. No disposal should be made which is harmful to Iranian economy or contrary to American policy of economic assistance to Iran. (9) Demolition of installations should be carried out with greatest reluctance and should not be resorted to without prior consultation with Dept or Embassy. (10) Sales price for installations and any Iranian claim for war damages might profitably

⁵² For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp 355 ff. See also T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 427-432.

⁵³ Letter of December 29, 1944, from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson's reply of January 19, 1945, and Acting Secretary of State Grew's acknowledgment of January 26, 1945, none printed; copies transmitted to Tehran in instruction 84, February 5, 1945, not printed.

be related in negotiations with Iranian Government. (11) Installations not desired by Iranian Government may be offered for sale to other persons, public or private, in or out of Iran. (12) Opening prices asked should be based on original cost minus depreciation but it is recognized that in some cases sales will have to be consummated on basis of fair value for intended use of purchaser. (13) In cases where there is joint American British investment PGC and Paiforce⁵⁴ will work together in establishing the respective investments and proceeds of sales will be divided in proportion thereto. Same principle will apply in disposal of any installations in which there is joint American and Russian interest. (14) The Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner, in process of organization, will be charged with disposal of War and Navy properties overseas. Until it is organized sales will be made in accordance with existing procedures.

War is instructing Commanding General PGC⁵⁵ to conform to above agreed procedures in disposal of PGC surplus.

GREW

891.24/3-2145

The Under Secretary of the Treasury (Bell) to the Deputy Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner (Connolly)

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1945.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Colonel Stetson⁵⁶ of your office has raised with us the question of acceptable means of payment for the sale of surplus property in Iran and has requested that we write you the views of the Treasury on this subject.

In view of the urgency of disposing of surplus property in Iran, it is our view that there should be negotiated with the Bank Melli and the Iranian Government an interim financial arrangement prior to the disposal of surplus property along the following lines:

1. The United States Army will dispose of surplus property for dollars, where possible, otherwise for rials, in accordance with procedures agreed upon with the Government of Iran. The rial proceeds would be deposited in a special account with the Bank Melli in the name of the Treasurer of the United States for account of the War Department.

2. It would be understood that the rial balance in this account would be eventually convertible into dollars and that as soon as mutually convenient negotiations between the Iranian and the U.S. Gov-

⁵⁴ Persian Gulf Command (American) and Persia and Iraq Force (British), respectively.

⁵⁵ Brig. Gen. Donald P. Booth.

⁵⁶ Col. John B. Stetson, Jr., Field Commissioner in Iran for the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner (OANLC).

ernments would be undertaken with a view to entering into a funding agreement with respect to this dollar obligation.

3. The balance in the account would be guaranteed against exchange risk so that any future alteration in the rial-dollar rate of exchange will not affect one way or the other the magnitude of this dollar obligation.

4. In the interim period, prior to and during negotiations for the ultimate liquidation of balances, the funds in the account could be used for the following purposes:

(a) Expenditures in Iran (other than the purchase of goods for export) by U.S. Government agencies.

(b) Transfers for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes.

(c) Transfers to American financial institutions to be used for personal remittances to Iran from the United States.

(d) Transfers to travelers for traveling expenses in Iran.

(e) Transfers to meet the Iranian currency requirements of American ships.

(f) Transfers for other purposes which may be agreed upon from time to time.

5. Iran would not be required to pay any interest on the balance in the account.

It will be noted that this arrangement enables the Army to dispose of surplus property for local currency without the necessity of long drawn out negotiations over the conversion of these balances into dollars. It is required only that Iran recognizes that it has a dollar obligation. The arrangement also provides that we would have certain limited uses for the rials we accepted in payment for surplus property.

We understand from Colonel Stetson that he is proceeding shortly to Iran to undertake negotiations relating to the disposal of surplus property in that country. If you so desire, the Treasury Representative⁵⁷ in Cairo could be instructed to proceed to Iran to assist Colonel Stetson in the financial aspects of these negotiations. The negotiations must, of course, be carried on with the participation of the American Embassy.

Very truly yours,

D. W. BELL

811.24591/5-2945

The Chargé in Iran (Ward) to the Secretary of State

No. 317

TEHRAN, May 29, 1945.

[Received June 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the negotiations for disposal to the Iranian Government of the American-built installations at Ban-

⁵⁷ C. Dillon Glendinning, Treasury Representative in the Middle East; resident at Cairo.

dar Shahpur have made very little progress to date. As reported in the Embassy's despatch No. 262 of April 9, "Disposal of American Installations at Bandar Shahpur",⁵⁸ an initial offer to negotiate was made by a note of April 2, 1945 from the Embassy to the Foreign Ministry, a parallel note being sent at the same time by the British Embassy. In its reply of April 12, copy of which is enclosed,⁵⁹ the Foreign Ministry asserted that the structures should be turned over without charge, basing its claim upon a financial agreement between Iran and the Allies which it said was in effect.

Neither this Embassy nor the British Embassy was aware of any such agreement, and the Ministry was accordingly asked to identify it more exactly. A copy of the Embassy's note of April 23 on this subject is enclosed.⁶⁰ Having received no reply by May 26, the British Embassy addressed a further note to the Foreign Office (enclosed)⁶¹ saying that it was assumed the Iranian Government was not interested and that the British authorities were, therefore, free to make some other disposition of the properties. This was, of course, designed primarily to spur the Iranian authorities to act quickly.

I was on the point of sending a similar, but less drastic, communication on behalf of the American interest in the port, when a Foreign Office note dated May 22,⁶¹ but received on May 28, was delivered. From the enclosed copy of that note it will be seen that the Ministry refers specifically to an agreement between Iran, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which it says went into effect as of September 1, 1941.⁶²

After some search, the British Embassy has informed me that it has tentatively identified this as a draft agreement presented by the Iranian Government to the British and Russian authorities in 1942. I am told that it has never been signed, most certainly is not in effect, and is not even being considered by the British and Soviets as a basis for negotiation.

We shall, of course, try to straighten this matter out with the Iranian authorities. The present despatch is intended merely as an interim report to keep the Department posted.

It may be well to say that there appears to be a strong feeling among Iranians that Allied fixed installations in Iran should be turned over to the Government entirely without charge, as compensation for Iran's

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ No. 434, not printed.

⁶⁰ No. 239, not printed.

⁶¹ No. 1238, not printed.

⁶² Under article 12 of this agreement, the note stated, the two Allied Governments would cede free of charge to the Iranian Government all of their immovable installations and landing fields in Iran when no longer needed for military operations and would give the Iranian Government the right to purchase movable property and railway equipment.

economic losses during the war. Speaking in the Majlis a few days ago, Deputy Rahimian not only made this assertion but added that a gift of one billion dollars should be thrown in. His remarks were received with applause. I think it quite likely, therefore, that the Iranian Government will resist all requests for payment for fixed structures.

Respectfully yours,

A[NGUS] WARD

891.24/7-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, July 23, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 9:52 a. m.]

520. To Secretaries of State and Treasury and OANLC. From Murray, Glendinning and Stetson. Following comments are relative to status of negotiations on financial arrangements for disposal of surplus property and to sixth draft agreement⁶⁴ dated 4 July forwarded to Field Commissioner.

Discussions with Iranians to date have proceeded on basis of principles laid down in Treasury's letter of March 21 to General Connolly. These negotiations have been carried on through three changes of Govt. The present Govt has indicated assent in principle to our proposals and has requested formal presentation thereof for which it has been waiting for over a month. As life of this Govt is exceedingly precarious there is need for as rapid action as possible. Action is also required to prevent further depreciation on both movable and fixed assets and to reduce staff of Army personnel required for maintenance and security.

We are firmly of conviction that nature of agreement which can be successfully negotiated with Iranians and in general procedures to be adopted in handling surplus disposals in Iran must differ in form if not basically in substance from those for other areas. Extreme state of political instability existing in Iran, fact that issues involved in disposal of surplus property are at political forefront and competence and character of politicians with whom negotiations must be conducted all necessitate an approach to disposal problem differing from that required in other areas. It is our opinion that if interminable negotiations is [are] to be avoided formal text to be submitted to Iran Govt should conform to following requirements:

⁶⁴ This refers to the sixth of a series of draft agreements to govern financial and other aspects of surplus property sales to Iran. Discussions by the State and Treasury Departments and the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner continued and on August 8 the terms agreed to by the three agencies were sent to Colonel Stetson for formal presentation to the Iranian Government (telegram Warx 46890, 800.24/8-845).

(a) Agreement should be such as may be consummated by a formal exchange of notes between Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not require formal reference to Majlis⁶⁵ either as a whole or as to specific provisions of a controversial character.

(b) Text should be expressed in simple language and be confined exclusively to minimum financial provisions.

(c) Technical provisions should be such as may be readily understood by Iranian officials who have a minimum comprehension of both American legal formalities and of financial and foreign exchange matters. If above are not followed in drafting of text it is our opinion that negotiations are likely to follow the pattern of negotiations for American treaty rights of occupation in Iran which were carried on for some three years without consummation of an agreement⁶⁶ and for a Lend-Lease agreement which have been in process for almost two years.⁶⁷

Furthermore we believe it should be recognized frankly that techniques and procedures of sales and relationship of the Field Commissioner vis-à-vis Iran Government will have to be worked out pragmatically as problems arise and cannot be neatly outlined in an all-inclusive agreement to be negotiated with Iran Govt as might be done successfully in other areas. Apart from basic question of terms of financial settlement most questions of procedure can be handled more successfully with Iran Govt on an informal basis rather than on basis of a formal written agreement.

Moreover in spite of apparently favorable attitude of Govt we believe that chances of obtaining an agreement in immediate future may well depend upon limiting understanding to an interim financial agreement committing Iran Govt only to principle of converting rial proceeds of surplus sales into dollars as was envisaged in Treasury's letter.

[Here follow comments on draft of July 4 and on status of negotiations with the Iranian Government.] [Murray, Glendinning, Stetson.]

MURRAY

811.24591/8-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, August 20, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received August 20—1: 15 p. m.]

632. Department's 298, June 15.⁶⁸ Embassy submitted note to Minister Foreign Affairs on June 16 rejecting Iranian contention that

⁶⁵ The Iranian Parliament.

⁶⁶ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 311 ff., *passim*; *ibid.*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 435 ff.; and *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 355 ff.

⁶⁷ For information on the proposed Lend-Lease agreement with Iran, see bracketed note, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 600.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

American installations in Iran affected in any manner by "financial accord" of September 1, 1941 (see enclosure 4⁶⁹ Embdesp 317, May 29) and requesting early intimation whether Iran Government prepared to negotiate for purchase American installations at Bandar Shahpur. On July 1, Embassy submitted note transmitting list of American installations, other than those at Bandar Shahpur and requested early indication those installations which Iran Government desires to purchase (Embassy's 455, July 4⁷⁰). Pending conclusion surplus property financial agreement which still under negotiation (Embassy's 625, August 18⁷⁰) no firm sales offer setting forth prices and terms of payment has been made.

Foreign Office in reply to both above notes takes position all American installations in Iran are to pass gratis to Iran Government under terms of above "financial accord" which accord it states is effective even though not adhered to formally by United States.⁷¹

Any attempt to persuade Iranians of error their position may involve protracted discussions with little or no assurance of success but Embassy will nonetheless attempt to persuade them to modify position. Embassy construes Foreign Office reply as evidence of absence of intention Iran Government acquire American installations in Iran through purchase and therefore recommends such construction be confirmed to Stetson by Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner with instructions that Stetson may offer surplus installations to interested individuals. Should no individual be interested in purchase of any one installation *in toto* the merchantable equipment of such installation may be salvaged and sold and nonmerchantable portion razed preparatory to returning land in prewar condition to owner (last paragraph Department's 343, July 9⁷⁰). This drastic action would be resorted to only if further negotiations useless and should it become necessary as last resort to force Iran Government adopt reasonable attitude and willingness negotiate acquisition by purchase. Stetson informed and concurs this recommendation.

Please keep Embassy informed of developments.⁷²

MURRAY

⁶⁹ Enclosure 4 not printed.

⁷⁰ Not printed.

⁷¹ In undated note 2648, received at the Embassy on August 15, 1945, the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs pointed out that the alleged accord with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had been put into effect with the approval and consent of British and Soviet representatives to apply to the transport of goods and war supplies to the Soviet Union, and that since the United States Government had replaced the British Government in taking charge of the delivery of supplies to Russia, the "credibility" of the agreement was also guaranteed by the United States Government. A copy of the note was transmitted to the Department in despatch 68, August 21, 1945, from Tehran; not printed.

⁷² In telegram 633, August 20, 1945, Tehran reported that the Iranian Minister of Finance (Bader) and the Governor of Banque Mellie (Ebtahaj) had come to agreement with American officials on a schedule of rial proceeds from sales of

Tehran Post Files : 824—Foreign Liquidation Commission

*The American Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Iranian Minister
for Foreign Affairs (Sepahbodi)*

No. 110

[TEHRAN,] September 1, 1945.

EXCELLENCY : I have the honor to quote below the text of an arrangement on financial terms to apply to the disposal of surplus property of the Government of the United States in Iran, which text is submitted for the formal approval of and acceptance by the Imperial Government of Iran :

“Certain property surplus to military needs belonging to the United States Government and located in Iran will become available in the near future for disposition as surplus. It is proposed that sales of such surplus property shall be made by the United States Government subject to the following financial terms and conditions :

“1. All payments by the Imperial Government of Iran or its Nationals, other than such payments as may be made in United States dollars by Iranian Nationals in accordance with Iranian foreign exchange regulations, shall be made in Iranian rials.

“2. Rial proceeds of the sales of surplus property shall be deposited in a special account designated ‘Treasurer of the United States’ to be opened by the United States Government with the Bank Melli Iran. No interest shall be paid by the Bank Melli Iran on the deposit of rial proceeds of sales of surplus property.

“3. Pending the ultimate conversion of rials into dollars, as provided in Paragraph 4, unconverted rial proceeds from the sale of surplus property may be utilized for all expenditures of the United States Government in Iran except the purchase of goods for export, unless such purchase of goods for export shall be authorized by the appropriate Iranian authorities.

“4. The Imperial Government of Iran will, to the extent that unexpended rials are held by the United States, convert such unexpended rials into dollars, at the official selling rate for dollars in Iran in effect at the dates of sale of surpluses, according to the following schedule: Three years from September 1, 1945, one-third of the then unexpended rials shall be converted into dollars; five years from September 1, 1945, one-half of the then unexpended rials shall be converted into dollars; seven years from September 1, 1945, the balance of all unexpended rials shall be converted into dollars. The Imperial Government of Iran does not obligate itself to convert into dollars rial proceeds from the sale of those categories of surplus property enumerated in Annex 1⁷³ to the present arrangement.

“5. The Imperial Government of Iran, through the Foreign Exchange Commission and the Bank Melli Iran, will assume the direct

United States Surplus property (891.24/8-2045). After approval by the State and Treasury Departments and the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner in telegram Warx 54437, August 24, 1945, to Colonel Stetson (891.24/8-2445), the substance of the agreement was incorporated in note 110, September 1, to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, *infra*.

⁷³ Not printed; it enumerated approximately 90 commodities.

responsibility for effecting the conversion of rials acquired from the sales of surplus property into United States dollars as provided in Paragraph 4.

"6. In the event the Imperial Government of Iran removes exchange controls on current international transactions and makes dollars freely available for transactions other than the transfer of capital, the status of any unconverted rial balances will be reconsidered by the two Governments with a view to relaxing the restrictions on the use and conversion of such balances as provided in any agreement then in force.

"7. The United States Government shall not be required to pay any customs, duties, or other charges as seller of surplus property. The Iranian Government shall assess only regular customs, duties, or other charges against the purchasers of surplus property."

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.⁷⁴

WALLACE MURRAY

800.24/9-1145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1945—8 p. m.

516. Re Depts. 483, Sept. 4; reEmbs 680, Sept. 1; 673, Aug. 31, 641, Aug. 22; and 618, Aug. 14.⁷⁵ After announcement of Jap surrender Dept. was not willing to approve the conclusion of a lend-lease agreement even if changes proposed by Finance and Foreign Ministers had been acceptable. Same point of view also held by FEA.⁷⁶

Both Dept. and FEA were willing to approve resumption of lend-lease deliveries of pipe-line items in view of fact that we originally favored halting such deliveries primarily to get a lend-lease agreement.

Every effort should now be made to get prompt payment of lend-lease obligation⁷⁷ or a written statement of when such payment shall be made. (ReEmbs 641) Immediate payment is preferable in view

⁷⁴ An undated marginal notation by the Counselor of Embassy in Iran (Ward) states that this note was not delivered. In telegram 700, September 7, 1945, Tehran reported that the agreement on conversion of rial proceeds from sales of surplus property was approved by the Iranian Council of Ministers on September 1 and that an exchange of notes formalizing the agreement was to be exchanged the next day. However, at a meeting on September 4, the Iranian negotiators insisted on eliminating conversion of rial proceeds from sales of installations and other fixed assets, whereupon the Embassy declined to exchange notes. Tehran noted that "indications are amply evident that Iranian Government intends fight tooth and nail to impose claim that all Allied (United States and British at least) immovable surplus property in Iran is to pass gratis to it upon evacuation of Allied troops." (800.24/9-745)

⁷⁵ None printed.

⁷⁶ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁷⁷ In a memorandum of November 28, 1945, to Col. Frederick F. Greenman, General Counsel of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Robert R. Williams, Special Assistant to the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (McCabe), stated: "For some two years or more there has been outstanding an unpaid debt

of U.S. Govt's. desire to come to early settlement of all lend-lease everywhere.

ACHESON

891.24/10-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 2, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received October 2—3: 07 p. m.]

789. Following is the text of statement issued by Embassy to press September 29 and published by most local newspapers September 30 and October 1:

“Articles published recently in certain Tehran newspapers⁷⁸ have shown a serious misunderstanding of the position of American military units in this country and of the American Government's policy in disposing of its surplus property in Iran. The following facts are furnished in a desire to eliminate this misunderstanding.

1. American troops first came to Iran in late 1942 with the express agreement of the then Prime Minister of Iran, His Excellency Qavam-es-Saltaneh.⁷⁹

2. Iran has been an ally of the United States in the war,⁸⁰ and it was understood by the American Government that the work of American troops in Iran directed toward the common victory was welcomed by the Iranian Government and people, who would have shared with the rest of the world the disasters of defeat if it had come.

3. Nevertheless, the American Government was willing to conclude a written agreement governing the status of American forces in this country. Negotiations to this end were carried on during 1943 but were abruptly suspended by the Iranian Government in December of that year. Although the American Government repeatedly expressed its desire to reopen negotiations, no action was taken by the Iranian authorities until March 1945 when the Iranian Minister at Washington advised the Department of State that the Iranian Government no longer considered an agreement necessary and regarded the whole matter as closed. It is clear therefore that the absence of

of the Iranian Government in the amount of approximately \$6,000,000 for Lend-Lease goods purchased on a cash reimbursable basis. In addition, approximately \$2,500,000 worth of rials are held by FEA as payment for cash Lend-Lease goods sold to Iran. These rials were to be converted into dollars by the Iranians, but have not so been converted. (891.24/11-2845)

⁷⁸ In telegrams 776 and 778, both dated September 27, 1945, the Ambassador in Iran reported a press campaign of vilification against United States surplus property disposal policy in Iran in which leftist newspapers cited the absence of a treaty basis for the presence of American troops in Iran as justification for refusing to permit the United States to dispose of its assets there and denounced the United States as aggressors. The former telegram also stated that the Ambassador had registered the “strongest possible protest” with the Iranian Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and that he would give the full facts to the press (891.00/9-2745 and 891.24/9-2745).

⁷⁹ See telegram 435, December 13, 1942, from Tehran, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, p. 315.

⁸⁰ Iran declared war against Germany on September 9, 1943, see *ibid.*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 428 ff., and against Japan on February 28, 1945, *ante*, p. 526.

any formal agreement on the presence of American forces in Iran is entirely the responsibility of the Iranian Government itself.

4. In carrying out their task, American Forces in Iran spent about \$100,000,000 in this country, much of which went to provide employment for Iranians while most of the balance went into improvements in roads, railroads and ports and the construction of camps to house the American troops. These expenditures represent a part of the enormous costs incurred by the United States in fighting the common war, costs which have raised the national debt of the United States to unbelievable figures and which include approximately [apparent omission] million dollars in lend-lease delivered to the other United Nations.

5. With the termination of the war considerable amounts of American property in Iran, both fixed and movable, have become surplus to military needs. Much, if not all, of this property would be highly useful to Iran [during the?] transitional period when supplies from abroad are still difficult to obtain, and the United States Government has offered to negotiate its sale to the Iranian Government or to private persons in Iran at a fair price. In the case of fixed installations, this price will undoubtedly be far below their cost. However, there has been and will be no effort to force anyone in Iran, whether the Govt or private individuals, to purchase any of these properties. Anything whose purchase in Iran is not desired will be shipped to other countries where it is more needed. Preparations for shipment of some types of goods especially railroad equipment are already under way.

6. Since the American Govt obviously cannot use Iranian currency except in very limited amounts negotiations have been conducted with the Iranian Govt for an arrangement whereby rials acquired through sale of surplus property may be converted into dollars over a period of years. Although the bases of such an arrangement have been accepted in principle the Iranian Govt has so far declined to sign the proposed agreement. This may prevent sales in rials and force the removal from Iran of most American property.

7. The American Govt does not believe that any hardship would be caused the Iranian nation through the sale to it of installations and equipment which the Iranian Govt itself has stated are urgently needed and which would be of immediate benefit to the national well-being. Statements in the Tehran newspapers that the British Govt is following a different policy in this regard are incorrect since the attitude of the American Govt is shared by the British Govt. The British Govt is likewise endeavoring to negotiate sales of its fixed and movable surplus properties in Iran."

MURRAY

891.24/10-445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Murray)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1945—8 p. m.

577. Dept approves of your action in giving out press release quoted in urtel 789 Oct. 1 [2]. Judging from urtels 801 and 802 Oct. 4⁸¹ re-

⁸¹ Neither printed.

lease has already had good effect. Dept will be glad if you consider advisable to call in Iranian Chargé to express similar views.

In this connection you may find it desirable when occasion arises to assure Iranian authorities that this Govt has not altered its traditional policy of friendship for Iran or its pledges of assistance as contained in Declaration on Iran.⁸² Dept will always view with sympathy Iranian requests for assistance. The Iranian Govt should, however, understand that such assistance must necessarily be considered separately from technical question of surplus disposal which is being carried out under specific legislation applied on a world-wide basis and cannot therefore be regarded as a method of extending financial or economic assistance.⁸³

BYRNES

[For recommendations by the Ambassador in Iran regarding the disposition of American surplus property in that country, see his letter of October 16 to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, page 425.]

891.24/10-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, October 25, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received October 26—6:15 a. m.]

885. Embtel 868, October 22.⁸⁴ Stetson presented memorandum to Sadr⁸⁵ on October 23 offering all surplus property, movable and immovable, for sale to Iran Govt under conversion agreement.

Sadr now states at instance of Shah that Govt interested in acquisition of immovable property only at this time and that purchase will be paralleled by conversion agreement applicable to immovables only.

Since disposal movable property much simpler than disposal of immovables Embassy very much pleased this turn events and has suggested to Stetson that every possible effort be exerted to exploit

⁸² Declaration agreed to December 1, 1943, at Tehran by President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin; see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 413. For documentation concerning efforts by the United States in 1944 to implement the Declaration, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 306 ff.

⁸³ In telegram 872, October 23, 1945, 10 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran stated: "I took occasion to express to Minister of Foreign Affairs before fall of Cabinet views contained in last paragraph Deptel 577, Oct. 11. Sepahbodi was most grateful and I believe he understood our position." The Ambassador added that the press release had had a beneficial effect on the United States position in Iran with the local press almost unanimous in praising all things American and Iranian officials clearly and strongly laying the American position before the Majlis. (891.00/10-2345)

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ Mohsen Sadr, Iranian Prime Minister.

this opportunity. Disposal immovables to Govt will release Persian Gulf Service Command⁸⁶ from claims which would certainly arise otherwise from contractual obligation to restore camp sites and other leased land to condition at time of occupation, and will dispose of Iranian contention that immovables are to pass gratis to Iran upon evacuation US forces. Furthermore without necessary maintenance which PGSC decreased personnel no longer able to furnish, buildings and structures will deteriorate rapidly upon advent rainy season therefore early disposal highly advisable. Also disposal will release Army personnel now engaged in guarding immovables.

Should we succeed in disposing immovables we shall nevertheless continue efforts persuade Iran Govt purchase all movables.

Attitude new Prime Minister Hakimi⁸⁷ toward acquisition surplus property by Govt not yet ascertained but interest of Shah in immovables will certainly prove strong factor.

MURRAY

891.77/11-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, November 3, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 3—5 : 40 p. m.]

910. Embassy telegram 820 Oct. 10.⁸⁸ Prime Minister Hakimi and Minister Finance designate Hajir state \$2,140,000 check for contracted purchase railway rolling stock will be paid tomorrow.⁸⁹ They also confirm (Embassy telegram 850 Oct 17⁸⁸) previous information that Govt unable raise funds immediately for purchase 184 additional tank cars and 25 cabooses totaling \$600,000 and confirm interest former Prime Minister Sadr (Embassy telegram 885 Oct 25) in purchase all immovable property.

They propose (1) immediate conclusion conversion agreement similar to Sept 1 agreement (that is conversion into dollars in equal installments in 3, 5 and 7 years) covering proceeds from sales of immovable property and above-mentioned 184 tank cars and 25 cabooses; (2)

⁸⁶ The Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) had been detached from the United States Army Forces in the Middle East and renamed the Persian Gulf Command on December 10, 1943. Under General Order 83 issued by the Africa-Middle East Theater (AMET) on September 21, 1945, the Persian Gulf Command became a subcommand of AMET and once more was designated as the Persian Gulf Service Command.

⁸⁷ Ibrahim Hakimi had become Iranian Prime Minister the previous day.

⁸⁸ Not printed.

⁸⁹ Payment was made on November 5 (telegram 917, November 5, 1945, 1 p. m., 891.77/11-545). On October 6, the Iranian Government had agreed to purchase approximately 1500 locomotives and railroad cars and other railroad tools and equipment and had made full payment of \$8,000,000 on October 9 (telegrams 808, October 6, 1945, 11 a. m., and 820, October 10, 1945, 9 a. m., 891.77/10-645, 10-1045).

immediate purchase of 184 tank cars and 25 cabooses; (3) immediate purchase all immovable property for lump sum equivalent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of invested costs; (4) payment to be made in Govt promissory notes payable in rials on conversion dates indicated above; (5) Iran Govt will assume all claims arising out of use of real estate on which American Army owned immovables have been erected.

We believe this proposal best possible obtainable and recommend its immediate acceptance for reasons: [Here follow reasons and other considerations.]

Earliest telegraphic approval above proposal requested⁹⁰ because of urgent time element. If accepted, we shall then endeavor interest Govt purchase all movable property⁹¹ which disposal would probably prove more profitable than piecemeal disposal to individual buyers and would greatly aid in early withdrawal of US forces.

MURRAY

811.24591/12-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 14, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 9:33 p. m.]

1127. Contract covering sale immovable surplus property (including British minority interest involved therein) in Iran, 184 railway tank cars and 25 cabooses to Iran Govt was signed Dec 12 in amount \$2,819,983.47 and payment made in 3 notes each in amount \$939,994.49 payable respectively on Dec 12, 1948, 1950 and 1952. General Conolly authorized waiver interest on principal of notes.

British disposal officials agreed to sale British minority interest in property on same basis (i.e. $7\frac{1}{2}$ % of invested cost) as US majority interest but details of US reimbursement to British still under negotiation.

Upon signing above sales contract I presented note⁹² to Minister Finance stating title to immovable property will be transferred to Iran Govt at any time prior Mar 2 next year in discretion either Iran

⁹⁰ Authorization was given in telegram War 81651, November 7, 1945 (891.24/11-745).

⁹¹ The Hamadan truck fleet, consisting of 972 used trucks, a quantity of scrap and tools, and 200 tons of spare parts, was sold to the highest private bidders on September 16 for rials which at the official rate of exchange of 32 to the dollar amounted to \$937,500 (see Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, *The History of Foreign Surplus Property Disposal, 1945-1949*, vol. II, *Field Administration and Operations*, pt. II, *The Disposal of Surplus Property in the Africa-Middle East and Persian Gulf Areas*, pp. 223-224). The remainder of movable surplus property in Iran was sold on December 5 to a private syndicate for \$2,500,000 and 144 million rials (telegram 1080, December 6, 1945, 3 p. m., from Tehran, 891.24/12-645).

⁹² Dated December 12.

Govt or Embassy. Advisability changing condition of title transfer from mutual consent as stated in second paragraph Embtel 1079, Dec 6⁹³ to discretion of Embassy arose from possibility Iranians may experience difficulty in getting guard detachment to Qazvin or may be tardy or otherwise delinquent in accepting custody of camp.

As Dept will realize from first paragraphs Embtel 1013, Nov 28 and 1080 Dec 6⁹⁴ Alluh's [*all?*] property in Iran thus far declared surplus was disposed of by JPMB⁹⁵ and FLC (Foreign Liquidation Commission), prior to arrival on Dec 8 and without assistance of General Connolly (Deptel 666, Dec 3⁹⁶). Connolly and General Giles⁹⁷ departed today. Disposal property not yet declared surplus will proceed soon as so declared.

MURRAY

103.9169/[12-2145]: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

TEHRAN, December 21, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received December 22—3:12 a. m.]

1166. For State, Treasury and Paige FEA⁹⁸ from Murray, Wells⁹⁹ and Glendinning. Following arrangements concluded as to Iranian Govt:

1. Lend Lease debt and rial conversion total 8.5 million dollars payable 12 equal quarterly installments first payment March 21, 1946.¹
2. Lend Lease goods in pipeline totaling 1.8 million dollars purchased by Iranian Govt payment in dollars against delivery from warehouse over a period of one year.²

⁹³ Not printed; it stated: "To prevent Russians from pre-empting US Army camps in northern Iran . . . and at request of Shah and Iran Government, title to immovable surplus property will not pass to Iran until some date mutually agreeable to Embassy and Iranians. Ultimate date for transfer title March 2 next year." (891.24591/12-645)

⁹⁴ Neither printed.

⁹⁵ Presumably a garble; may refer to the Ambassador.

⁹⁶ Not printed; it advised that a mission headed by Major General Connolly, the Deputy Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, had left by air for Iran on December 2 in connection with the disposal of surplus property and that Harold B. Minor, who was designated Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs on December 3, was accompanying him (811.24591/12-345).

⁹⁷ Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles, Commanding General, Africa-Middle East Theater.

⁹⁸ Robert M. Paige, Acting Chief of the Middle East Division of the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner. The lend-lease functions of FEA had, by this time, been transferred to the O.F.L.C.

⁹⁹ C. Edward Wells, Chief Representative of the Foreign Economic Administration at Tehran.

¹ The necessary arrangements calling for payments of \$8,541,040.75 were confirmed in a letter of December 21, 1945, from the Banque Mellie to the Foreign Economic Administration at Tehran (103.9169/[12-2145]).

² The necessary arrangements calling for payments totaling \$1,831,598.15 were incorporated in an exchange of correspondence between the Foreign Economic Administration and the Banque Mellie on December 20 and 21, 1945 (103.9169/[12-2145]).

3. Medical supplies and approximately 3,000 tires total value \$300,000 remaining will be sold to local dealers by Colonel Stetson acting as agent for FEA for full price in US dollars. Originals of documents will be carried to Washington by Wells who is about to return to US.

Sent Dept 1166, repeated to Cairo for Dawson² to FEA as 397. [Murray, Wells and Glendinning.]

MURRAY

[Camp Abadan was sold to a private Iranian corporation on July 24, 1946, for \$900,000 and Abadan Airport to the Iranian Government on March 11, 1947, for \$136,682. The contracts were signed at Tehran on behalf of the United States Government by the OFLC Field Commissioners in Iran (891.24/11-2746, 891.24 FLC/3-1147).]

ADVICE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE THAT OIL COMPANIES POSTPONE THE SENDING OF REPRESENTATIVES TO IRAN TO DISCUSS CONCESSIONS⁴

891.6363/10-645

The Ambassador in Iran (Murray) to the Secretary of State

No. 112

Tehran, October 6, 1945.

[Received October 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 523 of September 14, 1945,⁵ and the Embassy's telegram No. 803 of October 4,⁶ on the subject of the proposal of the Seaboard Oil Company to send a representative to Iran for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with the Iranian Government for the development of the country's petroleum resources. The proposal has been discussed at length by the Embassy staff and in amplification of the Embassy's telegram referred to above, I believe the Department will be interested in the following points which have been brought out in the course of our discussions:

It appears to the Embassy that there is perhaps one argument in favor of the proposal, namely, that with troop withdrawals in process,⁷

² John P. Dawson, Acting Economic Counselor.

⁴ For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the decision of the Iranian Government to prohibit negotiations with foreign interests for oil concessions, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 445 ff.

⁵ Not printed; it advised that the Seaboard Oil Company wished to send a representative to Iran to discuss the possibility of an agreement with the Iranian Government to develop petroleum resources for Iran under a managerial type of contract and requested the views of the Ambassador regarding the feasibility of such discussions (891.6363/9-1445).

⁶ Not printed; it stated: "Visit Seaboard representative definitely inadvisable at this time." (891.6363/10-445)

⁷ For documentation on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, see pp. 359 ff.

the Iranian Government may reopen oil concession negotiations some time within the next year and there may be some merit in having an oil company representative in Tehran closely in touch with developments. Whether this would turn out to be an advantage or a disadvantage, however, would depend very much on the type of man that was sent. Inasmuch as the Seaboard Oil Company proposes to discuss a managerial relationship rather than a concession as such he would not, technically at least, be directly violating the existing prohibition against concession negotiations on the part of the Iranian Government.

On the other hand, in view of the substantial foreign capital that would be required, any managerial relationship would probably have to be developed on lines rather similar to a concession. The discussions, therefore, would raise the question of violation by the Iranian Government of the Majlis⁸ prohibition of concession negotiations, particularly since secrecy would be definitely impossible and the public would assume that concession negotiations were in progress.

Inasmuch as Seaboard held a concession in the northern zone in 1937-38,⁹ the return of this company's representative might be interpreted here as a challenge to the Russian claim for a northern concession. The consequence might be to retard Russian troop withdrawals. It is quite likely that the Russians would intervene, demanding concessions for themselves, and applying pressures on the Government of the sort exercised last fall. It is unlikely that the Russians would be any happier at the prospect of the Americans holding a managerial type concession than a direct concession.

Other American oil companies, particularly Sinclair and Standard Vacuum, would probably want to send out representatives for the same purpose. Even one oil man in Tehran would be likely to stir up difficulties with and for the Iranian Government, but with two or three men here, the American Government would be placed in an awkward position unless it were prepared to force the issue.

Furthermore, there would be considerable risk that premature discussions would prejudice the American position for negotiations later on. In view of the delicate position politically of oil concessions in Iran, it would seem advisable to obtain informal clearance with the Iranian Government in advance of the arrival of any oil company representatives. It is the Embassy's opinion that it would be impossible to secure such clearance at the present time, but that it might be possible later on after the departure of the Russian troops.

In general, the Embassy's position is that this is not an appropriate time to discuss the development of Iranian petroleum resources by an

⁸ Iranian Parliament.

⁹ For documentation on concessions held by the Seaboard Oil Company in Iran during these years, see *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. II, pp. 734 ff., and *ibid.*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 752 ff.

American company, either on a managerial basis or an outright concession basis. The effect might be particularly unfortunate in the case of the Seaboard Oil Company because of its previous connections in the northern zone.

These are the Embassy's views, based largely on political grounds. However, it is believed that it might be helpful to discuss the pros and cons of the managerial type of concession with the Petroleum Attaché¹⁰ and the Embassy suggests that the Department instruct Von Schilling to come to Tehran in the near future for a short visit.

Respectfully yours,

WALLACE MURRAY

[In a letter of October 12, 1945, to John M. Lovejoy, President of the Seaboard Oil Company, the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) stated: "Following up our conversation concerning the possibility of your sending a representative to Iran, Ambassador Murray has now expressed his strong belief that this would be very inadvisable at the present time.

As you may have observed from the press, foreign troops must be withdrawn from Iran by March 2, 1946, after which time the Iranian Government will presumably feel free to discuss petroleum matters with the representatives of foreign firms." (891.6363/10-445).

A letter of similar purport was sent to Philo W. Parker, President of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, by the Chief of the Petroleum Division (Loftus) on November 28, 1945 (891.6363/10-945).]

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE TERMINATION OF ANGLO-SOVIET CENSORSHIP IN IRAN

[Anglo-Soviet censorship of telegraphic and postal communications emanating from or coming to Iran was based on the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance of January 29, 1942, and a supplemental arrangement made by the three concerned parties on February 7, 1942. In telegram 450, July 3, 1945, 9 a. m., the Ambassador in Iran (Murray) suggested immediate steps to eliminate Anglo-Soviet censorship and recommended that the Department indicate its interest in the matter to the British Foreign Office (891.918/7-345). In telegram 5601, July 10, 1945, 1 p. m., repeated to Tehran as No. 346, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) was requested to indicate to the Foreign Office the Department's interest in eliminating Anglo-Soviet censorship in Iran, a step regarded as "highly desirable in interests of free access to news in this important area" (891.918/7-345).

¹⁰ Franz von Schilling, Petroleum Attaché at the Legation in Egypt.

In the meantime, Ambassador Murray advised in telegram 458, July 5, 1945, 9 a. m. that he had suggested to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sepahbodi) the desirability of terminating such censorship (891.711/7-545). In telegram 584, August 2, 1945, 5 p. m., he reported further that the Iranian Foreign Office had sent notes dated July 31 to the British and Soviet Embassies requesting termination of censorship activities (891.711/8-245).

British Foreign Office views were conveyed to the American Embassy in a letter of August 28, 1945, the substance of which was sent to the Department in telegram 8920, August 31, 1945, 8 p. m. The Foreign Office maintained that the British had not exercised political censorship of press messages but had felt it necessary to censor communications regarding military matters as long as the war continued. With the surrender of Japan, the Foreign Office no longer regarded Allied censorship in Iran as necessary or justifiable. (891.918/8-3145)

Ambassador Murray, in telegram 675, September 1, 1945, 8 a. m., reported information from the British Ambassador in Iran (Bullard) that the British and Soviet censors had called on Iranian authorities the previous day at which time the British censor advised of the ending of British censorship controls in Iran and the Soviet censor advised that the Iranians need no longer submit to him any communication to be sent to the United States, Great Britain and their dependencies (891.711/9-145). In telegram 687, September 4, 1945, 4 p. m., the Ambassador reported Soviet censorship of telegrams had ceased the same day (891.711/9-445). The ending of Soviet censorship activities in Iran was reported in telegram 752, September 21, 2 p. m., from Tehran; for text, see page 415.]

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN REGARDING A PROPOSED CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT

[On March 8, 1945, Acting Secretary of State Grew transmitted to the Ambassador in Iran a draft air transport agreement to be submitted to the Iranian Government. The Ambassador submitted a copy of the proposed agreement to the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on April 5. In a note of November 8, the Iranian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Homayoundjah) informed the Ambassador of his Government's unwillingness to negotiate a civil air transport agreement with any foreign government while occupying forces remained in Iran.¹¹ The note, however, granted temporary permission for an American airline designated by the United States

¹¹ For documentation on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, see pp. 359 ff.

Government ¹² to undertake civil flight in Iran and to pick up and discharge traffic at Mehrabad Airport at Tehran. Under Departmental authorization on December 4, the Ambassador notified the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 17 of the acceptance of this interim arrangement by the United States.

The United States resumed discussions with Iran for a civil air transport agreement in 1946 but it was not until January 16, 1957, that the two Governments signed such an agreement at Tehran.¹³]

¹² On July 5, 1945, the Civil Aeronautics Board had designated Pan American Airways to operate commercial services to and from Tehran.

¹³ For text, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 4021*, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. ix, p. 407.

IRAQ

VISIT OF THE REGENT OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED STATES

[In March 1945, President Roosevelt extended an invitation to Abdul Ilah, the Regent of Iraq, to visit the United States as a guest of this Government. The invitation was accepted and arrangements were completed for the Regent to arrive on April 19. As a result of the President's death on April 12, the visit was suspended.

President Truman invited the Regent to visit the United States late in May, and the invitation was accepted. The President greeted his guest at the White House on May 28, in the company of White House staff and Department of State officers. Acting Secretary of State Grew noted, in a memorandum of conversation, that "we brought out the fact that we wished to develop closer relations with Iraq and that the best method of doing this was to develop a free flow of traffic and communications between our two countries. For this reason, and in order that more Americans might be interested in visiting Iraq, we felt it important that agreements should be made permitting the free and direct access of American civil aviation to Iraq and also the setting up of a direct radiotelephone and telegraph circuit with the United States so that messages would not have to pass through other capitals. Our interest in the great oil resources of Iraq was also brought out."

Nuri Pasha as-Said, former Prime Minister of Iraq and leading member of the Regent's entourage, discussed the question of Iraqi petroleum with officers of the Department on May 29; see memorandum of May 29 by Mr. Grew and footnote 10, pages 49 and 51, respectively.

The Regent and President Truman exchanged messages on June 27 and July 8, on the occasion of the departure of the former from the United States; for texts, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 8, 1945, page 71.

Documentation regarding the visit of the Regent is found in Department of State files under No. 890G.001.]

LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAQ¹

[For texts of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Iraq, signed at Washington, July 31, 1945, and accompanying exchange of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 470, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1535.]

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 643 ff.

LIBERIA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL REFORM IN LIBERIA

882.00/4-445

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*¹

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1945.

The Department has for some months been making an intensive study of economic, political, and social conditions in the Republic of Liberia, which compare most unfavorably with the situation in neighboring colonial territories. The inefficiency and lack of initiative of the ruling group, the corruption in government circles, the scandalous treatment of the native inhabitants, and the lack of democratic practices in this independent republic are of particular concern to us at a time when the problem of dependent peoples is under widespread discussion.

Representatives of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, who recently made a tour of West Africa at your suggestion, are reported to be shocked at what they saw in Liberia in comparison with British and French colonial administrations. Whether or not we admit it, Liberia is widely regarded as a responsibility of the United States.

At the suggestion of President Tubman,² the chief³ of the FEA⁴ mission in Liberia recently delivered a forceful speech calling attention to Liberia's shortcomings. President Tubman appears willing to undertake some housecleaning but not without "pressure" and moral support from the United States Government to enable him to face the resistance of the entrenched Americo-Liberian oligarchy. Mr. Felix Cole, our recent Chargé d' Affaires in Monrovia, has urged that plain speaking is necessary regarding conditions in Liberia, where we are advancing \$12,500,000 to construct a harbor⁵ and assisting the country with an economic survey, a health project and agricultural advice.

¹ Marginal notation: "D[ean] A[cheson] O.K. FDR" appears on a carbon copy of this memorandum attached to the file copy.

² William V. S. Tubman, President of Liberia.

³ Earl P. Hanson.

⁴ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁵ For documentation relating to the conclusion of the agreement between the United States and Liberia for the construction of a port and port works, signed at Monrovia, December 31, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 678 ff. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 411, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1357. For preliminary agreement on mutual aid between the United States and Liberia, signed at New York, June 8, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 324, or 57 Stat. 978.

There seems little use in handling our relations with Liberia in a sentimental vein or as if the Republic represented a successful experiment in democracy. Sincere friends of Liberia, as well as intelligent Negro opinion in the United States, are, in general, highly critical of that country. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to expect Liberians, without outside assistance, to make a showing that compares favorably with colonial areas which have regular subsidies from the mother country for education, health and administrative machinery.

If the sensitivities of the French, British or Dutch should be aroused over the question of trusteeship for dependent peoples, it is not impossible that some embarrassing charges against Liberia may arise at the San Francisco conference.⁶ There are indications that the British may, at some future time, to serve their own ends, throw a spotlight on compulsory labor practises in Liberia.

The Department considers that American interests in Liberia are of sufficient importance and our responsibilities compelling enough to justify strong representations to the Liberian Government, coupled with a program of moral, economic and possibly financial support, to bring about needed reform within the structure of Liberian independence. If you approve, the Department plans to proceed along these lines.

DEAN ACHESON

500.CC/5-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard)

[SAN FRANCISCO,] May 1, 1945.

I called on Vice President Simpson⁷ at his request and he informed me that a telegram had been received from President Tubman to the effect that the British Government had agreed to supply a trained Colonial Administrator to assist the Government of Liberia in handling problems relating to the native peoples of the hinterland. Mr. Simpson was not familiar with the background of this matter and could not explain the circumstances under which the arrangements had apparently been made with the British for the services of a colonial administrator. Mr. Simpson asked me what we thought of this development.

I expressed considerable surprise that the Liberian Government had entered into any such agreement. Mr. Simpson confessed that he too was at a loss to explain this seeming departure from a well-

⁶ The United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco April 25 to June 26, 1945; for documentation regarding the Conference, see vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.

⁷ Charles L. Simpson, Vice President of Liberia.

established Liberian policy, namely, not to encourage British influence in Liberia. I said that this development, however, might possibly tie in with certain signs we had noted in regard to increasing British interest in the country because of the recent growth of American interests, such as the port construction, economic mission, trade development, etc.

I suggested to Mr. Simpson that a British colonial expert in Liberia would be in an excellent position to obtain information about conditions relating to native welfare and to publicize those conditions if he saw fit. I said that, quite frankly, we had been somewhat concerned at the possibility of the British or some other colonial power making an issue in San Francisco of native conditions in Liberia if we continued to press our own strong views concerning trusteeship and general improvement for the lot of dependent peoples everywhere. I observed that the administration of the Liberian hinterland left a great deal to be desired and would undoubtedly be a source of public criticism in the near future by those who were beginning to become familiar with those conditions. I suggested the possibility that a British colonial administrator in Liberia might take advantage of the opportunity to counteract American views about dependent peoples under British control by presenting a picture of conditions in Liberia which was in some measure at least a responsibility of the United States.

To forestall any possible attempt by the British to give publicity to conditions in Liberia, I suggested that it might be advantageous to the Liberian Government if it could say that these problems were already under discussion with the United States Government and that a general program looking toward improved conditions was being worked out. I said I felt sure that this Government, if requested, would be in a position to assist Liberia in finding qualified personnel to advise and consult on administrative problems in the hinterland, as well as in matters affecting Liberia's welfare. If Liberia wished to take such matters up with us, we would be prepared to discuss them at any time.

Mr. Simpson said that he appreciated the foregoing comments and that he would send a telegram immediately to Monrovia strongly advising against the employment of a British colonial administrator. He said it was his personal view that the British should not increase their influence in Liberia and that he would urge this viewpoint upon President Tubman. He made no comment upon my suggestion that public criticism might soon develop in regard to conditions in Liberia or that the United States would be glad to discuss such subjects with the Liberian Government.

HENRY S. VILLARD

882.00/7-445

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Grew)*⁸

[WASHINGTON,] July 4, 1945.

I received yesterday Mr. Simpson, Vice President of Liberia, merely for a courtesy visit and today I asked him to come in again and had a short talk with him regarding affairs in Liberia. I sketched to the Vice President the active support which the United States had given to Liberia ever since its inception and spoke of the many ways in which we are aiding Liberia today, including the \$12,500,000 for the building of a port at Monrovia, and also our assistance in connection with public health and in the economic life of the country. I said to the Vice President that in view of the active support we were giving to his country, it was only reasonable to expect that Liberia would put its own house in order in various respects so that his country could take its place among responsible democratic nations in the post-war world, and I said that we were greatly concerned over present conditions in Liberia. We feel very strongly that without political and legislative reform the desired economic, social and educational progress in Liberia cannot be obtained and we feel equally strongly that these serious obstacles to progress should be removed. I spoke especially of the need for reform in the administration of the Liberian hinterland and also reform in education, the economic and social life of the country, including agriculture, and in public health. I said that our Government is studying the best means of assisting Liberia's carrying out such reforms and that we shall welcome suggestions from his Government regarding the type of assistance considered necessary. I urged upon the Vice President very earnestly that on returning to Monrovia, he should discuss these matters with his Government and tell both the President and his other associates of the improvements which we feel are essential if the desired progress and the justification of our assistance are to be attained. I added that I was speaking to him in a very intimate and friendly way and for that reason I had asked him to come to see me alone with nobody else present.

The Vice President appeared to take my remarks in a friendly way and said that it would be a great help to him if I would give him a memorandum of the points I had mentioned so that he could have it before him on his return to Monrovia. I said that I would be very glad to have such a memorandum prepared⁹ and to have it sent to him

⁸ Copies to the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Acheson, Assistant Secretary Dunn, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and the Division of African Affairs.

⁹ *Infra.*

in New York before his departure from that city on July 10. Mr. Simpson admitted freely the need for improvement in various ways and he said that President Tubman had these matters very much in mind. He had in fact only recently traveled all over the country and the hinterland and in cases where administrative officials were found to be incompetent or cruel in their methods they were being immediately replaced. He spoke also of our missions¹⁰ there and of the important help they were giving. The Vice President gave every evidence of a genuine desire on the part of his Government to meet the views which I had expressed, and he thanked me for the time I had given him.

JOSEPH C. GREW

882.00/7-445

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Vice President of Liberia (Simpson)

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945.

In connection with a conversation which took place today between Vice President Simpson and Mr. Grew, the following represents an elaboration of some of the remarks made by Mr. Grew.

The sympathy with which for over a century the United States has regarded the efforts of the people of Liberia to establish and maintain their independence and to demonstrate their right to a place among progressive democratic countries has been expressed by many friendly acts. This interest is primarily responsible for the preservation of an independent Liberia during a period in which much of Africa was concerted into colonies and protectorates and it was probably the realization of the friendly interest of the United States in its welfare which on several occasions in the past caused Liberia to turn to the United States when in difficulties.

During the present World War the United States signed a Lend-Lease Agreement with Liberia providing for the financing and construction of new port and harbor works at Monrovia. United States technical experts have made geological studies in Liberia. Health and agricultural missions are actively engaged in programs of assistance; further programs for education and economic development are under study.

We have repeatedly interested ourselves in the relations of the colonists and later of the Government of Liberia with the native tribes. We recognize with pleasure the amendment of your Constitution this year, by which your Legislature is enlarged to include three repre-

¹⁰ i.e., the Economic Mission under the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Public Health Mission under the United States Public Health Service.

sentatives of these native tribes, also the efforts of President Tubman and his administration to correct abusive and corrupt practices on the part of hinterland officials.

It is felt that the steps now being taken by your Government are favorable signs of progress in Liberia. They represent, however, only a beginning in the right direction. We feel very strongly that without far-reaching political and legislative reform the desired economic, social and educational progress in Liberia cannot be obtained and we feel equally strongly that present serious obstacles to progress should be removed.

At San Francisco the delegates of Liberia played an active and constructive role. They assisted in the preparation of a Charter to provide a system of international peace and security under which universal respect for the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms may be achieved for all men and women without distinction as to race, language or religion. We are glad that Liberia has dedicated itself to a policy designed to achieve world-wide progress and better standards of living.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY

Revenues

The Liberian Government's revenues for the ten year period ending December 31, 1944 are reported to have been as follows:

1935	\$ 602,717.00
1936	784,065.00
1937	1,012,336.00
1938	883,328.00
1939	826,700.00
1940	749,583.00
1941	982,244.00
1942	1,005,272.00
1943	1,429,926.00
1944	1,598,400.00
	<hr/>
Total	\$9,874,571.00

The average annual revenue has been slightly less than \$1,000,000. The increase in receipts during 1943-1944 and those reported also for the first quarter of 1945 largely must be ascribed to wartime prosperity. Receipts at this level may continue for a short time, but without new sources of income based upon further economic development, it is unlikely that revenues equal to those of the last two years can be anticipated in the post-war period.

The creation of the new port at Monrovia is essential to the economic growth of Liberia, but it is, and will remain, ineffective and will entail annual expense unless the economic development for which it was designed is undertaken and the port used. Without such develop-

ment it is impossible to foresee any substantial increase in the cargo volume to be handled through the new port. Monrovia now clears annually approximately 9,000 tons. The cost of operation of this port not including allowances for dredging or for breakwater repair is estimated at a figure slightly in excess of \$100,000 annually. A substantial part of this amount may well become a charge on your Budget of Expenditures unless shipments are rapidly increased.

Exports and Imports

In 1944 the value of Liberian exports is reported at a little over \$10,000,000. Of this sum \$9,076,723 represented rubber, which amounted to 91.1% of the total exports. Raw gold, represented 8.2% of that total; an accumulation of approximately two years was included in the total 1944 gold export figures. The next largest export value piassava fiber, represented about one-half of 1% of the total.

Rubber from Liberian owned plantations represents but a small proportion of the rubber shipments. The foreign exchange made available to the people of Liberia by these exports therefore is greatly less than their total value, and probably is not in excess of \$3,600,000.

Imports were reported in the sum of \$4,104,000. Much of this value is for imported food. The excess of import values over the foreign exchange made available through export sales was covered by various services, Missionary funds, advances by the United States Government, etc.

Authorized Expenditures

In 1944 your authorized Budgets of Expenditures reached the sum of \$1,522,137. This represented an increase of 45.7% over the 1943 budget. In 1945 the combined Budgets of Expenditures indicate a total of \$2,188,026.

The appropriation for 1945 was made possible through the following availabilities:

AVAILABLE FUNDS—1945	
Total Revenues, 1944	\$1, 598. 400. 94
Less Basic Budget, 1944	680, 339. 71
<hr/>	
Excess of revenues of expenditures available to be spent in 1945	918, 061. 23
Unexpended balance of leased lend funds	75, 929. 83
Unexpended balances of 1944 appropriations carried forward	204, 035. 42
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Total availabilities as above from other than estimated 1945 revenues	1, 198, 026. 48
Basic Budget, 1945 Estimates	990, 000. 00
<hr/>	
Total availabilities, 1945	\$2, 188, 026. 48

If budget estimates for 1945 are fully realized some excess of revenues will become available to be included in the 1946 estimates. However, it is apparent that the Government of Liberia has increased its current expenditures to an amount which exceeds the expanded receipts of 1943 and 1944 and goes far beyond the income of the Government before the War. Liberia cannot follow for any great length of time a policy of annual expenditure in excess of annual revenues without running the serious risk of financial disaster.

FUTURE POLICY

We have been advised of the desire of the Government of Liberia to carry out certain new projects of public works, among which are:

- (a) to move its Capital to a new location in the interior at a cost of several millions of dollars;
- (b) to install a sewage and water supply;
- (c) to construct a hydroelectric plant for power;
- (d) to construct a railroad for the development of the interior;
- (e) to hold a Centennial celebration in 1947 which will require substantial new construction and financing;
- (f) to construct a stadium at a cost of \$300,000.

We understand that the Liberian Government desires to explore in the United States the possibility of financing one or more of these projects. We venture to suggest that it would be undesirable to assume a number of unrelated financial commitments involving pledges of revenues not now obligated. It seems to us that it would be appropriate to first prepare a comprehensive program indicating the various projects and costs of public works, health, educational and agricultural developments planned. This will permit you to make the best use of Liberia's financial resources and to give priority to those things on your financial program which you desire first to accomplish.

At this time we are assisting Liberia by advancing funds necessary for the construction of the new port, by assuming in some instances all expenses, and in others the more substantial part of the costs of the Economic, Health, Agricultural and Educational Missions which have been requested by your Government and which are now in Liberia. To this extent the Liberian Government's current budget has been relieved of this burden. However we are of the opinion that no satisfactory development in Liberia can be expected from the mere supply of funds and facilities by the United States, or by the use alone of Liberia's temporary surplus revenues. What appears to be needed is a far-reaching program of economic and social development adjusted to Liberian needs and so implemented as to insure its success.

It would be appreciated if upon your return to Liberia, you would inform the President and other appropriate authorities of your Government of our continued interest in the welfare of Liberia and the

Liberian people. It is hoped that the Government of Liberia will give careful consideration to the views which we have expressed and will adopt measures which, in our opinion, are necessary if Liberia is to take its place among democratic, progressive nations.

882.51/7-2945 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, July 29, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

311. President Tubman and I conferred today for two hours and a half at the Legation. He commended Dept's "fine approach" in memorandum submitted by Acting Secretary Grew to Vice President Simpson with respect to the importance of Liberia's formulating a new financial program. It is his intention to hold a Cabinet meeting in the near future when it is expected that favorable consideration will be given to Dept's suggestion that the Liberian Govt formulate a comprehensive program which will specifically indicate various projects under contemplation and their respective costs in keeping with ability to pay.

I emphasized importance of administration taking heed of friendly advice given by Dept and President Tubman assured me that policy of retrenchment would be reflected in new budget.

Other memoranda brought back from Washington by Vice President Simpson were discussed. President Tubman favors idea of contracting railroad which would also serve French territory contiguous to Liberia provided American Govt interests are identified with such a project.

For two hours on the 28th instant Vice President Simpson discussed with me at the Legation memoranda in question. He appears to be in complete agreement with President except that like Walker¹¹ he prefers a combination of interests to operate iron ore concession and port.

WALTON

711.82/8-745 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, August 7, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 6:15 p. m.]

326. Following has been received by me from Acting Secretary King.

¹¹ Walter F. Walker, Liberian Consul General at New York.

"I am instructed by His Excellency the President to request that you bring to the attention of your Govt his deep appreciation of the interest which your Govt has in the past and is consistently manifesting in the welfare and well-being of the Liberian Govt and people; and that he welcomes the views and suggestions expressed in the memorandum of conversation had by Mr. Grew, US Acting Secretary of State, with Vice President Simpson in Washington July 4, 1945, the text of which is having the keen study and consideration of the Liberian Govt."

WALTON

882.51/10-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, October 24, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received October 25—9:32 a. m.]

418. Secretary of State Dennis in a formal note under date of October 23 advises that President Tubman has formulated a 5-year program for Liberia's development predicated largely upon suggestions in memorandum of conversation between Acting Secretary [of] State Grew and Vice President Simpson of July 4 and that Liberian Govt is sending to Washington in near future William Dennis Secretary of Treasury and H. Lafayette Harmon Counselor at Law to discuss and reach agreement with appropriate authorities "for effective putting into execution the proposed plan".

On October 20, Tubman conferred with Simpson, former Presidents Barclay and King and also James Cooper¹⁸ concerning 5-year plan which envisages borrowing of 25 million dollars from Import-Export Bank for 50 years. Only person who gave full endorsement was Cooper who opposed Tubman for President in 1943 elections. King thought plan should be carried out section by section only, Barclay wanted more time to give careful study; Simpson desired definite information about terms if loan was made.

Prominent Liberians have confidentially expressed hope that Dept will discourage negotiation of so large a loan which is not thought necessary or practical.

WALTON

882.51/10-2545 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, October 25, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 26—9:15 a. m.]

420. I have learned from a strictly confidential source that among items included in Liberian Government's contemplated loan for prose-

¹⁸ Democratic Party candidate for the Presidency of Liberia in 1943.

cution of 5-year program are: (in dollars) education 3,000,000; health 1,865,000; roads 6,000,000; light, power and water 3,000,000; agriculture 1,750,000; industries 1,000,000; transportation 4,200,000 of which 4,000,000 is for railroad construction; radio 261,000; telephone system 30,000; postal facilities 60,400; inland waterways 25,000; coast-wise transportation 175,000; banking facilities for making development loans 250,000; scientific industrial research 1,000,000; centennial celebration 3,018,000; for study on capital removal 100,000.

Liquidation of loan in 50 years, amortization to begin after 5 years, interest to begin at once chargeable to Government revenues.

On 23d instant Secretary State Dennis cabled and stated President Tubman had requested that I inform my Government of Liberian Government's intention to send delegation to Washington "to discuss 5-year plan of development". I inquired if request was formal and on receiving affirmative reply suggested transmission of formal note to Legation as matter of record which was done.

Neither President nor Secretary State has specifically referred to loan orally or in writing obviously because I have repeatedly emphasized economy in keeping with Department's expressed policy.

As John Adunaway, financial adviser, is now in USA his appointment as a member of any delegation seeking a loan should be very helpful.

WALTON

882.51/10-3045 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary of State

MONROVIA, October 30, 1945— 7 p. m.

[Received October 31—4: 05 p. m.]

427. President Tubman called by appointment at Legation afternoon October 29 and discussed from 5 to 7:30 his 5-Year Plan and contemplated loan which he said had stemmed from suggestions contained in the Grew memo of conversation¹⁴ with Vice President Simpson.

After divulging plans he invited my candid opinion as to their efficacy and prospects of winning favorable consideration. I expressed inability authoritatively to reflect my Government's attitude on matters which had not been formally presented or given consideration. However, I was of the opinion my Government was in full accord with any program which envisaged revision of election laws, enactment and amendment of labor laws, extension of education, health and agricultural activities, a geological survey of entire country and road construction.

¹⁴ Dated July 4, p. 591.

I expressed doubt as to my Government making available to Liberia \$4,000,000 for railroad construction and \$3,018,000 for centennial celebration. I reminded President Liberian Government neither formally or informally advised my Government of intention to celebrate Republic's 100th anniversary although Secretary State had authorized former Honorary Consul at Los Angeles to invite Governors of States to participate.

I observed that in my opinion operation of coastwise and inland waterways vessels was business proposition pregnant with promise and should be undertaken by private enterprise.

On subject of borrowing large sums for "scientific industrial research" I referred to Public Act 63 which makes possible assignment of technical assistants, as in geological survey of Bomi Hills in 1944 and presence now of technical assistants in country.

Tubman declared that, as the US already had sent various Missions to Liberia, he desired funds to enable Liberia to finance independently some of its own projects. I pointed out that Public Act 63 provides for Liberian Government's assumption of financial responsibility.

The idea of Liberian Government's constructing hotel for accommodation of visitors I thought impractical.

Tubman advised he was eliminating request for funds to construct railway and to operate coastwise and inland waterways vessels. He requested that I inform Department of our conversation.

At social affair on 26th former President King inquired what I thought of 5-year plan and expressed amazement that I had not seen it. He wanted to know how I, under circumstances, could properly interpret proposals to my Government. The following morning he talked with Tubman who subsequently invited me to his bungalow residence that evening. Because of previous engagement arrangements were made for me to visit President following day. President explained he had been very busy drafting message to Legislature, hence his failure go over plan in detail with me; that there was only one copy which was in possession of Secretary of Treasury and suggested that he call at Legation with document on evening of 29th.

When I alluded to fact that Secretary State had made arrangements for 2 delegates to leave Fisherman's Lake for New York October 31, although no word had been received from Department in reply to my telegram 418, October 24 and no visas had been applied for, he intimated precipitancy was due to Secretary State's characteristic haste.

Despite protests H. Lafayette Harmon will accompany Secretary of Treasury William E. Dennis.

I find no enthusiasm among officials or public for Liberia's negotiating a big loan.

[WALTON]

882.51/10-2545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1945—8 p. m.

283. Reurtels 418 Oct 24 and 420 Oct 25. Dept glad Liberian Govt drafting 5-year economic plan and would welcome opportunity-exchange ideas regarding program and financing. Dept inclined to feel however that proposed sending of Liberian delegation might well be deferred until Dept has received proposal and discussed it with interested agencies. Dept doubts direct conversations would be fruitful at this initial stage.

You should informally advise Govt above sense and suggest plan, in as much detail as possible, be submitted through Leg for Dept's study and consideration.

BYRNES

882.51/11-845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Liberia (Walton)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1945—6 p. m.

288. Please reassure Tubman, reurtels 418, 420, and 427, October 24, 25, and 30, of Department's interest in every phase of their 5-year program as originally drawn including parts expected to be financed privately. Department desires to consider the adequacy of the whole program of development in addition to means, foreign or Liberian, for financing, whether publicly or privately, any particular item.

Without study of the plan Department cannot of course say whether any particular item appears unwise, nor can any except a general preference be expressed for private as opposed to Governmental financing.

Department reiterates views expressed in Deptel 283, November 1, 1945, that direct conversations would not be fruitful at this stage. Continue to emphasize that basic social, political, and economic reform along democratic lines is an essential condition to expanded or even continued U.S. assistance.

BYRNES

882.51/11-2145 : Telegram

The Minister in Liberia (Walton) to the Secretary

MONROVIA, November 21, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received November 22—6:30 a. m.]

451. Today I received informal note from Secretary of State Dennis in reply to my informal note of November 13 conveying Dept's observations made in Deptel 288, November 8. I have been requested by Dennis to inform my Govt that President Tubman is greatly gratified

by assurance of interest expressed by Dept in every phase of Liberian Govt's 5-year program including those parts which are expected to be privately financed; that 5-year plan is very elaborate one whose execution will not be possible from current revenues of Liberian Govt and that in the event it becomes impossible to secure financing from United States plan will have to be modified and made to fit within limits of Govt's financial ability; that meanwhile intimation that Dept desires to consider adequacy of entire program of development is noted.

It is also the wish of Tubman that I inform my Govt that he has taken due note of emphasis which it places on social, political and economic reforms and that "he is profoundly concerned with and deeply cognizant of the matters pointed out in this respect and has already begun these reforms, being committed both by the outline of his policies published prior to his election and confirmed in his inaugural address to see these reforms made practical, not use such to insure expanded or even continued United States assistance, as the basic national fundamental justness and righteousness of such reforms."

Two copies of 5-year plan were enclosed for consideration of Dept which are being transmitted today by diplomatic pouch.¹⁶

WALTON

¹⁶ Transmitted to the Department in despatch 745, November 21, 1945, from Monrovia, not printed. The copies of the plan have not been found in Department files.

MOROCCO

STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER; RETURN OF TANGIER TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL¹

881.00/5-945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Wasson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1945.

Participants: Mr. George H. Middleton, Second Secretary, British Embassy.

Mr. Cole, AF²

Mr. Wasson, AF

Mr. Middleton stated that, in the absence of Mr. Michael Wright³ from Washington, he had been asked to bring us the British proposals with regard to Tangier. He said that he would leave the *aide-mémoire*⁴ for our study and that he would like to discuss the suggestions with us at our early convenience. Mr. Middleton remarked that after many months of waiting there was very little that was specific in the recommendations; however, he had been asked to express the earnest hope that the American Government would be prepared to associate itself actively in the future administration of the Zone, both in the interim period, when it was suggested that the 1923 regime⁵ with some amendments should be reintroduced pending the establishment of a new agreement, and later on when the new and permanent regime shall have been established. Mr. Middleton went on to say that these were preliminary views, and that the Foreign Office suggested that detailed discussions should be held in London at an early date, since they and

¹ For previous documentation relating to the termination of the Spanish occupation of the Tangier Zone, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v. pp. 553 ff.; for documentation relating to the Spanish occupation and control of the Tangier Zone, and reservation of American rights therein, see *ibid.*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 783 ff., and *ibid.*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 550 ff.

² Felix Cole, Appointed Minister to Ethiopia and temporarily assigned to the Division of African Affairs (AF).

³ Counselor of the British Embassy.

⁴ See *infra*.

⁵ Convention regarding the organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone, signed at Paris, December 18, 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. XXVIII, p. 541. For reservations of American treaty rights, see note to the French Ambassador, June 18, 1925, *Foreign Relations*, 1925, vol. II, p. 599. An agreement revising the Convention was signed at Paris, July 25, 1928, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. LXXXVII, p. 211. For reservation of American treaty rights with respect to this Agreement, see telegram 76, March 15, 1928, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1928, vol. III, p. 371.

the French had no one in Washington sufficiently familiar with the problem. The Foreign Office had informed the Embassy in Washington, according to Mr. Middleton, that the French Embassy in London had inquired what the British views were with regard to Tangier and had intimated that it would like to discuss steps looking to the withdrawal of the Spanish authorities in the Zone. While expressing the opinion that the U.S.S.R. should be kept informed of developments, Mr. Middleton felt that steps to restore the international regime should be taken by the United States Government, the French Government, and His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Middleton inquired whether we had made detailed studies of the administration of the Zone with a view to making recommendations regarding the nationality of those who should head the three sections of the central administration: finance, interior (municipal police, fire, prisons), and public health and assistance. He stated that the British felt strongly that an American or British subject should be in charge of finances and that a strict accounting should be demanded of the Spanish for the disposition made of all receipts during their illegal occupation of the Zone, no matter how much they objected. The British, he said, felt that a Spaniard might head the department of public health and assistance. Recommendations would be made looking to the reorganization of the Assembly, to reduce the number of votes controlled by the French under the 1923 Statute. He likewise inquired as to our views regarding such matters as the Mixed Court, currency, the native administration, and schools.

I informed Mr. Middleton that the British proposals would receive the careful attention of this Government and that we expected to receive specific recommendations from our Chargé d'Affaires⁶ at Tangier in a day or so which, we hoped, would cover the points which he had mentioned.⁷ In reply to our inquiry as to whether we might have a copy of the detailed British recommendations to which he referred, Mr. Middleton replied that they consisted of copies of a large number of telegrams sent from London to Tangier, some of which canceled suggestions made in previous messages. He would, if we made the request, ask London whether he might provide the Department with paraphrases of the telegrams. Mr. Middleton pointed out that they did not necessarily represent the views of His Majesty's Government.

⁶ J. Rives Childs.

⁷ These recommendations concerning specific details of the Tangier question were transmitted to the Department in airgram A-148, May 10, 1945, from Tangier, not printed (881.00/5-1045).

881.00/5-1245

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government consider that the present illegal occupation of the International Zone of Tangier by the Spanish Government should be terminated as soon as possible. Thereafter they are of the opinion that an international regime should be restored in Tangier and that appropriate steps should be taken to eliminate from the new regime the defects of the old regime set up by the 1923 Convention. In the view of His Majesty's Government the new regime should be more truly international and there should be greater equality of status among the Powers concerned.

2. His Majesty's Government consider, moreover, that under the new regime the Tangier Zone should not be entirely demilitarised, as was the case under the old regime, but that arrangements should be made to enable radar and airfield facilities in the Zone to be available for the defence of the Straits area in times of crisis.

3. Subject to these changes His Majesty's Government consider that the new regime should, generally speaking, follow the main lines of the 1923 Convention; i.e., an Administration with an administrative staff appointed in accordance with an agreement between the Powers concerned, a Committee of Control consisting of the diplomatic or consular representatives of these Powers, and also, possibly, a Legislative Assembly. (If, however, the Legislative Assembly is to be retained, His Majesty's Government consider that it will be necessary to ensure that it functions in a more satisfactory manner than in the past, and that to this end it may be desirable that its powers should be reduced, or at least more strictly defined and controlled).

4. His Majesty's Government realise that it will not be possible to introduce a new regime immediately, since it will first be necessary to reach agreement by negotiation among the Powers concerned regarding the precise form that this new regime should take. For this reason they propose that in the meantime, on the termination of the present occupation of the Zone by the Spanish forces, the former international regime as laid down in the Convention of 1923 should be provisionally restored, subject to such few amendments and changes as may be considered essential and to which general agreement can be quickly obtained. This will entail, in the first place, agreement between the Powers principally concerned on these amendments and subsequently their communication to and acceptance by the other Powers parties to the 1923 Convention. It will also be necessary to work out in detail the arrangements which will have to be made on the termination of the Spanish occupation for the re-establishment of the various ad-

ministrative services—e.g., police—of the restored international regime.

5. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the United States Government will be prepared to associate themselves actively in the future administration of the Zone, both in the interim period, when it is suggested that the 1923 regime be reintroduced pending the negotiation of a new agreement, and later on when the new and permanent regime has been established. His Majesty's Government are confident that such participation by the United States Government would be of great assistance in building up a strong and stable regime and would do much to ensure the smooth running of the international administration.

6. As a first step it will, of course, be necessary to require the Spanish Government to give up the control which they have illegally assumed over the Zone. His Majesty's Government, looking beyond their present relations with the existing Spanish Government and taking account not only of their long-term desire to establish friendly relations with the Spanish nation but also the need to ensure the willing collaboration of Spain in the maintenance of the security of the Straits area, consider that the representations to the Spanish Government should not be framed in such a way as clearly to humiliate Spain or cause lasting resentment among the Spanish people. For this reason His Majesty's Government consider that every effort should be made to arrange for the transition to a restored international regime to take place peacefully and with the full consent of the Spanish Government. His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the best method of achieving this object would be for a joint approach to be made to the Spanish Government by the United States Government, the French Government and His Majesty's Government as soon as possible after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe.

7. The three Governments should first make it plain that they cannot acquiesce in any continuance of the Spanish occupation of the Zone, and should point out that in any case the circumstances in which the Spanish Government claimed that for practical reasons it was necessary for them to intervene in the Tangier Zone, ostensibly in order to protect its neutrality, no longer exist. Thereafter, provided the Spanish Government agree to abandon their occupation, the latter should be invited to cooperate in the immediate restoration of the 1923 regime on a temporary basis and amended where necessary, pending the negotiation of a fresh agreement.

8. In this connexion it should be pointed out that the Spanish authorities have more than once recently raised the question of Tangier with His Majesty's Embassy in Madrid. From their attitude it would seem that the Spanish Government realise quite well that they will have to abandon their present position in Tangier as soon as the war

in Europe is over, and that they would be quite prepared to see an international regime revived, provided that reasonable consideration was paid to the interests of Spain in the Zone, and especially that France was not allowed to acquire a more favoured position than Spain.

9. His Majesty's Government consider that, in order to ensure a peaceful transition without the danger of civil disturbances, a temporary military occupation of the Zone will almost certainly be necessary. While there would be obvious advantages in a purely Anglo-American occupation, His Majesty's Government feel that, in order to avoid friction with either France or Spain, both countries should be invited to associate themselves with the United States and the United Kingdom in carrying out the occupation. The number of troops required to maintain order would in any case be small and it should be possible to arrange for the supply of equal contingents by Great Britain, the United States, France and Spain. In the view of His Majesty's Government the importance of avoiding offending the susceptibilities of either France or Spain and—what is equally important—of securing their genuine co-operation in the re-establishment of the international regime, outweighs the local inconvenience which this arrangement might be likely to cause.

10. His Majesty's Government are anxious to reach broad agreement with the United States Government on the policy to be pursued as soon as possible. Once such agreement has been reached the two Governments should then, it is suggested, initiate discussions with the French Government with a view to securing their agreement in principle and concerting a line of joint action. This action would take the form in the first place of a joint communication in the name of the United States, the United Kingdom and French Governments to the Spanish Government requiring the latter to terminate their occupation of Tangier and setting out the views of the three Governments as to the future of the Zone. If the Spanish Government agreed in principle to these points, they should then be invited to discuss with the United States, the United Kingdom and French Governments:—

(a) How best and most rapidly to end the Spanish occupation of the Zone and replace it by an Anglo-American-Franco-Spanish occupation.

(b) What changes should be made in the 1923 Convention before it is restored as in [*an?*] interim regime and how could the consent of the other signatory Powers most rapidly be obtained.

(c) What other steps should be taken in connexion with the restoration of the 1923 regime.

(d) What action should be taken to summon an international conference to determine the final form which the eventual permanent regime should take.

881.00/5-945

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Wasson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1945.

Mr. Middleton informed me that a telegram had just been received from London, suggesting that our respective Ambassadors in Paris should approach the French, saying that our two Governments agree that the Spanish occupation of the International Zone of Tangier should be terminated as soon as possible and that, if the French agree, a joint notification on the part of the three countries should be made to the Spanish Government at an early date. In the meantime, the British suggest that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States should agree not to take any unilateral action which might prejudice the existing or any future international arrangement.

Mr. Middleton stated that the Embassy's cable to London, which had been sent at our request, had crossed the incoming message and that it was considered that immediate action by our two Governments was called for.

About an hour later I informed Mr. Middleton that instructions were being sent to Paris along the lines which had been suggested,⁸ and he replied that their Ambassador in Paris would be similarly instructed.

881.00/5-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, May 22, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received May 24—1: 45 a. m.]

1105. It is not clear from Tangier's airgram A-148 and A-150 of May 10⁹ that adequate provision has been made for the participation in the proposed restoration of international control in the Tangier Zone of all of those powers who have signed or adhered to the Tangier statute. Although it may be that considerations of policy make inadvisable merely a return to the *status quo ante* the Spanish occupation, the fact can hardly be overlooked that the statute is nevertheless still in effect and that any action involving a revision of [*or?*] termination of the international regime for which the statute provides in which the initiative is taken or shared by the United States which has

⁸ In telegram 2198, May 19, 1945, 8 p. m., the Ambassador in France was instructed that after immediate consultation with his British colleague and in agreement with him he should approach the French Government in the sense of this memorandum (881.00/5-1945). Telegram 2926, May 24, 1945, 2 p. m., from Paris, stated that these instructions had been carried out; the British and American Embassies had delivered similar notes to the French Foreign Office on May 22 (881.00/5-2445).

⁹ Neither printed; with regard to airgram A-148, see footnote 7, p. 602.

never adhered to the statute and from which there are excluded any of the seven powers¹⁰ who were actively participating in the administration of that regime prior to Nov 1940 will be likely to expose the United States to serious criticism on the part of the excluded powers. I should, therefore, think it important that regardless of what form the actual reoccupation of Tangier may take and regardless also of the nature of the interim regime which it is proposed thereafter to install, the reoccupation should at least be given the appearance of being a joint action on the part of the participating statutory powers. With the possible addition of Sweden which has adhered to the statute but never actively participated in its administration and with the support, if desired, of the United States as a legitimately interested power designed to relieve Spain of the responsibility of preserving single-handedly the neutrality of the Zone, the emergency which prompted it to assume responsibility in 1940 having passed with the termination of hostilities in Europe. Within this formula the *de facto* participation of the United States could be invoked in whatever manner and to whatever degree might be deemed desirable and an interim regime could then be established in accordance with the requirements of the situation and in conformity with the best interests of those powers legitimately concerned.

Inasmuch as Spanish cooperation is indispensable in any enduring solution of the Tangier question it is essential as a matter of expediency that Spain be permitted to get out of Tangier without public humiliation or loss of face which as indicated in my 307 of Feb 10, 6 a. m. [*p. m.*]¹¹ it appears willing to do and to that end it would appear to be eminently advisable to invite the Spanish Govt. to participate in the reoccupation of the zone as reference airgrams suggest.

Whether it is deemed desirable or undesirable for us to participate in a duly revised international administration in Tangier I am opposed to our embarking upon such a course in a manner which might detract from our future prestige and influence there and elsewhere. The entire world and particularly the smaller nations will be holding under close scrutiny the manner in which we are to wield the vast power which we have amassed in the course of the present war and for us to lay ourselves open to the charge of treating Tangier as a prize of war or of taking such action there as could be construed as being in disregard of existing treaty obligation or of the rights of smaller nations would be to jeopardize that great moral influence which is in itself one of the most precious assets of our foreign policy.

Rptd to Tangier as 59, to Paris as 243 to London as 327 and Lisbon as 115.

ARMOUR

¹⁰ i.e., France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

¹¹ Not printed.

881.00/5-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 27, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 4:13 p. m.]

2993. My 2984, May 26.¹² The following is a translation of an undated note from Bidault¹³ concerning Tangiers:

"Referring to letter No. 499¹⁴ which Your Excellency had the honor to address to me on May 22, I have the honor to inform you that the French Govt believes, as does the Govt of US that the moment has come to require of the Spanish Govt the evacuation of the Tangier Zone.

The Spanish [*French*] Govt considers moreover that the situation ("*Vétat de fait et de droit*") existing at Tangier in 1940—before the Spanish action by force—should be integrally reestablished. The statute of 1923 could then be purely and simply reestablished.

It will be necessary however at the moment when the Spanish troops will be withdrawn, to disembark at Tangiers, to assure there provisionally the maintenance of public order, a police force. The French Govt considers that this police force should be a Sherifian¹⁵ force. The international organizations of the zone having been dissolved by the Spanish, it is in fact the principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan which should predominate until such time as the statute will have been effectively restored in operation.

Acting in its quality [*capacity*] as protecting power for Morocco by virtue of treaty of protectorate,¹⁶ French Govt will assume task of transporting this force by a French warship. It would only see advantages if this operation of disembarkation is accompanied in the roadstead of Tangier by an inter-Allied naval demonstration.

French Govt has proposed to Brit Govt, co-signatory with it of the convention signed in Paris Dec 18th 1923, to make common representations to Spanish Govt at Madrid with object of leading latter to consent without more delay to evacuation of the zone. French Govt hopes US Govt will agree to participate in these representations as well as in proposed naval demonstration.

If the considerations I have just had the honor to expose to Your Excellency are agreeable to the Govt of the US it would be of interest if as early as next week conversations can be held at Paris between representatives of the three Govts to decide on the details of the action which is envisaged."

Sent Dept as 2993 rptd Madrid as 178 to Tangier as 6 and London as 347.

CAFFERY

¹² Not printed.

¹³ M. Georges Bidault, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government of the French Republic. A note, substantially the same as M. Bidault's message herein quoted, was transmitted by the French Embassy to the Department of State on May 29 (not printed).

¹⁴ See footnote 8, p. 606.

¹⁵ i.e., Moroccan.

¹⁶ *Traité entre la France et le Maroc pour l'Établissement d'un Régime régulier et l'Introduction des Réformes nécessaires*, signed at Fez, March 30, 1912., *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cvj, p. 1923.

881.00/5-2945 : Telegram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, May 29, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 5:37 p. m.]

146. Paris' No. 6, May 27.¹⁷ There are several objections from our point of view to the reintegration of the Tangier Statute of 1923, namely:

(1) Original objections which we formulated, including the disproportionate participation allotted the United States, i.e. one seat in the Legislative Assembly as compared with three for Great Britain, and four each for France and Spain.

(2) Restoration of a Spanish administrator-in-chief and preponderance given Spain and France in statute with revival political rivalry of those two powers to the Dept [*sic*] to the detriment of Tangier which we and British at least are agreed should be avoided by all possible means in any new statute.

(3) The practical difficulty of our adhering to an admittedly unsatisfactory instrument while awaiting the elaboration of an improved statute.

Sent to Dept rptd to Paris, Madrid and London.

CHILDs

881.00/6-145

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1945.

Subject: Future Status of the International Zone of Tangier.

As you may recall, the Spanish Government in September, 1940 illegally moved troops into the International Zone of Tangier, Morocco and the Spanish Military Commander took control of the Zone from the International Administration. That Administration had been set up by the Tangier Convention of 1923, amended in 1928, to which we are not a party, though we had been invited to participate. One of the reasons for which we declined to participate was that we considered the part assigned to us not to be commensurate with our position and interests. As a result the administration of the Zone was largely in the hands of the French and Spanish, and to a less degree in those of the British, Italians and other European signatories.

Our long continued interest in Morocco is indicated by the numerous treaties we have signed concerning that country, dating as far back

¹⁷ Same as telegram 2993, May 27, 11 a. m., from Paris, p. 608.

as 1787,¹⁸ and including the Cape Spartel Agreement of 1865,¹⁹ the Madrid Convention of 1880²⁰ and the Act of Algeciras of 1906.²¹

The town of Tangier and the small district around it making up the International Zone was of importance during the war because Spain permitted Germany to reestablish a Consulate General there, and the entire Zone became an advance Axis espionage outpost against United Nations military traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar.²²

Recently we have been having preliminary discussions with the British Government as to the advisability of inviting the Spanish Government to terminate in the near future its illegal occupation of the Zone. The French Government is in accord with the idea that the Spanish occupation should be ended as soon as possible. Our information indicates that the Spanish will be prepared to comply with such a request from the three powers.

The American and British representatives at Tangier consider that at the time of the withdrawal of the Spanish forces, the Zone should be temporarily occupied by a small mixed force of perhaps 1000 men made up of American, British and French troops with a Spanish contingent. The British have proposed and we would be prepared to accept a Spanish contingent because of Spain's predominant position of long standing both as regards population and economic interests. It is suggested by the British and American representatives at Tangier that this force be commanded by an American or British officer, who would act as Military Governor of the Zone pending the calling of a conference of the interested powers to establish a new international regime which would avoid the defects of the 1923 Convention. The British express the hope that the United States will associate itself actively both in the interim administration and in the subsequent permanent international regime.

The French have made a preliminary suggestion that they occupy the Zone with forces of the Sultan of Morocco, which are under French command, and that this occupation be supported by a showing of British and American warships. Both the British and French have asked for a meeting with American representatives in London or Paris as soon as possible to agree upon a course of action. We feel that such a meeting would be desirable, preferably in London, and we are

¹⁸ Treaty of peace and friendship, signed June 28, 1787, Malloy, *Treaties, etc.*, 1776-1909, vol. I, p. 1206.

¹⁹ Signed at Tangier, May 31, 1865, *ibid.*, p. 1217. For documentation regarding the Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1864, pt. IV, pp. 412 ff., and *ibid.*, 1865, pt. III, pp. 351 ff.

²⁰ Signed at Madrid, July 3, 1880, *ibid.*, 1880, p. 917.

²¹ Signed at Algeciras, April 7, 1906, *ibid.*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495. For documentation regarding the Act, see *ibid.*, 1905, pp. 668 ff., and *ibid.*, 1906, pt. 2, pp. 1470 ff.

²² For documentation relating to the closing of the German Consulate in Tangier and the expulsion of Axis agents from the International Zone, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. V, pp. 539 ff.

prepared to direct our representative at Tangier to proceed to London for that purpose. This matter has been considered by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which went on record on March 16, 1945²³ favoring the withdrawal of the Spanish forces and the replacement of the illegal Spanish administration by an interim body made up of representatives of the participating powers. This committee also felt that it would be desirable for the United States to take part in the reestablishment of the International Zone of Tangier and the interim administration thereof.

We are inclined to favor the proposals of the American and British representatives at Tangier, which if carried into effect would require the following steps:

(1) Discussions with the British and French Governments, preferably in London.

(2) A simultaneous approach to the Spanish Government with a request for the termination of its illegal occupation of the Zone.

(3) The entrance of the mixed military force described above under the command of an American or British officer.

(4) The other powers interested in the Zone, which are Italy, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, would be informed of the action to be taken and given assurances that their interests would be fully protected. The U.S.S.R. would also be kept informed.

(5) These powers would be informed that it was the intention to call an international conference as soon as practicable to establish a new international regime.

(6) The military authorities would administer the Zone, consulting the local consular representatives of the four powers concerned but the military authorities would be wholly responsible for the decisions taken.

(7) To the extent desirable, the military authorities would apply the laws of the former international regime, void the laws promulgated during the illegal Spanish occupation and issue military decrees and such supplemental laws as might be required.

I should be appreciative if you would indicate whether you approve proceeding with discussions with the British and French with a view to reaching agreement for action along the lines indicated above.²⁴

JOSEPH C. GREW

881.00/5-2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945—1 p. m.

2481. Please inform the Foreign Office that the Department would prefer to hold conversations in London with regard to Tangier, and

²³ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, March 16, 1945, not printed.

²⁴ This memorandum was approved by President Truman.

will be prepared to do so as soon as American representatives can arrive there (urtel 2993, May 27, 11 a. m.). Although this Government agrees that the time has come to request the Spanish Government to withdraw from the International Zone of Tangier, the means by which this desired result may be obtained and the determination of the regime to be established should be determined only after the above-mentioned conversations have been held.²⁵

Repeated to London as no. 4383, to Madrid as no. 930, and to Tangier as no. 115.

GREW

881.00/5-1245

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Government of the United States has given careful study to the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* dated May 12, 1945, concerning the present illegal occupation of the International Zone of Tangier by the Spanish Government, in regard to measures to be taken for terminating it as soon as possible, and in regard to the restoration of a truly international regime which would avoid the defects of the old 1923 Convention and afford greater equality of status among the Powers concerned. For the establishment of such an international regime the Government of the United States would favor the convocation as soon as practicable of a conference of the interested Powers.

Pending the establishment of a permanent regime the Government of the United States agrees with the view of the British Government that a temporary military regime should be established, which should take into account the regime in force prior to the Spanish occupation but modified by the altered situation resulting from the war. The actions and the operations of the interim regime should be a matter for determination by the commander of the occupying forces, to whom the administration of the Zone would be temporarily entrusted. In the conduct of this regime the military authorities should be under instruction to consult the local consular representatives of the Powers concerned. The military authorities would, however, be solely responsible for the decisions taken.

In the opinion of this Government only a small number of troops would be required to effect the military occupation and these troops would be American, British and French with a Spanish contingent.

It would seem appropriate that the laws of the former international

²⁵ Telegram 3308, June 5, 1945, 4 p. m., from Paris reads as follows: "Note delivered to FonOff morning June 5 on Tangier situation in accordance Deptel 2481, June 1 [2]. Brit Embassy has not yet received similar instructions but expects them soon." (881.00/6-545)

regime should be applied except in so far as the military administrators find changes to be necessary in view of the altered situation; that the laws promulgated during the illegal Spanish occupation should be voided as quickly as possible; and that the laws could be supplemented, during the interim regime, by military decree. In other words any alteration in the administration of the regime in Tangier could, and would, be made by the military authorities on a purely provisional basis. In the circumstances it would appear unnecessary to consult with the signatories of the 1923 Convention in regard to the *modus operandi* of the interim regime.

The Government of the United States considers, however, that it would be desirable upon beginning the military occupation, to notify the interested Powers that their interests will be fully respected pending the eventual establishment of a new permanent international regime. The interested Powers should also be informed at an early date that it is proposed to invite them as soon as practicable to attend a conference at which the new permanent international regime would be established.

The Spanish Government should, as soon as may be practicable, be requested to withdraw from its present usurped position in the Zone. Spanish consent thereto should be obtained by a simultaneous approach made without delay by the three Governments most closely concerned, namely, those of the United States, Great Britain, and France.

The Government of the United States likewise has information similar to that contained in the *Aide-Mémoire* to the effect that the Spanish Government seems to realize that in view of the termination of hostilities in Europe it must abandon its occupation of the Zone and will be prepared to see the revival of an international regime, provided Spanish interests in the Zone receive reasonable consideration and adequate representation.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom appear to be in broad and substantial agreement as to the steps which should be taken immediately. Therefore a further approach to the French Government should be made promptly in order to obtain its agreement in principle, and to concert action, which should begin with early simultaneous communications addressed to Spain by the three Governments, requesting the termination of its illegal occupation and setting forth the views of the three Governments. Upon receiving the acquiescence of the Spanish Government, the four Powers might at once initiate discussions on this subject.

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1945.

881.00/5-2945

The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Embassy's note no. 134 dated May 29, 1945,²⁶ giving its approval to the proposal of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom looking to the termination of the illegal occupation of the International Zone of Tangier by the Spanish Government, and concurring in the view that proposals with regard to the future administration of Tangier should be the subject of an agreement in principle between the three Governments.

Appreciation is expressed for the courtesy of the Embassy in bringing to the attention of this Government the views of the French Government regarding Tangier. Since this Government feels that there are certain serious defects in the 1923 Statute, to which this Government was not a party, it is not disposed favorably to the return of the regime based on that Statute.

The Government of the United States is inclined to favor the convocation as soon as practicable of a conference of the interested Powers for the purpose of establishing a new international regime. Pending the establishment of such a regime the Government of the United States is of the opinion that a temporary military government should be set up following the withdrawal of the Spanish forces, which should take into account the regime in force prior to the Spanish occupation but modified by the situation resulting from the war. In the opinion of this Government only a small number of troops would be required to effect the military occupation and these troops should be American, British and French, with perhaps, if considered desirable in view of Spain's long-standing interest in Tangier, a small number of Spanish troops.

This Government believes that it would be desirable to hold conversations in London with regard to the interim government of Tangier and the means by which that government may be established.

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1945.

881.00/6-745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1945—6 p. m.

4686. Your 5742 and 5753 of June 7.²⁷

1. We are requesting Childs to endeavor to arrive in London by June 15 in order to discuss with Embassy and appropriate British

²⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 13, p. 608.

²⁷ Neither printed.

authorities Tangier question and, in case talks including France are decided upon, to take part in them. Villard,²⁸ who will head our representation to the London conversations, if France accepts invitation to attend, expects to depart shortly. We suggest, provided you have no objection, that Perry George²⁹ as the representative of the Embassy take part in these talks.

Certain documents are being sent by airmail³⁰ which should assist Embassy in preparing for the conversations.

2. If it is definitely decided that conference, including France, is to be held, we feel that the Soviet Govt should be informed at once of that fact and told that it will be kept advised of progress made. Furthermore, in our opinion, we should inform the Soviet Govt of such steps as may be decided upon before they are actually taken. It is important that the Soviet Govt should not obtain the impression that the Western powers are acting in a unilateral manner with regard to Tangier.

3. Although we agree that it would be helpful for representatives of the British and American Govts to continue to exchange views with regard to the Tangier problem before the more formal talks begin, we nevertheless believe that it is important that this exchange should not take a form which would give the French Govt ground to feel that we are endeavoring to form a common front vis-à-vis France.

4. It should be clearly understood by the French, British, and ourselves that the purpose of the conference in London is to make arrangements for replacing the illegal Spanish occupation of Tangier by a temporary allied occupation pending the holding of a broader conference to decide the future of Tangier.

5. In your discretion please bring our views as expressed above to the attention of the FonOff.

Repeated to Paris as no. 2681, Madrid as no. 989, and to Tangier as no. 122.

GREW

881.00/6-1145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Francis Lacoste, Counselor of the French Embassy.

Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director, NEA.³¹

Mr. Henry S. Villard, Chief, AF.

²⁸ Henry S. Villard, Chief of the Division of African Affairs.

²⁹ Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

³⁰ Transmitted to London in instruction 5600, June 13, 1945, and to Paris and Tangier on the same date in instructions 1032 and 404, respectively (none printed).

³¹ Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

Mr. Lacoste called at Mr. Henderson's request to receive the Department's reply³² to the French views on the future administration of Tangier as contained in the French Embassy's note of May 29, 1945. The Department's note which was handed to Mr. Lacoste stated that this Government was not favorably disposed to the restoration of the 1923 Statute, but that we would like to see a conference of the interested powers for the purpose of establishing a new international regime. Meanwhile, we felt that a temporary occupation of the Zone by American, British, French and perhaps Spanish forces would be desirable, and that conversations should be held in London with regard to the interim government to be set up.

Mr. Lacoste said that he did not know how his government would react to these statements, but that he thought the Sultan of Morocco might wish to be consulted in regard to anything so drastic as a joint military occupation of the International Zone. It was pointed out that since France acted for the Sultan in foreign affairs there would certainly be no objection to his being consulted in the premises.

Mr. Henderson observed that we felt it would be desirable to inform the Russians fully as to what we were doing, particularly as Russia was a signatory of the act of Algeciras. Mr. Lacoste did not appear to relish the thought that the Russians might wish to participate in the future administration of the International Zone. Mr. Lacoste was also informed that we would propose to issue a declaration of some kind to the effect that the rights of all interested powers would be safeguarded pending the establishment of a new regime.

It was carefully explained to Mr. Lacoste that the proposed meeting in London between representatives of the British, French and American Governments would be for the purpose of discussing ways and means of instituting an interim regime only, and not to decide upon the future status of the Zone in its final form. The latter objective could be achieved later on at an international conference at which all the interested powers would be represented.

Although Mr. Lacoste seemed inclined to feel that Shereefian troops under French direction could handle the interim problem without American assistance, it was likewise made clear to him that we thought it desirable for the military operation to be a joint affair for American, British and French forces, with the possibility of a small number of Spanish troops. Mr. Lacoste said that he would transmit our reply to his government.

HENRY S. VILLARD

³² Note of June 9 from the Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador, p. 614.

881.00/6-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 13, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received June 14—7:49 a. m.]

3526. Dept's 2481, June 1 [2]. Following is translation of note just rec'd from FonOff in reply to my note of June 4: ³³

"Referring to Your Excellency's note Numb 538 of June 4 I have the honor to confirm that the French Govt agrees entirely with the Govt of the US that the time has come to put an end to the Spanish occupation of Tangier.

His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco having informed the Resident General of France ³⁴ at Rabat of the interest which he places in recovering without further delay the exercise of the sovereign rights which belong to him—within the framework of the international statute—over this part of his Empire, the French Govt would like to engage with the least possible delay in conversations which would determine the form of a common approach to the Span. Govt. and determine the conditions for reestablishing the international administration of Tangier.

In this connection the Fren. Govt. believes—as I have already had the honor to inform your Excellency—that the regime established by the Convention of Paris, which has never ceased to be in force, should in its entirety be again put in application and serve as the basis for the political and administrative statute of the zone. The Fren. Govt. is not opposed to the examination by the interested powers at a later date of changes in the regime or adjustments which might reveal themselves as necessary; but it considers that the actual and legal status existing before the Spanish *coup de force* must first be reestablished.

As regards the place where the above-mentioned conversations should start, I am pleased to renew to Your Excellency the invitation which I had the honor to transmit by my note of May 26. It would seem to be indicated that the coming negotiations should take place in France, since on the one hand the preceding conferences of 1923 and 1928 were held in Paris, and on the other hand Tangier comes under the sovereignty of the Sultan, who, in accordance with the treaty of March 30, 1912 finds himself placed under the protectorate of France."

In a conversation with Bidault June 9 he said he had just approved the draft of the above note. With regard to the last pgh he stated that Fren. Govt. would not insist on holding the conversations in Paris but could not agree to their being held in London.

This cable sent Dept as 3526 rptd London as 419.

CAFFERY

³³ Not printed; see footnote 25, p. 612.

³⁴ Gabriel Puaux.

881.00/6-1345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 13, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received June 13—3: 55 p. m.]

5975. ReDept's 4686, June 11, 6 p. m. We have given UndSecy Harvey³⁵ Dept's views on Tangier. Harvey's immediate oral comments follow. Some written observations will be made by FonOff later.³⁶

Visit of Childs welcomed. Peake³⁷ is expected here on 14th. Harvey feels that in preliminary discussions participated in by Childs and Peake, much can be done to prepare details for talks between British, US and French. Selection of Villard as head of our representation if France accepts well received.

Harvey agrees that timely notice of talks should be given Soviets and that in preliminary exchange of views, all possible care must be taken not to wound French sensibilities.

Recent exchange of views between Dept and Brit Emb Washington, Harvey continued, indicated that there was no divergence on essentials except perhaps on extent and nature of joint military occupation. FonOff feels that anything approaching a military occupation functioning as a military govt should be avoided. FonOff feels further that an armed force made up of Brit, American, French and Spanish troops should be limited to one capable merely of performing police functions, with the actual administration of the Zone in the hands of a commission composed of the consular representatives of the four Govts.

Harvey also told us that Spanish MinFonAff informed Brit Chargé in Madrid that Spain was prepared to begin talks on Tangier at once. FonOff feels that in view of Spain's unilateral action in Tangier in 1940 Spain cannot justly claim right to be in on talks from the beginning. Brit Chargé in Madrid has been instructed so to inform Spanish MinFonAff.

Sent Dept as 5975; rptd to Paris as 359; rptd to Tangier as 29; rptd to Madrid as 159.

WINANT

³⁵ Oliver Charles Harvey, Superintending Under-Secretary of the Western Department of the British Foreign Office.

³⁶ Apparently a reference to proposals transmitted in despatch 23896, June 25, 1945, from London, not printed; see telegram 6189, June 19, 1 p. m., p. 621.

³⁷ Charles B. R. Peake, British Consul-General at Tangier.

881.00/5-945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard)

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1945.

Mr. Wright came in to say that a further telegram had been received from London setting forth the British views with regard to the interim administration of Tangier. Mr. Wright referred in this connection to a telegram dated June 7, 1945 from the British Embassy at Madrid, a copy of which he had transmitted to us under date of June 12,³⁸ reporting that the Spanish Government had approached the British Ambassador at Madrid with an offer to begin discussions on the withdrawal of the Spanish forces from Tangier.

In the latest telegram from the London Foreign Office it was explained that the British authorities were now hesitant to set up a military administration of Tangier in the interim period because of the impression it might create elsewhere. They would not object to the use of military forces for police purposes in order to insure an orderly transitional period, but they would prefer a civilian provisional administration for the International Zone rather than a full military occupation. Moreover, the British foresaw difficulties in appointing a commander of a combined military occupation force. They themselves did not wish to assume the command, and they did not wish the French to do so.

The British have no definite alternate plan to offer at this time, and they hoped that sufficient latitude would be allowed in our discussions at London to explore the question more fully. They realized that the United States could not participate in a revival of the 1923 statute, and since the British Government strongly desired American participation they would not insist on reintroducing the statute. We discussed the possibility of the Consular Corps at Tangier assuming control during the interim period but reached no conclusions. I mentioned the possibility that the Trusteeship Council of the World Organization might provide a solution for the International Zone of Tangier, and Mr. Wright thought this of sufficient interest to say he would pass it along informally to his government.

Mr. Wright also raised the point that some Swedish officials might be brought into the Tangier picture at this time in order to avoid complications and differences among the leading powers. I said I thought this was another subject which could be discussed at the forthcoming meeting in London.

³⁸ Not printed.

881.00/6-1945

The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

No. 226

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1945.

The Ambassador of France to the United States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Acting Secretary of State and, referring to his note No. 881.00 of June 9 concerning the International Zone of Tangiers, has the honor to communicate to him below the reply of the French Government.

The latter deems that the régime instituted by the Paris Convention of 1923, which has never ceased to be in force, must be again put into effect, at least as a whole, and that it must in any case serve as a basis for the political and administrative statute of the International Zone.

The French Government is, however, not opposed to the proposal formulated by the Government of the United States concerning the examination in common, at the proper time, by the Powers concerned, of changes which might be proposed in the said régime and of adaptations of its provisions which might prove necessary.

It feels, nevertheless, as does the American Government itself, that such examination could take place only later on and that it is advisable, meanwhile, to proceed without delay to common action before the Spanish Government in order to induce the latter to withdraw its troops from the International Zone. His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, in fact, has informed the Resident-General of France at Rabat of his desire to recover the exercise of his rights of sovereignty, which—within the framework of the International Statute—belong to him over that part of his Empire. The French Government desires, therefore, to enter as soon as possible into conversations which will make it possible to define the modalities of the said common action before the Government of Madrid and to determine the conditions under which the *de facto* and the *de jure* status existing before the Spanish coup can be restored.

As for the place where the said conversations shall be held, the French Government had, on May 26, already invited the American and British Governments, through their Ambassadors, to open the said negotiations in France. The French Government thinks that it would be natural for these conversations to take place in France because, on the one hand, of the fact that the preceding conferences on the International Zone of Tangiers, in 1923 and 1928, were held in Paris, and, on the other hand, of the fact that Tangier and its zone are under the sovereignty of the Sultan, who is placed under the protectorate of France by virtue of the Treaty of March 30, 1912.

The Ambassador of France would appreciate it if His Excellency the Acting Secretary of State would inform him as soon as possible

of the consideration which he will be good enough to reserve for these proposals.³⁹

Mr. Henri Bonnet is happy to avail himself [etc.]

881.00/6-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 19, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received June 19—10:14 a. m.]

6189. Childs, George and Dempster discussed Tangier informally yesterday with representatives FonOff.

British propose conclusion of an agreement between Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (parties to original Tangier convention) consisting of 13 articles.

1. Provides for provisional administration of Tangier Zone in accordance with agreement from a date 6 weeks after signature until replaced by new convention. Latter would be drawn up by Committee of Control in Tangier and upon completion conference would be held in Paris for its signature.

2. Provides "Govt of US is invited to participate in the administration of the Tangier Zone provided for by the present agreement, to exercise any right granted by the contracting parties in the Convention of 1923 and in particular to appoint the US representative in Tangier as a member of the Committee of Control, notwithstanding that the US has not become a party to the Convention of 1923. The representative of the US shall have the right to participate in the drawing up of the future convention to replace the Convention of 1923 and to become a party thereto".

3. Until an effective police is constituted law and order will be maintained by an internatl force of American, British, French and Spanish detachments under command of American officer who shall be under general superintendence of Committee of Control.

4, 5, 6 and 8. Are technical in character relating to turning over of the administration.

7. Provides that if the new administration requires a temporary credit an advance will be contributed in equal shares by UK, France, Spain and US.

9. Sultan will appoint, upon recommendation of Committee of Control acting by majority vote (a) chief administrator and assistants for (b) finance (c) judiciary (d) health and relief (e) public works (f) native affairs.

³⁹ In telegram 2934, June 25, 1945, 6 p. m., to Paris, Ambassador Caffery was instructed to inform the Foreign Office of United States acceptance of the invitation to participate in informal conversations on Tangier. The United States would be represented by Henry S. Villard, Chief of the Division of African Affairs, J. Rives Childs, former Chargé at Tangier, and Ernest J. Dempster of the Tangier Legation (881.00/5-2845). Telegram 3859, June 26, 1945, 9 p. m., from Paris, indicated that the French Foreign Office had been so informed (881.00/6-2645).

10. Above officers would constitute Administrative Council.
11. Tangier Zone shall be administered in accordance with provisions of the 1923 Convention as amended in 1928 subject to amendments set forth in annex to the agreement.
12. Committee of Control may during lifetime of agreement adopt amendments to annex by unanimous decision.
13. Agreement shall be open to accession by Italian Govt at such time as other parties shall agree.

This provisional agreement and annex are to be discussed formally with US and French representatives as soon as place and date of conversations may be determined.

The organic Dahir and all relevant Dahirs would be amended to conform with the present proposed agreement and annex and in their new form these Dahirs, in Child's view, might be submitted by French Resident General through Legt in Tangier for Dept's assent. This might be given subject to reservations to which British appear agreeable which would maintain our treaty position and rights in all essentials including during the provisional regime our extraterritorial rights.

Copies of proposal [*proposed*] drafts are being carefully examined and will be submitted to Dept with appropriate detailed comments.⁴⁰

Sent Dept as 6189, rptd to Paris as 377, Madrid as 163, Tangier as 33.

WINANT

[For documentation concerning Tangier during the period June 20–August 1, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, volume I, pages 989–1009, and volume II, entries in index, under Tangier, page 1638–1639.]

881.00/7–2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1945—6 p. m.

172. For Villard. Tangier's 210, July 24, 4 p. m.⁴¹

1. Dept concurs in your recommendation that public statement should be made by powers participating in forthcoming conversations to effect that final conference of all interested powers should be held as soon as possible but in any case not later than 12 months from date of statement.

2. We feel that use of Khalifian and Shereefian troops as suggested may offer preferable solution to question of replacement of Spanish

⁴⁰ Despatch 23896, June 25, 1945, from London, not printed.

⁴¹ Not printed.

occupation forces, since Military Attaché believes that entrance of any European or American troops would tend to create disorder and clashes. It is our clear understanding that notwithstanding what troops occupy the Zone we are to participate in the interim regime and that fact that native troops are employed is not to give French preponderant or controlling position in administration. With regard to use of military and naval forces you should give appropriate consideration to advice of military advisers who are being assigned to you.

3. It is felt that it would be extremely difficult to agree to definite plan for ousting Spaniards until Soviet attitude becomes known and Dept would appreciate receiving your further comments and suggestions at that time.

Reurtel 4269, July 16, 8 p. m. from Paris, Dept would be satisfied with formula contained in paragraph relating to UNO.⁴²

Repeated Paris 3582: London 6365: Madrid 1312.

GREW

881.00/8-245: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received August 2—5: 15 p. m.]

2742. In letter to FonOff of July 28 British Chargé⁴³ informed Soviet Govt that British and French Govts now proposed opening of Tangier talks in Paris on Aug 6. Object of talks was described as (1) prescribing of Spanish action for evacuation of zone and reestablishment of provisional international administrative regime on basis of 1923 statute; (2) setting out of *de facto* for reestablishment of international administration; and (3) arranging for conference of powers signatory to Algeciras Pact. Soviet Govt is invited by French and British Govts to participate.

With respect to Soviet Govt's interest and insistence on being consulted in this matter the following may be said:

A direct Soviet interest in Tangier as such is difficult to discern. It is our understanding that historically the international regime in Tangier grew up more or less on local and *de facto* basis largely by negotiation and arrangement among local consular representatives of great trading nations. Czarist participation in Algeciras Conference was presumably result of presence and prominence of Czarist consular representative at Tangier and of the fact that questions had come to threaten general European peace and Russia, as one of great powers signatory to the 1880 Madrid Conventions, was naturally invited to

⁴² This telegram had suggested consideration of placing a new Tangier regime within the framework of the United Nations (881.00/7-1645).

⁴³ Frank Roberts.

attend. Neither of these considerations would apply today. Tangier question is not threatening general peace. Soviet Union has never had trade worth mentioning with Tangier or Spanish Morocco and has no representatives there.

Failure of other powers to consult Russia in 1923 and 1926 was hardly surprising. Soviet leaders had only recently repeatedly denounced in most violent terms all "unequal" treaties and regimes of capitulation and had formally proclaimed what Soviet encyclopedia calls "full and unconditional renunciation by the Soviet State of the unequal treaties concluded by former Russian Govts". Soviet Russia had thus demonstratively disassociated itself from the Algeciras Pact and effort to consult it on this subject would doubtless only have evoked at that time a colorful revolutionary pronunciamento denouncing all interference in Morocco by great powers and calling on Moroccan proletariat to arise and eject them.

Soviet interest in Tangier can also not be explained by vague references to Russian access to the open sea and security of Russian shipping through Gibraltar. In modern era passage through Gibraltar has never presented any serious difficulty for Russia. Use of Straits by Soviet shipping has been so insignificant that if interest in Tangier question were to be calculated on this basis several powers much smaller than Russia would surely have a prior voice.

In view of above it seems clear that present Soviet expression of interest can be motivated only by :

- (1) General considerations of Soviet prestige and of recovery of Tsarist diplomatic assets with which Soviet leaders are preoccupied at this juncture to a painful degree; and
- (2) Desire to get an iron in Spanish fire.

Of these motives the latter is clearly of greatest importance for future.

Those who deal with Soviet representatives on Tangier question will probably find Soviet attitude determined less by interests of a stable and fair administration in Tangier than by political situation in Spain. As long as Spain is governed by a regime which denies political liberty to Leftist groups and closes Spanish territory to Soviet agents of all sorts, Soviets will presumably favor maximum Spanish exclusion from Tangier. Should elements subject to Soviet influence and penetration gain dominant voice in Spanish affairs, Soviet attitude toward Tangier might change.

Soviet attitude toward Spanish Moroccan affairs in general has never been clarified and probably never even formulated in recent years. If participation of Russia in these talks is followed by stationing of Soviet representative in Tangier it may be expected that in initial period his activity will be confined to building up contacts and

collecting information about conditions there. Evolvement of official Soviet policy would probably have to await completion this initial period.

Whatever policy may eventually be followed outwardly, however, Russians may be expected to endeavor at all times to keep a hand in with all various conflicting elements, including local Moroccan population; and it must be borne in mind that there is still nothing in their philosophy or methods which would prevent them from appearing at some future time, if they should find it desirable to do so, as champions of an oppressed colonial people against menace of foreign imperialism.

To Dept 2742, rptd to Paris 269, London 385, Lisbon for Madrid.

KENNAN

881.00/7-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1945—2 p. m.

3675. For Villard. With reference Embassy's despatch 2559, July 17,⁴⁴ transmitting French proposals on Tangier, Dept is inclined to prefer British proposals with alterations along lines of suggestions contained in Deptel 3271, July 13, 6 p. m.⁴⁵

Since we are not in position to adhere to 1923 Statute, we feel that we should insist on safeguarding all our rights under existing treaties including those acquired by custom and usage and not limit our reservations in this respect to those treaties and conventions to which we are signatory, as proposed by French.

There are objections to French proposal for interim exclusively Shereefian police force. Alternative solutions should be explored.

To provide funds for early administration during interim regime we favor equal contributions by major powers concerned over having such funds advanced by State Bank of Morocco. Availability of our contribution will depend in part on sum required. (Please reply to Deptel 3020, June 29.⁴⁶)

With particular reference to Legislative Assembly proposed by French, we would prefer during interim regime British suggestion for Consultative Legislative Committee. If there is to be a Legislative Assembly or a Consultative Legislative Committee, we advance suggestion for your consideration that France, Spain, Britain, US and USSR should each have three members, and Portugal, Belgium and Netherlands one member each, with provision for one Italian member as soon as Italy has been permitted to adhere to agreement. Also, of the six

⁴⁴ Not printed; it enumerated the French proposals. See also telegram 2993, May 27, 11 a. m., from Paris, p. 608.

⁴⁵ *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 1005.

⁴⁶ Same as telegram 5306 to London; *ibid.*, p. 989.

Moslem members, three might be designated by Mendoub and three by Committee of Control after consultation with Moslem community. The three Jewish members might also be chosen by Committee of Control, rather than by Mendoub, from list of nine candidates presented by Jewish community. Please inform Dept your view as to possibility obtaining three appropriate persons to serve as members of Legislative Assembly nominated by US. Please consider question of altering provisions as to eligibility of members of Assembly under 1923 Statute.

It is observed that neither British nor French drafts include provision for Soviet participation in interim administration. Entry of Soviet Govt into discussions will doubtless cause modifications in this regard.

Rptd London as 6534; Madrid as 1338; Tangier as 176.

GREW

881.00/8-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 6, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received August 7—2:10 a. m.]

4724. From Villard. Soviet delegation to Tangier Conference has arrived in Paris and consists of Kozyrev⁴⁷ with rank of Minister, Dourdenevski and Bondarenko as experts and Vidiassov Second Secretary. USSR has informed French Govt that it has no objection to the program indicated for the conference but that it will present several reserves and additions to certain provisions of the Statute of 1923.

It is probable that the forthcoming conversations will hinge largely on the issue of Spanish participation in the interim regime. Russia may be expected to take a strong stand on this question in line with the Potsdam Declaration on Spain⁴⁸ and to favor a Four Power administration of the international zone by France, Great Britain, Russia and the US.

We feel that for practical reasons we should have to oppose any Soviet demand for the complete elimination of Spain from the Tangier administration. If we can obtain agreement on this point and if the Dept approves we would propose that the conference issue a joint public statement along the following lines:

“The Govts of the USA, USSR, United Kingdom and France declare that the admission of the authorities of the present Govt. of Spain

⁴⁷ S. P. Kozyrev, Head of the First European Department of the Soviet Foreign Office.

⁴⁸ See *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. II, p. 1510. The statement, contained in the Communiqué of the Potsdam Conference, indicated that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union would not favor an application by Spain for membership in the United Nations in view of Spain's Fascist antecedents and associations; for related documentation, see *ibid.*, pp. 1171 ff.

in the provisional administration of Tangier does not imply in any sense a departure from the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945 on Spain but must be regarded as the sole practicable means in the present circumstances of taking into account the interests of the Spanish nation and people in the settlement of the Tangier question."

We believe that the issuance of such a statement would in any case serve a useful purpose by allaying possible criticism of the acceptance of Spanish participation in Tangier so soon after the Potsdam Declaration. The Dept's comment would be appreciated.

Meyrier states that the French Govt has received through its Embassy in London a communication from the representative of Negrin⁴⁹ dated July 23 stating that Negrin was opposed to any change in the Tangier Statute of 1923. Meyrier interprets this as an expression of the strong feeling on the part of loyal[ist] Spanish⁵⁰ to any attempt to dispossess Spain of its position in Tangier under the Statute. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 8, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received August 8—5:16 p. m.]

7977. Peake's new instructions re Tangier are, first, to get a date fixed for conference of Algeciras Powers on definitive regime. If this date reasonably early importance provisional regime will be minimized, but if not, provisional regime must be worked out with care and detail. Second, should Soviet delegation refuse admit Spaniards to conference Algeciras Powers, while French and we support British view important Spanish interests require Spain's participation as practical matter, Peake is to attempt to overcome Soviet objection. Should he encounter Soviet obduracy he is to report back for further instructions.

Incidentally, Peake's new instructions from Labour Govt seem indicative mild policy vis-à-vis Spain.

Sent to Dept as 7977; rptd Paris as 510; Madrid as 210; Tangier as 50; Moscow as 278.

WINANT

⁴⁹ Juan Negrin, Prime Minister of Spain, 1937-1939, under the Republican regime, and in exile since the victory of the forces under General Franco in 1939.
⁵⁰ i.e., supporters of the Republican regime.

881.00/8-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 8, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received August 9—7:05 a. m.]

4797. From Villard. The following represent our comments on Dept's 3675, August 4 and 3271, July 13: ⁵¹

1. It is our understanding that Dept in its 3271, July 13, 6 p. m. accepted the 1923 Statute as the legal basis for the temporary administration of Tangier as have also the British. From present indications it would appear to us and to the British that the French draft proposals as communicated to us unofficially offer the most practicable basis of discussion and it is understood that the French in fact propose to lay formally before us on August 10 these proposals slightly modified. We shall endeavor to obtain the inclusion in the eventual agreement and annex of those parts of the British proposal which seem essential to the effective functioning of the provisional administration.

2. For the safeguard of all rights accruing to the US from treaty, custom and usage, we are working on draft reservations to be embodied in our reply to the proposed forthcoming invitation to US to be associated in the provisional administration of the Tangier Zone and our suggested draft will be communicated to the Dept this week.⁵²

3. With reference to French proposal for interim police force we have prepared an alternative suggestion in consultation with the British. Our counter proposal eliminates temporary Sherifian force and contemplates a police body to consist of two sections; (1) rural, comprising native *gendarmérie* under a Spanish deputy commissioner and the other urban, comprising native and European French police under a French deputy commissioner. The overall commander of this body would be a police commissioner who is a national of a Tangier signatory power except France or Spain. He would coordinate the two sections and have complete authority to dismiss and recruit either French or Spanish police.

In informal conversations the French have expressed themselves as agreeable to the police force being commanded by the national of one of the smaller Tangier signatory powers. The commander would be personally responsible to the committee of control which in fact would be the police authority. It is proposed that the transfer of police authority to the police commissioner and his deputies should be immediate whereas the transfer of personnel would extend over a period of one month. We believe it advisable in addition that an American or British destroyer or both should stand off shore for

⁵¹ For latter, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 1005.

⁵² See telegram 4892, August 13, 7 p. m., from Paris, p. 631.

symbolic purposes for the one-month period during the replacement of the Spanish.

4. Dept's observations with respect to legislative assembly appear to us most reasonable and we shall endeavor to obtain their acceptance as far as may be possible. We believe, however, it would be more appropriate for the British to advance these proposals with our support (see comments on pages 4, 5 and 6 of enclosure No. 1, despatch 2663, July 27⁵³). See Tangier's 25 of August 6, 3 p. m.⁵⁴ regarding American members.

5. Concerning penultimate paragraph (Deptel 3675) answer is yes.

6. We shall bear carefully in mind paragraph 3 of Deptel 3271 of July 13.

Rptd Madrid 309, London 575, Tangier 31. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945—1 p. m.

3753. For Villard. Urtel 4724, Aug 6, 4 p. m. While you should not take the initiative with regard to the position of Spain in the interim regime for Tangier, you should not raise any objection if the Soviet delegation opposes the inclusion of representatives of the present Span. Govt. in the interim admin of the Zone, provided agreement can be reached on a clear-cut public statement that the interests of the Span nation and people in the Tangier question are fully recognized and that a place is being reserved for the eventual participation of Spain in the Govt of Tangier.

Sent Paris as no. 3753; rptd London 6703; Madrid 1361; Tangier 188; Moscow 1776.

BYRNES

881.00/8-1145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

SAN SEBASTIAN, August 11, 1945—midnight.

[Received August 12—12:10 p. m.]

SS12. British Ambassador⁵⁵ and French representative have received notes from Foreign Office here informing them that Spanish

⁵³ Not printed; in these paragraphs there was comment on the propriety of the American representative participating in the approval of local laws and at the same time being able to bar the execution of those laws upon American nationals and protected persons (881.00/7-2745).

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Sir Victor A. L. Mallet.

Govt not having been invited to participate in preliminary Tangier discussions at Paris wishes it to be understood that it reserves all its rights as a signatory of the 1923 statute.

Repeated Paris, London, Tangier and by courier to Madrid.

ARMOUR

881.00/8-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 13, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 10:25 p. m.]

4889. From Villard. Tangier Conference on August 11 was devoted to examination of point 1 (see Embassy's telegram 4855, August 10⁵⁶) and agreement in principle was reached for convoking within 6 months from the reestablishment of a provisional international regime of an international conference in Paris for the establishment of a definitive regime.

We proposed that if agreement could not be reached within 12 months on a permanent regime the question be referred to the United Nations Organization. Although we had been privately informed before the meeting that the British and Soviet delegations were in favor of this proposal they offered no official support of it whatever. The French delegation stoutly opposed it on legalistic grounds although the real reason for their opposition is undoubtedly the fear of ultimate administration of Tangier by the UNO (United Nations Organization) with possibility of this being an opening wedge for the extension of UNO (United Nations Organization) jurisdiction over the whole of Morocco.

The principal argument which does not appear relevant by the French was that article 54 of the Statute provided a means for the settlement of disputes regarding the Statute.

Unless Department considers we should press for our suggested emendation we feel that in view of the above situation it would be better to withdraw our proposal and at a later date propose inclusion in draft agreement of formula approved by Department in its telegram 3582 July 31.⁵⁷ If concurrence cannot be obtained on this from the other delegations we might then include formula in reservations accompanying our acceptance of eventual invitation to collaborate in administration of Tangier.

Paraphrase to London, Madrid, Tangier and Moscow by pouch. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

⁵⁶ Not printed; the reference is to the proposal that a conference on a permanent regime be convoked within a stated time (881.00/8-1045).

⁵⁷ Same as telegram 172, July 31, 6 p. m., to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier, p. 622.

881.00/8-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 13, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received August 13—6:58 p. m.]

4892. From Villard. We feel that existing rights of United States in Tangier would be adequately protected by inclusion of following reservations in our eventual acceptance of invitation to participate in provisional Tangier regime:

1. Such collaboration shall not imply adherence by the US to the Paris Convention of Dec 18, 1923 or to the final protocol of July 25, 1928 which purported to create an international statute for the Tangier Zone in Morocco;

2. The position of the US, the status of its representatives, the establishment, authority and powers of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, all and any rights accruing to the US and to its nationals and *ressortissants* from treaty, custom and usage as they existed throughout the territories of the Sherifian Empire prior to the introduction into the Tangier Zone of the administration proceeding from the above-mentioned Convention of 1923 and the Protocol of 1928, shall not be deemed to be modified or abridged in any manner by reason of the collaboration of representatives of the United States in Tangier in the provisional administration of the Tangier Zone of the Sherifian Empire;

3. Nothing in the terms, as at present stated or as they may later be modified, of the provisional agreement or Sherifian Dahirs which may make that agreement applicable, shall be deemed to prejudice the giving of consideration, in the formulation of a new regime for Tangier, to the placing of such a regime within the general framework of the United Nations Organization.⁵⁸

Copies by pouch to Tangier, Madrid, London and Moscow.
[Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 14, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received August 15—5:02 a. m.]

4921. From Villard. At today's session Soviet delegation proposed following text for adoption.

"The Conference examined the question of the control of the coast of the International Zone of Tangier and has agreed to recommend to the Govts. taking part in the Conference the following provisions:

⁵⁸ The Department's reply, in telegram 3859, August 15, 1945, 2 p. m., to Paris, stated: "For Villard. Suggestions contained in your 4889 of Aug. 13, 1 p. m., and your 4892 of Aug. 13, 7 p. m. are approved." (881.00/8-1345)

"1. The Govts of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France designate, respectively, for stationing a light war vessel not exceeding the size of a destroyer to assume a permanent service of control in the Tangier Zone.

2. The direction of the service of control of the coast of the International Zone of Tangier is assumed by a commanding superior naval officer whose functions are accomplished in rotation by the naval officers of the above-mentioned powers."

Soviet delegation stated that their proposal was intended to apply to the provisional regime but they expressed hope that at the final conference a similar arrangement could be adopted on a permanent basis. The project was taken under advisement by the conferees.

Although the British have indicated to us their intention to oppose the Soviet proposal we do not see how we could appropriately object to the stationing of naval vessels, provided this is based on the principle of rotation among the Four Powers designated and related at this time only to the interim regime. Department's instructions are requested.

Sent Dept 4921, repeated Madrid 315; London 589; Moscow 270; Tangier 33. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 14, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received August 15—2: 13 a. m.]

4922. From Villard. Soviet delegation submitted following today to Tangier Conference:

"The Conference has decided to recommend to Governments taking part in the Conference following resolution: 'Spain cannot be admitted to participation in the administrative organizations of the International Zone of Tangier until the regime of General Franco installed in Spain as a result of the support of the Axis Powers is replaced by a democratic regime.'"

The French and British delegations set forth the very great practical difficulties in the way of the adoption of the Soviet proposal. When opinion of American delegation was requested I replied in accordance with Department's instructions contained in telegram No. 3753, August 9 that while we recognized practical difficulties outlined we would not object to Soviet proposal on conditions outlined by Department. Soviet delegation expressed themselves as in accord.

French delegation proposed with concurrence of all delegations that question be reserved for subsequent decision by Conference and that in meantime delegations seek from their respective Governments in-

formation concerning (1) the measures which those Governments would be prepared to take, including use of armed force in the event of a refusal of Spain to comply with requirement that Spain evacuate Tangier without any participation in subsequent provisional administration; and (2) the extent to which the Four Powers would be prepared to assist in the provisioning of Tangier in event of Spain's refusal to continue to assume this burden.

After the conference the British delegation pointed out that Soviet proposal if accepted would raise acutely issue of continuance of Franco in power and they inquired attitude of United States Government toward forcing of this issue at this time.⁵⁹

Meyrier privately stated to us that it would be some days before the French answer could be expected as French protectorate authorities would have to be consulted inasmuch as the proposal raised the issue of possible use of troops on French Moroccan frontier against Spanish Zone. He thought it would be extremely difficult for French Government to agree to use of economic pressure against Spain as France was so dependent upon Spain for vitally needed foodstuffs but he did not think the French Government would be adverse to economic sanctions against Spain if these were limited to commodities such as military shipments in which France had no interest.

Both we and Soviet delegation expressed opinion that Franco would yield with[out?] necessity of use of force in face of a decision by the Four Powers represented at Tangier Conference.

Sent Department, Madrid 316, Moscow 271, Tangier 34, London 590. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 15, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

4948. From Villard. My 4889, August 13, 1 p. m. At last session of Tangier Conference we returned to our proposal that if agreement could not be reached on a permanent regime at forthcoming conference to be called in Paris, question should be referred to United Nations Organization. This time we suggested that reference of matter to United Nations Organization should be taken only by a majority decision of powers represented on Committee of Control.

British supported our proposal in this form. However, French delegation again strongly contested suggestion that United Nations

⁵⁹ For documentation relating to the position of the United States regarding the continuation of the Franco regime in Spain after the war, see vol. v, pp. 667 ff.

Organization would have competence in such a case. They read a long prepared brief on subject, copy of which is being sent Department by airgram⁶⁰ insisting that problem would lie outside jurisdiction of international organization, that position of Sultan had to be taken into account and that article 54 of the Statute would be applicable in situation. We declined to admit latter contention.

Although we again reserved question, it is our feeling that in view of determined attitude of French, it might be desirable not to press our point too strongly. If we cannot obtain acceptance of some reference to United Nations Organization in another form, it would always be possible to renew proposal in question at conference to determine final status of Tangier.

Sent Department as 4948, paraphrases by pouch to London 598, Madrid 319, Tangier 37, Moscow 277. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 17, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received August 17—5 : 54 p. m.]

4977. From Villard. British proposed yesterday that the Conference powers adopt a resolution as follows:

“No commercial wireless stations shall be established or permitted to operate during the provisional regime.”

This was accepted in principle by the Soviet and French delegations but we made a reservation and requested time to refer the question to Washington.

The Dept may wish to consider an alternative proposal that the powers agree to abide by such regulations as may be formulated by the Committee of Control concerning only the operating regulations of commercial broadcasting leaving US complete freedom to install and operate a commercial wireless telegraph station in the Tangier Zone.

A second alternative would be for us to make known to the Conference the willingness of the American Govt to examine sympathetically any proposals for the regulation of broadcasting with a view to making such regulations applicable to American *ressortissants* in the Tangier Zone under the reservation of the United States existing liberty to install and operate a commercial radio telegraph station this period.

⁶⁰ Airgram A-1194, August 18, 1945, from Paris, not printed.

Plakias⁶¹ has been consulted and concurs, subject to De Wolf's⁶² approval.

Dept's instructions urgently requested. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 17, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received August 18—12: 03 a. m.]

4985. From Villard. We proposed at yesterday's session that the administrator and assistant administrators of the Tangier Zone during the provisional period would be designated by Sharifian Dahir from among nationals of any of the following powers: Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal upon nomination by the Govts concerned, assisted by a French technical counselor. We had in mind elimination of the national rivalries which have prejudiced the international administration in the past as well as the difficulties in obtaining an American administrator or if one were obtained the top heavy scale of salaries which would be necessitated in as much as it is doubtful if other administrators would be willing to accept less than that paid the American administrator.

Previous to the meeting the British and Soviet delegations had expressed themselves in principle in accord with our proposal.

At the formal meeting however the French delegation explained at some length that in view of France's preponderant interest in Tangier it would have to insist on employment of at least a French administrator. Two alternatives were proposed: 1. That the administrator be of French nationality assisted by British financial administrator and Spanish administrator for public health. The second alternative proposed by the French was that the administrator be of French nationality assisted by a British financial administrator, Soviet administrator for justice, American administrator for economic affairs, Spanish administrator for public health and an administrator for public security, of Belgian, Dutch, Swedish or Portuguese nationality.

We are of the opinion our own proposal is preferable under all the circumstances but we would see no objection to the addition of France to the list of countries from which administrators be chosen provided the chief administrator were of non-French nationality.

Repeated to Tangier as 38, copies sent by pouch to London as 601, Madrid as 320 and Moscow as 280. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

⁶¹ John N. Plakias of the Embassy in France.

⁶² Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief of the Telecommunications Division.

881.00/8-1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 17, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received August 18—12: 56 a. m.]

4986. From Villard. See Embtel 4922, August 14, 9 p. m. At yesterday's session of Tangier Conference British delegation proposed in substitution of the Soviet proposal concerning Spain that the Conference make the following declaration.

"The Govt's of the US of A, the UK, the USSR and France declare that Spanish participation in the provisional administration of Tangier does not imply in any sense a departure from the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945 on Spain,⁶³ but represents the sole practicable means in the present circumstances of taking into account the interests of the Spanish nation and people in the settlement of the Tangier question."⁶⁴

Soviet delegation as well as the French and ourselves agreed to submit the British proposal for consideration to our respective Govts. The Dept will observe that the formula introduced by the British is essentially the same as that submitted by us to Dept in the Embtel 4724 August 6. We feel that the Soviet delegation by agreeing to submit this proposal to Moscow displayed a more reasonable attitude in the matter of Spanish participation than had been expected. The French and British delegation advanced strong arguments for the inclusion of Spain in the provisional administration on practical grounds and these arguments seem to have made some impression on the Russians.

Repeated Tangier 39, Moscow 281, London 602, Madrid 321.
[Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1745: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 17, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received August 18—3: 54 a. m.]

4988. From Villard. Concerning legislative assembly we proposed yesterday that this assembly not be reconstituted during the provisional Tangier regime. The British proposed that the legislative assembly be made consultative in character.

⁶³ See footnote 48, p. 626.

⁶⁴ Telegram 3905, August 20, 1945, 3 p. m., to Paris, stated: "We would have no objection to solution set forth in Embtel 4986, Aug 17, 9 p. m." (881.00/8-1745)

After some discussion in which the French delegation insisted as an example of democratic processes on the reconstitution of the original assembly with adequate American and Soviet representation, the French stated that the limit of their concession in this regard would be a provision in the agreement relating to the provisional regime according to which "the committee of control may at any time by an ordinance adopted by a majority of two-thirds, decide on matters which enter according to the terms of the Statute within the attributes of the legislative assembly. These ordinances thus rendered would be promulgated, published and executed in the same manner as similar acts of the assembly." We believe the French proposal offers a reasonable compromise with adoption if possible of suggestions contained in Dept's 3675 August 4.

Question of the number of American and Soviet members of the legislative assembly has not yet been determined but the thinking of the Conference is a distribution of the seats among nationals of the powers participating in the regime as follows: France 4, Spain if admitted 4, US, Great Britain and USSR 3 with 1 for each of the other powers participating in the regime.

Repeated Tangier as 40, copies sent by pouch to Moscow as 223, London as 603 and Madrid as 322. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-1745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—3 p. m

3892. For Villard. Urtel 4977, Aug. 17, 7. p. m. The Dept is opposed to including in the agreement clauses which would restrict for the benefit of foreign interests the natural economic development of Tangier or which would prevent the establishment in Tangier of legitimate commercial enterprises which might contribute to the prosperity of its inhabitants. The Dept therefore objects to the Brit proposal. It concurs in Villard's second alternative which appears to insure possibility establishment of US broadcasting stations in Tangier if desired as well as liberty to install and operate US commercial radiotelegraph stations. This latter privilege considered important but imminence of establishment of any such station should under no circumstances be intimated.

Sent Paris 3892; rptd Tangier 194; London 7017; Madrid 1420.

BYRNES

881.00/8-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

MADRID, August 18, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received August 19—12:10 a. m.]

1762. British and French colleagues inform me of resolutions introduced by Soviet's delegate at Tangier Conference in Paris on August 14 (1) to exclude Spain from interim regime so long as Franco Government remains in power and (2) that warships of Russia, Britain, Franco, and US be stationed off Tangier for patrol purposes command of squadron to rotate. British Ambassador has read me copies of telegram from Peake reporting proceedings. Peake states that Villard did not raise any objection to first Soviet resolution (Department's telegram 1361, August 9, 1 p. m.⁶⁶ for Villard) and seemed to feel that our Government might even be disposed to agree to second resolution. British Ambassador is expressing to Foreign Office London his concern over the reaction in Spain generally were either of Soviet proposals to be accepted. I agree with him and my French colleague that using Tangier to force the Franco issue would be a serious mistake. Exclusion of Spain even provisionally and for reasons stated from administration of Tangier would be severe blow to Spanish pride and might well have effect of rallying to Franco many of those elements now opposed to him and endeavoring to find a way to get him out. Any evolution in this direction to be successful would have to be accomplished by the army led by higher generals. Many of these have performed much of their military service in Spanish Morocco and would undoubtedly bitterly oppose any attempt to exclude Spain from Tangier. The action would be attributed to Soviet initiative and would be used by Franco as confirmation of his fears re Russia. Should our Government be reluctant to oppose Soviet proposals, I venture to suggest Department may wish to reconsider suggestion contained my telegram 1475, July 9,⁶⁷ repeated London as 440, Tangier as 81, Paris as 381, that our Government and Soviet Government abstain from participation in interim regime as not having been signatories to 1923 Statute.

Refer also Embassy's telegram 84⁶⁸ to Tangier, repeated to Department as 1645, Paris as 426, commenting upon deep Spanish national (as distinct from partisan) interest in matter.

Repeated to Paris as 440, London as 512, Tangier as 92.

ARMOUR

⁶⁶ Same as telegram 3753, August 9, 1 p. m., to Paris, p. 629.

⁶⁷ *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 1001.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

881.00/8-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—5 p. m.

3897. For Villard. Urtel 4921, Aug. 14, 8 p. m. Our understanding is that purpose of provisional regime would be to govern Tangier International Zone pending establishment of a permanent international administration. We have no info which would cause us to believe that in order effectively to govern that Zone it would be necessary to station in it a light war vessel. It would seem to us that such patrolling of the 30 nautical mile coast of the Zone as might be necessary could be carried out by local police administration. We would be agreeable to working out of arrangements which would provide for immediate despatch of war vessels to Tangier in case in the opinion of the majority of Four Powers responsible for the temporary Govt the peace of Zone should be threatened. We would be opposed, however, to entering into any arrangement which would call for unnecessary manifestation of armed force in or near the Zone.

Sent Paris 3897; rptd London 7021; Madrid 1422; Tangier 196; Moscow 1866.

BYRNES

881.00/8-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—5 p. m.

3898. For Villard. Urtel 4922, Aug 14, 9 p. m.

1. Although we do not insist upon the participation of the Span Govt in the International Zone of Tangier we would not be opposed to it. In fact we are inclined to agree with the French and Brit that the exclusion of the Span Govt would tend to increase the likelihood of economic and administrative difficulties which the provisional regime might be called upon to face.

2. We would not favor the Soviet resolution as drafted. It is too vague and its interpretation might give rise to disagreements. We would prefer a resolution drafted somewhat as follows:

The legitimate interest of the Span nation and people in the International Zone of Tangier is recognized and the govts represented at the conference agree that Spain will be admitted as a participant in the administrative organizations of that Zone just as soon as it possesses a govt with qualifications to justify its membership in the United Nations.

3. In order that it should be made clear that we are not discriminating against Spain as a nation, we would concur in the retention, in the technical or administrative work of Tangier, of Span nationals

who, in the opinion of the temporary Govt of Tangier, have not identified themselves with the falangist movement or who have not carried on political activity on behalf of the Axis powers or of regimes supported by those powers. Furthermore, it might be made clear that the provisional govt would consider favorably the application for the reemployment of former Span nationalists who have worked in a non-political capacity for the Tangier admin prior to the seizure of Tangier by Spain and who have been dismissed because of lack of sympathy for the Axis powers or for regimes supported by those Powers.

4. In our opinion, the press release issued at the end of your discussions should be drafted in such a manner that it could be used to combat propaganda in Spain to the effect that the allies are not giving full recognition to the legitimate interests of Spain in Tangier. It should furthermore be worded and employed in such a manner that it could not be regarded as an instigation to armed revolt in Spain.

5. We would favor an agreement among the four powers that if the Span Govt should refuse to evacuate Tangier, the question as to the action which should be taken would be submitted for the consideration of the great powers which have been proposed as the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

6. It would be impossible for the U.S. at this time, to make any commitments as to the extent to which it would be prepared to assist in the provisioning of Tangier in the event of Spain's refusal to continue to assume this burden, since the nature and weight of this burden is not as yet determinable. We could not undertake to answer hypothetical questions of this character. The U.S. however as one of the powers responsible for the effective functioning of the provisional govt, would, of course, accept appropriate responsibility for the economic welfare of Tangier.

7. It should be made clear that the authorities in Tangier should not engage in political activities but confine their activities to the admin of the Zone.

Sent Paris as 3898; rptd London as 7022; Madrid as 1423; Tangier as 197; Moscow as 1867.

BYRNES

881.00/8-1945: Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, August 19, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received August 19—7:36 p. m.]

238. Madrid's 1762, August 18. Entirely aside from Spanish reaction to Soviet proposals it would be most difficult from practical point

of view to exclude Spanish from interim administration in this city of 14,000 Spaniards. If nevertheless it is decided to exclude Spanish from administration, immediate steps should be taken by Allies to furnish shipping and provisions to Tangier since it is certain that Spanish will decline to send further supplies here.

Repeated Madrid as 106, Paris as 32, and London as 31.

ALLING

881.00/8-2045: Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, August 20, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received August 20—1:50 p. m.]

240. Deptel 196.⁶⁹ Villard and I agreed in consultation with British here that during period of about 1 month, when police were being reorganized, it might be desirable station Allied destroyer in harbor. We contemplated American destroyer for week or 10 days with relief of British and possibly French and Soviet destroyer. However, we never contemplated necessity of vessel to patrol coast. We had in mind that mere presence of Allied vessel would prevent disturbances during period when Spanish police were being replaced by police of international regime. It would, of course, be highly unfortunate if upon Spanish withdrawal disorders should occur here.

Sent Dept as 240, rptd Paris 33, Madrid 107, Moscow as 3 and London as 32.

ALLING

881.00/8-2045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1945.

On Sunday, August 19, Mr. Middleton, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, called the Division of African Affairs of the Department and stated that he had a telegram relating to Tangier which he would like to discuss. Mr. Timberlake⁷⁰ received him in the Department and, after talking over the telegram, accompanied him to the residence of Mr. Henderson in order to discuss it more in detail.

Mr. Middleton stated substantially as follows:

The British Embassy had received a telegram from its Government stating that the British Government had definitely decided that it

⁶⁹ Same as telegram 3897, August 18, 5 p. m., to Paris, p. 639.

⁷⁰ Clare H. Timberlake of the Division of African Affairs.

could not agree to the exclusion of Spain from the temporary administration of Tangier; that the British Government planned, if the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its demand for the exclusion of Spain, to join with France, as the two great Powers adhering to the Tangier Statute of 1923, in restoring on a temporary basis the regime set up under that Statute and illegally overthrown by Spain. All the Powers signatories of that Statute, with the exception of Italy, would be included in the new temporary regime and the United States and Russia would also be invited to participate. The British delegation to the Conference in Paris planned to make a proposal along this line at a meeting to be held on August 20. The British Government would appreciate obtaining some idea of what the attitude of the United States would be toward such a proposal.

The British and French delegations at the Paris Conference would be willing to promise that an international conference would be held in the not too distant future for the purpose of determining upon a permanent international administration for Tangier and the United States and the Soviet Union would be invited to this conference. The British and French hoped that by the time such an international conference would convene, the Franco regime in Spain would have been replaced by a regime acceptable to the United Nations. The French and British delegations at the Paris Conference were also prepared to promise that the United States and the Soviet Union would be invited to participate in an appropriate manner in the temporary administration of Tangier.

Mr. Henderson replied substantially as follows:

He could not, without consultation with his superiors, state what the attitude of the United States Government would be to what the British had in mind. He wished to point out, however, that if Great Britain and France had the idea of falling back upon legalism in order to avoid making a choice between the Franco Government and the Soviet Government, they could not logically, without the consent of the other signatories of the 1923 Statute, promise the United States and the Soviet Union that the reestablished statutory regime was to be of a temporary nature, and that the statutory regime would be terminated upon the successful conclusion of an international conference called for the purpose of determining upon the permanent regime of Tangier. It seemed to him that before Great Britain and France could make promises of this kind, they should be authorized so to do by the Powers adhering to the Statute of 1923. Was he to understand from the statements made by Mr. Middleton that the British Government was proposing to break up the Conference in Paris and to consider it as a failure?

Mr. Middleton replied that he would at once suggest to the British Government that before making promises of the character contemplated, it obtain authorization so to do from the other Powers signatory to the Statute. The British Government hoped that it would not be necessary for the Conference to break up as a failure. It was to be hoped that at the conclusion of the Conference an announcement would be made to the effect that an agreement had been reached providing for the convening of an international conference within a period of say six months for the purpose of working out a permanent international administration for Tangier. There was still of course the possibility that the Russians might be willing to agree to the inclusion of Spain provided a statement was issued to the effect that such inclusion did not imply a departure from the Potsdam Declaration of August 2, 1945, on Spain, but that it seemed to be the only practicable means in the present circumstances of taking into account the interests of the Spanish nation.

Mr. Henderson informed Mr. Middleton that it would not be possible to obtain a decision with regard to what the American attitude would be toward the British line of policy in time to permit instructions to reach Mr. Villard by the afternoon of August 20. He assumed that if the British made the proposal contemplated, Mr. Villard would state that he could make no reply until he had received instructions and that he would communicate with the Department.

Mr. Henderson added that in case the decision should be made to re-establish the 1923 Statutory Regime on a temporary basis, it was extremely important that the United States receive satisfactory assurances that the regime would be temporary and would not in fact become permanent as the result of the inability of the interested Powers to agree upon the kind of permanent regime which should take its place.

881.00/8-1745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1945—6 p. m.

3940. For Villard. Embtel 4978 Aug. 17, 7 p. m.¹ You will be authorized to sign or initial final act after approval of text by Dept.

French invitation should be transmitted to Dept by the French Embassy in Washington.

BYRNES

¹ Not printed; it transmitted a form of a final act of the Conference approved by the four delegations (881.00/8-1745).

881.00/8-2145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) of a Telephone Conversation With Mr. Childs at the American Embassy at Paris

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1945.

In response to Mr. Henderson's inquiry as to whether or not the Soviet Government had as yet agreed to the inclusion of Spain in the interim administration of the Tangier Zone, Mr. Childs replied that it had not; that this question is still a subject of discussion; and that it probably would be discussed again at the meeting on August 22.

Mr. Henderson then asked Mr. Childs whether the British had proposed at yesterday's meeting that the 1923 Statutory regime be reinstated in the event that the Soviets refuse to include Spain. Mr. Childs replied that they had not done so and that this was the first time that he or Mr. Villard had heard of this proposal. Mr. Henderson then outlined to Mr. Childs the action which the British plan to take in this respect as he understood it from his conversation on August 19, 1945 with Mr. Middleton, Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington.

Mr. Henderson continued that he had discussed the British proposal with Mr. Dunn⁷² and that our attitude would be that if the British and French insist upon the reestablishment of the 1923 Statutory regime we would register no serious objections. We have pointed out to the British here, however, that if they are planning to fall back legalistically upon a 1923 Statutory regime for Tangier we do not see how Great Britain and France could, without the consent of the other signatories of the 1923 Statute, undertake to call an international conference in order to work out a permanent regime; assure us that we would be invited to participate in a temporary regime; or assure us satisfactorily that the temporary regime eventually would be replaced by a permanent regime. In this connection, the British here have indicated that they are suggesting that the British Government approach the other signatory powers of the 1923 Statute with a view to obtaining assurances from them which would enable the British and the French to give the undertakings which they propose to give. Mr. Henderson added that we ought to have more definite assurances on these points than we have received so far and that he thought this phase of the British proposal deserved special attention.

Mr. Childs stated that he and Mr. Villard felt that very satisfactory progress had been made in the conversations to date and that only the following four points remained for discussion at the meeting on August 22:

⁷² James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.

- (1) The question of Spanish participation in the temporary regime;
- (2) the stationing of war vessels at Tangier. (At this point Mr. Henderson interrupted to inform Mr. Childs that we had no objection to the stationing of war vessels there during the changeover, or in case peace is threatened, and that our telegraphic instruction on the subject had to do with a permanent patrol.)
- (3) the question of the establishment of commercial wireless stations in the Zone; and
- (4) the question of placing the Tangier regime within the framework of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Childs said that Mr. Villard would like to know how strongly the Department feels on the question of the United Nations Organization, since it probably will be extremely difficult to obtain any concession on this point from the French beyond a possible reservation in our reply to the French invitation to participate in the interim regime. Mr. Henderson replied that the Department did not feel so strongly about this point at present and that our principal concern is to obtain some kind of assurance, as definite as possible, that there will be no obstacles placed in the way of terminating the temporary Tangier regime.

Mr. Henderson concluded by expressing the hope that the Soviets would change their minds regarding Spain's participation in the interim administration and said that he thought we should make it clear that we are not working for the exclusion of Spain; that the British say they are adamant and will break up the conference, so to speak, before they will permit Spain's exclusion; and that we shall acquiesce in a reversion by the British and French Governments to the 1923 Statutory regime, provided we receive assurances of the type mentioned previously.

881.00/8-2145

The Belgian Ambassador (Silvercruys) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

D. 5061
No. 5417

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: The Belgian Government has been informed that representatives of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France will soon enter into *pourparlers* in Paris with a view to putting an end to the Spanish occupation in Tangier and reestablishing there the international status of the zone. Furthermore, pending the opening of negotiations with respect to a new convention relative to the administration of the Tangier zone, there is said to be contemplated the establishment of a provisional régime which although based upon that of 1923, modified in 1928, would un-

dergo certain changes intended to render that régime more truly international.

My Government has therefore felt itself called upon to state its position in the matter, which is the following: the Belgian Government could not be considered as being bound by amendments made to a treaty to which it is a signatory or to arrangements made on the basis thereof as a result of negotiations in which it has not participated. It must particularly reserve the right to give its opinion concerning the text that may be submitted to it and to make its approval conditional upon the assurance that its legitimate interests have been taken into consideration.

The Belgian Government is convinced that its viewpoint is shared by the American Government. It is only for all pertinent purposes that, in compliance with my instructions, I have the honor at this time, Mr. Secretary of State, to bring it to your attention.

My Government would appreciate it if, in the interest of the negotiations, the American Government would be good enough to keep it regularly informed of their progress.

I avail myself [etc.]

SILVERCRUYS

881.00/8-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 22, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received August 23—1: 40 a. m.]

5085. From Villard. We have reached in our opinion a very satisfactory agreement considering all the circumstances, with respect to the legislative assembly and the appointment of administrators.

The legislative assembly would be composed of 4 French and 4 Spanish; 3 American, British and Soviet nationals and 1 Italian, Belgian, Netherlands and Portuguese, designated by their respective Consulates; with continuance of existing provisions re nomination of native members. We were unable to obtain any support whatever for the amendments in this regard suggested by the Dept in its telegram 3675 August 4 and drew from the French delegation an outburst of feeling accompanied by a statement that the Powers were in Tangier only on French sufferance and could be asked to leave in 1948, a view which the British immediately contested.⁷³ French agreed after con-

⁷³ Presumably the reference is to article 56 of the Convention of 1923, which states that the Convention is "concluded for a period of twelve years dating from ratification. . ." and ". . . shall be renewed automatically for one or more equal periods if at least six months before its expiring none of the contracting powers has demanded its revision. In such case it will remain in force while the revision by common agreement is being effected." The Convention was ratified on May 14, 1924.

siderable discussion to granting committee of control right to enact legislation on its own initiative by majority of two-thirds. French have also agreed as well as other delegations to appointment of a neutral administrator as well as assistant administrator and commandant police of Belgian, Netherlands, Portuguese or Swedish nationality. Administrator would be assisted by French technical counselor on native affairs and chief of police would be assisted by French counselor.

We feel we have succeeded in obtaining limit of French concessions and that arrangements are great improvement on old statutory provisions.

Sent Dept as 5085 repeated to Tangier; paraphrase by courier to London Madrid and Moscow. [Villard.]

FULLERTON

881.00/8-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received August 23—11:15 a. m.]

5086. From Villard. Referring conversation yesterday by telephone between Henderson and Childs British here inform us their position is as follows:

1. They have no intention of breaking up the Conference.
2. Their instructions are to hold out for Spain's participation in provisional regime.
3. If USSR cannot be brought to agree to Spanish participation British would propose agreement reached among all delegations, exclusive of one outstanding question, namely, Spanish participation in provisional regime, should be brought into force in Tangier and that invitations to USSR and USA should remain open.

As Dept has been informed (see Embassy's 4978, August 17⁷⁴ penultimate paragraph) four delegations have worked out draft agreement mentioned above which it had already been agreed would be signed by Great Britain and France alone with provision for invitations to be issued by France for USA and USSR for collaboration therein.

If USSR cannot agree to Spanish participation British proposal is that this very same agreement which has been worked out and agreed on by the four delegations, with the single exception of Spanish participation, should be brought into force but with Spanish participation in the provisional regime.

Question of restoring 1923 Statute unamended therefore does not arise.

⁷⁴ Not printed.

Sent Dept as 5086, repeated Tangier, Madrid, London and Moscow.
[Villard.]

FULLERTON

881.00/8-2345 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 23, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

5103-A. From Villard. ReEmbassy telegram 4977 Aug 17, 7 p. m. At our suggestion Tangier Conference yesterday decided to omit any reference in final agreement to commercial wireless telegraph or radio broadcasting and to consent instead to a reservation on our part reading as follows:

“The U.S. Govt agrees to give sympathetic consideration with a view to the application to American *ressortissants* in the Tangier Zone of such regulations as may be adopted by the Committee of Control looking to the supervision of commercial radio telegraphy and broadcasting in the general interest of the public.”

Both the British and French delegations expressed the strong hope that the U.S. would cooperate to the limit of its ability in interim regime to prevent “chaos” in field of radio and wireless which might ensue from unrestricted operations of numerous stations in the Tangier Zone. Despite repeated efforts we were unable to find a formula to include in the terms of the agreement which would meet the Dept’s position and at the same time placate the British and French.

Approval is requested by Dept of text of reservation to be included in our reply to invitation to collaborate in provisional administration of Tangier. [Villard.]

FULLERTON

881.00/8-2545 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 25, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

5157. From Villard. Ref Embassy’s despatch 2944, Aug. 23.⁷⁵ Tangier Conference yesterday adopted following resolution regarding approach to be made to Spanish Govt:

“The *démarches* to the Spanish Govt for the purpose of securing the evacuation of the Tangier Zone by the Spanish administration and the

⁷⁵ Not printed; it transmitted the preliminary texts of the Final Act of the Conference and the Anglo-French Agreement.

putting into force of the agreement annexed to the Final Act, must be undertaken immediately by the French and British Govts."

There follows the text of a proposed communication to be delivered at Madrid by representatives of the British and French Govts. This text has received the approval of all but the Soviet delegation, which is reserving its position on the entire question of Spain pending instructions from Moscow.

"In accordance with instructions received from their respective Govts, the British Embassy and the representative of the French Govt at Madrid have the honor to make the following communication to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"1. The Spanish Govt are aware that a Conference has been held in Paris concerning the international regime in Tangier between representatives of the Govts of the US, the UK, France and the USSR and the present communication is made in accordance with the conclusions reached unanimously at that Conference.

"2. A certified copy of the text of agreement signed by the Govts of the UK and of France at the conclusion of that Conference is transmitted herewith and: the Tangier Powers are invited to accede to this agreement in accordance with article blank thereof.

"3. This agreement provides for the restoration of the international regime at Tangier on the (date) on the basis of the Tangier Convention of 1923 as amended in 1928 subject to certain modifications which are regarded as immediately necessary. The Tangier Statute as so modified is to continue as a provisional regime until, as a result of a future conference of the Algeciras Powers, a revised Tangier Statute is put into force. The Govts of the USA and the USSR are being invited to collaborate in the provisional regime.

"4. It is open to the Spanish Govt to participate in the provisional regime. In any case the Spanish Govt is requested to hand over to the Committee of Control on the (date) the administration of the zone and to carry out the other provisions of paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* of article IV of the agreement. Further, in order to facilitate the transfer of the administration, the Govts of the UK and France trust that the Spanish Govt will instruct the present administration of the Zone immediately to collaborate with the Committee of Control, which will meet as soon as possible and before (date) in making arrangements for the transfer and to offer every facility to the Committee and the members of the new international administration."

Copies sent to Tangier, London, Moscow and Madrid by courier.
[Villard.]

FULLERTON

881.00/8-2545: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 25, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received August 26—12:01 a. m.]

5156. From Villard. Re Embassy's despatch 2944, August 23.⁷⁶ Following is further additional resolution adopted yesterday by Tangier Conference:

"The British and French delegations having expressed the desire of their Governments to see the Governments of the United States and of the USSR collaborate in the provisional regime, the invitation shall be transmitted to those Governments by the French Government. The procedure shall be in conformity with that provided for in article III of the accord annexed to the Final Act."

Following is the proposed text of an invitation to the Govt of the United States to participate in the provisional administration of Tangier to be transmitted to Department by the French Embassy in Washington:

"I have the honor to remit to Your Excellency herewith the text of an accord reached between Great Britain and France in application of the Final Act of the Conference of Experts for the purpose of determining the provisional regime which shall be put into force in Tangier after the Spanish evacuation and to communicate to Your Excellency the desire expressed by the French and British Governments to have the Govt of the United States participate in the administration of Tangier on the basis of that regime.

"The French Govt entertains the firm hope that the Government of the United States will be good enough to consent to give a favorable reply to the invitation of the British and French Governments. I shall be grateful if Your Excellency will be good enough to inform me as soon as possible of the decision of your Government."⁷⁷

Sent Tangier, Moscow, London, Madrid by courier. [Villard.]

FULLERTON

881.00/8-2045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Fullerton)

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1945—8 p. m.

4044. For Villard. Embtel 5034, Aug. 20, 6 p. m.⁷⁸ Dept approves in principle advance not to exceed \$100,000 subject to review of the

⁷⁶ Not printed.

⁷⁷ Telegram 4112, August 30, 1945, 8 p. m., to Paris stated: "For Villard. If an invitation along the lines outlined in Embtel 5156, Aug. 25, 3 p. m. is extended to the Govt of the US to participate in the provisional admin of Tangier, there is every expectation that the American Govt will accept." (881.00/8-2545)

⁷⁸ Not printed; it transmitted the text of a resolution relating to the reimbursement by the Four Powers of the State Bank of Morocco for advances made to the provisional administration of the Tangier Zone, and to the provisioning of the Zone. (881.00/8-2045) The text is almost identical with that of the Final Act of the Conference. (See bracketed note, p. 655.)

terms under which advances may be made by State Bank of Morocco. It might be advisable to include in interim agreement a provision to the effect that governments in default of their financial obligations for the maintenance of the interim government will be ineligible to participation in the regime.

Suggest that you consider the advisability of including in the agreement itself or in an announcement made to the press, a statement that the Powers agree to promote the fullest possible development and the most rational use of the resources of the Zone, both human and material and that no restraints will be imposed upon the economic and commercial activities of the inhabitants that would be harmful to them for the purpose of benefiting the Powers themselves. The administration will endeavor to promote the prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants.

Sent Paris as 4044; rptd Tangier as 200.

BYRNES

881.00/8-2545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Fullerton)

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1945—8 p. m.

4093. For Villard. Urtel 5153 Aug. 25, 2 p. m.⁷⁹ Importance of having radiotelegraph station in Tangier as a relay point to Eastern Europe, Near East and Far East cannot be too greatly emphasized and right of US interests to establish such a station must, under no circumstances, be jeopardized. However there is obviously no objection to technical control of such stations such as that exercised by FCC⁸⁰ in this country.

BYRNES

881.00/8-2945 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Fullerton) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 29, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received August 29—6:40 p. m.]

5222. From Villard. Final session of Tangier Conference took place today. Soviet delegation on instructions from Moscow declined to modify its position re participation of Spain but agreed to sign Final Act at same time making following declaration in form of an annex to that act:

“In signing this Final Act the Soviet delegation adheres to the point of view it has previously expressed according to which although the Spanish people is incontestably interested in the administration of the

⁷⁹ Not printed.

⁸⁰ Federal Communications Commission.

International Zone of Tangier and although Spain must be called eventually to participate in appropriate international organizations, this participation of Spain in the administrative organisms of the Zone of Tangier cannot be admitted until the regime of General Franco in Spain, a regime installed through the support of the Axis Powers and which represents in no manner the Spanish people, shall be replaced by a democratic regime."

The Conference agreed to this procedure and to have the chiefs of the respective delegations take note of the declaration by signing this annex.

The Conference agreed that in the same manner a second declaration would be made by the French, British and American delegations reading as follows:

"The American, British and French delegations deem that it is not desirable that Spain should be called to the Conference of the signatory powers of the Act of Algeciras so long as the present Spanish Govt remains in power and suggest that at the proper time the French Govt should consult the American, British and Soviet Govts on this subject."

A second paragraph reads as stated in Embtel 4986, Aug. 17 already approved by Dept with exception of mention of Soviet Govt.

As a consequence of foregoing it was decided to eliminate the whole of resolution NR 2 and paragraph 2 of resolution NR 3 (see Emb despatch Aug 23⁸¹). No other changes were made either in the Final Act or in the agreement which have not already been reported to Dept.

Signature will take place at the Quai d'Orsay at 5 p. m. Aug 31. Please urgently authorize me to sign Final Act and two annex declarations. Text of proposed press communiqué for release morning papers Sept 4 will follow.

Repeated Tangier 49, Madrid 331, London 632, Moscow 306; sent Dept 5222. [Villard.]

FULLERTON

881.00/8-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 30, 1945—8 a. m.
[Received August 31—2:58 a. m.]

5223. From Villard. In view of French hostility and both French and British suspicion regarding our motives in this connection, we have deemed it inadvisable to introduce any further mention of the United Nations organization in the Tangier Conference. Instead the Department may wish to consider the inclusion of the following

⁸¹ Not printed.

reservation in its reply to the forthcoming French invitation to participate in the interim administration of Tangier :

“Nothing in the terms of the agreements reached at this Conference or as they may eventually be modified [apparent omission] of the provisional administration shall, at the time of the elaboration of a new regime for Tangier, be deemed to prejudice the consideration of a proposal to relate that regime to the general framework of the United Nations Organization.”

Sent Dept as 5223; copies to Madrid, Moscow, London and Tangier by courier. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/8-2945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1947—7 p. m.

4111. For Villard. Embtel 5222 Aug 29, 9 p. m. You are authorized to sign final act and the second annexed declaration. You are authorized to sign the first annexed declaration provided you can do so in such a manner as to make it clear that you are merely taking note of the Soviet point of view.

While as stated above, we are willing to have you sign the first annexed declaration in the form indicated we note that a similar procedure has apparently not been envisaged for the Soviet delegation with respect to the second annexed declaration.

Please send certified copies of final act and agreement by fastest possible means in order that they may be available in the Department at the time of the publication of the statement for the press. We urgently request that this press statement, the text of which has not been received, be not released on Sept 4 but at a given hour on Sept 7 by which time we assume we shall have received from you all pertinent documents. We assume that the final act and agreement will be made available to the public at the time of the release of the press statement.

Sent Paris as 4111; rptd London 7464; Moscow 1933; Madrid 1484; Tangier 207.

BYRNES

881.00/8-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 30, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received August 30—7: 22 p. m.]

5235. From Villard. At final session of Tangier Conference yesterday we proposed an additional resolution regarding development

of Tangier Zone in the interest of its inhabitants along lines suggested by Department in its 4044, August 27, 8 p. m. While this proposal was warmly supported by Soviet delegation as in keeping with the spirit of the times, it provoked a strong adverse reaction on the part of the French who insisted that all points were already covered by existing international agreements and that it implied past failure by the powers to live up to the objectives outlined. The best we could obtain was agreement to insert in forthcoming press communiqué a statement reading as follows:

“The signatory powers, as in the past, will lend the fullest support to the development of the Tangier Zone. The international administration will continue to exert itself for the prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants.”

After careful consideration we did not feel it would be advisable to suggest that governments in default of their financial obligations should be excluded from Tangier interim regime. Such a proposal would have entailed eleventh hour modification of provisions relating to State Bank of Morocco and would most probably have given rise to further display of sensitivity by one or more of the delegations.

Sent Department as 5235; repeated to Tangier as 50. [Villard.]
CAFFERY

881.00/8-3145: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 31, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

5237. From Villard. Following schedule of events in connection with Tangier provisional regime was adopted at final session of Conference August 29:

September 4. Notification to Madrid and to signatory powers of Act of Algeciras; invitation to United States and to Soviet Governments.

September 12. Spanish acceptance.

September 25. Meeting of Committee of Control: (a) Designation of administrator and assistant administrator; (b) Naming of engineers; (c) Nomination of customs director.

October 1-10. Contact between heads of the international administration and the Spanish administration for the purpose of preparing the transfer of services.

October 11. Evacuation by the Spaniards and taking over by the Mendoub and international administration.

October 20. Designation of members of the Legislative Assembly.

October 25. Meeting of Legislative Assembly.

Sent Department 5237, repeated Tangier as 51, repeated to Madrid as 333. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

[Text of the Anglo-French agreement for the re-establishment of the international administration of Tangier, signed at Paris August 31, 1945, is printed in 98 United Nations Treaty Series 250; text of Final Act of the Conference concerning the re-establishment of the international regime in Tangier, signed at Paris August 31, 1945, and text of the Anglo-French agreement, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 21, 1945, page 613.]

881.00/9-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 1, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received September 2—4 p. m.]

5279. From Villard. Final Act of the Tangier Conference in the French, English and Russian languages was signed yesterday afternoon by chiefs of four delegations. Chiefs of British and French delegations signed Anglo-French Agreement copy of which was annexed to Final Act.

Both first and second declarations (Department's telegram August 30⁸²) were incorporated in Final Act at end of article 9 thus avoiding need of separate signatures. Soviet declaration is preceded by words "the conference took note of the following declaration made by the Soviet delegation".

There follows the full text of the tripartite declaration :

"The Conference also took note of the following declaration made by the American, British and French delegations:

1. The American, British and French delegations consider that the participation of Spain in the provisional administration of Tangier does not imply in any sense a departure from the Potsdam Declaration of 2nd August 1945 but represents in the present circumstances the sole practicable means of taking into account the interests of the Spanish nation and people in the settlement of the Tangier question.

2. While considering that the Conference of the powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras should not be held without Spain the three delegations do not think it desirable that Spain should be invited to the Conference as long as the present government in Spain continues in power; they suggest that at the appropriate moment the French Government should consult on the question of the Conference with the US, British and Soviet Governments."

Signed originals of Final Act being sent to Department by pouch.⁸³

Sent Department 5279, repeated Tangier 54, Madrid 338, London 641, Moscow 309. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

⁸² Presumably a reference to telegram 4111, p. 653.

⁸³ Despatch 3101, September 1, 1945, from Paris, not printed.

881.00/9-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 2, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 4:57 p. m.]

5284. [From Villard.] Now that Tangier Conference has been concluded it may be useful to comment briefly on Soviet participation therein. It seems clear that Soviet interest was motivated principally by:

- (1) Desire to make use of this opportunity to hit at Franco Spain; and
- (2) Possibility of establishing a naval vantage point in Straits of Gibraltar.

Soviet delegation displayed only an academic knowledge of provisions of Tangier Statute or of background of international regime and was not even aware of existence of Cape Spartel Lighthouse Convention. Discussion by Soviets was centered almost entirely on questions affecting Spanish inclusion either in provisional regime or in forthcoming final conference and it was evident at all times that political problem of Spain was uppermost in mind of delegation. As explained to me privately by Kozyrev, chief of Soviet delegation, memory of Blue Division⁸⁴ was still so fresh that it influenced all thinking of his Government in regard to General Franco.

Presence of a naval officer on Soviet delegation and persistent attempt to obtain agreement on stationing of war vessels to patrol Tangier Zone seemed indicative of an interest in Mediterranean and Atlantic waters which went considerably beyond needs of present situation. Altho Soviet proposal was defeated by lack of support from other delegations it is likely that the USSR will again raise this question at conference to determine final status of Tangier.

While general considerations of prestige were doubtless a factor in Soviet participation in Conference they were probably of less importance than foregoing motives.

Members of Soviet delegation were most cooperative and friendly throughout Conference and showed a real disposition to work out the various problems in a spirit of conciliation and cooperation. So marked was this attitude that it seemed to us Russians had received instructions to meet viewpoints of other delegations wherever possible even on treatment of Spanish question.

Sent Department 5284; repeated Tangier 57, London 644, Madrid 340, Moscow 312. [Villard.]

CAFFERY

⁸⁴ A contingent of Spanish volunteers who fought with the German Army on the Russian front.

881.00/9-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 2, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received September 3—8: 35 a. m.]

5289. From Villard. In replying to forthcoming French invitation to collaborate in provisional administration of Tangier it is suggested that Dept include the first two reservations in Embtel 4892, August 13, 7 p.m., the reservation concerning wireless in Embassy's 5103—A August 23, 4 p. m., and if desired reservation on United Nations in Embassy's 5223, August 30, 8 a. m.

Terms of reservation concerning commercial wireless stations do not impair complete liberty of American position inasmuch as the regulations therein referred to if and when introduced by provisional Tangier administration would have to receive Dept's assent qualified in whatever sense desired before they become applicable to American nationals and concerns. Moreover, in the course of the Conference discussions on contemplated regulations concerning commercial wireless stations American delegation made it clear that it would have to oppose the inclusion in such regulations of restrictions upon the installment of wireless telegraphy and/or broadcasting stations in Tangier and that the Dept's sympathetic consideration could be given only to technical operational regulations. However, in reference to Dept's 4093 of August 29, 8 p. m. the Dept may consider it desirable to add to the above mentioned reservation a clause specifying that "in regard to the matter of installment of commercial wireless stations the US Govt maintains its entire liberty." [Villard.]

CAFFERY

881.00/9-445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

SAN SEBASTIAN, September 4, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received September 5—noon.]

SS33. Pursuant to instructions from their Govts, British Ambassador and French delegate have today presented joint notes conveying to Spanish Govt results of Tangier conversations. In absence of Foreign Minister notes were handed to Political Director Doussinague who was advised orally that Spanish Govt's reply will be expected not later than Sept 12. Doussinague stated that notes would be duly studied but took occasion to reiterate his Govt's reservations with regard to decisions taken "behind its back", (my telegram SS 17, Aug 18).

Rptd to Paris. By courier to Tangier and Madrid.

ARMOUR

881.00/9-445

The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

No. 682

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: An agreement between Great Britain and France having been effected on August 31 in application of the final act of the Conference of Experts with a view to fixing the provisional régime which will be put into force at Tangiers after the Spanish evacuation, I have the honor, referring to the said text, to inform Your Excellency of the desire expressed by the British Government and the French Government to see the American Government participate in the administration of Tangiers on the basis of the said régime.

The French Government firmly hopes that the American Government will be good enough to agree to give a favorable reply to the invitation of the British and French Governments.

I should appreciate it if Your Excellency would be good enough to inform me, as soon as possible, of the decision made in this matter by your Government.

Please accept [etc.]

H. BONNET

881.00/9-545: Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, September 5, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received September 5—2 p. m.]

254. We are not sure we have complete text Tangier agreements reached at Paris. Pending Dempster's arrival with text we can make only preliminary comments as follows:

1. Belgian, Netherlands and Portuguese colleagues consider it quite impossible for their Governments transmit within period allotted names of nationals to occupy administrative posts. For that and other reasons they feel it will be impossible follow time schedule outlined in Paris Embassy telegram 5237 August 31.

2. Presumably funds advanced to provisional administration by State Bank of Morocco will be in francs. This raises question whether Tangier is to remain free exchange market or whether fixed dollar franc rate established in French Zone and other French controlled territory is to be imposed. The change from pesetas to francs as principal medium of exchange will in any case cause economic and financial disturbances of undetermined scope. If to these are to be added difficulties due to controlled franc rate we can expect great resentment on part of populace and unfavorable comparison between Spanish and international regime.

3. Belgian, Portuguese and Netherlands representatives are particularly disturbed at proposal that French representative be first president Control Committee. They consider alphabetic rotation in effect in 1940 should be resumed, at which time Portuguese representative was president. If alphabetical rotation were followed presumably US or USSR representative would be first president or if they were to be passed over Belgian representative would be next in order. In any case Belgian colleague has telegraphed his Government urging that US representative be first president.

4. It is view of aforementioned representatives that Mendoub should be no more under French control (which he will be in practice) in this International Zone than is Khalifa⁸⁵ in Spanish Zone. They desire completely independent Mendoub and I believe will work toward that end in final settlement.

5. I am surprised at extent of opposition on part of these representatives to France playing any greater part in International Zone than any other power.

ALLING

881.00/8-2145

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Belgian Ambassador
(Silvercruys)*

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of August 21, 1945, setting forth the position of the Government of Belgium with respect to the conversations then being held in Paris for the purpose of reestablishing the international regime in Tangier, and requesting that this Government keep the Belgian Government informed of the progress of those talks.

As you no doubt know, the conversations in Paris, which the United States was invited to attend, ended on August 31, 1945, and a statement regarding the work of the conference has now been released to the press. A copy of the text of this statement, dated September 4, is enclosed.⁸⁶

It is the understanding of this Government that the resolutions adopted by the conference with a view to reestablishing the international regime in Tangier were to have been communicated to the Belgian Government on September 4, 1945 by the Government of France. I am confident that no action will be taken affecting Belgian interests in Tangier without full consultation with the Belgian Government.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

⁸⁵ Representative of the Sultan in the Spanish Zone of Morocco.

⁸⁶ Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 9, 1945, p. 380.

881.00/9-1245 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, September 12, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received September 12—5 : 50 p. m.]

243. My British colleague⁸⁷ informs me that an official of French Consulate General called yesterday on one of his service Attachés and proposed formation of Anglo-French bloc on police level, subsequently to be raised to political level, to control international administration of Tangier. Dundas replied that any proposal of that nature would have to be taken up in London but that he was quite certain British wanted real international administration here for benefit of zone and wished scrupulously to avoid any political jockeying.

All my colleagues are convinced that French will endeavor to manipulate interim administration for their own purposes. I feel they are scurrying to obtain support wherever they can but they will meet with little success since consular body, with possible exception Spanish, are interested only in honest, efficient administration.

I suggest Dept examine most carefully may [*any?*] proposals made by French for provisioning of Tangier and financial controls here. For example, French Commercial Attaché yesterday proposed that any American supplies intended for Tangier be shipped via Casablanca. This would, of course, enhance French prestige since word would be passed that supplies came from French Zone. It would also benefit Franco-Spanish Railroad, but add greatly to cost of supplies. I urge that any provisions from US for Tangier be sent direct to this port.

ALLING

881.00/9-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State

SAN SEBASTIAN, September 15, 1945—noon.

[Received September 16—1 : 05 p. m.]

SS38. My SS33 September 4. Spanish Government's reply to joint Anglo-French note of September 4 conveying results of Tangier conversations was handed to British Ambassador and French Delegate by Foreign Minister on afternoon of September 13. Main points of reply which were set forth in lengthy note bearing date of September 12 may be summarized as follows:

1. Spanish Government is agreeable to prompt restoration in Tangier Zone of international regime in force prior to June 14, 1940 (in-

⁸⁷ Robert D. Dundas, British Acting Consul General at Tangier.

cluding modification embodied in previous Span exchange of notes of 1935) and to participation therein of other interested nations.

2. Spanish Government reserves its rights with respect to modification of statutory regime contained in Anglo-French accord of August 31 insofar as such modifications may prejudice rights accruing to Spain by virtue of previous negotiations and is obliged to reject amendments set forth in article 7 of that accord.

3. Spanish Government is disposed to negotiate with British and French Governments at a conference such as that envisaged in Anglo-French notes of September 4 with respect to modification of existing agreements governed by administration of Tangier Zone.

Note sets forth customary defence of Spain's action in Tangier and expresses continued belief of Spanish Government the inclusion of Tangier in Spanish Zone of Morocco under authority of Jalifa [*Khalifa*] offers "most logical and favorable solution" to Tangier problem. It refers briefly to text of four power Final Act and undertakes energetically to refute "certain attitudes and intentions" reflected in pages 8 and 9 of that Act. Note refrains however from any direct comment on proposed Soviet participation in provisional regime merely acknowledging fact that Soviet and United States Governments have been invited to participate.

With reference to latter point it may be mentioned that Foreign Minister reiterated to me this morning that Spain would not be inclined to object to presence of Russian representation in Tangier administration so long as such representation were not utilized as spring-board for interference in Spanish political situation. He went on to suggest moreover that Spanish Government might even look with favor on resumption of relations with Soviet Government provided United States would guarantee that Soviet representation in Spain would likewise not be used as base for inimical political activities. Under Secretary del Castillo who has just been named Spanish representative in Tangier and who claims to have drafted Spanish reply expressed similar sentiments during course of my conversation with him in Madrid earlier this week and suggested that presence of Soviet representatives in Tangier might in fact provide opening wedge toward resumption of Spanish-Soviet relations.

In view of length of Spanish reply and inasmuch as British Embassy states that its telegram to London conveying text of that reply has been repeated to British Embassy Washington from which it may be obtained by Department we are not telegraphing full text but will forward it by next air pouch.⁸⁸

Repeated to Paris, London, by courier to Madrid, Tangier.

ARMOUR

⁸⁸ Not printed.

881.00/9-2145 : Telegram

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State*TANGIER, September 21, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received September 21—1:26 p. m.]

272. Legtels 267, September 18 and 269, September 19.⁸⁹ Have now received from British copy Spanish reply Anglo-French representations re Tangier. Neither French nor British colleagues have any information re United States reply invitation extended by French Embassy Washington September 4 inviting us participate in this administration.

French representative has now called first meeting Control Committee September 25 and invited me attend. Have been obliged inform him am without instructions and cannot attend until they are received.

Although I do not want exaggerate importance this small territory, I suggest our failure participate in first meeting might be widely misinterpreted not only as lack of interest Arab Moslem world but also as lack of willingness cooperate in international undertakings.

In any case in event Department has decided I should not participate first meeting or even at all in Control Committee, I should appreciate guidance re explanation I am to give.

ALLING

881.00/9-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1945—8 p. m.

226. Urtel 267, Sept 17.⁹⁰ Dept understands that certified copies of Agreement between France and UK were to be communicated on Sept 4 by French Govt to Govts of Belgium, Spain, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden and that Govts of UK and France would undertake to collaborate in inviting accession of those Govts to the Agreement. It has no info concerning any replies which may have been made to notifications.

Main points of Span acceptance are summarized in telegram [SS] 38, Sept 15, noon from San Sebastian, copy of which was sent Tangier by courier.

Dept has no further info re proposed initial meeting of Committee of Control on Sept 25. While our acceptance of invitation to partici-

⁸⁹ Neither printed.⁹⁰ Not printed.

pate in provisional regime has not yet been communicated to French Govt, a formal note of acceptance will be sent French Embassy prior to Sept. 25. You are authorized to take part in preliminary conversations re provisional regime if asked to do so by inviting powers.

ACHESON

881.00/9-445

The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)

[WASHINGTON,] September 22, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of September 4, 1945, in which you express, on behalf of the Governments of France and Great Britain, the desire that the Government of the United States participate in the administration of Tangier on the basis of the provisional regime provided for in the final act of the Conference of Experts held at Paris during August, 1945.

The Government of the United States is pleased to accept the invitation of the French and British Governments.

In accepting this invitation, the United States Government wishes to point out that such collaboration on its part in the provisional regime so established does not imply adherence by the United States to the Paris Convention of December 18, 1923 or to the final protocol of July 25, 1928, which had as their object the creation of an international statute for the Tangier Zone in Morocco. The collaboration of representatives of the United States at Tangier in the provisional administration of the Zone shall not be deemed to modify or abridge in any manner: (1) the position of the United States, (2) the status of its representatives, (3) the establishment, authority and powers of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (4) any rights accruing to the United States and to its nationals and *ressortissants* from treaty, custom, and usage as they existed throughout the territories of the Shereefian Empire prior to the introduction into the Tangier Zone of the administration resulting from the above-mentioned convention of 1923 and the protocol of 1928.

With reference to Article 3(b) of the agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and France concluded on August 31, 1945, it is suggested that the French Government may wish to inform the other Powers referred to in Article 2(a) of the Agreement that the Government of the United States has accepted the invitation of the British and French Governments to participate in the provisional regime for Tangier, subject to the foregoing reservations.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON

881.00/9-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1945—1 p. m.

229. Urtel 272, September 21, 7 p. m. Reply to French note of September 4 inviting U.S. to participate in provisional Tangier regime delivered to French Embassy today. You are therefore authorized to sit on Committee of Control.

Dept's note of acceptance reserved all existing U.S. treaty and other rights in Tangier.

Sent Tangier at 229. Rptd Paris as 4459.

ACHESON

881.00/9-2545 : Telegram

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, September 25, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received September 25—3:21 p. m.]

278. Control Committee held first meeting this morning attended by British French Spanish Portuguese Belgian and United States representatives with Netherlands representative attending as observer, and agreed various temporary appointments of officials proposed by Acting Administrator to take over from Spanish. Spanish representative made formal reservation Spanish rights under Statute 1923 but apparently this was only for the record since otherwise he seemed disposed cooperate fully. He proposed temporary officials begin at once contact Spanish authorities so as gradually take over functions. He gave assurances Spain would continue supply provisions.

Communiqué was issued in usual official form recording time of meeting "in cordial atmosphere" etc. At suggestion Spanish representative original draft of communiqué prepared by French was amended include sentence welcoming presence American representative first time in Control Committee. Committee will meet regularly twice weekly henceforth Tuesday and Friday at 11 a. m.

Meeting representatives powers signatory Cape Spartel Agreement will be held September 29 to take over control lighthouse from Spanish authorities.⁹¹ It was agreed informally invite Italian and Swedish representatives, who are not at present members Control Committee, attend Cape Spartel Commission meeting. Russian Government is not signatory Cape Spartel Convention and hence not eligible attend.

⁹¹ Concerning the return of Cape Spartel Lighthouse to international control, see p. 672.

No information available when Russian representative may be expected arrive Tangier. Can Department enlighten me this point? Absence Russian from today's meeting naturally causing much speculation.

ALLING

881.00/9-2545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1945—8 p. m.

236. Reurtel 278, Sep 25, 5 p. m. Dept has no info concerning Russia's plans to send representative to Tangier. As suggested in Villard's telegram of Sep 2⁹² from Paris (repeated to Tangier as 57), Soviet participation in Conference seems to have been motivated by considerations other than an active desire to share in work of Control Committee. Moreover there was nothing in Russian attitude at Paris to indicate that immediate steps would be taken to appoint representative at Tangier following acceptance of invitation to take part in provisional regime.

In view of problem involved in establishing Consular Office, as well as in selection of suitable personnel, it would not be surprising in Villard's view to find Soviet arrival delayed until considerably later date in interim period. We should appreciate your reporting any info which may reach you on this subject.

For your info concerning eligibility Soviets attend meetings Lighthouse Commission, Russia, while not a signatory, acceded to Cape Spartel Convention in *procès-verbal* signed at Tangier on May 31, 1899. Question of eligibility may be affected, however, by reported failure Tsarist or Soviet Govts make payment annual quota for maintenance lighthouse since beginning first World War.

Sent Tangier as 236. Rptd Moscow as 2071.

ACHESON

881.00/10-145

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of African Affairs (Villard) of a Conversation With Mr. Francis Lacoste of the French Embassy

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1945.

Mr. Lacoste came in to say that the French Government had now received the adherence of all the interested governments to the Franco-British accord for the provisional regime in Tangier, and

⁹² Telegram 5284, September 2, 2 p. m., p. 656.

that the French Foreign Office proposed to issue the text of this document and of the Final Act on October 11. The Foreign Office pointed out that the four Powers at the Paris Conference had considered it "useless" (inutile) to publish the two declarations regarding Spain, made by Russia on the one hand and Great Britain, France and the United States on the other.

I said that I was not aware of any agreement at Paris according to which the text of these two declarations would be omitted from the Final Act at the time of publication. I observed that the declarations were an integral part of the Final Act, and that the document would be incomplete if this Section were omitted. I said that we, for our part, were very much interested in having our declaration regarding Franco Spain given publicity, and that I was sure the Russians would not have insisted on making their declaration on this subject if they had thought it was going to be filed in the archives.

Mr. Lacoste said that he was unable to give any explanation as to why his government assumed the declarations were not to be published but he thought that the French Government was inclined to be as easy as possible on Spain and might not wish to irritate that country by publishing the declarations at this time. He said he would transmit our views to Paris and would point out that the apparent French understanding in this matter conflicted with that of the American Government.

Mr. Lacoste himself commented that this was the second instance in which his government seemed to be under the impression that a decision had been taken at Paris which was contrary to the understanding of the United States. He referred to the previous telegram from his government stating that the Paris Conference had agreed to give France the exclusive right to assure the provisioning of the Tangier Zone in the interim period. Mr. Lacoste said he would call the attention of his government to these apparent discrepancies in our understanding of the decisions made by the Conference Powers.

HENRY S. VILLARD

881.00/10-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, October 2, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

5826. Your 4563, Oct. 1.⁹⁸ In a conversation with Meyrier he stated that Dept has undoubtedly by now been informed of instructions sent French Embassies in Washington, London and Moscow suggesting that text of Final Act of Tangier Conference and Anglo-French ac-

⁹⁸ Not printed.

cord be made available for publication in morning papers of October 11.

French Missions were also instructed to inquire if the other interested Govts wished to have published the two final declarations re Spain. French Govt would prefer not to publish these but is quite willing to do so if one or more of other Govts wish to do so.

Copies of replies from Belgian, Dutch, Portuguese and Swedish Govts were received from Foreign Office today. All announced their adherence to Franco-Brit agreement. However, Portuguese reply regrets that historical, geographical, and economic special rights of Portugal were not recognized in new Tangier regime and transmits Portuguese adhesion in hope that coming conference will take these rights into consideration.

Sent Washington 5826; repeated Tangier 58.

CAFFERY

881.00/10-545 : Airgram

The Ambassador in Italy (Kirk) to the Secretary of State^{93a}

ROME, October 5, 1945.

[Received October 19—6 p. m.]

A-798. Reference Department's telegram no. 1254 of July 27, 1945.^{93b} Foreign Office communicated with me again on September 26 concerning Italian participation in preparatory talks for drawing up statute for international zone of Tangier. This communication states as follows:

"Mr. Ambassador;

I thank you for your letter of September 13 in which you courteously informed Minister De Gasperi⁹⁴ of text of the resolution of the recent conference in Paris concerning provisional statute of the International Zone of Tangier concerning Italy.

"There had already, however, been received through confidential channels from London text of the Anglo-French agreement of August 31 concerning the provisional regime of Tangier.

"In this connection I cannot but point out how the decisions adopted at Paris, declaring to Italy the terms of Protocol of 1928, have prejudiced gravely the interests of Italy—which did not participate in the recent conversations, nor consulted them—in her capacity as 'contracting party' in the international regime of the Zone Tangier: a status which she had acquired through the aforementioned Protocol of 1928.

^{93a} Alexander C. Kirk was also United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater. In this capacity, his office was located at Caserta.

^{93b} Not printed.

⁹⁴ Alcide de Gasperi, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"This question is actually being studied by the legal offices and we shall not fail to inform you in good time of our point of view.

"I ask you to accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my highest consideration. (Signed) R. Prunas"

KIRK

881.00/10-1145 : Telegram

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)
to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, October 11, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received October 11—1 p. m.]

298. Transfer from Spanish to provisional international regime took place smoothly in atmosphere of calm. French police assumed police power effective midnight last night. Other services transferred today. *Duguay-Trouin* docked 9 this morning and debarked Goumier force⁹⁵ as Spanish Mehallas⁹⁶ withdrew into Spanish Zone. At 11 a. m. Mendoub proceeded with modest retinue from vessel to Mendoubia in Gran Socco through orderly crowds, and there received members of Diplomatic and Consular Corps and Mixed Court. Situation appears to be well in hand.

ALLING

881.00/10-1745 : Telegram

*The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to
the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, October 17, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received October 17—9:15 a. m.]

306. Discussions of Committee of Control now include reintroduction, with proposed modification, of various Tangier laws which were in force up to time of Spanish occupation. In view of maintenance of American extraterritorial judiciary organization in Tangier, Legation would appreciate receiving Department's instructions as to attitude of American Diplomatic Agent when as member of Committee of Control he assists at deliberations of Committee as ultimate legislative authority of Zone.

For legal background of this situation reference is made to pertinent comments on pages 5 and 6 of enclosure 1 to Paris Embassy's despatch No. 2663 of July 27, 1945.⁹⁷ Pages 7 and 8 of reference en-

⁹⁵ Moroccan troops, components of the Moroccan Army, under French command.

⁹⁶ Moroccan troops under Spanish command.

⁹⁷ Not printed; see footnote 53, p. 629.

closure suggest simplification of normal legal procedure for making Tangier laws applicable to American *ressortissants* by means of grant of authority to Diplomatic Agent to notify assent to Tangier laws without prior submission to Department at least in regard to enactments involving no departure from applicable treaty principles, while rejection of [or] assent to laws directly or indirectly impinging upon American treaty position would continue to be notified after consultation with Department.

It is suggested that the above procedure be considered as an internal arrangement of America for service in the premises; that it should not be disclosed to Moroccan authorities, because, in their eyes it might weaken position which we have consistently maintained in regard to validation of Moroccan laws, particularly in French and Spanish zones, where there is no counterpart of advisory intervention of American representative as there now is in regard to legislative enactments of Tangier administration.

Until I receive Department's approval of the suggestions outlined above or its alternative directions, I propose to abstain from voting on all legislative and other questions (other than administrative or procedural) involving our treaty rights, at the same time pointing out the situation fully and frankly to my colleagues in order that there can be no question of our *bona fides*.

ALLING

881.00/10-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 7:25 p. m.]

11051. Deptel 9228, October 18, 3 p. m.⁹⁸ This has been Embassy's understanding and is now informally confirmed by Foreign Office which assumes Soviet Government considers its primary purpose accomplished. Possibly Moscow does not intend participating provisional regime but expects engage in final conference.

Sent Department as 11051; repeated Paris as 680; Madrid as 279; Tangier as 58; Moscow as 360.

GALLMAN

⁹⁸ Not printed; it informed the Embassy that the Department had learned from the French that the Soviet Government had so far failed to answer the invitation of the French Government to participate in the provisional regime in Tangier (881.00/10-1845).

881.00/10-1745: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling)

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1945—8 p. m.

268. Urtel 306, Oct 17, 11 a. m. You should cooperate fully with your colleagues on Committee of Control and give them benefit of your views on all matters in connection with pending and future legislation for Tangier Zone during provisional regime. It is assumed that you already have made known this Govt's position and that there is no misunderstanding with respect to enforcement of local laws upon American *ressortissants*. Under these circumstances Dept sees no reason why you should abstain from voting on any legislative questions and you are authorized to do so in your discretion provided that such action is not opposed by other members of Control Committee.

Also, Dept approves of simplified procedure for making Tangier laws applicable American *ressortissants* as outlined on pages 7 and 8 of Paris Embassy's despatch 2663, July 27.⁹⁹

BYRNES

881.00/11-2045

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

No. 146

TANGIER, November 20, 1945.

[Received November 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of my Note of November 6, 1945, addressed to the President of the Committee of Control, informing him of the method previously used in obtaining the approval of the United States to laws enacted in the International Zone of Tangier. I also enclose a copy of the reply¹ of my French colleague who also informed me orally that he had submitted the matter to the Protectorate authorities at Rabat.

Very respectfully yours,

PAUL H. ALLING

[Enclosure]

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the President of the Committee of Control (De Beauverger²)

TANGIER, November 6, 1945.

MR. MINISTER AND DEAR COLLEAGUE: I have the honor to inform you that under the extraterritorial jurisdiction enjoyed by the United

⁹⁹ Not printed, but see telegram 306, October 17, 11 a. m. from Tangier, p. 668.

¹ November 17, 1945, not printed; it was an acknowledgment of receipt of the Diplomatic Agent's note of November 6.

² Baron Edmond de Beauverger was the French Consul General at Tangier.

States in Morocco, no laws, decrees, orders, or regulations can be made applicable to American nationals and *ressortissants* unless and until, upon formal application made to that effect by the Sherifian Government, the United States Government shall have given its assent thereto.

For the assistance of the Committee of Control in regard to the procedure to be adopted in the above connection in so far as concerns enactments of the Tangier administration, there are annexed hereto copies of correspondence³ exchanged in reference to consumption taxes on matches and on gasoline introduced by that Administration in the year 1931.

Please accept [etc.]

PAUL H. ALLING

881.00/11-2045

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the Secretary of State

No. 147

TANGIER, November 20, 1945.

[Received November 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram No. 268 of October 26 [24], 1945 concerning the position of the United States in relation to the International Administration of Tangier and to enclose a copy of my note dated November 6, 1945, on that subject, addressed to the President of the Committee of Control. I also enclose a copy of the reply⁴ addressed to me by the President of the Committee.

The Department will observe that my note of November 6 repeats the reservations contained in the Department's Note of September 22, 1945 addressed to the French Embassy at Washington accepting the invitation of the French Government to participate in the Tangier Administration. So far as I have been able to learn the French Government has not followed the suggestion contained in the final paragraph of the above-mentioned note and informed the governments concerned regarding the position of the United States in this matter. However, the President of the Committee of Control has now transmitted a copy of my note of November 6, 1945, to other members of the Committee, as will be observed from his note of November 17, 1945.

Respectfully yours,

PAUL H. ALLING

³ Not printed.

⁴ November 17, 1945, not printed; it was an acknowledgment of receipt of the Diplomatic Agent's note of November 6.

[Enclosure]

The Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier (Alling) to the President of the Committee of Control (De Beauverger)

TANGIER, November 6, 1945.

MR. MINISTER AND DEAR COLLEAGUE: In reference to the acceptance by my Government of the invitation of the French and British Governments to participate in the administration of Tangier on the basis of the provisional regime provided for in the final act of the Conference of Experts held at Paris during August 1945, I have the honor to transcribe hereunder the reservations under which such participation is conditioned.

“In accepting this invitation, the United States Government wishes to point out that such collaboration on its part in the provisional regime so established does not imply adherence by the United States to the Paris Convention of December 18, 1923, or to the final protocol of July 25, 1928, which had as their object the creation of an international statute for the Tangier Zone in Morocco. The collaboration of representatives of the United States at Tangier in the provisional administration of the Zone shall not be deemed to modify or abridge in any manner: (1) the position of the United States, (2) the status of its representatives, (3) the establishment, authority and powers of its extraterritorial jurisdiction, and (4) any rights accruing to the United States and to its nationals and *ressortissants* from treaty, custom, and usage as they existed throughout the territories of the Sherrefian Empire prior to the introduction into the Tangier Zone of the administration resulting from the above-mentioned convention of 1923 and the protocol of 1928.”

I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to bring the present communication to the attention of the Committee of Control at its next session and cause it to be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings.⁵

Please accept [etc.]

PAUL H. ALLING

RETURN OF CAPE SPARTEL LIGHTHOUSE TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL⁶

[In article 4 of the Anglo-French Agreement for the re-establishment of the International Administration of Tangier, signed at Paris, August 31, 1945, the two powers agreed that Spain would return the Cape Spartel Lighthouse to the control of the International Cape

⁵ This letter was acknowledged on November 17, 1945.

⁶ For documentation relating to the protest by the United States regarding the Spanish seizure of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 581 ff. For documentation regarding the Convention concerning the administration of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse, signed at Tangier, May 31, 1865, see *ibid.*, 1864 pt. IV, pp. 412 ff., *passim*, and 1865, pt. III, pp. 351 ff., *passim*. For text, see Malloy, *Treaties etc.*, 1776-1909, vol. I, p. 1217.

Spartel Lighthouse Commission. Texts of the Agreement and of the Final Act of the Four Power Conference of Experts on the future status of Tangier, held in Paris, August 10 to August 31, 1945,⁷ which preceded the signing of the Agreement, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 21, 1945, pages 613-618. In despatch 153, November 27, 1945, the Diplomatic Agent at Tangier reported that control of the Lighthouse was handed over to the International Commission on October 11, and that the Commission resumed its regular meetings on October 15 (881.00/11-2745).]

**REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES IN MOROCCO
CONCERNING AMERICAN CIVIL AVIATION RIGHTS IN MOROCCO**

811.79681/5-3145

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

No. 2783

TANGIER, May 31, 1945.

[Received July 7.]

Subject: Landing Rights for American Commercial Aircraft in French Morocco.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's instruction No. 395 of May 23, 1945⁸ and to report that in accordance with that instruction I have addressed a note, dated May 31, 1945, to the French Resident General⁹ which is identical with the proposed note transmitted under cover of the Department's instruction in question.

After a review of the changes proposed by the Department in the note transmitted under cover of my despatch No. 2727 of May 2, 1945,⁸ it was not considered that any substantive changes should be made in the last revised draft of the Department as it seemed to me to meet fully the situation. A copy of the note is transmitted to the Department for its records.

Respectfully yours,

J. RIVES CHILDS

[Enclosure]

*The American Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the French Resident General in Morocco (Puaux)*¹⁰

TANGIER, May 31, 1945.

MR. RESIDENT GENERAL: AS YOUR Excellency is no doubt aware, the *dahir* of October 1, 1928, which purports to regulate aerial navigation

⁷ For documentation regarding the Conference, see pp. 601 ff.

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Gabriel Puaux.

¹⁰ The Diplomatic Agent in Tangier stated in despatch 338, June 29, 1946, that no reply to this note had been received (811.79681/6-2946).

in the French Zone of Morocco, has never been submitted to my Government with a view to its application to American nationals and *ressortissants*. Your Excellency is also aware that during the past several years there has been a considerable development of American air transport into and across Morocco.

My Government does not desire for its commercial air transport services passing through Morocco any extraordinary privileges, but believes that relations between the United States of America and Morocco will be strengthened by the continued operation of American air services. It is therefore disposed to seek with the French Protectorate authorities some practical means for making applicable to American nationals and *ressortissants* certain rights and regulatory provisions with respect to air transport and aerial navigation which may be mutually agreed upon as desirable. Your Excellency will of course appreciate that such regulatory provisions could not include any measures which would tend to place United States air transport enterprises in a position of inferiority as compared with other commercial airlines. With a view to the foregoing, my Government suggests that such arrangements as those indicated be effected by an exchange of notes which would include the following stipulations:

- 1) Commercial aircraft authorized by the Government of the United States of America to operate on a regularly scheduled route via Morocco will be granted rights of transit through and non-traffic stop in Morocco, as well as the rights to pick up and discharge passengers, cargo and mail at Casablanca, on the route or routes to be determined in agreement between the appropriate United States and French Protectorate authorities.

- 2) United States aircraft while in Morocco shall be entitled to the use of airports and air navigation facilities on terms no less favorable than those accorded to Moroccan, French, or other aircraft. United States airlines authorized to operate into and through Morocco shall have the right to acquire, install, maintain, and operate whatever air navigational aids and operating facilities may be required.

- 3) The French Protectorate authorities agree that fuel, lubricating oil, spare parts, and regular equipment of aircraft, and stores retained on board civil aircraft of United States registry operating into or out of Morocco shall, upon arriving in or leaving the territory of Morocco, be exempt from customs, inspection fees, or similar duties or charges, even though such supplies are used or consumed by such aircraft on flights in Morocco.

- 4) The Government of the United States of America agrees that Moroccan laws and regulations as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crews or cargo of aircraft, and such regulations as relate to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, and customs shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers,

crews, or cargoes except as otherwise provided herein, upon entering into or departing from or while within the territory of Morocco, so long as such laws and regulations are not in conflict with existing American treaty rights.

5) The Government of the United States of America expresses its readiness to make applicable to United States nationals and *ressortissants* and to United States commercial aircraft entering, passing over and departing from Morocco, such technical provisions of the *dahir* of October 1, 1928 as constitute a reasonable regulation of aerial navigation, as well as such other technical provisions as the French Protectorate authorities and the Government of the United States may eventually agree upon as desirable to supplement the provisions of that *dahir*.

6) In the event that either the Government of the United States of America or the French Protectorate authorities consider it desirable to modify or supplement the foregoing provisions, that Government or those authorities may request consultation between the competent officials of both contracting parties, such consultation to begin within a period of sixty days from the date of the request. When new or revised provisions are mutually agreed upon, they shall come into effect after they have been confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

7) The provisions of the present agreement, and any amendments thereto, shall be carried out in such a manner that United States aircraft will receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded Moroccan or French aircraft or aircraft of any other country; it being further agreed that the application of Morocco laws and regulations will not conflict with existing United States treaty rights in Morocco.

Please accept [etc.]

J. RIVES CHILDS

881.00/6-1145 : Airgram

The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State

TANGIER, June 11, 1945.

[Received June 19—6 p. m.]

A-196. Referring to my telegram No. 160 of June 11,¹¹ I found the greatest interest manifested by the French Resident General as well as by other officials of the Protectorate in the Legation's note of May 31, transmitted to the Department under cover of my despatch No. 2783 of May 31, 1945, with reference to commercial landing rights for American aircraft in French Morocco.

The French Resident General stated that he was accompanying the Sultan ¹² to France on June 11 and that he would take advantage

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Muhammed V of Morocco.

of his visit to Paris to discuss the question with the appropriate French authorities. He asked me whether similar arrangements had been made with other countries and what we proposed to do with respect to Algeria.

I stated that we had concluded conventions with a number of countries concerning commercial landing rights, including in particular Spain,¹³ quite recently, and that a convention with France was under discussion.¹⁴ I added that Algeria, as an integral part of Metropolitan France, would fall within the orbit of our convention with France. I explained that for us the situation in French Morocco was quite different as we had important treaty rights in French Morocco which we did not possess in Algeria, and that it had seemed to us desirable to effect arrangements with respect of French Morocco through an exchange of notes.

The Resident asked me if I looked upon the proposed exchange of notes as merely provisional in character and as a war-time measure. He alluded to the fact that our military aircraft were now engaged in commercial air transport. I replied that the exchange of notes was not to meet a war-time situation, but was designed to normalize the very irregular situation now existing by which our aircraft were engaging in commercial air transport without being subject to any control.

Monsieur Puaux remarked that this was indeed the case as passengers were being brought into French Morocco and taken out without being subject to any control at all on the part of the French authorities. I replied that our exchange of notes would remedy this situation and I thought that our proposals were equally in the interests of the French Protectorate authorities as in our own.

The Resident General stated he had observed the proposed exchange of notes did not contain any reference to cabotage rights. He stated that the French Protectorate could not any more accord such rights than we would be disposed to accord the right to foreign air transport companies to pick up passengers in San Francisco and convey them to Alaska. I did not enter into any discussion of this matter in the light of the Department's instruction No. 395 of May 23, 1945,¹⁵ but it was quite evident from M. Puaux's remarks that the

¹³ Protocol additional to the air transportation agreement between the United States and Spain, signed at Madrid, February 19, 1945; see vol. v, pp. 724 ff.

¹⁴ An Arrangement between the United States and France was effected by exchange of notes signed at Paris December 28 and 29, 1945; for texts, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1679, or 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3474.

¹⁵ In this instruction (811.79681/5-245), transmitting the draft of the note of May 31 to the French Resident General in Morocco, *supra*, the Chargé was informed that no reference had been made in the note to cabotage, the right to which had hitherto been maintained by the United States in Morocco, because the Agreements and Convention relating to international civil aviation opened for signature following the International Civil Aviation Conference reserved cabotage

French Protectorate authorities will endeavor to clarify this question in the exchange of notes and that they are indisposed to accord us rights of cabotage.

I gained the distinct impression not only from my conversation with the Resident General but also from conversations with other interested Protectorate officials that our draft proposals had been favorably received. I think the French Protectorate officials are in a sense relieved that we have ourselves gone so far as to propose that American commercial air lines be subject to regulatory measures. As the Department is aware from the reports of its officers in Morocco, great anxiety has existed for some time since the landings¹⁶ concerning our intentions in French Morocco. The proposals made to the French Protectorate authorities on the subject of commercial air transport rights in French Morocco have contributed in their way to allaying these apprehensions and have elicited accordingly a favorable reaction in Rabat.

CHILDS

to the contracting state and defined territory to include areas under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, or mandate of the state. The United States had already announced its acceptance of the terms of the Agreements and Convention and France was expected to do so. The Chargé was further informed that the Department was not at that time taking a definitive position on whether American adherence to the Agreements and Convention constituted recognition that Morocco was to be treated as a part of France for purposes of civil aviation. Moreover, the United States Government would hesitate to make an outright reservation on French Morocco in this connection, since this would encourage reservations by other countries and might precipitate controversies that would jeopardize American aviation interests in the Panama Canal Zone. For documentation regarding the International Civil Aviation Conference, held in Chicago, November 1 to December 7, 1944, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. II, pp. 355 ff.

¹⁶The invasion of French North Africa, November 8, 1942, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

PALESTINE

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE ARAB-ZIONIST CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE AND TOWARD THE QUESTION OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ¹

867N.00/1-245

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1945.

Information has reached us that the Zionists intend to ask you to endorse the so-called Lowdermilk project for the development of Palestine. This project, which is described in a recent book entitled *Palestine, Land of Promise* by Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk of the United States Department of Agriculture, proposes the establishment of a Jordan Valley Authority on the model of the TVA,² with the object of making it possible for Palestine to absorb at least four million Jewish refugees. The author, who is Assistant Chief of the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, has made it plain that his plan represents his own personal views and does not have the backing of the Government. The project has, however, been heartily endorsed by the Zionists, who have not failed to stress the fact that the author is prominent in our own Government's reclamation work.

Quite apart from the foreign policy implications, we have some interesting comments regarding the Lowdermilk project, based on the view of scientists resident in Palestine, from one of our officers in the field, showing that from a purely technical standpoint there are serious obstacles to the plan. I thought that you would want to know this.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

¹ For previous documentation concerning the policy of the United States regarding the Palestine question, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 560 ff.

² Tennessee Valley Authority.

S90B.00/1-545 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, January 5, 1945—4 p. m.
Received January 5—3 : 10 p. m.

9. ReLegs 8, January 4, 1 p. m.³ Abdel Rahman Azzam⁴ informs me that in signing Pan-Arab Protocol⁵ King Abdul Aziz al Saud⁶ urges (1) military alliance to protect Arab States against aggression and (2) joint commitment to defend Arab Palestine against Zionism, by force if necessary. King stated he would be honored to die on battlefield himself, a champion of Palestine Arabs.

With Axis radio propaganda grossly exaggerating US official support of Zionism I submit that any pro-Zionist move by US Government would be most unfortunate. Details by airgram A-3, January 5, 9 a. m.⁷

Sent Department; repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut and Baghdad.

EDDY

S90F.001/1-945

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1945.

I think that you will be particularly interested in these two telegrams from Jidda⁸ regarding King Ibn Saud's attitude toward Pan-Arab matters and the Palestine question.

We attach considerable importance to his action in signing the Protocol of Alliance between the Arab states drawn up at the recent Alexandria conference, first, because there was some question whether Saudi Arabia would sign the agreement at all, and, second, because in doing so the King has proposed certain amendments to make the Alliance more effective, with particular reference to Palestine.

Ibn Saud's statement that he regards himself as a champion of the Arabs of Palestine and would himself feel it an honor to die in battle in their cause is, of course, of the greatest significance.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Egyptian Minister of State in charge of Arab relations.

⁵ Reference is to the Alexandria Protocol of October 7, 1944, which embodied the results of a meeting held at Alexandria, September 25–October 7, 1944, of official delegations from the several Arab States and known as the Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference; for text of the Protocol, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1947, p. 966. With regard to the interest of the United States in the general question of Arab union, see bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v. p. 660, and *ante*, p. 25.

⁶ King of Saudi Arabia.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Telegram 8, January 4, 1945, 1 p. m., not printed; and telegram 9 *supra*.

S67N.01/1-1245

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1945.

I think you will want to note these two airgrams from our Minister at Baghdad,⁹ the first of which outlines the reaction in Iraq to the revival of the Palestine resolutions in Congress,¹⁰ while the second gives the text of a note from the Iraqi Foreign Office to our Minister summarizing the position of Iraq and the other Arab countries in this regard.

These airgrams show quite clearly that the Arabs regard, and will continue to regard, the Palestine question with the utmost concern. Zionist activities in this country will remain the gravest threat to friendly relations between the United States and the countries of the Near East until a solution to the problem is reached.

We are sending copies of the Iraqi note to Tom Connally and Sol Bloom.¹¹

J[OSEPH] C. GREW

*The American Director of Economic Operations in the Middle East (Landis) to President Roosevelt*¹²

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have given much thought to your inquiry as to what you might say to King Ibn Saud in an effort to bring about a *rapprochement* to the Palestine problem.¹³

You must be warned in the first instance that Ibn Saud both personally and as a political matter feels very intensely about this subject. He has refused to date any suggestions emanating from emissaries of the United States that there might be some middle ground

⁹ Airgram A-75, December 19, 1944, and airgram A-77, December 21, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 649 and 652, respectively. Loy W. Henderson was Minister in Iraq.

¹⁰ For documentation concerning the Palestine Resolutions, see *ibid.*, index, p. 1338, entries under Palestine: Resolutions in U.S. Congress.

¹¹ Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, respectively.

¹² Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

¹³ Preparations were being made at this time for the tripartite conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin scheduled to begin at Yalta on February 4; for documentation concerning the Crimea Conference, February 4-February 11, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945. At the same time plans were being projected for President Roosevelt's return trip which would include individual meetings between himself and King Farouk I of Egypt, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, and Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, respectively; for documentation regarding these meetings which took place aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy* on Great Bitter Lake, February 13 and 14, see pp. 1 ff.

on this issue.¹⁴ Only recently he threatened in the presence of one of my people to see to the execution of any Jew that might seek to enter his dominion. One of his most important advisers, Sheik Izzidine Shawa, is a Palestinian Arab who spent his early life fighting the Jewish movement in Palestine and his later years in fleeing from the British because of these activities. Politically Ibn Saud represents the Moslem sect¹⁵ that is the spearhead of the true pan-Islam movement and that is unwilling to have any dealings with Infidels, not to say Jews. Indeed of recent years Ibn Saud has had to defend against increasing hostility his actions in being friendly with Christians and admitting them into the country.

I say this by way of introduction to indicate that no suggestion of yours with regard to Palestine that does not go to the root of the matter is likely to advance very far. For that very reason it may be wise for you to avoid the issue as much as possible unless you are prepared to make some far-reaching proposals. You will, of course, know best as to whether you are prepared to make such proposals. From my observations I do not believe that the State Department is yet prepared to do so. It does not seem to have concentrated on the possible solutions there are to this question and explored them, as it should in the first instance with some of the outstanding trustworthy Jews. A vacillating policy with reference to Zionism, as the past twenty years have proved, is the equivalent of no policy.

An approach to this problem must start from an insistence that the objective of the Jewish Commonwealth or the Jewish State as distinguished from the Jewish National Home must be given up. The political objective implicit in the Jewish State idea will never be accepted by the Arab nations and is not consistent with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.¹⁶ Nor is it demanded by the Mandate¹⁷ or the

¹⁴ In 1943 Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins undertook a special mission to King Ibn Saud at the direction of President Roosevelt to discuss this question; for documentation regarding this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 795-827, *passim*.

¹⁵ From the mid-18th century the family of King Ibn Saud had supported politically the puritan creed of the Wahhabis, followers of Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab; in turn the Wahhabi tribesmen of central Arabia had supported the extension of the domain of the Saudi rulers in the latter's evolution from Nedji nobles to kings of Saudi Arabia.

¹⁶ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. i, p. 367.

¹⁷ The Palestine Mandate was awarded to Great Britain by the Supreme War Council on April 24, 1920, and its terms were defined by the Council of the League of Nations at London on July 24, 1922; for text, see *ibid.*, 1924, vol. ii, p. 213. For documentation on the Convention between the United States and Great Britain regarding the Palestine Mandate, signed at London, December 3, 1924, see *ibid.*, pp. 203 ff.

Balfour Declaration.¹⁸ But given an adequate conception of the Jewish National Home together with the political limitations that must be placed on that conception, it should be possible to sell that conception to the Jews and to the Arabs as well. The one great stumbling block is the question of immigration. That question at the present possesses a significance that it should not possess because of its relationship to the political as distinguished from the economic future of Palestine. In other words, if the extent of immigration can be related to the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine rather than to the political issue of a Jewish minority or majority, there is a hope of striking an acceptable compromise even on the immigration question with the Arabs. This is particularly true now for I believe that the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine has been grossly exaggerated.

Finally, Palestinian policy must become an international responsibility. The British cannot be asked to carry it alone, nor can a steadfast policy be set and adhered to without whole-hearted Russian support. Without that support rifts will immediately appear of which discontented Arabs or Jews will avail themselves and vacillation among the Great Powers will once again occur.

I have not tried to give you an essay on this issue or to do other than forward general suggestions as I believed you wanted only general ideas at this time. I hope they may be of some use to you. I envy you your trip to that area and only wish you had some need for someone to carry your seventeenth brief-case.

With every hope and every wish,

Sincerely yours,

JAMES M. LANDIS

867N.01/1-3045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1945.

The Egyptian Minister¹⁹ called on me this afternoon at his request.

The Minister said that he did not wish today to take up with me the various problems between our Governments but he turned to the question of Palestine and said that in his opinion Palestine was one of the great danger spots of the world and, just as the Crimean War

¹⁸ For text of the letter concerning a Jewish national home in Palestine written by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Walter Rothschild on November 2, 1917, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 752, footnote 14. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the issuance of this statement of policy by the British Government, see *ibid.*, 1917, supplement 2, vol. i, pp. 317, 473, and 483.

¹⁹ Mahmoud Hassan.

had started in Palestine (?),²⁰ the development of unrest in that area might lead to another war in the future. He thought that Palestine should be a country where Mohammedans, Christians and Jews could live amicably and without the intrusion of politics, and he believed that sometime the problems of Palestine should be thrashed out around a green table, where much could be accomplished.

The Minister said further that Egypt, as a small country, depended greatly on the sympathetic and moral support of the United States, which the Egyptians knew to be a disinterested country without a desire for the acquisition of further territory.

[Here follows conversation relating to personal and social amenities.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

867N.01/1-3045

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*²¹

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1945.

PALESTINE: FORM OF GOVERNMENT
(A Summary)

1. The long-standing conflict between Arabs and Jews, resulting from the irreconcilable nature of the obligations inherent in the Palestine mandate and various unilateral commitments stemming from the last war and from the opposing demands of Arabs and Jews, creates a situation which requires a new approach to the settlement of the Palestine problem.

2. A Palestine settlement, which would ameliorate the basic conditions that have given rise to the Arab-Jewish conflict, and which would foster cooperation between the two peoples, is of immediate concern to the United States Government. The interest of this Government in such a settlement is based on a real concern for general security in the Near East area, on the fact that political forces now

²⁰ The Crimean War, 1853-1856, in part grew out of the conflict between France and Russia regarding the holy places in Palestine.

²¹ This document, and each of the three documents which follow, were based on a series of studies made in exploration of the bases for a postwar settlement in Palestine. These studies were conducted during 1943 and 1944 at the technical level of the Department by an Interdivisional Area Committee on Arab Countries composed of Messrs. Gordon P. Merriam, Foy D. Kohler, and Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, and Dr. Philip W. Ireland and Prof. William Yale of the Division of Territorial Studies; a revision of these papers was made on January 30, 1945, of which this and the following summaries constitute a part.

Though never considered up to this date at the policy level, the two studies relating to Palestine government and Palestine immigration were taken to London as background material for the informal discussions held at the British Foreign Office in April 1944 by the then Under Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius; see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 592 and 600.

aroused in the Near East and in the United States affect American interests, and, also, because of recent American commitments.

3. It is recommended: that Palestine be declared to be an International Territory under Trusteeship with a Charter, granted by the International Organization; that the Charter should supersede all previous commitments with respect to Palestine, setting forth the form of government and laying down principles for immigration, land transfers, and economic development; that Great Britain be appointed as the Trustee; that a Board of Overseers, composed of representatives of the Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities of the world, appointed by the International Organization, be created to function in an advisory capacity; and that the Arabs and Jews in Palestine be recognized as national communities and be granted self-government in all areas where they are, respectively, predominant.

4. This recommendation is made because: (a) it eliminates the conflicting commitments of the past; (b) it places Palestine outside the bounds of nationalist and imperialist ambitions; (c) it provides the means to solve basic economic problems; and (d) it would create conditions favorable to that cooperation between Arabs and Jews essential to the ultimate independence of Palestine.

867N.01/1-3045

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1945.

PALESTINE: IMMIGRATION

(A Summary)

1. The opposition of Arabs to Jewish immigration and the demands of Jews in Palestine, Great Britain, and the United States for unlimited Jewish immigration and for the revocation of the immigration clauses of the White Paper of 1939²² seem to indicate the necessity for the formulation of a policy with respect to Jewish immigration to Palestine.

2. It is recommended, that under the proposed post-war settlement for Palestine as an International Territory under Trusteeship, limited Jewish immigration be permitted in conformity with a statement of principles with respect to immigration incorporated in the Charter for Palestine. Immigration of Jews would be permitted under the general principle that the basic consideration governing im-

²² British Cmd. 6019 (1939) : *Palestine, Statement of Policy.*

migration should be the general welfare of the people of Palestine judged on the basis of the economic requirements of agriculture, commerce, and industry for immigrants.

3. This recommendation is made:

a) because unlimited Jewish immigration would result in economic instability and political unrest leading to violence.

b) because there is now overcrowding on Arab land and provision must be made for the rapidly increasing Arab population before immigration is permitted except on a limited scale.

c) because of the shortage of housing, food, and other consumer goods.

d) because, after the war, Palestine will face a difficult period of industrial readjustment and the serious problem of employment for thousands of demobilized soldiers and other war workers.

e) because until large-scale land reclamation projects are carried out and until there is a large expansion of Palestine industry Palestine cannot support any large number of immigrants.

867N.01/1-3045

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1945.

PALESTINE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

(A Summary)

1. Large-scale economic developments, because they are essential to the increase of Palestinian production and because they are insistently being demanded by Jewish groups, indicate the necessity for the formulation of a policy with respect to the economic development of Palestine in conformity with the proposed form of government. The low standard of living, which augments the friction between Arabs and Jews, would be ameliorated by large-scale development projects that would provide more electric power for industry and more irrigated land for agriculture.

2. It is recommended that large-scale development projects should be the joint responsibility of the International Organization and the Trustee Government in order that the natural resources may be exploited for the benefit of all the people of Palestine. It is suggested that the Trustee Government create a Palestine Development Corporation which would undertake an economic survey of Palestine, propose development projects to the Trustee Government, and undertake those projects authorized by the Trustee Government after being

certified by the International Organization as being in accordance with the terms of the Charter.

3. This recommendation is made:

- a) because of the necessity of increasing Palestinian production;
- b) because a competitive struggle between Arabs and Jews to control large-scale developments would foster a political conflict;
- c) because large-scale development projects would not attract private capital investment for profit and because a *laissez-faire* development policy would lead to serious political complications which would threaten the peace of Palestine.

867N.01/1-3045

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1945.

PALESTINE: LAND TRANSFERS

(A Summary)

1. The repeated and insistent demand of the Jews for the unrestricted right to buy land in Palestine, the opposition of the Arabs to Jewish purchase of land, the menace to the Arab peasantry of further alienation of agricultural land, and the uncertainty of the future policy of the British Government indicate the necessity for the formulation of a policy with respect to land transfers which will be in conformity with the proposed form of government.

2. It is recommended that in those areas over which the Arab and Jewish Communal Governments, respectively, have jurisdiction, they shall have the authority to regulate, control, restrict and prohibit by legislative action land transfers; that the Trustee Government shall have the authority to regulate, control, restrict and prohibit land transfers in Haifa, Jerusalem, Safad, and Tiberias and also have the power to regulate, control, restrict and prohibit land transfers in the Jordan Valley and the Negeb and to make provision for land transfers in these two latter areas in accordance with the terms of the Charter after large-scale developments have made land available for settlements.

3. This recommendation is made:

- a) because the transfer of land should be under the control of the communities, Arab and Jewish, whose members inhabit the lands;
- b) because the free transfer of land would lead to the dispossession of the Arab peasantry and create economic and political conditions which would lead to a renewal of the conflict between Arabs and Jews;

c) because the present policy of the British Government invites continued agitation for changes in land regulations and fosters uncertainty and stimulates Arab-Jewish controversy.

867N.01/2-145 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State ²³

JIDDA, February 1, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received 2:18 p. m.]

45. King Abdul Aziz made following startling statement yesterday during audience given to officers of American Legation, obviously announcing a policy of aggressive leadership in Arab affairs and contradicting British report of his reluctance to raise Palestine issue quoted in Department's circular telegram January 29, midnight.²⁴

"Two threats to Arab community exist: French oppression of Syria ²⁵ and Jewish oppression of Palestine. We count on the Allies to make good their recognition of Syrian independence and to accord Syria the Justice and freedom for which you fight the war. Unless the Allies restrain France, trouble will follow and the Arabs will be obliged to protect Syria themselves.

As to Palestine, America and Britain have a free choice between an Arab land of peace and quiet or a Jewish land drenched in blood. We do not ask for the removal of Jews; those who are there may stay, but there must be no more. We ask no special consideration, only that America settle this Palestinian problem in her native tradition of justice, which Americans insist upon for themselves and their neighbors. If America should choose in favor of the Jews, who are accursed in the Koran as enemies of the Muslims until the end of the world, it will indicate to us that America has repudiated her friendship with us and this we should regret. The choice, however, is for America. We have spoken, and it is my wish that these words be reported in full to your Government."

Details by airgram.²⁶

Repeated to Cairo as No. 22, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad and Caserta. Beirut please repeat to Damascus.

EDDY

²³ Text transmitted in unnumbered telegram of February 3, 1945, to the Secretary of State, at this time en route to the tripartite conference at Yalta.

²⁴ Not printed.

²⁵ For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the treaty problem which was at this time disturbing relations between France and Syria, see pp. 1034 ff.

²⁶ Not printed.

867N.01/2-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1945.

Participants: Dr. Stephen S. Wise ²⁷
 Dr. Nahum Goldman
 Mr. [Herman] Schulman
 Dr. Grynberg [*Hayim Greenberg*]
 Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew

Dr. Stephen S. Wise, accompanied by three of his associates, came to see me this morning and we talked for approximately forty minutes. Rabbi Wise opened the conversation with the statement, "The doors of Palestine must be opened to the Jews".²⁸ He then explained in detail the present situation in which only six thousand certificates are still available for Jewish immigration into Palestine, and that at the rate of 1,500 a month the supply of certificates will be exhausted within the next few months. He painted in vivid colors the serious conditions in which the Jews in Europe, especially in Rumania, are living today and said that when these Jews learned of the mere trickle that would be allowed to enter Palestine, there was universal mourning among the Jews in Rumania. Dr. Wise is aware that the President has taken his memorandum²⁹ on this subject to his forthcoming meeting with Churchill, who Dr. Wise characterized as being thoroughly sympathetic towards this whole problem. He said that he merely wished to establish contact with me so that I might fully understand the situation, but he asked for no action on my part.

I told Dr. Wise that I was already familiar with the problem which he had presented, and that in fact I knew a good deal about it. I said that he could assume my own complete sympathy with the plight of the Jews in Europe, and that few situations had distressed me more than the appalling conditions in Rumania and elsewhere, which he had presented.

Each of the other gentlemen talked on one phase or another of the problem.

The subject then turned to the appointment of Wallace Murray³⁰ as Ambassador to Iran and the hope was expressed that in filling his position in the State Department or in filling possibly new positions someone might be considered who understood the whole broad

²⁷ Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council. The other participants were Zionist leaders.

²⁸ A memorandum, not printed, by Mr. Philip W. Ireland, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, dated February 10, 1945, reported statements made at the First Annual Conference of the American Council for Judaism, held January 13 and 14, 1945, at Philadelphia, strongly dissenting from the Zionist point of view (867N.01/2-1045).

²⁹ Not found in Department files.

³⁰ Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

problem of the Jews and of Palestine, the implication being that the Near Eastern office naturally deals with many countries and many different problems, but that it would be helpful to have an officer in the Department who might specialize exclusively on Jewish interests abroad. I immediately replied that since coming to my present desk I had been deeply impressed by the thorough grasp of the Jewish and the Palestine problem by officers now in the Department, and that I had been convinced by the information and statistics furnished me that these officers understood the subject in a thoroughly expert way. I said, however, that the suggestion of Dr. Wise and his associates would be given full consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[For memorandum of conversation between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud, February 14, 1945, aboard the U.S.S. *Quincy*, on Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, see page 1.]

890F.001 Abdul Aziz/2-2245

*The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State*³¹

No. 74

JIDDA, February 22, 1945.

[Received about March 3.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram No. 69, February 21, noon,³² and to report in greater detail the discussion of Zionism between the King and Mr. Churchill.

On the day of his return to Jidda, February 20, 1945 (see Legation's Despatch No. 73, February 21, 1945³²), the King asked me to return after lunch for private audience with him at which no one else was present, not even his body-guard. He said he wanted my government to know exactly what was said about Palestine during his conference with Mr. Churchill. The King's statement is closely paraphrased as follows:

"Mr. Churchill opened the subject confidently wielding the big stick. Great Britain had supported and subsidized me for twenty years, and had made possible the stability of my reign by fending off potential enemies on my frontiers. Since Britain had seen me through difficult days, she is entitled now to request my assistance in the problem of Palestine where a strong Arab leader can restrain fanatical Arab elements, insist on moderation in Arab councils, and effect a realistic compromise with Zionism. Both sides must be prepared to make concessions and he looks to me to help prepare the Arab concessions.

³¹ Copy transmitted to President Roosevelt under cover of a memorandum of March 10, 1945.

³² Not printed.

"I replied that, as he well knows, I have made no secret of my friendship and gratitude to Great Britain, a friend I have always been ready to help as I shall always help her and the Allies against their enemies. I told him, however, that what he proposes is not help to Britain or the Allies, but an act of treachery to the Prophet and all believing Muslims which would wipe out my honor and destroy my soul. I could not acquiesce in a compromise with Zionism much less take any initiative. Furthermore, I pointed out, that even in the preposterous event that I were willing to do so, it would not be a favor to Britain, since promotion of Zionism from any quarter must indubitably bring bloodshed, wide-spread disorder in the Arab lands, with certainly no benefit to Britain or anyone else. By this time Mr. Churchill had laid the big stick down.

"In turn I requested assurance that Jewish immigration to Palestine would be stopped. This Mr. Churchill refused to promise, though he assured me that he would oppose any plan of immigration which would drive the Arabs out of Palestine or deprive them of the means of livelihood there. I reminded him that the British and their Allies would be making their own choice between (1) a friendly and peaceful Arab world, and (2) a struggle to the death between Arab and Jew if unreasonable immigration of Jews to Palestine is renewed. In any case, the formula must be one arrived at by and with Arab consent."

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

867N.01/3-545

*Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins*³³ to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling)

MARCH 5, 1945.

MY DEAR PAUL: In line with your suggestion, I am sending you some information summarizing the luncheon I had on Saturday . . . The luncheon was an entirely informal one with simply the President, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Boettiger. . . .

[Here follows discussion regarding several Near and Middle Eastern countries and their problems.]

Palestine:

I asked if the problem of Palestine had been discussed at Yalta, and he [President Roosevelt] said "no". The President said Mr. Churchill is as strongly pro-Zionist as ever and, among other ideas, Mr. Churchill wanted to put the Jews into Libya. The President said he had mentioned this to Ibn Saud, who objected violently, saying this would be unfair to the Moslems in North Africa. Mrs. Roosevelt referred to the wonderful work that had been done by the Zionists in certain parts of Palestine, which I agreed had been very well done. The President, however, commented on the fact that, except along

³³ Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins was at this time Economic Adviser to the Legation in Egypt, with concurrent appointments to the Legations in Syria and Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Ethiopia.

the coastal plain, Palestine looked extremely rocky and barren to him as he flew over it. Mrs. Roosevelt commented on the fact that the Zionists felt much stronger and were perhaps willing to risk a fight with the Arabs at Palestine. Mr. Roosevelt agreed that this was a possibility, but reminded her that there were 15,000,000 or 20,000,000 Arabs in and around Palestine and that, in the long run, he thought these numbers would win out. I said that the Zionists had attacked me particularly for the statement in my 1943 report³⁴ that a Zionist State in Palestine could be installed and maintained only by force. I asked the President if he agreed with this conclusion, which the Zionists continue to deny most aggressively, and he said he fully agreed with me. As Gordon Merriam³⁵ suggested, I then mentioned the fact that the State Department had a plan for Palestine as the country to be made an international territory sacred to all three religions—Moslem, Christian and Jew—which had been developed as a result of the suggestions which he had made to me when I saw him before, of a trusteeship for Palestine.³⁶ The President said he thought such a plan might well be given to the United Nations Organization after it had been set up to work out problems along these lines.

I asked him about Stalin's viewpoint on the Jews. He said that Stalin had stated that he, Stalin, was neither pro-Zionist nor anti-Zionist, and the President's comment was that at least Stalin was not the Jew-hater that he had been charged in some quarters with being.

[Here follows discussion of other Near Eastern countries and certain regional problems.]

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD B. HOSKINS

867N.01/3-1045 : Telegram

The Minister in Iraq (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, March 10, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received March 11—1:55 p. m.]

98. 1. The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs³⁷ told me a week ago in confidence that the Regent of Iraq³⁸ had recently received a

³⁴ For a bracketed note regarding Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins' report of April 20, 1943 on the situation in the Near East, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 19; for a "Summary" of the report, dealing almost exclusively with the Palestine question, see *ibid.*, p. 782.

³⁵ Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

³⁶ For the conversation between President Roosevelt and Lieutenant Colonel Hoskins on September 27, 1943, in which the President outlined his thinking for an international trusteeship for Palestine, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 811; subsequent discussion of this subject in the Department in 1943 is found *ibid.*, pp. 815-822, *passim*. For development of this idea as a plan of government for Palestine with particular reference to Under Secretary of State Stettinius' mission to London in April 1944, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 593, 594, and 601-602.

³⁷ Arshad al-Umari.

³⁸ Amir Abdul Ilah, Regent and Heir Apparent to the throne of Iraq.

communication from Ibn Saud enclosing a draft of a letter which Ibn Saud proposed to send to the President on the subject of Palestine and suggesting that the various Arab kings address similar letters to the President simultaneously. The Minister said that the Regent had agreed to Ibn Saud's suggestion and that it had been arranged for the letters to be delivered to the appropriate representatives of the American Government on March 10.³⁹

2. The Regent today has caused to be delivered to me a sealed envelope addressed to the President. He also sent for the files of the Legation a document which he said was an English translation of the Arabic text of a letter from himself to the President. The Regent's letter, after setting forth a number of arguments against Zionism, concludes as follows:

"The Arabs believe at present that the Jews want to have Palestine only as a means for their future domination of the whole Arab world economically as well as politically. Their future aim is no less than the colonization of all adjacent Arab countries. The Arabs naturally are opposed to such designs.

The Arabs maintain that they cannot unite unless Palestine is one of their constituent members. The geographical position of Palestine will obstruct Arab unity should it be in the hands of non Arabs whose interests conflict with those of the Arabs. The Arabs who regarded their unity as of prime importance can never agree to leave out Palestine. The Arabs individually and collectively regard the future of Palestine as a matter of life and death for them.

Excellency, these are only some of the most important reasons which induced the Arabs to defend their natural rights in Palestine. Such rights are undoubtedly supported by all humanitarian principles. It is the encroachment on such principles which is the main cause of all the wars and the troubles of the world. The world indeed needs the maintenance of peace and justice in order to achieve security and cooperation among the nations. Nothing that tends to promote discord should be tolerated.

As Your Excellency is one of the responsible men in high office who is endeavoring to realize such ideals and to share the world of tomorrow we appeal to you to support the natural rights of the Arabs in Palestine. In doing so you will eliminate one of the important factors which disturb peace and security not only in the Middle East but also throughout the entire world.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my hearty greetings and highest esteem."

³⁹ None printed; letters dated March 10 were received by President Roosevelt from the King of Saudi Arabia, the Regent of Iraq, and the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan; a letter from the President of the Syrian Republic (Kuwaitly) was undated; the Imam Yehya, King of Yemen, sent a telegram dated March 10; the Lebanese Prime Minister (Karame) addressed a communication of March 10 to the Secretary of State. These communications followed substantially the same lines in presenting Arab claims to Palestine—marshalling moral, historical, and political argumentation—and all reached conclusions similar to those voiced by the Iraqi Regent in this telegram. King Ibn Saud's letter was printed in the *New York Times* on October 19, 1945.

3. The envelope will go forward by next pouch.
4. A similar communication was handed today to the British Embassy for Churchill.

HENDERSON

867N.01/3-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, March 18, 1945—noon.
[Received March 18—8: 10 a. m.]

110. The Prime Minister⁴⁰ has informed me that a Reuter's⁴¹ despatch reports the President as having "reaffirmed his promises of last October to Rabbi Wise".⁴² The Prime Minister expressed the hope that this report is not true but if it is true he asks me to convey to the US Government the keen disappointment of the Iraqi Government.⁴³

MORELAND

867N.01/3-2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, March 20, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received March 21—11: 20 a. m.]

13. Local press has given limited publicity to Reuter despatch quoting alleged statement by President Roosevelt regarding Zionist state in Palestine. As a result students are on strike today, the city is partially closed, and a force of Syrian *gendarmierie* has been posted in front of the Legation. No disorders have occurred however.

The new Minister of Public Instruction⁴⁴ who is American educated informed me last evening that he had had great difficulty in dissuading the students from instigating serious demonstrations yesterday. He said that he thought there might be some disorders today but that they would not be serious as he had convinced the students that a wiser course would be to take advantage of Minister Hender-

⁴⁰ Hamdi al-Pachachi.

⁴¹ British news agency.

⁴² The *New York Times* reported on March 17 that Rabbi Wise had been received by President Roosevelt on the preceding day, and that he had been authorized to quote the President as saying, "I made my position on Zionism clear in October. That position I have not changed, and shall continue to seek to bring about its earliest realization"; regarding the position taken by President Roosevelt in October, 1944, see his letter of October 15 to Senator Robert F. Wagner, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 615.

⁴³ In telegram 108, March 19, 1945, 9 p. m., to Baghdad, the Chargé was informed that "Matter is being given immediate attention and you will receive further instructions as soon as possible." (867N.01/3-1845)

⁴⁴ Ahmad Sharabati.

son's ⁴⁵ presence in Damascus to present the following petition to the Legation:

"The students of Damascus, hurt by the last statement made by President Roosevelt regarding the opening of the doors of Palestine to Zionist immigration and by his confirmation of the statement he made during October of 1944, and by his decision to follow a colonial policy which would verify the establishment of a Zionist home in Palestine thus throwing the rights of the Arabs to the winds, protest against such statements which are inconsistent with the principles of liberty in the defense of which the nations are fighting, principles which have been proclaimed by the democracies to the world on several occasions. The students assure you moreover that Palestine is an inseparable part of the Arab world and that every attempt at its partition will be considered as injuring the very foundations of Arabism. The Arab world will never consent to such an attempt."

A similar petition was presented this morning by a committee of students representing the Syrian University.

SATTERTHWAITE

867N.01/3-1845

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Murray) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1945.

There is attached a brief memorandum ⁴⁶ for the President seeking his approval of a telegram which we have drafted in reply to Baghdad's 110, March 18, regarding an inquiry made of our Chargé d'Affaires by the Iraqi Prime Minister. This inquiry was prompted by a Reuter's report which stated that the President had reaffirmed to Rabbi Wise his pledge of last October on Palestine.

The reference is undoubtedly to a statement made by Rabbi Wise on March 16 after seeing the President, to the effect that the President was still in favor of unrestricted Jewish immigration and a Jewish state in Palestine. On inquiring at the White House, we were told by one of the President's secretaries that the President did in fact authorize Rabbi Wise to make such a statement.

This, of course, will have serious repercussions in the Near East when the matter becomes known and will have a most far-reaching effect upon American interests throughout the area. Specifically, the result will undoubtedly be the undoing to a considerable degree of the good effect of the President's recent meeting with King Ibn Saud. This is particularly so in view of the assurances which the President gave Ibn Saud at their meeting that he would make no move hostile to

⁴⁵ Loy W. Henderson, Minister to Iraq.

⁴⁶ March 22, p. 696.

the Arab people and would not assist the Jews against the Arabs in Palestine. It should also be borne in mind that on several occasions in 1943 and 1944 the President assured the heads of certain Near Eastern governments that in the view of this Government there should be no decision respecting the basic situation of Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.⁴⁷

Coming so soon after the President's visit to the Near East, the statement which he authorized Rabbi Wise to make is certain to cause consternation and dismay in the Arab world and may well set off another anti-American campaign with consequent damage to our position in the Near East. In his recent talks with the President and with Mr. Churchill, King Ibn Saud made his attitude abundantly clear and left no doubts as to the determination of the Arabs to fight, if necessary, in defense of their position in Palestine. The President's continued support of Zionism may thus lead to actual bloodshed in the Near East and even endanger the security of our immensely valuable oil concession in Saudi Arabia.

An additional aspect which concerns us is the Russian angle. As you know, the Soviets have been traditionally hostile to Zionist activities, they have made no commitments in favor of Zionism, and we have had clear indications that they are in fact opposed to a Jewish state. Consequently, in our memorandum on Palestine for the President's use at Yalta,⁴⁸ we strongly advised against attempting to reach any settlement of this question without the full agreement of the Soviet Government. In the face of this situation, the continued endorsement by the President of Zionist objectives may well result in throwing the entire Arab world into the arms of Soviet Russia.

The attached telegram⁴⁹ is an attempt on our part to provide an explanation, and, as you will note, it takes the line that the Rabbi's statement, like the President's pledge of last October, refers to action at some future time if conditions make such action practicable. We do not think that this reply will satisfy the Arabs, but we think it is the only one which can be made in the circumstances.

WALLACE MURRAY

867N.01/3-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, March 22, 1945—noon.

[Received 1:58 p. m.]

14. My 13, March 20. The students have now returned to their classes and all stores reopened.

⁴⁷ For documentation regarding such assurances by the United States Government, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 773-802, *passim*, and *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 589-598, *passim*.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 655.

⁴⁹ See telegram 116, March 24, 1 p. m., to Baghdad, p. 696.

However, the Legation has received telegrams protesting against the President's alleged statement on Palestine from the Arab Party and "the striking students of Homs". Also the Committee Against Zionism, composed of a large number of the leading politicians, editors and professional men of Damascus, has sent a delegation to the Legation to present the following written protest:

"The Zionist movement is a movement of colonization, the object of which is to take Palestine by force from its Arab owners and transform it into a Zionist home. The Arabs, who are fighting colonization and who hold to their rights with all their strength, determination and faith, see in this insistence a wound to the feelings of the whole Arab world. Moreover, they consider such insistence as contradictory to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, for the defense of which the democratic world has been fighting. That is why the Committee Against Zionism at Damascus received with great surprise and deep sorrow the news of support by the President of aggressive Zionism and of his approval of opening the doors of Palestine to unlimited Jewish immigration and colonization.["]

SATTERTHWAITE

867N.01/3-1845

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1945.

I am attaching a copy of a telegram from Baghdad⁵⁰ stating that the Prime Minister of Iraq had asked for confirmation of a Reuter's report to the effect that you had reaffirmed to Rabbi Wise your promises of last October to the Zionists. The telegram adds that the Prime Minister requested our Chargé d'Affaires to convey to this Government the keen disappointment of the Iraqi Government if the report should prove to be true.

There is also attached for your approval a proposed telegraphic reply to Baghdad.⁵¹

JOSEPH C. GREW

867N.01/3-1845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moreland)*⁵²

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1945—1 p. m.

116. In reply to the inquiry of the Prime Minister contained in your 110, March 18, noon, you may state that the Reuter's report in question is substantially correct and undoubtedly refers to a statement

⁵⁰ Telegram 110, March 18, noon, p. 693.

⁵¹ Telegram 116, March 24, 1 p. m., *infra*.

⁵² Marginal notation by the Acting Secretary: "Approved by the President. J.C.G."; repeated to London as telegram 2279 and to Cairo as telegram 685.

issued by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise following a conference with the President on March 16. No statement was issued by the President in this connection. (In discussing this matter with local officials you should point out that the Rabbi's statement refers to possible action at some future time.) In this same connection, it will be recalled that the President's letter of October 15, 1944, to Senator Wagner⁵³ regarding the Palestine plank adopted by the Democratic Party stated "efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable". You may state that the President is, of course, keeping in mind the assurances which were communicated on a number of occasions to the Governments of certain Near Eastern countries, including Iraq, to the effect that in the view of this Government no decision altering the basic situation of Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. You may renew these assurances to the Government of Iraq.

Sent to Baghdad, repeated to London and to Cairo, to be repeated by Cairo to Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus and Jidda.

GREW

867N.01/3-2945 : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the King of Yemen (the Imam Yehya bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din)*⁵⁴

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1945.

I have received the telegram which Your Majesty sent me under date of March 10⁵⁵ and wish to convey to you my warm appreciation of your expressions of friendship and esteem. The American Government is of course familiar with the views of the Arab States respecting the question of Palestine, and you may rest assured that those views will continue to receive the most careful consideration. I take this opportunity of sending my most sincere greetings to Your Majesty and my best wishes for Your Majesty's continued good health.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

⁵³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 615.

⁵⁴ In a telegram dated April 2, 1945, the King acknowledged receipt of the President's telegram, declaring, "Your high promise and your generous agreement with the rights of Arab peoples and about their sacred places merit the favor and the thanks of all Arabs—nay, of Islam and of all Moslems." (867N.01/3-2945)

⁵⁵ See footnote 39, p. 692.

867N.01/4-545

*President Roosevelt to the King of Saudi Arabia
(Abdul Aziz ibn Saud)*⁵⁶

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1945.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: I have received the communication which Your Majesty sent me under date of March 10, 1945,⁵⁷ in which you refer to the question of Palestine and to the continuing interest of the Arabs in current developments affecting that country.

I am gratified that Your Majesty took this occasion to bring your views on this question to my attention and I have given the most careful attention to the statements which you make in your letter. I am also mindful of the memorable conversation which we had not so long ago and in the course of which I had an opportunity to obtain so vivid an impression of Your Majesty's sentiments on this question.

Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.⁵⁸ Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.

It gives me pleasure to renew to Your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own, as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and to inform you that the policy of this Government in this respect is unchanged.

I desire also at this time to send you my best wishes for Your Majesty's continued good health and for the welfare of your people.

Your Good Friend,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

867N.01/4-645

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern
and African Affairs (Alling) to the Assistant Secretary of State
(Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1945.

You will recall that Mr. Grew asked you, in connection with the attached draft memorandum for the President regarding Palestine,⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Transmitted to Jidda in instruction 263, April 10, for delivery to the King.

⁵⁷ See footnote 39, p. 692.

⁵⁸ See footnote 47, p. 695.

⁵⁹ The draft memorandum, dated March 27, 1945, which it was proposed that the Acting Secretary send to President Roosevelt, read: "I think you will wish

whether there was any specific recommendation we could make to the President with a view to counteracting the unfavorable impression caused in the Near East by his continuing to give encouragement to the Zionists.

We had made the memorandum an informational one only, for the reason that the President's attitude on Palestine makes it difficult for us to follow any other course.

For some time we have been strongly of the opinion that the lack of any clearcut policy toward Palestine on the part of the United States has contributed materially to the instability of the political situation in the Near East and in particular to the continuance of friction between Arabs and Jews. Not only does this situation contain explosive potentialities of the most serious character; in addition, the recurring indications of support of Zionist aspirations in certain influential American Government quarters are affecting most gravely our standing in the entire area. It is our view, which we have long held and repeatedly made known, that unless some positive steps are taken to counteract the present tendency, our ability to afford adequate protection to American interests in the Near East will be seriously prejudiced.

As long ago as June, 1942, we began to urge the issuance, either unilaterally or in conjunction with the British, of a statement of policy on Palestine which would have had the purpose of warding off pressure from both sides until after the war.⁶⁰ We would also publicly have taken in this statement the position that no settlement should be reached without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

The proposed statement on Palestine was approved by Secretary Hull and the President and preparations were completed in Washington and London for it to be issued in July, 1943.⁶¹ At this point a leak occurred and the Zionists learned in a general way of our plans. They immediately bombarded high Government officials with protests. As a result, Mr. Hull felt that the matter should be decided on a military basis. The Secretary of War concluded that the military situation did not warrant the issuance of the statement and it was cancelled. In brief, a joint American-British statement, the exact text of which

to note these two telegrams from our Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus [telegrams 13 and 14, March 20 and 22, pp. 693 and 695 respectively] with regard to the reaction in Syria to the statement regarding your attitude on Palestine made by Rabbi Wise after seeing you on March 16.

While there were no actual disorders, there were student strikes in Damascus and Homs, some stores were closed, and gendarmes were sent to guard our Legation. A number of protests have been received at the Legation and the texts of two of these are given in the telegrams.

You will recall that we have already had a protest from the Iraqi Government regarding this same matter."

⁶⁰ For documentation regarding this statement, see *Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iv*, pp. 538-544, *passim*.

⁶¹ See *ibid.*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 790-804, *passim*.

had been agreed upon as being in the national interest by the highest political authorities of both countries, was killed by the American Zionist pressure group. A copy of the text which had been agreed upon is attached. (Annex 1)⁶²

Early in 1944 resolutions were introduced into Congress providing for unrestricted Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. A storm of protest arose in the Arab world. We accordingly again sought and obtained in March of 1944 the concurrence of the President in the issuance of the statement on Palestine, but the action at about the same time of Secretary Stimson in opposing the Palestine resolutions caused them to be shelved, and it was decided that it was not necessary to issue the statement.

Within a few days, however, of approving the issuance of the statement, the President on March 9 received Rabbi Wise and Rabbi Silver and they at once made an announcement (copy attached—Annex 2)⁶³ to the press which appeared to affirm the President's support of the Zionist position. This provoked an immediate protest in the Near East and it was necessary for us to prepare and clear with the President a confidential interpretation of the Rabbis' statement, for the use of our Near Eastern Chiefs of Mission, explaining that our policy was still based on consultation with both Arabs and Jews. This explanation was in line with assurances which the President had given King Ibn Saud late in 1943 and which were subsequently repeated to the Heads of the other Near Eastern Governments. It was decided, however, not to make public these assurances to the Arabs. The Zionists, of course, gave, and have always given, the greatest possible publicity to all encouragement which they have received from the President or any other officials.

During the 1944 Presidential campaign pro-Zionist planks were included in both major party platforms. This was not surprising and while the reaction in the Near East was immediate there was a general disposition to write off such pronouncements as mere party politics. When, however, on October 15, the President addressed a letter to Senator Wagner⁶⁴ in which he endorsed the Democratic Palestine plank, the matter assumed considerably more serious proportions. The President's attitude as expressed in this letter not only went beyond any previous official American pronouncements on Palestine but raised doubts in the minds of the Arabs regarding the pledges which the President had given to them. As might be expected, our position through the Near East suffered a severe blow. There was

⁶² See enclosure to letter of July 19, 1943, from Secretary of State Hull to President Roosevelt, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 798.

⁶³ See telegram 56, March 11, 1944, 11 a. m., from Baghdad, *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, p. 588.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 615.

an intensive anti-American press campaign in many countries, the Palestine Arabs boycotted the Culbertson Economic Mission⁶⁵ and a number of protests were received. So intensive was this reaction that we determined that it would be necessary to apprise the President at once of the seriousness of the situation. I am attaching a copy of a memorandum (Annex 3), dated October 27, 1944,⁶⁶ which we gave Mr. Stettinius and which formed the basis of a talk which he had with the President early in November.

When the Zionists desired the re-introduction of the Palestine resolutions in Congress immediately after the election, the President, evidently having these considerations in mind, authorized Mr. Stettinius to tell Rabbi Wise and Congressional leaders that the President felt it would be unwise to have the resolutions re-introduced at that time. Nevertheless, the resolutions were revived and were defeated only by the personal appearance of the Secretary before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The President's position, it should be noted, was made known orally to Rabbi Wise, Mr. Bloom and others, but it was not put in writing. Moreover, the President sent a message to Senator Wagner in which he pointed out that the passage of the resolutions might lead to bloodshed between Arabs and Jews and should, therefore, be averted at this time although he added: "Everybody knows what American hopes are" (an apparent reference to Zionist aims).

The President's feeling at this time was that he would shortly be having discussions on Palestine with Churchill and Stalin and that he did not wish to have his hands tied by any action on Capitol Hill. In connection with the Yalta Conference, we prepared a memorandum⁶⁷ in which we urged that the Palestine question be taken up with Churchill and Stalin and proposed that the British should commence to implement their existing commitment to consult interested parties, by requesting Arabs and Jews to submit their respective views. The position which we took here had changed as compared with our earlier stand, for we had first to recognize that there had been an improvement in the strategic situation affecting the Near East and second to concede that we were unable to prevent agitation of the Palestine issue. We therefore sought in this proposal to confine the agitation to constructive channels. Palestine was not, however, discussed at the Yalta Conference. Later the President did, as you know, discuss the question in Egypt with King Ibn Saud.

During their meeting the President assured King Ibn Saud that he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist

⁶⁵ For documentation regarding the Culbertson Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 38 ff.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 624.

⁶⁷ Memorandum entitled "Suggested Procedure Regarding the Palestine Question," *ibid.*, p. 655.

the Jews as against the Arabs. He pointed out that it was, of course, impossible to prevent discussion of the question in the press and in Congress, but he said that he gave his assurances as Chief Executive of this Government. Following his return, the President saw Colonel Harold Hoskins on March 3, and it was evident from their conversation, as reported to us, that he had been greatly impressed by the intensity of the Arab feeling with regard to Palestine. During this talk he replied in the affirmative when Hoskins asked if he did not agree that a Jewish state in Palestine could only be established and maintained by military force.

When on March 16 Rabbi Wise issued a statement saying that the President was still in favor of unrestricted Jewish immigration and a Jewish state, this was, of course, immediately protested by the Arabs. We secured the President's approval to a message to our Near Eastern posts explaining that while the President did authorize Rabbi Wise to make this statement, it referred only to possible action at some future date and that the President of course had in mind his pledges to the Arabs that they as well as the Jews would be consulted.

This reply will probably not satisfy the Arabs, but it seemed to be the only constructive course of action open to us. In our opinion the situation is so serious, and the adverse effect upon our long-term position in the Near East so likely, that we should reconsider the entire position, adopt a definite policy on Palestine, and obtain the President's concurrence, with the hope of averting any future misunderstandings as to what our policy actually is. In the last few days we have received communications regarding Palestine from King Ibn Saud, the Regent of Iraq and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. We are replying to these communications, most of which are addressed to the President, by affirming again that our position is based upon consultation with both Arabs and Jews. But we must adhere strictly to this position, if we are to be of real assistance in working out an equitable future settlement. Of course, if we were actually to implement the policy which the Zionists desire, the results would be disastrous.

I should be glad to have the attached memorandum for the President rewritten if you think we can incorporate any of the foregoing in a memorandum to him. For example, the suggestion might be made to the President that he make public on some suitable occasion the assurances we have given the Arab Governments that no solution of the Palestine problem will be reached without consultation with both Arabs and Jews.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, in a memorandum of April 10 to Mr. Alling, stated that he liked the idea of this paragraph and inquired whether the occasion of a visit to the President by a Near Eastern Chief of State would be appropriate (867N.01/4-645). In a marginal notation Mr. Alling suggested the

We had already arranged for the two attached Damascus telegrams ⁶⁹ to be included among the telegrams sent over to the President.
 PAUL H. ALLING

867N.01/3-1245

*The Secretary of State to the President of the Lebanese Council of Ministers (Karame)*⁷⁰

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I have received the letter which you addressed to me under date of March 10, 1945,⁷¹ relative to Palestine, and have taken note of the views which you express regarding this question.

You may rest assured that in its consideration of the Palestine problem the Department of State will not fail to bear in mind the position of Lebanon and of the other Arab states regarding this matter. You will recall in this connection that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision should be reached affecting the basic situation in Palestine without consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINUS, JR.

867N.01/4-2145

*President Roosevelt to the Regent of Iraq (Abdul Ilah)*⁷²

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1945.⁷³

YOUR HIGHNESS: I have received the letter which you sent me under date of March 10⁷¹ and in which you outline the attitude of the Arabs toward the question of Palestine.

I take this opportunity to express to you my appreciation for this statement of the Arab position, which I have read with the greatest interest. I know of the deep concern with which the Arab world is following developments relating to Palestine and I desire, in this connection, to renew to you the assurances which have been previously

impending visit of the Regent of Iraq. A statement for use on that occasion was drafted, along with an informational memorandum for President Roosevelt setting forth some of the points of view expressed herein by Mr. Alling to Mr. Dunn (867N.01/4-1245); both were set aside because of the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. For information on the visit of the Regent of Iraq to the United States, see bracketed note, p. 586.

⁶⁹Telegrams 13, March 20, 4 p. m., and 14, March 22, noon, pp. 693 and 695, respectively.

⁷⁰Transmitted to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon in instruction 368, April 11, 1945, for delivery to the Lebanese Prime Minister.

⁷¹Not printed, but see footnote 39, p. 692.

⁷²Transmitted to Baghdad in instruction 312, April 21.

⁷³President Roosevelt was in Warm Springs, Georgia, on this date.

communicated to the Iraqi Government to the effect that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I am looking forward to meeting Your Highness on the occasion of your forthcoming visit to the United States⁷⁵ and, in the meantime, I send you my warmest greetings and my best wishes for the continued well-being of the people of Iraq.

Sincerely yours

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

867N.01/4-1345

*President Roosevelt to the President of the Syrian Republic
(Kuwatly)*⁷⁶

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1945.⁷⁷

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have received the letter which you sent me under date of March 11, 1945,⁷⁸ regarding the question of Palestine, and desire to thank you for having given me this statement of the attitude of the Arabs toward this problem.

I have read your letter with very great interest and you may rest assured that I will not fail to take your views into account in considering the Palestine question. As far as the attitude of this Government is concerned, it gives me pleasure to renew to you the assurances which I had previously given that in the view of the Government of the United States there should be no decision regarding the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I avail myself of this opportunity to send Your Excellency my best wishes for the continued well-being of the Syrian people.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

867N.01/4-1345

The Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is very likely that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing

⁷⁵ For information regarding the Regent's state visit, postponed to June from late April because of President Roosevelt's death on April 12, see bracketed note, p. 586.

⁷⁶ Transmitted to Damascus in instruction 120, April 21, 1945.

⁷⁷ President Roosevelt was in Warm Springs, Georgia, on this date.

⁷⁸ Not printed, but see footnote 39, p. 692.

for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state.

As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews of Europe. If this question shall come up, therefore, before you in the form of a request to make a public statement on the matter, I believe you would probably want to call for full and detailed information on the subject before taking any particular position in the premises. I should be very glad, therefore, to hold myself in readiness to furnish you with background information on this subject any time you may desire.

There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East largely as a result of the Palestine question and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of this country.

Faithfully yours,

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

867N.01/5-145

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1945.

On April 18 Secretary Stettinius sent you a personal and confidential letter in which he pointed out that efforts would undoubtedly be made by the Zionists to obtain commitments from you in favor of their program for Palestine, and that while we were making every effort to relieve the suffering of the Jews in Europe we felt that the question of Palestine was a highly complex one which should be handled with the greatest care.

In this connection I thought that you would like to know that although President Roosevelt at times gave expression to views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave certain assurances to the Arabs which they regard as definite commitments on our part. On a number of occasions within the past few years, he authorized the Department to assure the heads of the different Near Eastern Governments in his behalf that "in the view of this Government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews". In his meeting with King Ibn Saud early this year, moreover, Mr. Roosevelt promised the King that as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs.

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum summarizing the conversation between Ibn Saud and Mr. Roosevelt, of which the original is presumably with Mr. Roosevelt's papers.⁷⁹ After the meeting, this memorandum was approved by both the President and the King, so that it may be regarded as completely authentic. On April 5, only a week before his death, the President signed a letter to Ibn Saud in which he repeated the assurances which he had made to the King during the meeting. A copy of this letter is also attached.⁸⁰

The Arabs, not only in Palestine but throughout the whole Near East, have made no secret of their hostility to Zionism and their Governments say that it would be impossible to restrain them from rallying with arms, in defense of what they consider to be an Arab country. We know that President Roosevelt understood this clearly, for as recently as March 3, after his trip to the Near East, he told an officer of the Department⁸¹ that, in his opinion, a Jewish state in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force.

I should be glad at any time to furnish you with any additional background material which you may desire bearing upon the entire Palestine problem.

JOSEPH C. GREW

867N.01/4-1945

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1945.

I am attaching a letter in Arabic, together with a translation, written by the Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan to President Roosevelt under date of March 10, 1945, regarding Palestine.⁸² As Trans-Jordan is under British mandate, the letter was transmitted through the British Foreign Office and our Embassy in London, and has just been received.

The Amir's letter is one of a series which the different Arab leaders recently decided to send President Roosevelt, in a concerted effort to bring to his attention the Arab point of view on the Palestine problem. Prior to Mr. Roosevelt's death, such letters had been received from the following: King Ibn Saud, the Regent of Iraq, the President of Syria, and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon. To all of these, replies were made stating that in the view of this Government there should be

⁷⁹ See p. 1.

⁸⁰ *Ante*, p. 698.

⁸¹ Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins; for his record of the conversation, see his letter of March 5 to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling), p. 690.

⁸² Not printed, but see footnote 39, p. 692.

no decision with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Assurances to this same effect had previously been made by President Roosevelt to the heads of a number of the Arab Governments, including the Amir of Trans-Jordan.

As we believe that it would be appropriate for you to acknowledge this letter and to renew these assurances, we have prepared the attached reply⁸³ for your approval, and will be glad to transmit it to the Amir through the Embassy at London if you so desire.

JOSEPH C. GREW

867N.01/5-1745

*President Truman to the Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan*⁸⁴

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1945.

YOUR HIGHNESS: I am writing with reference to your letter of March 10, 1945 to the late President Roosevelt which has just been received.

I have given careful attention to the views respecting the question of Palestine which you outline in your letter, and I am glad you brought forth your views in this manner. I know that this is a matter which the Arabs regard with the greatest concern, and I fully appreciate the interest which they have displayed with respect to a solution of the Palestine problem.

As regards the question of Palestine, I am glad to renew to you the assurances which you have previously received, to the effect that in the view of this Government, no decision should be taken respecting the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Highness my sincere greetings and my best wishes for your continued well-being and that of the people of Trans-Jordan.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN

⁸³ *Infra*.

⁸⁴ Transmitted to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) with instruction 5523, May 26, 1945; it was directed that the President's letter be transmitted to the British Foreign Office with the request that it be sent to the Amir Abdullah (867N.01/4-1945). A copy was also sent to Jerusalem with unnumbered instruction of May 26.

867N.01/5-2545

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1945.

I am attaching a letter dated April 30 addressed to you by the Egyptian Prime Minister regarding Palestine,⁸⁵ which the Egyptian Minister in Washington handed us with the request that it be sent on to you.

The enclosure to the Prime Minister's letter (a memorandum on the Palestine question) is another in the series of communications which the different Arab States decided last March to send to this Government.⁸⁶ We have replied by assuring the senders that their views have been carefully noted and that our policy toward Palestine is based on consultation with Arabs as well as Jews. This, you will recall, was the substance of the reply which we drafted for your signature to the Amir of Trans-Jordan and which you signed on May 17.

The attached Egyptian memorandum is a plea that justice be done to the Arab cause in the solution of the Palestine problem. The memorandum takes the position that there should be no further Jewish immigration into Palestine and that the Zionist project of setting up a Jewish State there should be resisted "at all costs".

There is attached for your signature, if you approve, a reply⁸⁷ which we have prepared and which we will be pleased to give to the Egyptian Minister here.

JOSEPH C. GREW

867N.01/6-445

*President Truman to the President of the Egyptian Council of Ministers (Nokrashy)*⁸⁸

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have received Your Excellency's letter with its enclosure⁸⁹ relating to Palestine which you sent me under date of April 30 through the Egyptian Minister at Washington.

I wish to assure you that the views set forth in the memorandum have received my careful attention. I am fully aware of the deep interest of the Arab countries in reaching an equitable solution of the Palestine question, and I wish to renew the assurances which your

⁸⁵ Not printed; it expressed opinions common to all the communications addressed to President Roosevelt earlier in the year by Arab heads of government, and which were summarized in telegram 98 from Baghdad, March 10, 11 p. m., p. 691.

⁸⁶ See footnote 39, p. 692.

⁸⁷ Same as reply dated June 4, *infra*.

⁸⁸ Transmitted to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) by the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) with a note of June 6, 1945.

⁸⁹ Neither printed, but see footnote 85, above.

Government has previously received to the effect that in the view of the Government of the United States no decision should be taken regarding the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

I take this opportunity [etc.]

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/6-1645

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1945.

According to information reaching us from Zionist sources at San Francisco,⁹⁰ the Zionists desire to confer with you in the near future in anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Churchill,⁹¹ as they think it is likely that Palestine will be discussed at that meeting.

For your information, we are preparing some material for you on Palestine for possible use at the meeting, as we feel that it will be necessary for the British to make some decision regarding that country in the near future. It is not our belief that the question is one which will require detailed discussion, or any decision on your part, during the course of your meeting with Mr. Churchill. It would be most helpful, however, if we could have some idea of the intentions of the British Government with regard to the future of Palestine.

The Zionists will undoubtedly give you some memorials and some printed matter and will urge that you insist upon a settlement of the question in their favor. You may recall that our basic attitude on Palestine is that it is one of the problems which should come up for settlement after the war through the United Nations Organization, and that in any event no decision regarding it should be taken without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. It does not seem, therefore, that you need to go any further, unless you care to do so, than to thank the Zionist leaders for any material which they may give you and to assure them that their views will be given your careful consideration.

JOSEPH C. GREW

⁹⁰ For documentation regarding the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, 1945, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

⁹¹ This is a reference to the impending July meeting between President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin at Potsdam, July 16-August 2, 1945. For documentation regarding this meeting, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, 2 vols.; for Conference documentation on Palestine, see *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 972 ff. and *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1402 ff.

867N.01/6-2045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*⁹²

[WASHINGTON,] June 20, 1945.

Participants: Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the World Jewish Congress
 Mr. Henderson, NEA
 Mr. Merriam, NE
 Mr. Wilson, NE

Dr. Goldmann called to pay his respects to Mr. Henderson and to apprise the Department of what he described as the grave crisis confronting the Zionist leadership as a result of the continued failure of the British and American Governments to make known a settlement of the Palestine question. He said that for five years and more, the moderate Zionist leaders, such as Dr. Weizmann,⁹³ Rabbi Wise, and himself, had been urging their people to follow a policy of moderation and not to expect a solution of the Palestine question along Zionist lines before the end of the war in Europe. This advice to their followers had been based on assurances which the Zionist leaders had received from President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and other statesmen to the effect that if the Zionists would only be patient and do nothing to interfere with the war effort, their aims would eventually be realized. Dr. Goldmann said that the Zionist leadership had succeeded to a notable degree in imposing a policy of restraint upon the Jews of the world. There had been some extremists, of course, notably in Palestine itself, but on the whole the Jews had shown great moderation.

Now, he continued, the mood of the Jewish people was turning to one of desperation. They had seen millions of their fellow Jews ruthlessly murdered, their homes destroyed, and their culture completely stamped out, in certain portions of Europe. These developments had naturally brought sorrow to all Jews but there had always been the hope that once the common Nazi enemy was defeated, the Jews would see their aspirations in Palestine realized. It was only owing to the existence of this feeling of confidence in the future that the Zionist leaders had been able to persuade their people to accept in a disciplined manner the terrible misfortunes which had been visited upon world Jewry in the last few years.

Dr. Goldmann continued that the Jewish people were beginning to

⁹² Copy transmitted on June 25, 1945, to the Acting Secretary (Grew) and Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), who commented in part in a memorandum: "More violent attacks than usual may be made at any time by certain more radical Zionists on the Dept." (867N.01/6-2045). A group of Zionists were received by the Acting Secretary on June 28, at which time much the same discussion took place as recorded here; for extracts from this memorandum of conversation, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, p. 974.

⁹³ Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization.

ask how long they would need to wait, now that the war with Germany was over. They were only too well aware of the vast problems with which any program of rehabilitating the Jews of Europe must cope. Anti-Semitism had remained as the one substantial legacy of the Nazis on the European scene and those Jews who were left in Europe were facing almost insuperable obstacles. In the Jewish community of Palestine there was a new spirit of determination, a readiness to resort to strong measures if necessary, which was rather disturbing. Anything might happen in a community where 60,000 young men were fully trained and ready to take up arms in defense of their rights. In Palestine, as elsewhere, the Zionist leadership had been strongly criticised for following a policy of "appeasement" instead of insisting on the literal fulfillment of Jewish demands. Dr. Goldmann himself had been branded a Quisling while he was in Palestine last year.

So strong was the opposition which was developing, that at any time Dr. Weizmann and the other moderates might be ousted in favor of Rabbi Silver⁹⁴ and other advocates of a stronger policy. At least seventy per cent of American Zionists, including the Mizrahi (the religious Zionists), were backing Rabbi Silver strongly and it was not at all certain that the extremists would not prevail. There was also much talk of bringing the Revisionists back into the World Zionist Organization, as Rabbi Silver desired. This had been considered twice recently as a result of a request by the New Zionists that they be admitted to the American Zionist Emergency Council, but Dr. Goldmann and his group had been successful in maintaining the position that the Revisionists should not be re-admitted unless they would first pledge themselves to maintain the discipline of the Council.

In these circumstances, Dr. Goldmann asked, what can the Zionist leaders say to their people? Dr. Weizmann was not a well man and was anxious to resign his leadership. Dr. Goldmann himself had no personal ambitions, but felt it his duty to try to guide his people. Dr. Weizmann had called a meeting of the Smaller Actions Committee of the World Zionist Organization, which would convene in London late in July after the British elections and which would include representatives from Palestine, Great Britain, the United States, and other countries. This meeting would have to decide the course which the Zionist movement would follow. If there were no indications by then of a favorable solution in Palestine, the present leadership would probably resign in favor of Rabbi Silver and his adherents. Dr. Goldmann said that this would be unfortunate, since it would mean that the control would pass to those not averse to violence. There might even be actual bloodshed in Palestine, as no one knew how much longer the young people could be held back if no support were given to their aims.

⁹⁴ Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver had been co-chairman, with Rabbi Wise, of the American Zionist Emergency Council until he resigned in December, 1944.

Dr. Goldmann continued that recently Dr. Weizmann had sought an interview with Mr. Churchill but the Prime Minister was engrossed in his election preparations, and had instead sent his son, Randolph, to see Dr. Weizmann. Randolph Churchill had been at pains to assure Dr. Weizmann that his father was as much of a Zionist as ever. Without some concrete evidence of official support, however, it was difficult for the leadership to continue playing upon that support. In this country, the Zionists had had an appointment with President Truman last week, but it had been canceled at the last minute. They hoped to see the President after his return from the Pacific Coast for a detailed discussion of the Palestine question as he had promised them.

Dr. Weizmann [*Goldmann?*] referred to his visit to San Francisco during the Conference and said that he had conferred with a number of delegates there, including some from the Arab countries. He had had some long talks with Lord Cranborne⁹⁶ which the latter would report to Mr. Churchill. Mr. Jan Masaryk⁹⁷ had again given assurances, based on a recent visit to Moscow, that the Soviet Union would favor a Jewish State in Palestine. This was in line with what the Zionists had been told by President Roosevelt on his return from Yalta when he had remarked that, to his surprise, Stalin had not appeared opposed to Zionism.

Mr. Henderson here referred to a recent public address by Professor Korovin in Moscow, who had stated that the Soviet Union was supporting the Arabs in Palestine, and he inquired whether Dr. Goldmann had heard of this. Dr. Goldmann showed considerable interest and agreed that there were conflicting indications as to the position of the Soviets in this matter.

In closing, Dr. Goldmann reverted to the crisis facing the Zionist leadership, and said that he could not stress too much the serious nature of the situation. Mr. Henderson thanked Dr. Goldmann for giving us this full account of the present position and assured him that we would bring his views to Mr. Grew's attention and that they would receive very careful consideration.

867N.01/6-2245

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1945.

If time permits, I believe that you will wish to glance at the attached . . . report⁹⁹ which stresses the extent to which the more extreme

⁹⁶ Robert Cecil, Baron Cecil of Essendon, at this time British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

⁹⁷ Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁹⁸ Addressed to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) and Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

⁹⁹ Not found attached to file copy of memorandum.

elements among the Zionists in this country are gaining ground as against the more moderate leaders such as Rabbi Wise and Dr. Nahum Goldmann.

This report, which is based on information from various Jewish sources, takes the position that since the death of President Roosevelt and the end of the war in Europe, many Jews have become disillusioned regarding the policies of the United States and Great Britain, and this has resulted in a "mood of impatience and desperation". Some observers say that the present situation is driving Jewish youth "into the arms of Moscow", while others predict that there will be serious trouble in Palestine unless some concessions are made to the Jews. There is also stated to be a real possibility that the present Zionist leadership in this country under Rabbi Wise and Dr. Goldmann will be replaced by the more militant elements personified by Rabbi Silver.

While some parts of this report may be exaggerated, we have reason to believe that there is considerable truth in the claim that the extreme Zionists are gaining support among Jews both here and abroad. We have just had a talk with Dr. Goldmann, of which we are sending you a memorandum¹ and which bears this out. If such a development should occur and if, as is also likely, there should be disorders in Palestine as a result of some British decision regarding the future of immigration, we might easily be faced with a very difficult situation.

LOY W. HENDERSON

867N.01/6-2745

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 27, 1945.

Participants: Mr. David Ben Gurion—Jewish Agency²
Mr. Eliezer Kaplan—Jewish Agency
Dr. Nahum Goldmann—Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson—NEA
Mr. Merriam—NE
Mr. Wilson—NE

Dr. Goldmann brought Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Kaplan in to meet Mr. Henderson and to discuss the Palestine question. Mr. Ben Gurion

¹ *Supra.*

² David Ben-Gurion was Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, located at Jerusalem; London was the headquarters of the Jewish Agency itself. Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine made provision for the recognition of a Jewish Agency ". . . as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine. . . ."; and from 1922 until 1929 an organ of the World Zionist Organization acted as such. In 1929 agreement

Footnote continued on following page.

outlined the Zionist position at some length, going back to the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper and stressing the opposition of the Jews of Palestine to the present policy of the British Government. He declared that unless "this intolerable regime" were modified, there was bound to be trouble, since in his words the Jews could not continue indefinitely to put up with the breach by the administration of its obligations to the Jewish people. What the Jews desire, he said, was to be allowed to set their own house in order without interference from outside elements. For example, they objected to a situation in which their demands in Palestine, which they regarded as legitimate, could not be met because ~~Lord Killearn³ in Cairo had to appease some Egyptian pasha~~. The Jews could not, he asserted, recognize that an Egyptian pasha or a Bedouin shaikh, or an Iraqi bey had any rights or interest in the Palestine question. The Arabs of Palestine were, of course, legitimately interested in that country and there was no intention of disturbing them or calling their rights into question. Jews and Arabs had lived there in amity for many years and there was no reason why they should not continue to do so, provided the Arabs elsewhere left them alone.

Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Kaplan both agreed with Mr. Ben Gurion that the claim of any Arabs outside Palestine to any interest in the problem was preposterous.

Mr. Ben Gurion continued that the Jews for the past few years had received promises from Allied leaders which had caused them to believe that they would eventually see the fruition of their aims in Palestine, if only they kept quiet during the European war. Now that that war was over the Jews were beginning to ask what was holding up the implementation of these pledges. Mr. Ben Gurion said that the world must not underestimate the strength of the Jews' feeling on this point. The Jews had no desire to have any trouble with the British Government and they knew perfectly well that if the worst came to worst, they would not last long against the combined might of the British Empire. They would, however, fight if necessary in defense of their rights and the consequences would be on Great Britain's head if the Jews were provoked into some action which no one wanted to see. In other words, the Jews were determined to have their demands met and if the British should decide otherwise, the fault would be that of the British Government.

was reached between Zionists and non-Zionists for the inclusion of the latter in the Agency, as provided for in the same article 4, and the enlarged Jewish Agency was officially recognized by the British Government in a letter dated August 6, 1930. The Executive of the Agency, located at Jerusalem, came to function virtually as a government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government.

³ Miles W. Lampson, Baron Killearn, British Ambassador to Egypt.

In reply to a question from Mr. Henderson as to whether the Arabs were not likely to make trouble in the event that the British should adopt a pro-Zionist solution in Palestine, Mr. Ben Gurion and his companions expressed complete confidence in their ability to deal with the Arabs. Mr. Ben Gurion said that he knew the Arabs well and that they would not really put up any kind of a fight. The Bedouins of the desert were, of course, good fighters but it was well known that they had no interest in the Palestine problem and so the leaders of the Arab States would not be successful in rallying their people to support of the Arab position on Palestine.

Mr. Henderson asked whether it would be correct to say that the immediate objective of the Zionists was to obtain a lowering of the bars to Jewish immigration into Palestine. Mr. Ben Gurion, seconded by Dr. Goldmann and Mr. Kaplan, said that while it was, of course, imperative to reach a settlement on immigration at the earliest possible moment, they were opposed to any attempt to solve the Palestine problem by piecemeal methods. Their position was well known and they had come to the point where they could no longer accept anything less than the granting of all their demands, including the immediate establishment of a Jewish State.

Mr. Henderson thanked Mr. Ben Gurion and his colleagues for giving us their presentation of their views, which he assured them would be carefully noted by the Department.

867N.01/7-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton)

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—7 p. m.

129. In recent weeks reports have reached Dept, primarily from Zionist sources, predicting widespread disorders and an uprising of the Jews in Palestine in the event of an unfavorable decision of Brit Govt respecting further Jewish immigration. These reports stress preparedness of certain elements in Jewish community and allege that the more moderate leaders may not be able to restrain such elements in a crisis.

Please telegraph immediately and repeat to London your reaction to foregoing together with summary of information available regarding present state of security in Palestine and probabilities for future.

Sent Jerusalem, repeated London.⁴

BYRNES

⁴ Repeated to London as No. 5480.

867N.01/7-1445: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 14, 1945—3 p. m.

7126. In discussing Palestine situation head of Eastern Dept of FonOff⁶ observed that there are two outstanding points:

(1) It had always been understood that nothing definite would be done about Palestine until the end of the war in Europe. That point has now been reached and it is being asked what the next step is to be.

(2) Immigration quotas are running out and will be completely exhausted by November. Before that date the Brit Govt will consequently have to make "a very important decision" and regardless of what is done trouble will almost certainly follow since it will be extremely difficult to avoid arousing either the Jews or the Arabs. No such decision has yet been taken and it is not even clear whether it will be of a long or short term nature. The probabilities are, however, that it will be a short term plan designed principally to meet the immigration problem and that decision will be deferred until the post election Govt has had time to consider that matter.

Sent to Dept as 7126 repeated to Jerusalem as 2.

WINANT

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁷

[BABELSBERG,] July 24, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Palestine

There is great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of May, 1939, continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most interested in Palestine and in the Jewish problem. They fervently urge the lifting of these restrictions which deny to Jews, who have been so cruelly uprooted by ruthless Nazi persecutions, entrance into the land which represents for so many of them their only hope of survival.

Knowing your deep and sympathetic interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine, I venture to express to you the hope that the British Government may find it possible without delay to take steps to lift

⁶ Charles William Baxter.⁷ Copy obtained from the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine.

While I realize the difficulties of reaching a definite and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine problem, and that we cannot expect to discuss these difficulties at any length at our present meeting, I have some doubt whether these difficulties will be lessened by prolonged delay. I hope, therefore, that you can arrange at your early convenience to let me have your ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem, so that we can at a later but not too distant date discuss the problem in concrete terms.

867N.01/7-2545

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1945.

There is attached a memorandum regarding the effect which the Charter of the United Nations⁸ may have upon United States policy with respect to Palestine. The memorandum points out that the United States Government will find itself obligated to adopt a definite policy towards the future status of Palestine.

If you concur, we would suggest, contingent, of course, upon whatever decisions or agreements may be made at Potsdam that as soon as the Potsdam results are known, we ask Ray Hare in London to:

(a) make discreet but definite inquiries as to whether or not the British Government intends to place Palestine under the trusteeship system,

(b) ascertain whether, in the event of Palestine being placed under the trusteeship system, the British Government desires to have any part or all of Palestine designated a strategic area, and

(c) if the British reply that they contemplate some form of trusteeship, state that upon completing appropriate studies, we would be glad, whenever the British desire, to take part in consultations on a technical level to discuss the terms of the trusteeship agreement for Palestine as a preliminary step in preparation of the trusteeship agreement to be submitted, ultimately, to the United Nations for approval.

In the meanwhile, we understand that you would like to discuss with us the four basic policy documents on Palestine,⁹ which you have. We would be glad to do so at your earliest convenience.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

⁸ Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

⁹ This is an apparent reference to the studies covered by the four summaries dated January 30, pp. 683-686.

[Annex]

Memorandum by Mr. William Yale of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Although none of the basic factors of the Palestine problem have been changed by the Charter of the United Nations, Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter will have a direct bearing upon United States policy with regard to the future status of Palestine.

By article 77 of Chapter XII, Palestine falls within those categories of territories which may be placed under the trusteeship system. There is nothing, however, in the charter which makes it obligatory upon Great Britain to place Palestine under the trusteeship system.

It is clear, nonetheless, that should Great Britain be unwilling to place Palestine under trusteeship, the British Government cannot continue to administer Palestine under a mandate from the League of Nations, which will cease to exist after the United Nations comes into existence on the ratification of the Charter. It is therefore inevitable that the status of Palestine will be changed. The liquidation of the League of Nations and, with it, that of the League mandatory system will not give Great Britain a free hand in disposing of Palestine. The British Government cannot change the existing rights of the United States in Palestine as defined by the treaty of December 3, 1924,¹⁰ without the assent of the United States. Furthermore, both Great Britain and the United States have given assurance to several of the independent Arab States that no decision regarding basic changes should be made in the status of Palestine without prior consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Therefore, the United States Government may find itself obliged to adopt a definite policy with regard to the future status of Palestine. The British Colonial Office may, with the support of various political groups, propose to include Palestine within the British Commonwealth and Empire under some special status. Although there have been suggestions made to this effect, it seems unlikely that the British Government, confronted by the probable opposition of the Soviet Union and the Arab States to the inclusion of Palestine within the British Empire, would advocate seriously such a status for Palestine. It would appear more likely that Great Britain will propose the placing of Palestine under the trusteeship system, especially so if the United States favored placing of Palestine under trusteeship and agreed to the appointment of Great Britain as the administering authority.

In case the British Government should favor placing Palestine under trusteeship, the British would, under article 79 of the United Nations Charter, be in a position to insist that the terms of trusteeship

¹⁰ Convention between the United States and Great Britain relating to rights in Palestine, signed at London, December 3, 1924, *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, p. 212.

be acceptable to the British Government. The United States, however, as one of the states directly concerned with the future status of Palestine would, by article 79 of the Charter, be called upon to agree to the terms of trusteeship. Indirectly as a member of the United Nations and directly as a member of the Trusteeship Council, the United States will assume serious responsibilities for the future of Palestine as a trust territory. It would therefore be incumbent upon the United States Government to formulate a policy with respect to Palestine as a trust territory and to make certain in the drafting of the terms of trusteeship for Palestine that our interests are protected.

In view of the foregoing, it would seem advisable, at an early opportunity, to ask the British Government whether it wishes to place Palestine under trusteeship, and if so, under what type of trusteeship. After receiving this information, it would then seem desirable to state to the British our readiness to take part in discussions, on a technical level, with respect to the terms of a trusteeship agreement for Palestine, whenever the British so desire.

Truman Papers

*Memorandum by the British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*¹¹

I have read your memorandum of July 24 about Palestine. You will I am sure understand that I cannot give you any statement on policy until we have had time to consider the matter, and this is simply to inform you that we will give early and careful consideration to your memorandum.

C. R. ATTLEE

BERLIN, 31 July, 1945.

867N.01/8-345 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,^{11a} *to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 3, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 4:48 p. m.]

3170. British Commanding General Palestine has been informed by Palestine Government that no Jewish immigrants can be accepted during August. Approved quota for month filling up already and further group from Europe cannot be taken. If not exceeding 1500 party can be taken in Sept but Commanding General Palestine must be notified immediately so acceptances from other places can be withheld.

¹¹ Copy obtained from the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

^{11a} Mr. Kirk was also Ambassador in Italy.

Returning bona fide residents and Palestine nationals can be accepted any month. Visas authorized for returning residents have letter G at end of visa authority number; immigrants, authority numbers end CLS ORD. Any doubtful cases of alleged Palestine nationals or residents should be referred to British authorities Palestine without delay, and persons concerned not allowed to proceed until *bona fides* confirmed. Commanding General Palestine requests previous advice on numbers and arrival dates of nationals and residents.

KIRK

867N.01/8-945 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, August 9, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 8:59 p. m.]

141. Director of Migration informs me total immigration balance under White Paper quota as of August 1 is 7,881 of which 3,074 have not yet been given to Jewish Agency. Balance remaining from 10,300 given Agency in October plus 3,000 given recently for refugees from German camps was 4,807 as of August 1 which balance can be distributed by Agency. Balances are subject to slight revisions as only entries are estimated. Admissions are now limited to rate of 1,500 per month without carry-over for previous unfilled monthly quotas and total balance will therefore last through December unless policy is changed.

Refugees now held Mauritius numbering about 1,300 are expected to arrive during August and these with some Greek children admitted during month will exhaust quota for August. This explains information in Department's 147, August 6, 8 p. m.¹² Quota controls are now exercised through Army and Ministry War Transport which must have advance approval from Palestine Government before sending immigrants forward. General Officer commanding been informed group from Italy probably be admitted during September.

PINKERTON

867N.01/8-1345 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, August 13, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7:17 p. m.]

146. My telegram 141, August 9, 11 a. m. Palestine Government has authorized joining August and September quotas permitting entry

¹² Not printed.

3,000 in either month. Action taken because shipping difficulties make arrival Mauritius refugees during August doubtful. This makes provision for group referred to in Department's telegram 147 August 6¹³ and prevents charge of deliberate stretching of White Paper quota if either month is filled.

PINKERTON

867N.01/8-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1945.

Mr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Counselor of the Egyptian Legation, called this afternoon. He said that he had been sent by his Minister to express concern lest the statements made yesterday by the President with regard to Palestine might indicate a change in policy of this Government which would give rise to great unrest in the Arab world.

He said that his Minister, before reporting the President's remarks¹⁴ to his Government, would appreciate any comments with regard to them or interpretation which the Department could make.

I replied that I was not as yet in possession of any information which would put me in a position to comment upon the President's remarks or to interpret them. I promised that, in the event I should be able, at a later time, to elaborate on what the President had said, I would be glad to discuss the matter either with the Minister or with him.

Mr. Fawzi said that Egypt was extremely anxious to have close and friendly relations with the United States. At the same time, Egypt was endeavoring to discharge its responsibilities for assisting in maintaining peace in the Near East. In order for Egypt to remain as an effective factor for peace in the Near East, it must continue to possess the confidence of the Arab nations. It sincerely hoped, therefore, that the United States, in determining the policies which it is to pursue in the Near East, would have consideration for the delicate position of Egypt. Under the apparently quiet surface of the Arab world there was intense feeling with regard to the Palestine problem. A sudden move on the part of the great powers prejudicial to Arab interests in Palestine, might well set the Arab world in motion and result in violence on a wide scale.

I promised the Counselor that I would bring his statements to the attention of the appropriate officials of the Department.

LOY W. HENDERSON

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ For substance of President Truman's remarks, see telegram 163, August 18, 5 p. m., to the Consul General at Jerusalem, *infra*.

867N.01/8-1845 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Jerusalem
(Pinkerton)*

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1945—5 p. m.

163. Following for background info is substance of remarks on Palestine made by President at Aug 16 press conference :

In reply to inquiry whether Jewish national state had been discussed at Potsdam President said it had been discussed with Churchill and Attlee and was still being discussed. Asked whether he had discussed it with Stalin President replied in negative adding there was nothing Stalin could do about it. In reply to subsequent question as to the American view on Palestine that was put forward at Potsdam, President said that we want to let as many Jews into Palestine as is possible and he added that the matter would have to be worked out diplomatically with the Brit and the Arabs and it would have to be on a peaceful basis as he had no desire to send half a million American soldiers to keep the peace in Palestine. *End summary.*

In case you receive any inquiries regarding this statement you may in your discretion state that the foregoing represents your understanding of the President's remarks. You should not unless otherwise instructed attempt to comment on these remarks or interpret them in any way.

Sent Jerusalem, repeated Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Damascus.¹⁵

BYRNES

867N.01/8-1845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office
of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1945.

Mr. Koudsi ¹⁶ asked if I could give him any background regarding the President's remarks at his recent press conference regarding Palestine. I said that I could not. I said that it appeared to me from the press reports that the President's remarks came in answer merely to one of many questions asked him by reporters.

I asked Mr. Koudsi what his reaction was and what he thought the reaction of his Government would be. Mr. Koudsi said that while of course he had not had time to receive anything on the subject from his Government, he had considered the matter himself a great deal and had come to the conclusion that if he were asked his own preference, he would have to say that in balance he was glad the President had

¹⁵ Repeated as telegrams 1590, 254, 247, 241, and 50, respectively.

¹⁶ Nazem al-Koudsi, Syrian Minister.

said what he did rather than that no statement of the American Government's policy be made at all. He thought that the fact that the President made it clear that any solution to the Palestine problem must be worked out through diplomatic channels in consultation with the Arabs and that the United States did not intend to send any armed forces to introduce and maintain a new regime in Palestine were both helpful.

He was disturbed, however, by his knowledge that the Arab peoples of the Middle East would not appreciate the force of these important parts of the President's statement and would focus their attention on his expressed wish that as many Jews as possible might be admitted to Palestine. He hoped that the Government officials and enlightened peoples in the Arab world would appreciate the helpful portions of the President's statement.

867N.01/8-2045: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, August 20, 1945—7 p. m.
 [Received August 21—2: 30 p. m.]

309. This morning I called at Foreign Ministry on Minister's request. Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Director General of Ministry, referred to President's press conference of August 16 and asked if Legation had text of President's statement on Palestine. On being told that Legation had only brief radio summary Jamali said he would reserve final judgment until full text could be consulted. However, he in common with Iraqi officials and Arab nationalists generally took serious view of President's endorsement of immigration into Palestine to as many Jews as possible.

Jamali, disregarding limitations and qualifications of President's statement, stated his objections based on alleged offence to Arab rights, Iraqi rights and human rights.

He continued by saying that both Iraqi, [Prime Minister?] Dr. Imin Hamdi al-Pachachi, and Secretary General of Arab League, Abdul Rahman Bey Azzam had issued statements in Alexandria rejecting further Jewish immigration into Palestine.

Jamali was irked by statement to effect that question of Palestine had not been discussed with Marshal Stalin and that Soviet Union could do nothing about it. Citing Azzam Bey as authority and inspiration Dr. Jamali claimed either that problem of international nature and USSR has an interest too, or problem is of domestic nature and neither US or USSR have any interest. When I inquired if Jamali thought every nation has an interest in every international

problem he replied that USSR's interest in Near East is growing rapidly and that USSR should be consulted about Palestine.

He continued by saying that Soviet Minister to Baghdad Mr. Zaitsev had been doing effective propaganda favorable to USSR and detrimental to US by contrasting Soviet opposition to Zionism with US support. Incidentally he remarked Soviet Minister is pressing for negotiations of a Soviet-Iraqi trade agreement.

Jamali pointed out with obvious pleasure that 40 million Arabs oppose a Jewish state in Palestine and are prepared to resist it by any means whatsoever. He saw or thought he saw in President's recent statement other evidence that Zionists in US are strong enough to determine US policy toward Palestine regardless of justice of Arab position and that 40 million Arabs might as well prepare to resist. He seemed fascinated by words "40 million Arabs" and used them over and over.

In separate interview Minister Foreign Affairs began by telling how well he had been treated in US and how much he liked Americans.¹⁷ He then audibly hoped that no misunderstanding should arise between US and Arab nations because of Palestine. However, he looked with some misgivings on President's recent statement. While withholding judgment pending receipt of full text he saw one encouraging sign: President's reference to half a million troops indicated that he appreciated gravity of present situation.

Sent Department; repeated Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Beirut, for Damascus.

MOOSE

867N.01/8-2145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: The attached telegram¹⁸ addressed to you by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, who is now in London, was routed to us but does not appear to call for any particular action or acknowledgment on our part.

In the telegram Rabbi Wise expresses the "warmest appreciation" of the Jewish Agency "to you and Chief for taking up our problem at Potsdam and for what we know to be your continued and friendly interest". He also sends you the text of a statement,¹⁹ which we had already seen in the press, issued by the Jewish Agency in connection

¹⁷ The Foreign Minister had led his country's delegation at the San Francisco Conference.

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ Not found attached to file copy.

with the President's recent remarks on Palestine and he adds some comments as to the number of troops which would be required to keep order in that country.

Rabbi Wise apparently takes the view that no large military forces would be especially required in Palestine to keep the Arabs in check in case it should be decided to permit unlimited Jewish immigration. If you would care to have us do so, we would be glad to ask our War Department for up-to-date information on the military position in the area, with particular reference to the probable force required to maintain order in Palestine in the event that the lowering of the bars against Jewish immigration into Palestine should result in disturbances on the part of the Arabs.²⁰

LOY W. HENDERSON

867N.01/8-2245: Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, August 22, 1945—noon.
[Received August 23—9:10 a. m.]

316. Local group of Arab nationalists gets into acute state of nerves whenever problem of Palestine, i.e. Zionism, is brought up. This group includes majority of Arab city dwellers of Iraq, literate Arabs, and ruling classes. It contains all Iraqi party leaders, right or left, of whatever racial origin, and is not an issue of local partisan politics. For practical purposes, Zionism has no local supporters. Whatever part of the population does not enthusiastically support Arab nationalism is apathetic. For example, Bedouin Arabs, village Arabs and Kurdish and Turcoman minorities know little and are little concerned about Palestine, though their Moslem background makes them sympathetic to Arab and therefore Islamic aspirations. Excitable group, however, is in charge of machinery of state and its importance is all out of proportion to its numbers. If so minded, it can easily rouse ignorant tribesman and villager to violence, and can direct violence against Jews or wherever else it wishes.

Besides fundamental causes of Arab nationalism, nationalists feel that there is overwhelming urgency now, just after end of hostilities, to do something. They think this may be critical time when they can lose Palestine, or perhaps wider area of Near East, to Zionists. This belief has origin in American and British references to settlement in Palestine "after the war", in uncompromising Zionist statements, in belief that Zionists are accumulating arms in Palestine, in conceit of

²⁰ Marginal notation: "Yes." A request for information was despatched to the War Department in a memorandum of August 30, 1945, by the Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation (Lyon) (867N.01/10-945). For reply, see memorandum by the War Department, 19 September, p. 742.

Arabs who attribute to their own efforts rebuffs to French in Lebanon in 1944 [1943?] and in Syria in 1945,²¹ and in natural desire to try out efficacy of brand new Arab League²² about which they talk so much.

Rabid nationalists have little sense of proportion, and usually concern themselves with Palestine and Arab rights to greater extent than with Iraqi rights. They accept program of their group as article of faith rather than as matter subject to reason; and make little use of the many good points which can be adduced in support of Arab claims. They freely predict bloodshed over Palestine, and attribute blame therefore to United States, British or Zionists, but never to Arabs. Anyone not also vocal Arab nationalist is regarded as potential Zionist or Zionist sympathizer; and any statement short of unqualified endorsement of Arab pretensions in Palestine is likely to be target for criticism. Hence the protests against the President's statement of August 16 (re Department telegram 254, August 18, 3 p. m.²³ and Legation telegram 309, August 20, 7 p. m.). Similar outbursts have followed previous declarations, but Arab nationalist tempers are shorter now than they were formerly. Current month of fasting (Ramadan) does not help.

One Government has pursued policy which has been notably successful here. It has made no declarations of policy or preference, and Arab nationalists look on it as being sympathetic. That Govt is USSR. It has greatly increased its influence in Iraq by refraining from declaring its position in Palestine. Trend among extreme nationalists is to look to Soviet Union for help against Zionism and nations sympathetic thereto. Soviet Union's secret weapon hereabouts has been its ability to maintain silence, and this weapon has been effective in building up good will and considerable measure of influence while retaining for USSR full liberty of action.

MOOSE

867N.01/8-2245

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

No. 343

DAMASCUS, August 22, 1945.

[Received September 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that scarcely had the Department's telegram no. 50 of August 18, 5 p. m., 1945²³ been received than the Acting Director of the Political Bureau of the Syrian Foreign Office

²¹ For documentation regarding the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943 and the Franco-Syrian crisis of May-June, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 996-1056, and *post*, pp. 1034-1154, respectively.

²² The League of Arab States was formed on March 22, 1945.

²³ See footnote 15. p. 722.

telephoned to state that the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamil Mardam Bey, had instructed him to inquire whether the Legation had any precise information as to the statement of President Truman concerning the Palestine problem at a recent press conference. I gathered from Abdul Karim Bey Dindashi that the Ministry's inquiry was motivated by press reports which indicated only that the President had proposed "granting permission for the largest possible number of Jews to enter Palestine".

The timely arrival of the Department's telegraphic instruction enabled me to answer this official Syrian inquiry along the lines indicated therein, which I did in a conversation in the Foreign Office with Abdul Karim Bey on August 20. He said that the details of the President's statement, when they became generally known, would create a very good impression in Arab circles.

On August 18, however, it was apparent that Prime Minister Faris el-Khourri at least had had an opportunity to examine a correct version of the President's statement, for on that date in an interview granted to the Damascus daily, *Al Kifah*, Faris Bey reportedly said:

"The statement made by the President of the United States indicates sagacity and deep wisdom. For he considers that the solution of this question depends on the Arabs in the first place and when he states that the United States will not send soldiers to Palestine he means that both parties will be satisfied."

Public and journalistic reaction to the generally inaccurate press coverage of President Truman's statement has not been marked, and the published views of the Prime Minister concerning it have already had a notable effect in calming the fears of those who were perhaps inclined to place too much dependency on what they read in their local newspapers.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM J. PORTER

867N.01/8-2445

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: I venture to bring to your attention the attached memoranda relating to the problem of Palestine which have been prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the Department. This problem is likely to assume an acute form during the next few months and may be brought to your attention by the British during your stay in London.²⁴ The strong internal and international reac-

²⁴ For documentation regarding the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, September 11-October 2, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

tion to the President's comments on the subject of Palestine during a recent press conference serves to give an indication of the delicacy and importance of this problem.

No solution of the Palestine problem can be found which would be completely satisfactory to both the Arabs and the Jews. Many plans for the future of Palestine have been advanced. Some are so impractical that they deserve no consideration whatsoever. The attached memoranda present a summary of four plans for the possible settlement of the Palestine question and a summary of observations upon them. The four plans are as follows:

1. Palestine: Status as a Jewish Commonwealth.
2. Palestine: An Independent Arab State.
3. Proposed Plan for the Partition of Palestine Under the Trusteeship System.
4. Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.

We are aware that Palestine has become a problem in American internal politics as well as one in the field of foreign relations. The President and his political advisers are in a much better position than we to evaluate the domestic political factors involved and, therefore, we do not presume to give advice in this regard.

We feel, however, that we would be derelict in our responsibility if we should fail to inform you that in our considered opinion the active support by the Government of the United States of a policy favoring the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine would be contrary to the policy which the United States has always followed of respecting the wishes of a large majority of the local inhabitants with respect to their form of government. Furthermore, it would have a strongly adverse effect upon American interests throughout the Near and Middle East. We believe it would be almost inevitable that the long-established American cultural, educational and religious institutions in the Near East would be placed in a difficult position and might be forced to suspend their activities; that American trade would probably be boycotted; that American economic interests, including our oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries would be jeopardized. At the present time the United States has a moral prestige in the Near and Middle East unequaled by that of any other great power. We would lose that prestige and would be likely for many years to be considered as a betrayer of the high principles which we ourselves have enunciated during the period of the war.

On the other hand, for the United States to support the recognition of Palestine as an independent Arab State would almost inevitably mean that we would be endeavoring to assist in setting up a regime which would fail to give to the large Jewish minority in Palestine the just and equitable treatment to which that minority is entitled. En-

couraged by announcements made by governmental authorities and private persons and organizations in the United States and Great Britain during the last twenty-five years, tens of thousands of ardent Jewish nationalists have immigrated into Palestine and have been devoting their lives unselfishly, in the face of tremendous hardship and frequently of physical danger, to the task of laying an economic and political basis for a Jewish homeland. It is almost certain that these settlers would encounter difficulties from any Arab Government which might be set up in Palestine, regardless of the safeguards which we might endeavor to erect. Furthermore, as a result of past policies of this Government with regard to a Jewish National Home, a large amount of Jewish-American capital has been invested in Palestine, and it would possibly not be secure in an Arab State.

The proposed plan for partition under the trustee system also has serious defects. A technical Royal Commission sent to Palestine by the British Government in 1938²⁶ in order to attempt to devise a practical plan of partition found that there were almost unsurmountable obstacles to this kind of a solution of the Palestine problem.

Plan No. 4 for the proposed trustee agreement for Palestine would not satisfy either the Arabs or the Zionists since it is in the nature of a compromise. Nevertheless, our present opinion is that some kind of a solution similar to this plan, which has been prepared by members of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, in close cooperation with other interested Divisions of the Department, after months of research and study, would be preferable to the other plans suggested herein from an international point of view. Our support of a plan of this nature might subject us to considerable criticism among the more extreme Arab nationalists. It would not, however, stir such acute resentment as would be aroused by our support of the plan for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Similarly our support of such a compromise plan would give rise to protests on the part of the Zionist organizations in the United States and of some of their friends and political allies. We are inclined to believe, however, that the more moderate Arabs and Jews would be likely to regard the adoption of a plan of this character as being as equitable a solution as any that could be found in the circumstances.

In our opinion it is important that Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and, if possible, France should endeavor to reach an agreement among themselves with regard to the future of Palestine and, after having done so, consult with the Jews and with the Arabs before putting their plan into effect. Otherwise, there is a danger that one or more of these great Powers might endeavor to pass on to

²⁶ See British Cmd. 5854, (1938) : *Palestine Partition Commission Report* (The Woodhead Report).

the other Powers the responsibility for the decision made, with the result that both Arabs and Jews might have grounds to hope that with a sufficient amount of agitation on their part the decision could be revised. Such a situation would almost inevitably lead to years of political instability in Palestine and in the Near East. Moreover, Palestine is a problem of world-wide importance and should in our judgment be dealt with by the five major Powers.

The detailed plans of which the enclosures are summaries are in the possession of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. The Division has been studying and living with the difficult Palestine problem for many years and would be glad to make available to you or to anyone whom you might care to designate such information and specialized knowledge as it has been able to acquire.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[Annex 1]

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1945.

FOUR PROPOSED PLANS FOR A PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

1. NE has drafted four different plans for a settlement of the Palestine problem. These plans are based upon extensive research work done by members of NE and of the now defunct Division of Territorial Studies extending over a period of almost three years.

Two of these plans are designed to meet respectively the Zionists' demand for a Jewish State and the Arabs' demand for an Arab State. The third plan is based on partition, and the fourth is a compromise plan.

Each of the four plans is accompanied by observations in regard to the implications inherent in the implementation of each plan.

2. *Plan No. One—Palestine: Status as a Jewish Commonwealth.*

This plan proposes that the Biltmore Program²⁷ of the Zionists be carried out by placing Palestine temporarily under the trusteeship system with Great Britain as the administering authority. The proposed trusteeship agreements set forth as the principal and special objective the creation of those conditions, including unrestricted Jew-

²⁷ An "Extraordinary Conference" of American Zionists, attended by such leaders of international Zionism as Dr. Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, met at New York City's Biltmore Hotel in May 1942, and on May 11, 1942, formulated its views in a number of resolutions which became known as the Biltmore Program. The closing paragraph of the resolutions stated: "The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world."

ish immigration and land purchases, which will lead to the creation of a Jewish majority and the early recognition of Palestine as an independent, democratic Jewish commonwealth.

The plan provides for an interim trustee government with wide powers given to a Jewish agency in order to enable the government with the aid of a Jewish agency to undertake those economic and political measures which would lead to the creation of an independent Jewish commonwealth.

3. *Plan No. Two—Palestine: An Independent Arab State.*

This plan proposes that the demands of the Arabs for an independent Arab Palestinian State be met after a transitional period under the present Mandatory Power. During the transitional period, the Arabs of Palestine shall draft a constitution for submission to the General Assembly by the United Nations. Provision is made for a Bill of Rights and adequate protection of the Jewish minority. Immigration would be controlled by the local government, but would be based upon the principle of economic need and economic absorptive capacity without discrimination on the basis of race, religion or nationality.

4. *Plan No. Three—Proposed Plan for the Partition of Palestine Under the Trusteeship System.*

This plan proposes that Palestine be partitioned into three political entities each under trusteeship, with Great Britain as the administering authority for each of the three trusteeship territories. Trusteeship territory *A* would consist of an area including Haifa and Jerusalem, the undeveloped areas of the Jordan Valley and the Negeb, and such territory as would provide for the safeguarding of the sacred shrines and the protection of the main lines of communication. Trusteeship territory *B* would be a Jewish State, and Trusteeship territory *C* would be an Arab State. The Trusteeship Council would appoint a technical commission to decide upon the actual boundaries of the three trusteeship territories.

5. *Plan No. Four—Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.*

This plan proposes that Palestine as a Holy Land sacred to Christians, Jews and Moslems be given a special status as an international territory under the trusteeship system with Great Britain as the administering authority. It proposes that the Arabs and Jews of Palestine be recognized as national communities with the right to organize communal governments having jurisdiction over all those rural districts, villages, towns and cities where the Arabs and Jews respectively are in the majority, with the exception of Haifa, Jerusalem, the undeveloped areas of the Jordan Valley and the Negeb. It makes provision for future immigration without restrictions as to race, religion

or nationality, for the regulation of land transfers on an equitable basis for both Arabs and Jews, and for the economic development of the undeveloped land areas of the Jordan Valley and the Negeb.

[Annex 2]

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1945.

OBSERVATIONS ON FOUR PROPOSED PLANS FOR PALESTINE

1. *Plan No. One—Palestine: Status as a Jewish Commonwealth.*

This plan, which would fulfill Zionist demands, would certainly provoke widespread discontent among all Arabs and Moslems, would result in civil war in Palestine and diplomatic if not armed intervention in more than one Arab State. This plan would be profoundly injurious to American cultural, religious and commercial interests in all the Arab and Moslem countries of the Near East, and it would probably result in the cancellation of the important American oil concession in Saudi Arabia. United States endorsement of this plan would be a serious blow to American prestige throughout the Near East.

On the other hand, this plan would fulfill the promises made to the Zionists in the relevant planks of the 1944 platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties and endorsed by the Presidential candidates of both parties. It would be applauded by the American Zionist organizations.

2. *Plan No. Two—Palestine: An Independent Arab State.*

This plan, which would fulfill Arab demands, would certainly provoke widespread discontent among all Zionists and most Jews, would result in civil war in Palestine and diplomatic if not armed intervention by the Arab States. The probable armed resistance to this plan by Palestinian Jews would necessitate the maintenance of large armed forces in Palestine for a considerable period of time. The support of this plan by the United States would have very serious political repercussions in American domestic politics.

On the other hand, the Arabs throughout the Near East would be greatly pleased with this solution, and United States support of it would increase American influence and prestige in all Near Eastern countries.

3. *Plan No. Three—Proposed Plan for the Partition of Palestine Under the Trusteeship System.*

This plan is based on the assumption that a unitary Palestine is not possible because of irreconcilable antagonisms between Arabs and Jews. The partition of Palestine would not meet the demands of either the Arabs or the Zionists. It is doubtful whether the Arabs

would give their approval willingly to this settlement; there are, however, some indications that some of the Zionist leaders might assent to the partition of Palestine as the only way out of an impossible impasse.

If this settlement were imposed by the unanimous backing of the three great Powers, the United Kingdom, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States, the Arab States might feel compelled to acquiesce without offering armed resistance. It would be likely to arouse widespread discontent in the Arab and Moslem worlds which would be somewhat unfavorable to American interests.

4. *Plan No. 4—Proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.*

This plan is clearly a compromise solution which would meet with disapproval of both Arabs and Zionists. It presents some intricate problems of administration and will require international financial assistance in order to carry out economic development projects which are a part of the general plan.

On the other hand, this plan would not be likely to provoke widespread discontent in Arab States resulting in violence and armed intervention, nor be likely to result in reprisals against the United States injurious to American interests. This plan would probably receive considerable support from non-Zionist Jewish groups who may be expected to look upon it as a reasonable compromise solution.

867N.01/8-2745 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, August 27, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 1:27 p. m.]

161. Have received belated protests from Palestine, Arab and Istiqlal parties upon President's press conference Aug 16. These protests express opposition to any further Jewish immigration and say White Paper was result of consultation with Arabs and Jews. They followed receipt here of protests in Egyptian press (previously some more conservative Arab leaders said President's reference to need for peaceful settlement indicated he was familiar with Arab attitude toward Zionism and they did not condemn statement). Arab press has been only mildly critical pointing out that Jewish immigration and peace in Palestine are inconsistent. Hebrew press has in general approved statement but regretted reference to half a million soldiers to maintain peace which some papers regard as encouragement to Arabs to resist any settlement. All are agreed Arabs will not accept Zionist program in present or any modified form and they press Jewish right to immigration in spite of Arab opposition.

PINKERTON

867N.01/8-3145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1945.

MR. SECRETARY: You will recall that we told you during a recent conversation in your office that the Division of Near Eastern Affairs was making a study of the current problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine and that we hoped to be able to give you the results within a few days. This problem is pressing since the present quota of Jewish immigrants allotted under the White Paper is practically exhausted, and the Zionists on the one hand are pressing for immediate mass Jewish immigration into Palestine, while the Arabs on the other are insisting that there shall be no further Jewish immigration. It is possible that while you are in London, the British Government will ask you what the attitude of the United States toward this problem is. In such an event, it is our hope that the information and suggestions incorporated in the attached memoranda²⁸ may be helpful to you. It is also possible that the President may have some interest in this matter.

We realize that any decision which might be made will result in a certain amount of irritation both to the Zionists and their friends and to the Arabs. The adoption of the suggestions made by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs will not be fully agreeable to either side. Nevertheless, in view of all the circumstances, they seem to me to offer the best solution of the problem that has been offered from any source.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[Annex]

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)*²⁹

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1945.

Within a few months the British Government, acting under its White Paper policy respecting Palestine, will have issued all of the immigration certificates allowable under the terms of that policy unless Arab acquiescence is obtained to further Jewish immigration. Since it is hardly conceivable that formal Arab acquiescence could be secured,

²⁸ One of the memoranda dated August 29, 1945, by William Yale of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, entitled "Immigration into Palestine Previous to a Final Decision with regard to the Future Status of Palestine", is not printed; for a summary, see the memorandum of August 31 by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam), printed as an annex to this document.

²⁹ Addressed to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), and the Secretary of State.

the British will be obliged to make a difficult decision: whether to abide by the White Paper policy and thus, in effect, terminate Jewish immigration into Palestine, or to establish a new interim policy whereby Jewish immigration will continue, at least for the time being, until the Palestine Mandate is revised and brought under the United Nations.

It is probable that the British will decide to permit Jewish immigration into Palestine to continue, and there are indications that the British Government will seek the support of the United States Government for its decision. Accordingly, Mr. Yale of NE has prepared the attached paper³⁰ dealing with the subject. The paper has been drawn up, as you know, in close consultation with interested officers in both NE and NEA, and it has NE's approval.

The main points are as follows:

1. The Zionists demand that one million Jews be admitted to Palestine as rapidly as possible.

2. The maximum number of Jews in Europe who will desire to migrate is probably closer to half a million than to a million. (The Soviet Government is unlikely to permit its Jewish citizens to emigrate to Palestine). Many European Jews prefer emigration to the United States over emigration to Palestine.

3. The housing situation in Palestine is bad. Without any immigration, additional accommodations for about 200,000 persons will be needed in 1945 and 1946.

4. Nine-tenths of Palestinian industry is Jewish-owned. However, it has serious reconversion problems because it became greatly expanded during the war to meet military demands, with little regard to costs or to peacetime markets. Hence, Palestinian industry will not be able to furnish work for new immigrants over the short term. On the contrary, the immediate outlook is for unemployment of existing industrial labor.

5. Mass immigration into Palestine would be opposed by the Arab, probably by means of armed force.

6. Any government or governments which sponsor large-scale immigration into Palestine would incur responsibilities to the prospective immigrants, since European Governments would relax efforts to reintegrate the Jews into the national life. If, after large-scale immigration had begun, it had to be stopped or curtailed, for any reason, the sponsoring governments would have to find places other than Palestine to receive these Jews.

7. The security requirements, if Palestine were opened to large-scale immigration, would be very considerable. No Government should advocate a policy of mass immigration unless it is prepared to assist in making available the necessary security forces, shipping, housing, unemployment guarantees, et cetera.

8. In view of the foregoing, the United States should refrain from supporting a policy of large-scale immigration into Palestine during the interim period.

³⁰ Not printed.

9. The United States could support a Palestine immigration policy during the interim period which would carry restrictions as to numbers and categories, taking into account humanitarian considerations, the economic welfare of Palestine and political conditions therein. The British Government, as the mandatory power, should accept primary responsibility for the policy and be responsible for carrying it out.

If you approve of the line we have taken, you may wish to bring this matter to the Secretary's attention, in view of the fact that the British may seek our views on the subject during his forthcoming visit to London.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

867N.01/8-3145 : Airgram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 31, 1945.

[Received September 26—6 p. m.]

A-126. With reference to the Department's telegram no. 241 of August 18, 5 p. m.,³¹ concerning the President's remarks touching on the Palestine problem made at his press conference of August 16, 1945, it may be of interest to report that, while the local press has limited its coverage to reproduction of foreign agency press reports and while there has been no overt manifestation of public or official reaction, the Legation gathered from several usually reliable local sources that the President's remarks had in fact given rise to considerable speculation and no little apprehension lest, with the end of hostilities, American policy might under Zionist pressure (which had been much remarked by Lebanese representatives at the San Francisco Conference) be tending towards advocacy of high-level unilateral decision permitting a new wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

While in the light of previous experience this absence of press comment and overt manifestation might seem surprising, it could be explained as resulting from close public and official preoccupation with pressing Lebanese affairs of both internal and external nature. The new cabinet had not yet announced its program. Franco-Levant relations were at best unstable and gave cause for serious concern. Any strong Moslem anti-Zionist stand would but further French attempts to accentuate Moslem-Christian disunity. And generally in political circles there was acceptance of the theme reported in my telegram no. 253 of August 11, 5 p. m.,³² that Lebanon could render better service to the Palestine Arab cause if working from within rather than from without the family of the United Nations.

³¹ See footnote 15, p. 722.

³² Not printed.

More specific explanation was, however, given me yesterday when making my first call on the new Prime Minister, Sami Bey Solh. Both he and the Minister of Public Health, Dr. Jamil Talhuk (a graduate of the American University in Beirut and a friend of long standing whom I have never known to be other than well-informed in such matters) assured me that it was only because of strong deterrent action on their part that press and political leaders had been dissuaded from launching a new anti-Zionist campaign and using the President's remarks as a *point-de-départ* for querying the good faith of war-time-made British and American statements which had seemingly promised that no variation from British White Paper policy would be considered except in full consultation with the Arab Governments as well as with Zionist leadership.

The Prime Minister said specifically that a number of local personalities, including journalists and a committee from the anti-Zionist bloc, had called on him in the matter and that it had been only with some difficulty that he had been able to persuade them that it was not in Lebanon's interest to agitate the question at the present delicate juncture of the country's internal and external political relations.

He concluded in substance: "Lebanon cannot admit that it is second to any other Arab state in interest in the Palestine problem or desire to support the cause of the Palestine Arabs. We did not, however, read into your President's remarks that he proposed to take or urge any immediate action designed to force open the doors of Palestine without first providing for a full airing of the views and interests of all concerned."

Having in mind the Department's current instruction that I was not to comment on or endeavor to interpret the President's remarks, I limited my reply to saying that I had always understood the position of my Government to be that the views of both Arabs and Jews were to be given fullest consideration if and when, independently or in concert with other governments, it might feel itself called upon to take any action to implement its various statements of policy in the matter.

GEORGE WADSWORTH

867N.01/8-3145

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*³³

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Because of the natural interest of this Government in the present condition and future fate of those dis-

³³ Handed by the Secretary of State to the British Prime Minister at London presumably on September 10, 1945.

placed persons in Germany who may prove to be stateless or non-repatriable, we recently sent Mr. Earl G. Harrison to inquire into the situation.³⁴

Mr. Harrison was formerly the United States Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, and is now the Representative of this Government on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. The United Kingdom and the United States, as you know, have taken an active interest in the work of this Committee.

Instructions were given to Mr. Harrison to inquire particularly into the problems and needs of the Jewish refugees among the displaced persons.

Mr. Harrison visited not only the American zone in Germany, but spent some time also in the British zone where he was extended every courtesy by the 21st Army Headquarters.

I have now received his report.³⁵ In view of our conversations at Potsdam I am sure that you will find certain portions of the report interesting. I am, therefore, sending you a copy.

I should like to call your attention to the conclusions and recommendations appearing on page 8 and the following pages—especially the references to Palestine. It appears that the available certificates for immigration to Palestine will be exhausted in the near future. It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin.

On the basis of this and other information which has come to me I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine. The number of such persons who wish immigration to Palestine or who would qualify for admission there is, unfortunately, no longer as large as it was before the Nazis began their extermination program. As I said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.

I know you are in agreement on the proposition that future peace in Europe depends in large measure upon our finding sound solutions of problems confronting the displaced and formerly persecuted groups of people. No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known persecution and enslavement.

³⁴ For documentation on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 1146 ff.

³⁵ See "Report of Earl G. Harrison," Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, p. 456.

The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

867N.01/9-1545

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*³⁶

[LONDON,] September 14, 1945.

No. 8. Mr. Byrnes handed me at the beginning of this week your letter of August 31st about displaced persons in Germany, with a copy of Mr. Harrison's report dealing especially with the problems and needs of Jewish refugees. I have since then, in conjunction with my colleagues, been giving it my most earnest consideration. I hope that I may be able to send you a considered reply in the course of the next few days.

2. In these circumstances I cannot conceal from you that I learned with concern of a conversation which Mr. Byrnes had today with the Foreign Secretary in which he told him that you are proposing to issue a statement about Palestine this evening and to include in this statement Mr. Harrison's report of which you kindly sent me a copy. I fully endorse on behalf of His Majesty's Government the view which the Foreign Secretary expressed to Mr. Byrnes, namely that such action could not fail to do grievous harm to relations between our two countries.

3. I do not know whether Mr. Byrnes will have reported his conversation with the Foreign Secretary to you but there is one point which I should like to bring to your notice. The Jews are not now using the number of certificates which are being made available to them and up to the present have not taken up the 1,500 certificates offered for this month. It appears that they are insisting upon the complete repudiation of the White Paper and the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates, regardless of the effect on the situation in the Middle East which this would have.

4. I am glad to hear from Bevin that Mr. Byrnes after his conversation has recommended to you that this statement should not be made. The position in the Middle East is already one of great danger and difficulty and I fear that this action, had it been taken, would have precipitated a grave crisis which would indeed be a lamentable start to the work of reconstruction to which we are now devoting ourselves.

³⁶ Copy of telegram transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) by the British Ambassador (Halifax) in a letter of September 15, 1945, not printed.

867N.01/9-1745: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*³⁷

[LONDON,] 16 September, 1945.

9. I am now in a position to give you a considered reply, which I am telegraphing in order to save time, to your letter of August 31 enclosing a copy of Mr. Harrison's report.

I am sure you will appreciate the very grave difficulties that have confronted our representatives on the Control Commission and from my own investigation of the matter it is quite clear that they have endeavoured to avoid treating people on a racial basis. Had they done this then there would have been violent reactions on the part of other people who had been confined to these concentration camps. One must remember that within these camps were people from almost every race in Europe and there appears to have been very little difference in the amount of torture and treatment they had to undergo. Now, if our officers had placed the Jews in a special racial category at the head of the queue, my strong view is that the effect of this would have been disastrous for the Jews and therefore their attempt to treat them alike was a right one. After all, the situation in Central Europe is appalling. The number of displaced persons, refugees from concentration camps, the violent driving of people from one territory to another, is one of the most horrible events in human history. So concerned are we about the starvation generally in that area that we have been taking steps to try and prevent epidemics arising and spreading to other countries. On this matter we shall be communicating with the State Department as soon as possible.

With reference to immediate relief there is a camp at Philippeville, North Africa, capable of taking 30,000 and another one at Fedala with a capacity of 5,000. I suggest that, in order to relieve immediate suffering, these two places be used. I understand that UNRRA have it under their control. It would of course involve our commanders in the task of sorting them out. This, however, should relieve the situation.

In case of Palestine we have the Arabs to consider as well as the Jews and there have been solemn undertakings, I understand, given by your predecessor, yourself and by Mr. Churchill, that before we come to a final decision and operate it, there would be consultation with the Arabs. It would be very unwise to break these solemn pledges and so set aflame the whole Middle East. I know you realize that as things are the responsibility of preserving order with all the consequences involved rests entirely on this country.

³⁷ Copy of telegram transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) by Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, in a memorandum of September 17, 1945, not printed.

As I mentioned in my earlier telegram the Jews are not now using the numbers of certificates available and up to the present have not taken up the 1,500 available for this month which was offered them. Apparently they are insisting upon the complete repudiation of the White Paper and the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates quite regardless of the effect on the situation in the Middle East which this would have.

In addition to this problem we are engaged upon another related one and that is India. The fact that there are ninety million Moslems, who are easily inflamed, in that country compels us to consider the problem from this aspect also. Therefore, while sympathising with the views of Mr. Harrison and weighing them very carefully, we believe that the suggestion which he has made raises very far-reaching implications, which would have to be most carefully balanced against the considerations which I have set out above. We have got the matter under urgent examination, with a view to the formulation of a long-term policy which we propose to refer to the World Organization as soon as practicable. Meanwhile we are considering how to deal with the immigration problem in interval and I shall be very happy to let you know as soon as I can what our intentions are in this matter.

867N.01/9-1745 : Telegram

*President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Attlee)*³⁸

WASHINGTON, 17 September, 1945

7. Replying to your number 9. Your efforts in the interest of Jews and other displaced persons in Europe are appreciated.

I am aware of the complications of the problem from your point of view. It also makes difficulties for us.

It is hoped that we can work out a successful program that will provide for them some measure of relief at an early date.

I have today talked by telephone with Secretary Byrnes and will take no further action in the matter until after his return to Washington.

867N.01/9-1845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, September 18, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received September 18—6:30 a. m.]

358. British Embassy has received telegram containing text of statement by Senator Gillette on September 13, according to which Presi-

³⁸ Copy of telegram transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) by Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, with a memorandum of September 17, not printed.

dent Truman authorized Senator to announce that he had written a personal letter to Prime Minister Attlee requesting Britain to permit immediate immigration to Palestine of 100,000 Jews now allegedly in prison camps in Germany. For unknown reasons story not yet released here, but if and when it is we are almost certain to be attacked violently by local press and public with probable condemnation of President's initiative in matter. It might be helpful if we could have exact text of Gillette's statement and assignment and advice possible.

MORELAND

867N.01/9-1945

Memorandum by the War Department to the Department of State

WASHINGTON, 19 September, 1945.

Attention: Frederick B. Lyon, Chief, Division of Foreign Activity Correlation

1. The following comments are offered in reply to your memorandum, same subject, dated 30 August 1945.³⁹

2. The force required to maintain order in Palestine and nearby countries in the event that lowering the bars against Jewish immigration should result in disturbances and/or armed intervention on the part of the Arabs would probably mean a force of 400,000 men actively employed.

3. From the military standpoint, it is estimated the British are at present in a position in the Middle East to provide the equivalent of four divisions of the force. Information is not available concerning the demobilization and repatriation of forces in the Middle East contemplated by the British which would result in consequent reduction of the British capability to assist in maintaining order. The willingness of the British to participate in such a project is not known to the War Department. Because of the lack of knowledge of British plans and attitude, only a very general estimate can be made of the possible U.S. commitment. It appears that it would be at least four or five divisions with supporting air and service forces, or a total of over 200,000 men, and it might be over 300,000. The commitment would continue for an indefinite period.

4. The repercussions of introduction of U.S. forces into Palestine in connection with the project mentioned in your memorandum would include an indefinite delay in demobilization of U.S. Army forces. On the reasonable assumption that British and probably French commitments to the Middle East would be increased by resulting disturbances and by participation in operations in this area, there would be a

³⁹ Not printed, but see footnote 20, p. 725.

consequent decrease in Allied capability to assist in carrying the burden of occupying Japan and Germany. This would probably result in a consequent increase in U.S. military commitments with its corresponding effect on U.S. demobilization.

For the Secretary of War:
A. D. REID

867N.01/9-2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, September 20, 1945—8 a. m.
[Received September 21—8:55 a. m.]

367. Baghdad press today featured story mentioned my 358, September 18. By direction of Prime Minister I was called to Foreign Office and requested to ascertain authenticity and accuracy of story. Instructions requested.

All papers gave figure as 1,000,000 Jews. I requested Foreign Office to correct this sensational distortion and prevent such in future. Foreign Office copy of Jewish press bulletin gave only 100,000.

MORELAND

740.00119 Council/9-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1945—2 p. m.

8361. Secdel ⁴⁰ 106. Personal for the Secretary. A delegation of prominent Zionists called upon me yesterday in order to obtain information re negotiations which they say they have learned through reliable sources are taking place between Brit and American Govts with regard to Palestine. They referred particularly to a letter which they understood President has addressed to Brit and to conversations which they have heard have been going on between you and members of Brit Govt.

I told them that I knew nothing re negotiations which may have taken place between American and Brit Govts with regard to Palestine. When they expressed concern lest important decisions affecting future of Palestine might be made by Brit and American Govts before Zionists have been given a full opportunity to present their case I told them that the American Govt on a number of occasions had made it clear that in its opinion both Jews and Arabs should be consulted

⁴⁰ Secdel was the code designation for telegrams addressed to the Secretary of State during the period of an overseas mission, in this case, the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

in connection with any basic decision which might be made with regard to Palestine and that I was confident that no basic decision affecting future of Palestine would be taken without consultation with Arabs and Jews.

I would appreciate being informed if you approve position which I have assumed.

ACHESON

867N.01/9-2645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD [undated].

[Received September 26, 1945—2: 55 p. m.]

373. The Prime Minister handed to me yesterday the following note: ⁴¹

Monsieur Le Chargé d'Affaires: I wish to invite your attention to the disturbing news contained in the latest telegrams concerning the pressure which is being exerted by American circles on the British Government and which is increasing from day to day to induce it to dishonor its obligations to the Arabs of Palestine, and to the news that His Excellency President Truman is urging the British Government to open the door of Palestine for Zionist immigration, thereby promoting the interests of the Zionist and the realization of their ambitions. If this is true, it is contrary to all the promises and undertakings oral and written, which have been given to the Arabs to the effect that the US would take no action with regard to Palestine before consulting the Arabs. Moreover it would indicate an indifference to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs who are the sole owners of the country.

Iraq, which entered this war on the side of the United Nations, impressed by the principles of the Atlantic Charter, cannot imagine that the American nation which is regarded by the world as a citadel of liberty and international justice, would cast aside this Charter.

Arabs in general and Iraq in particular, sympathize with the destitute of Europe—victims of Nazism—just as the American people do, but they do not believe that Zionism is the means of solving the world Jewish problem, or that it should be solved at their expense, because Zionism is in fact an aggressive movement which aims at the colonization of Palestine and the expulsion of peaceful Arabs from their own country, or rendering them a small powerless minority in the land which they inherited thousands of years ago. Such is the meaning of opening Palestine to Zionism immigration.

It has been proved to the Arabs beyond all doubt, that the Zionists intend to invade other Arab countries after they have overrun Palestine. We therefore regard the Palestine question as a matter of life and death. Zionism is an aggressive movement directed at the heart of the Arab nation and any support which may be given to it will create in Arab circles thoughts and impressions which would not be

⁴¹ In telegram 383, October 4, 1945, from Baghdad, the Chargé stated that "Text Prime Minister's protest published all local papers today." (867N.01/10-445)

desirable by the American Government. The Arab nation is resolved to use all means at its disposal to defend its existence, and safety and security in the homeland.

It was anticipated that the tragedies and crimes which occurred in Palestine because of the Zionists would come to an end, especially so as the Atlantic Charter clearly guarantees the right of all weak nations to security and freedom from fear. The strength and military power of the US is more than sufficient to compel the Arabs to acquiesce in any policy which the US may impose on the nations. If this is the case, why all these charters and pledges, to which America has bound itself, for safeguarding human rights and liberties? And what is the effect of the glorious history which has made America known, throughout the world, as the constant supporter of right and justice? We do not wish at all to believe that Zionist influence in America can reverse facts so as to make right wrong and wrong right. It is the right of the Palestine Arabs to determine their own fate without the intervention of others in their affairs. To compel them to receive among them strangers, who harbor the most dangerous intentions towards them, would be contrary to all logic and conscience.

While inquiring about the truth of the news which reports the intervention of Americans in general and President Truman in particular in defense of Zionist immigration into Palestine, I strongly protest in the name of the Iraq Government and people against any intervention contrary to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs in their homeland and against any attempt to admit strangers there without the consent of the Arabs who are the legitimate owners of Palestine. The Iraq Government deems its duty again to inform the American Government that it regards any support to Zionism as an act directed against the interests of the Iraq State in particular and the interests of the Arab peoples in general. It is hoped, in view of the friendship which Iraq feels towards the American people, that America will avoid injuring the Arabs in their own homelands by any such intervention.

I request, Monsieur Le Chargé d'Affaires, that you will be kind enough to communicate the contents of this note to your Government and to accept my highest consideration and respect.

Signed Hamdi al Pachachi.

MORELAND

867N.01/9-2645

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁴²

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1945.

Subject: Present Status of Our Policy on Palestine, and Suggestions

MR. HENDERSON: Recent developments with respect to Palestine have in our opinion rendered it all the more essential that the Department

⁴² Attached to this memorandum was a hand-written comment addressed to Mr. Henderson by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen) as follows: "It seems apparent to me that the President (and

Footnote continued on following page.

should do everything possible to bring about a more unified and positive Government policy on Palestine. The essentials of such a policy should, we believe, be made public and be adhered to by all branches of the Government in the future handling of the Palestine question.

Reports which have been received from newspaper and other sources in the past ten days have served once again to emphasize the necessity for a clarification of our policy on a question which has such far-reaching and explosive potentialities as does the Palestine problem. It would appear, although we have as yet no definite confirmation of this in NE, that under date of August 31 President Truman addressed a secret communication to Prime Minister Attlee enclosing a copy of the Harrison report on refugees, and urging that immediate steps be taken to admit 100,000 displaced Jews into Palestine from the internment camps in Germany. This letter was apparently taken by the Secretary to London and became the basis for certain discussions which he has had on the subject with Foreign Secretary Bevin and other British officials. The President evidently intended to make the Harrison report public, together with the proposal he had made to Mr. Attlee, but was dissuaded by an urgent appeal from Mr. Attlee, who considered that nothing could be more calculated to cause "grievous harm" to the relations between Great Britain and the United States. The existence of the President's letter to Mr. Attlee was announced in the press by former Senator Gillette, who, however, a few days later issued a formal and complete denial of any statements attributed to him on this subject.

More recently the matter has been mentioned in newspaper accounts carried by Reuter's from London and it is to be anticipated that these reports will also appear in the press in the Near East. When this occurs, the Department will undoubtedly be bombarded by protests from Arab sources, as well as requests from our representatives for confirmation of the reports and instructions as to our policy. One detail in the Reuter's despatch which is of special interest is the claim that the President's alleged communication to Mr. Attlee is particularly resented by certain British officials because the Truman ad-

perhaps Mr. Byrnes as well) have decided to have a go at Palestine negotiations without bringing NEA into the picture for the time being. The question we must answer is: Should we nevertheless inject ourselves actively into the negotiations with further recommendations at this stage, or should we wait to be called?

There are pros and cons, but on balance I'm inclined to recommend that we stand by for the moment. It is true that as officials of the Govt. we have a responsibility to recommend the course of action which in our judgment is best, whether we are asked to do so or not and regardless of whether our suggestions are adopted. In some cases I strongly favor this line. But in the present case, we have already given Mr. Byrnes our fully considered recommendations on Palestine. I see nothing further we can appropriately do for the moment except carry on our current work, answering letters and telegrams, receiving callers, etc. as best we can, pending the time (which will come soon) when the whole thing will be dumped back in our laps." (867N.01/9-2645)

ministration had recently rejected a proposal by the British Cabinet to share responsibility for Palestine. This may be a reference to discussions which Mr. Truman told the press he had had with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee at Potsdam but regarding which we in NE have no information.

To summarize, the present handling of our Palestine policy at the highest levels has already seriously irritated the British and threatens to have even more far-reaching effects upon our relations with the Near Eastern countries. It is accordingly our recommendation that the Department undertake the necessary clearance with the President, the Secretary, and the British Government for the issuance by the Department of a public statement of policy on Palestine which would seek to clarify the present position.

Such a statement would have as its starting point the Harrison report on refugees which undoubtedly prompted the President's apparent intervention with the British Government. This report deals with the displaced persons in the camps in Germany and points out with considerable clarity not only that the present physical condition of these persons leaves much to be desired, but also that they have no hope for the future in their former places of residence. Mr. Harrison asserts that the vast majority of the Jews in the camps, who number less than 100,000, desire to go to Palestine and that immediate steps should be taken to facilitate this objective.

Our proposed statement, after stressing the deep sympathy which the American Government feels for the displaced Jews of Europe, in line with our established policy of affording aid to the victims of Nazi persecution, would say that the possibility of admitting these persons into Palestine in the immediate future had been discussed with the British Government. The British, however, had decided that in present circumstances it would be impossible to allow any large number to go to Palestine. In view of the responsibility which the British bear as the Mandatory Power, we were not in a position to take issue with their decision. The statement would then summarize concrete steps which might be taken to assist the displaced persons in question. Such steps would include the issuance by the President of a strongly-worded directive to the American military authorities, urging immediate action to improve conditions in the internment camps. Steps should next be taken toward separate handling for the displaced Jews, in recognition of their special plight as compared with the other displaced persons. Every effort should be made, in conjunction with UNRRA⁴³ and other agencies, to get the Jews out of the camps as soon as possible. Those willing to return to their former homes should be assisted to do so, while the remainder, representing the

⁴³ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

hard core of the stateless and non-repatriable persons, should be the object of the urgent consideration of the Allied Governments. Those whom the British Government would be willing to admit to Palestine should be allowed to proceed there as promptly as possible. Efforts should be made to amend our present visa procedures and other restrictions so as to make it possible for some of these Jews to come to the United States under our immigration quotas. Some properly equipped and managed temporary place or places of refuge should be developed as a place where the ultimate remainder could go pending a final decision as to their disposition. Such a decision might well involve an appeal by our Government to each of the other United Nations to accept as immigrants a proportionate number of these people, in the same proportion as we ourselves were ready to accept them.

With regard to Palestine, our statement would add that while Palestine is primarily a British responsibility, the American Government naturally has a deep interest in reaching an equitable solution of the different problems involved, which will undoubtedly come up for settlement under the trusteeship provisions of the San Francisco Charter. The statement would conclude by pointing out that in any event it is the view of the Government of the United States that there should be no decision affecting the basic situation of Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

The foregoing will, of course, require considerable implementation with the military authorities in Germany (and with our own visa issuing authorities) but it is believed to present the only feasible means of getting our policy out of its present impasse and on to a workmanlike basis.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

740.00119 Council/9-2745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)

LONDON, September 27, 1945.

[Received September 27—8:05 p.m.]

Delsec⁴⁴ 67. Your Secdel 106, September 24.⁴⁵ If you are approached further by the Zionists I suggest that you say you have not been in communication or participated in any negotiations with the British Government about Palestine, that they were right in believing that the President had written Prime Minister Attlee about Palestine but that you did not know whether or not Mr. Attlee had replied or what the nature of the reply might be. It might be added that in-

⁴⁴ Code name designating the series of telegrams sent by the Secretary of State while on an overseas mission.

⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 743.

formation on the subject of that correspondence could be obtained only from the President or Mr. Attlee.

BYRNES

867N.01/9-2845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, September 28, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received September 28—7:30 a. m.]

375. ReLegtel 367 of September 20. Press attacks on President Truman's alleged advocacy of immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine is strong as feared.

In an impertinent article entitled "America must choose" authored anonymously for *As-Sa'a*, Fadhil Jamali, Director General FonOff expresses pained surprise at President Truman's "generosity at expense of Arabs" [apparent omission] all destitute Jews are not received in US, and questions moral, legal and political bases of President's behavior. Article states America must choose between hypocrisy and honesty, and must demonstrate whether oft pronounced principles of peace, independence and self-determination are more than "empty words drawled by American leaders". Article concludes that Americans must decide whether they wish to sacrifice Arab friendship and their economic interests in Near East in a bloody war to uphold unjust Zionism.

Iraq condemns President Truman's attitude toward Zionism as indication of "frank hostility" to Arabs, and asserts President's policy is inspired by personal ambition. Editorial also criticises British for remaining silent in face of President's "interference" in purely Anglo-Arab affair.

Al-Akhabar lashes President Truman "aggression" against rights of Palestine, and with sarcasm and venom rips into America for holding itself out as protector of Four Freedoms while supporting imperialistic Zionism.

Similar editorial criticisms appear in other papers and more will follow.

MORELAND

867N.01/9-2845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, September 28, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received September 29—2:16 a. m.]

64. Rising press and public sentiment resulting from sensational treatment accorded by British controlled press and radio in Near

East to alleged letter of President Truman to Mr. Attlee advocating 100,000 Jewish immigrants for Palestine leads me to inquire whether Department contemplates issuance of mitigating statement.

PORTER

867N.01/9-2945 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, September 29, 1945—noon.

[Received September 29—8:20 a. m.]

365. FonMin states King is preparing message to President Truman which will be given me to cable thru Department probably within 24 hours.

Message will seek clarification of radio reports that search of President Roosevelt's papers fails to discover record of pledge to King re Palestine in which case King proposes to publish evidence including especially letter to him from President Roosevelt dated April 5, 1945 sent through this Legation as enclosure to Department's instruction 263 of April 10, 1945.⁴⁶

EDDY

867N.01/9-2945 : Telegram

Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan to President Truman

AMMAN, September 29, 1945—2 p. m.

The report in the press of the Middle East that Your Excellency asked the Prime Minister of Great Britain in a personal message to grant 10,000 [100,000] immigration certificates to the Jews has caused great anxiety here. I had the honour of receiving a reply from you to my telegram to the late President⁴⁷ to the effect that no decision would be taken about Palestine before the Arabs and Jews had been consulted but the admission of 10,000 [100,000] Jewish immigrants is so important a decision that the Arabs consider that they ought to be consulted. I hope to receive a favourable reply which will remove this anxiety.

ABDULLAH IBN HUSSEIN

⁴⁶ Instruction 263 not printed: for text of President Roosevelt's letter of April 5, see p. 698.

⁴⁷ March 10, 1945, not printed, but see footnote 39, p. 692. For President Truman's message of May 17, see p. 707.

867N.01/10-145

*The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1945.

Subject: American Promises of Consultation with Both Arabs and
Jews Regarding Palestine.

MR. ACHESON: We are deeply concerned at the repercussions resulting from reports which are being widely disseminated to the effect that the President, without consultation with either Jews or Arabs, is bringing pressure upon the British Government to arrange for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. You will recall that the Zionists have expressed their concern at what appears to be a tendency on our part to dispose of the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine without consulting them. In the case of the Arab world, unrefuted allegations are being made that the United States is not living up to the pledges which it has made repeatedly during recent years, to the effect that no decision should be made respecting the basic situation of Palestine without consultation with Arabs and Jews.

The Iraqi Prime Minister on September 26 [25?] handed our Legation at Baghdad a note⁴⁸ in which he stated that if it is true that President Truman is urging the British Government to open the doors of Palestine to Zionist immigration, such action "is contrary to all the promises and undertakings, oral and written, which have been given to the Arabs". The Prime Minister asks point blank if it is true that the United States is actively intervening in the problem of Zionist immigration into Palestine. Our Chargé at Baghdad had already asked twice for instructions and confirmation of the reports regarding this matter.

In an airgram from Beirut dated August 31, 1945⁴⁹ our Minister to Syria and Lebanon refers to the presence of "apprehension lest, with the end of hostilities, American policy might under Zionist pressure be tending towards advocacy of high-level unilateral decision permitting a new wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine".

In a telegram from Cairo dated September 24, 1945,⁵⁰ our Minister to Egypt states:

"To the already mounting tension over the Palestine problem on Egypt's eastern frontier came today's Reuter report of President Tru-

⁴⁸ See telegram 373, from Baghdad, p. 744.

⁴⁹ Airgram A-126, p. 736.

⁵⁰ Telegram 1797, not printed.

man's proposal that 100,000 additional certificates be issued immediately for Jewish immigration. Press has featured the announcement sensationally. In view of this and the publicity given recent American Congressional visitors, interest in Arab cause does Department authorize me to make any statement to attenuate the shocking effect which the President's declaration is having in Arab circles."

Information from Saudi Arabia also indicates growing anxiety and irritation at what appears to be the present attitude of the United States with regard to its pledges concerning Palestine.

In case the Government of the United States should continue to press for the mass immigration of Jews into Palestine at this time, on humanitarian or other grounds, much of the work done in the Near East in recent years in building up respect for, and confidence in, the United States and in increasing American prestige, will be undone. Nevertheless, if it should be the considered decision of the responsible authorities of the Government of the United States to carry out such a policy (in the name of humanity) and if we should be willing to participate in the responsibility of such an undertaking, it would obviously be the duty of the Department of State to accept such a decision to do all that it possibly could to mitigate the damages resulting from it, and to assist in carrying it out.

The mere resentment of the Near Eastern peoples towards the United States on the ground that we have decided to disregard the Arab viewpoint with regard to Palestine would be unpleasant. It would be much more serious, however, if we should give them ground to believe that we do not live up to our firm promises already given. No matter what decision we might make, we should not overlook the assurances that we have given that we shall consult in advance the Arabs and the Jews. Those assurances have been given in writing by both President Roosevelt and President Truman. There can be legitimate differences between the Arab peoples, the Zionists, and ourselves as to what should be the future status of Palestine. There should not, however, be any differences as to the willingness of the United States Government to keep its word.

We feel that our good name is at stake in the Near East and elsewhere and we sincerely hope that before any further moves are taken by this Government in the matter of Palestine we shall be in a position to reassure the Arab Governments as well as the Jews that we intend to live up to our promises of consultation. We also hope that if we decide, regardless of reactions in the Near East, to embark upon a policy which seems likely to alter the basic situation in Palestine we shall actually consult with Arabs and Jews before taking any steps towards adopting and implementing that policy.

If you would like to bring our views expressed herein to the attention of the President or to the Secretary, we should be glad to repeat them in whatever form you may consider appropriate.

LOY W. HENDERSON

867N.01/10-245

*The British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman*⁵¹

[LONDON,] October 1, 1945.

14. In view of statements in Washington that I did not send a reply to your letter to me of August 31st I feel bound to let it be known that I did in fact send a reply on September 16th and that I understood no further action would be taken until after Mr. Byrnes had returned to Washington. I think you will agree that otherwise a very false impression might be created.

The question of immigration referred to in last sentence of my telegram to you No. 9 of September 16th is still under consideration but I shall not fail to let you know our views as soon as possible.

867N.01/10-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 2, 1945.

[Received October 2—7:45 p. m.]

10261. Press today carries following statement issued last night by Ministry of Information:

“Statements have been made in Washington that the Prime Minister has not sent any reply to President Truman’s letter to him of August 31 on the subject of Jewish immigration into Palestine. In fact, the Prime Minister sent a reply on September 16, and he understood that no further action would be taken until after Mr. Byrnes had returned to Washington.”

WINANT

867N.01/10-245

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1945.

We have seen your statement to the press in reply to the question whether Mr. Roosevelt had made commitments to the King of Saudi

⁵¹ Copy transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the British Ambassador in a letter of October 2, 1945, not printed.

Arabia not to make an issue out of the Palestine question.⁵² We have also noted the proposal of King Ibn Saud, in this connection, to make public the letter written to him on April 5, 1945 by President Roosevelt. A copy of this letter is attached.⁵³

We also attach a statement of the basic views of the Department of State on the question, which we believe you would wish to consider. The essence of the matter is that promises have been made to both the Jews and the Arabs that both parties will be consulted before any basic steps are taken regarding Palestine.

You may perhaps wish the Department to prepare a full summary of the situation, including our recommendations.

DEAN ACHESON

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1945.

Subject: Views of the Department of State concerning American Promises regarding Palestine

Both Jewish and Arab leaders have been deeply concerned by the reports which are being widely disseminated that the President has urged the Government of Great Britain to permit the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. Zionist leaders called at the Department a few days ago to express their concern at what appears to be a tendency to dispose of the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine without consulting them. The Arabs, moreover, are making strong protests against what they consider to be our failure to live up to frequent promises which we have made to them during recent years that in our view they should be consulted before any decision respecting the basic situation of Palestine is made.

Our assurances of consultation are to be found in several letters addressed by President Roosevelt to Arab leaders and were repeated in a letter from President Truman to the Amir of Transjordan.⁵⁴ The most categorical assurance was contained in President Roosevelt's letter to King Ibn Saud on April 5, 1945.

* The President's proposal would, if adopted, constitute a basic change in the Palestine situation, and it is already clear from the violent reaction of the Arabs that it would in fact make an immediate issue out of the Palestine question. The British White Paper, adopted in 1939,

⁵² At a press conference on September 26, President Truman had stated that the late President Roosevelt had made no commitments to King Ibn Saud which excluded consideration of the Palestine question by the United States Government.

⁵³ *Ante*, p. 698.

⁵⁴ May 17, 1945, p. 707.

established a quota of 75,000 for Jewish immigration into Palestine during the following five years, after which time there was to be no further Jewish immigration without Arab acquiescence. President Truman's proposal would involve the abrogation of a cardinal feature of the British White Paper policy.

The disposition on our part to fail to carry out our promises would constitute the severest kind of blow to American prestige not only in the Near East but elsewhere. Much of the work done in the Near East in recent years in building up respect for, and confidence in the United States would be undone. Beyond the loss of prestige is the very serious threat to vital American interests in that area which would result from a hostile Arab world. Moreover, the smaller nations of the world, who have looked to the United States for leadership and on whose support we counted so heavily at San Francisco, would be sadly disillusioned if we violated our word in this conspicuous instance.

S67N.01/10-345

*The King of Saudi Arabia (Abdul Aziz ibn Saud) to President Truman*⁵⁵

[Translation]

No. 12/8/3/170

[JIDDA,] October 2, 1945.
Shawal 25, 1364.

[Here follows first paragraph of a letter from the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister in Saudi Arabia, transmitting the text of the King's letter.]

"Excellency: It was told to me that according to foreign broadcasts, a statement concerning Palestine has been attributed to Your Excellency on August 16, 1945. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked for a clarification of your statement, and received in reply from the United States Legation in Jidda a text of your speech, and this has served to calm us; but we have been made aware lately, through the radio broadcast, of a speech attributed to Your Excellency that you have searched through the papers of the late President, our dear friend, President Roosevelt, and that you were not successful in finding any confirmation of his talk with us regarding the Palestine question. We did not previously publish the subject discussed between us and the late President regarding this matter. However, in some particular cases, we did inform various heads of Arab States concerning that conversation which took place on February 14, 1945, as well as informing them of the letter that he sent to us on the subject, dated April 5, 1945, in reply to the letter we sent to His Excellency.

⁵⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 179, October 3, 1945, from Jidda: received October 19; a summary of this message was transmitted to the Department in telegram 372, October 2, 1945, 6 p. m., from Jidda (neither printed).

We believe that the statement attributed to Your Excellency has been erroneously published, just as in the case of your previous speech. For the clarification of the position regarding ourselves and regarding the policy of the United States toward the Arab people, I ask Your Excellency's indulgence that we should publish the conversation which took place between us and between His Excellency President Roosevelt on February 14, 1945, and his reply to us on April 5, 1945, so as to make known our position and the position of the United States which we believe, and the whole world believes, that the United States did not enter this war except that the right and justice should triumph, and that it is impossible that she would support the expulsion of a nation from its country so as to replace it with another nation by means of might and force, and under the protection of military forces. Abdul Aziz"

[Here follows closing paragraph of the letter of transmittal from the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.]

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs
YUSUF YASSIN

867N.01/10-245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1945—7 p. m.

297. Your 372 Oct 2.⁵⁶ Please advise urgently whether our assumption is correct that version of Feb 14 conversation which King desires to publish is memo written by you and subsequently cleared with Roosevelt and King. We also assume King is proposing unilateral rather than joint publication of memo and letter.

ACHESON

867N.01/10-345

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 3, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Acheson

Mr. Mahmoud Hassan, Egyptian Minister.

Mr. Ali Jawdat, Iraqi Minister.

Dr. Nazem al-Koudsi, Syrian Minister.

Mr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister.

Mr. Henderson, NEA.

Mr. Acheson received the Ministers of four Arab countries—Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon—this afternoon at the request of the Min-

⁵⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 55, p. 755.

isters. Mr. Henderson, of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was also present.

The Egyptian Minister, acting as spokesman for his colleagues, stated that they had been instructed by their Governments to call upon the Acting Secretary of State in order to draw the attention of the American Government to the anxiety and uneasiness which were being created in the Arab world as a result of reports to the effect that the President of the United States was endeavoring to prevail upon the British Government to permit 100,000 Jewish refugees to immigrate to Palestine.

The Minister stated that it was difficult for the Arab peoples to believe that reports of this kind could be true since they had been assured repeatedly by both President Roosevelt and President Truman that the United States would not support any policy which would result in a change in the situation in Palestine without consulting all concerned, including the Arabs and the Jews. President Roosevelt had personally assured the Minister that the American Government would make no move which would change the situation in Palestine without consultation with representatives of Egypt and other Arab States.

The Minister went on to state that in his opinion any step taken by Great Britain which might change the basic situation in Palestine would be contrary to the principles of international law. It was well established that a protecting power had no right to change the situation of a country to which it gave protection without the consent of the inhabitants of the protectorate. Certainly a mandated country like Palestine was entitled to more rights than a protectorate. Therefore, it would seem that it would be an abuse of power for Great Britain to take steps to change the situation in Palestine by admitting a mass of Jewish immigrants or by employing other measures to change Palestine from an Arab to a Jewish State without prior consultation with the population of Palestine.

The Minister continued that the four Governments and the Arab League, on whose behalf the Ministers were making their call, would appreciate assurances from the Government of the United States that the policy of the American Government with regard to Palestine had not changed and that the American Government intended to live up to the promises of consultation which it had made.

Mr. Acheson stated that he was not in a position to discuss the matter at the present time since he had not, during the brief period that he had been Under Secretary, concerned himself with the question of Palestine. The Secretary of State was expected in Washington in the near future, and he would be glad to convey the views of the Ministers to the Secretary. Just as soon as the Department was in a

position to furnish the information which the Ministers desired, they would be informed.

During the course of the conversation various of the Ministers pointed out that the Arabs had always had friendly feelings for the Jews and that the Jews in Arab countries had, as a rule, been treated with consideration. These feelings of friendliness had not changed, and they were hoping that policies would not be adopted which would give rise to hostilities between these two peoples who had lived amicably side by side for many hundreds of years. They expressed their appreciation of Mr. Acheson's courtesy in receiving them and said that they would be glad to await the return of the Secretary before replying to the instructions which were responsible for their visit.

867N.01/10-345

*The President of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (Weizmann) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁷

LONDON, 3 October, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that you will probably be returning to the States very soon, and would therefore like to send you a word of farewell, and of warm thanks for your very kind reception of me last week.

I am hopeful that you may find time, among your many urgent pre-occupations, to deal with our problem. Our immediate anxiety is to see the White Paper régime abrogated: that would mean the repeal of the Land Regulations of 1940, which constitute a discrimination against Jews and forbid us to acquire land in by far the greater part of the country. With regard to immigration, we would like to see the doors of Palestine open for all Jews desperately in need of a home—in the first instance, an immediate decision to admit 100,000 immigrants, and enable us to bring them over as quickly as possible, for time means lives. The pace depends entirely on the facilities provided. While the Jewish communities will bear their full share of the burden, shipping is in the hands of the British and American authorities. The funds and supplies now used *à fonds perdu* in maintaining these people idle in the camps could be much more profitably employed in initiating them into productive careers in Palestine. The greater the help given, the quicker and more effective the rescue.

⁵⁷ In reply to this letter, the Secretary of State wrote to Dr. Weizmann on November 5: "I have received your letter of October 3 with its enclosure regarding the future of Palestine, and wish to assure you that careful note has been taken of the position of the Jewish Agency with respect to this matter.

It was a pleasure to see you while I was in London." (867N.01/10-345)

There has been much talk of late about "referring the whole issue to the United Nations." We have given expression to our views on this subject in the attached note, which you may care to glance through.

I am greatly looking forward to the privilege of seeing you again in the States. I am planning to go there at the end of the month.

Yours sincerely,

CH[AIM] WEIZMANN

[Annex]

Memorandum Prepared in the Jewish Agency for Palestine

LONDON, September 25, 1945.

Commenting on a report appearing in the press that H.M.G.⁵⁸ had decided to refer to the Council of the United Nations the whole issue of the future of Palestine and of Jewish immigration into that country, a spokesman of the Jewish Agency said:

No official information is to hand as to the authenticity of the report. International recognition of the Jewish claim to Palestine had always been a cardinal principle of Zionist policy. Even now, Great Britain holds Palestine by international authority as the trustee of the League of Nations. But the White Paper of 1939 was promulgated by the British Government on their own responsibility. The authority of the League of Nations had not been sought. Nor had there been prior consultation with the United States, with whom Great Britain had concluded a treaty regarding Palestine based on the League of Nations Mandate. Moreover, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations pronounced the White Paper to be incompatible with the terms of the Mandate. Thus on the notable occasion when the competent organ of the League censured the policy laid down by the British Government, they persisted in it, in defiance of international authority.

The views of the Mandates Commission were fully shared by Mr. Churchill and the Labour Party. In the Debate on the White Paper, the Labour Opposition charged the Chamberlain Government with concealing from the House the Mandates Commission's disapproval of the new policy.

There can, of course, be no possible objection to the British Government's now seeking international approval for the new policy in Palestine which they intend to adopt. But this cannot be made an excuse for maintaining in the meantime the White Paper, the responsibility for which rests on the British Government and on them alone. The breach of faith was committed by them, and by them it must be undone.

⁵⁸ His Majesty's Government.

867N.01/10-545 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, October 5, 1945—10 a. m.
[Received October 5—7:22 a. m.]

374. Reference Department's telegram 297, October 3. King has in mind memorandum cleared with Roosevelt and himself as Department assumes. He will await reply to Legation's telegram 372, October 2.⁵⁹

Acting Foreign Minister informed me this morning King would welcome joint publication of memorandum and letter and suggests Friday October 12 at approximately 400 hours GMT as date of release in Mecca and Washington. He also suggests that section 2 on page 3 be omitted as not germane to present question.

If President Truman prefers King is prepared to publish unilaterally.

SANDS

867N.01/10-645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, October 6, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received 1:02 p. m.]

375. ReLegtel 374 October 5. King also wishes to publish at same time his letter of March 10 to President Roosevelt⁶⁰ to which latter's [letter?] of April was in answer.

SANDS

867N.01/10-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1945—7 p. m.

300. As President is away from Washington for few days it is impossible to discuss with him arrangements proposed in your 374 Oct 5. You should inform Acting Foreign Minister that in opinion of Dept it would be preferable that no action be taken in the matter of publication until the Dept has had an opportunity to consult the President. The views of the Govt with regard to the matter will be furnished as soon as they have been formulated.

BYRNES

⁵⁹ Not printed, but see footnote 55, p. 755.

⁶⁰ Not printed, but see footnote 39, p. 692.

867N.01/10-945 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 9, 1945—noon.

[Received 4:49 p. m.]

193. Remytel 192, October 6, 9 a. m.⁶¹ Mass meetings held throughout Palestine yesterday without any untoward incidents. Usual attack made on White Paper and demand for immediate revocation, strong statements made to effect that Jews will enter Palestine by all means and that Jewry will strenuously oppose any impairment of its rights in the homeland, including land restrictions. Indignation expressed against recent frontier incident at Kfarginadi and affirmation made that Jewish Community stands ready at command of national institutions for whatever called upon to undertake.

Comment: Organized illegal immigration from Syria and Lebanon becoming prominent and Kfarginadi was attempt of Frontier Force to detain group of some 50 on October 6. About 7 settlers injured, one seriously, when the FF (Frontier Force) clashed with villagers armed with sticks. This incident may become a focal point for continued Jewish propaganda.

HOOPER

867N.01/10-945 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 9, 1945.

[Received October 9—7:25 p. m.]

10527. Press gives wide coverage to news stories from Palestine concerning apprehension there of impending disorders, cessation of leave for British forces, and mass meetings of Jews urging abolition of White Paper restrictions on immigration. Locally it is reported that Foreign Secretary Bevin spent several hours yesterday discussing Palestine situation with Mr. George Hall, Colonial Secretary, and Azzam Bey, Secretary General of Arab League. It is added that he also saw Dr. Weizmann, head of Jewish Agency for Palestine, during weekend.

GALLMAN

⁶¹ Not printed; it reported that mass meetings and stoppage of work by Jews were called for October 9 (867N.01/10-945).

867N.01/10-945

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 9, 1945.

MR. BYRNES: You will recall that before your departure for London you approved a suggestion made by this office that an informal inquiry be made of the War Department regarding the extent of force which might be required to maintain order in Palestine and near-by areas in case disturbances should take place as a result of decisions to open Palestine to Jewish immigration.

The Department's informal inquiry⁶² and the informal reply of the War Department⁶³ are attached hereto as of possible interest to you.

It will be observed that the War Department estimates that 400,000 men would be needed, including both British and American troops. Detailed information regarding the British portion of this force is not available but the War Department is of the opinion that the possible United States commitment would be at least four or five divisions, with supporting air and service forces, or a total of 200,000 or perhaps even over 300,000.

The memorandum takes the position that the use of American forces in this respect would result in an indefinite delay in the carrying out of demobilization plans, while the effect of the disturbances upon the commitments of the British and French in the Middle East would decrease their ability to share in the occupation of Japan and Germany.

It would seem that the number of troops needed would depend, to an extent, upon the character and scope of such uprisings as may take place. We believe that it is just as difficult for the War Department as for this Department to foresee precisely how extensive the disturbances might become. We should therefore bear in mind in examining the figures presented by the War Department that those figures must be regarded as estimates based upon developments which cannot be accurately foreseen. Nevertheless, these figures are of interest since British military experts may use similar methods in calculating the number of troops which would be necessary in case disturbances should follow decisions to open Palestine to Jewish immigration. If British military authorities are submitting similar estimates, the opposition of the British Government at this time to the opening of the doors of Palestine to Jewish mass immigration is understandable.

LOY W. HENDERSON

⁶² See footnote 20, p. 725.

⁶³ Memorandum by the War Department to the Department of State, September 19, p. 742.

867N.01/10-1045

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1945.

Subject: Palestine

After our talk this morning, I consulted Mr. Henderson. His attached memorandum is a suggestion for the first steps in the program you outlined.

The appointment with the Arab Ministers with you has been fixed for Friday. I suggest that tomorrow you may wish to discuss the attached memorandum with the President so that you will be free to take the position with them outlined in paragraph 4 of Mr. Henderson's memorandum.

Both Mr. Henderson and I suggest that it may be unwise to start consultations with the Arabs and Jews in the next few weeks since that will both be before we have had an opportunity to reach agreement with the British upon a common plan and it will also start a good deal of public controversy. Under Mr. Henderson's proposal we would not reach that stage for some little time.

I suggest that you might wish to discuss this with the President orally rather than send a memorandum to him since memoranda on this subject seem to have a way of getting out.

DEAN ACHESON

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1945.

Subject: Suggested Immediate Program for Dealing with the Palestine Question

MR. SECRETARY: (1) Both President Roosevelt and President Truman have given assurances to Arab and Jewish leaders that no decision should be taken affecting the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. ~~Because of recent statements appearing in the press regarding correspondence between President Truman and Mr. Attlee relating to the immigration of European Jews into Palestine, there is much concern in both Jewish and Arab circles lest basic decisions be made with regard to Palestine without consultation with them.~~ The White House and the Department have received a number of inquiries, particularly from Governments of

Arab States, regarding our present policy toward Palestine, and replies to these inquiries can not be much longer delayed.

(2) King Ibn Saud has asked the President for his approval to make public the contents of the memorandum of conversation between President Roosevelt and himself on February 14, 1945 and the correspondence exchanged between himself and President Roosevelt in the spring of this year on the subject of Palestine.

(3) In order to clarify the situation and at the same time to meet the proposals of Ibn Saud, we suggest that arrangements be made for a correspondent at a White House press conference in the near future to ask the President whether it is true that the American Government has at various times given assurances to Jewish and Arab leaders that they should be consulted before a decision is reached respecting the basic situation in Palestine and whether there has been any change in the policy of the American Government in this respect. We further suggest that the President make a reply to this inquiry along the lines of the suggested statement attached hereto as enclosure no. 1.⁶⁴

(4) In our opinion we have no adequate basis for refusing King Ibn Saud's request to publish President Roosevelt's letter to him of April 5, 1945. However, the publication just now of the memorandum of the conversation between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud would have unfortunate consequences both in this country and abroad. We therefore suggest that a date for the President's statement to the press and for the publication of the letter be decided upon and that a telegram along the lines of the attached be sent at once to our Legation at Jidda.

(5) It is our further recommendation that you receive as soon as possible the Ministers of the four Arab States which have diplomatic representatives in Washington and who are pressing for an appointment with you to discuss our present policy with regard to Palestine. During the course of this conversation, you may desire to make to them informally statements similar to those which we have suggested the President make at his press conference, omitting, of course, any reference to President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud.

(6) We also suggest that immediately following the issuance by the President of a statement to the press along the lines proposed, the Department send out appropriate replies to the inquires which we have received both from our missions abroad and from various Arab governments.

LOY W. HENDERSON

⁶⁴ Not found attached to file copy.

867N.01/10-1145

*The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Syria*⁶⁵

[Translation]

DAMASCUS [undated].

POLITICAL DIVISION

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to bring to the attention of the Government of the United States of America the serious developments in the general situation in Palestine, which threatens with dangerous consequences not only Palestine but all the Arab world. It is not untrue that these developments have been encouraged by official statements made in Washington recently, by widespread Zionist propaganda in the American Press, and by alleged statements of some of the responsible personalities of the United States.

The interest of Syria particularly and the Arab world as a whole in the future of Palestine is due to the firm links that bind her to this part of the Arab world, these links being not less powerful than those among the people of America and its different states. It is right to expect that the American people who can see no difference between New York and San Francisco or between Detroit and Texas should appreciate more than any other people important links that bind Jerusalem to Damascus as well as to the other Arab states. Moreover, the Zionist movement is not a humanitarian one whose aim is to deliver a people from destruction but it is a mere political movement working openly for the establishment of an independent state and the throwing out of a peaceful people from their own national homeland. From this point of view it is a real danger threatening not only Palestine but the whole Arab world as well; and its success or failure in that particular case is regarded by the Arabs as a question of life or death.

Zionism has lately endeavored to convince public opinion in the Allied countries, particularly in the United States of America, that opening the gates of Palestine for the immigration of Jews persecuted by Nazis in different parts of Europe, would be a humanitarian effort, but political Zionism is one thing and the aim [*aide*] to be accorded to persecuted Jews is another. Aid motivated by a noble humanitarian attitude must be expressed in a different way than by the throwing out of the people from their homeland and the replacement of them by

⁶⁵ Received by the Legation on October 10; copy transmitted to the Department with despatch 363, October 11, from Damascus; received November 13.

another people. In such a case, aid is rendered to a people by oppressing others who will then be in need of the same aid. One injustice cannot be removed by another even more harmful. In this case we will be face to face with the Zionist Nazism against the Arabs instead of a German Nazism against the Jews.

All this, however, does not prevent the Arabs sharing the sympathy of the civilized world towards persecuted Jews who have been victims of Nazi aggression. The Arabs are always ready to share in any humanitarian scheme which helps persecuted Jews to secure a peaceful life. There are many sparsely inhabited regions in the world to shelter great number of those who need help. With regard to Palestine it cannot absorb even its present Arab and Jewish population and any new immigration means the throwing out of a number of Arabs corresponding to the number of incoming Jews, and the strengthening of political Zionism by weakening the Arab people.

Syria is greatly concerned with the future of Palestine and cannot remain inactive in the face of the injustice caused to that country. She cannot but support with the other Arab States the Arabs of Palestine in their struggle for existence.

The Syrian Government would like to call the attention of the Government of the United States of America to its uneasiness concerning the last dangerous developments in the question of Palestine and expects that the attitude of the Arab World towards this problem will be taken into consideration for the sake of strengthening the mutual friendship between America and the Arab World which is very keen to seize every opportunity to do so.

867N.01/10-1245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1945.

Participants: The Secretary
 Mr. Acheson
 Mr. Henderson, NEA
 Mr. Mahmoud Hassan, Egyptian Minister
 Dr. Nazem al-Koudsi, Syrian Minister
 Mr. Ali Jawdat, Iraqi Minister
 Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister

At their request, the Secretary this morning received the Ministers in Washington of four of the Arab countries.

The Egyptian Minister, speaking on behalf of his colleagues, stated that it did not seem necessary for him to present in detail to the Sec-

retary the views of the Arab countries and peoples with regard to Zionist ambitions affecting Palestine, including the Zionist demand for mass immigration into that country. These views had already been expressed to the Department on several occasions—only recently to Mr. Acheson—and he was sure that they were known to the Secretary.

The Secretary stated that Mr. Acheson had informed him regarding the statements made to him by the Arab Ministers during their recent conversation with the Under Secretary.

The Egyptian Minister said that in order that he and his colleagues would not take up too much of the Secretary's time, they had decided to prepare a brief *aide-mémoire* summarizing the attitude of the Arab countries and of the Arab League with regard to the question of Palestine. He handed this memorandum to the Secretary and added that the Secretary could read it at his leisure.

The Secretary said that he was glad that the Ministers had called upon him because it gave him an opportunity to make clear to them that there had been no change in the policy of the United States with regard to Palestine. The Government of the United States continued to adhere to the policy that it would give no support to any change in what it would consider to be the basic situation in Palestine until after such change had previously been fully discussed with Arabs and Jews.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

[Annex]

The Arab Ministers to the Secretary of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The renewed general interest on the part of many quarters in the question of Palestine seems to call for a restatement of this question from the point of view of the Arabs. This restatement should prove all the more instructive as the Arabs now have formed a League of Arab States which has, since its foundation, expressed the strongest interest in the fate of Palestine.

The bare historical facts are quite simple. Ever since the Balfour Declaration was made known, the Arabs of Palestine and the Near East have never failed to express by every means at their disposal their strong disapproval of unrestricted Jewish immigration and sale of land to the Jews in Palestine. It is unnecessary to recall the various forms which this expression of disapproval took during the last twenty years.

It is also significant to note that every independent Arab government has repeatedly made known its view on this matter. All of them have evinced the keenest interest in Palestine and regarded themselves

directly involved in any settlement of that issue. The Arab League itself finally gave a more articulate and unified form to this general Arab concern by incorporating it into its Constitution.

The essence of the Arab position is that no change in the status of Palestine should take place without the consent of the Arabs. The historical, cultural, religious, political and geographical ties which bind Palestine to the rest of the Arab world have always made this world feel Palestine to be a part and parcel of itself, a part for whose destiny it is directly and unavoidably responsible.

The British White Paper of 1939 recognized this decisive interest of the Arab world in the affairs of Palestine by stipulating that beyond the envisaged quota of Jewish immigration until 1944, any further changes could not be introduced without the consent of the Arabs, and recognizing the right of Palestine to complete eventual independence.

The Zionist leaders throughout the world have been proclaiming lately far and wide that their aim is to transform Palestine into a sovereign Jewish state. This aim seems to have been attended with much publicity. This has resulted on the one hand in a great misunderstanding of the real issue in Palestine on the part of American public opinion, and on the other in the generation of a deep feeling of concern throughout the Arab world. In this connection, it is right to call attention to the fact that the question of Palestine stirs not only the Arab world, and that regardless of religion, but also the Moslem world at large, and that regardless of nationality. To transform a country that has been non-Jewish for thousands of years and Arab for 1300 years into a Jewish state is an act that obviously cannot be viewed with equanimity by the Arabs.

The Arab people and states desire nothing more sincerely than to be on the best of terms with the people and Government of the United States. The two great peoples have always enjoyed a background of happy relations. It is in the highest interest of peace that these relations be preserved and promoted.

The Arab people have always believed that the United States would not favor the bringing about of any changes in the status and character of Palestine without the consent of the Arabs of that land and at the expense of themselves and the rest of the Arab world. They have lately been perturbed over reports that this policy may have changed. But they cannot believe that the United States, famous as she is in her history and outlook for a very exalted sense of justice, would favor a course of action which would run counter to the freely expressed wishes of the Arabs, especially as assurances have been made by the late and present Presidents that such would not be the case.

The Arabs sincerely deplore the persecutions inflicted upon the Jews

in Europe. In this connection it is instructive to note that one of the most brilliant pages of Jewish history was written when the Jews shared with the Arabs the great achievements of their mediaeval culture. Feeling a sense of complete solidarity with the civilized world, the Arabs declare their readiness to do their part in helping to solve this world problem. They are sure Palestine will not solve it; and if it does, it will be only at the expense of the Arabs. In helping to shoulder a sacrifice, the Arabs cannot be asked to sacrifice themselves.

Regarding the peace of the Near East in general, and of the Arab world in particular, one principle is certain: there obviously can be no peace in that region ~~by sacrificing Arab interests for the sake of the Jews. A Zionist political state can be created in Palestine, but only with the help of external force.~~ Such an artificial creation, or even the introduction of further Jewish immigrants into Palestine, is obviously not in the interests of world peace, nor is it conducive to the development of the friendliest relations between the Arabs and the external world.

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1945.

867N.01/10-645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1945—2 p. m.

306. Your 372, October 2,⁶⁶ 375, October 6 and previous telegrams on the subject. Please deliver the following message from President Truman to King Ibn Saud:

"I am inclined to believe from your message to me of October 2 that certain remarks on Palestine which I made informally on September 26 may have been inaccurately reported to you.

During the course of a press conference on that date I was asked whether President Roosevelt had made a commitment to you that the United States would not make an issue of the Palestine question. I replied that ~~there was no record of any such commitment.~~

~~In order that there should be no misunderstanding with regard to the assurances which President Roosevelt has given to you I am contemplating stating publicly on October 18 that he has given certain assurances to you, as well as to other Arab leaders. It is my intention at that time to make available to the American press a copy of the President's letter of April 5, 1945 to you and to point out that the policy of the Govt of the US in this respect is unchanged.~~

I would have no objection to your making President Roosevelt's letter public on the same day. I do not believe that it would be wise for me to make public your letter to President Roosevelt, but its release by you is entirely a matter for your decision.

⁶⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 55, p. 755.

In my opinion the publication just now of the memorandum of the conversation which took place between you and the President on February 14⁶⁷ would not be in the common interest of our two countries.[⁷²]

BYRNES

867N.01/10-1645: Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, October 16, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received October 16—9 a. m.]

379. Re Department's telegram 306 October 13. King gratefully accepts President Truman's proposals re publication. He intends to publish his letter of March 10 to Roosevelt morning of Friday October 19 simultaneously in Mecca, Arab capitals and London. In absence Saudi Legation Washington Acting Foreign Minister asks that King's letter above be furnished to Syrian Minister Nazem al-Koudsi for publication there same date.

If Department has no objection [Acting] Foreign Minister also asks that following be handed to al-Koudsi:

"For Nazem al-Koudsi from Yusuf Yassin.⁶⁸ The American Government has agreed to publish President Roosevelt's letter dated April 5 in answer to His Majesty's letter. The Department of State may give you copy of His Majesty's letter. Please make necessary arrangements for publication His Majesty's letter morning Friday October 19 when President Roosevelt's letter will also be published, and ask cooperation Arab Chiefs of Mission in this matter."⁶⁹

SANDS

867N.01/10-1845

*Press Release Issued by the Department of State, October 18, 1945*⁷⁰

The Department of State has recently received a number of enquiries as to whether it was true that the U.S. Government had on

⁶⁷ See p. 1.

⁶⁸ The Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister, who often acted for the Foreign Minister, the Amir Faisal.

⁶⁹ This communication, together with a copy of King Ibn Saud's letter of March 10 to President Roosevelt, was delivered to the Syrian Minister at the Department of State at 4:40 p. m., Thursday, October 18.

⁷⁰ Text quoted in telegrams of October 18 to Jidda (311), Baghdad (311), Cairo (1970), Jerusalem (219), Beirut (329), Damascus (65), and London (9239). The telegrams stated in addition: "Text of Roosevelt's letter of Apr 5 referred to is being transmitted to you in Dept's immediately following telegram [No. 312, October 18]. In discussions with appropriate officials or in reply to inquiries regarding policy of this Govt toward Palestine you may call attention to Dept's statement above as well as Roosevelt letter in question." (867N.01/10-1845)

various occasions expressed the view to Jewish and Arab leaders that they should be consulted before a decision is reached respecting the basic situation in Palestine. In response to these enquiries Secretary of State James F. Byrnes made the following reply:

“On several occasions this matter has been the subject of oral and written discussions with various Jewish and Arab leaders. The substance of this Government’s position has been that this Government would not support a final decision which in its opinion would affect the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Jews and Arabs.

“At a press conference today President Truman referred to his exploration with Prime Minister Attlee of ways and means of alleviating the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe, including consideration of Palestine as a possible haven for some of these homeless Jews. There is general agreement that it is our duty to take energetic measures to assist these unfortunate victims of Nazi persecution.

“As the President pointed out today, this matter is still under consideration. Should any proposals emerge which in our opinion would change the basic situation in Palestine, it would be the policy of this Government not to reach final conclusions without full consultation with Jews and Arabs. This policy was stated, for instance, in a letter which President Roosevelt addressed to King Ibn Saud on April 5, 1945 and the text of which I have been authorized to make available.”

The text of President Roosevelt’s letter of April 5 is as follows:
[Here follows text of letter printed on page 698.]

867N.01/10-1945

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty’s Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and under instructions from His Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to make to him the following communication from His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom on the subject of Palestine.

Reports have recently been published to the effect that Jews in British and American occupied Europe are still living in conditions of exceptional hardship. It is unfortunately true that, until conditions in Europe become stable, the future of large numbers of persons of many races and nationalities cannot finally be decided. His Majesty’s Government, so far as they are concerned, cannot accept the view that Jews are at present living under worse conditions than any other victims of Nazi persecution. Constant steps are in fact taken to try to improve the lot of all these unfortunate people. His Majesty’s Government consider that it is of great importance that Jews should be enabled to play an active part in building up the life of the countries from which they came, in common with other nationals of these coun-

tries. The extent to which this will in fact ultimately prove to be possible does, however, call for examination.

2. With this object in view, His Majesty's Government suggest that a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry should, as a matter of urgency, be set up at once, under a rotating chairmanship, with the following terms of reference:

(i) To examine the position of the Jews in British and American occupied Europe as it exists today;

(ii) To make an estimate of the number of such Jews whom it may prove impossible to resettle in the country from which they originated;

(iii) To examine the possibility of relieving the position in Europe by immigration into other countries outside Europe; and

(iv) To consider other available means of meeting the needs of the immediate situation.

3. The Committee of Enquiry would be invited to deal with its terms of reference with the utmost expedition, though, if the investigation is to be thorough and effective, it must inevitably take time. The Committee would in the first place visit British and American occupied Europe in order to inform themselves of the character and magnitude of the problem created by the war. Having done so, they would turn their attention to countries of disposal. In the light of their investigations they would make recommendations to the two Governments for dealing with the problem in the interim until such time as a permanent solution can be submitted to the appropriate organ of the United Nations.

4. The question of Jewish immigration into Palestine, among other countries, would fall to be considered by the Committee of Enquiry under the third of their terms of reference. In this connection, His Majesty's Government desire to inform the Government of the United States of the situation which obtains at present in that country and of the immediate action which they propose to take concerning it.

5. The Mandate for Palestine requires the mandatory to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced thereby. His Majesty's Government have thus a dual obligation, to the Jews on the one side and to the Arabs on the other.

6. The lack of any clear definition on this dual obligation has been the main cause of the trouble which has been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. Every effort has been made by the mandatory to devise some arrangement which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and co-operate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. Any arrange-

ment acceptable to one party has been rejected as unacceptable to the other. The whole history of Palestine since the mandate was granted has been one of continual friction between the two races, culminating at intervals in serious disturbances.

7. The fact has to be faced that there is no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews. They differ in religion and in language; their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as difficult to reconcile as are their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace. Both communities lay claim to Palestine; the one on the ground of a millenium of occupation, the other on the ground of historic association and of an undertaking given to it during the first World War. The antithesis is thus complete.

8. The repercussions of the conflict have spread far beyond the small land in which it has arisen. The Zionist cause has strong supporters in the United States, in Great Britain, in the Dominions and elsewhere; civilization has been appalled by the sufferings which have been inflicted in recent years on the persecuted Jews of Europe. On the other side of the picture, the cause of the Palestinian Arabs has been espoused by the whole Arab world and more lately has become a matter of keen interest to their ninety million coreligionists in India. In Palestine itself, there is always serious risk of disturbances on the part of one community or the other, and such disturbances are bound to find their reflection in a much wider field. Considerations not only of equity and of humanity but also of international amity and world peace are thus involved in any search for a solution.

9. His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the recommendations of a Committee of Enquiry such as they have suggested would be of immense help in arriving at such a solution. The Committee would, in the course of its investigation, make an examination on the spot of the political, economic, and agricultural conditions which are at present held to restrict immigration into Palestine and, after hearing the views of representative Arabs and Jews, submit proposals for dealing with these problems. It will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take action both with a view to securing some satisfactory interim arrangement and for placing Palestine under trusteeship. At both these stages great weight would naturally be given to any recommendations, interim or final which His Majesty's Government might receive from the Committee of Enquiry.

10. His Majesty's Government thus propose to deal with the Palestine issue in three stages, namely:

(i) They will consult the Arabs with a view to an arrangement which will ensure that for the time being (and possibly pending the

receipt of any ad interim recommendations which the Committee of Enquiry may make in the matter), there is no interruption of Jewish immigration at the present monthly rate.

(ii) They will explore, with the parties primarily concerned, the possibility of devising other temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it can be reached acting either on their own initiative or on the basis of any ad interim recommendations made by the Committee of Enquiry.

* (iii) They will prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations, and if possible an agreed one.

* 11. In regard to the immediate future, referred to in (i) of the previous paragraph, His Majesty's Government have decided that the only practicable course is to maintain the present arrangement for immigration. The Government of the United States will realise that His Majesty's Government have inherited, in Palestine a most difficult legacy and their task is greatly complicated by undertakings, given at various times to various parties, which they feel themselves bound to honour. Any violent departure decided upon in the face of Arab opposition, would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's Government but would probably cause serious disturbances throughout the Middle East, involving a large military commitment, and would arouse widespread anxiety in India. Further, Arabs have not forgotten the assurances given by the late President Roosevelt and by President Truman to the Heads of Arab states of their desire that no decision should be taken in respect to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. It can hardly be contended that a decision to depart from the present policy in respect of immigration would not constitute a decision in respect to the basic situation in that country.

12. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the course which they propose to pursue in the immediate future is not only that which is in accordance with their obligations but also that which, in the long view, is in the best interests of the Jews themselves. It will in no way prejudice either the action to be taken, or the recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry or the terms of the trusteeship agreement, which will supersede the existing mandate and will therefore control ultimate policy in regard to Palestine.

13. An announcement of His Majesty's Government's intentions in regard to Palestine cannot be much longer delayed and it is proposed that a statement shall be made in Parliament on October 25th, defining those intentions on the general lines set out in paragraph 10 above. Should the Government of the United States agree to cooperate with His Majesty's Government in the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, the fact would be announced

simultaneously. His Majesty's Government trust that such agreement will be forthcoming and, further that they will have the support of the Government of the United States in the course which they propose to pursue in the interim period.

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1945.

867 N.01/10-1945

The British Embassy to the Department of State

INFORMAL RECORD OF CONVERSATION

His Majesty's Government feel that the problem of Palestine is a terrible legacy. A further attempt must be made as soon as possible to settle it.

2. The aim of His Majesty's Government is to try and get a satisfactory long-term settlement to be submitted to the United Nations Organization under the trusteeship system.

3. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government would be lacking in frankness if they did not make it clear that the approach to the problem in the United States is being most embarrassing to them and is embittering relations between the two countries at a moment when we ought to be getting closer together in our common interests.

4. His Majesty's Government therefore invite the United States Government to take part in an Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, to be set up immediately with rotating chairmanship, to study and report (a) on the position in future of the Jews in British and American occupied Europe, and (b) the possibility of relieving the position in Europe by immigration into other countries outside Europe (including Palestine).

5. His Majesty's Government cannot accept the view that all the Jews or the bulk of them must necessarily leave Germany, and still less Europe. That would be to accept Hitler's thesis.

6. There are reports that the Zionists are using every possible form of intimidation to stop Jews leaving Palestine in order to go back to Europe and to play their part in its reconstruction. This requires close examination. The first thing to do is to ascertain what is the view of the Jews in Europe. Are they going to survive, and under what conditions? His Majesty's Government are not satisfied with Mr. Earl Harrison's report.

7. No doubt, when the problem has been settled of the future of Jews in Europe, there will still be many Jews who want to go to Palestine. Then arises the question, what can Palestine absorb? Figures have been submitted which at first sight seem fantastic. Arguments have been advanced that the south of Palestine can be developed and that

great opportunities out of that desert are possible. This is a specific question. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will join with them in investigating and obtaining impartial evidence. There is also the question of the Jordan scheme advocated by Mr. Lowdermilk.⁷¹ What are its possibilities? His Majesty's Government would like to have an enquiry in order to put it to the test.

8. It is not right to go on asserting that there are great opportunities in Palestine unless we can show to the Arabs that they are practicable and that the admission of more Jews will not necessarily increase the pressure on the land.

9. To fly in the face of the Arabs after all the undertakings that have been given would cause a breakdown at the beginning. His Majesty's Government have therefore confined themselves for the moment to seeking the consent of the Arab countries to continue the present arrangement for limited immigration, but their whole plan is a clear indication of a desire for a settlement without waiting until the United Nations Organization, to which the problem must be referred in the end, is ready to deal with it.

10. As regards the possible government of Palestine, Mr. Bevin recently had a talk with Dr. Weizmann, who appears now to be against partition and talked about a Swiss constitution with cantons which would be a bilingual state with opportunities for both races to be represented abroad, and which would provide common services within. His Majesty's Government would be willing for consideration to be given to this as well.

11. Mr. Bevin is anxious to make a statement in Parliament on October 25th. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will agree to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in the establishment at once of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, and that the fact could be announced simultaneously.

12. The personality, standing and impartiality of members of the proposed commission would be of the utmost importance. In selecting the British representatives, His Majesty's Government would be guided primarily by these qualifications. Their selection might include at least one member of the House of Lords or the House of Commons.

13. His Majesty's Government suggest that three British and three American members would be a suitable number.

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

⁷¹ See memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, January 4, p. 678.

867N.01/10-1945

Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Halifax)

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

[Here follow brief remarks regarding the Soviet Union and a statement of remarks by Lord Halifax along the lines set forth in the "Informal Record of Conversation", printed *supra*.]

SECRETARY BYRNES: Does he ⁷² set forth his views on a permanent solution?

LORD HALIFAX: No, he doesn't except that naturally we should have every regard and give great weight to whatever findings might come out of this Committee.

SECRETARY BYRNES: I wonder when he speaks of a proposal being submitted to the United Nations Organization what scheme he had that would affect the United Nations Organization.

LORD HALIFAX: His thought would no doubt be that in the light of recommendations the Committee might make, if you came in, they should put up a scheme placing Palestine under the trusteeship of the Trusteeship Council of the League on some basis to be decided upon. No doubt he would formulate that after seeing the recommendations and the thought of the Committee. I shouldn't think it would move further than that at this stage.

There are a few other points he wished to give you. It saves you trouble perhaps to have them on paper. He wants to make a statement on the 25th. I realize that is rather quick but he is under very great pressure as you may suppose. Indeed some of the pressure comes from this side. Therefore, if you could get your great mind on to that fairly soon. . . .

SECRETARY BYRNES: I am trying to figure what would be the result of it, just at this time. Looking at that calendar over there—I am not turning my head away from you—that is next Thursday.

LORD HALIFAX: The last day Parliament meets in that week you see. They don't want to miss another weekend. That would be their thought.

BYRNES. Quite frankly, I am thinking of the New York City election the following Tuesday and when this is submitted to the President he has to think about that.

LORD HALIFAX: Would this not be rather good?

SECRETARY BYRNES: I am wondering whether it would or not. I have not followed it but I know that other people do. I know it has a lot to do with that election and I am going to reach about it with much interest.

⁷²The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin.

LORD HALIFAX: Is it the following Tuesday—the New York election?

SECRETARY BYRNES: Yes. We will just have to think that one over. I am thinking of the alternative. The alternative is that for the present nothing would be done. I had thought that when Mr. Attlee came over there would be a discussion by the President and Mr. Attlee.⁷³ That, however, will be some weeks. That date is uncertain.

LORD HALIFAX: I believe the date has not been announced.

SECRETARY BYRNES: No, unless you have.

LORD HALIFAX: No. There were two dates.

SECRETARY BYRNES: It is that very next week isn't it?

LORD HALIFAX: Between the 5th and the 11th of November. If it is at all possible for you—I quite realize the importance of this other thing for you—but if it is at all possible I would hate to have them announce in London—I don't know quite what they would announce—it would be rather silly and flat to announce later that you were going to join in. I don't know how they will feel. They originally wanted to put it on the third, which was Tuesday. They are under very great pressure.

SECRETARY BYRNES: Does he really believe that this would be a wise disposition of the matter at this time? I judge that he concluded that his cabinet will not agree to any more than 1,500. I just assume from your statement of his views here that having that conviction and having the pressure for some change that he hoped that he could keep this thing reasonably quiet by saying he was going to have an investigation to determine whether there was justification for increasing the number.

LORD HALIFAX: He points out in there, as of course you know, that your responsibilities are not only to get the Jews in Palestine but to see the rights of the people there are not prejudiced. I don't think that we could possibly, without consultation with the Arabs, do anything in the way of basic change of the immigration decision, as is stated under the terms of the President's letter to King Ibn Saud. That is obviously a temporary arrangement, pending recommendations of the Committee which would carry greater weight, if you are able to join.

SECRETARY BYRNES: Your idea is that he is going to make to Commons a speech along the lines of this memorandum?

LORD HALIFAX: He would make a statement there, yes. One other point. He told me when he sent this, to "See Byrnes and President". I haven't said anything to the President and I always hesitate to bother anyone who is so busy. Should I see him or not?

SECRETARY BYRNES: I would present it to him anyway. I don't think it is necessary. It isn't necessary because I am going to give him these documents to read. He will read them because he is very much

⁷³ See footnote 15, p. 17.

interested in them. He is greatly disturbed about this thing. Of course when the President signed those letters—he signed a letter substantially the same as President Roosevelt's—that was immediately after he had become President. It was presented by the State Department, by Mr. Grew.

LORD HALIFAX: Did he write to King Ibn Saud?

SECRETARY BYRNES: No, but he did to some other Arab—at least one letter, maybe two. Therefore, he is embarrassed. If he were making that statement today, I don't think it would be made. That statement was made by President Roosevelt and they called attention to the fact it was just one week before his death. It must have been the day he left Washington. I was going to look that up. I know that he was in no condition at all to be transacting business.

LORD HALIFAX: No he wasn't. I saw him that day.

SECRETARY BYRNES: I remember seeing you when I came out. That was the first day that I realized that the President was an ill man. He looked terrible. That was the day he signed this letter and I imagine he would not have signed so quickly under other circumstances.

LORD HALIFAX: Still Truman's letter

SECRETARY BYRNES: I don't think he would have supported any action without basic consideration, without consultation with the Jews and the Arabs. I see no harm in that. You have to do it anyway. I am sure he will be exceedingly anxious. In fact, I am going to send it over to him as soon as I read it.

LORD HALIFAX: Very good. Then as far as I am concerned I need not bother at this stage?

BYRNES: No, I will tell him. If he does want to talk to you, he will let you know.

740.00119 FEAC/10-2245

Memorandum of Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Halifax)

[WASHINGTON,] October 22, 1945.

[Here follows discussion relating to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission and the projected visit of British Prime Minister Attlee to Washington.⁷⁴]

LORD HALIFAX: Doesn't that ⁷⁵ depend a bit on what is your decision about the Palestine thing? If you have decided to come along on the Palestine thing that will be due by that time. If you let us announce the Palestine thing and say you are coming along and you do that on

⁷⁴ For documentation regarding these subjects, see index entries in vols. II and VI.

⁷⁵ i.e., the scheduling of Mr. Attlee's arrival in the United States.

the 25th of October, which is what we want to do, then obviously, the Jews will know that will not be the subject of the visit. Then if on the first of November you announce Attlee's coming over to talk about the bomb, then the Jews would believe it.

SECRETARY BYRNES: That wouldn't push it aside. When you left this morning I had to see Eugene Meyer.⁷⁶ I didn't know what he was going to talk about—it was Palestine. Then when I walked out of the White House Dave Niles⁷⁷ asked me what he could tell the news about Palestine. That made me mad—that fellow stopping me when I was so busy. It may work out but if we agreed to the appointment of a commission, they will conclude it was in the making. I don't see much harm that could be done.

LORD HALIFAX: You see today is Monday and Bevin has got to know. I'd like to be able to tell him today or tomorrow what your judgment is.

SECRETARY BYRNES: I am going to think that one over this evening. I am not clear but I think if the terms of reference⁷⁸ were different that the President could better agree to it. But the terms of reference as set out do not even mention Palestine.

When you get to Number 3 "to examine the possibility of relieving the situation [*position*] in Europe by immigration into other countries outside of Europe" whether it is United States, as many would say, or whether Canada or whether Palestine, is not indicated. There are two things in here—I don't know whether he intended it or not. In the terms of reference he seems to divert the mind of the commission from the Palestine question to finding places in other countries.

LORD HALIFAX: I know exactly what he has in mind. I am sure that in his mind is a desire to put up a flag and say "All you people who say that the only remedy for the Jews is Palestine, you put your head in a bag." "It is not true and we are going to look into all possibilities." A great many will want to go back to their homes. Europe or United States or to Palestine, but, for Heaven's sake, stop saying Palestine is the only solution.

SECRETARY BYRNES: If in general terms—I say I have not thought it out yet—but if in general terms he could say to examine—there are two things here. As a matter of fact I don't see why he did that—must be because of the Harrison report.

LORD HALIFAX: No, he is not satisfied with that—nor is Eisenhower. All he is saying there is "Let's find out from the Jews if they want to settle in France or Rumania, and if they want to stay there"—that is all right.

SECRETARY BYRNES: It says it may prove impossible to resettle—

⁷⁶ Editor and publisher of the *Washington Post*.

⁷⁷ David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President.

⁷⁸ See note from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, October 19, p. 771.

We believe that this thing should be settled through a trusteeship in the United Nations as it is set out in here, and that pending that settlement by the United Nations, there should be a joint Anglo-American committee of Enquiry as a matter of urgency (reads from memo).

LORD HALIFAX: I should think that it might be possible for him to have a more specific reference to Palestine. It would help you. Providing you don't put him into a position of accepting a Hitler thesis that there is no room for Jews in Europe.

SECRETARY BYRNES: I have repeated his position about that as you have stated it to me, but as a matter of fact there is a problem affecting immigration. ~~No one questions that.~~ The question is how many, whether 1,500 or 3,000 per month that could be absorbed into the population of Palestine, and in determining this they should consider the housing and such other matters as they deem essential to a determination of the number of immigrants which it would be wise and fair, and if they did that I don't see where these people can object at all. I know what they are going to say about this—you did have in 1939 a commission and they went around the world and of course nothing was done. The Jews are going to say this is just another trick and nothing will be done; whereas it looked to me like Bevin has a sound approach to say there should be a trusteeship under the United Nations and if he said that and said in the meantime pending the decision—pending the administration by the United Nations we will have an inquiry made by a committee composed of representatives of the two countries, whose duty it will be to consider all phases of the question and report to their respective governments views as to the number of immigrants that could be wisely and safely admitted.

LORD HALIFAX: Into Palestine?

SECRETARY BYRNES: Yes, into Palestine.

LORD HALIFAX: I see your difficulty about that. If you said a committee of inquiry to consider all phases, all sides of the Jewish problem.

SECRETARY BYRNES: You see what he has got there. I have my doubts in his doing it. He is covering a lot of territory by considering the plight of Jews everywhere. When you say send them everywhere I first ask, Does that mean United States and all other countries? Bevin also makes the point that this condition is the same as every other displaced person. Why should we examine the position of the Jews any more than the Frenchman, Belgian, English, Irish, Scotsman? If you take that literally, to examine that means to go into camps and all to determine and separate them as apart from all other people. The only reason I can see for doing it is because of the Harrison report. He didn't like the Harrison report. Harrison submitted a report and Eisenhower made an answer. So far as that is concerned, I think that is a military report and is finished.

It would make us in the position of coming in and instead of sitting in the grandstand and shouting at you we would have to come in and participate. It ought to stop for a reasonable time, the pressure and the Ally would have delay in court to talk to the commission and if the commission made a report that was worthwhile it might help educate a lot of people in this country. Then we would join you. I don't think we would on this.

LORD HALIFAX: How do you think it might be if you would say that he should make some announcement that it should be under the trusteeship, that the United States had agreed to join a committee of inquiry of which the terms of reference would be announced at an early date. That would give us more time.

SECRETARY BYRNES: Well, there is only one thing about it. If the thing is general I am afraid that the Jews would say, "Well, that is not considering the Palestine problem which is the only problem we are interested in. Mr. President, you should not agree to it when you don't know what it is."

LORD HALIFAX: He would agree, I am sure, to an inquiry limited to Palestine. I think he might agree to an inquiry that would include Palestine in the terms but that will take a bit of time to work out. If you thought well to let me have your suggestions of the terms of reference I could try them on him.

SECRETARY BYRNES: That is what I will do.

LORD HALIFAX: All he intended is to have a general statement and say that further announcement would be made as to the terms of reference.

SECRETARY BYRNES: He could say he is going to invite us to join in the terms of reference. I don't think the President would want on Thursday to agree without going—I think I could get him to agree to assume responsibility and for serving on the Palestine problem. He would not want to do it when there was a chance of it being said that it was not for the purpose of making the inquiry in which the Jews were interested, but it was for finding a way of not doing it. That would be pretty bad. And right here before an election the following Tuesday it would be pretty bad to take a part in this thing. It is the terms of reference. If you went ahead and made a statement to say he is going to invite, but I hate to do that if he said that, then the next morning they would be on the President's back to see the terms of reference, and then he would have to say he couldn't do it because they were so general when they were submitted to him. They did not refer to the Palestine problem while there was a Jewish problem all over the world. The problem now is as to determine number that could be absorbed into the population. He could not join in a plan to divert from that. Let me figure some terms of reference that would do both.

LORD HALIFAX: Supposing you said he would also want the point

to examine the possibility of relieving the conditions in Europe of Jews who do not wish to return to their countries, or something to that effect?

(They discuss wording of terms of reference, the Secretary suggesting numbers 1 and 2 and use numbers 3 and 4.)

SECRETARY BYRNES: You see, as it now stands, it doesn't mention Palestine.

LORD HALIFAX: When I first saw this, I sent it back and said to put Palestine in.

SECRETARY BYRNES: It is explained in the rest but in the terms of reference he doesn't have what he has in the statement.

LORD HALIFAX: That is the best way of dealing with this? The time is very short.

SECRETARY BYRNES: Let me fix my ideas and send them over to you and you can send them over to him.

LORD HALIFAX: Would you like me to send one of my fellows down to sit with one of your boys?

SECRETARY BYRNES: Fine. At 5:00. I will get one of my fellows. Ask for Mr. Henderson. He is the man in charge of this.

LORD HALIFAX: What shall I tell Bevin meanwhile? He is pressing me all the time whether he can do this on the 25th.

SECRETARY BYRNES: If we can get some arrangement I will tell the President to agree to some reasonable thing like we have there.

HALIFAX: Failing to agree on it, the only thing he can say is that he is going to submit it to the President, that he has advised the President of this speech and he is going to send to him the terms of reference in the hope that it will be possible to reach an agreement. You wouldn't mind that?

BYRNES: No.

LORD HALIFAX: He is proposing it to the United States Government and will submit the terms of reference in due course.

SECRETARY BYRNES: Fine. That will give him more time to think about it.

LORD HALIFAX: If we can do the whole thing, it will be better.

SECRETARY BYRNES: It will. In the meantime we might get something I can tell him we will agree to.

867N.01/10-2045: Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, October 20, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 12:58 p. m.]

70. On October 18 Saudi Arabian Legation here requested Syrian Press Bureau to distribute to newspapers texts of Ibn Saud's letter

of March 10, 1945⁷⁹ to President Roosevelt and President Roosevelt's reply of April 5. Texts received front page treatment in all local newspapers on Friday, but public is apathetic. Release had little news value because Reuter's despatches had for weeks been hinting at contents of above-mentioned exchange of letters.

PORTER

867N.01/10-2245 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁰

BAGHDAD, October 22, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received 10:13 a. m.]

400. Instr 312, April 21.⁸¹ FonOff has asked whether any objection to release of Roosevelt letter dated April 12 to Regent assuring "full consultation with both Arabs and Jews" re Palestine.

In view similarity with letter quoted Deptel 312, October 18,⁸² I told Foreign Office I perceived no objection.

MORELAND

867N.01/10-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, October 22, 1945.

[Received October 22—10:40 a. m.]

401. Immediately following wide local publicity given correspondence between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud, all Baghdad newspapers this morning front-paged text of Regent's letter of March 10 to President Roosevelt and late President's reply dated April 12.

MORELAND

867N.01/9-2645 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moreland)

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1945.

314. Your 373.⁸³ You are requested inform the Iraqi Prime Minister with reference to his note of Sept 26^{83a} regarding Palestine that

⁷⁹ See footnote 39, p. 692.

⁸⁰ Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: "O.K. J[ames] F. B[yrnes]."

⁸¹ Not printed.

⁸² Not printed, but see footnote 70, p. 770, and President Roosevelt's letter of April 5 to King Ibn Saud, p. 698.

⁸³ *Ante*, p. 744.

^{83a} See telegram 373, undated, from Baghdad, p. 744.

you have been authorized by your Govt to convey to him the following information :

During recent weeks President has been in exploratory correspondence with Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain in an effort to find ways and means of alleviating the situation of the displaced Jews in Europe. Everyone will agree that it is the duty of all of us to take energetic measures to assist these unfortunate victims of Nazi persecution whose situation has been so serious. The President has suggested to Prime Minister that among other measures consideration be given to Palestine as a possible haven for some of these homeless Jews. In making this suggestion he of course kept in mind the well-known policy of the Govt of the US with regard to Palestine as communicated on a number of occasions to Iraqi Govt and notably in President Roosevelt's letter of Apr 12 to Iraqi Regent to the effect that in the view of this Govt no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. In assuring Prime Minister that there has been no change in this policy you should inform him that the views of the Iraqi Govt as set forth in his note of Sept 26 have been given the most careful consideration by the American Govt which has been pleased to note statements of prominent Arab leaders of their recognition of the humanitarian aspects of this question.

Sent Baghdad. Repeated Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Damascus, Beirut, London.⁸⁴

BYRNES

867N.01/10-2345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moreland)

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1945—7 p. m.

318. Please refrain from consenting to the release for publication of any previously unpublicized communications from the US Govt relating to Palestine without prior authorization from Dept.

Sent Baghdad. Repeated Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus.⁸⁵

BYRNES

867N.01/10-1945

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to state that in view of the

⁸⁴ Repeated to Cairo as No. 1992, to Jidda as No. 314, to Jerusalem as No. 226, to Damascus as No. 69, to Beirut as No. 335, and to London as No. 9329.

⁸⁵ Repeated to Cairo as No. 2002, to Jidda as No. 315, to Jerusalem as No. 229, to Beirut as No. 336, and to Damascus as No. 71.

earnest desire of the Government of the United States to assist in alleviating the situation of the Jews in Europe who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and in view of its deep interest in the future of Palestine, the Government of the United States would be prepared to accept an invitation from the British Government to participate jointly with the British Government in a Committee of Inquiry, under a rotating chairmanship with the following terms of reference:

"1. to examine the political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

"2. to examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression, and to make estimates of those who wish, or will be impelled by their conditions, to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

"3. to hear the views of competent witnesses including representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by the conditions subject to examination under paragraph (1) and (2) above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to the governments of the United States and Great Britain for the ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

"4. to make such other recommendations to the governments of the United States and Great Britain to meet the immediate needs arising from the conditions subject to examination under paragraph (2) above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for immigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe."

It should be understood, however, that the Government of the United States in expressing its willingness to accept an invitation to participate in the proposed inquiry is not necessarily associating itself with the observations made in the memorandum of October 19, 1945, handed to Secretary Byrnes by Lord Halifax. The President has made known to the Prime Minister his views with regard to the migration of Jews from Europe to Palestine. Although the President appreciates the complexity of the problems involved, he still adheres to the views that he has expressed.

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1945.

867N.01/10-2445

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1945.

Palestine:

We have just had word from the British Embassy that Mr. Bevin has decided to postpone the statement on Palestine which he had expected to make in the House of Commons tomorrow. The Embassy has no information concerning the length of postponement but is telegraphing to London immediately the text of the communication which Lord Halifax received from you this morning on the subject.

[Here follows section concerning the Turkish Straits, printed on page 1258.]

LOY W. HENDERSON

867N.01/10-2445 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, October 24, 1945—5 p. m.

Received October 24—4:35 p. m.

217. ReDept's unnumbered circular telegram [219?] and telegram 220, October 18,⁸⁶ in clear with instruction to inform appropriate Saudi Arabian authorities of Department's October 18 press statement.

I personally presented statement upon its arrival on morning October 20 to Saudi Arabian Acting Consul General who expressed himself as highly pleased at the courtesy and expressed opinion that his Government and King would not be less appreciative of the gesture than he himself was. He said it was not intention of Saudi Government to disturb the situation by wantonly publishing notes that were by agreement to be kept secret but that circumstances altered the case and his Government's hand was forced due to fact that Secretary General of Arab League had referred to Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud. Arab news agency and Arab press published statement on October 21 in full and spoke of it as a distinct diplomatic courtesy. Statement appeared in all papers on October 21 without deletions and were referred to by local broadcasting stations. Jewish press published statement without comment while Arab press comments

⁸⁶ See press release of October 18, and footnote 70, p. 770.

were favorable. Saudi Acting Consul General stated that October 19 had been set for local Arab demonstrations and sermons regarding Roosevelt-Ibn Saud exchange of notes but that he intervened as he felt that Arab-Jewish friction might inevitably result from such demonstrations and they did not take place. Past 2 weeks have been otherwise uneventful.

HOOPER

867N.01/10-2445 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, October 24, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received October 25—6:30 a. m.]

73. Secretary General of the Presidency informed me this morning of intention of Syrian Government to publish on October 25 texts of letters concerning Palestine exchanged between President Kuwatly and President Roosevelt on March 11⁸⁷ and April 12, 1945. To my inquiry as to whether Syrian Minister at Washington had informed Department, Secretary General stated instructions had been sent 2 days ago to Kudsi to obtain Department's consent to publication but that no reply had yet been received. I suggested that it might be well to await reply before publishing texts, to which the Syrians readily assented.

PORTER

867N.01/10-2745

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON, October 25, 1945.]

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to Mr. Byrnes' note of October 19th [24?] on the problem of the Jews, has the honour to state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are much gratified that the United States Government has been able to accept their invitation to take part in the proposed Committee of Enquiry. Mr. Bevin wishes to thank Mr. Byrnes and to say that he shares his troubles in this difficult question. As regards the terms of reference suggested by the United States Government, while His Majesty's Government appreciate the desire of the President to give more prominence to the Palestine aspect, they feel that the difficulties with the Arabs must not be forgotten. The method of approach may make all the difference as regards their attitude. His Majesty's Government are confident that

⁸⁷ See footnote 39, p. 692.

they can be persuaded to make a contribution if humanitarian grounds precede the racial. Mr. Bevin has been in close touch with all parties in London, and if Mr. Byrnes can help him with this readjustment of the terms of reference, thinks it will make all the difference. He feels that the pledges given in this connection by President Roosevelt, President Truman and by His Majesty's Government to the Arab rulers must not be forgotten. For the above reasons His Majesty's Government think it is very important that the order of the first two terms of reference shall be changed. His Majesty's Government have also one or two other amendments to suggest. They accordingly propose that the terms of reference should be as under.

(1) To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to ~~make estimates of the extent to which emigration to Palestine or other countries outside Europe may be necessary.~~

(2) To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

(3) To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs (1) and (2) above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

(4) To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of the United States as are necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph (1) above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

2. It will be noted that there is an important change in (3). "To hear the views" creates impression that it is merely intended to hear the witnesses and dismiss them. His Majesty's Government are anxious that the Committee should *consult* them and so create a conference. This would have a profound effect and increase the chances of a permanent solution.

3. In order to meet the obvious desire of the United States Government that there should not be any delay in dealing with the Palestine question, His Majesty's Government would see no objection to the insertion after the terms of reference of a directive to the Committee to the effect that the procedure of the Committee will be determined by the Committee themselves and that it will be open to them if they think fit to deal simultaneously through the medium of sub-committees with their various terms of reference.

4. His Majesty's Government note that the United States Government now propose that the Committee should "examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution". His Majesty's Government do not object to this but assume the United States Government has taken account of the difficulties which may arise in extending the enquiry into Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

5. His Majesty's Government propose that their announcement should include the agreed terms of reference.

867N.01/10-2645

Memorandum by the Minister to Saudi Arabia (Eddy), Temporarily in the United States,⁸⁸ to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

WASHINGTON, [October 26, 1945.]

I wish to reaffirm in writing the adverse effect on United States interests in Saudi Arabia caused by the uncertainty of U.S. policy regarding Palestine, a subject on which I have heard the King speak frequently, and as recently as October 2, 1945.

1. The Saudi Arabian Government cannot reconcile the promise of prior consultation with Arabs and a reported proposal by the United States that 100,000 Jews should be admitted to Palestine now without prior consultation. I was given definitely to understand on October 2 that any such decision effected without participation by Arab leaders would constitute definite proof to the Saudi Arabian Government that the Government of the United States in its policy regarding Palestine is neither consistent nor friendly to the Arabs.

2. The Saudi Arabian Government believes that the publication of the letter from President Roosevelt to the King dated April 5, 1945 would clarify U.S. policy and put an end to the Zionist demand for unilateral action. If unilateral action should nevertheless take place to affect the basic situation in Palestine, we shall be accused of bad faith, and our prestige with the Saudi Arabian Government will be liquidated. The King believes that the independence and survival of the Arab state of Palestine is a more legitimate concern of the surrounding Arab countries in the Near East than it is of Americans 5,000 miles away, whether those Americans are Jew or Gentile, and he consequently is determined that the Arab Governments shall have not less but more to say about the future of Palestine than Zionists living at a great distance. The King was very explicit with former President Roosevelt on this point, which was reiterated to me.

⁸⁸ For documentation on the presence in Washington at this time of Chiefs of Mission in the Near East, see pp. 10 ff.

3. If the growing suspicion should be confirmed that the U.S. Government is flirting with a Palestine policy friendly to political Zionism and therefore (in Arab opinion) hostile to the Arabs, United States enterprises in Saudi Arabia will be seriously handicapped. For example, our military airfield at Dhahran⁸⁹ and its military personnel, whose presence is suspect in any case by the more fanatic Arabs, would appear increasingly to constitute a base for political aggression and foreign occupation.

While the King has never mentioned to me the possibility of sanctions against the Arabian-American oil company concession (which has been rumored in the press) he has stated that he will never permit any airplane carrying a Zionist to Palestine to land in Saudi Arabia. The Deputy Foreign Minister has also intimated to me unofficially that the King would not agree to have the oil from his country carried in a pipeline which terminates in Jewish controlled area, thereby making his country contribute to the livelihood and prosperity of Zionists. These small straws in the wind are indications of the attitude which the Saudi Arabian Government may be expected to take in the event of any pro-Zionist move by the United States Government.

4. The Saudi Arabian Government takes the position that Palestine is protected by the United Nations Charter in the right to have its future settled by international agreement. It is certain that they expect consultation with Arabs to precede any settlement of the future of Palestine, and unless such consultation takes place in the very near future the political climate of Saudi Arabia may well prove hostile to United States interests.

WILLIAM A. EDDY

867N.01/10-2645

*Memorandum by the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth),
Temporarily in the United States, to the Director of the Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1945.

Based on my experience in Syria and Lebanon, you ask brief reply to the following question: "Is the lack of clarity in our present attitude with regard to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine and towards other Zionist policies, notably opening the doors of Palestine to mass Jewish immigration, affecting the conduct of our relations with the countries of the Near East and the development of economic and cultural ties?"

My answer is: "Yes, the conduct of our relations with Syria and Lebanon has been distinctly affected during the three years of my

⁸⁹For documentation regarding this subject, see pp. 845 ff.

service at Beirut and Damascus by lack of clarity in our attitude with regard to this problem."

To the people of Syria and Lebanon, from university graduate to mountain villager, there is no more burning issue in the field of international relations. Palestine is their next-door neighbor; they fear Zionist expansionism.

It is not illogical, therefore, that to them an important measure of the *bona fides* of the policies of any one of the great Powers is its attitude towards the Palestine problem. An Arabic proverb often quoted in this connection is: "The friend of my enemy is also my enemy."

When I arrived in the Levant three years ago, its people and leaders, like those of all "our" world, placed high in political discussion the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms and the Pact of the United Nations.

The first question often put to me by these leaders was how my Government expected to apply these principles to Syria and Lebanon. I had the answer in my basic instructions. It was clear, positive and, in the circumstances, satisfying.

Rarely, however, was discussion permitted to stop at that point. Their most common second question was as to our Palestine policy. The best I could say in reply was that we would take no basic action except in consultation with Jews and Arabs. This was negative, lacking in clarity, and unsatisfying.

During the ensuing three years there has been no basic change. To these same Arab leaders the principles of San Francisco now replace those of the earlier war period. Democracy and self-determination are still fundamental.

To conclude: Our Palestine policy is at best "suspect". It has clouded and continues to cloud our relations with Syria and Lebanon.

As to economic and cultural ties, as distinct from "relations" in general, I can best say, to keep this memorandum to the brevity you ask, that Americans in Syria and Lebanon, from educator and missionary to business man and trader, in varying degrees but without known exception, feel insecure as to the future of their work because of this lack of clarity in our Palestine policy. To them also it is "suspect".

They sympathize with the Arab view voiced fervently and with increasing bitterness. They would deplore official American Government support of the basic aim of political Zionism: The establishment of Palestine as an independent Jewish State.

To them, unless that question be answered with unequivocal negative, mass Jewish immigration into Palestine cannot be viewed except

as being primarily designed to build a Jewish majority, precedent to the establishment of such a state.

These Americans—and in pertinent knowledge and patriotism they need take second place to none elsewhere—hope above all to see their Government seize what today is within its grasp, moral leadership of the Arab world, and build thereon, or strengthen, economic and cultural ties.

To this end they feel their Government should adopt a positive regional policy; and this cannot be done so long as lack of clarity continues to characterize attitude with regard to this distressingly confusing Palestine problem.

867N.01/10-2645

Memorandum by the Minister to Egypt (Tuck), Temporarily in the United States, to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1945.

Before attempting to answer the question, the following reaction of a prominent Egyptian official may be of interest. He expressed the opinion that while American official policy with regard to Palestine follows a course which recognizes and tries to find ways of reconciling both Zionist and Arab aspirations, the humanitarian aspects of the problem would seem to be uppermost in the minds of many Americans. As a result, there was a tendency among Egyptians to believe that the humanitarian aspects have become confused with the political aspects of the Palestine problem. They consider that the case rests on the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and on the fact that throughout their history Moslems have lived peacefully with Jewish minorities.

In answer to the specific question as to whether our present attitude with regard to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine is actually affecting the conduct of our relations with the countries of the Near East and the development of our economic and cultural ties, it must be fairly stated—in so far as Egypt is concerned—that there is as yet no direct evidence to this effect. It may be said, in fact, that the present nationalistic trend in Egypt, which is evidenced by certain draft legislation and measures unfavorable to foreigners, stems more from the desire to limit and control foreign influence than from any direct anti-Semitic feeling. Jews in Egypt are not discriminated against and the Jewish community, although relatively small, has so far been treated tolerantly. No later than October last the Jewish community in Egypt went on record as opposing the establishment of

a Jewish State in Palestine and as favoring the settlement of four or five million Jews in "some other land of refuge" than Palestine.

The nationalistic trend above referred to has unquestionably influenced Egypt's attitude and policy in so far as the League of Arab States is concerned, which, as an organization, derives its cohesive force from a common attitude among all Arab States towards Jewish immigration into Palestine.

If the Egyptians should at any time become convinced that the United States has definitely decided to adopt a policy or attitude favoring the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, it is believed that both the conduct of American relations with the Egyptian Government and the development of our economic and cultural ties with that Government would be immediately and adversely affected. Already, the lack of clarity in our attitude towards Palestine has provoked a series of communications from various Arab States, and the Egyptian Government has done likewise for its interest in the Palestine problem is a real and vital one. The present Egyptian Prime Minister remarked informally to the undersigned that what shocked and mystified his countrymen in the American reaction towards the Palestine issue was not only the internal political implications involved but also our apparently amazing indifference to and ignorance of the Arab side of the problem.

S. P. TUCK

867N.01/10-2645: Telegram

The British Embassy to the Department of State

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF OCTOBER 26TH, 1945

I⁹⁰ am sending you at once the text of the statement which I propose to make on Palestine next week.⁹¹ I am sending it to you in full so that the United States Government can see exactly how I shall present the proposals in the House. The United States Government will see that they are not committed in any way beyond the agreed terms of reference and that it is we who take the initiative. In drafting this statement I have had the New York elections in mind as well as the Jews and India.

I very much hope that when Mr. Byrnes has seen this statement he will agree that it goes a long way to meet his difficulties. I have just received your telegram of yesterday evening and I ask you to press the United States Government strongly to consent to the retention of the words "or other countries outside Europe". There are the Dominions,

⁹⁰ The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin).

⁹¹ Enclosure, p. 795.

Colonies and other territories to which it may be possible for Jews to emigrate. Palestine is not the only country.

I most earnestly beg Mr. Byrnes to help me over this point. If he reads the terms of reference in the light of the whole statement which I am sending you he will see that we are not minimising Palestine in any way, but Palestine cannot deal with the whole emigration problem.

867N.01/10-2645

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to enclose herein the text of a statement on Palestine which Mr. Bevin proposes to make in the House of Commons next week.

Mr. Bevin is sending to the Secretary of State the text in full so that the United States Government can see exactly how he will present the proposals in the House of Commons. The United States Government will see that this proposed statement does not commit them in any way beyond the announcement of the terms of reference (the final text of which is still to be agreed upon).

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1945.

[Enclosure]

AMENDED DRAFT OF STATEMENT WHICH MR. BEVIN PROPOSES TO MAKE
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ABOUT PALESTINE

His Majesty's Government have been giving serious and continuous attention to the whole problem of the Jewish community that has arisen as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, and the conditions arising therefrom. It is unfortunately true that until conditions in Europe become stable the future of a large number of persons of many races, who have suffered under this persecution, cannot finally be determined. The plight of the victims of Nazi persecution, among whom were a large number of Jews, is unprecedented in the history of the world. His Majesty's Government are taking every step open to them to try and improve the lot of these unfortunate people. The Jewish problem is a great human one. We cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe and should not be permitted to live again in these countries without discrimination and contribute their ability and talent towards rebuilding the prosperity of Europe. Even after we have done all we can in this respect it does not provide a solution of the whole problem.

There have recently been demands made upon us for large scale immigration into Palestine. Palestine, while it may be able to make a contribution, does not by itself provide sufficient opportunity for grappling with the whole problem. His Majesty's Government are anxious to explore every possibility which will result in giving the Jews a proper opportunity for revival.

The problem of Palestine is itself a very difficult one. The Mandate for Palestine requires the Mandatory to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced thereby. His Majesty's Government have thus a dual obligation, to the Jews on one side and to the Arabs on the other.

The lack of any clear definition of this dual obligation has been the main cause of the trouble which has been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. His Majesty's Government have made every effort to devise some arrangement which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and to co-operate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. Any arrangement acceptable to one party has been rejected as unacceptable to the other. The whole history of Palestine since the Mandate was granted has been one of continual friction between the two races, culminating at intervals in serious disturbances. ~~The fact has to be faced that there is no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews.~~ They differ in religion and in language; their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as difficult to reconcile as are their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace. Both communities lay claim to Palestine; the one on the ground of a millennium of occupation, the other on the ground of historic association and of an undertaking given to it during the first world war. The antithesis is thus complete.

The repercussions of the conflict have spread far beyond the small land in which it has arisen. The Zionist cause has strong supporters in the United States, in Great Britain, in the Dominions and elsewhere; civilisation has been appalled by the sufferings which have been inflicted in recent years on the persecuted Jews of Europe. On the other side of the picture, the cause of the Palestinian Arabs has been espoused by the whole Arab world and more lately has become a matter of keen interest to their ninety million coreligionists in India. In Palestine itself, there is always serious risk of disturbances on the part of one community or the other, and such disturbances are bound to find their reflection in a much wider field. Considerations not only of equity and of humanity but also of international amity and world peace are thus involved in any search for a solution.

In dealing with Palestine all parties have entered into commitments. There are the commitments imposed by the Mandate itself,

and in addition the various statements of policy which have been made by His Majesty's Government in the course of the last twenty-five years. Further, the United States Government themselves are committed; for example, by the assurances given by the late President Roosevelt and by President Truman to the Heads of the Arab States of their desire that no decision should be taken in respect to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Having regard to the whole situation and the fact that it has caused this world-wide interest which both affects Arabs and Jews, His Majesty's Government decided to invite the Government of the United States to co-operate with them in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, under a rotating chairmanship, to examine the question of European Jewry and to make a further review of the Palestine problem in the light of that examination. I am glad to be able to inform the House that the Government of the United States have accepted this invitation.

The terms of reference of the Committee of Enquiry will be as follows:

[Here follow terms of reference substantially the same as given in note of October 25 from the British Ambassador, page 788.]

The procedure of the Committee will be determined by the Committee themselves and it will be open to them, if they think fit to deal simultaneously through the medium of sub-committees with their various terms of reference.

The Committee will be invited to deal with the problem of the Jews in Europe and with the other matters referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of their terms of reference with the utmost expedition. But if the investigation is to be thorough and effective, it must inevitably take time. In complying with the first and fourth paragraphs of their terms of reference, the Committee will presumably take such steps as they consider necessary in order to inform themselves of the character and magnitude of the problem created by the war. They will also give consideration to the problem of settlement in Europe and to possible countries of disposal. In the light of their investigations they will make recommendations to the two governments for dealing with the problem in the interim until such time as a permanent solution can be submitted to the appropriate organ of the United Nations. The recommendations of a Committee of Enquiry such as will now be set up will also be of immense help in arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem. The Committee will, in accordance with the second and third paragraphs of their terms of reference, make an examination on the spot of the political, economic and social conditions which are at present held to restrict immigration into Palestine and, after consulting representative Arabs and Jews,

submit proposals for dealing with these problems. It will be necessary for His Majesty's Government both to take action with a view to securing some satisfactory interim arrangement and also to devise a policy for permanent application thereafter. This enquiry will facilitate the finding of a solution which will in turn facilitate the arrangements for placing Palestine under Trusteeship.

So far as Palestine is concerned it will be clear that His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of their duties and responsibilities under the mandate while that mandate continues. They propose in accordance with their pledges, to deal with the question in three stages:—

(i) They will consult the Arabs with a view to an arrangement which will ensure that, pending the receipt of the ad interim recommendations which the committee of enquiry will make in the matter, there is no interruption of Jewish immigration at the present monthly rate.

(ii) After considering the ad interim recommendations of the committee of enquiry, they will explore, with the parties concerned, the possibility of devising other temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it can be reached.

(iii) They will prepare a permanent solution for submission to the United Nations and if possible an agreed one.

The House will realise that we have inherited, in Palestine, a most difficult legacy and our task is greatly complicated by undertakings, given at various times to various parties, which we feel ourselves bound to honour. Any violent departure without adequate consultation would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's Government but would probably cause serious reactions throughout the Middle East, and would arouse widespread anxiety in India.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the course which they propose to pursue in the immediate future is not only that which is in accordance with their obligations but is also that which, in the long view, is in the best interests of the Jews themselves. It will in no way prejudice either the action to be taken on the recommendations of the committee of enquiry or the terms of the trusteeship agreement, which will supersede the existing mandate and will therefore control ultimate policy in regard to Palestine.

His Majesty's Government in making this new approach, wish to make it clear that the Palestine problem is not one which can be settled by force and that any attempt to do so by any party will be resolutely dealt with. It must be settled by discussion and conciliation and there can be no question of allowing an issue to be forced by violent conflict.

We have confidence that if this problem is approached in the right spirit by Arabs and Jews, not only will a solution be found to the Palestine question, just to both parties, but a great contribution will be made to stability and peace in the Middle East.

Finally, the initiative taken by His Majesty's Government and the agreement of the United States Government to cooperate in dealing with the whole problem created by Nazi aggression, is a significant sign of their determination to deal with the problem in a constructive way and a humanitarian spirit. But I must emphasise that their problem is not one which can be dealt with only in relation to Palestine: it will need a united effort by the powers to relieve the miseries of these suffering peoples.

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1945.

S67N.01/10-2445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Syria (Porter)

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1945—8 p. m.

72. Syrian Chargé was informed Oct 26 of our preference that his Govt might defer for time being publication of exchange of correspondence on Palestine between Roosevelt and Kuwatly mentioned in your 73 Oct 24. It was pointed out to him that Dept in its press release of last week had made it clear that this Govt's attitude on Palestine had been made known to various Arab leaders as well as Jewish.

BYRNES

S67N.01/10-2745 : Telegram

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁹²

TEXT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE DATED
OCTOBER 27TH, 1945

I do not want to risk failure to agree with the United States Government on the terms of reference when we are so close.

Byrnes has told you that if the United States Government were to agree to transposition of (1) and (2) of the terms of reference, they would find it extremely difficult to consent to the retention of the words "or other countries outside Europe" in our re-draft of the original No. 2 [3?].

⁹² Forwarded to the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Allen) by the British Minister (Balfour) on October 27, 1945.

You have authority to revert to the original order of terms of reference provided that we can keep the words "or other countries outside Europe", to which I attach very great importance.

867N.01/10-2745

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)*⁹³

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency, the British Ambassador, and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note of October 26, 1945, enclosing the text of the statement on Palestine which Mr. Bevin proposes to make in the House of Commons next week, and to state that the statement in its present form is unsatisfactory to this Government.

It is the view of the Secretary of State that it would be preferable if the whole matter could be postponed until the visit of the Prime Minister to Washington on November 11th, during the course of which it is hoped that an understanding with regard to the procedure for solving the problem may be reached between the two Governments as a result of conversations between the President and the Prime Minister.

In the event that Mr. Bevin feels that it is necessary to make a statement on the subject before November 11th, it is hoped that he will find it possible to omit any reference to the attitude of this Government with regard to the establishment of a Joint Committee of Inquiry. If any statement is made with regard to the attitude of this Government in this respect, the President may feel impelled immediately to make a statement of this Government's view that it would much prefer a solution along the lines of his letter to the Prime Minister, and would cooperate in any inquiry which would delay action only because no other choice would be left to it, and only if the terms of reference would be as suggested by it.

Accept [etc.]

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1945.

867N.01/10-2745

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the text of a telegram from the Foreign Office dated October 27, 1945, which Mr. Balfour was so good as to transmit to the Department and in which

⁹³ Handed to the British Minister (Balfour) by the Secretary of State on October 27.

it is indicated that the Foreign Office cannot agree to eliminate from its "redraft of the original No. 2 [3?]" the words "or other countries outside Europe."

The Government submitted a counter-proposal⁹⁴ as to terms of reference only because there seemed to be no other course to take if His Majesty's Government would not agree to immediate action to remedy conditions as suggested by the President in his letter to the Prime Minister of August 31, 1945. This counter-proposal concluded with the statement that the President still adhered to the views which he had expressed in his letter to the Prime Minister.

This Government fears that any inquiry directed to an examination of conditions not only in Palestine, but other countries outside of Europe, would result in delaying the alleviation of a situation which requires prompt remedial action.

It is obvious from the telegram of the Foreign Office referred to above that it is not possible for the two Governments at this time to agree upon the terms of reference. It is therefore desired that it be clearly understood that the counter-proposals of this Government have been withdrawn.

When the Prime Minister visits the President during the course of November, it is hoped that an agreement may be reached which will permit prompt remedial action and provide the satisfactory solution of the problem desired by both Governments.

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1945.

867N.01/10-2845: Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, October 28, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received October 29—10:05 a. m.]

76. At Foreign Office this morning where I called at Prime Minister's request, latter stated his Govt is much embarrassed at premature publication in Iraqi press on October 26 of texts of Roosevelt-Kuwatly letters.⁹⁵ He said that after my suggestion on October 24 that publication be held up pending receipt Dept's views, he had telegraphed Syrian Missions abroad instructing no publication until further notice. He deeply regrets this slip and hopes Dept will accept his apologies. With reference Dept's 72, October 26, decoded after this interview, he gave me to understand that Syrians desired

⁹⁴ See the Secretary of State's note of October 24, p. 785.

⁹⁵ President Kuwatly's letter of March 11 not printed; see footnote 39, p. 692. For President Roosevelt's letter of April 12, see p. 703.

publication merely as proof they, like Saud⁹⁶ and Abdullah,⁹⁷ had not failed to bring their views on Palestine to our attention.

PORTER

867N.01/10-2945 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State*⁹⁸

JIDDA, October 29, 1945.

[Received October 29—10:23 p. m.]

383. ReDepts 311, October 18.⁹⁹ Following note dated 27th from Foreign Minister :

“Monsieur Le Chargé d’Affaires: It is my pleasure to acknowledge your note number 268 dated October 20, 1945 that contains the text of the statement made in Washington by His Excellency Mr. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, in which there was stated the policy of the Government of the United States of America in regard to Palestine and His Excellency’s confirmation that no final decision that will effect the basic situation in Palestine will be taken before consultation with both Arabs and Jews and that the discussions between His Excellency President Truman and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, were exploratory in order to find a solution for the problem of the Jews who have been displaced from their homes and the possibility of Palestine as a shelter for some of them.

His Majesty’s Government appreciates the value of this declaration and avails itself of this opportunity to thank His Excellency President Truman and the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, for their good will toward the Arabs and perceives that Mr. Byrnes’ statement is positive proof that the American Government has adhered to the promise officially given in President Roosevelt’s letter to His Majesty the King which has recently been published.¹ The promise is that no decision in regard to the basic situation in Palestine will be made before full consultation with the Arabs and that the American Government will not take any action that will prove hostile to the Arab people.

It is also my pleasure and duty to call the attention of the friendly American Government to the fact that the subject to which His Excellency the Secretary of State has referred about the interest of President Truman in finding a shelter for oppressed Jews, the search for such shelter for these oppressed people, is admitted by the Government of Saudi Arabia and all to be a humane act, but one which should be completely separate from the question of political Zionism. In the interest of justice in distribution the oppressed Jews over the world it should be noted that Palestine has already borne the greatest share of these refugees and that the avowed purpose of the Zionists in crowding the greatest possible numbers of Jews in Palestine is not based on

⁹⁶ King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

⁹⁷ Amir Abdullah of Transjordan.

⁹⁸ Copy sent to President Truman by the Secretary of State on November 3, 1945.

⁹⁹ See press release of October 18, and footnote 70, p. 770.

¹ April 5, p. 698.

humane principles but rather on a determination to alter the "basic situation" in Palestine and to lodge a Jewish majority there in order to disturb the Arabs and expel them from their homes and that this is what the friendly American Government has guaranteed that it will not do, according to its promise not to effect any basic change, or to take any unfriendly step against the Arab in Palestine. All over the world there are wide lands for Jews where they can live prosperously instead of being crowded in this narrow land (Palestine) that has borne from them and from the crimes of the Zionists a great burden that has not been supported by any other country in the world. All the committees that have been sent by the British Government to study the situation in Palestine have confessed this fact and the British Government was obliged to express it in the white paper. Therefore, to add any number of refugees whatsoever without consultation with the Arabs is a change in the basic situation, a step which the Government of the United States has guaranteed that it will not take. Such action will increase the danger of the Palestinian question and will be a menace to the peace of the Middle East in general and of the Arab countries in particular.

The Government of Saudi Arabia asks the Government of the United States, that is tied to this country by the strongest bonds of friendship, not to take any step that will be a menace to peace in the Middle East, revoke the principles drawn up by the United Nations and violate the guarantees given by President Roosevelt to His Majesty the King and declared in writing.

The Government of Saudi Arabia as it submits this request to the Government of the United States of America has the fullest confidence that it will receive due consideration as it is a request calling for confirmation of high principles and guaranteed promises.

Please accept the assurances of my high respect. For the Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed Yusuf Yassin.⁷

SANDS

867N.00/10-2945

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

No. 2253

JERUSALEM, October 29, 1945.

[Received November 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch no. 2227 of October 13, 1945,² on the political situation during the first part of the current month, wherein I reported that the incidents occurring at Kfar Giladi, Athlit, Yajour and Montefiore³ were, in the opinion of the Chief Secretary for Palestine, instigated and carried out by the Hagana.⁴

² Not printed.

³ This refers to a series of clashes between Jews and police, for the most part not involving gunfire. These arose as a result of attempts by the Palestine Government to cope with the problem of illegal entry into Palestine by Jewish immigrants.

⁴ Secret military organization of the Jewish Agency; though technically illegal, it generally enjoyed the status of a legitimate Jewish "home defense force".

These incidents provoked the tension and unrest that prevailed in the country until the arrival of considerable military reinforcements about mid-month, after which time the tension has lessened but the unrest continues subsurface.

I have been reliably informed that at the height of the tension, namely up until October 20, the High Commissioner Lord Gort called three members of the Jewish Agency Executive Committee to his residence and spoke sternly and disapprovingly of the recent incidents resulting from illegal immigration. It appears that he stated emphatically that any such acts of militant nature could easily be dealt with as he, the High Commissioner, had ample military forces at his disposal and that he meant to use them whenever necessary. He is credited to have accused the Jewish Agency of "rattling the saber" and that as a professional soldier he knew something of the same art.

While illegal immigration continues, there have been no further incidents to report, and it is surmised by those whose business it is to keep in touch with both political and enforcement personalities in Palestine that the policy of "temporary blindness" will continue until the Prime Minister's statement is known. It is a fair assumption, therefore, to believe that the British will avoid any incidents which might result in clashes and that this policy of restraint will be continued as indicated.

The authorities insist that even when the policy will have finally been announced that other than terrorist outbreaks are not anticipated. It may be impossible to avoid clashes with the Yishuv⁵ once the authorities undertake firm suppression of illegal immigration.

Respectfully yours,

MALCOLM P. HOOPER

867N.01/10-2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Evan M. Wilson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1945.

Dr. Zurayk⁶ called to hand me the attached translations of two telegrams⁷ received on October 29 from his Government, explaining that through inadvertence the exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and President Quwatly of Syria on Palestine had been made public in Iraq and expressing the Syrian Government's regrets at this incident. I told Dr. Zurayk that we had heard of this (Damascus Legation telegram no. 76, October 28, 4 p. m.) and I assured him that we fully understood that the correspondence had been published through inadvertence.

⁵ The Jewish community in Palestine.

⁶ Dr. Costi K. Zurayk, Syrian Counselor of Legation.

⁷ Neither printed.

I then asked Dr. Zurayk whether he had any information of newspaper reports to the effect that his Government had forbidden the entry of all Jews into Syria. I remarked that if these reports were substantiated we would undoubtedly receive a great number of communications from different groups in this country, Jewish and non-Jewish, as well as Zionist and non-Zionist, asking us to protest to the Syrian Government. Dr. Zurayk said that he had seen these reports but that the Legation had received no official confirmation and that the Syrian Consulate was in fact still issuing visas to Jews. He said that if such a decree had been passed it was undoubtedly due to the desire of his Government to prevent the illegal movement of Jews through Syria into Palestine rather than any attempt at discrimination against Jews as such. There was no such legal discrimination in Syria as far as he knew.

867N.01/11-145 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, November 1, 1945—noon.

[Received 9:12 p. m.]

225. Preliminary Government report to be released immediately describes as follows concentrated bomb outrages throughout Palestine during night of October 31.

“Attacks were made by Jews to disrupt all railroad communications in Palestine. All railroad lines were cut in 50 places from Acre to Wazzan from Affula to Haifa from Lydda to Jerusalem. At 3:45 a. m. November 1 heavy attacks were made on the Lydda railway station in which a railway train, a locomotive and a signal box were heavily damaged. Other equipment was mined. The casualties in this attack were given as Army 1 killed, 1 wounded; police 2 killed, 1 wounded; railway staff 2 killed 6 wounded. A train was held up between Lydda and Jerusalem by armed Jews in Army uniforms. Two police launches were heavily damaged between here and Jaffa. A heavy explosion took place at the Consolidated Refinery at Haifa during the night, 1 dead was found.”

HOOPER

883.00/11-245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 2, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 2—11:28 a. m.]

2045. Organized “Balfour Day” demonstrations which have been occurring spasmodically during the morning in Mousky, Al Azhar

and native districts appear to be degenerating into looting of Jewish shops and general disorder. Situation still too confused for accurate assessment but on advice of security officials have advised most of Legation staff to remain at home this afternoon.

LYON

867N.01/11-245 : Telegram

Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Secretary of State

CASERTA, November 2, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 9:22 p. m.]

4022. British Mideast have sent following appreciation of Palestine situation to War Office: Present calm indicates pressure by Jewish Agency to check extremists in order not to prejudice case before Govt announcement. Reports from Greece and Rumania indicate large scale movement Jews southward to ports of embarkation in vessels of all sizes for illegal immigration to Palestine. Jewish Agency policy is to publicize migration using strong humanitarian pleas; also to justify use of Hagana in assisting landings. Official and unofficial mention of Hagana activities increasing and shows desire to obtain recognition of this force as a legal body. Jewish Agency seeking also by publicizing "successes" against police such as Athlit incident, throwing local British administration notably police into disrepute.

Following is likely to be immediate reaction to Government announcement unfavorable to Jews:

a. general strike, *b.* protest meetings and demonstrations giving rise to incidents by which considerable disorders may be occasioned, *c.* advantage of situation likely to be taken by terrorist organization to start campaign of action and sabotage of Government installations and of moves and attempts on lives of Government and police officers and possible service personnel, *d.* although extremists in Agency may go over to terrorists it is not believed that Jewish Agency will countenance terrorism but will certainly disapprove and show their disapproval by embarrassing HMG⁸ as much as possible, *e.* Agency will definitely press forward with maximum illegal immigration and throw onus of preventing it and responsibility for incidents and loss of life incurred on Government.

Any incidents will certainly be followed by world-wide and tententious propaganda. Widespread military employment of Hagana or spontaneous rising considered improbable. Not unlikely is possibility of some Hagana extremists uniting with Irgun and Stern.⁹

⁸ His Majesty's Government (the British Government).

⁹ The Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang were Jewish terrorist organizations in Palestine.

Seizure of Govt lands may follow if immigration successful. Information suggests that unless Arabs interfere no anti-Arab action is envisaged by the Jews. There is no evidence of preparations on Arab side who feel as Jews displaying such apprehension there is little cause for themselves to worry. In prevention of illegal immigration Arabs may certainly be counted on to cooperate.

KIRK

883.00/11-345 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 3, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 3—3:25 p. m.]

2053. Sporadic and indiscriminate rioting continued this morning and several more shops in the smart shopping district had their windows bashed in while rocks were heaved at several cinemas. However, the situation seems to have completely quieted down at present.

The opinion is growing that in spite of the fact that the Prime Minister¹¹ personally visited one of the scenes of the riot yesterday the Govt lacked real energy in quashing the hoodlum activities. The British Minister,¹² whose Embassy has received protests and claims from several important British shopowners who have suffered, in some cases considerably, called on Nokrashy today to urge a firmer hand.

We have heard from several sources that the Govt endeavored to enlist labor syndicates for yesterday's demonstrations in order to create a strong pro-Arab atmosphere for the Arab League Conference now in session.

The students at Al Azhar and Fouad Universities continued their strike today but as far as is known have not caused undue trouble. The Legation has now received over 120 telegrams in addition to numerous petitions, many of which protest against President Truman's policy as well as the Balfour Declaration.

The Consulates at Port Said and Suez had nothing of interest to report but at Alexandria rioting was apparently even more serious than Cairo with some 200 reported injured and from 4 to 10 killed, reports varying. Doolittle¹³ says not a show window in immediate neighborhood of Consulate is intact but it appears looting was on a considerably smaller scale than in Cairo.

LYON

¹¹ Mahmoud Fahmy el-Nokrashy.

¹² Reginald J. Bowker, Counsellor of British Embassy in Egypt, with the rank of Minister.

¹³ Hooker A. Doolittle, Consul General at Alexandria.

883.00/11-345: Telegram

The Consul General at Alexandria (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State

ALEXANDRIA, November 3, 1945.

[Received November 4—12:09 a. m.]

97. Yesterday strike against Balfour Declaration planned as peaceful demonstration developed into riot at Alexandria. Gangs of hoodlums and street urchins armed with stones and sticks made shambles of shopping district around Consulate. Police forced to fire on mobs with result 10 dead, 300 wounded. Crowds directed by well-dressed Egyptians who seemed to have Wafdist¹⁴ connections. Situation got under control only after 5 p. m. Damage inflicted indiscriminately on Jewish, Greek, Armenian, other European and even few Moslem establishments. Some observers pretend to see pattern personal revenge in certain cases.

Damage to Americans included windows smashed in headquarters Alexandria Port Command, attack on mail convoy of four military trucks, two soldiers slightly hurt. Dental clinic of Dr. H. F. Curtis damages estimated 500 pounds. Window smashed in American Merchants Seamens Club. Most stores closed today and more serious troubles expected. Already reports being received of gatherings in native quarters.

DOOLITTLE

867N.00/11-345

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

No. 2263

JERUSALEM, November 3, 1945.

[Received November 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 225, November 1, 12 noon, and to my despatch No. 2259 dated November 2, 1945,¹⁵ reporting on the concerted sabotage of Palestine railways by armed Jews. The former acquainted the Government in the most immediate manner of the concerted attacks made by the Jews on the transportation system of the country, and I now am able to give the views of Dr. Bernard Joseph, Acting Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in the absence of Mr. Shertok.

Dr. Joseph asked for an appointment and visited the Consulate General yesterday, November 2, 1945. The interview took place before the reporting officer and the American Military Liaison Officer attached to this Consulate General. Dr. Joseph's first statement was

¹⁴ The Wafd (Nationalist) Party.¹⁵ Latter not printed.

to the effect that the Jewish Agency had nothing to conceal from the American Government and that he wished to tell the Consul in Charge whatever he knew of the unfortunate events involving attacks on the railway system and other acts committed during the night of October 31—November 1, 1945.

Dr. Joseph appeared highly excited and under considerable nervous strain. He inferred that the whole matter was being investigated by the Jewish Agency but that he had no positive knowledge as to who the perpetrators were. Although he more or less refrained from point-blank indication that the Hagana had been the responsible body, he repeated several times that an operation of such vastness could only have been carried out by a large number of people, inferring beyond any doubt that the existing terrorist organizations—Stern and Irgun Zvei Leumi—had no adequate manpower to operate on such a large scale. He indicated that at least 3,000 people must have taken part in the operation.

The conversation revolved around the *Palestine Post* editorial of the same day. The editorial was highly militant and impressively frank, practically admitting Hagana's participation in these so-termed "acts of resistance". The editorial admits that the acts served as "signal that the Jews have gone over from defensive to offensive action". At another point, the editorial states that "it is not easy to say whether this section of the Yishuv or that, or a combination of its elements, has launched itself on a career of violence". Still at another point, the editorial proclaims that "it is difficult to see how any Jew can be dissociated in thought if not in fact from what has happened". The strongest implication that Hagana participated in the events appears in the following statement of the same editorial: "There have been suggestions that the elements in the Yishuv dedicated hitherto to the defense of Jewish life and property (unmistakably Hagana) despising aggression and rejecting retaliation have now been impelled towards direct action."

Dr. Joseph, in disclaiming positive knowledge Hagana's part in the outrages, very readily admitted that sentiments expressed in the editorial were the true sentiments of the Yishuv as a whole. In questioning Dr. Joseph on the connection between the Jewish Agency and the Hagana, Dr. Joseph stated that as far as the Jewish Agency was concerned Hagana existed solely for the protection of lives and property of the Yishuv, and if the Hagana should choose to branch into other fields of activity, of offensive nature for example, the Jewish Agency would hardly be able to exercise any control over that body. He insisted that no fusion had taken place of Hagana and the terrorist organizations and pointed to the fact that the Jewish Agency cooperated closely with the Government in breaking up terrorist ac-

tivities during the past year. He admitted that some members of Hagana have joined the Irgun Zvei Leumi.

The question of dissolution of the Jewish Agency came up and Dr. Joseph admitted that such a possibility, indeed, existed. The impression gained from his statement was that either the Jewish Agency would so lose control over the Yishuv as to be unable to operate effectively or else would be presumed by the authorities as the guiding force of the resistance movement and would be dissolved as a security measure.

Dr. Joseph, ordinarily a somewhat emotional person, appeared in an exceedingly high state of excitement. His occasional outbreaks in the defense of the outrages belied many of his more formal statements but left little doubt in the minds of the interviewing officers as to the part played by the Jewish Agency and the organizations it controls.

A question was put to Dr. Joseph as to whether the Yishuv was prepared to sacrifice a large number of lives. Dr. Joseph's retort was that they were willing, inasmuch as there seemed to be no other way to impress the people in Great Britain and America that the Jews were willing to die in the defense of their rights and homeland and for their ideals.

Dr. Joseph was quite insistent that should the Jews be left alone, that is should the British troops be withdrawn, they could cope with the menacing attitude of the surrounding Arab countries very effectively with their superior training, their courage, their convictions, and, of course, their arms, which they are well able to use.

Dr. Joseph indicated that in this moment of stress, he regretted greatly the absence of Mr. Shertok and said that he cabled Mr. Shertok requesting his immediate return. In making a comment on political future of the Agency, he indicated that Dr. Weizmann's resignation is feasible.

Respectfully yours,

MALCOLM P. HOOPER

867N.01/11-545

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: When we were talking this morning¹⁶ you said that before we discussed Palestine tomorrow you would look over Mr. Bevin's various suggestions. As I mentioned to you, Mr

¹⁶The Secretary of State and Lord Halifax had had a meeting devoted essentially to consideration of subjects other than Palestine.

Bevin points out that the annual pilgrimage to Mecca takes place in November, culminating on November 14th, and that this may result in pressure being brought to bear on the various Arab governments to harden their attitude in respect of Jewish immigration. If, therefore, any announcement were made which could be regarded by the Arabs as weighted against them, there might be serious anti-Jewish demonstrations, and the acceptance by the Arab world of any compromise solution might be prejudiced.

There have already, as you know, been pretty bad riots in Egypt and demonstrations in the Levant States which are likely to result in a stiffening of Arab opinion. And, as I mentioned to you today, the postponement of a statement in deference to the wishes of the United States Government has inevitably led to the choice of a date which is unfortunate from the point of view of Moslem reactions.^{16a} Mr. Bevin feels that this makes it all the more important that the terms of reference of the proposed committee should not be such as to appear to them to prejudice the case. For if Arab opinion were to become even more difficult than it is, this might lead them to boycott any committee in whose terms of reference Jewish immigration into Palestine appeared to be featured with excessive prominence. And the findings of a committee which was able to hear only the Jewish side would not only be of little value but might be extremely dangerous.

Mr. Bevin therefore hopes that you will be able to help us through this in the same way as we tried to help you, and that you will feel able to agree to terms of reference which are not likely to produce a refusal of Arab cooperation.

I am enclosing copies of a statement showing the alternative terms of reference which have so far been proposed. In the light of the above, Mr. Bevin earnestly hopes that you may after all be able to agree to (A).¹⁷ If, however, you feel, as I hope you will not, that this is absolutely impossible for you, he would, I think, in the last resort be able to accept (B).¹⁸ But in view of the worsening of the atmosphere it would, I judge, be virtually impossible for him to accept much change in (B), and in particular to agree to an inversion of the order of, or to further alterations in, clauses 1 and 2. I have tried to set out these alternative drafts in comprehensible shape, and to put

^{16a} During a conversation on October 29 between Lord Halifax and Secretary Byrnes, they reached the conclusion that no statement would be issued before November 11.

¹⁷ Terms of reference proposed in note from the British Ambassador, October 19, p. 771.

¹⁸ Terms of reference proposed in note from the British Ambassador, October 25, p. 788. A third section, labeled (C), enumerated the terms of reference specified in the memorandum by the Secretary of State, October 24, p. 785.

Mr. Bevin's cards squarely on table! I am sure you will do the best you can to help him.¹⁹

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

P.S. Mr. Vinson²⁰ and Mr. Clayton²¹ have asked me to attend a meeting on our other business²² at 4:00 p. m. tomorrow. I hope that this will not conflict with whatever time you have in mind for our talk.

[During a conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador in Washington on November 6, 1945, they discussed the changes to be made in the Terms of Reference. They agreed that the following terms would be referred to President Truman for his approval:

(1) To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression.

(2) To make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe and to make such recommendations to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph (1) above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to Palestine or settlement in countries outside Europe.

3. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

4. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraph (1) and (2) above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution." (Memorandum of conversation: 740.00119FEAC/10-2245)]

867N.01/11-645

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Dr. Weizmann, accompanied by Mr. Shertok, came to see Mr. Bevin on November 2nd. Mr. Bevin asked them whether the outrages com-

¹⁹ In an annex entitled "Footnote" the view was set forth that the British Government wished concurrently with the announcement of terms of reference for the enquiry to make public the British intention to deal with the Palestine issue in three stages, which were then specified; these phases were earlier described in paragraphs 10 and 13 of Lord Halifax's note of October 19, p. 771.

²⁰ Fred M. Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury.

²¹ William C. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State.

²² Reference presumably is to the American-British financial negotiations; for documentation regarding this subject, see vol. VI, pp. 1 ff.

mitted in Palestine on the previous day were to be taken as an indication that the Jews intended to settle the question by force, and whether we were to regard the effort that we have been making for conciliation as at an end. Dr. Weizmann said that he deprecated these outrages, and quoted a published resolution of the Jewish Agency, repudiating recourse to violence but adding that it found "its capacity to impose restraint severely tried by the maintenance of a policy which Jews regard as fatal to their future". Mr. Bevin pointed out that these last words were in effect a condonation of violence. He could not accept the implication that there had been a spontaneous outbreak resulting from Jewish exasperation. All the evidence showed that the attacks had been carefully planned and synchronised in advance. It appeared to Mr. Bevin that all the aggressive organisations in Palestine, and not merely the Stern Group, had been involved. Mr. Bevin therefore asked Dr. Weizmann to issue a categorical denunciation of violence as a means to settling this problem, and he said that he would do this.

He has in fact addressed a message to the Jewish community in Palestine, the relevant passage of which reads as follows:

"Nobody understands better than I the state of mind out of which recent events have come. Nevertheless I deplore and disapprove of them, and urge for the sake of our cause that they should not recur."

It is clear to Mr. Bevin that the Jewish Agency can no longer be regarded as an innocent party in relation to these outbreaks in Palestine. Not only are they largely responsible for creating the state of mind to which Dr. Weizmann refers, but there is also no doubt that machinery under their control was directly implicated in the latest outrages. Mr. Bevin made it clear to Dr. Weizmann that His Majesty's Government should have to re-examine their position in the light of these, and that our future course would be determined to a very large extent by whether this kind of action was not only denounced but stopped.

Estimates of the strength of Jewish paramilitary formations in Palestine vary somewhat, but the following figures seem to be reasonably accurate (1) Hagana, the body controlled by the Jewish Agency itself, 60,000-80,000 (including the Palmach or Commando Units, which amount to about 6,000), (2) the more extreme Irgun Zvai Levmi, 6,000-7,000, (3) the terroristic Stern Group, some hundreds.

Dr. Weizmann has left this country for the United States. I should like Mr. Byrnes to be informed before Dr. N. Weizmann's arrival, of the substance of the above.

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1945.

867N.01/11-745

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

I have talked with the President about the rearrangement of paragraphs discussed by us and he regrets he cannot agree to the Terms of Reference in that form.

I should appreciate it if you would therefore convey the following message to Mr. Bevin:

"The President, as you know, has been very much concerned that American participation in the Joint inquiry with reference to Palestine should not be misunderstood particularly in light of the British policy regarding the current rate of immigration. The revised terms of reference which we suggested on October 24 were an attempt to meet as far as possible your difficulties and yet not prejudice the situation one way or the other.

"The President is fearful that changes you now suggest will be construed as turning the focus of attention away from Palestine. He feels our proposal of October 24 will enable all questions you wish to be considered by the joint inquiry and he hopes very much you can go along with it. In your statement you can give emphasis to the provisions of the Terms in which you are particularly interested, which would be more helpful to you than whether Palestine is mentioned in the 1st or 2nd paragraph."

The telegram from the Foreign Office dated October 27 which Mr. Balfour kindly left with me indicated that Mr. Bevin had no objection to our proposal provided there was retained in the Terms of Reference the words "or other countries outside Europe". Those words were in the draft we proposed. We agree to their being retained. If Mr. Bevin is still of the view entertained on October 27, he can act upon our proposal as a firm commitment.

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1945.

867N.01/11-745

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

No. 2269

JERUSALEM, November 7, 1945.

[Received November 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General's confidential airgram no. A-89, September 4, 1945,²⁴ regarding Jewish immigration.

²⁴ Not printed.

Approximately 4,800 certificates were reported available as of August 1, 1945, out of the 10,300 allotted October 1, 1944. The arrivals in August numbered 1,489 and in September 2,080. The number of arrivals during October has not yet been determined, but one ship brought about 1,000 immigrants, and it appears that the White Paper quota is for all practical purposes exhausted.

About 3,000 certificates still remain in the hands of British authorities to cover commitments previously made. Due to cancellations of some of such previous commitments, the British authorities offered the Jewish Agency additional 1,500 certificates in September, which were to have been used upon the exhaustion of the 10,300 allotment, which the Jewish Agency declined to accept, indicating that they would not engage in any discussions connected with the White Paper policy. Nevertheless, the Government allotted 800 certificates to Jewish refugees in Italy and 630 to Bulgarian Jews who had been promised certificates over a year ago. These refugees are expected to leave for Palestine shortly.

Mr. E. Dobkin, Head of the Immigration Department of the Jewish Agency, at a press conference appears to have stated that of the 75,000 certificates under the White Paper quota, 72,000 have actually been used up, of which 20,000 certificates were deducted by the Government for illegal immigrants entering the country during the past six years.

Respectfully yours,

MALCOLM P. HOOPER

867N.01/11-945

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: Mr. Bevin asks me to tell you, in reply to your memorandum of November 7th about Palestine, that His Majesty's Government are ready to accept the proposal of the President. They will proceed to act upon it as a formal commitment.

His Majesty's Government have only made one addition to the terms of reference you now propose, and that is to re-insert the words "and to consult" in the third term of reference. You will remember that, when you discussed the question with Mr. Balfour on October 20th, you thought that these words were an improvement, and I assume you will have no objection to them.

I enclose the terms of reference²⁵ as now agreed upon between the two Governments with the addition referred to above.

Mr. Bevin hopes to make a statement in the House of Commons on November 12th or at the latest, November 13th. He attaches great importance to the observance of secrecy till his announcement is made.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

867N.01/11-945

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: With reference to my letter of today about Palestine, Mr. Bevin wishes me to let you know that in his proposed statement in the House of Commons on November 12th or November 13th, he will amend the passage in paragraph 3 [4] beginning with the words "The fact has to be faced" and substitute the following text which he believes you will judge to be an improvement:—

"The fact has to be faced that since the introduction of the Mandate it has been impossible to find common ground between the Arabs and the Jews. The differences in religion and in language, in cultural and social life, in ways of thought and conduct, are difficult to reconcile. This in the last twenty-five years has been the greatest bar to peace. On the other hand, both communities lay claim to Palestine, one on the ground of a millennium of occupation and the other on the ground of historical association coupled with the undertaking given in the First World War to establish a Jewish home. The task that has to be accomplished now is to find means to reconcile these divergencies."

Mr. Bevin will also amend the third sentence of paragraph 6, as you suggested, to read "Further, the United States Government themselves have undertaken that no decision should be taken in respect of what, in their opinion, affects the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews". He will furthermore omit altogether the sentence in paragraph 9 which reads "But if the investigation is to be thorough and effective it must inevitably take time". He is thus meeting your wishes on both these points.

I enclose a copy of Mr. Bevin's proposed statement in the House of Commons containing the above amendments.²⁶

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

²⁵ Not printed. These were substantially the same as those proposed in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the British Ambassador, October 24, p. 785: however, the final text of the terms of reference as communicated to Lord Halifax by Secretary Byrnes in his note of December 10, p. 839, reveals certain changes in paragraphs 3 and 4, both substantive and technical.

²⁶ Not printed; it was otherwise identical with the proposed statement printed on p. 795.

867N.01/11-1145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, November 11, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received November 11—2: 40 p. m.]

82. Reference my telegram 76, October 28. Influential daily newspaper of Damascus, *Alef Ba*, today published texts of Roosevelt-Kuwatly letters. Prime Minister telephoned during course of morning to express his regret and to say that as this had been done without Government permission he had suspended newspaper for 1 month.

Inasmuch as public will no doubt believe we are responsible for this suspension, and because of our proclaimed advocacy of freedom of the press, I suggest that the Dept authorize me to indicate to the Prime Minister that while we appreciate his desire to cooperate with us in such matters we would not object if suspension of this newspaper were lifted.²⁷

PORTER

867N.01/11-1145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 11, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 13—10: 45 a. m.]

2101. Secretary General Arab League²⁸ today delivered memo which he especially urged that I transmit by telegraph.

Memo contained section 2 this message.

The British Embassy has also furnished me in confidence text of Palestine statement Bevin proposes issuing Parliament 3:15 p. m. (GMT)²⁹ tomorrow, copy of which I am told was furnished Dept. In view proposed British action I thought it would be useful for Dept have Arab League statement quickest.

Killearn due Cairo this evening from London. Will deliver copy Bevin's statement to Egyptian Prime Minister tomorrow afternoon.

Section 2.

The Secretary General of the League of Arab States presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State of the USA and has the honor to inform him that he is authorized to communicate to His Excellency the following in the name of the League of Arab States

²⁷ In telegram 78, November 12, 1945, 6 p. m., the Chargé was authorized to inform the Prime Minister along the lines he had suggested (867N.01/11-1145).

²⁸ Abdul Rahman Azzam.

²⁹ Greenwich mean time.

and in accordance with a decision taken unanimously by its Council on the 10th of November, 1945.

Peace-loving Arab States participating with United Nations in war sacrifices and international pacts and willing to maintain best relations with USA and Great Britain wish for the sake of maintaining peace and security in Arab countries that no decision concerning Palestine should be taken that may be harmful to friendly relations or may disturb peace and security in Palestine or any other country.

The Arab Govts members of the League of Arab States in order to make clear their attitude consider it their duty to draw the attention of both the USA and the British Govt to the following:

1. The British Govt has issued in 1939 the White Paper which precised their policy towards Palestine³⁰ and in which essential and final rules had been laid down.

a. Paragraph 3 of article XIV of the White Paper mentioned: "After the period of 5 years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."

b. Paragraph 4 of article XIV of the White Paper mentioned: "His Majesty's Govt are determined to check illegal immigration and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who despite these measures may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas."

c. Article XV of the White Paper mentioned: "His Majesty's Govt are satisfied that when the immigration over 5 years which is now contemplated has taken place they will not be justified in facilitating nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate the further development of the Jewish national home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population."

d. Article IV mentioned: "His Majesty's Govt therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish state against their will."

The National Govt in its capacity as a mandatory power and after a long experience of 20 years during which the proportion of Arab population to Jews which was 10 to 1 has been decreased to 2 to 1 found it by its own free will necessary to pledge herself to the above principles and to stop all immigration to Palestine after 5 years of the issue of the White Paper.

The late President Roosevelt made it clear to heads of Arab States that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with the Arabs and he assured them that he would take no action in his capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of the USA which [would?] prove hostile to the Arab people.

These undertakings have been later confirmed by President Truman and by the Secretary of the Dept of State.

³⁰ British Cmd. 6019 (1939): *Palestine, Statement of Policy.*

Any attempt to renew Jewish immigration into Palestine will no doubt change the basic situation in that country and the Arab States cannot agree to any decisions that change the standing policy pledged in that respect by the White Paper of 1930 [1939?] and consider it inconsistent with undertakings given by both US and British Govts.

Arab Govts therefore desire to express their wish and hope that the British and the US Govts shall not take decisions on resolutions regarding immigration or settling of the Palestinian problem without full consultation and agreement with Arab States.

They are sure that both American and British Govts will fully realize how deep and sincere [is?] the existing friendship of the Arab people and their Govts towards the two great democracies.

The Secretary General of the League of Arab States takes this opportunity to renew to His Excellency the Secretary of State the assurance of his very highest consideration.

LYON

867N.01/11-1345 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1945.

9912. President today issued following statement regarding Palestine:

"Following the receipt of information from various sources regarding the distressing situation of the Jewish victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution in Europe, I wrote to Mr. Attlee on August 31³¹ bringing to his attention the suggestion in a report³² of Mr. Earl G. Harrison that the granting of an additional 100,000 certificates for the immigration of Jews into Palestine would alleviate the situation. A copy of my letter to Mr. Attlee is being made available to the press. I continue to adhere to the views expressed in that letter.

I was advised by the British Government that because of conditions in Palestine it was not in a position to adopt the policy recommended, but that it was deeply concerned with the situation of the Jews in Europe. During the course of subsequent discussions between the two Governments, it suggested the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, under a rotating chairmanship, to examine the whole question and to make a further review of the Palestine problem in the light of that examination and other relevant considerations.

In view of our intense interest in this matter and of our belief that such a committee will be of aid in finding a solution which will be both humane and just, we have acceded to the British suggestion.

The terms of reference of this committee as agreed upon between the two Governments are as follows:

[Here follow the terms of reference, substantially the same as those proposed in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the British Ambassador, October 24, page 785, except as noted in footnote 25, page 816.]

³¹ *Ante*, p. 737.

³² Department of State *Bulletin*, September 30, 1945, p. 456.

It will be observed that among the important duties of this committee will be the task of examining conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration. The establishment of this committee will make possible a prompt review of the unfortunate plight of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been subjected to persecution, and a prompt examination of questions related to the rate of current immigration into Palestine and the absorptive capacity of the country.

The situation faced by displaced Jews in Europe during the coming winter allows no delay in this matter. I hope the Committee will be able to accomplish its important task with the greatest speed."

Text of letter of August 31 referred to will be given in Dept's immediately following telegram.³³

Sent London. Repeated Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda.³⁴

BYRNES

867N.01/11-1345

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Acheson
 Mr. Ali Jawdat, Iraqi Minister
 Mr. Nazem al-Koudsi, Syrian Minister
 Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister
 Mr. Anis Azer, Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires
 Mr. Henderson

Mr. Acheson received the four Chiefs of Mission of the Arab countries in Washington this afternoon at their request. The visitors included the Minister of Iraq, who acted as spokesman, the Minister of Syria, the Minister of Lebanon, and the Chargé d'Affaires of Egypt. Mr. Henderson of NEA was present.

The Iraqi Minister informed Mr. Acheson that the three Ministers and the Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from their respective governments, desired to hand him identical notes with regard to Palestine. The Minister said that Mr. Acheson was so well acquainted with the views of the Arab governments on Palestine that it did not seem necessary to make any oral comments with regard to the notes.

Mr. Acheson accepted the notes from the visitors and stated that he thought it would be preferable to reserve comment on the part of the Department until the Department had had an opportunity to ex-

³³ Actually this was done in the preceding telegram, 9911, not printed, which was repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and Jidda in telegrams 2109, 252, 356, 334, 79, and 325, respectively.

³⁴ As Nos. 2110, 253, 357, 335, 80, and 326, respectively.

amine them. The Iraqi Minister inquired if there would be any objection to the immediate publication of these notes in Washington. Mr. Acheson said that he would prefer to reply to that question after looking over the notes.

Following the departure of the Chiefs of Mission, Mr. Acheson, after glancing at the notes, authorized Mr. Henderson to inform the Arab Chiefs of Mission that there would be no objection on the part of the State Department to the publication of the notes. Mr. Henderson passed on this information to the Chiefs of the Arab Missions.

The four notes in question are attached hereto.³⁵

867N.01/11-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 13, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received November 14—12:35 a. m.]

11904. Reference Embtel 11887.³⁶ Following reading of statement on Palestine by Foreign Secretary former Colonial Secretary Stanley stressed its significance and suggested that in circumstances it merited careful study before being subjected to debate. Ensuing discussion was in fact brief and served to evoke assurances by Foreign Secretary of sincerity of efforts being made to find solution and great importance which he personally attached thereto. He referred in latter connection to remark which he said he had made privately a few days ago to effect that he would be willing to stake his political future on finding solution for Palestine problem.

In responding to several questions of a somewhat tendentious nature, Foreign Secretary made a plea against approaching this subject in spirit of racial antagonism.

Foreign Secretary also expressed gratification with way Arabs and all but a few Jews had responded in this matter.

WINANT

867N.01/11-1445 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, November 14, 1945.
[Received November 17—6:20 p. m.]

238. Today's papers report Acting Head Jewish Agency's Political Department states after having read Bevin announcement it was bitter

³⁵ Not printed; the texts were substantially the same as text contained in telegram 2101, November 11, 6 p. m., from Cairo, p. 817.

³⁶ November 13, not printed; it transmitted the text of Foreign Minister Bevin's statement to the House of Commons on November 13 announcing the establishment of the Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (867N.01/11-1345).

disappointment to Jews and Jewish people would never submit to it. Late last evening Dr. Joseph said in subsequent interview "statement will be made by Jewish Agency London. I do not desire at this moment to enter into detailed consideration of the announcement; all I can say is that we are deeply disappointed. The Jewish people will never submit to this. We informed officer administering government to this effect when we met him this afternoon. The Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency Mr. D. Ben-Gurion is expected in Palestine by the end of this week. We have asked the other members of our Executive in England and United States to hasten their arrival in Palestine. There will be meeting of inner Zionist Council in Jerusalem beginning of next week to consider the new situation created by Bevin's statement."

When Arab and Jewish delegations returned from Government House each held meetings. Jewish delegation met with Vaad Leumi Executive and subsequently the Executive announced general protest strike by Palestine Jewry from noon to midnight today. It affects all urban interurban transport, all institutions and for first time includes Government personnel. Essential services to be maintained.

Arab leaders do not conceal keen disappointment that statement made no explicit reference immediate constitutional changes. Jewish man on street reaction one of frustration.

HOOPER

867N.01/11-1445

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: Knowing how busy you are, I am sending you by hand, rather than asking you to set aside a time for another talk, a message I have just received from Ernie Bevin about Palestine. I am, of course, at your disposal at any time to talk it over.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

[Enclosure]

COPY OF MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN DATED NOVEMBER 14TH, 1945

The statement on Palestine was well received in the House and by the press here. It is now very urgent to select and announce the Joint Committee.

I suggest that the Committee should consist of about seven persons on either side so as to allow it to divide up into sub-committees and

deal with the work simultaneously and expeditiously. I am selecting a team of a general character containing members of both Houses of Parliament and experts from outside politics. I had considered appointing one or more women members but am advised this might give rise to undesirable reactions from Moslem opinion. I will let you know the exact composition of the British team as soon as possible, but meanwhile please pass to Mr. Byrnes again my thought, which I have no doubt he will share, how important it is that those whom we select should be impartial people who have not been connected publicly or officially with either the Jewish or the Arab cause.

867N.01/11-1445: Airgram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, November 14, 1945.

[November 29—1:26 p. m.]

A-86. Upon receipt of the Department's approval of the suggestion contained in my telegram no. 82 of November 11, I called at the Foreign Office during the regular Tuesday 5-7 p. m. period which Saadallah Bey Jabri reserves for members of the diplomatic corps. I informed him in the sense of the telegram under reference, i.e. that while we greatly appreciated his desire to cooperate with us in this matter of the Roosevelt-Kuwatly correspondence, we would have no objection if the suspension of *Alef Ba* were lifted. As I did so his relief was evident. He said, "I felt I had to suspend *Alef Ba* to prove to your Government my good faith in this matter. But this suspension has been very embarrassing to me."

Saadallah Bey did not go into detail, but we were aware that his embarrassment was increasing. *Alef Ba* had taken this correspondence from an Egyptian newspaper, and Saadallah Bey promptly suspended it for 1 month. However, *Al Waqt* of Aleppo the next day reprinted the correspondence from *Alef Ba*, and was also suspended. *Ad Duha* of Homs then took the texts from *Al Waqt* on November 13 and was about to be suspended when I conveyed the above message to Saadallah Bey. As a result, it seems probable that the holidays (Id al-Adha³⁷) of several editors will be rendered more enjoyable.

W. J. PORTER

³⁷ A Moslem holiday of approximately 4 days, the last 3 of which are given over to festive pastime; the first day is marked by the observance of the "sacrificial feast", and coincides with the end of the Mecca pilgrimage.

867N.01/11-1545 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, November 15, 1945—noon.

[Received 3:52 p. m.]

239. Kaplan, Jewish Agency, called today, expressed bitter disappointment and more than frustration. Stated there would be a period of cooling until Zionist attitude towards British policy determined at first full meeting of Plenary Jewish Agency Executive Jerusalem November 25. Silver, Wise and Lipsky³⁸ expected attend.

Arab League Council reported will make statement November 20.

Since Kaplan call reports received police having much difficulty restoring order Tel-Aviv. Reinforcements sent Tel-Aviv area comprising units of police and battalion of paratroopers. Unofficial police statement indicates authorities faced with mob rule and appear not to have been able enforce curfew and only remain in control outskirts Tel-Aviv. It is hoped reinforcements will remedy situation. Believed outbreaks spontaneous, doubted whether Hagana or other organizations at root.

HOOPER

867N.01/11-1645 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, November 16, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 6:42 p. m.]

391. In memo dated 13 Nov, Foreign Minister gives [recap?] of attitude on Palestine including reminder of Roosevelt statements and White Paper guarantees. Message states same memo being transmitted by all Arab Govts to US and Britain.

British Minister informs me King noted conflict with White Paper when informed of Anglo-American decision to appoint Joint Committee to study problem Jewish immigration into Palestine. Minister also stated that King made speech to pilgrims Sunday 11th in which he referred to British as "Arabs' best friend" and counselled patience.

Sent Dept rptd Cairo for Eddy as 357.

SANDS

³⁸ Louis Lipsky, sometime president of the Zionist Organization of America.

867N.01/11-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 16, 1945—8 p. m.
[Received November 17—5 : 30 a. m.]

12036. Reference Embassy's telegram 12001.³⁹ In accordance with assurances given by Secretary of State for Colonies⁴⁰ yesterday Under Secretary Jones today gave details of Tel-Aviv rioting. In deploring these events Creech Jones said Foreign Secretary had made it clear last Tuesday that there could be no question of allowing issue to be forced by violent conflict and those responsible for maintaining law and order in Palestine might be assured that they would have full support of Government in carrying out their duty. He said no incident of major significance had occurred outside Tel-Aviv.

Foreign Office tells us that report received from Jerusalem today states that there is no evidence that Tel-Aviv riots were inspired or controlled by any Jewish organization but that they appear to have been primarily acts of hooliganism. Foreign Office added that this should not be construed as indicating that organized violence might not be expected but that for the moment it seemed that Jewish organizations were still in process of taking stock of situation.

Sent Department as 12036 repeated Jerusalem as 22.

WINANT

867N.01/11-1745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, November 17, 1945—noon.
[Received 9 : 35 p. m.]

369. President Truman's statement on Palestine and British Foreign Minister's statement in Parliament have been greeted with reserve, officials stating that they need time to study proposals. It would seem that cautious attitude arises from desire to await Arab League reaction. However, undercurrent of feeling is against proposal to admit 1500 Jews monthly on the grounds this constitutes violation of White Paper. Review of problem by impartial Anglo-American Commission is not objected to, but any proposals for trusteeship are frowned upon.

MATTISON

³⁹ November 15, not printed.

⁴⁰ George H. Hall.

867N.01/11-1745 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1945—5 p. m.

10079. Please convey following message to Mr. Bevin:

"The President and I spoke with Mr. Attle^{40a} about the need for speed in the joint inquiry regarding Palestine and our view that the Committee should be constituted at once and instructed to report in 120 days. I hope very much you will support this suggestion so as to avoid serious protest here that inquiry will needlessly delay action. Please advise me at once whether you agree to this suggestion as to time. Signed Byrnes."

BYRNES

867N.01/11-1945 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1945—11 a. m.

234. Please arrange for immediate transmission to Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan of following message from the President:

"I have received Your Highness' telegram of Sept 29 and have noted that you appear to be under the impression from recent developments that there may have been a change in the policy of the Govt of the US toward Palestine as previously made known to you. In this connection you refer to the letter which I addressed to you under date of May 17 1945 and in which I stated that in the view of this Govt no decision should be taken respecting the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. In assuring you that this remains the policy of this Govt I take this opportunity to send my personal greetings to Your Highness. Signed Harry Truman"

Sent Jerusalem. Repeated London, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus.⁴¹

BYRNES

867N.01/11-1945 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 19, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 20—9:35 a. m.]

2162. Lord Killearn who returned last week to Egypt after 2 months' absence in England tells me that when he called on King Farouk last Saturday the latter indicated that he was all in favor of the Anglo-

^{40a} See footnote 15, p. 17.⁴¹ Repeated as Nos. 10086, 2137, 333, 340, 369, and 82, respectively.

American proposal in regard to Palestine as announced on November 13. Lord Killearn gathered that His Majesty would recommend to the Egyptian Govt support of the proposal and similar action by the Arab League. The Ambassador requests that this info be kept in absolute confidence inasmuch as at the time of the interview with King Farouk the latter had not yet discussed the subject with his Prime Minister. Consequently it might prove embarrassing to the King if at a later date he, Farouk, was forced to change his present views. Lord Killearn adds that when he presented Mr. Bevin's statement to Nokrashi Pasha ⁴² on the afternoon of November 13 the latter was non-committal. Lord Killearn states "in view of the Prime Minister's character I interpret this as favorable".

LYON

867N.01/11-1945

Memorandum of Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Halifax)

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1945.

Lord Halifax called at his request to see the Secretary at 4 p. m. The Secretary told Lord Halifax of the difficulties in connection with the bill about to be introduced in the Senate restating the American position on Palestine. This bill would cause a lot of anti-British comments on the floor of the Senate and the Secretary told Lord Halifax he had spent most of the day with the Senators trying to discourage its introduction.

The Secretary told Lord Halifax that the only thing that will stop the introduction of the bill, in his opinion, is the announcement of a time limit for completion of the work of the Commission to be appointed to investigate the situation. It is the opinion of our Congress, and also of the American people in general, that one way to shelve an issue is to appoint an investigating committee, and if a time limit could be set for the Commission to report it would give the impression that an earnest effort will be made during that period of time to reach a solution.

Lord Halifax explained that Mr. Bevin does not think it wise to set a definite time limit. Mr. Bevin wonders if the two Governments might ask the Commission to designate a date for the completion of their work.

The Secretary emphasized that he hopes a time limit can be agreed upon.

⁴² The Egyptian Prime Minister.

Lord Halifax said he would advise Mr. Bevin of this and say that if a definite time limit could not be agreed to by the British, then the Secretary could probably agree, as an alternative, that the Commission be invited to report, if possible, in 120 days.

Lord Halifax stated that the British hoped to appoint seven members on the Commission and asked the Secretary's opinion on this.

The Secretary replied that he was in favor of appointment of five members of each Government because he felt that the smaller the group the more they will accomplish.

It was agreed that Lord Halifax would advise the Foreign Office that the Secretary prefers to appoint five members, but would agree to appoint six.

The Secretary expressed the desire that persons of very high standing be appointed, that he has in mind appointing an outstanding judge, a former presidential candidate and the president of a large university. He said he hoped Mr. Bevin would not appoint members of Parliament, because he would then be compelled to appoint members of our Congress and he disliked doing this because all of them were on record as to their position in the matter.

Lord Halifax said he would ask to be advised about this, and would communicate with the Secretary.

867N.01/11-2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 20, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 12:20 p. m.]

2164. From Minister Eddy ⁴³ Cairo. Amir Faisal ⁴⁴ asked me today whether US promise to seek no change in basic situation in Palestine without prior consultation with Arabs means without prior "agreement" of Arabs. If prior agreement is conceded to be a condition something may still be done to preserve waning respect of Arabs for the USA. I told him that consultation would be meaningless if the results were predetermined but that my personal understanding is that it assures full consideration of Arab opinion and local conditions.

Faisal spoke at length of his deep concern for our future relations.

"I am one of the few Arabians who have seen and know the USA. I know that your people are not anti-Arab nor eager to have the Zionists violate our sovereignty. Yet your Government has permitted itself to be placed in the position of urging the British to break their

⁴³ William A. Eddy, Minister to Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁴ Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs, second son of King Ibn Saud.

pledges to us. I assure you that the British are now telling us officially that they favor the Arab case against Zionism but they are being pushed by you into pro-Zionist moves. The very real admiration and respect which all Arabs held for America is evaporating rapidly and may soon disappear altogether along with our many mutual interests and cooperation."

"We Arabs would rather starve or die in battle than see our lands and people devoured by the Zionists as you would do if we were giving them one of your states for a nation. Do not think we would yield to Zionism in the hope of survival or prosperity elsewhere. If it develops that the USA and British will aid the Zionists against our will and to our destruction we shall fight Zionism to the last man. In the meantime don't forget that the British are blaming the initiative on the Americans."

Sent Department as 2164, London as 131. [Eddy.]

LYON

867N.01/11-2045

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: AS I said to you just now when we spoke on the telephone, Mr. Bevin asks me to tell you that he fully appreciates your desire to show that the Committee on Palestine will produce results quickly. On the other hand, he feels sure that it would be a mistake to fetter the Committee by making it work under the pressure of a fixed final date for the presentation of its conclusions.

Mr. Bevin suggests that these two considerations could be reconciled if the Committee were instructed to present interim recommendations within 120 days while being left free to determine itself the date of its final report. Mr. Bevin adds that the ground on which speed is demanded is the present plight of displaced Jews in Germany and that this would naturally be one of the suggestions for interim recommendation. He points out that he made this clear in paragraph 12 of his statement in the House of Commons. The point could be underlined in the instructions to the Committee.

Mr. Bevin presumes that the 120 days would have to start from the time when the Committee begins its investigations into the facts and after it has settled its procedure.

As Mr. Bevin fully shares your desire for speed, I know that he will be hoping to hear from you as soon as may be possible whether you agree to the above suggestion.

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

867N.01/11-2445

The Consul at Jerusalem (Hooper) to the Secretary of State

No. 2295

JERUSALEM, November 24, 1945.

[Received December 13.]

SIR: With reference to the Department's telegram no. 334 [234] of November 19, 1945, I have the honor to inform the Department that President Truman's message was delivered to the Emir Abdullah in Amman by an officer of this Consulate General on November 21. The Emir expressed gratification for the message and requested that his thanks be conveyed to the President.

During the course of the audience the Emir stated that he had felt obliged, following the announcement regarding the admission into Palestine of 100,000 Jews from Europe, to inform the President of his views on the subject and of the reaction of the Arab world to such a step. He expressed the belief that his message to the President had been the direct cause for the subsequent statement on American policy toward the Palestine question made by the Secretary of State. The Emir was assured that the President and the United States Government valued and appreciated his views which were given full consideration.

The officer delivering the message was accompanied to the audience, which lasted the better part of an hour, by the Assistant British Resident, Mr. J. H. Iliffe, and a high officer of the Arab Legion, Colonel R. Broadhurst. The meeting took place in a very friendly atmosphere and it is believed that the Emir was greatly pleased by the gesture of the President's message.

It should be added that in accordance with established procedure advance copies of the official note to the Emir were given to the Acting Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government⁴⁵ and to the British Resident in Amman.⁴⁶

Respectfully yours,

MALCOLM P. HOOPER

867N.01/11-2445

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: Mr. Bevin asks me to tell you that, while he still feels the doubts which he has already expressed to you on the wisdom of fettering the Palestine Committee with a fixed time limit, he is prepared to defer to your wishes. He suggests that some

⁴⁵ Presumably J. V. W. Shaw, the Chief Secretary.⁴⁶ Alec S. Kirkbride.

such formula as the following might be used by our two Governments in announcing the formation of the Committee.

“His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government wish to urge on the Committee the need for the utmost expedition in dealing with the subjects committed to them for investigation and request that they may be furnished with their report within 120 days of the inception of the enquiry”.

He hopes that you will be able to agree to something on these lines.

Mr. Bevin adds that he consents to the above on the understanding that if the Committee has not finished its work within the time stated, the period will of course be extended.

Mr. Bevin also agrees to your suggestion that the Committee should be composed of six British and six American members, with rotating chairmanship.

The following will be the British members:

Mr. Justice Singleton (the Honourable Sir J. E. Singleton) of the King’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice. He will be the British Chairman.

Lord Morrison.

Sir Frederick Leggett (until recently Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Labour and National Services).

Mr. Crick, Economic Adviser to the Midland Bank.

Mr. Crossman, M.P. (Labour).

Major Manningham Buller, M.P. (Conservative).

The two members of the House of Commons are being chosen as men of sound common sense and integrity who have not committed themselves in any way on the Palestine question.

Mr. Bevin is appointing two Secretaries and presumes that you will do the same.

I shall be grateful if you can let me know as soon as possible whether you are in agreement with the above. If so, it would presumably remain to draft a joint or simultaneous statements containing the names of the American as well as of the British members of the Committee, and to fix a very early date for the announcement.

Yours sincerely,

HALIFAX

867N.01/11-2545

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Referring to your note of the twenty-fourth with reference to the Palestine Committee, although it is our

desire that the Committee be required to report within 120 days, we will agree to the formula suggested by Mr. Bevin that the Committee be requested to furnish the report within 120 days of the inception of the inquiry.

However, I cannot agree to the statement if Mr. Bevin insists upon the understanding contained in the paragraph of your note reading as follows:

“Mr. Bevin adds that he consents to the above on the understanding that if the Committee has not finished its work within the time stated, the period will of course be extended.”

Such an understanding would nullify the request for a report within 120 days. If members of the Committee are told that if they do not finish their work within four months that the time will “of course” be extended, there is no reason why they should make any effort to complete the inquiry within the time stated. Though no reference is made to this suggestion in the proposed release, experience causes me to believe that such an understanding would be known and relied upon by any persons who did not wish to speed the work.

Of course the two Governments would have the right to extend the time in which the Committee could report if there were good and sufficient reasons why it should be done but the time should not be extended unless there were strong reasons why it should be extended. Any request for an extension would have to be considered upon its merits. If there were good reasons, I have no doubt our Government would agree to it. If, however, it appeared that inquiry was being unnecessarily delayed and the members appointed by the United States wished to complete the inquiry and file a report, we certainly would not want to be in the position of having to agree to an extension of time as a matter of course. Therefore I could not agree if at the end of four months the Committee had not finished its work the period would of course be extended.

I regret that this has been proposed as a part of the agreement because it will prevent me from advising the Senate Committee on Monday that a time limit had been agreed upon. However, it is more important that there should be no misunderstanding about our position.

Sincerely yours,

[JAMES F. BYRNES]

Secretary's note added in pen: If we can agree on a time limit the release of that fact should be made immediately. It will take us some days to make appointments. We have done nothing along that line awaiting settlement as to time limit.

867N.01/11-1345

*The Secretary of State to the Minister of Iraq (Jawdat)*⁴⁸

[WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of November 13,⁴⁹ with which you transmitted a communication from your Government relative to the Palestine problem, and to inform you that the subject of this communication has received the careful consideration of the appropriate officials of the Department of State.

In this connection, I am certain that you have seen the announcement which the President of the United States made on November 13, 1945 relative to the establishment of a joint American-British Committee of Inquiry to study the question of the persecuted Jews in Europe and to make a further review of the Palestine problem. It will be observed that the terms of reference of this committee provide, among other things, that it is to hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine.

Accept [etc.]

JAMES F. BYRNES

867N.01/11-2545

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TELEGRAM FROM MR. BEVIN TO LORD HALIFAX DATED THE 27TH
NOVEMBER, 1945⁵⁰

Please thank Mr. Byrnes for his letter of November 25th and express my satisfaction that we have reached agreement on the terms in which the time limit is to be formulated. I accept his suggestion that "the two Governments would have the right to extend the time if there were good and sufficient reasons".

2. I have no objection to Mr. Byrnes telling the Senate Committee of this agreement nor to his making the fact public. For my part, however, I would prefer to make the formal announcement here when the full list of United States and British names is ready.

3. I do not propose to announce the British in advance of the American names. The full list might well be published simultaneously in Washington and London and we can agree on the date.

⁴⁸ The same note, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent also to the Syrian Minister (Koudsi), to the Lebanese Minister (Malik), and to the Egyptian Chargé (Azer).

⁴⁹ Not printed; see footnote 35, p. 821.

⁵⁰ An *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy on November 28 stated: "Mr. Bevin wishes to confirm to the Secretary of State that he is in agreement with Mr. Byrnes' message about the Palestine Committee." (867N.01/11-2845) See letter of November 25, p. 831.

867N.01/11-2745: Telegram

*The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State*⁵¹

BAGHDAD, November 27, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received November 27—8:50 a. m.]

451. On November 13 British Embassy submitted note to Iraqi Foreign Ministry asking approval for Palestine [policy] described that day in House of Commons by Bevin. Iraqi reply delivered yesterday took four pages to restate Iraq's position and to affirm that Iraq (1) opposes further Jewish immigration into Palestine (2) opposes formation of Joint Anglo-American Investigation Committee (3) opposes formation in Palestine of Jewish state no matter how small and (4) suggests that if position of European Jew is so difficult they be taken into US or some part of British Empire.

There is excellent reason to believe that this comprehensive rejection of Bevin proposals surprised British Embassy here.

Sent Dept repeated to Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut for Damascus, paraphrase by airmail to Jidda.

MOOSE

867N.01/11-2745: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Lyon) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, November 27, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 27—5:34 p. m.]

2192. From Eddy. Sheikh Yusuf Yassin⁵² called on me at the American Legation Cairo today and in the course of conversation, which lasted an hour and a quarter, he reviewed current discussions of Palestine by members of the Arab League Council. In general, he confirmed statements by Azam Bey⁵³ given in Cairo's telegram 2188 November 26, 8 p. m.⁵⁴ to the effect that moderate counsels were prevailing upon the extremists to keep negotiations open until the completion of Joint Commission for Palestine is known. Two special points emerged from this conversation.

1. Sheikh Yusuf expressed the hope that the American Secretary [Section.2] of the Commission might include someone who knows conditions in and around Palestine from recent first hand observation, such as Senator Pepper or Congressman Mundt or Congressman Bolton.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Repeated by the Department in telegram 10334, November 28, 7 p. m., to London.

⁵² Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵³ Abdur Rahman Azzam, Secretary General of the Arab League.

⁵⁴ Not printed.

⁵⁵ Claude Pepper, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Karl E. Mundt and Mrs. Frances P. Bolton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; all had been in the Near East in recent months on Congressional trips.

2. Sheikh Yusuf stated that the Arab League would act independently to check Zionism without regard to ultimate solutions proposed in London or Washington. Measures which he stated would be announced soon include (1) boycott in all Arab countries of merchandise from Zionists in Palestine; (2) prohibition in each Arab country of any personal aid to Zionism, whether this aid be financial or political; individuals or firms convicted of contributing to Zionism to be treated as enemies of the local govt; (3) prohibition upon travel of Zionists from one Arab country to another. [Eddy.]

LYON

867N.01/11-2845

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State*⁵⁶

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1945.

Mr. Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, who is handling Palestine affairs for the Embassy, called me by telephone this afternoon. He said that it would be helpful to know whether, in view of the fact that the Committee of Inquiry was to be joint, the American Government would like for the announcement of the appointment of the Committee to be a joint statement issued simultaneously by the two Governments, or whether we would prefer that each Government issue a similar statement including in it the names of its members only.

In any event he said that the British Government hoped that the announcements could be made simultaneously, that they would be similar, if not identical, in character, and that the British Government would have ample time to make its announcement. It was hoped that the American Government would not, on the spur of the moment or with only a few hours notice, make an announcement on the subject. This matter was so important to the British Government that it was anxious that there should be no slip-up in the way in which it would be presented to the world. He also asked if I had any information as to when the American Government might be prepared to make an announcement.

I told him that I was not in a position to answer his questions, but that I would pass them on to you. I added that in the meantime his Government might desire to furnish us with a copy of an announcement of the type which it would like to have made.

LOY W. HENDERSON

⁵⁶ Marginal notation, presumably by the Secretary: "If Wright wishes go ahead can do so, will take us some time".

867N.01/11-2945 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, November 29, 1945—6 p. m.
 [Received November 30—10:42 a. m.]

461. Dept's 314 of October 23 communicated to Iraqi Prime Minister in note dated October 25. Prime Minister's reply dated November 28 and received today reads as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of October 25, 1945 concerning the explanatory correspondence recently exchanged between His Excellency President Truman and Mr. Attlee Prime Minister of Great Britain on the extension of assistance to the homeless Jews in Europe. In expressing my pleasure at your assurance that no change has taken place in the American Govt's policy enunciated in its previous statements on the situation in Palestine, I wish to draw attention to the fact that this assurance is not compatible with President Truman's recent desire for permitting 100,000 Zionists to immigrate into Palestine which we regard as prejudicial to the fundamental issue in Palestine because the subject of immigration is really the basis of the problems and disturbances in Palestine.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my highest consideration and respect. Signed Hamdi Al-Pachachi"

MOOSE

867N.01/11-3045

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1945.

Mr. Wright telephoned me late in the evening to say that he had tried to get the Secretary on the telephone. Not being able to do so, he asked me whether it would be possible for the names of the American members of the Joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry into the Palestine question to be announced before Tuesday, December 4. The Embassy had just received a message that Mr. Bevin would like to make a statement in the House of Commons on that date. Mr. Wright said that the message⁵⁷ had been sent to Mr. Henderson for consideration of the rest of its contents, but that he would like to have an answer on this point immediately if possible.

After speaking with the Secretary, I called Mr. Wright back and told him that, although the Secretary had been spending a very great part of his time in trying to line up a list of top-flight names, he was positive that it would not be possible to complete the list by Tuesday.

⁵⁷ Not printed: it was concerned with questions relating to the announcement of the composition of the Committee of Enquiry (867N.01/11-3045).

Mr. Wright asked whether I thought it would be well to try to have Mr. Bevin postpone his statement, and whether I thought it would cause difficulties if Mr. Bevin did make his statement and gave out the British list without the American list. I said that I had not discussed this with the Secretary and did not feel in a position to express an opinion.

DEAN ACHESON

867N.01/11-3045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Egypt (Lyon)

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1945—3 p. m.

2249. In discussing this Govt's Palestine policy with Arab or other leaders you should make it plain that full "consultation" with both Jews and Arabs as referred to in my statement of Oct 18 and other statements of policy does not mean prior "agreement" with Jews and Arabs. It is obvious that if no basic change could be made without the full agreement of both Jews and Arabs very little if any progress could be achieved in the direction of a solution at this time.

The attention of Arab leaders should also be called to the fact that wherever consultation is mentioned in our statements of policy there is a specific reference to consultation with Jews as well as with Arabs.

Allegations have been made in various quarters to the effect that the President, in writing to Mr. Attlee on Aug 31 regarding the displaced Jews in Europe, was proposing that a basic change be made in Palestine without prior consultation with Arabs and Jews. These allegations have apparently been put forward without a careful examination of the wording of the President's letter, which was made public on Nov 13. The President's proposal was made for the purpose of obtaining the views of the Brit Govt regarding this pressing problem. Moreover, in my statement of Oct 18, in referring to the President's exploratory discussions with Mr. Attlee, I said: "Should any proposals emerge which in our opinion would change the basic situation in Palestine, it would be the policy of this Govt not to reach final conclusions without full consultation with Jewish and Arab leaders."

Sent Cairo reference its 2164 Nov 20 from Eddy, repeated Bagdad ⁵⁸ reference its 461 Nov 29 and 464 Nov 30.⁵⁹ Repeated also to London, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, and Jerusalem ⁶⁰ for info and appropriate action.

BYRNES

⁵⁸ As No. 359.

⁵⁹ Telegram 464 not printed.

⁶⁰ As Nos. 10581, 392, 90, 344, and 269, respectively.

867N.01/12-645 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1945—8 p. m.

10598. Dept today gave British Embassy following names of American members of Joint Committee of Inquiry on Palestine: ⁶¹

Judge Joseph C. Hutcheson of the Fifth Circuit Court at Houston, Texas (American Chairman).

Frank Aydelotte, former President of Swarthmore College and Director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. He is American Secretary of the Rhodes Trust and is a former Rhodes scholar.

Frank W. Buxton, editor of the *Boston Herald*.

James G. McDonald, Chairman of the Board, Foreign Policy Association 1919-33; High Commissioner of Refugees 1933-35; member editorial staff *New York Times*, 1936-38.

O. Max Gardner, former Governor of North Carolina, now practicing law in Washington.

William Phillips, formerly Under Secretary of State, Ambassador to Italy, personal representative of President with rank of Ambassador, New Delhi, and Delegate to London Naval Conference, 1935.

President will announce composition of Committee at 10:00 a. m., Saturday, December 8, simultaneously with an announcement by British Government. Inform FonOff. ⁶²

BYRNES

867N.01/12-745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 7, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 7:45 p. m.]

404. In audience for entire Diplomatic Corps Thursday King Abdul Aziz said he wished it clearly understood that his moderation on Palestine question was due entirely to his disinclination for a misunderstanding with America and Britain and not to fear of Jews or change in categorical attitude.

Sent Dept as 404, repeated Cairo for Eddy as 281.

SANDS

⁶¹ In a statement released by the White House on December 10, President Truman made public the names of both the American and British members of the Committee; see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 16, 1945, p. 958. Subsequently, on December 18, President Truman announced the appointment of Bartley C. Crum, San Francisco lawyer, as a member of the Committee replacing O. Max Gardner.

⁶² Because of the desire of Mr. Bevin to make the announcement in the House of Commons, the time for the simultaneous release of the announcement was changed to Monday, December 10, 1945, 10 a. m., e.s.t.

867N.01/12-1045

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, with reference to our conversations on the subject, that the Government of the United States agrees to constitute, in cooperation with the Government of the United Kingdom, a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry with the following terms of reference.

1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein;
2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe;
3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems are affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom for an interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution; and
4. To make such other recommendations to the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.

The Committee should be composed of six nationals of the United States, appointed by the Government of the United States, and six nationals of the United Kingdom, appointed by the Government of the United Kingdom, and shall operate under a rotating chairmanship.

The Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom shall urge on the Committee the need for the utmost expedition in dealing with the subjects committed to it for investigation and shall request that they may be furnished with its report within 120 days of the inception of the inquiry.

The procedure of the Committee shall be determined by the Committee itself and it will be open to it, if it thinks fit, to deal simultaneously through the medium of subcommittees, with any of the subjects entrusted to its consideration.

Each Government shall be responsible for compensating its own members of the Committee and other personnel selected by it and for

paying such other expenses as are not susceptible of being jointly shared by the two Governments. All other expenses of the Committee shall be borne jointly by both Governments in equal proportions.

Accept [etc.]

JAMES F. BYRNES

867N.01/12-1045

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 10, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in agreement with the terms of your note of the 10th December about the Joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry to report on the position of the Jews in certain countries of Europe and in Palestine.

I have the honour [etc.]

HALIFAX

867N.01/11-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moose)

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1945—4 p. m.

371. We have noted adverse reaction of Iraqi Govt as set forth in your 451 Nov 27 to establishment of joint Palestine Committee as well as other indications of Arab opposition or criticism. You may in your discretion point out to appropriate officials that this committee was created by American and Brit Govts after extended discussion during which careful consideration was given to various aspects of the matter, that it should be clear from an examination of the statements of the two Govts in this connection that they regard the creation of this committee as a completely legitimate means of formulating their policy with regard to the complex issues involved and that they are very hopeful that through the Committee it may prove possible to reach a satisfactory solution. You may make it clear that the Committee will welcome any info which various Arab and Jewish spokesmen may desire to give, since such info would aid it in reaching its decisions under terms of reference, particularly no. 3 which involves consultation with representative Arabs and Jews.

You may further point out that the willingness of Committee to hear views of representative Arabs and Jews will provide a unique opportunity for each of the interested parties to make its views known to Committee and thus to American and Brit Govts.

For your info American members of Committee will begin assembling here late this week.

Sent Baghdad with reference its 451 Nov 27; repeated Jerusalem, Cairo, London, Beirut, Jidda, and Damascus⁶³ for info and appropriate action.

ACHESON

867N.01/12-1645 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 16, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 5:57 p. m.]

415. I was summoned today to 45-minute audience with King who stated:

1. The Allies are pursuing political and no doubt sincere means to find a solution for Palestine, whereas the Zionists are pausing for no such delays. They are taking direct action: Illegal immigration, distributing arms, committing acts of terrorism. Pending agreement on a final settlement, immigration of all Zionists should be stopped completely, and Zionists disarmed. Otherwise the forbearance and patience of the Arabs will have been abused.

2. The Arabian new fiscal year has begun without any official word of assurance of the US aid to stabilize budgetary needs broached a year ago (Deptel 283, Dec 24, 1944,⁶⁴) and promised at intervals since. The element of uncertainty of basic necessities from month to month is distressing to me and disturbing to my people, especially when we read of the announcement of US financial loans to other small and impoverished countries. The assurance of provisions and stability for my people has by force become my overwhelming concern, and I look to you alone to bring me the word from your Govt.

Foregoing sent Dept; repeated Cairo, Beirut, paraphrase to Jerusalem.

EDDY

867N.01/12-1745

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON PALESTINE, 79TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION,
DECEMBER 17 AND 19, 1945

[This resolution, adopted by the United States Senate and the House of Representatives on December 17 and 19, was a composite of three previous resolutions which had been pending since October 1945, and was based as well on resolutions offered in 1944 (see especially S.J. Res. 112, H.J. Res. 264, S.J. Res. 247, H.J. Res. 418 and 419). It may be noted that the resolution of December 17-19, 1945, differs from the

⁶³ As Nos. 274, 2285, 10732, 401, 352 and 95, respectively.

⁶⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

previous resolutions, especially in that it does not call specifically for a "free and democratic Jewish commonwealth" in Palestine but for a "democratic commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall have equal rights." The resolution also differs from the Zionist demands as expressed in the resolution of the World Zionist Conference which met in London during August 1945.]⁶⁵

WHEREAS the Sixty-Seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved: "That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

WHEREAS the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish Homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution; and

WHEREAS these urgent necessities are evidenced by the President's request for the immediate right of entry into Palestine of one hundred thousand additional Jewish refugees; and

WHEREAS the influx of Jewish immigration into Palestine is resulting in its improvement in agricultural, financial, hygienic and general economic conditions; and

WHEREAS the President and the British Prime Minister have agreed upon the appointment of a Joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to examine conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and the Jewish situation in Europe and have requested a report within 120 days: Therefore be it

RESOLVED by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that the interest shown by the President in the solution of the problem is hereby commended, and that the United States shall use its good offices with the Mandatory Power to the end that Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum of its agricultural and economic potentialities, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization and development, so that they may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine as the Jewish National Home, and, in association with all elements of the population, establish Palestine as a democratic commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall have equal rights.

⁶⁵ Brackets appear in the original.

867N.01/12-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, December 21, 1945—4 p. m.

Received December 23—6:03 p. m.

98. With official encouragement press has momentarily turned aside from its preoccupation with Anglo-French accord on Levant⁶⁶ to discuss with extreme bitterness Congressional resolution advocating Jewish immigration into Palestine.

PORTER

867N.01/12-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, December 21, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received December 22—9:33 a. m.]

509. Senate resolution on Palestine featured Baghdad papers. Two editorial attacks thus far, others will follow: *Sawt Al Ahali* condemns resolution as major offense to Arabs; asserts that Senators should not permit Zionist money to outweigh Arab friendship; and warns of dangers involved in becoming "tool of aggressive Zionist intervention in Palestine".

Al Akhbar asks what's use of Truman's change of mind or Joint Commission of Inquiry since Senate has resolved to open Palestine to Jews. Arabs must demand abolition of Joint Committee and insist Palestine question be restricted to Arabs and British. America plans to create Zionist state as base for mid-east penetration. Arabs must remember that America can't be enemy and umpire at same time. *

In conversations at a press reception yesterday local editors condemned Senate's "hostile action" and many who are personally friendly expressed regret over what they regard as irreparable blow to American prestige in Iraq.

MOOSE

867N.01/12-2845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, December 28, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 4:01 p. m.]

515. Reference Legation's telegram No. 509, December 21, 5 p. m. No local official has mentioned to Legation Congressional resolutions

⁶⁶ December 13; for text, see p. 1181.

on Palestine nor has usual note of protest been received from Foreign Ministry. Possibly Iraqi officials now consider United States as irrevocably in Zionist camp.

MOOSE

867N.01/12-2945 : Airgram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moose) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, December 29, 1945.

[Received January 15, 1946—2:49 p. m.]

A-175. Continuing Legation's telegram no. 515 of December 28, 3 p. m. Fadhil Jamali, Director General of Foreign Office, states that customary note of protest has not been sent to Legation regarding Congressional resolutions favoring Zionism because 1) full text of resolutions not yet obtained by Foreign Ministry; and because 2) Nuri Pasha, who is usually consulted on such matters, has been out of country. Dr. Jamali assures Legation that protest will be made in due course.

MOOSE

867N.01/12-3145 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 31, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1946—12:06 a. m.]

449. Foreign Minister has just brought me following message from King to transmit:

The resolution regarding Palestine passed by Congress disturbed the King deeply. He is convinced that Congress must have been deceived by Jewish propaganda, for certainly so august a legislature would not wittingly pass resolutions so unjust and so contrary to democratic principles.

The King has received many telegrams from pious Muslims in all parts of the Muslim world expressing their outraged feelings when they received news of the resolutions.⁶⁷

EDDY

⁶⁷ The Secretary of State, in telegram 7, January 5, 1946, 8 p. m., authorized Colonel Eddy to inform the King that "a concurrent Congressional resolution such as the one recently adopted on Palestine does not have legislative force. It is merely an expression of the two houses of Congress but in nowise binds the Executive." (867N.01/12-3145)

SAUDI ARABIA

EXTENSION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES TO SAUDI ARABIA;¹ PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY MISSION, THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIRFIELD AT DHAHRAN,² AND THE SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT; DESIRE OF SAUDI ARABIA THAT THE UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL MISSION IN SAUDI ARABIA BE CONTINUED³

890F.50/145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Parker)

[WASHINGTON,] January 1, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor of British Embassy
Mr. Murray, NEA⁴
Mr. Alling, NEA⁵
Mr. Parker, NE

Mr. Murray began by stating that unlike the British Government, which has funds available for such purposes, this Government has been obliged to rely upon lend lease as a means of rendering financial assistance to Saudi Arabia. This, he pointed out, is only a temporary expedient on our part which, of course, is not a very satisfactory method of providing such assistance. We have, therefore, been making plans to secure adequate funds for assisting Saudi Arabia on a sound, long-range basis. Necessarily legislative authorization will be required to obtain such funds. For this reason it is not possible as yet to explain our plans in detail.

Mr. Murray continued by stating that the Department has instructed the American Minister⁶ to inform King Ibn Saud⁷ at the time of his forthcoming visit to Jidda that we are making plans of the aforementioned character and will acquaint him with the details of

¹ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 670 ff.

² For previous documentation on the construction of an airfield at Dhahran, see *ibid.*, pp. 661 ff.

³ For previous documentation on the Agricultural Mission, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 561 ff., and *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, p. 708, footnote 12.

⁴ Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁵ Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁶ Col. William A. Eddy, Minister to Saudi Arabia.

⁷ Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

these plans at such time as it may be possible to do so. We shall also, Mr. Murray stated, inform the British Government of the nature of these plans at the time we convey this information to the King.

Mr. Murray stated further that our Minister is not informing Mr. Jordan, his British colleague, of the message he is about to convey to the King because of Mr. Jordan's generally uncooperative attitude in the past.⁸ Mr. Murray referred to Mr. Jordan's action in at least two cases (i.e., the Dhahran airfield and the radio station matters⁹) in discussing matters of interest to this Government with Saudi Arabian officials without acting jointly with our Minister in regard to these matters. Cooperation, Mr. Murray pointed out, works both ways, and, if Mr. Jordan acts alone, of course our Minister must do likewise.

Mr. Wright inquired whether it would be possible at this time to provide detailed information about our plans for assisting Saudi Arabia. Mr. Murray replied that our plans are not yet in final shape and that, therefore, we could not discuss them as yet in detail.

Mr. Wright stated that just before coming to the Department he had read through hastily a telegram to his Embassy just received from the Foreign Office regarding the 1944 joint supply program and certain plans for 1945. He said that he had not had an opportunity to digest this telegram fully but that he would like to discuss this matter further at the Department on the afternoon of January 3. It was agreed that Mr. Wright should return at that time to continue the discussions.¹⁰

S90F.51/1-145: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, January 1, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received January 2—1:26 a. m.]

3. King Abdul Aziz expressed gratitude for message Department's 283, December 24, 2 p. m.¹¹ which I delivered to him in private audience today. He welcomed prospect of early accords with United States Government which in the past either referred him to British or seemed to accept unsatisfactory British terms of joint proposals to him.

King stated bluntly, "I have always found goodness and honor in my American friends, and usually in my British friends, including the former Minister Mr. Bird."¹² But Jordan is our enemy and an enemy

⁸ For documentation regarding the dissatisfaction of the United States Government with Mr. Jordan's activities, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 752 ff., *passim*.

⁹ For documentation regarding the proposed establishment of a direct radio-telegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia, see *ibid.*, pp. 760 ff.

¹⁰ No record of further discussions on January 3 found in Department files.

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

¹² Francis H. W. Stonehewer-Bird, British Minister in Saudi Arabia, 1940 to 1943.

of the USA too. To the extent of his power he has sought to prevent our good relations and to injure my country. Except for his evil influence, I am sure the mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and the USA would have developed more rapidly months ago. I have confirmed that his more malicious acts were his own without knowledge of the British Government.”

King urged again need for transport especially trucks to move essential goods stating that depreciation of vehicles and cannibalization of cars to secure spare parts make situation desperate.

EDDY

890F.51/1-845

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] January 8, 1945.

When we talked together on the 23rd of December, I referred briefly to the attached memorandum¹³ outlining a program of seeking Congressional approval for direct financial aid to Saudi Arabia.

Lend-Lease aid will not be available for this purpose after this fiscal year. The attached memorandum gives reasons indicating why it is in our national interest to extend this assistance, otherwise Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly turn elsewhere with resulting grave long range effects on our position in that country. The War and Navy Departments agree as to its desirability. Estimates of the amount involved vary from a minimum of 28 million to a maximum of 57 million, for the five year period 1945-50.

We did not have the time to go into the matter thoroughly together but it was my understanding that you were favorably inclined towards the proposal. I enclose the memorandum from which we talked for your consideration and approval.¹⁴

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

800.24/1-2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945—7 p. m.

24. From Department and FEA for Eddy and Awalt.¹⁵

1. On January 20 Department and FEA proposed to British representatives here that Saudi Arabian Supply Program be continued for first six months of 1945 on same basis as 1944 Joint Supply Pro-

¹³ Dated December 22, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 757.

¹⁴ Marginal notation: "ERS Jr., OK, FDR".

¹⁵ Fred H. Awalt, Economic Analyst at the Legation in Saudi Arabia; acted also as Territorial Representative of the Foreign Economic Administration in Saudi Arabia and Jidda Representative of the Middle East Supply Center (MESAC).

gram. British have apparently viewed proposal with favor. London is being consulted, but we anticipate early agreement.

2. Proposal contemplates that first half 1945 Joint Supply Program will cover same items (except for currency) as 1944 program and that quantities of these items to be supplied will be one-half agreed 1944 quantities.

3. Since no decision has yet been reached regarding method of financing U.S. contribution to Saudi Arabia after July 1, 1945, above proposal has been made to insure uninterrupted movement of supplies into Saudi Arabia during next six months while this problem is under consideration.

[Here follows discussion of shipments of cereals to Saudi Arabia.]
Sent to Jidda, repeated to Cairo. [Department and FEA.]

GREW

890F.51/1-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1945—3 p. m.

27. The Department would appreciate amplification of Saudi budget figures contained in Legation's 33, January 24, 5 p. m.¹⁶ or comment thereon.

The only feasible method of providing assistance to Saudi Arabia in the first half of 1945 would appear to be a continuation of the same general procedure used in 1944. You are authorized in your discretion therefore to discuss with your British colleague such assistance as may be necessary to meet the 1945 supply, budgetary and currency requirements of Saudi Arabia, taking into account: (1) MESC appraisal of Saudi import needs, (2) the proposed continuation of 1944 joint supply program at same level through first half of 1945, and (3) 1944 budget figures and 1945 estimates furnished by Saudi Government.

Wherever necessary discussions may extend to entire calendar year 1945 but separate recommendations should be made for first half of year. You are authorized to bring the appropriate Saudi officials into the discussions to the extent you deem advisable.

GREW

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported, in millions of riyals, budget figures furnished by the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as follows: for 1944, expenditures of 143.5 and income of 137.9, of which 94.6 represented British and American subsidies; and estimates for 1945 of expenditures of 114.3, including the 1944 deficit of 5.6, and income of 81.5, of which 43.6 were to be British and American subsidies (890F.51/1-2445). The Saudi Arabian statement, dated January 19, 1945, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 63, January 31, not printed.

890F.51/2-1245 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, February 12, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received 8:29 a. m.]

61. Reference Department's 27, February 3, 3 p. m. British Minister waiting instructions before joining me in discussion of Saudi finance and currency requirements. He insists privately that there is no currency problem, we should lend lease no more riyals and he resents our sale of bullion gold to Saudi. Obviously he will press for substantial cut in total subsidy without regard to Saudi budget and needs. I agreed to defer discussion of budget and currency for a few days.

He agreed to join me in recommendation "that the subsidy supply program of commodities be continued for 6 months January 1-June 30, 1945 at the same level of quantities and total cost as 1944 subsidy, with substitutions and improvements proposed through MESC, provided: that any joint subsidy for 1945 or fraction thereof be decreased in total cost to combined governments below 1944 figures by (1) increase in revenue from oil (2) increase in revenue from pilgrimage and (3) profit from sale of bullion gold." To this I agreed as these increases, if any, will appear in Saudi budget.

Comment

1. In view of expectations we have raised in Saudi minds (reference Department's 283, December 24, 2 p. m.¹⁷) urgent we balance their legitimate budget and not join British in imposing less help than in 1944. While joint subsidy should allow for increased Saudi income as above and though certain commodities such as textiles should be partially returned to commercial channels the USA should assure balanced budget by additional help outside of subsidy if necessary with or without Jordan's concurrence in Saudi budget figures.

2. If lend lease to Saudi Arabia will end in June I recommend urgently that total lend lease riyals for entire year be authorized and minted before June. Ten million at least needed again. Consult Lebkicher Aramco¹⁸ who believes 15 million additional riyals for sale to Americans needed this spring. Riyals and gold bullion may be our only present means of supplementing Saudi income if British insist upon inadequate subsidy.

3. Comment on Saudi budget will follow shortly.¹⁹

EDDY

¹⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

¹⁸ Roy Lebkicher, representative of the Arabian American Oil Company who acted in a liaison capacity with the Saudi Arabian Government on currency questions.

¹⁹ In despatch 77, March 2, 1945, the Minister in Saudi Arabia stated: "I am convinced that the Saudi Arabian budget statements are modest and reasonable. Obviously, some of their expenditures cannot be verified, but it may be noted that, in spite of a sharp rise in costs, they have not increased their expenditures in the estimate for 1945. In summary, a grant of five million dollars would balance the Saudi Arabian budget for 1945." (890F.51/3-245) For Saudi Arabian budget figures, see footnote 16, p. 848.

S90F.515/1-2445

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Foreign Economic Administrator
(Crowley)*

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. CROWLEY: I refer to your letter of January 24, 1945,²⁰ addressed to the Secretary, reviewing certain aspects of lend-lease assistance to Saudi Arabia in the past, and recalling discussions between officers of the Department and the Foreign Economic Administration with regard to the desirability of placing the Saudi Arabian supply program on a more permanent basis and of substituting some other form of assistance for lend-lease aid. Your letter suggests that any new means of financing a supply program for Saudi Arabia should take effect at the beginning of the 1946 fiscal year, that is, on July 1, 1945.

While the Department is aware of the reluctance of the Foreign Economic Administration to continue lend-lease aid to Saudi Arabia after June 30, 1945, and will continue to press its search for a feasible alternative procedure, no definite plans have yet matured. In the Department's judgment it would be unwise to assume that such plans can be developed and put into effect before July 1, 1946.

To provide sufficient time for consideration of all the factors involved, because of the political importance of assuring an uninterrupted flow of essential supplies to Saudi Arabia, and in furtherance of the war effort, it is requested that the Foreign Economic Administration take the measures necessary to make lend-lease help available to Saudi Arabia until July 1, 1946 on approximately the same basis as during the calendar year 1944.

The Department and the Foreign Economic Administration have already proposed to the British Embassy the continuation of the joint supply program for Saudi Arabia during the first semester of 1945 at the same level as in 1944. Conceivably it might be necessary to continue at this level throughout 1945 and the first six months of 1946. Aid to be extended to Saudi Arabia during the first half of 1945 would be financed from the current Foreign Economic Administration budget, while that extended during the latter half of 1945 and the first six months of 1946 would be charged to the 1946 appropriations of the Foreign Economic Administration. It is therefore suggested that the necessary provisions be made in your 1946 budget estimates to allow for help to Saudi Arabia as indicated above. The Department of State will be glad, if requested to do so, to support the inclusion of lend-lease funds for Saudi Arabia in your 1946 estimates.

²⁰ Not printed.

The foregoing is based on the assumption that during the entire period to July 1, 1946, a joint American-British supply program for Saudi Arabia similar to that in effect in 1944 will be in operation. Should the British contribution to the joint program be decreased or withdrawn, help for Saudi Arabia might be needed on a scale larger than that indicated above.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

890F.51/2-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1945—7 p. m.

47. Export-Import Bank has been approached²¹ with respect to possible financing of essential development projects in [Saudi] Arabia. In this connection Wagner²² was asked whether he would be willing to have Twitchell²³ supply first hand information on possible projects which could be submitted for Export-Import Bank consideration. Wagner now wants Twitchell to airmail suggestions for three or four specific projects, listed in the order of importance to the Saudi Arab economy and interest to the King, according to Twitchell's judgment. He should also give his best estimate of probable cost of each project listed, and any other details which he believes would be useful in determining feasibility of undertakings, such as labor and material requirements, engineering difficulties, et cetera.

The Legation is authorized to use its discretion in communicating the foregoing to Twitchell and in the transmission of his recommendations by official channels. In discussing this matter with Twitchell, its confidential character should be emphasized, and it should be made clear that the matter is not to be discussed with Saudi Arab officials.²⁴

GREW

²¹ In a memorandum of February 6, 1945, Paul F. McGuire of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs stated that Departmental officers met with the Export-Import Bank on February 2, 3, and 5 (890F.51/2-645).

²² Marcel Wagner, President of the American Eastern Corporation.

²³ Karl E. Twitchell, representative of the American Eastern Corporation in Saudi Arabia, who had acted as an informal representative of King Ibn Saud in the United States and had headed the American Agricultural Mission to Saudi Arabia in 1942.

²⁴ In despatch 79, March 3, 1945, the Minister in Saudi Arabia transmitted copy of a letter from Mr. Twitchell to Mr. Wagner, in which was outlined a number of development projects in Saudi Arabia for possible consideration by the Export-Import Bank (890F.51/3-345). In a memorandum of April 10, the Vice President of the Export-Import Bank (Whittemore) stated: "The Bank has received through the medium of the State Department a request for credits to Saudi Arabia to finance modest sized worth while development projects. Among those which have been suggested is a water system for Jidda, some roads and some reclamation projects. It is recommended that a credit of not to exceed \$5,000,000 be authorized", subject to various terms and conditions (890F.51/4-1045).

890F.51/2-2245

*Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*²⁵

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE FOR THE EXTENSION OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate and to recommend the procedure to be followed in the immediate future for the purpose of furnishing economic assistance to Saudi Arabia.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Just prior to the establishment of SWNCC, conversations between the State, War and Navy Departments resulted in the submission of a memorandum to the President²⁶ with respect to the provision of financial aid to Saudi Arabia. It was pointed out that the current budgetary deficits of that country are a source of concern to this Government, and it was recommended that all possible steps be taken to supply aid, including, if necessary, a request to Congress for an appropriation to be used directly to this end. The President approved this recommendation in principle.

3. With the establishment of SWNCC, the problem of devising ways and means of achieving the objectives so approved by the President was laid before it. This Sub-Committee was, in turn, constituted for the purpose of investigating and reporting as to the procedure to be followed.

4. The most important economic fact in connection with Saudi Arabia is the presence in that country of rich oil resources presently under concession to American companies. Although the War Department has an interest in Saudi Arabia because of its geographical location athwart the most direct air route to the East, it is the oil of Saudi Arabia which makes that country of particular interest to the armed services. It is the wartime inability to develop the existing oil concessions in a normal commercial fashion which is the main source of the present budgetary deficits. It has been recognized from the beginning that, in addition to the extension of self-liquidating loans for projects by an agency such as the Export-Import Bank, a solution not available for the moment, the channels of possible assistance to Saudi Arabia divide broadly into two:

(a) The immediate and interim, although indirect, assistance which can be furnished by the War Department through (1) the construc-

²⁵ Circulated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 19/1 on February 22, 1945.

²⁶ Dated December 22, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 757.

tion of military air fields, (2) the improvement of roads, and (3) the despatching of a military mission; and

(b) The longer range and much more important direct assistance which may conceivably be supplied through arrangements relating to the oil resources.

5. The Sub-Committee's consideration has been given to both of these avenues of approach. In the case of the former, on February 7, 1945, SWNCC referred to the Sub-Committee a paper, SWNCC 19,²⁷ consisting of a report to the Assistant Secretary of War²⁸ from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff²⁹ reciting the projects which the War Department is prepared to embark upon immediately. They are: (a) the establishment of a military mission,³⁰ (b) the improvement of certain roads, and (c) the construction of an airport at Dhahran. The first two are not regarded by the War Department as necessary to the prosecution of the present war and will be proceeded with only upon the State Department's assurance that they are advisable and in the national interest in order to assist in the accomplishment of other important objectives. The construction of the Dhahran field is, on the other hand, considered by the War Department to be necessary to the prosecution of the present war.

6. The State Department member of the Sub-Committee reports that the State Department is ready to extend the formal assurances required with respect to the military mission and road improvement projects. The State Department also strongly favors the third project but, on the basis of information received by it, is of the opinion that permission to construct the Dhahran field cannot be obtained from King Ibn Saud until after British consent is procured, which, in this instance, involves concurrence by the British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the case of all three of the War Department projects there is, of course, the need for prior discussions and negotiations with Ibn Saud in order that he shall have been fully informed, and shall have approved in advance, of everything that is proposed to be done. Assuming the fact of British consent to the proposed air field, it is the recommendation of the State Department that a War Department representative be sent immediately to Saudi Arabia to meet with Colonel Eddy, the American Minister, to discuss the presentation to King Ibn Saud of the plans for the three War Department projects. It will be for Colonel Eddy, in consultation with the War

²⁷ Memorandum of February 5, 1945, from the War Department to the Department of State, not printed.

²⁸ John J. McCloy.

²⁹ Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy.

³⁰ A United States Army Military Mission, consisting of a small ground force training group, under Col. Garrett B. Shomber, had been functioning in Saudi Arabia since 1944; for the establishment of the Mission, see despatch 145, March 29, 1944, from the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 678.

Department representative to recommend whether or not the military mission and the road improvement projects are to be presented to the King as matters on which the War Department is prepared to proceed immediately and irrespective of the construction of the air field; or whether the three projects are to be taken up simultaneously on the basis that Saudi Arabian consent to the air field is a *sine qua non* of this Government's decision to provide the other two.

7. The Sub-Committee's consideration of the second method of approach to Saudi Arabia's financial difficulties, namely, the oil resources, resulted in a unanimity of conclusion that the only permanent solution of these difficulties lies in increasing the development and commercial utilization of the petroleum deposits. A normal commercial exploitation of these resources should provide the royalties which mean financial stability to Saudi Arabia. The problem at the moment is that production is well below the point where the royalty revenues to the King are adequate to his country's needs. As of the end of 1945, it is expected that production will reach a level where oil royalties approximate $7\frac{1}{2}$ millions of dollars; whereas the King's annual requirements from oil royalties, as distinct from and exclusive of all of his non-oil revenues such as the pilgrim traffic, are approximately double this amount. The direct financial aid from the United States, contemplated in the memorandum for the President, should be directed towards filling up this gap by one means or another until such time as it is reasonable to expect that the resumption of normal trade conditions will admit of a production which supplies the necessary royalties.

8. The Sub-Committee concluded that the next step should be for the State Department to approach Senator Connally, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and to lay the problem informally before him, in the hope that his responses would shed some light on the particular kind of solution that would meet with Congressional favor. The Sub-Committee is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the State Department's representative in such conversation to have been supplied in advance with two things: first, an estimate, worked out in as detailed and precise a manner as possible from available figures, of Saudi Arabia's actual needs for financial aid over the next few years, and, second, a number of alternate plans, even though formulated in the broadest outline, for the extension of such aid. It is the Sub-Committee's thought that the Senator in all events will desire to have as exact an idea as possible of the actual amounts of money involved; and, further, that, should he appear disposed to explore the matter of specific plans in any detail, it would be wise to have suggestions at hand to make to him for his consideration. In this connection the Sub-Committee discussed a number of possible alternatives which this Government might follow in making

available such funds as Congress may appropriate. These alternatives included the following:

a. Advances to the Saudi Arabian Government to be repaid from future royalties.

b. Loans to the Saudi Arabian Government to be secured by interests in the oil reserves.

c. Purchases by the United States Government, either from the Saudi Arabian Government or from the interested private companies, of direct interests in the oil reserves in the ground.

d. Purchases from the private companies of oil above ground for future delivery.

e. Options to purchase oil above or below ground.

f. Loans to the private companies to make advance royalty payments, or to build facilities to increase production

g. Construction by this Government of facilities which will result in increased production.

h. Outright grants to the Saudi Arabian Government of sums needed to make up budgetary deficits.

9. The Sub-Committee's consideration of the foregoing methods did not extend to the advocacy of any one of them as against the others. They are merely regarded as suggestive of the different types of plans which can be elaborated and, if the circumstances warrant, brought to the attention of Senator Connally. The Sub-Committee did incline very much to the view that the most fruitful approach undoubtedly lies along some line involving active and direct participation by the private companies in the financial burdens involved.

10. Whatever form the financial assistance to be provided by this Government may ultimately take, the Sub-Committee was in complete agreement that it should be accompanied by arrangements for intimate and continuing participation by this Government in the supervision and administration of Saudi Arabian public finances. This could probably best be accomplished by detailing American financial advisers to work directly with the Saudi Arabian Government. Some considerable degree of American supervision in this regard is also important from the standpoint of assuring the achievement of one of the major objectives of the assistance program, namely, an improvement of the standards of living and general economic well-being of the Saudi Arabian population.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. The Sub-Committee's specific recommendations as to the procedure to be followed immediately are:

I. The War Department's Projects

A. Airfield at Dhahran

1. A letter in the form of Appendix A ³¹ should be sent im-

³¹ Not printed.

mediately by SWNCC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting the latter to take up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, the question of British approval of the proposed field.

2. As soon as such approval has been secured and appropriately communicated to the King through the British Foreign Office, negotiations with respect to the field, including efforts to secure post-war rights of the nature specified in SWNCC 19, should be undertaken under the supervision of the State Department.
3. In anticipation of such negotiations, Colonel Voris H. Connor should be sent immediately to Saudi Arabia with instructions to discuss with the American Minister there the manner of the presentation to King Ibn Saud of the question of the air field at Dhahran. Colonel Connor shall be instructed to make clear to the American Minister that it is for the latter, in consultation with the War Department representative, to recommend whether the two projects described hereinafter in paragraphs B and C shall be presented to the King as matters upon which the United States is prepared to act without reference to the Dhahran air field, or whether the King's consent to the construction of the latter on satisfactory terms is a condition precedent to American aid in the form of the military mission and the road improvement projects.
4. Actual construction of the field shall be commenced by the War Department upon receipt of official notice from the State Department that satisfactory negotiations with respect to it have been completed.

B. The Military Mission

1. The Secretary of State should notify the Secretary of War by letter that the mission is advisable and in the national interest.
2. The preliminary organization of the military mission should be proceeded with, including the prompt despatch of Colonel Voris H. Connor to Saudi Arabia where he will, in conjunction with the American Minister and subject to the conclusions of the latter as contemplated in sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph A above, discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government the scope and nature of the mission.
3. The Military Mission shall be actually despatched to Saudi Arabia upon receipt by the Secretary of War of notification from the Secretary of State that satisfactory negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government with respect to the details thereof have been completed.

C. The Improvement of the Roads

1. The Secretary of State should notify the Secretary of War by letter that the road improvement project is advisable and in the national interest.
2. The preliminary plans for the road improvements should be proceeded with, including the prompt despatch of Colonel Voris H. Connor to Saudi Arabia where he will, in conjunction with the American Minister and subject to the conclusions of the latter as contemplated in sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph A above, discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government the details of such improvement program.
3. The road improvement shall actually be begun upon receipt by the Secretary of War of notification by the Secretary of State that satisfactory negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government with respect to the details thereof have been completed.

II. The Oil Resources

- A. The question of further financial assistance to Saudi Arabia, over and above those limited and interim benefits which will result from the War Department's projects described above, should be further studied and related to the exploitation of the Saudi Arabian oil resources.
- B. The State Department, for the use of its representative in exploratory conversations with the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee should prepare (1) an estimate of Saudi Arabia's financial needs over the next few years, and (2) a suggested method, or alternative methods, by which, in the opinion of the State Department, direct financial assistance to meet those needs might be afforded by the United States. The documents so prepared by the State Department shall be laid by the Sub-Committee before SWNCC. Under Secretary of the Navy Bard has asked to attend the SWNCC meeting at which these documents will be considered.³²
- C. After consideration by SWNCC and at its direction, the problem presented by the inadequacy of present royalty revenues should be discussed informally with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, with a view to ascertaining probable Congressional sentiment as to the best method of rendering financial assistance. The results of this conversation will be

³² In accordance with the recommendations in this paragraph, the Department prepared two studies entitled "The Budgetary Requirements of the Saudi Arabian Government, 1945-1949" and "Alternative Methods for Direct Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia", neither printed. The studies were circulated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 19/2 on March 1, 1945.

reported to SWNCC by the Sub-Committee, together with recommendations for such further steps as appear to be desirable.³³

890F.51/2-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1945—7 p. m.

50. ReDepts 24, January 27, 7 p. m. In further discussions with British on February 9 proposal to continue modified joint supply program was modified and British authorities here have again referred to London for instructions.

Proposal in its present form contemplates assurance to King Ibn Saud that arrangements are being made for prompt delivery of supplies in substantially half the quantities (not necessarily half the values nor for any definite number of months) specified in joint note to the King dated August 1, 1944 as supplemented by subsequent agreement (reDepts 177, September 12³⁴) and for continuation of monthly credits of £10,000 for diplomatic missions. King Ibn Saud would be informed at same time that this aid is intended to cover interim period to allow new plans for assistance to be worked out, also that before next July 1 he will be apprized of what further assistance can be given him in 1945. It should be noted that proposal does not now provide that 1944 level of joint supply program will be maintained in 1945 or in any period thereof, though such intention might be inferred. Neither does it prevent either American or British Government from extending appropriate aid outside joint program in 1945 as both did in 1944.

It is not clear to the Department what considerations make it desirable as recommended reurtel 61, February 12, 8 a. m. to decrease the 1945 joint supply program to offset possible increases in 1945 revenues, rather than to take such items of income into account as 1945 general budgetary receipts.³⁵

The Treasury has indicated that it will wish to give thoroughgoing consideration to impending Saudi requests for lend lease silver, and action on such requests in the past has been slow. It therefore behooves the Saudi Government to make a preliminary request at an early moment for such silver as it will require in 1945 for dollar-riyal conversion and any other currency purposes.

³³ By informal action, recorded in SWNCC 19/3, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved on March 2 the recommendations contained in paragraph 11.

³⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 739.

³⁵ In telegram 96, March 8, 1945, 3 p. m., the Minister in Saudi Arabia stated that the decrease referred to was in the total cost of the financial subsidy, not in commodity supplies (890F.51/3-845).

Even though the British Minister has not yet been authorized to discuss Saudi supply, currency and budgetary needs in 1945, there seems to be no reason why fullest details should not be obtained now.

You should therefore bring to the attention of the appropriate Saudi authorities the need for prompt submission of any contemplated request for silver, without, however, suggesting any quantity. On February 6, Aramco wired Ohliger³⁶ to inform Saudi Government that oil company will require 15 million riyals. The Department will endeavor to secure prompt consideration here.

You should keep the British Minister fully informed of your action. His cooperation would be welcome but is not essential since the British Government is unlikely to supply silver to Saudi Arabia. If impracticable in Jidda, coordination with the British can be achieved here by joint discussions before action is decided upon.

GREW

890F.51/3-245

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's document SWNCC 19 of February 7, 1945 entitled "Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia".³⁷ There was set forth therein a proposal for the despatch of a United States Military Mission to Saudi Arabia.

I consider that such a mission is advisable and in the national interest. I recommend, therefore, that this mission be established administratively as soon as practicable and despatched to Saudi Arabia at such time and under such circumstances as may be considered appropriate, following recommendations regarding the matter from the American Minister at Jidda and subsequent negotiations with the Government of Saudi Arabia with respect thereto.³⁸

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

890F.51/3-245

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee's document SWNCC 19 of February 7, 1945 entitled

³⁶ Floyd Ohliger, manager in Saudi Arabia of the Arabian American Oil Company.

³⁷ See paragraph numbered 5 of the Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, p. 852.

³⁸ In his reply of March 7, 1945, the Secretary of War stated that he was taking action to establish and despatch the Mission as recommended (890F.51/3-745).

"Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia". There was set forth therein a project for the improvement of roads in Saudi Arabia by the United States Army.

I consider that such a mission is advisable and in the national interest. I recommend, therefore, that administrative arrangements be made for this project as soon as practicable and that this project be undertaken at such time and under such circumstances as may be considered appropriate, following recommendations regarding the matter from the American Minister at Jidda and subsequent negotiations with the Government of Saudi Arabia with respect thereto.⁴⁰

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

890F.20/3-245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1945—8 p. m.

64. ReLegs 82, March 2, 11 a. m.⁴¹ It is expected that Colonel Voris H. Connor will depart for Jidda within the next few days to discuss with you plans for the despatch of a military mission in Saudi Arabia which *inter alia* will undertake road improvement and pilot training projects. It is contemplated that after conferring with him you will submit your recommendations to the Department, and, upon receipt of instructions based thereon, that you will, with his assistance, negotiate with the Saudi Arab Government for establishment of the mission.

The Dhahran airfield matter is being taken up in Washington by the Joint Chiefs with the Combined Chiefs. If the British objection is withdrawn, you will be instructed also to negotiate regarding this matter.

You should remind the King of your remarks to the effect that this Government is actively engaged in formulating plans for financial and economic assistance (reDepts 283, December 24, 2 p. m.⁴²) and express the hope that he will make no commitments inconsistent with the extension of such assistance before the plan can be explained further in detail. You should not mention, of course, the plan for a military mission.

GREW

⁴⁰ In his reply of March 7, 1945, the Secretary of War stated that he was making administrative arrangements to implement the project along the lines recommended by the Department of State (890F.51/3-745).

⁴¹ Not printed.

⁴² *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

890F.00/3-845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1945.

In accordance with the direction of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Mr. Acheson arranged through the Speaker of the House a conference which was held this afternoon.⁴³ There were present the Speaker; the Majority Floor Leader, Mr. McCormack; Mr. Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee; Mr. Drewry, ranking Majority Member of that Committee; the Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Bard; Mr. Keith Kane,⁴⁴ Colonel George Brownell⁴⁵ and Mr. Acheson. Mr. Bloom of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Mr. May of the Military Affairs Committee, who had been expected, were not present.

Mr. Acheson presented to the meeting the financial situation of the Saudi Arabian Government, the assistance which had hitherto been provided by the British Government and by this Government through Lend-Lease, and the needs of the Saudi Arabian Government for the next five years, pointing out that this demonstrated an approximate deficit of \$50,000,000 over the next five years, of which about three-fifths would occur in the next two years. He reviewed the existing oil concessions held by American companies and the interest of the Navy in preserving those concessions. He indicated the possible danger to those concessions should the Saudi Arabian governmental deficit not be met. He also touched briefly upon the desire of the Army to establish an airfield in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Bard for the Navy and Colonel Brownell for the Army briefly stated the interest of their Departments in this matter, Mr. Bard stressing the desirability of obtaining for the armed forces the right to draw on Saudi Arabian oil to relieve reserves in this country.

Mr. Acheson then stated that the first question was to obtain the advice and guidance of the Leaders as to whether and how the aid of the Congress could be enlisted to make possible the granting to Saudi Arabia of the financial assistance needed. He stated that if the Leaders believed that the Congress would be willing to take such a step there were, in general, four ways of going about it. The first would be a series of outright grants to the Saudi Arabian Government. This was the method followed by the British Government. The second was a series of payments to the Saudi Arabian Government in return for which it would make firm guarantees regarding the conces-

⁴³ Conference held in the Office of the Speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn of Texas.

⁴⁴ R. Keith Kane, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.

⁴⁵ Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (Lovett).

sions. The United States might obtain in return for these payments either from the Government or from the oil companies a right to a billion barrels of oil at an agreed rate per year and at a price which would return the money to this Government through a reduced price of oil. The third method would be an unsecured loan with the Saudi Arabian Government to be repaid when its revenues were restored to a point agreed upon. The fourth method would be a guaranteed loan by which future royalties paid by the oil companies to the Government would be assigned to this Government in such way as would repay the amounts advanced.

The Speaker stated that in his opinion it was highly desirable to undertake these payments even though they were made on the basis of a direct grant. The other Leaders present expressed their agreement of the desirability of adopting one or a combination of the methods. Mr. Vinson was strongly in favor of a method which would obtain a *quid pro quo* for the United States, believing that if such were done the possibility of approval would be greatly increased. He strongly favored the *quid pro quo* which would obtain oil at a reduced price for the armed forces. Mr. Drewry agreed with this view. Mr. McCormack also expressed approval, although at one time in the discussion Mr. McCormack appeared to favor a secured loan.

The suggestion was then made that a draft proposal should be prepared and that the meeting should be reconvened at an early date.

Mr. Acheson then inquired whether it was the opinion of the Leaders that such a draft proposal should spell out in the formal legislation the entire transaction or whether it would seem wiser to the Leaders to have legislative action consist of placing the necessary funds in the hands of the Secretary of State, or in the hands of the Secretary of Navy to be spent through the State Department, without specifying the purpose except in the most general way, with an understanding between the Executive Departments and the appropriate Committees of the House and the Senate that the funds should be expended in a particular way and the Committee kept informed. The discussion brought out for consideration that if the entire matter were stated at some length in a bill this would require extensive hearings in which strong attitudes might be taken by various private interests, that such a debate could not take place before the Saudi Arabian Government is approached without doing great harm in the negotiations, and that embarrassment might occur if the debate takes place after the Saudi Arabian Government is approached. It appeared to the Leaders highly desirable and practicable to adopt the second course. [Here follows discussion regarding development of a domestic oil reserve.]

It was agreed that the officers from the Executive Departments should confer at once, prepare some concrete suggestions, and resume the conference at an early date.

After the conference these officers agreed that they should immediately proceed with this and also with discussions with appropriate Senators.

DEAN ACHESON

890F.51/3-1645 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, March 16, 1945—noon.

[Received 2:25 p. m.]

109. ReLegs 96, March 8, 3 p. m.⁴⁶ Saudi Government officially requests riyals for 1945 as follows:

“(a) Fifteen million riyals requested for sale to Aramco as requested by them February 27. (Comment) This does not include riyals for sale to American Legation and to SAMS⁴⁷ which resumes operations next month with expanding riyal needs.

(b) Fifteen million riyals lend lease for the Government of Saudi Arabia to meet her essential requirements because:

1. Except in a few cities Arabians have used Maria Theresa dollars and rupees until quite recently. Now riyals are the sole currency everywhere.

2. Financiers and merchants used to hold their balances in foreign exchange. Now that the riyal is more stable than foreign currencies they hold their assets in riyals.

3. The silver content of the riyal has a market in Saudi Arabia as commodity silver and jewellers consume many riyals in making ornaments.

The Saudi Government therefore requests a total of 30 million riyals for 1945 in accordance with the terms agreed in 1944⁴⁸ to meet the needs of the Government and of Aramco.”

EDDY

890F.24/3-1445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1945—9 p. m.

652. ReLegs 643, March 14, 3 a. m.⁴⁹ For Hoskins⁵⁰ and Dawson.⁵¹ On March 14 Department and FEA representatives met with British

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate.

⁴⁸ Two agreements were entered into in 1944 on this matter: see telegrams 57, April 12, 1944, to the Minister Resident in Saudi Arabia, and 180, September 14, 1944, 8 p. m., to the Appointed Minister to Saudi Arabia, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 681 and 740, respectively.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, Adviser on Economic Affairs, assigned concurrently to Missions in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia: resident at Cairo.

⁵¹ John P. Dawson, Special Representative of the Foreign Economic Administration at Cairo.

officials to discuss possibilities of a joint Saudi Arabian supply program for 1945. British on instructions from London proposed cutting extent of joint aid arbitrarily in half; Department on the other hand insisted that Saudi Arabia's minimum essential needs, both supply and budgetary, must be met, taking into consideration what merchants may be reasonably expected to import through commercial channels. British are reporting our view to London requesting instructions. If London accepts our view, it is contemplated that Eddy will be instructed to confer with British Minister and submit recommendations and factual statements as to what these minimum essential needs are.

It is believed it may prove helpful to attempt to define the functions, as we see them, of the various groups concerned with a joint supply program for Saudi Arabia:

1. MESC shall determine, just as is done with respect to all other territories, over-all total Saudi Arabian imports, of which the joint supply program would form a part.

2. Department, together with FEA, in consultation with the British in Washington will determine principles upon which joint program is to be based.

3. Eddy, presumably after consultation with British Minister, will provide Department with facts, figures and information needed to translate the principles agreed upon into actual aid (to determine, for example, what are the minimum essential needs to be met under a joint program and what specifically is required to meet these needs). In compiling this factual information Eddy may call upon American economic officials in Cairo for such assistance as he desires and Cairo will cooperate fully in complying with his requests.

4. Upon receipt of factual information and recommendations from Eddy, Department, together with FEA, will seek agreement with British in Washington on actual program based on Eddy's findings, to which British Minister at Jidda presumably will have agreed.

5. After specific program is agreed upon, FEA and American economic officials in Cairo, in conjunction with MESC, will arrange for sources of supply, effect deliveries and maintain delivery schedules.

6. Eddy and Cairo should keep each other and Department fully informed of their activities with respect to aspects of the program for which they have primary responsibility.

6. [*sic*] Although policies and general principles will be determined in Washington, Eddy and also American economic officials in Cairo should feel free at all times to make recommendations and offer suggestions in regard thereto to Department.

Sent to Cairo, repeated to Jidda.⁵²

ACHESON

⁵² As telegram 80.

890F.51/3-1645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1945—7 p. m.

82. [Here follows discussion of sale of gold by the Saudi Arabian Government to produce revenue, and of other factors affecting the Saudi Arabian budget.]

For your information also, after studying your despatches no. 63, January 31,⁵³ and no. 77, March 2,⁵⁴ the Department's thinking tends towards acceptance of the SAG^{54a} estimates of expenditures and revenues, except for revision of revenues as follows:

(a) Royalties increased by \$2,220,000 to \$3,600,000 on information supplied by Aramco.

(b) New item for seigniorage on 15,000,000 riyals (may actually be 17,000,000) in amount of 6,000,000 riyals, and new item for profit on conversion into gold, 3,000,000 riyals, or total increased revenue of 9,000,000 riyals or \$2,700,000 from metals programs.

Total increased revenues from (a) and (b) would be \$4,920,000, which would reduce SAG estimated deficit from \$23,143,000 to \$18,223,000. Your comments are requested.

Other adjustments might prove possible, if some trade could be returned to normal channels with less than dollar for dollar effect on SAG revenues from sales of supplies. Or perhaps SAG should be expected to sell a somewhat greater proportion of its supplies, in view of increasing employment of Arab labor by Aramco and SAMS. These are merely suggestions for your consideration. At present, pending further advice from you, Department considers \$18,000,000 to be the total requirements of SAG for external assistance in 1945.

Sent to Jidda, repeated to Cairo.

GREW

890F.51/3-1645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1945—9 p. m.

84. ReLegs 110, March 16, 5 p. m.⁵⁵ It is hoped that you have been reassured by Department's 80, March 19, 9 p. m.⁵⁶ Department, furthermore, is requesting FEA to finance if necessary entire supply program for 1945 up to approximately 18 million dollars with or with-

⁵³ Not printed ; but see footnote 16, p. 848.

⁵⁴ Not printed ; but see footnote 19, p. 849.

^{54a} Saudi Arabian Government.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ Same as telegram 652, March 19, 9 p. m., to the Minister in Egypt, p. 863.

out British participation. Although this matter is still under discussion, it is hoped FEA will accede to Department's request. Department is doing its best to support you.

Sent to Jidda, repeated to Cairo.

GREW

890F.515/3-2345

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Foreign Economic Administrator
(Crowley)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. CROWLEY: I refer to the Department's letter of February 14, 1945, concerning lend-lease assistance to Saudi Arabia and the proposed continuation of the American-British joint supply program for that country during 1945.

The British Government has now proposed that any joint supply program for 1945 be fixed arbitrarily at approximately one-half the figure for 1944. The Department, on the other hand, is firmly of the opinion that Saudi Arabia's minimum essential requirements must be met if American national interests in Saudi Arabia are to be safeguarded and if law and order are to be preserved there while oil is being produced for use in the prosecution of the war.

The Department desires to be in a position to inform the British Government that the United States Government is prepared itself to meet Saudi Arabia's minimum essential requirements during the calendar year 1945 alone if necessary, but that British participation in a program designed to attain this objective will be welcomed either on an equal basis or to a lesser extent if so desired by the British Government.

It is requested, therefore, that the Foreign Economic Administration inform the Department that it is prepared to finance the entire Saudi Arabian supply program, including requirements for both goods and silver, during the calendar year 1945 up to the amount budgeted by the Foreign Economic Administration for such purposes for the eighteen-month period January 1, 1945-June 30, 1946, inclusive. It is appreciated, of course, that a relationship will exist between the rate of expenditure during 1945 and the ability of the Foreign Economic Administration to extend assistance during the first six months of 1946.

Although the cost of the supply program can not be determined accurately at the present time, it is estimated that a total sum of approximately \$18,000,000 will be needed for this purpose during the calendar year 1945. The Department hopes, however, that funds from other sources will be available before the end of 1945 for the extension of assistance to Saudi Arabia.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

890F.248/3-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, March 24, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 4:15 p. m.]

122. ReDeps 78, March 6, 10 p. m.⁵⁷ and 64, March 6, 9 [8] p. m. Section 1. After consultation with Colonel Connor and with his concurrence I recommend:

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff should secure British concurrence in United States airfield at Dhahran before negotiations are opened with Saudi Government regarding projects of military mission. The airfield is the principal interest of United States Army to whom other projects of mission are subsidiary. Saudi Government has notified us and presumably British that they await concurrence of principal allies in this war measure and would interpret as United States political weakness any proposal for military mission before United States Army has secured British concurrence.

2. While some commitment as to United States financial and economic assistance would strengthen greatly our hands, negotiations for military mission and projects should be undertaken at Riyadh immediately following British concurrence in airfield.

ReDepins undated and unnumbered⁵⁸ delivered to me by Colonel Connor, my recommendations follow in sections 2 and 3, wherein it will be noted that I recommend negotiations with Saudi Government be opened with clear-cut, candid distinction between offers to assist and requests for concessions, a distinction which the King would welcome.

Section 2. I recommend negotiations with Saudi Government (reDepins handed me by Colonel Connor) as follows:

The United States offers to Saudi Arabia:

Improvement of road between Dhahran and Riyadh to be undertaken immediately as set forth in subject reference enclosure 1,⁵⁹ 4 b, after completion of which the United States will undertake improvement of road from Riyadh to Jidda.

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ Presumably the Department's instruction of March 10, 1945, in which the Minister was informed regarding projects for the extension of interim assistance to Saudi Arabia through the establishment of a military mission, the construction of roads, and the construction of airfields and related facilities, and was instructed to submit his recommendations following consultation with Colonel Connor (890F.20 Missions/3-1045).

⁵⁹ This enclosure to the Department's unnumbered instruction of March 10 was a memorandum of February 5 from the War Department to the Department of State, not printed (see paragraph numbered 5 of the Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee circulated on February 22, p. 852). Paragraph 4b of the enclosure stated that the War Department was prepared to undertake the improvement of this road, a distance of approximately 290 miles, commencing on or about March 1, 1945. It also stated that the British had undertaken minor repairs of the road from Jidda to Riyadh and recommended that the United States not consider undertaking repairs of this road pending clarification of the British position.

Comment: King wants entire road improved to connect Riyadh with both coasts and bind national economy together. He considers this project implicit in permission for extensive photo control surveys already made by United States Army. British accomplished practically no improvement of roads and informed me they contemplate no more road repair, having long ago withdrawn feeble and poorly equipped road mission (reLegs 278, September 15, 11 a. m., 1944⁶⁰).

2. Training of Saudi pilots and crews as set forth in enclosure 1, annex A, paragraph 9,⁶¹ with offer to bequeath to Saudi Government (upon termination of the air training activities of the mission) training field, installations and planes.

3. United States Army medical mission which while caring for health of United States personnel will provide health services in vicinity and will assist in establishing medical services of Saudi Army.

4. Training of Saudi Army Quartermaster, Ordnance and Signal Corps; assisting to establish service of supply, maintenance of equipment and technical services.

Comment: While the demand will come in time I do not believe the Saudi Government would now welcome offer to assist their army in financial procedures or efficiency rating of personnel.

5. The offers of assistance listed in 1 to 4 above would be administered by a single inclusive United States Military mission with headquarters in AUS⁶² military concession in Dhahran area. Personnel of mission to be determined by War Department depending upon scope of projects agreed.

Section 3. In return for offers in section 2, United States requests:

1. Agreement to establish United States Army first class airdrome with all facilities including longtime lease and postwar commercial rights at Dhahran as set forth in instruction referred to, enclosure 1, 4c and annex B.⁶³

⁶⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 741.

⁶¹ This paragraph stated that the proposed mission would be equipped to train approximately 15 pilots and 30 air and ground crew members of the Saudi Arabian Army at one time.

⁶² Army of the United States.

⁶³ Paragraph 4c stated that construction of the airfield would involve expenditures of up to \$10,000,000 and that prior to starting the construction of the airfields and related facilities, "it will be necessary for the State Department to secure from Saudi Arabia not only the right to perform all of the necessary construction work, but also the right for United States forces to maintain and occupy the airfield and the other facilities, together with such appropriate housing, servicing, maintenance, weather and communications facilities as may be required, for the duration of the German and Japanese wars plus one year. It will also be necessary to secure flying rights over Saudi Arabia and permission to locate navigational aids, such as weather stations and one emergency field in the center of the country, at a place to be determined by the Air Force." These rights were described as essential ones and it was declared desirable to secure additional rights such as a longer term agreement. Annex B was a detailed study of the needs of the proposed airfield.

The agreement to establish a United States military mission to co-ordinate airfield and all military projects offered in section 2. This mission to constitute only mission in Saudi Arabia for military assistance and advice.

This mission will require permission to construct adequate housing facilities at Dhahran for mission personnel and construction crews.

Comment: Although not included in my subject instructions from Department, I suggest it might be opportune to include request for Saudi Arabia radio telegraph station for direct and immediate communications with USAF is also long overdue (reLegs 106, March 14, 3 p. m.⁶⁴ Colonel Connor concurs in text above message and requests copy be furnished War Department. Attention Operations Division from Connor.

Repeated as No. 60 to Cairo for General Giles.

EDDY

890F.51/4-745

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] April 7, 1945.

As you know, considerable thought has been given recently to ways and means of assisting the Government of Saudi Arabia to meet its budgetary deficit when lend-lease aid is no longer available. Officers of NEA⁶⁵ have expressed the belief that the American oil concession in Arabia is in danger of being lost if King Ibn Saud does not obtain sufficient financial assistance pending the time when royalty payments become adequate to cover his deficit. NEA has recommended that assistance be supplied either by purchase of an underground reserve by the Navy Department, or by a direct U.S. Government loan to the Government of Saudi Arabia secured by future oil royalties. The State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee has taken an interest in these proposals, and, at the suggestion of that Committee, Mr. Acheson has had preliminary discussions with certain members of Congress.

There appears to be general agreement that Arabian oil is of great importance to the future military security of the United States. Although the military officials recognize that Arabian oil might not be subject to the direct strategic control of U.S. forces in the event of another world war, it is suggested that if Arabian oil can be developed, it can replace in European and Mediterranean markets substantial quantities of Western Hemisphere oil which might otherwise be dis-

⁶⁴ *Post*, p. 1014.

⁶⁵ Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

posed of there. In this way, Western Hemisphere oil subject to U.S. military control could be conserved.

I agree that this is a highly desirable objective from the standpoint of national defense. But I am not at all sure that the measures so far suggested are the best for accomplishment of the objective sought. You will appreciate that the objective will not be popular with the American petroleum industry other than the two companies (Texas and Socal⁶⁶) participating in the Arabian concession. The industry reaction to U.S. Government assistance in the speedy development of Arabian oil was made abundantly clear at the time of the Petroleum Reserve Corporation pipe-line proposal two years ago.⁶⁷ At that time, the industry was successful in marshaling strong Congressional and public opposition to the scheme, making good use of the popular antipathy against the "government's getting into the oil business."

I am quite certain that similar opposition will develop against any proposal for either the purchase of a foreign oil reserve by the Navy, or the use of U.S. Government funds to keep King Ibn Saud favorably disposed towards the private American company now holding the oil concession. On the other hand, if the American company, or its parent companies (Texas and Socal) were to advance Ibn Saud the funds he needs pending development of adequate production and markets, while the U. S. Government limited its assistance to the usual diplomatic support accorded all American business interests abroad, plus sustained efforts to work out a satisfactory international petroleum agreement within the framework of an international security organization, the American petroleum industry would have much less opportunity to stir up effective opposition.

I feel that the Department must consider this matter very carefully, and should particularly avoid being drawn unnecessarily into a controversy which has been going on for over two years between certain Washington officials desiring to obtain a foreign oil reserve at any cost (the group headed by Navy Assistant Secretary Bard and the Chairman of the House Naval Appropriations Committee, Mr. Vinson), and a perhaps even larger and more influential group opposing government entry into business (for which Senator Connally will be a particularly vigorous spokesman). I am afraid that the Department, properly desirous of cooperating in the accomplishment

⁶⁶ The Texas Company and the Standard Oil Company of California, joint owners of the Arabian American Oil Company.

⁶⁷ For documentation on the concern of the United States in 1943 to assure the safeguarding and increased development of adequate petroleum reserves in Saudi Arabia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 921 ff.

of a desired objective, has accepted somewhat too uncritically certain proposals which are not necessarily the best which could be devised.

In my opinion both the national interest and the interests of the oil companies concerned, as well as certain broader interests of the Department, might be better served if the oil companies themselves were to provide the funds needed by King Ibn Saud. Neither the national interest nor the interest of the companies will be advanced if a controversy develops similar to the "pipe-line" controversy of two years ago. I am surprised to learn that the oil companies have not even been advised of the plans under foot. I feel strongly that they should be consulted before their interests are again made a "political football". I suspect that if the riskiness of an approach to Congress for U.S. Government funds were pointed out to them, they would consider it advisable in their own interest to advance the funds themselves against future oil royalties. I am advised that the amount required will probably not exceed \$30,000,000 over the five year period following the expiration of lend-lease aid. This would represent a relatively small addition to a total recoverable investment which, by present indications, will be smaller relative to potential reserves and profits than the investment in any similar reserve anywhere in the world.

In mentioning certain broader interests of the Department in the foregoing paragraph, I had in mind the charges of American imperialism which may be advanced if the Navy should acquire a reserve in Arabia, and the effect upon the Government's investment and development policy if a precedent is established for the use of U.S. Government funds to finance the budgetary deficits of foreign countries in which Americans are doing business. These possibilities deserve serious consideration, although they should not be permitted to stand in the way of accomplishment of an objective essential to the national defense if said objective can be accomplished in no other way.

Perhaps there are compelling reasons of which I am not aware for believing that the oil concession cannot be adequately protected by the private interests entitled to the profits from its exploitation. But if so, doubt is cast upon the adequacy of the American private enterprise system in the international field. It is true that the British Government has put its capital directly into the Middle East oil business, but it has also retained a direct equity interest in the profits of that business. It is not difficult to anticipate the questions which may be raised by the American taxpayer, and the Department should avoid putting the Arabian American Oil Company in an embarrassing position without giving it every opportunity to stand on its own feet.

I should like to discuss these matters with you at your convenience.

890F.20 Missions/4-945 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, April 9, 1945—8 a. m.

[Received 10:18 a. m.]

147. Deputy Foreign Minister ⁶⁸ informed both British ⁶⁹ and American Ministers that the Saudi Government understands both military missions at Taif will close when present courses of instruction are completed about the end of April. He expressed gratitude for the valuable services of the US Army Mission and hope that cooperation with US Army will continue. However, supply of qualified candidates for training now given at Taif is exhausted.

I recommend this announcement be accepted without discussion or dissent. Both Missions at Taif have served their purpose and would earn only diminishing returns if continued. I am convinced the Saudi decision is political in view of British desire to quit and will not prejudice new and different proposals if made by US Army in the future.

British will train Saudi officers and men at military bases in Egypt and Sudan. (See Legations No. 13, January 9, 10 a. m.⁷⁰) No mention whatsoever has been made of possible activities of US Army either to or by the Saudi Government. I have reason to believe they have expectations from presence of Colonel Connor Mission.

Repeated Cairo as 75 for General Giles.

EDDY

890F.20/4-1245 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, April 12, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received April 12—10:50 a. m.]

158. For Department only. Can Department give me personal and confidential information about status of recommendations in Legation's No. 122, March 24, 11 a. m.

Colonel Connor informs me he intends to request his recall by War Department to review proposal of military mission though I have persuaded him to postpone action until his return Jidda from Dhahran Sunday April 15.

I consider any such delay might be fatal to plans for military mission. Saudis are now discussing with British Legation tentative suggestions for military medical mission to Saudi Army with two

⁶⁸ Yusuf Yassin.

⁶⁹ Laurence B. Grafftey-Smith was appointed British Minister to Saudi Arabia on February 7, 1945, and presented his letters of credence on February 22.

⁷⁰ Not printed.

hospitals and mobile ambulance clinics. With approaching close of Taif mission we should move quickly with some official approach to King.

EDDY

890F.515/4-1645 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JDDA, April 16, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 10:05 p. m.]

167. ReDepts 105, April 7, 7 p. m.⁷¹ Saudi Government requests as special favor that gold slugs be flown out by airplane when ready May 15 as was done with first shipment received December 2, 1944.⁷²

Comment: I recommend this request be granted, taking the liberty to remind the Department that Saudi Government has not yet any definite assurance as to amount or duration of joint subsidy and has heard nothing of progress on the subject of Department's 283, December 24, 2 p. m.⁷³ Riyal deliveries will probably be late, first supply of gold long since exhausted, and purchasing power will be sorely needed to furnish free food to oases eaten out by locusts. (Legs 164, April 15, 9 a. m. [*p. m.*]⁷⁴) Since gold has been proposed by Department as important means of assistance during 1945 (Department's 82, March 22, 3 [7] p. m.) this early delivery by air seems reasonable. Furthermore early plans now for subsequent minting of slugs could assure delivery by surface vessel at intervals of 3 months whereas even air delivery this time makes interval 5 months since first delivery. Finally gold being the form of assistance by USA which has actually materialized as distinct from other proposals merely pending I recommend it be exploited. Our political position and our economic claims need all the present support that can be given.

EDDY

⁷¹ Not printed.

⁷² In telegram 276, September 12, 1944. 9 a. m., the Minister in Saudi Arabia reported a request from the Saudi Arabian Government for the purchase of gold bars worth \$1,000,000 (890F.515/9-1244). In telegram 370, December 15, 1944, the Minister transmitted the expression of gratitude of the Saudi Arabian Government for the shipment of gold bars which had been received at a time of economic crisis. This message also transmitted the Government's order for a second shipment of gold equal in value to the first and in the form of round pieces with milled edges (890F.515/12-1544). This shipment arrived by plane on May 29 and was delivered the same day.

⁷³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

⁷⁴ Not printed; it stated: "Saudi Government has addressed to both American and British Ministers appeal for increase in foodstuffs to be procured for Saudi Arabia during 1945 to offset catastrophic loss of crops from current infestation of locusts . . . I recommend immediate steps to provide substantial increase in cereals for Saudi Arabia Government with early provision for increased quotas at loading areas to prevent fatal delay. My British colleague is sending similar recommendation." (890F.48/4-1545)

890F.20/4-1745 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, April 17, 1945—noon.

[Received April 17—11:25 a. m.]

171. ReLegs 82, March 2, 11 a. m.⁷⁵ Deputy Foreign Minister told me today Saudi Government wants to contract for improvements of Jidda air field including night-lighting, runways, installations for maintenance and repair of planes. He inquired whether in my opinion such improvements would be undertaken by the Americans if requested officially. I replied that I would be happy to transmit such a request if made. He then inquired further whether in my opinion it would be more practical for such work to be requested jointly as an Anglo-American effort or from one friendly nation. I replied that the form of such a request would be for them alone to decide. He then asked me whether the Saudi Government could expect offers by the United States to cooperate in making improvements such as the Jidda airport or whether they should look elsewhere. I replied that I felt sure a request for such cooperation would be sympathetically considered by my Government but that I have no authority to anticipate my Government's reply.

Comment: There is no doubt in my mind that a similar overture is being made to the British Minister. We need not be surprised if (failing an early overture along the lines of Legation's 165, April 15, 11 a. m.⁷⁶) we find the British Army soon engaged in constructing military and aviation facilities in Saudi Arabia.

EDDY

890F.248/4-1245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1945—5 p. m.

114. ReLegs 158, April 12, 11 a. m. Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken up Dhahran airfield matter with Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff have replied along the following lines:

1. They concur in our proposal to construct a military airfield at Dhahran stating that the British Government is prepared to support our case with King Abdul Aziz should we so request;

2. The British Commonwealth requires equal rights with the United States in regard to fly-over privileges and landing at the airfield, but

⁷⁵ Not printed.

⁷⁶ Not printed; this message from Colonel Connor to the War Department General Staff requested permission to return to Washington to explain the urgency of the situation, if authority to open negotiations with the King were not forthcoming by April 21, 1945 (890F.20/4-1545).

the British intend to use the airfield only in case of an emergency;

3. It is assumed by the British Chiefs of Staff that labor and work services will be a responsibility borne by the United States Government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff regard this reply as somewhat ambiguous in regard to what the British mean with respect to "equal rights". They are endeavoring to clarify this ambiguity with the British Chiefs of Staff and expect to have a reply within about the next 2 days.

As soon as this matter is cleared up satisfactorily, the Department proposes to request the British Embassy to ask the Foreign Office to instruct the British Minister at Jidda to inform King Abdul Aziz that the British objection is withdrawn. When the British Minister so informs the King, it is contemplated that you will be instructed, together with Colonel Connor, to initiate negotiations.

In view of the attention we are having to give to Amir Faisal⁷⁷ and his party, it would have proved helpful if Major Harry Snyder⁷⁸ had been here to continue his effective liaison work in regard to the airfield matter.

STETTINIUS

890F.24/4-1745

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Government feel that the time has arrived when a decision must be reached on the broad policy underlying the subsidy to be given to Saudi Arabia in 1945.

2. It is understood that the State Department's view is that the two Ministers at Jeddah should be instructed to produce a full report containing recommendations for the 1945 subsidy. This was the procedure which the Foreign Office had also contemplated but only on the understanding that the two governments were in substantial agreement on the principle that the 1945 subsidy should be roughly half of last year's figure. This basis, however, appears to be unacceptable to the United States Government. In these circumstances it would not appear possible for the two Ministers to be able to agree [on?] a joint report.

3. His Majesty's Government have decided that the United Kingdom subsidy for 1945 must be limited to one of approximately one and a quarter million Pounds. It is recommended that this contribution

⁷⁷ The Amir was in Washington on April 12 to register his country's adherence to the United Nations Declaration. For text of his remarks at the ceremony, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1945, p. 682. The United Nations Declaration was signed at Washington on January 1, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 25.

⁷⁸ Member of the mission of Colonel Connor to Saudi Arabia.

should take the form of the supply of cereals, sugar and tea, but the actual make-up of the programme could be settled later. So far as the United States contribution is concerned, there would appear to be two alternatives: either the United States Government may decide to give a larger subsidy than His Majesty's Government is prepared to make available in which case the existing 50/50 arrangement will no longer apply: or alternatively if the United States Government's decision enables the 50/50 basis to be maintained, His Majesty's Government will be glad to make a joint communication to Ibn Saud as was done last year.

4. Before the United States Government take their decision, His Majesty's Government wish to explain the considerations which have led them to decide on a reduction in their share of the subsidy. The original subsidy was intended as compensation for the fall in Ibn Saud's revenues from the pilgrimage. These revenues have now revived and in 1944 were well above those derived from the somewhat poor pilgrimages of the immediate pre-war years. Furthermore Ibn Saud now obtains a large revenue from payments by the Oil company operating in Saudi Arabia. Given the extremely high figure to which assistance by the two Governments rose in 1944, the Saudi Arabian Government's income would be now at least four times higher than it was immediately before the war. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government feel that there is no justification for continuing the subsidy on its recent scale, since the Saudi Arabian Government or the local merchants or both should now be able to finance without difficulty any balance of Saudi Arabian import requirements not covered by the subsidy. This consideration is quite apart from the desirability, if only for the sake of Ibn Saud's own prestige, that he should cease as soon as possible to be dependent upon foreign subventions. In all circumstances and in view of the need for restricting the overseas financial commitments of the United Kingdom, His Majesty's Government do not feel that they can exceed the figure of one and a quarter million Pounds mentioned above.

5. If the United States Government is anxious to give in 1945 a subsidy larger than His Majesty's Government think is required and if Ibn Saud wishes to receive it, His Majesty's Government do not wish to stand in the way. In that case, however, it would be necessary thereafter to distinguish between supply questions and subsidy questions. On supply questions there would presumably still be a small Anglo-American (i.e. a M.E.S.C.) programme and communications on this subject to the Saudi Arabian authorities would presumably still be joint communications as in the past. On subsidy questions, however, each Government would resume its liberty of independent action.

6. The above paragraphs attempt to give a picture of the present position and of the possible alternatives open to both governments, as His Majesty's Government see them. His Majesty's Government, however, feel very strongly indeed that the 50/50 basis should be maintained if at all possible. They feel that abandonment of the principle of equal partnership would inevitably give the impression of Anglo-American rivalry which on political grounds both governments are so anxious to avoid. Moreover, even if the 50/50 basis were maintained so far as the subsidy proper was concerned, this would not preclude the United States Government from furnishing special assistance to Saudi Arabia in such matters as the development of cultural projects, the construction of roads, or any other enterprises in which the United States Government might wish to help Ibn Saud.

7. For those reasons His Majesty's Government greatly hope that the United States Government will decide to reduce their subsidy for 1945 to the same level as theirs. This would enable the two Governments to agree upon an appropriate joint communication to Ibn Saud, which is becoming a matter of great urgency.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1945.

S90F.24/3-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1945—7 p. m.

117. [Here follows substance of memorandum of April 17 from the British Embassy, *supra*.]

The memorandum just described was obviously drafted before London received word of recent damage done by locusts (reurtel 164, April 15, 9 p. m.⁷⁹).

Department's attitude has been that Saudi Arabia's minimum essential needs, both supply and budgetary, must be met (reDepts 80⁸⁰) and information available has made it appear that such minimum needs in 1945 would require a supply program comparable to that of 1944 plus 8,000,000–10,000,000 lend lease riyals plus 17,000,000 conversion-plan riyals. Total value of assistance would be between \$15,000,000 and \$16,000,000 excluding conversion riyals; British proposal of \$10,000,000 maximum therefore is inadequate.

FEA has not yet given definite assurance that it will finance entire 1945 program if so requested, but Department has reason to believe that it will.

⁷⁹ Not printed, but see footnote 74, p. 873.

⁸⁰ Same as telegram 652, March 19, 9 p. m., to Cairo, p. 863.

Your 164 may require revision of estimated minimum essential needs. Please cable promptly your estimate of kinds and minimum quantities of cereals required in Saudi Arabia in 1945, as well as estimates of MESC or British Minister if different from your own. Also state quantity of cereals delivered to Saudi Arabia since completion of 1944 cereals program. Your comment is requested.

If possible the Department wishes to have your reply before meeting British Embassy members on April 21 at 11:00 a. m.

Sent to Jidda, repeated to Cairo.

STETTINIUS

890F.24/4-2045 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, April 20, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 10:14 a. m.]

179. ReDept's 117, April 18, 7 p. m. Relieved to learn that British Government will not stand in way of United States economic assistance in 1945 greater than British proposed subsidy. However road construction and cultural assistance are irrelevant to problem of subsidized supplies now being delivered at approximately 1944 quantity level all of which must be paid for. Saudi Government cannot offer prospect of improved roads to UKCC⁸¹ in payment for cereals or spare parts.

King Abdul Aziz has heard nothing definite about 1945 supplies or subsidy. Troubled, indignant, convinced delay is unnecessary, he is entitled now to statement of our intentions re his normal supply and budgetary needs. I recommend this be done without delaying to include extra cereals needed to offset locust ravages which can be estimated only after survey.

Any joint communication to King proposing inadequate subsidy such as proposed British figure would terminate confidence in United States and confirm Saudi fears that United States follows British lead to the detriment of Saudi Arabia as they believe we did in 1944. If however such communication is preceeded or accompanied by assurance United States will make funds available to purchase balance of supplies on 1944 level then it matters not how much the joint program is reduced.

Financing of entire program by FEA would solve most of the problems provided we assure purchasing power as well as deliveries in kind. Portions of current supply program are now held up because UKCC requires assurance by some one of payment in cash. Profit from riyals and seigniorage on gold might suffice if means can

⁸¹ United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

be found to permit SAG to pay now for items in supply program which would be excluded from subsidy under British proposal.

I agree that SAG requires in 1945 supply program comparable to 1944 including monthly stipends for foreign missions and 10 million lend lease riyals plus 17 million conversion-plan riyals plus additional cereals to be determined by survey. I feel certain this last emergency item need not delay present decision as British later will hardly dare to refuse to share cost of addition[al] cereals needed to prevent certain starvation.

British Minister, FEA representative Awalt and I agree:

“1. Destruction of crops by locusts in the Nejd is serious and extensive. Estimates are being requested from Locust Mission,⁸² Al Kharj Mission⁸³ and traveling observers. Infestation continues and damage not yet complete therefore cannot furnish Department with estimates for at least a fortnight.

2. So far no evidence of serious infestation of Asir or Ulhasa or Hejaz.

3. Quantities of cereals (wheat flour, millet, and rice) required to be imported into Saudi Arabia in 1945 agreed by both Ministers and MESC Jidda and reported fully in MESC Jidda's savingram to Cairo No. 23, December 14, 1944.”

Cereals delivered to west coast on 1945 program to date total 8996 tons out of 1945 total program of 33,000 tons for west coast which includes 3415 tons over delivered in 1944.

Cereals delivered to east coast to date total 180 tons out of 17,000 tons total program for east coast. From 1944 program for east coast 3522 tons cereals remain still undelivered.

This message sent to Department and repeated to Cairo as 93.

EDDY

890F.515/4-2045

The Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have your letter of February 14 in which you request FEA to take measures to make available Lend-Lease funds

⁸² The Middle East Anti-Locust Unit (MEALU), theoretically a joint mission of the United Kingdom and the United States but with only nominal American participation, which approached the problem of locust control in the Near East on a regional basis. In airgram A-404, August 8, 1945, to Cairo, the Department stated: "For the present at least anti-locust work in Saudi Arabia should continue as a purely British project." (890F.612/4-845) A copy of this airgram was sent to the Minister in Saudi Arabia.

⁸³ The United States Agricultural Mission in Saudi Arabia. The Mission, whose Chief was David A. Rogers, was staffed by seven American experts in dry farming who were sent to Al Kharj by the Foreign Economic Administration in December 1944.

for a program of assistance to Saudi Arabia during the fiscal year, 1946.

We also have your letter of March 23 in which you request assurance that this Administration is prepared to make available up to \$18,000,000 to finance a program of assistance to Saudi Arabia in the calendar year 1945 in the event the British Government decides not to participate in a joint Saudi Arabian Supply Program for 1945.

Up to March 31, 1945 we had allocated to procurement agencies approximately three million dollars for the purchase of supplies for Saudi Arabia in addition to silver and in addition to those supplies which constitute a part of the 1944 Joint Anglo-American Supply Program. During the final quarter of the current fiscal year we are prepared to make available an additional three million dollars for the procurement of supplies requested by Saudi Arabia and recommended by our representatives in the field.

We have included in the FEA Lend-Lease budget, as submitted to the Bureau of the Budget for transmission to the Congress, the sum of \$12,060,000 for aid to Saudi Arabia during the fiscal year 1946. This is based upon our understanding that the Department of State will at our request support this budget item before the Congress, and will also undertake to secure written supporting statements from the War and Navy Departments.⁸⁴

If Congress passes the Lend-Lease appropriation with this item included in the budget the FEA is prepared to expend the funds so appropriated as rapidly as the Government of Saudi Arabia and State and FEA Representatives in the field recommend, supply allocations permitting. However, should the Export-Import Bank extend credit to Saudi Arabia we would wish to request that the Saudi Arabian Government be asked to utilize such credit for the procurement of capital goods, thus limiting Lend-Lease aid to consumer type goods. Subject to the above conditions, we believe this letter enables you to

⁸⁴ In a letter of May 5, 1945, to the Secretary of War, the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) stated that the minimum essential needs of the Saudi Arabian Government in 1945 and fiscal year 1946 "have been estimated at some \$16,000,000 for the 1945 calendar year, though if the British Government continues joint aid to Saudi Arabia in the same ratio as in 1945 [1944?], the cost to the United States Government would be reduced substantially below \$16,000,000." He also stated that "It would be of great assistance in securing the necessary long-range help for Saudi Arabia if the War Department could supply this Department with a letter supporting this item of the Foreign Economic Administration's budget." (890F.515/4-2045) A virtually identical letter was sent to the Secretary of the Navy the same day. In a joint letter of May 21 to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Bard) stated: "Such financial assistance to the Government of Saudi Arabia as may be necessary to maintain political and economic stability in that area is important to the successful prosecution of the war against Japan." (890F.24/5-2145)

inform representatives of the British Government that the U.S. is prepared to finance, with or without British assistance, a program of aid to Saudi Arabia which State and FEA Representatives deem to be adequate to meet that country's minimum essential requirements during 1945. We should like to emphasize that supply and shipping restrictions may make it difficult or impossible for the U.S. to fulfill, in the sense of physically delivering the goods, a commitment of the kind contemplated in your letter of March 23 even though Congress may have appropriated sufficient funds for this purpose.

We are fully prepared to undertake action within our powers to carry out foreign policy objectives formulated by the State Department and to cooperate with the policy of aiding Saudi Arabia to the extent that Congressional approval of this program and supply and shipping limitations permit. However, we wish to repeat the request made in our letter of January 24⁸⁵ that the Department secure Congressional approval for some form of assistance to Saudi Arabia other than Lend-Lease aid. We trust that this possibility is still being actively explored, as stated in your letters of February 14 and March 23, and that an alternative to Lend-Lease aid will be available by the beginning of 1946.

Sincerely yours,

LEO T. CROWLEY

890F.248/4-2445

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State is informed by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff that the British Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the United States project to acquire and to construct a United States military air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.^{85a}

The British Chiefs of Staff have been asked to inform their Government of their concurrence in this project, and the Department of State is requested to ask the British Government to indicate its approval of this project to King Ibn Saud at the earliest possible date.

Accordingly, the Department of State would be grateful if the British Embassy were to communicate with the Foreign Office at

⁸⁵ Not printed.

^{85a} It should be noted that in these documents the words "airfield", "field", "airport", and "airbase" are used interchangeably without any apparent distinction in meaning. In particular, the documentation indicates quite clearly that the United States did not contemplate the establishment of an extended military facility at an airfield to be constructed at Dhahran.

London with a view to the issuance, as soon as possible, of appropriate instructions to the British Minister at Jidda.

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1945.

890F.24/4-1745

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The memorandum of the British Embassy dated April 17, 1945 sets forth in detail the attitude of the British Government toward a supply program for Saudi Arabia in 1945, and makes the following principal points:

1. The British Government has decided that its subsidy to Saudi Arabia in 1945 must be limited to approximately one and one-quarter million pounds sterling, or roughly half that supplied in 1944;

2. This basis appears to be unacceptable to the United States Government;

3. The British Government feel strongly that the 50/50 basis of a joint supply program should be maintained if possible;

4. If the 50/50 basis were maintained in so far as the joint program is concerned, that would not preclude the United States Government from furnishing special assistance to Saudi Arabia such as cultural projects, road construction, and so on;

5. The British Government hopes that the United States Government will decide to reduce its aid to Saudi Arabia in 1945 to the British level and will make possible a joint communication to King Ibn Saud as in 1944;

6. Should the United States Government decide to give Saudi Arabia greater assistance than the British Government is prepared to make available, then the 50/50 arrangement will no longer apply and an impression of Anglo-American rivalry will inevitably be given.

The aim of the United States Government in extending aid to Saudi Arabia has been to meet the minimum essential needs of that country, both supply and budgetary, and the Department of State would be reluctant to approve, on behalf of the United States Government, any program of assistance for 1945 which does not meet those needs.

Information currently available to the Department of State leads to the conclusion that a program of assistance to Saudi Arabia valued at approximately \$16,000,000 is required in 1945 to meet those minimum essential needs. This estimate is not a firm figure, but might be adjusted upward or downward in 1945 in response to unforeseen developments in Saudi Arabia or in the supply situation, or in consideration of more accurate or more complete information. It will be noted that the estimated value of the entire 1944 program is about \$20,000,000, or one-fourth greater than the corresponding figure for 1945.

The data on which the 1945 estimate is based will be made available to the British Embassy, if desired, and any desired explanations will be made to clarify the reasoning leading to the figure of \$16,000,000.

The Department of State is in accord with the views of the British Government regarding the desirability of equal American and British shares in a joint supply program for Saudi Arabia in 1945, and the presentation of a joint note or identical notes to King Ibn Saud. It also is in full accord that adoption of a program for 1945 is a matter of urgency.

The Department does not believe, however, that such considerations would justify it in accepting a program of assistance to Saudi Arabia which it has reason to believe is inadequate.

The problem, therefore, is one of reconciling, within an equally shared joint program, the British decision to limit the British subsidy to approximately £1,250,000 and the American view that an adequate program of aid will amount to some \$16,000,000.

Of a total cost of \$16,000,000, the value of the contemplated supply program is about \$13,000,000, and half that sum would amount to approximately £1,625,000. Thus, leaving aside reimbursable lend-lease riyals as was done in 1944, half of the value of an adequate joint supply program in 1945 would be met if the British Government were to increase its limit from £1,250,000 to £1,625,000 or by some £375,000.

It is hoped that the British Government will consider that the advantages of continuing the 50/50 basis of assistance in 1945 would be well worth the suggested increase in expense.

On the other hand, if the British Government feels that it cannot contribute more than £1,250,000, an alternative, though possibly less desirable reconciliation of the two points of view, might be achieved by setting up, on a 50/50 basis, a joint supply program consisting principally of foodstuffs and valued at \$10,000,000. Then, in addition to the joint program, the United States Government would supply under lend-lease facilities the contemplated silver riyals plus an individual supply program consisting of trucks, tires, spare parts and similar items valued at some \$3,000,000. If the special assistance mentioned in paragraph 6 of the British Embassy's memorandum were expanded to include supplies and equipment, this plan would conform to the British suggestion noted in (4) above.

In either event a joint communication could be delivered to King Ibn Saud with regard to the joint program, and the United States Government would inform the King of the additional supplies and equipment which it had decided to furnish after consultation with the British Government.

In view of the necessity of reaching a prompt decision, it is hoped

that the views of the British Government on the suggestions made above can be obtained as a matter of urgency.

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1945.

S90F.248/3-2445

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

WASHINGTON, [April 25, 1945.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the desire of the War Department to secure rights in Saudi Arabia for the establishment of an air route directly from Cairo to Dhahran and thence to India, and for the installation of a flying field at Dhahran and other necessary facilities; and particular reference is made to telegram no. 122, dated March 24, 1945, 11 a. m., from Jidda, a copy of which was forwarded to the War Department.

In preparing instructions for the guidance of the Legation in Jidda in its impending negotiations for air rights, it is believed that consideration should be given to a recent indication by the Saudi Government of its desire to improve the Jidda airport, including the installation of night-lighting, runways and maintenance and repair facilities.

When negotiations for the Dhahran field and route are begun, the Saudi authorities may be expected to bring up the subject of the desired installations at Jidda in that connection, and, with a view to expediting the negotiations, a decision on this point might be made by the War Department beforehand.

It is therefore suggested that in addition to offering the assistance described in the telegram mentioned above, the Legation at Jidda be given discretionary authority to agree that the Army will carry out the desired improvements at Jidda if, in the Legation's opinion, such agreement is necessary to secure the field at Dhahran and the required transit rights.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH C. GREW

S90F.515/4-2545 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, April 25, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 5:53 p. m.]

183. ReDept's 105, April 7, 7 p. m.⁸⁶ Saudi Government requests purchase in 1945 of 2 million additional dollars worth of gold slugs similar in every respect to the one million dollars worth now being minted for them.

⁸⁶ Not printed.

In view of time required by mint this request is made now in hope that this order of gold can be delivered by United States Army airplane earliest possible date.

Comment: I recommend granting this request to purchase gold which fits in with means for balancing Saudi budget suggested by Department in number 82, March 22, 3 p. m.

EDDY

890F.248/3-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1945—7 p. m.

123. ReLegs 122, March 24, 11 a. m. The project for the establishment of a U.S. military air base at Dhahran has been approved by the British Chiefs of Staff, and they have been requested to inform the British Government of their decision.

On April 24 the Department asked the British Embassy to request the Foreign Office to instruct the British Minister in Jidda to inform King Ibn Saud of British approval.

The War Department is now working on further instructions intended for the Legation's guidance in the impending negotiations.

GREW

890F.24/4-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1945—6 p. m.

125. ReLegs 179, April 20, 10 a. m. In a conversation on April 21 and by a memorandum dated April 24 the Department replied to the British memorandum of April 17 substantially as follows:

[Here follows substance of memorandum of April 24 to the British Embassy, printed on page 881.]

The British Embassy is reporting the two suggestions to London with the Department's request for an early reply.

NOTE: Estimate presented to British coincides with Legation's estimate except that riyals for coinage purposes are estimated at 8 million instead of 10 million. An explanation of this reduction lies in certain gold operations being described in airmail instruction.⁸⁷

Seventeen million conversion scheme riyals are also contemplated but are not of course included in a supply program.

GREW

⁸⁷ No. A-272, April 24, not printed.

890F.248/5-345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy)*

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1945—6 p. m.

130. ReDepts 123, April 26, 7 p. m. The Legation is authorized, as soon as it has official knowledge that King Ibn Saud has been notified of withdrawal of British objections to open negotiations with the Saudi Government respecting an airfield at Dhahran including efforts to secure postwar rights as described in paragraph 4(c) of the memorandum cited (reLegs 122, March 24, 11 a. m.) and in Annex B⁸⁸ thereto as amended by the following addition:

*Beginning of addition and continuation of paragraph 10 c:*⁸⁹ "Duly authorized United States airlines should also be granted transit rights in Saudi Arabia and the right of commercial entry at Dhahran.

Paragraph 10 d. In the event military air rights should terminate one year after the termination of the present war as provided in subparagraph a⁹⁰ above, United States civil airlines will continue to have transit rights in Saudi Arabia and the right of commercial entry at Dhahran, together with the use of the Dhahran airport and its facilities on a non-discriminatory basis, so long as any commercial air services are permitted to operate in or through Saudi Arabia.

Paragraph 10 e. More detailed provisions applying to United States commercial air transport services in and through Saudi Arabia may be included in a supplementary agreement." *End of addition and end of paragraph 10 Annex B.*

The recommendation contained in last paragraph section 1 of Legation's 122 that projects for military mission and improvement of roads be presented to Saudi authorities as matters in which the United States is prepared to act without reference to Dhahran airfield is approved.

The Legation is authorized to inform the Saudi Government that the United States Government is prepared to send a military mission to Saudi Arabia as described in paragraph 4-a of the memorandum referred to above and in Annex A thereto.

⁸⁸ Not printed, but see last sentence of footnote 63, p. 868.

⁸⁹ Paragraph 10 reads: "It is concluded, therefore, that a substantial military necessity exists for the acquisition and development of a U.S. military air field at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and"; subparagraph c read: "That it is desirable from a military standpoint that U.S. civil airlines be permitted to operate into, on and from the airfield at Dhahran, and to construct and maintain such installations or facilities as they might require, subject to controlling U.S. military authority if and whenever the airfield should be occupied by U.S. military forces."

⁹⁰ Of paragraph 10, which read: "That permission of the Saudi Arabian Government should be sought immediately for U.S. forces to construct, maintain and occupy such an airfield, together with such appropriate housing, servicing, maintenance, weather and communications facilities as may be required for the duration of the war plus one year."

The Legation is further authorized to inform the Saudi Government that the United States Government is prepared to construct a road in Saudi Arabia as described in paragraph 4-*b* of the same memorandum.

The Department is not now in a position to give assurance that construction of the Riyadh-Jidda road will be undertaken when the Riyadh-Dhahran road is completed. Neither is it able to assure bequest to Saudi Government (on termination of mission's air training activity) of training planes, training field and installations.

The Legation should take up the foregoing subjects with the appropriate Saudi authorities without unnecessary delay. The War Department is ready to despatch the proposed military mission and to begin construction of Dhahran airfield and Riyadh-Dhahran road on receipt of this Department's official notice that satisfactory negotiations with the Saudi Government with respect to those projects have been completed. The Department's official notice, in turn, will depend upon the outcome of the Legation's negotiations.

For your information only: This Department has suggested to the War Department that in addition to military mission and road construction referred to above, the Legation be given discretionary authority to agree that the War Department will make improvements in the Jidda airport along the lines indicated in Legation's 171, April 17, noon if, in the opinion of the Legation, such improvements are required to secure desirable permission for Dhahran field and air rights. Should the War Department approve the Department's suggestion, bequest of training facilities recommended in Legation's 122 would appear to lose its importance.

Sent to Jidda, repeated Cairo for General Giles.

GREW

890F.248/5-445

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In reply to the memorandum from the Department of State of April 24, His Majesty's Embassy have been informed by the Foreign Office that instructions are being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Jedda to indicate to King Ibn Saud the approval of His Majesty's Government of the United States project to acquire and to construct a United States military air base at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia.

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1945.

890F.20 Mission/5-445

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 119

JIDDA, May 4, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to report upon a visit to Taif to attend the graduation of the third class of ninety Saudi Arabian officers, which constituted at the same time the final public review, of the U.S. Army Military Mission at Taif, Hejaz, Saudi Arabia, April 30, 1945.

Accompanied by Foreign Service clerks Carl E. Forkel and Roland T. Morel, Mr. Karl Twitchell of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, Mr. Clifford Lee of the Arabian American Oil Co., and Mr. Maynard Owen Williams of the National Geographic Magazine, I left Jidda by jeep and command car at 11:00 a. m., Sunday, April 29, arriving at Taif soon after sunset. The Acting Viceroy, Amir Mansour Ibn Abdul Aziz,⁹¹ had insisted on sending three sedans from Mecca to transport to Taif officers whom Colonel Shomber⁹² expected from AMET⁹³ Headquarters, and representatives of the American Legation. Having heard nothing at the Legation about the coming of officers, nor their number if they did come, we proceeded with the local army cars, leaving the sedans for the visitors if and when they might arrive. None came, and after waiting all day and half the next, the three sedans returned to Mecca.

No one who attended the exercises could have any doubt of the professional success of the U.S. Army Military Mission of Instruction, nor of the gratitude and goodwill they have earned for themselves, for the U. S. Army, and for the United States. By contrast, the British Mission, having exhausted their display of wares in a single public exercise in February, folded up recently and left Taif without any ceremony. This third and final graduation of a class at the American Military Mission showed remarkable progress over the excellent performance at the first graduation which I also attended and which was reported to the Department in Report No. 3 of October 16, 1944.⁹⁴

The exercises began formally at 9:00 a. m., Monday, April 30, with the arrival of the guest of honor and reviewing officer, Amir Mansour Ibn Abdul Aziz, Acting Viceroy of the Hejaz, as well as Minister of Defense for Saudi Arabia. Brief addresses were made by the American Minister (in Arabic), by Mr. Twitchell, by the Commanding

⁹¹ Son of King Ibn Saud, who was Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense.

⁹² Col. Garrett B. Shomber, Commanding Officer of the United States Army Military Mission in Saudi Arabia.

⁹³ Africa-Middle East Theater, known prior to March 1, 1945, as United States Army Forces in the Middle East.

⁹⁴ Not printed; it was reported that the first graduation ceremonies took place on October 11, 1944 (890F.20 Mission/10-1644). In despatch 59, January 27, 1945, the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) gave the details of the second graduation exercises, which took place at Taif on January 14, 1945 (890F.20 Missions/1-2745).

Officer of the Mission, Colonel Garrett B. Shomber (both in English and translated by Captain Mossawir), and by Amir Mansour (in Arabic, translated and repeated in English by one of his Arabian liaison aides). The prince's remarks will be commented on below.

Most impressive was the snappy, alert, intelligent performance of the cadet officers themselves, who (in marked contrast to the British parade in February conducted mostly by British enlisted men) conducted the exercises, explained and demonstrated the arms and technical equipment, and demonstrated accurate fire and field manoeuvres without prompting by their U.S. instructors. The pride which they took in the execution of assignments augurs well for the permanent influence of the Mission upon the morale as well as the efficiency of the Saudi Arabian army.

At the conclusion of the firing demonstration of machine guns, Amir Mansour left his reviewing stand to fire the 50 calibre machine gun himself, in the presence of the throng of Arabian courtiers and officers, and in full view of the many hundreds of native spectators who, like a carpet of many colored heather, covered the hills that lie in a semicircle just behind the camp. It was expected that he would fire a few rounds only, but he would not stop until he had riddled the targets 500 yards away with repeated volleys. His enthusiasm for the machine gun was contagious and spread to the crowd who took great and vocal pride in his marksmanship.

After the exercises, I made my official call on the prince at his palace in Taif, accompanied by Colonel Shomber and my fellow Americans from Jidda. When we attempted to excuse ourselves after the conventional conversation, coffee and lemonade, the prince refused to let us go and, in the presence of many of his official household, repeated with obvious sincerity sentiments he had expressed in his address at the opening of the exercises, which may be summarized as follows:

“I want you and the U.S. Army to know that we can never express adequately the debt we owe to Colonel Shomber and his staff. It is not only that they have introduced many scores of our officers to the use of the best instruments of modern warfare, thereby contributing to the defense of Saudi Arabia, and equipping us to defend our realm as never before. There is a personal achievement even more remarkable: from living and working with Colonel Shomber and his staff, our officers have acquired ambition to improve, a sense of discipline and therefore of greater loyalty, and a professional instinct and inclination which is already transforming our army wherever these graduates go. I know whereof I speak, for, as Minister of Defense, I observe my army officers. Those who have gone out from previous classes under Colonel Shomber are teaching these professional benefits to their fellows, both deliberately and also unconsciously. Colonel Shomber's good work for us is not coming to an end; it is only beginning.”

Inasmuch as I am one of the few Americans who have visited the Mission at Taif, and one of the even fewer who have observed it at

first hand from the beginning, I am glad to make this testimony, given by the prince, a matter of record.

The prince insisted on lending us his personal Ford sedan and chauffeur for the return trip to Jidda. We left Taif at 5:00 a. m., May 1, and arrived at Jidda at 11:30.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

[In a note of May 6, the day on which the American Military Mission left Saudi Arabia, the Minister of Defense expressed to the Minister in Saudi Arabia the appreciation of the Army and Government for the work done by the Mission. A copy of the Minister of Defense's letter was transmitted to the Department in despatch 126, May 16, 1945. (890F.20 Mission /5-1645).]

890F.51/5-545 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 5, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

193. ReDepts No. 130, May 3, 6 p. m. While 2 months ago King Abdul Aziz would have been quite receptive to proposals confined to subject of my approaching visit I expect him to demand information on matters of greater urgency to him now (a) subsidy program for 1945 (Department's No. 125, April 7 [27], 6 p. m.) and (b) expectations of long range financial aid (Department's No. 283, December 24, 2 p. m.⁹⁵)

If possible can Department authorize me to make any statement on either subject during this visit? Locust plague, non-delivery of cereals and spare parts, lack of any indication whether his budget will be balanced disturb him profoundly Minister of Finance⁹⁶ informs.

EDDY

890F.248/5-545 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 5, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received May 5—3:25 p. m.]

194. ReLegs No. 192, May 5, 3 p. m.⁹⁷. Grafftey-Smith just informed me that he has received his instructions to support the pro-

⁹⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

⁹⁶ Abdullah Suleiman.

⁹⁷ Not printed.

posal for a United States airfield at Dhahran and is writing to the Saudi Government to that effect.⁸⁸

I am therefore requesting permission of the King to visit him with Colonel Connor May 9. Will confirm date later.

Repeated to Cairo as No. 113 for Colonel Connor.

EDDY

890F.51/5-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1945—7 p. m.

131. ReLegs 193, May 5, 6 p. m. Department appreciates the situation with which you will be confronted upon visiting the King and is providing you with the following statement of developments and the nature of plans now being worked out as expeditiously as possible.

Early this year, as soon as statistical information regarding Saudi Arabian 1945 supply requirements became available, we proposed to the British that the 1944 joint supply program be continued on substantially the 1944 basis during the first 6 months of 1945 until a plan could be formulated for the entire year. The British, however, proposed a drastic reduction of approximately 50 percent for 1945 as compared with 1944. We, on the other hand, maintained that Saudi Arabia's minimum essential requirements must be met. British representatives in Washington then referred the question to London with a request for further instructions. After the lapse of several months British officials have just indicated to us unofficially that the British Government will cooperate in a reduced joint supply program for 1945 amounting to 10 million dollars and will acquiesce in a proposal of the United States Government to make up the difference independently between the 10-million-dollar figure and what we consider to be Saudi Arabia's minimum essential requirements for 1945. We are now, therefore, confronted with the necessity of expending larger funds than originally contemplated. The Foreign Economic Administration has expressed its willingness to finance our half share of the proposed reduced joint program as well as our contemplated independent supplementary program, provided Congress appropriates the necessary funds, which are requested in the FEA appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1946 presumably to be acted upon by Congress within the next 60 days. Although, of course, we cannot predict with certainty what action Congress will take, we are hopeful that the funds requested will be appropriated.

⁸⁸ A copy of the British Minister's note of May 6, 1945 to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was transmitted to the Department in despatch 123, May 7, from Jidda (not printed).

The Department has been discussing with the Export-Import Bank the possibility of a 5-million-dollar development loan to the Government of Saudi Arabia. It will be necessary to work out a satisfactory method of assuring repayment of principal and payment of service charges in dollars. It is hoped that the Bank will, in the near future, be in a position to present a development loan plan for the King's consideration.

As you know, we had planned to request Congress to appropriate funds for the extension of direct financial assistance to Saudi Arabia on a long-range basis to meet governmental budgetary deficits during the next 5 years or as long as, in our judgment, such financial assistance is needed for this purpose. After preliminary discussions, however, it now appears to us that a more practicable method of extending such aid would be through the Export-Import Bank by means of loans quite distinct from the development loan under consideration. We are hopeful that it will be found possible for the Export-Import Bank to render financial assistance to the Government of Saudi Arabia after Congress approves pending legislation authorizing a substantial increase in the Bank's capital.

Although we regret that we are unable to provide you with concrete and detailed proposals for presentation to King Abdul Aziz at this time, it should be readily apparent from the foregoing that there is reason to be hopeful that satisfactory detailed plans can be worked out in the near future for the extension of adequate financial and economic assistance to Saudi Arabia.

You are authorized to inform the King of such of the foregoing as you may consider advisable in the exercise of your discretion except for that portion relating to our discussions with the British in regard to the supply program. With respect to the supply program, you should inform the King that we are working on a program whereby we hope that Saudi Arabia's minimum essential 1945 requirements will be met. In your discussions with the King you should make clear that the information which you are imparting to him does not represent definite commitments but only plans which we are hopeful can be translated into accomplishment.

GREW

890F.24/5-845 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JDDA, May 8, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received May 9—1:46 a. m.]

197. ReDepts No. 125, April 27, 6 p. m., paragraph 4. British Minister told me yesterday he has recommended British Government

maintain parity in 1945 supply program by raising its limit by an additional 375,000 pounds but he fears British Treasury will oppose. I believe he is sincere in regretting influence of Jordan's policy.

He also told me Saudi Government has requested loan of 500,000 pounds sterling from Gellatly-Hankey⁹⁹ who are in a tight spot. Foreign Office refuses to mix in the affair or to advise Gellatly-Hankey either way. Failing to receive to date any assurance of total subsidy for 1945 or of cereals needed, Saudi Government is seeking funds wherever it can and is not in good mood.

EDDY

890F.248/5-945

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1945.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your undated letter¹ referring to negotiations concerning the construction of an airfield at Dhahran and improvements to the Jidda field.

The War Department cannot justify the use of military resources for improvement or construction of an airdrome at Jidda for which no military requirement exists.

It is recommended, therefore, that the Legation at Jidda not be given discretionary authority to agree that the Army will carry out the desired improvements at Jidda if, in the Legation's opinion, such agreement is necessary to secure the field at Dhahran together with transit rights.

HENRY L. STIMSON

890F.248/5-1345 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 13, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 2: 56 p. m.]

205. ReDepts No. 130, May 3, 6 p. m. Results of visit to Riyadh with Colonel Connor. Details by pouch:²

⁹⁹ Gellatly, Hankey & Co., a British firm which served as banking agent for the Saudi Arabian Government.

¹ *Ante*, p. 884.

² Despatch 124, May 13, 1945, not printed; it reported that Colonel Eddy, accompanied by Colonel Connor, Lt. Col. K. K. Ellis and Maj. Harry Snyder, left Jidda for Riyadh on May 9 and returned to Jidda on May 12 (890F.248/5-1345). Transmitted with the despatch were three enclosures: Mr. Eddy's note of May 9 to King Abdul Aziz in which he set forth the various projects the United States was prepared to undertake; the reply of May 12 by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Mr. Eddy's further note of May 11 to the King.

1. King Abdul Aziz grants permission for construction of airfield at Dhahran provided field and fixed installations pass to Saudi Government immediately war ends.

2. King grants use of field by US Forces for period of 3 years after end of war, and most-favored-nation terms for US commercial airlines when field is opened to civil aviation.

3. King is grateful for offer to build road but wishes engineer and survey team be sent now to determine with him location and type of road from Riyadh to Persian Gulf before construction is planned. He holds strong views on route to be chosen.

4. King wishes a week or more to consider with advisors other services offered with military mission. His desire for aviation school was obvious as well as need for medical and health services but his reply on services requested of mission will follow later.

5. Colonel Connor is proceeding immediately to Cairo to confer with General Giles thence to Washington to make full report in person to War Department.

Repeated to Cairo as No. 120 for General Giles.

EDDY

890F.24/5-1645

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given full consideration to the memorandum from the State Department, dated the 21st [24th] April, 1945, in which were set out the views of the United States Government on the scale of the 1945 supply programme to be made available on a joint subsidy basis to Saudi Arabia.

2. His Majesty's Government are grateful for the care which has been given to the study of this problem, and they appreciate the anxiety of the United States Government to maintain the basis of an equal sharing of the subsidy supply programme. But His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to agree that the joint 1945 subsidy programme should be on the scale envisaged by the United States Government—namely one of \$16,000,000, (made up of supplies valued at \$13,000,000 plus silver riyals), and they feel bound to adhere to the view that the British share of the joint programme should not exceed \$5,000,000, which would include the cost (estimated at \$40,000 a month) of supporting Saudi Arabian missions abroad.

3. Accordingly His Majesty's Government suggest that the alternative arrangement proposed in paragraph 10 of State Department's note of the 21st [24th] April should be adopted and that there should be a joint subsidy supply programme, to be shared equally by both Governments, valued at \$10,000,000, leaving the United States Gov-

ernment to supply under lend-lease both silver riyals plus an individual supply programme of trucks, tyres, spare parts and the like valued at some \$3,000,000.

4. His Majesty's Government have been led to the above conclusion partly by the desire to avoid further delays in communicating to Ibn Saud the scale upon which assistance will be made available to him by the United States and the United Kingdom Governments in respect of 1945. It is accordingly hoped that if the United States Government is prepared to agree to the arrangement summarised in the preceding paragraph, a joint communication can be made to the King as soon as possible. The Foreign Office is preparing the draft of such a note which will be communicated to the State Department as soon as possible, while the Resident Minister in Cairo ³ has been asked to concert with the F.E.A. representative there a schedule of supplies to constitute the proposed joint subsidy programme and to be included in an annex to the joint communication to Ibn Saud. It would be appreciated if instructions could be sent to the F.E.A. representative to cooperate in this task.

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1945.

890F.51/5-1745

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1945.

Participants: Senators Barkley, George and Walsh ⁴
Under Secretary of Navy Bard
Colonel Brownell ⁵
Mr. Acheson

Mr. Bard, Colonel Brownell and Mr. Acheson met with the three Senators by appointment this afternoon. Mr. Acheson stated the problem in summary as follows: He showed the Senators a map of the United States with the Middle Eastern oil-bearing areas superimposed upon it and gave them a brief résumé of the amounts of oil involved in the various areas and the national interests in that oil. The Senators agreed that the United States had a vital interest in Saudi Arabia, both in order to prevent internal disturbance and foreign intervention and in order to protect American national interests in the oil reserves of that country. He then briefly stated the King's

³ Sir Edward Grigg, British Minister Resident in the Middle East.

⁴ Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky, Senate Majority Leader; Walter F. George of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance; and David I. Walsh of Massachusetts, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

⁵ George A. Brownell, Executive Officer to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (Lovett).

financial position, showing them a chart of estimated recent expenditures and the estimated deficits. He pointed out the consequences which might follow upon failure to care for these deficits. The Army and Navy representatives supported this position strongly. The Senators agreed that something was required.

Mr. Acheson then stated the four broad methods of approach, that is, by secured loan, by unsecured loan, by gift and by purchase of oil in the ground. He stated to them the result of our conference with the House leaders.⁶

The Senators were unanimous in agreeing that a gift to the King would not have Congressional support and that an unsecured loan might meet with Congressional difficulty. The conference then became somewhat involved in details of the various plans. Colonel Brownell stressed the importance of Congressional direction as to the plan to be followed. After some discussion Senator Barkley summed up the conclusions by stating that the three Senators were unanimous in their opinion that some action was required and in their assurances of support. He stated their agreement that this should be done with as little legislation as seemed necessary and certainly without legislation which specified the particular area under discussion. Senator George stated his preference for a plan which would be based upon a purchase of oil since he regarded that as the simplest to understand and explain. He was quite willing, however, to consider other plans or a combination of plans. It was concluded that the representatives of State, War and Navy should work out in more detail alternative plans, one based upon a loan through the Export-Import Bank, and possibly in conjunction with a collateral contract between the Navy and the oil company and possibly the Export-Import Bank. The other plan should be based upon a purchase of oil in the ground. Both plans shall be as specific as possible and include the legislation and the appropriation required.

In a short discussion after the conference Mr. Bard thought that it was important at once to arrange a conference with the President so that we might have President Truman's approval of the broad project, as we had had President Roosevelt's. Mr. Bard will make this appointment for as early a date as possible and notify Colonel Brownell and Mr. Acheson.

890F.24/5-1845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1945—1 p. m.

1046. For Hoskins, Dawson and Eddy from Dept and FEA. Brit representatives in Washington have delivered *aide-mémoire*⁷ stating

⁶ See memorandum of March 8 by the Assistant Secretary of State, p. 861.

⁷ Dated May 16, p. 894.

Brit Govt agrees to a joint supply program for Saudi Arabia valued at 10 million dollars to be shared equally by American and Brit Govts. Included in Brit share is 40 thousand dollars per month for support of Saudi Arab missions.

In response to our proposal of Apr 21 [24] *aide-mémoire* suggests that US Govt provide independently for a supplementary supply program for trucks, spare parts, tires and similar articles valued at 3 million dollars plus such riyals as US Govt deems necessary for coinage purposes.

Brit Govt is telegraphing Resident Minister in Cairo to cooperate with American economic representatives there in working out proposed schedule of supplies for joint program.

Step 2 as contemplated in Deptel 652 Mar 19 has now been taken. It is requested that Eddy in cooperation with Hoskins and Dawson after consultation with appropriate Brit officials submit recommendations as to composition of joint American-Brit 10 million dollar supply program, as well as separate recommendations regarding composition of independent American 3 million dollar program.

When these recommendations have been approved by Dept and FEA they will be considered jointly by American and Brit representatives in Washington who will pass upon them finally.

Sent Cairo repeated Jidda.⁸ [Dept and FEA.]

GREW

890F.515/5-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1945.

141. From Treasury and Foreign Economic Administration. The following is the suggested letter to be sent to the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury :

“My dear Mr. Secretary :

“Reference is made to our letter addressed to you on April 24, 1944,⁹ relative to the demand for silver coin to be supplied to foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia in exchange for dollar credits in the United States.

“The Government of Saudi Arabia will be unable to meet the demand for silver coin of foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises during the calendar year 1945 unless an additional quantity of silver is provided under the Act of March 11, 1941¹⁰ for the specific purpose of exchanging silver riyals for dollar credits in the United States.

“Accordingly, I request, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that you will be so kind as to inform the Foreign Economic

⁸ Repeated to Jidda as No. 138.

⁹ Not printed; but see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 68, footnote 61.

¹⁰ The Lend-Lease Act (55 Stat. 31).

Administration that the need of Saudi Arabia for silver for coinage to be used to supply foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia with riyals in exchange for dollar credits in the United States during the calendar year 1945 may be met to the extent of 5,843,750 ounces of silver from the stocks of silver of the United States Treasury.

"I am prepared, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, to transmit to the Foreign Economic Administration the request of Saudi Arabia for the above-mentioned silver and the agreement of Saudi Arabia to fulfill the commitments made in this letter and to return to the United States Treasury within 5 years after the end of the existing emergency, as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver bullion in an equivalent or higher fineness and equivalent in quantity and form to the total number of ounces of silver transferred to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941, from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver, provided however, that if conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by agreement of both Governments for an additional 2 years.

"I agree, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that the 5,843,750 ounces of silver to be transferred to Saudi Arabia under the agreement which I am prepared, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, to transmit to the Foreign Economic Administration, shall be coined into 17 million riyals¹¹ by the United States mint for Saudi Arabia to be used only for the purpose of providing riyals for foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia in exchange for dollar credits in the United States at the rate of 30 United States cents per riyal. I agree, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that whenever, after the date of this letter, riyals are furnished to foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in exchange for dollar credits, 60 percent of the dollar credits so obtained shall be deposited in the account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the United States, entitled 'His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, Special Dollar Account', until deposits have been made to such account of 60 percent of the dollar credits obtained from an amount of riyals equivalent to the total number of riyals coined from silver supplied after the date of this letter to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941. It is understood that such deposits shall be in addition to the \$1,800,000 required to be deposited for the silver supplied in accordance with our request of April 24, 1944. The dollars in such account shall be held for the sole purpose of purchasing silver to be returned to the United States until silver has been returned to the United States equivalent to the total amount of silver supplied to

¹¹ In telegram 143, May 19, 1945, 8 p. m., the Department stated: "You will note that although SAG requested only 15 million riyals for this purpose, the documents provide for 17 million riyals. You should explain to appropriate SAG officials that the US Government has taken the liberty of drafting the documents in this way because it has information of additional needs of the Legation and American companies (SAMS and American Eastern) amounting to more than 1 million riyals and has provided a margin for emergencies." (890F.515/5-1945) For request by Saudi Arabian Government for 15 million riyals, see telegram 109, March 16, noon, from Jidda, p. 863.

Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941. It is understood that the dollars in such account will be held and may be used pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in our letter to you of April 24, 1944.

"The costs incurred by the United States Mint in minting the 17 million riyals and the cost of shipping the riyals to Saudi Arabia will be paid by Saudi Arabia out of the dollars derived from the provision of riyals to foreign diplomatic missions and foreign business enterprises in Saudi Arabia. It is understood that these costs will be over and above the amount deposited in the account, 'His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, Special Dollar Account', at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York."

The following is the suggested letter to be sent to the Honorable Leo T. Crowley, Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration:

"Dear Sir:

"His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, through _____ (name) _____, _____ (title) _____, hereby requests the Foreign Economic Administration to supply as soon as possible 5,843,750 ounces of silver under the Act of March 11, 1941 from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver.

"I hereby agree, on behalf of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia, that Saudi Arabia shall return to the United States Treasury within 5 years after the end of the existing emergency, as determined by the President of the United States, an amount of silver bullion in an equivalent or higher fineness and equivalent in quantity and form to the total number of ounces of silver transferred to Saudi Arabia under the Act of March 11, 1941 from the stocks of the United States Treasury silver, provided however, that if conditions of the world supply of silver make it advisable, such period may be extended by the agreement of both Governments for an additional 2 years; and that Saudi Arabia will fulfill the commitments made in the letter addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States on, 1945."¹²

[Treasury and Foreign Economic Administration]

GREW

890F.515/5-1945: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1945—8 p. m.

142. From Treasury. With reference to the request of the Saudi Government for an additional 2 million dollars worth of gold slugs,

¹² In telegram 244, June 23, 1945, noon, the Minister in Saudi Arabia reported that the proposed letters were signed by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance on June 21 (890F.515/6-2345). The letters were forwarded in despatch 145, June 23 (890F.515/6-2345). Copies were transmitted by the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Vinson) and the Foreign Economic Administrator on August 1 with the Department's recommendation "that the request of the Government of Saudi Arabia be granted". (890F.515/6-2345)

transmitted through the Legation on April 25, 1945,¹³ Treasury is prepared to facilitate the sale. It is suggested that the Government of Saudi Arabia place an order directly with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York authorizing them to purchase and ship this gold on behalf of the Government of Saudi Arabia.¹⁴ [Treasury.]

GREW

890F.51/5-2945

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] 23 May, 1945.

Last January President Roosevelt approved¹⁵ the following State Department proposals, concurred in by the Secretaries of War and Navy, for the extension of aid to Saudi Arabia:

1. A request to Congress for funds to meet Saudi Arabia's urgent financial requirements.
2. Notification to the Export-Import Bank of the President's desire that it make a commitment in principle of its intention to provide, after the necessary study, development loans to improve economic conditions and living standards.
3. The construction by the Army of air fields and strategic roads, and the dispatch of a military training mission.

Action with respect to the last two proposals has already begun. Neither of these, however, solves the immediate problem to which the first proposal is addressed, namely, the annual budgetary deficits of Saudi Arabia caused by the war. It is estimated that they will continue for the next five years, in an aggregate amount of approximately \$30,000,000 to \$50,000,000.

Thus far these deficits have been met by a combination of grants from the British, American Lend-Lease, and substantial prepayments of future royalties by the American companies holding the concession covering the country's oil. The oil royalty advances stopped some time ago when the companies felt that they had reached their limit in terms of justifiable business practice. There is considerable doubt as to whether Lend-Lease can be continued beyond the present year. In any event, it assures neither a permanent nor a wholly satisfactory solution of the problem of the next five years. The prompt solution of this problem is essential in order to assure the stability and inde-

¹³ See telegram 183 from Jidda, p. 884.

¹⁴ The gold discs arrived at Jidda on October 21, 1945, and their receipt was acknowledged by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance in a cable of November 5, 1945, to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (890F.515/11-545).

¹⁵ See memorandum of January 8 by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt and footnote 14, p. 847.

pendence of Saudi Arabia. In our judgment, it is in the best interest of the United States that the situation be met through arrangements for the continuance of our financial aid to Saudi Arabia during the period of the deficits.

It has been our view that, before formally requesting Congress for funds for this purpose, the opinions of key Congressional leaders should be obtained as to the manner in which such funds are to be made available to Saudi Arabia. We have discussed the matter in detail with certain leaders, first on the House side with Speaker Rayburn and Representatives McCormack, Vinson and Drewry, and later with Senators Barkley, George and Walsh.¹⁶

All agreed that, because of Saudi Arabia's strategic position in relation to the Pacific War, and, even more importantly, because of its vast oil resources now under concession to American nationals, the United States has a vital interest in the stability of Saudi Arabia. All gave assurance of their support of an appropriation, but indicated a distinct preference that its use be related in some manner to the oil in Saudi Arabia. There are various ways in which this might be done, all centering about the basic idea that assistance to Saudi Arabia should be accompanied by arrangements which will provide a substantial reserve of Saudi Arabian oil for the future use and security of the Army and Navy. The money would be advanced only as needed and under the supervision of American experts detailed to Saudi Arabia to assist in the management of its public finances.

Both the Senate and House groups instructed us to prepare alternative plans, together with drafts of appropriate legislation, and to return to them for further discussions. It will, of course, be necessary at some point in the near future to enter into at least preliminary talks with the two American oil companies holding the Saudi Arabian concession. It has also seemed desirable to us to explore at the outset the possibilities of broadening the participation of the American oil industry in the potentially huge reserves represented by this concession.

Before proceeding further, the State Department wishes to have your approval in principle of the general objectives described above and of the foregoing method of approach.¹⁷

JOSEPH C. GREW

¹⁶ See memoranda of March 8 and May 17 by the Assistant Secretary of State, pp. 861 and 895, respectively.

¹⁷ Marginal note by President Truman on May 29: "Approved in principle[:] details to be worked out later." The President's approval followed his conversation the previous day with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Bard; see memorandum of May 28 by the Assistant Secretary of State, p. 902.

890F.248/5-1245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1945—7 p. m.

149. Believe it desirable to further clarify terms mentioned in numbered paragraph 2 your 205, May 13 to make sure that US commercial air services will not be precluded by the agreement from using Dhahran just as soon as airport is completed and other conditions permitting, and that our commercial airlines may continue to use this field after it reverts to Saudi Government.

GREW

890F.51/5-2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1945.

Subject: Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia

Participants: The President

The Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Bard

The Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson

Under Secretary Bard and I saw the President by appointment on Monday, May 28. Prior to our visit the President's Naval Aide, Captain Vardaman, had given the President the attached memorandum¹⁸ and had discussed the matter briefly with him.

At the President's request, we showed the President the map which had been prepared on which the Middle Eastern Oil area is superimposed upon the map of the United States, and went over with him the various amounts of oil already proved in the area and the location of various concessions. We explained to the President the financial position of the King, his need for assistance, and the various possibilities by which the United States might furnish that assistance. We told the President of President Roosevelt's approval in principle of seeking Congressional approval of American assistance and told him of our talks with House and Senate members.

The President said that we had his approval to go forward and stated that he would call Senator O'Mahoney,¹⁹ with whom we should also talk. The President subsequently did this.

Mr. Bard mentioned the fact that we had spoken to Secretary Ickes²⁰ about this matter and that Secretary Ickes was not enthusi-

¹⁸ Dated May 23, p. 900.

¹⁹ Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming, member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and Chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Petroleum Resources.

²⁰ Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior and Petroleum Administrator.

astic. He thought that Secretary Ickes might intervene in the matter and that it would certainly be confused if it were complicated by any idea of bringing Saudi Arabian oil into the United States. The President was familiar with Secretary Ickes' attitude and told us that we were to go forward. We both gathered the impression that the President did not anticipate difficulty with the Petroleum Administration.

DEAN ACHESON

890F.248/5-2945 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 29, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received May 31—8: 47 p. m.]

222. ReDept's 149, May 26. Saudi Govt not prepared to negotiate terms on which commercial air services would operate on Dhahran air field. They wish time to study agreements in force in neighboring countries and competitive rates. They promise only non-discriminatory terms to US whenever commercial services are authorized.

As stated in my despatch 124, May 13,²¹ I believe it would be most unwise to request definite concessions for commercial air service before US economic aid is forthcoming to Saudi Arabia. If, however, Dept wants negotiations now the commercial rights will have to be bought and Air Attaché Curren²² should come down from Cairo armed with data for negotiations.

King has indicated he wishes me to visit Riyadh again to discuss details of services offered by Army but not until his mind is made up on what he wants and does not want. Curren could come then if Dept so instructs.

Saudi Govt expects to open field to US commercial aviation at end of war but to propose bluntly use of field by US commercial aviation as soon as field is completed would arouse suspicion that military need is secondary to commercial purpose. This would be a very bad time to make such proposal.

EDDY

890F.20 Missions/5-3045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1945—7 p. m.

151. Colonel Connor's preliminary report has been presented to War. Before he can make his final report and before a directive can be issued to General Giles for negotiations made through you re tech-

²¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 893.

²² Ralph B. Curren, Civil Air Attaché at Embassy in Iran and concurrently at Legations in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria; resident at Cairo.

nical details of proposed installations it will be necessary to ascertain final wishes of King Abdul Aziz re organization of mission. Please state when it can be expected that King's decision will be received.

GREW

890F.248/5-3145 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 31, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 8:28 p. m.]

224. Leg's 205, May 13. King Abdul Aziz wants me visit Riyadh about June 9 to discuss Army proposals and other projects of cooperation. King requests I bring full information re financial and economic aid US contemplates as he wishes to discuss entire field, military and economic.

Request Dept instruct me as fully as possible before June 9.

EDDY

890F.248/5-3145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Egypt (Tuok)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945—7 p. m.

1151. For Eddy. It is not possible at this time to provide you with any additional info re proposed US financial and economic aid to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore there have been some recent new developments re Dhahran airfield matter now under discussion between Dept and War.

For these reasons it is considered highly advisable for you to postpone your proposed visit to Riyadh giving as your reason that certain matters are under consideration in Washington and that you consider postponement advisable pending receipt of additional info from Dept.

Dept will endeavor to instruct you as fully as possible in very near future.

Sent Cairo repeated Jidda.²³

GREW

890F.248/6-1145 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, June 11, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 12:05 p. m.]

235. Re Dept's 156, June 5.²⁴ King Abdul Aziz has telegraphed that he agrees to postponement of my visit to Riyadh as he wishes

²³ As No. 156.

²⁴ Same as telegram 1151, *supra*.

negotiations to be comprehensive including all proposals of US Govt in Saudi Arabia. He expects to hear from me before the end of June officially on the matters broached to him tentatively in Dept's 131, May 7.

EDDY

890F.796/6-1545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy
 Mr. Merriam, NE
 Mr. Parker, NE
 (Mr. Paul Alling, former Deputy Director of NEA,²⁵ participated in the later stages of the conversation)

On June 14, Mr. Alling informed me that Mr. Wright had spoken to him privately to the effect that he (Mr. Wright) was in an embarrassing position with respect to his own Government, due to the fact that he had been instrumental in obtaining the approval of the British Government for the construction of an American military airfield at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, only to learn that when we asked the King for permission to do so, we had also made a request for civil air rights.

After some checking, and conferring with AV,²⁶ I invited Mr. Wright to come in for a discussion of the matter, and he did so on June 15.

I first apologized to him because the British Embassy had not yet received an answer to its memorandum of May 24, 1945.²⁷ asking to be informed of the details of our request to King Ibn Saud for air facilities. I explained that an answer had been drafted promptly but had got held up in the Department, and that I had only just learned that it had not gone out. In view of Mr. Phillips' ²⁸ feeling that the substance, but not the text, of our communication to Ibn Saud should be made available to the British, I informed Mr. Wright orally of the substance and said that we expected to communicate it to the British Embassy in writing.

Mr. Wright then observed that the British Government had supported our desire to construct a military airfield at Dhahran only to find out that we had requested something quite different from the Saudi Arabian Government. It had been his understanding that we

²⁶ Mr. Alling was the Appointed Diplomatic Agent and Consul General to Morocco.

²⁵ Aviation Division.

²⁷ Not printed.

²⁸ William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

would ask for a military airfield only. He also observed smilingly that he had listened to strong lectures in the Department from Mr. Wallace Murray on the subject of approaches by the British representative at Jidda to the Saudi Arabian Government without informing our representative in advance.

In reply, we made the following points:

1. There may have been a divergence between his earlier informal understanding and the character of the instructions actually sent to Jidda owing to the fact that officials in the Department who had the earlier talks were away when the instructions were drafted.

2. Our representative at Jidda had taken up two matters with the King: a military airfield, and civil air rights. Thus he had not requested quite a different thing, but an additional thing.

3. We felt that we had clearance from the British Government for taking up civil air matters with Saudi Arabia by virtue of the Department's note of October 19, 1944, to the British Embassy²⁹ and the latter's reply of February 16, 1945.³⁰ It is true that our military airfield is not yet in existence, but our civil air people felt strongly that we would be shirking our responsibilities if we did not bring up the question of civil air rights at the same time we were discussing a military field, in view of the desirability of inaugurating civil air services in the relatively near future.

4. We had expressly asked for non-discriminatory civil air rights in connection with the field. We were thus, in effect, opening up the field to British civil airlines as well as to American.

5. The question remained why our Minister in Jidda had not informed his British colleague that we intended to take up the question of civil air rights with the King. We reminded Mr. Wright that despite his helpfulness, it had taken many months to get clearance from the British on the military project, during which time the Department had been under heavy and insistent pressure from the War Department. Since our civil air people felt so strongly that we should not raise the military question without also raising the civilian question, we ran the risk that, in view of obstructive British tactics throughout the Middle East to prevent our civil airlines from operating,³¹ the British would object to a discussion with the King of civil air rights and thus cause further delay in presenting the military plan. We emphasized that our Government felt very keenly on the subject of these obstructive British tactics. In view of the foregoing, and the fact that the King much prefers projects to be presented to him as a whole and not piecemeal, we felt obliged to consider the civil air aspect from the standpoint of general procedure in such a matter, and not from the standpoint of the special understanding as to consultation between the two Ministers in Saudi Arabia; that this matter pertained to the general question of civil aviation in the Near East and not just to Saudi Arabia as is the case with matters about which the two Ministers have had prior consultations. We said that if Mr.

²⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 490.

³⁰ *Ante*, p. 64.

³¹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 64 ff.

Wright desired to have a further conversation with the Aviation Division, we would be glad to arrange it.

Mr. Wright indicated that he would do what he could with our explanation, but that he would prefer not to arrange for a talk with AV until he heard again from London.

We stated that the general policy of cooperation between Ministers in Saudi Arabia remained unchanged, so far as we were concerned.

890F.612/6-1645 : Airgram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, June 16, 1945.

[Received July 2—4 p. m.]

A-53. Success of U.S. Agricultural Mission ³² at Al Kharj is remarkable in spite of long delay in receiving their essential tools, equipment and transport. King Abdul Aziz is emphatic in his praise of personnel of Rogers Mission and of work accomplished already under great handicaps which included almost disastrous infestation by locusts.

Agricultural Mission has attracted favorable attention of everyone, and visitors to Arabia from various agencies commend mission and express anxiety that its permanence be assured, with expansion and plans to rotate personnel. Various independent proposals have been forwarded by these observers to Cairo or Washington, including the proposal that Rogers himself should soon visit the United States to recruit personnel to assure continuance of mission at end of 18-month contract period of which 9 months now passed.

The Legation concurs in the value placed upon work of mission, as reported frequently to the Department, and yields to no one in concern lest this most promising U.S. Government form of cooperation should not continue and grow. Rogers and two of his staff have just left Jidda after 11-day visit to collect and recondition motor vehicles and engineering equipment secured for them from U.S. Army Military Mission at Taif which concluded its work April 30, 1945. After repeatedly conferring with Rogers and the King, I recommend the following considerations be taken into account before acting on any specific proposals for enlargement or extension of Mission:

³² In a memorandum of July 17, 1946, to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs stated that by the middle of 1945, irrigation ditches had been completed, pumps installed, and a variety of cereals, vegetables, folder crops, date palm and other fruit-bearing trees successfully grown on the 2,000-acre tract at Al Kharj (890F.61/7-1746).

(1) Plan for more permanent or larger mission must await availability of financial resources for development program in Saudi Arabia, before the dimensions of any more permanent U.S. Agricultural cooperation can be assessed. The longer future effort cannot be confined to a war budget or agency, but must be part of a national program planned with the King.

(2) As soon as financial resources or long time loans permit, Rogers and other experts should propose to the King the agricultural program they recommend for a given period of years, together with estimate of personnel and equipment required. Rogers agreed to draft now his ideas and recommendations, and to seek an early audience with the King as soon as the finances are in sight.

(3) The agricultural program must be one the King himself wants, not one devised at a distance and presented to him. The Mission at Al Kharj sets the pattern he wants: An enterprise of the Saudi Government, sponsored and protected by the King, with personnel ultimately responsible to him.

EDDY

890F.51/6-1845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1945—8 p. m.

169. ReLegs 235, June 11. Hearings on Lend-Lease budget started this week. Unlikely it will get final Congressional approval before June 30, and it might take longer. We can make no final commitment to the King on 1945 budgetary assistance until budget is approved, including the specific item for Saudi Arabia.

As for the rest of the matters discussed in Dept's 131, May 7, in the Department's opinion you should tell Ibn Saud quite frankly that it will be a matter of several months before the U.S. Government will be in position to tell him exactly how it intends to assist him over the next several years. A long range financial assistance program of the type desired by Ibn Saud is without precedent in United States history. The fact that it is being seriously considered is in itself proof of the great interest of the United States Government in the King's problems and the welfare of his people. There is practically unanimous agreement amongst all government officials who have been studying the matter, including President Truman himself,³³ that necessary assistance should be provided. Delay does not represent lack of agreement on that basic objective, but rather reflects the earnest efforts being made to determine ways and means which will receive the wholehearted support of Congress and the approval of the American public. It is thought essential that when plans are finally presented to Con-

³³ See memorandum of May 28 by the Assistant Secretary of State, p. 902.

gress, they should be in such shape as to merit quick approval with a minimum of controversy.

This means that there must be much preliminary study, and cautious testing of Congressional opinion on an informal basis from time to time. Such a program requires continual close collaboration and reconciliation of views between several different agencies, including War, Navy, State, Treasury and Interior Departments and probably the Export-Import Bank. Aramco must of course be consulted, and the views of the rest of the petroleum industry cannot be ignored. The probable reactions of the King to the various types of proposals advanced by different groups must be explained by the Department, so that time will not be wasted in getting approval of Congress for a plan which the King might turn down, requiring us to start all over again.

Substantial progress has been made, particularly during the past month, and the Department is now quite confident that a definite program will be worked out and approved by the early part of 1946. Even if we fail to meet that deadline, we feel confident that the King's essential needs will continue to be met in one way or another until the over-all program is finally ready. We hope that you will be able to impart this feeling of confidence to the King, and to persuade him that patience will be in his own best interest in the long run. Please try to disabuse him of any idea he may have that the U.S. Government intends to pay him so and so much on the spot for any given act of cooperation on his part. You should rather stress the point that his cooperation is in the interest not only of Saudi Arabia but also of the Arab world generally. The relationship between the two Governments must be one of mutual trust, confidence and forbearance.

It is difficult for the Department to believe that the King will refuse to wait 6 months for an American offer, when his only alternative would be to accept funds from some other power under extremely onerous conditions.

It had been hoped that a \$5,000,000 development loan could be announced at the same time as the 1945 supply program. It now appears that this loan may have to be made part of the longer range assistance program, since the problems met in working out the development loan are much the same as the general problems connected with the budgetary assistance program. It is felt that a general solution should be sought; an attempt to rush a solution on the development loan might endanger the entire program.

In summary, you may inform the King that you cannot give him a final commitment on assistance for the year 1945 until about 15 days

after the lend-lease budget is approved by Congress; that you will inform him when you are in position to make the commitment; and that you hope it will be not later than July 15. You can point out that all other lend-lease recipients must also await this budget approval before being certain of the aid they are to receive.

You may inform him that you will not be in a position to present a detailed program for long range budgetary assistance and development until early next year, but that work is going forward in Washington on such a program with President Truman's personal approval; that there is general agreement that assistance should be given; that delay reflects only the care being taken to formulate a really sound program which will receive the whole-hearted approval of Congress and the American people; and that you will be glad to explain further when you visit him in connection with the 1945 assistance program. It is hoped that the background information given in this telegram will assist you in making that explanation.

GREW

890F.515/6-1145: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1945—7 p. m.

173. ReLegs 236, June 11.³⁴ If agreements signed promptly, first resale riyals should arrive by September 1. No decision yet on amount of credit lend-lease riyals, although likely only 10 million riyals will be provided including half and quarter riyals, and not 15 million as MinFonAff originally requested. You may not wish to mention reduction in amount until whole assistance program is presented. But you should inform MinFonAff that no arrangements can be made on credit riyals until after Congress approves lend-lease budget. If approval received we will work toward delivery of credit riyals by November 1, in time for pilgrimage.

You should inform MinFonAff that U.S. Government has provided no dollar credits to merchants of Iraq, Egypt or Lebanon. He may be referring to dollar quotas established by British for Egypt and Iraq, and a similar quota which may be established by French for Levant States. Such dollars must be purchased with sterling owned by Egypt and Iraq, or French francs owned by Levant States. Doubtful if British would sell dollars to Saudi Arabia against sterling even if SAG had surplus sterling, since Saudi Arabia is not a member of the sterling bloc. MinFonAff should be referred to British Minister.

GREW

³⁴ Not printed.

890F.51/6-2145

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 144

JIDDA, June 21, 1945.

[Received June 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the Department's long telegram, No. 169 of June 18, 8 p. m., giving the reasons for postponement of proposals to secure Congressional authority for financial aid to Saudi Arabia, and to enclose herewith a copy of the Note³⁶ which I consequently delivered, with some oral comment, to the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Yusuf Yassin. I have the honor to submit the following comments:

I. SUBSIDY AND BUDGETARY AID FOR 1945

The Saudi Government has heard nothing from the British or American Governments regarding the amount of a joint subsidy, nor the extent to which they may expect help in balancing their budget for 1945. Delays in delivery of cereals and other subsidy items, uncertainty regarding the Lend-Lease riyals to be furnished, the approaching end of the first six months of the year without any word, and the locust plague, have naturally aroused considerable anxiety, and they are disappointed not to receive any word this month. However, the Acting Foreign Minister and the Minister of Finance, at least, understand fully and accept without question the plain fact that Congress must act on the Lend-Lease bill before any recipients can be informed of the amount of aid they will receive.

In view of this disappointment, I am convinced it would be a disadvantage for us if I am required to join with my British colleague in communicating a joint note stating that the joint subsidy will be limited to a total of ten million dollars, before I am authorized by the Department to communicate the additional aid the United States will give to balance the 1945 budget. I hope the two communications can be made at the same time. So far as the joint subsidy is concerned, Mr. Grafftey-Smith prefers, and I agree, that that note be delivered to the Foreign Ministry here in Jidda without any trip to Riyadh.

II. LONG RANGE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The news that action on a long range program of economic cooperation must be deferred until 1946 came very clearly as a hard blow to Saudi hopes and plans. The Acting Foreign Minister and the Minister of Finance have held two long sessions with me in an effort to prepare communications of their own to accompany my Note to soften the blow for the King. Ever since the hope of such a program "in

³⁶No. 221, June 20, not printed.

the near future" was held out to them six months ago (Department's telegram No. 283, December 24, 2 p. m.³⁷) they have been hoping to emerge from the "crisis" stage of always being uncertain of food, a balanced budget, of means for much needed public developments. Now they have to wait other long months before they can hope for an economic accord which will stabilize their economy over a period of time. It is not a question of whether "the King will refuse to wait six months for an American offer"; he *has* waited six months, and obviously must wait as many months as may be. The question rather is whether *we* can afford to wait. The "crisis" psychology does not make for stability, nor does it permit sound financial planning by the local government, nor does it provide for the minimum developments needed in the country without delay, such as improvements in transport and agriculture. Without any development fund in sight, for example, what is to become of the FEA Agricultural Mission at Al Kharj, whose time is now half over? Can it be enlarged and continued, and if so with what funds? Or will its fine work come to naught? In this connection, the Department's telegram nullifies my recommendations in Legation's A-53 of June 16, and I now urge that steps be taken immediately to provide for the future of the agricultural mission and for the rotation of its personnel, before all the experienced Americans on the spot leave together at the termination of their contract.

Even though budgetary and direct financial assistance must be postponed until 1946, an equal misfortune is the postponement of a loan for development purposes which, surely, is not also without precedent! Much sound planning and thinking has been going on among Saudi officials with regard to improvements in irrigation, water supply to the cities, transport services, electric power, which depend upon funds to initiate. I had hoped that this new era in Saudi economy might begin with a substantial loan this summer to be used for American goods and services. The negotiations with Mackay Radio,³⁸ and with American Eastern³⁹ for sundry commercial ventures may well have been dealt a fatal blow. The loss, I repeat, is one which touches us as well as the Saudi Government.

I believe it is a mistake to believe that the King's "only alternative would be to accept funds from some other power under extremely

³⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 759.

³⁸ For proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government by the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, see telegram 145, May 22, 4 p. m., to Jidda, p. 1022.

³⁹ The American Eastern Corporation, an American company engaged in trading activities in the Near and Middle East, had proposed to the Saudi Arabian Government in 1945 the establishment of a shipping company under the Saudi Arabian flag and a development company to construct and operate public and private works to participate in agricultural development, to engage in general merchandising activities, and to furnish technical and other services in Saudi Arabia.

onerous conditions." I venture to predict that his alternative, as well as his temporary recourse, would be to bleed Aramco for loans to stabilize his economy and to initiate such improvements as he is unwilling or unable to postpone. And funds secured this way would not be confined necessarily to American goods and services. The bleeding of Aramco has consequences much less damaging to Saudi Arabia than to Americans: it would be a great hardship on the company who would be confirmed in their growing and articulate opinion that Aramco is the substance and the Legation the shadow, and that United States Government moves in Saudi Arabia end up at their door for them to supplant or supply. I have recently come confidentially into possession of evidence that Aramco does not believe it has much to expect from our government except trouble. To have the King continue to extort loans from them will contribute to the decline of the relative prestige of our government.

I do not believe there is any doubt in the mind of the King of the "mutual trust, confidence, and forbearance" that exist between our two governments. The personal relations are excellent, and the goodwill fostered by American generosity, the friendship of President Roosevelt, the warm hospitality now being shown to Amir Faisal and his party, make any further reassurance on this score unnecessary. The uneasiness, on the contrary, is precisely at the vulnerable point of "ways and means". The King and his government want nothing more than long time economic cooperation with the United States, to escape exclusive dependence on a regional imperial power, to benefit by acquiring over the years the superior brand of American technical goods and services. But they wonder whether the machinery of American government will permit long range commitments to Saudi Arabia. This they may now ponder for a further space of time. This is the primary anxiety of the King, expressed by him to President Roosevelt, as reported in the Legation's Despatch No. 80, March 3, 1945, paragraph (d), page 6.⁴⁰

From the above comments, the Department will understand why in dealing with the Saudi Government I have made very sparing use of the explanatory paragraphs in the telegram under reference, and have confined my observations to the summary of the situation embodied in the enclosed Note.

III. PROJECTS OFFERED BY THE MILITARY MISSION

These were not mentioned in the Department's telegram, nor was there mention of the airfield at Dhahran, concerning which the King is still waiting to learn the plans of the War Department. However,

⁴⁰ *Ante*, p. 7; the page reference is to the second paragraph of section (d).

now that it is made clear to the King that the only improvements he can expect this year are those offered by the United States Army, it is very likely that I shall be summoned to Riyadh to hear his views on the proposals of the Military Mission, which I think may be amended substantially by him, if indeed they are accepted at all. To disarm criticism by reactionaries against the "infiltration" of the land by foreign military, he had hoped to announce to his people civilian and economic cooperation as well. I do not attempt to forecast his reply to the Army proposals, which will perhaps have been made before this reaches the Department. In reply to a direct question this morning, I stated that the Army offers still stand, and that they are not contingent upon action by Congress, construction of an airfield at Dhahran, or any other factor. If accepted and undertaken, the Army projects will do much to recover ground for the United States. For this reason I hope the Department will urge upon the Army the expenditure of the very best (and not the easiest nor the cheapest) services, namely the establishment of a well-equipped air mission, and the building of a first-class highway, etc. Since the Army possesses the only financial resources available for improvements in Saudi Arabia this year, and since the Army has a very considerable strategic interest in the country, their resources should be used to the utmost to establish impressive monuments to American technical skill and enduring goodwill.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

890F.248/6-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, June 24, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 1:25 p. m.]

245. Summoned by King I leave for Riyadh June 29 or 30 to receive his reply to offer of military services committed in Legs despatch 124, May 13, enclosure 1 *b* and enclosure 3.⁴¹

My anxiety re resources for improvements and public works (Legs 243, June 23⁴²) already justified by visit from Acting Foreign Minister who, without any prompting whatsoever, inquired:

⁴¹ Despatch not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 893. Enclosure 1 was Mr. Eddy's note of May 9, paragraph *b* of which dealt with offers of assistance to Saudi Arabia in the form of a military mission and improvement of the road between Dhahran and Riyadh; enclosure 3 was Mr. Eddy's note of May 11 which gave more detailed information on the scope of such assistance in connection with the training of pilots and ground crews, medical services, technical army services, and miscellaneous services.

⁴² Not printed; it reported that with the postponement of long-range budgetary assistance to the Saudi Arabian Government, a danger existed that sterling credits might prove the only means of financing public services (890F.51/6-2345).

"Is there any way the friendly US Govt can assist us in public improvements such as water supply to cities and electric power? Could some of these such as bringing water from Wadi Fatima to Jidda surveyed by US Army and Aramco engineers be done by lend-lease?"

Brit engineers have recently made proposals but we prefer first to explore all possibilities of public works developed with US cooperation."

To the possibilities of military lend-lease I would respectfully repeat recommendation for improvements Jidda airport (Dept's 130, May 3, last) though this has not been reopened with me by Saudi Govt.

EDDY

890F.248/6-2545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1945—6 p. m.

177. With change in redeployment plans involving transfer of troops from European to Pacific war theaters through US War considers there is diminishing military necessity for construction of airfield at Dhahran. For this reason War feels expenditure of funds for construction of airfield on basis of military necessity would be of doubtful legal validity. It is generally agreed however among interested departments that airfield would be in American national interest. These interested departments have recommended that matter be presented to President on national interest basis. If President approves presumably military airfield will be constructed at Dhahran. Present status of matter therefore is that it is contemplated that the question will be presented to President. No action will be taken until his decision is made. Dept will provide you with appropriate instructions at that time. Foregoing for your strictly confidential info only.

GREW

890F.248/6-2645

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] June 26, 1945.

Reference is made to the Department of State's memorandum of May 23, 1945, regarding financial assistance to Saudi Arabia which you have approved in principle with the suggestion that the details should be worked out later. There is also a proposal to construct a United States military airfield at Dhahran which might well be considered in connection with this program, although not a part of it.

In March 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that there was a military necessity for the construction of a United States military airfield at Dhahran (J.C.S. 1277/1, 12 March 1945). It was planned to utilize this field as a base between Cairo and Karachi in the projected plan of operations, thereby shortening the air route by approximately 200 miles and producing a substantial saving in fuel and airplane hours. In accordance with this conclusion King Ibn Saud's consent for the construction of the field was obtained by our Minister in Jidda and representatives of the War Department. The King expressed a willingness for the field to be used by United States military forces for a period of three years after the end of hostilities, and for United States commercial airlines to enjoy most-favored-nation terms when the airfield is made available for use by civil airlines. The condition is imposed that the airfield and its fixed installations pass to the Saudi Arabian Government at the end of the war.

Events subsequent to the above conclusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including changes in redeployment planning, have resulted in a substantial diminution of the military requirement for the Dhahran airfield. The War Department now reports that while early availability of the field would still be of value in increasing the operational efficiency of the Cairo-Karachi route, the extent of this value is in direct ratio to the rapidity of its completion and it believes may not justify the large commitment of United States funds and resources from a military standpoint alone. It is, of course, possible that a change in situation in the Pacific war might substantially increase the military value of the project. Notwithstanding the fact that present planning indicates a diminished military requirement, the War Department is prepared to proceed with the construction of the field if it is determined to be in the over-all American national interest to do so.

It is believed to be in the American national interest to construct this field together with certain related facilities. Among the reasons responsible for this belief are the following:

1. The Saudi Arabian oil fields, which promise to be among the most valuable in the world, are now under concession to an American company. The continuance of that concession in American hands holds out the best prospect that the oil of Saudi Arabia will be developed commercially with the greatest rapidity and upon the largest scale, producing the revenues which will contribute to the betterment of the economic condition of Saudi Arabia and, in consequence, to its political stability. The manifestation of American interests in Saudi Arabia in addition to oil will tend to strengthen the political integrity of Saudi Arabia externally and, hence, to provide conditions under which an early expansion of the costly development of the oil concession can be proceeded with. The immediate construction by this

country of an airfield at Dhahran, to be used for military purposes initially but destined for an ultimate civil utilization, would be a strong showing of American interest.

2. Subsequent to the utilization of such an airfield for military purposes it would be a major asset to American postwar civil aviation as the most feasible intermediate stop on the route to India and as a means of air traffic to and from American-owned or controlled oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein. It would greatly facilitate the further developments of close relations between this Government and that of Saudi Arabia.

3. If, after having conducted successful negotiations with King Ibn Saud to obtain his permission to construct the field, this Government would be compelled to inform him that it had decided not to build it, King Ibn Saud would be likely to gain the impression that our policies with regard to Saudi Arabia are of a wavering character. This would contribute to his existing uncertainty as to the extent to which he may rely upon the United States.

The Secretaries of War and the Navy concur in the view that the construction of a United States military airfield at Dhahran is in the national interest for the aforementioned reasons and recommend that you authorize the Secretary of War to proceed with the construction of the field and related facilities at the expense of the War Department.⁴³

JOSEPH C. GREW

890F.51/6-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1945—6 p. m.

178. ReDepts 169, June 18, Legs 243, June 23,⁴⁴ and Legs 245, June 24. Department will try to push development loan without waiting for working out of long-range budgetary assistance program. You may inform King that Export-Import Bank has approved in principle the loan of funds for development of such projects as water supply, electric power and roads, provided adequate security for repayment can be arranged. You may say that you hope to be able to present a definite proposal before the end of this year. You should emphasize that these funds will be repayable loans, not gifts.

For your strictly confidential information, major difficulty causing delay is fact that Aramco has option of paying royalties in either sterling or dollars, while oil is likely to be sold mostly for sterling for some time to come with no certainty that sterling will be freely

⁴³ Presidential approval was conveyed to the Secretary of State in a memorandum of June 28, 1945, by Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy (890F.7962/6-2845).

⁴⁴ No. 243 not printed, but for summary, see footnote 42, p. 914.

convertible into dollars. Company would ordinarily not pay royalties in dollars until it had met other dollar expenditures such as dollar salaries of employees, U.S. income taxes, purchases of equipment in the United States, and perhaps dividends to stockholders. Question is whether a sufficient proportion of annual production will be sold for dollars or a sufficient amount of sterling proceeds be convertible into dollars, to cover all foregoing dollar expenditures and also payment of dollar royalties in an amount sufficient to permit SAG to meet interest and amortization on dollar loans in addition to current dollar needs. Export-Import Bank and others who have studied this problem have grave doubts that oil royalties can be considered adequate security for dollar loans unless firm dollar market can be found for oil. This problem is the core of difficulties Department is facing in seeking dollar loans for Saudi Arabia or any other country whose exportable resources, however attractive for the long pull, are not likely to be importable into the United States as long as U.S. production is adequate for U.S. need.

Congressional leaders have indicated that outright grants specifically to Saudi Arabia are out of the question. Purchase of an oil reserve by the Navy or advance payment of royalties on such a reserve, has been considered in connection with budgetary assistance program, and would eliminate repayment problem, but Navy Department is worried about reaction of domestic petroleum industry, and is not ready to commit itself to spend any money for present or future Arabian oil.

This explanation may help you to understand delays. Department is seeking solution earnestly, and progress is being made daily.

GREW

890F.248/6-2845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1945—1 p. m.

180. Deptel 177 June 25. For your background info during forthcoming discussions with Ibn Saud you are advised that President Truman has approved recommendation for construction of US military airfield at Dhahran.

GREW

890F.24/7-445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1945—6 p. m.

186. From Dept and FEA for Eddy and Awalt. Your 247 June 24 rpt to Cairo as 142, Cairo's 1319 June 25 rpt to Jidda as 174.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Neither printed.

1. We concur in your judgment that it would be preferable to include textiles and exclude trucks from the 1945 Joint Supply Program. We have proposed this change to UK Treasury Delegation here and anticipated no objection.

2. Commodity composition of 1945 Joint Supply Program will therefore be as follows: (a) cereals 50,000 tons, (b) textiles 6,871,000 yds, (c) tires 8,500 units, (d) automotive replacement parts for Govt-owned trucks and cars of US manufacture, estimated value \$114,000, (e) sugar 3,000 tons, (f) tea 120 tons, (g) expenses of diplomatic missions 120,000 pounds sterling.

3. As in 1944 contributions of US and UK Govts to this Joint Supply Program which it is estimated will cost a total of \$10,000,000 (2,500,000 pounds sterling) will be of equal value.

4. Message giving suggested text joint communication to Ibn Saud by American and Brit Ministers will be sent you.

5. After analysis of SAG essential requirements and resources for meeting these requirements it has been determined that in addition to supplies to be provided under Joint Supply Program and in addition to 17,000,000 resale riyals and 10,000,000 credit riyals there should be provided a supplemental US program in 1945 valued at approx \$3,000,000.

6. Only items we are now procuring for Saudi Arabia which we are not obligated to supply under the 1944 and 1945 Joint Supply Programs are as follows: (h) 287 trucks \$1,400,000 our estimate or \$1,800,000, MESC estimate, (i) paper \$7,500, (j) farm equipment and supplies \$37,000, (k) radio and other communications equipment \$134,000, (l) distillation plants \$34,000, (m) passenger cars \$5,000, (n) garage equipment \$30,000. These total \$1,647,500 to \$2,047,500. Procurement or shipment well advanced on all these items and they should be included in US supplemental program.

7. We may be able to place in procurement hospital electrical installation \$20,000 and the marine engines \$100,000 indented for but these items cannot be supplied in time to be of practical value in 1945, and should be excluded from US 1945 supplemental program.

8. We are prepared to consider additional L/L⁴⁶ indents for essential supplies valued at from \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000 to bring total of supplemental program up to \$3,000,000. Any such indents would have to be reviewed here on basis of supply and other considerations but favorable action could be expected under present Lend-Lease policy. We will need recommendations on items to be obtained under these additional indents from you. When the time comes to announce US program to King you should inform him that items mentioned above in para 6 are on way and ask what else he wants to complete \$3,000,000 total of US supplemental program.

⁴⁶ Lend-Lease.

9. Proposed 1945 Joint Supply Program differs from 1944 Joint Program by providing less textiles, tires and auto spares and no dates, medical supplies or steel. Supply situation precludes possibility of US providing more textiles, tires or spares than quantities called for by 1945 program. US cannot supply dates. Reasonable quantities of medical supplies and steel could appropriately be added to proposed US aid program if desired.

10. Your recent cables have suggested that on account of locusts MESC should increase estimate of Saudi's cereal requirement above 50,000 ton figure. If this is done US could, subject to shipping availability, supply some cereals as part of US supplementary program.

11. Lend-Lease appropriation was passed by House June 28 and Senate should act before July 7.

12. Foregoing is for your confidential information and should not be divulged to the Saudi Arabian Govt until British-American communication on Joint Program is delivered.

Sent to Jidda repeated to Cairo. [Dept and FEA.]

BYRNES

890F.20 Mission/7-445 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Dhahran (Sands) to the Secretary of State

DHAHRAN, July 4, 1945—midnight.

[Received July 5—8:50 a. m.]

35. From Eddy. King Abdul Aziz has decided to decline the service of a U.S. Army military mission preferring to have foreign cooperation in developing his country achieved through civilian agencies (this applies to the projects proposed by Connor Mission including road building, but does not affect Saudi agreement to permit construction of air field at Dhahran).

King's decision against foreign military assistance in his domestic economy based on three objections (1) criticism by fanatical reactionary subjects (2) abuse from his Hashemite⁴⁷ enemies who proclaim him a puppet under foreign military and (3) objection by British to a military mission in which they do not share at least equality [*equally?*]. Full details by pouch.⁴⁸ [Eddy.]

SANDS

⁴⁷ The family of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca and guardian of the Moslem holy places in the Hejaz, who, in alliance with the British, led the Arab revolt during World War I which led to the detachment of the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire from Turkish sovereignty. Sons of Hussein founded dynasties in Iraq and Transjordan.

⁴⁸ See despatch 150, July 8, from Jidda, p. 923.

890F.24/7-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—3 p. m.

187. Suggested text joint communication to Ibn Saud by American-Brit Ministers regarding commodity content Saudi Arabian 1945 joint supply program follows. Please wire comments.

Begin text. 1. The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given careful consideration to the question of their assistance to the Saudi Arabian Government during 1945. They have come to the conclusion that this assistance can best be provided by making available certain quantities of essential supplies either on a subsidy basis (in the case of the U.K.) or on Lend-Lease terms (in the case of the U.S.) as was done last year.

2. As the Saudi Arabian Government has undoubtedly been aware, it has for some time been the intention of the two friendly governments to aid Saudi Arabia in this way during the current year. The delivery during the first half of 1945 of substantial quantities of tires, trucks and cereals, in addition to certain remaining balances which the two governments agreed to deliver as part of their assistance with respect to the year 1944, has been evidence of their intention to continue this program during 1945.

3. To enable the Saudi Arabian Government to plot its financial course and to plan and budget its future expenditures with full knowledge of the assistance it can expect from the U.S. and the U.K. Governments during 1945, the two governments now wish to inform the Saudi Arabian Government that they propose to deliver, in addition to supplies delivered in 1945 in fulfillment of the 1944 joint supply program as set forth in their communications of July 30 and September 18, 1944, the following supplies in respect to the entire year 1945:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Quantity</i>
a. Cereals	50,000 tons
b. Textiles	6,871,000 yards
c. Tires	8,500 units
d. Automotive replacement parts for trucks and cars of U.S. manufacture	Requirements of government-owned trucks and cars; estimated value, \$114,000
e. Sugar	3,000 tons
f. Tea	120 tons
g. Expenses of diplomatic missions	£120,000 (sterling)

As in 1944, the contributions of the U.S. and U.K. governments to this 1945 joint supply program, which it is estimated will cost \$10,000,000 (£2,500,000), will be of equal value.

5. It should be understood that wartime supply and shipping stringencies may make it impossible to deliver all of the commodities listed above in full quantity before December 31, 1945, but the two

governments will endeavor to make full deliveries by this date, and to the extent that this cannot be done will endeavor to complete deliveries as early in 1946 as possible. It is planned to time deliveries so as to keep a reasonable supply of the foodstuffs contemplated in this program on hand in Saudi Arabia this year if possible.

6. The assistance provided by the joint supply program set forth above does not preclude either of the two governments, individually, from furnishing further aid to the Saudi Arabian government by making available additional commodities or by assisting in connection with particular activities or projects. Any assistance provided outside the 1945 joint supply program will be the subject of separate communications to the Saudi Arabian Government. *End text.*

Brit have sent this text to London for discussion there and in Cairo.

Do not deliver this to King or SA Govt until informed that Lend-Lease budget has been passed.

Sent Jidda repeated Cairo via Diplomatic pouch.

BYRNES

811.79600/7-545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1945—6 p. m.

188. You may convey to Saudi authorities info in Depcirtel July 5,⁴⁹ emphasizing that establishment such services through Saudi Arabia is of course dependent on the rights we hope to obtain. Also state that if agreeable to King we are ready to submit draft bilateral civil air transport agreement similar to those now being negotiated with other countries. Please inform whether we should forward you such draft agreement at this time.

BYRNES

890F.248/5-2445

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of May 24, 1945,⁵⁰ stating that the Foreign Office desires to be acquainted with the terms of the request of the American Minister at Jidda to the Saudi Arabian Government for the right to construct a United States military air base at Dhahran.

The following is the substance of a communication on this subject addressed by the American Minister at Jidda to King Ibn Saud:⁵¹

⁴⁹ Vol. II, p. 1460.

⁵⁰ Not printed; see memorandum of June 15 by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, p. 905.

⁵¹ Dated May 9; see footnote 2, p. 893.

The construction of an airfield at Dhahran on the Great Circle route from Cairo to Karachi is considered by the United States to be an immediate military necessity as well as being of great value to Saudi Arabia. It is desired, therefore, that landing strips and necessary buildings and installations be constructed there.

In addition to the construction, the United States feels it will be necessary to maintain and occupy this airfield and the related facilities for a term of years after the conclusion of the present war. In this connection, flying rights over Saudi Arabia are needed, along with permission for American military forces to locate, construct, maintain and remove necessary navigational aids, also one emergency field in central Saudi Arabia.

It is hoped that American civil airlines will be permitted to operate on the Dhahran airfield and to construct there such facilities as they may reasonably require.

Such airlines would need transit rights in Saudi Arabia plus commercial entry at Dhahran, and these rights and entry should continue on a nondiscriminatory basis as long as any commercial air services operate in or through Saudi Arabia.

More detailed provisions regarding American commercial air transport services may be the subject of a subsequent agreement.

The United States War Department is prepared to make available to Saudi Arabia a military mission to train Saudi Arab pilots and ground crews, and to afford additional instructional services. The War Department is also prepared to improve the road between Dhahran and Riyadh.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1945.

890F.20 Missions/7-845

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 150

JIDDA, July 8, 1945.

[Received July 17.]

SIR: I have the honor to report on my visit to Riyadh, July 1-3, 1945, and to enclose⁵² (1) a translation of a Note from the Saudi Arabian Government, dated July 4, at Riyadh; (2) Summary of a statement made by the King, July 1, 1945; and (3) Summary of a second statement made by the King, July 2, 1945, the substance of which was reported to the Department in Dhahran's telegram No. 35, July 4, midnight.

Before leaving Jidda, I was again assured by the Acting Foreign Minister that the summons from the King was for the purpose of

⁵² Enclosures not printed.

giving his reply to the services offered by the U.S. Army (Legation's telegram No. 245, June 24), and I repeated that I had no information to impart regarding 1945 subsidy or long range economic assistance, beyond that already communicated in Legation's Note No. 221 of June 20, copy of which was sent to the Department as Enclosure to Despatch No. 144 of June 21. There proved, indeed, to be little to discuss: the audiences consisted of statements made by the King to me with little occasion for me to comment.

The substance of the King's reply is a courteous but unqualified decision to decline the services of a Military Mission, a decision which he elaborated orally to apply, of course, to any foreign Military Mission, whether American or not. This generalization, however, does not appear in the official Note translated in Enclosure I.

The Acting Foreign Minister had also inquired of me whether there was any connection between the offers of the Military Mission and the construction of an army airfield at Dhahran. Did the U.S. Government consider one to be dependent upon the other? Did the U.S. Army have any interest of its own in the proposed Military Mission, or were the services of a Mission offered for the Saudi Government to accept or reject, in whole or in part, without prejudice? This question suggested a trap. I replied that the U.S. Government regarded its request for an airfield as separate and independent of its offer of a Military Mission which had been proposed only to provide certain services which we had been led to believe were desired by the Saudi Government.

The reply of the King is incorporated in a more general statement of the needs and special conditions in his Kingdom; partly this is oriental circumlocution—an effort to surround his rejection of a military mission with an affirmative framework; partly it is also an effort to set his needs in perspective, to furnish a background for future proposals for assistance cooperation, or public works in Saudi Arabia. There is little that is new in the statement; the priority given to internal telegraphic equipment is the most noteworthy. Training of Saudi pilots and mechanics, a subject of discussion for the past year, was not mentioned by the King in the audiences, but was apparently remembered later and included in the Note.

The King inquired whether equipment to renovate his domestic telegraph system could be provided in any way by the United States. When I replied that I would forward his inquiry, but that my personal opinion was that communications equipment on such a scale is at the disposition of the Army but is still in very short supply for civilian purposes, he asked whether it could be secured from the Army under military Lend-Lease “and delivered to Saudi Arabia for my personnel to install and operate”. I made no attempt to forecast the probabilities.

I am convinced the King is sincere and correct in anticipating violent criticism from reactionaries and fanatics if a substantial foreign military mission engaged in extensive services in the interior of his country. He is still criticized today for concessions he has made to foreigners residing in his country; recent events in Syria and Lebanon,⁵³ foreshadowing a general Arab demand for evacuation of all foreign soldiers from Arab countries, makes the present time even more difficult for him. The airfield, he explains, is quite another matter: it is for the war effort of his own military Allies and can be justified thus, as well as by the fact that foreign military personnel will be restricted to the Dhahran-Ras Tanura area, furthest from the Holy Cities and from the more reactionary shaikhs to whom a foreigner soldier means a hostile intruder.

Most significant of all his statements, however, is the third argument that "the British would object". I considered it unwise to question the King about this statement which he did not offer to elaborate. I do not know whether the British have been consulted and have objected, or whether the King is only predicting that they would have objected. I incline toward the former and more depressing view. This past winter there were plenty of signs that the King was prepared to free himself of British censorship and deal independently with us, provided, of course, that he would be assured of continued economic stability and supply of elemental needs. However, more recently, the King seems to be reverting to the belief that, however powerful and friendly the United States may be, Britain continues to dominate the Middle East, to act where others concur. Quite recently a confidential source reports the Saudi Acting Foreign Minister to have told his intimates in the Arab League Committee in Cairo: "The Americans are our friends and we like them; but Britain is the power with which to deal". Whether under British tutelage or not, the Saudi Government seems to be presently persuaded of the return of regionalism, of a future British sphere of influence in the Middle East, similar to her past position and similar to our Monroe Doctrine. Britain's intervention in Syria and Lebanon⁵⁴ has capped the argument. Our failure to date to secure British concurrence in direct radio-telegraph communications between Saudi Arabia and the United States⁵⁵ (which it has been humiliating to admit), our inability to provide dollars or to sell for local currencies, our statement that great care and more time must be taken to assure Congressional support for long range economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia have weighted the scales again in favor of Britain as the political and military power which can be counted on to act and not just to create expectations.

⁵³ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1034 ff.

⁵⁴ See pp. 1123-1189, *passim*.

⁵⁵ For documentation on the proposed establishment of a direct radio-telegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia, see pp. 1009 ff.

I do not believe I am exaggerating the abrupt revival of British prestige. To be sure, the King stated to me frankly that Britain would be bankrupt and vanquished without the United States, that Britain helps him and the Arab world with resources she has received from us, but he seems also to be convinced that the Britain which acts directly on his frontiers, which controls the approaches to his Kingdom and the sources of his subsistence, must be conciliated, even though he sacrifices benefits of a military mission from the more remote and benevolent United States of America from which he has received no assurances for the future, military or economic. Britain is not outbidding us in offers of economic assistance; quite the contrary. However, she does guarantee his political and national security from aggression, and she holds potential economic sanctions as we do not, by virtue of her control of commodities and foreign exchange.

On the other hand, I hope the King recognizes the unreasonableness of requesting the United States of America to supply the subsistence needs of his country and to cooperate in development of his national resources, if Britain is to exercise a veto at will over his development. Only when we find a way to match Britain as an effective guarantor of Saudi Arabian economy can we hope to eliminate, once and for all, this British veto on United States proposals in Saudi Arabia. Otherwise, for all our investments in the land, Britain, I believe, will enjoy a political advantage over the United States of America.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

811.001 Truman, H.S./7-945

King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia to President Truman ⁵⁶

[Translation]

RIAD, July , 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: We have received with great pleasure Your Excellency's answer ⁵⁷ to the message ⁵⁸ we had sent you by our son Amir Faisal. What pleased us most in that answer was Your Excellency's promise that an opportunity would offer itself for our meeting together in the near future. Thus we shall hope to continue the friend-

⁵⁶ Copy of translation from the Arabic transmitted by the Legation in Saudi Arabia in despatch 151, July 9; received July 20.

⁵⁷ Dated June 1, not printed.

⁵⁸ To President Roosevelt, March 28, 1945, not printed. The letter was transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Amir Faisal "for presentation to President Truman instead of to the late President." The Amir, second son of King Ibn Saud, came to the United States as Chairman of the Saudi Arabian delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, which met at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. The Amir visited Washington July 31-August 1, 1945, for discussions with Departmental officers. For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1000 ff.

ship we had established, as a result of our meeting with your predecessor, into a new friendship with Your Excellency. We are certainly looking forward to that opportunity with eager anticipation.

As I write my answer to your message and generous promise, I cannot but refer to the friendship that bound us with the late President Roosevelt and with the American people and the friendship that is being renewed with Your Excellency. It is on the basis of what we know of Your Excellency's and your people's interest in the welfare of our country and our people that we feel encouraged to approach Your Excellency with regard to a matter that is of extreme importance to our country in the present circumstances.

I am certain that His Excellency the United States Minister has informed Your Excellency and other authorities concerned about the present situation in our country. The aid that the United States Government has been extending to us in accordance with the recommendations of the late President Roosevelt, together with the aid that we have been receiving from the British Government, helped us in steering our country through a most difficult crisis, which has been caused by the present war situation. At the same time I feel certain that, like your predecessor, you will be concerned about the welfare of our country, so that it will be able to pass safely through the present crisis.

We have learned from Colonel Eddy, United States Minister, that the amount of supplies and the amount of currency in the form of Arabian rials assigned to our country for the second half of this year on the basis of lend-lease have not been finally approved due to a delay in presenting the case to the American Congress. What I know of Your Excellency's and your people's concern for the welfare of my friendly country gives me the assurance that this matter will receive Your Excellency's immediate attention, and that you will extend a helping hand to my country, which is threatened by the war crisis and which has been greatly injured by the locust scourge.

We are happy to send Your Excellency our most sincere greetings and wishes.

Your sincere friend

ABDUL AZIZ AL-SU'OD

890F.24/7-945

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945—1 p. m.

197. Reference Depts 187, July 5. As suggested your 262 July 9⁵⁹ para 2 we agree auto parts should include those for trucks and cars

⁵⁹ Not printed; it made comments on the suggested text of the joint communication. The last paragraph urged "strongly that delivery of joint note be followed same day by notification of additional US Lend-Lease aid even if joint note needs to be delayed to accomplish this." (890F.24/7-945)

of Canadian and UK manufacture. Therefore suggest para 3(d) should read "automotive replacement parts".

Confusion para 6 can be eliminated by changing wording 4th line to read "available additional supplies" thus permitting either more of same or else different items to be included.

Agree with your last para and will authorize you to act accordingly re additional US aid.

We are still awaiting approval by London of wording of joint communication which has been approved in principle. Hope to approve your simultaneous presentation SAG of both joint program and US aid program in next few days.

GREW

890F.248/7-845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1945—1 p. m.

198. Dhahran's 35 July 4 and Jidda's 258 July 8.⁶⁰ King's decision re Connor Mission proposals surprising in view his repeated requests that US Army build roads and train Saudi pilots. The King's fear of adverse reaction within his country is appreciated but not considered sufficient reason inasmuch as the King has for over 2 years pressed this Govt to have the US Army provide services that he now rejects. Furthermore since Army is only American agency equipped to render these services free of charge King is in effect turning down American aid. This is reversal of policy that apparently can be explained only in terms of British pressure.

What effect will cancellation of this aid have on the stability of Saudi Govt and thus on security of American interests? Who for example will physically operate Dhahran airfield when Saudis take title at end of Japanese war? Cancellation of Connor Mission means Saudi pilots and technicians will not be trained to take over field. Saudi Govt will have to rely on foreign technicians and the US Govt might build an airfield in center of great American oil reserves only to find it controlled and operated by some nation other than Saudi Arabia. Further what assurances do we have that present or future Saudi Govts can maintain order if roads are not built or air force and Army are not improved?

Your detailed report awaited with interest. If report does not cover points raised above particularly giving evidence of Brit maneuvering cable further info.

⁶⁰ Latter not printed.

Meanwhile Gen Giles and yourself should not hold projected conference with Saudi officials re airfield pending further instructions. . . .

GREW

711.90F27/7-1445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, July 14, 1945—noon.

[Received 4:10 p. m.]

267. Dept's 188, July 5. King agreeable to proposal that Dept submit draft bilateral civil air transport agreement for his consideration. Please forward such draft.

EDDY

890F.248/7-1545 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, July 15, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 6:55 p. m.]

270. ReDept's 198, July 13. I agree that King's rejection of military air training mission and military road building was decisively influenced by British pressure which King admitted. However, Pan-Arab nationalism and internal fanaticism also have influenced King to keep Holy Land free from taint of foreign occupation.

Rejection of road is most serious and should weaken King's future appeals for sand equipped trucks to cross Dahna which Britain might well be now expected to supply.

King's request for pilot training however was always limited to training in USA. He never accepted proposal of air mission in Saudi Arabia (reLeg's despatch 33, Nov 8, 1944⁶¹) and I believe even at that date British were opposing any further US military missions.

I see no absolute assurance that future Saudi Government will maintain order with or without roads.

I am convinced British do not want US to build Saudi army or air force, preferring in future themselves to "rescue the land[""] if disorder arose as they have rescued Syria and Lebanon.⁶²

However, no use in scolding King for this situation; he expects us to have more influence with British with our greater power as creditor and principal Ally but he fails to see proof of our influence (Leg's despatch 150 July 8 paragraph 8 and 9). Furthermore he was as-

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² For documentation on British intervention in Syria and Lebanon, see pp. 1123-1189 ff., *passim*.

sured Connor Mission proposals were not connected with permission for air field (Dept's 130 May 3 paragraph 5).

As soon as supplementary aid for 1945 is announced to Saudi (Dept's 197 July 13, paragraph 3) pressing [*freeing?*] US aid [for] the first time from British joint limitation, I recommend the US assure security of airfield by stipulating in negotiations that when the field reverts to Saudi Government all foreign technicians employed shall be Americans since US built the field with its funds and personnel.

General comment: I have no immediate evidence of British maneuvering beyond King's statement, but British resentment at our overtures re civil airways, opposition to radio communications, jealousy of Shomber Mission which they insisted on matching in numbers, bank and military lend-lease given, all tell one story: British oppose and will oppose any US activity in Saudi Arabia which gives even appearance of political or military precedence. British permit us to relieve them of burden of supply but will not part with decisive vote and veto power. I hope we never join in joint subsidy or supply again but instead attach our independent economic aid to our own strings instead of to British apron strings.

To match Britain's political influence in Saudi Arabia we need:

(1) A financial plan for nonrepayable funds such as Navy purchase of oil reserves mentioned in Dept's 178, June 27, section 2 paragraph 2.⁶³ If our national interest is really strategic we can afford surely to outbid Britain as economic stabilizer and do it with dollars to be spent for only US goods and services.

(2) Open agreement with Britain on highest level recognizing the primary interest of US in Saudi economy and candid statement by British Govt that they welcome all constructive moves by US to assist in Saudi development.

EDDY

890F.24/7-1645: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1945—7 p. m.

204. Brit Emb Washington has at last received approval from London text suggested joint communication to Ibn Saud by American-Brit Ministers re commodity content Saudi Arabian 1945 joint supply program. London has suggested following changes in text sent you 187 July 5 to which we agree.

1. Last sentence of para 2 can be construed as suggesting possible continuance of program in 1946. Therefore delete entire sentence 2 para 2 beginning "the delivery during" and substitute following sentence "And during the first half of 1945 substantial quantities of tires,

⁶³ Penultimate paragraph of telegram 178. p. 917.

trucks and cereals were delivered in addition to certain remaining balances of goods which the two Governments agreed to deliver as part of their assistance for the year 1944."

2. Para 3(c) under quantity should be changed to read "8,500 tires 8,500 tubes."

3. Para 3(d) under item should be changed to read "automotive replacement parts of US manufacture."

4. At the end of para 5 change "Saudi Arabia this year if possible" to "Saudi Arabia throughout 1945 if possible."

London expressed the desire that the joint communication deal only with the joint supply program and that any assistance provided outside the joint program be the subject of separate communications to SAG. Although the Brit are fully aware of and accept the principle of supplementary US supply program they do not wish the subject raised in the joint communication. Therefore the whole of para 6 beginning "the assistance provided" should be omitted.

You are authorized to make any minor changes in wording that may seem necessary to you and to Brit Minister.

Pres Truman has signed lend lease appropriation bill ⁶⁴ and funds are now assured for US 5 million dollar share 1945 Saudi Arabian joint supply program plus supplemental US aid program of 10 million riyals and 3 million dollars worth of commodities.

You are herewith instructed to join with your Brit colleague in giving to SAG at whatever location seems most advantageous the joint communication first sent you in Depts 187 July 5 as corrected Depts 197 of July 13 and above.

You are also instructed to communicate to SAG in whatever form and whatever place and time you feel most desirable (as per para 5 through 12 of Deptel 186 July 4) info re additional US aid of 10 million riyals and 3 million dollars worth of commodities.

Sent Jidda repeated Cairo.

GREW

890F.61A/7-1845

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 157

JIDDA, July 18, 1945.
[Received August 3.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose the text of a Note received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia ⁶⁵ requesting the extension of the American Agricultural Mission at Al Kharj, which is a project of the FEA.

⁶⁴ Lend-lease appropriations were approved on July 5, 1945, as part of the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1945, 59 Stat. 412, 429.

⁶⁵ Dated July 10, not printed.

As indicated in this Note and as reported in the Legation's secret Despatch No. 150 of July 8, 1945, King Abdul Aziz, on the occasion of my recent visit with Colonel Hoskins to Riyadh, again expressed his satisfaction at the accomplishments of the Agricultural Mission and requested that its work continue beyond the 18 months originally envisaged.⁶⁶ The agricultural development of Saudi Arabia is very high on the King's priority list of desires for his country. A full account of the Al Kharj project will be found in the Legation's Despatch No. 108 of April 18, 1945.⁶⁷

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

890F.248/7-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1945—10 a. m.

210. We are glad to have your penetrating analysis of Saudi-Brit-American relations (reLegs despatch 150, July 8 and Jidda's 270, July 15). You are authorized to meet with Saudi officials at Gen. Giles' convenience to conclude airfield details and contract. War will send Gen. Giles technical instructions. Assume you will obtain at once necessary entry permits for construction personnel and equipment and notify Gen. Giles. To assure US operation of airfield we are exploring possibility of TWA making independent contract with King at time of your meeting providing for TWA operation when field reverts to Saudis. If King is unwilling alternative is to incorporate in contract your recommended stipulation that when field reverts all foreign technicians employed shall be American but Dept dislikes this stipulation since as matter of general policy we are opposed to exclusive advisor arrangements such as exist in Iraq in favor of Brit. What is your recommendation? Do not hold meeting until this point settled. If commercial contract feasible TWA⁶⁸ Cairo representative and Air Attaché Curren will be instructed to accompany Gen. Giles and you. No further consideration will be given

⁶⁶ The body of despatch 150, p. 923, makes no mention of the Agricultural Mission. However, a "Memorandum of Statement Made by His Majesty, Abdul Aziz al Saud at Riyadh, 2 July 1945", which was transmitted as enclosure III to this despatch, is pertinent. After giving the reasons for the rejection of the United States' offer of a military mission, the memorandum summarizes the King's views as follows: "I am forced, therefore, to await the day and the circumstances that will permit cooperation through civilian agencies. We have a model in the American agricultural mission at Al Kharj, which I hope your government will find the means to prolong, enlarge and equip. I admire greatly those splendid Americans who work daily in the fields with Arabians to bring more nourishment from the soil. They are the symbols of our common humanity and toil, and they are the models of the civilian and fraternal cooperation which I hope will increase and multiply between our peoples." (890F.20 Missions/7-845)

⁶⁷ Not printed.

⁶⁸ Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.

to Mansour's projected trip unless you have compelling reason to recommend otherwise.

Sent Jidda, repeated Cairo for Gen. Giles.

GREW

890F.248/7-2345 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, July 23, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

276. Re Department's 210, July 21.

1. I do not believe contract for civilian operation of airfield can be rushed through now. With absolutely no experience in commercial aviation Saudi Government would wish to study any proposition and compare with contracts in neighboring countries Acting Foreign Minister told me in Riyadh, therefore, I recommend TWA representative and Curren open negotiations separately and after military airfield is under construction.

2. I believe Arabian confidence in greater United States efficiency and safety in aviation will assure us operation of field after the war. This will be the first major cooperative enterprise between the two Governments and will go far to establish our serious future interest in Saudi Arabia. I do not believe the King would prefer third power to operate the field. Since stipulation would be against Department's general policy I recommend that during negotiations the King be simply informed of Department's understanding that the field is built by us for him to inherit but not for any third power to acquire or operate.

3. Giles is pressing for admission of materials which must await final negotiations.

. . . Sent Department as 276, repeated Cairo for General Giles as 163.

EDDY

890F.248/7-2645 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, July 26, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 6:55 p. m.]

283. 1. I believe better results will come from concluding first contract for military air field (re Department's 214, July 24⁶⁹) which

⁶⁹ Not printed; the Department tentatively proposed that "there be presented to Saudis at forthcoming meeting three contracts: Military contract, bilateral air transport agreement and, to assure US operation of airfield (Deptel 210), an airfield management contract", and requested Mr. Eddy's recommendations (890F.248/7-2445).

presents plenty of minor but delicate problems King is waiting to discuss (Legation's despatch nr 124, May 13⁷⁰ enclosure 2). Both Dept and King have stated preference to have civil air rights negotiated later (same despatch enclosures 1 and 2).

2. I see no objection to submitting bilateral air transport agreement and air field management contract at same time provided military contract not dependent upon them. Otherwise I predict interminable delay and probable failure of all negotiations. British have certainly exacted promise from King that they will be consulted before any civil air rights are granted to us.

3. Neither Saudi Govt nor I have ever seen even a sample of any of the proposed contracts. Military contract could be presented with good chance of quick acceptance at Riyadh. Civil contracts will certainly be studied lengthily before reply (Legation's 276, July 23) and might therefore be submitted through Saudi Foreign Ministry first.

4. Military contract should be signed before Ramadan Bairam feast and preoccupation with pilgrimage. Furthermore every delay throws suspicion upon war need for military air field which is all British have concurred in or King granted.

Repeated Cairo as 167 for Gen Giles and Air Attaché Curren.⁷¹

EDDY

890F.24/7-1845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1945—5 p. m.

218. Deptel 187, July 5; 197, July 13; 204, July 16; and Jidda's 274, July 18 and 278, July 23.⁷² Brit here have received word from Jidda via London re certain differences in Brit and American texts of joint 1945 supply program communication to Ibn Saud.

After discussion we have agreed to following changes:

Line 8 para 1 Deptel 187 strike out "on a subsidy basis". Insert "free of charge".

Section *d* para 3, Deptel 187 under column headed "Item" should read "automotive replacement parts of US manufacture for trucks and cars owned by Saudi Govt". This wording reached after discussion with Brit and FEA in which Deptel 197, July 13, para 1 and Jidda's 274, July 18 and 278, July 23, were kept in mind. We recognize that

⁷⁰ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 893.

⁷¹ In telegram 220, July 27, 1945, 6 p. m., to the Minister in Saudi Arabia, the Department stated: "Will abide by your judgment that bilateral air transport agreement and TWA airport contract should not be rushed." It also advised that the War Department was anxious that the military contract be concluded and would send General Giles technical data for incorporation in the contract within a few days (890F.248/7-2645).

⁷² Nos. 274 and 278 not printed.

all Saudi Govt trucks need spare parts. Under this arrangement, however, certain automotive replacement parts of US manufacture that will fit will be available for all trucks and cars owned by Saudi Govt regardless of whether those trucks and cars are of US, Canadian, UK or other manufacture. Brit prefer that automotive replacement parts of Canadian and UK origin if sent to Saudi Arabia in 1945 be outside joint supply program and on payment basis.

Section *d* para 3 under column headed Quantity "\$114,000" should read "\$114,800".

Section *g* para 3 Deptel 187, under "Quantity" strike out "£120,000 (sterling)" and add "His Majesty's Government in the UK will as part of their contribution to this program furnish the Saudi Arabian Government with £10,000 (sterling) a month in respect of the expenditure incurred on Saudi Arabian missions and consulates".

Brit here have wired London their approval these changes with wish that delivery of joint notes be expedited. We hope that any further differences between your and Brit texts can be adjusted in Jidda and identical documents presented to Ibn Saud at earliest possible date.

Sent Jidda, repeated Cairo.

GREW

890F.24/7-3045

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 161

JIDDA, July 30, 1945.

[Received August 10.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on July 29, at 5:00 P.M., my British colleague and I called upon the Acting Foreign Minister, Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, who is also the Minister of Finance, and delivered to him a joint note⁷³ regarding the United States-British subsidized supply program for 1945, as instructed in the Department's telegrams No. 204, of July 16, 7:00 PM, and No. 218, of July 26, 5:00 PM.

I had suggested to my British colleague that the note be addressed to the King, as was done in 1944, but he pointed out that he was instructed to accompany the delivery of the note with some oral explanations, and that he preferred, therefore, to address the note to the Acting Foreign Minister so that he would be free to comment on its contents. I agreed readily, and we further agreed to remain together throughout the interview rather than to take turns ostentatiously leaving the room.

After the Acting Foreign Minister had read the joint note, Mr. Grafftey-Smith then (1) expressed the regret of his government that

⁷³ Dated July 29.

the burden of domestic reconstruction in Britain, and their staggering obligations, made it impossible for them to give more assistance than was stated in the joint note; (2) stated that it would be necessary for the Saudi Government to acquire automotive replacement parts of British and Canadian manufacture by purchase, before they could be delivered by United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, which should be without delay to be ready for the Pilgrimage.

Thereupon I delivered the note addressed to the King regarding the supplementary United States assistance program which I stated I had held until the joint note should have been delivered first. The note had been prepared for my signature July 20, 1945 and I preferred not to rewrite it nor to post-date it, preferring rather to have it known that we were ready to announce our assistance some days earlier. Since this note was addressed to the King,⁷⁴ it was necessary for me to repeat its contents in detail for the information of the Acting Minister, which I did in the presence of my British colleague, to whom I also furnished a copy.

The Acting Foreign Minister thanked us both for the communications and we shortly took our leave. The following day, the Acting Foreign Minister inquired from me privately at some length regarding the commodities which might be obtainable with the million-odd dollars not yet obligated in the United States supplementary program, and indicated that he would shortly send me a request for certain quantities of United States wheat, rice, and sugar, which I shall forward by telegraph when received.

I wish to record the very cooperative attitude of my British colleague throughout the preparation of the joint note and its delivery . . . Mr. Graftey-Smith had argued strongly with his government against their penny-pinching tactics, especially with regard to the British and Canadian spare parts so badly needed to recondition motor transport now rusting in disuse.

[Here follows expression of personal views of the British Minister in Saudi Arabia on British policy regarding the 1945 subsidy.]

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

711.90F27/7-1445

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy)*

No. 329

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1945.

SIR: With reference to the Legation's telegram 267 of July 14, 1945, there are transmitted herewith two copies of a draft bilateral civil

⁷⁴The undated reply of the King to the Minister's note of July 20, 1945, expressing his thanks for the aid offered by the United States, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 169 of August 23, from Jidda (890F.24/8-2345).

air transport agreement⁷⁵ between this Government and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This draft agreement is virtually identical with the proposals submitted by this Government to other governments in the Near East and elsewhere.

The Department's circular telegram of July 5, 1945⁷⁶ described the routes certificated by the Civil Aeronautics Board for the appropriate United States airlines. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is contemplated that Transcontinental and Western Air will proceed from Cairo to a point in Palestine, thence to Basra, Dhahran, and beyond to Bombay. The certificate granted to Transcontinental and Western Air permits this company, after further approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board, to make changes in its route pattern for the general area served. It is therefore possible that at some future time TWA might wish to enter Dhahran from another direction, but this is a matter which can be discussed subsequently under the terms of Article 8 of the proposed agreement, and need not be mentioned at this time.

As will be seen from the attached draft, reciprocal landing rights are granted by the two Governments, rather than granted to an airline itself.

For your information, a number of the Near Eastern countries have proposed certain restrictions on the so-called Fifth Freedom⁷⁷ traffic, with the object of curtailing or prohibiting carriage of traffic by United States airlines between two countries in the same area, for example, between Lebanon and Iraq. This Government so far has not accepted these counter-proposals, but is willing to consult with the governments concerned in accordance with the terms of Article 8 of the agreement, with a view to making an equitable adjustment of traffic in the event that U.S. airlines unduly prejudice the operations of local or regional services. In other words, should a Saudi airline be established at a later date to operate services to nearby countries, and should the Saudi Government be apprehensive of possible competition from the American airline on routes to nearby countries, this Government would prefer to deal with such problems as they arise, rather than incorporating arbitrary restrictions in the bilateral agreement before it is known how the traffic will develop.

It will be noted that the preamble of the draft agreement contains a reference to the International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago,⁷⁸ to which Saudi Arabia did not send a delegation. The

⁷⁵ Not printed.

⁷⁶ Vol. II, p. 1460.

⁷⁷ The right to pick up and discharge traffic at intermediate points along a designated trunk route.

⁷⁸ Held November 1–December 7, 1944; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 355 ff.

draft agreement forwarded herewith is substantially similar to the so-called "standard form"⁷⁹ drawn up at Chicago. However, if the Saudi Government prefers to omit reference to this Conference the preamble may be shortened to read: "Having in mind the desirability of mutually stimulating and promoting the sound economic development of air transportation between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia, the two Governments parties to this agreement agree that the development of air transport services between their respective territories shall be governed by the following provisions:". At the same time the Department would prefer to see Article 7 remain as is since this Government is obligated to register all of its air transport agreements with the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization resulting from the Chicago Conference.

A copy of the draft agreement is being sent to the Legation at Cairo,⁸⁰ for the information of the Civil Air Attaché.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
DEAN ACHESON

890F.248/8-345 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy)*

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1945—5 p. m.

231. [Here follows information on airport requirements, air routes and other technical aspects of planning concerning the Dhahran airport, sent by the War Department to General Giles, and on the measures to be taken by the Arabian American Oil Company to assist in the construction of the airport.]

Conversation with Prince Faisal, 1 August,⁸¹ indicates desirability of clarifying agreement of 12 May 1945, signed by Yusuf Yassin,⁸² with respect to Dhahran airport. Agreeable that airport, together with fixed installations, may be transferred to Government of Saudi Arabia immediately after war is over. However, right of United States to use, operate, maintain and control airfield for subsequent 3-year period should be covered. Present agreement provides only for "Use". Inasmuch as Saudi Arabian nationals not qualified to maintain field at required standards, believe it essential that provision

⁷⁹ For text of the standard Form for Provisional Air Routes, see Department of State, *Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference*. . . , vol. 1, pp. 127-129.

⁸⁰ In instruction 1363, August 1, not printed.

⁸¹ For documentation on the Amir Faisal's visit to Washington for discussions with Departmental officers, see pp. 1000 ff.

⁸² See footnote 2, p. 893.

be made to insure United States operation, maintenance and control. Anticipated that prior to expiration of 3-year period actual work of maintaining and operating field may be performed by TWA as certificated carrier under contract to War Department. Use by military aircraft during 3-year period should be without cost.

Although this government cannot insist upon use to which field will be put after expiration of 3-year period it should be made clear that unsatisfactory to turn over operation and control of field to another foreign power after expiration of 3-year period. If Saudi Arabian nationals not able to maintain and operate Dhahran after the expiration of the 3-year period, believe United States should be asked to assume this responsibility.

During 3-year period, ATC⁸³ would permit use of field by any commercial airline of an Allied power upon same basis as an American carrier, provided that they adhere to local airport regulations, including security restrictions and payment of established charges.

GREW

890F.248/8-345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1945—8 p. m.

232. Reference is made to message of July 31 from War Dept no. 42558 to Giles at Cairo.⁸⁴ It is desired to obtain, in connection with ATC operations in Saudi Arabia, rights permitting (a) free transit of aircraft, the landing at designated bases, and the transporting of personnel, matériel and mail, (b) landing in emergency at any airfield, (c) authority to station necessary personnel at designated bases to provide for housekeeping, security and all necessary operations, including overland supply, (d) installation and operation of weather and communications services and equipment, air navigational aids and servicing facilities as may be required for all necessary operations, (e) use and security of necessary codes, and (f) carrying of traffic in the national interest as provided for in Executive Order No. 9492 of Oct. 24, 1944.⁸⁵

Please consult Giles and endeavor to have provision for such rights included in contract. These rights are desired for duration of war and an additional period of three years. Advise Dept as to progress. Repeated to Cairo as Depts 1502.

GREW

⁸³ Air Transport Command.

⁸⁴ Not printed.

⁸⁵ 9 *Federal Register* 12859.

890F.248/8-445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1945—8 p. m.

233. Vice President TWA, Jack Nichols, will arrive Cairo about August 9th on general Middle Eastern business. While there he desires to initiate Saudi negotiations. War and State approve in principle an American civil airline attempting to make separate contract with King providing for operation and maintenance of Dhahran airfield when U.S. Army control ends 3 years after V-J day.⁸⁶ TWA is logical candidate since it is the only airline certified by CAB⁸⁷ to stop at Dhahran. Army might subcontract operation and maintenance of field to an American civil airline before expiration of 3-year period but subcontract would have no connection with proposed TWA-Saudi negotiations. Nichols understands Saudis cannot be rushed and that Department will abide by your judgment on all aspects relating to TWA proposal. He requests conference in Cairo with General Giles, Air Attaché Curren and yourself after military contract signed. If convenient suggest you return to Cairo with Giles for Nichols conference. Otherwise notify Nichols through Giles of alternate date. Travel authorization follows.⁸⁸

Repeated to Cairo for General Giles and Air Attaché Curren.

GREW

890F.51/8-745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1945—7 p. m.

6689. ReEmbs 7944, August 7.⁸⁹ For Collado.⁹⁰ Joint British-American note on 1945 joint supply program valued at \$10,000,000 presented to Saudi Foreign Ministry July 29. \$5,000,000 is British gift. \$5,000,000 is U.S. credit lend-lease. At same time separate American note presented, offering \$6,000,000 additional lend-lease aid, including 10,000,000 riyal coins valued at 30 cents each, and \$3,000,000 worth of commodities, about \$1,600,000 of which already requisitioned, leaving \$1,400,000 for additional goods SAG may request. Much of

⁸⁶ August 15, 1945.⁸⁷ Civil Aeronautics Board.⁸⁸ Telegram 236, August 8, not printed.⁸⁹ Not printed.⁹⁰ The Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy was one of a group of Departmental officers headed by Assistant Secretary of State Clayton who were conducting discussions with British officials on financial and economic matters. For documentation on these discussions, see vol. VI, pp. 1 ff.

latter will probably be additional wheat or pharmaceuticals. Riyals offered are in addition to 17,000,000 already minted and being shipped this month for sale to American business concerns and legation. Forty percent of dollar proceeds such sales available purchase of gold, upon which 50 percent riyal profit is realizable in Saudi Arabia. No Saudi comment on adequacy of program yet received.

On July 31 Prince Faisal, Saudi Foreign Minister, was informed in Washington of both the joint and supplementary programs for 1945. Although Prince asked why riyals offered totaled only 27 million when 30 million had been requested, he appeared satisfied with explanation that profit on gold would more than make up difference.

Prince was assured that active consideration was being given to means of providing budgetary assistance after expiration of Lend-Lease Act. He was told that there was general recognition of the need for such assistance for about 5 years after end of war. That delay was not due to disagreement as to need for assistance, but to desire to work out means satisfactory to Congress and American people. He was warned that assistance would probably be in the form of loans rather than outright gifts, but was assured we would make terms such as not to burden Saudi economy unduly. He was advised that any program would work more smoothly if Saudi Government would appoint an American financial expert who could explain needs to Congress and advise on modern fiscal and accounting procedures. He was told this government assumed SAG would limit requests, in future as in past, to essentials. He said his government had always asked only what was [no] more than essential.

He was told Eximbank would open \$5,000,000 line of credit for development purposes, with 4 per cent service charge payable on outstanding balances, and amortization to be deferred for some years. Just prior to meeting, Aramco had informed Bank that it was prepared to undertake to make available to the Saudi Government each year, either through purchase of riyals, payment of royalties, or any other method convenient to company, dollar exchange sufficient to cover all dollar obligations of SAG to Bank during said year, on account of this \$5,000,000 credit. Prince was informed of Aramco's agreement. Bank is working out detailed proposal to present to King.

Little progress made on plans for long-range budgetary assistance recently. Several conferences were held with Judge Vinson,⁹¹ but he left matter undecided when he went to Treasury. Snyder has not held conference as yet, but probably will soon. Navy not pushing

⁹¹ Fred M. Vinson, formerly Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, was appointed Secretary of the Treasury on July 23, 1945. He was succeeded as Director by John W. Snyder.

actively, apparently believing next move is up to State or to Snyder. Aramco was told of plans, informally, though not given copies, and has expressed willingness to go along on either basis, subject to satisfactory working out of details.

Summary of two plans⁹² as presented to Judge Vinson follows:

(a) Plan I. Saudi Government would assign to U.S. Navy (and Army) title to billion barrels of oil underground. Royalty on this oil would be reduced to 15 cents on each barrel, payable when produced, as against 23 cents per barrel royalty specified in present Aramco concession. In consideration of reduced royalties, Navy, with funds appropriated by Congress, would make advance royalty payments annually to extent necessary to balance Saudi budget for next 5 years, as determined by board with War, Navy, State and Treasury membership, with aid of recommendations of American financial expert employed by Saudi Government. Total advances not to exceed \$50,000,000. (Department's estimate of probable deficit for 5 years starting in 1946, assuming war ends by July, 1946, is \$31,000,000.) While any advances outstanding, no royalties payable on oil produced for Navy but advances would be canceled at rate of 15 cents per each barrel produced. Aramco would agree to produce, transport and refine oil belonging to Navy at actual cost.

(b) Plan II. Eximbank would loan dollar funds to Saudi Government, as recommended by American financial expert, with 4 per cent annual service charge on outstanding advances. Amortization to begin after 10 years, extending over 10-year period. Loan would be in dollars, without requirement that they be spent in United States. To assure SAG ability to pay interest and amortization in dollars, it would be necessary to secure agreement of Aramco to pay appropriate proportion of royalties in dollars, or in some other way provide enough dollar exchange to allow SAG to meet dollar obligations. Aramco probably would not agree unless it could foresee substantial sales of oil for dollars, only sure guarantee of which would be Navy commitment to purchase oil. Navy so far unwilling to make such commitment.

Other features of plans, such as Navy's desire to make Aramco promise to build pipeline, are not inherently necessary.

BYRNES

⁹² Plan I was entitled "Advance Royalty Payments on Underground Oil Reserve Ceded to U.S. Army and Navy by Government of Saudi Arabia" and Plan II, "Export-Import Bank Loan to Saudi Arabia". Copies of the two plans were attached to a proposed letter to the Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Snyder), drafted for the signature of Willard L. Thorp, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton), by Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on August 10. The letter was not sent (890F.51/9-1445). In a memorandum of August 11 to Assistant Secretary Dunn, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) stated that the two plans had been presented to the Army and Navy Departments, the Export-Import Bank, and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (890F.51/8-1145). On September 22, the plans were given to the Arabian American Oil Company and on September 28, discussions on them were held with company officials by Department officers (890F.51/9-2845).

890F.248/8-845

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 162

JIDDA, August 8, 1945.
[Received August 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with instructions in Department's Telegram No. 210, July 21, accompanied by General Giles, I submitted to the King of Saudi Arabia at Riyadh, August 5, 1945, text of a proposed agreement for the construction at Dhahran of a United States military airbase. The text had been largely drafted by Lieut. Colonels Shumate and Ellis, on the basis of instruction from the War Department, and was modified by me at points on which I had been specifically instructed by the Department of State. After considerable minor changes in phraseology made at Riyadh to include points reserved by the King, and to clarify statements not wholly clear in Arabic translation, the text was agreed by the King and signed by the Acting Foreign Minister, Shaikh Yusuf Yassin. A copy of my Notes No. 237 of August 5, and No. 238 of August 6, and an English translation of the Saudi Arabian Government Note No. 17/2/6/83 of August 6, embodying the agreement verbatim, are enclosed with this despatch.

Upon receipt of final technical data from the War Department, Lieut. Colonels Shumate and Ellis and a Captain of A.T.C. flew from Cairo to Jidda, August 3, to discuss with me the draft of the agreement they had prepared, thus providing a day of deliberation and revision before the arrival the next day of General Giles, who had only just returned to Cairo from an extended trip to the Far East. Stormy weather, however, prevented the plane carrying Colonels Shumate and Ellis from landing at Jidda, and they spent the night at Port Sudan where their plane landed only with the greatest difficulty. They arrived at Jidda the next day, only two hours before the arrival of General Giles with Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, recalled by the King from meetings of the Arab League committee. On August 5, the entire party proceeded from Jidda to Riyadh on the King's plane, returning to Jidda August 7. General Giles and his party proceeded immediately to Cairo.

I believe the Department will find that the agreement reserves all the rights and includes all the essential provisions contained in my instructions, including the rights reserved by the Air Transport Command (Deptel. No. 232, August 3), received by me just as we were leaving for Riyadh. In any case, the agreement includes all the concessions we were able to secure, and more than I expected we would carry away. Several points on which I had expected debate and

compromise, such as the numbers of foreign workers to be imported and their nationality, were accepted without question. General Giles took full part in all discussions and concurred in the final form of the agreement.

Reservations and objections raised by the King were almost exclusively concerned with preserving the appearance, as well as the reality, of his sovereignty and jurisdiction: He insisted that the Saudi flag should fly over the inland posts, the emergency landing field and the isolated stations where navigational aids are to be located, though the operation and control of technical services at these posts will belong to the United States Army. As a matter of fact, I am convinced that this will promote the security and efficiency of these posts, as the untamed tribesmen near those inaccessible posts will respect a station which belongs to the King, and will not consider the presence of isolated United States Army personnel as an "invasion". While the King concedes United States Army jurisdiction over all non-Saudi Arabian personnel within the airbase limits, jurisdiction over police court cases and crimes committed outside the airbase, and involving mixed nationals, is to be the subject of agreement reached after full study of the problems involved. It should also be noted that the Agreement is a concession only for military use of the airbase, including Air Transport Command traffic in the national interest.

All civil air-service concessions and rights will be negotiated and granted on a non-discriminatory basis (see Legation's despatch No. 124, May 13, 1945⁹⁴) by the Saudi Arabian Government. Sub-contracts with commercial airlines cannot be negotiated between the commercial company and the United States Army. To clarify this point, the King insisted on an additional note (Legation's Note No. 238) specifying that if the military need for the airbase should terminate before the end of the three post-war years, the operation and maintenance of the airbase would, at such date, revert to the Saudi Arabian Government. It is also understood, however, that negotiations may be opened with the Saudi Arabian Government at any time for the inauguration of commercial air service to begin whenever the military situation permits the use of the field concurrently by civil airlines.

With regard to the provision for "normal facilities for personal recreation and self improvement", I had expected possible objection to pagan dramatics or Christian worship, neither of which was mentioned. The only query raised was whether the clause would be

⁹⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 893.

abused to import prostitutes. Oral assurances to the contrary were accepted.

Time did not permit full details to be drawn up and agreed regarding (1) procedure in criminal cases involving mixed nationals, mentioned above; (2) procedure for administration of customs inspection and passport regulations for civilians, at such time as civilian traffic through the airbase will justify the posting of Saudi customs and passport officers there. Both General Giles and I preferred, at almost all costs, to bring away a signed document covering essentials; instead of postponing the Agreement until all minor matters had been studied. While the United States Army has been studying and drafting its requirements for months, the Saudi Government had no advance opportunity to study the proposed agreement. The speedy conclusion of a signed agreement constitutes a remarkable exception to oriental habits of leisurely consultation and bargaining. Another time, as in the case of proposed Agreements for civil air rights, I hope the text can be forwarded for study by me and by the Saudi Government rather than presented abruptly for an immediate decision.

The contrast between the King's willingness to make concessions during this visit and his unwillingness to accept the valuable services of a military mission early in July was very marked. On the former occasion he had heard nothing about economic and financial help for 1945, and had also recently been advised that plans for long-range economic cooperation would be indefinitely postponed. This time, the visit followed closely upon the notification of generous budgetary aid for 1945, more than twice the aid being given by Britain, and closely upon receipt by the King of enthusiastic reports from Amir Faisal regarding his conferences in Washington with the Acting-Secretary and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,⁹⁵ July 31-August 2 [1], 1945.

In conclusion, I would add a word of apology for the execrable style which mars portions of the Agreement: awkward phraseology, *nonsequiturs*, repetitions, and lamentable incoherence. Hurried attempts at joint revision of phraseology, both at Jidda and at Riyadh, during a few crowded hours, are partly to blame; but the original reason is the attempt to cover in the English text elaborations and explications coined in Arabic by the Saudis and inserted at points which, however eloquent they may be in the classical Arabic, disfigure the English text. However, there was no time for final revision of the style.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

⁹⁵ Joseph C. Grew and Loy W. Henderson, respectively.

[Enclosure 1]

*The American Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Saudi Arabian
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin)*

No. 237

RIYADH, August 5, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Note of May 11 [12], 1945⁹⁸ in which the Saudi Arabian Government agreed in principle to the establishment of a United States Military Airbase at Dhahran for the prosecution of our common war against Japan. The Saudi Arabian Government agreed to the construction and operation of this airbase by the United States Army for the duration of the war against Japan, and for its continued use by the United States Armed Forces for a period of three years after the cessation of hostilities against Japan.

I now have the honor to transmit the following proposals of my Government with regard to the details of construction and operation of the airbase, proposals which are hereby submitted to the government of His Majesty, the Great King of Saudi Arabia.

This airbase, not to exceed an area of five (5) miles by five (5) miles, to be located at approximately Longitude 26°20' North, Latitude 50°10' East, which is within the so-called Damman Tracts, will be constructed by the United States Government in accordance with United States Army mobilization type construction policies, making use of pre-fabricated steel buildings for certain structures. The base in general will consist of two runways and the necessary facilities as are usual for the operation of an airbase accommodating five hundred (500) persons. This five hundred (500) man capacity airbase will be so designed to permit the housing and all other pertinent facilities to be increased to any extent up to a two thousand (2000) man capacity. Such expansions will be made at such time and in such manner as and if deemed necessary by the United States Government during the period of time that the base is occupied by United States Armed Forces. In addition, the United States Government will construct on a Saudi Arabian post to be established near Lauqa, Arabia, at approximately Longitude 29°56' North and Latitude 45°7½' East, an intermediate emergency airfield. This airfield will consist of the very minimum of improvements and facilities to permit efficient and safe aircraft operations from Cairo, Egypt, to Dhahran. In addition, the United States Government will install standard navigational aids, meteorological facilities and housing, as determined necessary, on a Saudi Arabian post to be established in the vicinity of Hafar al Batin, 28°25' North and 45°35' East. Similar aids and facilities will also be installed at the Dhahran and Lauqa fields.

⁹⁸ See footnote 2, p. 893.

The air route for which the above installations are required will extend from Cairo, Egypt, to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, by way of Ma'an, Trans-Jordan; Lauqa, Saudi Arabia; and Hafar al Batin, Saudi Arabia.

In the event future technical surveys reveal the necessity of installing certain navigational aids at points along the air route which are not mentioned above, the United States Government will construct same. Navigational aids required at points not on the established air route will not be constructed until the approval of the Saudi Arabian Government is obtained. The coordination of radio frequencies to be used in connection with navigational aids and other communications will be accomplished between technical representatives of the Saudi Arabian Government and the United States Government. In this connection, the United States Government is authorized to employ codes as may be necessary for security purposes.

The Saudi Arabian Government will arrange the necessary details for the United States Government to assume immediate entry rights at Dhahran and Ras Tanura and surface reservations to the required land within the Damman Tracts, and to be granted immediate access to the required lands near Lauqa and Hafar al Batin. This is to permit the rapid and unhampered construction of installations. The land for the Dhahran airbase will be reserved for the exclusive use of the United States Government and the installations thereon will be at the disposition of the United States Government who will use, operate, control and maintain same. On the day of cessation of hostilities against Japan, the airbase at Dhahran will be relinquished by the United States Government, and the fixed installations thereon, as well as at Lauqa and Hafar al Batin, will become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government; however, for a period not exceeding three years following the cessation of hostilities against Japan, the United States Armed Forces will continue to use, operate and maintain the airbase at Dhahran at its expense. The equipment and improvements at Lauqa and Hafar al Batin will be at the disposition of the United States Government, but the installations will be under the command of the Saudi Arabian Government who will rely upon United States Government technicians for the operation and maintenance of all equipment and for supervising technical tasks.

In view of the extensive air traffic activities involved during the re-deployment and period of Army occupation, the Saudi Arabian Government grants the right for the United States Army to use, operate, and maintain the installations referred to above for a period of three years after the cessation of hostilities against Japan.

The United States Government will reimburse the Saudi Arabian

Government for all damage to personal property caused by the construction or operation of the above named facilities.

In view of the changing requirements and operations of such an airbase, it is agreed that during the time the airbase is being used by the United States Armed Forces, the United States Government has the right to remove, replace, or alter such items of material and equipment not permanently affixed to or installed on the airbase. It is further agreed that the United States Government has the privilege to make minor alterations, additions and improvements to permanently installed property.

On the expiration of the three-year period following the cessation of hostilities against Japan, the United States Government will turn over these installations in sound condition to the Saudi Arabian Government for operation, control and maintenance. However, the Saudi Arabian Government will not turn such responsibilities over to a third national power nor its subjects.

The construction, maintenance and operation of the airbase requiring the entry and exit of large numbers of United States Army personnel, American civilians and employees of the United States Government, all travelling under competent orders of the United States Government, it is agreed, in order to eliminate undue delay, that such orders issued by the United States Government will be accepted and honored by the Saudi Arabian Government in lieu of passports and residence permits. All other persons authorized by the United States Army Air Transport Command to travel in the national interest will have in their possession the required passports and visas.

These Army personnel, representatives and employees of the United States Government, other than Saudi Arabian subjects, will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the civil or criminal courts of Saudi Arabia for unlawful acts committed within the boundaries of the airbase. All Saudi Arabian subjects will be subject to the Saudi Arabian courts.

It being mutually agreed that mechanics, artisans and labor are not available in sufficient quantities among Saudi Arabian subjects to prosecute the construction of the airbase within the time allotted, the Saudi Arabian Government will allow the United States Government to import into Saudi Arabia, during the construction period, approximately 500 Americans, 1500 Italians, 500 Iraqis and Iranians, 1000 from Aden Protectorate, and 25 Egyptians of European descent for the construction work on the airbase. Wage rates for all employees will be uniform in accordance with individual degree of skill and will conform with current wage rates existing within the locality in which the work is being performed.

During the period when the airbase is at the disposition of the United States Armed Forces, all items on United States Government

bills of lading are to be allowed entry into Saudi Arabia free of all Saudi Arabian Government duty, taxes and restrictions. This exemption applies to supplies and provisions for all United States Army personnel, and the operations in connection with the airbase which will not be subject to taxation, reimbursement, nor compensation to the Saudi Arabian Government.

The United States Government considers that normal facilities for personal recreation and self-improvement should be provided by the United States Army for its personnel and employees, as at other airbases.

The Saudi Arabian Government has no objection to the purchase by the United States Government during their occupancy of the airbase of electric power and natural gas from the Arabian-American Oil Company at such prices as are agreed upon between the purchaser and vendor. In the event the Saudi Arabian Government cannot, at the time it assumes complete responsibility of the airbase, secure an agreement with the Arabian-American Oil Company for the supply of required electric power, the United States Government will provide adequate generators to assure the continued operation of the airbase.

It is understood the United States Government has assigned the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Africa-Middle East Theater, the mission of construction of the airbase and installations contained in the area of operations described above.

Detailed agreements on procedure for the administration of justice involving nationals of more than one country, and for customs and passport regulations, will be the subject of additional memoranda.

At a later date, and in connection with civilian use of the airport, the United States Government will discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government terms under which the Saudi Arabian Government might acquire equipment and non-fixed installations remaining on the airbase when relinquished by the United States Army.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed expression of my high regard.

WILLIAM A. EDDY

[Enclosure 2]

*The Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin)
to the American Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)*

No. 17/2/6/83

[RIYADH,] August 6, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I have received your letter dated August 5, 1945, specifying the following:—

[Here follows text of letter of August 5, *supra*.]

I have the honor to inform you that the Government of Saudi

Arabia has agreed to what has been said in your letter, the text of which is mentioned here above.

Please accept my high regards.

YUSUF YASSIN

[Enclosure 3]

The American Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Saudi Arabian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yassin)

No. 238

RIYADH, August 6, 1945.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: With reference to my letter to Your Excellency, dated August 5, 1945, I wish to explain the purpose of the United States Government in securing the use of the airbase at Dhahran by the armed forces of the United States after the cessation of hostilities against Japan, for a further period of not more than three years. It is understood that, if the United States Government should discover at an earlier date before the end of the three years that the military need for the airbase no longer exists, then at that date the United States armed forces will relinquish to the Saudi Arabian Government the operation and maintenance of the airbase.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed expression of my high regard.

WILLIAM A. EDDY

890F.24/7-3045: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1945—6 p. m.

242. ReLegs 393, July 30.⁹⁷ You may advise Acting MinFonAff that although end of Japanese war may necessitate changes in procedure, it might be to SAG advantage to transmit immediately letters identical to those signed on September 21, 1944.⁹⁸ The Honorable Fred M. Vinson is now Secretary of the Treasury. Assuming SAG desires 9,000,000 full riyal coins, 1,000,000 half riyals, and 2,000,000 quarter riyals (reLegs 209, May 17⁹⁷), amount of silver required same as in September, 1944 letters.⁹⁹

BYRNES

⁹⁷ Not printed.

⁹⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 740, footnote 54.

⁹⁹ In despatch 168, August 18, 1945, the Chargé in Saudi Arabia transmitted letters dated the same day, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Foreign Economic Administrator. These letters, signed by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Yusuf Yassin), contained the official request of the Saudi Arabian Government for 3,437,500 ounces of silver from the stocks of the United States Treasury, which, the Chargé stated, would be coined into 10,000,000 riyals (890F.24/8-1845).

890F.61A/8-1845

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

No. 347

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1945.

The Secretary of State refers to despatch no. 157¹ from Jidda on the subject of the request by the Saudi Arabian Government for an extension of the American agricultural mission at Al Kharj, and the attached copy of the letter dated July 18, 1945² from the Acting Foreign Minister to the American Minister at Jidda. The fact has been noted that on the occasion of Mr. Eddy's recent visit with Colonel Hoskins to Riyadh, King Abdul Aziz expressed his satisfaction at the accomplishments of the American agricultural mission at Al Kharj, and requested that its work continue beyond the 18 months originally envisaged.

The Officer in Charge should, in his discretion, inform the Government of Saudi Arabia that the Government of the United States is gratified that King Ibn Saud looks with favor on the work being done by the American agricultural mission at Al Kharj.

Amir Faisal was informed on August 1 in Washington that it will not be possible for the United States to continue to provide funds for this mission beyond the original 18 months. He was also told that the United States contemplated making a five million dollar loan to the Government of Saudi Arabia through the Export-Import Bank for development purposes, and that agricultural work in and around Al Kharj is an example of the type of project which this Government would like to see the Government of Saudi Arabia undertake with these funds.

800.24/9-445

The Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton) to the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley)

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1945.

DEAR LEO: The President has, as you know, agreed to the continuation of those special lend-lease programs to the fulfillment of which this Government was firmly committed prior to the termination directive of August 17.³

It is my understanding that this exception approved by the President authorized the continuation of three programs, the details of which are given below:

Saudi Arabia: The United States has outstanding commitments to the Government of Saudi Arabia to supply \$8,870,000 worth of

¹ Dated July 18, p. 931.

² Not printed.

³ For text, see telegram 7012, August 18, 4 p. m., to London, vol. vi, p. 102.

commodities and \$2,500,000 worth of silver for coinage to that country. The program having been approved both by President Roosevelt and President Truman, the Saudi Arabian Government was informed in writing by Minister Eddy on July 28 [29], 1945 ⁴ that this Government would share equally with the Government of Great Britain in a joint 10 million dollar supply program, and that the United States would provide Saudi Arabia with a supplementary supply program of six million dollars. This commitment was also given in person in Washington on August 1 [July 31], 1945, to the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia.

[Here follow details of the programs for Liberia and Italy.]

I shall appreciate confirmation of our interpretations of the President's decision, and advice that the Foreign Economic Administration will fulfill the lend-lease programs noted above.⁵

Sincerely yours,

W. L. CLAYTON

890F.24/9-1145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1945—5 p. m.

274. Lend-Lease assistance Saudi Arabia as programmed will be continued 1945 despite general discontinuance. Please inform SAG and British representative.

ACHESON

890F.612/6-1645 : Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1945.

A-52. Re ur A-53 June 16 and Depts instruction No. 347, dated Sept 4, 1945 on the subject of the future of the US Agricultural Mission at Al Kharj. When Prince Faisal was in Washington on August 1, 1945 he was informed that the Government of the United States would extend a 5 million dollar development loan to the Government of Saudi Arabia through the Export-Import Bank. Prince Faisal was also told that if the Government of Saudi Arabia so desired, the

⁴ See despatch 161, July 30, from Jidda, p. 935.

⁵ In his reply of September 18, 1945, to Mr. Clayton, Mr. Crowley stated: "I wish to advise you that the Foreign Economic Administration will be pleased to carry out the President's instructions and fulfill the programs referred to in your letter." (800.24/9-1845) In a letter of October 16, 1945, Mr. Arthur Paul, Executive Director of the Bureau of Areas, Foreign Economic Administration, informed Mr. Clayton that "We interpret the President's instructions excepting Saudi Arabia from the termination of lend-lease to refer only to the 1945 program. Therefore it is clear that any future assistance to Saudi Arabia which may be considered desirable will have to be provided under arrangements not involving the use of lend-lease funds." (890F.24/10-1645)

Government of the United States would look with favor on the use of funds provided by this Export-Import Bank loan to continue and expand the work of the US Agricultural Mission at Al Kharj, which cannot be continued on its present basis beyond the expiration of the present contract.

Will you sound out the Government of Saudi Arabia as to whether or not it wishes to continue the US Agricultural Mission with funds provided through the Export-Import Bank loan. If an affirmative answer is received, Rogers and the other experts should propose to the King the agricultural program recommended for a given period of years, together with estimates of personnel, required equipment, and cost. If the King, Rogers, and you agree upon plans for an agricultural program,⁶ the Department will take up with the Export-Import Bank the question of obtaining part of the funds provided by the 5 million dollar development loan for this purpose.

ACHESON

890F.24/9-1345

President Truman to King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1945.

YOUR MAJESTY: It is indeed a pleasure to receive your letter⁷ and to learn that like myself you are looking forward to the time when we may meet and re-affirm the friendship between our respective countries which has already been cemented by the auspicious meeting between Your Majesty and the late great President Roosevelt.⁸ I can assure you that I, too, share the strong feeling of friendship which bound him to you and to your people.

You are quite right in assuming that the welfare of your country is important to me and that I recognize the importance of extending you sufficient aid to enable Saudi Arabia to pass safely through the

⁶ In airgram A-58, October 25, 1945, to Jidda, the Department stated that the personnel of the Agricultural Mission had been transferred to the Department of State (112/10-2545). A meeting on the future of the mission was held by Department officers, Colonel Eddy, and personnel of the Foreign Economic Administration on October 30. The memorandum of this conversation by Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs stated "It was agreed that the mission should be continued after June 30, 1946, when the contracts of the present members of the mission expire." (890F.61A/10-3045) The FEA Mission at al-Kharj was terminated in June 1946 with the return of American personnel to the United States. The work of the project was continued thereafter, by the Arabian American Oil company.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 926. On August 11, 1945, the White House requested the Department of State to prepare an appropriate reply for the President's signature. The Department's suggested reply, sent to the White House on September 10, was returned to the Department on September 13 and was transmitted to the Minister in Saudi Arabia for delivery to the King, under instruction 351, September 18. (890F.24/9-1045, 890F.24/9-1345)

⁸ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1 ff.

present crisis. You state in your letter that you have learned from Colonel Eddy that the amount of supplies and the amount of currency assigned to Saudi Arabia for the second half of 1945 have not been finally approved by the American Congress. I am happy to inform Your Majesty that our Congress has now acted favorably upon this matter and that I am supporting the fulfillment of the commitment to you. As Colonel Eddy informed Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, your Acting Foreign Minister, and as the Department of State informed His Royal Highness Amir Faisal at the time of his visit to Washington, the Government of the United States has agreed to provide aid to Saudi Arabia in 1945 in two supply programs. The first of these is the joint American-British ten million dollar supply program to which we and the Government of the United Kingdom are each supplying commodities valued at five million dollars. Secondly, because we do not feel that this joint supply program provides sufficient assistance to carry your country through this critical period, the Government of the United States is providing a supplementary supply program of six million dollars. This program is composed of three million dollars worth of commodities desired by you and three million dollars worth of silver riyal coins. It is my sincere belief that this assistance will be sufficient to maintain the economy of your country on a sound basis throughout 1945.

May I also call attention to the fact which was communicated to His Royal Highness Amir Faisal in Washington that the Government of the United States has decided to extend a five million dollar development loan to Saudi Arabia through the mechanism of our Export-Import Bank, if the terms of the loan prove agreeable to Your Majesty. It is our hope that you will find these funds useful in developing telecommunications, roads, water works, light plants, agricultural projects, and other projects necessary to the strengthening of your economy.

With very best wishes for your continued health and happiness,
Believe me,

Your sincere friend,

HARRY TRUMAN

711.90F/9-1345

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 173

JIDDA, September 13, 1945.
[Received September 27.]

Sir: I have the honor to submit respectfully a few general observations regarding United States-Saudi Arabian relations, involving also the United States position in Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis the British.

1. The unfortunate "crisis" psychology of the Saudi Arabian Government continues to create uncertainty regarding their future economic resources and stability; the relative future strength of the United States and Britain in this area; and the prospects of the United States prevailing upon the British to cease and desist from their opposition to United States civil air rights, direct radio-telegraph communications, United States missions to Saudi Arabia, control of dollar exchange in the Middle East, etc.

2. While Amir Faisal has reported enthusiastically about his conversations in the Department, July 31–August 1, 1945, and the transcript of those conversations⁹ have awakened renewed hopes of long-range agreements with the United States, the Saudi Government does not yet have any official assurances which would emancipate them from economic and political dependence on the British. United States policy in Saudi Arabia for the years ahead is still obscure; British controls and potential sanctions are very visible; Saudi Arabian dependence upon some powerful friend is clear. A confidential source told me this week that King Abdul Aziz will attempt to sit out the "rivalry" between United States and British interests in the Middle East, and to defer reply to any proposition made by either to which the other objects. Thus the British did not get their Financial Advisor at Riyadh, and the United States has not gotten direct radio communications.

3. Saudi Arabia has limited experience in foreign relations, and watches carefully what takes place in neighboring countries. With regard to the draft of a bilateral civil air rights agreement, submitted to the Saudi Arabian Government this week,¹⁰ I was asked whether other Arab countries had signed similar agreements and whether the Saudi Arabian Government could see the exact terms of the agreements when signed by their neighbors. It will be of great assistance to United States interests in Saudi Arabia, therefore, if the mortmain of British economic strangulation can be relaxed from the throats of neighboring governments; and if the notorious political and diplomatic precedence of the British can be abolished in Egypt and Iraq.¹¹

4. Conversely, any move by the United States Government which could be interpreted as support for any British action detrimental to the Arabs would injure United States interests in Saudi Arabia, not only because it would be resented on its own account, but because it would confirm the reiterated British propaganda to the effect that Britain acts while others concur. This would be eminently true of any

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ In note 247, September 10, not printed.

¹¹ For documentation on the dissatisfaction of the United States with British precedence in these countries, see pp. 19 ff.

pro-Zionist move or declaration,¹² but it would also be true of any move to perpetuate French special influence in the Levant, or to readmit Italy to any Muslim territory in Africa.

5. Finally, to strengthen the United States position in Saudi Arabia, I recommend respectfully that American economic assistance to Saudi Arabia, whether the supply of necessities of life, development of natural resources and public services, or long-range financial aid to stabilize the national economy, be contingent upon treatment of the United States on a completely non-discriminatory basis in Saudi Arabia in all political and economic matters, including communications, transportation, and commerce. Indeed, a treaty to this effect might be requested prior to the notification of any future aid. It is time we got tough, or rather it will be time whenever legislation is passed which will implement the plans which the Department explained to Amir Faisal, plans which would permit the United States to match or replace Britain as stabilizer of Saudi Arabian economy.

The divorce between United States assistance and United States rights in Saudi Arabia has been regrettably complete. It has been impossible to use our economic aid in bargaining for privileges the past two years, because the economic aid was made known officially too late in the year, when the Saudi Government was already concerned about subsistence for the following year. The perpetual "crisis" is to our disadvantage; agreements for a period of years would enable the United States Government to make its assistance dependent upon prior assurance by the Saudi Government that it will maintain the Open Door against all efforts by the British to close that door.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot 52-M45

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*¹³

SWNCC 19/22

WASHINGTON, undated.

Subject: Continuation of Construction of Airfield at Dhahran.

It will be recalled that Mr. Grew on June 26, 1945 submitted to the White House a memorandum asking if you would approve the construction of a United States military airfield at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The substance of that memorandum was forwarded to you, and the State Department was informed on June 28 by Admiral Leahy¹⁴ that you had given your approval to the project.

¹² For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the Arab-Zionist controversy concerning the future status of Palestine, see pp. 678 ff., *passim*.

¹³ Sent to the Secretary of State by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on September 22, 1945, for signature and transmittal to President Truman.

¹⁴ See footnote 43, p. 917.

Following the receipt of your approval, negotiations with regard to the airfield were undertaken direct with King Ibn Saud by General Giles and Mr. Eddy, our Minister to Saudi Arabia, and an agreement was reached on August 6.¹⁵

On August 23, however, the War Department in a memorandum submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee¹⁶ suggested that the matter be re-examined in view of "rapid developments in the war against Japan". Now that Japan has capitulated, the War Department feels that by the time the construction is completed, the military usefulness of the airfield in connection with the present war will be doubtful. It is, therefore, of the opinion that any decision to continue the construction should be based not upon the possible usefulness of the airfield in connection with the present war, but upon the broader considerations involving the national interests of the United States.

In addition, the War Department has stated that in its opinion any expenditure of War Department funds now appropriated by Congress without specific authorization by the President and without specific authorization or sanction by the Congress for the construction of the airfield at Dhahran could not be considered a purpose for which War Department funds are currently available.

The Secretaries of State, War and Navy, after considering the various factors involved, have reached the conclusion that construction of the airfield and auxiliary facilities at Dhahran should be completed by this Government in the national interest, provided that United States air rights are adequately guaranteed along the lines suggested in the next paragraph. The Secretary of State is of the opinion that such construction should be completed by the War Department at its own expense as implementation of United States national policy.

They feel that if the United States military and civil air rights are to be adequately guaranteed the Government of Saudi Arabia should agree (a) that the United States Army will have title to the airfield and auxiliary facilities until completed, and control thereof so long thereafter as needed by the United States Army up to a maximum of three years after the date of completion, (b) that it will enter into a contract with an approved American company which will enable the latter to operate the airfield for the Saudi Arabian Government from the date on which the United States Army control ends to January 1, 1956, or until such time as the Saudi Arabian Government has available the trained technicians competent to operate the field, and (c) that it will sign the standard United States Air Transport Agreement.

¹⁵ See despatch 162, August 8, from Jidda, p. 943.

¹⁶ Memorandum of August 21, 1945, by the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) not printed; circulated as SWNCC 19/18/D by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 23.

Since shipping and materials have been allocated and United States Army engineers and civilian laborers have already reached Dhahran and have started construction of the airfield, and since this work will continue unless halted by instructions from Washington, it is important that a decision be made as to whether the airfield is to be completed, and if so, under what conditions, and that this decision be brought at once to the attention of the Government of Saudi Arabia.

The Department of State would therefore appreciate being informed if you authorize the completion of the construction by the War Department at its own expense of this airfield and its auxiliary facilities on the conditions outlined above provided that Congressional approval or sanction for the use of War Department funds already appropriated be obtained, or, if it should prove impracticable to secure such approval or sanction, that appropriation by Congress for the specific purpose be obtained.

If you approve of the completion of the construction of the field on the foregoing basis, Congressional sanction or authorization as aforesaid will be applied for by the War Department.

DEAN ACHESON

Records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Lot 52-M45

Memorandum by President Truman to the Acting Secretary of State

SWNCC 19/22

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1945.

With respect to your recent undated memorandum on the subject of "Continuation of Construction of Airfield at Dhahran", I approve the completion of the construction by the War Department at its own expense of this airfield and its auxiliary facilities with the following provisos:

(1) That the terms set forth in the second paragraph of page two of your memorandum¹⁷ be made conditions of the agreement to complete the construction, and;

(2) That the Congress either approve for this purpose the use of War Department funds already appropriated, or that the Congress make an additional appropriation therefor.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

890F.24/10-245

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

No. 177

JIDDA, October 2, 1945.

[Received October 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to bring to the attention of the Department the fact that although only three months remain until the beginning

¹⁷ Paragraph 6 of the memorandum.

of 1946, no plans have been developed, so far as this Legation is aware, for the continued subsidization of Saudi Arabia next year.

It is believed that assistance is contemplated over a period of time, but diminishing from year to year so as to reduce gradually, rather than abruptly, Saudi Arabia's dependence abroad for her economic stability. Such being the case, a program, if somewhat reduced, must be developed for 1946 which will be effective when the year begins in order that essential supplies for the people, who must continue to eat regularly, will not be interrupted. It is pointed out in this connection that although an early start was made during 1944 in work on the 1945 subsidy program, the negotiations were not completed nor the Saudi Arabian Government informed until the end of July 1945.

Despite that seven months' gap before the 1945 program was decided, continuity of Lend-Lease as well as interim commitments of our co-contributor, the United Kingdom, offset, without too serious an interruption in deliveries during the first half of the year, the awkwardness which was a consequence of the very tardy agreement on the 1945 program. No such saving factor can be looked for to minimize the consequences of similar indecision in 1946.

The complete cessation of hostilities has already ended Lend-Lease to most countries except Saudi Arabia, and it appears most unlikely that it can carry over here beyond the delivery of goods to which we are committed under the 1945 program. His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Jidda, moreover, has let it be known that the share of the United Kingdom, if any, in next year's subsidy must be further reduced, while the closing of Middle East Supply Centre¹⁸ with its distribution machinery and its pool stock facilities in the Middle East place an added responsibility upon the United States. Unlike the beginning of 1945, therefore, the old machinery will not still be in existence to carry on and it becomes mandatory to set up a new authority and machinery to take up the burden at the beginning of 1946 when the old relinquishes it at the end of the year.

This problem is of great concern to the Saudi Arabian Government, who made specific reference to it when the American and British Ministers jointly informed them of the closing of Middle East Supply Centre. It is urged, therefore, that no time be lost in making a prompt and effective decision in regard to United States assistance to Saudi Arabia for 1946, so that procurement of commodities and their transportation can be arranged in time to preclude undue hardship upon the government and people of Saudi Arabia.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM A. EDDY

¹⁸ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 85 ff.

S90F.51/10-545

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (McGuire) to Mr. Willard L. Thorp, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1945.

After I had completed the underlying memo,¹⁹ Mr. Collado informed me that he was seriously considering asking the Export-Import Bank to provide the necessary funds without absolute assurance regarding availability of dollars for servicing, in the expectation that we will find some means of assisting the British to make sterling a freely convertible currency. He asked me to draft a memorandum for presentation to Wayne Taylor²⁰ along those lines, and implied that in his judgment the chances of getting the Bank's approval were good enough so that we need not proceed with further negotiations on Plans I and II²¹ for the time being. However, I am sending the underlying memorandum along anyway for your files, in case further work on Plans I and II becomes desirable.

S90F.51/10-1945

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Collado) to the President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington (Taylor)*²²

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1945.

The time is fast approaching when some decision will have to be reached as to the method by which the United States Government is to provide the financial assistance which King Ibn Saud has requested to cover his budgetary deficit during the next few years. I think there is general agreement that the national interest in the American oil concessions in Saudi Arabia requires that such financial assistance be provided to the extent necessary to enable the King to maintain political and economic stability until oil royalties make the country self-sufficient. President Truman signified his agreement last May,²³ and asked that the State, War, and Navy Departments formulate plans for provision of such assistance.

¹⁹ Memorandum of October 5 to Mr. Thorp not printed; the memorandum was entitled "Suggested Procedure for Further Negotiations on Plans I and II for Saudi Arabia".

²⁰ President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

²¹ See footnote 92, p. 942.

²² Drafted by Paul F. McGuire, Assistant Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs. Marginal notation by Richard H. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs: "This plan of McGuire's was presented to Taylor on Oct. 19 by Eddy, Henderson, Sanger and McGuire. It met with a favorable reception, and the Bank is working up a draft of an agreement."

²³ See Mr. Grew's memorandum of May 23 to President Truman, p. 900.

At that time all concerned were impressed with the lack of precedent for financial assistance of this type by the United States Government to a foreign government. But, although the Export-Import Bank had not hitherto engaged in such operations, it was agreed that the Bank was not precluded by existing legislation from doing so, particularly since the budgetary deficit of the Saudi Government was roughly equivalent to its external trade deficit, so that loans by the Bank could be used for the most part to finance exports of American goods to Saudi Arabia.

However, those in the Department who had studied the situation closely felt constrained to point out that such loans might not be a sound banking risk. Petroleum experts agreed that the petroleum reserves in Arabia were perhaps the richest in the world, and that royalties would some day make the Government of Saudi Arabia very wealthy. But they pointed out that the market for Arabian oil would for some time to come be limited to European and Middle East countries whose currencies might not be freely convertible into dollars. Officials of the Arabian American Oil Company stated very frankly that their contract with Ibn Saud gave them the option of paying royalties in either sterling or dollars at the Company's option, and that if their revenues from sale of oil were predominantly in sterling currencies not convertible into dollars, they would have to pay their royalties in such currencies. Thus no matter how large the King's royalty revenues might become, they might not provide him a single dollar with which to pay interest and amortization on dollar loans made by the Export-Import Bank during the critical post-war years.

As we viewed the world trade outlook and the financial condition of sterling area and European countries last spring, the risk of such complications appeared so great that straight dollar loans to Saudi Arabia seemed to be outside the realm of sound banking practice. A great deal of time has been spent since then in concocting complex plans which would get around this problem.

Under one of these plans the War and Navy Departments would agree to buy with dollars a certain amount of Arabian oil each year, the dollar value of which the Oil Company would agree to pay in royalties to the Saudi Government, which in turn would promise to use them to service outstanding Ex-Im Bank loans. War and Navy representatives have indicated grave doubts that their Departments would actually commit themselves in advance to buy any given quantity of Arabian oil, in view of the probable objections of the American petroleum industry.

Another plan would avoid an intergovernmental loan entirely. The War and Navy Departments would pay royalties in advance to the Saudi Government on oil to be produced for their use at some indefinite future date. This involves setting aside an underground

reserve for the War and Navy Departments, which would require legislation, create considerable technical oil production difficulties, might prove very costly in terms of interest on the public funds invested unless the oil was used fairly soon, and would not necessarily be any more acceptable to the domestic industry than an outright agreement to purchase oil.

I doubt very much that either of these plans or their several variants can be put into effect without bringing on a full dress Congressional debate on international petroleum policy. It occurs to me that we ought to re-examine the Saudi Arab financial problem in the light of the developments of the past few weeks, and see whether there is in fact anything so unique about it as to call for the desperate measures to which the planners have been resorting.

It seems clear to me that although Saudi Arabia was the first clear case to come to our attention, it is by no means the only one where inconvertibility of currencies would limit ability to service dollar loans. In fact the problem is practically world-wide, and few applicants for Export Bank loans outside Latin America would be any better risks than Saudi Arabia in a world of inconvertible currencies and scarce dollars. In such a world, Saudi Arabia would in fact be one of the better risks, because there is at least a fair chance that ten years from now, if not sooner, the United States will have to import Arabian oil to supplement domestic supplies.

Of course we all earnestly hope that we will not have to face a world of inconvertible currencies indefinitely. In my opinion there is good reason to believe that the present discussions with the British²⁴ will bring us much closer to the establishment of free convertibility of currencies on current transactions, including the servicing of dollar loans.

I should like to suggest, therefore, that in considering a financial assistance program for Saudi Arabia, it is no longer appropriate to seek a specific guarantee that the Saudi Government will have dollar revenues sufficient to cover service on loans, so long as it is clear that that Government will have adequate overall foreign exchange revenues. Unless the petroleum experts are entirely wrong, I think there can be no question as to the adequacy of Saudi Arabia's foreign exchange revenues for repayment of loans, over a reasonable period of time, beginning in about 1955.

The latest estimates in the Department indicate that the expenditures of the Saudi Government necessary to maintain political and economic stability will exceed revenues by about \$11,000,000 in 1946, \$7,000,000 in 1947, \$5,000,000 in 1948, and \$2,000,000 in 1949, or a total

²⁴ On financial and trade subjects; for documentation, see vol. vi, pp. 1 ff.

of \$25,000,000 for the four-year period. By 1950 the budget should be in balance, and thereafter a surplus should appear. However, during the four succeeding years, the Saudi Government will have to purchase and return to the U. S. Treasury about \$10,000,000 worth of silver bullion lend-leased during the war.

It is believed that by the year 1955 the Saudi Government could begin substantial amortization payments on its dollar obligations. In fact, if, as petroleum experts believe, production of Arabian oil has reached 100,000,000 bbls. per annum by 1955 (3% of estimated world production in that year), the Government of Saudi Arabia should have surplus revenues over and above total expenses equivalent to at least \$3,000,000 per annum.

It is interesting to note also that this surplus might be entirely in the form of dollar exchange even if sterling were inconvertible, provided that only 30,000,000 barrels out of the 100,000,000 barrel production could be imported into the United States (such imports would be only 2% of total U.S. consumption). Under such circumstances, the oil company could hardly refuse the King's request to pay the royalties on that amount of oil in dollars; such royalties would total nearly \$7,000,000, of which the King would need no more than \$4,000,000 for essential purchases in the United States, leaving \$3,000,000 in dollar exchange for amortization of dollar debts.

My staff will provide further analysis along these lines shortly. At the moment I should like to call your attention to the fact that Colonel Eddy, American Minister to Saudi Arabia, will be in Washington for the next two weeks. I suggest we make every effort during that time to formulate a definite proposal which can be presented to King Ibn Saud before December 1 of this year, so that any negotiations which may be necessary over the terms or arrangements for supervision of expenditures can be completed before January 1, 1946.

890F.24/10-2245

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Treasury (Vinson)

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS you will remember the President at a meeting which we both attended on August 17 agreed to the continuation of those special Lend-Lease programs to the fulfillment of which this Government was firmly committed prior to the termination directive of August 17.²⁵

At that time the United States had outstanding commitments to the Government of Saudi Arabia to supply \$8,870,000 worth of commodi-

²⁵ For text, see telegram 7012, August 18, 4 p. m., to London, vol. VI, p. 102.

ties and \$2,500,000 worth of silver to that country for coinage. The program having been approved by both President Roosevelt and President Truman, the Saudi Arabian Government was informed in writing by Minister Eddy on July 28 [29], 1945,²⁶ that this Government would share equally with the Government of Great Britain in a joint 10 million dollar supply program, and that the United States would provide Saudi Arabia with a supplementary supply program of six million dollars, which included the silver for coinage into riyals needed to meet the currency needs of Saudi Arabia. This commitment was discussed in detail with the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia on August 1, 1945 during his visit to Washington.

On August 29, President Truman informed Mr. Snyder, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, that this United States commitment to Saudi Arabia was one of the three to be fulfilled by special continuance of Lend-Lease throughout the rest of 1945.

The Foreign Economic Administration has told the Department of State that it has completed all the details and filed the necessary requisitions for the 2½ million dollars worth of silver to be minted into riyal coins. The FEA however states that the Treasury Department has not yet agreed to release the necessary silver for this purpose.

Because this silver is specifically part of the Lend-Lease aid which this Government is committed to provide to Saudi Arabia in 1945, and in view of the fact that President Truman has taken the position that this program of Lend-Lease aid to Saudi Arabia shall be completed, I should be grateful if you would review the facts in this matter, with a view to making available to the Foreign Economic Administration the silver required to fulfill this Government's commitment to Saudi Arabia.²⁷

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

890F.24/10-3145

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands)

No. 363

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1945.

SIR: I refer to a memorandum sent recently by the President of the United States to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the issuance of lend-lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to Allied Governments. Besides outlining the general terms for such

²⁶ See despatch 161, July 30, from Jidda, p. 935.

²⁷ In a letter of November 13, 1945, the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Bell) informed the Secretary of State that on October 17 the Treasury Department had written to the Foreign Economic Administration that the needs of the Saudi Arabian Government for 3,437,500 ounces of silver should be met from Treasury stocks (890F.24/11-1345).

issuance, the President directed that "maintenance items" for United States equipment now in the possession of allied armies might be issued, for purposes other than those specifically approved as eligible, against payment on terms and conditions to be determined by the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established procedures.

I hereby advise you that until further notice, the War and Navy Departments may issue such maintenance items on the understanding that the government of Saudi Arabia will make full cash payment upon presentation of a bill by the Foreign Economic Administration. In view of the current readjustments in procurement by the Government of the United States of munitions and military and naval equipment, it is suggested that this Government should be informed of the requirements of the government of Saudi Arabia for the maintenance items in question.*

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
W. L. THORP

890F.796/10-3145

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

No. 185

JIDDA, October 31, 1945.
[Received November 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the negotiations which Mr. Jack Nichols, Vice President of T.W.A. Airlines, has been carrying on with Saudi Arabian Government for the establishment of air line services in this country. On October 17-18, 1945, Mr. Nichols was again in Jidda for this purpose, in the company of Major General B. F. Giles, general officer commanding in the Middle East.

I enclose herewith copies of letters he addressed to the Minister of Finance and the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to Prince Faisal.²⁸ These two letters sum up succinctly the entire course of these negotiations, and I have no comment to make on the technical nature of the proposals.

On October 27 the Acting Foreign Minister, to whom the King

*The information in this instruction may be communicated by you to the appropriate authorities of the Government of Saudi Arabia. [Footnote in the original.]

²⁸Dated October 18, 1945, neither printed. The joint letter to Abdullah Sulaiman and Yusuf Yassin called attention to the conversation on aviation matters between the Amir Faisal and Mr. Nichols during the Amir's visit to Washington (see pp. 1000 ff.), and stated that within 45 days TWA could submit three alternative proposals for the establishment of passenger, mail, and cargo services in Saudi Arabia, as follows: 1. TWA would be granted a concession to supply air services to meet the requirements of Saudi Arabia, the approximate cost to the Government being set forth; 2. Saudi Arabia would own outright the proposed airline and TWA would enter into a management contract, whereby, for certain compensation, it would operate the airline for the Government; or 3. TWA would supply air services to meet the requirements of Saudi Arabia and be reimbursed for its costs, plus 15%.

had given plenary powers to negotiate air agreements, gave me the government's answer to Mr. Nichols, with the request that I transmit the message. It stated that the Saudi Government granted a forty-day period to T.W.A. for the purpose of making a technical survey of the possibilities of a domestic Saudi air line for the transport of passengers, and a ninety-day period for the study of cargo transport. During this period the government undertook not to conclude an agreement with any other company for these services, but reserved the right to conduct similar negotiation with others. To date there has been no reply from Mr. Nichols.

During the entire course of these conversations the Acting Foreign Minister was quite explicit that the principal obstruction to any agreement with an American company was the objection of the British Government. Ali Abdullah Ali Reza, who carried the enclosed letter to Prince Faisal, also reported to me that while Faisal himself was entirely sympathetic with the American proposals, he had admitted that any offer from an American company would be shown to the British, in order to ascertain if they could make the same offer, or a better one. Faisal is at this writing on his way to London, and will take no part in further negotiation, so that Shaikh Yusuf Yassin remains as the considerable hurdle in the way of their successful completion, insofar as purely Saudi influences are at work. It is said that the only stipulation which the King has made is that the line should not be government-owned or managed, since he knows the limitations of his own people.

Further developments will be promptly reported.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM L. SANDS

890F.248/11-1945: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*²⁹

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1945—6 p. m.

10103. Unless you perceive objection please inform the appropriate authorities of the Brit Govt substantially as follows:

Following termination of the war, American public opinion is insisting that in expending funds upon construction operations abroad,

²⁹ In a memorandum of November 16, 1945, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) submitted a draft of this telegram to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), and the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) for approval and stated: "A conversation on Tuesday, November 13 with Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy in Washington, has made it clear that the British will object to the granting to us of Fifth Freedom Rights in Saudi Arabia as requested in this cablegram unless steps are taken at a high level to effect a change in, or at least an exception to the over-all British policy of opposing our obtaining such rights anywhere." (890F.248/11-1945)

the American Govt should be in a position clearly to demonstrate that such operations are in the interest of the US. The President and Congress, after examining the situation with regard to the Dhahran airfield, have decided that the completion of this project could be justified to the American public only under the following conditions:

1. Conclusion between the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) and the Govt of the US of the standard bilateral Air Transport Agreement, including full "Fifth Freedom" traffic rights.

2. Amendments of the existing Agreement for a United States Military Airbase at Dhahran to provide:

- (a) That the US Army will retain title to the fixed installations of the airfield at Dhahran as well as to auxiliary facilities at Lauqa and Hafar al Batin until construction is completed.

- (b) That the US Army will be granted the exclusive right to operate and maintain the above-mentioned installations and the right to make use of them for as long after completion as needed by the US Army up to a maximum of 3 years and that the US Army be granted the necessary air transit rights over routes agreed upon between the American and Saudi Arabian Govts for the same period.

- (c) That upon termination of US Army control the US Govt will turn over these installations in sound condition to the SAG for operation, control and maintenance. However the SAG will agree not to turn such responsibilities over to a third national power nor its nationals without the prior concurrence of the US Govt.

- (d) That upon termination of US Army control an American company approved by the US and the Saudi Arabian Govts will be permitted to operate the airfield for the SAG on terms to be agreed upon by the SAG and an American company, preferably prior to the date at which US Army control is relinquished. The American company will be permitted to operate the airfield until January 1, 1956, or until such earlier date as the SAG has available trained technicians who are, in the agreed opinion of the US and Saudi Arabian Govts, competent to operate the airfield according to minimum international standards.

- (e) That it be understood that the SAG may grant, if it so desires, to planes of nationality other than US nationality transit and landing rights through Saudi Arabia similar to those accorded to American planes.

The American Govt intends to instruct the American Minister in Jidda and General Giles to present this matter to Ibn Saud and to inquire of the latter whether the SAG is willing to meet conditions necessary for the completion of the airfield. The Govt of the US earnestly hopes that the Brit Govt will find it possible to instruct the Brit Legation in Jidda to make it clear to the SAG that the American Govt has informed the Brit Govt of the nature of the proposals which it is making to the SAG and that the Brit Govt would have no objection to the completion of the airfield under the conditions prescribed.

The Govt of the US is particularly anxious that there should be in Saudi Arabia sincere cooperation between it and the Brit Govt on a basis that will prove beneficial to the US, to Great Britain, and to Saudi Arabia. The Brit Govt must be aware of the far-reaching implications on Near Eastern stability of the success or failure of such cooperation. While the Dhahran airport is only one item in the over-all problem of relations with Saudi Arabia this Govt considers its completion as of extreme importance. The advantages which might be derived from the existence of an efficiently managed modern airfield so strategically located should be apparent to the Brit Govt. As a civil airfield it would also serve our common interests. This Govt seeks no privileged position with regard to its use even though American funds are building it.

The attitude of the Brit Govt may well be the factor determining whether or not the airfield is to be built. If as a result of the attitude of the Brit Govt the airfield is not completed, it will be difficult to dispel from the minds of the American public and of the peoples of the Near East the idea that the Brit and American Govts are not able to cooperate with each other in that area.

It might be appropriate at this time to point out that it is the policy of this Govt:

1. To develop and protect American economic interests in a manner mutually satisfactory to the Saudi Arabian and American Govts but not on a basis prejudicial to the interests of any other friendly power.
2. To endeavor to provide, in cooperation with other friendly powers, such assistance, financial and otherwise, as may be necessary to assure the economic and political stability of Saudi Arabia and to make possible the elevation of the standards of living, agriculture, and health of its people.
3. Not to seek a preferred position in Saudi Arabia, but to consult with the Brit Govt in connection with important moves which it may take in that country, in the belief that the US and Great Britain have a common interest in securing prosperity and political stability in Saudi Arabia, and in working in harmony to that end.

It is hoped that the Brit Govt may find it possible to give us their ideas with regard to this matter in the immediate future.

BYRNES

890F.24/11-2145

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

Ref: 129/ /45

His Majesty's Embassy have been instructed by the Foreign Office to inform the State Department that His Majesty's Government have

given consideration to the questions of supply and subsidy for Saudi Arabia in 1946 and have concluded that it is desirable to inform Ibn Saud that, as far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are concerned, he should make arrangements to secure all supplies for 1946 through commercial channels.

2. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the necessity for a communication of this kind arises from the fact that, unlike last year, deliveries under the subsidized supply programme for 1945 appear likely to be completed by the end of the current year. Consequently there will be no back-log of supplies arriving in the early months of 1946 to keep the economy of Saudi Arabia running until fresh arrangements can be made. It will moreover be necessary for Ibn Saud to purchase and arrange for the shipment of essential supplies under the new procedure in the first weeks of 1946. It would be clearly undesirable, in the view of His Majesty's Government, that Saudi Arabia should find itself deprived of such essential supplies at the beginning of 1946 because of delay in giving Ibn Saud notice of the need to procure. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government are not yet in a position to determine the extent of their subsidy in 1946: they can only indicate at the moment that, if they grant one, it will in all probability be a good deal smaller than in 1945.

3. In these circumstances, His Majesty's Government feel obliged to convey to Ibn Saud the warning contained in the first paragraph of this memorandum at a very early date; but in accordance with the arrangements for mutual consultation with the U.S. Government in matters relating to the economy of Saudi Arabia which are still in force, the Foreign Office are consulting the State Department before approaching Ibn Saud.

4. His Majesty's Embassy are therefore instructed to enquire whether the State Department have any observations to offer on the above proposals. The Foreign Office is further of the opinion that, as far as can be foreseen, the divergence between the respective American and British scales of assistance to Saudi Arabia next year is likely to be sufficiently wide to put the preservation of any appearance of continuing a joint subsidy out of the question. While His Majesty's Government greatly regret the discontinuance, for which they can see no remedy, of this manifestation of joint Anglo-American cooperation in Saudi Arabia, they would wish to assure the State Department of their earnest desire to continue to cooperate with the United States Government within the limits imposed by the altered circumstances.

5. Since this matter is one of some urgency, His Majesty's Embassy hope that it may be possible for the State Department to give an early reply to this memorandum.

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1945.

890.F.248/11-2245 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands)

JIDDA, November 22, 1945—noon.

334. [Here follows text, except for minor changes of language, of telegram 10103, November 19, 6 p. m., to London (page 966), beginning with the second paragraph through paragraph numbered 2(e).]

The above information has been transmitted to the Brit Govt and their concurrence in the immediate future has been requested. As soon as the Brit reply is received General Giles and Air Attaché Curren will accompany Minister Eddy from Cairo to Jidda to present the above information to the King and to obtain his agreement. Meanwhile this telegram is to provide you with advance information but must be kept confidential pending Minister Eddy's instructions.

For your own background it should be pointed out that while the signing of the bilateral Air Transport Agreement is one of the two necessary conditions to completing the airfield, it is our wish that the condition be not included in the revised Agreement for a United States Military Airbase at Dhahran. This procedure is important in order to avoid the interpretation by other nations that we are purchasing bilateral air transport agreements with airfields built with US funds. In oral discussions with the King you may need to state unequivocally that the airfield is a *quid pro quo* but the signed agreements should give no indication of this fact; hence it is probably desirable to conclude the bilateral Air Transport Agreement first.

Sent to Jidda. Repeated to Cairo³⁰ for Minister Eddy, General Giles and Air Attaché Curren.

BYRNES

890F.248/11-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 28, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 28—11:33 a. m.]

12421. Substance of Dept's 10103, November 19, 6 p. m. has been given Foreign Office in writing. We have also discussed its contents with Under Secretary Ronald who has supervision of aviation matters and Under Secretary Howe who is responsible for Middle East matters. A written reply was promised us as soon as possible but Ronald pointed out that besides questions of civil aviation and Middle East policy matters, there was still another item entering the picture and that was the relation between this airfield and the principle of regional

³⁰ As No. 2161.

defense as outlined in article 43 of San Francisco Charter.³¹ These were all questions he pointed out which would call for some study.

Ronald said that consideration of the questions raised in connection with the airfield at Dhahran would be facilitated if we could furnish him with information re the nature and volume of military traffic now using this airfield and the nature and volume of military traffic that will be using this airfield in the immediate future. He said he would also appreciate learning when it was planned to ask Congress for the funds for the completion of this airfield and for its eventual adaptation to civilian use. He added in this connection that consideration of questions we raised re the Dhahran Airfield was related to the larger question of an Anglo-American air transport agreement. He said he hoped that before funds were appropriated for completion of the Dhahran airfield at least a *modus vivendi* covering the Fifth Freedom would have been worked out between the British and US.

[For remaining two paragraphs of this telegram, see page 81.]

WINANT

S90F.248/11-3045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1945—11 a. m.

10394. Re London's 12421, Nov 28. Please inform appropriate Brit authorities urgently substance of the following:

1. Following termination hostilities Army had no authority to continue work on Dhahran airfield without specific approval of President and Congress. This approval including necessary appropriations has now been given by both President and Congress with stipulation that Dept of State secure at once agreement to conditions specified Dept's 10103 of Nov 19.

2. We do not see how airfield negotiations under reference would affect "Principle of regional defense" outlined in Articles 51 or 53 (not 43) San Francisco Charter since upon completion airfield will become property of Saudi Arabian Govt (SAG) and will be operated on behalf of SAG under general control of SAG. Any use of airfield by Security Council would be subject to future negotiation between Security Council and SAG under Article 43.

3. Because airfield is still under construction military traffic is not routed via Dhahran. US military traffic continues routed via Abadan.³² However in view of international complications in Iran which

³¹ Charter of the United Nations, signed on June 26, 1945, Department of State Treaty Series No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031.

³² For documentation on the use by the United States of facilities at Abadan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 486 ff.

have led to our joint decision to withdraw armed forces from Iran on or about January 1, 1946,³³ operations at Abadan airfield must soon cease. It is planned that traffic be rerouted via Dhahran as soon as that field is completed. As of January 1, 1946 approximately 120 military planes per month will be operating between Far East, India, and Cairo, hence the necessity of having Dhahran airfield available soon as possible.

4. This Govt does not consider Dhahran airfield related to larger question of an Anglo-American air transport agreement. The Brit position on "Fifth Freedom" is understood and it is not this Govt's intention to maneuver Brit into approval of the general Fifth Freedom concept by securing Brit approval of our proposed negotiations with Saudi Arabian Govt. On other hand this Govt continues to maintain its position that it has the right to negotiate Fifth Freedom traffic rights with independent third Powers if such Powers are willing. This Govt is merely requesting, in view of the urgent need for Dhahran field, that Brit Govt not endeavor to obstruct Saudi-American negotiations involving a bilateral air transport agreement.

5. In answer to last paragraph London's 12421 it should be pointed out that this Govt has requested several times that Brit officials meet with American officials for such negotiations, and it is still hopeful that Brit Govt is prepared to enter into such discussions at an early date.

6. In view of the stipulations referred to above laid down by the President and Congress the Dept must approach SAG at once on this subject. Otherwise the Army may be charged with the misuse of funds. Dept therefore, in any event, must issue instructions to Legation in Jidda within few days to begin negotiations with SAG. It is hoped therefore that Brit Govt will issue appropriate instructions to its Legation in Jidda without delay and will inform us of its action.

The situation may be summarized as follows:

(a) This Govt, under stipulations already set forth which we believe are fair and reasonable, can build an airfield available to all.

(b) If work is stopped now and labor and material already assembled is dispersed it is not likely that this Govt will be able later to complete the field.

(c) We believe the Brit Govt would agree with us that it would be regrettable if the airport, which would be extremely useful, particularly in times of possible stress, is not built within the next few months and be readily available for future contingencies.

Sent to London, repeated to Cairo for Minister Eddy.

BYRNES.

³³ For documentation on this subject see pp. 845 ff.

890F.51/11-3045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Financial Affairs (McGuire)

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1945.

Participants: Messrs. Tandy³⁴ and Christelow,³⁵ British Embassy
Messrs. Merriam, Jones,³⁶ Jenkins³⁷ and Sanger, NE
Mr. McGuire, FN
Mr. Page, IFLS³⁸

Mr. Merriam explained that it had seemed appropriate to the Department, in continuation of the practice of mutual consultation between the U.S. and U.K. Governments on matters relating to the economy of Saudi Arabia, to inform the British Embassy of plans which the U.S. Government was formulating for providing U.S. financial assistance to Saudi Arabia after December 31, 1945. After that date, lend-lease would no longer be available as a source of funds, but interested U.S. officials were convinced that King Ibn Saud would need financial assistance for about five years. In the absence of any indication that the U.K. Government intended to provide any financial assistance to Saudi Arabia after the present year 1945, U.S. plans had been drawn up on the assumption that the United States Government would have to undertake the entire responsibility itself, in contrast to the joint Anglo-American supply programs which had been carried out in the years 1944 and 1945. In fact, a recent *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy had indicated that the United Kingdom Government did not consider it practicable to continue on a joint basis, because the aid which the U.K. could possibly provide was so small relative to that which the U.S. seemed to believe necessary.

Accordingly, the Department had drawn up a five-year financial assistance program. Advances under this program would be in the nature of loans, which the Saudi Government would be expected to repay out of future oil royalties. The Department was reasonably confident that its suggestions would be approved, and that funds would be available by January 1, 1946.

At Mr. Merriam's request, Mr. McGuire elaborated somewhat upon the plan, and answered questions asked by Mr. Christelow. Mr. McGuire brought out that the advances the first year might be as high as \$11,000,000, but advances in subsequent years would be reduced, and the total contemplated for the five-year period would not exceed \$25,000,000. He stressed the fact that Ibn Saud would be

³⁴ A. H. Tandy, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

³⁵ Allan Christelow, Assistant Secretary of the United Kingdom Treasury delegation in the United States.

³⁶ George L. Jones, Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

³⁷ William L. Jenkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

³⁸ Robert M. Paige of the Interim Foreign Liquidation Service.

told in advance how much assistance he could anticipate in each of the five years, but if he economized and saved money in any year he could use the conserved funds in subsequent years. It was hoped thus to encourage the King to put his financial house in order, while at the same time providing some flexibility. After the five-year period of advances, there would be a five-year period of grace before amortization began, and repayment would then take place over a ten-year period. Interest would average about 3 percent over the entire twenty-year period. Advances could be spent only on certain specified commodities, not including silver, which the King would have to procure out of his own revenues from oil royalties or pilgrim fees.

Mr. Christelow asked whether the loan would be "tied," i.e., expendable only for American goods and services. Mr. McGuire said it was contemplated that the funds would be so spent for the most part.

Mr. Christelow asked whether special Congressional approval would have to be obtained for the loan, or whether it could be made under existing authorizations. Mr. McGuire said it was felt that Saudi Arabia was a good credit risk for a twenty-year loan, and that it might be possible for an existing lending agency such as the Export-Import Bank to advance the funds as a part of its regular foreign lending program. Mr. McGuire stressed the point that nothing was settled as yet; the Department of State had formulated certain plans, but there was no certainty that they could be carried out.

There was some discussion as to whether the U.S. plans would be affected in any way if the British were to decide that they desired to provide a small amount of financial assistance. Mr. McGuire said that if the British were to commit themselves in advance to providing a given amount of assistance during each of the next five years, the U.S. Government would probably take that into account in determining the size of its own advances. However, he made it clear that the U.S. Government attached great importance to having a definite five-year program to present to the King before the end of this year, and that rather than delay presentation or introduce an element of uncertainty, the U.S. Government would prefer to go ahead on its program, even though the King might later on secure more assistance than we believed necessary by obtaining additional advances from other sources. On the other hand, if the British could give a definite indication in the very near future that they planned to provide assistance, it might be very helpful, since it was to the advantage of both governments that Ibn Saud not have an opportunity to play one off against the other and thus obtain more assistance than he needed.

The British representatives indicated their understanding of the

U.S. position, and said they would inform London. Mr. Paige and Mr. Christelow discussed certain technical problems arising from attempts to balance the U.S. and U.K. contributions to the 1944 and 1945 joint programs, and the meeting then adjourned.

890F.51/12-145 : Telegram

The Minister in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, December 1, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received December 3—10:05 a. m.]

2221. From Eddy. Strongly urge earliest possible conclusion of Eximbank loan arrangements with Saudi Govt to permit early procurement of basic commodities for 1946. Delay may mean gap of weeks or months after consumption of 1945 provisions before purchases under loan can arrive. Procurement, shipping and banking formalities will require much time in any case. Stability of Saudi economy admits of no prolonged gap in arrival of food and other necessities.

In view of current distrust of US Near East policy early conclusion of loan is urgent for political reasons also.³⁹ [Eddy.]

TUCK

890F.248/12-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 3, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received December 3—5 p. m.]

12646. We have given substance of Dept's 10394, November 30, 11 a. m. to Foreign Office orally and in writing.

Under Secretary Ronald assures me everything is being done to give us a reply as quickly as possible but he adds that a number of British officials are being consulted and that Mr. Bevin⁴⁰ himself might want to give the matter a final review.

Sent Dept as 12646, repeated Cairo as 66.

WINANT

³⁹ In telegram 2235, December 5, 1945, 6 p. m., to Cairo, the Department agreed with the viewpoint expressed in 2221 and stated that it "is continuing to press Eximbank. Difficulty is that Bank cannot act before its new board is fully instituted. There are several other important loans new board must consider but Dept is hopeful for action Saudi loan by Dec 15." (890F.51/12-145)

⁴⁰ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

890F.248/12-1345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945—6 p. m.

356. Although Brit have been hoping to give us a reply on airport before Bevin's departure for Moscow ⁴¹ no word yet received from London. Terms of Presidential directive and understanding with Congress put Dept in position which makes further delay in obtaining King's approval impossible.

You should therefore, in company with General Giles negotiate with Ibn Saud on terms stated Dept's 334 Nov 22, 11 a. m. [noon] to Jidda, repeated to Cairo as 2161. You may desire to explain situation fully to your Brit colleague before departing for Riyadh.

We are still hoping that Brit reply will reach you before conversations with King begin.

Sent to Jidda. Repeated to London ^{41a} for transmission of contents to Brit Govt. Repeated to Cairo for Giles.

ACHESON

890B.24/12-1745 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 17, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 6 : 11 p. m.]

417. For ComGenAMET.⁴² Reurtel 372, December 15. Undelivered items of military lend-lease officially promised in writing to Saudi Govt are items critically needed by Saudi Army consisting principally of ammunition for arms already delivered and tools for army vehicles already delivered. Without tools the vehicles are soon useless in the desert, and ammunition speaks for itself.

Chief consideration is political importance of fulfilling promises to Arab Govts at this particular time. Saudi Govt was informed that by direction of the President entire lend-lease program made in 1945 would be carried through to completion, and they naturally assume this to include all categories of materials promised.

Sent Cairo repeated Dept as 417.

EDDY

⁴¹ To participate in the meeting of Foreign Ministers, December 16-26, 1945.

^{41a} As No. 10775.

⁴² Commanding General, United States Army Forces, African-Middle East Theater (Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Giles).

890F.248/12-1845 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 18, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received December 18—10:39 a. m.]

418. When I asked the King whether I could have audience with him to include General Giles and General Wilson⁴³ December 22 or 23rd, the King replied "I am always available for important work but the work of importance on which so much depends is the supply of critical needs. As this is the oldest outstanding subject, I hope it will be discussed first."

I cannot overstate to the Department my conviction that General Giles and I will receive a negative reply or no reply at all to the communications we must make (Deptel 356, December 13) unless I can at same time give some definite assurance regarding long range financial loan which Department hoped would be ready December 15 (Deptel 223 [2235] to Cairo December 5⁴⁴) and without British concurrence in bilateral air agreement.

It has been obvious for some time that replies to TWA and American Eastern (among others) await the same word. If Eximport Bank cannot be induced to act now but defers action until after holidays when King will be leaving for Egypt, I should not care to predict effect on US interests. Furthermore, my position as US envoy would become untenable because King already misunderstands my return empty-handed after extended consultation in Department (Legtel 415, December 16, paragraph 2⁴⁵).

EDDY

890F.248/12-1645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1945—8 p. m.

362. Two telegrams for Jidda should clear Dept by Dec. 20. They are (1) changes in draft of proposed commercial agreement⁴⁶ entitled "Proposed Provisions for Use in Drafting Commercial Agreements with Particular Countries" which you took with you, which put that document in form for presentation to SAG; and (2) summary

⁴³ Gen. T. B. Wilson, Chairman of the Board of Directors of TWA.

⁴⁴ Not printed; but see footnote 39, p. 975.

⁴⁵ *Ante*, p. 841.

⁴⁶ See telegram 365, December 20, to Jidda, p. 1033.

of contract which has been drawn up for submission to new board of Eximbank, which you will be authorized to discuss with King.

You should thus be able to present SAG with US proposals regarding agreement (Legtel 416 Dec 16⁴⁷) and Eximport loan before discussions with Giles and King Dec 22-23 regarding airfield. (Legtel 413, Dec 14⁴⁸).

ACHESON

890F.51/12-1945 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 19, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received December 19—2:03 p. m.]

422. Just received Deptel 362, December 18 bringing news that I shall be authorized to discuss with SAG summary of contract re Eximbank proposed loan. First appointment for Giles and me with Foreign Minister will be Saturday morning December 22 as arranged in courtesy audience with King yesterday. King left for Mecca but can receive us again when necessary.

Re your paragraph 1, I did not bring out with me 7-page "Proposed Provisions for Commercial Agreements With Particular Countries" (Dept's memo of conversation of CP October 26⁴⁹) because CP wished to make alterations. Please rush text by pouch.

EDDY

890F.248/12-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1945—8 p. m.

10927. Re Depts 10103, Nov 19, London's 12421, Nov 28, Depts 10394, Nov 30, and Depts 10775.⁵⁰ Will you please call personally upon the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. McNeil, and inform him that it is impossible for us longer to continue building operations on the airfield at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia unless we obtain from Ibn Saud the conditions under which President and Congress agreed to have field

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ Not printed; it stated that in connection with revising the Dhahran airport agreement, concluding a bilateral air transport agreement and concluding an Export-Import Bank loan, the Department should bear in mind the King's departure early in January for prolonged visits to Egypt and Syria. It concluded: "Our relations should be established before he leaves since probably no one will remain competent to make decisions for him." (890F.248/12-1445)

⁴⁹ Memorandum by Francis Boardman of the Division of Commercial Policy, not printed.

⁵⁰ Same as telegram 356, December 13, 6 p. m., to Jidda, p. 976.

completed. We are therefore compelled to take this matter up with Ibn Saud at once.

One of required conditions is Bilateral Air Transport Agreement as we have previously pointed out to Brit Govt. We understand that some time ago Brit Govt gave Saudi Arabian Govt (SAG) to understand that it was opposed to SAG's signing such an agreement with US. We have asked Brit Govt to let SAG know that it no longer opposes our entering into such an agreement and that it does not oppose building of Dhahran airfield under conditions which we are proposing. However we have thus far had no reply from Brit Govt.

If Brit Govt takes no action in this matter SAG will have impression that Brit Govt is opposed to completion of field under conditions laid down by President and Congress. In such circumstances SAG in desiring not to give offense to Brit Govt may reject our proposals with result that field will not be completed and that millions of dollars already expended on this field by US would be lost. If this should occur American prestige in whole Near and Middle East would be seriously impaired and impression created that US and Great Britain no longer cooperate in that area.

American Govt is convinced that such a development would be harmful to interests of both American and Brit Govts both in Near East and elsewhere, and sincerely hopes therefore that Brit Govt will find it possible to send appropriate instructions regarding its attitude on completion of airport at Dhahran to its representative in Saudi Arabia, within the next few days.

Repeated to Jidda as no. 363.

ACHESON

890F.248/12-2045

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1945.

I telephoned Lord Halifax⁵¹ this afternoon and discussed with him the question of the Dairen [*Dhahran*] airfield. I said that we had sent off a cable to Ambassador Winant in London asking him to see Mr. McNeil, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to raise this question urgently with him. I stated that General Giles and Mr. Eddy were expecting to be in Jidda on the 22nd and 23rd of this month and that it was necessary that we reach some conclusion about this airfield.

I told Lord Halifax that under our arrangement, of which the Embassy was informed, we had started building this field on the supposi-

⁵¹ The British Ambassador.

tion that the King would enter into a bilateral agreement with us which would have the five freedoms in it. I said it was my understanding that the King was willing to do this but that he wanted to be sure that it was not objected to by the British Government, since he had to get along both with the British and with us. So far, the British Government had objected. I stated that if the King did not enter into such an agreement we would have to discontinue building the field and bring the people home even though the work had been going on for some time and several millions of dollars had been spent. Therefore, I said, we had urged that Mr. McNeil send word that the British Government did not object to it. We felt particularly bad about holding the thing up because we thought the airfield was as important to British aviation as it was to American aviation. Also, a great deal of trouble would be caused since the idea that our two Governments could not work out a thing as simple as this would be very unfortunate.

Lord Halifax stated that he thought his Government's position, rightly or wrongly, was that they did not want to prejudice the general position about the fifth freedom in advance of argument [*agreement?*] in one part of the world only, nor did they wish to see it prejudiced. If it were prejudiced in one part of the Middle East it might be in other parts and then the whole thing would be a little bit prejudged. The Ambassador said that he would look into the matter at once.

Lord Halifax telephoned me about 30 minutes later and said that he had before him the last telegram the Embassy had received from London on the subject stating that their man in Jidda had reported the text of the proposals which the United States had submitted to King Ibn Saud and which Ibn Saud had shown him, one of the clauses of which said that the TWA was to have a thirty-year monopoly charter from the King to do all transport of persons, property and mail between points inside Arabia and points outside Arabia. The telegram continued that a United States General coming from the Middle East and Africa, accompanied by General Wilson, Chairman of TWA, was expected at Jidda the next day (December 21) for discussions. King Ibn Saud had inquired whether the British had any comments.

I told Lord Halifax that I had heard nothing at all about this, but that I would look into it at once and call him back.

After discussing the question with Mr. Henderson, I telephoned Lord Halifax and said that we had never heard of this in any way. I said we had called the TWA people here in Washington and they knew nothing of it. We had understood that TWA was having some discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government looking toward the furnishing to them of technicians, training people, et cetera, in the

event the Saudi Arabian Government wanted that sort of technical advice in setting up their own airlines. However, that was the only thing we knew about. I continued that our policy is dead against the sort of thing the Ambassador had read to me over the telephone, and we would not permit any American company to do that. I said we were sending off a telegram tonight to ask what this is all about. If General Giles or anyone else had allowed himself to be placed in that position we would tell him he had to stop it. I said I hoped the Ambassador understood that this had nothing whatever to do with our contract with the King. Apparently, if the report should prove to be true, TWA was trying to deal on the side directly with the King and we would tell them they could not do that. I said that we not only did not question the Ambassador's objection to this, but we shared it.

The Ambassador replied that he had thought I would feel that way. He said he would telegraph London this evening and he had no doubt that my emphatic condemnation of this report would have a strong bearing on his Government's decision in the matter.

DEAN ACHESON

890F.51/12-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945—8 p. m.

368. ReLegs 418 Dec. 18. Eximbank has provided Dept with draft loan agreement which is being forwarded by air pouch.⁵² Because full membership of new board of directors of Bank will probably not meet until after Jan 1st, agreement will probably not be acted upon until about Jan 15. However Bank has agreed that draft can be shown to King and Saudi authorities provided it is made clear that it is not a definite proposal until Board has acted, that Board may make changes in draft before approval, and that there is always possibility that Board might refuse to approve any loan.

Pending arrival of draft, you may present following summary to Saudi authorities for preliminary discussion.

Eximbank would establish line of credit totaling 25 million dollars, 5 million to be available until June 30, 1948, for public works and other useful developmental projects approved by Bank, 20 million to be available to finance acquisition and transportation to Saudi Arabia of US products and services of types listed in agreement such as cereals, sugar, motor vehicles, etc. Financing of other than US products would be only with specific approval of Bank. Before any purchase of any product is effected, Saudi Govt must inform Bank of items to be purchased and approximate purchase price to be paid, but such

⁵² Instruction 376. January 2, 1946, not printed.

info can be provided for all proposed purchases for a calendar year or part thereof.

Twenty million for products and services to be available to extent of 11 million during calendar year 1946, 7 million during 1947, and 2 million during first 6 months of 1948, but unexpended balances of fund made available in any year can be expended in subsequent years up to June 30, 1948.

Bank will advance up to 1 million as first advance on 20 million. As invoices are received evidencing expenditure of funds, Bank will make additional advances in multiples of \$100,000. Each advance to be evidenced by a promissory note of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Service charge of 3 per cent per annum payable in dollars semiannually on Apr 30 and Oct 31 of each year, computed on unpaid balance of each note outstanding beginning soon as drawings are made against note. Principal represented by each note repayable commencing Oct 31, 1951, with 10 per cent repayable in 10 approximately equal semiannual instalments commencing Oct 31, 1951, 30 per cent in similar instalments commencing Oct 31, 1956, and 60 per cent in similar instalments commencing Oct 31, 1961.

Notes would be a general liability of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but in addition, SAG would undertake to convert or cause to be converted into dollars such amount of any oil royalties received by SAG as is required to pay principal and service charges due on notes. SAG would agree not to sell, encumber or in any manner dispose of to any third party its interest in any present or future oil concession or the royalties therefrom while any credits are outstanding without written consent of Eximbank. If SAG receives royalties in excess of the equivalent of 30 million dollars in any one year after the year 1950, it would apply one-half of the excess to prepayment of notes in inverse order of maturity.

For Legs info, last minute change from 5-year assistance program to 2½-year program necessitated by passage by Congress of bill prohibiting certain corporations, including Eximbank, from making any credits available after June 30, 1948 unless they have been granted federal charters.⁵³ Bank is at present incorporated in District of Columbia. You may wish to explain to SAG that inability to present a 5-year program is due to a technicality, and that there is every likelihood that if SAG requires a moderate amount of assistance during last 6 months of 1948, and during years 1949 and 1950, it will be possible to arrange for such assistance. You should point out, however, that original plan called for a total of only \$4,000,000 for all of 1948, \$2,000,000 for 1949 and \$1,000,000 for 1950, and that any additional as-

⁵³ Public Law 248, approved December 6, 1945, particularly section 304b; 59 Stat. 597, 602.

sistance that may be granted will probably be in accordance with that schedule, it being the firm opinion of this Govt that with appropriate planning by SAG, no greater assistance should be necessary to accomplish balancing of Saudi budget in those years.

ACHESON

890F.796/12-2045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia
(Eddy)*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945—10 p. m.

369. 1. Dept disturbed by report that TWA proposes 30-year monopoly charter from the King to do all transportation of persons, property and mail between points inside Arabia and points outside Arabia.

2. Neither Dept nor TWA here have details of negotiations being handled in Near East for TWA by General Wilson other than wire received by TWA that negotiations for Saudi Arabian air transport enterprise are proceeding satisfactorily. We had understood TWA was having discussions with SAG looking towards furnishing technicians, training and similar aid in event SAG wanted such technical advice on setting up Saudi Arabian air lines.

3. This Govt adheres to principle of non-exclusivity of foreign air rights by international air services. We would not permit any American company to get into any such monopolistic position as that suggested for TWA in paragraph 1 above. If any U.S. public official or private citizen allowed himself to be placed in that position, we would inform him it must be terminated.⁵⁴

4. Please telegraph latest developments TWA-Saudi Arabian negotiations, repeating wire to London and Cairo.

5. Sent Jidda. Repeated to London as 10982 and to Cairo as 2348.

ACHESON

[In note No. 287 on December 20, 1945, from the American Minister in Saudi Arabia to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Asad Al-Faqih,⁵⁵ he recalled that by an exchange of letters signed at Riyadh on August 5 and 6, 1945,⁵⁶ the King of Saudi Arabia had consented to

⁵⁴ In telegram 10978, December 20, 1945, 10 p. m., the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) directed the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to "make it clear immediately to appropriate British officials that this Govt would oppose entering by any American company into an agreement which would exclude air lines of other nationalities from conducting business with Saudi Arabia." (890F.796/12-2045) This telegram was repeated to Cairo as No. 2347 and to Jidda as No. 370.

⁵⁵ Copy of note transmitted to the Department in despatch 198, January 3, 1946 from Jidda; received January 16, 1946.

⁵⁶ See enclosures 1 and 2 to despatch 162, August 8, 1945, from Jidda, pp. 946 and 949, respectively.

the construction of an airfield at Dhahran by the United States Army to help in the common purpose of carrying on the war against Japan. Major construction efforts on the airfield had hardly started before the war against Japan had been concluded.

It was the belief of the United States that such an airfield at Dhahran could be completed for use in common peacetime interests, but this would require some revisions in the original agreement in order to make possible non-military operation of the field following the completion of the repatriation of soldiers and material from the theaters of war. The Minister, therefore, proposed certain revisions on behalf of the United States which would enable the construction of the field to be completed, its transfer immediately to the government of Saudi Arabia, and with provisions for its operation in accordance with the highest standards of safety.

Although the authorization from Congress for the expenditure of United States Army funds for war purposes had ended, the American Government had looked into the situation concerning the mutual long range interests that would allow the completion of an airport at Dhahran and had found out under what circumstances further funds could be appropriated for this construction.

1. The conclusion between the two governments of the standard bilateral air transport agreement would be required, including full fifth freedom rights, as had been proposed in the United States note No. 247 dated September 10, 1945.^{56a} Civilian airplanes could not operate successfully between the two countries without such agreement.

2. The existing agreement for a United States airfield at Dhahran would need to be amended to contain these provisions:

(a) The fixed installations of the airfield at Dhahran, as well as the fixed auxiliary installations at Lauqa and Hafar-al-Batin, will become the property of the Saudi Arabian Government as soon as construction is completed.

The only change here is the substitution of the date when construction is completed for the date of the cessation of hostilities against Japan.

(b) The United States Army will be granted the exclusive right to operate and maintain the installations mentioned above, and the right to make use of them for as long after completion as needed by the United States Army up to a maximum of three years, and that the United States Army be granted the necessary air transit rights over routes agreed upon between the American and Saudi Arabian Governments for the same period.

The only change proposed here is the same as in paragraph (a).

(c) Upon termination of control of the United States Army, the United States Government will turn over these installations in sound condition to the Saudi Arabian Government for operation, control and maintenance. That Government is to agree

^{56a} Not printed.

not to turn such responsibilities over to a third power nor its nationals without the prior concurrence of the United States Government.

There is no change here except the addition of the final phrase "without the prior concurrence of the United States Government", and this makes it possible to disregard this provision if both parties agree to do so.

(d) Upon the termination of control by the United States Army, an American company approved by both the United States and Saudi Arabian Governments will be permitted to operate the airfield for the Saudi Arabian Government on terms to be agreed upon by the Saudi Arabian Government and an American company, preferably before the date when the United States Army control is relinquished. The American company will have permission to operate the airfield until January 1, 1956, or until an earlier date when the Saudi Arabian Government shall have available trained technicians who, in the agreed opinion of the United States and Saudi Arabian Governments, are competent to operate the airfield according to minimum international standards.

The purpose of this proposed change is to assure a period of operation and maintenance of the field as a civil airfield with the highest standards of safety until such time as the Saudi Arabian Government has available properly trained personnel.

(e) It is to be understood that the Saudi Arabian Government, if it so desires, may grant to planes of a nationality other than United States nationality transit and landing rights through Saudi Arabia similar to those accorded to American planes.

This proposal would extend the use of the airfield to planes of any nation as the Saudi Arabian Government may direct, during the interval of operation by Americans, rather than the restriction to planes engaged in the common Allied war effort.

The preceding proposals were also communicated to the British Government and its concurrence was requested. The proposals were made in accordance with the provision in the last paragraph of the original agreement. This specified that the United States Government at a later date would discuss the civilian use of the airport with the Saudi Arabian Government.]

890F.248/12-2145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945—6 p. m.

373. Deptel 369 to Jidda, Dec 20. We feel it important that it is made clear to Ibn Saud and to the Brit Legation that there is no connection whatsoever between proposal that an American company operate Dhahran airfield and negotiations now going on between SAG

and TWA in regard to technical assistance and certain other aspects of air travel in Arabia.

Sent Jidda, repeated London.

ACHESON

S90F.248/12-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 22, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received December 23—6:47 a. m.]

13407. We have been in touch with Under Secretary Sargent (rather than McNeil who as Parliamentary Under Secretary does not assume charge in absence of Bevin and Cadogan) and also with Under Secretary Ronald following receipt of Dept's 10927 of December 19 regarding completion of Dhahran airfield. They said written reply to our earlier representations had just been sent which they thought covered question quite adequately. Following is quotation of essential portion of their subsequently received letter:

"His Majesty's Government have taken due note of the US plan for the completion of the airport and for its operation and maintenance for a maximum period of 3 years by the US Army. His Majesty's Govt, however, assume that during that period the civil airlines of other countries would enjoy the same facilities as would be accorded to the US airlines.

We should like to make a comment on the proposal that upon termination of control by the US Army, an American Company should be permitted to operate the airfield for the Saudi Arabian Govt until the latter are competent to operate it themselves according to minimum international standards. It is said that we would much prefer that the Saudi Arabian Govt should be advised to sign the Chicago Interim Agreement⁵⁷ and thus be enabled to invoke under article 11 of that agreement the assistance of the provisional international civil aviation organization in maintaining and operating the airfield until they themselves are fully capable of taking over.

As regards Fifth Freedom rights, Ibn Saud has been made aware of the conflicting US and British views on this vexed question and it is the opinion of His Majesty's Govt that he should exercise his own discretion as to whether he should grant full Fifth Freedom traffic rights to US airlines in the terms of the standard American bilateral air transport agreement. Commercial airlines enjoying full Fifth Freedom at Dhahran would, of course, not be able to exercise this privilege between Saudi Arabian and British territory.

In your letter of December 3, you said that the State Dept did not

⁵⁷ The Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature on December 7, 1944, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 469, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1516. This was one of several agreements made at the International Civil Aviation Conference which met from November 1 to December 7, 1944; for documentation on this Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 355 ff.

perceive how these specific airfield negotiations would be affected by the United Nations Charter. I should explain on this point that we thought that this Govt might possibly be contemplating that under article 43 of the Charter, the Saudi Arabian Govt should offer as their own contribution to the Security Council the fact of an already established American base in their territory. If in fact that is what the US Govt have in mind we trust that the implication of the proposal is that the airfield would be in perpetuity under American control should be clearly explained to the Saudi Arabian Govt."

Since Foreign Office letter did not make clear basic point regarding instructions which Foreign Office had sent or proposed sending to British Minister in Jidda, we again approached Ronald today and obtained assurance from him that telegram would be sent immediately instructing British Minister in Jidda to advise the Saudi Arabian Govt following the approach of the American Minister that the proposals of the US Govt had been made with the foreknowledge and concurrence of the British Govt and that their early acceptance in principle would be in the interests of all concerned subject to clarification of the points in the quoted excerpts above. The British Minister would also be told to advise his American colleague of his instructions in order to facilitate coordination of action.

Ronald asked that we let him have as soon as possible Dept's observations on point raised in Foreign Office's letter as requiring clarification.

Sent Dept as 13407, repeated Jidda 11.

WINANT

890F.796/12-2245 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 22, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

424. ReDepts 370, Dec. 20.⁵⁸ I am familiar with all details of TWA negotiations with Saudi Govt. General Wilson and party are here in Jidda now.

I can assure Dept that reports that TWA is seeking monopoly charter are wholly without foundation. Estimates on passenger and cargo services TWA is submitting at Saudi Govt request do not suggest the slightest tinge of monopoly. On the contrary all facilities contemplated would be open to any and all airplanes operating in Saudi Arabia. TWA has proposed to assist in establishing a Saudi Arabian airline to be owned jointly by Saudi Govt and TWA to operate 2 weekly round trips Dhahran, Riyadh, Jidda, Cairo with 2 more planes available for special contract services for Saudi Govt. No exclusive terms are included.

⁵⁸ Same as telegram 10978, 10 p. m., to London; see footnote 54, p. 983.

Possibly rumor derived from request of Saudi Govt that TWA estimate cost of gigantic freight haul of 50 thousand tons annually from both coasts to Riyadh to replace motor transport in moving food imports. Reluctantly and under pressure TWA furnished estimates which only proved the exorbitant cost of air freight on such a scale which TWA has no desire to undertake.

Dhahran airport construction or management has not even been mentioned by TWA in their conferences with Saudi Govt (Dept's 372⁵⁹ and 373, Dec 21) and they are taking no part in discussions on these subjects General Giles and I are conducting. No connection between the TWA and the Dhahran Airport negotiations has been made or will be made here.

Sent to Dept; repeated to London.

EDDY

890F.796/12-2345 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 23, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received December 28—5:51 p. m.]

428. As stated in Legation's 424, Dec 22 proposals discussed by TWA with SAG (Saudi Arabian Govt) this weekend do not include any exclusive or monopolistic provisions whatsoever. This has been verified in conversations with Saudi Acting Foreign Minister Yusuf Yassin last night. One of three preliminary draft proposals furnished to Yassin in Cairo by TWA 3 weeks ago did include, I now discover, a provision that the Saudi Govt would not itself charter other competitive Saudi flag airlines of its own, but even this suggestion did not discriminate against operation in Saudi Arabia of airlines under other flags whether British, Egyptian or any other. However, to prevent any misunderstanding this clause has been removed from that draft and Dept can be assured that all pending proposals by TWA conform to Dept's 371 [369?], Dec 20 in letter and in spirit.

Sent Dept repeated London.

EDDY

890F.248/12-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 24, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received December 24—9:10 a. m.]

430. After Yusuf Yassin had relayed to him summary of draft for SAG loan which Eximbank will submit to its board in January,

⁵⁹ Not printed.

and thereby ascertaining that he would have no definite word before he leaves on extended visit to Egypt, King directed that Giles and I speak with Yassin and did not suggest appointment with himself. Yassin informs me King may wish to see me this week and may not. Revision of agreement regarding Dhahran airport (Deptel 334, November 22) was presented in formal note⁶⁰ and discussed in detail by Giles and me with Yassin, Abdullah Sulaiman and Asad al-Faqih. TWA not informed of these discussions but British Minister Jidda fully informed in advance.

Although entire matter is now before the King and he will send official reply comment by Saudi Ministers indicates:

1. Amendments to airport agreement can probably be negotiated successfully though it is obvious no agreement for operation after the Army relinquishes field until 1956 would be made with any one US company without provision for termination on adequate notice after a year or two if services of said company proved unsatisfactory to King.

In such case operation and maintenance would have to pass to another American company.

2. Situation regarding bilateral air agreement and fifth freedom rights has not changed. Only comment made was that so far British have maintained opposition. SAG is in touch with British Minister Jidda and is no doubt awaiting British concurrence.

3. In any case no reply to US has yet been made. The comments above are not inconclusive [*conclusive?*] and do not bind SAG.

Sent Dept repeated London.

EDDY

890F.796/12-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 24, 1945—noon.

[Received December 25—6:12 a. m.]

431. Deptel 369, December 20. Negotiations conducted December 22-23 by TWA with SAG (Saudi Arabian Govt) concerning internal SAG airline or other air services made no progress except clarification of proposals. SAG requests more time to study subject and may request another conference with General Wilson January 2-4. Otherwise, and more probably, negotiations will be deferred.

TWA furnished ultimatum on three proposals:

(1) Straight concession to TWA to operate 2 planes on a single weekly scheduled round trip Cairo-Jidda-Riyadh-Dhahran plus 2 additional planes available for charter service.

(2) Same services as above with TWA operating management contract with ownership entirely by SAG and at SAG risk.

⁶⁰ Dated December 20; see bracketed note, p. 983.

(3) Joint ownership with TWA taking not more than 20% stock in flag airline.

All proposals are non-exclusive and without prejudice to formation of other flag airlines or use of facilities by planes of other nationality.

SAG indicated preference for type 3 proposal to which they might want to add modifications or other services if they renew negotiations at all in near future.

I am puzzled by Dept understanding that TWA would propose only "technical or advisory services". TWA has made straightforward proposals including technical and advisory services in a view to developing commercial aviation for Saudi Arabia. I did not understand that such proposals need apology provided they are not monopolistic. SAG informed TWA and me that similar commercial proposals have been made also by a British and an Egyptian company making at least three competitive proposals under consideration.

Sent Dept, repeated Cairo as 291 and to London.

EDDY

890F.248/12-2245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1945—3 p. m.

11039. Urtel 13407, Dec 22. In answer to British reservations re Dhahran airfield Deptel 10103 Nov 19 Section E intended to make clear that civil airlines of other countries would enjoy same facilities at Dhahran as those to be accorded US airlines during period of Army operation and maintenance as well as thereafter.

When provisional international civil aviation organization is in position to take over, Dept will give consideration to suggesting that American company transfer contract for operation of field to ICAO⁶¹ until Saudis are fully capable of taking over.

British suggestion that Ibn Saud exercise his own discretion regarding granting Fifth Freedom traffic rights satisfactory only if he is given fully to understand that his decision to do so will not excite British displeasure. We cannot build airport unless we are to have Fifth Freedom rights with regard to its use.

Paragraph explaining reference to Article 43 of San Francisco Charter interesting but hard to understand in view of fact that US has never contemplated establishing American base in Saudi Arabia and has repeatedly made clear that control of airfield would go to Saudis within at least 3 years, and that the Saudi Arabian Govt would

⁶¹ International Civil Aviation Organization.

be free to operate the field with Saudi Arabs rather than with American technicians as soon as qualified Saudi Arabs can be found.

Sent to London; repeated to Jidda.⁶²

ACHESON

890F.248/12-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 24, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 29—2: 29 a. m.]

434. Re London's 13407 to Dept December 22, repeated Jidda. British Minister told me today that he has informed SAG that British concur in our requests re Dhahran airfield and that with regard to Fifth Freedom British hope SAG will consult its own national interests without regard to previous British objections now withdrawn. No reply yet to us from SAG.

Sent Dept 434; repeated Cairo for Giles as 293 and to London.

EDDY

890F.248/12-2645

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1945.

I called Lord Halifax and said that I wanted to continue our previous discussion of the Dhahran Airport⁶³ and reminded him that I had promised at the end of our last conversation to find out what I could about the report he had given me that TWA was endeavoring to negotiate a contract with the Saudi Arabian Government which would give TWA a monopoly. I said that we now had a telegram from Jidda in which it was flatly denied that any such negotiations have been or will be undertaken by TWA or this Government. I said that TWA had, at the request of the Saudi Arabian Government, submitted a plan for organizing with that Government a Saudi flag line which would operate certain trips within the country and outside it but which would have no tinge of monopoly and whose facilities would be open to any and all air lines. Lord Halifax indicated that he was glad to know that there was evidently no reason to believe that TWA was now negotiating a contract contemplating a monopoly but he maintained that he had been shown documents very strongly supporting his previously stated information that such negotiations had been

⁶² As No. 375.

⁶³ See memorandum of December 20 by the Acting Secretary of State, p. 979.

carried on although he was quite willing to believe that they were now stopped.

I told Lord Halifax that we had received information through Winant⁶⁴ of a note from Under Secretary Sargent in which His Majesty's Government stated their assumption that during the contemplated three-year operation at Dhahran airport by the United States other countries would be accorded the same facilities as the United States. I told Lord Halifax that in a cable to Winant we were telling him to reply that, of course, this was a correct assumption. The British note continued that with reference to the proposal that an American company should take over the operation of the airport at the end of the three-year Army control, the British Government would greatly prefer that the Saudi Arabian Government should be advised to sign the Chicago Interim Agreement and so be enabled to invoke Article 11 of that Agreement and under that Article ask for and obtain assistance of the International Civil Aviation Organization in maintaining and operating the air field until the Saudi Arabian Government felt able to take it over itself. I told the Ambassador that we were replying that we were sympathetically inclined toward this idea when this organization should be set up. I said that the British note expressed the opinion that as the Saudi Arabian Government knows of the differences of opinion between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government on the question of the Fifth Freedom rights His Majesty's Government thought that Ibn Saud should exercise his own discretion as to whether he should grant this freedom to United States commercial air lines. I told Lord Halifax that we were stressing in our telegram to Winant that it is not sufficient merely to say that Ibn Saud should exercise his own judgment but that it should be made clear beyond doubt to Ibn Saud by the Foreign Office that in exercising his own judgment he will not be looked upon with disfavor by the British Government if he grants such freedom to United States lines. I said that I should greatly appreciate anything that Lord Halifax could do to urge this upon his Government. Lord Halifax replied that while he would try to find some way of doing this he did not believe our anxieties on this point were well founded; that he had had a telegram from the Foreign Office stating the line they would take with Ibn Saud, which would be sincerely to urge him to make up his own mind. Lord Halifax said that if I thought it would be helpful he would send a telegram to London.

About an hour later Lord Halifax called me back to say that he had looked up the file and that he had also seen a telegram which

⁶⁴ See telegram 13407, December 22, 2 p. m., from London, p. 986.

had just come in from the Foreign Office reporting instructions given to Jidda on the subject. The instructions stated that the Foreign Office was anxious that the Saudi Arabian reply to the United States proposals should be sufficiently favorable to permit the United States Government to go ahead with their plans subject to such provisos as Ibn Saud judges advisable for his country; that the British representative at Jidda should have this in mind in what he said to the Saudi Arabian Government. Lord Halifax also referred to an earlier telegram to their representative in Jidda telling him very clearly that Ibn Saud should exercise his own judgment and that the British had no intention of pressing him one way or another.

Lord Halifax thought that in view of these two clear statements from the Foreign Office that office would not be able to understand any further anxiety on the part of this Government and that it would be much better for him not to go back again to the Foreign Office by telegraphing them for further assurances or action in this matter. I told Lord Halifax that I was willing to accept his judgment in this matter.

DEAN ACHESON

890F.00/12-2745 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 27, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 6:48 p. m.]

438. King comes to Jidda from Mecca today or tomorrow to receive credentials of Syrian Minister Jamil Mardam and will probably summon me for audience according to Acting FoMin.

He also told me that Syria and Lebanon are deferring action on bilateral civil air agreement with USA⁶⁵ until they ascertain US and British policies in Levant in immediate future and extent of real aid and support US will afford. He implied that Saudi Arabia will act in concert with other Arab States and agree with them before acting on US offer of bilateral air agreement. Though official reply will be given by King alone FoMin implied that there is no chance of Saudi Arabian Govt signing air agreement now. I gathered that Arab League is holding common front on bilateral air agreements as possible *quid pro quo* until they ascertain extent to which anti-Arab policies may be pursued by Allies in Levant and Palestine but this is only my inference and must be verified by developments.

EDDY

⁶⁵ For documentation on discussion between the United States and Syria and Lebanon regarding proposed civil air transport agreements, see pp. 64 ff.

711.90F27/12-2745 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 27, 1945—noon.

[Received 8:34 p. m.]

439. Legtel 434, December 24. Both British Minister and FoMin have stated to me separately that speaking personally and not officially they consider bilateral air agreement a subject independent of Dhahran airbase with which it was never tied up until now. To require SAG to act immediately and without area study on effect of Fifth Freedom rights on future development of native aviation in Arab countries they consider unreasonable. British have withdrawn formal objection to SAG signing of bilateral agreement with US but have been diligent for months in preaching that this is not in best interests of any Arab State which should look forward to operating and owning air traffic and airways just as it owns its national highways.

EDDY

711.90F27/12-2745 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 27, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 9:22 p. m.]

440. Legtel 438, December 27. King has postponed coming from Mecca to Jidda until Saturday, December 28 [29].

Acting FoMin tells me that instead of signing bilateral air agreement King's reply will probably state that US airplanes may enjoy rights in Saudi Arabia including Fifth Freedom privileges so long as they do not conflict with the welfare of the SAG or the Saudi Arabian people.

EDDY

890F.796/12-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1945—7 p. m.

376. Dept is pleased to have your telegram 431, Dec 24 since it is first information we have had regarding what actually took place during negotiations between TWA and SAG concerning internal SAG airline and other air services.

Dept has no objection to proposals outlined in that telegram especially in view of statement that all proposals are non-exclusive.

Concern reflected in Dept's 369 Dec 20 arose from fact that Brit Embassy had confidentially submitted what purported to be summary

of proposal allegedly made to SAG by TWA which contained clause "Company will have 30-year monopoly-charter from the King to transport by air persons, property and mail between points within Saudi Arabia and between Saudi Arabia and points outside."⁶⁶

We did not desire that Brit Govt just at this time have any reason to believe that while we were seeking to prevail upon it to withdraw its objections to our having fifth freedom rights in Saudi Arabia an American company was secretly endeavoring to secure an air monopoly within Saudi Arabia and between that country and points outside.

Sent to Jidda. Repeated to Cairo and London.

ACHESON

890F.51/12-2845 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 28, 1945—noon.

[Received 9:17 p. m.]

443. ReDepts 368, December 20. Preliminary draft of proposed Eximbank loan has been discussed informally with Foreign Minister who has informed King.

Dept will understand that delays and whittling down of amount of loan and its duration from 5 years to shortest period, necessitated by technicalities, are not convincing to SAG who fear that hostile elements and my own ineffectiveness are interfering with consummation of long-promised budgetary help. If there are any more amendments to terms of proposed loan, I earnestly hope they may be to make the terms more generous rather than otherwise. This is more than a bank transaction. It is a political commitment of long standing.

Dept will recall that its own thinking began with a 50 million dollar maximum loan and that apart from repeated deferment of action, I was assured at one time (Depts 131, May 7) that SAG 1946 needs would be taken care of one way or another. Now King faces period in early 1946 during which he cannot procure subsistence commodities until loan funds are available and deliveries can be made. For this last time I urge full and earliest action on loan in the interest of our entire position in Saudi Arabia. No visit to Yemen should precede such conclusive action.⁶⁷

EDDY

⁶⁶ Submitted by the British Embassy in an "Oral and Informal Communication" on December 24, 1945, not printed.

⁶⁷ For documentation on the initiation of negotiations for the establishment of formal diplomatic and treaty relations between the United States and Yemen, see pp. 1312 ff.

711.90F27/12-2745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1945—8 p. m.

380. 1. As interim measure Dept will accept as air transport agreement an exchange of notes containing undertakings along lines indicated in your 440 Dec 27, provided rights are on a non-discriminatory basis and undertaking includes 6 months advance notice of termination. Confidentially Dept would reluctantly accept 3 months period if necessary.

2. Information available to Dept does not confirm inference made urtel 438 Dec 27 that Arab League is holding common front on bilateral air agreements pending clarification of Allied policies toward Arab states.

3. Egypt has already granted provisional air operating rights on 6 months basis and conclusion of permanent bilateral agreement with fifth freedom rights is expected shortly.

4. Iraq has granted temporary operating rights to US air services including limited fifth freedom privileges pending conclusion permanent agreement which is expected to be on broader basis.

5. Dept has not pressed for conclusion of bilaterals with Lebanon and Syria since there are now no adequate airports in those countries. However Dept believes that satisfactory fifth freedom rights can be obtained from Lebanon and Syria when 4-motor operations are possible.

6. Iran has granted interim operating rights including fifth freedom privileges but has refused to conclude permanent bilateral agreement at this time because of the presence of foreign troops in Iran.

7. In Turkey negotiations for a permanent fifth freedom agreement are proceeding favorably.

8. Dept deems undertaking paragraph "1" this telegram will meet requirement "1" Dept's 334, Nov 22, and upon receiving information in immediate future that you have received it in writing will so advise War Department and recommend completion of work on airport.

ACHESON

711.90F27/12-3145 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 31, 1945—noon.

[Received 4:42 p. m.]

446. Deptel 380, December 29. Foreign Minister is still in Mecca with King and will return to Jidda late today. I shall immediately

press for inclusion of 6 months' notice in SAG (Saudi Arabian Govt) written reply.

EDDY

711.90F27/12-3145 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, December 31, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 9 : 50 p. m.]

448. Legtel 446, December 31. Foreign Minister states that he feels sure the 6 months' notice before termination of air rights can be included in writing but must of course see King in Mecca. I will inform Dept when exchange of letters is complete which may not be for 2 or 3 days.

Only other outstanding difference is regarding date when operation of airfield would be turned over to Saudi personnel. SAG is writing into their reply stipulation that, if US and SAG differ as to competence of Saudi employees to assume operation at any given time, the matter be referred to the international aviation authority set up at Chicago.

Am pushing negotiations as much as possible and they are proceeding satisfactorily now that signing of standard bilateral agreement is no longer required. In view of many pressures on King just now, it would be most unfortunate if any interruption of construction of the airbase took place.

Sent Dept as 448, repeated Cairo for Giles as 304.

EDDY

[On January 2, 1946, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, at this time Yusuf Yassin, sent a message No. 11/1/9/156 to the American Minister at Jidda⁶⁸ which replied to the Minister's No. 287 of December 20, 1945,⁶⁹ wherein reference was made to the agreement reached through an exchange of letters on August 5 and 6, 1945, at Riyadh. This had concerned the construction of an airfield at Dhahran. Since the war against Japan had come to a close before the completion of the construction, the American Minister had suggested certain revisions in the original agreement, needed to meet legal

⁶⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 198, January 3, 1946, from Jidda, which noted: "While the reply of the Saudi Arabian Government is not all that was to be desired, the Department will observe that some points which appear to be touched inconclusively are wholly covered by the original agreement of August 5-6, 1945, which remains binding except where specifically modified by an amendment." (890F.248/1-346)

⁶⁹ See the bracketed note, p. 983.

requirements of the United States Government, so that the construction of this airfield could be finished. The Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs made these points in reply :

1. The Government of Saudi Arabia had given permission for the construction of the airfield as a contribution to the war effort against the common enemy.

2. That Government was pleased that the war against Japan had ceased before the construction of the airfield had been completed.

3. That Government did not object to the operation of the field by the United States Army for a maximum period of three years after its completion, if required by the Army to close its military operations and to demobilize its soldiers. The hope was expressed that the Army authorities, who would be operating this field, would give to Saudi Arabian subjects during this time the broadest possible training in the operations so that they would be prepared to run and administer the airfield when the time came for them to take it over.

4. The Saudi Arabian Government wished the airfield to be used for civilian purposes by civilian planes of the United States, or by planes of any other country granted landing rights by that Government in accordance with the regulations which it would prescribe.

5. It was likewise desired that civilian planes would have use of the airfield upon its completion to the extent that such usage would not interfere with the needs of the United States Army. This civilian use would be in accordance with Saudi Arabian regulations for taxes and control.

6. When this airfield should be delivered to the Saudi Arabian Government, the United States could be assured that the field would be operated with all the best international standards, either by the Saudi Arabian personnel, or by American employees under Saudi Arabian control, or under an agreement with a qualified American company. The competence of Saudi Arabian employees for the safe operation of the field would be attested by certificates issued by United States Army specialists in the operation of this airfield, or by certificates from the appropriate authorities of the International Aviation Conference of Chicago, who were specialists in flight operations.

7. The Saudi Arabian Government anticipated that this airfield would be kept open for ten years provided that its facilities were not disabled by an Act of God and that the field did not become a burden on the treasury of the Government at any time by causing a deficit.

8. The Saudi Arabian Government repeated its agreement to the use of the Dhahran airfield by civilian airplanes of the United States along routes authorized by that Government.

The Saudi Arabian Government stated that it had no objection to the enjoyment of Fifth Freedom rights for the present by United States airplanes over routes authorized by the Saudi Arabian Government for them to fly for as long as this did not injure the interests either of the Saudi Arabian Government or people. The right was reserved by the Saudi Arabian Government to cancel the permission whenever it desired, after having given six months' advance notice to the United States Government of its desire to terminate this right.]

890F.51/12-2845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1946—1 p. m.

2. Re your 443, December 28. Newly constituted Board of Directors of ExImbank, at first meeting on January 3, approved a \$25,000,000 line of credit for Saudi Arabia in accordance with terms of draft agreement previously sent you by air pouch and summarized in Depts 368, December 20. Exact text of proposed agreement will be supplied soon with instructions concerning translations, signatures, et cetera.

BYRNES

890B.24/12-1745

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1946.

In 1944 this Government agreed with the Government of Great Britain on a joint program of modest dimensions involving assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of safeguarding the internal security of that country. The total value of this program was about \$3,000,000, to be divided equally between the United States and Great Britain. Our share of the program was to be delivered through the mechanism of military Lend-Lease.

The British have completed their share of this Saudi Arabian security program. We have provided all of our share except for certain items valued at \$97,000, most of which are already in Cairo.

This undelivered balance includes tools and parts for radio sets which are needed for the completion of supplies previously received from the United States.

You may recall that when, on August 17, 1945 you directed the immediate termination of Lend-Lease,⁷⁰ you made it clear that your directive did not apply to certain country programs to which the United States was specifically committed. On August 29, 1945 you informed Mr. Snyder, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, that Lend-Lease aid to Saudi Arabia came under this heading.

The War Department, before delivering the various military supplies included in the program, desires assurance that your directive applies to military as well as to civilian Lend-Lease items. Although it is the understanding of the State Department that it was your decision that the program would be completed in full it is submitting

⁷⁰ For text of directive, see telegram 7012, August 18, 4 p. m., to London, vol. VI, p. 102.

the matter to you before giving the War Department the assurance which it desires.

The British have asked if we intend to complete our share of this joint security program to Saudi Arabia and have indicated that if we are not going to deliver our share they desire to receive a cash payment from us to equalize the cost.

In the opinion of the Department of State the United States is under obligation to complete its share of this joint security program at the earliest possible date. According to a telegram dated December 17 from Mr. Eddy, the United States Minister to Saudi Arabia,⁷¹ these undelivered items were officially promised in writing to the Government of Saudi Arabia and are critically needed by that country. As Mr. Eddy points out, the vehicles which we have sent to Saudi Arabia will soon be useless in the desert unless the tools to maintain them are provided. The Government of Saudi Arabia was informed last year that by direction of the President of the United States the entire Lend-Lease program for 1945 would be completed. It continues to assume, therefore, that it will receive all categories of materials which were promised.

It would be appreciated, therefore, if you would inform the Department whether it is correct in assuming that your directive authorizing the completion of Lend-Lease aid for Saudi Arabia applies to this internal security program.⁷²

JAMES F. BYRNES

VISIT OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR FAISAL TO WASHINGTON,
JULY 31-AUGUST 1, 1945⁷³

890F.0011/7-3145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1945.

Participants: H. R. H. Amir Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz
H. E. Shaikh Ibrahim Sulaiman
Shaikh Ali Alireza
Mr. Grew⁷⁴
Mr. Henderson

At four o'clock this afternoon Amir Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia and son of Ibn Saud, King of Saudi

⁷¹ No. 417, p. 976.

⁷² Marginal notation by President Truman: "Approved 1-31-46; Proceed as suggested."

⁷³ For documentation on the Amir Faisal's visit to the United States in 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 840 ff. For further references to his discussions with the Department of State in 1945, see *ante*, pp. 938 ff., *passim*.

⁷⁴ Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State.

Arabia, accompanied by Shaikh Ibrahim Sulaiman and Shaikh Ali Alireza, called upon the Acting Secretary at the Department.⁷⁵ Mr. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was also present. Shaikh Ali Alireza acted as interpreter.

Mr. Grew welcomed Amir Faisal and his party to Washington on behalf of the President. He said that the President had requested him to express the President's deep regret that he could not be in Washington personally to receive the Amir. The Amir, of course, well understood the important nature of the duties which made the President's absence from the United States necessary. The President had authorized Mr. Grew and Mr. Henderson to represent him in such discussions as might take place.

The Amir replied that he appreciated the fact that the President was absent from the United States in order to carry on tasks, the successful accomplishment of which would be of great benefit not only to the United States but also to the rest of the world, including Saudi Arabia. He had asked, upon the request of his father, King Ibn Saud, for an interview with the President because his father felt that as a matter of courtesy such a request should be made. Furthermore, his father desired that he express personally to the President the deep appreciation of the Government and people of Saudi Arabia for the interest which the Government of the United States had shown in the welfare of Saudi Arabia. His father was extremely gratified to have had the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with President Roosevelt,⁷⁶ and had been deeply distressed to learn of his death. His father had taken some comfort, however, in the fact that reports which had come to him indicated that President Truman, like President Roosevelt, was a man of integrity and ability and had an interest in the welfare of the peoples of the Near East. His father had considered that it would be helpful for Amir Faisal to become personally acquainted with President Truman.

The Amir added that he regretted that his own presence in Saudi Arabia was needed so urgently that he could not remain in the United States pending the return of President Truman. He had, nevertheless, come to Washington in order to present his respects to the American Government and to talk with the appropriate American officials

⁷⁵ The Amir Faisal had been in the United States as Chief of the Saudi Arabian delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization which met at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. He had been instructed by the King to call on President Truman after the termination of the Conference but the latter was attending the Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), which met from July 17 to August 2, 1945. On July 23, President Truman designated the Acting Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to carry on the conversations with the Amir.

⁷⁶ For documentation on the meeting of President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud at Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, on February 14, 1945, see pp. 1 ff.

on subjects pertaining to relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Mr. Grew pointed out that in terms of travel time Saudi Arabia and the United States were rapidly coming closer together. The latest schedule, computed by one of the American airlines, placed Saudi Arabia as less than 36 hours distant from Washington by air. This proximity in travel time was contributing to a sharp increase in American interest in Saudi Arabia. The outstanding work done by the Saudi Arabian delegation in San Francisco had received wide attention and approval in the United States, and had also aroused deeper interest in Saudi Arabia among Americans.

The Amir thanked Mr. Grew for his kind words and said that the Saudi Arabian delegation at San Francisco had merely tried to carry on its duties like any other delegation.

With regard to his visit to Washington, the Amir stated that he had no authority to enter into any formal negotiations on behalf of his father. His father had, however, asked him to make clear to the American Government the position of Saudi Arabia and to endeavor to ascertain the nature of various plans which the American Government may be formulating with regard to Saudi Arabia. The King had instructed Amir Faisal to say that he had absolute confidence in the United States. In view of this confidence, the King was permitting American citizens to engage in activities in Saudi Arabia of a nature which he had been unwilling to permit the citizens of any other great power to carry on. He had entrusted to American enterprise the task of developing the greatest potential source of Saudi Arabian wealth; namely, the Saudi Arabian oil fields. He was permitting American citizens to enter into other fields of activities in Saudi Arabia as well. His Majesty hoped that the American Government and American citizens would, however, understand that His Majesty could not move too rapidly in opening up his country to American enterprise. He also hoped that they would understand that in case the Saudi Arabian Government should delay in accepting certain American suggestions, it was not because His Majesty did not have confidence in the American Government or that he did not believe that the suggestions were sound. They should realize that these delays frequently arose as a result of His Majesty's conviction that it would be unwise for him to move too fast.

Every Government and every ruler had internal and external enemies. Furthermore, every Government and every ruler had friends of proved value. His Majesty must move carefully in order not to strengthen the hand of his enemies against him or to give offense to his friends.

The people of Saudi Arabia possessed an ancient civilization. Nevertheless, they were really children in the field of international affairs. They looked with suspicion on every innovation and on every change. It took time to prepare them to accept inventions and customs which were new to them. Unless they were thus prepared, they might be tempted to listen to the whispers of unfriendly persons to the effect that His Majesty was leading them away from the traditions and virtues of their forefathers.

Similarly, there were malicious groups among the Arabs outside of Saudi Arabia, who hate Ibn Saud and his family and wish to discredit them. Mr. Henderson, who had recently come here from Baghdad,⁷⁷ must be acquainted with some of these groups. These people endeavored to spread rumors throughout the Arab world to the effect that His Majesty was selling out his people to American imperialism and was bartering the traditions of the holiest of Moslem countries for American gold.

His Majesty had for many years enjoyed the friendship of a great power. This power was also a friend of the United States. Nevertheless, the representatives of this great power showed a tendency to have hurt feelings when they observed that His Majesty was granting certain rights and privileges to American nationals which he had been withholding from their fellow nationals. They embarrassed His Majesty when they asked him why he granted these favors to Americans and not to their people. His Majesty did not wish to lose this friend. That was another reason why he must move slowly. Nevertheless, he desired that the American Government should know that in the end, he believed that most of the suggestions which have been made to him by this Government would be accepted by the Saudi Arabian Government.

The Amir said that certain reactions which took place following the establishment of the recent American military mission in Saudi Arabia⁷⁸ would serve to illustrate what he had been endeavoring to express. The primary purpose of this military mission was to train the Saudi Arabian Army. Nevertheless, rumors were circulated, not only throughout Saudi Arabia but also throughout the whole Arab world, to the effect that the American soldiers in Saudi Arabia were the forerunners of the American military imperialism in the Near East, and that Ibn Saud, by permitting American soldiers to establish themselves in Saudi Arabia, was laying foundations for the mili-

⁷⁷ Mr. Henderson had been Minister in Iraq until his appointment as Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on April 17, 1945.

⁷⁸ For the establishment of the United States Military Mission in Saudi Arabia, see despatch 145, March 29, 1944, from Jidda, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 678; for the termination of the mission, see despatch 119, May 4, 1945, from Jidda, *ante*, p. 888.

tary occupation by the United States of various points in the Near East. Intelligent Arabs, of course, could perceive at once the maliciousness and the falsity of such rumors. They could appreciate the difference between soldiers sent to train troops and those sent to rule the country. However, many uneducated persons and persons not acquainted with the history and background of the United States believed these rumors to be true.

Mr. Grew expressed his appreciation of the frankness with which the Amir had explained some of the problems which King Ibn Saud was facing. He said that American officials who were assisting in the conduct of American relations with Saudi Arabia realized that the Saudi Arabian Government could not move too fast. Nevertheless, the statements made by the Amir were most helpful. The Amir could be assured that it was not the desire of the American Government to press any suggestions made by American officials upon the Saudi Arabian Government. They thoroughly understood that the Saudi Arabian Government was in the best position to decide what moves to make and when such moves could be most advantageously made.

Mr. Grew went on to state that the American policy towards Saudi Arabia was that of providing all possible economic and advisory assistance, without interference in the political affairs of the country. The United States wished to strengthen Saudi Arabia and to help Saudi Arabia strengthen itself.

Although the United States was anxious to aid the friendly power, Saudi Arabia, as much and as fast as possible, it must be borne in mind that, unfortunately, the United States was still at war. The extensive facilities normally controlled by the civilian agencies of the United States were now entirely in the hands of the Army and Navy, and were being used to the maximum extent in crushing the enemy. The American Government was hopeful that in the not too distant future, peace would come again, and that civilian facilities, based on peace-time needs, would once more be available. However, there was, of course, a possibility that the war would continue for several years.

It was hoped that Amir Faisal would bear in mind, and that King Ibn Saud would also understand, that under the American system of Government it was not possible for the State Department or for other governmental agencies to expend American funds until they had been authorized to do so by laws passed by Congress. Passage of laws, authorizing expenditure of money, usually required considerable periods of time. Thus far, in assisting Saudi Arabia, the State Department and other governmental agencies, had been able to spend funds under the authorization of lend-lease and similar legislation. It appeared that it would not be possible to continue to justify the expenditure in Saudi Arabia of governmental funds on the basis of

war time legislation of this character. Delays undoubtedly would take place in the preparation and enactment of additional legislation. It was hoped that King Ibn Saud would be patient until the United States could once again return to a peace-time basis. The friendly feelings which the United States had for Saudi Arabia were deep, and as Amir Faisal would see, in the course of his conversations during the next few days with various United States governmental officials, the Government of the United States was ready to prove its friendship by definite and concrete actions.

In order that Amir Faisal might receive the most complete information possible with regard to the plans of the United States with respect to Saudi Arabia, it had been arranged that, under the leadership of Mr. Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, there would be held a series of conversations in which the experienced officers of the Department of State most directly concerned would participate.

Mr. Grew added that in case the Amir desired to see Mr. Grew personally during the course of these conversations, or if Mr. Grew could be of assistance to him or to any member of his party, he hoped that the Amir would not have any hesitation in calling upon him.

The Amir expressed his appreciation of the courtesy with which he had been received. He said that he was fully conscious of the friendly attitude of the United States towards Saudi Arabia; that in the past, the United States had fully demonstrated by action its friendly feelings; and that he was confident of the friendship of the United States for Saudi Arabia in the future.

Mr. Grew said that he was looking forward to seeing Amir Faisal and his party at the Luncheon, and the Amir said that he would be extremely happy to see Mr. Grew again at that time.

890F.0011/8-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 1, 1945.

Participants: H. R. H. Amir Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz
H. E. Shaikh Ibrahim Sulaiman
Shaikh Ali Alireza
Mr. Grew
Mr. Henderson

At five o'clock this afternoon Amir Faisal, Shaikh Ibrahim Sulaiman and Shaikh Ali Alireza called upon Mr. Grew, the Acting Secretary of State, in order to bid him farewell before leaving Washington.

They were accompanied by Mr. Henderson of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs. Shaikh Ali Alireza acted as interpreter.

Mr. Grew said that he hoped that the Amir was pleased with the information which had been given him during the two days of conversation ⁷⁹ and that the discussions had been satisfactory in all respects.

The Amir said that he was extremely pleased with the discussions; that he felt that as a result of them the United States was in a much better position to understand the problems of Saudi Arabia, and that he on his part understood much more clearly the situation in the United States. He and his party were returning to Saudi Arabia with a much better understanding of the United States, of what the United States was trying to do, in particular so far as Saudi Arabia was concerned, and of the difficulties which the United States Government was being compelled to overcome in order to carry out its various programs. He was deeply impressed by the efforts of the officials of the State Department to find ways and means of assisting Saudi Arabia. He regretted that his country should be compelled to seek assistance abroad. Nevertheless, under present war-time conditions it had no other recourse. He hoped that, in the not too distant future, the economic position of his country would be so sound that it would not be necessary to ask for economic aid.

The Amir said that he wished again to emphasize the point, which he had made during his first conversation with the Acting Secretary, namely, that the Saudi Arabian Government must at times move slowly in carrying out suggestions made to it by the American Government. He had learned just today that the Egyptian newspapers were carrying articles to the effect that the American aviation authorities, without consulting the Saudi Arabian Government, had announced the establishment of air lines from the United States to and through Saudi Arabia. These articles were, of course, inspired by foreign groups who desired to create friction between the United States and Saudi Arabia. They should not be taken too seriously. Nevertheless, they served to demonstrate the interest of third parties in developments in relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States and to show that a degree of caution was advisable in order not to alienate friends or strengthen enemies.

Mr. Grew asked the Amir if he had any requests to make before returning to Saudi Arabia. The Amir replied that he would like to make one request—an important and urgent request. This was that the American Government take just as deep an interest in the welfare of other Arab States as it had taken in the welfare of Saudi Arabia. For assistance in the maintenance of its independence, Saudi Arabia

⁷⁹ See telegram 235, August 8, 5 p. m., to Jidda, *infra*.

was deeply indebted to the United States. There were other Arab peoples bound by close historical and blood ties to the people of Saudi Arabia, who also needed American help in order to realize their full independence.

Mr. Grew replied that the United States was interested in the welfare of all the Arab peoples, not only of those living in Saudi Arabia. The United States was prepared not only to look with friendliness upon these Arab peoples, but also to act on their behalf on the basis of justice and in a spirit of mutual helpfulness.

The Amir said that the Arabs of the whole world, including those in Palestine, were intensely interested in the fate of the Arabs of Palestine and in the future of Palestine.⁸⁰ They feared that the recent change in the Government of Great Britain⁸¹ might affect the policy of Great Britain with regard to Palestine. They hoped that the United States would not support any policy which would tend to deprive the Arabs in Palestine of their property and rights and place them under the dominance of a Jewish Government. The Arabs, relying upon the American sense of justice, could not believe that the United States would fail to insist that justice be done in Palestine. It was to be hoped that the American Government was not contemplating a change in policy so far as Palestine was concerned.

Mr. Grew replied that the policy of President Roosevelt with regard to Palestine was well known. So far as he was aware, no change in this policy was contemplated at the present time; that policy, in effect, was that the interests of both Arabs and Jews should be taken into consideration in the making of any decision with regard to Palestine.

The Amir said that the Arabs did not desire to make demands with regard to Palestine which would give the Arabs rights which had not always been theirs. The Arabs, in asking that their rights in Palestine be safeguarded, did not wish the United States, or any other power, to ignore the rights of others. There were, however, certain energetic, aggressive groups who would like to have changes introduced into Palestine which would result in the loss by the Arabs of their rights. Mr. Grew asked Mr. Henderson if the latter had any comments to add to those which Mr. Grew had made with regard to Palestine. Mr. Henderson replied that it seemed to him that Mr. Grew had set forth clearly the policy of the American Government in this respect. So far as he was aware, no change in this policy was under contemplation.

⁸⁰ For documentation on United States policy regarding the future status of Palestine, see pp. 678 ff.

⁸¹ The British War Cabinet headed by Winston S. Churchill was replaced by a Labor Government headed by Clement R. Attlee following the elections of July 1945.

Mr. Grew told the Amir that the President had asked that the Amir be requested to take back to Saudi Arabia the President's cordial and friendly greetings to King Ibn Saud, and to transmit to his father the President's sincere good wishes for the King's good health and for the happiness and prosperity of the Saudi Arabian people.

The Amir thanked Mr. Grew and asked Mr. Grew to present to the President, upon his return, his own greetings and those of his father.

890F.0011/8-845 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1945—5 p. m.

235. Amir Faisal and party sailed *Queen Mary* August 5 for Britain following satisfactory completion 2 days conversations in Washington. Practically every phase American Saudi Arabian relations discussed either in two talks with Mr. Grew or in series of conversations in Mr. Henderson's office in which interested political, economic, and cultural officials of Dept, army officers, and executives of TWA,⁸⁴ participated.

Topics covered included⁸⁵

(1) Presentation of joint American-British supply program for 1945;

(2) Presentation of supplemental U.S. supply program for 1945;

(3) Discussion of Lend-Lease problems including mutual benefits of signing Lend-Lease agreements;

(4) Willingness of the US to provide \$5,000,000 development loan through Export-Import Bank;

(5) Assurances that US is working on problem of financial aid to carry Saudi Arabian government until oil royalties mature;

(6) Petroleum problems, particularly the future of Saudi Arabian oil;

(7) Communications, especially desirability of having Saudi Arabian government construct radio station.

(8) Army plans for Dhahran airfield and related facilities along air route. Army stated it might subcontract field, perhaps to TWA, prior to expiration of 3-year period.

(9) TWA proposal to operate airfield when Army passes title to Saudis;

(10) Background on international air agreements between US and other countries, and proposal that SAG and US sign such an agreement.

(11) Aspects of US commercial policy, particularly with reference to a possible new treaty of commerce, friendship and navigation.

⁸⁴ Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.

⁸⁵ For documentation on several of these topics, see pp. 49 ff., pp. 845 ff., pp. 1009 ff., and pp. 1032 ff.

- (12) Proposed US clinic at Jidda.⁸⁶
- (13) Plans to construct US consulate building at Dhahran.
- (14) Possible use of funds from development loan to finance continuation of Al Kharj project.

Transcript of these conversations being sent you by air pouch.⁸⁷

Faisal expressed closest friendship for US and appreciation of our aid. Refusal of US military mission was on his mind particularly and he justified turndown for reasons outlined by you⁸⁸ but emphasized that King has not refused civilian services.

Nothing official said re establishment Saudi Legation in Washington but remarks made suggest this will be done within 6 months.

BYRNES

REPRESENTATIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING THE PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIRECT RADIO-TELEGRAPH CIRCUIT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA⁸⁹

811.7490F/12-2244 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1945—midnight.

19. Re your 11374, December 22, 1944.⁹⁰ Please inform Foreign Office that detailed proposals for establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia will shortly be made to the Saudi Arabian Government and obtain definite assurances that British Government will interpose no objection to establishment of such a circuit and operation of a radiotelegraph station by Saudi Government provided adequate censorship arrangements are agreed upon by the British, American and Saudi Governments.

Please endeavor to obtain above assurances at earliest possible date.

STETTINIUS

⁸⁶ In 1945, the Department of State entered a contract with the American University at Beirut under which the University agreed to act as scientific agent for the clinic, receiving funds, advising on equipment, assisting in the selection of physicians, and the like. In telegram 194, July 9, 1945, the Department advised the Minister in Saudi Arabia it had approved a grant of \$54,700 to the University, of which \$16,500 was for the establishment of the clinic and \$19,100 for each of 2 years' running expenses (890F.1281/7-945). In the conversations on August 1, 1945, the Amir Faisal was informed that an official of the University's School of Medicine was in Jidda to discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government, through Colonel Eddy, arrangements for organizing the clinic.

⁸⁷ Not printed; a copy was sent to the Minister in Saudi Arabia under instruction 336, August 17, 1945, for delivery to the Amir Faisal.

⁸⁸ In despatch 150, July 8, p. 923; see also telegram 35, July 4, midnight, from Dhahran, p. 920.

⁸⁹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 760-773.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 772.

811.7490F/1-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 8, 1945—4 p. m.
 [Received January 8—12:13 p. m.]

247. ReEmbs 34, January 2, 7 p. m.⁹¹ Foreign Office has now replied in writing to the action taken by us on January 2 concerning a direct circuit to Saudi Arabia.

Foreign Office says it assumes that the Department's telegram which was mentioned by us was despatched before the Department received Cable and Wireless⁹² proposals. Foreign Office continues that while it is passing our request for assurances on to the departments concerned for their consideration Foreign Office feels that it will probably be found difficult for these departments to reach any conclusion until they have been informed of the views of the American authorities on the proposals of Cable and Wireless which it should be noted embodied Cable and Wireless offer to supply an entirely satisfactory service. It should perhaps have been specified Foreign Office that this would include making available an instantaneous link between Dhahran and Bahrein and the elimination in retransmission of any delays.

WINANT

811.7490F/12-3144 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1945—6 p. m.

164. You may inform Foreign Office in connection with your 11579 of December 31⁹³ that Department much appreciates cooperative spirit of British authorities and Cable and Wireless in connection with improvement of communications between Saudi Arabia and the United States but that it wishes to continue to consider proposals for a radio station to be established on mainland and operated by Saudi Arabian Government. Therefore it will be appreciated if assurances may be obtained that British Government will interpose no objection to establishment of direct circuit between United States and Saudi Arabia and operation of radio-telegraph station by Saudi Government. (See Department's 19, January 1, 1945).

STETTINIUS

⁹¹ Not printed.⁹² Cable and Wireless, a British telegraph company.⁹³ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 772.

811.7490F/1-845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1945—2 p. m.

254. Department's telegram no. 164 of January 8 which crossed your 247 of January 8, 4 p. m., represents the Department's views on the question of a radio station in Saudi Arabia and it will be appreciated therefore if you will obtain the desired assurances.

GREW

811.7490F/1-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 23, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received January 23—10:40 a. m.]

794. We have just received an informal note from the Foreign Office referring to our oral and written representations on the question of radio-telegraph communications between Saudi Arabia and the United States and with particular reference to our request for the assurances mentioned in Department's 164 January 8, 6 p. m. The Foreign Office note reads in substance as follows:

(*Begin paraphrase*). From conversations which members of the British Embassy in Washington have had with the State Department and from the letters which you have written to us, we understand that the object sought is the establishment of rapid means of communication with the United States to serve the purposes of the California-Arabian Oil Company,⁹⁴ which is building up a large strategic refinery under a directive from the United States Chiefs of Staff,⁹⁵ as well as the American Consul at Dhahran. In my letters of December 29 and January 8⁹⁶ last we put to you certain proposals with these objects in mind. These proposals appear to meet all the wishes of the United States Government so far made known to us in regard to rapid communication between the United States and Dhahran. Moreover, they would meet them at an earlier stage in the war than if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to install their own station.

Therefore, it is not altogether clear to us why it is still felt necessary by the State Department to give consideration to the proposals for establishing on the mainland a radio station to be operated by

⁹⁴ The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), known until January 1944 as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company.

⁹⁵ For documentation regarding the policy of the Department of State with respect to the construction of refinery facilities in the Middle East by American interests, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 921 ff.

⁹⁶ See telegram 11579, December 31, 1944, from London, *ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, p. 772, and telegram 247, January 8, 4 p. m., from London, *ante*, p. 1010, respectively.

the Saudi Arabian Government. Such a wireless station, it would appear, would not seem likely to give a service comparable to that provided by Cable and Wireless Limited since the Government of Saudi Arabia has no experience, at present, of operating a long distance wireless telegraph station. We are informed, furthermore, as stated in my letter of December 29, that a station on the mainland is likely to be subject to greater atmospheric interference than one located on Bahrein Island.

There is, finally, the point that the establishment of such a station would involve a modification of the contract between Cable and Wireless Ltd. and the Government of Saudi Arabia, to the disadvantage of the former.

His Majesty's Government, you will readily understand, would not particularly welcome a step which would injure an important British interest unless it could be established that, in the interests of the war effort, such a step was necessary. However, it appears from what I have said above, that the considerations, put forward by the State Department, connected with the war effort could be better served by our proposals than by the suggestion that a station be operated by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, we very much hope that you will accept the former proposals, thus allowing Cable and Wireless to proceed with the necessary steps, as soon as possible, to open immediate communications on the lines suggested in my note of December 29. (*End paraphrase*).

The proposals of December 29 mentioned in the Foreign Office's communication were transmitted to the Department in our 11579, December 31. The proposals mentioned as having been given to us in a letter dated January 8 were embodied in our telegram No. 247 January 8, 4 p. m.

We would appreciate the Department's comments on the statements made by the Foreign Office before taking further steps in this matter.

WINANT

811.7490F/1-2345: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945—midnight.

789. ReEmbs 794, January 23, 2 p. m. Please reply substantially as follows to the Foreign Office's most recent informal note regarding radio-telegraph communications between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The Department of State is pleased to learn that Cable and Wireless Ltd. is prepared to establish adequate communications facilities between Dhahran and Bahrein. As you know, the Arabian American Oil Company has, for a number of years, been urgently in need of such facilities and particularly of direct means of communication between

eastern Saudi Arabia and the United States. In order to provide a direct circuit between Dhahran and the United States, it is contemplated that the Saudi Arabian Government would operate its own station constructed on its behalf by an American company, which would be prepared to provide the necessary technical advice and assistance to ensure efficient operation while local personnel is being trained. In connection with operational matters, it may be stated here that we are informed that, from the technical point of view, a station on the mainland is not likely to be subject to greater atmospheric interference than one located in the Bahrein Islands.

As may be recalled, the Saudi Arabian Government has given due notice of intention to modify the existing contract with Cable and Wireless,⁹⁷ presumably to alter the terms thereof to permit the erection of its own station to establish a direct radio circuit with the United States. The giving of this notice of intention, of course, is strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract.

It is hoped, therefore, that the British Government will entertain no objection to the erection of a Saudi Arabian Government station at Dhahran for the establishment of direct radio communication with the United States. In that event, the American Government, of course, would entertain no objection to the extension of the proposed facilities contemplated by Cable and Wireless between Dhahran and Bahrein to provide communication between Dhahran and the United States via Bahrein.

GREW

S11.7490F/2-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 19, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received February 19—4:25 p. m.]

1726. A reply has been received from the Foreign Office commenting as follows on the Embassy's recent representations regarding radio-telegraph communications in Saudi Arabia in accordance with Department's telegram No. 789, February 1, midnight:

1. The Foreign Office maintains that action taken so far by the Saudi Arabian Government does not amount, as we had suggested, to giving notice of intention to modify its agreement with Cable and Wireless, but merely constitutes a reservation of right to do so within the time limit prescribed by the agreement. Thus far, no proposals for specific modifications of the agreement have been put forward by the Saudi

⁹⁷ For notice of intention by the Saudi Arabian Government to modify the agreement of April 13, 1935, see telegram 348, November 21, 1944, noon, from Jidda, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 768.

Arabian Government. If and when it does so, its proposals will be a matter for negotiation between the parties, but in the meantime the Foreign Office finds it difficult to bind itself in advance regarding its attitude toward any modification which the Saudi Arabian Government may propose.

2. The Foreign Office finds itself "a little puzzled" by the statement that the Arabian-American Oil Company has for a number of years been urgently in need of more rapid and direct communication facilities between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and observes that it was only in October 1944 that the Foreign Office was informed regarding any cause for complaint on that score. Moreover, Cable and Wireless has informed the Foreign Office that it had received no complaints of delay over a period of years during which time telegrams were taken by the company's launch to Bahrein for despatch and, in the case of such messages sent, almost all were day letter telegrams which did not indicate great urgency.

3. The Foreign Office "feels quite frankly" that, if the service is now found inadequate, the proper course is not to modify the Cable and Wireless agreement in such a way as to transfer some of its business to an American company, but rather to improve the service so as to meet any reasonable complaints. An offer to that effect was contained in the Foreign Office's preceding communication and it still remains open, but the Foreign Office does not feel that it can accept responsibility for any further delay in the speeding up of a service which has been represented to it as an urgent war need.

Although there are obvious points in the Foreign Office's unpromising reply which invite immediate rejoinder, we are refraining from doing so and referring the matter to the Department for instructions.

WINANT

811.7490F/3-1445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, March 14, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7:58 p. m.]

106. Re Department's instruction No. 233, February 12.⁹⁸ Inconclusive delays in securing British concurrence in Saudi Government radio station tend to convince Saudi Government that United States is still unable to assert independent policy in Saudi Arabia, highly confidential Saudi official source states. Radio communications regarded as minimum right between sovereign nations. British concurrence awaited as test of our vigor and prestige vis-à-vis Britain whose concurrence in weightier matters such as military and finance Saudis will not expect us to secure.

⁹⁸ Not printed; it transmitted copies of telegrams 794, January 23, 2 p. m., from London, and 789, February 1, midnight, to London, pp. 1011 and 1012, respectively.

I suggest respectfully that Saudi confidence in vigor of United States policy may be important at both [the] coming visit of British Ministers to Riyadh (reLegs 84, March 2, 4 p. m. and 95, March 8, noon⁹⁹).

EDDY

811.7490F/4-2045: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, April 20, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 3:01 p. m.]

180. ReLegs 151, April 11, 10 a. m.¹ Deputy Foreign Minister² inquires officially whether United States has any proposals regarding direct radio telegraph communication with USA for which they understand we have engaged to secure British concurrence. He pointed out that SAG³ insisted on notice of intention to modify Cable and Wireless contract over violent protests by British Minister⁴ in response to strong representations from United States Government. He states SAG has done its part and inquires for our intentions.

I replied that the matter is pending and I have no further information.

He then inquired whether he should understand from the delay that (1) the United States Government has lost interest in establishing such communications or (2) we have been unable to secure British concurrence. I replied that I have no information leading to either inference.

EDDY

⁹⁹ Neither telegram printed; the former reported that Sir Edward Grigg, British Minister Resident in the Middle East, accompanied by the British Minister in Saudi Arabia, would visit King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud between March 9 and 11 and that the visit had been "suggested in Cairo by Churchill who offered it to King as return of King's visit to Churchill, to be made on his behalf" by Sir Edward Grigg (033.4190F/3-245); the latter advised of postponement of visit (033.4190F/3-845). In telegram 121, March 23, 1945, 11 a. m., the Minister in Saudi Arabia reported further postponement of the visit "until after Sir Edward Grigg has made a trip to London." (033.419F/3-2345) For information on the meeting of British Prime Minister Churchill and King Ibn Saud at Fayoum, Egypt, on February 17, 1945, see despatch 74, February 22, p. 689.

¹ Not printed; it inquired whether notice of intention to modify the contract with Cable and Wireless, Ltd., 6 months before the end of the 5-year period meant that such modification must be specified and agreed to before the end of the 6-month period. In telegram 119, April 20, 1945, the Department indicated its understanding that only specification of modification must be set forth within the 6-month period. (811.7490F/4-1145)

² Yusuf Yassin.

³ Saudi Arabian Government.

⁴ See telegrams 348, November 21, 1944, noon, and 349, November 21, 1944, 1 p. m., from Jidda, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 768 and 769, respectively. Stanley R. Jordan was the British Minister in Saudi Arabia at that time.

S11.7490F/4-2045

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁵

[WASHINGTON,] April 27, 1945.

Two telegrams have been drafted for despatch—one to London and one to Jidda—requesting in forcible terms that the British Government not oppose directly or indirectly the establishment of direct radio circuits between the United States and independent countries of the Near and Middle East, and inviting a British statement to that effect.

The United States Government approves the establishment of direct radio communications between the United States and every other country, and opposes radio communications monopolies in principle.

The Department has received evidence of British opposition to direct radio circuits between the United States and Iran and between the United States and Iraq.⁶ The Cable and Wireless, Ltd. (and the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd.⁷) have a conceded monopoly over the foreign telecommunications of Saudi Arabia except to neighboring countries. The unsatisfactory service afforded by the Eastern Telegraph Company and its obstructive attitude have caused needless inconvenience to American interests in Saudi Arabia engaged in war projects. With the prospective establishment of an American military air base at Dhahran, the completion of the refinery at Ras Tanura and the prospective establishment of an American controlled shipping company in Saudi Arabia, the obstructive tactics of the Eastern Telegraph Company will be even more troublesome, and may become almost intolerable.

The Arabian American Oil Company has had to resort to the device of mounting a radio transmitter on a tugboat whence company radio messages are sent from a point in the Persian Gulf outside the three-mile limit directly to New York. The United States Coast Guard has assisted by supplying codes and by deciphering messages in New York.

The monopoly of the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd. renews itself by periods of five years. The British Government has made it plain both to the United States and Saudi Government that it opposes any modification of the monopoly, and while urging the Saudi Government to maintain the present agreement unchanged, British

⁵ Addressed to William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton).

⁶ In telegram 138, April 3, 1945, the Minister in Iraq reported that the Iraqi Government was not "at present" interested in the establishment of a direct radio circuit between the United States and Iraq (S11.7490G/4-345).

⁷ Subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, Ltd.

officials have asked that their opposition be kept from the knowledge of the American Legation at Jidda and from the American Company most concerned.

The British Government has raised a number of untenable objections, basing its opposition variously on wartime censorship needs, on the alleged adequacy of existing facilities at Bahrein, on the imputed inability of the Saudi Government to operate a radio station, on the pretended superiority of Bahrein over Dhahran as a site for a radio station, on the alleged readiness of the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd. to establish a service via Bahrein and possibly via London, and on the disinclination of the British Government to take "a step which would injure an important British interest".

It has become increasingly clear that forcible representations will be required to remove the opposition of the British Government, and until such opposition is removed, there is no certainty that the Saudi Government will take the action necessary to modify the monopoly. Probably the Saudi Government would do so if the United States Government were in a position to assure financial support to Saudi Arabia for a period of years, but such assurance cannot be given yet.⁸

Meanwhile, the monopoly agreement will on June 1, 1945 renew itself until December 1, 1949, unless the Saudi Government proposes specific modification. On November 21, 1944, the Saudi Government, after strong representations from the Legation in Jidda, gave notice of intention to propose modifications, but made it clear that the United States and British Governments must agree on the modifications before the Saudi Government would take further action.

It is of great importance that direct radio communications be established with countries of the Near and Middle East, and the case of Saudi Arabia is very likely to be a test case; hence, the necessity for obtaining British withdrawal of its opposition to the direct United States to Saudi Arabia circuit.

It may be of interest to know that in November last, when it was doubtful that Saudi Arabia would give notice of intention in the face of British opposition, and when the deadline (December 1) for such notice was approaching, the late President authorized a telegram directly to Mr. Churchill urging withdrawal of British opposition. The telegram was never sent because notice was given before the message could be despatched.

LOY W. HENDERSON

⁸ For documentation on financial assistance by the United States to Saudi Arabia, see pp. 845 ff.

811.7490F/2-1945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1945—6 p. m.

3384. ReEmbs 1726, February 19, 6 p. m. 1. After examining communications exchanged between the Department and London and between the Department and Jidda, the dilatory tactics employed by the British authorities and the untenable arguments which they have put forward have led to the conclusion that it would serve no useful purpose to prolong preliminary discussions with the British Government regarding our desire to establish a direct radio circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

2. We are convinced that it would be in the interest of the United States, of the people of the Near and Middle East, and eventually of Great Britain itself, to establish direct radio circuits between the countries of the Near and Middle East and the United States, and to remove monopolistic restrictions on radio communication which hamper normal development of economic relations between the United States and those countries. We are further convinced that the improvement of our communications in these areas will eventually benefit world economy, and will strengthen the world security system.

3. While not admitting that direct radio circuit can be established between the United States and Saudi Arabia within a period of 5 years if and only if the Saudi Government before June 1 proposes a modification of its contract with the Eastern Telegraph Company, we are suggesting to the Saudi Government that it propose such a modification immediately.

4. It would be appreciated therefore if you would inform the Foreign Office of our conviction set forth in paragraph 2 above. You may add that the United States is suggesting to the Governments of the Near and Middle Eastern countries that such radio communications circuits be established; that it earnestly hopes that the British Government will not directly or indirectly oppose measures by Governments of those countries for the purpose of establishing such communications circuits; that in particular the British Government will not object to proposals which the Saudi Arabian Government may make for the modification of its agreement with the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd., for the purpose of establishing a direct radio communication circuit with the United States; and that a statement by the British Government to the Governments of both the United States and Saudi Arabia that it will not oppose such proposals would be welcome.

5. You may point out that it would be unfortunate if the impression should be created in independent Near and Middle Eastern countries that Great Britain is opposed to normal development of communications between those countries and the United States. It would be particularly unfortunate if the United States Congress, press and people should obtain an impression that Great Britain is deliberately following a policy calculated to prevent improvement of radio communications between the Near and Middle East and the United States or calculated to support restrictions on such radio communications in the Near and Middle East which hamper normal development of economic relations of the United States with that part of the world. The British Government may wish to weigh the disadvantages of such an impression.

A prompt reply on the part of the British authorities would be welcome.

Sent to London, repeated to Jidda.

GREW

811.7490F/4-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1945—6 p. m.

127. ReLegs 180, April 20, 11 a. m. While the contract is not entirely clear on the point, it appears that failure of the Saudi Government to propose specific modification of its contract with the Eastern Telegraph Company before June 1 would prejudice its right to demand consideration of such proposals if presented later. If, however, the modification is proposed before June 1, there appears to be no time limit within which agreement must be reached.

You should therefore approach the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and suggest that the Saudi Government propose before June 1 a modification in the contract with the Eastern Telegraph Company.

The proposal might be phrased substantially as follows:

In continuation of the Saudi Government's communication to the Eastern Telegraph Company, Ltd., dated November 21, 1944, concerning its intention to modify the agreement dated April 17, 1935, between the Saudi Government and the Sudan Government on the one hand and the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Cable and Wireless, Ltd. on the other, and in conformity with the provisions of Article 17 of that agreement, the Saudi Government proposes the following amendment to the agreement to become an additional article in Part III:

“Neither Article 11 nor any other article of this agreement shall be construed to limit the right of the Saudi Government to use or to permit the use of radio stations in Saudi Arabia for the establishment and operation of direct radio communications

circuits with other countries when, in the opinion of the Saudi Government, the use of such channels would be in the interest of Saudi Arabia."

An alternate, though less desirable modification, would be the amendment of Article 17 to provide that the Saudi Government will have the right to propose modifications of the agreement at any time. This alternative should not be mentioned unless the first suggestion is unacceptable to the Saudi Government.

You should point out that the Saudi Government has already signified its intention of proposing a modification of the agreement, and that the step now suggested merely carries out the intention previously announced to the American and British Governments.

In view of impending developments in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Government can scarcely consent to have its economic and transport development hampered by a monopolistic arrangement which can be revised only at 5-year intervals, which does not respond to the needs of the country, and which imposes exorbitant rates.

In your discretion you may add that the proposal suggested above has been couched in terms of a sufficiently broad nature to guarantee that the Saudi Government will retain full liberty not only to continue discussions looking toward the establishment of direct radio contact with the United States but also to insist on alterations being made in terms of the concession which would enable the Saudi Government to prevent the continuance of restrictions on international communications which might later handicap the normal development of economic enterprises in Saudi Arabia. You have likewise discretionary authority to inform the Saudi Government that we are asking the British Government not to oppose the taking of measures by the Saudi Government for the purpose of establishing direct radio circuits between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

There will be repeated to you in a separate message for your information only the text of further instructions on the subject sent to the Embassy in London.⁹

GREW

811.7490F/5-545 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 5, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 5:55 p. m.]

4554. Substance of the Department's 3384, April 30, 6 p. m., has been communicated in writing to the head of the General Department¹⁰

⁹ *Supra.*

¹⁰ Rodney A. Gallop.

of the Foreign Office, which is the department handling telecommunications, and the matter has also been taken up orally with Hankey of the Eastern Department who said that he would do all he could to see that our proposals are given a full and reasonable hearing but that despite the general desire of the Foreign Office to follow a policy of sincere Anglo-American collaboration in the Near and Middle East he frankly foresaw difficulty in bringing British thinking around to our point of view in this particular case. We also intend approaching Campbell, Supervising Under Secretary for Eastern Affairs, with a view to allowing no room for doubt as to the importance which we attach to this matter.

Sent Department as 4554, repeated to Jidda as Embassy's 4.

WINANT

811.7490F/5-1345 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 13, 1945—10 p. m.
[Received May 14—2:20 p. m.]

206. Re Department's 127, April 30, 6 p. m. Deputy Foreign Minister is securing in writing from British Minister¹¹ statement that Saudi Government already has secured right to modify contract with Eastern Telegraph at any time. Saudi Government will then notify us officially.

Saudi Government also has suffered from exorbitant rates and lack of competition and is determined to retain freedom in external communications. In my opinion they would welcome now a definite proposition re building for them a Government-owned radio station.¹²

EDDY

811.7490F/5-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1945—7 p. m.

3898. Embs 4554, May 5. In San Francisco the Secretary spoke¹³ to Anthony Eden¹⁴ in presence of Cadogan¹⁵ and Nevile Butler¹⁶

¹¹ Laurence B. Graftey-Smith.

¹² In telegram 3896, May 17, 1945, 7 p. m., to London, which conveyed the substance of telegram 206, the Department stated that it was "arranging to have such a proposal made to Saudi Government in very near future". (811.7490F/5-1345.)

¹³ On May 11. The Secretary was participating in the United Nations Conference on International Organization which met at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. For documentation on this Conference, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

¹⁴ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁶ Nevile M. Butler, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

regarding Saudi Arabian telecommunications matter. Mr. Eden who is now in London stated he would give matter his personal attention and hoped to be able to have a reply favorable to our desires.

Please continue to follow this matter closely bearing in mind necessity of having Saudi Arabian Government make known to Cable and Wireless nature of proposed modification before first of June.

Sent London, repeated Jidda.¹⁷

GREW

811.7490F/5-2245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1945—4 p. m.

145. Reference Legation's recent suggestion¹⁸ that Saudi Government would be pleased to be furnished a definite proposal in connection with station to be owned by it, the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company states the proposal attached to its letter of Jan 8¹⁹ is still applicable. Depts air mail instruction 230 Feb 6. Mackay Company's message to Department follows:

[Here follow proposals by the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, contained in its message of May 21, for construction of a 15 KW radio-telegraph transmitting station and management of the station for the Saudi Arabian Government by Mackay for a minimum period of 2 years.]

If further details are desired it is suggested that you obtain them from the company's letter of Jan. 8.

Unless you perceive objection to such course it is suggested that you immediately forward proposals of Mackay Radio to Saudi Government. If latter wishes information additional to that contained in this telegram and company's letter Jan 8, telegraph and Department will contact company for further information.

GREW

811.7490F/5-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 24, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received May 26—3: 08 a. m.]

216. ReDept 136 Apr [May] 17 to London [Jidda].²⁰ Saudi Govt informs me they consider that they have already reserved all rights of

¹⁷ As No. 136.

¹⁸ See telegram 206, May 13, 10 p. m., p. 1021.

¹⁹ Not printed; copy forwarded to the Minister in Saudi Arabia solely for the information of his staff in instruction 230, February 6 (not printed).

²⁰ Same as telegram 3898 to London, p. 1021.

modification of contract at any time in future by virtue of their notice given Nov 21, 1944. They have today so officially notified British Govt and Cable and Wireless Co.

I am transmitting proposal in Depts No. 145, May 22, regarding which, however, Saudi Govt assures me June 1 date is of no consequence as they are certain of their freedom to establish any external communications they wish.

Rptd London.

EDDY

811.7490F/5-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 25, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received May 25—4:53 p. m.]

5239. ReDepts 3896, May 17, 7 p. m.²¹ Saudi Arabian telecommunications matter has again been raised with Acting Head of General Dept of FonOff, who said he realized necessity for expediting action but that present situation is that matter has been referred on high level to other interested Depts and impossible to reach a decision until their views have been received. He promised to advise us immediately of any development of importance.

Rptd to Jidda.

WINANT

811.7490G/8-2245

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)*²²

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. BEVIN: Toward the end of our meeting at Potsdam,²³ I had a brief talk with Cadogan with respect to certain difficulties we were encountering in establishing direct radiotelegraph circuits between the United States on the one hand and Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other.

²¹ Not printed, but for summary, see footnote 12, p. 1021.

²² Copy transmitted by the Secretary of State, under covering letter of August 22 to London, for delivery to Mr. Bevin (811.7490G/8-2245); Secretary Byrnes also forwarded a shorter letter for Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (811.7490G/8-2245).

²³ This is a reference to the July 16–August 2 meeting between President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill (Mr. Clement Attlee was Prime Minister from July 28), and Soviet Chairman (Premier) Stalin; see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, 2 vols.

Unless this problem clears up before we meet in London²⁵ next month I shall wish to discuss it further with you. I am enclosing, therefore, a brief memorandum from which you will note that, in line with our general policy of favoring the establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuits between this country and points abroad, we are particularly anxious to set up direct communication facilities with Iraq and Saudi Arabia in order to reduce the time of delivery and costs of messages. You will agree, I believe, that we should work for the most efficient and maximum flow of international communication and I feel sure that we can settle any points of difference on this particular problem when we meet. In view of my conversation with Cadogan, I am also sending him a copy of the enclosed memorandum.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

[Enclosure]

DIRECT RADIOTELEGRAPH CIRCUITS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ON
THE ONE HAND AND IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA ON THE OTHER

The United States favors the establishment, wherever possible, of direct radiotelegraph circuits between this country and points abroad. As a result, there are at present direct radiotelegraph circuits between the United States and practically every foreign country. For some time past we have been endeavoring to prevail upon the Governments of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to cooperate in the establishment of direct telegraph communications between the United States and these two countries. Telegrams to these countries at present must pass through London or other relay points. In consequence, the cost of these telegrams is exorbitant and delivery is delayed.

It is obviously to the advantage of the United States on the one hand and Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the other, both from the cultural and economic points of view, that adequate, rapid and cheap means of communications be established between them, and the only way to bring this about is by the establishment of direct radiotelegraph circuits such as now exist between the United States and other Near Eastern countries, notably, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. American governmental agencies and American communication companies are prepared to establish such direct circuits with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Private British communication interests, which have practical monopolies upon the external telegraph communications of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have been endeavoring to prevent the establishment of the direct circuits between the United States and Iraq and Saudi Ara-

²⁵ This refers to the impending meeting at London on September 11 of the Council of Foreign Ministers; for documentation regarding this meeting, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

bia. We feel that it would be unfortunate if the development of communications between the United States and these two Near Eastern countries should be blocked by private interests eager to continue to derive profit from the present unsatisfactory system. It should be pointed out that the United States Government is opposed to the efforts of private monopolies to prevent the utilization of scientific developments for the general good. Furthermore, the United States would not support any American telecommunication company which might seek to prevent the establishment of direct radiotelegraph communications between any portion of the British Commonwealth of Nations and foreign points based on any monopolistic contract which such American company might enjoy.

The matter of a direct radiotelegraph circuit with Iraq has been discussed with the Regent of Iraq and other members of his suite,²⁶ who have indicated great interest in the establishment of such a circuit. The American Legation at Baghdad has also been instructed²⁷ to press upon the Iraqi authorities the desirability of such a means of communications between our two countries.

Similarly, for some time past now, the question of the establishment of a direct radiotelegraph circuit between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been actively discussed both with the Saudi Arabian Government and the British authorities in London. The Saudi Arabian Government has given notice of its desire to modify an existing exclusive contract which it had entered into with a private British communication company, and is considering the erection of a radio station in Saudi Arabia which would be capable of communicating directly with this country and which would be operated by the Saudi Arabian Government. It is hoped that no further impediments will be placed in the way of the establishment of this circuit.

890F.76/10-1345 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, October 13, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received October 13—12: 44 p. m.]

378. When asked again for reply to Department's telegram 289, September 25²⁸ Acting Foreign Minister said matter was "under con-

²⁶ For information on the visit to the United States of the Regent of Iraq, Prince Abdul Ilah, see bracketed note, p. 586. The question of the direct circuit was discussed by President Truman with the Regent and Nuri as-Said, former Iraqi Prime Minister (memorandum of May 28 by Acting Secretary of State Grew, 890G.001/5-2845); for memorandum of May 29 covering further discussions on the matter by officers of the Department with Nuri Pasha and the Iraqi Minister, see p. 49.

²⁷ Instruction 332, June 6, not printed.

²⁸ Not printed; it advised that the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company had inquired about the present status of its proposal to build a radio station for the Saudi Arabian Government (890F.76/9-2545).

sideration" and reverted to suggestion that we "settle it between ourselves and Britain". He admitted as well strong British pressure against bilateral air rights agreement.²⁹

SANDS

811.7490G/10-2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 20, 1945—noon.
[Received October 21—11:25 a. m.]

11003. Having in mind the Secretary's letters of August 22 to Bevin and Cadogan³⁰ on direct radio telegraph circuits with Iraq and Saudi Arabia we arranged to see Under Secretary Ronald³¹ and Gallop, head of General Section of Foreign Office, on October 17 and in talking with them emphasized the various points brought out in memorandum which accompanied the Secretary's letters. At conclusion of discussion it was agreed that statements made by Ronald which included suggestions for meeting our needs would be put in writing. This has been done in a communication dated October 18. A summary with pertinent excerpts follows:

1. Iraq:

British understanding is that American Legation Baghdad approached Iraqi Government late last year re direct circuit and that Iraqi Government replied establishment of wireless communications with stations outside Iraq was last item on list proposed improvements in telecommunications and that Iraqi Government not interested in offer at present. When American Legation in Baghdad indicated to British Embassy there that Iraqi attitude was due to advice from Embassy British Chargé³² gave assurance British had not intervened in any way and Foreign Office regrets that we still appear to retain impression to contrary. Letter states specifically on this point: "at no time have the Iraqi Government asked our advice on this question nor have we at any time volunteered an opinion to them on the matter." (In oral discussion of matter Ronald made it clear that this statement also carried with it absolute assurance that no attempt to dissuade Iraqis would be made in future.) Also pointed out that "the case of Iraq differs from that of Saudi Arabia in that Cable and Wireless

²⁹ For documentation on the proposal of the United States to enter a civil air transport agreement with Saudi Arabia, see pp. 845 ff.

³⁰ Letter to Sir Alexander Cadogan not printed; see footnote 22, p. 1023.

³¹ Nigel B. Ronald, Superintending Under Secretary, General Department, British Foreign Office.

³² Geoffrey H. Thompson.

Limited or their subsidiaries enjoy no exclusive rights in the former countries.”³³

2. Saudi Arabia :

(a) During last year we had advanced various reasons for asking Britain to take initiative in informing Saudi Arabian Government in favor of modification of Eastern Telegraph agreement to enable erection wireless telegraph station at Dhahran to be owned by Saudi Government and operated by American company in order to establish direct radio circuit with US. One of these arguments was slowness, expense and inadequacy of present facilities. Britain felt that if service deficient proper remedy was to improve it rather than modify agreement to company's detriment and certain proposals put forward for meeting our requirements. “We had naturally deferred putting these into effect until we heard that they met your requirements. You had however maintained that nothing would satisfy you short of having your own direct circuit.”

(b) “While in general [we agreed with your dislike of]³⁴ monopolies, we were opposed in principle to the multiplication of direct circuits except where traffic could be shown to justify them on the ground that they would involve the wasteful and uneconomical use of equipment and also of frequencies in an already overcrowded frequency spectrum. There was a clear divergence of views between us as to the quantity of traffic which Saudi Arabia could be expected to offer in the next 5 or 10 years and all our investigations reaffirmed our belief that it was unlikely that there would within a measurable time be room for two systems.”

(c) Re statement in our memo that “the Saudi Arabian Government has given notice of its desire to modify an existing exclusive contract which it had entered into with a private British company.” Letter of Foreign Office states “if this had been the case there would have been nothing to discuss for it is within the right of the Saudi Arabian Government having given due notice at the correct time to modify the agreement. They do not require our consent. All that the Saudi Arabian Government have in fact done was by the material date of the 1st December 1944 to reserve the right to modify the concession if and when they should desire to do so. The Saudi Arabian

³³ The Department in telegram 295, October 2, 1945, had directed that further representations be made to the Iraqi Government concerning a direct radio-telegraph circuit between the United States and Iraq (811.7490G/10-245). In despatch 953, November 3, 1945, Baghdad notified the Department of receipt of a note dated October 31 from the Iraqi Foreign Office which stated that the Iraqi Government had “decided upon the erection of a short wave radio transmitting station suitable for direct communication with the United States” (811.7490G/11-345). The Department in telegram 357, December 4, 1945, thereupon requested that American companies be permitted to submit bids for the necessary equipment on an impartial basis (811.7490G/11-345). Baghdad notified the Department in telegram 483, December 10, 1945, that the Iraqi Government would not solicit bids as steps had already been taken to order the equipment in the United Kingdom (811.7490G/12-1045).

³⁴ Bracketed insertion based on full text of Foreign Office letter transmitted to the Department in airgram A-1145, October 20, 1945, not printed.

Government have at no time informed us that they wish to modify the concession in any particular sense. They have however expressed the hope that the British and US Governments should reach an agreed view on the question at issue which would spare them the difficulty and embarrassment of choosing between our two conflicting viewpoints."

(d) After foregoing review letter concludes as follows: "In brief therefore we feel that our attitude in this matter has throughout been entirely reasonable. This question has, however, given rise to a volume of correspondence and apparently engendered feelings which appear to us quite out of proportion to its intrinsic importance, and we should not wish it to remain unsettled and thus risk being magnified out of its true perspective. We are therefore prepared, while maintaining our views of principle, to instruct our Minister at Jidda to inform the Saudi Arabian Government that he understands that your Government are anxious that the Saudi Arabian Government should modify their agreement with the Eastern Telegraph Company in such a way as to permit of the erection and operation by an American company of a wireless telegraph station to be the property of the Saudi Arabian Government for the exclusive purpose of operating a direct wireless circuit between Saudi Arabia and US, and that if the Saudi Arabian Government wish to avail themselves of his offer our Government would not wish the agreement with the Eastern Telegraph Company to stand in their way. In this connection I should mention that De Wolf³⁵ informed MacLean, of our Embassy Washington, on 11 January that the State Department were quite prepared to see the American installed transmitter in Saudi Arabia confined to the Saudi Arabia-US circuit leaving the Eastern Telegraph Company in possession of all other traffic. As soon as we hear from you that the State Department are sending appropriate instructions to your Minister at Jidda we will also instruct our Minister to concert with yours in order that he may make the appropriate communication to the Saudi Arabian Government." By way of comment I may say that, although Ronald did not admit of any weakness in British position in this matter throughout our long discussion, he appeared on other hand to be genuinely concerned by unfortunate consequences which might result from continued misunderstanding and to be intent on finding a ground for definite agreement even though this might necessitate basic concession on British side. In circumstances it is suggested that, in order to take advantage of this new and apparently conciliatory attitude of officials now handling this matter in Foreign Office, the Embassy be advised whether explanations and assurances given by Ronald meet our requirements.

Full text of Foreign Office letter by airgram.

Sent Department as 11003; repeated Baghdad as 19 and Jidda as 9.

GALLMAN

³⁵ Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief of the Telecommunications Division.

811.7490F/11-145 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1945—5 p. m.

9614. Urtel 11003 Oct 20. You are hereby instructed to contact appropriate officials of Brit Govt and convey the substance of the following message on subject of direct radiotelegraph circuit between US and Saudi Arabia.

US Govt appreciates interest the British Govt has shown in this matter and is happy to know that Brit Govt is genuinely interested in coming to an understanding in regard to it.

However, there are certain factors connected with this situation which we would like to mention. To begin with the intimation in above mentioned telegram of Oct 20 that Mr. de Wolf informed Mr. MacLean of Brit Embassy Washington that State Dept on 11 January was "quite prepared to see the American installed transmitter in Saudi Arabia confined to the Saudi Arabia-US circuit leaving the Eastern Telegraph Company in possession of all other traffic" is not accurate. Mr. de Wolf merely informed Mr. MacLean that main interest of US was a Saudi Arabia-US circuit.

The Dept would next like to point out that Saudi Arabian Govt (SAG) may find it uneconomical to maintain a station for sole purpose of communicating with US, and that as a result the future of a station so limited in scope would be uncertain. After station is built it may be necessary for SAG to decide (1) that it cannot afford not to use station for sending and receiving of messages to countries other than US or (2) to abandon this station altogether. In opinion of US Govt it might therefore be unfortunate for SAG at this time to give any definite statements to the effect that in future it would not use proposed station for communication with any other country than US.

Furthermore, US Govt cannot encourage or permanently acquiesce in restrictions upon telecommunications of the type suggested by Brit Govt in urtel 11003 without contravening its basic policy in regard to worldwide telecommunications which is reflected in its refusal to support any US communications company in an effort to enter into contracts of an exclusive nature in countries outside US. It intends at forthcoming Bermuda Conference³⁶ to propose an undertaking by the Govts represented there not to support their communications companies in applications for exclusive contracts in countries outside the US and the British Commonwealth.

In view of considerations advanced above it appears to this Govt that it would be more conducive to a mutually satisfactory solution of this problem if Brit Govt, in instructing Brit Minister at Jidda to inform SAG that Brit Govt would have no objection to the erection and operation of a SAG wireless telegraph station, would add the hope that if at some future date SAG desired to expand the list of

³⁶ The Bermuda Telecommunications Conference which met at Hamilton, Bermuda, from November 21 to December 4, 1945.

countries covered by the station, SAG would consult with Brit Govt, and such other Govts as may have a direct interest in the change.

In connection with the above US Govt assumes that Brit Govt will raise no objection to the use of this SAG station as an automatic relay for radio messages from US to points in Far East where existing direct radio circuits between US and such Far Eastern points are not satisfactory for technical reasons. Such automatic relay would of course have no effect on traffic arrangements between SAG and other communications companies, notably Cable and Wireless.

For your information the President has indicated his interest in this problem and Dept has asked the Brit Emb here to obtain a commitment from Brit Govt at earliest possible date. In the circumstances it will be appreciated if you will obtain a final confirmation of Brit Govt's acquiescence to the agreement suggested in this telegram at earliest possible moment. Dept wire to Jidda held pending British reply.

Sent London. Repeated Jidda as Dept's 321.

BYRNES

811.7490F/11-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 9, 1945—midnight.

[Received November 10—5:30 a. m.]

11807. Substance Dept's 9614, November 1 was communicated to Foreign Office and following is essential paragraph of its reply:

"As this reply raises various new proposals which have not previously been put to us, we may need a little time to consider the matter and it may be best that conversations should be pursued at the Bermuda Conference where this particular case can be considered in the light of the general principles by which such questions are governed."

WINANT

811.7490F/12-1345 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945.

357. Following is text of section 1 of Protocol between UK and US concluded at Bermuda Telecommunications Conference on Dec 4.³⁷ Full text of Protocol is being sent by mail.³⁸

"The United Kingdom Government will inform the Saudi Arabian Government that they understand that the United States Government

³⁷ For full text of Protocol, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1518*, p. 10, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1644.

³⁸ Instruction 373, December 11, 1945, not printed.

are anxious that the Saudi Arabian Government should modify their agreement with the Eastern Telegraph Company in such a way as to permit of the erection by a United States Company of a radiotelegraph station, to be the property of the Saudi Arabian Government, for the purpose of operating a direct radiotelegraph circuit between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and that if the Saudi Arabian Government wish to avail themselves of this offer, the United Kingdom Government would not wish the agreement between the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Saudi Arabian Government to stand in their way. It is understood that the question of any further modifications of the concession required to permit of the operation of other direct radiotelegraph circuits by the Saudi Arabian Government would be for determination by the latter."

BYRNES

811.7490F/12-845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1945—5 p. m.

11102. Telegram dated Dec 8 from Legation at Jidda ³⁹ states British Minister has sent Legation copy of note dated Dec 6 to Saudi Foreign Office informing latter that British Government does not wish Saudi Agreement with Eastern Telegraph to prevent Saudi Government accepting radio station at Dhahran for US-Saudi circuit.

Foregoing action was apparently taken 2 days after signature of UK-US Protocol at Bermuda Telecommunications Conference. Please convey to Foreign Office Dept's appreciation for UK prompt carrying out of undertakings in UK-US Protocol and express also this Government's satisfaction at satisfactory outcome of Bermuda Telecommunications Conference. Documents of Conference are being sent to you separately by air mail.⁴⁰

ACHESON

[On October 10, 1946, the Saudi Arabian Government and the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby the latter would construct a radiotelegraph station at Jidda for the Saudi Arabian Government and operate the station on behalf of the Government for a period of at least two years (811.7490F/12-1346).]

³⁹ No. 405, not printed.

⁴⁰ Instruction 6273, December 11, 1945, not printed.

DRAFT COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES TO SAUDI ARABIA

611.90F31/11-1445 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Sands)

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1945—7 p. m.

328. Please convey following message to For Min ⁴¹ from Sec State and report by urgent cable when delivered ⁴² so that intention in final paragraph can be implemented.

“Because of the increase in the common interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia during recent years, I believe it would be to the mutual advantage of our two nations if we could supplement our present provisional agreement ⁴³ with a broader type of commercial accord. On the basis of this belief, and following upon the reference to the subject made to Your Highness in Washington recently, ⁴⁴ I am arranging to send Your Highness a draft accord which I hope the Govt of Saudi Arabia will wish to consider consummating with the United States. This draft will be transmitted in the relatively near future by the American Minister in Jidda ⁴⁵ whom I shall authorize to discuss any general or specific suggestions which the Saudi Arabian Government may see fit to make.

For your personal information, this Government expects at an early date to propose to the Imam Yehya ⁴⁶ that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Yemen negotiate a simple provisional agreement concerning diplomatic and trade relations ⁴⁷ generally similar to that which we have had for years with the Saudi Arabian Government.” ⁴⁸

Eddy will bring sample of draft accord.

BYRNES

⁴¹ Amir Faisal.

⁴² In telegram 392, November 16, 1945, 6 p. m., the Chargé in Saudi Arabia reported: “Message contained in Deptel 328, November 14, has been delivered to Acting Foreign Minister.” (611.90F31/11-1645) Yusuf Yassin was Deputy Foreign Minister.

⁴³ Agreement in regard to diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, commerce and navigation, signed at London, November 7, 1933, *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. II, p. 999.

⁴⁴ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1000 ff.

⁴⁵ Col. William A. Eddy was in Washington for consultation; he returned to Jidda on December 13.

⁴⁶ The Imam Yehya bin Mohammed Hamid-ud-din, the King of Yemen.

⁴⁷ For documentation on the initiation of negotiations for the establishment of formal diplomatic and treaty relations between the United States and Yemen, see pp. 1312 ff.

⁴⁸ In telegram 402, December 4, 1945, 5 p. m., the Chargé in Saudi Arabia transmitted a message from the Saudi Arabian Minister acting in charge of the Foreign Office, acknowledging the above message and stating that the Saudi Arabian Government would give sympathetic consideration to any project or proposal received from the United States Government (611.90F31/12-445).

611.90F31/12-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945.

365. Following is text of draft note on commercial matters which you are authorized to submit to SAG⁴⁹ in such manner and at such time as you deem appropriate. True copy follows by air pouch:⁵⁰

I have the honor to make the following statement of my Government's understanding of the agreement reached through recent conversations held at Jidda by representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with reference to the treatment which the United States of America will accord to the commerce of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will accord to the commerce of the United States of America. These two Governments, desiring to affirm their adherence to a program of purposes and policies, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, designed to bring about an expansion of international trade on a broad basis and directed to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and desiring to maintain the most-favored-nation principle in its unconditional and unlimited form as the basis of their commercial relations, agree to supplement the provisional agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in regard to diplomatic and consular representation, juridical protection, commerce and navigation, signed November 7, 1933, with the following provisions:

[Here follows the text of the proposed provisions.]

If the above provisions are acceptable to the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, this note and the reply signifying assent thereto shall, if agreeable to that Government, be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments which shall become effective 15 days after the date of such acceptance.

ACHESON

[The draft commercial accord was handed to the Saudi Arabian Government late in December 1945, but there were no discussions until May 1947.]

⁴⁹ Saudi Arabian Government.

⁵⁰ Instruction 377, December 29, 1945, not printed.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF SYRIA AND LEBANON¹

Opposition by the United States to the claim by France for a position of special privilege in Syria and Lebanon; Bombardment of Damascus by French troops and intervention by British forces; Criticisms by the Department of State of certain provisions of the draft Anglo-French accords and of the accords as signed at London on December 13, 1945

S90D.01/1-945: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, January 9, 1945—noon.

[Received January 10—2: 13 p. m.]

5. ReDepins 270 December 13.² I have presented the President's letter of December 7 to President Kuwatly who asked me to telegraph his "keenest thanks to Mr. Roosevelt and the American Government".

His comment on memorandum of October 5³ was:

"I know it almost by heart; we have turned to it often for renewed strength to persevere in the way we have chosen. The letter signed by your great President gives in [*it*] a new and precious frame."

Record of our ensuing discussion of Syria's current political problems will be forwarded by despatch.⁴ Its most interesting theme centered on possibility of Syria proposing simultaneously to Britain, France, Russia and United States "identic treaties of friendship, establishment, commerce and consular relations", as suggested last fall by Iraqi Foreign Minister.⁵

Department will recall that this possibility was not seriously considered at the time because French Provisional Government, not then recognized by other powers, was deemed not to possess treaty making

¹ For previous documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, pp. 774 ff.

² Not printed; it transmitted to Beirut letter of December 7, 1944, from President Roosevelt to President Shukri al-Kuwatly of Syria, printed in *ibid.*, p. 812.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 795.

⁴ No. 618, January 10, not printed.

⁵ For suggestion by Arshad al-Umari, see telegram 228, October 20, 1944, 10 a. m., from Beirut, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. v, p. 803.

capacity. President made personal suggestion that Department send us informally a suitable outline model of such a treaty.

My British colleagues express interest in revival of this suggestion as perhaps offering way out of impasse reached in French relations with Levant Governments, notably over army question, and thus creating less unfavorable atmosphere for Franco-British agreement on question of completing equipment of local *gendarmeries*.

[Here follow accounts of the views of British diplomatic and military officials in the Near East and other persons on the situation in Syria and Lebanon.]

Meanwhile Lebanese ministerial crisis has developed on the whole favorably to national best interest. Premier Solh was finally prevailed upon to resign January 7 and yesterday Abdul Hamid Karami (see biographic report ⁶) accepted invitation to form new Ministry in what I believe was sincere belief that he best can maintain continuity of foreign policy and attempt urgently needed internal reform with support of fair majority of Parliament.

Paraphrases to Paris and Cairo by mail.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/2-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy
 Mr. Murray ⁷
 Mr. Alling ⁸
 Mr. Kohler

Mr. Wright called at his request to present the attached *aide-mémoire* ⁹ enclosing copies of recent instructions of the Foreign Office to the British Minister at Beirut and Damascus ¹⁰ and asking us for our support of the representations which the latter was instructed to make to the local governments with a view to the settlement of the present impasse between them and the French.

Mr. Wright also read two telegrams sent to the Foreign Office by Mr. Shone, H.M. Minister at Beirut and Damascus. In the first Mr.

⁶ Copy not found in Department files.

⁷ Wallace Murray, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁸ Paul H. Alling, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

⁹ *Infra*.

¹⁰ Terence A. Shone.

Shone reported a conversation between M. Ostrorog¹¹ of the French Délégation Générale and the Syrian President¹² in which the former had suggested that a high calibre Syrian representative, possibly the Foreign Minister,¹³ should proceed to Paris to initiate direct discussions with the French Government authorities; the reaction of the President had been negative. In the second Mr. Shone reported that he had discussed the attached Foreign Office instruction with his American colleague¹⁴ and that both agreed that the suggested representations would not be opportune at the present moment in view of agitated local atmosphere.

In reply to Mr. Murray's question, Mr. Wright said that he believed the British Government would instruct Mr. Shone to go forward with the representations in any case at the earliest suitable opportunity. In the ensuing discussion, which reviewed the previous steps taken by the British and American governments in connection with the situation in the Levant States, Mr. Wright expressed his strong personal view that some settlement of this question must be reached in the near future if we are not to face serious difficulties not only in Syria and Lebanon but throughout the Near East a year hence which would be likely to involve Russia as well as the other Allies and could have serious consequences. It was generally agreed that the intransigent negative attitude of the local Governments was quite indefensible,¹⁵ particularly in view of the written assurances which they have already given to this Government regarding the recognition and protection of American rights and interests in those territories.¹⁶

Mr. Murray assured Mr. Wright that the Department would give prompt and careful consideration to this question and would keep him advised of developments.

¹¹ Count Stanislas Ostrorog, Diplomatic and Political Adviser, French Délégation Générale in Syria and Lebanon.

¹² Shukri al-Kuwatly.

¹³ Jamil Mardam.

¹⁴ George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon.

¹⁵ On February 2, 1945, Mr. Kohler informed Mahmoud Hassan, the Egyptian Minister, that the United States was hardly in a position to support the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in their refusal to negotiate agreements of any kind with the French (890D.01/2-245).

¹⁶ See telegram 182, September 9, 1944, noon, from Beirut, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 775. The written assurances of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were given in letters of September 8, 1944, to Mr. Wadsworth by the Syrian and Lebanese Foreign Ministers. For these letters and the pertinent United States communications of September 7, 1944, to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series Nos. 434 and 435, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1491 and 1493, respectively.

S90D.01/2-145

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

As the State Department will be aware negotiations between the French and the Levant States for settlement of future relations between them have not progressed at all. The Levant States have persisted in their refusal to enter into discussions with the French though His Majesty's Government believe that they do not know at all what the French propose in detail. The Levant States assert that the French plan to undermine their independence in some way but M. Bidault¹⁷ has given Mr. Eden¹⁸ most categorical assurances on this head.

2. In the view of His Majesty's Government it is essential to secure an agreement between the French and the Levant States on the nature of their relations in future, and His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States has been instructed to approach the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in the sense of the attached telegrams.¹⁹

3. In informing the State Department of the instructions sent to Mr. Shone His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to enquire whether the State Department would be willing to support these representations through the United States Minister in Damascus. As they have already made clear, His Majesty's Government are not seeking to impose any particular procedure or conditions on the Levant States. But it seems to them inevitable and proper that termination of a special relation between two states should be regularised by some kind of agreement, that this is in the general interest and that the present misunderstanding between the French and the Levant States should not be allowed to get out of hand to a degree at which they might well hamper the war effort.

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945.

S90E.01/12-1944: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1945—7 p. m.

22. We understand from the British Embassy that you and Shone have discussed the instructions sent him by the Foreign Office on Janu-

¹⁷ Georges Bidault, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁹ Dated January 26, neither printed; for substance, see memorandum of conversation, February 1, *supra*.

ary 26 and that you agree in considering the representations called for therein inopportune in the present local atmosphere. We should appreciate your urgent comment on this, as the Department is inclined to agree with the British views set forth therein. Please review the memorandum of conversation with Mr. Chamoun on December 15,²⁰ copy of which was sent to you.

GREW

890E.01/2-245 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 2, 1945—noon.

[Received 1:35 p. m.]

31. ReDeptel 22, February 1, 7 p. m. Shone spoke with me briefly January 28 regarding his "new" instructions which I gathered were in general sense that Foreign Office still believed local governments should negotiate with French; heightened tension in Franco-Levant relations being cited as constituting added reason rendering negotiations desirable from British viewpoint which seems based primarily on desire to prevent disorders.

I commented that, if prior to current tension there had, as I believed, been little chance that local governments could be induced to accept Foreign Office view, the present moment appeared to me to be peculiarly inopportune to reiterate it. I added that in my view were he to do so, his representations would probably be unsuccessful and might at same time by undermining confidence in British good judgment, render less efficacious other and more important representations which he might be called on to make to local governments were situation to degenerate further.

To me the most interesting and constructive point made in Department's memorandum of conversation with Chamoun were in last two sentences of third paragraph where suggestion was made that local governments might themselves draw up treaties for submission to major Allied Powers. I have discussed this possible sortie from impasse with both Foreign Ministers and with Shone and all appear to be coming seriously to accept it.

Lebanese Foreign Minister²¹ in particular has made it keystone of policy. He is endeavoring to have both Governments accept. He already has his Premier's approval and is meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister this weekend specially to discuss it. If I might say

²⁰ Camille Chamoun, Lebanese Minister in the United Kingdom; memorandum of conversation not printed.

²¹ Henri Pharaon.

to both Governments that it has Department's approval, I believe I could bring them to accept it definitely and act promptly thereon.

Paraphrases to Paris, Baghdad and Cairo.

WADSWORTH

S90D.01/2-245 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, February 2, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3 : 35 p. m.]

48. ReLegs 45, February 1, 11 a. m.²² In interview today Deputy Foreign Minister²³ inquired officially on behalf of Saudi Government whether Syria and Lebanon can count on support of the US in the event that France continues to insist upon political and military concessions which they cannot and do not accept.

Comment: Saudi Government states Syria has rejected French demands definitely, but is being pressed by British to yield. They inquire, not about attitude of US toward agreements or treaties into which Syria might enter with French, but only for US attitude if negotiations break down completely.

Repeated to Beirut.

EDDY

S90D.01/2-945

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Attached are copies of telegrams²⁴ containing the latest reports received by His Majesty's Embassy about the Levant States.

2. It will be seen that the Syrian Government have now with some difficulty been persuaded to approach the French on the subject of general negotiations and are to invite the French to state their desiderata. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris²⁵ has been instructed to inform Monsieur Bidault accordingly, and to express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that when the French explain to the Syrians their proposals for a settlement they will do so with the utmost moderation and tact. Mr. Duff Cooper is to impress Monsieur Bidault that in the view of His Majesty's Government the most hope-

²² *Ante*, p. 1037. In telegram 36, January 24, 1945, 11 p. m., the Minister in Iraq (Henderson) reported a request by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs that the United States Government be informed of the dangerous situation in Syria and of the hope of the Iraqi Government that the United States would endeavor to exert a restraining influence on France (S90D.01/1-2445).

²³ Yusuf Yassin.

²⁴ None printed.

²⁵ Alfred Duff Cooper.

ful procedure for getting the discussions well started is to begin on the less contentious questions.

3. Now that the Syrian Government have shown themselves more receptive to advice than had been expected in the present rather tense atmosphere, His Majesty's Government feel that any action which the United States Government may feel able to take in Paris and Damascus to support their efforts will help to improve the situation.

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1945.

890D.01/2-1145

*The British Delegation at Yalta to the Secretary of State*²⁶

The principal outstanding question in the Levant States is the settlement of the future relations between them and the French. The Levant States have been promised their independence and are well on the way to achieving it. We have obtained from the French Provisional Government the most categorical assurances that they intend to carry out this undertaking, which we have endorsed. The French wish to preserve a special friendly relationship with the Levant States, such as Great Britain has in Iraq. We have told them that we would be ready to admit this in principle, but that it must be freely agreed with the Levant States and that we could in no circumstances attempt that it should be imposed on them by force. We are urging them strongly to adopt a forthcoming and understanding attitude towards the aspirations of the Levant States.

2. The Levant States are afraid that the French plan to undermine their independence and they have until last week refused to enter into any discussions with the French regarding the future settlement even on quite uncontentious items. It is now understood that they will make their own proposals to the French shortly.

3. In general it has seemed to His Majesty's Government essential

²⁶ In a memorandum of March 1, 1945, to Assistant Secretary of State Dunn and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) stated: "The attached *aide-mémoire* was sent to Mr. Stettinius by the British delegation at Yalta on the final day of the Conference. It did not require action and no action was taken with respect to it." (890D.01/2-1145) The Yalta Conference took place February 4-11, 1945, between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier); for documentation on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*.

Copies of the British memorandum and of a memorandum of March 15 of a conversation with the Counselor of the British Embassy (p. 1055) relating thereto were transmitted to United States diplomatic missions at London, Paris, Moscow, Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo on March 22.

that there should be a settlement by agreement. The French certainly seem entitled to have an understanding regarding the continued existence of their schools and the treatment of their nationals and commercial interests, e.g. in taxation matters. Yet if the mandate were terminated tomorrow without any other understanding being reached, they would not even have the same rights as the Americans have under their Treaty of 1924.²⁷

4. Other rights which the French may possibly claim (e.g. in military or educational matters) are more contentious, but it is hardly possible for us to help the Syrians and Lebanese further unless they discuss the outstanding questions regarding settlement.

5. Another question which will need an internationally agreed settlement in due course is that of the position of racial and religious minorities. We do not think that the mandate should disappear without the Syrian and Lebanese Governments reaffirming their obligations not to discriminate against their racial and religious minorities.

6. In general it seems to us inevitable and proper that the termination of a special relationship between two states should be regularised by some kind of agreement, that this is in the general interests of good international relations, and that the present misunderstandings between the French and the Levant States should not be allowed to get out of hand to a degree at which they might well hamper the war effort.

7. The Syrians have, we believe, in the past harboured a feeling that the United States Government would approve of their resisting any understanding at all with the French. We hope that in the interests of a peaceful and fair settlement of the position in the Levant States the President will, if he sees the President of Syria while in Egypt,²⁸ urge him to adopt a circumspect and forthcoming attitude.

8. Incidentally President Shukri Quwatly is anxious to create a national army and in principle we are in favour of his doing so, but we earnestly hope that the United States Government will not agree to supply arms to either of the Levant States Governments until some understanding as to the future settlement has been arrived at. Otherwise, our own responsibilities in this theatre may be greatly complicated.

11 FEBRUARY, 1945.

²⁷ Convention between the United States and France, signed at Paris April 4, 1924, *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. I, p. 741.

²⁸ President Roosevelt did not meet President Kuwatly while in Egypt. For documentation on his meeting with the sovereigns of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia in February 1945, see pp. 1 ff.

890E.01/2-245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1945—6 p. m.

33. We have been having discussions with British and Syrian situation has been receiving high level consideration. I regret we still have no definite word for you on action but desire meanwhile to give you our reaction to final sentence your 31, February 2, noon.

We were glad, in effort to be helpful, to advance suggestion that local Government's objectives might be served by submission of acceptable treaty proposals simultaneously to France and major Allied powers. However, we are not prepared to put this suggestion forward as a formal proposal. In our view, the explosive potentialities of the situation reside in the relations of France and the Levant Governments and in the final analysis this is the problem which must be solved, whatever developments there may be as regards the relations of Syria and Lebanon with other Governments.

GREW

[For memorandum of February 14 of a conversation between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud dealing in part with Syria and Lebanon, see page 2.]

890E.01/2-245 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1945—7 p. m.

36. Reurtel 31, February 2, noon. Having itself concluded executive agreements with Syria and Lebanon providing for the recognition and protection of the rights and interests of the United States and its nationals, this Government is clearly not in a position to support the local Governments in refusing to enter into negotiations with the French for the same purposes.

The Department is repeating to you its telegram to Paris²⁹ instructing the Ambassador there to discuss this matter urgently with the French authorities. In acquainting the local authorities with the nature of these representations you should urge them to adopt a more moderate and realistic attitude, and specifically to enter into negotiations with a view to securing treaties with the French which would be consistent with their independence and non-discriminatory as re-

²⁹ No. 633; see footnote 43, p. 1046.

gards third powers and which would still provide the reasonable assurances which the French justifiably desire with respect to the protection of the considerable rights and interests of France in the Levant States.

This Government wishes to be helpful in every possible way and has no intention of diminishing or retracting its recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence.³⁰ In this spirit the Department was glad to advance informally for the consideration of the local Governments the suggestion that their objective might be served by the submission of acceptable treaty proposals simultaneously to France and to the major Allied powers. However, we are not prepared to put this suggestion forward as an official proposal. The explosive potentialities of the situation reside in the relations of France and the Levant Governments and in the last analysis this is the major problem which must be solved, whatever developments there may be as regards the relations of Syria and Lebanon with other Governments.

Sent to Beirut. Repeated to Paris.³¹

GREW

890D.01/2-245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1945—9 p. m.

40. Reurtel 48, February 2, 1 p. m. You may assure the Saudi authorities that the influence of this Government will in all circumstances be exercised in favor of the completion and maintenance of the full independence of Syria and Lebanon. This Government would support the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in resisting pressure for the conclusion of treaties which would in effect deny them the independence which we have recognized or which would give discriminatory privileges to France or any other power. However, we have ourselves concluded executive agreements with the local Governments providing for the recognition and protection of the rights

³⁰ For exchange of correspondence of September 7 and 8, 1944, with Syria and Lebanon constituting United States recognition of their independence, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series Nos. 434 and 435, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1491 and 1493. For statements on Syrian and Lebanese independence by the Secretary of State on September 19, 1944, and by President Roosevelt the following day, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 782, and Department of State *Bulletin*, September 24, 1944, p. 313.

³¹ As No. 632. Information on the action taken on Syria and Lebanon was also sent to the Minister in Iraq on February 16 for transmittal to the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs (890D.01/2-1645). The following day, similar information was telephoned to the Egyptian Minister by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (890D.01/2-1745); and on February 23 and March 11, the Department authorized the Ministers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to convey the information to the Government to which they were accredited (890D.01/2-2245, 3-1145).

and interests of the United States and its nationals and are consequently unable to support them in refusing to enter into negotiations of any kind with the French.

You may also inform the Saudi Government that we are taking steps to urge both sides to show moderation and to undertake friendly negotiations for the settlement of outstanding issues.

Sent to Jidda. Repeated to Beirut and Paris.

GREW

890D.01/2-145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1945—10 p. m.

633. Reurtel 6469 [469], February 1, 6 p. m.³² The potentially explosive situation in Syria and Lebanon resulting from the intransigent conflicting attitudes of the French and local Governments toward remaining unsettled issues connected with Syrian and Lebanese independence is a source of continuing concern to this Government. All outstanding questions seem to us susceptible to settlement by friendly negotiation or arbitration in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter³³ to which the United Nations have adhered.³⁴ We therefore desire both sides to show moderation and should look with disfavor on French use of military force in present impasse, whether in form of French troops or French-controlled native levies. We hope the French Government will instruct its representatives in the Levant States to seek friendly agreement, and are urging the local Governments likewise to show moderation and to enter into amicable negotiations with a view to the conclusion of mutually acceptable accords defining the relations between France and Syria and Lebanon.

If the French intend sincerely to implement their promises of independence we can see no reason why they should refuse to:

1) Transfer the *Troupes Spéciales* to the local Governments, subject only to such overall supervision by the French and British mili-

³² Not printed; it reported that the British Ambassador in France had delivered a note to the French Foreign Office on February 1 calling attention to the inflammatory situation in the Levant in connection with the *Troupes Spéciales* and had asked the French Minister for Foreign Affairs if the French Government could not make a gesture of appeasement. Mr. Bidault was reported to have replied in the negative but that the French authorities would do everything to avoid trouble or provocation and would reply only if attacked by force of arms (890D.01/2-145). In telegram 495, February 2, 1945, midnight, Mr. Caffery quoted a communiqué, issued by the French Cabinet on February 2, as stating "France alone is responsible for the maintenance of order in Syria and the Lebanon. . . . The Government is resolved to maintain order in these countries." (851.00/2-245)

³³ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

³⁴ In the United Nations Declaration, signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

tary authorities in the Theater as may be considered necessary by these authorities for the duration of the war in Europe and accepted by the local Governments.

2) Agree to the reasonable equipment of the Syrian and Lebanese *gendarmeries* (we understand that the plan approved by General Holmes³⁵ involves the transfer of only 100 automatic weapons and 33 reconnaissance cars).³⁶

3) Replace its *Délégation Générale* at Beirut and *Délégation* at Damascus by diplomatic missions.

At the same time we appreciate the desire of the French to obtain assurances regarding the protection of the reasonable rights and interests of France and French nationals in the independent Levant States. We are accordingly instructing Wadsworth³⁷ to urge the Syrian and Lebanese authorities to alter their present negative attitude and to enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of mutually acceptable accords with the French, defining the relations between them, which do not infringe the rights and interests of others, including the United States. (This telegram is being repeated to you).³⁸

In this connection, we regret to state that a preliminary examination of the draft "*Convention Universitaire*"³⁹ which the French are seeking to conclude with Syria and Lebanon indicates that its terms contemplate discriminatory privileges for France and that its conclusion would seriously injure American educational and cultural interests in the two States. We are now making a study of that convention⁴⁰ and will be prepared shortly to present our views in greater detail. We assume, however, that the French are not seeking to promote their own interests at the expense of others and that they would be glad to make appropriate modifications in the proposed terms.

Please discuss urgently with the Foreign Minister, solution reached which, while adequately assuring the protection of French interests, will confirm and ensure the full independence of Syria and Lebanon. You should also make it clear, if the need arises, that we regard our policy toward the independent Levant States as entirely distinct and separate from our policy toward France and the French Empire.

³⁵ Lt. Gen. Sir William G. Holmes, General Officer Commanding the British Ninth Army (Levant).

³⁶ In a letter of March 30, 1945, the British Embassy stated that the plan involved transfer of 82 Bren guns, 76 Sten guns, and 30 reconnaissance cars (890D.01/3-3045).

³⁷ Telegram 36, February 16, 7 p. m., p. 1042.

³⁸ As No. 632; same as No. 36, February 16, 7 p. m., to Beirut, p. 1042.

³⁹ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 441, July 14, 1944, from Beirut, not printed.

⁴⁰ Entitled *United States Educational Interests in Syria and Lebanon and the Proposed Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian Educational Conventions*, prepared on February 16, 1945, by the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs as Report No. A-7 (890D.42/2-1745).

Keep Department closely informed. Sent to Paris. Repeated to Beirut.⁴¹

GREW

890D.01/2-145

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State is in essential agreement with the views expressed in the British Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of February 1, 1945, regarding the situation in the Levant States, which is a source of continuing concern to the United States Government.

The American Minister at Beirut and Damascus has accordingly been instructed to make representations to the Lebanese and Syrian Governments similar to those being made by his British colleague with a view to persuading them to alter their present attitude of refusing to enter into negotiations of any kind with the French. The American Ambassador at Paris is being instructed at the same time to urge the French Government to adopt an attitude of moderation and to take steps to meet the reasonable desires of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments as regards the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, the equipment of the *gendarmeries*, and the establishment of normal diplomatic representation at Beirut and Damascus.

Paraphrases of these instructions⁴² are attached for the information of the British Government.

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1945.

890D.01/2-2145 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, February 21, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 6:29 p. m.]

44. I called on President Quwatly yesterday in Damascus (in absence of Foreign Minister) to acquaint him with nature of representations regarding Franco-Levant relations Ambassador Caffery had been directed to make urgently to French Foreign Minister (Deptel 36, February 16, 7 p. m.), and your consequent instructions to me (Deptel 37, February 16, 9 [10] p. m.⁴³).

⁴¹ As telegram 37.

⁴² Telegram 36, February 16, 7 p. m., to Beirut, p. 1042, and telegram 633, February 16, 10 p. m., to Paris, p. 1044.

⁴³ Instruction to Ambassador in France was telegram 633, February 16, 10 p. m., repeated to Beirut as No. 37, p. 1044; instruction to Minister to Syria and Lebanon was telegram 36, February 16, 7 p. m., p. 1042.

[Here follows account of conversation regarding President Kuwatly's trip to Jidda and Cairo, including information given to him concerning discussions between President Roosevelt and the Kings of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴]

I then read him pertinent passages of my instructions and of those sent Caffery, saying I felt confident they would reassure him as to our policy. He listened carefully, then had me repeat certain parts on which he commented.

I had begun with passage "all outstanding questions seem to us susceptible of friendly negotiation or arbitration in accord with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which the United Nations have adhered". He commented that for himself he had, unhappily, little faith in French good-will or good intentions. He asked what was implied by "arbitration"; I could make only general reply.

He continued by asking how Syria could adhere to United Nations pact; ⁴⁵ he wished very particularly to do so. I suggested this would seem a most appropriate question for his new Minister in Washington ⁴⁶ to take up with you. He concurred but said he would appreciate my obtaining brief direct reply. He had read that Peru and two other Latin American Republics had recently declared war on Germany.⁴⁷ Was such declaration essential? He had gathered the contrary when talking last week with Egyptian Premier.⁴⁸

Resuming main line of discussion, he welcomed our representations to French Government, especially passage beginning "if French intend sincerely to implement their promises of independence" and Department's clear statement of Syria's three chief desiderata. But he had little hope French could be brought to accept our views.

On ensuing passage he commented that Syrian Government had always been willing to give specific assurances that French interests would be fully protected; it had assumed international obligations of predecessor regime. But what were those interests?

If they were schools and missions, he continued, they might have same guarantee as that given American institutions; if railways or other material interests, no difficulty should be encountered in drafting reasonable specific assurances. If, however, there was question of so-called historic position of France, with implied right of intervention to protect minorities, or of alliance, with conventional special position such as Britain has in Iraq, he could never agree.

⁴⁴ For documentation on these discussions, see pp. 1 ff.

⁴⁵ United Nations Declaration signed at Washington, January 1, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

⁴⁶ Nazem al-Koudsi who was accredited as Syrian Minister on March 19, 1945.

⁴⁷ Relevant documentation on declarations of war on Germany by certain American Republics is included in vol. IX under Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

⁴⁸ Mahmud Fahmy el-Nokrashy.

As to reopening negotiations, he recalled that that had already been done. Just 2 weeks ago Foreign Minister Mardam had invited written proposals on all pending questions (reLegtel 35, February 8, 5 p. m.⁴⁹). Only answer thus far received was that this *démarche* had been communicated to Paris and that Paris must be given time to draft reply. What, he asked, had the French been doing these many months? He answered his own question: "Primarily playing for time."

He continued substantially as follows: "We want to finish with them. We will negotiate. The British and now you counsel patience. We have agreed, but I tell you our waiting will be in vain. You know what has happened in the Alaouite country during my absence" (reLegtel 42 of February 14, 6 p. m.⁵⁰ and despatch 663, February 19⁵¹). He elaborated: "Our gendarmes would have had little trouble in restoring order in the Murshid district⁵² had the French military not intervened. French political officers incited the trouble, and now not only do their military prevent our suppressing it but their agents are distributing arms to villages and sending word to other Alaouite districts that the French have returned and will restore their regime of autonomy of 1936-39. On least alarming construction all this seems designed to put pressure on us to sign their kind of treaty."

On subject of treatment of minorities he said Syria would willingly adhere to any formula or give any guarantees proposed by United Nations but could not incorporate such matter in treaty or accord with France alone.

He made no comment except by way of general concurrence when I told him of Department's objections to *Conventions Universitaires*.

In recapitulation, when I again urged moderation, I felt I should stress that our representations in Paris were strongly oriented to induce French to meet Syrian desiderata. I ventured to suggest that Department would not have made them except in belief that some progress towards satisfactory settlement would result.

He replied that he understood this and was appreciative but not optimistic. All he could see was protracted delay, continuing tension and, unhappily, possibility of serious conflict. Parliament had just reconvened. Its members were already impatient and less willing or able to appreciate international implications of the situation.

Had he in mind, I asked, any particular gesture—if not of good will, at least of a willingness to meet him part way—which the French

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Not printed: it reported clashes between chieftains and gendarmes in the Alaouite section of Syria and the despatch of troops by the French to restore order (890D.01/2-1445).

⁵¹ Not printed; it cited reports of French sponsorship of plans to detach the Alaouite section from Syria (890D.01/2-1945).

⁵² So named after Sulaiman Murshid, a chieftain with a large following in the Alaouite section of Syria, especially among the mountain villages back of the port of Latakia.

might make to ease the present tension, such, for instance, as prompt withdrawal of their objection to completion of gendarmery equipment? He replied by asking whether, if the French would not so agree, we would be willing to supply the lacking automatics and reconnaissance cars.

In conclusion he asked me to let him and his Government have memorandum of my instructions and those to Caffery. In light of foregoing, are there any parts thereof Department would wish me specially to stress if approving my presenting such a document; and would Department care to take that occasion to make brief reply to his specific queries on arbitration and as to how Syria might sign pact of United Nations?

His query on gendarmery equipment question was, I believe, more rhetorical than of nature requiring direct answer.

Paraphrases by mail to Paris, Baghdad, Cairo and Jidda.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/2-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, February 21, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received February 22—5:20 p. m.]

805. Bidault says in connection with the Department's 633, February 16, 10 p. m., that the situation from their point of view has much improved recently. The new British representative in the Levant⁵⁸ is much more "understanding"; Bidault's recent conversations with the Syrian and Lebanese representatives here and the conversations of the French representatives in the Levant recently have been encouraging. He says it is his intention to reach a solution which will ensure the protection of French interests but will confirm the full independence of Syria and Lebanon. He said that the "fly in the ointment" in regard to the "*Troupes Spéciales*" is the presence of 40,000 British troops in Syria "ready to take over where we leave off".

Sent Department; repeated to Beirut as 3.

CAFFERY

890D.01/2-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, February 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received February 23—10:54 a. m.]

827. My 805, February 21, 7 p. m. Bidault says that the draft proposals they will soon put forward to Syria and Lebanon for treaties

⁵⁸ Mr. Shone was appointed British Minister to Syria and Lebanon on December 22, 1944.

imply for France the same position as the British have in Egypt and Iraq.⁵⁴ They include permanent rights in naval and air bases and the turning over of the *Troupes Spéciales* at the end of the war.⁵⁵

Sent Department 827, repeated London 102, Beirut 5.

CAFFERY

890E.01/2-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1945—7 p. m.

42. You are authorized to give Syrian and Lebanese authorities memoranda incorporating substance of Department's 36 and 37, February 16.⁵⁶ In using term "arbitration" Department had in mind simply procedure commonly adopted by contending parties in agreeing to seek outside impartial assistance if and when direct negotiations fail to produce a solution of issues between them. Separate telegram follows on reply to be made to Syrian President's query regarding United Nations' pact.⁵⁷

Sent to Beirut. Repeated to Paris.

GREW

890E.01/3-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, March 1, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received March 3—3:34 a. m.]

975. Bidault tells me today, in connection with paragraph 6 of my telegram 944, February 28,⁵⁸ that although "there was no meeting of

⁵⁴ The British position in Egypt was defined in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of friendship and alliance, signed at London, August 26, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 401; the British position in Iraq was defined in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance, signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, *ibid.*, vol. CXXXII, p. 363.

⁵⁵ In telegram 1791, April 11, 1945, noon, the Ambassador in France reported French demands as airfields in Syria and Lebanon, a recognized position for French cultural and educational institutions, a position of preeminence for French diplomatic representatives, roughly similar to the British position in Egypt, and a hand in the organization and control of the *gendarmérie* (890D.01/4-1145).

⁵⁶ Telegram 37 same as No. 633, p. 1044.

⁵⁷ In telegram 48, March 2, 1945, 7 p. m., the Department stated: "As it is necessary for us to consult our associates, no reply can be made now on question of adherence of Syria and Lebanon to United Nations Declaration and attendance at San Francisco Conference." (500.CC/3-245) For documentation on invitations to Syria and Lebanon to participate in the San Francisco Conference, see vol. I, pp. 154 ff., *passim*.

⁵⁸ Not printed; the pertinent part of this paragraph reads: "In regard to Syria there was no meeting of minds. The British did not approve the draft Bidault gave Duff Cooper the day before they left for London." (740.0011 EW/2-2845) Mr. Bidault, accompanied by Mr. Duff Cooper, left for London on February 25 for discussions with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden and returned to Paris on February 27.

minds" the British did say they would support France's desire for a "predominant place" in Syria and Lebanon.

Sent Department; repeated Beirut 8, London 120.

CAFFERY

890D.01/3-245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 2, 1945.

The French Ambassador ⁵⁹ called on me this afternoon at his request and referred to a report, the source of which he did not mention, to the effect that the Soviet Union and the United States were both opposed to the claim of France to a privileged position in Syria and the Lebanon. In reply I asked the Ambassador whether I should regard his inquiry as an official *démarche* or whether he was merely exploring this subject informally. The Ambassador stated that his inquiry was entirely of an informal nature but that he wished to register the fact that if the United States had taken a position of opposition to the enjoyment by France of a privileged position in Syria and the Lebanon, his Government would greatly regret such a position on our part. I said that the term "privileged position" was of a very general nature and open to the widest interpretations. The Ambassador spoke of France's traditional interest in those countries especially from a moral and cultural point of view and said that this tradition justified his Government in claiming such a privileged position. I reminded the Ambassador that we had recognized the independence of both Syria and Lebanon, to which the Ambassador assented. I said that in view of the Ambassador's inquiry I would look into this matter and, in accordance with his request, would consider whether I might wish at some future opportunity to express an opinion on the point which he had raised.

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/3-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 2, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received March 3—3 a. m.]

2163. A Foreign Office official with whom the situation in the Levant States was discussed made the following observations.

(1) He professed satisfaction with the stand on the Syrian problem recently communicated to the French and Syrian authorities by repre-

⁵⁹ Henri Bonnet.

representatives of the American Government and he said he thought our action would contribute greatly to a reasonable solution.

(2) During the recent visit there of Bidault the question of the Levant States only came up for cursory discussion and nothing of importance was decided.

[(3)] The British representative at Damascus reports that the Syrians are becoming increasingly restive because of the failure of the French to indicate their desiderata but the French authorities there say that they are still awaiting instructions from Paris. Meanwhile the French have suggested opening discussion on a modified version of the *Convention Universitaire*⁶⁰ but the British have expressed the view that it would seem preferable to begin negotiations on less contentious subjects such as consular rights and establishment.

(4) In the conversation between Churchill and the Syrian president at Cairo⁶¹ the latter emphasized that there could be no question of negotiating a treaty with France which would infringe on Syrian independence. Churchill expressed sympathy with this point of view but said he didn't see why a treaty with the French need necessarily involve derogation of Syrian independence. He went on to say, however, that he felt that the special position of France in the Levant States deserved recognition and developed familiar themes of argument in that connection. To this Kuwatly replied that in any event there could be no question of recognition according to the French a position in Syria which would be on a par with the special position of the British in Iraq. According to the Foreign Office official the conversation was not productive of any conclusive results.

(5) Regarding the declarations of war by Syria and Lebanon the British warned both governments beforehand that they had not been among the countries listed in the Yalta Communiqué⁶² and that there could be no assurance that their declarations of war would make it possible for them to attain recognition as United Nations. The Foreign Office official added that he was glad that it had been possible to give such prior warning because he was doubtful whether it would be possible to intervene effectively in behalf of Syria and Lebanon at this late date, particularly in view of possible opposition by the French.

Repeated to Beirut as Embassy's No. 7 and to Paris as 126.

WINANT

⁶⁰ Dated February 26, 1945; copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 705, March 19, 1945, from Beirut (not printed).

⁶¹ February 17, 1945; for Prime Minister Churchill's statement on these conversations made to the House of Commons February 27, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1287, 1290.

⁶² Released to the press February 12, 1945, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, p. 968.

890D.01/3-245

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Francis Lacoste, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Alling (NE)
Mr. Kohler (NE)

Following the conversation between the Acting Secretary and the French Ambassador on March 2, 1945, M. Lacoste called on Mr. Alling today for further discussion of the question of Syria and Lebanon, with particular reference to the desire of the French for a "privileged" position therein.

Mr. Alling initiated the discussion by reviewing the relation[s] of the United States with the mandated States since the first World War. He pointed out that while we had not participated in the League and had ourselves taken no territory, we had been at considerable pains to establish our rights as a leading participant in that conflict to equality of treatment with the mandatory powers and with other members of the League. Such equal treatment, including the right to establish schools teaching in the English language, had been assured to us in the case of Syria and Lebanon by the Franco-American Treaty of 1924 and related instruments. On the occasion of the recognition of the independence of Syria and Lebanon, in September 1944, we had concluded agreements with the local Governments under which they had undertaken to continue to accord to the United States and its nationals the same equal treatment granted by the Treaty of 1924. We fully realized that France had a close relationship with Syria and Lebanon and that she had considerable interests therein, which were likewise entitled to recognition and protection by the local Governments. During the recent tension which had developed in the Levant, we had urged the French to take steps to complete the independence of Syria and Lebanon and had at the same time urged the local Governments to moderate their negative attitude and seek to negotiate agreements with France which would define their future relationships and protect French interests while not discriminating against those of other powers, including our own.

Copies of the Treaty of 1924 and of the Agreement of September 7-8, 1944, with Syria were handed to M. Lacoste, together with a paraphrase of the Department's instructions of February 17 [16], 1945 to Ambassador Caffery.⁶³ He indicated that he was familiar with

⁶³ See telegram 633, p. 1044.

the Department's Memorandum of October 5, 1944, handed to the French Delegation here.⁶⁴

During this discussion, M. Lacoste made some "personal" observations on the American "open-door" policy. He said that at the turn of the century, when this policy was defined,⁶⁵ the United States was only one of a number of powers in the world of relatively equal size and strength. However, we had now become so colossal that if the open-door policy were followed, the others would be unable to compete with us. Consequently, M. Lacoste implied, other Governments would have to seek exclusive areas and advantages.

Mr. Alling vigorously disagreed with this analysis, emphasizing the decreasing size and the increasing interdependence of the whole world. He pointed out that equality of opportunity was high on our list of war aims and that we had no intention of fighting this war and then abandoning our objectives.

M. Lacoste then inquired specifically whether we objected to a "privileged" position for France in Syria and Lebanon. Mr. Alling replied that if "privileged position" meant "privileges" not available to others, we certainly did object. We had been guaranteed equality of treatment under the mandate and could hardly agree to less favorable treatment now that they are independent.

M. Lacoste said his Government would be disappointed at our unwillingness to recognize a "privileged" position for France in the Levant States. France had given Syria and Lebanon the benefits of French culture and civilization which had greatly benefited them and had cost the French a great deal of money. France deserved some return for this investment. Mr. Alling replied that there could certainly be no element of surprise for the French Government in our views. They had been consistently and clearly stated for the past 25 years, having been the subject of long negotiations and of repeated conversations between French and American officials. Recently, our attitude had been explicitly set forth in the Department's Memorandum of October 5, 1944. Mr. Alling went on to say, however, that we should welcome a clear definition of what the French had in mind when they spoke of a "privileged position", as there had always been considerable obscurity on this point. For example, Lyttelton had written General de Gaulle in 1941⁶⁶ assuring him that after Syria and

⁶⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 795.

⁶⁵ For documentation on the enunciation of the open door policy in China, see *ibid.*, 1899, pp. 128 ff.

⁶⁶ For exchange of letters of August 7, 1941, at Beirut, by Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State in the Middle East, and Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Chief of the Free French, see British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945): *Statements of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, 8th June-9th September, 1941*, p. 3. For documentation on the interest of the United States in this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 725 ff., *passim*.

Lebanon were independent, Britain recognized that France should enjoy therein a "predominant position among European powers". In his reply, de Gaulle had referred to a "pre-eminent and privileged" position. While it was true that Mr. Churchill had used the words "French privilege" in this connection in his recent speech in Parliament,⁶⁷ there seemed to be marked confusion as to what either the British or the French really meant. M. Lacoste said he would try to obtain clarification from Paris. In reply to his inquiry, Mr. Alling said that while our principal direct concerns in Syria and Lebanon were economic and cultural, our interests should not be interpreted as being limited to those fields.

M. Lacoste then referred to the use of the word "unconditional" in connection with our recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence, which he said had been avoided by other recognizing powers. Mr. Alling said he believed the same terminology had in fact been used in exchange of messages between Mr. Molotov⁶⁸ and the Syrian and Lebanese Foreign Ministers. In any case, this was similar to the "privilege" question. Would the French have wanted us to impose "conditions" on the Syrians and Lebanese? If so, what "conditions"?

890D.01/3-1545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Alling) ^{68a}

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy
 Mr. Paul H. Alling
 Mr. Foy D. Kohler

Mr. Wright called at his request to discuss current matters.

I took occasion to refer to the memorandum on Syria and Lebanon, dated February 11, 1945, which was sent to Mr. Stettinius by the British Delegation at Yalta on the final day of the Conference. I said he might want to inform the Foreign Office that this document had had our attention.

With particular reference to Paragraph 7, I said I believed the Department's memorandum of February 17 enclosing paraphrases of our recent instructions to Ambassador Caffery and Minister Wadsworth covered the point raised therein and that the Syrian and Leba-

⁶⁷ Mr. Churchill stated on February 27: "However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian or Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both, and we do not believe that they are incompatible." For full text of statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 408, cols. 1287, 1290.

⁶⁸ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

^{68a} Drafted by Mr. Kohler.

nese Governments understood that we could not support a purely negative attitude on their part as regards their future relations with the French.

With reference to Paragraph 8, I pointed out that neither Syria nor Lebanon were "Lend-Lease" countries and said the British could rest assured that we would not in any case, unilaterally supply arms to either State without consulting and securing the agreement of the British authorities who are responsible for the military command in that theatre. I added that as a matter of fact we were adopting a general policy of not transferring any arms (other than small quantities for purely police purposes) to countries not actively participating in military operations for the duration of the war, and that we hoped other powers would follow the same policy; and after the war, we hoped armaments would be regulated by international agreement.

Mr. Wright expressed appreciation and said he would inform the Foreign Office.

890D.01/4-1645

The Syrian Minister (Koudsi) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you it has come to the attention of my Government that the French Foreign Office has opened up negotiations with the British Government with a view to the separation of the "French" army in Syria from the Allied Middle East Command and the withdrawal of the British forces from the Syrian territory.

It is the view of my Government that, prior to any decision in this matter, it is necessary to transfer the immediate command of the forces in Syria which are now under French command to the Syrian Government. The so-called French army in Syria is predominantly composed of Syrian nationals, and it is only fair and legitimate that it should be placed under the authority of the Syrian Government.

The independence of Syria has been internationally recognized. She has declared war on the Axis powers and joined the ranks of the United Nations. There remains no reason why such an independent and sovereign state should not possess the command of its forces within its territory. Without an army, independence and sovereignty lose much of their force and meaning.

The attempt of the French Government to secure exclusive command of the forces in Syria runs counter to its own recognition of Syrian independence. Its present demand for the withdrawal of the British troops from Syria gives the Syrian Government more reason to insist on its rights to command the forces in its territory

since the refusal of the French to relinquish their military authority in that territory has been based on the presence of British troops in it.

The transference of the French command of the present forces in Syria to the Syrian Government will not only restore to this Government its legitimate right. It will in addition lead to a simpler and better coordination of the armed forces in Syrian territory. The present intervention of French military authority between the Allied Middle East Command and an army which is predominantly Syrian is wholly unnecessary and does not in any way help the war effort in that territory.

Finally, it can only be said that the attempt of the French Government to secure the withdrawal of the British forces in Syria, at a time when the question of the transference of the forces under its command to the Syrian Government is the subject of negotiations between it and the latter Government, such an attempt can have no other effect than to delay and complicate these negotiations.

My Government is deeply conscious of the fact that the Government of the United States of America has always considered the Syrian situation with the utmost fairness, and that, convinced of Syria's right to freedom and independence, it recognized this independence fully and unconditionally. For this reason, my Government feels confident that the American Government will appreciate the Syrian position in this question which is so vital to Syria and bound up with the principles of democracy and justice for which this war is being fought.

Please accept [etc.]

N. KOUDSI

890D.24/4-2645

The French Embassy to the Department of State

[Translation]⁶⁰

No. 553

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1945.

The Embassy of France in the United States presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs it to have the goodness to give its attention to the matter set forth below.

The French Government has heard that the American Government is willing to supply the Syrian Government with equipment and arms for the Syrian National Army.

By order of its Government, the Embassy of France has the honor to remind the Department of State that the Inter-Allied military agreements concerning the States of the Levant are still in force, and

⁶⁰ File translation revised by the editors.

that, by virtue of such agreements, the burden of the Territorial Command and the responsibility therefor rests with the French Command. It is, accordingly, the duty of the latter to control the organization and the arming of all local forces, and it will not escape the Government of the United States that observation of the arrangements in question is necessary for the maintenance of good order in the States of the Levant.

The French Government is therefore confident that the American Government, in case it should contemplate supplying equipment and arms to the Syrian Government, will be good enough to inform it of its possible intentions, and will not initiate any measure of execution or negotiation in this connection without previous agreement with the French Government.⁷⁰

The Embassy avails itself [etc.]

890D.01/4-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1945—7 p. m.

3277. According to a message from AmPolAd⁷¹ the French propose to move French colonial troops from North Africa and France to the Levant by two of their warships. It is not known whether these troops are reinforcements or relief. The Commanding General Mid-east⁷² has notified the British War Office that he is opposed to any further increase of the French garrison in the Levant, and similar opposition to such a move, particularly in warships, has been expressed by the British Minister at Beirut.

You should discuss the matter with the Foreign Office, informing it of our opposition to the French proposal to send troops to the Levant States if this means an increase in the number or a provocative show of force. In view of the delicate political situation prevailing there,

⁷⁰ In a memorandum of May 12 of a conversation with the French Counselor (Lacoste) and the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) stated: "Mr. Henderson confirmed what had been said to Mr. Lacoste at the time the latter delivered the note [of April 26]; namely, that we were not giving consideration to supplying arms to the Syrian Government, which had not approached us on the subject." (890D.01/5-1245) For further information on this subject, see paragraph numbered 1 in telegram 1776, April 30, 7 p. m., to Paris, p. 1060. No formal reply to French note or record of conversation of April 26 found in Department files.

⁷¹ Telegram 1702, April 24, 1945, 6 p. m., from Alexander C. Kirk, United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, at Caserta, not printed.

⁷² Gen. Sir Bernard Paget, Commander in Chief, British Forces in the Middle East.

the arrival of any considerable number of French troops in the Levant at this time would certainly be regarded by the local population as a provocative and intimidating act, would prejudice relations between France and the Levant States and would add to the difficulties of achieving a satisfactory solution of the Levant problem.

We are prepared, if necessary, to instruct Embassy at Paris to discuss the matter with the French.

Sent to London. Repeated to Caserta, Paris, and Beirut.

GREW

890D.01/4-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 28, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

4334. We have discussed the subject of the Department's 3277, April 26, 7 p. m. with Campbell, Assistant Under Secretary of State, who exercises superintending jurisdiction in Near Eastern matters and with Hankey, Acting Head of the Eastern Department. They said that the Foreign Office had been seriously concerned by the reported French intention to transfer troops to the Levant States and that a telegram had been despatched last night to the British Ambassador, Paris, covering the following points:

[Here follow a summary of the telegram and British Foreign Office comment on that message.]

Regarding the views expressed by the Department and the suggestion that we might approach the French in Paris on the subject, the Foreign Office officials noted with satisfaction the striking similarity of the conclusions which we and they had reached although approaching the matter independently and they said that they had in fact had in mind seeking our cooperation and with that in view had reported to British Embassy in Washington all telegrams on this subject in order to have them available in case of need. As a consequence, the suggestion of our also approaching the French in Paris came at a most opportune time and was highly welcome. The only suggestion which the Foreign Office would have to make was that the Department might wish to suggest to our Ambassador in Paris that he consult with his British colleague before approaching the French in order to check upon latest developments and to determine whether there might be certain phases of the question requiring particular emphases or special treatment.

Repeated to Paris, Beirut and Caserta.

WINANT

890D.01/4-2845: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1945—7 p. m.

1776. You should immediately consult your British colleague with reference to the Department's 3277, April 26, 7 p. m. to London, London's 4334, April 28, 6 p. m. to the Department, and Beirut's 106 April 27, 4 p. m.,⁷³ all repeated to you, concerning the reported intention of the French to send additional troops to the Levant States. The representations which you will thereafter make to the appropriate French authorities should, of course, reflect changes in the situation and stress particular aspects of the matter which may require emphasis at this time. Subject to such modifications, you should make the following points to the French:

1. On April 26 a representative of the French Embassy at Washington delivered to us a strongly worded memorandum noting a report that the United States was willing to supply arms and equipment to the "Syrian National Army", and stating that, in view of the responsibility of the French Command to control the organization and armament of all local forces in the Levant, the United States should consult with France and obtain its agreement before taking any action. We informed the French representative that the report had no foundation in fact and that we were fully aware of the highly delicate nature of security questions in those States, which, moreover, are now under negotiation between them and France.

2. To our great surprise, we are now informed that the French are sending troops to the Levant States by warship and that as a result of the arrival of these troops, the strength of the French forces there will be increased. It has also been indicated to us that the French forces in the Levant are being augmented by local recruitment.

3. We are convinced that the arrival of additional French forces, particularly by warship, would be regarded in the Levant States as designed to influence the course of the negotiations. Any such action would seem particularly inappropriate in view of the long delay which has occurred in the presentation of the French proposals for the settlement of outstanding questions, and might well lead to civil disturbances. If the local recruitment by the French should also become generally known, this would be an additional disturbing factor. In the circumstances, in so far as they are known to us, it is difficult for us to avoid the impression that France, for political purposes, is holding down the local forces while building up her own.

4. This Government has a strong interest in the matter because:
(1) Disorders in the Levant States would be extremely unfortunate

⁷³ No. 106 not printed.

either now, when Allied forces are making their supreme effort, or in the near future when the Near East will become a highly important avenue for redeployment to the Far Eastern theatre of war; (2) The relationships to be established at the San Francisco Conference between the major powers, including France, and the smaller powers, including the countries of the Near East, constitute an issue of the first importance. Even a minor act on the part of a major power at this time which could be regarded as provocative, would have an effect out of proportion to its intrinsic importance. (3) As the French are already aware, we feel that the application by France of military force or even a threat on the part of France that it may resort to military force in order to bring about an accord with the Levant States would cause doubts to arise not only in the Middle East but in other parts of the world of the intention of the Great Powers of the United Nations to support the principles of international conduct which they have repeatedly enunciated. A friendly accommodation cannot be achieved between France and the Levant States if the element of compulsion is introduced into the situation.

5. Accordingly we earnestly hope that the French Government will not increase its troops in the Levant and that if it is considered necessary to replace troops being withdrawn from that area the French will see fit to do so in a nonprovocative manner and will give the Lebanese and Syrian Governments ample notice of their intentions. In view of the prevailing state of feeling in the Near Eastern countries, and in the absence of military necessity, we consider that any increase in the strength of the French forces in the Levant States could not be more ill timed and would be potentially detrimental to the peace and security of the Near East in a vital period.

Sent to Paris. Repeated to London, Caserta, and Beirut.

GREW

890D.01/4-3045

The First Secretary and Consul at Damascus (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State

No. 279

DAMASCUS, April 30, 1945.

[Received May 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of the conversation ⁷⁴ which Minister Wadsworth had with President Shukri Kuwatly and with Foreign Minister and Acting Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey on April 25, 1945. This memorandum will, it is believed, provide the Department with background information of a nature to

⁷⁴ Not printed.

further its comprehension of the situation in Syria in the light of present or possible developments.

It is becoming more and more evident that the principal point of French policy in the Levant at the moment revolves around a French belief in the necessity for delay. The Department will recall that the French Delegate General in the Levant, General Beynet, departed for Paris on March 9, purportedly to receive instructions after reporting to his Government. A more amicable atmosphere for negotiation had at last been established, mainly due to American and British pressure, and the General's visit, Syrian officials were led to believe, would require some ten days, after which he would return with instructions permitting him to attempt to solve Levant problems.

It will be apparent from the conversation that the Syrian Minister in Paris, Adnan Attassi, had with General Beynet and M. Bidault on April 12, as reported in the attached memo, that more than one month after the General's departure from Syria the French had little of a constructive nature to say to the Syrian Minister. General Beynet had left Syria on March 9 to get instructions in Paris from M. Bidault, and on April 12 M. Bidault was looking forward to discussing Franco-Syrian problems with the Chairman of the Syrian Delegation at San Francisco.⁷⁵

From the Syrian point of view all this procrastination seems a deliberate policy. Government officials are well aware of the temper of the population, whom they have done their best to restrain, but in Jamil Mardam Bey's final words to Mr. Wadsworth, a way must be found out of this political obscurity or "serious new troubles will result".

Respectfully yours,

J. C. SATTERTHWAITE

890D.01/4-1645

The Acting Secretary of State to the Syrian Chargé (Zurayk)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1945.

SIR: I have received the note of the Minister of Syria dated April 16, 1945 in which it is stated that it has come to the attention of your Government that the French Foreign Office has commenced negotiations with the British Government with a view to the separation of the military forces under French command in Syria from the Allied Middle East Command and the withdrawal of the British forces from Syrian territory.

The views of your Government on this problem have been carefully noted. As you are aware, the American Government has urged the

⁷⁵ Faris al-Khouri, Syrian Prime Minister.

French Government to take steps to meet the reasonable desire of your Government as regards the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, subject only to such overall supervision by the French and British military authorities in the Theater as may be considered necessary by these authorities for the duration of the war in Europe and accepted by your Government.

The attitude of this Government in the matter has also been made known to the British Government.

Accept [etc.]

For the Acting Secretary of State:
WILLIAM PHILLIPS

890D.01/5-345

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1945.

Mr. Michael Wright, of the British Embassy, who is our chief contact on Near Eastern questions, came in this morning to make my acquaintance. We took advantage of the occasion to go over the matter of the despatch of additional French troops to the Levant States. Mr. Wright brought in the attached telegram⁷⁶ which gives an account of Duff Cooper's talk with de Gaulle.⁷⁷ The British Ambassador had hard sledding, and I imagine that our Ambassador similarly will not find the going easy when he acts on the Department's telegram of April 30.

We were particularly struck, however, by the following passage:

"He (de Gaulle) went on to say that if we (the British) were prepared to withdraw all our troops from Syria, he would withdraw all his even though he would not consider it wise to do so, but so long as we maintained our force there we could not ask him to reduce his which he would be doing if he handed over the special troops."

In view of de Gaulle's suspicion that the British want to get the French out of the Levant States in order to take their place, perhaps he felt safe in making such an offer. Nevertheless, it is a clear and forthright proposition which might be used to some purpose.

Therefore, in considering with Mr. Wright what sort of instructions should be sent to the British Minister in Beirut by the Foreign Office, and to our Minister by the Department, it was tentatively

⁷⁶ Not found attached to file copy of memorandum.

⁷⁷ Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of the French Provisional Government. For his account of events in Syria and Lebanon during 1945 and the international ramifications arising therefrom, see *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946* (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1960), especially pp. 210 ff. In the companion volume of *Documents*, pp. 239-379, are the texts of various documents including French exchanges with British and American officials and with French authorities in Syria and Lebanon.

suggested that both we and the British should inform the Syrians and Lebanese of our attitude in the matter and of the action we, respectively, had taken, in order to keep the record clear. The French might think that we were inciting the Syrians and Lebanese, but that, of course, was the risk the French ran by acting as they are doing. We and the British would, of course, calm down the Syrians and Lebanese as much as we could. The thought was thrown out to Mr. Wright that the British, with de Gaulle's offer in mind, might say that they would endeavor to make an arrangement with the French whereby both British and French troops would leave the Levant States as soon as circumstances permit and very possibly before the end of this year.

This suggestion seemed to interest Mr. Wright.

He, "thinking aloud," asked whether British and French troops in the Levant States might possibly be replaced by American troops. We replied that we did not think this would be well received by the local people, who want to get all foreign troops out. We also pointed out that we have no ground forces in the Middle East which could be used, and we seriously doubted whether the War Department would agree to making American troops available for this purpose.

I hope you will agree with the line we took with Mr. Wright.⁷⁸ There appears to be nothing we can do until we hear that Ambassador Caffery has had his talk with the French about the matter and learn the French reaction. We have sent a telegram⁷⁹ asking him to let us know of the outcome without delay so that we can instruct Mr. Wadsworth in Beirut what to say in case the French put additional troops in, as they will probably do.

LOY W. HENDERSON

890D.01/5-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 3, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 6:20 p. m.]

2315. Duff Cooper showed me the text of his telegram reporting his interview with General de Gaulle.⁸⁰

After Duff Cooper had expressed the apprehension of the British Government and of the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East over the situation, de Gaulle replied that the maintenance of order in Syria

⁷⁸ Marginal note: "I think you handled the matter exactly right." W[illiam] Phillips.

⁷⁹ No. 1828, May 3, 1945, 1 p. m., not printed.

⁸⁰ For an account by General de Gaulle of his conversation with Duff Cooper on April 30 and General de Gaulle's memorandum of this conversation, see *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946*, pp. 186, 510.

was a French responsibility. He added also that when the French cruiser *Emile Bertin* visited Beirut⁸¹ during the past year, it was an occasion for festivities. The French would be glad, of course, to send troops by civil tonnage, but all French ships were being used by the pool. Duff Cooper then suggested that they be sent to Alexandria and thence by land, to which de Gaulle replied that the British would probably make objection and difficulties for the overland trip.

As it was, de Gaulle said, he was sending in three battalions and withdrawing one, whereas the British have a whole division in Syria. He then added that there would be no disorder in the Levant unless it was stirred up by the British. Duff Cooper strenuously objected to this charge. De Gaulle, however, remained "incredulous" and said that the British wanted to weaken French influence in the Near East. De Gaulle then brought up the matter of the removal of the Vichy French troops after General Dentz's surrender⁸² and without his consent; he referred also to the fact that when the British needed troops in Greece, they moved them from Italy rather than from Syria; and he spoke of the harm done by General Spears'⁸³ policy and implied that Shone, while an improvement over Spears, had arrived too late to do much good.

De Gaulle said that he was willing to withdraw all troops if the British did likewise, but did not consider this a wise move. He also added that he had never said that he would hand over the special troops to the Syrians, but implied that he now might do so.

Repeated to Beirut as No. 14.

CAFFERY

890D.01/5-445: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 4, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 6:32 p. m.]

2343. Reurtel 1776, April 30. The Department's views on the French decision to send additional troops to the Levant States by warship were brought forcefully to the attention of Chauvel⁸⁴ who stated that he was not in a position to give an official reply to my representations as this question would have to be referred to General de

⁸¹ In despatch 638, January 24, 1945, the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported the arrival of the *Emile Bertin* at Beirut on December 23, 1944 (890E.00/1-2445).

⁸² For documentation on the surrender of Gen. Henri-Fernand Dentz, French High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon, on July 14, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 725 ff.

⁸³ Maj. Gen. Sir Edward L. Spears, who resigned as British Minister to Syria and Lebanon on December 15, 1944.

⁸⁴ Jean Chauvel, Secretary of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Gaulle. He said that he assumed that I was familiar with the representations made by Duff Cooper in this regard and the reply General de Gaulle had made to him (reour tel 2315 to Department⁸⁵ and 14 to Beirut). I replied in the affirmative and he said that he believed any reply that might be forthcoming from de Gaulle would be in a similar vein.

Sent Department 2343; repeated to Beirut 15.

CAFFERY

890D.01/5-345: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1945—7 p. m.

128. Reurtel 117, May 3, 3 p. m.⁸⁶ The considerations expressed in your final paragraph are fully appreciated by the Department. You may inform the appropriate officials of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in the following sense: We received information only a few days ago of this proposed move of the French and promptly instructed our Ambassador in Paris to make energetic representations to the French regarding the unwisdom of any such action on their part. Since we have not yet been informed that the representations have been made, we do not know as yet the French reply.

You may add that we hope also that, if the French land additional troops in spite of our advice, the Lebanese and Syrian Governments will do everything in their power to keep the situation in hand in the Levant.

For your information we have discussed with a representative of the British Embassy here the possibility that Britain might take up de Gaulle's statement that he would withdraw French troops in the Levant if the British would do likewise, and might consider arranging with the French at once that at least a tentative date be set for a progressive parallel removal of the forces of both countries.

Sent to Beirut. Repeated to Paris and London.

GREW

⁸⁵ May 3, p. 1064.

⁸⁶ Not printed; it requested the promptest possible authorization to discuss with Syrian and Lebanese officials the arrival of the French troops. The last paragraph reads: "The personal relations of mutual trust which we have established with Syrian President and Ministers, thanks in largest measure to forthright declarations of policy and frank explanations received from the Department during last two and a half years, would I feel be undermined were any inconsistency with such past practice to color our attitude at this perhaps seriously critical moment." (890D.01/5-345)

740.0011 EW/5-545

*The British Minister (Balfour) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁸⁷

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1945.

DEAR MR. HENDERSON: With reference to the difficulties which have arisen over the French desire to send reinforcements to the Levant States, the Foreign Office have asked me to let you know how grateful they are for the helpful instructions which the State Department have sent to the U.S. Ambassador in Paris.

2. Mr. Duff Cooper has now been instructed to deliver to General de Gaulle a message from the Prime Minister, of which I enclose a copy.

3. Mr. Duff Cooper has been instructed at the same time to try and find out what the French intentions are as regards a treaty. The Foreign Office are disturbed at the French delay in putting forward their proposals and in starting negotiations with the Levant States, and Mr. Duff Cooper is to try to confirm that the French Government are still anxious to conclude a treaty as soon as possible.

4. Finally, Mr. Duff Cooper is asked to report whether de Gaulle has reverted to the suggestion which he made, at one time, for a simultaneous withdrawal of British and French troops from Syria, and whether, in any case, it is considered that this suggestion was a serious one.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BALFOUR

[Enclosure]

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to the President of the Council of Ministers of the French Provisional Government (de Gaulle)

[LONDON, May 4, 1945.]

Duff Cooper has reported to me his talk with you⁸⁸ about reinforcements for the Levant.

2. I am sorry to hear you look on this matter as one concerning the prestige of our two countries in the Levant.

3. We have recognized your special position in the Levant but, our commitments and duties extend throughout the Middle East. Our main task is to ensure that Allied Communications to Indian and Far Eastern theatres by land, sea and air and essential oil supplies drawn

⁸⁷ Acknowledged by Mr. Henderson on May 10.

⁸⁸ See telegram 2315, May 3, 6 p. m., from Paris, p. 1064.

from M.E. are kept secure from interruption and disturbance. The Arab countries hold firmly together and inconvenient as it may be we cannot disregard event[s] in the Levant States.

4. I have several times assured you that His Majesty's Government have no designs against French interests in Syria and the Lebanon. I am anxious to prove this to you and to meet you in this matter but so long as relations between France and the Levant States remain undefined we have to be on our guard against disturbances which might affect the whole of the Middle East. I am willing therefore, to order a withdrawal of all British troops from Syria and the Levant at the moment a treaty has been concluded and is in operation between French Government and Syrian and Levant Governments. From this point of view it would seem a great pity if the sending in of reinforcements, above those which are needed as replacements, were to cause unrest or a rise of temper. Of course this again might be offset if troops speciale [*troupes spéciales*] were handed over. It would help greatly if you could make an immediate declaration on this subject. As you imagine it is a matter of great importance to us not to have Arab world roused up with probability of sympathetic reactions in Iraq.

5. If you reinforce your troops at this moment the Levant States who have been waiting for treaty proposals for some time past may well suppose you are preparing a settlement to be concluded under duress. This might injure both yours and our relations with them and poison the atmosphere for negotiations you are about to begin. I hope therefore that you will help me in avoiding this addition to our troubles. Good wishes.⁸⁹

890D.01/5-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 6, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received May 6—8 p. m.]

2425. ReEmbtel 2381, May 5, 1 p. m.⁹⁰ Duff Cooper tells me that de Gaulle promised him last night to turn over one brigade of the *Troupes Spéciales* to the Syrians in the very near future.

CAFFERY

⁸⁹ Copy of General de Gaulle's reply of May 6 not found in Department files; for text, see *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946*, p. 512.

⁹⁰ Vol. IV, p. 686.

890D.01/5-745 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 7, 1945—noon.

[Received 8: 15 p. m.]

121. Reurtel 128, May 4, 7 p. m. I saw Syrian President and Foreign Minister in Damascus, May 5, and on return to Beirut reviewed situation with Shone yesterday evening. Meanwhile, in Beirut, Pharaon on May 5 sent note of protest⁹¹ to Ostrorog, and cruiser⁹² arrived May 6 and debarked some 900 officers and men. French Naval Commander informs Lockard⁹³ cruiser is expected to depart May 8 with approximately equal number of troops.

News of cruiser's arrival has not as yet been widely disseminated and there has been little public reaction, largely because yesterday was Greek Easter. Saturday evening several hundred Nationalist hand bills of protest were posted and only two newspaper articles have appeared today, both heavily censored.

Pharaon's note "esteems it duty to make clear that independent and sovereign Lebanon is within its rights to ask from the Allies the respect of international usage as regards the presence and passage of Allied troops on its territory." Even though in present instance only a relief is involved and Lebanese Government has been notified,⁹⁴ it is "esteemed indispensable that in future measures of this nature be made the subject of a previous accord".

Note concludes: "It goes without saying that Lebanon, at war with Germany and Japan, will always contribute with all its means and power to bring the war to victorious conclusion, by facilitating in every manner the task of Allies and notably the movement of their troops. Nevertheless prior agreement remains necessary in analogous circumstances."

[Here follows an account of general discussions on the situation in Syria and Lebanon with President Kuwatly.]

President then said Syria would protest, as had Lebanon, against this latest infringement of its rights of territorial sovereignty and

⁹¹ Copies of this protest and that of May 7 by the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs were transmitted to the Department in despatch 815, May 15 from Beirut, not printed.

⁹² The *Montcalm*.

⁹³ Lt. Comdr. Derwood W. Lockard, Naval Attaché in Lebanon.

⁹⁴ In telegram 118, May 4, 1945, 11 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported the French, at British instance, had informed the Lebanese and Syrian Governments on May 3 and 4, respectively, that a cruiser was arriving at Beirut with 800 troops as replacement for a battalion to leave approximately one week later on the same vessel (890E.01/5-445).

that Jamil Bey would concert with Pharaon to evolve a joint *démarche* designed to provide for parallel progressive withdrawal of French and British troops and transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*. Meanwhile Premier Khoury ⁹⁵ at San Francisco would be instructed to protest to Mr. Stettinius and to British and French Foreign Ministers and to consult with other Arab delegations.

Shone and I would have found in this line of approach more hope for Franco-Levant settlement had his latest telegrams from London and Paris not been discouraging, especially those reporting de Gaulle's answer ⁹⁶ to Churchill's personal messages (of which we assume Department will be informed by British Embassy in Washington). I was particularly struck by the following:

That for the first time British is [*are*] inquiring directly from the French the exact nature of the treaty arrangements France desires to conclude with Lebanon and Syria;

That de Gaulle has said frankly his chief desideratum is a military base, adding that Beynet is to return shortly to the Levant with treaty proposals and authorization to turn over to Syria one brigade of *Troupes Spéciales* "which is rather more than the reinforcements the French are sending";

That de Gaulle only reluctantly agreed that Beynet be instructed to return to Beirut before the projected reinforcements should arrive or even that formal announcement of decision to reopen negotiations be made in Paris before Beynet's departure; and

That when Duff Cooper complied with instructions to tell de Gaulle Britain would accept his proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of British and French troops, latter laughed and said ["if the British would withdraw all their troops from the Middle East[?]]. Shone added the following bit of local information in further proof of seeming intention of French to reinforce their Levant troops despite British and American protest; Ostrorog told him May 4 that if French were to transfer *Troupes Spéciales* it would be "essential" to reinforce their own troops.

It seemed to Shone and me, even at risk of further rebuff, continued effort should be made to prevent arrival of these now seemingly clearly projected reinforcements; if their prospective arrival becomes known, local situation is most likely to degenerate rapidly, with smashing of any remaining small hope of early Franco-Levant settlement through negotiation.

Repeated to Paris as 25, sent Department, paraphrases to Arab Capitals.

WADSWORTH

⁹⁵ Faris el-Khoury, Chairman of the Syrian delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

⁹⁶ See footnote 89, p. 1068.

890E.01/5-845 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 8, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

124. Grigg⁹⁷ was obviously much perturbed by information reported in my 123, May 8, 6 p. m.⁹⁸ To disturb the Prime Minister on this of all days⁹⁹ was the last thing he would have wished to do.

His position, he said, was that General Paget was responsible for overall security in the Middle East; this move of the French might well disturb it seriously; he himself was not able to authorize Paget to act (e.g. order French troops to barracks) in the event of actual trouble breaking out in the Levant.

In answer to my questioning he said that the naval C-in-C Mediterranean could hardly order the vessel, if on the high seas, not to proceed; to do so would seem almost an act of war.

I suggested that if the vessel actually brought reinforcements (rather than replacements as in case of *Montcalm*) he consider authorizing Paget, in line with powers he had just mentioned, to order that such troops be not disembarked. He said he would consider it and asked if I believed my Government would support him in such action. I replied that I would report our conversation to you urgently.

Repeated to Paris as 27, sent Department as 124, paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

890E.01/5-845 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1945—7 p. m.

133. Reurtel 124, May 8, 7 p. m. It is believed that action of the character suggested might have such far-reaching consequences that it should not be taken without the approval in advance of the highest authorities of the American and British Governments. If the British desire our support for it, it would be advisable for them to approach us through London on a high level.

GREW

⁹⁷ Sir Edward Grigg, British Minister Resident in the Middle East.

⁹⁸ Not printed; it reported the *Jeanne d'Arc* was expected to sail from Bizerte on May 8 or 9 to bring French troops to Beirut (890E.01/5-845).

⁹⁹ Presumably because May 8 was the day of surrender of Germany to the Allied Forces.

890E.01/5-945 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 9, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received May 9—5:10 p. m.]

125. ReLegtel 123, May 8, 6 p. m.¹ British Naval Base Beirut has received today a repeat signal from CinC Mediterranean that *Jeanne d'Arc* sailed from Toulon for Oran yesterday morning.

Montcalm sailed from Beirut today noon carrying some 500 Senegalese troops relieved by incoming 900 (reLegtel 121, May 7, noon, second paragraph).

Lebanese Parliament had dignified discussion yesterday ending with vote supporting Government's position as set forth in Pharaon note outlined in my same telegram.

Foreign Minister and Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee tell me they propose to reopen discussions with Beynet upon his now announced early return but to break them off short and even break all relations if French bring in more troops without withdrawing equal number. If French refuse they believe clash is inevitable.

I have had further discussion with Grigg who believes it might be helpful were Washington and London to agree that approach suggested by Pharaon note is acceptable and so inform French and local governments.

Grigg supplemented his remark of yesterday by telling me in strictest confidence he had telegraphed Churchill that "if you approve I will authorize the CinC to take such action as he sees fit" with view to maintaining overall Middle East security.

Sent to Department as 125; repeated to Paris as 28; paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

890E.01/5-1145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1945—6 p. m.

134. The British Embassy provided the Dept. with a copy² of the instructions sent by the Foreign Office to Shone prescribing the line which he is to take in discussing with the Syrian and Lebanese Govts. the landing of additional French troops. It is suggested in these instructions that he "point out that the French are within their tech-

¹ Not printed; but for summary, see footnote 98, p. 1071.

² *Aide-mémoire* of May 11, 1945, not printed.

nical rights in sending troops, that they have a formal responsibility (towards the Allied Command) for the maintenance of internal security of the Levant States, at any rate, while the war continues".

We feel that the French are landing the troops for political rather than for strategical reasons connected with the war and we do not desire that the impression be created that we are defending or condoning the French action. Nevertheless, it is suggested in view of the Foreign Office's instructions that in discussing the matter with the Syrians and Lebanese you do not take the attitude that the French have no technical right to land these troops.

It is also suggested that in your conversations with the Syrians and Lebanese you counsel them to abstain from doing anything that might cause the situation to deteriorate further or lead to an open rupture with the French. It is essential that the Levant Govts. should not misconstrue our sympathetic understanding of their difficulties as encouraging violence or disturbances of any sort.

Sent to Beirut. Repeated to Paris and London.

GREW

890E.01/5-1245

*The Lebanese Minister (Malik) to the Secretary of State, at
San Francisco*³

SAN FRANCISCO, May 12, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency's attention the following information which I received from my Government.

The French General Delegation in Lebanon informed our Foreign Minister verbally that a French cruiser was arriving in Beirut with 800 Senegalese soldiers on board destined to be disembarked there for the purpose of relieving other troops. Whereupon our Foreign Minister handed a note to the French General Delegation in Beirut dated May 3 [5] in which he emphasizes that independent and sovereign Lebanon is right in demanding of the Allies the respect of international usage in regard to the presence or passage of Allied troops upon Lebanese soil even where relief of troops was only involved. The Foreign Minister then stated that he regarded it indispensable that in the future measures of this nature should be the object of a previous agreement between the Lebanese Government and Allied interested Authorities. While Lebanon will always aid its Allies

³ The Secretary of State was head of the American delegation attending the United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. The message was telephoned to the Department on May 13 by Mr. Alling, then serving as a Political and Liaison Officer in the American delegation (890E.01/5-1345), and sent by him to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs the following day.

by every means in its power in bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, by facilitating in every way their task especially in regard to the displacement of their troops, it must insist, the Foreign Minister concludes, upon a previous agreement in circumstances similar to those above-mentioned.

The outcome of this unfortunate incident has been that public opinion in our country has become once again anxious for our independence. With such anxiety it is impossible to concentrate on the twofold task ahead of us, that of helping to bring the war in the Far East to a victorious end and that of building up a wise and just international order for the maintenance of international peace and security. We are interested in both tasks, because we declared war on Japan, and because we are here in San Francisco trying with our sister United Nations to project a charter for a lasting peace.

Owing to the uneasy tension of public opinion in Lebanon, my Government fears the outbreak of public disorders; and owing to our membership in the Arab League, such disorders may easily spread to our neighboring sister Arab countries. It is because such disorders (or even their possibility) are obviously not in the interest of our common war effort, nor of the success of our deliberations here in San Francisco, that I thought it fit to bring this whole matter to Your Excellency's attention.⁴

Permit me to seize this opportunity [etc.]

CHARLES MALIK

890D.01/5-1645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1945—3 p. m.

2104. A representative of French Embassy called on May 12⁵ at Dept's request and was informed in following sense re situation in Levant States: The landing of troops in Beirut, although apparently constituting replacements, was regarded with concern and suspicion by the Lebanese and Syrian Govts. When it becomes known that

⁴ In a memorandum of May 17, 1945, to the Acting Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs referred to a telephone conversation with his Deputy Director at San Francisco and stated: "Mr. Alling added that some of the Arab delegations, particularly the Syrian and Lebanese, had approached the American delegation with the suggestion that the recent action of the French in landing forces in the Levant without the consent of the Levantine governments be brought before the Conference, or at least be discussed informally among the interested delegations in San Francisco. Mr. Alling said that Mr. Stettinius felt that it would be inopportune for the Levantine problem to be injected into the discussions at San Francisco, and that the matter should be handled in Washington." (890D.01/5-1745)

⁵ Memorandum of conversation by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam), not printed: for discussion on May 12 of the question of supplying arms to the Syrian Government, see footnote 70, p. 1058.

French are sending more troops whose arrival would increase military establishment in Levant States, a strong reaction on part of Syrian and Lebanese could be expected. Although we had confidence in French good faith, we felt their action was unwise because Levant States may regard it as pressure upon them in connection with negotiations now in course. If as result popular uprisings should occur they might spread to other Near Eastern countries to detriment of war effort. Moreover, as Great Powers including France are now engaged in creating international organization in which trust and confidence of small countries is vital, it would make things difficult for us all if suspicion should arise from occurrence of this sort. The view was expressed that a mistake by Western power could not fail to affect the standing of them all in the Near East. Concluding, it was made clear that we had exercised a moderating influence on the Levant States by advising them to exert every effort to keep situation in hand.

The French representative replied that we could depend upon him to bring our views to his Govt's attention.

You should reiterate to the French Government the serious view taken by this Govt. of the French action in sending reinforcements to the Levant at such a critical time and in such a manner as to risk repercussions in the Near East. Moreover, it seems clear to us that such action would impede rather than facilitate the negotiations between France and the Levant States. At the same time you may state that this Govt. hopes the French Govt. will give favorable consideration to Churchill's recent proposal for the simultaneous progressive withdrawal of both French and British troops from the Levant States.

For your information the Dept. wishes to stress the concern with which it views the present situation and the importance which it attaches to your representations in Paris. It is desirable that our representatives in Paris and Beirut keep their respective British colleagues informed of developments in this matter.

Sent to Paris. Repeated to London and Beirut.

GREW

890D.01/5-1645

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1945.

The present crisis in the Levant arises from the disinclination of the French to forego in Syria and Lebanon a position of "preeminence and privilege" to which they feel entitled by virtue of their long historical association with the Levant States.

The United States recognized the complete independence of Syria and Lebanon in September, 1944; it is not prepared to admit a "pre-eminent and privileged" position for France or any other country in the Levant States. To do so would give France a legal position in these independent countries which it did not have even under the Mandate. On the other hand we have long made it clear that we would welcome free and voluntary negotiations between the French and the local Governments with a view to defining their relations.

The principal demands of the Levant Governments have been :

- (1) that the French turn over control of the native troops (known as the *Troupes Spéciales*) to the local Governments,
- (2) that the French permit the reasonable re-armament of the local *gendarmeries*, and
- (3) that normal diplomatic relations be established between the French and themselves in place of the present "High Commissioner" set-up.

The principal demands of the French, on the other hand, are substantially as follows :

- (1) airfields in Syria and Lebanon,
 - (2) a "recognized position" for its cultural and educational institutions there,
 - (3) a position of preeminence for its diplomatic representatives, roughly similar to the position the British held in Egypt,
 - (4) France must be consulted and have some hand in the organization and control of the *gendarmerie*.
- (General de Gaulle has recently stated to the British that he desired to obtain a military base in the Levant.)

The situation has thus been deadlocked for some months: The French are determined to try to maintain a special position in the Levant and to keep effective control of the *Troupes Spéciales*, and the Levant States are equally determined that their independence shall in no way be compromised and that the *Troupes Spéciales* shall be turned over to their control.

Largely through American and British efforts a *détente* in Franco-Levant relations was recently achieved, and it was hoped that a general settlement of outstanding problems could be reached in the improved atmosphere.

A crisis has now arisen, however, in view of French action in sending further troops to the Levant. Approximately 800 Senegalese officers and men arrived at Beirut aboard a French warship on May 6, to serve as replacements for a similar number who were embarked on the same vessel. Reinforcements to the extent of two battalions

are scheduled to reach Beirut on May 17 aboard another French warship.⁶ In the absence of any military justification, this action appears to bear the taint of duress in connection with the negotiations which are being resumed upon the return of the French Delegate General, Beynet, from Paris. There is even a suspicion that the French may attempt a *coup d'état* to reestablish their former position, if they cannot get what they want through negotiations. National feeling is running too high in Syria and Lebanon to be diverted, and the landing of more French troops may provoke popular uprisings that could have highly serious repercussions throughout the Near East.

We have, on the one hand, vigorously called to the attention of the French Government the serious concern with which we view its action, especially at a moment when an international organization is being built at San Francisco which requires the faith and confidence of the smaller Powers toward the major Powers. On the other hand, we have counseled both Syria and Lebanon to act with a sense of responsibility and restraint.

The occasion of the French Foreign Minister's visit to Washington may well be seized to reiterate our attitude and to express our earnest hope that France will avoid precipitating a condition in the Levant States that may lead to disorders, causing a diversion of the war effort; adversely affect the standing of the Western countries throughout the Arab world; and prejudice the outcome at San Francisco.

In regard to French demands, it may be well to emphasize our opposition to the extension of the French military establishment in Syria and Lebanon, which countries we have recognized as completely independent, and to express the hope that France will agree to Churchill's proposal for an early progressive and simultaneous withdrawal of French and British troops from Syria and Lebanon.

If a military establishment is required in the Levant States, it is suggested that the proposal be pursued in the framework of the international security system. We should also support the three principal demands of the Levant Governments (enumerated on page 1), and make clear our opposition to an educational or cultural convention which would give a preeminent position in the educational systems of Syria or Lebanon of any foreign language or culture.

We might also state that we are convinced that a generous attitude toward the Levant States now would create good will toward the

⁶ In telegram 135, May 17, 1945, 7 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported the arrival at Beirut of the *Jeanne d'Arc* at noon of the same day, the disembarking of 600 officers and men, and the French intention to withdraw perhaps 100 men (S90E.01/5-1745).

French on the part of the Syrian and Lebanese people and thus protect and serve the long run interests of France much better than insistence on retaining or creating powers or privileges which would certainly create an explosive quantity of ill will and resentment. We do not have the slightest objection to French influence in the Levant States, so long as the French secure it on a non-discriminatory basis and by the free consent of those countries.

LOY W. HENDERSON

890E.01/5-1645 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 16, 1945—4 p. m.
[Received May 17—9 : 54 a. m.]

133. Lebanese MinForAff informed me last night that following his meeting with Beynet he had again reviewed situation with Syrian MinForAff (who is to receive Beynet ⁷ today in Damascus) and established full community of view and policy. He then outlined for me highlights of his talk with Beynet substantially as reported in fifth paragraph 130, May 14 ⁸ but with three interesting additions namely:

1. Beynet, while volunteering to telegraph Lebanese Government's views regarding despatch of further French troops, gave no indication that such troops were actually en route;

2. When Pharaon referred to report and rumor of last fortnite that second cruiser was to visit Beirut, Beynet commented that this question was subject of exchange of views between Churchill and de Gaulle personally;

3. Beynet agreed to request instructions with respect to suggestion of Lebanese and Syrian Governments that accord be concluded [to] provide for progressive withdrawal of all Allied troops.

Sent to Department as 133, repeated to Paris as 32, paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

⁷ General Beynet returned to Beirut May 12.

⁸ Not printed; this paragraph reads: "According to Shone, Pharaon told Beynet today that, despite incidents of last few days, Lebanese and Syrian Governments wish to negotiate settlement of outstanding questions provided French proposals in nowise infringe their country's [*sic*] sovereignty, but that negotiations could not be continued if more French troops be brought except as replacements; Beynet had replied that he would telegraph de Gaulle report of their conversation and that he himself felt moment was not propitious for arrival of more troops." (890E.01/5-1445)

890E.01/5-1845 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 18, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received May 19—4: 12 a. m.]

137. I will report in later telegram⁹ more important details of today's conversations with Leb. PriMin and Syr. MinForAff (see last paragraph my 135 May 17¹⁰).

Latter, accompanied by Leb. MinForAff, had received formal call this morning from Beynet, who left with them identic *aides-mémoire* of which full text is quoted in my immediately following telegram.

Jamil Bey's comment to me was that "this document constitutes step backward from even Catroux's 1941 declarations¹¹ and fetters countries' sovereignty". He said that to Beynet he and Pharaon had simply said that matter would be laid at once before their respective Presidents and Councils of Ministers but it is their intention that, following such separate consideration, a joint meeting of Presidents and Councils be held tomorrow to determine texts of identic replies and other action to be taken (e.g. convening of parliaments in special session, early meeting of Arab League Council and protests to Allied Governments at Frisco Conference).

I have again urged your good counsel on both Governments but question seriously whether they can in fact keep situation in hand once text of French *aides-mémoire* becomes known. I believe demonstrations of popular protest are inevitable; and, with both Governments, I fear French *agents provocateurs* will be able so to manipulate such demonstrations as to precipitate clashes and afford Beynet pretext to intervene with armed forces "to maintain public order".

Repeated to Paris as 35; paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

⁹ No. 140, May 19, 1945, 11 a. m., not printed; it reported the allegations of the Lebanese Prime Minister, before he had seen General Beynet's *aide-mémoire*, that the French were planning to precipitate serious internal troubles, notably between Christians and Moslems, thus supplying a pretext for armed intervention, that they were unwilling to negotiate on the "reasonable basis" suggested by the United States in February, and that French policy seemed clearly one of reinforcement and reoccupation. The telegram also stated: "[When] Pharaon told Beynet that Bidault had said at Frisco France would withdraw if Brit would do so also, Beynet answered, 'That is Bidault talk; de Gaulle did not say so.'" (890E.01/5-1945)

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ For documentation on the proclamations of June 8, September 27, and November 26, 1941, regarding the independence of Syria and Lebanon, made by Gen. Georges Catroux, Free French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in Syria and Lebanon, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 726 and 786-806, *passim*.

890E.01/5-1845 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 18, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received May 19—1 : 12 p. m.]

138. Following is translation of original French text referred to in my 137, May 18, 6 p. m. :

"The first gesture of the authorities of Free France upon its arrival in the Levant in 1941 was to proclaim the independence of Syria and Lebanon. It is because of this gesture that this independence is now a fact. France congratulates herself that the initiative taken by her has had this happy result. She desires that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments exercise their full authority without any kind of limitation or obstacle.

"It is in this spirit and without any reservation respecting the independence of Syria and Lebanon that the French Government desires to assure, in so far as she is concerned, the defense of the essential interests which France retains in Syria and Lebanon.

"These interests are of three kinds: Cultural, economic and strategic.

"The cultural positions of interest to Syria and France may be defined and guaranteed by a university convention.

"The respective economic positions may be defined and guaranteed by various accords in accordance with ordinary international procedure (a convention of establishment, a consular convention, a commercial agreement, etc.).

"As regards the strategic positions, these would consist of bases permitting the guarantee of France's lines of communication and of her overseas possessions.¹²

"Once agreement is reached on these three points, the French Government would be agreeable to effecting the transfer of the special troops to the States under reservation of maintaining the troops under the High French Command as long as circumstances do not permit the full exercise of a national command."

WADSWORTH

890E.01/5-1845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 18, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received 9 : 25 p. m.]

2763. Chauvel took careful note of the message contained in Department's 2104, May 16, but remarked that he had not seen any offer

¹² In a note of May 20, 1945, to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs advised of General Beynet's statement that "under instructions from General de Gaulle, France would request naval bases in Lebanon and air bases in Syria". In despatch 293, May 24, 1945, which transmitted a copy of the note, the Chargé at Damascus noted that this was "more specific than the request for bases set forth in the French *aide-mémoire*". (890D.01/5-2445)

from the British for "the simultaneous progressive withdrawal of both French and British troops from the Levant States". The British Prime Minister in his letter to de Gaulle had spoken of a withdrawal of British troops "at the moment a treaty has been concluded and is in operation between the French Government and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments".

Duff Cooper when approached in connection with the Department's telegram was very vague and had nothing new to offer.

As reported in my 2522, May 11,¹³ he told me then that the Prime Minister¹⁴ was feeling much more cheerful about the whole business.

Sent Department as 2763, repeated to Beirut as 19.

CAFFERY

890D.01/5-1945

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault)*¹⁵

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1945.

I said that we were considerably disturbed over reports which were coming to us from Syria and Lebanon, and that a rather explosive situation seemed to be developing as a result of French troops which were being sent to the Levant States. We realized that some of these troops were merely replacements, but our reports indicated that in addition to replacements the forces were being augmented. I then read to the Minister a paraphrase of the instructions which I had sent to Ambassador Caffery on April 30th¹⁶ for presentation to the French Government. This message expressed the various reasons for the interest and concern of this Government:

a) That it would be extremely unfortunate for disorders to occur in the Levant States when a supreme effort is being made by the Allied forces, or in the near future, when redeployment to the Far Eastern theater of war will make the Near East a highly important avenue;

b) That an effect out of proportion to its intrinsic importance might be created at this time by an even minor act of a great power which might be regarded as provocative, and this in turn might be an issue of first importance at San Francisco;

c) That the application or even threat of force by France would give rise to doubts throughout the world in regard to the intention of the major United Nations to support their enunciated principles by force.

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ The British Prime Minister.

¹⁵ This memorandum is an extract from a longer memorandum of conversation on several subjects. The longer memorandum indicates that Messrs. Henri Bonnet, William Phillips, and H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, were also present (711.51/5-2145).

¹⁶ Telegram 1776, p. 1060.

The message concluded with the statement that we consider that any increase in French forces in the Levant States could not in the absence of military necessity be more ill-timed. Mr. Bidault listened attentively, and the Ambassador summarized the entire despatch in French in a remarkable piece of interpretation. The Minister did not answer specifically the points raised. He spoke of the responsibility of the French to maintain order. He referred to the presence of nearby British troops and that if any foreign troops were to be withdrawn they should all be withdrawn simultaneously. I interrupted by assuring him that I was not referring to a withdrawal of French troops but merely the dangers involved by augmenting their present forces.

890E.01/5-2045 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 20, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 7:10 p. m.]

143. Leb MinForAff Pharaon handed me this morning copies of following documents as approved at meeting yesterday of Syrian President and Minister for Foreign Affairs—Acting PriMin with Lebanese President,¹⁷ PriMin and himself:

Text of identic memorandum replies made yesterday to Beynet *aide-mémoire* reported in my 138 May 18;

Original note addressed to me requesting that such text be transmitted to you; and,

Copy of similar note addressed to Brit Minister.

Pharaon said with obvious sincerity and satisfaction, for he had personally drafted these documents, that there had been full unanimity of views between the two delegations. He said copies of memo were being given to all United Nations representatives in Beirut. Copies of all documents will go forward by air pouch this week.¹⁸

Memo stresses efforts of local govts to maintain atmosphere favorable to negotiations for Franco Levant settlement, an atmosphere now

¹⁷ Bechara el-Khouri.

¹⁸ Despatch 825, May 22, 1945, not printed. Copies of documents reflecting Franco-Syrian relations were transmitted by the Chargé at Damascus in despatch 293, May 24, 1945, not printed. Among these were General Beynet's *aide-mémoire* of May 18 and the Syrian reply of May 20, a Syrian note of May 13 to the French Delegation General protesting the use of arms, and two Syrian notes of May 21 to the French Delegation General denouncing alleged stationing of French troops on the principal routes leading to Damascus as an encroachment on its rights and exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of security, and protesting against incidents in Aleppo. (890D.01/5-2445)

seriously troubled as result of arrivals of French troops which are described as "not only infringement on independence and sovereignty but also inadmissible pressure at hour when negotiations are envisaged". Recent representations to French are then recapitulated, and memo ends:

"In these conditions the Lebanese Govt declares it is not in a position to negotiate under menace of armed force and, deploring that which is happening, can only refuse to accept responsibility therefor.

It must add that the *aide-mémoire* in its form reveals a spirit and propositions incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon.

The Leb Govt makes on this subject, in renewing its solemn protest, the most express reserve."

Transmitting notes to Brit Min and me review the memo, stressing points mentioned above, and end with expression of confidence that Leb Govt can count on our Govt's sympathetic understanding and efficacious support.

In note to me there is special passage saying Govt "has followed perfectly the kindly considerate advice of the American Govt as formulated in the memo which you handed me March 7, 1945 with a view to settlement of the problems in suspense thru frank negotiations" (see my despatch 686 Mar 10, 1945).¹⁹

In conversation with Beynet yesterday evening I was disturbed to find him apparently still unimpressed with potential seriousness of security situation. He stressed that in delivery of *aide-mémoire* he was only obeying instructions and gave me clearly to understand that despatch of cruisers and troops and policy set forth in *aide-mémoire* constituted carefully considered personal policy of de Gaulle. I commented that I could not believe it would be acceptable to local govts or in fact to my own.

He answered that he understood our position having been kept informed of Caffery's representations in Paris. He commented that I, too, was only obeying instructions and seemed to appreciate helpfulness of our counsel to local govts. Airgram follows.²⁰

I am leaving at once for Damascus at invitation Syr MinFonAff and will report later his and Pharaon's oral comment on situation.

Rptd to Paris as 40; paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

¹⁹ Memorandum of March 7 not printed; handed also to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs on March 8, pursuant to the authorization contained in telegram 42, February 24, 1945, 7 p. m., to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, p. 1050. A copy was transmitted to the Department by Mr. Wadsworth in despatch 686, March 10, not printed.

²⁰ No. A-54, May 21, 1945, not printed.

890D.01/5-2145

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The latest telegrams from His Majesty's Minister at Beirut show that the situation in the Levant is rapidly deteriorating and may lead to violence at any time. It will not be possible for Mr. Shone and his United States colleague to restrain the local Governments much longer unless they can point to some initiative which offers a prospect of escape from the present impasse.

2. His Majesty's Government are considering whether there would still be advantage in inviting General de Gaulle to London for consultation about the Levant. Meanwhile it is important that proposals should be presented, the acceptance of which would lead at least to a *modus vivendi* in the Levant States on the question of military forces there and which would have the effect of dispelling the present fear of the Levant Governments that French reinforcements will continue without any limit with the object of exerting pressure during their negotiations with the French.

3. In view of His Majesty's Government any such proposals would best be based on the military necessity of ensuring the security of the Allied base in the Middle East and Allied lines of communication to the Far East during the Japanese war. The proposals could also be linked to the recent request of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that the entry and passage of United Nations Forces into and through the Levant should be effected by agreement with the local Governments.

4. His Majesty's Government therefore would be grateful to learn, as a matter of the greatest urgency, whether the United States Government would be prepared

(a) to join them in an approach to the French and Levant States Governments urging that the whole question of United Nations Forces in the Levant States during the Far Eastern war should be the subject of immediate talks between the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Levant States. It is suggested that such discussions might be held in Beirut;

(b) to instruct the United States Minister in Beirut to join with His Majesty's Minister in urging the Levant States Government, pending the discussions suggested in (a) above, to avoid any final breach in negotiations with the French and to refrain most carefully from any action which could precipitate disorder;

(c) to instruct the United States Ambassador in Paris to join with His Majesty's Ambassador in urging the French Government to desist from further reinforcements pending these discussions.

5. Any *modus vivendi* would of course be without prejudice to any final settlement between the Levant States and the French Govern-

ment or to any decision of the World Organisation should the question ultimately have to be submitted to it. It would equally be made clear that His Majesty's Government stand by their offer to withdraw all British forces from Levant as soon as a treaty is in operation between the French and the Levant States Governments.

6. In the view of His Majesty's Government, to be effective, any action taken on the above lines must be taken immediately.

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1945.

S90D.01/5-2145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to Mr. William Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1945.

I am attaching hereto an *aide-mémoire*²¹ which was handed to Mr. Merriam, Mr. Colquitt and myself early this afternoon by Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy. Mr. Balfour stated that this *aide-mémoire* was presented in accordance with instructions contained in a telegram from the British Foreign Office dated May 20.

After examining the *aide-mémoire* we asked Mr. Balfour if he was aware of the fact that on May 18 Beynet, the French Delegate General to the Levant, had presented a memorandum to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments setting forth the basis upon which the French would be willing to negotiate a settlement with Syria and Lebanon. He said that the Embassy had received no information regarding Beynet's memorandum. We then showed him our translation of Beynet's memorandum and pointed out that the French were demanding military bases in the Levant as one of their conditions for settlement. We said that we were afraid that if there should be a meeting in Damascus [*Beirut*], as the British *aide-mémoire* suggested, of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Syria and Lebanon, in order to discuss the whole question of United Nations forces in the Levant States, the French would interject into those discussions their demand for military bases.

Mr. Balfour agreed with us that there was a distinct possibility that the French would not be willing to give any undertaking regarding the disposal of French forces in that area unless they could receive an advance assurance that they would be given bases. Mr. Balfour said that it seemed to him possible that when the British *aide-mémoire* was drafted in London the Foreign Office had not been advised of Beynet's demands.

²¹ *Supra.*

We also drew Mr. Balfour's attention to the statement contained in Mr. Wadsworth's telegram No. 143 of May 20, to the effect that Beynet had told Wadsworth on May 19 that the despatch of cruisers and troops to the Levant and the policy set forth in the *aide-mémoire* "constituted a carefully considered personal policy of de Gaulle". We said that it seemed to us likely that we could accomplish nothing in any conference in the Levant so long as Beynet took the attitude that the Levant policy of the French was a personal policy of de Gaulle. In our opinion, progress could be made in relieving the situation in the Levant States only if de Gaulle personally could be included in conversations on that subject.

We told Mr. Balfour that we were expressing merely our own personal opinions and that we were not in a position to give a definite answer to the *aide-mémoire* without consulting other members of the Department. Mr. Balfour stressed the urgency of the matter and said that he would appreciate it if we could give the British Embassy, some time during the day, an idea of our attitude with regard to the suggestions contained in the *aide-mémoire*. He added that if we felt that a conference in the Levant along the lines suggested by him would serve no useful purpose, it would be helpful if we could give to the Embassy some kind of counter suggestion.

We fear that the situation in the Levant is extremely dangerous. There is the possibility that disturbances will become so widespread that the French will call in more troops, battleships, and perhaps even airplanes for the avowed purpose of maintaining the peace. If we adopt at this time a negative attitude towards the situation, and if we offer no counter-suggestion the British might be in a position to state that we, by our failure to take any practical steps, are responsible for what may take place. You will note from the attached paraphrase of a telegram, dated May 17, from the British Minister in Beirut to the Foreign Office,²² that the British Minister has already reminded the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as the President of Syria, of Churchill's statement to the effect that it was not for Great Britain alone to defend by force either the independence of the Levant States or the French position.

We are wondering whether it would be advisable for us to inform the British Embassy that we do not believe that a conference in the Levant of the character suggested would be useful; that we feel that it would be preferable to have a conference in London provided de Gaulle could be persuaded to go to London in the immediate future; or, if de Gaulle would find it impossible to go to London at once, to have a conference in Paris. We might say that we on our part would be willing to ask Wadsworth to proceed to Paris to assist Caffery during the course of

²² Not printed.

this conference, and add that possibly the British might like to send Shone. In case the conference should be in London we would similarly be willing to have Wadsworth go to London.

There is a possibility that the British have already given certain commitments, unknown to us, to the French with regard to French demands upon the Levant States. It might be appropriate in making our reply to the British Embassy to state that we would appreciate it if the British could tell us whether they have reached any understandings with the French with regard to the Levant States which are not known to us. It is imperative, before we enter into conferences including the British and French, that we know what if any understandings exist between them. This is particularly true with regard to French bases in the Levant States. From certain remarks which have been made to us on various occasions by British representatives, we are inclined to believe that the British may have agreed not to oppose the establishment of such bases. Before conversations could be had it would also be important for us to know what our attitude should be with regard to the establishment by the French of bases in the Levant States, and with regard to the method by which such bases might properly be obtained.

LOY W. HENDERSON

S90E.01/5-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 21, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 8:15 p. m.]

212. Acting MinFonAff today presented urgent joint communication from King to American and British Ministers describing [apparent garble] use of arrival French reinforcements and Beynet's alleged demands for air and naval bases in addition to assurance French economic and cultural interests. King has already telegraphed de Gaulle, awaits reply.

Arabs cannot remain mere spectators to aggression against these states. King carefully considers Allied position and wants avoid conflict between Arabs and French.

Prince Faisal²³ instructed communicate Dept and Brit representatives Washington. King most urgently asks opinion American, Brit Govts re steps to improve grave situation and implement their promises of Syrian and Lebanese independence and what reply he can give to Levantine pleas for aid.

Repeated to Beirut.

GEIER

²³ Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

890E.01/5-2145 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 21, 1945—11 p. m.
[Received May 22—7:40 p. m.]

145. 1. ReLegtel 143, May 20. When handing me note yesterday morning Lebanese MinFonAff stressed that French-Levant affairs had reached impasse which in his view could be resolved only if great powers, especially US, intervened and insisted on application of their declared principles. Lebanon, he declared, had never since Nov 1943²⁴ been so nearly unanimous in support of its Govt.

He believed announcement that all Allied troops would be progressively withdrawn would constitute practical measure most conducive to solution; another would be conversion of French Delegation General into diplomatic mission with its implicit corollary of full recognition of Levant sovereignty and capacity to treat diplomatically with France as between equals.

Lebanese Govt, he suggested, could perhaps best contribute to solution by keeping anti-French demonstrations within orderly bounds and as counter-proposal to Beynet *aide-mémoire* submitting draft treaty of friendship, commerce and consular relations to three Great Powers and France.

2. In Damascus yesterday afternoon at meeting with foreign representatives Syrian MinFonAff handed each a copy of Syrian reply to Beynet *aide-mémoire*.

Covering note to me was along same line as Leb note but stressed also assurances of sympathetic support given in President Roosevelt's letter of December 7.²⁵ Interesting point was added that when calling on President Quwatly May 17 Beynet had said he was charged by de Gaulle to inform Syrian Govt that among French desiderata were "the concession of naval bases in Lebanon and air bases in Syria".

Anti-French movement he said was threatening throughout country; Syria was in paradoxical position of having to protect those who were cause of its troubles; all Syrians knew French had lost war but saw that here they were endeavoring to dictate terms as Germans had done in France; were their troops now to intervene purportedly to maintain order it would be like pouring petrol on fire; public temper was highest since 1925 revolt;²⁶ great powers would be asked to intervene. Airgram follows.²⁷

²⁴ For documentation on representations by the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation concerning the Franco-Lebanese crisis of November 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 996 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1944, vol. v, p. 812.

²⁶ For documentation on this subject and precautions by the United States for the safety of Americans, see *ibid.*, 1925, vol. ii, pp. 105 ff.

²⁷ No. A-60, May 24, 1945, not printed.

3. A disturbing factor in situation is that Pres Quwatly had last night serious relapse of duodenal ulcer hemorrhage which has necessitated his withdrawal on physicians' insistence from active participation in policy decisions.

Rptd Paris 42; sent Dept 145; paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

890E.01/5-2145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1945—7 p. m.

148. 1. Reurtel 144 May 21.²⁸ Dept is grateful for the manner in which you have kept it currently informed of developments in this and other messages.

2. In view of the present delicate international situation, we hope that you will continue to endeavor to prevail upon all parties to dispute to exercise restraint and to refrain from action which would exacerbate feelings and render it still more difficult to find a common ground for agreement.

3. In returning Beynet's call (reurtel 146 May 22²⁹) the foregoing should be borne in mind. You may in your discretion inform him in friendly terms that we are deeply concerned at present developments in the Levant and feel that unless the peoples of these countries can obtain some definite assurance that the French are not intending to resort to the use of force in order to carry out their policies in that area, there may be far-reaching consequences.

4. The Acting Secretary, on May 19, expressed to Bidault our hope that the French would not land additional troops in the Levant States. During the conversation Mr. Grew read to the Foreign Minister a paraphrase of passages of the Department's telegram to Paris no. 1776 of April 30.

Sent to Beirut. Repeated to Paris.

GREW

²⁸ Not printed; it reported tension was high in Syria and Lebanon; the *Jeanne d'Arc* had sailed "this morning carrying off 143 misc ineffective military and 90 naval personnel contrasting with debarkations of 600 French effectives"; and that the Syrian Acting Prime Minister had asked General Paget "today" for British military intervention on "ground that for French troops to intervene would be simply pouring petrol on fire". (890E.01/5-2145)

²⁹ Not printed. In telegram 166, May 30, 1945, 10 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported he had not returned General Beynet's call "and would prefer not to do so in present situation unless you have some specific word for me to convey to him". (890D.01/5-3045) For "present situation" see Mr. Wadsworth's telegram 163, May 29, 9 p. m., p. 1114.

890E.01/5-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Iraq (Moreland) to the Secretary of State

BAGHDAD, May 22, 1945.

[Received May 22—9:30 p. m.]

198. Following note from the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs³⁰ was delivered to me this afternoon :

“Your Excellency has undoubtedly read the exciting news reported in recent telegrams concerning the submission by General Beynet, France’s delegate in Syria and the Lebanon, of proposals for the conclusion of a treaty to embody economic, cultural and strategical privileges between France and the Republics of Syria and the Lebanon; also the news of the landing of French troops on the territory of the two countries, whose number has now reached 2,000 men without the permission or approval of the Syrian and the Lebanese Governments; and the resultant disturbances while negotiations were being conducted between the two parties. The Syrians and the Lebanese have regarded this as a threat and as the application of force for imposing the French proposals on the Syrian Lebanese side in a completely military dominated atmosphere. This resulted in protests by the two Governments against the French side, and in the anxiety and disturbance of Syrian and Lebanese public opinion. These activities are exactly similar to the methods of force which the French authorities were accustomed to adopt in Syria and the Lebanon during the period in which it denied the Syrian and the Lebanese peoples the right to exercise government in their own country.

In view of these activities of the French Government and its return to the policy of force to impose its will on two free and independent peoples whose independence has been recognized by the Great Powers, at a time when the eyes of the big and small nations are directed with all their hopes and aspirations toward the consultations of the San Francisco Conference which is preparing the charter for the international peace organization and for the prevention of aggression and despotism, the Iraqi Government regrets to call the attention of the Government of the USA to the French policy of aggression which contradicts the statements which have been made by responsible Allied officials during this war, including the French themselves. I especially refer to the following statements :

1. The statement of Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain made on May 29, 1941.³¹
2. The statement of General Catroux made on behalf of General de Gaulle on June 8, 1941³² announcing, in the name of France, the end of Mandate and rendering the Syrian and Lebanese peoples free and independent.
3. The statement of His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador in Egypt on behalf of the British Government on June 8, 1941.³³

³⁰ Prime Minister Hamdi al-Pachachi.

³¹ British Cmd. 6289, Misc. No. 2 (1941) : *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden . . . delivered at the Mansion House on May 29, 1941.*

³² *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 726.

³³ British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945) : *Statements of Policy by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and The Lebanon, 8th June–9th September, 1941, p. 2.*

4. The speech of Mr. Churchill the British Premier which he delivered in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941³⁴ and in which he announced that the administration in Syria would be handed over to the Syrians and that the realization of this would not have to await the postwar period. Mr. Churchill clearly reiterated that France would not have the position which it held before the outbreak of war—the French Government had decided upon the necessity of ending that position. Mr. Churchill concluded his statement by saying ‘Syria’s independence is a notable point in our foreign policy.’

5. General Catroux’s statement of November [December] 1943 in which he recognized in name of the French Committee of National Liberation the handing over of all powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.³⁵

6. The recognition by the Governments of the USA, USSR, and the Republic of China of the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. These Governments confirmed by their recognition their disapproval of any power having a special position in the territory of the said two Republics.

In view of the foregoing and whereas the Iraqi people are bound with Syrian and Lebanese peoples by strong ties of race, politics, culture and economics, and in view of Iraq’s special position vis-à-vis these two countries, the Iraqi Government cannot but strongly protest against the recent activities of the French Government, its landing of forces in Syrian and Lebanese territories without the permission of the two Governments, and its provocation of Arab public opinion. I therefore request Your Excellency kindly to transmit this protest to the Government of the USA and to request it persistently to interfere, mediate, and extend advice to the French Government to desist from the use of military pressure and the policy of violence on the said two Governments, and to withdraw the troops which it has landed. The Iraqi Government will hold French responsible for any grave consequences which might result in the event it fails to withdraw the troops which it has landed in Syrian and Lebanese territories, and for the critical situation which has arisen from the disturbed public opinion in the Arab countries which deeply condemns France’s return to the methods of force at the hour of victory in which the Allies and the United Nations have proclaimed the extermination of Fascist aggression.

Accept etc.,

Signed Hamdi Al Pachachi.”

MORELAND

³⁴ For extract of speech pertaining to Syria, see British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945) : *Statements of Policy by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and The Lebanon, 8th June–9th September, 1941*, p. 4.

³⁵ Presumably the agreement signed at Damascus on December 22, 1943, by Gen. Georges Catroux and the Governments of Syria and Lebanon; see telegram 9, December 24, 1943, 3 p. m., from Damascus, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 1054. General Catroux had been, until July 1943, Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in Syria and Lebanon of the French Committee of National Liberation.

890E.01/5-2345 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1945—1 p. m.

2271. 1. The British Embassy informed the Dept on May 21 that the Foreign Office had instructed it to suggest that it might be helpful if the British and American Govts could prevail upon the French to join them and the Levant States in discussions with regard to the whole question of the United Nations forces in the Levant States during the Far Eastern war. The suggestion was that these discussions might be held in Beirut.

2. The Dept has replied that since Beynet maintained that the present French policy in the Levant States is de Gaulle's own personal policy; since it was likely that the French demand for military bases would be introduced into the conversations; and since it would be unfortunate for the three great powers to argue such a subject in the presence of representatives of Lebanon and Syria, we were not in favor of entering into conversations of this character in Beirut.

3. We feel that if we are to be successful in bringing about a change in present French methods and possibly in French policy we must convince de Gaulle personally of the necessity for it. We are therefore considering the advisability of proposing early informal discussions in Paris to be participated in, in their initial stages, by the British, French and Americans, and possibly in their later stages, if agreement is reached, by the Syrians and Lebanese. Our idea is that you, with the assistance of Wadsworth, if you would like to have him, might present the American case. We hope that Shone with his intimate knowledge of the situation will in any event assist the British representative. We would appreciate an expression of your opinion as to the advisability of endeavoring to arrange for such discussions.

4. We are deeply concerned at present developments in the Levant and feel that unless the peoples of those countries can obtain some definite assurance that the French are not intending to resort to the use of sheer force in order to carry out their policies in that area, there may be far-reaching consequences. The peoples of the Near East may lose confidence in the West if at this juncture a great Western power continues to pursue the policy France has adopted in the Levant States. Regardless of whether discussions of the character under consideration are held it is hoped that you will take every appropriate occasion to impress upon the French Govt the seriousness with which we view the situation in the Levant States and to express our hope that they will refrain from additional acts which might be interpreted as a resort to force or threats of force.

5. On May 19, I expressed to Bidault our hope that the French would not land additional troops in the Levant States. During the conversation I read to the Foreign Minister a paraphrase of passages of the Dept's telegram to you no. 1776 of Apr 30.

Sent to Paris. Repeated to London.

GREW

890D.01/5-2345

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State*³⁶

[WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1945.

It seems to us that the present situation in Syria and Lebanon may have extremely far-reaching consequences, and we therefore feel that we should express to you some of our thoughts on the subject.

In spite of the friendly suggestions which the British and ourselves have been making to the French, they have persisted in pursuing a policy in the Levant States which certainly does not seem to be consistent with the principles which the United Nations have stated they are upholding, and which apparently ignores the purposes and aims of the International Security Organization which we are trying to form in San Francisco. On the same day that the French diplomatic representative in the Levant States presented to Syria and Lebanon demands which would give France a special position, including "strategic bases", and which would infringe upon the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon, the French landed additional armed forces from a French warship. It is clear that France is at present using force, or the threat of force, in order to extract from two members of the United Nations, which both France and we recognize as independent countries, concessions of a political, cultural and military nature. While we in San Francisco are talking about world security and are devising methods for combating aggression, France is openly pursuing tactics which are similar to those used by the Japanese in Manchukuo and by the Italians in Ethiopia. It will be difficult for any small nation or any great power to have any confidence in the effectiveness of the International Security Organization if, at the very time that it is being built, we close our eyes to what is taking place in Syria and Lebanon,

³⁶ In a memorandum of May 23, 1945, to Mr. Grew, Mr. Phillips, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, stated: "Mr. Henderson's memorandum is worth careful study. After talking to him about the situation, I feel strongly of his opinion as it is expressed in the final paragraph on page 2 and the following paragraph on page 3 [the last two paragraphs of the memorandum]. He presents an alarming picture which we must have clearly in mind while we are pursuing our policy of closer association with Britain and France." (890D.01/5-2345)

merely because at this particular moment it would be politically inopportune, from an international point of view, for us to take a firm attitude towards France.

We realize that just now it is extremely important that the three great Western powers, Great Britain, the United States and France, cooperate closely together to strengthen such ties as already exist between them. On the other hand it is more important that these ties be strengthened on a basis which will strengthen the confidence of the rest of the world in us.

So far as we are aware, French action with regard to Syria and Lebanon is the first instance since the formation of the United Nations in which a great Western power has deliberately set about by force and threats of force to work its will upon smaller powers, without provocation and in its own selfish interest. It is possibly true that Russia has pursued similar tactics with regard to various smaller countries in Eastern Europe. Our inability to take effective measures to prevent Russia from infringing upon the sovereignty of its neighbors has resulted in the loss of prestige to the United Nations. That is serious. But it is much more serious for a great Western power, possessing democratic traditions, to follow a course similar to that pursued by Russia in Eastern Europe. It is possible for the small countries of the world to differentiate between the great democratic powers of the West and the Soviet Union. They are almost certain, however, to judge all the Western powers in the light of policies pursued by any one of them. Western prestige in the Near and Middle East rises or falls to the extent to which the great Western powers live up to the principles which they themselves maintain they are defending.

At the present time, while France is pursuing a policy which is alarming the whole Near East, the American press is carrying numerous articles to the effect that there is an improvement in the relations between the United States and France, and that we are planning for still closer cooperation with France. Thus far there has been no indication from any official source that the Government of the United States does not approve of the tactics which the French are pursuing. It is understandable, therefore, that the countries and peoples of the Near East are rapidly losing confidence in us and are beginning to question our good faith. In this, the first great test of the sincerity of our statements that we are determined to bring about a world system in which all small nations may have a sense of security, we are remaining silent and are allowing the exigencies of the moment to prevent us from taking action which might help to prevent the world from going back to the practices which, from 1931 to 1939, resulted in the present war.

In this memorandum we are not attempting to give suggestions as to precisely what action we should take with regard to the tactics adopted by France in the Levant States. Our purpose here is merely to emphasize the importance of the decisions which we must make in the immediate future. Are we, at the moment that the International Security Organization is being launched, to tolerate one of our Allies engaging in a policy which partakes of aggression because we do not wish to give offense to that Ally? Or are we to make it clear to that Ally and to the rest of the world that we intend to follow a policy of combating aggression, even though such aggression should be committed by our closest friends and even though the combating of it might be extremely inconvenient to us?

LOY W. HENDERSON

890D.01/5-2445: Telegram

*The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mardam) to President Truman*³⁷

[Translation]

DAMASCUS, May 23, 1945.

Syrian Government handed your Minister Damascus copy French *aide-mémoire* formulating demands absolutely incompatible Syrian sovereignty independence as well as copy note in reply Syrian Government protesting against influx French troops and refusing any discussion on bases. *Aide-mémoire* your Government had recognized Syrian independence and excluded granting any privilege. Now France asks privileges infringing on independence and legitimate rights Syria. Anxious to maintain order Near East and not to have recourse to extreme measures of nature to open new phases of bloody hostilities after end of war in Europe Syrian Government solicits use of your benevolent intervention in order to induce France to withdraw troops and respect Syrian sovereignty.

JAMIL MARDAM

890D.01/5-2345

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Ref: 256/—/45

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the interest of the United States Government in the problem of the Levant

³⁷ Original message transmitted to the Department on May 24 by M. C. Latta, Executive Clerk of the White House, and returned to him on June 21 with a translation and a copy of the Acting Secretary's reply, telegram 161 of May 30, p. 1115.

States and are prepared, as they suggest, to join the United States Government in proposing discussions in Paris on the question of Allied Forces in Syria and the Lebanon.

2. His Majesty's Government do not wish to discuss the question of French bases at such a meeting. They regard this question as one that should be settled by agreement between France and the Levant States. Alternatively, if there is disagreement (as now seems inevitable), the question might be settled by the World Organisation when it is formed. At this stage His Majesty's Government do not feel that it is for them, either alone or in association with the United States of America, to tell the Syrians and Lebanese that they must accept a French base or bases under any particular conditions, or for that matter to tell the French that in the absence of agreement they cannot have one.

3. The immediate question at issue is whether or not France will be entitled to send reinforcements to the Levant States against the wishes of their Governments. Clearly during the war with Japan there are special considerations here, quite apart from any long-term strategic rights the French may have in Syria and the Lebanon. His Majesty's Government would hope to get a provisional understanding with the Levant States and France, as the result of the discussions proposed, that in future Allied troops will only be sent to Syria and the Lebanon by agreement with the Levant States, but that the latter will grant any facilities necessary for the prosecution of the war with Japan and possibly also that Allied troops will not in any circumstances be used for internal political purposes.

4. Clearly this will in the end require Syrian and Lebanese participation in the discussions, but His Majesty's Government would be willing to endeavour to open matters with the French by joint representations in Paris, as proposed by State Department, provided the Levant States are kept informed. His Majesty's Government do not feel able to recall Mr. Shone for these discussions while the present local tension continues.

5. His Majesty's Government would be grateful to learn as soon as possible whether the United States Government will make joint representations with them to the French Government accordingly, at the same time informing the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of the action being taken and urging them to preserve order while the discussions are in progress. The representations of His Majesty's Government and the United States Government to the French Government should, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, include an urgent request not to send further reinforcements to the Levant States pending the outcome of these discussions.

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1945.

890D.01/5-2345

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1945.

Participants: Mr. J. Balfour, British Minister
 Mr. Merriam ³⁸
 Mr. Henderson

Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy left the attached *aide-mémoire* ³⁹ with me today. After glancing at it I told him that we had already asked Caffery if in his opinion any useful purpose would be served by the holding of discussions in Paris, and that we would let him know the nature of Caffery's reply.

I also told him in confidence that we were considering the advisability of sending a strong note to the French Government on the subject of French policy in Syria and Lebanon and outlined to him what we had in mind. He was very much interested and said that he would appreciate it if we would let him know the nature of any action which we might decide to take.

He asked me if the United States opposed the granting of bases by the Levant States to France. I said that I was not in a position to give an answer to that question at the present time; that at present we were confining our representations to France to the tactics which France appeared to be employing rather than to French objectives. I doubted that we would oppose the free granting by Syria and Lebanon of bases to France, but I could make no positive statement on the subject.

LOY W. HENDERSON

890E.01/5-1245

The Acting Secretary of State to the Lebanese Minister (Malik) ⁴⁰

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 12, 1945, in which you bring to my attention certain information which you have received from your Government in regard to the proposed landing of French relief forces at Beirut.

This Government is aware of the circumstances referred to in your note and is giving the matter its careful attention, and earnestly hopes

³⁸ Gordon P. Merriam, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

³⁹ *Supra.*

⁴⁰ Sent by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on May 24 to the Deputy Director of that Office for delivery to Dr. Malik at San Francisco.

that a solution may be reached which will be satisfactory to the Government of the Lebanese Republic.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

S90D.01/5-2445 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 24, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received May 25—5:07 p. m.]

218. ReLegs 212, May 21, 7 p. m. Second note from King Abdul Aziz received this hour to which he expects answer. Summary as follows:

French Levant trouble has reached crisis. Announced French policy violates independence and challenges all who support Syrian and Lebanese independence including USA, Britain and all Arab countries.

Limit has been reached. If French aggression continues Syrians will defend themselves but this defense can succeed only with help from US and Britain which recognized and supported their independence. Unless USA and Britain intervene the blemish and blame will fall upon all.

I request intervention by whatever means will effectively (1) prevent violence (2) oblige the French to withdraw such demands as violate independence (3) persuade the Syrians to seek peaceable solution.

This is the first test and the whole world is watching. I request the Allies to redeem the high principles they announced and the liberties for which they sacrificed life and property in the war.

Such intervention will maintain the honor of the Allies, the plighted word of Arab solidarity and the renown of the King Abdul Aziz, who continues to advise the Syrians to be calm, believing that after victory the Allies would see justice done to Syria and Lebanon.

Intervention is requested now.

Paraphrased to Arab capitals.

EDDY

S90E.01/5-2445 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 24, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received May 24—5 p. m.]

152. 1. Syrian MinFonAff today informed Satterthwaite that Govt had received from Beynet acknowledgment of Syrian reply to his *aide-mémoire* saying in view of prevailing situation he had referred it to his Govt.

2. Lebanese MinFonAff repeated to me substantially as outlined in my 145, May 21, his views on how escape from Franco-Levant impasse might be found. He felt situation was deteriorating in Syria and the now well in hand in Lebanon, Lebanese would react sympathetically [if] serious Franco-Syrian clashes should occur. He then diagnosed resulting problem as requiring "combined palliative and direct treatment".

The palliative he urged should be Allied statement that their troops would be progressively withdrawn and *Troupes Spéciales* simultaneously progressively transferred to the states implemented by exchanges of notes or *modus vivendi* defining status of Allied troops during such transitional period. As direct treatment he was now prepared to offer draft treaty proposals to three great powers and France; he had completed first drafts and would go over them this week-end with Syrian MinFonAff.

Pharaon then said he had already mentioned possibility of such direct *démarche* to Brit and Soviet Ministers; with me he wished to go further on strictly personal plane should I so prefer; as I had been helpful in obtaining text of our Norwegian treaty⁴¹ as suggestive model he would like me to read and if possible comment on his drafts; in their preparation he had consulted several other texts as well.

I agreed but can readily avoid offering any comment even of personal nature should you so prefer. It was clear too that he would particularly welcome some encouragement from you as to the wisdom and timeliness of his suggested *démarche*. He would of course find it very awkward to be rebuffed in all quarters.

3. I found of interest also in this general connection comment made to me 2 days earlier by Gen Paget substantially as follows: "International cooperation is needed to solve this problem; I can't, even should I persuade Beynet to agree to necessity for completing arming of *gendarmerie*. World opinion as I see it can't accept the terms Beynet has offered; we couldn't for example force Egypt to give us bases; there they could be had only by mutual agreement based on mutual interest. Why should the French be permitted to force these countries to give them; besides this is no place strategically speaking from which to protect French lines of communication."

Similarly Gen Pilleau⁴² commented to me yesterday evening that solution of this problem would seem to lie only on highest international plane, e.g. by Big Three or Anglo-American decision (prefer-

⁴¹ Treaty of friendship, commerce and consular rights, and additional article, signed at Washington June 5, 1928, and February 25, 1929, respectively, *Foreign Relations*, 1928, vol. III, p. 646. Two copies of the treaty were transmitted to the Minister in Syria and Lebanon in instruction 306, February 2, 1945, not printed.

⁴² Maj. Gen. Gerald A. Pilleau, Acting Commander of the British Ninth Army (Levant).

ably with French participating and concurring) that all Allied troops will leave progressively.

Such a decision he suggested might probably best be implemented by General Alexander as Allied CinCMed⁴³ responsible to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Rptd Paris as 45, sent Dept as 152, paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/5-2545

The Syrian Chargé (Zurayk) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 52S/57L

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed by my Government to call the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the growing seriousness of the situation in Syria, brought about by the new demands of France and her sending of fresh troops to our country.

The demands of the French Government for cultural and economic privileges and for military bases in Syria, as a condition for the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* to the Syrian Government, and its stipulation that even then these forces should remain under French military command, constitute an encroachment on the national sovereignty of our country, whose independence has been fully recognized by the United States Government and whose representatives are now participating with the representatives of the other United Nations at San Francisco in the drawing up of a Charter of International Organization.

As one of the United Nations, Syria has always been ready and willing to shoulder her responsibilities in the new World Organization, and for this purpose she legitimately wishes to enjoy the rights of independence and full sovereignty, first among which is the possession of military authority over her own territory.

It is the decided policy of the Syrian Government to cultivate cooperation and mutual understanding with all the United Nations. It sees no reason why it should grant any privileges to any single Power, especially when such privileges limit its independence and condition its sovereignty.

Instead of recognizing this natural and historical right of Syria, the French Government has delayed the transfer to the Syrian Government of the *Troupes Spéciales*—which are predominantly composed of Syrian nationals—and has lately made this transfer conditional on the Syrian Government's acceptance of its demands for a privileged cultural, economic and military position in Syria.

⁴³ Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

Furthermore, the French Government has sent new troops to Syria. This measure, in the view of my Government, can be interpreted only as a means of exerting pressure on it to accept the French demands. This appears from the fact that the first contingent of troops arrived on May 8, a few days before the French representative General Beynet presented to the Syrian Government the demands of his Government (May 19 [18]). The second contingent came just on the eve of the latter day.

The Syrian Government and people have protested vehemently against this new move, in which they see a threat to their independence and to their freedom. The situation grows daily more serious, and its repercussions are spreading through all the Arab Middle East. While the Syrian Government is ready to continue to exercise the utmost self-restraint and to do its best to relieve the present tension, it cannot but protest against and resist this attempt to impose upon it conditions and demands which bind the future of the Syrian people.

The Syrian Government deeply appreciates the sense of fairness and justice with which the United States Government has always viewed this question. It has therefore every reason to hope that the United States Government will exercise its utmost to secure its prompt and just settlement, on the basis of Syria's internationally recognized independence and full sovereignty.

Please accept [etc.]

COSTI K. ZURAYK

890D.01/5-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 25, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 8:04 p. m.]

2957. My tel. 2956, May 25.⁴⁴ In view of Bidault's statement regarding Syria and Lebanon I suggest that the proposal set out in Depts 2271, May 23, be held in abeyance for a few days.

Sent Dept as 2957, rptd London as 340.

CAFFERY

890D.01/5-2545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 25, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received May 25—5:24 p. m.]

5241. In discussing Levant States question with us yesterday Hankey, Acting Head of Eastern Dept spoke favorably of Dept's sug-

⁴⁴ Vol. iv, p. 699.

gestion that discussions should take place at Paris rather than Beirut but said that Shone did not feel that he could absent himself from his post at so critical a time in order to participate in discussions and FO ⁴⁵ agreed. Hankey indicated however that a FO official might go to Paris if it was decided to hold conversations there.

Regarding possible discussion of military bases during projected conversations Hankey indicated that current FO thinking is opposed to taking up that issue at this time and favors confining discussion to reinforcement question with emphasis on implications bearing on prosecution of Far Eastern War. To take up question of bases at this time, Hankey observed, would almost certainly lead to protracted discussion entailing undesirable delay in clearing up reinforcement matter.

Meantime, said Hankey, a telegram had just been received from Duff Cooper suggesting that French might be receptive to a proposal by which the *Troupes Spéciales* would be turned over in return for certain assurances in respect of recognizing special French position and granting military bases. Hankey was inclined to doubt the practicability of such an offer and reiterated disinclination of FO to bring the question of military bases to the fore at this time.

This morning Lebanese Chargé d'Affaires called to leave with FO copy of a note delivered by him and Syrian Minister at the FO on May 23 and to express on his own behalf and that of Syrian Minister their great concern as result of reports reaching them from their Govts, the most recent of which had been received this morning and had stated that situation was taking a serious turn which made it difficult to predict consequences unless there is rapid intervention. Chargé expressed view that half measures would only serve to prolong difficulty and appealed for strong Anglo-American move to curb unjustified French designs on Levant States once and for all.

Note to FO conveys text of communication of May 19 from Lebanese Govt to French representative in Beirut, mentions a similar protest made by the Syrian Govt and says that on advice of Eden and Churchill calm had been preserved by Syrians and Lebanese regarding previous *Troupes Spéciales* difficulty but that situation has again been aggravated by latest French action and Syria and Lebanon therefore look to Brit Govt for support in spirit of Eden's declaration at San Francisco that "the smaller powers shall be left free to live their

⁴⁵ Foreign Office.

lives in full independence.”⁴⁶ Full text of note being transmitted by airmail.⁴⁷

Sent Dept as 5241 ; rptd Beirut as 11 and Paris as 304.

WINANT

611.0031/5-2645

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1945.

Participants: The President;
Mr. Dean Acheson;⁴⁸
The Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew.

I called on the President this morning at 9 : 30 with Dean Acheson. Admiral Leahy⁴⁹ was also present at my request. I took up the following matters :

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11. I told the President of the serious situation developing in the entire Near East as a result of the sending of French troops to Syria and Lebanon, thereby bringing pressure to bear on those countries in anticipation of negotiations, and that I thought we should address a note to the French Government which while polite in tone would register our unequivocal opposition to France’s policy and action in those states. I also said that we might watch the situation for a few days but that if France continued to follow her present policy, which is totally contrary to the whole spirit and purpose of the San Francisco Conference, we might consider publishing our note in order to make our position clear to the entire Near East and such publicity might have a favorable effect on the French Government. The President read the proposed note and approved it after consulting Admiral Leahy.

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JOSEPH C. GREW

⁴⁶ This seems to be a paraphrase of remarks made by Mr. Eden on April 26, 1945, at the First Plenary Session of the United Nations Conference on International Organization ; for text, see Department of State, *The United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, April 25 to June 26, 1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 261, 262.

⁴⁷ Despatch 23287, May 28, not printed.

⁴⁸ Assistant Secretary of State.

⁴⁹ Fleet Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy.

890D.01/5-2645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)*⁵⁰

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1945—noon.

2331. Unless you perceive strong reasons for withholding action, I wish you to present the following note to the French Government:⁵¹

"I have been instructed by my Government to convey to the Government of France the deep concern which my Government feels with regard to recent developments in Syria and Lebanon.

An impression has been created in the United States and elsewhere that French representatives have been using the threat of force to obtain from Syria and Lebanon concessions of a political, cultural, and military nature. It is understood that, at a time when the French Delegate General to the Levant States was presenting to the Governments of Syria and Lebanon proposals which, if accepted, would give France a special position in those countries, a French warship was landing fresh armed forces in Beirut.

Syria and Lebanon are recognized by France and the United States as independent countries. They are also members of the United Nations whose representatives, including representatives of France and of the United States, are now discussing in San Francisco means for guaranteeing world security and for combating aggression.

It is important, at the very time when the International Security Organization is in process of being created at San Francisco, that in order to inspire confidence in its future effectiveness all nations, both great and small, refrain from any act which might give rise to a suspicion—however unjustified—that a member of the future organization may be pursuing a policy not in conformity with the spirit and principles which that organization is being established to defend.

The United States places a great value upon the historic friendship which, since its founding, has bound it to France. It considers that France and the United States which share the inheritance of a common democratic past have a particular responsibility for the vitality and influence of the democratic tradition, and that the extent to which that tradition will continue to influence the course of history depends upon the manner in which the great nations which are its exponents make use of their position and their power and upon their willingness to cooperate with one another.

The Government of the United States, therefore, in a most friendly spirit earnestly urges the Government of France carefully to review its policy toward Syria and Lebanon with the purpose of finding a way to make it clear to those countries and to all the world that, in its dealings with the Levant States, France intends to treat them as fully sovereign and independent members of the family of nations."

GREW

⁵⁰ Marginal notation: "OK H[arry] S T[ruman]."

⁵¹ In telegram 3011, May 28, 1945, 5 p. m., the Ambassador in France reported that he had delivered the note to the French Government the same morning (890D.01/5-2845).

890D.01/5-2645

The British Minister (Balfour) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

Ref: 256/—/45

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1945.

MY DEAR HENDERSON: This is to let you know that in reply to further telegrams from our Minister at Beirut stressing the extremely tense situation which has developed in Syria, the Foreign Office sent him further instructions on May 25th.

These instructions request Shone to represent to the Syrian Government at once that it is essential that they should maintain control of the situation. If the Syrians precipitate disorder it would not predispose His Majesty's Government in their favour. It seemed essential in particular that they should control the situation at Homs and Hama. Only a few hundred French troops have so far arrived and there are no grounds which would excuse the Syrians resorting to disorders which may have repercussions on the Allied war effort.

Shone was authorized to inform the Syrian Government at the same time that His Majesty's Government are also making representations in Paris about the need for calm. The Foreign Office suggested to him that he should speak similarly to General Beynet if he had not already done so.

Shone for his part has emphasised the need for some public statement indicating that His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have started conversations with the French Government about the position of Allied troops in Syria and the Levant.

You will no doubt let us know, as soon as you are in a position to do so, how your further consideration of this matter is developing.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BALFOUR

890E.01/5-2745 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 27, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received May 28—11:43 a. m.]

157. Herewith summary of yesterday's reports:

In Lebanon no outward change or relief to troubled leaders. PriMin called following meeting with Syrian Acting PriMin to urge promptest possible reassuring statement by Brit, French and Amer Govts.

One week ago, he said, simple forthright French declaration that no more troops would arrive could probably have calmed situation; since then too much had happened for us to count on that sufficing; today most effective additional curative would be for all French troops

to leave cities immediately; otherwise countrywide civil war in Syria seemed inevitable with sympathetic anti-French rising in Lebanon.

At this meeting PriMin's need for further arming of *gendarmeries* to reestablish order in such degree as Gen. Paget (irrespective of French objection) might decide was necessary most effectively to reestablish order was listed as third urgent desideratum; a fourth was assurance that *Troupes Spéciales* would be early transferred irrespective of progress of treaty negotiations.

Decision was also taken that Govts could no longer cooperate with French in OCP; ⁵² to do so in present state of security would be to invite failure of grain collections with resultant threat of famine in urban areas; this threat would become reality were revolt to sweep the country; Govts were willing to advance necessary Lebanese pounds 60,000,000 for crop purchases and to retain 50 odd Brit technical experts now serving in OCP.

Syria and Lebanon, he added, have now asked for immediate meeting of Arab League Council heretofore belated in deference to Ibn Saud's wish that Faisal attend.

[Here follow accounts of anti-French demonstrations at Damascus and alarming reports from Aleppo of desertions by *Troupes Spéciales*, the wounding of persons by shells or grenades, and damage to houses.⁵³]

WADSWORTH

890D.01/5-3045

Statement by the Acting Secretary of State ⁵⁴

Asked to comment on the situation in Syria and Lebanon, the Acting Secretary said that he had learned with deep regret that disorders resulting in injury and loss of life have occurred in Lebanon and Syria following the recent arrival of French troops in Lebanon.

He said that during recent months this Government has repeatedly urged the Government of France, Lebanon, and Syria to make every effort to reach a friendly agreement with regard to outstanding questions which would be fully consistent with the independence of the latter countries and which at the same time would take cognizance on a non-discriminatory basis of French interests therein.

He added that it is particularly unfortunate, at a time when the

⁵² *Office des Céréales Panifiables*, a joint Franco-British organization which monopolized the purchase and distribution of grain, particularly wheat, in Syria and Lebanon.

⁵³ In telegram 159, May 27, 1945, 10 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported serious clashes between *Troupes Spéciales* and demonstrators at Hama (890D.01/5-2745).

⁵⁴ File copy indicates that this statement was issued "in lieu of press and radio news conference, Monday, May 28, 1945".

United Nations are endeavoring to perfect an International Security Organization, that differences between members of the United Nations have resulted in disorders and loss of life. This Government is continuing earnestly to urge the French, Lebanese, and Syrian Governments to refrain from taking any action which might aggravate the situation and render still more difficult the reaching of an amicable and equitable settlement in a friendly atmosphere.

890D.01/5-2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1945.

Participants: Mr. John Balfour, British Minister
Mr. Phillips
Mr. Henderson

Mr. Balfour of the British Embassy handed me, on the afternoon of May 26, the attached *aide-mémoire*⁵⁵ which stresses the growing seriousness of the situation in Syria and Lebanon and urges an immediate conference in Paris or London, preferably in London, in which the United States, Great Britain and France would participate for the purpose of discussing the Levant problem.

I told Mr. Balfour that our Ambassador in Paris had informed us that he considered that it would be advisable not to suggest discussions for the moment.⁵⁶ I added that in the meantime we had sent him a telegram⁵⁷ incorporating a note on the subject to the French Government which we asked him to deliver in his discretion. This note was couched in friendly language. It expressed the desire of the United States to strengthen the friendly relations which existed between France and the United States and the hope that the French Government, in view of the effect which the employment of force in Syria and Lebanon would have upon the San Francisco Conference and possibly upon the peace of the Near East, would review its policy with regard to Syria and Lebanon. I pointed out that in our opinion there would be nothing to prevent the inauguration of discussions in London or Paris even though such a note should be delivered, provided our Ambassador in Paris should express the opinion that a conference might be useful.

On Sunday⁵⁸ afternoon Mr. Balfour telephoned me. He said that he had just received an urgent telegram from London stating that his

⁵⁵ No. 256/—/45, May 26, p. 1105.

⁵⁶ Telegram 2957, May 25, 4 p. m., p. 1101.

⁵⁷ No. 2331, May 26, noon, p. 1104.

⁵⁸ May 27.

Government is convinced of the necessity of the inauguration at once of discussions with the French Government on the subject of Syria and Lebanon; that it would like to issue at once an invitation to De Gaulle to come to London; and that it hoped that the State Department would not present the proposed note to the French Government for the moment but would instead support a meeting with General De Gaulle either in London or Paris. He added that he was sending the Department an *aide-mémoire* on the subject. A copy of the *aide-mémoire* is attached hereto.⁵⁹

I told Mr. Balfour that the note which we had sent to our Ambassador for possible delivery to De Gaulle was friendly, and in our opinion would not necessarily prevent the holding of a conference. I said that it was our feeling that it is the duty of the American Government to urge the French Government not to weaken the prestige of the great democratic powers by following a policy which employed methods which make it appear that France is using the threat of force in order to obtain concessions from the Levant States. I added that I would nevertheless refer the matter to my superiors in the Department.

I informed Mr. Phillips later in the afternoon (Sunday) of the substance of my conversation with Mr. Balfour. Mr. Phillips was of the opinion that we should continue to leave the decision with regard to the delivery of the note to the discretion of Mr. Caffery. I have not, as of this morning, given a final reply to the British suggestion that we agree to inaugurate conversations with De Gaulle.

During the course of the telephone conversation on Sunday afternoon with Mr. Balfour, Mr. Balfour told me that Duff Cooper had reported that during a conversation which he had with De Gaulle on May 26 De Gaulle seemed surprised when the British Ambassador told him that the Americans were interested in the subject of Syria and Lebanon. De Gaulle said that he had heard nothing from the United States Government on this subject. Mr. Balfour promised to send me a paraphrase of Duff Cooper's report of his conversation with De Gaulle. This paraphrase was sent to the Department late Sunday afternoon in the form of an *aide-mémoire* which is attached hereto.⁵⁹

Mr. Balfour also informed me that the Foreign Office had received a telegram from Beirut, dated May 25, from which it would appear that the French are planning to send additional troops to Syria and Lebanon on a warship said to be called the *Jean Bart*.

LOY W. HENDERSON

⁵⁹ Not found attached to file copy.

890E.01/5-2845

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The manner in which the British Government, through the British Embassy in Washington, has kept the American Government currently and fully informed regarding recent developments with respect to Syria and Lebanon, and the British Government's views with regard thereto, is deeply appreciated by the American Government.

Delivery of the note by the American Ambassador in Paris to the French Government urging that the Government of France review its policy in Syria and Lebanon should not, in our view, interfere with the holding of conversations on the subject of the Levant States with the French Government.

The note in question, which was of a friendly nature and which should cause the French Government no grounds for taking offence, was delivered this morning.

Now that the French Government is in possession of this note it knows before entering into any conversations with representatives of the American Government on the subject of the Levant States what the views of the American Government are.

The American Government would be glad to have its representatives participate in discussions with representatives of the British and French Governments with regard to the situation in the Levant States either in Paris or in London. It feels, however, that it would not be advisable for the American Government to join with the British Government in inviting the French Government to such a conference.

It should be clearly understood that the American Government could not at this time enter into discussions regarding the future of the whole Near East. The American Government must limit its participation in such a discussion to the immediate and urgent problem of the Levant States.

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1945.

890E.01/5-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1945—7 p. m.

150. Reurtels 212 May 21 and 218 May 24. You should inform King Ibn Saud that we acknowledge receipt of his two notes with appreciation and inform him that this Govt is deeply concerned at recent developments in the Levant States. You may add that it is endeavoring to prevail upon all parties involved to pursue policies which would

be in harmony with the principles adhered to by the United Nations and which would enable them to come to an equitable and friendly agreement.

Sent to Jidda. Repeated to Paris and Beirut.

GREW

890D.01/5-2245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iraq (Moreland)

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1945—7 p. m.

187. Reurtel 195 [198], May 22. You should inform the Acting Foreign Minister that the Govt of the US is deeply concerned at recent developments in the Levant States. You may add that it is endeavoring to prevail upon all parties involved to pursue policies which would be in harmony with the principles adhered to by the United Nations and which would enable them to come to an equitable and friendly agreement.

Sent to Baghdad. Repeated to Paris and Beirut.

GREW

500.CC/5-2945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[SAN FRANCISCO,] May 29, 1945.

Subject: The Crisis in Syria and Lebanon.

Participants: H. E. Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha, Chairman of the Egyptian Delegation.

Arshad al-Omari, Chairman of the Iraqi Delegation.

Wadiah Naim, Chairman of the Lebanese Delegation.

H. R. H. Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz, Chairman of the Saudi Arabian Delegation.

Faris al-Khouri, Chairman of the Syrian Delegation.

Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali, Director General of Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

The Secretary of State.

Mr. James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State.

Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Department of State.

At the request of Amir Faisal, the Secretary today received the chairmen of all the Arab delegations. The Syrian Prime Minister, acting as spokesman, recited the development of the situation much as reported in the Department's telegrams. He said that while an unknown French source had said that the French troops recently landed in Syria and Lebanon were on their way to the Far East, it was

obvious that they were not en route anywhere but were going to stay in Syria and Lebanon. In this connection, he cited statements by General Beynet and by M. Bidault which frankly indicated that French troops would remain in Syria and Lebanon until the French had received satisfactory assurances as to the protection of their interests in those countries and the fulfillment of their demands upon them. The Prime Minister said he realized that this was a political matter and that it was being dealt with by the State Department in Washington. He felt, however, that it was a Conference matter since the aggression of one of the so-called big five-powers against small states at the time when we were seeking to create an organization for future world peace and security was most disruptive to the atmosphere and hence to the work of the Conference at San Francisco. It was for this reason that he ventured to disturb the Secretary with an ostensibly extraneous matter. Amir Faisal, in supporting the Syrian Premier's statement, added that his government was very concerned that if there were any delay in reaching a solution, a new situation might be created which would make an equitable readjustment increasingly difficult.

The Secretary replied that we were gravely concerned about the situation which had arisen in Syria and Lebanon following the landing of French troops. He categorically reaffirmed that United States policy toward the independence and sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon, as set forth in communications of President Roosevelt and of the State Department, remains and will continue to remain unchanged. The Secretary said that we have already made very strong representations to the French on this subject and assured the Arab delegates that the United States will do everything in its power to find an early and satisfactory solution. In conclusion, the Prime Minister presented the attached written communication, dated May 28, signed by himself and by Wadih Naim, Chairman of the Lebanese delegation.⁶⁰

FOY D. KOHLER

890D.01/5-2945: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 29, 1945.

[Received May 29—1 p. m.]

3031. Information Ministry has issued following communiqué:

"The French Government is following with the greatest attention the incidents which have developed in the last few weeks in certain

⁶⁰ Not printed; it submitted a summary of Syrian and Lebanese views of their relations with France entitled "An Exposé of the Relations of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics with France, on the Occasion of the Recent Events."

cities of Syria and even of the Lebanon, the authors of which have taken as a pretext certain French troop movements on an extremely small scale which were solely connected with relief and deployment.

"It remarks that these movements took place at the same time as more extended military measures in the same region and without doubt for the same reasons undertaken by the British authorities without having previously consulted with the French authorities entrusted with the maintenance of order.

"The French Government regrets that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have felt it necessary to take this occasion to refuse the negotiations which General Beynet, Delegate General and Plenipotentiary of France, had been instructed to undertake with them for the purpose of arriving at a general settlement of the questions interesting France and Syria on the one hand and France and the Lebanon on the other.

"It is difficult to believe that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments can have any real fears as to the intentions of France regarding their independence when it was France which proclaimed this independence, when France today offers to settle the conditions which should definitely guarantee this independence as far as France is concerned and when France has just given open proof of its intentions by arranging that the United Nations should invite Syria and the Lebanon to take part in the Conference of San Francisco.

"There is no reason to believe that this situation, the real motives of which as well as the efforts made to develop it appear very artificial, can be misinterpreted by international opinion in spite of the tendentious character of certain statements."

This evening's semi-official *Le Monde* in addition to the above communiqué carries a Reuter despatch from London of an interview with Beynet reading in part as follows:

"We wished to negotiate on a friendly basis but the Levant States have refused to negotiate. We have given up all control over the administration except that of the army and the telegraphs which is required by the war. There was no unfriendliness in the French offers and it was not a question of an ultimatum. I am certain that France will not refuse to discuss an agreement put forward by the Levant States which would protect the interests of those States and of France but up to now we have not received acceptable proposals. It is no longer up to us to take the first step. It is not a question of pride."

Le Monde also prints the British Foreign Office statement of May 27.⁶¹

CAFFERY

⁶¹ Printed in the London *Times*, May 28, p. 3.

890E.01/5-2945 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 29, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 3 : 14 p. m.]

161. I have just seen Lebanese MinFonAff at his request. He spoke substantially as follows:

“We (Leb Govt) are in increasingly difficult position. If Lebanon is calm it is because we have maintained calm despite extremist and now mounting popular pressure to show solidarity with Syrians by general strike and anti-French demonstrations.

“If we have maintained this calm it is not because we do not feel with the Syrians but because we believe we are following policy best calculated to serve our common interests. Now, however, Syrian Govt too is putting pressure on us to act. They themselves are fast losing control of situation; I doubt if they will be able to bring quorum to Parliament this afternoon; there is such hatred of French. Their people and Deputies want action, not more words.

“I know you have reported fully to your Govt re situation and views of Syrian and my PriMins as to what steps should be taken to meet its immediately threatening aspects. I concur; but what I want to emphasize is my own view that outstandingly best way to meet this new pressure is for us to announce that in answer to French treaty proposals we are making counter-proposals for similar treaties with the four powers.

“Therefore I ask you to request urgently your Govt’s views on my suggestion for ‘direct treatment’ of situation (reLegtel 152, May 23 [24] pgh 2). I cannot make such announcement without your Govt’s formal encouragement at least in principle. Any changes you or other powers may wish to suggest in my draft treaties will be made willingly.

“Shone tells me Brit Govt views my suggestion favorably but prefers it be made only to French, Brit and Amer Govts. I feel Russians should be included. Do you know how Syrians feel on this point?”

I was able to reply that in Damascus yesterday Syrian MinFonAff had stated to me categorically he too preferred including Russians and Chinese as well. Pharaon answered: “Then please ask your Govt also as to its view on this point.”

Rptd Paris as 53, sent Dept as 161, paraphrased to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

890E.01/5-2445 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1945—7 p. m.

156. Reurtel 152, May 24. In line with our past advocacy of Levant States' entering into treaty relations with France we would welcome any treaty proposals which the Lebanese Govt might be disposed to make. For your confidential information we are contemplating making an appeal in a friendly spirit to the French Govt⁶² to alter its basic policy towards the Levant States and therefore are particularly anxious just now that you do not become involved in the dispute in such a manner as to give the French the impression that you are assisting Lebanese efforts to find means of embarrassing them. It would be preferable therefore for you to avoid participating personally in drafting of proposed treaties, although there would be no objection to your making suggestions in regard to what in your opinion might be this Govt's attitude toward any of the provisions which Lebanese officials may propose making in the draft of an American-Lebanese treaty.

GREW

890D.01/5-2945 : Telegram

*The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary
of State*BEIRUT, May 29, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received May 29—3 : 54 p. m.]163. Supplementing my 162 of May 29 :⁶³

At 7:30 p. m. Porter⁶⁴ phoned me from the Orient Palace Hotel Damascus reporting heavy machine gun and rifle fire from direction French barracks between hotel and bazaar.

As we were talking, answering fire came from various nearby places including roof of hotel; then reported [*repeated?*] machine gun bursts (which I heard over telephone) came from neighboring French Foyer des Soldats; then line was cut.

Ten minutes later BGS⁶⁵ Ninth Army telephoned me "French are

⁶² This refers, presumably, to the note delivered by Ambassador Caffery on May 28; telegram 156 was drafted on May 26.

⁶³ Not printed; it reported that Damascus was "seething" and that the "conflagration" in Syria was spreading, notably in the Jebel Druze where all Frenchmen were prisoners of the Syrian Governor and several hundred *Troupes Spéciales* had transferred their allegiance to the Governor (890E.01/5-2945).

⁶⁴ William J. Porter, Vice Consul and Attaché at Damascus.

⁶⁵ Brigadier General Staff (Jasper G. Frère).

shelling Damascus; General Pilleau will see General Humblot⁶⁶ at once; I am off for Damascus; can't dine with you; good-by".

At 8 p. m. Satterthwaite phoned from Brit Leg that French airplane had just dropped bombs on and machine-gunned city.

Rptd Paris as 55; sent Dept as 163; paraphrases to Arab cap[ital]s.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/5-3045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1945—7 p. m.

161. Please inform Jamil Mardam Bey that the President has received his telegram of May 23 and wishes to assure him that this Government, which deplores the loss of life that has occurred in Syria, is deeply concerned at what is taking place in Syria and Lebanon and is employing every means to assist in finding a peaceful solution and preventing further bloodshed and disorder. Consultations with all parties involved are proceeding actively.

GREW

890D.01/5-3045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SAN FRANCISCO, May 30, 1945.

[Received May 30—3:32 p. m.]

8. Apart from their direct effect on the situation throughout the Near East, the events in Lebanon are seriously disturbing the atmosphere of the Conference. I would suggest, subject to the agreement of the President and yourself, that the President send a direct message to General de Gaulle appealing to him to do everything possible to restore tranquility without delay so that the Levant issue will not impair their forthcoming talks, which would include a discussion of this question. If you consider it would be helpful, I should be glad at the same time to cable personally to Bidault. I should emphasize the detrimental influence of the events in the Levant on the work of the Conference at San Francisco and appeal to him personally to make every effort to alleviate this situation without delay.

STETTINIUS

⁶⁶ Gen. Emile Humblot, Commander of French forces in Syria and Lebanon.

890D.01/5-3045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State at San Francisco

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1945.

21. Your No. 8, May 30. I shall have a draft message from the President for de Gaulle ready for the President's approval upon his return to Washington tomorrow. Pending the President's decision you may wish to defer any message to Bidault. I am also considering the advisability of suggesting to the President a message along the following lines to the British Government:

"The situation in the Levant States is deteriorating so rapidly that in the opinion of the Government of the United States the most energetic steps should be taken immediately to bring about a cessation of the fighting. The American Government is therefore considering the advisability of calling upon the Governments of France, Syria and Lebanon to agree to a truce, pending the outcome of the proposed conference in Paris or London, with the understanding that neither side during the duration of the truce take any step to improve its position. For instance no additional French forces or military supplies would be introduced into Syria and Lebanon and no French warships would be despatched to the Levant. Since the population has been aroused by the armed clashes which have taken place, it may be difficult for the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to restrain their people. In these circumstances it may be desirable for British troops with the consent of both sides to assist in the maintenance of order during the period of the truce and for the French to concentrate their forces into barracks in the more important centers. The American Government is now of the opinion that it might be advisable to invite representatives of Syria and Lebanon to participate in some of the conversations to be held at London or Paris.

"An expression of the views of the British Government would be appreciated."⁶⁷

GREW

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman*⁶⁸

[Paraphrase]

[LONDON,] May 30, 1945.

59. You will no doubt have had reports confirming our news of the situation in the Levant States especially in Damascus. Here the French have been shelling the town and causing serious loss of life and destruction of property. The position has deteriorated seriously in the last 24 hours. Continuance of the present situation both in

⁶⁷ There is no indication in the Department files that this message was actually sent to the British Government.

⁶⁸ Received from the British Embassy on May 31, 1945.

Damascus and elsewhere in Syria will, I am convinced, cause the most grave trouble throughout the Middle East and upon our joint lines of communication via Egypt and [Suez] Canal with the Far East.

We should therefore be prepared to order Commander-in-Chief of Middle East to intervene with British troops in order to stop fighting. Before doing so I feel I ought to know that we should have your approval and support. In this case will you telegraph at once that you are in agreement. Any representations that you may decide to make in Paris will of course be of the utmost value. We will on hearing from you in this sense send the following telegram to General de Gaulle.

*Begins.*⁶⁹ In view of the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant States and severe fighting which has broken out we have ordered the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to intervene to prevent further effusion of blood in the interests of security of the whole of the Middle East which involve communications for the war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French forces we request you immediately to order French troops to withdraw to their barracks and to cease fire thereafter except in self-defence.

We have communicated with United States Government and have received their approval to our taking these steps which are a cause of deep sorrow to us especially because of hopes of a treaty between France and the Levant States upon satisfactory conclusion of which as I told you a month ago we should be ready to withdraw our troops from Syria and Lebanon.⁷⁰ Once firing has ceased and order has been restored we shall gladly begin Tripartite discussions in London.
Ends.

I most earnestly hope to hear from you at the earliest moment.

[WINSTON S. CHURCHILL]

890E.01/5-2945 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1945—7 p. m.

162. Reurtel 161, May 29. Dept feels that it is for the Lebanese Govt alone to determine countries to which it may make treaty proposals and that the matter is not one in which this Govt could give advice with propriety.

GREW

⁶⁹ For message as actually sent to General de Gaulle on May 31, see telegram 2428, p. 1121.

⁷⁰ See message of May 4, p. 1067.

890D.01/5-3145

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*⁷¹

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Franco-Levant Crisis

Information which we have received from our Legations in Syria and Lebanon, and also through British diplomatic channels, indicates that disorders in Syria and Lebanon are rapidly developing into open warfare; that in various outlying districts French garrisons have been taken prisoner; that the French have shelled or bombed by plane several populated centers of Syria, including Damascus; that several hundred Syrians have been killed and a number wounded; that a small undetermined number of French soldiers have been killed or wounded, and that there is a possibility that Arabs from Iraq may come to the aid of their Syrian kinsmen.

We have received messages from chiefs of various Arab countries, including the Prime Minister of Iraq and King Ibn Saud, charging that the French have violated the principles of the United Nations and demanding that the United States intervene. The President of Syria on May 30 sent the following message to the Secretary of State:⁷²

“Where now is the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms?⁷³ What can we think of San Francisco? I would that President Truman re-read and confirm to us Mr. Roosevelt’s last letter (December 7)⁷⁴ assuring us of his support of our independence; if ever the principles voiced in its last paragraph were applicable, it is today; your country has encouraged us in our stand to refuse special privilege to France or any other country but you have permitted France to block the adequate arming of our *gendarmerie*; now the French are bombing us and destroying our cities and towns with Lend-Leased munitions which were given for use against our common enemies.”

The Council of the newly formed Arab League will meet on June 4 to consider the situation. Mr. Stettinius states that the Levant crisis is “seriously disturbing the atmosphere of the Conference” in San Francisco.

For many months the situation in Syria and Lebanon has been strained. Incidents resulting from bad feelings between the local population and the French troops, whose presence in the Levant is re-

⁷¹ Original taken to the White House by the Acting Secretary of State on May 31, 1945.

⁷² Telegram 165, May 30, 1 p. m., from Beirut, not printed.

⁷³ See President Roosevelt’s State of the Union message to Congress, January 6, 1941, *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 1, p. 44.

⁷⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 812.

sented, have taken place from time to time. The present outbreaks result from the landing by the French on May 6 and May 18 of fresh French forces. The reinforcements were not large in number but their landing caused a crisis, since it indicated that instead of planning to withdraw their forces the French were taking steps to strengthen them.

We received information on April 25 [24] to the effect that the French were planning to send additional troops to the Levant. On April 30 we telegraphed our Ambassador in Paris asking him to inform the French Government that we earnestly hoped that it would not increase its troops in the Levant; that in the absence of military necessity we considered that any increase in the strength of the French forces in the Levant would be ill-timed and potentially detrimental to the peace and security of the Near East. The Ambassador carried out our instructions. Mr. Grew expressed our views in a similar manner to Mr. Bidault while the latter was in Washington.

The British Government also, on a number of occasions, urged the French not to send additional troops into the Levant.

The French not only sent additional troops in spite of the suggestions made to them, but they sent them in warships, and on May 18, the day on which one of these ships was discharging troops, the French Delegate General to Syria and Lebanon presented notes to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments demanding certain concessions, including strategic bases, which, if granted, would curtail the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon and would commit those Governments to discriminate against other powers in favor of the French. The fact that this note was presented while a French warship was in the harbor of Beirut strengthened the impression of the Syrians and the Lebanese that the French were endeavoring to frighten them into accepting the French demands.

On May 28 Mr. Caffery, under instructions from us, presented a strong but friendly note to the French Government suggesting that it review its policy towards the Levant States with the purpose of making it clear that it intends to treat them as sovereign and independent countries.

On May 28 we informed the British Government, which is trying to arrange for a conference on the Levant situation with the French and ourselves, that we would be willing to attend.

In view of the situation Mr. Stettinius telegraphed from San Francisco suggesting that it might be well for you to send a direct message to de Gaulle appealing to him to do everything possible to restore tranquility without delay, so that the Levant issue would not impair their forthcoming talks.

A proposed message from you to General de Gaulle is therefore attached hereto for your consideration.⁷⁵

890D.01/5-3145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extracts]

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1945.

Participants: The President
Acting Secretary Grew

Also present during part of the conference:
Admiral Leahy
Captain Vardaman⁷⁶
Mr. Phillips

At my conference with the President at 10:15 this morning the following matters were taken up:

2. Admiral Leahy, Captain Vardaman and Mr. Phillips then entered the study and there was a general discussion of the situation in the Levant and of General de Gaulle's proposed visit to Washington.⁷⁷ Although at my last conference with the President he had directed me to arrange for General de Gaulle to come to Washington on June 12, I told the President that I had held up action, first, in view of the fact that there was no certainty that the San Francisco Conference will have terminated by June 12 and, second, owing to some doubt as to whether a visit from General de Gaulle would be desirable before a settlement of the hostilities in the Levant. I said that it might be held, that a personal conference with de Gaulle might prove helpful to this situation, but on the other hand the Arab states might interpret such a visit as indicating our leaning toward the French position. The President expressed himself as very much relieved that I had refrained from specifying a definite date for the visit and said he thought it might now be set for the second period mentioned by de Gaulle,⁷⁸ that is, between June 25 and July 5. I said to the President that in my opinion it would be much better to avoid any commitment at present as to a specific date, and that we could explain to de Gaulle that the matter had to be left open owing to a possible conflict with

⁷⁵ Attachment not printed; with minor changes in language, the text was the same as that sent in telegram 2428, May 31, noon, to Paris, p. 1121.

⁷⁶ Capt. James K. Vardaman, Naval Aide to President Truman.

⁷⁷ For documentation on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 661 ff.

⁷⁸ See letter of May 29 by the French Ambassador (Bonnet) to President Truman, vol. iv, p. 701.

the President's intention to proceed to San Francisco to close the Conference. The President said that he agreed.

There was then some discussion as to the President's reply to Churchill's telegram to the President requesting his concurrence in the decision of the British Government to intervene in Syria. Churchill had asked for a reply last night, but in the meantime the British Government had already acted. It was decided to inform Churchill that the President had agreed with the intentions of the British Government to take appropriate measures to prevent further bloodshed in the Levant.

I then told the President that I proposed in my press conference at noon today to release to the press the text of our note of May 28 to the Provisional French Government,^{78a} in which the President concurred, and it was also decided that I should tell the press that this Government had concurred in the British decision. There was also some discussion as to what should be said in reply to a question from the press as to whether our lend-lease material was being used by the French in the Levant. I submitted to the President the following formula :

"Military equipment transferred by this Government to the French Government under lend-lease was provided in accordance with the terms of an agreement by which such equipment is to be used for the defense of France against the Axis in this war and this Government does not intend to provide military equipment for any other purpose. This Government has not assigned any material for use in Syria."

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

President Truman to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)

WASHINGTON, 31 May, 1945.

50. The telegram to General de Gaulle proposed in your number 59⁷⁹ meets with my approval.

[HARRY S TRUMAN]

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1945—noon.

2428. The President requests that the following message be immediately transmitted from him to General de Gaulle :

^{78a} See telegram 2331 to Paris, p. 1104.

⁷⁹ May 30, p. 1116.

"I have received your cordial message through Ambassador Bonnet to which I hope to be able to reply definitely within a few days.⁸⁰

"Bidault will have told you of the grave concern which is felt in this country over developments in Syria and the Lebanon where open strife between French troops and the peoples of these two countries has occurred. I have instructed the U.S. representative to urge the Governments of Syria and Lebanon to refrain from any action which would further aggravate the situation, and I hope you can see your way clear to issue the necessary instructions to your forces in order that tranquility may be restored and that a peaceful and orderly solution may be achieved which will not prejudice the legitimate rights of the nations concerned. I have also asked Caffery to keep in close touch with your Government with a view to assisting in arriving at a satisfactory settlement."⁸¹

GREW

890D.01/5-3045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1945.

The Chargé d'Affaires of Syria called on me this afternoon and left with me the appended note⁸² which he said was already a little out

⁸⁰ For Ambassador Bonnet's letter of May 29 concerning the proposed meeting of President Truman and General de Gaulle in Washington, and President Truman's reply to General de Gaulle, transmitted in telegram 3036, July 2, 11 a. m., to the Ambassador in France, see vol. iv, p. 701.

⁸¹ In telegram 3170, June 1, 1945, noon, the Ambassador in France reported receipt of this instruction on June 1, 3 a. m., and its delivery to General de Gaulle the same morning (890D.01/6-145).

⁸² No. 54S/57L, May 30, 1945, in which the Chargé stated: "I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed by my Government that, in pursuance of my note of May 25, I call the attention of the United States Government to the worsening situation in Syria. The attempt of the French authorities to enforce their demands by force of arms is creating a state of disturbance which is becoming more serious every day.

In addition to the loss of life and the destruction of property which is being incurred by armed conflicts and the shelling of towns, the troubles threaten to have a disastrous effect on this year's crops. As this is the season of the harvest in Syria, the state of disorder and the lack of laborers would completely spoil the crops and threaten the country with famine. This will add to the gravity of an already serious world problem.

Furthermore, the repercussions which the troubles are having in the Arab Middle East endanger world security in that strategic region, at a time when the war in Asia is not yet over and all means should be used to overcome any obstacles to its successful conclusion.

For all these reasons, as well as for the preservation and defense of the principles of international justice for which this war is being fought, my Government wishes to appeal again to the Government of the United States of America, which has always supported Syria's right to full independence, to take the necessary steps to secure the protection of that independence by the withdrawal of the French troops and the just recognition of Syria's right to military authority over her territory. This is the necessary condition for Syria—as indeed for any state—to be able to exercise its sovereign rights; to determine and pursue freely the economic, cultural and other interests of its people; and to cooperate with the other states of the world in the organization of international order and security."

of date in view of rapid developments in the Levant; the Chargé had wished to deliver the note yesterday afternoon but I gathered that there had been some garbles in the telegram which had to be cleared up. The Chargé pointed out that two important considerations are set forth in the note: first, that the hostilities in the Levant would have a disastrous effect on this year's crops so that the country would be threatened with famine, and second, that the armed conflict would endanger world security in the strategic region of the Middle East at a time when the war in Asia is not yet over. The hostilities are affecting the entire Arab world.

I thanked the Chargé for the note, which I said would have our careful consideration. I stated that in the meantime I wished to tell him of two steps which had been taken this morning in press conference: one, my statement to the press that we concurred with the intention of the British Government to use its best efforts to prevent further bloodshed in the Lebanon, and second, the release of the text of our note of May 28 to the Provisional French Government⁸³ on this general subject, a copy of which I handed to the Chargé. I said that we were in constant touch with the French Government and with the Governments of Syria and Lebanon, and that we earnestly hoped for an early termination of the hostilities, which were especially unfortunate as occurring at the very moment that the nations were trying at San Francisco to establish a world organization for the maintenance of peace and security. I said that this Government was counselling the Provisional French Government and the Governments of Syria and Lebanon to use their best efforts to avoid further bloodshed.

The Chargé thanked me for my statement and said that his Government has complete confidence in the Government of the United States, knowing that our interest in the affair is based purely on principle and not on self-seeking.

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/6-145 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Truman*⁸⁴

[Paraphrase]

[LONDON,] May 31, 1945.

61. In the light of the deteriorating situation in the Levant States, His Majesty's Government felt bound to order the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East to intervene, in order to prevent further

⁸³ See telegram 2331, May 26, noon, and footnote 51, p. 1104.

⁸⁴ Transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the British Minister (Bal-four) on June 1.

effusion of blood. My immediately following message⁸⁵ contains the statement on the subject which the Foreign Secretary has just made in the House of Commons.⁸⁶

Owing to the urgency, His Majesty's Government felt they could not wait longer for your reply to my message No. 59 but I feel sure that I may count on the support of United States Government for the steps which we have felt bound to take.

890D.01/5-3145

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁸⁷

MESSAGE FROM MR. CHURCHILL TO GENERAL DE GAULLE OF
MAY 31ST, 1945

In view of the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant States and severe fighting which has broken out we have with profound regret ordered the Commander-in-Chief Middle East to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in the interests of security of the whole Middle East, which involves communications for war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French forces we request you immediately to order French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks. Once firing has ceased and order has been restored we shall be prepared to begin tripartite discussions in London.

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, May 31, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received June 1—9:40 a. m.]

227. King Abdul Aziz sent third joint message American Brit Ministers today relevant situation. French have disregarded Allied interests by violating peace in Middle East; they are bombing towns and firing on the population.

His Majesty continues silent and perplexed at what answer he can give to increasingly clamorous appeals from the other Arabs and his own people. Requests immediate American, Brit intervention to stop this unjustifiable aggression and find satisfactory solution.

Sent Dept rptd Beirut.

GEIER

⁸⁵ Copy not found in Department files.

⁸⁶ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 411, col. 378.

⁸⁷ Transmitted to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright), May 31, 1945.

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, May 31, 1945—6 p. m.
[Received May 31—4: 54 p. m.]

170. I have just received through Satterthwaite and British military courier a message addressed to President Truman handwritten and signed by President Quwatly this morning reading in original French text as follows:

"Syria is the object of widespread destruction. French bombs have been showered pitilessly on peaceful unarmed cities.

"Homs, Hama and Aleppo have been subjected to unparalleled bombardments. For 3 days Damascus, the city that is historic and holy for the Arab and Moslem world, has been subjected to savage bombardments by planes, artillery and tanks. Fires following the bombardments have broken out everywhere. Entire sections and streets have been ravaged by fire, bombs and destruction. Several thousand persons have been killed and wounded in the streets and under the ruins. Bombardments and machine guns continue exterminating peaceful men, women and children.

"All these killings are supposed to be justified only because we refused to grant special privileges to France incompatible with our sovereignty and independence. Our country is destroyed despite assurances given by Allies recognizing our independence. I cite among these assurances the last letter that the lamented President Roosevelt addressed to me personally and signed a few hours before his death.⁸⁸

"We are convinced that the sentiments of democracy, justice and peace of the United States will not allow the continuation of the destruction of Damascus and other Syrian cities and the extermination of its peaceful populations in (several words missing). Do not democratic and human principles require that an end be put to these massacres?"

Satterthwaite adds that a similar message has been sent to Churchill.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, May 31, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received May 31—11: 42 a. m.]

3159. Referring my telegram 3158, May 31,⁸⁹ following is the translation of a note which although dated May 30, I have just received from Bidault:

⁸⁸ For President Roosevelt's letter of April 12, 1945, to President Kuwatly, see p. 704. This message, however, dealt with the Palestine question and did not contain assurances about Syrian independence. It is possible that the Syrian President was referring to President Roosevelt's letter of December 7, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 812.

⁸⁹ Not printed.

"I have taken particular note of your letter of the 28th instant in which you were kind enough to inform me of the attitude of the Govt of the United States regarding the situation in Syria and Lebanon.

The appeal which you have made to the liberal traditions of France and to the democratic principles which she has sought to disseminate in the world for the past 150 years cannot fail to find me responsive. These principles and these traditions are the basis of French policy. It is in order to follow them that the French Committee of National Liberation proclaimed the independence of Syria and Lebanon upon the arrival of Allied Forces in those countries in 1941.⁹⁰ The Provisional Govt of the Republic recently gave new proof of these sentiments by intervening with the four Great Powers in order that Syria and Lebanon might be admitted to the San Francisco Conference.

If France believes that she has the duty and the right to defend in the Levant the century-old [*centuries-old*] interests with [*of*] which [*she has charge,*]⁹¹ she does not consider that this legitimate position is irreconcilable with the independence of the (Levant) States. The crisis which has now occurred proves that certain local elements which favor a policy of violence, the consequences of which can be serious for all, are ready to seize on any pretext in order to create confusion. An endeavor has been made to establish a connection between the general policy followed by France in her relations with the Levant States and troop movements of minor importance which were made in conformity with the military regime existing in Syria and Lebanon as it does on the territory of all of the Allied powers. Similar movements of troops, made since the beginning of the war by decision of the Allied military authorities, had never caused any protests. The very violence of the reactions which have just occurred permits the belief that they were prepared long in advance.

If measures are being taken to assure the defense of French soldiers and Nationals, I can nevertheless assure you that my Govt has never had the idea of going counter to its previous engagements. I myself have recently had the opportunity of declaring that the independence of Syria and Lebanon had been established and that France was happy to recognize it since it was she herself who had proclaimed it. This position is the basis of French policy and should allow the seeking of a reasonable solution once that order is reestablished and that spirits have calmed down."

CAFFERY

⁹⁰ For documentation on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 725 ff., and 785 ff.

⁹¹ Bracketed insertions based on text in French transmitted to the Department in despatch 2137, June 1, 1945, from Paris (not printed).

890D.01/6-145 : Telegram

*The Egyptian Prime Minister (Nokrashi) to the Acting Secretary of State*⁹²

[CAIRO,] May 31, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: I feel it my duty to bring to Your Excellency's attention the painful impression which the recent events in Syria and the Lebanon have caused through all Arab countries. Far from being less tense the situation is becoming more critical. The French troops have shelled the cities and clashes have occurred between the people and the French and they are now in actual fighting. In appealing to the Great Powers we consider that we address ourselves to the states which have the authority and the duty to intervene to put an end to the use of force in settling disputes between nations. We consider also that while the United Nations are at San Francisco to establish the basis of international peace and security the use of force is liable to diminish the faith of the world in a satisfactory solution of the international postwar problems. At San Francisco the Great Powers among which France, Syria and the Lebanon are sitting will not refuse to give an effective and efficient assistance to stop fighting and bloodshed. We regret the bloody events of these last days the more so that the Allies have promised to give all their attention to the fact that no problem should be settled other than by peaceful means. Contrary to the hope entertained by the world we are witnessing at the present painful time a manifestation of an armed action against unarmed peoples. The solution of the problem of the Levant must be based on equality and justice. On the morrow of the war by which all the world has suffered and in which the Allies have pooled all their moral resources no one can imagine that the lesson which everybody ought to have learned is already forgotten. I am convinced that the Great Powers as well as the Arab peoples are interested in a prompt solution. There is no means to come to such a solution without the immediate stopping of fighting, the prevention of bloodshed and the reasonable intervention of the Great Powers to bring France to a more sound conception of this grave situation so that the gulf that lay between France and all Arab countries should not be widened. Those countries would be profoundly grieved and disappointed if such a beneficent intervention was not to be made. Unless all the United Nations stand

⁹² Transmitted under covering note 608 by the Egyptian Minister (Hassan) to the Acting Secretary of State on June 1, 1945.

by the principles of the Atlantic Charter and by the basis on which universal peace will be established in the near future the world cannot but doubt that such a peace be obtained and that justice may ever triumph. In appealing to Your Excellency I am fully convinced that the great country you represent will protect the rights of peace by defending the just cause of those two Arab States.

M. F. NOKRASHI

[On May 31, the Regent of Iraq, Abdul Ilah, his adviser, Nuri As-Said, and the Iraqi Minister, Ali Jawdat, called on Acting Secretary of State Grew. Mr. Grew's memorandum of their conversation stated: "There was some talk about the situation in the Levant, and I told the Regent of the position and steps which we had taken in connection with the hostilities now occurring there. I gave copies to the Iraq Minister and to Nuri Pasha, for the Regent, of our note of May 28 to the Provisional French Government." (890G.001/5-1845) For information regarding the visit to the United States of the Regent of Iraq, see bracketed note, page 586.]

890D.01/6-145

The Soviet Chargé (Novikov) to the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1945.

SIR: The Soviet Government has instructed me to transmit to you its following note:⁹³

"In accordance with information received, military actions are taking place on the territory of Syria and Lebanon, it being known that the French troops there have clashed with the Syrians and Lebanese, having shelled with artillery and mine throwers the capital of Syria—Damascus. Damascus is being bombed from air. Armed clashes are also taking place in some other towns of Syria and Lebanon. The number of killed and wounded is mounting with every day.

"The situation is being aggravated by the fact that the said three Governments: France, Syria and Lebanon are members of the United Nations participating in the Conference taking place in San Francisco.

"The Soviet Government considers that the events in Syria and Lebanon do not correspond to the spirit of decisions adopted in Dumbarton Oaks⁹⁴ and to the aims of the United Nations Conference on the establishment of an organization for the guaranteeing peace and security of the peoples which is taking place in San Francisco. Therefore the Soviet Government considers that urgent measures should be

⁹³ In telegram 1864, June 2, 1945, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported special statements had also been addressed by the Soviet Union to the Governments of France, Great Britain, and China (890D.01/6-245).

⁹⁴ For documentation on the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. I, pp. 713 ff.

taken for the cessation of military actions in Syria and Lebanon and settlement of the arisen conflict by peaceful means. This proposal the Soviet Government has brought before the Provisional Government of the French Republic and is also bringing before the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and China, which are the initiators of the post-war organization for peace and international security.”

Accept [etc.]⁹⁵

890D.01/6-145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1945.

Participants: Nikolai V. Novikov, Soviet Chargé d’Affaires
Mr. Grew, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. Durbrow, Chief, Eastern European Division

The Soviet Chargé called and left the attached note⁹⁶ from the Soviet Government outlining its position with regard to the Syrian-Lebanese crisis.

I expressed to Mr. Novikov my gratification that his Government appeared to be in agreement with the attitude we have taken in regard to this question. He concurred and brought to my attention, as his personal opinion, the implication contained in the note that the Soviet Government perhaps desired to initiate consultations with the Big Five in order to settle the basic questions involved now that the cease-firing order had been issued by the French Government. Since the note does not ask directly for consultations, I made no comment on Mr. Novikov’s personal opinion as to what the Soviet Government might have in mind.

I assured Mr. Novikov that this message would receive our careful consideration and study, and told him that we had yesterday sent to his Government through Mr. Harriman copies of the notes we had sent on this subject.⁹⁷

JOSEPH C. GREW

⁹⁵ In a memorandum of June 2, 1945, to President Truman, the Acting Secretary of State transmitted a copy of the Soviet Chargé’s note and stated: “The Soviet position seems to parallel ours.” (890D.01/6-245)

⁹⁶ *Supra.*

⁹⁷ Telegrams 1185, May 31, 1945, 7 p. m., and 1186, May 31, 1945, to Moscow, neither printed; the notes were those of May 28 to the French Provisional Government (see telegram 2331, May 26, noon, to Paris, p. 1104) and President Truman’s note of May 31 to General de Gaulle (see telegram 2428, May 31, noon, to Paris, p. 1121). In telegram 1863, June 2, 1945, noon, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that the texts of the two notes and a summary of the situation in Syria and Lebanon were being communicated to the Soviet authorities “today”. (890D.01/6-245)

890D.01/6-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 1, 1945.

[Received June 1—12: 45 p. m.]

5529. Eden announced in Commons this morning⁹⁸ that information had been received that Commander French forces in Syria had informed Commander British Ninth Army last night that he had received instructions from Paris not to oppose order of Commander-in-Chief Middle East.⁹⁹ Eden said he was sure this information would be warmly welcomed in all parts of the House and confidence was felt that all concerned would not [*now*] cooperate in restoration of law and order which was first step in solution this complex problem. He said British Government sincerely hopes it will be possible to open conversations in London to which he referred yesterday and as a result of which it is hoped to promote a final settlement of this vexed problem.

WINANT

890D.01/6-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 2, 1945.

[Received June 2—12: 25 p. m.]

3219. The following is translation of communiqué issued last evening by de Gaulle :

“Since the 8th of May the troops of certain French garrisons in Syria in particular at Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus as well as several military and civil French establishments have been sporadically attacked by armed bands at the head of which were often elements of the *gendarmerie* and the local police of the Syrian Government.

“These disorders began the day after General Beynet, General Delegate and Plenipotentiary of France, had proposed to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to begin negotiations on the basis of instructions which he had received from the French Government. Our

⁹⁸ For text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 411, col. 491.

⁹⁹ In telegram 173, June 1, 1945, noon, the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported: “Early yesterday evening, on orders General Paget, General Pilleau in interview with General Humblot arranged for issuance of cease-fire order and consignment to barracks of all French forces in Syria. Only condition made by Humblot was that French would return fire if attacked in barracks . . . No satisfactory reports have been received from provinces as communications still cut. French-controlled Radio Levant broadcast last evening that, order having been reestablished throughout greater part of Syrian territory during day of May 31, the French Commander, upon intervention of Brit Middle East Commander for cease-fire, had deferred to Brit desire under instructions to that effect previously received from French Govt.” (890D.01/6-145)

troops had to resist and were everywhere in control of the situation except in the Djebel Druse which was held only by a few squadrons recruited locally. Our losses total a dozen killed. At Damascus it was necessary to use artillery.

"To ease the situation and to comply with the request of the British Government which expressed its fear that the incidents in Syria might spread to other regions of the Near East the French Government on May 31 ordered the French forces in the Levant to cease fire. This order was carried out in the evening of the same day. In the mind of the French Government it was a question of creating if possible a more favorable climate for conversations with the American and British Governments and later with the Governments of the various Arab States, conversations dealing with the entire situation in the Near East and regarding which moreover the Soviet Government should at least be informed. On June 1st at 4:30 p. m. Holman, Counselor (*sic*¹) of the British Embassy, brought to the office of the President of the Government the text of a message addressed by Mr. Churchill to General de Gaulle which had been read at 3:45 by Mr. Eden to the House of Commons. This telegram having thus been published in its tone and in its form could only permit a public reply, which the President of the Provisional Government of the Republic felt preferable not to address to the British Prime Minister.

"The orders given to the French troops by the French Government are to cease fire and to remain in their positions."

Sent to Department as 3219, repeated London as 380 and Beirut as 26.

CAFFERY

890D.01/6-245 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, June 2, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.]

174. I arrived at Damascus 5 p. m. yesterday. Brit MP² post passed me into city. Streets were empty except for an occasional gendarme and emerging civilian, French troops having withdrawn only shortly before. En route to Leg I stopped at Serai,³ Hotel⁴ and Parliament. They were unguarded, empty, gaping with bullet holes, littered with shattered glass, Parliament benches overturned, papers scattered.

Quarter hour later some 60 British tanks and armored cars entered city taking up positions at important squares and crossroads. Rela-

¹ As in the original. Adrian Holman had the local rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

² Military police.

³ Syrian Government Headquarters.

⁴ Presumably the Orient Palace Hotel which was heavily damaged by gunfire.

tively few Brit troops in trucks followed (a battalion being stationed outside city). People emerged from houses and cheered.

Gen Paget called with Brit Min on Pres who was still in bed at his home; Mins soon foregathered there. Paget gave Pres copy of communications he had handed Beynet in Beirut that morning and stressed that his was soldiering job to reestablish order and not to determine political issues.

Paget did, however, agree to issue *gendarmerie* long promised automatic weapons and reconnaissance cars (and additional 500 rifles) thus solving that long pending question which to him has always been of military rather than political character.

Paget's communication to Beynet opened: "Owing to the grave situation which has arisen in the Levant States I have by [as] Supreme Commander in the Middle East Theatre been ordered by my Govt to assume command in Syria and Lebanon. My aim is to restore order as quickly as possible."

To this end, it continued, certain orders must be carried out forthwith. These were briefly that all orders issued by him be obeyed without question and that French troops and *Troupes Spéciales* withdraw to barracks, French aircraft remain grounded and naval units in harbor. Special reference was made to supplies for troops and safety of French families and hope was expressed that Beynet would cooperate "to terminate as quickly as possible a state of affairs which we both of us deplore".

Final paragraph, added at Churchill's special request, stated "as soon as firing has ceased and order has been restored it is proposed that discussions shall be held in London between French and Brit Govts which the Govt of the US will attend."

Discussing this communication later with Gens Paget and Pilleau they told me their meeting with Beynet had been formal and somewhat strained but that he had been "reasonable" and had showed them translation of instructions he had rec'd from de Gaulle informing him French Govt had been notified that Brit intervention was to take place and that he was not to oppose Brit orders.

They had then agreed that such orders would be implemented thru a joint Anglo-French staff presided by Brit Ninth Army. This staff has already met and will implement orders already issued dealing with transport, censorship, local broadcasting, French civilian aircraft and OCP. Latter is to be operated under Brit command without French participation.

Paget told me his very extensive preparations had been necessitated by uncertainty as to whether de Gaulle would send appropriate instructions to Beynet. He had even prepared for active French resistance. He was obviously relieved it had not come to that.

His plans are to move all French troops to camp near Rayak in Lebanon and *Troupes Spéciales* in disaffected Syrian centers to camps well away from cities. He plans too to require Beynet to remove Gen Oliva-Roget ⁵ from Damascus command as being most immediately responsible for "wanton destruction". He sent Brit columns to north Syria yesterday and will himself visit Homs, Hama and Aleppo today.

He said also that in Lebanon his only action had been to order all French troops except those on outside guard duty to remain in barracks as precautionary measure against spread of conflict. He did not, however, know how long he could "keep them inside" for his orders were simply to intervene to stop fighting.

He was obviously somewhat anxious on this latter score feeling that Lebanese Nationalist leaders equally desirous of ridding their country of French soldiery might precipitate clashes. He and Brit Min had therefore urged strongly on Leb Pres and PriMin that their cause when considered in London would be harmed rather than helped by such action. In line with your earlier instructions I plan to second these representations in general terms.

Finally Paget expressed highest gratification that Amer Govt had lent full moral support to this intervention. Only thereby, he felt, had it been possible to induce de Gaulle to yield and only our backing and participation in forthcoming London discussions could assuage French fears and those of Nationalist extremists in Arab countries that move might be simply of Brit designing to replace French by Brit influence. In point of fact, he said, both Brit and French troops will leave.

In this connection he welcomed particularly presence of Amer correspondents and assistance which Amer University hospital is preparing to render Syrian medical authorities. I had taken dean of medical school with me to Damascus and arrangements were made on his return for despatch today of first aid units and supplies to that city and to Homs.

A following telegram ⁶ will report my visit yesterday to Syrian Pres and MinFonAff both of whom expressed high appreciation of support rec'd from Pres Truman and Amer Govt.

I have repeated no telegrams to London. If negotiations are to take place there it might be well were Paris to forward by pouch copies of those sent during last month and of future messages.

Rptd Paris as 64, paraphrased to Arab caps.

WADSWORTH

⁵ Brig. Gen. Fernand Oliva-Roget, French Delegate in Syria and Commander of French forces in southern Syria.

⁶ No. 175, June 2, 1945, 2 p. m., not printed.

890D.01/6-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 3, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

3269. The opening statement of de Gaulle's press conference yesterday⁷ to effect that Syrian crisis is not an isolated Middle Eastern incident but an international crisis appears to be the key to what de Gaulle has in mind. There are of course obvious reasons for him to take this line. There is little doubt that de Gaulle feels that the Syrian crisis and the manner in which the Brit intervened has seriously damaged his prestige in France and abroad. This is reflected in the bitterly anti-Brit tone of his statements. The fact that he was placed in position of having to accept what he felt practically amounted to a Brit ultimatum has not only infuriated and humiliated him but has led him to try to find some way to save French face, gain support for the French position and embarrass the Brit.

His formula of suggesting a conference between the US, Britain, France and Soviet Russia to discuss all problems of the Middle East is obviously calculated not only to embarrass Britain in Egypt, Palestine and elsewhere but by inviting Russia to participate in such discussions he appears to be making a bid for Russian support to balance what he may feel to be an Anglo-Amer coalition on the Syrian affair. In view of Russia's great interest in the Near East de Gaulle may feel that it will be difficult if not impossible for the Brit or the Americans to object to Russian participation in any conversations. (De Gaulle's tactics are interesting in light of Plevin's remarks my 3218, June 2.⁸)

That Soviet Russia is delighted to have her foot firmly in the Near Eastern door is apparent from the treatment of the de Gaulle proposal by *Humanité*⁹ this morning.

Sent Dept as 3269, rptd London 386, Moscow 109 and Beirut 33.

CAFFERY

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Geier)

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1945—7 p. m.

155. Reurtel 227, May 31. King Abdul Aziz should be informed in reply to his messages re Levant situation that this Govt has made its position abundantly clear in published note to French Provisional

⁷ For extracts from this press conference, see *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946, Documents*, p. 253.

⁸ Not printed.

⁹ Communist Party newspaper in Paris.

Govt (Deptel 153 June 2¹⁰), which may be quoted to him. The King is no doubt aware that British military intervention to prevent further loss of life and destruction was carried out with our concurrence.

Sent to Jidda. Repeated to Beirut and Baghdad.

GREW

890D.01/6-445

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 4, 1945.

The French Ambassador called on me this afternoon and left with me a note to the President dated today,¹¹ in which the Ambassador communicates to the President a quoted message from General de Gaulle with regard to the situation "in Syria and in the whole of the Near East". The Ambassador said that General de Gaulle's message was sent from Paris on June 1 and through some unexplained delay had reached him only today.

The Ambassador added that the order of the Provisional French Government to the French forces in Syria to cease fire had been sent from Paris at 11:30 p. m. on May 30, and that Churchill's message to General de Gaulle had been received only on the afternoon of the thirty-first.

After reading the note, I observed that General de Gaulle was merely making a statement to the President, and that no inquiry was contained in the message, and I therefore assumed that General de Gaulle would not expect a reply from the President. The Ambassador said that this would depend on the President's wishes, and that in any case he would be ready to transmit a reply if the President so desired. I said that I would transmit the note promptly to the President this afternoon.

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/6-445

*The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to President Truman*¹²

[WASHINGTON, June 4, 1945.]

MR. PRESIDENT: General de Gaulle, President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, has directed me to forward to you the following message, which was sent from Paris on June 1st, and which reached me only today on account of delay in its transmission:

"I understand the concern which you feel about the situation in Syria and in the whole of the Near East. I am convinced that the

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ *Infra.*

¹² Transmitted to President Truman June 4, 1945.

worst factor of trouble is divergency between the great Powers concerned, a divergency which looks like rivalry, especially when it becomes public.

"I have learned that you had instructed your representatives in Syria and the Lebanon to recommend moderation to the Governments at Damas and Beyrouth. I thank you for this and hope that their advice will be heeded. The French Government has ordered its troops in the Levant to cease fire on May 31st and to stay on their positions in order to facilitate as much as possible a solution of appeasement. The situation, in my opinion, now can and must become easier. I wish that no *de facto* initiative taken on the spot by another side may lead to any serious deterioration."

I beg you to accept [etc.]

HENRI BONNET

890D.01/6-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945—noon.

2528. In June 4 Bonnet delivered text of message, dated June 1 but delayed in transmission, from General de Gaulle to the President on the subject of the situation in the Levant. Text follows in separate cable.¹³ Please convey the following reply to General de Gaulle in the President's name:

"Through the courtesy of the French Ambassador I have received your message of June 1 with regard to the situation in the Levant. I have noted the orders which you have issued to the French forces there and share your hope that the situation will now be susceptible of solution by peaceful means."

GREW

890D.01/6-545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945—7 p. m.

2543. Beirut's 178 June 5¹⁴ repeated to you as 67. In view of General de Gaulle's order to French forces in the Levant to cease fire and the hope which he expressed in his message of June 1 to President Truman¹⁵ that a peaceful solution of the situation could now be arrived at, we are loath to believe that there can be any truth in the report from Beirut that the *Jeanne d'Arc* has sailed from Oran with French reinforcements for the Levant.

¹³ No. 2549, June 5, 1945, 8 p. m., not printed.

¹⁴ Not printed.

¹⁵ See letter of June 4 from the French Ambassador to President Truman, p. 1135.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, however, it is desired that you immediately bring the report to the attention of the French authorities and, while expressing skepticism regarding its truth, request a confirmation or denial.¹⁶

Should the report be confirmed you should urge in the strongest possible manner that the ship not proceed to its destination. You may point out that for the French to send reinforcements at this critical moment would have the most provocative effect and might lead to the most serious consequences.

GREW

890D.01/6-545

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Ref: 256/—/45

His Majesty's Government have been considering conditions in which Levant States representatives should be associated with the proposed discussions in London. There is likely to be much mis-giving in the Middle East re the possibility that in the absence of such representatives some agreement might be reached with the French behind the backs of the Arabs, and that the Arab case would thereby be prejudiced.

2. Two possible methods occur to His Majesty's Government of associating Levant States representatives:

(a) the conference could formally include representatives of the Levant States as well as British, American and French representatives, and it might be understood that after a formal meeting of all five parties most of the conversations would be held without the Levant States and French representatives actually meeting. His Majesty's Government do not think that after recent events acrimonious discussion between these delegates in front of British and American representatives would advance matters at all, and that it would be better to avoid such a situation arising.

(b) Alternatively, there might in effect be two conferences or two sets of discussions going on in London simultaneously on parallel lines. The British and American representatives would meet the French on a tripartite basis on the one hand, and on the other they would have four party discussions with the Syrian and Lebanese representatives.

¹⁶ In telegram 3337, June 6, 1945, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in France reported information from the French Foreign Minister that the French troops on the *Jeanne d'Arc* had been disembarked at Bizerte (890D.01/6-645).

3. His Majesty's Government have an open mind as between these two alternatives. They would be most grateful to learn the views of the State Department. They would also be glad to learn the views of the State Department on the note from the Soviet Government.¹⁷

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1945.

890D.01/6-545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 5, 1945.

[Received June 5—4: 05 p. m.]

5669. In statement in Commons this afternoon on Syrian situation Churchill said¹⁸ that when such regrettable incidents occur between nations so firmly attached as Britain and France it was usually case that less said the better, but he felt harm would result from leaving some statements in de Gaulle's press message¹⁹ unanswered.

Sense of de Gaulle's speech was to suggest trouble in Levant States due to British interference. Eden had already made it clear that far from causing agitation all British influence had been used in opposite direction and most strenuous efforts had been made by British Minister to produce calmer atmosphere in which negotiations could be conducted for settlement of outstanding questions between France and Levant States. Churchill said he himself had impressed on Syrian President need for peaceful settlement when he was in Cairo in February²⁰ and that as result of British pressure Levant States had been persuaded to open negotiations whereas they had previously been unwilling to do so.

Churchill said British have absolutely no ambitions in Levant States and sought no territory and no advantage there not given any other countries.

Churchill said in message to de Gaulle last February [*May*]²¹ he had made it clear British recognized special French position in Syria but he had pointed out British Government could not disregard events in Levant States. He had told de Gaulle he was willing to order withdrawal British troops from Levant immediately treaty concluded and in operation.

¹⁷ Note from the Soviet Chargé, June 1, p. 1128.

¹⁸ For text of statement, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 411. col. 689.

¹⁹ See telegram 3269, June 3, 2 p. m., from Paris, p. 1134.

²⁰ For an account of the conversation between the British Prime Minister and the Syrian President on February 17, see telegram 2163, March 2, 7 p. m., from London, p. 1051.

²¹ See message of May 4, p. 1067.

He had urged upon de Gaulle bad impression sending French reinforcements to Syria would create but nevertheless French forces began to arrive on May 17 and internal situation became very tense. On May 25 British Minister had been instructed to represent to Syrian Government necessity for maintaining control of situation. On May 28 Syrian Foreign Minister informed British Minister that events had overtaken him and that he could no longer be responsible for internal security.

Fact that message to de Gaulle informing him of British intention to intervene had been delivered following statement by Eden in Commons had been made subject of expression of regret by Churchill and no discourtesy was intended.

Until intervention by British they had issued no arms to Syrians or Lebanese but they are now doing so for sake of maintaining order.

Suggestion that British Minister in Beirut ²² was recalled to please General de Gaulle was not true.

In reply to question by Attlee ²³ regarding proposals for obtaining settlement, Churchill said that suggestion of conference between British, United States and French Governments in London still stands and hoped it will not be cast aside. He had seen suggestion of five-power conference bringing in Russia and China. This would cause great delay and "would require very careful consideration on many grounds".

WINANT

890D.01/6-545

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Government of the United States is in accord with the British Government as to the desirability of associating representatives of the Levant States with the proposed discussions in London, and inclines to the second of the two methods suggested in the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of June 5, 1945, namely, that there might be, in effect, two conferences or two sets of discussions taking place in London simultaneously on parallel lines. It is felt, however, that particular consideration should be given to preferences that might be expressed by the French Government in this regard.

²² Maj. Gen. Sir Edward L. Spears, who, according to Mr. Churchill's statement, wished to relinquish his post to return to his Parliamentary duties. The Minister resigned on December 15, 1944.

²³ Clement R. Attlee, leader of the British Labor Party.

There is nothing in the Soviet note which would indicate that the Soviet Government desires to participate in any conference relating to the Near East.

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1945.

890D.01/5-3145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1945—1 p. m.

170. Reurtel 170, May 31. In response to message from President Quwatly, please deliver to him the following message from the President:

"I deeply deplore the loss of life and the destruction which you have described in your letter to me. You may be assured that this Govt has followed the recent tragic events in Syria with most serious attention and concern.

You now doubtless know of what we have done to make our attitude clear to the entire world, and the action we have taken in order that the destruction and loss of life in Syria should cease. I sincerely hope that from this point on it will be possible to compose all differences in a peaceable manner. Harry S. Truman."

GREW

890.00/6-745

The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]²⁴

No. 184

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1945.

The Ambassador of France presents his compliments to His Excellency the Acting Secretary of State and has the honor to request him to be so good as to propose to the American Government, on behalf of the French Government, the meeting of a conference on Near Eastern matters as a whole, in which would take part, besides the British Government and the French Government itself, the American, Soviet and Chinese Governments.

The French Government believe, in fact, that the events which occurred recently in Syria and Lebanon, and lastly the open intervention of Great Britain in these two countries, necessitate an examination of the present situation in the Levant with a view to as early a settlement as possible. The attitude of Great Britain in this matter has been manifested under such conditions that, in the opinion of the French Government, the settlement cannot be sought in exclusively Franco-

²⁴ Translated copy filed under 890D.01/6-745.

British conversations. The London Government, furthermore, itself recognized this in proposing several days ago a conference in which the Government of the United States would be associated. Since then, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has, for its part, in a note addressed simultaneously on the first of June to the American, British, Chinese and French Governments,²⁵ noted the importance that it attaches to the solution of the Syrian affair from the point of view of international security. This point of view is that of the French Government.

Moreover, these differences with the Damascus Government are essentially concerned with military questions: organization of the command and conditions for stationing Allied troops at the present time; for the future, defining an arrangement for security in the region. The difficulties that it has experienced in settling these questions with the Damascus and Beirut Governments arise from the fact that they are not confined to Syria and Lebanon. They concern all of the Near East, Egypt included, and cannot be treated so far as the two states of the Levant are concerned without being made the object of a general settlement for the region of which these two states form a part. It is for this reason, furthermore, that the British command, whose headquarters are at Cairo, considered itself justified in intervening, and it is for that reason that the French Government is impelled to request a general examination, in the exercise of principles the application of which is now being worked out at San Francisco by the five major powers. In this spirit, it would gladly welcome their representatives to Paris for the proposed meeting, if the choice of that city should be agreeable to them.

Monsieur Henri Bonnet is happy to take [etc.]

890.00/6-745

The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the French Ambassador and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note no. 184 of June 7, 1945, in which is set forth a proposal of the French Government that a Conference take place, possibly in Paris, between the French, British, Soviet, Chinese and United States Governments to discuss Near Eastern questions as a whole. Mr. Bonnet's note takes the view that the elements involved in the Syrian question are of a broad, regional nature and that a solution must be sought on an international basis in harmony with the principles now being given concrete form at the International Conference in San Francisco.

²⁵ See note from the Soviet Chargé, June 1, and footnote 93, p. 1128.

The United States Government is of course entirely in accord with the desire of the French Government that the Syrian question be settled in harmony with the principles of international justice and cooperation. On the other hand it does not believe that an international conference on Near Eastern questions as a whole would be appropriate or helpful at this time. The United States Government would, however, be glad to discuss with the French Government any further suggestions it may care to make looking toward an orderly settlement of the immediate difficulties which have arisen in acute form in Syria and Lebanon. A just and amicable solution of this question would in the opinion of this Government restore tranquility and mutual confidence, thus preparing the way for a later and more general consideration of the wider issues involved in harmony with the principles of international security now under discussion at the conference in San Francisco.

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1945.

890D.01/6-145

The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Novikov)

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1945.

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your note of June 1, 1945 expressing the concern of the Soviet Government in regard to the unfortunate situation which has developed in Syria and Lebanon.

The United States Government is pleased to note that the position taken by the Soviet Government in regard to this matter is similar to that taken by the United States Government.

The United States Government shares the concern of the Soviet Government regarding the regrettable incidents involving bloodshed which took place. As the Soviet Government is aware from the communications which Ambassador Harriman addressed to the appropriate Soviet authorities, the United States Government promptly made its position clear and took steps to bring about a solution of this open conflict. The United States Government will not relax in its efforts to assist the countries concerned in reaching a just and amicable settlement of this matter.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/6-145

The Acting Secretary of State to the Egyptian Minister (Hassan)

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1945.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note no. 608 of June 1, 1945 transmitting a telegraphic message from Nokrashy

Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt, regarding recent events in Syria and Lebanon.²⁶

I should be grateful if you would be good enough to convey to the Prime Minister my appreciation of his message and inform him that the Government of the United States is in full agreement that the problem should be settled by peaceful means on a basis of justice and equality. As you are now aware, this Government sought to bring about a cessation of bloodshed and disorder, and it will continue its efforts to the end that a peaceable and satisfactory solution of the problem may be found.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/6-1145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

[WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1945.

Mr. Zurayk²⁷ came in at his own request and inquired as to our attitude toward the proposed discussions looking to a settlement of the crisis in the Levant States.

I replied that we had, as he doubtless knew, received a communication from the French on the subject, but that I was not in a position to indicate to him the nature of our reply. Our general attitude toward arrangements for the conversations had been mentioned by the President in his revised statement to the press on June 7, to the effect that the United States would have no intention of discussing a solution of the Syrian problem at a meeting from which France, Syria and Lebanon were absent.

Dr. Zurayk asked whether it would be proper for him to report to his Government that this was our general attitude. I said I saw no reason why he should not inform his Government of the President's revised statement, and gave him a copy of the text (attached).

The Chargé then asked whether I thought there was any step his Government might usefully take at this juncture with respect to the proposed conversations, pointing out that Syria was most anxious to coordinate its policy with the policy of this Government.

I replied that I did not, at the moment, think that any step along this line was needed from the Syrian Government. We were fully aware that Syria wanted to be brought into such conversations as might be arranged, and of the desirability of settling the Levant States problem as soon as possible. However, we felt that it would be a good thing if the conversations could take place on the best possible footing. Since there was some difference of opinion as to what the footing

²⁶ Note not printed; for text of telegraphic message, see p. 1127.

²⁷ Costi K. Zurayk, Syrian Chargé.

should be, it might take a little time to work the matter out. In the meantime, we hoped that there would be a cooling-down all around.

[Annex]

Statement to the Press by President Truman

[WASHINGTON, June 7, 1945.]

"When replying this afternoon to a question at his press conference which related to a proposed meeting of the Five Powers to settle the Syrian question, the President indicated that it would not be desirable to have such a meeting in view of the imminence of the meeting of the Big Three.²⁸ This of course does not mean that the United States would have any intention of discussing a solution of the Syrian problem at a meeting from which France, Syria and Lebanon were absent."

890D.01/5-3045

The Acting Secretary of State to the Syrian Chargé (Zurayk)

WASHINGTON, June 11 1945.

SIR: The receipt is acknowledged of your notes of May 25 and May 30, 1945²⁹ in which you bring to the attention of the Government of the United States the seriousness of the situation in Syria.

This Government has followed recent events in Syria with deep concern, and, as you are now aware, it used its influence with a view to preventing a situation from arising which would result in disorders. When disorders and loss of life unfortunately occurred, it immediately took action looking to the restoration of order. I assure you that this Government will continue its efforts for the realization of a just and peaceful settlement compatible with the independence of Syria.

Accept [etc.]

JOSEPH C. GREW

890D.01/6-2045

*The British Ambassador in France (Duff Cooper) to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault)*³⁰

No. 452

PARIS, 16 June, 1945.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: I have the honour, on instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform

²⁸ The Tripartite Conference at Berlin, attended by the heads of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, from July 17 to August 2, 1945. For documentation on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, 2 vols.

²⁹ For note of May 30, see footnote 82, p. 1122.

³⁰ Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2308, June 20, from Paris; received June 26.

Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have considered most carefully the suggestion made in the French Ambassador's note No. 236 of June 6th that a conference of French, British, American, Chinese and Soviet representatives should be called to consider current questions in the Middle East.

2. The United States Government have kindly communicated to His Majesty's Government a copy of the reply sent by them on June 8th ³¹ to a similar communication from the French Government. It is observed that the United States Government, though they would be glad to discuss the difficulties which have arisen in Syria and in the Lebanon, do not believe that an international conference on Near East questions as a whole would be appropriate at the present time. His Majesty's Government share the views of the United States Government on this point. They doubt very much whether an early solution of the difficult problems raised in the Levant States would be facilitated by a discussion of the questions relating to other parts of the Near and Middle East, or by arranging the participation in the discussions of other powers who have had no close associations with or detailed knowledge of Arab countries in that region.

3. At the same time His Majesty's Government consider it essential that there should be a discussion of the position in Syria and the Lebanon between the Governments directly concerned. His Majesty's Government therefore extend a cordial invitation to the French Government to send representatives to London to take part in conversations directed towards a settlement of the difficulties which have arisen in Syria and the Lebanon, and the establishment of a new understanding between the Governments most closely concerned with this problem. They would propose that representatives of the United States Government should participate in these conversations. Arrangements for associating the representatives of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments with the conversations will clearly also be required.

4. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that in the higher interests of a return to the former confident collaboration which marked relations between Great Britain and France, the French Government will see their way to accepting this invitation.

I have the honour [etc.]

DUFF COOPER

³¹ See note by the Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador, p. 1141.

890D.01/6-1745 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to the Secretary of State

JIDDA, June 17, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

239. Acting MinFonAff has just handed me telegram from King Abdul Aziz on Syria and Lebanon which I am sending verbatim translation. Previous appeals have been made identically and simultaneously through Brit and American Ministers but it is significant that this time communication to Brit Minister was made yesterday and consisted of gratitude for action taken. In handing me telegram today, Acting Minister stated it requests US Govt to take equally effective action with American economic weapons.

[Here follows text of telegram from King Abdul Aziz.³²]

Sent Dept; rptd Beirut; paraphrases to other Arab capitals.

EDDY

890.00/6-1945

*The Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*³³

Ref: 256/—/45

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1945.

DEAR LOY: I enclose copies of two telegrams from the Foreign Office to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris³⁴ containing the reply of His Majesty's Government³⁵ to the suggestion of the French Government that conference of French, British, American, Chinese and Soviet Representatives should be called to consider the current situation in the Middle East.

The Foreign Office have instructed Lord Halifax³⁶ to extend to the United States Government an official and cordial invitation to send representatives to London to take part in the proposed conversations with His Majesty's Government and the French Government. His Majesty's Government consider that arrangements for

³² King Abdul Aziz wrote in his telegram that he was very grateful for the stand taken by the American and British Governments with regard to Syria and Lebanon and expressed the hope that with their assistance the two Arab countries would achieve their independence and freedom. The King desired that the American Government take such action as would cause France to desist from its intransigence toward Syria and Lebanon, even if this should take the form of reconsideration of the economic assistance extended to France under lend-lease. He believed that this stand, if taken by the United States, would have a considerable restraining effect upon French activities. The King concluded by stating his strong hope that the American Government would not hesitate to do all that was possible to sustain the independence of the two countries.

³³ Acknowledged orally by Mr. Henderson.

³⁴ Neither printed.

³⁵ No. 452, June 16, p. 1144.

³⁶ British Ambassador.

associating representatives of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments with these conversations will also clearly be required. I discussed this with Mr. Reber³⁷ yesterday afternoon. At his suggestion we have telegraphed to the Foreign Office asking whether they think it would be helpful for the United States Government before replying to His Majesty's Government to send a message to the French Government suggesting that the United States Government and the French Government should both accept His Majesty's Government's invitation, and should add that the United States Government would be prepared to consider any place which might be agreed upon for holding the talks. We are awaiting a reply from the Foreign Office to this suggestion.

I enclose a copy of this letter and of the enclosures for Mr. Reber.
Yours very sincerely,

MICHAEL WRIGHT

890D.01/6-2045

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 20, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Lacoste, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Merriam, NE
Mr. Colquitt, NE

Mr. Lacoste opened his remarks by referring to newspaper reports regarding the debate in the Consultative Assembly regarding the Franco-Levant situation. He remarked that the "olive branch" had been extended to Great Britain, but that this involved certain considerations which were of primary importance in the opinion of the French. He referred to the statements made by Churchill in the House of Commons explaining British intervention in the Levant. Despite these explanations, Mr. Lacoste said, the British seem to have a very different object in mind which could not be reconciled with their public pronouncements. Mr. Lacoste then proceeded to make a free translation of instructions which he said had been sent by the French Foreign Office to the French Ambassador in Great Britain. The following is the gist of these instructions:

The Levant is a region where military responsibility was assumed by the French and the British under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement of 1941. The French expected that the participation of the British military in the Levant would be in the nature of Franco-British cooperation, but, in fact, the message read in the House of Commons by

³⁷ Samuel Reber of the Office of European Affairs.

Churchill made it clear that by the recent British action the French were being dispossessed (*désaisie*)—that French authority was being discarded and French jurisdiction ignored. General Paget's note to General Beynet was unacceptable; it contained a threat to French troops who were told not to use their arms even if attacked. The note was not justified, and it was calculated to make France appear not as an associate, but as a troublemonger. It was clear, therefore, that from the British point of view the threat to security came from the French and not from the Syrians. Furthermore, military and civilian personnel were being ordered out of Syria by the British, the British had taken over the O.C.P., and the British had deprived the French of their telephone network (Mr. Lacoste referred to the latter as outright confiscation). British agents were being substituted for French. Military and civilian personnel in Syria were unsafe—they were being attacked and they had no protection. In Lebanon where the situation was normal, the British had imposed censorship unfair to the French. The French Government, therefore, must ask the British to explain the discrepancy between their announced policy and the way in which they had acted—the way their agents were taking action on the spot. How does the British Government expect a return to normal circumstances? The French Government desires a reply at the earliest date. Liquidation of French interests is continuing and, as pointed out by General Beynet, there would soon be nothing left to lose. No country will permit itself to be treated as a culprit by its ally. With respect to establishing responsibility for recent incidents, the French Government reserves the right of appeal to any international organization or procedure it deems appropriate. To render possible a settlement of recent incidents, the French Government asks the British Government to make known the program for their agents in the Levant, and demands the British to take no general measures affecting French interests without the concurrence of French officials. So far as the settlement of the problem of what the French position in the Levant is to be, this is a matter of concern only to France on the one hand and to Syria and Lebanon on the other. Great Britain is charged with the military command in the Middle East, and has been given responsibilities pertaining to security in Syria and Lebanon for the duration of hostilities. The French Government is prepared to discuss directly with the British Government through diplomatic channels the problem of how the present situation may be liquidated in a manner which will guarantee the security of the Levant during the period of the war. The French Government insists on the urgent need of a reply. In spite of its resentment at the treatment inflicted by the British Government, the French Government is fully conscious of its obligations in the war and is fully conscious of its solidarity with

Great Britain. It would dislike to be compelled to resort to ways of action making it too apparent that the situation in Syria and Lebanon is a conflict between France and Great Britain. The French Government desired that a settlement of recent incidents in the Levant should be handled directly between London and Paris. Once settled, it would be possible to broach more general aspects of the problem on a wider international basis. These suggestions would, however, be applicable only if applied at the earliest possible date: if the present danger of losing everything in the Levant continues, the French Government would be compelled to try other solutions . . .

In reply to Mr. Henderson's query, Mr. Lacoste said that the three steps proposed by the French Government toward the settlement of the problem were:

1. Negotiations between France and Great Britain for a settlement of the immediate difficulties. Syria and Lebanon would be admitted only to the latter stages of these negotiations. (Mr. Lacoste commented that "it would not be proper for Syria and Lebanon to be present at a settlement of difficulties between France and Great Britain".)

2. Negotiations between France on the one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other to define the basis for relations between them.

3. A conference on Near Eastern problems as a whole in which at least the five major powers would participate.

Mr. Henderson said that the American position should be borne in mind during various negotiations which might take place: we cannot look with favor on any agreement that would discriminate against the United States, and we would regard it as unfortunate if any agreement contrary to this principle should be entered into. Mr. Merriam read to Mr. Lacoste a portion of an exchange of correspondence with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in September, 1944 regarding the recognition and protection of American rights. Mr. Henderson pointed out that we simply wanted ordinary normal intercourse with that part of the world, free of artificial restraint. To Mr. Lacoste's reference to British restrictive treaties with countries of the Middle East, Mr. Henderson pointed out that we did not condone those treaties, but that there was an obvious difference between a treaty made in 1930³⁸ and expiring five years hence, and a new treaty that might now be made.

Mr. Lacoste asked whether we had offered the British our good offices. Mr. Henderson said we had gone no further than to inform the British that we would be willing to attend a three-power conference, but that we would not initiate a proposal to the French to hold such a conference in London.

³⁸ The reference is presumably to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance, signed at Baghdad, June 30, 1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.

Mr. Lacoste concluded by saying that the French Government would, as indicated by the instructions he had read to us, demand a showdown of British intentions in the Levant States. The situation was disintegrating and there was general agreement among the French, even among opponents of de Gaulle, that the British were trying to oust the French from the Levant.³⁹

Mr. Henderson in conclusion emphasized the necessity of an early amicable settlement of the dispute for the sake of preserving Western prestige in the Near East. As the British Ambassador in Iraq, Cornwallis, once remarked to him, "Whenever agitation in the Near East rises against one power, it ends by being agitation against all of us".

890D.01/6-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 23, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received June 23—5 : 13 p. m.]

3800. My telegram 3799, June 23.⁴⁰ Bidault said this afternoon that the British declaration meant just one thing to them: It is clear that the British expect Syria and Lebanon to drive every Frenchman out of their countries and that the British will do nothing to prevent them.

He said that in reply to his urgings that the British make some proposal to them, they have received nothing.

He told me that he had sent a telegram to San Francisco in regard to the possibility of an investigation by representatives of "neutral states" as to what has taken place in Syria and Lebanon.

He said that he does not favor a three-power conference but would be happy to talk concurrently to me here and to Duff Cooper, but

³⁹ In a memorandum of June 25, 1945, of a conversation with the French Ambassador the same morning, the Acting Secretary of State wrote: "The Ambassador said, first, that there was the unfortunate situation in the Levant in which we are supporting the British position. I interrupted to say that our attitude was based in no respect on the British position but that we were following our own view of the matter and that the Ambassador knows very well what that view is, namely, our desire to see an end to the disturbances in Syria and Lebanon. The Ambassador assented to this observation." (740.00119 E.W./6-2545)

⁴⁰ Not printed; it reported on the reaction of the French press to the British statement of policy, June 22, 1945 concerning the Levant (890D.01/6-2345). The statement, as printed in the London *Times*, on June 23, was transmitted to the Department in despatch 23936, June 27, from London. It declared that "The Syrian and Lebanese Governments are primarily responsible for the maintenance of order within their territories. . . . In the event of disturbances which cannot be dealt with by the forces at the disposal of the Government the local British commander will be authorized to take such impartial action as he considers necessary . . . and that intervention by British troops implies no intention on the part of the British to supplant the French in Syria and Lebanon." (890D.01/6-2745)

separately, not the three together; or, he said, Massigli and Winant could do the same thing with the British there.

He took occasion to criticize somewhat bitterly our chief representative in the Levant States. I endeavored to persuade him that his remarks were unjustified.

CAFFERY

890D.01/6-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy)

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1945—8 p. m.

174. Reurtel 239, June 17. In replying to the King's communication re Syria and Lebanon you should inform him of this Govt's appreciation of his message and assure him that careful note has been taken of his views in the matter. You may add that this Govt will continue to work toward a settlement of the Levant crisis which will take full account of the independence and sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon.

GREW

890D.01/7-545

The Head of the French Delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization (Paul-Boncour) to the Chairman of the Conference (Stettinius)

[Translation]

SAN FRANCISCO, 24 June, 1945.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1.—The Chairman of the United Nations Conference has been informed of the grievous incidents which have taken place in the Levant States and which have deeply stirred public opinion in France and borne upon the good relations between France and the United Kingdom.

2.—The French Government have attempted to resort to various procedures in order to fully elucidate the origin and nature of these incidents, and to initiate a conciliatory settlement. In the last instance they proposed a conference of the Five Powers. None of these proposals have been agreed to.

3.—The French Government are fully aware of the fact that in the present state of things, the Organization which has been provided for in the Charter is not yet established and that the San Francisco Conference is not competent to decide in the substance of a political dispute. Therefore their purpose is neither to refer this dispute to the

United Nations Conference nor to promote the discussion by the Conference of the Levant difficulties. They have only in mind to take the opportunity of the United Nations representatives here convened, to seek their support in view of the designation, in conditions acceptable by all, of three neutral and impartial commissioners who would investigate the origin of the dispute and thus facilitate its conciliatory settlement.

4.—This designation, which does not require a discussion of substance, could be made by the Executive Committee or through such procedure as the latter would recommend.⁴¹

890D.01/7-545

Memorandum of Conversation Held at San Francisco, June 24, 1945 ⁴²

Mr. Paul-Boncour called on Mr. Stettinius

Also present: Mr. Dunn, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. George Allen, Mr. Hyde ⁴³

Mr. Paul-Boncour and Mr. Dejean ⁴⁴ called on the Secretary this morning and presented the attached *Aide-Mémoire* ⁴⁵ in regard to the problem of the Levant. Mr. Paul-Boncour said that he had received this morning a cable from his Government instructing him to present to Mr. Stettinius, as Chairman of the United Nations Conference, the proposal of the French Government that the Executive Committee of the newly established Preparatory Commission be asked to appoint a commission of representatives of three neutral and wholly disinterested governments which might, presumably in consultation with British, French, United States and perhaps Syrian representatives, make a thorough investigation on the spot of the difficulties which have arisen in the Levant, and prepare a recommendation for their solution.

⁴¹ No indication of a formal reply to the French *aide-mémoire* found in Department files. On July 2, 1945, the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) sent copies of the memorandum of conversation (printed *infra*), the French *aide-mémoire*, and a translation to the Ambassador in France and the Minister to Syria and Lebanon under instructions 1157 and 452, and stated: "The French Embassy has not as yet approached the Department on the subject." (890D.01/7-545) There is no indication in the Department files that the French made any further approach on the subject.

⁴² Memorandum is unsigned.

⁴³ James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State; John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs; George V. Allen, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; and Louis Kepler Hyde, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of State. Messrs. Dunn and Hickerson were advisers to the United States delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization; Mr. Allen was Political and Liaison Officer of the delegation; and Mr. Hyde was Assistant to the Chairman of the delegation (Stettinius).

⁴⁴ Maurice Dejean, Director General of Political Affairs in the French Foreign Office and Assistant Delegate of France at the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

⁴⁵ *Supra*.

Mr. Paul-Boncour said that his Government realized that this was not a problem with which the San Francisco Conference itself might properly deal and it had therefore not presented its proposal until the conclusion of the Conference. The French Government felt, however, that since the British Government had just rejected its proposal for Five-Power consultation on this question, it had no recourse but to refer it to the body which seemed to be the only interim organ of the United Nations pending the final establishment of the organization itself.

Mr. Paul-Boncour added that his Government felt it of special importance that the difficulties in the Levant be settled as soon as possible as they were jeopardizing the good relations between the French and British to which the French Government attaches so much importance. With this fact in view, Mr. Paul-Boncour added that he had before coming to Mr. Stettinius first presented his Government's proposal to Lord Halifax who seemed to receive it favorably. Mr. Paul-Boncour's instructions from Paris, moreover, mentioned that the proposal had already been placed before the British Government which also seemed to receive it with sympathy.

Mr. Stettinius replied that he realized of course the serious nature of the difficulties in the Levant and the importance of settling them as rapidly as possible. He was convinced, however, that the Preparatory Commission and its Executive Committee established by this conference are not the proper bodies to deal with this problem. They were set up for specific purposes of a wholly different character, that is, to make the administrative arrangements in connection with the establishment of the new organization and the opening sessions of its various organs. The Preparatory Commission and its Executive Committee would have absolutely no power to deal with political or diplomatic matters of this sort and to refer to them such matters would be to change completely the concept under which they were established. Furthermore, Mr. Stettinius added, the United States representative on these bodies would not be charged with the authority for dealing with matters of this sort and would not be able to act upon them. This was a matter, Mr. Stettinius felt, which should be taken up with him as Secretary of State after his return to Washington, and in regard to which consultations should continue among the foreign offices of France, the United States and Great Britain.

Mr. Paul-Boncour argued the matter at some length but, upon being informed that Mr. Stettinius' decision on this point was final, agreed that he would recommend to his Government that the matter be taken up in Washington in the normal way.

In conclusion, however, he pointed out the very grave results which he felt might occur if during the interval which will elapse before the final establishment of the international organization there exists no

regular international machinery for dealing with the many troublesome problems which are certain to arise during the coming months. Mr. Stettinius replied that this Government is fully alive to this problem, that it is giving thought to the necessity of the establishment of some regular means of consultation at a high level among the Big Five and that it may have a proposal to make along these lines before very long.

890D.01/6-2545 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1945—6 p. m.

184. Counselor of Syrian Legation⁴⁶ has expressed to Dept⁴⁷ his Govt's earnest desire that *Troupes Spéciales* be turned over to Syrian authority at earliest possible time. He pointed out that clashes between French and Syrians were unavoidable so long as France retained command of these troops and attempted to prevent desertions or apprehend deserters. He emphasized that transfer of *TS* would greatly facilitate restoration of normal conditions and would remove one of worst causes of irritation between Syrians and French.

Dept appreciates desirability of transfer of these native troops, but is aware of difficulty of effecting it in present circumstances. Your views after appropriate consultations would be appreciated.⁴⁸

GREW

890D.01/7-145 : Telegram

*The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary
of State*

BEIRUT, July 1, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 2:41 p. m.]

206. Deptel 187, June 26.⁴⁹ Lebanese FonMin Pharaon informed me yesterday that Ostrorog's "conciliatory" proposal as communicated

⁴⁶ Costi K. Zurayk.

⁴⁷ Memorandum of this conversation of June 19, by Adrian B. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, not printed.

⁴⁸ In telegram 205, June 30, 1945, 4 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported that after consultations with the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs and British military spokesmen, his personal view was "that transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* to Syrian and Lebanese command would go far towards relieving local tensions and creating atmosphere favorable to international consideration of Levant relationships. Basically more constructive, however, would be meeting of second Syrian desideratum namely withdrawal of French troops". (890D.01/6-3045) For text of No. 205, see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, 1945, vol. I, p. 962.

⁴⁹ Not printed; it advised of a report from the Ambassador in France that "Ostrorog left Paris for Beirut taking with him 'very conciliatory instructions' with reference not only to Levant States but also to Britain". (800.00 Summaries/6-2645)

to him "officieusement" on June 28 was that *Troupes Spéciales* be transferred and that French troops withdraw from Levant simultaneously with Brit troops, thus ending tension created by recent incidents and permitting France and Levant States "in atmosphere of restored good will to work out their common problems". Nature of ensuing discussion suggests that by this *démarche* French hope to by-pass Brit proposal for London conference with Amer participation.

Pharaon's answer made clear that while transfer of *Troupes Spéciales* and withdrawal of French troops were among main Syrian and Leb desiderata and while minor outstanding questions (such as French-retained "common interests", see penultimate pgh my 173, June 1⁵⁰) might be made subject of bilateral discussion, Syrian and Leb Govt's firmly-shared conviction was that basic issue of future Franco-Levant treaty relations could be effectively settled only within framework of international discussion.

As, however, Ostrorog's offer was not conditioned on any commitment in this latter regard, Pharaon, after consultation with Syrian FonMin Mardam, replied orally in second conversation had yesterday that informal reaction of Syrian as well as Leb Govt to this informal *démarche* "might well be taken as being on the whole favorable" and that consequently Ostrorog "could so inform his Govt and request authorization to put his offer formally". Ostrorog had answered that he would arrange with Beynet to telegraph immediately to Paris in this sense.

Concluding our conversation (of which memo is being forwarded in next pouch⁵¹) Pharaon voiced some apprehension lest this French *démarche* be simply another maneuver designed "to isolate us" and to postpone a showdown until after Big Three had met this month.⁵²

I will report more fully as to Syrian reaction after seeing Mardam later this week.⁵³ . . . I doubt that it [the proposal] will modify basic position of Syrian leaders, e.g. as voiced by Chamber President Jabri last week in Aleppo Mosque: "We have one present aim, to force France to quit our country."

⁵⁰ Not printed; it listed the administrative services still held by the French as "Port of Beirut, Office Economique de Guerre, Séquestre Général, Radio Levant, Tripoli Refinery and Administration of Railways." (890D.01/6-145) Most of these services and others not so listed were reported turned over to the Lebanese Government in airgram A-182, December 29, 1945 (890E.01/12-2945).

⁵¹ Despatch 883, July 2, 1945, not printed.

⁵² At Berlin.

⁵³ In telegram 207, July 5, 1945, 8 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported that he had been informed by the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that if the French wished, immediately and unconditionally, to transfer the *Troupes Spéciales* under their Syrian officers and with their normal equipment, such transfer would have a salutary effect on the general security situation, but that he saw nothing in the Ostrorog *démarche* to indicate any change in the basic French policy (890D.01/7-545).

Sent Dept as 206, rptd Paris as 75 with request to rpt to London; paraphrases to Arab cap [ital]s.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/7-845: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, July 8, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 10:32 p. m.]

4100. The following communiqué issued by FonOff:

“In accordance with a declaration made at Beirut⁵⁴ by Gen. Beynet, French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in the Levant, it has been decided in view of the end of hostilities in Europe to agree to the desire of Syria and Lebanon to establish a national army, and consequently to transfer to the Syrian and Lebanese Govts the locally recruited military units which are under French control.⁵⁵ The details of the transfer will be settled within 45 days.”

Figaro comments on above that “French diplomatic circles” consider that it should be interpreted as indicating a French desire to reestablish cordial relations with Syria and Lebanon and to establish their independence fully and definitely, thus contradicting certain rumors current abroad.

Sent Dept as 4100 rptd Beirut as 44 and London as 502.

CAFFERY

890D.01/7-1145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Henderson
Mr. Kohler

Mr. Michael Wright called at his request to read to us a telegram from the Foreign Office regarding the status of the British proposal to the French and ourselves for the convocation in London of a tripartite conference on the situation in the Levant States. The Foreign

⁵⁴ Presumably, the communiqué issued on July 8 by the Délégation Générale; for text, see telegram 211, July 9, 2 a. m., from Beirut, *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, 1945, vol. I, p. 968.

⁵⁵ For accounts by Mr. Wadsworth of his discussions with Count Ostrorog and Major General Pilleau on the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* and other matters, see his telegrams 208, July 7, 3 p. m., and 213, July 9, 7 p. m., *ibid.*, pp. 967 and 969; for report by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom on remarks made by a “FonOff official” on the situation in the Levant, see his telegram 6908, July 9, 8 p. m., *ibid.*, p. 970.

Office expressed its great appreciation of the willingness of the Department to participate in such conversations either in London or elsewhere and of our offer to do anything we could to help secure French consent. The Foreign Office felt, however, that in view of the way the situation had developed nothing could be done at the present time to expedite the holding of the proposed conference.

It was pointed out that the French were now seeking a solution by direct approaches to the Lebanese (and Syrians) and that there was little likelihood of their consenting to a tripartite conference unless and until these approaches failed.

The Foreign Office further stated that it would be reluctant to agree to hold the conversations in Paris or other French territory, which would require a French chairman and enable the French to put all the blame on the British. Furthermore, Mr. Eden himself desired to conduct conversations on this question and, consequently, neutral territory, such as Switzerland, would likewise be ruled out.

Mr. Henderson expressed his agreement with the observations of the Foreign Office, adding that it was also clear that the French were inclined to oppose U.S. participation in conversations on the Levant situation.

890D.01/7-1345: Airgram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, July 13, 1945.

[Received July 20—3 p. m.]

A-92. [Here is given an account of initial public reaction and reaction among the *Troupes Spéciales* to the announced transfer of these troops to Lebanese and Syrian control.]

The reaction of the Lebanese Government is contained in a joint Lebano-Syrian statement issued on July 9, following consultations at Shatura between Jamil Mardam Bey, Acting Prime Minister of Syria and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lebanese Premier Abdul Hamid Karameh and Foreign Minister Henry Pharaon. The text of this communiqué is given below:

"The Syrian and Lebanese Governments have taken cognizance of the declaration published by the Provisional Government of the French Republic dated July 8th, 1945, whereby the locally recruited troops were transferred to these two governments.

"Registering the said declaration of the P.G.F.R., the Syrian and Lebanese Governments proclaim the satisfaction they feel in taking charge of their troops.

"The two governments have decided each to appoint a technical committee for the takeover of these troops."

When questioned on the Lebanese point of view concerning the French declaration, as well as the services which have not been transferred, and concerning the foreign troops on Lebanese soil, the Foreign Minister made the following statement:

“Concerning the services which are ours, I hope that their transfer will suffer neither delay nor difficulty.

“As regards the withdrawal of foreign troops this will be the object of a simultaneous settlement among the interested parties.”

The British have been active in urging the local governments to accept the French offer at its face value, motivated, I believe, by a desire to see the situation settled as rapidly as possible and an end put to a series of events which have imposed a serious strain on Anglo-French relationships.

Further developments will be reported by airgram or despatch as warranted.

GEORGE WADSWORTH

890D.01/8-945 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945—noon.

227. We have been informally discussing with Brit Emb their suggestion⁵⁶ of possible desirability establishing commission of disinterested powers, probably excluding Big Three, to report on Franco-Levant problem, perhaps recommending solution to ForMins Council or to UNO.⁵⁷

Our initial reaction that such proposal might delay rather than expedite solution unless direct negotiations being tried by Ostrorog. reach impasse. Please give us your estimate prospects for continued progress and satisfactory solution by direct negotiations and comment on suggested commission, which should be mentioned only your Brit colleague.⁵⁸

BYRNES

⁵⁶ *Aide-mémoire* of August 7, not printed.

⁵⁷ United Nations Organization.

⁵⁸ In telegram 258, August 16, 1945, 6 p. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon stated: “I cannot see that useful purpose would be served by neutral suggested commission . . . time for such fact finding is now long past . . . to investigate such issues now, even were useful facts to be established, would be to reopen old wounds and render more difficult any effort by Council of Big Five Foreign Ministers to find basis for Franco-Levant settlement.” He also said that “Ostrorog’s ‘direct negotiations’ have not even touched on basic issues”. (890D.01/8-1645) On September 21, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) a draft reply to

890E.01/8-2245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1945.

The Minister of Lebanon, Dr. Charles Malik, called upon me this morning. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to make the four following statements to the State Department.

1. The Government of Lebanon hopes that the Government of the United States will bear in mind during these somewhat troublesome and confusing times that no person is empowered to speak on behalf of the State of Lebanon except an accredited representative or a responsible official of the Government of Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon has been somewhat concerned because two categories of persons have of late shown a tendency to speak for the State of Lebanon who have not been authorized so to do. In the first category are officials of governments other than the Government of Lebanon, some of whom, even with good intentions, intimate that they speak for the Government of Lebanon as well as for their own government. To the second category belong Lebanese citizens who are not Government officials who presume to speak on behalf of the State and people of Lebanon. It was clear that in the first category the Minister had in mind Government representatives of Syria and in the second category, the Maronite Lebanese Bishop, who is at present visiting the United States.

2. The Government of Lebanon sincerely hopes that the Government of the United States will not allow itself to be induced to enter into discussions with regard to the future of Lebanon in the absence of authorized representatives of the Government of Lebanon. It was clear that this statement was made because of concern on the part of the Lebanese Government lest General de Gaulle might succeed in prevailing upon American Government officials to negotiate with him while he is in Washington with regard to the future status of Lebanon.

3. The Government of Lebanon wishes to make it clear that it must repudiate any international agreement reached with regard to the future status of Lebanon to which the Government of Lebanon is not a

the *aide-mémoire* of August 7 which stated: "We have no objection to the British suggestion in principle, but think it impractical. We suggest that if the British-French conversations do not make satisfactory progress, the question could be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers in London for settlement in consultation with representatives of Syria and Lebanon." (890D.01/9-2145) In a memorandum of October 8 for the files, Adrian B. Colquitt stated: "In view of the fact that this matter has developed along another line and is being pursued on another basis, it is not thought that a written reply to the British memorandum is necessary. The attached draft reply is therefore not being sent." (890D.01/10-845) The draft reply is not found in Department files.

party. This statement obviously was also made with De Gaulle's visit to the United States in mind.

4. The Lebanese Government wishes again to inform the Government of the United States that it will categorically refuse to enter into any kind of an agreement with any foreign power which would be discriminatory against a third foreign power.

I thanked the Minister for his statements. I told him that all of them appeared to be reasonable and understandable. The Government of the United States fully realized that only persons authorized by the Government of Lebanon could speak on behalf of the State of Lebanon. I was sure that the Government of the United States had no intention of negotiating behind the back of the Government of Lebanon with regard to the future status of Lebanon or without the knowledge of Lebanon of entering into agreements with other powers with regard to the future status of Lebanon. The policy of the Government of the United States, furthermore, coincided with that of the Government of Lebanon with regard to the granting of privileges of a discriminatory nature by one power to another power.

890D.01/8-2345 : Telegram.

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 23, 1945—12 a. m.
[Received August 23—9:01 a. m.]

265. ReLegtel 258, August 16.⁵⁹ At small dinner given last evening by Syrian President for Minister Eddy, President and PriMin⁶⁰ were insistent that time had come for formal declaration of clear undertaking by British and French Governments that their troops be withdrawn: Combatant units "immediately" and administrative services at earliest date consistent with technical considerations, entire operation to be completed within specified time limit.

Sent Department as 265, repeated to Paris as 87 with request to repeat to London, paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

⁵⁹ Not printed; it gave Mr. Wadsworth's opinion that the "most promising approach to Franco-Levant settlement might be found in direct representations to Paris and London that time has come for British and French Governments to make joint announcement that their troops will be withdrawn progressively from Levant during next 6 to 8 months." (890D.01/8-1645)

⁶⁰ Sami Solh, who became Lebanese Prime Minister on August 22, 1945.

890D.01/8-2545 : Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, August 25, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 4:05 p. m.]

267. ReLegtel 265, August 23. In course my first call on new Lebanese Foreign Minister⁶¹ yesterday he expressed full unity of view with Syrian President as to urgent desirability of early joint Anglo-French declaration of intention to withdraw British and French troops from Levant within specified time limit. He added that following such declaration he would if desired gladly conclude *modus vivendi* to govern technical conditions of withdrawal.

Paget after brief visit here has left for 10 days in London where he will discuss question. Ostrorog tells me that in answer to inquiry by Paget as to French views in matter Beynet said that while French Govt is in principle agreeable to withdrawal when British do so he had no instructions or authority to discuss details.

Sent Dept as 267, repeated Paris with request repeat to London; paraphrases to Arab capitals.

WADSWORTH

890D.01/8-2845

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1945.

The Syrian Minister called on me today. During the course of our conversation he asked whether the problem of Syria and Lebanon had come up during the De Gaulle conversations.⁶² I replied that I had no information on the subject. He said that he supposed that he could assume that this problem had not arisen, since certainly the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs would have been consulted in case it had. I answered that it would not be safe for him to make such an assumption since it was quite possible that an exchange of views with regard to the policy in the Levant of each Government had

⁶¹ Hamid Frangieh.

⁶² The memorandum covering the two conversations between President Truman and General de Gaulle on August 22, gives no indication of discussions on Syria and Lebanon (vol. iv, p. 707). The record of their conversation on August 24, printed in *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946*, p. 553, makes a passing reference to the two countries. The joint statement of President Truman and General de Gaulle, released by the White House on August 25, is printed in vol. iv, p. 725. For memorandum of meeting by the Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister on August 24, see p. 722.

taken place. Both the President and the Secretary of State were fully acquainted with the policies of the American Government with regard to the Levant. There would be no reason, therefore, for them to consult with the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs or with the Division of Near Eastern Affairs during the course of a discussion of this kind with General De Gaulle. I added that I was confident that there had been no change in our policy with regard to Syria and Lebanon in consequence of General De Gaulle's visit.

890D.01/8-3045

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1945.

MR. HENDERSON: Mr. Lacoste, of the French Embassy, was in to see me this afternoon on a couple of other matters and, as he was very much pressed for time, he asked me to convey to you the following message:

Lacoste stated that at the present time, both in Beirut and London, the French and British are engaged in confidential conversations with regard to the joint withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant States. He said that this was an extremely delicate negotiation because of the Franco-British relationship in the area and needed to be handled with the greatest care in view not only of those relations but the possible effect of the troop withdrawal on third parties, notably the Christian population in Lebanon. With this as a preface, Lacoste expressed the hope that the American representative in Beirut will be cautioned against discussing the question of troop withdrawals with the Syrian government. He hastened to add that they would have made this request regardless of who our representative was in Beirut, and that it was by no means to be regarded as a reflection on Mr. Wadsworth. On the contrary, he said that as far as he was aware, and in spite of some earlier difficulties, Mr. Wadsworth had conducted himself with great tact and understanding through the recent crisis. I made no comment whatever other than to assure him that I would pass on the message to you.⁶³

J. C. H. B[ONBRIGHT]

⁶³ In telegram 265, September 11, 1945, 8 p. m., the Acting Secretary of State instructed the Minister to Syria and Lebanon as follows: "For your info French and British are presently engaged in confidential conversations with regard to joint withdrawal of their troops from Levant States. In view of delicate character of these negotiations it would be helpful if you could avoid being drawn into discussions on this subject while they are in progress." (890E.01/9-1145) In telegram 283, September 14, 1945, 4 p. m., Mr. Wadsworth stated that he would have no difficulty avoiding such discussions (890E.01/9-1445).

890D.01/9-545

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In a desire to contribute to a solution of the Levant problem, Mr. Bevin⁶⁴ discussed the situation informally with the French Ambassador in London on August 16th, making it clear that he could not commit His Majesty's Government since the Cabinet had not yet considered the matter. Mr. Bevin was anxious to remove what is believed to be a strong French suspicion that if both British and French troops were withdrawn from the Levant States and trouble thereafter arose, British troops would return and remain in those countries.

2. His tentative suggestions were therefore as follows:

(1) both Governments should agree forthwith to withdraw their troops,

(2) if the French were afraid of attacks on the Christian minorities, it would be for the United States, Great Britain and France in the interim period before the functioning of the World Organisation to decide whether they should intervene, and if so, to determine what troops should be used. Britain, for her part, would support the employment of French troops for this purpose. Mr. Bevin thought that this would have a moral effect in preventing outbreaks and would cause the Syrians and Lebanese to take care to see that disturbances did not arise,

(3) the police force should be efficiently organised,

(4) steps should be taken to deal with the problem of exchange in order to enable the territories to be fed. This would be a matter of discussion,

(5) France's claim to a base should be dealt with by the World Organisation when the time came.

3. Mr. Bevin concluded by stating that if this tentative approach appealed to the French Government, he would take the matter up with the Cabinet. If it would assist the French, Mr. Bevin was agreeable to the above proposals emanating from them.

4. The French Ambassador has now replied to the above proposals stating that his communication is strictly personal and confidential and that it represents the personal views of M. Bidault but does not commit the French Government, which has not discussed them.

5. M. Bidault considers that the proposal for simultaneous evacuation of the Levant States by French and British forces is open to serious objections. He believes that the Christian communities at Jazireh would be in danger following the withdrawal of Allied forces and that, should disturbances arise necessitating foreign intervention, there would be a long delay before the French troops could arrive on

⁶⁴ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Labor Government organized by Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee on August 5, 1945.

the spot, since the nearest point at which they are located is Tunisia. The necessary prior agreement between Washington, Paris and London would take time and in the meantime British troops would be forced to intervene for humanitarian reasons and to prevent the development of a situation threatening the security of Palestine. Such British intervention would confirm the worst French suspicions of British motives.

6. M. Bidault therefore proposes the following alternative solution. The military dispositions at present in force should be maintained, but French political officers should be abolished, together with other unspecified arrangements not consonant with the independent status of Syria and Lebanon. The French and British Governments would agree mutually to withdraw officials objectionable to each other. Sufficient French troops for intervention in the interests of keeping the peace should be retained in certain places in the Lebanon to be decided by Franco-British agreement, confirmed by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. The balance of French forces, if any, would then be evacuated simultaneously with the evacuation of British troops. The French should retain an airfield at Mezze and perhaps also a further airfield in Jazireh. Such a measure would reassure the Christians and contribute to the general pacification. M. Bidault added the following further suggestions on his own account,

(a) that His Majesty's Government should undertake to support with the World Organisation the French claim to bases in the Levant,

(b) His Majesty's Government would undertake to refuse to supply British advisers to Syria and Lebanon administrations. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments should be informed of this undertaking and an attempt should be made to obtain a similar undertaking from the United States Government,

(c) His Majesty's Government would undertake to recognise priority for France in all matters concerning loans or financial operations which Syria or the Lebanese Governments might wish to incur to meet obligations devolving on them in consequence of their independence.

(d) His Majesty's Government would assist the French Government to obtain guarantees of safe-guarding French educational establishments in the Levant.

7. Mr. Bevin would be glad to learn the view of the State Department on this matter. He has informally notified the French Ambassador that he personally sees no prospect for a settlement on the basis of the suggestion of M. Bidault that French troops should remain in the Levant after the withdrawal of British troops. Mr. Bevin's proposal that the French and British forces should be withdrawn from Syria was fundamental to the whole scheme which he propounded; and he had supposed that the principle of simultaneous evacuation was acceptable to the French Government in view of Count de Ostrorog's statements to the present and previous Lebanese Govern-

ments on this subject. In the present circumstances it would be unrealistic to suppose that Syrian or Lebanese consent could be obtained for the continued presence of French forces in the Levant. Such an arrangement could in practice only be realised if it were imposed on the States by force or threat of force and could not possibly last.

8. Mr. Bevin added that in his opinion if agreement can be reached on the question of joint withdrawal a substantial measure of agreement on the other points mentioned by the Ambassador should be possible, though he could not undertake to resist the appointment of a United States adviser. Mr. Bevin appreciates the importance which the United States Government attaches to its right to provide advisers at the request of Governments who make application for them.

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1945.

741.51/9-1745 : Airgram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, September 17, 1945.

[Received September 27—6 p. m.]

A-130. The Department will have noted the text of the important statement made by General de Gaulle to the London *Times* correspondent in Paris on September 9⁶⁵ last, dealing basically with Franco-British relations and *inter alia* with the two powers' mutual interest in determining their relationships with the Arab countries in general and Syria in particular.

The passage of this statement which has occasioned particular concern in Syria and Lebanon read, in suggested translation, as follows:

"They should together help the countries of the Near East to determine their mutual relations—and they should frankly adjust their relations with the activities of those countries individually."

Yesterday, September 15, the local press carried two important declarations made respectively by the Syrian Prime Minister, Faris Bey el-Khoury, and the Lebanese Prime Minister, Sami Bey es-Solh, commenting particularly on this quoted passage. They had previously met, together with their Foreign Ministers, on September 10 to consider general Franco-Levant relations. On September 14 the Foreign Ministers again met to pursue the earlier discussion and, in particular, to consider the general implications of this de Gaulle statement.

Faris Bey was reported by the press to have said, when questioned by local newsmen: 1) That France had been asked "to evacuate her

⁶⁵The London *Times*, September 10, p. 4. For French text, see *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Salvation, 1944-1946*, p. 558.

armed forces as speedily as possible from Syria and Lebanon"; and 2) That Syria would refuse "any special or privileged position on our territory to any government."

He then made the following declaration:

"General de Gaulle has no business to make the rights of the Near East States and their sharing with Britain a subject for bargaining. De Gaulle knows that the Arab States, both together and separately, repudiate all decisions taken by others as they themselves are their own guardians, and no one has the right to make them a subject for bargaining."

The Lebanese Prime Minister's declaration is longer, carefully worded and lays particular emphasis on the broader theme (specially noted also in current local editorial comment on the subject) that the principles on which war was won and peace is to be made preclude that Great Powers concert together as in the past to dispose of the Arab Lands as "zones of influence." In full text it reads, in suggested translation, as follows:

"We cannot but welcome any agreement that may be concluded between the two neighbour States, Great Britain and France, as such an agreement would constitute a new guarantee for world peace in general, and European peace in particular.

"On the other hand, we will in no way accept that Lebanon or Syria, or any other Near Eastern country, become a scene of competition for zones of influence between this or that group of Powers. We are all equal in rights and obligations, as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, which does not differentiate between the great and the small members of the said world organisation.

"We should like to remind the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic he has forgotten an organisation which has its weight in the Orient, namely, the League of Arab States, which the United Nations Charter has recognised and regarded, together with similar regional organisations, as a further guarantee of world peace and security.

"We had hoped at this stage we are traversing, and after we had proved our good intentions, in spite of all the difficulties and obstacles, that the atmosphere would not be troubled by such declarations as the one in question, so that we may not be led to doubt the good intentions of others."

GEORGE WADSWORTH

890D.01/9-1845: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1945—3 p. m.

277. Syrian Minister informed Dept this morning that his Foreign Office had asked him to check accuracy of certain info which had

reached Syrian Legation Washington allegedly from French official sources. This info was to effect that during De Gaulle's visit in US it had been arranged that American Govt would support French demands for bases in Levant in return for French agreement to give certain bases to US in Africa. Minister said he was sure this info was incorrect since such an agreement in opinion of his Govt and himself would not be in keeping with principles on which American foreign policy is based.

Minister was informed that report in question was without any foundation in fact and that subject of bases in Levant so far as Dept was aware had not been discussed with French during De Gaulle's visit.

Sent Beirut repeated Paris and Secdel ⁶⁶ London.

ACHESON

890D.00/9-2445

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

Ref: 256/ /45

His Majesty's Embassy has been instructed by the Foreign Office to inform the State Department, in strict confidence, that Mr. Bevin is taking advantage of the presence in London of Monsieur Bidault and His Majesty's Minister at Beirut to ascertain whether any progress can be made with the French on the Levant question on the basis of withdrawal of French and British troops at the earliest possible moment.

2. Monsieur Bidault has agreed that a member of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs should visit London in the immediate future for exploratory discussions with the Foreign Office.⁶⁷ No public announcements of these discussions is to be made. Monsieur Bidault has, however, insisted that scope of discussions should nominally be extended to cover matters of mutual interest to France and Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and that this should be line to be taken in any announcement which might have to be made, if there were any leakage. These forthcoming discussions should throw considerably more light on the French attitude than is available at present, and will certainly reveal whether, and if so in what circumstances, French Government are really prepared to agree to the withdrawal of troops.

⁶⁶ Code designation used to identify telegraphic messages sent by the Department to the Secretary of State while he was head of the United States delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which met at London from September 11 to October 2, 1945. For documentation on the meetings of the Council, see vol. II, pp. 99 ff.

⁶⁷ In telegram 9885, September 24, 1945, 6 p. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom reported that a formula providing for the withdrawal of British and French troops from the Levant had been worked out by representatives of the British and French Foreign Offices (741.51/9-2445).

3. Should the State Department wish to inform the United States Minister at Beirut about the above London discussions, His Majesty's Government hope that Mr. Wadsworth will be instructed not to mention the matter for the moment.⁶⁸

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1945.

890D.01/9-3045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, September 30, 1945—noon.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

5787. London's 9885, September 24 to Dept.⁶⁹ Chauvel states that "on technical level" a draft formula for withdrawal of British and French troops from the Levant was worked out in London for consideration by British and French Govts.

He said that it was made clear to Britain, however, that the French Govt could not divorce the question of withdrawal of troops from other questions relating to France's position and facilities in the Levant in particular and Near East in general and, therefore, French Govt could only seriously consider the troop withdrawal formula when formula for the other problems had been found.

He added that the British had been requested to give the French a general outline of their views on the whole Near East question without, of course, making any firm commitments so that Franco-British relations and policies could be coordinated. He said that thus far the British had not set forth their general views and expressed the personal opinion British over-all policy in Near East has not as yet crystallized.

Repeated to London.

CAFFERY

890D.01/9-1845

The Acting Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler) to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1945.

DEAR GEORGE: The first intimation we had that the Levant question was discussed during the course of De Gaulle's visit to Washington

⁶⁸ In a memorandum of September 25, 1945, for the files, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs stated:

"The attached memorandum from the British Embassy, dated September 24, 1945, was left with me by Mr. Michael Wright yesterday.

"I informed Mr. Wright, in discussing the third paragraph of this memorandum, that the Department had asked Mr. Wadsworth to endeavor to prevent himself from being brought into discussions relating to the withdrawal of troops from Syria and Lebanon." (890D.00/9-2545)

⁶⁹ Not printed, but for summary, see footnote 67, p. 1167.

was a brief reference in the September 6 issue of the Department's *Weekly Review*,⁷⁰ reading:

“. . . France wants to keep a privileged position in Syria and Lebanon and still hopes to accomplish this by treaties which these countries will freely accept.”

We asked Eur⁷¹ for further information and they sent us the enclosed translation of a memorandum, written by Lacoste of the French Embassy, of a conversation between Mr. Byrnes and M. Bidault on August 24 at which Lacoste was present. Eur says⁷² that the Secretary was the only American present and apparently made no record of the conversation himself. In answer to our question as to whether we took occasion to reiterate the policy of this Government, Eur made the following comment:⁷³

“Apparently the talks were not very conclusive on this subject, but it appears that Mr. Byrnes *did* ask the French why they wanted special privileges in countries whose independence they had recognized. The general tenor of the Secretary's questions certainly implied disapproval of the French efforts to maintain a privileged position, and I have no doubt the French so interpreted them.”

I am enclosing a copy of this letter for the Legation at Damascus.
Sincerely yours, Foy D. KOHLER

[Enclosure—Translation]

Memorandum of Conversation Between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bidault) and the Secretary of State, Held in Washington, August 24, 1945

3) *Question of the Levant*

Again without transition Mr. Byrnes takes up the Levant question: “Where have you got to there?”, he asks, putting his finger on the Syrian-Lebanese area. M. Bidault sums up the situation in a few words. He admits that mistakes may have been made on the French side, mistakes which are small in themselves, and he emphasizes how everyone has gone out of his way to exploit these mistakes at France's expense. “What is your objective?” M. Bidault points out our desire to keep a privileged position in these two countries. “Why privileges imposed on States whose independence you have just recognized

⁷⁰ Entitled *Current Foreign Relations*.

⁷¹ Memorandum of September 18 by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), not printed.

⁷² Memorandum of September 18 by Mr. Bonbright to Mr. Kohler, not printed.

⁷³ Memorandum of September 19 by Mr. Hickerson to Mr. Henderson, not printed.

yourselves?" M. Bidault replies that it is not a question of imposing our desiderata but rather in having them accepted by treaties freely acquiesced in. Mr. Byrnes insists on the incompatibility of the privileges which France claims with the independence of Beyrouth and Damascus which she has recognized. M. Bidault (brings up) the freedom of these countries to sanction contractually certain legitimate advantages (for us) in the fields in which we are interested. "Why are they legitimate? On what do you base these claims?" M. Bidault recalls the centuries-old antiquity of France's treaties in the Near East; the 1860 expedition which the Concert of Europe entrusted to France; the benefits which France has conferred on these peoples where her worst enemies call her to task in her own language. Finally he paints the picture of the situation of the Christians, those of Levant and those of Djezirah. Mr. Byrnes asks questions about the Maronites, the Alouites, the Druses, the Assyro-Chaldeans. M. Bidault gives him the information requested. Mr. Byrnes returns to his desk and changes the subject.

[Here follows discussion on other subjects.]

890.00/10-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 3, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

10288. Paris telegram 718, September 30, noon.⁷⁵ We have been told by Under Secretary Harvey that a formula covering the general situation in the Near East as it affects the British and French has now been worked out between Ambassador Massigli and Howe, the superintending Under Secretary for the Middle East. The formula has not as yet been seen by Mr. Bevin. Bevin has until now been too occupied with the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The formula would, however, be brought to his attention as soon as possible.

Harvey added that Mr. Bevin is personally very anxious to come to an understanding with the French on the Middle East in general and particularly on Syria just as quickly as possible so that the way will be open for talks on questions more immediately touching Anglo-French relations.

Sent Department as 10288; repeated Paris as 644.

WINANT

⁷⁵ Presumably No. 5787, p. 1168.

890.00/10-1845: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 18, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 10:36 p. m.]

10909. Embassy telegram 10288 October 3, 5 p. m. Following additional information re Anglo-French conversations on Levant has been given us by officials of Eastern Department of Foreign Office.

Meetings opened with French asking for what would have amounted to virtual restoration of their previous position in Levant. British demurred and suggested proceeding with discussion of immediate question of troop withdrawal. French agreed and paper was prepared for submission to both Governments providing:

(1) French and British military authorities should draw up plan for withdrawal which would take into consideration (a) desirability of avoiding reduction of troops beyond point where minimum security requirements could be met in time of possible need and (b) fixing date for final withdrawal to coincide with assumption of defense obligation by United Nations Organization.

(2) Arrangement would be made for talks with Syrians and Lebanese on troop withdrawal and also certain other matters such as schools.

Following drawing up of this paper French suggested that it would be much easier to obtain approval of French Govt to troop withdrawal if that proposal were accompanied by plan for general Anglo-French cooperation in Arab countries and they submitted paper to that effect which British did not find to their liking and French were so advised. British observed, however, that they assumed that decision on definite proposals re withdrawal would not be conditional on action taken on wider paper and it was their understanding that French agreed.

British Government promptly approved paper on troop withdrawal and when no reply received from French Foreign Office telephoned Paris several days ago inquiring re status of latter. French said they were still waiting for reply to second paper and indicated that they hesitated to approach de Gaulle on basis of first paper only. British stated that they had already given reply on second paper and it was in negative.

Having reached this apparent deadlock Foreign Office has been going through second French paper again with view to seeing whether area of disagreement with French might not be narrowed by picking out certain points which might serve as possible basis for discussion

but results were not promising. British still seeking to find way out of impasse but next move problematical.⁷⁶

Sent Department as 10909, repeated Paris as 673 and Beirut as 21.

GALLMAN

890D.01/10-2545 : Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Porter) to the Secretary of State

DAMASCUS, October 25, 1945.

[Received October 25—4:20 p. m.]

74. At press conference yesterday Premier stated: "Reestablishment of our relations with France conditional upon three points: first, the withdrawal of troops; second, transfer to us of remaining powers and attributes; third, settlement question diplomatic representation on normal basis." Explaining last point Premier said Syria could not tolerate presence of French Delegate General and that French, like other powers, should be represented here by Minister.

PORTER

890D.01/11-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 6, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received November 6—11:50 a. m.]

11624. Embassy's 11483, November 2; ⁷⁷ repeated to Paris as 710, November 2. Assistant Under-Secretary Howe tells us that Foreign Office proposal on points in French paper covering general relations of British and French in Near East, on which Foreign Office felt agreement might be reached, has been considered by Bidault. Bidault's reaction is favorable. Final word, however, rests with de Gaulle who now has proposal under consideration.

Howe expressed Foreign Office hope that French approval would be given at an early date so that withdrawal of troops from Levant States would be undertaken without much further delay. In Syria particularly, he added, restiveness over continued presence of French troops had of late increased. In this connection, Howe called attention to a statement made by the Syrian Prime Minister at a press

⁷⁶ In telegram 11483, November 2, 1945, 7 p. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom reported that the British Foreign Office had given "further examination of French second paper covering general relations of the British and French in Near East, [and] it had been decided that there were certain points of broad principle on which it might be possible to reach agreement and that proposal to that effect had been put to French". (741.51/11-245)

⁷⁷ Not printed, but for summary, see footnote 76, above.

conference about a week ago that negotiations with the French would not be undertaken by Syrians until French troops had been withdrawn and normal diplomatic representation had been established.

Sent Dept as 11624, repeated Paris as 717.

WINANT

890D.01/9-545

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has carefully noted the contents of the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of September 5 and memorandum of September 24, 1945, regarding the Franco-Levant States problem.

The Department appreciates the information contained in the former with regard to the preliminary exchange of views which took place between Mr. Bevin and the French Ambassador in London on August 16 and has noted the former's desire to learn its view on this matter. It has also learned with regret from Mr. Shone's telegram from Beirut, dated October 22,⁷⁸ that the further talks which took place in London failed to result in any agreement between British and French authorities.

The Department agrees with Mr. Bevin that there is little prospect for a settlement on the basis of M. Bidault's suggestion that French troops remain in Syria and Lebanon after the withdrawal of British troops, and that it is most improbable that Syrian or Lebanese consent could, under present circumstances, be obtained for the continued presence there of French forces.

While the Department believes that French interests and French institutions in Syria and Lebanon should receive all reasonable protection on a nondiscriminatory basis, it could not for its part give any encouragement to M. Bidault's personal proposals since they are based on the assumption that France enjoys a special position in the Levant States. In particular, it is the general American view that American advisers and technicians have the right to be employed by any independent government which requests their services, and it is noted with appreciation that Mr. Bevin took this view into account.

The Department would at the same time welcome and would deem it appropriate that both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments give assurances that they will continue to give full and adequate protection to foreign and minority interests following the withdrawal of French and British forces. They should in particular make it clear that they

⁷⁸ Not printed; copy sent to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs by the Counselor of the British Embassy (Wright) on October 23, 1945.

will maintain a sound and dependable judicial system. It is believed that these assurances would have more value if they were given freely and not in response to intimations that unless obtained the troops would not be withdrawn.

As to the manner in which such assurances might possibly be obtained, it is noted in the telegram from Mr. Shone, referred to above, that he expects that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will shortly address to the French and British Governments formal requests, although probably in different terms, for the withdrawal of French and British troops. It may be that Mr. Bevin would deem it appropriate that Mr. Shone suggest to the two Levant Governments that in the notes addressed to him such assurances might well be included.

The Department regrets that it is not in a position to comment at this time regarding the action to be taken in the event that it should, unhappily, be found necessary, after the withdrawal of French and British troops and before the functioning of the World Organization, to determine the necessity of sending a military force back into Syria and Lebanon for the protection of Christian minorities. It would wish to examine the situation in the light of the conditions existing at that time.

The Department does not, however, possess information which would cause it to be particularly apprehensive that upon the withdrawal of French and British troops the Christian minorities might become the object of murderous attack. It is of course probable that from time to time there may be minor incidents in the future as there have been in the past resulting from fanaticism on the part of various individuals or from provocative acts. There is also the possibility of more general mistreatment of Christians if any considerable number of them should engage in activities which might be considered as threatening the integrity of the state.

The Department is glad to state, in conclusion, that it is in general agreement with most of Mr. Bevin's other tentative suggestions.

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1945.

890D.01/12-345

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 3, 1945.

Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy, handed me this afternoon copies of three documents, copies of which are attached:

1. A draft agreement regarding similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East.

2. A draft agreement between the British and French Governments regarding withdrawal of troops from Syria and Lebanon.

3. An extract from a telegram dated November 16 addressed by the British Foreign Office to the British Minister to Syria and Lebanon.⁷⁹

Mr. Wright informed me that after protracted negotiations, two draft agreements had been drawn up between the British and French Governments: the first relating to the similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East, and the second regarding the withdrawal of troops. He was handing me copies of these two drafts in the hope that the Department could furnish the British Embassy confidentially its views with regard to them. If these agreements should be signed by the British and French Governments, it was possible that one obstacle to the conclusion of a British-French entente, namely, differences between the British and French regarding the Near East, would be removed.

I expressed appreciation of the courtesy of the British Government in submitting these drafts to the Department and said that after we had had an opportunity to examine them, we would be glad to pass along to the Embassy informally our views.

Mr. Wright asked me if I could glance at them at once since it would be helpful to him without delay to obtain at least my personal impressions.

[Here follows statement of Mr. Henderson's personal views which coincided with those given as the views of the Department of State in "Substance of Oral Statement", December 13, page 1178. With regard to the first draft agreement, Mr. Henderson records: "Mr. Wright said that the Embassy had foreseen what our reaction to the proposed agreement would be. Before presenting the draft to the Department, the Embassy had, therefore, suggested certain changes in the penultimate sentence which would eliminate such an expression as 'the leading role'. The Foreign Office had replied that the French Government was insisting that the agreement be signed without any changes whatsoever."]

I said that I was not prepared to discuss the suggestions contained in the telegram of November 16 from the Foreign Office to the British Minister to Syria and Lebanon since the suggestions contained in that telegram seemed to be predicated upon conclusion of the two agreements.

Mr. Wright said he thought it would be helpful if he could transmit a summary of our conversation to his Government. I replied that I had no objection provided he made it clear that my remarks were of a preliminary and personal nature and had been made without full discussion with the other interested members of the Department.

⁷⁹ Extract from telegram of November 16, not printed.

[Annex 1]

Draft Agreement Regarding Similarity of British and French Aims in the Middle East

The Provisional Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, having examined the situation in the Middle East, declare that they are animated by the same intention to do what is required of them to ensure that the independence which has been promised to the countries in question shall be assured and respected. The two governments are agreed that it is in their mutual interests to promote, in collaboration with other governments, the economic well-being of the peoples of this region in conditions of peace and security. They will exchange information as may be required regarding the best means by which this object may be attained. It is their desire that by such exchanges of information they will be able to avoid divergencies of policy which might impair their mutual interests. They affirm their intention of doing nothing to impair the leading role which, within the framework of the full independence of the countries in question, they mutually recognise to pertain, as far as they are concerned, to their interests in the territories where they have been exercising their responsibilities since 1919. It is in this spirit that they will examine any proposals submitted to the United Nations Organisation on the subject of collective security.

[Annex 2]

Draft Agreement Regarding Withdrawal of Troops

1. British and French military experts will meet on the 1945, at to draw up the details of a programme for evacuation by stages with a corresponding regrouping of forces.

2. The programme of evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it will ensure the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security until such time as the United Nations Organisation has decided on the organisation of collective security in this zone. Until these arrangements have been carried out, the French Government will retain forces regrouped in the Lebanon.

3. The French and British Governments will inform the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of their intention to withdraw their troops, and will invite these Governments to send to Paris or London on the 1945 Representatives empowered to discuss the conditions of this withdrawal.

4. One of the objects of this discussion will be to fix the date on which the withdrawal will begin.

5. The discussion will also deal with the measures to be taken in order to enable the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to discharge their duty of maintaining order.

890E.01/12-445 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 4, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

397. Yesterday evening I called on President Khoury at his request.

He expressed deep concern over the question of foreign troops in Levant. Citing recent American action in Iran as a parallel, he asked that US, as one of the Big Three, remind France and Great Britain that the war was now over and that it was high time that these troops were withdrawn from Levant.

He said that Lebanon had heard nothing officially of any conversations re withdrawal of troops since meeting of ForMins in September yet was aware of fact that conversations were in progress.

He was insistent that Lebanon and Syria should be represented at the outset in any conversations dealing with matters which concerned them.

He wished to make clear that Lebanon would never accept a decision reached without consultation with both Syria and Lebanon. He and his Govt had been in jail before and if necessary were willing to go again. The atmosphere in the Levant was now calm and he would hate to have renewed disturbances break out at a time when there was so much trouble throughout the world.

Therefore he wished to make his views entirely clear beforehand as any unilateral announcement made without consultation and approval of both Govts could only be rejected and any attempt to enforce such decision would result in serious disturbances.

I informed the President that I would see that his views were presented to my Govt at earliest possible moment.

In commenting on the interview I would like to say that there is an undercurrent of fear in the country that the French and British are making a "deal" whereby the French will retain a predominant position in Lebanon and the British a similar one in Syria. While the President made no specific mention of this subject it would seem evident that current uneasiness on this score had prompted his request.

Sent Dept as 397, repeated as 101 to Paris with request repeat to London, paraphrases to Arab capitals.

MATTISON

890D:01/12-1345

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*⁸⁰

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945.

SUBSTANCE OF ORAL STATEMENT

The Department of State fully appreciates the urgent desire of the British Government to reach an early agreement with the French Government on the Levant problem. It also appreciates the courtesy of the British Government in requesting the Department to furnish the British Embassy with its informal and confidential views on the draft agreements, of which it was good enough to furnish copies.

With regard to the draft agreement "regarding similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East," the fixed policy of the United States Government has been and continues to be, as the Embassy knows, that the granting of mandates over certain territories following the First World War conferred on the Mandatory Powers and their nationals no rights or privileges to which the United States and its nationals were not likewise entitled. So far as concerns the Class A Mandates conferred on Great Britain and France in the Near and Middle East, the position of the United States in this respect was recognized by those two countries in treaties on that specific subject. The Department feels, therefore, that it would be unfortunate if the British and French Governments were to enter into any agreement containing an understanding of the type outlined in the final two sentences of this agreement.

The penultimate sentence of the agreement appears to the Department to signify that the British and French Governments are agreeing to divide certain areas in the Near East between themselves as spheres of influence. The sentence would at least be open to that interpretation. It would no doubt be charged, moreover, that following the First World War the British and French Governments divided certain portions of the Near East between themselves without adequate consideration for the wishes of the population by resorting to the device of the mandates and that now, even with the termination of these mandates (with the exception of that over Palestine), they are dividing the area between themselves into spheres of influence.

The Department, on the other hand, feels that the conception of a preferred position in the independent countries of the Near East of any of the Great Powers is now outmoded. It is further believed that an agreement between Great Britain and France tending to perpetuate such a concept would bring discredit not only upon themselves but

⁸⁰ Handed to the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy).

also upon the other Great Powers, such as the US, which are cooperating with Great Britain and France in so many fields.

The Department further feels that the last sentence of the proposed agreement on British and French aims in the Middle East is even more unfortunate than the preceding one. The impression would be obtained from this sentence that Great Britain and France were entering into an agreement to present a common front in the United Nations Organization, the purpose of which would be to perpetuate Great Power spheres of influence in the Middle East. It is felt that if the Great Powers should resort to the practice of entering into private agreements to cooperate with each other in the United Nations Organization for the purpose of making sure that the various small powers would be brought into their respective spheres of influence, the aims of the United Nations Organization would not be achieved and that Organization would come to be regarded as an instrument for the extension or perpetuation of imperialism rather than as an instrument for the preservation of world peace on the basis of justice and non-discrimination with respect to all nations, large and small.

With regard to the draft agreement "regarding the withdrawal of troops" the Department has been disappointed to learn that notwithstanding all the previous discussions and negotiations on this subject the draft agreement does not provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon unless and until the United Nations Organization has decided on the organization of collective security in that zone, and that it is apparently intended, despite the expressed desire of the Government of Lebanon that foreign troops be withdrawn, that the French Government retain its forces in that country for the maintenance of "collective security." The United States Government recently proposed that the Soviet and British Governments withdraw their forces from Iran and has given instructions that its own forces be withdrawn from that country by January 1, next.⁸¹ It was the Department's understanding that the British Government also desired the withdrawal of these troops. It would seem that the Governments of Western countries should be just as concerned with regard to the principles of sovereignty in Syria and Lebanon as for those in Iran.

The Department therefore feels that if these two agreements as drafted should be signed, the conclusion would be drawn that the British Government had definitely decided that, in exchange for French support of British predominance in other parts of the Near East, the British would support French predominance in Syria and Lebanon, in spite of the fact that the Syrian and Lebanese Govern-

⁸¹ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 359 ff.

ments have made it clear that they are determined that no Great Power shall have any special rights or privileges in their respective countries.

Moreover, since the handling of the thorny question of the departure of non-national forces from the Levant States is the immediate touchstone on which any such agreements would be judged, notably in those and other Arab countries, it is the view of the Department that such withdrawal should be begun in substantial measure at the earliest possible date and be wholly consummated with the least possible delay, preferably by direct accord reached between the British and French Governments in no wise conditioned on political agreements of the nature under discussion; and, if there be technical aspects of the question of withdrawal of non-national troops, seemingly requiring for most efficient solution the cooperation of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, then it is the opinion of the Department that provision for such solution should be made in full partnership with the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

890D.01/12-1345

The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Tandy) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

Ref: 256/—/45

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1945.

DEAR MR. HENDERSON: I enclose herewith a copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office to this Embassy, dated the 12th December, containing the text of the following two documents.

(a) an agreement between His Majesty's Government and the French Government concerning the evacuation of British and French troops from the Levant States, and

(b) a statement concerning the similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East.²²

It is not proposed at the moment to publish the above two documents and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have been requested to treat them as confidential for the present.

Mr. Bevin is making a statement in the House of Commons announcing the agreement of the French on this matter at about 3 p. m. Greenwich Mean Time today, Thursday the 13th December. A communiqué to press is being issued at the same time.

Yours very sincerely,

A. H. TANDY

²² Copies of the official French texts of the two accords and the communiqué issued by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs were transmitted to the Department in despatch 4010, December 13, from Paris, not printed.

[Enclosure]

*Paraphrase of Telegram From Foreign Office to British Embassy,
Washington, D. C., Dated the 12th December, 1945*

Following is the text of a plan for the evacuation of British and French troops from the Levant.

British and French Military experts will meet at Beirut on December 21st to draw up the details of a programme for the evacuation by stages with a corresponding regrouping of forces.

The object of this parley will be to fix a very early date on which the withdrawal will begin.

It is understood that the evacuation of Syria shall be carried out *pari passu* in such a way as to be completed at the same time by British and French forces.

The programme of evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it will ensure the maintenance in the Levant of sufficient forces to guarantee security until such time as the U.N.O. has decided on the organization of collective security in this zone.

Until these arrangements have been carried out the French Government will retain the forces regrouped in the Lebanon.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government will inform the Lebanese and Syrian Governments of the details of the evacuation and will invite those Governments to appoint as soon as possible representatives empowered to discuss the dispositions to be jointly agreed upon as a result of these decisions.

The discussions will also deal with measures to be taken in order to enable the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to discharge their duty of maintaining order.

Following is text of document regarding the similarity of British and French aims in the Middle East.

The Provisional Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom having examined the situation in the Middle East declare that they are animated by the same intention to do what is required of them to ensure that the independence which has been promised to the countries in question shall be assured and respected.

The two Governments are agreed that it is in their mutual interest to promote in collaboration with the other Government the economic well-being of the peoples of this region in conditions of peace and security. They will exchange information as may be required regarding the best means by which this object may be attained. It is their desire that by such exchanges of information they will be able to avoid divergencies of policy which might impair their mutual interests. Each Government affirms its intention of doing nothing to supplant the interests or responsibilities of the other in the Middle East having full regard to political status of the countries in question.

It is in this spirit that they will examine any proposals submitted to the U.N.O. on the subject of collective security.⁸³

890D.01/12-1345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 13, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 10:04 p. m.]

13096. Replying to a private motive [*notice*] question by Eden in Commons this afternoon asking if Foreign Secretary had statement to make on progress of conversations between British and French Govts regarding Syria and Lebanon, Bevin said he was very glad to be able to inform House that agreement had been reached and he thereupon read prepared statement on subject. Following reading of statement Eden asked Foreign Secretary to accept for himself and those who had worked with him congratulations on solution of this vexing problem and added he felt sure it would be applauded by House as removing obstacle between British and their French friends. Eden added no doubt it would also be warmly welcomed by Syria and Lebanon.⁸⁴

FonOff has furnished Embassy text of Bevin's statement together with copies of two agreements covering troop withdrawal and general intention of Britain and France regarding Middle East. FonOff said that copies of these documents were being furnished Dept by British Embassy in Washington.

In discussing matter with member of Embassy staff immediately following announcement Baxter, head of Eastern Dept of FonOff, said British were very pleased that agreement had finally been reached and a long standing source of irritation removed. He particularly emphasized importance which British attached to fact that French have not only agreed to evacuate by stages but to do so expeditiously. Baxter said agreements had been signed by Bevin and Massigli here today at 12 o'clock and that he had advised Lebanese and Syrian Ministers of action taken simultaneously with Bevin's statement in Parliament. He said point to which both Ministers, but particularly Lebanese, had taken exception had been that for regrouping of French forces in Lebanon until arrangements for turning over to UNO had been completed.

⁸³ The accords were signed at London by British and French authorities on December 13, 1945. On the same date British officials gave these documents to the Governments of Syria and Lebanon and the Soviet Union.

⁸⁴ For Mr. Bevin's statement and Mr. Eden's question and remarks, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 417, cols. 627, 628.

Baxter referred to consultations on this matter with Dept and said that observations of Dept had been used to influence French to accept modification of concluding sentence in paragraph 2 of general agreement concerning affirmation of intention by British and French to do nothing to supplant interests or responsibilities of the other in Middle East while having full regard for political status of countries in question.

Sent to Dept as 13096; repeated to Beirut as 22.

WINANT

890D.01/12-1845

The British Embassy to the Department of State

RECORD OF ORAL COMMUNICATION

MESSAGE FROM MR. BEVIN

I wish to thank Mr. Loy Henderson orally for his very helpful criticisms when these two earlier drafts were first communicated to him. His comments enabled us to represent very forcibly to the French Government the objections which would be felt in America to the phrase "the leading role", and as a result we were able eventually to induce the French Government to agree to a revised wording which is not open to similar objection.

I realise that the State Department would have preferred that evacuation plan should not have provided for retention of forces in Lebanon until United Nations Organisation have arranged for organisation of collective security in the Levant. But they will appreciate that the French Government hold very strong views on this point. When the agreement is regarded as a whole, this item, on which we have had to meet French views, falls into its proper proportions. After all, it is no small achievement to have persuaded the French to agree to evacuation by stages of the whole of the Levant, i.e. both Syria and Lebanon, beginning at a very early date. The complete evacuation of Syria will take place quite independently of discussion of the Levant problem by the United Nations. It will now be open to the United States Government and other interested governments, to do what they can to hasten the discussion of the Levant problem in the United Nations Organisation so as to enable evacuation of Lebanon also to be completed at the earliest possible date. We for our part agree that this will be very desirable.

We do not agree that the Levant agreements will give the Soviet Government the slightest excuse for keeping the troops in Iran after treaty date. In Iran date for withdrawal of Allied troops was defi-

nately laid down by treaty.⁸⁶ In Syria and Lebanon there has hitherto been no treaty whatever providing for withdrawal of French troops.

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1945.

890D.01/12-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison)

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1945—9 p. m.

413. Following observations on Franco-Brit accords concerning evacuation of troops from Levant and similarity of aims in Middle East are for your info:

(1) While statement in agreement that troops are to be withdrawn is welcomed Dept considers it disappointing that notwithstanding such statement and in spite of the protracted discussions and negotiations on this subject the agreement actually provides for retaining forces in Levant until UNO has arranged for organization collective security in that area.

(2) It is possible to interpret agreement as recognition by Brit and French Govts of a special position of each of these Govts in countries in the Near East. Dept feels that concept of preferred position in independent countries of Near East is outmoded and that to perpetuate such concept would bring discredit upon Great Powers.

(3) It is felt that if Great Powers should resort to private agreements to cooperate with each other in UNO for purpose of retaining whatever special interests are mutually recognized by them, UNO would come to be regarded as instrument of extension or perpetuation of imperialism.

(4) Although Dept considers accord unsatisfactory in these respects, Brit Govt points out that, while aware our preference for immediate evacuation, French Govt holds very strong views on this point and it was no small achievement to have persuaded French to agree to evacuation by stages of whole of Levant beginning at very early date. Furthermore, Brit point [out], complete evacuation of Syria will take place independently of UNO discussion of Levant problem. Brit also note that the US and other interested Govts are free to take steps for hastening discussion of Levant problem in UNO and for bringing about evacuation of Lebanon at an early date. Brit agree this will be very desirable.

⁸⁶ Treaty of alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and Iran, signed at Tehran, January 29, 1942, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249; for documentation regarding the position of the United States with respect to this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.

(5) Brit insist that it would not be appropriate to compare withdrawal problem in Levant with that in Iran since the date of withdrawal from Iran is prescribed by treaty.

You may make it clear, in response to inquiries (reference Damascus' 95 Dec 18⁸⁷) that statements to effect that this Govt has given its approval to the agreement have no basis in fact. You may point out that we were not parties to the negotiations which led to their conclusion but are naturally hopeful that the agreements will in practice work out to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned.⁸⁸

Sent Beirut for Damascus; repeated London, Paris, Moscow.

ACHESON

890D.01/12-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 21, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received December 22—8:25 a. m.]

427. British Legation informs me that full text of Anglo-French agreement will be released in London and Paris at 3 p. m. GMT and that they are now issuing a local communiqué announcing that talks between British and French military experts began today.

Repeated to Paris as 108, to London as 15. Sent to Department as 427.

MATTISON

890E.01/12-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 22, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

429. Lebanese Foreign Ministry late last night published statement on Anglo-French agreement, full text of which I am forwarding by airgram today.⁸⁹

Statement emphasized that Lebanon would not be bound by decisions taken in its absence and as member of United Nations would not accept any act tending to modify Lebanon's status in UNO or Arab League.

⁸⁷ Not printed.

⁸⁸ In a memorandum of December 21, 1945, to Acting Secretary Acheson and Assistant Secretary Dunn, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs reviewed the Franco-British accords and stated: "We are of the opinion that the agreement, far from solving the problem of the Levant, will give rise to fresh complications and to considerable acrimony and that eventually the whole thorny problem will be deposited in the lap of UNO." (890D.01/12-345).

⁸⁹ No. A-179, not printed.

Franco-British military talks now in progress in Beirut would be given most vigilant attention.

British First Secretary Young told me last night that he was doing his best to persuade Lebanese not to issue statement as in view of British efforts to secure agreement he considered it "ungrateful" and liable to disturb the atmosphere.⁹⁰

MATTISON

890E.00/12-2445: Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 24, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 12:42 p. m.]

430. I called on FonMin this morning at his request.

He stated that he had been informed of an intention to invite Lebanon and Syria to Four Power discussions with France and Great Britain. He would like to know:

1. What my Govt's views were on the holding of such discussions.
2. In view of our expressed interest during the incidents of last May, would the US be willing to approach France and Great Britain, and make known our views on the subject. He implied that he wished us to make it clear that we did not want proposals made which would result in any impairment of the sovereignty of the two countries, whose independence we had recognized unconditionally.

I inquired whether he had any agenda for the discussions, and he replied that he had asked for agenda, as naturally he did not wish to enter into discussions without knowing what subjects were to be dealt with.

With regard to the Franco-British agreement I made clear to him the fact that we had not approved the agreement (reDeptel 413 of Dec 20). He seemed worried over the terms and I believe he fears that his country may yet be "sold down the river".

I promised him that I would ask for a speedy reply to his inquiry as he would like to know our attitude before giving a reply to the French and British should they extend a formal invitation. He re-

⁹⁰ In telegram 100, December 27, 1945, 10 p. m., the Chargé in Syria reported the gist of a statement on the Franco-British accord made in Parliament by the Syrian Prime Minister on December 22 that "documents were so ambiguous he had demanded clarification on many points; that such clarification, though given, consisted of generalities; that he still could not understand how two countries could make arrangements between themselves until United Nations decided on arrangements for collective security in this zone; that Syria could accept only what she liked in agreements inasmuch as she had not participated in negotiations; that no nation would ever have privileged position here". (890D.01/12-2745) The text of the statement and the comments were transmitted in the Chargé's despatch 383, December 24, 1945, not printed.

quested that the message be shown to Mr. Wadsworth if he is still in the US.⁹¹

Repeated London as 16 and Paris as 109; sent Dept as 430.

MATTISON

890E.00/12-2445 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison)

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1945—8 p. m.

420. Reurtel 430, Dec 24 10 am. US Govt feels that in general it is helpful to solution of common problems for interested govts to participate in discussions of these problems.

US Govt's policy of opposing special privileges for any third power in Syria and Lebanon and of supporting unconditional independence of those two countries is believed to be well known to their two Govts. Its views on recent Anglo-French agreement have already been made clear on informal basis to Brit Govt as result of latter's informally expressed desire to have this Govt's views (see Dept's 405 Dec 14 6 pm,⁹² 413 Dec 20 9 am, and copy of memo of conversation between Loy Henderson and Michael Wright of Brit Embassy of Dec 3 now on way, substance of which Brit say was communicated to French).

If during course of suggested discussions any question should arise on which any participating Govt might desire expression of views of US Govt Dept would be glad to give careful consideration to any such requests it might receive.

Sent Beirut (for repetition to Damascus); repeated London and Paris.

ACHESON

890E.01/12-3045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 30, 1945—10 a. m.

[Received 3:19 p. m.]

442. The substance of Deptel number 421 [420] of December 28 was communicated to ForMin yesterday evening and he expressed his appreciation therefor.

⁹¹ Mr. Wadsworth left Beirut on October 16, 1945, to proceed to the United States for consultation. He left Washington on December 28 for London in connection with the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization and returned to Beirut on March 9, 1946. For documentation on the visit to the United States of Mr. Wadsworth and other American Ministers in the Near East, see pp. 10 ff.

⁹² Not printed; it quoted the text of the Franco-British accord. The message was sent to Moscow and repeated to Paris, and Beirut for Damascus. (890D.01/12-1445)

In response to my inquiry he stated that agenda of proposed discussions had not been received nor had there been any formal invitation issued. However, he had informed BritMin zone [*Shone*] that Lebanon would not enter into any discussions dealing with subjects which might constitute diminution of Lebanese sovereignty or which accorded special privilege to any foreign power.

Repeated to London as 22; to Paris as 113; sent to Dept as 442.

MATTISON

890E.01/12-3145: Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Mattison) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, December 31, 1945—noon.

[Received 1:54 p. m.]

443. Information re progress of Franco-British military conversations now taking place in Beirut increasingly difficult to obtain. This is, I suspect, at least partially due to the lack of progress in these conversations.⁹³

I have talked with one of the British members of the committee and, while obtaining little factual information, I found him somewhat pessimistic as to results achieved to date and also resentful of the fact that what were supposed to be purely military conversations have become political in nature owing to the difference in instructions received by British and French delegations.

Sent Dept as 443, repeated Paris as 114 and London as 23.

MATTISON

890D.01/12-1845: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1946—6 p. m.

60. If favorable opportunity presents itself you may wish to inform M. Bidault or some other appropriate Foreign Ministry official that Dept's views re Anglo-French Levant agreement are those contained in first three paragraphs of Dept's 5975, Dec. 20, 9 p. m.^{93a} As stated in Dept's 6069, Dec. 28, 7[8] p. m.,⁹⁴ these views were made clear, at Mr. Bevin's request, to Brit Govt which has indicated that substance thereof was communicated to French.

Oral communication received from Brit Emb here quotes Mr. Bevin as stating in fact that our views enabled Brit "to represent very

⁹³ In several telegrams sent by the Missions in Paris, London, and Beirut, the Department was informed that the British delegates were pressing for transfer of British troops from Syria to Lebanon while the French delegates were maintaining that such transfer should be made to Palestine, Transjordan, or Iraq.

^{93a} Same as telegram 413 to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, p. 1184.

⁹⁴ Same as telegram 420 to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon, p. 1187.

forcibly to French Govt objections which would be felt in America to the phrase 'the leading role' (contained in first draft agreement shown Dept) and as a result we were able eventually to induce French Govt to agree to revised wording which is not open to similar objection".

Sent Paris. Repeated London and Beirut for Damascus.

BYRNES

DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES NOT TO OBJECT TO THE ANTICIPATED ABOLITION OF THE MIXED COURTS SYSTEM BY SYRIA

890D.05/8-2245

The British Chargé (Balfour) to the Secretary of State

No. 411

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a communication⁹⁵ from His Majesty's Minister to Syria and the Lebanon⁹⁶ on the subject of the Syrian Mixed Court, concerning which previous communications have recently been made to the Near Eastern Division by this Embassy.

2. It will be observed that paragraph 4 expresses the view of His Majesty's Government that no modification of the Mixed Court system should be made without the consent of all interested powers and that His Majesty's Minister, who is pressing the Syrian Government for an assurance in this respect, hopes that his representations may be accorded the support of his United States colleague.⁹⁷

3. Mr. Balfour understands that the United States are not a party to the Mixed Court system, but he would be glad if, after due examination by the appropriate legal and other experts, he could receive an indication of the views of the Department on this proposal.

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1945.

890D.05/8-2245

Memorandum by Mr. William W. Bishop, Jr., of the Office of the Legal Adviser, to Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1945.

Reference is made to your underlying memorandum⁹⁸ and to the note of August 22, 1945 from the British Embassy with respect to

⁹⁵ Not printed.

⁹⁶ Terence A. Shone.

⁹⁷ George Wadsworth, Minister to Syria and Lebanon.

⁹⁸ Of August 31, not printed; it requested the views of the Office of the Legal Adviser regarding the reply to be made to the note of August 22, *supra*.

the Syrian Mixed Courts. It appears that the British Government has urged that there be no modification of the mixed court system without the consent of all the interested powers, and that the support of the American Minister to Syria is desired in pressing the Syrian Government for assurances on this point.

The mixed court system was established pursuant to Article VI of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon⁹⁹ which required it [*the?*] mandatory to establish "a judicial system which assures [*shall assure*] to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights". The preceding article of the mandate agreement provided that the Capitulatory rights of foreigners should not be applicable in Syria and the Lebanon, but that unless the powers enjoying such rights should have renounced them, such privileges and immunities upon the expiration of the mandate be immediately re-established. Although the United States was not a member of the League of Nations and therefore did not take a formal part in the granting of the mandate, the convention between the United States and France signed April 4, 1924 gave the United States rights in Syria and the Lebanon similar to those secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League (Four Treaties, etc.¹ 4169).

It appears that the so-called "Mixed Court" system in Syria was established under a decree of the French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon, dated November 16, 1921 (*Recueil des Actes Administratifs du Haut-Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et au Liban*), Vol. II p. 416. Modifications were introduced from time to time, particularly by the decrees of July 7, 1923, March 28, 1924 and February 17, 1928 (IV *ibid.* 110, V *ibid.* 126, IX *ibid.* 28).

It would appear that the Mixed Court System was itself solely a matter of local law, which would be subject to change without the need for obtaining approval of other governments. On the other hand, the Mixed Court System was instituted pursuant to obligations under the mandate and in lieu of the regime of extraterritoriality which had been previously in force in Syria and the Lebanon while they formed a part of the domains of the Ottoman Empire. It should be noted that under the terms of the mandate, powers having such extraterritorial rights were to resume them unless other arrangements were made. So far as I am aware, the United States has never renounced its extraterritorial rights in Syria and the Lebanon (see II Hackworth's *Digest*, 517, 523-524, see also *ibid.* 529). In view of the retention by the United States of its extraterritorial rights in Syria, it would seem that there would be some legal justification for insistence

⁹⁹ The terms of the Mandate are set forth in the Convention between the United States and France defining American rights in Syria and Lebanon, signed at Paris, April 4, 1924, *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. I, p. 741.

¹ *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1923-1937* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1938), vol. IV.

by the United States that adequate measures for the protection of foreign interests be retained in the Syrian judicial system. We would probably not have as strong a case for pressing such a demand as would Great Britain and the other powers which participated in the mandate arrangement, but we could instruct our Legation in Damascus to join in appropriate representations on the subject, if as a matter of policy, we so desire. The question whether it would be desirable for this Government to take such action, or to associate itself with a British position, is a question of policy on which no opinion is expressed.

890E.01/10-145 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)*

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1945—5 p. m.

291. Brit Embassy has informed Dept that in view of its Govt no modification of Mixed Court system in Syria should be made without consent of all interested powers. As Shone has suggested that it would be helpful if you were to receive similar instructions, Embassy has requested indication of Dept's views on this proposal. Shone, however, has quoted Syrian Premier as saying that he himself holds strongest views on matter and that he cannot accept continuance of Mixed Courts as he considers them symbol of mandate.

Legal Adviser's office expresses opinion² that Syrian Mixed Court system in itself appears to be solely matter of local law which would be subject to change without need for obtaining approval of other govts but points out that it was instituted pursuant to obligations under mandate and in lieu of regime of extraterritoriality which had been previously in force in Syria and Lebanon while they formed part of Ottoman Empire. Accordingly since US presumably resumes its extraterritorial rights in Syria upon expiration of mandate Legal Adviser's office concludes that there would be some legal justification for insistence by US that adequate measures for protection of foreign interests be retained in Syrian judicial system.

Dept hopes Syrian Govt will take no action at this time which might give foreigners ground for feeling they may not in future receive as just treatment in Syrian Courts as in past. We feel it would make particularly bad impression were Syrian Govt to abolish Mixed Courts without at least discussing matter with Govts which had capitulatory rights at time mandate was instituted.

² Memorandum of September 18, *supra*.

Before instructing you to approach Syrian Govt on this delicate subject Dept would appreciate receiving by telegraph expression of your views.

ACHESON

890E.01/10-445: Telegram

The Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

BEIRUT, October 4, 1945—9 a. m.

[Received 3:30 p. m.]

304. ReDeptel 291, Oct. 2 [1]. From viewpoint Syrian Ministers, question of so-called mixed courts is, I believe, awkward rather than delicate. They have no hesitation in discussing it informally and readily admit present situation requires corrective action which they would like to make agreeable to friendly foreign govts as well as consonant with their own full sovereignty.

In such informal discussion I have frequently heard following points made:

1. Article 6 of mandate simply charged mandatory with establishing "judicial system which shall assure to natives as well as foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights."

2. Courts set up under resulting system, known as "tribunaux de la république Syrienne", comprise two "juridictions", denominated respectively "jurisdiction nationale" and "jurisdiction statuante en matière étrangère". They are commonly referred to as native courts and mixed courts, former having jurisdiction only in matters involving natives and non-privileged foreigners and latter only in those involving privileged foreigners and mixed interests.

3. Both jurisdictions apply same codes of law and procedure, only concrete differences being that in former, language is Arabic and judges Syrian, while in latter French language is commonly used and both French and Syrian judges sit, with French judges controlling proceedings.

4. Actually, however, decisions of the two hierarchies frequently differed in matters involving interpretation of law due to differing legal background of French and Syrian judges. Cynics add: Due also to differing political backers, French judges favoring French interests and Syrian judges those of influential natives.

At time of May troubles culminating in bombardment of Damascus, mixed courts were about to adjourn for summer recess. They closed hurriedly at that time, all French judges leaving country, and have not since reopened. Former Foreign Minister⁴ several times told

⁴ Presumably Jamil Mardam, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs continuously from the organization of the Nationalist Government on August 19, 1943, until the formation of the Khoury Government on August 26, 1945.

me that wishing at least postpone awkward complications, he considered courts technically recessed.

Adding that Syria could never agree reinstate French judges, he assured me that if any American interest should find itself harmed by resulting situation he would welcome my laying case before him for any possible administrative relief. No such case has arisen.

During intervening months I have heard some talk that govt was considering issuing decree amending existing legislation to permit nomination of "foreign" in lieu of French judges, but this was apparently discarded in favor of more radical suggestion that jurisdiction of native courts be enlarged to include that of mixed courts, thus in effect abolishing latter.

In strictly informal conversation with former Premier ⁵ following his return from San Francisco, I gathered that he favored latter suggestion but with additional provision for setting up strong inspectorate general to which govt would appoint two or more competent Swiss or Belgian magistrates.

He argued that govt could make such appointments without the sacrifice of sovereignty or prestige in same way it could employ other expert technicians, e.g. for irrigation or finance. He seemingly admitted practical need for services of such judicial inspectors and hoped their appointment would reassure foreign govts not only that their nationals' interests would not suffer under contemplated abolishment of mixed courts but also that desire to take such action was not motivated by xenophobia.

Minister Antaki,⁶ who will probably receive Foreign Affairs portfolio in new ministry, spoke with me along same lines Sept 30 and suggested that I discuss question with Dept when in Washington later this month.

It would be most helpful, he said, were we, despite British views to the contrary, to see our way to sharing his views; as an experienced lawyer with several important foreign clients, and without minimizing weaknesses of Syria's present judicial system, he could add that he believed sincerely American interests could be assured henceforth in native courts as effective justice as that rendered heretofore in mixed courts.

I am returning to Damascus this weekend and would welcome authority discuss substance Deptel 291 with Antaki.⁷

WADSWORTH

⁵ Faris el-Khoury.

⁶ Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance and Minister of Public Works.

⁷ This authority was granted in telegram 315, October 8, 1945, 6 p. m., to Beirut (890E.01/10-445).

890D.05/10-1745

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On the 22nd August, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presented to the State Department a memorandum inviting the Department's views on the subject of the Mixed Courts in Syria and expressing the hope that the representations of His Majesty's Minister at Beirut to the Syrian Government for an assurance that no modification of the Mixed Court system would be effected without the consent of all interested powers might be accorded the support of Mr. Shone's United States colleague.

2. It is understood that the matter is still under consideration by the Department's legal experts. It appears, however, that this complicated question has now become one of some urgency in Syria and His Majesty's Embassy has been instructed to put before the Department the following development of the various points involved.

3. In Syria the two chief considerations of importance would now appear to be, firstly, the expressed desire of the Syrian Prime Minister⁸ to obtain the complete abolition of these courts, and, secondly, the problem of finding a *modus vivendi*, to enable their work to be carried on pending a final agreement upon them.

4. The Syrian Prime Minister, as the State Department is aware, has expressed the view that the French Mandate over Syria has been finally liquidated with the adhesion of Syria to the United Nations' Charter;⁹ and that the Mixed Courts, which were set up in pursuance of Article 6 of that Mandate, have therefore lost their legal basis. He repeated this view in reply to a question in the Chamber on August 29th. In conversation with His Majesty's Minister at Beirut, he has admitted that, if his view is correct, the United Kingdom and the other capitulatory powers would, under Article 5 of the Mandate Charter, be entitled to resume capitulatory privileges (which presumably include Consular Courts); though he also expressed the hope that such powers would not insist on doing so, having abandoned similar privileges in all other parts of the world, and that they, and the other powers concerned, would be prepared to make separate agreements with Syria, admitting the sole jurisdiction of the Syrian Courts. His Majesty's Minister was naturally unable to give an as-

⁸ Saadallah Jabri.

⁹ Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaty Series 993, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031. The formal instrument of ratification of the Charter of the United Nations was deposited with the Department of State on October 19 by the Syrian Minister (Koudsi).

surance on these points, and the Prime Minister is known to have since admitted in conversation that one way to attract the foreign capital which Syria so badly needs might be to give foreigners some guarantee of a special juridical status. But he and his Government are under constant pressure from the Chamber to secure the complete abolition of the Mixed Courts, which have become a particular object of attack in view of their exclusively French admixture, and cannot even if he would, abandon attempts to obtain at least some modification of their status.

5. With regard to the legal principles involved in the Prime Minister's contention, it may be relevant to point out that General Catroux,¹⁰ by his Arrêté No. 97/FL of August 18th, 1941, which rules that a majority of French judges is no longer obligatory, substantially whittled down the privileges enjoyed by the capitulatory powers. This Arrêté remains in force unless and until it is modified or cancelled by Syrian legislation.

6. The Prime Minister's other argument, that the French extended the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts to cover many types of case in which no privileged foreign interest is involved, is regarded by His Majesty's Government as unconvincing, for the Lebanese, in October 1944, showed the remedy by themselves passing legislation which removed all such types of case from the jurisdiction of these Courts.

7. Apart from these theoretical considerations, the practical question of a *modus vivendi* is both important and urgent. At present the Syrian Mixed Courts are in a state of suspended animation. Preliminary processes of justice which can be performed by Syrian *juges d'instruction* and *procureurs-généraux* are going on, and it would not be surprising if the Courts were hearing cases which do not involve British or United States interests, although the Syrians have assured both His Majesty's Minister and the United States Minister that their Courts will not deliver judgments in any case involving British and American interests. They point out, however, that this state of affairs cannot possibly continue much longer and are asking for views as to what they should do.

8. The provisional views of a British legal expert, who has been consulted, are contained in the attached note.¹¹ It will be seen that this authority feels that since French judges cannot possibly return to Syria, and as the Mixed Courts must be enabled to resume their functions, the only possible alternative is to agree to the Syrians

¹⁰ Gen. Georges Catroux, French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in Syria and Lebanon, 1941-43.

¹¹ Not printed.

amending their law in such a way as to enable them to appoint foreign judges in place of French. For obvious reasons His Majesty's Government cannot encourage the Syrians to ask for British judges and it doubts whether the United States Government would welcome a proposal to appoint United States judges. The best course would probably be for the Syrians to apply to some European country or countries (e.g. Switzerland or the Netherlands), whose legal system is formed, like their own, on the continental model. It would naturally be represented to the Syrian Government that this was regarded as a temporary measure pending a final settlement and without prejudice to it.

9. This course appears to His Majesty's Government to be the only practical one in the present situation. It is true that in general it is highly desirable that the Mixed Courts question should be decided as part of the general settlement between France and Syria; but this settlement may well be long delayed, in which case the work of the Courts obviously could not be held up so long. The Syrians, despite their wish to abolish the Courts altogether, appear ready to listen to any positive and constructive suggestion.

10. It might be argued that the Syrians and Lebanese might be able to make a case for the total abolition of the Mixed Courts. The discretion given to the French under Article 6 of the Mandate Charter might have entitled them to abolish the Mixed Courts themselves, if they had been prepared to take the responsibility of convincing the Mandate's Commission that foreign rights would still be safeguarded thereafter; and that the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, as successors to the Mandatory Power, might be entitled to take the same line. If however the Levant Governments take this view, His Majesty's Government are prepared to reply that they could not agree to the abolition of the Mixed Courts except as part of a general settlement, indicating at the same time the possibility of a temporary solution on the lines of paragraph 8 above.

11. His Majesty's Embassy would be glad to learn the views of the State Department upon the above proposals. If these commend themselves to the United States Government, it will clearly be advantageous that the United States and His Majesty's Ministers at Beirut should approach the Syrian Government in the same sense. It would doubtless also be advisable to inform the French of the suggestions put forward, with the observation that this temporary measure appeared to be in their interests, since they presumably prefer to have a leavening of impartial foreign judges in courts trying cases in which their interests are involved, than to run the risk of these cases being tried

by purely Syrian courts (or alternatively being indefinitely adjourned).

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1945.

890D.05/8-2245

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The important questions concerning the Mixed Courts in Syria raised in communications received from the British Embassy on August 22 and October 17 last have been made the subject of careful study on the part of the legal and other appropriate officials of the Department of State, who appreciate the urgency of finding some solution, even though temporary, in order that the work of the Syrian courts may be carried on pending a final solution.

From conversations on this subject which the American Minister held in Damascus with the Syrian Premier and other Ministers prior to his departure for the United States,¹² it appears that the Syrian Government, although desirous of reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement with the other Powers, feels that it will be obliged, for political reasons, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Syrian national (native) courts to include that of the Mixed Courts, thereby in effect abolishing the latter.

The Department has reached the conclusion that it does not have adequate legal grounds on which to object to the unilateral abolition of the Mixed Courts in the event the Syrian Parliament takes such action, as it now seems determined to do.

Should the Syrian Government follow this course, it is the Department's view that Syria, as a sovereign state, possesses the right to do so, and that such action on the part of Syria would not contravene any juridical right possessed by the United States. Although the United States automatically has the right to resume the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction in Syria upon the termination of the Mandate, the Department would be extremely reluctant to reestablish consular courts there under present circumstances. Of course the United States would retain the same rights to take appropriate action in cases of denial of justice to American nationals in Syria as in other countries.

The Department feels that it would be improper to insist that the Syrians amend their law in such a way as to enable them to appoint

¹² On October 16.

other foreign judges to replace, at least in part, the present French judges, as suggested in paragraph 8 of the Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* of October 17, although it would not be averse to independent action by them in that sense. Since it may be politically inexpedient for the Syrians to amend their law in this manner, the suggestion has been made to the American Minister that they might set up an Inspectorate General to which the Government would appoint two or more competent foreign magistrates. The Government could make such appointments, it was argued, without the sacrifice of sovereignty or prestige in the same way it could employ expert technicians for other branches of the national administration, such as finance or irrigation. The Department would be pleased to see this suggestion carried out.

Since the Department does not feel justified in instructing its representative in Damascus to approach the Syrian Government along the lines suggested in the Embassy's communications, but is at the same time anxious that adequate maintenance of protection for foreign and minority interests be retained in the Syrian judicial system, it is suggested that a satisfactory temporary solution might be found in informing the Syrian Government that should it insist on abolishing the Mixed Courts, we would raise no objection to the work of these courts being done by the national (native) courts as a temporary measure pending final settlement and without prejudice thereto.

Such a solution would have the particular advantage of offering immediate temporary relief in this important and urgent question without committing us to any final decision. At the same time it would not improbably put the Syrian Government on its mettle to manifest by concrete performance that its courts are in fact competent to render justice to foreigners in accordance with generally accepted international standards. It would also give the Syrian Government an opportunity to appoint competent foreign magistrates to an Inspectorate General without undue pressure on our part. In the meantime, the continued existence of capitulatory rights on the part of the United States and other countries should go far to prevent any flagrant denial of justice to foreigners, including the French, until such time as a final satisfactory settlement could be reached.

The Department will be interested in learning the reaction of the Foreign Office to the foregoing proposal.

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1945.

REQUEST BY THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT FOR A UNITED STATES MILITARY MISSION TO TRAIN SYRIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES¹³

890D.20 Missions/7-1145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Kohler)

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Henderson¹⁴
Mr. Kohler

Mr. Michael Wright called at his request to read to us a telegram from the Foreign Office transmitting a request of the British Minister Resident in the Middle East, Sir Edward Grigg, that the United States send a military mission to the Levant States,¹⁵ of the same kind as its missions in Iran and Saudi Arabia,¹⁶ to train the Syrian and Lebanese *gendarmeries* and to supply them with any additional equipment required to enable them to maintain order in Syria and Lebanon.

Sir Edward pointed out that the *gendarmerie* had behaved admirably during the recent events in the Levant States¹⁷ but that the situation continued tense and that further outbreaks could be anticipated,

¹³ For earlier reference to Syrian desire for an American mission to train the Syrian *gendarmerie*, see telegram 193, September 19, 1944, 10 p. m., from Beirut, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 780. The questions of whether the United States would be willing to be of direct assistance to Syria in organizing, equipping, and training a Syrian Army or whether the United States would be willing to urge the French Government to complete arrangements for the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* (French-controlled troops recruited in Syria and Lebanon) to the Syrian Government were raised informally with the Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Wadsworth) by the President of the Syrian Republic (Kuwatly) in conversations on January 4 and 5, 1945. In reporting these conversations in despatch 618, January 10 (received February 3), the Minister stated his reply was: "I did not believe my Government would wish to intervene actively in the problem of French-Syrian relations in its present form". (890D.01/1-1045) For documentation on Franco-Syrian relations, see pp. 1034 ff.

¹⁴ Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

¹⁵ In telegram 224, July 19, 1945, 11 a. m., the Minister to Syria and Lebanon reported that British military commanders in the Middle East had suggested to him that the United States "take over full responsibility for organizing and training security and national defence forces" of Syria and Lebanon (890D.6131/7-1945). In telegram 230, July 26, 1945, 11 a. m., the Minister stated that the British Minister to Syria and Lebanon (Shone) had informed the Presidents of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics that such an arrangement would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government (890D.01/7-2645). Bechara el-Khoury was President of the Lebanese Republic.

¹⁶ For documentation on the establishment of a military mission in Iran, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 398-399 and 510-561, *passim*; in Saudi Arabia, see *ibid.*, pp. 904-918, *passim*.

¹⁷ See telegram 163, May 29, 9 p. m., from Beirut, p. 1114, and ff.

particularly in view of the relative weakness and deficient equipment of the *gendarmérie* and of potential Moslem-Christian conflicts. Sir Edward regarded this as a question of considerable urgency, and felt that French suspicions almost precluded the British from taking the necessary action in this respect.

Mr. Henderson pointed out that there were technical difficulties in the way of such action on the part of the U.S., notably the ineligibility of Syria and Lebanon for lend-lease assistance. However, he felt that the U.S. should be prepared to assume responsibilities in the Near East consonant with its announced policies and commitments and accordingly assured Mr. Wright that the Department would give this request prompt and careful study and sympathetic consideration.

890D.20 Mission/8-945

The Syrian Minister (Koussi) to the Secretary of State

No. 82S/57L

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945.

SIR: In your absence in Europe,¹⁸ I had the honor of calling on the Honorable Joseph C. Grew, the Acting Secretary, and of presenting to him the enclosed memorandum¹⁹ relating to the request of the Syrian Government to the United States Government for her assistance in sending an American Military Mission to organize and train the army that has been transferred to Syrian command from the French authorities, and for the supplying of this army with modern military equipment.

Mr. Grew gave this request his sympathetic attention and assured me he would submit it to your consideration after your return from Europe. My Government is deeply appreciative of this attention which conforms to the traditional favorable attitude which the United States Government has always taken toward Syrian independence and progress.

I understood from Mr. Grew, however, that this request—in particular that part of it which concerns the supplying of the Syrian army with modern military equipment—raises a number of legal and other questions which have to be considered before an appropriate answer can be given by the American Government.

In view of the vital importance of this matter for Syrian independence and security, my Government wishes now to emphasize the first part of her request—the sending of a Military Mission to study the ways of organizing the Syrian army and to help in training it.

¹⁸ Mr. Byrnes had been participating in the Tripartite Conference which met at Berlin from July 17 to August 2, 1945. For documentation on this Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, 2 vols.

¹⁹ Dated August 3; not found in Department files.

In the meantime, the second part of the request—the supplying of this army with modern military equipment—could be studied at length, and the various questions involved given their due consideration.

I cannot, Mr. Secretary, overemphasize the extreme urgency of this matter for the newly developing State of Syria, and its bearing on the establishment of peace and security in its strategically located region. I am confident that it will receive from the United States Government the same generous response which this Government has always given to Syria's request and aspirations.

Please accept [etc.]

890D.20 Mission/8-1745

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn)

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1945.

The Syrian Government has made a formal request (copy attached ²⁰) that an American military mission be sent to Syria to assist the Syrian Government with the organization and training of its national defense and security forces, now that the Syrians have assumed direct control from the French not only of the *gendarmerie* but also of the *Troupes Spéciales* (native levies heretofore under French command). In submitting the request the following considerations were advanced by the Syrian Government:

(1) The Syrian troops transferred from the *Troupes Spéciales* are in a disorganized condition, and need organization, technical training and modern equipment.

(2) The training of these troops by an American mission would ensure their not being used for aggressive purposes, but only to ensure the internal security of Syrian territory.

(3) The training of these troops by American officers will furnish an important form of education to a section of the Syrian population and will inculcate in them the spirit and traditions of democracy.

(4) This is the first time that an Arab country has made this kind of request and a favorable decision by the United States would have a profoundly beneficial effect in the entire Arab world.

The organizational problem involves the creation of a Syrian defense and security force of approximately 20,000 strength, from the following material:

- 7,000 *Troupes Spéciales* who deserted to the Syrian Government during the recent crisis
- 1,500 *Troupes Spéciales* transferred by the French to the Syrian Government on and since August 1

²⁰ Copy not found attached to file copy.

- 1,500 *Troupes Spéciales* of Syrian nationality to be transferred from the Lebanese contingents
- 2,000 *Troupes Spéciales* "Avenantaires"* to be transferred in the near future from the French
- 7,500 *Gendarmerie* and *Meharistes* (Desert Patrol)

NEA ²¹ suggests that the matter be submitted to the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee for early consideration and strongly recommends, for political reasons, that the request be met and that steps be taken as early as possible towards its implementation.

It is hardly necessary to point out that the war has emphasized the strategic importance of the Near East, a region whose component countries are in a state of intense political, social and economic readjustment. There is vital need for a stronger role for the United States in the economic and political affairs of the Near and Middle East, especially in view of the strategic importance of oil reserves and the emergent role of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the present request from the Syrian Government constitutes an excellent opportunity which we should seize at once. The effect of our entering upon this comparatively small task will undoubtedly extend through the whole region and will serve to strengthen greatly our influence and prestige well beyond the borders of Syria.

An American officer recently returned from the Levant has aptly stated, on the other hand, that our refusal to meet the present Syrian request would be comparable, in its disillusioning and unsettling effect throughout the Near East, only to the retirement of the United States into isolationism after the first World War.

An American military mission of the kind desired would make an important contribution to the implementation of Syrian independence by paving the way for complete withdrawal of British and French forces, and would be consistent with our political policy towards the Levant States. It would in fact constitute material assistance to a formerly subject people now struggling to further their independence—a concept which this Government has consistently put forward as a basic principle of its foreign policy.

The British Government would welcome our acceptance of this undertaking among the new responsibilities that have arisen as a result of British intervention in the Levant following French attempts to subjugate the native population by force of arms. We have, in fact, as yet done little or nothing to assist the British in carrying the burden which they assumed in Syria only after they consulted with us and received our full concurrence and political support.²² We feel that

*Troops originally intended for permanent service with the French Army. [Footnote in the original.]

²¹ Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

²² See telegram 59, May 30, from British Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman, p. 1116.

the American Government should take a part more active than it has, and more consonant with its increasingly important responsibilities in this critical area.

The French Government would doubtless be displeased by our action in sending a military mission to Syria. The French might presume to assert their technical responsibility for territorial security under the wartime Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement of 1941,²³ despite the fact that the only serious disorders in Syria during the war have been due directly to French actions and policy. In any case, whatever validity this claim may have had has now been removed by the complete collapse of French security control in Syria and by the termination of hostilities. The French might also claim an option on supplying any advisers to the Levant States Governments. This is a claim which the United States could not in any circumstances admit and which could not be seriously put forward under present conditions. Even French civilians have been obliged to quit Syria and so great is the local antagonism that the Syrians would undoubtedly allow complete chaos to develop rather than call upon the French for help. . . .

890D.20 Missions/9-1545 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister to Syria and Lebanon
(Wadsworth)

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1945—1 p. m.

276. Question of sending military mission to assist Syrian Govt with organization and training of defense and security forces is still being studied.²⁴ There are certain rather serious legal, financial, and political difficulties connected with such an enterprise.

For your info Dept is studying the question of suggesting an amendment of US code which would permit dispatch of military

²³ For exchange of letters of August 7, 1941, at Beirut, by Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of State in the Middle East, and Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Commander of the Free French, see British Cmd. 6600, Syria No. 1 (1945) : *Statements of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in Respect of Syria and The Lebanon, 8th June-9th September, 1941*, p. 3. For documentation on the interest of the United States in this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 725 ff.

²⁴ In a memorandum of September 5, 1945, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Bonbright) stated: "Mr. Matthews told me yesterday that he had talked with Mr. Acheson about the proposal to send an American Military Mission to Syria. Mr. Acheson is favorably inclined toward the idea but does not want us to go off halfcocked. In this connection, he asked that we make a study of the question of what arms will be needed and where they can be obtained, also the question of who pays for the Mission. Mr. Acheson also wishes to have formal notes addressed to the French and British Governments telling them of the request made of us, adding that the question is under consideration and asking the views of those governments." (890D.20 Mission/9-545) H. Freeman Matthews was Director of the Office of European Affairs and Dean G. Acheson was Under Secretary of State.

missions in normal times outside Western Hemisphere.²⁵ We are also inviting views of Brit and French.

ACHESON

890D.20 Missions/9-1845

The Department of State to the French Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Syrian Government has requested an American Military Mission to assist it in the organization and training of the Syrian defense and security forces, consisting largely of the Syrian troops recently transferred to Syrian control by the French authorities.

The Syrian Government's request is now being considered by this Government, which would be glad to receive an expression of the views of the French Government in this connection.

A similar communication is being transmitted to the British Embassy.²⁶

WASHINGTON, September 19, 1945.

890D.20 Mission/12-2145

The British Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

Ref: 256/ /45

In reply to the State Department memorandum of the 19th September²⁷ requesting the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject of a proposed American military mission to assist in the organisation and training of the Syrian defense and security forces, the Foreign Office state that, as is known to the State Department, they have always favoured the dispatch of such an American mission. This task could not be undertaken by the United Kingdom for obvious reasons. It must be recognised, however, that French reactions to the idea of an American mission have hitherto been unfavourable. The Foreign Office consider that every effort must be made to induce the French to realise, firstly, that the training of Syrian forces is an essential and

²⁵ On October 11, 1945, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 201, a report by the SWNCC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East. The report called for Congressional action to amend Section 540 of Title 10 of the United States Code to authorize the President of the United States to detail officers and enlisted men of the United States Army to assist foreign governments upon application from the foreign governments and when the President determined that the public interest rendered such a course advisable. The report also called for amendment in a similar manner of Section 441 (a) of Title 34 of the United States Code in connection with Naval missions.

²⁶ September 19, *mutatis mutandis*.

²⁷ See footnote 26, *supra*.

urgent task, since it will fall to the Syrians alone to maintain order on the departure of French and British troops, and secondly, that there is not the slightest hope of persuading the Syrians to agree to a French training mission.

2. If it turns out that the French would greatly prefer a training mission from Holland or Denmark or some other small European country, it may be necessary to reconsider the position in spite of the fact that such countries would probably have no representatives in the Levant nor anyone with experience of local conditions.

3. In a separate note,²⁸ the State Department is being informed, in strict confidence, that advantage is being taken of the presence in London of Monsieur Bidault²⁹ and His Majesty's Minister at Beirut to ascertain whether any progress can be made with the French in the direction of withdrawal of French and British troops from the Levant at the earliest possible moment. For these reasons the Foreign Office thinks that the State Department might wish to hold the matter of the training mission in abeyance until Mr. Bevin's³⁰ forthcoming talks with the French have clarified the position.

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1945.

890D.20 Missions/10-545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

[WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Lacoste, Counselor, French Embassy
 Mr. Henderson, NEA
 Mr. Merriam, NE

Mr. Lacoste came in to leave the attached *aide-mémoire* of October 5, 1945,³¹ in response to the Department's memorandum to the French Embassy of September 19. He expressed the great appreciation of his Government over the fact that we had sought his Government's views in regard to the question of our sending a military mission in response to a request from the Syrian Government, but said that, for the reasons mentioned in the *aide-mémoire*, his Government would be obliged to consider a favorable response on our part to the Syrian request as an unfriendly act (*un geste inamical*).

Mr. Henderson observed that the French reply used rather strong language. For our part, we would not consider meeting the request

²⁸ Dated September 24, p. 1167.

²⁹ Georges Bidault, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³⁰ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³¹ *Infra*.

of the Syrian Government in any sense as an unfriendly act towards France. We, frankly, would prefer not to send a military mission to Syria. On the other hand, Mr. Henderson felt it necessary to restate our position that any independent Government is perfectly free to request technical assistance from us, and that we are perfectly free to accede to such requests. Therefore, while as a general proposition we would much prefer to have Syria's need for technical assistance met by the French, our feeling would not be the same if French assistance resulted from any preferred position of the French in Syria, which we considered to be an outmoded system.

Mr. Lacoste indicated his understanding of our general attitude, but was obviously not pleased at this reference to the fact that we did not favor a preferential status for France in Syria.

It was also mentioned to Mr. Lacoste that if some other Government were approached by Syria with a similar request, that Government might not see fit to consult the French in the matter prior to making a decision. Mr. Lacoste said that his Government had considered that possibility.

In leaving, Mr. Lacoste pressed for an indication that we would not comply with the Syrian request. Mr. Henderson replied that while he could not forecast what our decision would be, he could assure Mr. Lacoste that the French views would be given most careful consideration and that we would inform the French in advance if we should decide to send in a military mission.

890D.20 Missions/10-545

The French Embassy to the Department of State

[Translation ³²]

No. 809

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1945.

In its memorandum of September 19, the Department of State was good enough to inform the Embassy of France in the United States that the Syrian Government had requested the American Government to send it a military mission to help organize and train Syrian troops. In the same document, the Department of State expressed its desire to know the attitude of the French Government on this matter.

Referring to this courteous communication, for which it thanks the Department of State, the Embassy of France has the honor to call its attention to the following points:

³² File translation revised by the editors.

In transferring to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments the so-called special troops, the French Government had no other object than that of granting the requests of these two governments which, invoking their accession to independence and declaring that they were now prepared to exercise for themselves all the functions of sovereignty, were insisting upon the immediate turning over of these functions, including especially those of the defense of the country and of maintenance of order by means of a national army. As the Department of State recalls, these demands of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have had the constant support of British and American representatives in the Levant.

The American Government will understand that under these circumstances, the French Government cannot but be surprised to see that the Syrian Government, after having itself prepared to assume the responsibilities which the burden of a national army entails, requests, so soon after the transfer of the special troops to its authority, foreign assistance in the organization and training of its troops, preparing thus to entrust to other hands one of the functions of which it so vigorously sought possession as one of its essential rights by virtue of its newly acquired independence. The spirit in which the French Government replied to the desire expressed by the Syrian Government would be violated and, in its opinion, its action deprived of its true significance, if the function of counselor and guide which it has just relinquished in favor of the Syrian Government, at the explicit request of the latter, should be transferred to another Power.

The Department of State will not fail to note that in the event that the Government of the United States should agree to send American advisers to the Levant, the decision would run risk of being interpreted, in the circumstances resulting from the recent crisis, as participation in an action designed to evict France from the positions it formerly occupied. The Syrian request, if it should become known, could be considered, in fact, by French opinion, only a manoeuvre intended to offend France.

Under these circumstances, a favorable reply by the American Government to the request just addressed to it by the Damascus Government would necessarily appear as an act unfriendly to the French Government.

In informing the Department of State of the foregoing, the Embassy of France wishes to express again its appreciation of the communication which has been transmitted to it, and avails itself of the occasion of this note to renew assurances of its highest consideration.

390D.20 Mission/12-2145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

[WASHINGTON, November 13, 1945.]

DEAR FREEMAN: We have been giving a lot of thought to the matter of the military mission to Syria and Lebanon. We realize that the appointment of such a mission will extremely irritate the French and that they will probably do their utmost by intrigue in the Levant as well as through diplomatic means to make the mission a failure. We also realize that regardless of French intrigue, there is always a possibility that, as a result of the confused conditions in the Levant, the backwardness of the Syrian people, and the lack of public honesty on the part of various Syrian leaders, the mission may in any event be a failure. We shall undoubtedly be incurring a risk in sending such a mission to Syria and Lebanon. On the other hand, active participation by the United States in foreign affairs involves risks. If we are to follow the line that we should not embark upon undertakings in the international field which involve risks, our foreign policy is certain to be weak and vacillating.

For several years we have taken the position that the United States is sympathetic to the maintenance by the countries of the Near East of their independence³³ and that the United States is prepared to take steps to aid them in maintaining this independence. If we refuse the Syrian request for a military mission, the impression is sure to be created in the Near East that although we are willing to talk glibly regarding our interest in the welfare of the peoples of the Near East, we are unwilling to implement the principle to which we say we adhere by refusing to take any measures which might meet the fierce opposition of any great power. They will feel that when the principles of the United Nations come to close grips with imperialistic ambitions, the proponents of those principles do not have the courage or assurance which characterizes the advocates of Western imperialism. Therefore, it seems to me extremely important that we do not permit French opposition to the sending of this mission to be a factor which will influence the decision which we may make.

While Mr. Wadsworth is here,³⁴ I hope that the interested members of EUR³⁵ and NEA can get together and can reach an agreement with regard to the recommendations to be made to the Secretary as to

³³ See bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 660-661.

³⁴ Mr. Wadsworth left Beirut on October 16 to proceed for consultation in the Department.

³⁵ Office of European Affairs.

what our response to the Syrian invitation should be. In case it is found impossible for such an agreement to be reached, we might at least screen out the points with regard to which we are unable to agree and present these points for decision to higher levels.

The attached memorandum, prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, represents the views of that Division with regard to the mission. I would appreciate it if you would have this memorandum examined by the appropriate members of EUR and let me know when they will be prepared to confer with members of NEA. I hope that the conference can take place this week, since Mr. Wadsworth will be leaving in the not distant future and since a decision should be made before his departure.

LOY W. HENDERSON

[Annex]

*Memorandum by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*³⁶

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1945.

Subject: Request for American Military Mission for Syria

The Syrian Government on August 3, 1945 made a formal request that an American military mission be sent to Syria for the purpose of assisting the Syrian Government with the organization and training of its national defense and security forces. These levies consist of *gendarmerie*, police and local militia totaling approximately 20,000. The militia, which roughly accounts for rather more than half of the total, were transferred formally from French to Syrian control (after some 7,000 had deserted from French to Syrian command) following the Franco-Syrian dispute which culminated in the French bombardment of Damascus last May.

These Syrian troops are in a disorganized condition and are badly in need of reorganization, technical training and modern equipment if they are to be effective in maintaining public order and security throughout Syria. With the approach of winter the morale of the

³⁶ In a memorandum of August 31, 1945, to Mr. Henderson, dealing with the question of sending a military mission to Syria, the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) set forth the general assumptions of that Division as follows: "That it is in the interest of the United States that we strengthen our position in the Near East; that we lend appropriate assistance when possible and when requested to the Governments of the Near East to enable them to maintain their political independence and to develop themselves socially and economically; that in doing so, we should take care not to give to any great powers valid ground for offense; but that we do not consider that any great power has any ground for taking offense because we have direct relations with and lend direct aid to independent third countries which are members of good standing of the United Nations." (890D.20 Mission/9-545)

troops is low, as they lack warm clothing. The Syrian Government has expressed its desire to purchase woolen uniforms from surplus American Army stocks, and the War Department has agreed to supply them. The French have been informed of the matter and have no objection provided payment is not made in scarce dollars. The question of whether or not payment in dollars will be required is not yet settled.

In the past two months the Syrian Government has on several occasions reiterated its request for a military mission and has urged prompt consideration. For example, on the occasion of Senator Pepper's³⁷ recent visit to Damascus President Quwatly told him that the military mission was Syria's greatest need and that only America could meet it. Senator Pepper is said to have given assurances of his support.

A strong argument in favor of our acceding to the Syrian request is the fact that a cardinal point in the foreign policy of the United States is to lend assistance to small states in their efforts to achieve and maintain their independence and in order to enable them to avoid outside interference as much as possible. We have declared this policy with especial reference to Syria several times during the past two years. We have done little to implement this policy up to the present time. The present request is a small one, easily granted, but of the greatest importance to Syria. If the Syrians do not develop some kind of army they cannot hope even to maintain order within the country. A refusal of the request would make us subject to entirely justifiable accusations that our foreign policy consists merely of statements which are not implemented. An American military mission of the kind desired would make an important contribution to the implementation of Syrian independence by paving the way for complete withdrawal of British and French forces.

Moreover, from the point of view of American national interests, it is hardly necessary to point out that the war has emphasized the strategic importance of the Near East, a region whose component countries are in a state of intense political, social and economic readjustment. There is need for a stronger role for this Government in the economic and political destinies of the countries of the Near and Middle East, especially in view of the strategic importance of its oil reserves. The effect of our entering upon the comparatively small task under discussion would, if successfully performed, serve to strengthen greatly our influence and prestige well beyond the borders of Syria. Consequently, we feel that the question of sending a mili-

³⁷ Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, who was making a tour of Europe and the Middle East to study the possibilities of expanded foreign trade in connection with the work of the Senate Special Committee to Study and Survey the Problems of Small Business Enterprises.

tary mission to Syria should be given the most careful consideration and that the advantages and disadvantages of complying with the request should be carefully weighed in arriving at a policy decision which will affect our position in the Near East.

One factor against meeting the Syrian request is that our action would be objected to by France. The French Government commented as follows in reply³⁸ to our request of September 19, 1945 for their views on the subject of the proposed military mission:

“. . . in the event that the Government of the United States should agree to send American counselors to the Levant, the decision would run the risk of being interpreted, in the circumstances resulting from the recent crisis, as participation in an action designed to evict France from the position formerly occupied

“. . . In the circumstances, a favorable reply of the American Government to the request just addressed to it by the Government of Damascus would necessarily appear as a gesture unfriendly to the French Government.”

A desire to avoid giving offense to France has been the basis on which there has been some hesitation in the Department to the granting of the Syrian request. This factor as regards France, whose return to a strong international position may be in our national interest, must be given due weight.

Another deterrent to sending the mission is the changed attitude of the British Government regarding the proposed mission. Although the British originally supported—in fact themselves proposed—an American military mission to Syria, they informed us as follows in reply³⁹ to our inquiry of September 19, 1945:

“. . . the Foreign Office state that, as is known to the State Department, they have always favoured the despatch of such an American mission. . . .

“. . . If it turns out that the French would greatly prefer a training mission from Holland or Denmark or some other small European country, it may be necessary to reconsider the position in spite of the fact that such countries would probably have no representatives in the Levant nor anyone with experience of local conditions

“For these . . . the State Department might wish to hold the matter of the training mission in abeyance until Mr. Bevin's forthcoming talks with the French have clarified the position.”

This modified attitude reflects a softening of British policy vis-à-vis the French in the Levant. NEA is aware that lack of British support might impair—or contribute to the impairment of—the success of the mission. It seems highly probable, however, that the British will support us if we show that we mean business.

³⁸ See memorandum of October 5 from the French Embassy, p. 1206.

³⁹ See memorandum of September 24 from the British Embassy, p. 1204.

While admitting the weight of these factors in opposition to sending the suggested mission, NEA feels it is essential to emphasize the consequences of a decision not to meet the Syrian request. The United States and France follow basically different policies regarding Syria; in a word, the United States recognizes the complete independence of Syria and opposes a privileged position for any country, whereas French policy is directed toward keeping Syria weak and disorganized until France is in a position to reassert its former privileged position. The French are playing for time, hence their opposition to American assistance to Syria.

NEA is of the opinion that our failure to meet the Syrian request in the face of France's intransigence would constitute an unfortunate and perhaps disastrous admission of the lack of an effective independent American policy in the Near East, and would undermine the faith of small nations in the Atlantic Charter⁴⁰ or the United Nations Organization. It would be obvious that our refusal was due to French opposition and that we were bowing to French imperialistic designs. We must face the fact that there is a growing suspicion in the Near East that the policy of the United States is a negative one and that we simply follow British and French policy except in small matters. It has been pointed out that the outstanding weakness of American policy in the Near East is vacillation, lack of continuity or follow through and, at times, its inconsistency. Clearly, the United States has strategic interests in the Near East that require a consistent, effective, long-term policy if this country is to take a rightful place as a world power. NEA does not consider that France or any other great power has valid grounds for taking offense because we lend direct aid to independent countries which are members of good standing in the United Nations. The supplying of military missions is a common and acceptable practice in international relations.

At the present moment the Syrian Government is passing through a critical phase and our assistance in providing a military mission would bolster the Government in the transition to stable conditions and would inspire confidence in the Near East toward the United States and toward the United Nations Organization.

Finally, we should consider what the prospects are for the success of the mission. Obviously, failure would be undesirable and might lower our prestige. Failure might result from French intrigue and from a lack of full British support. It might result from local political differences. (Minister Wadsworth considers that all of these dif-

⁴⁰ Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 367.

faculties will not amount to much, and some of them may not arise, if the personnel of the mission is strictly top-notch.) In particular, if the United States should throw its full support to the Zionist program in Palestine,⁴¹ the resulting atmosphere in Syria would without doubt make the success of the mission an impossibility.

On balance, after taking into account the various advantages and disadvantages, the doubts and the uncertainties, as well as the probable benefits, we feel that we should give a favorable answer to Syria. In doing so, we would carry out our established foreign policy and the effect of doing so would be, on the whole, helpful to the situation in the Near East. It seems to us that we should be lacking in courage and in the spirit of enterprise which has made this country what it is if we refuse to accept this opportunity, which is also a challenge, to implement our foreign policy merely because we prefer inaction to running a risk of failure.

A technical impediment to meeting the Syrian request is our present lack of enabling legislation. The detail of naval or military missions to foreign countries is governed by Section 540 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which authorizes such missions only during war or a declared national emergency. SWNCC has proposed to the Secretary,⁴² however, that necessary steps be taken to obtain appropriate modification of the language of the statute to permit the detail of missions to any part of the world whenever deemed to be in the national interest.

The purpose of this paper is to present the arguments pro and con with a view to our reaching a decision *in principle* whether or not we should accede to Syria's request, provided the necessary legislation is enacted.

We have already informed Lacoste that we will not send the mission without first informing him of our decision. It might, consequently, be appropriate at that time to add that in view of our long and firm friendship with his country, we cannot consider such a decision illogical or inappropriate in the circumstances of our relations with Syria or the situation in that country and, consequently, that our decision is not of a nature properly to give offense to his Government. On the contrary, we would appreciate the cooperative assistance of the local French military authorities so long as they may remain in the Levant.

⁴¹ For documentation on the policy of the United States concerning Palestine, see pp. 678 ff.

⁴² Memorandum of October 22 from the Acting Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Matthews), not printed.

890D.20 Mission/12-2145

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1945.

DEAR LOY: I have read your memorandum of November 13, together with the statement prepared by NE on the subject of the request of the Syrian Government for an American military mission, and fully appreciate the arguments which you have put forward in favor of our acceding to the Syrian request.

I am frankly of the opinion, however, that this is not a propitious time to reply to the Syrian invitation, wholly apart from the fundamental question of whether or not the invitation should be accepted.

In the first place, I understand that the proposed enabling legislation, without which this Government lacks the authority to send a military mission to Syria, is not yet before Congress and it seems likely that it will be a matter of weeks, if not months, before we could hope to have the legislation enacted, even assuming that Congress reacts favorably. I seriously doubt the wisdom of committing ourselves to the Syrian Government, even informally, to the sending of a military mission before Congress has passed on the general question.

Secondly, I think it would be unwise to inject ourselves into the situation at a time when to do so might be a disruptive factor in the discussions which have been going on for many weeks between the French and British Governments looking to the joint withdrawal of French and British troops. It can be argued that these discussions have dragged on interminably and that nothing concrete may come of them. I am more hopeful, however, inasmuch as the Levant problem is one which has stood in the way of a Franco-British alliance which I believe both Governments are now anxious to conclude.

Finally, as indicated in NE's memorandum, the attitude which this Government takes towards the Zionist program in Palestine would have a vital bearing on the chances of success for an American military mission in Syria. I quite agree that this Government should not hold back from any desirable course of action merely because that action confronts us with the risk of failure. I also agree, as you know, with the general principle that this Government should take a clear position with regard to important questions of foreign policy and should not be content, as was so often the case prior to the war, to adopt a passive attitude and to avoid embarrassing decisions in distant parts of the world where our interests were not at that time considered to be directly concerned. But, as in any specific undertaking, the possible disadvantages have to be weighed against the possible advantages and

at the moment it seems to me that in this case the former considerably outweigh the latter.⁴⁴

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

**PROBLEM OF DOLLAR EXCHANGE NEEDED BY SYRIA AND LEBANON;
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING AN INFORMAL REQUEST BY SYRIA FOR A
\$20,000,000 LOAN**

[In telegram 220, August 3, 1945, 3 p. m., the Department notified Beirut of information from the French Embassy that the French Government would make available to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments up to \$9,000,000 for 1945 and that since their exports to the United States were estimated at \$6,000,000, a total amount of \$15,000,000 would be available to those Governments for expenditures in the United States. The telegram stated that if these dollar allocations were available, "it will be impossible for US Govt to provide dollar credits when such credits are already available under an established and agreed procedure". The message also stated that "Dept has no indication that French would make any attempt at present time to use dollar allocation for purpose of extracting political advantages." (890E.51/8-345)]

In despatch 948, August 22, 1945, Beirut reported confirmation of these figures from local French officials, except that the total might go as high as \$18,000,000 (890E.51/8-2245).]

890D.51/9-1045

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1945.

The Syrian Minister ⁴⁵ called on me today. He said that his Government had requested him to endeavor to effect arrangements of some kind with the American Government whereby twenty million dollars would be made available to Syria immediately to purchase supplies in the United States for which Syria was in desperate need.

He pointed out that during recent years Syria had been unable to satisfy its normal needs for foreign products and that as a result the country was in a critical situation so far as both capital and consumers' goods were concerned. He said that the Syrian Government had been depending upon the French for dollars up to last spring

⁴⁴ Aside from discussion among Department officers, no further action was taken on this matter in 1945.

⁴⁵ Nazem al-Koudsi.

when what almost amounted to a rupture took place between France and Syria and that at the present time the Syrians felt impelled to turn to the United States direct for their dollars.

I told the Minister that the Syrian need for dollars had already been discussed in the Department and that informal conversations on the subject had also been held with appropriate French officials. The French had assured us that they were still ready to furnish Syria with a reasonable amount of dollars and that if the Syrians would make application for the dollars through the usual channels, they would have no difficulty in obtaining them. It would be difficult to prevail upon the appropriate American authorities to approve the loan of dollars to Syria for the purchase just now of broad categories of imports in the absence of evidence that the French Government was unwilling freely to make dollars available to Syria in accordance with arrangements effected some time ago between France and Syria. I asked the Minister if the Syrian Government had formally applied to the French for dollars and had been refused.

The Minister said that he could not answer my question. He was of the opinion, however, that if the Syrians had not approached the French, their failure to do so had been based either upon their conviction that the French would ask for political concessions involving sacrifice of the sovereignty of Syria in return for the dollars or upon their determination not to approach the French Government for favors at a time when French-Syrian relations were strained. He said that in any event the Syrian Government did not desire that its currency continue to be based upon that of the French. The Syrian Government felt that it should be financially independent of a country which obviously was endeavoring to deprive it of its political independence. It was the hope of the Syrian Government that the Government of the United States would be willing to take steps which would result in Syria's having more complete financial independence. He added that he would appreciate it if arrangements could be made for the financial expert of the Syrian Legation to have talks with the appropriate experts in the Department of State.

I told the Minister that I would be glad to take steps for such conversations to take place. I said, however, that so far as I was aware, the only means available for the granting of loans to foreign countries such as Syria were through the Import-Export Bank and that this bank might have hesitation in advancing foreign loans unless there seemed to be some likelihood that such loans could eventually be paid in dollars. At the present Syria's dollar income was limited and it appeared that it would be difficult to expand that income in the next few years to any appreciable extent.

The Minister said that this problem was one of several which he would like to have his expert discuss with the members of the Department.

890D.51/9-1845

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Adrian B. Colquitt of the
Division of Near Eastern Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1945.

Participants: Dr. Nazem al-Koudsi, Syrian Minister
Mr. Sawwaf, Syrian Counselor
Messrs. Luthringer, McGuire and Ansara, FN ⁴⁶
Messrs. Merriam, Satterthwaite, Kohler and Colquitt,
NE ⁴⁷

A meeting was held in Mr. Collado's ⁴⁸ office on September 18 to hear and discuss a request of the Syrian Government for a loan of twenty million dollars to be used for the purchase of supplies in the United States.

[Here follows discussion of Syria's financial situation, similar to that recorded in the memorandum of September 10, *supra*.]

In reply to the observation that, according to information furnished to the Department by the French authorities, a substantial and reasonable amount of dollar exchange was available at Beirut for the asking, Dr. Koudsi stated that his Government did not wish to utilize those funds because it felt that the French would seek in return to impose political conditions that would limit Syria's independence. Mr. Merriam suggested that, as the French seem disposed to make the money available, and as the established machinery already exists, it would seem a good idea for the Syrians to utilize the offer and see whether the French actually would try to couple the dollar exchange with political demands. Dr. Koudsi said his Government objected to France having its finger in the control of Syria's foreign exchange.

Mr. Collado cited examples of other countries short of dollar exchange that found it necessary to have a finger in the control of foreign exchange in cases similar to Syria's. Summing up, Mr. Collado said there appeared to be two problems to be considered, (1) how could Syria realize on its existing assets which were convertible into francs

⁴⁶ George F. Luthringer and Paul F. McGuire, Chief and Assistant Chief, respectively, of the Division of Financial Affairs, and James M. Ansara of the same Division.

⁴⁷ Gordon P. Merriam and Foy D. Kohler, Chief and Assistant Chief, respectively, of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, and Joseph C. Satterthwaite of the same Division.

⁴⁸ Emilio G. Collado, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy, who was also present at this conversation.

or sterling but not dollars, and (2) if there was any scope for considering a long-term program of developing the national economy. He thought that anything on these lines would have to be considered separately, and that Syria's immediate needs should be met through approach to the French. The manner in which long-term assistance could be given would require study, as it was a broad problem not limited to Syria. The facilities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development could be looked into, and it would also have to be determined whether assistance from this source would be on a bi-lateral basis or on a broader United Nations basis. Mr. Kohler called attention to the fact that, although Syria "came of age" too late to be a signatory to the Bretton Woods agreement,⁴⁹ the matter of admitting new members would be opened when the Bretton Woods Fund is established. Mr. Collado said that, under international agreement, reasonable and non-discriminatory exchange controls could be maintained for a period of three to five years during the transition period. Mr. Luthringer remarked that Syria's future exchange situation depended largely on the condition of the franc and the pound, and that Syria would be in a good position if France and England eventually freed back balances.

⁴⁹The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to 22, 1944, and formulated the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1501; 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1401) and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1502; 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1440). The Agreements were signed by the United States on December 27, 1945, and entered into force the same day. For documentation on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 106 ff.

TURKEY

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE DEMANDS OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR REVISION OF THE REGIME OF THE TURKISH STRAITS AND OTHER MATTERS AFFECTING TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

767.68119/3-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 9, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received 11:45 p. m.]

331. The Yugoslav Ambassador¹ informed me today that he had learned from a reliable source that subsequent to the Yalta Conference,² Molotov³ had informed the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow⁴ that the Soviet Government would desire soon to discuss with the Turkish Government a revision of the Montreux Convention.⁵ The Turkish Ambassador is said to have replied that the Montreux Convention "was an international matter".

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as No. 12.

STEINHARDT

761.6711/3-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 21, 1945.
[Received March 21—6:10 p. m.]

835. Moscow press March 20-21 publishes following announcement of Information Bureau of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of USSR:

"On March 19th People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of USSR V. M. Molotov, in connection with approaching termination of period

¹ Iliya Shumenkovich.

² The Yalta Conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union Stalin met February 4-February 11, 1945; see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*.

³ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴ Selim Sarper.

⁵ Signed July 20, 1936, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213; for documentation on the interest of the United States in the Montreux Conference regarding the regime of the Straits, June 22-July 20, 1936, see *Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. III, pp. 503 ff.*; for documentation concerning discussion of the Montreux Convention at Yalta, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 328-329, 903-904, and 982*.

of effectiveness of Soviet-Turkish treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, concluded December 17th, 1925,⁶ handed Turkish Ambassador Mr. Sarper, on behalf of Soviet Government, a statement for transmission to Government of Turkish Republic.

"In this statement it is declared that Soviet Government, acknowledging value of Soviet-Turkish Treaty of December 17, 1925 in cause of maintaining friendly relations between Soviet Union and Turkey, nevertheless considers it necessary to assert that owing to deep changes which have taken place particularly in course of second world war, this treaty no longer corresponds to the new situation and requires serious improvement.

"In view of the above, Soviet Government gave Government of Turkish Republic notice of its desire to denounce above-mentioned treaty along with all its supplementary clauses in accordance with points of November 17, 1935 protocol providing for procedure of its denunciations.

"Turkish Ambassador Mr. Sarper replied that he would immediately transmit V. M. Molotov's statement to Turkish Government."⁷

Sent to Department as 835 ; repeated to Ankara as 16.

HARRIMAN

767.68119/3-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 21, 1945—12 noon.

[Received March 21—9 : 30 a. m.]

385. ReEmbs 331, March 9. The decision of the Soviet Government to terminate the Soviet-Turk treaty of friendship and neutrality has been accepted philosophically by the Turk Government as the forerunner of the inevitable request for a modification of the Montreux Convention. As under the terms of the treaty notice of termination is required to be given prior to May 7, 1945, it is the impression in Turkish official circles that the notice was given at this time to avoid the exaggerated importance that might otherwise be attached to such

⁶ Signed at Paris on December 17, 1925, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLVII, p. 355 ; Protocol of Prolongation, signed at Ankara December 17, 1929, *ibid.*, p. 361 ; Protocol of Prolongation, signed at Ankara October 30, 1931, *ibid.*, p. 367 ; Protocol of Prolongation, signed at Ankara November 7, 1935, *ibid.*, vol. CLXXXIX, p. 129.

⁷ In telegram 836, March 21, 1945, Ambassador Harriman reported that *Izvestiya* for March 21 carried an editorial entitled "Regarding Soviet-Turkish Relations". The Embassy reported that the article, quoting from the Molotov statement of March 19, and reviewing the history of the treaty of 1925, asserted in effect that ". . . it cannot go unmentioned that during present war Soviet-Turkish relations have left much to be desired at various times. Automatically to leave in force a treaty concluded under completely different circumstances would not, of course, be in internal interests of either side. It would also not be in interest of fruitful development of international relations as whole at time when democratic countries united for defeat of German aggressor have already concerned themselves with laying foundation for lasting peace." (761.6711/3-2145)

notice were it to be given immediately prior to or at the time of the San Francisco Conference.⁸

That the Turk Government is prepared to consider proposals for a modification of the Montreux Convention is evidenced by a remark recently made to me by an official of the Foreign Office who said that he did not "blame the Russians for not wanting the Japanese to be concerned with the administration of the Straits".

Sent to Department repeated to Moscow as 16.

STEINHARDT

761.6711/3-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 21, 1945—11 p. m.

[Received March 22—7:05 a. m.]

853. Background of Russian denunciation of Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship, in so far as apparent here in Moscow, is as follows:

According to the protocol of November 7, 1935 the treaty itself was renewed for 10 years, to be prolonged by tacit consent for further 2-year periods unless denounced 6 months before expiry. If therefore the treaty were not to remain operative until at least November 7, 1947 it would have to be denounced by one party or the other by May 7 of this year, at the latest.

It has been anticipated in Turkish circles in Moscow that the Russians would wish to denounce the treaty, and the Turkish Ambassador had advised his Government to this effect 1 or 2 months ago. There were indeed a number of points in respect to which it had not proved possible for one side or the other to observe the letter of the agreement or of its various protocols, and parts of it had clearly become of doubtful applicability to present circumstances.

The denunciation itself was therefore not a surprise but the circumstances in which it took place were unexpected. The Turkish Ambassador had arranged to return to Turkey for a period of consultation which was expected to last several weeks. He was scheduled to depart March 25. On March 19 he told Kavtaradze⁹ that he would be glad to call on Molotov to say good-by although he had nothing to discuss with him. To his surprise, he was invited to call the same day. Molotov informed him of the denunciation of the treaty and told him that the Soviet Government had intended to take this step at a some-

⁸ The United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco, April 25—June 26, 1945; for documentation regarding this Conference, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

⁹ Sergey Ivanovich Kavtaradze, Soviet Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

what later date but in view of his impending departure had decided to act at once, in order that he might be able to discuss Turkish-Russian relations with his Government against this background. Molotov's attitude was consistently friendly and correct, and there was no intimation on his part that the action reflected ill feeling or any tendency to bring pressure on Turkey.

The Ambassador inquired Molotov's views as to the ways in which the present treaty might be "improved". Molotov was unwilling to commit himself on this point and said that after the Ambassador had talked with his Government he would be glad to learn how the Turkish Government felt on this point.

By way of background to this Russian move, it may be said that the information reported in Ankara's message to the Department on March 9, 7 p. m., repeated to this mission as No. 12, to effect that Molotov had expressed to the Turkish Ambassador the Soviet desire to discuss revision of the Montreux Convention was substantially correct. This conversation took place 3 or 4 weeks ago. When the Ambassador pointed out to Molotov that the Montreux Convention was an international agreement to which a number of other countries, including Japan, were parties, and that this would complicate a discussion of its revision, Molotov said that he hoped the Turkish Ambassador would not make too much of a point of the necessity of consulting the Japanese. The Ambassador replied by pointing out that Turkey was at war with Japan and that he had no intention of defending Japanese interests. Molotov appeared to attach much significance to this statement and greeted it with satisfaction, saying that it was a distinct step in advance. The Ambassador thereupon reiterated that his remark was based on the state of Turkish relations with Japan and did not imply a view of his Government as to the modalities of possible discussions looking toward the revision of the convention.

In the view of this Embassy, the main factors underlying Soviet policy toward Turkey at this moment are probably (a) the Soviet desire to obtain a revision of the regime of the Straits more favorable to Russian prestige and security than the present one and (b) the assumption that such revision will probably not be readily acceptable to Turkey and that considerable pressure may therefore eventually have to be applied.

In denouncing the treaty at this time the Russians undoubtedly have in mind the anticipated discussion of the Montreux Convention at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the three Allies.¹⁰ The denunciation of the treaty makes it possible for them to insist on the

¹⁰ This had been agreed upon at the Yalta Conference; see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, pp. 903-904.

early redefinition, in a new agreement, of their relations with Turkey, and thus opens up a channel of pressure on the Turkish Government which may prove useful as the question of the Straits again comes under discussion. The Soviet-Bulgaria policy seems pointed in the same direction.¹¹ It is evidently Russian tactics to maneuver the Turks into coming forward first with their ideas on the redefinition of Turkish-Russian relations. What will come after that is impossible to predict, but the Russians would of course then be free to accept or to criticize the Turkish suggestion as they liked, and issues might be raised in the course of these discussions which would provide opportunities for the exertion of strong political pressure. This in turn opens several possibilities. Turkey might be asked, for example, to accept, in advance of any broader discussions, a given set of Soviet views with respect to the regime of the Straits, on the assumption that it would be difficult for any outside power to challenge or ignore a program advanced by the two countries most directly concerned.

Sent to Department as 853 repeated to Ankara as 18.

HARRIMAN

F.W. 761.6711/3-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 22, 1945—noon.

[Received 2:44 p. m.]

390. My 385, March 21. In conversation last night with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office¹² he stated that when informing the Turkish Ambassador of the intention of the Soviet Government to terminate the Soviet-Turkish treaty of friendship and neutrality, Molotov had explained that the treaty was "out of date and required revision", pointing out that when the treaty was negotiated in 1925, "the Soviet Union had no treaty with Great Britain such as now exists"¹³ and did not even have diplomatic relations with the United States".¹⁴ Molotov indicated that the Soviet Government is prepared to conclude a new treaty with Turkey which would take into consideration changed world conditions.

In discussing the subject later in the evening with the Soviet Ambassador,¹⁵ he remarked that the termination of the treaty should not

¹¹ For documentation regarding the relations of the Soviet Union with Bulgaria, see vol. iv, pp. 135 ff.

¹² Cevat Acikalın.

¹³ This is a reference to the Treaty of Alliance signed at London May 26, 1942, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353; for documentation regarding events leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 490-566 *passim*.

¹⁴ For documentation regarding the recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union, November 16, 1933, see *ibid.*, 1933, vol. II, pp. 778 ff.

¹⁵ Sergey Alexandrovich Vinogradov.

be regarded as “unfriendly”, but as merely reflecting the desire of the Soviet Government “to bring the treaty up to date”. He expressed the opinion that little difficulty would be encountered in negotiating a new treaty.

Still later in the evening, the President’s¹⁶ confidential secretary¹⁷ intimated that if no demands are made by the Soviet Government which infringe Turkish sovereignty “such as a request for bases on Turkish territory”, the negotiating of a new treaty would encounter no obstacles from the Turkish Government. Anderiman said that notice of termination of the treaty has been expected by the Turkish Government for quite some time.

Repeated to Moscow as No. 17.

STEINHARDT

761.6711/3-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 23, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 6:09 p. m.]

3025. The Foreign Office today showed us a message dated March 22 from the British Ambassador in Ankara¹⁸ regarding the denunciation by the Soviet Government of the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. This telegram stated that the Turkish Foreign Minister¹⁹ had sent for Peterson yesterday in connection with this matter. Saka had told him that Molotov had said to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet Government was denouncing the treaty earlier than was necessary because he, the Turkish Ambassador, was returning shortly to Ankara. (The Foreign Office remarked that this was an odd excuse.) Molotov had said that the treaty was old and “altered conditions rendered serious modifications necessary”. Saka stated to Peterson that the Turkish Ambassador was due back from Moscow on April 2 and that the Turkish Government felt that it would have to make some statement to the Soviet Government after the Ambassador’s return. Peterson was told that the Turkish Government wished to consult the British Government before making any such reply. Saka continued that despite the denunciation, the treaty would remain valid until November 7 next.

Saka believes that the Soviets in reality wished to have bilateral conversations with the Turks in order that the Montreux Convention

¹⁶ Ismet İnönü.

¹⁷ Süreyya Anderiman, Director of President İnönü’s Private Secretariat.

¹⁸ Sir Maurice Peterson.

¹⁹ Hasan Saka.

might be modified. Peterson told Saka that the British Government had no evidence of any such desire for bilateral conversations on the part of the Soviet Government.

The Turkish Foreign Minister continued by stating that the Turkish Government really wished to place their relations with the Soviet Government on a better footing in order that they would not be a hindrance in any way to the best possible Anglo-Soviet relations. He remarked, however, that this would not be possible if Moscow believed that Turkey could be treated in the same fashion as Rumania and Bulgaria were now being handled.

Saka, in referring to Molotov's moderate attitude toward the Turkish Ambassador, stated that the Greek Ambassador in Ankara ²⁰ had told him that his Russian colleague had received instructions from Moscow that he should be adamant with the Turks in a demand for deeds and not words.

Repeated to Moscow as 108 and Ankara as 18.

WINANT

761.6711/3-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 26, 1945—7 p. m.
[Received 11:30 p. m.]

418. With reference to London's 3025 of March 23 to the Department in connection with the notice of termination given by the Soviet Government of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, in discussing the matter with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he expressed the opinion that the reason for giving notice at this time was not the impending departure of the Turkish Ambassador from Moscow for Ankara, but more probably the reason suggested in my 385 of March 21 that the Soviet Government deemed it preferable to give such notice late in March rather than immediately prior to or during the San Francisco Conference. It has been understood in Ankara official circles for some time that the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow planned to visit Ankara over a month ago and that he had postponed his departure at the last moment.

Thus it is doubtful that his departure provided the motive for giving notice of termination at this time.

I am constrained to regard Peterson's statement to Saka that the British Government "has no evidence" of a desire by the Soviet Government for bilateral conversations with the Turkish Government with a view to modification of the Montreux Convention as wishful thinking unless he meant formal evidence. To my mind there has

²⁰ Raphael Raphael.

been ample evidence over the past 5 years that the Soviet Government regards the control and administration of the Straits as an exclusively "Black Sea affair" and resents the fact that non-Black Sea powers are signatories to the Montreux Convention. In consequence, I have long been persuaded that at what the Soviet Government regarded as a propitious time it would seek to induce the Turks to enter into bilateral discussions looking to a modification of the Montreux Convention, and that while observing its conception of the international amenities by subsequently confronting the British with a *fait accompli*, it would resist any attempt by the British to plan a consequential role in the negotiations looking to the setting up of a new regime for the control and administration of the Straits.

In my opinion the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance in 1939²¹ was distasteful to the Soviets who regarded the alliance between the Turks and the British with little less disfavor and suspicion than they would have regarded a similar alliance between the Finns and the British. Obviously the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Germany and the subsequent Anglo-Soviet treaty prevented any outward manifestation of dislike by the Soviets for the Anglo-Turkish alliance, in addition to which until the summer of 1944 this alliance served to safeguard the southern extremity of the Soviet Union at a time when such protection was essential and of real value. Now however that there is no longer any doubt as to the outcome of the war and that the British have given evidence of their continued interest in the Balkans and that they intend to entrench and strengthen their position in Turkey and particularly in the light of the firm British stand in Greece I am inclined to the view that the Soviet Government is about to embark on its delayed program of seeking to make it clear to the British that the Soviet Union regards Turkey in much the same light as it does Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, and that to achieve this end it will press its intention to carry on bilateral discussions with Turkey for a modification of the Montreux Convention.

If this hypothesis is correct, Soviet policy will follow the familiar pattern from which there has been little if any deviation since 1939—that is to say, criticism of the Turkish Government and outbursts in the Soviet press and on the radio against the Turks. These have in fact already begun. Rumors will be circulated of a nature tending to alarm the Turks. The first of these was put into circulation a few days ago by the Soviet Assistant Naval Attaché who stated two Bulgarian Army Corps were being concentrated on the Turk frontier, a statement which the Turkish, American and British military authorities inform me is not in conformity with the facts. After these tactics

²¹ Treaty of Mutual Assistance signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

have presumably "softened" the Turks the Soviet Government will expect them to enter into bilateral discussions. If the Turks are not too resistant to entering upon such bilateral discussions the proposals advanced by the Soviet Government for a modification of the Montreux Convention will probably be far less onerous than the Turks appear to anticipate. Nor would this be surprising for I am persuaded the Soviet Government does not desire territorial aggrandisement at the expense of the Turks but rather complete freedom to navigate the Straits with every type of vessel in times of war as well as in times of peace under a convention which in effect will constitute the Turks guardians of the Straits for the benefit of the Soviets, such convention if attainable not to include any non-Black Sea power other perhaps than for the purpose of underwriting the Soviet desiderata. Such a program, which would logically lead to a Soviet-Turkish alliance far transcending the treaty of friendship and neutrality of 1925, would accomplish what I have long believed the Soviet objectives to be in respect of the Straits in particular and Turkey in general. It would have the following advantages from the Soviet point of view:

1. Joint free access to and egress from the Black Sea to Soviet vessels of every type in times of war as well as in times of peace while denying the same to non-Black Sea powers in times of war or threatened conflict.
2. Automatically constitute Turkey an Ally of the Soviet Union in any future war involving the Soviets.
3. Oblige Turkey to sustain the first impact of any contemplated attack on the Soviet Black Sea ports.
4. Eliminate Great Britain from any direct voice in the control and administration of the Straits.
5. Enhance Soviet and diminish British prestige throughout the Balkans and the Middle East.

While it is probable, having regard to existing Anglo-Soviet relations, that the Soviet Government will proceed with extreme caution in endeavoring to realize the objectives outlined above and that it will pay attention to British susceptibilities and may then accept some degree of compromise, I am convinced that the objectives outlined above are and will continue to be the Soviet goal. Nor do they reflect any material change from the objectives sought by the Soviet Government at the time of Potemkin's visit to Ankara²² and Sobolef's visit to Sofia.²³

²² Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, had visited at Ankara from April 29 to May 5, 1939, in the course of a series of visits to the capitals of the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe; see Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1929-1941*, vol. II (1936-1941), pp. 240-242; see also telegram 571, June 11, 1942, 10 a. m., from Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. IV, p. 818.

²³ Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev, Secretary-General of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, had visited King Boris of Bulgaria at Sofia on November 25, 1940; for documentation concerning this visit, see *ibid.*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 532, 535, 537, and 631-632.

Insofar as concerns the Turkish attitude, it would be a mistake to measure the probable Turkish reaction to excessive Soviet demands by the meekness of the Turks toward Germany. I have little doubt that the Turkish reaction to excessive demands put forth by the Soviets would be pugnacious, their meekness toward Germany during the past 3 years having been intended to preserve their strength for this purpose. The dividends now being received by the Finns on their 5-year investment in uncompromising resistance to threatened Soviet domination as distinguished from present conditions in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria is not being overlooked by the Turks with a population five times that of Finland, only two cities of any importance, little industry, a largely self-sufficient peasant population and a mountainous country with extensive areas suitable for guerilla warfare.

As to Saka's expressed desire that Turk-Soviet relations be placed on a better footing in order that there would not be a hindrance in any way to the best possible Anglo-Soviet relations, this is but another way of seeing that the Turks are fully alive to the implications inherent in the Soviet objectives and seek the support of Great Britain as well as of the United States to counteract their fear of being swept into the Soviet sphere of influence by modifications of the Montreux Convention which would deprive Great Britain of a voice in the control and administration of the Straits.

I feel obliged to add that the Turks, who have been most reluctant to take up arms against Germany, would almost welcome an armed conflict between Britain and the Soviets and would throw themselves into any such conflict on the British side with enthusiasm. Their reluctance to participate actively at any time in the war against Germany has been motivated by their conviction that Britain and the Soviets would sooner or later come into conflict in the Balkans and that Turkey could and would tip the scales in Britain's favor. Thus there has been ample evidence during the past 3 years that the Turks also have been engaged in wishful thinking.

Repeated to London as 21 and Moscow as 20.

STEINHARDT

761.6711/3-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 28, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 8:32 p. m.]

3200. ReEmbs 3025, March 23, 5 p. m. Sir Orme Sargent²⁴ said to us today that the Foreign Office regarded the Soviet notice to

²⁴ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

terminate the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship as the first move in a Soviet plan to "soften" Turkey preparatory to bilateral discussions on the Straits. The Turkish Government has, therefore, been told by the British Government that if the Soviet Government should approach it on this subject the Soviet Government would have to be reminded of the international nature of the Montreux Convention and that Great Britain, too, was interested in the administration of the Straits.²⁵

Repeated to Moscow and Ankara.

WINANT

761.6711/3-3145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, March 31, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received 10:03 p. m.]

440. In taking leave of the Foreign Minister today,²⁶ he outlined his conception of Soviet motives and intentions in giving notice of termination of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. He then set forth the Turkish present and probable future reaction. He enumerated his interpretation of Soviet motives and intentions substantially as follows:

1. A desire to make it clear to the British that the Soviet Government regards Turkish-Soviet relations as within the framework of regional understandings notwithstanding the Anglo-Turkish alliance.
2. Notice to the world that the Soviet Government regards the future regime of the Straits as exclusively the concern of the Black Sea powers.
3. Notice to the British that the Soviet Government desires bilateral discussions with the Turkish Government in respect of future Turkish-Soviet relations including the regime of the Straits.
4. An attempt to force bilateral discussions on the Turkish Government primarily for the purpose of facing the British with a *fait accompli*.

Saka expressed the view that while the Soviet Government will resort to what he described as "its customary methods" to achieve its

²⁵ Further views of the British Government were communicated to the Turkish Government on the afternoon of March 28, the occasion being a call on Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Cevat Acikalin, head of a Turkish delegation then in London for financial conversations; Mr. Eden suggested that the Turks might wish to inform the Soviet Government that they were willing to enter into negotiations, and to ask for proposals, reminding the Russians if necessary that only multilateral conversations could be entered into. This information was given to the Embassy at London by sources in the Foreign Office on March 29, and was in turn reported to the Department in telegram 3246, March 29, 1945, 5 p. m. (761.6711/3-2945).

²⁶ Mr. Steinhardt was leaving Turkey, having been appointed Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

end and will not hesitate to exert extreme pressure including violent criticism and denunciation of the Turkish Government through the press, radio and by other means it will not resort to armed force.

Saka outlined the reaction of his Government as follows:

1. The Turk Government has for some time past anticipated the notice of termination.

2. The Turkish Government is prepared to discuss a modification of the Montreux Convention.

3. The Turkish Government would prefer international rather than bilateral discussions looking to a modification of the Montreux Convention but does not exclude bilateral discussions.

4. The Turkish Government has already inquired informally of the Soviet Government as to the modifications which the latter has in mind and has been informed the Turkish Government should make the suggestions. To this the Turkish Government has informally replied that as it is the Soviet Government which desires the modifications it seems natural that the suggestions originate with the Soviet Government. Saka then remarked that this exchange of points of view would probably continue through the regular diplomatic channels up to the time of the San Francisco Conference when he looked forward to an opportunity of seeking the advice of the British and American Governments as to the future course to be pursued by the Turkish Government.

5. The Turkish Government recognizes the great changes which have taken place since the treaty with the Soviets was entered into in 1925 and is prepared to negotiate a new treaty with the Soviets as well as to agree to reasonable modifications in the regime of the Straits.

6. The Turkish Government will not be influenced by the "customary methods" of the Soviet Government, will cede no territory or bases to the Soviets and will employ its armed forces if necessary.

In discussing the possibility the Soviet Government might employ armed force if the Turkish Government should not prove amenable to its wishes, Saka expressed the view Soviet losses in the war against Germany have been so great that such large occupying forces would be required in Germany, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria and that manpower in the reconstruction of Soviet cities, industries, railroads et cetera was so essential that it was most unlikely the Soviet Government would embark on any such venture entirely aside from a desire not to create an unfavorable impression throughout the world as the result of aggression. He also observed that the Soviet Government would doubtless wish to send large forces to the Far East either to participate in the war against Japan or to benefit from Japan's defeat.

Sent to Department, repeated to Moscow as 22 and London as 24.

STEINHARDT

761.6711/4-745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 7, 1945.

[Received April 7—9:37 p. m.]

472. The semiofficial *Ulus* publishes the following information today:

[Here follows account of Soviet denunciation of the 1925 treaty based on the Molotov statement of March 19 as printed in the Moscow press.]

[“]After studying the matter, the Government of the Republic in a declaration presented to Mr. Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador at Ankara, by Hasan Saka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on April 4 informed the Soviet Government that it has always wished to maintain and strengthen the good neighbor relationship and sincere friendship which has bound Turkey and the Soviet Union to one another for a long time, that it has desired to place emphasis on the value of the pact of December 17, 1925 which has rendered great service to Turkish-Soviet friendship and that it has noted the wish expressed by the Government of the Soviet Union to terminate this pact.

Therefore, the Government of the Republic which accepts the suggestion of the Soviet Government with regard to replacing the expiring pact with another pact more suitable to the present interests of both parties and including thorough-going modifications has informed the Government in question that it is ready to study with great care and good intentions the proposals to be made to it with this aim.”

Repeated to Moscow as 25.

PACKER

761.67/4-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 7, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received April 7—4:50 p. m.]

3553. An official of the Foreign Office today said that British representatives in Bulgaria had become somewhat alarmed at stories current in Sofia that the Russians contemplated some sort of aggressive action in Thrace against Turkey. The Foreign Office, however, is of the opinion that these stories have been “planted”, probably by the Russians in their current war of nerves against Turkey. The official stated that it was fanciful even to consider that Russia would launch an act of aggression against Turkey at the present juncture “although this might not be the case in 2 or 3 years”.

Repeated to Caserta, Moscow, Ankara.

WINANT

761.67/4-1145 : Telegram

The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, April 11, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 3:20 p. m.]

192. I talked with the Minister for Foreign Affairs²⁷ yesterday about some of the more extreme rumors concerning Russian designs against Turkey that reach the British and our military personnel here. Please see my telegram No. 171 March 31, 5 p. m.²⁸ and General Crane's²⁹ 1458 Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Minister said he had no way of defining Russian intentions about anything, that the agents of Russian policy were inscrutable as we all know. Said the Minister, "However, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill should have a far better comprehension of what the Russians have in mind than I can have, the subject of the Straits and the future of Russo-Turkish relations must have been discussed at Yalta."³⁰ The Minister then assured me that so far as Bulgaro-Turkish relations are concerned no change has been planned. He added that Antonov, the recently appointed Bulgarian Minister to Ankara,³¹ had been instructed to assure the Turkish Government that Bulgaria had no intention of altering its policy of good neighborly relations with Turkey and that the presence of Russian forces in Bulgaria could in no way modify the desire of Bulgaria to preserve such relations with Turkey. He told me that there has been no increase in strength of Bulgarian military forces in southeastern Bulgaria and that he knew of no recent increase in Russian forces in that area. It seemed clear from what the Minister said that Bulgaria has no desire for adventure at the expense of Turkey.

Repeated to Moscow as 89, to AmPolAd³² as 96 and Ankara.

BARNES

761.6711/4-2745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 27, 1945—8 p. m.

[Received April 28—4:18 a. m.]

571. ReEmb's 472, April 7. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs³³ informed me this morning that there has been as yet no reaction

²⁷ Petko Stainov.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ Maj. Gen. John A. Crane, chief U. S. military representative on the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria.

³⁰ See *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, index entry on Soviet Union: Turkish Straits, p. 1017.

³¹ Nikola Antonov.

³² American Political Adviser (Alexander C. Kirk), to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, at Caserta, Italy.

³³ Nurullah Esat Sümer.

from the Russian side to the Turkish note to the Soviet Ambassador here concerning the proposed discussions to revise the Turkish-Soviet treaty of friendship and neutrality. The Minister stated that he did not expect any Soviet proposal until after Molotov's return from San Francisco.

PACKER

761.67/4-2845 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 28, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received April 29—6:40 a. m.]

578. ReEmbs 452, April 4.³⁴ In the course of a conversation yesterday with the Turk Ambassador to Moscow Sarper informed me that he does not believe that the Soviets intend to advance any claim to Turk territory in the Kars or Ardahan areas but that he considers it probable they will press for a revision of the Montreux Convention which he emphasized is multilateral not bilateral.

He said that a study made at this [his?] Embassy in Moscow of Russian press criticism of the US, Great Britain and Turkey revealed that both "quantitatively and qualitatively" Soviet criticism of the Anglo-Saxon powers exceeded that of Turkey.

He was inclined to believe that the Soviet selection of "fifth class representatives" for the San Francisco Conference (this was prior to the decision to send Molotov³⁵) was based on a desire to place the San Francisco Conference on a lower plane internationally than the Yalta Conference at which only the Big Three were represented. He thought it unlikely that Molotov would remain in San Francisco until the end of Conference as his presence at Moscow will probably be desired in order that he may make the usual report of the Government to the forthcoming session of the Supreme Soviet.

Sarper expects to depart for Moscow in about 2 weeks.

Sent to the Department; repeated to Moscow as 28.

PACKER

761.6711/5-2245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 22 1945—4 p. m.
[Received May 22—2:45 p. m.]

671. Embtels 452, April 4,³⁶ 571, April 27, and 578, April 28. Turkish Ambassador to Moscow informed me today that while there had

³⁴ Not printed; it reported Ambassador Sarper's arrival in Ankara, and the immediate granting of an audience to him by President İnönü (701.6761/4-445).

³⁵ For Chairman Stalin's agreement to send Mr. Molotov to San Francisco as head of the Soviet delegation, see telegram 1161, April 13, 11 p. m., from Moscow, vol. I, p. 269.

³⁶ See footnote 34, above.

been some conversations with Russians since his arrival here no definite conclusions have been reached with regard to any new Turk-Soviet agreement.

Sarper said a matter far transcending in importance Turk-Soviet relations was that of relations between three big powers which seemed at moment not to be running too smoothly. He said Turkey had stood firm in the face of Russian and German demands in 1939 and could not be coerced now. He seemed to feel that any attempt at coercion on the part of Russia was unlikely.

Sarper is leaving for Moscow May 24.

Sent to Dept rptd to Moscow as 32.

PACKER

761.67/6-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, June 12, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received June 13—6:30 a. m.]

786. Re my 782, June 12, 1 p. m.³⁷ The PriMin³⁸ told me this morning that a telegram was received late last night from the Turk Amb in Moscow which indicates the Russians have now put forward a more definite point of view. Without indicating details he said his first impression is that "it smells bad".

Later in the day I saw the Acting FonMin who also told me of the telegram from Moscow. He said the matter will require very careful consideration and it will be a few days before it can be determined whether the Soviet views offer an acceptable basis for discussion. He said he would keep me informed.

Sent to Dept, rptd to Moscow as 36.

[WILSON]

767.68119/6-1445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 14, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received June 14—10:52 a. m.]

6019. We learned from Sir Orme Sargent that Ambassador Peterson has reported from Ankara that Molotov recently raised with the

³⁷ Not printed; in this telegram Edwin C. Wilson reported that after he had presented his letters of credence as Ambassador to Turkey to President İnönü on June 11, in the course of the ensuing conversation he inquired whether there were any recent developments in Soviet-Turkish relations. President İnönü replied that there were none, and that the Turks "are waiting". He added that "we are prepared to discuss anything with the Russians so long as it doesn't affect our independence and sovereignty". (500.CC/6-1245)

³⁸ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

Turkish Ambassador in Moscow the question of revision of the 1921 Turkish-Soviet treaty,³⁹ the granting of bases in the Straits to Russia, and revision of the Montreux Convention.⁴⁰ Peterson obtained this info from Turkish Acting MinFonAff.

Molotov tried to justify revisions of the 1921 treaty, we were told, on the ground that treaty had been negotiated under duress.

Turkish Amb replied in effect to Molotov that 1921 treaty had been freely negotiated and that its validity had never been questioned; that granting of bases in the Straits was out of the question; and that revision of the Montreux Convention was a matter for a number of interested govts and not one to be discussed solely by Turkey and Russia.

Turk Govt has approved the way Turk Amb handled this situation but as Peterson pointed out Molotov's move has created considerable nervousness in Turk Govt circles.

Sent Dept as 6019, rptd Moscow as 199, rptd Ankara as 50.

WINANT

³⁹ The treaty of March 16, 1921, was signed in Moscow between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. In a Turkish account of the negotiation of this treaty sent by the Turkish Ambassador in London, Cevat Acikalin, to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, on March 4, 1946 (a copy of which was furnished to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on March 26 by the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax), it was explained that "the definitive establishment of the frontier line was made by the Treaty of Moscow and it was M. Stalin who personally played . . . the important role in the settlement of this question." (761.67/3-2646) This frontier line was described in article I of the treaty, and in article XV Soviet Russia undertook "to take the necessary steps with the Transcaucasian Republics with a view to securing the recognition by the latter, in their agreement with Turkey, of the provisions of the present treaty which directly concern them". This was accomplished in the Treaty of Friendship signed at Kars on October 13, 1921, between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Governments of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Georgia, with the participation of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. The Turkish account mentioned above stated that during the negotiation of the treaty "it was severally repeated by the delegates of the Transcaucasian Republics that their Governments agreed totally to the demarcation of the frontier line, as fixed in Moscow, and that they intended to conform strictly to the terms of the Treaty." (761.67/3-2646) For the texts of the Treaty of Moscow, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxviii, p. 990, and for the Treaty of Kars, *ibid.*, vol. cxx, p. 906. The final demarcation of the frontier was done in 1926. See Max Beloff, *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1929-1941*, vol. II, 1936-1941, p. 40.

⁴⁰ For the account of the three specific demands raised by Molotov in his conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, Selim Sarper, on June 7, see his telegram 817, from Ankara, June 18, 1945, in *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. I, p. 1020. For the report of the second Conference on June 18, when Sarper informed Molotov that the Turkish Government "could not accept as a basis for discussion the three points proposed", see telegram 844, from Ankara, June 22, *ibid.*, p. 1024.

767.68119/6-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, June 18, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received June 18—2:40 p. m.]

6149. Embtel 6019, June 14. FonOff official today in remarking on Soviet demands on Turkey said Molotov had told Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that there was a fourth demand which might make the other three unnecessary. FonOff said that "Molotov was coy" about this. Turks believe this fourth demand might be the rupture of the Anglo-Turkish alliance (which the FonOff considers highly unlikely) or a "modification" of the Turkish political regime so that the Turkish Govt might be "reorientated" as have been the Govts of Rumania and Bulgaria.

In this connection Peterson wired that he recently invited to dinner at the Embassy the Acting Secretary General of the FonOff and Dr. Aras, former ForMin and Ambassador in London. The Acting Secretary Gen took Peterson aside after dinner and requested that he not be invited again on the same occasion as Aras, describing the latter as "this well known Soviet agent".

Repeated to Ankara as 56 and to Moscow as 211, sent to Dept as 6149.

WINANT

[For documentation concerning this subject during the period June 18–August 2, 1945, leading up to and including the Conference of Berlin between the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, July 16–August 2, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, volume I, pages 1010–1054, and *ibid.*, volume II, pages 256–258, 266–267, 301–305, 312–314, 320, 365–367, 372–373, 387*n*, 391, 393, 453, 551, 606, 1420–1440, 1496–1497, 1573, and 1600.]

767.68119/8-945: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1945—noon.

813. Following is the text of the provisions concerning the "Black Sea Straits" contained in the Protocol signed at Berlin on August 2, 1945:⁴¹

⁴¹ This was article xvi of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference: see *Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)* vol. II, p. 1496, and footnote 90.

“The Three Governments recognized that the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the Three Governments and the Turkish Government.”

BYRNES

767.68119/8-2045 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, August 20, 1945—9 p. m.
[Received August 20—3:05 p. m.]

1140. Important note and accompanying memorandum regarding recent Russian demands on Turkey and question of Straits in which reference is made to decisions taken at Potsdam and to “the proposal of President Truman in accordance with which the United States would associate itself to guarantee the freedom of the Straits” have just been handed me by Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Am telegraphing separately the texts in translation of note and memorandum.⁴²

Saka informed me that similar communication had been handed to British Ambassador. This is confirmed by Counselor of British Embassy.⁴³

The Minister stated that he would await with interest Washington’s response to what he termed “the Turkish initiative” which he said had been decided upon with a view to ascertaining as soon as possible the British and American points of view in this important matter.

He said that he had decided to transmit this communication through American Embassy in Ankara rather than Turkish Embassy in Washington in order to facilitate its receipt by “the American Foreign Office”.

PACKER

⁴² The texts of the Turkish note and memorandum are not printed. The nature of the demands proposed to Turkey are, however, already described in considerable detail in the memorandum of conversation of June 18 by the Acting Secretary of State (*Conference of Berlin (Potsdam)*, vol. I, pp. 1017-1020), and in telegrams 817 of June 18, 822 of June 20, and 844 of June 22, from Ankara (*ibid.*, pp. 1020, 1022, and 1024, respectively). For expressions of the American reaction see telegram 649 of June 23, to Ankara, telegrams 858 of June 26, and 898 of July 3, from Ankara, and the memorandum of conversation of July 7 by the Acting Secretary of State (*ibid.*, pp. 1028, 1030, 1034, and 1044, respectively).

⁴³ Indications of the views of the British Government in regard to the demands by the Soviet Union and the situation created by them are printed, *ibid.*, pp. 1017-1054, *passim*.

767.68119/8-2145

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1945.

Mr. Tandy⁵⁰ called on me this morning in order to acquaint the Department with the following developments regarding the Straits question. He had with him a sheaf of telegrams on the basis of which he talked.

The first communication dealt with a conversation of the British Ambassador on July 28 with the Turkish Government. The gist of this message was:

(1) The Turks fully appreciate the importance of the cooperation of the Government of the United States in the internationalization of the Straits.

(2) The Turks would be prepared to accept internationalization of the Straits on "condition that neither Turkey's sovereignty nor security were diminished".

(3) Any such settlement must mean improved relations with USSR.

Another message, dated August 11, received from the British Ambassador in Ankara states that the Turks are most anxious to have some communication from the American Government.

Another message, dated August 18, also from Ankara, states that the Turks still have not received any communication from the American Government.

The telegram which occasioned Mr. Tandy's visit was, however, a message dated August 19 from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington (repeated Istanbul), of which the following is a very close summary:

(1) Message begins that it was agreed at Potsdam that the American Government should "try to make the Turks see the advantages of international control of the Straits and that we (i.e. the British) should support their representations".

(2) The American Government, so far as the Foreign Office is aware, has taken no action.

(3) The Foreign Office regards it as essential to know "exactly what the American Government has in mind in this respect".

(4) In view of the Foreign Office "internationalization" might mean:

(A) Modification of the Montreux Convention so that while Turkey would remain responsible for the defense of the Straits, the USSR would be allowed to move ships of war through the Straits in war as well as in peace. This might be guaranteed by

⁵⁰ A. H. Tandy, First Secretary, British Embassy.

an International Commission at Istanbul or merely by an agreement without such a Commission.

(B) "Complete demilitarization of the Straits under the guarantee of the Great Powers."

(C) "International control of the Straits by the establishment of bases by some or all of the Great Powers in that area."

(5) British Embassy is requested to put the "ideas" in the immediately preceding paragraph to the American Government and to request the comments of the American Government regarding these "ideas".

(6) Foreign Office states that it is "not clear" whether the American Government intends to approach the Turks in the near future or to leave it for discussion by the Foreign Secretaries⁵¹ as a part of the "international water ways scheme". British Embassy is requested to ask the American Government about this.

I informed Mr. Tandy that we learned only this morning that the Turkish Government had handed a note and memorandum to our Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara. I told him that obviously the Turks' communication, which was also being handed to the British Ambassador in Ankara, would require study before we could formulate the views requested in the August 19 telegram from the Foreign Office.

Ankara Embassy Files : 1945 : 720 Straits

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1945.

The Turkish Ambassador⁵² called for the purpose of a general discussion of matters relating to Turkey. During the course of the conversation lasting more than two hours, the Ambassador made the following observations:

Several things have happened during recent months which, the Ambassador would like to say, speaking in all frankness and sincerity, seem to indicate a lessening American interest in Turkish affairs and even some letdown in American support for Turkey. The first of these was our refusal to participate with the British in making representations to the Russians, prior to the Berlin Conference, regarding Russian demands on Turkey. The American reference to the fact

⁵¹ Turkey was not included on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers which met at London from September 11 to October 2. For discussion between the Foreign Ministers at their first (procedural) meeting on September 11, in which the decision was made not to include the subject of the Black Sea Straits, see vol. II, pp. 112 ff.

⁵² Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur.

that the Russian-Turkish conversations had been "friendly" was disappointing to Turkey, because no demand for two Turkish provinces could possibly be regarded as friendly. In the second place, the Ambassador understood that the American Government regarded Russian demands for Kars and Ardahan as a matter between Russia and Turkey. The Ambassador referred at length to the sad experience which the western powers had had in appeasing Hitler in his territorial demands prior to the world war, and expressed strongly the view that the great powers had an obligation to prevent any likelihood of aggression when it first arises. He felt confident, from his long experience in Moscow, that the Russians would regard any indication of disinterest on the part of the United States in Turkish territorial questions as a green light to Russia to do whatever she desired.

The Ambassador understood that at the Berlin Conference, the United States had taken the position that the Turkish Straits should be open to the unrestricted commerce of vessels of all kinds. He recalled that during the entire history of the Straits controversy, over the past many years, one of Turkey's principal desires had been to limit the number of foreign warships which might be in transit through the Straits at any one time. If he understood the American proposal correctly, there would be nothing to prevent Russia from sailing its entire Black Sea fleet into the Sea of Marmora at any time, leveling its guns at Istanbul, and presenting Turkey with demands. Unless the United States was willing to undertake very specific guarantees of support to Turkey in the event of aggression, the American proposal regarding the Dardanelles would be most detrimental to Turkish interests.

A further small but significant cause of Turkish concern regarding the American attitude towards his country was the radio speech which President Truman made following his return from Potsdam.⁵³ The President had referred to the "selfish" use of waterways in Europe, naming specifically in the same context the Kiel Canal, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Straits. The Ambassador went to great lengths to show that Turkey had never exercised a selfish control over the Dardanelles and said that the Turkish public had been bewildered by the President's reference. He said that the Turks felt very keenly that the President had linked a Turkish waterway with three Axis water-

⁵³ August 9, Department of State *Bulletin*, August 12, 1945, p. 208. President Truman had stated with respect to the Straits question: "One of the persistent causes for wars in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways of Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states.

"The United States proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We proposed that regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities."

ways. This seemed to indicate that the United States had forgotten that Turkey was one of the Allies and had rendered conspicuous service to the Allies in 1940 and 1941 by barring the way to Hitler's armies which had reached the Turkish frontier and were anxious to drive through to the Caucasus and the Suez. Turkey's full mobilization of its troops and clear determination to defend its territory against any aggression had saved the Middle East and possibly even the eastern front for the Allies.

The Ambassador hoped that the United States would consider Soviet demands concerning the Straits and concerning Kars and Ardahan as a part of the same problem. I said that I thought the two questions might be handled separately. The Ambassador construed my remarks as meaning that Kars and Ardahan presented a Turkish-Soviet problem in which the United States has no concern. I assured him that the United States takes its membership in the United Nations Organization with all seriousness and that through our membership in this Organization, we are concerned with any threat to the peace anywhere. We hoped that the Kars and Ardahan question would not give rise to any such threat.

As regards the Ambassador's impression that the United States was not supporting the Turkish Government fully in its present difficulty, I endeavored to explain the various events which the Ambassador had adduced to support his thesis and assured him of my confidence that there had been no change in the American Government's policy in any way. He expressed full appreciation for this assurance.

767.68119/8-2745

The British Embassy to the Department of State ⁵⁴

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Re: 2581/--/45

On August 21st a member of the staff of His Majesty's Embassy discussed with the State Department the question of the Straits. He recalled that it was agreed at Potsdam that the United States Government should try to persuade the Turkish Government of the advantages of international control of the Straits and stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would support their representations. He said that in the course of conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara on August 11th the Turkish Prime Minister had stated that the Turkish Government were not disinclined in principle to accept internationalization of the Straits provided (a)

⁵⁴ Handed on August 28 to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) by the British Chargé (Balfour).

that Turkish Sovereignty was unimpaired and (b) that there would be a change in the Russian attitude towards Turkey as a result.

The member of the staff of His Majesty's Embassy went on to express the wish of His Majesty's Government to know exactly what the United States Government had in mind as regards the Straits. It seemed to them that internationalization might mean one of three things:

(a) Modification of the Montreux convention so that while Turkey would remain responsible for the defence of the Straits, Russia would be allowed to move ships of war through the Straits in war as well as in peace. This might be guaranteed by an international commission at Istanbul or merely by an agreement without such a commission.

(b) Complete demilitarisation of the Straits under the guarantee of the Great Powers.

(c) International control of the Straits by the establishment of bases by some or all of the Great Powers in that area.

The State Department were also asked whether they intended to approach the Turkish Government on this question in the near future or to leave it for discussion as part of the International Waterways⁵⁵ scheme at the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The State Department replied that this question would be examined in the light of a memorandum from the Turkish Government on this subject communicated to His Majesty's Embassy at Ankara on August 19th and to the United States Embassy at Ankara on August 20th.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires is instructed to inquire whether the State Department is now in a position to express its views on the points mentioned above.

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1945.

767.68119/9-345

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1945.

After consideration of the question of changes in the Montreux Convention, I am convinced that we should confine our proposal to what is set forth in the attached memorandum.

I do not believe that at this time we should recommend that Turkish control of the Straits should be impaired or that the Straits be neutral-

⁵⁵ In his conversation with Mr. Balfour on August 28, at the time the Department received this *aide-mémoire*, Mr. Dunn informed the British Chargé "that the President had always included mention of the Black Sea straits in his discussion at Potsdam of the unrestricted use of inland waterways, but my own personal opinion was that the United States should be prepared to have discussion of the Dardanelles separated from the other waterways if there seemed to be general disposition to do so." (840.811/8-2845) For documentation regarding the subject of international inland waterways, see vol. II, pp. 1364 ff.

ized. I think that the United Nations Organization should be the court of appeal for any nation which considers that Turkey has abused its control or has failed to abide by its undertakings. As regards neutralization, it is difficult for us to request Turkey to dismantle her fortifications and agree to neutralization unless we are willing to give a guaranty to Turkey of assistance by the United States in case Turkey is later attacked.

I do not think we should make the guaranty unless we are prepared to fulfill our pledge and I do not think we should do this without first submitting it to Congressional leaders.

Reliance on prompt action by the United Nations is not satisfactory to Turkey in view of the veto power against such action enjoyed by all the permanent members of the Security Council. Furthermore, a suggestion that the Straits be neutralized encourages similar suggestions regarding Panama and Suez.

If you concur, I will draft a telegram to Turkey embodying the attached suggestions. At the same time, we would inform the British and Russian Governments of our actions.

J[AMES] F. B[YRNES]

[Annex]

PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CHANGES IN THE MONTREUX
CONVENTION OF 1936 ⁵⁶

Changes Suggested

1. Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times.

Significance

This would constitute a relatively small change from the present regime, since freedom of commerce is already assured with minor exceptions. Under the Montreux Convention Turkey may, when at war, refuse passage to the merchant vessels of her enemy. Moreover, when Turkey

⁵⁶ According to a memorandum of August 31, 1945, not printed, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), proposals were discussed in the office of the Secretary of State regarding possible changes in the Montreux Convention. The Secretary suggested that a memorandum be drawn up of these proposals showing in parallel columns the significance of the changes as compared with the existing regulations. The procedure adopted by the Office, minuted Mr. Henderson, was to limit recommendations to topics without any attempt to draft changes in text, as "The Montreux Convention is based on more than 100 years of treaty regulations governing the Straits and its wording resulted from long debates and study at an important international conference." (767.68119/9-2845) For extracts from the principal treaties and conventions affecting the Straits, 1774-1936, together with comparative charts, see Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Department of State Publication 2752, Washington, 1947), pp. 13 ff.

considers herself threatened with imminent danger of war, she may limit passage of merchant vessels to certain routes and to daylight navigation. Our proposal would eliminate both these exceptions and provide for freedom of commerce at all times. While Turkey may be expected, in practice, to prevent the passage of vessels of her enemy if she can do so, regardless of treaty provisions, the change would deprive Turkey of the right to place restrictions on merchant vessels whenever Turkey decides she is threatened.

The change would bring the regulations governing the Straits into line with those governing the Suez and Panama Canals as far as merchant vessels are concerned. It would require a slight alteration in Article 2 of the Convention and the omission of Articles 4, 5, and 6.

2. Straits to be open to the warships of Black Sea Powers at all times.

While the Straits are already fully open to the warships of Black Sea Powers *in time of peace*, the Straits are now closed, in time of war, to the warships of any belligerent powers if Turkey is neutral. Moreover, Turkey may now close the Straits to all warships whenever she considers herself threatened. Turkey has striven for these safeguards, to prevent hostilities between belligerents from taking place in Turkish waters. However, the Black Sea Powers can with propriety insist that they be assured the right to move their warships in and out of the Straits at all

3. Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times, except with the specific consent of all of the Black Sea Powers.

4. Certain minor changes to bring the Montreux Convention in line with present day conditions, such as the substitution of the United Nations for the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.

times, and we should request Turkey to make this concession.

At present a maximum of 45,000 tons of non-Black Sea warships may be in the Black Sea at one time. This provision is not of vital concern to non-Black Sea Powers and may well be surrendered by them in the interest of harmony and as evidence of a lack of any hostile intent by non-Black Sea Powers.

The present convention contains provisions requiring Turkey to cooperate with measures taken by the League of Nations against aggression. The United Nations Organization should be substituted for the League, and the provisions should make it clear that Turkey will open or close the Straits at any time and in such manner as the UNO may request for the purpose of preventing aggression.

761.67/9-1045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 10, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received September 10—9 p. m.]

3228. While Soviet press campaign against Turkey has somewhat subsided, members of my staff have recently heard from various Soviet contacts remarks which seem to indicate that at least some Soviet citizens feel that USSR still has a score to settle with Turkey. These remarks which we regard as genuine expressions of personal opinion range from prophecy that USSR will go to war with Turkey this autumn to statements that "we shall have to have a talk with the Turks". There have been reported no such remarks regarding Greece or Iran.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ For documentation regarding the political situation in Greece and Iran, see pp. 98 ff., and pp. 359 ff., respectively.

Presumably these comments reflect recent party guidance for domestic public opinion. The fact that press agitation against Turkey has recently been muted may indicate a subsequent moderation of policy toward Turkey to which public opinion has not yet been adjusted. Or it may simply be a calculated lull in overt verbal attacks.

To Dept 3228 repeated London 443 Ankara 52.

HARRIMAN

[For a conversation of September 10, as recorded on October 15, between the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) and the Turkish Ambassador (Baydur), see page 1253.]

767.68119/9-1445 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 14, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received September 15—7:25 a. m.]

1226. Secretary General of FonOff asked me to call upon him this morning. He referred to current press reports concerning latest statement made by President Truman regarding Dardanelles.⁵⁸ These reports are substantially same as that contained in Radio Bulletin No. 208 [218], September 12 from Dept.⁵⁹

Acikalin said that these press reports had created if not anxiety at least some disquiet in Turkey and that fact that Turk Govt had not been informed concerning President Truman's attitude toward Dardanelles produced conviction that either (1) the formula which President Truman had worked out was incompatible with or prejudicial to the interests of Turkey or (2) it had been decided not to approach Turk Govt on the subject prior to the proposed discussion thereof at London Conference of Foreign Ministers in order that Russians might be informed that no discussion of subject had taken place with the Turks.

Informed Acikalin that I had immediately telegraphed to Washington communication which he had recently handed me (Embassy's 1140 [1141] to 1147 inclusive August 29 [20]) but that I had received nothing from Dept in reply; and that I had no instructions from Dept

⁵⁸ Transcript of President Truman's September 12 press conference may be found in *Public Papers of the President of the United States Harry S. Truman*, 1945, p. 132.

⁵⁹ Radio Bulletin No. 218 reported: "In answer to a query, President said that he had not been in communication with the Turkish Government regarding a proposal for the internationalization of the Dardanelles, explaining that he had read this proposal to the Big Three meeting at Potsdam and that it was now up to the Council of Foreign Ministers."

on subject. I said that I would be glad to telegraph at once to Dept his interest as above expressed and to communicate to him any message I might receive for him in reply adding that I doubted very much that he would hear anything until London Conference was finished.

I inquired any information from Ambassador Baydur on subject. He said he had nothing from the Ambassador regarding President Truman's statement to press although he had received report on Ambassador's recent discussion with George Allen.

I remarked that as I had no instructions on subject I could not speak officially but that personally I could not believe United States and England would take any position prejudicial to Turk interests in the Straits. Acikalin said that he was inclined to same view but that he would like very much to know what President Truman had meant by "internationalization of the Dardanelles".

Has the Dept any instructions? ⁶⁰

Sent to Dept as 1226; to London as 89 for the Secretary.

[PACKER]

767.68119/9-2045 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1945—8 p. m.

939. In the Potsdam agreement, the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. each agreed to discuss with Turkey the question of revision of the Montreux Straits Convention. The U.S. intends to follow this procedure, and the Department expects to be able to send you in the near future American suggestions regarding revision for communication to the Turkish Government. The American Government does not now propose to bring the Straits question before the London Conference.

The Department has no official information concerning the plans of the British and Soviet Governments for discussion of the subject with Turkey but it seems apparent that those Governments are waiting for the United States to approach Turkey first. We expect to inform the British and Soviet Governments of our proposals simultaneously with our approach to Turkey.

You may inform the Turkish Government of our intentions as outlined above.

Sent to Ankara, repeated to London and Moscow.⁶¹

ACHESON

⁶⁰ The Ambassador was informed in telegram 931, September 19, 1945, 8 p. m., to Ankara, that "Department regrets that it has not as yet been able to send you information regarding Straits question. Recommendations for certain revisions in Montreux Convention are still under consideration and we hope to be able to reply to Turks in near future. You will be informed as soon as decision is reached." (767.68119/9-1445)

⁶¹ Repeated to London and Moscow as telegrams 8265 and 2041, respectively.

767.68119/9-2245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 22, 1945—2 p. m.
[Received September 22—12: 50 p. m.]

1243. Minister of Foreign Affairs asked me yesterday if I had any word regarding discussion in Council of Foreign Ministers at London concerning Straits question. I said I had no information and did not know whether question had yet been discussed. He said he would appreciate greatly receiving any information on subject as soon as available.

He also referred to interest of Turk Government in receiving information concerning details of President Truman's proposal at Potsdam for international guarantee of Straits. After all, he said, this question affects Turkey far more directly than any other power. I told him that Packer had telegraphed regarding inquiry in this sense made by Secretary General of Foreign Office on September 14 (Embassy's 1226, September 14) but that no reply had been received. I said I doubted if any reply could be expected until after London meeting. Saka said he assumed this would be the case.

I asked whether Turk Ambassador at Moscow had had any further conversations touching on this matter. He said the question had not been mentioned at Moscow since second Molotov-Sapar conversation on June 18.

Sent to Department as 1243, repeated to Moscow as 74 and to London as 93.

WILSON

761.67/9-2545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 25, 1945—11 a. m.
[Received 9: 31 p. m.]

1252. Memorandum regarding Soviet-Turkish relations attached to Department's instruction 727 dated July 2⁶² contained statement "The Straits are the crux of the Turkish question". Insofar as Soviet-Turkish relations are concerned I believe this statement is open to doubt. Development of air power since World War I has fundamentally altered question of Straits. Freedom of passage of Straits for Russia cannot be effectively guaranteed by international agreement nor even by actual control of Straits because air power based for example on Crete could deny effective use of Straits to Russia. Rather it seems to me question of Straits as raised by USSR instead of being

⁶² Not printed.

crux of matter appears merely façade behind which lies real Soviet objective. This objective as regards Turkey is to bring about change in Turkey's internal regime. In chain of countries bordering USSR on west and south from Baltic to Black Sea, Turkey is sole country which is not governed by "friendly" regime. A "friendly" regime in Turkey under Soviet domination would mean actual control by USSR of Straits. But more important than this it would mean termination of Turko-British alliance and end of western liberal influence in Turkey and probably ultimately in Middle East.

Soviet pressure on Turkey beginning with denunciation of friendship pact last March followed by Molotov demands in June and by subsequent radio and press attacks forcing Turkey to maintain large military forces mobilized with consequent strain on already unsatisfactory economic situation is doubtless intended to "soften up" Turkey. These tactics have not succeeded so far. But any agreement among great powers giving Russia privileged position at Straits at expense of Turkish security would so upset conditions in Turkey as conceivably to bring about downfall of present regime with resultant situation playing into Soviet hands.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as 77, to London as 95 for Secdel.

WILSON

767.68119/9-2545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1945.

In a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador today, I informed him of the Department's telegram to Ankara (No. 939, dated September 20, 1945), in which the American Embassy at Ankara was instructed to inform the Turkish Government that the United States did not intend to bring the Straits question before the Council of Foreign Ministers in London and that we would communicate with the Turkish Government in the near future our views regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention. I told the Ambassador that the Potsdam Agreement provided that the Governments of the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., which were in agreement that the Convention should be revised to meet modern conditions, would each discuss the matter separately with Turkey.

The Turkish Ambassador said that this was a somewhat different version of the Potsdam Agreement than that given the Turkish Government by the British Embassy in Ankara. The Turks understood from the British that President Truman had undertaken at Potsdam

to speak for the three Allies (U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R.) in discussing the matter with Turkey. The Ambassador said that his Government would be disappointed to learn that the British version was not entirely correct, since the Turkish Government would much prefer to discuss the question with the United States on behalf of the other Allies rather than to discuss it with each separately.

I said that I thought I could explain how the misunderstanding had arisen. Immediately following the oral discussion of the Straits question in Potsdam, Mr. Eden had telegraphed to the British Ambassador in Ankara instructing him to inform the Turkish Government that the United States had agreed to discuss the Straits question with Turkey. I thought the British were undoubtedly convinced that Mr. Truman had agreed to take the initiative in the matter, although there was little basis for any impression that the United States would speak for the other Allies. When the Agreement was reduced to writing some days later, it provided clearly that each of the Allies would discuss the matter with Turkey, and there was no indication as to which would speak first.

The Turkish Ambassador said that as regards internationalization, his Government felt that it understood well the American point of view since our position with regard to waterways had always been to favor the most liberal use of such waterways. He recalled that we had taken this attitude during the Lausanne Conference of 1923,⁶³ and he understood that we were merely adhering to our well established position.

767.68119/9-2645: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, September 26, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

1263. I informed Secretary General of Foreign Office in sense of your 939, Sept. 20, 8 p. m. He said his first impression was that there had been an evolution in the thinking of United States Govt regarding this matter. Information furnished by British last July has been to effect that President Truman had proposed international control of Straits. It now appears that United States intends to present proposals for revision of Montreux Convention. Of course he added it is possible that suggestions to be received from State Dept may in fact propose internationalization.

Acikalin went on to say that he was gratified to note two points in connection with information I had given him. First it would appear

⁶³ For documentation concerning the attitude of the United States on the freedom of the Straits at the Lausanne Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. II, entries in index under sub-heading "Straits, freedom of", p. 1269.

that question of Straits was not to be treated in conjunction with question of European inland waterways. Second point was that instead of discussion among the five Foreign Ministers at London it now appears that United States is going to make proposals first to Turkey for revision of Straits Convention notifying Britain and Russia of these proposals. He said that this procedure would be regarded with appreciation by Turk Govt.

To Dept as 1263, repeated to London as 96 and to Moscow as 78.

WILSON

761.67/9-2745: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 27, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received September 29—6 p. m.]

3387. Am heartily in agreement with views expressed in Ankara's 1252, September 25, to Department, repeated London 95. I know of nothing in Soviet ideology or diplomatic practice which would justify us in hoping that Soviet aspirations with respect to Turkey would be satisfied by concessions regarding the Straits. We must expect that any concessions of this nature will be exploited to utmost in Moscow with view to elimination of western influence in Turkey and establishment of regime "friendly" to Soviet Union.

Sent Department. Repeated London for Secretary's delegation 478 and Ankara 56.

KENNAN

767.68119/9-2845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 28, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

10083. Following is text of communication received from Foreign Office regarding approach to Turks on Straits question.

"The State Department have informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington that they have instructed the United States Ambassador in Turkey to inform the Turkish Government that the United States Govt do not intend to raise the question of the Montreux Convention at the Council of Foreign Ministers and that they favour a procedure under which each of the powers concerned would furnish their views direct to the Turkish Govt. The State Dept added that this is intended as interim reply to the Turkish Govt.

You may like to know that His Majesty's representative in Turkey is being instructed also to return an interim reply to the Turkish Govt

which, after formally acknowledging receipt of their note, will assure them that the question of the Montreux Convention is engaging the attention of His Majesty's Govt.

We consider it of great importance that before the United States Govt or His Majesty's Govt return definitive replies to the Turkish Govt the two Govts should consult together to make sure that they are thinking on the same lines. I very much hope that you will agree with this, and if you think that your delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers would care to have preliminary discussions here, we should be delighted to arrange this."

This message had been brought to the attention of Delsec with particular reference to concluding paragraph.

WINANT

761.67/10-845 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 8, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received October 9—7:10 a. m.]

3488. Embassy's 3228, September 10. Although press remains quiet regarding Turkey, we have received more reports from Soviet and other contacts to effect that Russian people are being told by internal party agitators that USSR may go to war with Turkey.

Both British and French Embassies have received similar information. Our latest report is from Naval section of our military mission which is advising Navy Dept that it has been informed that at three Moscow factories, workers have been told by agitators that USSR may have to fight Turkey. Navy Dept will presumably pass this message on to Dept. While we are inclined to view these reports with definite reserve, they come from such widely separated sources that we feel they cannot be summarily dismissed as only idle gossip.

This domestic agitation might conceivably be designed to distract public mind from internal conditions, to explain continued military production and to spur factory output. Again it may be that these reports are being planted on foreign observers as part of an unusually refined war of nerves designed to soften up Turks. Whatever the real motivation, the reports deserve careful attention.⁶⁴

To Dept 3488, repeated London 503, Ankara 61.

KENNAN

⁶⁴ The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) reported in telegram 10621, October 11, 5 p. m., that "Foreign Office has received reports similar to those in Moscow's 3488 but is inclined to discount them as part of war of nerves." (761.67/10-1145)

767.68119/10-1545 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 15, 1945.

[Received October 15—3:47 p. m.]

3547. Following Tass denial concerning Turkey published *Pravda* October 15.

A few days ago in American press appeared report alleging that leaders of Three Powers at Berlin Conference agreed to approach Turkish Government individually regarding review of Montreux Convention with aim of internationalizing Dardanelles.

According to information received by Tass from authoritative sources this report is not accurate. In reality agreement was reached at Berlin Conference that Montreux Convention regarding Straits should be reviewed since it does not correspond to conditions of present time and that this problem should be subject of direct conversations between each of three Governments and Turkish Government.

Sent to Department; repeated Ankara commercially 62 London 522 and Paris 383.

[HARRIMAN]

767.68119/10-1545

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam)

[WASHINGTON,] October 15, 1945.

On September 10, 1945, I had luncheon with the Turkish Ambassador at the Embassy. After luncheon we had an informal talk in which we went over various aspects of the Straits question. I did not make a record of the conversation at the time as the conversation was on a personal basis and, for my part, I made no remarks which could in any way be considered as an official expression of views, other than to repeat what had already been transmitted to the Turkish Government.

The Ambassador was somewhat puzzled as to why the President had apparently considered the Straits question to be similar to the question of the inland European waterways.⁶⁵ I said to the Ambassador that

⁶⁵ President Truman had written in part in a memorandum to the Secretary of State on October 13: "My position on Dardanelles has never changed. I think it is a waterways link with the Black Sea, the Rhine and the Danube as the Kiel Canal is an outlet to the Baltic Sea, which must eventually be internationalized. I am of the opinion if some means isn't found to prevent it, Russia will undoubtedly take steps by direct action to obtain control of the Black Sea straits.

"It seems to me that an international control would be much more satisfactory to Turkey than to lose Provinces over in the northwestern [*northeastern?*] corner of the country and lose the straits too, which undoubtedly would be the final result." (767.68119/12-1345)

according to my personal understanding the President wanted the greatest possible freedom in the use of all of these waterways. I added that I realized, of course, that free passage of merchant shipping in both peace and war through the Straits was provided for under the Montreux Convention.

The Ambassador then explained at some length that the reason why the Straits were not used for Allied merchant shipping during the greater part of the war was because the Germans commanded the Aegean and the Black Sea approaches, not because the Turks had prevented Allied shipping from going through.

I replied that I fully realized that was the case, and that, once German command of approaches to the Straits had ceased, the Turks had given a favorable interpretation of the Convention by allowing American merchant vessels to pass through to Russia despite the fact that they were armed. I said that we had, of course, fully briefed the President on these and other aspects of the rather complicated Straits question.

The Ambassador seemed to have got hold of the idea that it was contemplated that the Montreux Convention would be modified in a way to permit Soviet Russia to send warships through the Straits. When I made no comment, he went on to indicate that if such an arrangement were made, the Turks might desire a guarantee of their territorial integrity, otherwise they would be in a helpless situation. I replied along the lines of our previous telegram to Ankara, that we intended to work with and through the International Security Organization, the principles of which we fully supported.

GORDON P. MERRIAM

767.68119/8-2145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1945—4 p. m.

1017. ReEmb 385, March 21, 1945. Turkish-Soviet Treaty of December 17, 1925 and its protocols will expire November 7, 1945. Estimate of probable effect of expiration on Turkish-Soviet relations would be useful.

Sent to Ankara as Department's 1017, repeated to Moscow as Department's 2188, and to London as Department's 9254.

BYRNES

767.68119/10-1945

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1945.

You will recall that at Potsdam we agreed to discuss with Turkey the question of a revision of the Montreux Convention. On September 3, 1945, I sent you a draft of a note that we might send to the Turkish Government in this connection.⁶⁶

The problem of the Straits was not on the agenda of the London Conference. The agreement at Potsdam provided that the revision of the Montreux Convention should be the subject of direct conversations of each of the Three Governments with the Turkish Government.

Following my return⁶⁷ I have gone over our draft again and have made some minor changes, principally in the provision regarding the right of non-Black Sea warships to enter the Black Sea in time of peace.

There is attached a proposed telegram to our Embassy at Ankara⁶⁸ containing a note to be communicated to the Turkish Government. If you concur,⁶⁹ we will have this note transmitted immediately.

While I share your view that probably more drastic attention will be necessary in the revision of the Montreux Convention to arrest Russian pressure in this area, I am inclined to doubt the wisdom of putting forth anew your suggestion regarding internationalization until the Russians have shown their hand.

⁶⁶ The attachment to the memorandum of September 3 was the paper entitled "Proposals of the United States for Changes in the Montreux Convention of 1936", *ante*, p. 1243. No draft telegram was sent to the President at that time. The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) in a memorandum of September 14 to Under Secretary of State Acheson summarized the status of the matter: "An American proposal for the revision of the Montreux Convention has been prepared and is now waiting for the President's approval." (111.75/9-1445)

⁶⁷ Mr. Byrnes returned to Washington on October 4. On the 4th Mr. Henderson wrote in a memorandum to Mr. Acheson in regard to matters for discussion with the Secretary: "We have yet to learn from the White House whether the President approves the Department's proposals for revision of the Montreux Convention. Our draft proposals . . . cannot be found in the White House and we are now sending over a copy." (890.00/10-445)

⁶⁸ This proposed telegram submitted to President Truman was identical with telegram 1049, October 30, 3 p. m., to Ankara, *post*, p. 1265, except for the change made in the third principle in the fifth paragraph. This wording replaced that used in the draft proposed telegram which had read: "(3) save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, the Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations."

⁶⁹ In a memorandum of October 20 to the Secretary of State, the President wrote: "I am returning the suggested communication to the Turkish Government approved." (767.68119/10-2045)

If, however, you wish to go further at this time we could add to the principles suggested for the revision of the Montreux Convention the following:

"In the event of interference from any source with the rights of passage guaranteed by the revised Convention, the states parties thereto, including the United States, agree to consult and take collective action within the framework of the United Nations Organization to ensure the enjoyment of such rights."⁷⁰

But if you wish to go this far, it probably would be wise to consult with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate before making our suggestion. Mr. Dulles, when I spoke to him on the way to London, was somewhat wary about our undertaking a guarantee of passage in waters so far distant from our shores.

JAMES F. BYRNES

767.68119/10-2245: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 22, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received October 22—5 p. m.]

11053. Dept's 9254 October 19.⁷¹ We discussed with Foreign Office official today possible effect of expiration of Turkish-Soviet treaty. Official's remarks were the following:

Foreign Office does not anticipate any drastic change in Turkish-Soviet relations for reason that Foreign Office cannot believe that Russians would create any incident resulting in an overt act against the Turks. For this reason although war of nerves is once again under way if the Turks keep calm they should be able to weather storm and resist intimidation. Sent Dept as 11053; repeated to Moscow as 361, and Ankara 106.

GALLMAN

767.68119/10-2345: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 23, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received October 24—6:30 a. m.]

1357. Deptel 1017, Oct. 19, 4 p. m. I doubt if expiration of 1925 treaty on November 7 next will have any appreciable effect on Turkish-

⁷⁰ In his memorandum of October 20 to the Secretary of State, President Truman declared: "I believe we had better leave the suggested paragraph out for the time being, although I think we ought to keep pushing the program so as to prevent Russia from taking the Straits over." (767.68119/10-2045)

⁷¹ Same as telegram 1017 to Ankara, p. 1254.

Soviet relations. Looking at matter from Turkish angle it was Turkey which took initiative of Moscow conversations last June having been encouraged to do so by Soviet Ambassador here in his informal talks with Sarper. Jolt which Turkey received from Molotov is not apt to encourage Turks to pursue this line further. Also Turks feel that after Potsdam initiative is in hands of United States, Britain and USSR particularly former and they are now awaiting receipt of our suggestions for modification of Montreux Convention. From Soviet angle recent Tass communiqué makes plain what was already fairly obvious, namely that Soviets are not in favor of internationalization of Straits. It seems possible that Soviets rather than be drawn into discussion for internationalization would prefer to let matter ride for time being, feeling that a day may come when through internal difficulties in Turkey a regime here more "friendly" to USSR may be brought to power. In any case USSR as Black Sea power enjoys favorable status under Montreux Convention and stands to lose nothing by postponing action for a while. This would seem indicated course if, as I believe, and have so reported to Department,⁷² question of Straits as raised by USSR is mere pretense behind which lies real Soviet objective namely domination of Turkey.

Of course it may be that Soviets have already reached decision to use strong arm methods against Turkey at early date. But implementation of such decision would be on basis of opportunism and would hardly be related to expiry of 1945 treaty.

Sent Dept as 1357; repeated to Moscow as 85 and to London as 110.

[WILSON]

767.68119/10-2345

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 23 October, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: There was one matter that I had had it in mind to mention to you yesterday afternoon, but our time was taken up with other things.

This matter concerned the reply that your Government and my own will presumably have to send at no distant date, to the Turkish approach about the Straits. Mr. Bevin⁷³ judges this matter to be of great importance, and is very anxious that we should move in completely close step about it. He would, I know, be very happy to consult with you about the answer that he would advise His Majesty's Government to send, and greatly hopes that you will be similarly pre-

⁷² See telegram 1252, September 25, 11 a. m., from Ankara, p. 1248.

⁷³ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

pared to give him an opportunity of consultation in regard to the reply of your Government before it is despatched.

Yours sincerely,

HALIFAX

767.68119/10-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 24, 1945—11 a.m.
[Received October 24—7:10 a. m.]

3644. Dept's 2188, Oct. 19.⁷⁴ Treaty of December 17, 1925 between USSR and Turkey was designed to meet situation which long ago ceased to exist. It was concluded at a time when both States were weak and ostracized. It was a defensive alliance of very young black sheep.

With USSR now a mighty expansionist power and Turkey feeling itself menaced by USSR, this treaty no longer has validity. That letter of treaty has thus far been observed is due to international military and political considerations, not to Soviet concern for sanctity of treaties. Its expiration, therefore, has formalistic rather than intrinsic meaning. After Nov 7, Soviet policy toward Turkey will continue to be result of Moscow's estimate of need for expansion into Turkey as calculated against probable resistance such expansion would encounter from Turkey and degree of support from Britain and USA. Immediate effect of expiration will be, of course, intensification of Soviet war of nerves.

To Dept 3644, rptd Ankara 67.

HARRIMAN

867N.01/10-2445

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1945.

[Here follows section regarding Palestine, printed on page 787.]

Turkish Straits:

When Lord Halifax sees you at 2:30 this afternoon, he will request that we delay our communication to the Turkish Government on the Straits question until the British Government had had an opportunity to comment. We gave the British Embassy today a copy of the note⁷⁵ we plan to send to Turkey on this subject.

⁷⁴ Same as telegram 1017 to Ankara, p. 1254.

⁷⁵ A copy of this note was sent by Mr. Henderson to Michael R. Wright, Counselor of the British Embassy. Regarding the note, see footnote 68, p. 1258.

Our telegram to the American Embassy in Ankara instructing it to transmit our proposals to the Turkish Government is attached and ready for signature. In view of the British request, you may desire that this telegram be held up temporarily.

LOY W. HENDERSON

767.68119/10-2445

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1945.

Attached are brief preliminary British comments⁷⁶ on our Turkish Straits proposals. These comments refer solely to our suggestion that the right of non-Black Sea warships to transit the Straits be restricted. The British feel (1) that their warships should be permitted freely to go into the Straits as far as Istanbul without restriction, and (2) that Bulgaria and Rumania should not be allowed to prevent non-Black Sea warships from entering the Black Sea.

As regards the first British suggestion, we feel that our proposals, which refer to the transit of warships *through* the Straits, are susceptible of interpretation along the lines the British desire. Our proposal that non-Black Sea warships be restricted as regards passage *through* the Straits would not prevent, in our view, the entry of ships into the Straits.

As regards the second British suggestion, we feel strongly that we should not concur. The fact that Bulgaria and Rumania are enemy states at present does not alter the fact that in the long view all Black Sea states, both large and small, have an equal interest in the security of that area.

767.68119/10-2545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 25, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received October 26—7: 40 p. m.]

1370. In conversation with Acikalin, former Secretary General of Foreign Office and now appointed Ambassador to London, he said he wondered what was exact significance of Tass communiqué of October 15⁷⁷ concerning question of Straits. He said, that following receipt of information last month that US intended to submit to Turkey suggestions for revision of Straits Convention, Turk Govt had assumed that US suggestions would be taken as basis for discus-

⁷⁶ Not found attached to file copy.

⁷⁷ See telegram 3547, October 15, from Moscow, p. 1253.

sion with Britain and USSR and that discussions among these four powers would lead ultimately to new conference for revision of Montreux Convention. Tass communiqué, however, not only makes clear that Soviet Union is opposed to internationalization of Straits but also indicates that USSR intends to discuss revision of Montreux Convention separately with Turkey and independent of any discussions which Turkey may have with US and Britain. How will it be possible, he asked, to make any progress if Turkey is expected to carry on three separate sets of negotiations? Furthermore, he added, apparent Soviet insistence upon meeting separately and alone with Turkey means that we are in effect back where we were last June. Sent Department as 1370, repeated Moscow as 88 and London as 113.

WILSON

761.67/10-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 27, 1945—noon.
[Received October 28—9:15 p. m.]

1371. Having heard yesterday that on previous day Turkish General Staff had summoned British Military, Naval and Air Attachés, I requested my Military Attaché⁷⁸ to obtain information. He spoke with British Military Attaché who, beyond saying that Turks were nervous over Soviet concentration of troops in Balkans, was reticent. Harriman then inquired of Chief of Turkish Military Intelligence who spoke frankly as follows: Turkish Military Intelligence has confirmed that in last 3 days 7 to 8 Soviet divisions have moved into Rumania from Russia and are moving south. This movement began about 2 weeks ago. Recently 5 to 7 Russian divisions have arrived in Rumania from Czecho. This means possibility of up to 15 new Russian divisions in Rumania. Turkish Military Intelligence has confirmed that in Bulgaria there are 7 Russian infantry divisions, 1 armored corps and 1 motorized brigade. Also confirmed that during past 72 hours 3 additional Russian divisions have crossed Danube into Bulgaria. This adds up to about 40 infantry divisions and 8 armored brigades in Rumania and Bulgaria with unconfirmed report of 2 additional divisions recently arrived in Bulgaria. Also there are unconfirmed reports of additional Soviet forces in Caucasus and Iranian Azerbaijan. Chief Turkish Military Intelligence said this situation had been explained to British Service Attachés with statement that if Russian attack takes place Turkey will resist, and inquiry as to what assistance they can count on from British. Also suggested that if British intend to give assistance immediate discussions should

⁷⁸ Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Harriman.

take place. He stated that British Attachés had replied that they considered this information too fragmentary to evaluate and in any case question of British support would have to be decided in London. Turkish Military Intelligence considered this reply unsatisfactory. It was added that Turkish Army because of economic pressure began demobilization of 1922 Class 5 days ago; this has been halted and General Staff is considering request to Government for general mobilization. When asked when he thought attack might take place he said about November 8 after expiration of 1925 Treaty which would give Russians 2 weeks to complete preparations.

Later yesterday I spoke with Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said Turkish Government was seriously concerned over Soviet troop concentrations in Bulgaria and Rumania. He added that Soviet aviation had been strengthened recently in Bulgaria. He said that he had consulted British Ambassador and that Turkish General Staff had consulted British Service Attachés regarding this situation and to obtain their advice and guidance. Minister said of course these troop movements might be simply stepping up of war of nerves against Turkey, or Soviets might be sending troops to Balkans to exert pressure during forthcoming elections. However, there was also real possibility of sudden military action against Turkey and Turkish Government could not be taken unprepared. He said they were taking such measures as they could in way of strengthening garrisons at certain points, and Government was considering calling up more troops and even ordering general mobilization, although they wish to avoid anything which might make situation worse or give any semblance of provocation at Soviets. He said "We should know the answer in 2 weeks after November 7".

Last night I saw British Ambassador. He told me of talks with Foreign Minister and General Staff. He was inclined to feel that Turkish General Staff is unduly nervous particularly because of absence of Chief of Staff General Orbay who has been in Erzurum for 2 weeks and returns to Ankara tomorrow (my Military Attaché discounts this). Peterson thinks this situation may be another phase of war of nerves; also that Soviets may feel their troops are so unpopular in Balkans that they must be kept on move from one country to another. However, he said possibility of Soviet attack cannot be ruled out.

My comments are as follows: If Soviets are engaged in intensified war of nerves they would probably do exactly what they are now doing as regards troop concentrations, coinciding with expiration of 1925 Treaty. They have in fact succeeded to limited extent in creating atmosphere of concern here with widespread alarmist rumors.

There are, however, other elements in situations which can not be

ignored. For example see Embassy Moscow's telegram to Department 3488, October 8. Also Soviets have been steadily building up through press and radio case for annexation of Turkish eastern vilayets to Soviet Armenian Republic. Furthermore, fact that USSR has recently deposited ratification of United Nations Organization is not likely to weigh too heavily in calculation of regime which in August 1939 after violent anti-Nazi and pro-collective security campaigns could without apparent difficulty as regards its public opinion switch completely over to Soviet-Nazi pact.⁷⁹ There are possibly other factors to be taken into consideration, which I am unable to appraise, such as Stalin's absence from Moscow on vacation and Marshal Zhukov's last minute "illness"⁸⁰ which prevented his trip to United States as well as reports here of recent ascendancy of Soviet military leaders who know nothing of outside world and seek military action now while Soviet power is at zenith.

There is further fact that Soviets have put themselves out on limb beginning with demands last June and now with concentration these military forces in Balkans. In view Turkish refusal to give way it may be difficult for them to retire gracefully and save political face.

To sum up: Logic would clearly argue against Soviet attempt at military action against Turkey; but there are illogical factors in situation which cannot be ignored.

To Department as 1371 repeated to Moscow as 89 for the Ambassador.

WILSON

767.68119/10-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, October 27, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received October 28—6:40 p. m.]

1372. British Ambassador tells me that his Govt referred to him for comment US proposals for revision of Montreux Convention. He has informed his Govt that he considers them satisfactory except provision that in time of war warships of non-Black Sea powers even when on business of United Nations Organization can not enter Straits or pass into Black Sea without consent of Black Sea powers. He said that British must have right to send war vessels thru Straits as far as Istanbul. Also British could not be placed in position of seek-

⁷⁹ Treaty of Non-Aggression, with Secret Protocol, signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, pp. 245-247; for documentation concerning the making of this pact, see *Foreign Relations, 1939*, vol. I, pp. 312 ff.

⁸⁰ See telegram 3451, October 4, 5 p. m., from Moscow, vol. V, p. 888.

ing consent of Bulgaria and Rumania to send its war vessels into Black Sea.

Dept may possibly appreciate I was scarcely in position to discuss matter helpfully inasmuch as I have not been informed by my own Govt concerning its proposals. This is in fact second time in past 3 months that I have enjoyed receiving from British Ambassador my first information concerning important proposals made by my own Govt concerning question of Straits.

WILSON

767.68119/10-2745 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1945—6 p. m.

1048. Embs 1372 Oct 27. We deeply regret that British Ambassador should have received text of President's proposals before you. The British Embassy here was pressing us for an opportunity to examine the proposals before their submission to the Turkish Government, and a copy was given the Embassy upon receipt of the text from the White House. We had expected to send the text to you the same day but British urgently pressed us to hold it for a day or two until they could obtain London's reaction. We are sending you the text today.

We fully understand the embarrassment caused you by this type of thing and will make every effort to avoid its repetition.

BYRNES

761.67/10-2945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 29, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received 10:10 p. m.]

3700. Today I called informally on Molotov to thank him for the arrangements he had made for my trip to Sochi. In connection with the rumors about Stalin's ill health which he had asked me to comment on publicly, I took the occasion to speak of other rumors including those regarding war between the Soviet Union and Turkey. He commented that no one could believe such a report, it was unthinkable that there should be war between the Soviet Union and Turkey and he was surprised that people would print such a rumor.

I brought this subject up with Molotov because of War Department's

X78357, October 24 from G-2⁸¹ to Military Attaché Paris, London and Moscow and Ankara's message of October 27⁸² on this subject.

Repeated for the Ambassador to Ankara as nr 69, to London as 546 and Paris as 399.

HARRIMAN

767.68119/10-2045

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1945.

You handed me several days ago the telegram to Ankara regarding the Straits, with the instructions to hold it up for a day or two until the British had had an opportunity to comment upon it. The British now have made their comment. One comment is that they do not like the idea that Great Britain might be compelled in certain instances to ask such former enemy countries as Bulgaria and Rumania for consent in case Britain desired to send warships into the Black Sea. We have discussed this matter informally with the British Embassy and are inclined to believe that this British suggestion is of no importance at the present time. This is the type of thing which could be ironed out during the course of an international conference.

The other British suggestion was that the language in our third general principle, to be found near the bottom of page 2 of the telegram, should be changed so that instead of reading: "the Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times," it would read: "passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers at all times". We consider this British suggestion as a good one since, if adopted, it would permit warships of non-Black Sea Powers to visit Istanbul, which is in the Straits, without obtaining the permission of all of the Black Sea Powers. We have accordingly taken the liberty of making this small change in the telegram as drafted.

The British have also suggested that it might be advisable to postpone sending the telegram at present. They believe that our proposals will be unsatisfactory to the Russians, who will doubtless disapprove of any proposal which does not specifically give to the Soviet Union a military base in the Dardanelles. They point out that there are a number of points of disagreement between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and Great Britain on the other at the present time, and that it might aggravate the situation if just at this moment another clear-cut difference in views should arise.

⁸¹ Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence, War Department General Staff.

⁸² Telegram 1371, p. 1260.

Although we recognize the force of this British suggestion we are inclined to believe, on balance, that it would be advisable to make the proposals to Turkey without further delay. The President stated at Potsdam, as long ago as July 16, that the United States would discuss this matter with Turkey. Since that time we have been pressed on several occasions by both the Turkish and British authorities to let them know what action we were taking in carrying out this commitment. Just two days ago the Turkish Ambassador again pressed us on this subject, stating that his Government found that the failure of the American Government to make its promised suggestions added to the uneasiness of the Turkish public. We believe that the forthright thing for us to do is to go ahead with our suggestions to Turkey on the revision of the Montreux Convention, fulfilling the assurances we gave to Britain and Russia at Potsdam.

LOY W. HENDERSON

Since there is a possibility that Mr. Wilson, our Ambassador at Ankara, may be in a position to make a helpful suggestion with regard to the content or timing of the proposals, we have prefixed to the telegram the words "Unless you perceive serious objection".

767.68119/10-3045 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1945—3 p. m.

1049. Following is the proposed text of the communication to the Turkish Government on the Straits question. You will be instructed further regarding its communication to the Turkish authorities.⁸³ Meanwhile your comments will be welcomed.

"The American Government has given careful consideration to the Turkish Government's note of August 20, 1945,⁸⁴ together with the *aide-mémoire* attached thereto, concerning the question of the Straits.

"The Turkish Government is no doubt aware that at the recent conference in Berlin, the President of the United States concurred with Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee (1) that the Convention of 1936 signed at Montreux regarding the regime of the Straits

⁸³ In telegram 1050, October 30, 1945, 7 p.m., to Ankara, the Department instructed Ambassador Wilson to deliver the proposed note to the Turkish Government immediately "unless you perceive strong objection"; the Ambassador was requested further to notify the Department and the Embassies in London and Moscow of the date of delivery of the note; the telegram, repeated to London and Moscow as telegrams 9560 and 2247 of even date, respectively, directed those Missions to hand copies of the note to the British and Soviet authorities at the appropriate time (767.68119/10-3045). In telegram 1397, November 1, 1945, 7 p. m., from Ankara, the Department was informed that the note would be handed to the Turkish Foreign Minister on the afternoon of November 2 at 3:30 p. m., Ankara time (767.68119/11-145).

⁸⁴ See footnote 42, p. 1237.

should be revised to meet present day conditions and (2) that the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three governments and the Turkish Government. It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the problem of the control and use of the Straits can be solved in a manner which will promote international security, will show due consideration for the interest of Turkey and all Black Sea riparian powers, and will assure the free use of this important waterway to the commerce of all nations.

"It is the understanding of the Government of the United States that the Montreux Convention is subject to revision in 1946. This Government suggests that an international conference be held for the purpose of revising the convention in order that the regime of the Straits may be more in harmony with changed world conditions. The United States, if invited, would be pleased to participate in such a conference.

"The Government of the United States is of the opinion that a revision of the Montreux Convention undertaken to meet changed world conditions should be based on the following principles: (1) the Straits to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times; (2) the Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times; (3) save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations; and (4) certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the United Nations system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.

"The British and Soviet Governments are also being informed of the American Government's views set forth above."

Sent to Ankara. Repeated to Moscow and London ⁸⁵ for information only.

BYRNES

767.68119/10-3145

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Allen)

[WASHINGTON,] October 31, 1945.

I called Mr. Maclean ⁸⁶ (Mr. Wright and Mr. Balfour, who have been dealing with the subject, were out of town) to let him know that the American Ambassador at Ankara has been authorized, unless he perceives strong objections, to deliver to the Turkish Government our proposals concerning the revision of the Montreux Convention. I em-

⁸⁵ As telegrams 2239 and 9545, respectively.

⁸⁶ Mr. Donald Maclean, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

phasized that Ambassador Wilson had been given his discretion and that consequently it could not be stated with certainty when the note would be delivered, but that Ambassador Wilson had also been instructed to inform our Embassies in London and Moscow of the date on which he would deliver the note, if he decided to do so. Consequently, the British Government could keep abreast of the matter through our Embassy in London.

As regards our decision to authorize the delivery of the note now, I said the Department had given very serious consideration to the British Government's view that it might be advisable to postpone delivery, but that we had decided to go ahead in view of the long delay which had already occurred since President Truman undertook to discuss the subject with Turkey and in view of the frequent inquiries by Turkey in the matter. I pointed out that the Turkish Ambassador as recently as two days ago had emphasized the uncertainty which would continue to exist in Ankara as long as we delayed delivery.

I told Mr. Maclean that we had also given serious study to his Government's suggestions regarding our proposals and had promptly adopted the suggested change in the wording of recommendation (3) from "the Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea powers" to "passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers". As regards the British objection to our inclusion of Bulgaria and Rumania among the Black Sea powers whose consent would be necessary for the passage of non-Black Sea warships through the Straits, I pointed out that this consent would be required only in cases involving tonnage in excess of the amount to be agreed upon in the revised convention. Consequently, our proposals might well constitute a liberalizing of the existing convention as regards non-Black Sea warships. I said that I realize that Great Britain objected to any provision requiring Bulgarian and Rumanian consent but that we felt differently in the matter.

During the conversation I mentioned the unfortunate article in the *New York Times* of yesterday, which implied that United States and Great Britain were formulating a joint policy on the Dardanelles question in order to face Russia with a solid front. I pointed out that this story from London had undoubtedly resulted from our having consented to the British request to see our proposals in advance. Mr. Maclean expressed confidence that the "leak" had not occurred in the British Foreign Office and that if it did, strong disciplinary action would be taken because it was contrary to Mr. Bevin's policy to give the Russians any basis for feeling that they were being confronted by a united Anglo-American position.

761.67/11-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 1, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 10: 55 p. m.]

1399. Yesterday General Orbay, Turkish Chief of Staff, called on my Military Attaché and reviewed situation with him. Information furnished regarding Russian troop concentrations was same as that given by head of Turkish Military Intelligence (1371, Embassy's October 27, noon) with three additional divisions reported as having moved in last few days from Czechoslovakia into Rumania. General Orbay considers his information very reliable as regards Bulgaria and Rumania; less reliable as regards Iran; and very fragmentary as regards Caucasus where his estimate is between 10 and 15 Russian divisions. His appraisal of situation as follows: Presence of Soviet troops in Balkans can be explained (a) strengthen control over those countries (b) exert pressure during elections (c) threat to Greece, or (d) action against Turkey. Soviet troops in Iran can be explained as due to Kurdish troubles or for use against Turkey. He is unable to find any reason for presence Soviet divisions in Caucasus other than possible use against Turkey.

General Orbay said he was faced with grave responsibility of whether he should recommend mobilization. Demobilization of 1922 class had been begun in order to get more men on farms where they are needed to reduce Army expenditures, and also because Turkey, as member of United Nations Organization, felt entitled to look to that organization for security. If, however, Turkish mobilization is to be effective it would have to take place before hostilities since transport facilities could be disrupted by initial bombing. Harri-man formed impression that Orbay will not recommend mobilization at present but that he will do so if any alarming developments should take place from Soviet side.

In case aggression, General Orbay considers likely Soviets make a last effort through Thrace towards Straits as well as invasion east provinces but is not overlooking possibility of limited operation in eastern provinces.

Sent Department as 1399, to Moscow as 92.

WILSON

767.68119/11-145 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1945.

1058. For your information the *New York Times* carried an article datelined London Oct. 29 alleging that the U.S. and British Govts

were seeking a common attitude on the Straits question before taking the matter up with Turkey "in order to meet the Soviet view when bargaining on this problem begins".

In answer to a question concerning this report at my press conference yesterday I said that the report was incorrect.⁸⁷ I recalled that at the Berlin Conference, President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Marshal Stalin agreed that their Governments would each discuss with Turkey the question of the revision of the Montreux Convention. I said that the American Govt was without information concerning the plans of the British or Soviet Govts in this connection, but that the U.S. was in communication with the Turkish Govt. in the matter.

Sent to Ankara. Repeated to London and Moscow.

BYRNES

767.68119/11-245

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1945.

At my request Mr. Eralp^{87a} called at 10:30 a. m. today. I handed him the text of the note delivered by Ambassador Wilson to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs at 3:30 p. m., November 2.

Mr. Eralp read the note and smiled broadly. He said that in his opinion it was "very satisfactory" and that "Turkey could have hoped for nothing better."

A copy of the communication handed to Mr. Eralp is attached.^{87b}

767.68119/11-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 2, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 3—1:40 a. m.]

1404. Embassy's 1397, November 1, 7 p. m.⁸⁸ I have delivered note on Straits to Minister Foreign Affairs. He expressed appreciation at receiving it. In reading it he commented on suggestion for interna-

⁸⁷ For the Secretary's press conference statement, October 31, 1945, see Department of State, *Verbatim Reports, Press Conferences*, vol. xvi (1945) No. 55, p. 6. In a memorandum of November 7, Mr. Henderson noted that the British Foreign Secretary had been disturbed by the leak but had been unable to discover the source. Mr. Bevin did understand the decision of the United States to go ahead with the presentation of its note to Turkey, although the British Government had decided not to make any communication to Turkey for the time being. (767.68119/11-745) Secretary Byrnes at his press conference on November 7 discussed the contents of the November 2 note to the Turkish Government at unusual length; see *ibid.*, No. 56, pp. 1-6.

^{87a} Mr. Orhan Eralp, Second Secretary, Turkish Embassy.

^{87b} See telegram 1049, October 30, 3 p. m., p. 1265.

⁸⁸ See last sentence of footnote 83, p. 1265.

tional conference that obviously US would be invited as this would be condition *sine qua non* of holding conference from Turkish viewpoint. Regarding principles listed in note for revision of Montreal [*Montreux*] Convention he commented regarding (1) that this was in fact present situation (2) "This is new"; (3) and (4) "Turkey certainly will not insist that Japan be a signatory".

Saka said that at time of Potsdam Conference impression existed that as note stated question of revision of Straights Convention would represent synthesis of views of US, Britain and USSR. He inquired whether present note in fact reflected views of British and Soviets. I replied that note represented suggestions of US Govt and that as note stated question of revision of Straits Convention would be subject direct conversations between each of three Govts and Turkey. I stated that my Govt was without information regarding plans Britain and USSR in this matter.

Foreign Minister said he would give immediate study to our note and would advise me of viewpoint of Turkish Govt as soon as possible.

Sent Dept as 1404; to Moscow as 94 and London as 117.

WILSON

761.67/11-245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 2, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 3—9: 30 a. m.]

1408. Minister of Foreign Affairs told me this afternoon that serious concern which existed few days ago regarding Soviet troop movements near Turkish frontier has diminished. He said Turkish Govt's present estimate of situation is that probably there has not been appreciable net increase of Soviet troops in area near Turkish frontier, since recent arrivals of Soviet divisions now seem to have been largely offset by withdrawals. While Turkish information is that new Soviet troops are better equipped and trained than those withdrawn it is not felt that this need necessarily give rise to concern.

I told him of Molotov's comments to Harriman (Moscow's 3700 to Dept, October 29). He said he had just heard this from British Ambassador who had been informed by his opposite number at Moscow. Saka said he attached great importance to this which was one of elements leading Turkish Govt to take happier view of situation. He also remarked that statements by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes on October 31 regarding satisfactory nature of visit to Stalin

were encouraging.⁸⁹ He added that Turkish Govt hopes fervently that *rapprochement* may be effected among Big Three since situation resulting from impasse at London Conference has greatly worried Turks in its possible effect on their relations with USSR.

Sent Dept as 1408, to Moscow as 95.

WILSON

767.68119/11-245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 2, 1945—10 p. m.

[Received 10:24 p. m.]

11524. See Department's 9545 to Embassy sent Ankara 1049, October 30 and Moscow as 2239 also Ankara's 1397 November 1 to Department⁹⁰ repeated London as 116 and Moscow as 92. Text of note concerning Straits was handed to FonOff official 3 p. m. today.

Official commented that at first sight the points mentioned in note seemed satisfactory to the British. He added that he did not expect that his Government at present time would communicate with Turks on this subject but he said that if Turks approached them they would say that they would of course be glad to participate in any conference for the revision of the Montreux Convention.

Sent Department as 11524, repeated Ankara as 113 and Moscow as 376.

WINANT

767.68119/11-345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 3, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received November 4—10:35 a. m.]

1412. I have given Soviet and British Ambassadors copy of our proposal from [*for*] modification of Montreux Convention.

Attitude Soviet Ambassador of interest as possibly foreshadowing position his Government. He immediately inquired with reference to principle (3) what would be situation in time war. He stated pro-

⁸⁹ In regard to the conversations which Ambassador Harriman had with Stalin, see the memoranda of conversations by Edward Page, First Secretary of Embassy at Moscow, dated Gagry (near Sochi), October 24 and 25, vol. vi, p. 782 and p. 787. Ambassador Harriman gave his impressions of these conversations with Stalin in telegram 3671, October 26, 9 p. m., from Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 796.

⁹⁰ See last sentence of footnote 83, p. 1265.

posal furnishes no guarantee that denial of passage through Straits to warships of non-Black Sea powers would be enforced in time of war. He stated that because of this our proposal fails to offer necessary security to USSR. I pointed out that on assumption Turkey accepts such proposal Turkey would incur obligation to deny passage through Straits to non-Black Sea warships. He objected that Turkey too weak to do this and also that USSR could not trust Turkey to fulfill such obligation. He made bitter criticism of Turkey's record during war and took issue with President İnönü's exposition of Turkey's war position in address at opening of National Assembly November 1. He admitted that under instructions his Govt he had on January 19, 1942, expressed appreciation for Turkey's attitude but insisted that Turkey, by failing to enter war after Cairo Conference,⁹¹ had forfeited any claim to good will of western Allies. I pointed out that neither his country nor mine had entered war until attacked and stated that looking at record objectively it seemed to me good case could be made that Turkey's resistance to German demands at critical period of war had been helpful to Allies.

I inquired whether Soviet Govt intends to submit separate proposal to Turkish Govt. Vinogradov replied only that his Govt's views had been stated by Stalin at Potsdam. I asked if this meant that USSR maintains demand for bases in Turkish territory. He said that in no other way could Russian security in time of war be safeguarded.

Vinogradov spoke with such bitterness and hostility concerning Turkey that assuming his attitude reflects views his Govt there would seem little likelihood reasonable settlement of Straits question on its merits with USSR. Rather his attitude tends to confirm view that Straits question as raised by USSR is façade behind which stands Soviet objective to control Turkey.

British Ambassador said he thought our proposal satisfactory with exception of provision obliging Britain to secure consent of Bulgaria and Rumania to send war vessels into Black Sea. He said Britain would not mind asking consent of Russia but he could see no reason why they should ask consent Bulgaria and Rumania. He admitted, however, that this was not essential point. He said he was glad to note that certain changes had been made in our proposal and that he interprets principle (3) as permitting entry non-Black Sea warships into Dardanelles and Marmara although passage through Bosphorus into Black Sea would require specific consent Black Sea powers. He thought it likely British Government would submit separate proposal

⁹¹ Meeting between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Turkish President İnönü at Cairo, December 4-6, 1943; see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 690 ff.

to Turks which would differ enough from our proposal "so as not to look the same".

Repeated Moscow and London.

Sent Dept as 1412, to Moscow as 96 and London as 118.

WILSON

767.68119/11-745

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁹²

EXTRACT OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FROM HIS MAJESTY'S REPRESENTATIVE AT ANGORA DATED NOVEMBER 5TH, 1945

The Turkish Secretary General called on me this morning and spoke about the American note on the Straits presented on November 2nd.

M. Erkin said that he saw three difficulties in the American proposals:

(a) There was no indication how the Black Sea powers were to decide whether or not warships of non-Black Sea powers were to enter the Black Sea,

(b) the Turks may find the whole Soviet and possibly Satellite Navies in the territorial waters of Istanbul at one and the same time,

(c) the effect of the American proposals would be to turn the Black Sea into a Russian naval base from which the Soviet Navy could make tip [*hit?*] and run expeditions into the Mediterranean without danger of pursuit.

I said that I thought his first point would also occur to London. There did not seem to me much in the other two points since it was no use hoping to satisfy the Russians with anything less than unrestricted egress and ingress. I added that I should have thought the new American proposals would be more acceptable to the Turks than earlier ideas of demilitarization and internationalization.

M. Erkin agreed. He went on to ask when Turkey might expect reaction of His Majesty's Government. I said I had no information as to this but I did not think you would be in a hurry. M. Erkin seemed to accept this but on leaving me he visited the Counsellor to whom he emphasized that Turkey was most anxious to receive even unofficial views of His Majesty's Government on the American

⁹² In telegram 1070, November 7, 8 p. m., to Ankara, the Department inquired whether the Ambassador in Turkey had been informed by his British colleague of the events described herein (767.68119/11-745), and the Ambassador responded in the negative in telegram 1434, November 9 (767.68119/11-945). Subsequently, in telegram 1442, November 10, 2 p. m., Ambassador Wilson apprised the Department that in conversation with the British Ambassador about another matter that morning Sir Maurice had informed him of the conversation with the Turkish Secretary-General; the British Ambassador had added that "subsequent to that conversation Erkin had asked his Counselor to obtain informally expression of Brit Govt's views concerning [the United States] proposal" and that this request had been cabled to London (767.68119/11-1045).

proposals which would help her should e.g. the Soviet Union invite Turkish comment upon these proposals.

767.68119/11-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 6, 1945—6 p. m.

[Received 9:55 p. m.]

1421. While I have not as yet asked anyone at FonOff what they think of our proposal concerning Straits, I have been told by various well-informed Turks, including newspapermen and a deputy who is a member of Foreign Affairs Committee of National Assembly, that proposal has been very favorably received by Turkish Government. This afternoon parliamentary group of People's Party is meeting to hear explanation by Foreign Minister of our proposal.⁹³

Sent Dept as 1421; repeated to London as 122 and Moscow as 97.

WILSON

767.68119/11-245

The Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Novikov)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and encloses for his information the text of a note delivered by the American Ambassador to Turkey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey on November 2, 1945. The text of the note has been made available to the Soviet Government by the American Embassy in Moscow.⁹⁴

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1945.

767.68119/11-945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 9, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 10—3:15 p. m.]

1432. In talking with me last night regarding our proposal for revision of Montreux Convention Foreign Minister said he thought it

⁹³ In his telegram 1423, November 8, 11 a. m., Ambassador Wilson reported to the Department that "PriMin said to me last night he finds our proposal for revision Montreux Convention 'excellent' and he is 'greatly pleased' with it. He added that he believed British 'are in no hurry' regarding this matter." (767.68119/11-845)

⁹⁴ The French Embassy was handed a text of the note on November 2, the French Ambassador having in a note of October 1 declared the interest of the French Government in the matter of the proposed revision of the Montreux Convention (767.68119/10-145).

would be unwise for Turkey to reply until Soviet viewpoint has been made known. He feels that if Turkey should accept our proposal USSR would consider Turkey committed by that much and would then declare itself dissatisfied with our proposal and raise the ante.

Saka said that following same line of reasoning it would be unwise for Turks to display much pleasure over our proposal. We therefore should not be surprised if attitude some newspapers and other comment appear lukewarm or even critical.

Sent Department as 1432; repeated to London as 126 and Moscow as 99.

WILSON

767.68119/11-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 12, 1945—4 p. m.

[Received November 13—8 a. m.]

1445. In conversation this morning with Erkin, Secretary General of Foreign Office, he referred to our proposal concerning revision of Montreux Convention. He said that he had been authorized by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to inform me officially that Turkish Govt is glad to have received this proposal and appreciates warmly evident concern of United States Govt in drafting proposal to safeguard sovereignty and independence of Turkey. Suggestions of United States are in principle acceptable to Turkish Govt subject to agreement on details at contemplated international conference. Turkish Govt regards as essential that United States Govt participate in conference. Before making more detailed reply to our note, Turkish Govt prefers to await receipt of views of British and Soviet Govts. But in meanwhile foregoing may be considered as interim official reply of Turkish Govt.

Erkin then went on to express what he said were his personal views regarding certain details of our proposal (these follow lines of what British Ambassador told me of his conversation with Erkin, see Embtel 1442, November 10, 2 p. m.⁹⁵). As regards first point Turkish Govt, of course, fully supports principle of freedom of passage. However, in time of war, Turkey being belligerent, it would be difficult to expect Turkey to permit passage of merchant vessels of neutral powers carrying munitions and supplies destined for country at war with Turkey. Some exception covering this case would doubtless be necessary as also in case of merchant vessels belonging to country at war with Turkey. Regarding our second point, Erkin said that with complete freedom of transit for warships of Black Sea powers at all times, pos-

⁹⁵ See footnote 92, p. 1273.

sibility would exist for Soviet Union, for example, to send overwhelming naval force through Bosphorus for surprise attack on Istanbul. Some formula could probably be found under which tonnage of warships of other Black Sea powers in transit through Straits at any one time would be inferior to tonnage of Turkish fleet in sea of Marmara. Also regarding our second point possibility would exist for Black Sea powers to send naval force through Straits for attack on some port in Mediterranean and then to take refuge in Straits where non-Black Sea powers could not pursue them. This, however, is a question which primarily concerns non-Black Sea powers rather than Turkey.

As regards our third point procedural difficulties can be foreseen as regards obtaining specific consent of Black Sea powers for passage through Straits of warships of non-Black Sea powers. For example, 38 [3?] votes in affirmative, 1 in negative: What would be decision? Here again, however, it is a question which concerns primarily non-Black Sea powers rather than Turkey and if they are interested, they will presumably raise question at contemplated conference. Erkin reiterated that foregoing were his personal views.

Sent Dept as 1445; repeated to London as 129 and Moscow as 101.

WILSON

761.67/11-1245: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 12, 1945—5 p. m.
[Received November 13—9:52 a. m.]

1446. In conversation this morning with Prime Minister, he said there was a matter concerning which he wished to inform me. He had received visit of Bulgarian Minister Antonoff who had talked for hour and half in rambling manner in course of which he had stated following: That he had come on his own initiative without instructions of Bulgarian Government because he was worried over state of relations between USSR and Turkey, and as friend of both countries, he hoped this situation might be improved. He wanted to tell Prime Minister that during visit of Bulgarian Exarch to Moscow, Soviet officials had spoken in friendly terms of Turkey. Antonoff then stated that before coming to see Saraçoğlu he had been to see Soviet Ambassador here "so that there might be no misunderstanding". Bulgarian Minister then went on to say that something should be done to improve Turko-Soviet relations and asked why Turkish Government could not take some initiative in this sense. Prime Minister said he replied that he himself in 1939 after having reached agreement with Potemkin on essential article of proposed treaty of alliance between USSR and Turkey had taken initiative of

going to Moscow to conclude negotiations. Everyone knew what result had been. Later Turkey had two or three times made effort in sense of improving relations with USSR but without result. Latest effort had been last summer when Sarper after conversations with Vinogradov in Ankara had been encouraged by latter to take initiative of opening discussions with Molotov in Moscow. Sarper had been met by demands for Turkish territory. Under these circumstances Prime Minister was unable to see how any useful purpose could be served by Turkey taking further initiative.

Bulgarian Minister then said that he believed Soviet Government was interested in possibility of a pact between Black Sea Powers "including Greece". Antonoff did not explain nature of this pact and Saraçoğlu said that he refrained from asking any question concerning it.

Prime Minister said to me that he had been turning over in his mind this idea of a pact of Black Sea Powers "including Greece". It occurred to him that if Soviets are throwing out this idea they may have in mind that in any future war with Britain, latter with development great striking power, naval aviation might be able force way into Black Sea and dominate Soviet Black Sea coast. This could be prevented by pact including Greece which would enable USSR to utilize Greek Islands and thereby control Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.

Prime Minister added that at close of conversation with Bulgarian Minister, latter had referred to extreme cordiality of recent visit to Turkey of Iraq Regent and rumors that steps were being taken to strengthen even further relations between Iraq and Turkey. He also referred to report in press here November 9 that Syrian Premier had stated that acknowledgment of Syrian independence by Turkey is to be a "fait accompli". Antonoff had pointed to a map on wall and indicating countries south of Turkey said, "Frankly if Turkey goes on in this way with these countries, I fear Soviet Union will not like it at all".

Saraçoğlu said that he had told British Ambassador of foregoing and also wished to inform me.

Sent Department as 1446; repeated Moscow as 102.

WILSON

767.68119/11-1345: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 13, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received 9:46 p. m.]

1450. My 1445, November 12, 4 p. m. In conversation with Prime Minister he asked whether I was satisfied with form of interim reply

given me by Erkin to our proposal for revision Montreux Convention or whether I would prefer a written reply. I said that Erkin had explained that his statement should be regarded as official interim reply of Turkish Govt pending receipt of views of British and Soviet Govts when a more detailed and presumably written reply would be made. Under these circumstances I said that I personally saw no reason to request any change in form of this interim reply.

WILSON

767.68119/11-1545: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 15, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received November 15— ? p. m.]

1460. In calling yesterday on Secretary General of Foreign Office he informed me he had just received visit of Greek Ambassador who recounted following: On November 13, Soviet Ambassador accompanied by his Counselor Mikhailov called on him (Greek Ambassador). Soviet Ambassador brought conversation to question of US proposal for revision of Montreux Convention. He stated that proposal made little change in existing situation and that in particular in time war it failed to provide guarantee for Soviet security. Greek Ambassador asked what he meant by guarantee. Vinogradov replied Soviet security in time war could be guaranteed only by control of Straits and this could be joint Soviet-Turk control permitting USSR use of bases in Straits. Raphael stated that from his 10 years' residence here he was convinced Turks would never agree to such proposition. Soviet Ambassador replied he was not so sure of this; Turkey might agree "under certain conditions". Raphael asked what these conditions were but Vinogradov was evasive. Greek Ambassador remarked US proposal had been drawn up within framework of Montreux Convention. Soviet Ambassador replied that "spirit" of agreement of Big Three at Potsdam did not mean that framework of convention need necessarily be retained and that entirely new system for Straits could be established without reference to Montreux Convention. Raphael inquired whether Soviet Govt intends to present its own proposal to Turkish Govt. Vinogradov replied that Soviet point of view had been set forth to Turkish Ambassador at Moscow last June and to Americans and British at Potsdam.

Commenting on foregoing Erkin said to me that Vinogradov's reference to "certain conditions" under which Turkey might accept Soviet-Turk control of Straits doubtless meant in return for treaty of alliance with USSR. Turkey, however, would never pay such price. If, moreover, objective of Vinogradov talk with Raphael was

to encourage Turks to take further initiative vis-à-vis Soviet Govt it would not succeed. Turkish Govt had just recently had under consideration whether it should take further initiative with Soviet Govt and had reached decision it would be unwise to do so. (See Embassy's 1446, November 12, 5 p. m.⁹⁶)

Later yesterday Greek Ambassador came to tell me himself of Vinogradov's visit. His account confirmed what Erkin had told me at second hand as reported above. He added following: He had come to know Vinogradov well during 7 years of latter's residence in Ankara; they used to meet and talk together frequently until 6 months ago when Vinogradov stopped seeing him. Visit on November 13 was first in 6 months. It was clear that Vinogradov came to see him under instructions from Soviet Govt to tell a definite story with purpose of having it repeated to Turkish Govt. Soviets know that Raphael has close relations with Turkish Govt and enjoys their confidence. In fact Vinogradov had on various occasions in past similarly used Raphael to bring Soviet views indirectly to Turkish Govt.

From foregoing these points emerge:

1. Views which Vinogradov stated to me on November 2nd (Emb's 1412, November 3, 6 p. m.) and which at that time must have been his personal views have now been confirmed by Soviet Govt.

2. Soviet Govt considers our proposal not acceptable.

3. Soviets have no intention of making a new proposal of their own but intend to stand on position stated in Moscow last June and later at Potsdam.

4. Soviet Govt wishes Turkish Govt informed indirectly of points 2 and 3 above.

5. USSR envisages solution Straits question on basis bilateral agreement with Turkey. US and Britain see solution on international basis within framework Montreux Convention. Upshot of which is that one more difference on question of principle has arisen between USSR on one hand and US and Britain on other.

Sent Dept as 1460, repeated to Moscow as 103.

WILSON

767.68119/11-1645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 16, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received November 16—6 p. m.]

12034. Deptel 9545, October 30.⁹⁷ Regarding Straits question Foreign Office official told us today that the Turks had asked the British

⁹⁶ Not printed.

⁹⁷ Same as telegram 1049 to Ankara, p. 1265.

for their comments on US note of November 2 to the Turkish Govt. Reply has been drafted (but not yet finally approved in Foreign Office) stating that British would of course be glad to attend a conference for the revision of Montreux Convention and that the British prefer to withhold their comments on US note until conference; official remarked the points in American note seemed satisfactory.

Sent Dept as 12034; repeated Ankara 125 and Moscow 390.

WINANT

767.68119/11-2145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 21, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 6:40 p. m.]

1475. Embs 1442, November 10, 2 p. m.⁹⁸ British Ambassador has given me copy of memorandum he left this morning with FonMin in reply to Turk Govt request for expression of British Govt's views regarding US proposal for revision Montreux Convention. He said copies were being furnished Govts at Washington and Moscow. He remarked "It doesn't change things much".

He told me Saka remarked he fully agreed this question was not particularly urgent. Also that he hoped greater measure of agreement might be reached regarding it by Soviets, British and Americans. Peterson said he assumed if Soviets should inform Turks they were in general agreement with principles US proposal, Turkey would be prepared to have international conference. Saka replied that if such event occurred Turkey would of course be willing.

Peterson then called on Soviet Ambassador and furnished him copy of memorandum. Vinogradov inquired whether memorandum meant that British were in agreement with US proposal. Peterson replied he assumed it did mean they were in agreement in principle although of course methods of application and other details would have to be worked out at conference. For example, British were not in accord with provision that non-Black Sea warships must obtain permission from Black Sea powers to pass through Straits.

Vinogradov then said that US proposal failed provide adequate security for USSR. Peterson said he was unable to understand this: Proposed revision convention would be on international basis with United Nations Organization which has succeeded League of Nations standing behind revised convention and concerning itself actively with world security. Vinogradov said that Russian concern for security at Straits was apparently better understood in 1914 than

⁹⁸ See footnote 92, p. 1273.

today.⁹⁹ Peterson replied situation today differs vastly from that of 1914 when Europe was divided into two camps with war inevitable; today United Nations with US, UK and USSR at head afford security for all. Vinogradov replied "somewhat ominously" that that might be true "provided the three of us can in fact find a way of working together". He repeated that US proposal was unsatisfactory from viewpoint Soviet security.

Sent Department as 1475 repeated London as 132 and Moscow as 105.

WILSON

767.68119/11-2245

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have been considering the request of the Turkish Government for their views concerning the communication about the Straits made to the Turkish Government by the United States Government on November 2nd.

His Majesty's Government are not anxious to enter into detailed discussion with the Turkish Government at the present time. His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara has, however, been instructed to communicate a note to the Turkish Government on the following lines.

His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the request of the Turkish Government for their views concerning the United States Government's note to the Turkish Government dated November 2nd concerning the future of the Straits. His Majesty's Government agree with the United States Government that a revision of the Montreux Convention is necessary, but they are not inclined to regard this question as particularly urgent. If, however, the Turkish Government or the Soviet Government desire to call a conference for revision of the Convention, His Majesty's Government will be ready to take part.

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1945.

761.67/11-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 22, 1945—3 p. m.
[Received November 23—2: 30 a. m.]

1478. Secretary General of Foreign Office told me this morning that Turkish Government while not unduly alarmed over conditions in

⁹⁹ Regarding the consideration given by Great Britain and France to Russian political aspirations for Constantinople and the Straits early in 1915, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 577, footnote 50.

Iran¹ is nevertheless concerned with possibilities in situation there which may affect Turkey. He read me two telegrams received from Turkish Ambassador at Tehran about 6 months ago. The first reported information to effect that Soviet authorities were stirring up revolt in northern Iran and when this broke out Soviets would prevent Iranian authorities from restoring order. Second telegram few days later reported that if revolt should in fact take place it should be regarded as preparatory step to be followed by early action by USSR in Turkey's eastern provinces to bring about their annexation to Soviet Armenia. Erkin remarked "first step seems to be taking place. It may be another phase of general war of nerves—or it may be something more serious".

Sent Department as 1478; repeated Moscow 106 and Tehran 8.

WILSON

767.68119/11-2345 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, November 23, 1945—noon.
[Received November 24—4:30 a. m.]

1480. Embtel 1445, Nov 12, 4 p. m. Erkin tells me that now that British have expressed their view in writing concerning US proposal on Straits, Turkish Govt believes it desirable to make written reply to our note of Nov 2. He said Turkish note should be ready next week and will follow line expressed to me orally on Nov 12.

Sent Dept 1480; repeated Moscow 107 and London 133.

WILSON

767.68119/12-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 6, 1945.
[Received December 7—3:37 a. m.]

1541. In regular monthly press conference held yesterday Prime Minister Saraçoğlu after summarizing this Embassy's note on subject of Straits stated as follows:

"The best basis for reconciling Turkish security and sovereignty and the present clauses of the Montreux Convention relative to the rights of liberty of passage of war and merchant vessels in times of peace and war should be established at an international conference clearly envisaged by that convention. After the several points of view of the three interested Govts are communicated to and examined

¹ For documentation regarding the question of northern Iran, see pp. 359 ff. *passim*.

by our Government we will be able to make known our own opinions. We favorably regard in principle the American viewpoint and it goes without saying that it merits being accepted as the basis of discussion in order to study the method of its application at the appropriate time. In any event it is strong desire of our Government to see the United States participate in the future conference and furthermore we consider such participation an essential."

Prime Minister then gave résumé of British note on Straits without offering any comments.

WILSON

767.68119/12-745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 7, 1945—noon.
[Received 11:05 p. m.]

1543. Embtel 1480, November 23, noon. Secretary General of Foreign Office tells me that Turk Govt has now reverted to its original decision not to make written reply for time being to our note of November 2 regarding Straits and to leave matter on basis verbal interim reply of November 12.

In this connection Erkin mentioned Prime Minister's statement to press December 5 in which reference was made to US note.

Sent Dept as 1543; repeated London 140 and Moscow 117.

WILSON

761.67/12-1145

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1945.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: Mr. Bevin has asked me to let you know that while he is not inclined to put the question of Turkey on the agenda for the Moscow discussions,² he will wish to discuss the question with you with a view to deciding whether anything should be said to the Russians and whether there is anything you and he can jointly do to encourage the Turks.³

² For documentation regarding the meeting of the Secretary of State with the British Foreign Secretary and the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow, December 16-27, 1945, see vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

³ Ambassador Winant reported from London in telegram 13048, December 12, 8 p. m., that a Foreign Office official had spoken to him on the subject of Russo-Turkish relations, the gist of the latter's remarks being that it was "very desirable that some sort of assurances be obtained from the Soviets that they will stop harrying the Turks and let a solution of the Straits question be solved through peaceful and friendly negotiations and without pressure and threats continually being applied to the Turks." (761.67/12-1245)

In informing me of the above, Mr. Bevin tells me that he has noted an appreciable intensification of the Soviet war of nerves against Turkey, but that, so far as he is aware, it has not been accompanied by any increased military preparations on the Soviet side. Nor have His Majesty's Government seen any sign that the Turks are weakening in their opposition to Soviet demands.

Yours sincerely,

HALIFAX

767.68119/12-1245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 12, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received December 13—12:45 p. m.]

1562. Erkin has called my attention to reports in Turk press from Washington that question of Straits will be on agenda Foreign Ministers Meeting Moscow. He asked if I had any information. I said I had none. If there is anything which Dept could furnish me for information Turks I should appreciate receiving it soonest.⁴

Sent Dept as 1562, repeated Moscow as 123.

WILSON

760J.67/12-1945 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 19, 1945—2 p. m.

[Received December 20—10:44 a. m.]

1593. Reference recent announcement USSR would grant facilities to Armenians abroad who wish immigrate to Armenian SSR, Turk press publishing items to effect Soviet Consulate General at Istanbul begun register names of persons in Turkey of Armenian origin who wish to go to Soviet Armenian and some 200 Armenians have so far applied to Consulate General.

Secretary General of Foreign Office tells me his information is that number who have so applied greatly exceeds 200 and that Soviet Consulate General is in effect "recruiting" Armenians to send to Soviet Armenia.

Soviet plan presumably is to bring large number to Armenian SSR who would find insufficient living space and reinforce demands for annexation Turk eastern provinces.

Dept may wish to instruct our missions in countries having large number Armenians such as France, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, etc., to

⁴ In telegram 1175, December 17, 5 p. m., to Ankara, the Department cabled that "According to present plans US will not raise Straits question in Moscow." (767.68119/12-1245)

follow this situation and report concerning number and type of Armenians registering at Soviet Consulate General and departing for USSR. I should appreciate being informed of such reports.

Sent Dept as 1593, repeated Moscow as 130.

WILSON

761.67/12-2145 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in Europe and the Near East

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1945—3 p. m.

Soviet Consulates in Turkey, Iran and probably elsewhere are registering persons of Armenian origin who wish to go to Soviet Armenia which according to reports is unable to support a greatly increased population. The artificial population problem thus created may reinforce demands for Turkey's eastern provinces. Please report developments in your country as regards number and type of Armenians registering with Soviet authorities and departing for USSR.⁵ Repeat data to Ankara, Moscow and London.

Sent to Ankara, Moscow, London, Paris, Beirut for Damascus also, Cairo and Baghdad.

ACHESON

867.014/12-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, [December 22, 1945.]

[Received December 24—1:53 a. m.]

1604. [Apparent omission] ⁶ statement by Soviet press and radio of Tiflis newspaper article claiming Turkish Black Sea coast for Georgian SSR caused great stir here. Secretary General Foreign Office told me last night he had seen President İnönü earlier who was furious about it. Erkin said Foreign Office had cabled Turkish Ambassador Washington to inquire view of US Government concerning this new phase Soviet war of nerves in which in mockery of principles United Nations USSR is seeking dismemberment of Turkey. Erkin asked me to cable State Department as well stating Turkish Government most anxious know views US Government concerning this development.

⁵ A few early reports received by the Department by the end of the year gave conflicting and imprecise information.

⁶ The apparent omission may refer to the article written by Georgian professors concerning the question of claims of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic for Turkish territory. In telegram 1616, December 24, 1945, 3 p. m., from Ankara, Ambassador Wilson reported that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that the Turkish Government would not take "official cognizance of these newspaper articles and radio broadcasts". (867.014/12-2445)

I said I would be glad to cable. I added that this seemed to be as he had indicated a new phase of war of nerves and I expressed hope Turkish Government would remain calm and not give way to resentment, in particular taking measures to prevent any incident or manifestation in Turkey which might furnish pretense for Soviets to carry campaign further. Erkin said there was no reason to worry on this score as Turkish Government appreciated seriousness situation and would take steps prevent any incident.

Later I had talk with Foreign Minister on same lines as above. Saka seemed seriously concerned over this development.

Please inform me whatever Department states to Turkish Ambassador.

Sent Department as 1604, repeated Moscow 133.

WILSON

760J.67/12-2245 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 22, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received December 24—1:18 a. m.]

1605. Embtel 1593, Dec 19. It appears that in arrangements of Soviet Consulate General Istanbul to receive applications Armenians wishing go to Soviet Armenia only one person at time is admitted to Consulate General which results in long line forming in street before building. With feelings running high this offers obvious possibilities for street incidents and activities of *agents provocateurs*. In talking yesterday with FonMin I spoke of this and expressed hope adequate measures would be taken to avoid any incidents involving Armenians. Saka said Turk authorities were taking careful measures in this sense and he was confident there would be no trouble. He said Govt was preparing communiqué for press to effect those wishing to proceed to Armenia would be free to do so and giving information as to obtaining passports. He is informed some 1500 have applied at Soviet Consulate General so far, most of them "loafers" without any stake in Turkey and ready for any adventure.

Sent Dept as 1605, rptd Moscow 134.

WILSON

867.014/12-2845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, December 28, 1945—1 p. m.
[Received December 29—10:57 a. m.]

1631. In 2-hour conversation with Soviet Ambassador following points seem of interest:

1. He said he had not received full text of Georgian professors' article but knew that Georgian people felt very strongly on question of recovering territory from Turkey which they regarded as Georgian.

2. After discussion causes [of?] present tension between USSR and Turkey I asked what could be done to improve relations. He said Molotov had given Sarper formula last June. I asked whether this meant that from Soviet viewpoint only way improve relations was cession bases in [and?] eastern territories. He replied that Soviet security required bases; and that Armenian Republic insists upon reincorporation eastern vilayets and USSR must advance interests of Armenian Republic. I asked how territorial demands could be squared with provision United Nations Charter for respect sovereign equality of all states. He said provision for equal rights of peoples applies to Georgian people as well. I remarked that frontiers were settled by treaties of Moscow and Kars of 1921. He replied that those treaties were negotiated "when USSR was weak" and that situation now requires reconsideration in view changed conditions.

3. With regard to persons in Turkey of Armenian origin desiring to proceed to Armenian Republic, Vinogradov said "several thousand" had so far applied to Soviet Consulate. He said he has not yet received instructions regarding facilities for transportation these people to Armenian Republic. He remarked "Turks seem very nervous and upset about this".

4. He told me that his Counselor Mikhailov had received orders to report for duty in Moscow and would leave next month. (This seems of some interest when read in connection with my secret airgram 228, Nov 27.⁷)

Sent Dept as 1631, repeated Moscow as 144.

WILSON

867.014/12-2945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)⁸

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1945.

Participants: Mr. Acheson, Acting Secretary
 Mr. Huseyin Ragip Baydur, Turkish Ambassador
 Mr. Jones, NE

The Turkish Ambassador called on the Acting Secretary by appointment today at 2 p. m.

⁷ Not printed; it reported that the Soviet Military and Naval Attachés of Embassy in Turkey had left for Moscow 2 weeks before the Potsdam Conference and had never returned (701.6167/11-2745).

⁸ Partial summary sent to Ankara in telegram 1210, December 29, 9 p. m., not printed.

The Ambassador stated that he had read in the newspapers that Turkish matters were discussed at the recent meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and that, if possible, he would like to know the results of these conversations.

The Acting Secretary replied that the Secretary had only arrived this morning. He said that he did not know whether the subject of Turkey had been raised in Moscow although he too had seen the press reports. He said that he would put this question to the Secretary at an early opportunity and that the Secretary might wish to see the Ambassador or to send him some word on this point.

The Ambassador referred to the recent Soviet demands for Turkish territory in the Trabzon-Ardahan region and said that he would like to know the Acting Secretary's views on this question.

The Acting Secretary replied that the people in the Department interested in Turkish affairs, who did not yet have the benefit of the Secretary's information regarding any talks dealing with Turkey which might have taken place,⁹ had noted carefully the publication in the Soviet press of the letter dealing with the Trabzon-Ardahan region. He said that the United States is exerting every effort to make UNO an effective instrument to prevent war of any kind and that the smaller nations would only complicate this difficult task if they should give way to resentment or defeatism leading to unilateral action in despair of effective UNO action. The Acting Secretary said that he thought that the Turks would be well advised to remain calm in the present situation and to take measures designed to prevent any incident or manifestation in Turkey at this time—particularly with the meeting of UNO only two weeks away. The Acting Secretary, in concluding, expressed the thought that while the Turks are naturally deeply concerned, the general questions involved extend beyond Turkish territory into the sphere of world peace and security, in which this Government has the deepest interest.

The Turkish Ambassador expressed his thanks to Mr. Acheson, but made the point that it was very difficult for the Turkish people to contain themselves when they were the target of vehement attacks by a disturber of the peace. He said that Turkey had not disturbed the peace: it was the Soviet Union which had directed attacks upon Turkey. He said that surely the defense of the Turkish position in the Turkish press and in the Turkish Parliament could not be interpreted as "aggression" on the part of Turkey.

⁹ In a memorandum of January 2, 1946, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), informed Mr. Acheson that ". . . no three-power talks re Turkey took place although Mr. Bevin did discuss Turkey with the Russians bilaterally with no substantial results. . . ." A notation on the memorandum by Mr. Jones stated: "Mr. Acheson telephoned news to Turkish Ambassador. L J". (761.67/1-246)

The Acting Secretary agreed to this statement.

On taking his leave, the Turkish Ambassador indicated that he would expect to hear further from the Department regarding his inquiry as to what, if any, discussion regarding Turkey took place in Moscow.

767.68119/1-246

*The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson) to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)*

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1945.

DEAR ED: I deeply regret that your letters of November 5 and 10¹⁰ regarding the Straits have gone so long unanswered. We have been endeavoring to have some research work done on certain of the penetrating questions you asked, but unfortunately we have not been able to obtain it. In order to avoid any further delay, we shall give you our own thoughts on the matter as best we can.

Considering first your letter of November 5, answers to your numbered questions are as follows:

(1) The Department at no time prepared a proposal on the basis of internationalization of the Straits. The impression that we were considering such a proposal arose from the fact that the President mentioned the Straits in connection with his proposal for the internationalization of certain rivers and waterways in Europe.¹¹ It seems clear, however, that the President had in mind primarily waterways which actually traverse the borders of two or more States, and that he was thinking primarily of the transit of merchant vessels and commercial cargo. Following the Potsdam Conference, the Secretary pointed out to the President, in a memorandum, that if the United States proposed internationalization of the Straits, we would inevitably be called upon to assume rather definite commitments in their regard. In spite of the fact that the newspapers frequently referred to proposals for internationalization of the Straits, the Department has not at any time given serious consideration to any proposal which would supplant Turkish sovereignty in that area.

(2) It is true that a good deal of consideration was given to the question of demilitarization. For your own information, there was considerable support in the Department for demilitarization on the score that our proposals would have to go at least this far in order to interest the Soviet Union at all. Strong argument was made that demilitarization would be a much less evil for Turkey than Soviet

¹⁰ Neither printed.

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, p. 654.

naval bases on the Straits, and that Turkish forts were of little value anyway, in the era of airplanes and atomic bombs. It was finally decided, however, that if the United States took the initiative in suggesting that Turkey dismantle her fortifications, we would *ipso facto* assume at least a moral obligation to come promptly to the assistance of Turkey if Turkey should subsequently be attacked and be unable to defend herself because she had accepted our own proposal to demilitarize. It was decided that if Turkey were to be asked to accept demilitarization, the initiative should come from someone else. We have no reason to object, as far as American national interests are concerned, to Turkish fortification, and if some other Power objects to them, it was decided to let that Power say so. We have not decided what position we shall take if such a demilitarization proposal is made. Our decision will naturally be based on the circumstances at the time and on other attendant proposals which may be made.

(3) Your question regarding the delay and confusion in making our proposals is entirely understandable, particularly in view of some conflicting statements which got out to the press here and in London. This is what actually happened. As you know, it was agreed at Potsdam that each of the three major Powers would discuss with Turkey the revision of the Montreux Convention. Following the Potsdam meeting, we in NEA waited for a few weeks to receive instruction from the Secretary regarding any action he wished us to take in the matter. Finally, George Allen mentioned the matter to Jimmy Dunn, who suggested that we go ahead and draft proposals. We did so, but we were without instructions as to the line our proposals should take. We were aware, of course, that the general purpose of the revision of the Convention was to change its provisions in Russia's favor, and we went over it with that in mind. We boiled down our suggestions to four general principles (regarding merchant vessels, warships of Black Sea Powers, warships of non-Black Sea Powers, and general provisions). The only discussion which took place in the Department concerning our draft was on the question of demilitarization. Finally the Secretary, a few days before he left for London in September, approved our draft without change and sent it to the President with a memorandum of his own,¹² pointing out that our draft did not provide for either internationalization or demilitarization, and suggesting that the President would probably not wish proposals of this kind to be included unless they were first discussed with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in view of the commitments the proposals would probably entail. The Secretary discussed the matter orally with the President just before taking the plane for London. The President expressed

¹² *Ante*, p. 1242.

concurrence in our views, and the Secretary thought the matter was settled. He instructed me, however, to obtain his approval in London of the exact text of the proposals before they were sent out, since one or two drafting questions were still open. We understood that the file would come back to us from the White House with the President's O.K. After the Secretary's departure, we waited three weeks or more for the file from the White House. The matter was mentioned to the White House Secretariat a time or two and assurance obtained that it would be handled promptly. Finally it developed (again this is for your own ear) that the file had been misplaced. We sent over a duplicate. Shortly thereafter the Secretary returned from London. Before we had had a chance to see him, he held a press conference and was asked about our Straits' proposals. He was under the impression that the note had already been delivered to Turkey, and a certain amount of confusion resulted, but the record was immediately set straight. A few days later the Secretary again went over the matter carefully with the President and the decision to make our proposals along the lines we had drafted was confirmed. A certain amount of actual drafting still remained to be done, but the principles were definitely agreed upon.

At this point a most unfortunate further complication arose. The British Embassy had been asking us for several weeks about our proposals. The Secretary agreed to give them a copy on the morning of October 24, the day we expected the proposals to be sent to you. Our telegram to you was in the Secretary's office awaiting his signature. Within six hours the Embassy had communicated with London and received a reply urgently requesting us to withhold our proposals until the British had had an opportunity to comment. The Secretary agreed to hold them up for a brief period. Without our knowledge the British had meanwhile telegraphed the proposals to Hugessen¹³ with a request for his comment, although no telegram had yet gone to you on the subject. I may add that your complaint of October 27 was entirely understandable and justified and served a most useful and considerably broader purpose than you may have intended. Both the Secretary and Dean Acheson have insisted that an incident of this kind must not happen again. I hope it will not.

My memorandum to the Secretary of October 29, a copy of which is attached,¹⁴ shows what happened next. We adopted one British suggestion and rejected the other.

In answer to your specific question, nothing happened at London which changed our proposals in any way. The experience may have

¹³ Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen was British Ambassador to Turkey, 1939-44, and was succeeded by Sir Maurice Peterson in September, 1944.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 1264.

convinced the Secretary more firmly than ever that we should not suggest internationalization or demilitarization, but beyond this possibility I know of no effect which the London meeting had on our proposals.

(4) My memorandum of October 29 will answer your question about changes made after consultation with the British. The only change made in our original proposal as a result of the British suggestion was to change a phrase in our third proposal from "the Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers . . ." to "passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea Powers . . ." The British suggestion was a good one, and in fact stated more clearly what we had actually had in mind all along.

(5) I do not believe there is any "inwardness" or special significance in any of the clauses in the Department's proposals. Under our third suggestion, the phrase "agreed limited tonnage" is vague, but we have in mind generally the amount of tonnage provided for in the present Convention, subject to possible negotiation either up or down. In our fourth suggestion, we referred to substituting UNO for the League of Nations, but we have in mind that UNO control might be somewhat greater than that conferred upon the League in the present connection.

As regards the point raised in your letter of November 10, I agree that the phrase "in time of peace" needs definition. We certainly did not intend that no non-Black Sea warships could pass through the Straits if there was a war between Ecuador and Peru. The proposal refers in general to a time of peace in the region of the Straits or the Black Sea, but the phrase will have to be defined much more carefully when actual negotiations begin. Unless there is good reason to the contrary, we would be inclined to stick generally to the provisions of the present Convention.

It is true that under the letter of our proposals, Turkey would be technically responsible for keeping the Straits open both to the merchant vessels of all powers (including even an enemy of Turkey) in war as in peace. Moreover, strictly speaking, Turkey would also be responsible for keeping the Straits open to the war vessels of her enemy in time of war. Such provisions actually apply on paper to the Suez Canal and as far as merchant vessels are concerned, some authorities believe they apply technically to the Panama Canal. In actual practice, we know that any nation will do what it can to defend itself and defeat its enemy in time of war. Neither the British or ourselves have suffered any embarrassment as regards Suez or Panama, although it is true that a small power might find corresponding obligations more onerous. The advantage of our Straits' proposals, however, is that they enable us to point out that the Straits' provisions would in this respect be similar to those governing the Suez Canal.

The Soviet authorities like to make invidious comparisons on this score whenever possible.

I hope these remarks will be found helpful. Please let me express again my deep regret at the embarrassment caused you by obtaining your first look at our proposals from your British colleague. We shall try to prevent anything like this happening again, and your telegram of October 27 has strengthened our hand greatly.

Very sincerely yours,

LOY W. HENDERSON

LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY; CLARIFICATION OF OBLIGATION OWED BY TURKEY FOR AMERICAN LEND-LEASE MATERIAL RECEIVED THROUGH BRITISH CHANNELS ¹⁵

867.24/1-145 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, January 1, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received 3:06 p. m.]

1. ReEmbs 2427, December 29 and 2437, December 30.¹⁶ In a final endeavor to persuade the Turkish Government to agree to the proposed exchange of notes when the mutual aid agreement is signed¹⁷ I had a talk yesterday afternoon with the Prime Minister.¹⁸ Saraçoğlu frankly expressed his concern that the American Government might seek to take advantage of the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the proposed notes at some time in the future. He also referred to the firm opposition of Parliamentary leaders to the notes as drafted. At the close of our 2-hour talk the Prime Minister proposed the following alternatives with the object of resolving the impasse.

1. The signing of the mutual aid agreement without the exchange of notes, discussions with respect to the notes to continue.
2. That he seek the approval of the Parliamentary leaders to the proposed exchange of notes as drafted subject to the addition of a

¹⁵ For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 1087 ff.

¹⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 912 and 914, respectively.

¹⁷ The text of the proposed agreement was similar to that of the master agreement concluded with Great Britain on February 23, 1942 (Department of State Executive Agreement Series 241; 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433); differences are described in the Department of State's *aide-mémoire* to the Turkish Embassy, March 8, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 1096. For draft text of the proposed exchange of notes, as transmitted to Ambassador Steinhardt, see telegram 60, January 16, 1943, to Ankara, *ibid.*, p. 1088; in instruction 460, August 17, 1944, to Ankara, not printed, the Department added a fourth article to the proposed draft exchange which read: "It is, of course, understood that in the implementation of the provisions of the agreement each Government will act in accordance with its own constitutional procedures."

¹⁸ Sükrü Saraçoğlu.

paragraph specifying that in the application of the provisions of the notes Turkey shall receive no less favorable treatment than any other country which has entered into a similar agreement with the United States.

I should appreciate the Department's instructions.

STEINHARDT

867.24/12-2944 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1945—8 p. m.

7. Your 2427 of December 29 and your 2437 of December 30.¹⁹ You are authorized to sign the proposed lend-lease agreement without the accompanying proposed exchange of notes if necessary provided paragraph 4 of such notes is included in the agreement.

STETTINIUS

867.24/12-2944 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1945—7 p. m.

11. Your 1 of January 1. Alternative 2 is wholly unsatisfactory to the Department and FEA.²⁰ Early signature of agreement with paragraph 4 of proposed exchange of notes incorporated as a provision thereof is desired (our 7 of January 1). If you believe further discussion of notes in form originally proposed would be fruitful after signature of agreement, Department would have no objection to your alternative 1.

Our 7 of January 1 was sent with expectation that basis there authorized would prevent further delay in concluding agreement.

STETTINIUS

867.24/1-2745 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, January 27, 1945—7 p. m.

[Received January 28—3:40 a. m.]

143. I have had three conferences with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office²¹ and four with the Prime Minister since my 2427 of December 29, 2437 of December 30, 1 of January 1, and the Depart-

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 912 and 914, respectively.

²⁰ Foreign Economic Administration.

²¹ Cevat Açıkalın.

ment's 1121 of December 1, 1208 of December 21,²² 7 of January 1 and 11 of January 2, with the object of concluding the mutual aid agreement.

My talks with the Prime Minister were rendered necessary by the insistence of the Secretary General on incorporating in the mutual aid agreement an additional paragraph containing a provision that the agreement should not have any retroactive effect and specifically stating that none of the Lend-Lease deliveries heretofore made should be regarded as covered by the agreement. This new proposed paragraph was handed me by the Secretary General after the Prime Minister had instructed him to incorporate paragraph 4 of the proposed exchange of notes into the agreement. I stated to the Secretary General that I must decline to submit to the Department for inclusion in the agreement a provision which I was reasonably certain would be rejected. The Secretary General accepted my statement with undisguised satisfaction as indicating our abandonment of the mutual aid agreement and gave every evidence that he considered the matter closed. Under these circumstances and being aware of the fact that virtually the entire Foreign Office including the Minister for Foreign Affairs²³ share the Secretary General's view that the Turkish Government should not sign any mutual aid agreement covering past deliveries since Lend-Lease deliveries to Turkey have been discontinued, I deemed it necessary to appeal again to the Prime Minister who in the course of my talks with him gave evidence of being under extreme pressure from the Foreign Office as well as from some of the party leaders not to intervene in the matter. I pointed out to the Prime Minister that insistence on an affirmative statement that the agreement is not to have any retroactive effect was meaningless when embodied in an agreement under the terms of which the Turkish Government merely assumed a general obligation without undertaking any specific commitment. I argued that from a practical point of view the delivery by the United States after the signing of an agreement containing the desired non-retroactive provision of a single item of nominal value would obligate the Turkish Government to identically the same extent as it would be obligated were it to sign an agreement without the non-retroactive provision. I referred to the unfortunate impression that has already been created in Washington by his Government's delay in signing the agreement and urged him to remove the probability of a charge of bad faith in accepting Lend-Lease deliveries over a period of two and a half years and then declining to formally acknowledge the same. The

²² Telegram 1208 not printed; for other telegrams of 1944 dates, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 911-915.

²³ Hasan Saka.

Prime Minister replied that while the Turkish Government appreciated the war material it had received from the American and British Governments his Government had been placed in what he described as a "unique and extraordinarily difficult position" by the manner in which Lend-Lease deliveries from the United States had been made to Turkey. He said that while the Turkish Government had reason to believe that a substantial part of the war material it had received had had its origin in the United States as indicated by the manufacturers marks, insofar as the Turkish Government had been formally advised, virtually all Lend-Lease deliveries had been made to Turkey by Great Britain. He pointed out that the British had required Turkey to pay for Lend-Lease deliveries including those of American origin by charging the same against the arms credit extended to Turkey by Great Britain²⁴ and that in consequence insofar as the Turkish Government was aware American Lend-Lease deliveries to Turkey had already been paid for. He said that while he had been informally told that this situation would be adjusted as between the United States, Great Britain and Turkey at some time in the future and that Turkey would not be required to pay in cash for Lend-Lease war material of American or British origin, as matters stood today the Turkish Government had nothing more than a verbal assurance to this effect as to a substantial part of all the material received, and that having lived through the period of intergovernmental financial disputes after the last war he was in no position to assure the Turkish Parliament that Turkey might not even be asked to pay twice for the same material.

The Prime Minister then referred to the fact that the American Government had never deemed it necessary to explain to the Turkish Government the reasons for extending American Lend-Lease aid to Turkey through the British. He pointed out that the war material received by Turkey from the United States and Great Britain had never been definitively allocated as between the countries of origin, that no accounts, statements or records had been presented to the Turkish Government by the American Government, and that short of the

²⁴ The terms establishing the arms credit of 1939 to Turkey were incorporated in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty of Mutual Assistance concluded between Great Britain, France, and Turkey at Ankara on October 19, 1939, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167. For a summary of the relationship between the military aid extended by Great Britain to Turkey from 1939 to 1942 under the 1939 credit, and under Lend Lease following the Casablanca and Adana Conferences early in 1943, see letter from the First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States (Thorold) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), May 31, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 1104.

fact that the Turkish Government had been required to receipt to the British Government for all war material received from either Britain or the United States, the Turkish Government was entirely uninformed as to what it might be called upon by the United States to pay for some day or for that matter to whom the payments would have to be made. He said that while he desired to acknowledge the valuable aid and assistance Turkey had undoubtedly received from the United States indirectly through the British, he felt that the position his Government had been placed in, as he had outlined it to me, was probably different from that of any other country which had received American Lend-Lease aid and that in consequence some reservation must be made at the time of the signing of a mutual aid agreement which would not place him in what he described as "an impossible position vis-à-vis the Turkish Parliament".

The Prime Minister then referred to the concluding sentence of the agreement which provides that the agreement shall take effect as from the date of signature and inquired as to whether in my opinion this language fairly interpreted did not have a non-retroactive effect. I admitted that it might be so interpreted observing that the sentence "spoke for itself", but remarking that I doubted the Department would be willing to incorporate any such interpretation in the body of the instrument itself. The Prime Minister then inquired as to whether I thought the Department would agree to my addressing a letter to the Foreign Minister interpreting the sentence as meaning that the agreement was not to have a retroactive effect. I said I did not believe the Department would agree to my writing the letter, to which he replied that such unwillingness would go far to justify the insistence of the Foreign Office that the Turkish Government would be well advised not to sign any mutual aid agreement.

As it became increasingly apparent in the course of my last talk with the Prime Minister that I was losing ground and that he had about made up his mind to follow the advice of the Foreign Office and to decline to sign any mutual aid agreement I suggested that while I did not believe the Department would approve of a letter from me in which I undertook to interpret the sentence in question it might conceivably be willing to agree that the Foreign Minister address a letter to me giving his interpretation and that if the letter was so printed as to make it unmistakably clear that the deliveries made in the past were to be the subject of future discussion and settlement there was a remote possibility the Department might agree thereto. I added that I would not be willing to submit the draft of such a letter to the De-

partment unless he would give me his personal assurance that should the Department agree to the letter, paragraph 4 of the proposed exchange of notes would be incorporated in the agreement, no further changes of any kind would be sought by the Turkish Government and the agreement signed without further discussion. To this the Prime Minister agreed. The text of the proposed letter is set forth in my next numbered telegram.

While I have no way of anticipating the Department's reaction to the understanding which I have arrived at with the Prime Minister and which he clearly understands is subject to the Department's approval I feel it my duty to point out that in accepting the letter we will at least have a mutual aid agreement with Turkey whereas by refusing to accept the same it seems reasonably certain the Turkish Government will take advantage of my impending departure from Ankara to decline thereafter to enter into any mutual aid agreement covering past deliveries. I have little doubt that personal embarrassment of which the Prime Minister gives evidence whenever I discuss the subject with him will disappear with my departure.

I hope the Department will give serious consideration to the acceptance of the Prime Minister's proposal which I am convinced he has offered in good faith in a final endeavor to bridge the gap between the Department and his Foreign Office.

STEINHARDT

867.24/1-2645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, January 26 [27?], 1945—8 p. m.

[Received January 28—1:30 a. m.]

144. The following in translation is the text of the letter referred to.

“Mr. Ambassador, in conjunction with the signature today of the mutual aid agreement, I consider it helpful, in view of the constitutional procedures of the Republic, to point out to Your Excellency that the provisions contained in the said agreement, as in fact the text indicates, may not in any event extend to deliveries made before the date of its signature; these deliveries are to be the subject of consideration at the time of the final determination of the aid furnished by virtue of the Lend-Lease law of May [March] 11, 1941.”²⁵

STEINHARDT

²⁵ 55 Stat. 31.

867.24/1-2645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1945—8 p. m.

165. Reference your 143 and 144. Department is now considering relative merits of proposed letter and will communicate with you in a few days.

In telegram to London today and repeated to Ankara for your comments, Department inquires as to possibility of British informing Turkish Government that Turkey's obligations for deliveries of lend-lease articles of American origin are to the United States and not to Great Britain.

Department greatly appreciates your persistent and able efforts.

GREW

867.24/2-545 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Winant)*²⁶

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1945—10 p. m.

901. The Turkish Government is reluctant to sign a lend-lease agreement without an understanding that the agreement is not retroactive.

Turkish Government partly explains its position by saying (1) that it received American goods via the British, (2) that the British had required Turkey to pay for lend-lease deliveries including those of American origin by charging the same against the arms credit extended to Turkey by Great Britain and that in consequence insofar as the Turkish Government was aware American lend-lease deliveries had already been paid for, and (3) that if Turkey formally acknowledged that Turkey had received lend-lease articles from the United States, Turkey might find herself under a double obligation for the same goods and might even be asked to pay twice.

Attitude of Department and FEA of course is that the Turks are not obligated to British for lend-lease articles of American origin. Department and FEA assume that Britain would agree that any economic or financial obligation arising from the delivery by the British of lend-lease goods of American origin is owed to the United States even though American goods may have been delivered in discharge of a British political or military undertaking. If British views are similar to ours please inquire urgently whether British

²⁶ Repeated to Ankara as telegram 164.

would formally state to the Turkish Government that lend-lease articles of American origin are not charged against Turkey in an economic or financial sense under the arms credit arrangement or other undertaking, but that the economic and financial obligations arising from the delivery of such goods to Turkey are obligations owed to the United States.²⁷

GREW

867.24/2-845 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 8, 1945—3 p. m.

[Received February 8—12:55 p. m.]

188. Department's 164²⁸ and 165 of February 5. I doubt that any statement the British might make to the Turks informing them that Turkey's obligations for deliveries of Lend-Lease articles of United States origin are to the United States and not to Britain would cause the Turk Government to recede from its position that the mutual aid agreement is not to have a retroactive effect particularly as I have repeatedly assured the Prime Minister that Turkey would not be called upon to pay or obligate itself to both the United States and Great Britain for the same material.

I am inclined to the view that any approach by the British to the Turks at this time having to do with our negotiations for the conclusion of a mutual aid agreement will be seized upon by the Turks as a further excuse for not signing the agreement. In this connection I trust the Department will bear in mind the British have not as yet been successful in persuading the Turks to sign substantially the same mutual aid agreement with them.

Rightly or wrongly I am under the impression the British are most anxious our agreement should not be signed before theirs. If my impression is correct Department will appreciate the probable consequence of any approach at this time by the British to the Turks on the subject.

STEINHARDT

²⁷ In telegram 1461, February 10, 1945, 7 p. m., from London, the Department was advised that the matter had been taken up with the Foreign Office and that assurance had been given "that matter would be given immediate consideration and that we would receive its reply shortly". The Embassy also reminded the Department of a 1944 letter, dated July 21, 1944, from Winthrop Brown of the Mission for Economic Affairs in London to William T. Stone, Director, Special Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration, which repeated British assurances that no charge had been made against the Anglo-Turkish arms credit with respect to any identifiable Lend-Lease equipment or materials either military or civil. (867.24/2-1045)

²⁸ Same as telegram 901 to London, *supra*.

867.24/1-2645 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1945—2 p. m.

197. January 26, reEmbs 144. In view of the suggested letter of the Prime Minister and the discussion you have had with him, it appears that the Turks are still confused about the details of ultimate settlement and the principles of a broad and general nature on which the settlement will finally be negotiated. The letter is unclear as to where the one ends and the other begins. Nevertheless, we desire to go more than half way and suggest that you inform the Prime Minister immediately that his letter would be acceptable if the wording substantially as follows is put in place of the words which follow the phrase "text indicates":

"do not in any event alter the fact that the extent of the deliveries made before the date of its signature are to be the subject of consideration at the time of the final determination of the aid furnished by virtue of the Lend Lease Law of May [*March*] 11, 1941".

Also the Prime Minister should be told that contrary to his information numerous lend-lease requisitions are held by the Foreign Economic Administration. Turkish officials in the United States signed these requisitions. Significant quantities of automobiles, wheat, military factory supplies, and other items are contained in these requisitions and are under straight lend-lease as distinguished from lend-lease of the cash reimbursement type. In addition Turkish officials in New York have signed shipping documents for other military supplies.

It should also be pointed out, that in the monthly statements of arrivals of military supplies given to the Turkish Foreign Office by the British, goods of United States origin are noted separately from those of United Kingdom origin.

Apart from the merits of the case, the Turkish delay in signing the master agreement is causing a great deal of concern in the various United States agencies connected with supplies for Turkey, and this in numerous ways contributes to the difficulties of the Turks in securing equipment and supplies.

The Foreign Office, London, in a telegram of January 25 to the British Embassy, Ankara, states that Great Britain is most anxious for the Turks to sign the "draft military supplies agreement". This would seem to indicate that we and the British may have at this time a common objective. If in your opinion this is the case, you may want to take the matter up with your British colleague.²⁹ It seems

²⁹ Sir Maurice Peterson.

that the proposed British declaration repeated to you in the Department's 164 of February 5³⁰ could well be incorporated *inter alia* in some British communication to the Turkish Government in connection with their military supplies agreement, thus removing finally the Prime Minister's objection mentioned near the end of the second paragraph of your 143, January 27, but without showing that we have requested the British to support your statements or in any way showing that we are making a joint approach.

February 8, reEmbs 188 we assume that the Amembassy, London, has already raised this matter with the British Government as the result of our telegram repeated to you as Department's 164.

In addition should our counter-proposal be rejected and no further acceptable proposals be made by the Turks a statement from the British Government would be helpful in any future demand the President may make in return for the aid granted under the Lend-Lease Act.

GREW

867.24/2-2045 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 20, 1945—12 a. m.

[Received 11:25 a. m.]

240. ReDepts 197, February 15. I have had a further talk with the Prime Minister in connection with the mutual aid agreement at the close of which I left with him a draft of the proposed letter revised in accordance with the suggestion contained in Department's telegram under reference. Saraçoğlu said he would endeavor to persuade the Foreign Office to accept Department's proposed letter and that I would receive a reply before my departure. Later in the day the Secretary General of the Foreign Office and the head of the commercial section who have been in charge of these negotiations informed me that in view of their departure for London on February 23 "it was most unlikely that anything could be done in so short a time."

STEINHARDT

867.24/2-2045 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey
(Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1945—4 p. m.

225. ReEmbs 240, February 20. Please inform the Prime Minister personally of the Secretary General's somewhat casual indication of

³⁰ Same as telegram 901 to London, p. 1299.

further delay. Department suggests that the Prime Minister should, in Turkey's best interest, see to it that Turkey's signature of the Mutual Aid Agreement is not delayed by the absence from Ankara of one or two officials. The matter is too important to be left dangling, particularly at this time.

GREW

867.24/2-2445 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, February 24, 1945—1 p. m.

[Received February 25—5:48 a. m.]

260. My 240, February 20. As the Secretary General of the Foreign Office continued to evidence an intention to take advantage of his impending departure for London to oppose the Mutual Aid Agreement I took advantage of my farewell visit to the President³¹ on February 21, to express my regret that it would be necessary for me to leave Turkey on February 24 without having signed the agreement. The President expressed surprise that an agreement had not been reached and instructed the Minister for Foreign Affairs who was present at the interview to make a further effort to conclude the agreement before my departure.

The following day the Secretary General invited me to call at his office and at once raised objections to the changes in the proposed letter as suggested in the Department's 197 of February 15. In the course of the ensuing discussion which continued for over 3 hours the Secretary General proposed no less than 10 new drafts of the letter. All of these drafts were either a rehash of the letter submitted to the Department in my 144, of January 27 or contained the word "retroactive". When it became apparent to me that the Secretary General had succeeded in persuading the Prime Minister not to agree to the letter textually as suggested in the Department's 197 of February 15, I suggested that he revise the text of the letter provided the change did not affect the sense and was made in the first part of the letter previously drafted by him and not in the concluding part of the letter as revised in the Department's 197, of February 15. So modified the text as finally agreed upon reads as follows:

"Mr. Ambassador: In connection with the signature today of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America on the principles applying to aid under the Act of March 11, 1941 I consider it helpful to point out to Your Excellency that the extent of the deliveries made

³¹ Ismet Inönü.

by virtue of the Lend-Lease law of March 11, 1941 before the date of the signature of the said agreement is to be the subject of consideration at the time of the final determination of the aid furnished by virtue of the said Lend-Lease law."

After the text of the letter had been revised as above I insisted that the Secretary General submit the letter to the Prime Minister while I waited in his office. After a lengthy wait the Secretary General returned to his office and said that the Prime Minister insisted that the word "retroactive" be incorporated in the letter. To this I replied that the Prime Minister had assured me that the Foreign Office would not insist on the inclusion of the word "retroactive" and that if he had now changed his mind I regarded any further discussion as useless. The Secretary General thereupon immediately inquired as to whether 1 o'clock on February 23 would suit my convenience for the purpose of signing the documents.

Insofar as concerns the text of the Mutual Aid Agreement the preamble and articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are as drafted by the Department. Article 8 (formerly paragraph 4 of the proposed exchange of notes) reads as follows: "It is understood that in the implementation of the provisions of the agreement each Government will act in accordance with its own constitutional procedures".

Article 9 provides that the agreement shall take effect "as from this day's date" and shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments and concludes "Done in duplicate in the English and Turk languages both authentic at Ankara this 23rd day of February 1945".

The Mutual Aid Agreement together with the exchange of notes embodying the assurances authorized by the Department in October 1944³² and the letter referred to above were signed at 1:30 p. m., on February 23 by the Turk Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself. At the last moment Saraçoğlu's legal advisers informed him to his disappointment that the Prime Minister was without legal authority to sign any such document.

Had time permitted I should very much have preferred to have submitted to the Department for its approval the modification made in the letter. In this connection I trust the Department will bear in mind that the Acting Secretary's request of me to postpone my departure from Ankara was not received by me until after the time for the signing of the documents had already been fixed and that at so late a stage in the proceedings it would have been most embarrassing to delay the actual signature in order to obtain the Department's approval

³² See telegrams 880, October 10, 1944, 7 p. m., and 900, October 14, 1944, 8 p. m., to Ankara, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 907 and 910, respectively.

of a modification which my legal knowledge and common sense told me was not only relatively unimportant but to our advantage.

The documents³³ are being forwarded to the Department promptly by airmail pouch.

STEINHARDT

867.24/3-945: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 9, 1945—5 p. m.

[Received 9:30 p. m.]

2454. ReEmbs 1461, February 10, 7 p. m.³⁴ The following communication concerning the Lend Lease Agreement with the Turkish Government has just been received from the Foreign Office.

“I am sorry to have been so long in replying to your letter of the ninth February in which you informed me of the reluctance of the Turkish Government to sign a Lend Lease Agreement on account of the possibility that in so doing they might be called upon to pay twice over for those items of United States Lend Lease origin re-transferred to them through British channels. It has taken some time to find out the details of this rather complicated matter.

Last year the departments concerned went fully into the question as it stood at that time, and the results of their investigations were embodied in a letter which Davidson of the Treasury wrote to Mr. Northrop [*Winthrop*] Brown of your Embassy on the thirteenth July last. That letter shows that arrangements were made whereby all identifiable Lend Lease items re-transferred to the Turkish Government by ourselves are reported to Washington and expressly excluded from the Anglo-Turkish armaments credit so that all such items represent a direct obligation by the Turks to the United States Government. We have been and are continuing to apply this method.

We should be quite prepared to give the Turkish Government an assurance in this sense. I understand however that they have now signed the Lend Lease Agreement with you; and in these circumstances I should be glad to learn whether you still consider it desirable that we should give the Turks this assurance.”

Please let us know whether it is still desired that the British give the Turks the assurance dealt with in the foregoing communication.

WINANT

³³ For text of agreement and accompanying exchanges, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series 465, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1476. Negotiations for a final settlement were begun early in 1946.

³⁴ See footnote 27, p. 1300.

867.24/3-945 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1945—1 p. m.

2141. ReEmbs 2454, March 9. The Department requests the Embassy to inform the Foreign Office that the United States Government would appreciate the action of the British Government in giving an assurance to the Turkish Government to the effect that lend-lease items retransferred to the Turkish Government by the British are excluded from the Anglo-Turkish armaments credit, and that whatever obligation arises from such deliveries represents a direct obligation by the Turks to the United States Government.³⁵

GREW

867.24/4-2145 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, April 21, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 6:55 p. m.]

542. The British Embassy here has received instructions from the Foreign Office at London formally to inform the Turk Government that Lend-Lease goods of American origin furnished to Turkey through British channels are outside the scope of the Anglo-Turk armaments credit and obligations in respect of the deliveries of such items are owed direct to the United States Government by the Turk Government.

A copy of the British note which was prepared after consultation with me is being forwarded by airmail.

Sent to Department; repeated to London as 3 [32?].

PACKER

867.24/5-245 : Telegram

The Chargé in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 2, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

594. ReEmbs 542 to Department and 32 to London April 21, noon. After further consideration of the matter, the British Embassy has decided, before presenting the proposed note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on American Lend-Lease goods supplied to Turkey via British

³⁵ Telegram 3507, April 6, 1945, 5 p. m., from London, reported information from the Foreign Office that the British Ambassador at Ankara had been instructed to give this assurance to the Turkish Government (867.24/4-645).

channels to raise certain questions with the Foreign Office in London and is accordingly telegraphing today substantially as follows (the telegram is being repeated to the British Embassy in Washington) :

“Unless we are clear as to the precise meaning of ‘re-transferred’ and ‘deliveries’, I hesitate to give the assurance in the terms suggested. Only 7 ships came direct to Turkey from the United States out of 240 ships carrying Lend-Lease supplies. Others were unloaded in the Middle East where a considerable proportion of the supplies were diverted permanently or temporarily. Consequently, ‘re-transferred’ could relate not only to Lend-Lease supplies originally supplied to the British Government but also to Lend-Lease supplies originally destined for Turkey but which reached Turkey via Middle East irrespective as to whether they may or may not have been used there temporarily before being forwarded.

“Practically all American Lend-Lease supplies arriving in Turkey were handled in Middle East by British and frequently forwarded in British bottoms from Middle East. Freight and handling charges connected therewith, seem to be part of ‘obligations in respect of deliveries’. Is it the intention of the two Governments that they should be regarded as owed directly by the Turkish Government to the United States Government? In these circumstances please instruct whether we should give the assurance as directed.

“The whole question of United States and British proportional financial interests in Lend-Lease supplies to Turkey is raised by the pending proposal to dispose locally of British surplus military stores in Turkey. The British Military Attaché will discuss details with Middle East who may be expected shortly to inform War Office by telegraph.”

Sent to Department repeated to London as 38.

Robert Moore of FEA who has just arrived in Washington from Ankara is familiar with this matter.

PACKER

867.24/5-245 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Turkey (Packer)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1945—4 p. m.

562. Embs 594, May 2.

1. Expression “retransfer” as applied to lend-lease goods shipped to Turkey has no connection with trans-shipment of goods from vessels carrying material from U.S. to the Middle East onto vessels moving from Middle East to Turkey. Lend-lease goods deemed retransferred when the original transferee govt. (e.g., U.K.) turns goods over to another govt. (e.g., Turkey). When such retransfer is effected and reported to proper officials in Washington in accordance with established procedures and Master L-L Agreements, lend-lease account

of original transferee govt. (e.g., U.K.) is credited with value of the goods and retransferee government (e.g., Turkey) is charged with value of the goods. (We aware reports on retransfers have not been complete in many cases.) Therefore U.S. looks only to the latter govt. for whatever benefit is to be received by U.S. for such lend-lease aid and former govt. (e.g., U.K.) should be prepared to assure retransferee govt. (e.g., Turkey) that no charge remains on books for such items.

2. Value of the lend-lease aid measured by amount actually expended by U.S. Govt. in rendering such aid. If freight and handling charges paid by U.S. such costs are added to value of aid rendered. If such charges are paid by another govt. (e.g., U.K.) such charges are not included as part of aid rendered by U.S. to any govt. If the U.K. paid the cost of shipping lend-lease goods of U.S. origin from Middle East to Turkey such costs are not included as lend-lease aid by U.S. to Turkey.

3. Negotiations relating to disposal of surplus military stores held by Brit. in Turkey are completely separate from question of the extent of lend-lease aid to Turkey. So-called fatigue stores were lend-leased only to U.K. and were not retransferred to Govt. of Turkey and hence this matter involves an issue only as between U.S. and U.K.

Sent Ankara. Rptd London re Ankara 38, May 2.

GREW

867.24/7-545

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

No. 55

ANKARA, July 5, 1945.

[Received July 18.]

SIR: Referring to the Embassy's telegrams no. 542, April 21, and no. 594, May 2, and to the Department's telegram no. 562, May 26, 1945, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a note addressed by Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson, the British Ambassador to Turkey, to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs under date of June 30, 1945, regarding American Lend-Lease material delivered to Turkey through British channels. The British note was sent in accordance with new instructions received by the British Ambassador from the Foreign Office in London, after ascertaining from Mr. Milton Winn, Special Representative in Turkey of the Foreign Economic Administration and myself that no objection was perceived to the note being sent.

Respectfully yours,

EDWIN C. WILSON

[Enclosure]

The British Ambassador in Turkey (Peterson) to the Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sümer)

No. 279

[ANKARA,] June 30, 1945.

(194/40/45)

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In connection with the delivery to Turkey through British channels of Lend-Lease goods of American origin, and in view of the arrangements concluded on February 23rd 1945 between the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Ambassador, I have the honour, by direction of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, to inform Your Excellency that the value of any items which the United Kingdom may have received on Lend-Lease terms from the United States and which they have subsequently retransferred to the Turkish Government would be outside the scope of the Anglo-Turkish Armaments Credit, and that any obligations in respect of such items are owed direct to the United States Government by the Turkish Government.

I avail myself [etc.]

MAURICE PETERSON

INTEREST OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN INCREASING TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IN SECURING AN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT LOAN

867.51/10-1845

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson)

No. 788

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1945.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Embassy a copy of a note recently presented by the Turkish Ambassador to the Department,³⁷ likewise copies of memoranda of conversations,³⁸ all

³⁷ Not printed. The proposals presented in this note were the outcome of plans for increasing the economic and commercial relations of Turkey with the United States which were brought to the attention of the Department in telegram 581, April 28, 5 p. m., from Ankara (not printed), in which the Chargé (Earl L. Packer) repeated a conversation with the Turkish Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sümer). (641.6731/4-2845) The present note declared the intention of the Turkish Government to plan for the thorough industrialization of the country. To accomplish this the Turkish Government was anxious to secure a credit in the United States of \$500,000,000 at 2½% interest. The suggestion was made that the annual repayments would not impose hardship on the Turkish economy, and there was persuasive comment that Turkey would foster greatly increased trade with the United States, would consider taking steps for the complete abolition of the export tax, and for the reduction of the prices on export goods. The note closed with expression of gratitude for any assistance which might be given in the negotiation of a credit with the appropriate United States authorities. (867.51/10-245)

³⁸ Memoranda not printed.

in reference to an Export-Import Bank loan to the Turkish Government. While these documents are largely self-explanatory, it should be noted, nevertheless, that officers both of the Department and of the Eximbank stated to Ambassador Baydur and his associates that there was little hope that a loan of the amount requested could be made to Turkey. Furthermore, Ambassador Baydur was informed that the interest rate of 2- $\frac{3}{8}$ percent mentioned in the Embassy's note was given only on loans of limited amount to liberated and war-devastated countries which had lend-lease agreements with the United States. No specific rate on loans to Turkey was mentioned by Mr. Taylor³⁹ but for the confidential information of the Embassy, the rate on loans, if granted, is likely to average about 3% with varying rates on serial notes of different maturities. Ambassador Baydur was assured that Turkey would receive equal treatment with other nations in regard to the terms of loans.

In view of the present financial position of Turkey and the substantial economic progress of recent years the Bank, in all probability, will make loans to Turkey if satisfactory projects are presented. At least, all requests for loans will be given sympathetic consideration by the officials of the Bank. Nothing can be done at this time either by the Department or the Bank until the requested information is received both on projects and on the financial position of the Turkish Government. It is expected that this information will be furnished shortly. Ambassador Baydur and Counselor Yazici were apparently well satisfied with the reception given them by Mr. Taylor and it can confidently be expected that relations between the representatives of the Turkish Government and officers of the Bank will be on a friendly and cooperative basis.

867.51/10-1745

The Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador (Baydur)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Turkey, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note of the second of October, wherein His Excellency reviews the plans of the Turkish Government to undertake a far-reaching plan of industrialization of Turkey, and states that the Turkish Government desires to secure in the United States a credit of five hundred million dollars at a suggested interest rate of two and three-eighths percent.

The Secretary of State notes with interest the plans of the Turkish Government to promote the economic development of the country

³⁹ Wayne C. Taylor, President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

and has already arranged for discussion of this request for a credit with the appropriate officials of the United States Government.

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1945.

**AMERICAN-BRITISH DISCUSSIONS REGARDING A CONTEMPLATED
JOINT SUPPORT PURCHASE PROGRAM IN TURKEY⁴⁰**

[Discussions between the Department of State and the British Foreign Office, in implementation of the policy of economic assistance to Turkey agreed upon at the time of Turkey's break with Germany in August 1944, and initiated at that time, continued inconclusively into 1945. This protracted negotiation arose out of the inability of the two Governments to work out a program for the joint purchase of Turkish products, on an equal cost and loss sharing basis, which would be exported normally to Axis Europe. In May 1945 the Department decided to end the discussions, in consideration of changed circumstances arising out of the unexpected strength shown by the Turkish economy and the termination of the war in Europe. This subject is set forth in considerable detail, with careful reference to supporting documentation, in a report by the Foreign Economy Administration entitled "Support Purchase Program in Turkey", May 28, 1945, in the files of the Department of State under No. 811.20 Defense (M) Turkey/6-145.]

⁴⁰ For previous documentation on the subject of economic assistance to Turkey, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 904 ff.

YEMEN

INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC AND TREATY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND YEMEN¹

711.90J/1-1745 : Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Clark) to the Secretary of State

ADEN, January 17, 1945—11 a. m.

[Received 4:40 p. m.]

4. Acting upon oral suggestions made to me in Division Near Eastern Affairs last summer, since my arrival in Aden I have explored possibility of visiting the Yemen. British have not objected though their delicate relations with Imam² make them wary of Yemeni advances to Americans.³ Delegates from Imam are now at Aden consulting with British and have confidentially asked me to come to Sana where I may discuss how relations between the Yemen and the United States can be strengthened. They mentioned purchases of textile and other machinery and assignment of American experts including medical officers to the Yemen. They even broached question of treaty relations. I said I had no instructions to act but would be glad to pay an informal visit to Sana possibly within a few weeks.

I have informed British in general terms of nature of my proposed visit since I am convinced that attempts to maintain secrecy would be unsuccessful and might discredit us in this area. I did not reveal specific proposals.

Foregoing is informational but I should appreciate Department's views. Full details being airmailed this week.

CLARK

¹ For previous documentation concerning this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1927, vol. III, pp. 825 ff.

² The Imam Yehya bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din, the King of Yemen.

³ The Yemeni had been engaged in a border dispute with the British in the Western Aden Protectorate in 1943 and 1944, in the course of which (1944) an agent of the Imam had approached officials of the United States Legation in Egypt with a request that the United States Government intervene; exchanges between the Department and the British Foreign Office resulted in agreement that the border controversy was primarily a problem of the British Colonial Office.

711.90J/1-1745 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Clark)

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1945—9 p. m.

6. Your proposed informal visit to the Yemen meets with Department's approval. Bearing in mind that this Government has not accorded official recognition to the Yemen, you should listen to such proposals or suggestions as Yemeni officials may make to you, stating that you will be glad to convey them to your Government, but you should, of course, make no commitments of any kind.

Please report fully to Department upon your visit.

GREW

711.90J/4-1645 : Telegram

The Consul at Aden (Clark) to the Secretary of State

ADEN, April 16, 1945—noon.

[Received April 17—2:05 a. m.]

21. On my informal visit to the Yemen I was given courtesies and facilities such as they have not before accorded a foreigner and was received with great cordiality by the Imam and the Royal Princes. They frankly said they had known for many years the Yemen has vast natural resources to be developed but had so feared the imperialistic designs of the great powers who offered help they preferred to remain backward and isolated. They had long believed that the only nation they could rely on for disinterested help was the United States and now that its world leadership to maintain the rights of small nations was assured they would welcome such economic and cultural assistance as it could give. They wished first to enter into a standard treaty of friendship and commerce with United States and then to employ sufficient American technicians to assist in developing the country.

They said they wanted good relations with all nations and supported the Allied cause but had not declared war because they did not wish to send a representative to the San Francisco Conference⁴ as had the other Arab Nations. One said he regarded a war declaration without active participation as hypocritical.

I was told by various informants that the Yemen has rich deposits of iron, lead, copper, mica, asbestos and other minerals as well as extensive oil fields. However, no thorough survey has ever been made. I was impressed by Yemeni agriculture and the industry and intelligence of the people. They are poor and oppressed but with proper

⁴ For documentation regarding the United Nations Conference on International Organization held at San Francisco, April 25-June 26, see vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.

foreign help and guidance their lot could be bettered under the present regime. The Imam is interested principally in obtaining urgently needed medical supplies and an American doctor at the earliest possible date but he also asked for machinery and other equipment. He is 76 and not well. He was greatly pleased with Dr. Palmer's⁵ treatment (my 14, March 9, 5 p. m.⁶).

I made no commitments and impressed on all that I had no instructions to act but would submit the Yemeni views to my Government for its consideration. These will be forwarded by airmail⁷ together with other important information. I have no reason to doubt the good faith of the Yemenis and feel that it would be to our advantage to accede to their wishes in so far as practicable.

CLARK

711.90J/4-1645

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*⁸

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1945.

Subject: Suggested Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Yemen

Mr. Clark, American Consul in Aden, acting on instructions from the Department, recently made a visit to the Imam (King) of the Yemen at Sanaa. Mr. Clark has reported that the Imam and the Royal Princes extended to him courtesies and facilities not hitherto extended to any foreigner.

In the course of their conversations, the Yemeni authorities stated that the Yemen wished to enter into a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States, that it desired to employ American technicians to aid in development plans, and that it would welcome economic and cultural assistance from the United States. The Yemeni authorities added that they feel that the United States is the only country on which they can rely for disinterested help. The Imam is particularly interested in securing medical supplies and the services of an American doctor without delay.

Mr. Clark repeats unverified reports of the existence in the Yemen of rich deposits of various minerals including petroleum.

The Yemen is one of the few independent countries of the world with which the United States has no diplomatic relations. In view of American interest in near-by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, and also in view of possible future developments in the

⁵ Lt. Comdr. Alfred M. Palmer, medical officer in the United States Naval Reserve, stationed at Aden, who accompanied Consul Clark on his trip.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Despatch 52, April 23, received July 30; not printed.

⁸ President Truman on May 1 verbally informed the Acting Secretary of his approval of this memorandum.

Yemen, it is the Department's belief that the United States should indicate to the Imam its readiness to extend formal recognition to the Government of the Imam (already in treaty relations with the British and with Saudi Arabia) and to establish a channel for the exchange of diplomatic correspondence. This measure, it is believed, should precede any decision on Yemeni requests for assistance.

As soon as recognition has been extended to the Government of the Yemen, an exchange of notes could provide reciprocal, unconditional, most-favored nation treatment pending negotiation of a formal treaty of commerce and navigation.

The Department would appreciate an expression of your views on the suggested establishment of relations with the Yemen. In the event you approve its suggestion, the Department will be glad to take the steps necessary to accomplish that end.

JOSEPH C. GREW

711.90J/4-1645 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Aden (Clark)

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1945—8 p. m.

16. The Department has read with great interest your 21, April 16, noon, and commends the initiative which you have shown in connection with your recent trip to Sanaa as well as the satisfactory results which you obtained.

Without awaiting receipt of details by airmail, the Department is giving immediate consideration to the extension of formal recognition to the Yemen and the establishment of diplomatic relations.

This is for your confidential information only.

GREW

890J.01/10-1545 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1945—8 p. m.

9141. Please advise appropriate Colonial and FonOff officials possibly through a call by Hare⁹ that this Govt proposes to accept invitation of Govt of Yeman to send an envoy to Sana'a probably late this year to negotiate a provisional executive agreement of the type now in force with Saudi Arabia (Executive Agreement Series no. 53 signed Nov 7, 1933¹⁰); and that accompanying envoy with full powers will be a small staff and a physician.

⁹ Raymond A. Hare, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

¹⁰ Signed at London, *Foreign Relations*, 1933, vol. II, p. 999; for documentation regarding the negotiation of this agreement, see *ibid.*, pp. 986 ff.

Also that this Govt appreciates assistance extended by Aden Govt to American Consul at Aden in connection with his recent visit to Yemen, and helpful attitude of the officials of the Aden Govt in connection with exchange of information concerning affairs in southern Arabia; that it believes US and Great Britain have a similar interest in ensuring prosperity and political stability in Arabian Peninsula; and that in consequence Brit Govt will welcome acceptance by US of Imam's request for recognition. Please telegraph British reaction.

For your information Consul Clark will return to Aden ¹¹ via London where he will advise competent Brit official of our plans for recognition party.

Sent to London as Depts 9141. Repeated to Aden as Depts 41 for information of Aden Government officials.

BYRNES

890J.01/11-1345: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 13, 1945—9 p. m.

[Received 11:55 p. m.]

11886. Following oral discussion with Foreign Office re intention of US Government to negotiate a provisional agreement with Yemen as reported in Embtel 10960 October 19 ¹² we have now received written communication from head of Eastern Department of Foreign Office thanking us for information given, saying that Colonial Office and Government of Aden had been advised and stating "We agree with your suggestion that our two Governments have a similar interest in insuring the prosperity and political stability of the Arabian Peninsula". Foreign Office also expressed pleasure that relations between Aden Government and American Consulate also satisfactory.

Sent Department as 11886; repeated Aden as 3.

WINANT

890J.01/10-1945

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1945.

Subject: Plans for Recognition of the Yemen

On May 1, 1945 the President, in reply to a memorandum from the Department of State of that date, informed Acting Secretary of

¹¹ The Consul had been at the Department for consultation.

¹² Not printed.

State Grew that he approved of the Department's suggestion that the US recognize the Yemen.

In accordance with this decision the attached telegram¹³ to His Majesty Zaidi Imam Yehya of the Yemen has been drafted. It states that the Government of the United States would be pleased to discuss the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the Yemen, and suggests the sending of a mission to Sana'a for that purpose. Being addressed to a Chief of State, it is contemplated that the message will bear the President's name.

The British Government and the Government of Saudi Arabia have been informed of the proposed action of the United States towards the Yemen and have interposed no objection.¹⁴ Selection of personnel and equipment and other preparations for the mission of recognition are progressing and can be completed soon after a favorable reply to this cable has been received from the Imam.

DEAN ACHESON

890J.01/11-1945 : Telegram

President Truman to the King of Yemen (the Imam Yehya bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din)

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1945.

YOUR MAJESTY: I avail myself of this opportunity to thank Your Majesty for the cordial reception accorded Mr. Clark, the American Consul at Aden, on the occasion of his recent informal visit to the Yemen, and for the expressions of friendship which Your Majesty graciously asked him to convey to me.

Mr. Clark has reported that Your Majesty's Government might be agreeable to entering into a provisional agreement concerning diplomatic and trade relations. I have pleasure in informing Your Majesty that the Government of the United States would be pleased to discuss such an agreement with your Government.

I suggest, subject to Your Majesty's approval, that such discussions might be conducted between representatives of Your Majesty's Government and an envoy whom I would send to Sana'a with full powers for this purpose. My representative would have the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary and would be accompanied by an appropriate staff, including an American physician.

If with Your Majesty's approval, a mission is sent to discuss an agreement it might be convenient to comply at the same time with Your Majesty's request for the assistance of a technical expert with a knowledge of textiles and other manufacturing processes.

¹³ *Infra.*

¹⁴ For exchange with the Saudi Arabian Government, see p. 1032.

It is my intention to designate the Honorable William A. Eddy, who is now Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Saudi Arabia to act as my representative on this mission.

I propose that my representative and his staff as well as the technical expert travel to Sana'a by plane if this is agreeable to Your Majesty. The plane would follow the route and land at such spot as Your Majesty might designate.

I shall appreciate being advised by telegram whether Your Majesty desires at this time to discuss such a provisional agreement between our two Governments and if so, whether Your Majesty approves of the suggested arrangements.

I take this opportunity of conveying my best wishes for the continued good health of Your Majesty and Their Royal Highnesses Your Majesty's sons.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

711.90J/12-245: Telegram

*The King of Yemen (the Imam Yehya bin Mohamed Hamid-ud-din)
to President Truman*¹⁵

[Translation]

SANA'A, December 2, 1945.

With great pleasure we received your esteemed and generous cable. From it we learned what we had so greatly desired—our mutual wish to establish friendly relations between our Government and your noble Government.

We thank Your Majesty for the noble and sagacious sentiments expressed. They cause me to admire your great person most profoundly.

We welcome the delegates whom you mention with pleasure and, God willing, there will prevail understanding and preparation for the foundation of these friendly relations on the basis of justice and right.

Their arrival will be by plane to Aden; then their travel to us will be by the same way followed by Mr. Clark. Please accept our sincerest respects.

YEHYA

¹⁵ Original telegram in Arabic forwarded from the White House to the Department on December 4 with request "for translation and appropriate action" (711.90J/12-445). The White House was informed on December 14 by the Chief of Protocol (Summerlin) that "appropriate action . . . is being taken by the Department". (711.90J/12-445)

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¹ In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) the name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as signer of outgoing messages unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary's or Acting Secretary's direct participation; (2) the names of American officers appearing merely as signers of messages to the Department of State; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed.

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