



# LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

## **Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1919. The Paris Peace Conference. Volume I 1919**

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/G5OAT7XT7HRHX84>

As a work of the United States government, this material is in the public domain.

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

Foreign  
Relations  
of the  
United  
States



Paris Peace  
Conference

1919

I

Department  
of State  
Washington



The University of Chicago  
Libraries







U.S. Dept. of State  
/ Papers Relating to the  
Foreign Relations  
of the  
United States  
1919

**THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE**

Volume I /



United States  
Government Printing Office  
Washington : 1942

JX233

A3

cop. 2

SSR.2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLICATION 1815

---

For sale by the  
Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C.  
Price \$1.25 (Buckram)



Don.

## PREFACE

I know that I speak for the American people—and I have good reason to believe I speak also for all the other peoples who fight with us—when I say that this time we are determined not only to win the war but also to maintain the security of the peace which will follow.

These words, addressed to Congress on January 6, 1942, by the President of the United States, serve to emphasize the conviction, which so many of us share, that the achievement of the right kind of peace after the cessation of hostilities is, like the winning of the war in the field, a major objective of the American people. We fully understand that the just and stable order to which we look forward can be realized only by judicious planning and skilled execution. To that end we must not only study every phase of the international structure of today but we must also draw upon the world's last great experience in peacemaking, the Paris settlement of 1919.

Whether a more effective peace settlement in 1919 or a more effective execution of that settlement would have saved us from the devastating war in which we are now engaged is a question which it may not be possible even for the historians of later generations to settle beyond a doubt. But irrespective of the verdict of history it is imperative that we make every effort to avoid the pitfalls of the period following the last war. To avoid those pitfalls it is necessary for us to have at hand while the next world settlement is in the making, available to the public and to responsible officials alike, full and authoritative information on the peacemaking of 1919. The present is, therefore, an especially appropriate time for the Department of State to fill an obvious gap in its *Foreign Relations* series by publishing in this volume and in the volumes to follow the official American records of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

None of the governments represented at Paris in 1919 has yet given a substantially complete record of the Conference to the public, although there is a large unofficial literature on the Conference already in existence. This literature includes volumes of memoirs by distinguished participants and collections of documents dealing with certain aspects of the work of the Conference, such as David Hunter Miller's *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* and the same author's *The Drafting of the Covenant*; A. G. de Lapradelle, *La documentation internationale: la paix de Versailles*; James T. Shotwell, *The*

*Origins of the International Labor Organization*; René Albrecht-Carrié, *Italy at the Paris Peace Conference*; Philip M. Burnett, *Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference*; Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*; Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations*; Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, volume IV; Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz, *The Treaty of St. Germain*; Count Aldrovandi, *Guerra diplomatica and Nuovi ricordi*; David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*; André Tardieu, *The Truth About the Treaty*; and H. W. V. Temperley (editor), *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. These titles and many others are to be found in such bibliographies as Robert C. Binkley, "Ten Years of Peace Conference History" in the *Journal of Modern History*, volume I, December 1929 pages 607-629; Paul Birdsall, "The Second Decade of Peace Conference History," *ibid.*, volume XI, September 1939, pages 362-373; Samuel F. Bemis and Grace G. Griffin, *Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775-1921*, pages 673-684; and Nina Almond and Ralph H. Lutz, *An Introduction to a Bibliography of the Paris Peace Conference*.

The documents published in this edition are largely from the files of the Department of State and those of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, whose extensive records are now also in the possession of the Department. A certain number of closely related documents from other sources, whose publication seemed desirable in the interest of completeness, have also been included. Among these may be mentioned documents from the papers of Woodrow Wilson, Robert Lansing, Tasker H. Bliss, Henry White, Breckinridge Long, and David Hunter Miller in the collections of the Library of Congress, and those of Colonel Edward M. House at Yale University.

It is intended that the volumes of the present series be arranged in three groups, as follows:

1. Volumes I and II, containing documents on the preliminary period dealing with preparations for the Conference and the period between the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, and the first meeting of the Council of Ten on January 12, 1919.
2. Volumes III through X, containing minutes of the Plenary Sessions of the Conference, the meetings of the representatives of the Powers with Special Interests, and minutes of the meetings of the governing bodies of the Conference, i. e., the Supreme Council in its various aspects: the Council of Ten, Council of Four, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Heads of Delegations, International Council of Premiers (through its meeting of January 20, 1920), and Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; and (in Volume X) minutes of meetings of the American Commissioners Plenipotentiary and documents relating to the

composition, organization, and activities of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

3. Volume XI and following volumes, containing (1) minutes and reports of the Commissions of the Conference, with other documents relating to the same subjects, arranged in general in the order followed in the Treaty of Versailles and the other peace treaties; (2) documents on the negotiations with the enemy powers and the signature and ratification of the treaties of peace; (3) documents concerning the negotiation of the other treaties produced by the Paris Conference; and (4) documents bearing on economic aspects of the work of the Conference, including regulation of trade, the blockade, food relief, and the Supreme Economic Council and its subordinate bodies.

With few exceptions the publication of documents will not be carried beyond the period of active American participation in the Conference, which ended with the departure from Paris of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace on December 9, 1919.

The principles being followed with regard to selection of material and inclusion or exclusion of documents or parts of documents in the volumes are the same as those which have governed in the preparation of earlier volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series as set forth in the order approved by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925, given in full in the preface to *Foreign Relations*, 1914, supplement, pages iii-iv. While it is planned to print all of the more important minutes, proceedings, and other papers in substantially complete form, it will be necessary to omit some material of secondary importance in order to keep this edition within reasonable limits.

The publication of these records was undertaken by the Department of State during the administration of the late Dr. Cyril Wynne as Chief of the Division of Research and Publication. The volumes are being compiled in the Research Section of the Division of Research and Publication by Dr. James S. Beddie, Dr. Morrison B. Giffen, and Mr. John W. Foley, Jr., under the immediate direction of Dr. Ernest R. Perkins. The editorial work is directed by Miss Matilda F. Axton, the principal editor of the Research Section. Those engaged upon the project are deeply appreciative of the interest in and support of their work by Mr. G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, and his Executive Assistant, Mr. Laurence C. Frank. Many other officers of the Department have cooperated generously in reviewing material and in offering their papers for publication. Officers of the Library of Congress, of Yale University, and of the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace have very kindly placed certain of their collections at the disposal of the Department. The interest in the project so frequently expressed by students of foreign policy throughout the country has been an inspiration to the compilers.

E. WILDER SPAULDING

*Chief, Division of Research and Publication*





## LIST OF TREATIES

### PRINCIPAL TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AND ACTS NEGOTIATED AT THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS OF 1919, TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES WAS A SIGNATORY

#### WITH GERMANY:

Treaty of Peace, June 28, 1919 (printed in *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers*, vol. III, Senate Document No. 348, 67th Cong., 4th sess., p. 3329).

Protocol, June 28, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3522).

Agreement With Regard to the Military Occupation of the Territories of the Rhine, June 28, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3524).

#### WITH AUSTRIA:

Treaty of Peace, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3149).

Protocol, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3295).

Supplementary Declaration Regarding Shipping Losses, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3297).

Declaration on Blockade of Hungary, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3298).

#### WITH BULGARIA:

Treaty of Peace, November 27, 1919 (*Peace Treaties*, S. Doc. 7, 67th Cong., 1st sess., p. 47).

Protocol, November 27, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 162).

#### WITH HUNGARY:

Treaty of Peace, June 4, 1920 (*Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, vol. III, p. 3539).

Protocol, June 4, 1920 (*ibid.*, p. 3696).

Declaration on Shipping Losses, June 4, 1920 (*ibid.*, p. 3697).

#### MINORITIES TREATIES:

Poland, June 28, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3714).

Czechoslovakia, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3699).

Serb-Croat-Slovene State, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3731).

Roumania, December 9, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3724).

#### OTHER TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AND ACTS:

United States and France, Guaranty Treaty, June 28, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3709).

Italian Reparation Payments, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3301).

Declaration modifying the preceding, December 8, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3305).

Cost of Liberation of Territories of the Former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3299).

Declaration modifying the preceding, December 8, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3303).

Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and Protocol, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3752).

Convention Relating to the Liquor Traffic in Africa, and Protocol, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3746).

Convention Revising the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels, September 10, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3739).

Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, October 13, 1919 (*ibid.*, p. 3768).

Treaty Relating to Spitsbergen, February 9, 1920 (*ibid.*, vol. IV, S. Doc. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess., p. 4861).

Of the above, those ratified by the United States were the Treaty Relating to Spitsbergen, the Convention Relating to the Liquor Traffic in Africa (for the form in which ratified, see *ibid.*, p. 4856), and the Convention Revising the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels (for the form in which ratified, see *ibid.*, p. 4849).

# CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS.....	XI
LIST OF PAPERS.....	XVII
TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES:	
Statements and messages regarding the termination of hostilities and the conclusion of the armistice.....	1
AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE:	
Organization and work of "The Inquiry".....	9
Choice of place for the Conference and arrangements for the accommoda- tion of the Commission to Negotiate Peace.....	119
President Wilson's trip to Europe.....	128
Personnel of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.....	155
Arrangements for securing information.....	194
Censorship and relations with the press.....	212
REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE:	
American Republics.....	223
Scandinavian countries.....	236
China.....	241
Finland.....	246
Hejaz.....	247
Liberia.....	248
Montenegro.....	254
Persia.....	256
Poland.....	264
Roumania.....	265
Russia.....	267
Switzerland.....	279
POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ALLIES:	
The United States.....	285
The Inter-Allied Conference at London, December 1918.....	333
France.....	344
Great Britain.....	407
Italy.....	416
Japan.....	489
PROPOSALS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.....	497
OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE:	
International telegraphic communication.....	535
Labor questions.....	539
Liberian affairs.....	543
Rules for aerial navigation.....	550
The Tacna-Arica question.....	552
INDEX.....	565



## LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS

- ALI GHOLI KHAN, Ansari, Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- ALI-KULI KHAN, Mirza, Persian Counselor of Legation at Washington; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
- AUCHINCLOSS, Gordon, Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State and aide to Colonel House
- BAKER, Newton D., Secretary of War
- BAKER, Ray Stannard, Director of the Press Bureau of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- BAKHMETEFF, Boris A., Russian Ambassador at Washington
- BALFOUR, Arthur James, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- BARCLAY, Colville A. de R., Counselor of the British Embassy at Washington; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
- BARUCH, Bernard M., Chairman of the War Industries Board; economic adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- ✓ BEER, G. L., specialist on Africa, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- BENEŠ, Eduard, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- BENSON, Admiral William S., Chief of Operations, United States Navy; technical adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- BISSOLATI, Leonida, Italian Minister of War Relief
- BLISS, Robert Woods, Counselor of the Embassy in France; Chargé d'Affaires in the Netherlands, September 21 to November 22, 1918; Chargé d'Affaires in France from December 23, 1918
- BLISS, General Tasker H., United States Military Representative on the Supreme War Council; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- ✓ BOWMAN, Isaiah, Chief Territorial Specialist and Executive Officer, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- BRATIANO, J. J. C., Roumanian President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs
- BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU, Count von, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from December 20, 1918
- BRUN, Constantin, Danish Minister at Washington
- BULLARD, Admiral William H. G., Commander of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean; representative on the Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Inquiry into Adriatic Affairs
- BULLITT, William C., Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State; attached to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- BUNDY, Richard C., Second Secretary of Legation in Liberia; Chargé d'Affaires
- CAFFERY, Jefferson, Secretary of Embassy in France
- CALDWELL, John L., Minister to Persia
- CHOTCH, Dr. P., Montenegrin Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
- ✓ CHURCHILL, General Marlborough, Director of Military Intelligence; general military liaison and coordinating officer, Commission to Negotiate Peace

- CLEMENCEAU, Georges E. B., French President of the Council and Minister of War; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference and president of the Conference
- CLÉMENTEL, Etienne, French Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Posts and Telegraphs; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council; French representative on the Inter-Allied Relief Commission
- COBB, Frank I., editor of the New York *World*, special representative of the Department of State in Europe
- ✓ COOLIDGE, Professor Archibald Cary, Director of the Special Commission of Study in Austria, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- COSTO, Pedro, Uruguayan Minister at Washington
- CRAVATH, Paul D., Advisory Counsel of the Mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance
- CREEL, George, Chairman of the Committee on Public Information
- CRESPI, Silvio, Italian Minister of Provisions
- CROSBY, Oscar T., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; President of the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance
- DA GAMA, Domicio, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs
- DAVIS, John W., Solicitor General; appointed Ambassador to Great Britain, November 21, 1918
- DAVIS, Norman H., Treasury representative at London and Paris; financial adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- ✓ DAY, Clive, specialist on the Balkans, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- DE CARTIER DE MARCHIENNE, El., Belgian Minister at Washington
- DE CHAMBRUN, Charles, French Counselor of Embassy at Washington and Chargé d'Affaires, December 1918 to June 1919
- DE IPANEMA MOREIRA, Alberto, Brazilian Counselor of Embassy at Washington, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
- DERBY, Earl of (Edward George V. Stanley), British Ambassador at Paris
- DI VALENTINO, Baron Pietro Arone, Italian Secretary of Embassy at Washington; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
- ✓ DIXON, Dr. R. B., specialist on Inner Asia, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- DMOWSKI, Roman, President of the Polish National Committee
- DODGE, H. Percival, Special Agent to Serbia (at Corfu) of the Department of State; Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia
- ✓ DRESEL, Ellis Loring, Director of the Special Commission of Study in Germany, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- DROPPERS, Garrett, Minister to Greece
- ✓ DULLES, Allen W., Second Secretary of Legation in Switzerland; attached to Commission to Negotiate Peace
- DULLES, John Foster, Counsel to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- EBERT, Friedrich, Chancellor of the German Provisional Government from November 9, 1918
- EISNER, Kurt, Bavarian Socialist leader; Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bavarian Republic from November 9, 1918
- EKENGREN, W. A. F., Swedish Minister at Washington
- ERZBERGER, Matthias, German Secretary of State without portfolio; President of the German Armistice Commission
- FOCH, Ferdinand, Marshal of France and Generalissimo of the Allied forces
- FRANCHET D'ESPÉREY, General A. L., Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in the East

- GARRETT, John W., Minister to the Netherlands; accredited also to Luxemburg
- GARY, Hampson, Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Cairo
- GAY, Edwin F., representative of the Shipping Board on the War Trade Board
- GIBSON, Hugh S., Secretary of Embassy in France; assigned to assist Chairman of Inter-Allied Food Council, Herbert Hoover; member of Inter-Allied Mission to countries of former Austro-Hungarian Empire
- GLASS, Carter, Secretary of the Treasury from December 16, 1918
- GOMPERS, Samuel, President of the American Federation of Labor
- GRANT-SMITH, Ulysses, Counselor of Legation in Denmark; Chargé d'Affaires
- GREW, Joseph C., Secretary General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- GVOSDENOVITCH, General Antoine, Montenegrin Minister at Washington
- HACK, Louis, Commissioner at Constantinople
- HARRISON, Leland, Diplomatic Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- HARTS, General William W., Commander of American forces in the District of Paris; military aide to President Wilson while in Europe, December 1918-June 1919
- HASKINS, Dr. C. H., specialist on Western Europe, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- HOOVER, Herbert C., United States Food Administrator; Chairman of the American Relief Administration; Chairman of the Inter-Allied Food Council
- HORNBECK, Stanley K., specialist on the Far East and Pacific, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- HORTON, George, Consul General at Saloniki
- HOUSE, Colonel Edward M., the special representative of the United States in Europe from October 16, 1918; American plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- HOWARD, Daniel, President of the Republic of Liberia
- HURLEY, Edward N., Chairman of the United States Shipping Board; President of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation
- HYMANS, Paul, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- JAY, Peter Augustus, Counselor of Embassy in Italy
- JEFFERSON, Mark, specialist on Geography and Cartography, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- JEFFERY, Robert E., Minister to Uruguay
- JUSSERAND, Jules J., French Ambassador at Washington
- KARNEBEEK, Dr. H. A. van, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.
- KEBNAN, Major General Francis J., technical military adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- KEYNES, John Maynard, attached to the British Treasury, 1915-1919; official Treasury representative at the Paris Peace Conference
- KLUTCHNIKOFF, Yuri Veniaminovich, Acting Foreign Minister of the Kolchak government at Omsk
- LAHOVARY, N. H., Roumanian Secretary of Legation at Washington and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim
- LANSING, Robert, Secretary of State; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- LAUGHLIN, Irwin B., Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain; Chargé d'Affaires, October 3 to December 17, 1918
- LAW, Andrew Bonar, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 1916 to January 1919
- LEFFINGWELL, Russell C., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
- LIPPMANN, Walter, Secretary of the American Commission of Inquiry for the Peace Conference; attached to the Commission to Negotiate Peace



- LYOYD GEORGE**, David, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury ; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference  
**LOGAN**, T. F., United States special shipping commissioner at Paris  
**LONG**, Breckinridge, Third Assistant Secretary of State  
**LOEB**, Dr. R. R. H., specialist on Russia and Poland, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace  
**LUNT**, Dr. W. E., specialist on Italy, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace  
**MCADOO**, William Gibbs, Secretary of the Treasury to December 16, 1918  
**MCCORMICK**, Vance C., Chairman of the War Trade Board  
**McFADDEN**, George, War Trade Board representative at Paris  
**McKINSTRY**, General C. H., head of the War Damages Board  
**McMILLIN**, Benton, Minister to Peru  
**MACCHI DI CELLERE**, Count Vincenzo, Italian Ambassador at Washington  
**MEZES**, Dr. S. E., Director of the Division of Territorial Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace  
**MILLER**, David Hunter, technical adviser on international law to the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
**MINISCALCHI-ERIZZO**, Count Bonifacio, Italian Counselor of Embassy at Washington ; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim  
**MORGAN**, Edwin V., Ambassador to Brazil  
**MORRIS**, Ira Nelson, Minister to Sweden  
**MORRIS**, Roland S., Ambassador to Japan  
**MORROW**, Dwight W., adviser to the Allied Maritime Transport Council  
**MURPHY**, Dominic I., Consul General at Sofia  
**NICHOLAS I**, King of Montenegro, December 19, 1900–November 26, 1918  
**ORLANDO**, Vittorio E., President of the Italian Council of Ministers ; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference  
**OSBORNE**, Lithgow, Second Secretary of Legation in Denmark ; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim  
**PADEREWSKI**, Ignace Jan, Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Polish Government  
**PAGE**, Thomas Nelson, Ambassador to Italy  
**PASHITCH**, Nikola P., Serbian President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs  
**PATCHIN**, Philip H., Executive Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
**PERSHING**, General John J., Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe  
**PHILLIPS**, William, Assistant Secretary of State  
**PICHON**, Stephen, French Minister of Foreign Affairs ; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference  
**PILSUDSKI**, Joseph, Chief of the Polish State  
**POINCARÉ**, Raymond, President of the Republic of France  
**POLK**, Frank Lyon, Counselor for the Department of State  
**POOLE**, Dewitt C., Chargé d'Affaires in Russia (Archangel)  
**POPOVITCH**, Eugene, Montenegrin Minister of Foreign Affairs  
**PRICE**, William J., Minister to Panama  
**RATHBONE**, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury  
**READING**, Earl of (Rufus Daniel Isaacs), British High Commissioner and Ambassador on Special Mission at Washington ; British representative on the Inter-Allied Relief Commission  
**REINSCH**, Paul S., Minister to China  
**RICKARD**, Edgar, Acting United States Food Administrator from November 1918  
**ROUSSOS**, Georges, Greek Minister at Washington

- RUBLEE, George, United States Shipping Board representative at London; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council
- SCAVENTIUS, Erik, Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs
- SCHEIDEMANN, Philipp, German Minister of Finance from November 9, 1918
- SCHMEDEMAN, Albert G., Minister to Norway
- SCOTT, James Brown, technical adviser on international law to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
- SEYMOUR, Dr. Charles, specialist on Austria-Hungary, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- SHARP, William G., Ambassador to France
- SHELDON, L. P., War Trade Board and Food Administration representative at London
- SHOTWELL, J. T., Chief of the History Division and Librarian, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- SIMITCH, Y., Serbian Secretary of Legation at Washington
- SKINNER, Robert P., Consul General at London
- SOLF, Wilhelm, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, October 3, 1918-December 17, 1918
- SONNINO, Baron Sidney, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- STEVENS, Raymond B., Vice Chairman of the Shipping Board; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council
- STEWART, W. A. W., War Trade Board representative at Rome
- STOVALL, Pleasant A., Minister to Switzerland
- SULZER, Hans, Swiss Minister at Washington
- SUMMERS, Leland L., Chairman of the United States War Industries Board Mission in Europe; member of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council
- TARDIEU, André P. G. A., French High Commissioner to the United States; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- TAYLOR, Alonzo E., representative of the Secretary of Agriculture on the War Trade Board
- THEODOROFF, T., Bulgarian President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs
- TUDELA, Dr. Don Francisco, Peruvian Minister at Washington
- UCHIDA, Viscount, Yasuya, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
- VENIZELOS, Eleutherios K., Greek Premier and Minister of War
- VICTOR EMANUEL III, King of Italy
- VOPICKA, Charles J., Minister to Roumania
- WEMYSS, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, British First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff
- WESTERMANN, Dr. W. L., specialist on Western Asia, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- WHITE, Beaver, representative of the Food Administrator on the War Trade Board
- WHITE, Francis, Second Secretary of Legation in Switzerland
- WHITE, Henry, American plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- WHITE, John Campbell, Chargé d'Affaires in Siam
- WHITEHOUSE, Sheldon, Counselor of Legation in Sweden
- WHITLOCK, Brand, Minister to Belgium
- WILLIAMS, Edward T., specialist on the Far East and Pacific, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace
- WILSON, Charles Stetson, Chargé d'Affaires in Bulgaria
- WILSON, Hugh R., Secretary of Legation in Switzerland; Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

- WILSON, Woodrow, President of the United States; plenipotentiary at the Paris Peace Conference
- WISEMAN, Sir William, Chief of the British intelligence service in Washington; liaison officer between Colonel House and the British during the World War; chief adviser on American affairs to British Delegation, Paris Peace Conference
- WOOLLEY, Clarence M., representative of the Shipping Board on the War Trade Board
- WOOLSEY, Lester H., Solicitor for the Department of State
- ✓ YOUNG, Dr. Allyn A., specialist on Economics and Statistics, Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace

# LIST OF PAPERS

## TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES

### STATEMENTS AND MESSAGES REGARDING THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 11	<i>Announcement by President Wilson</i> Of the signing of the armistice.	1
Nov. 11	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Salute to democracy and to Wilson as its leader.	1
Nov. 12	<i>The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) (tel.)</i> Expression of joy felt by the U. S. Government and people, and their admiration for the British nation.	1
Nov. 12	<i>The Secretary of State to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon) (tel.)</i> Congratulations and expression of admiration of the American people for the French people.	2
Nov. 13	<i>The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Appreciation of the French nation for telegram of congratulation.	2
Undated [Rec'd Nov. 13]	<i>The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Uchida) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Congratulations on the triumphant conclusion of an armistice.	2
Nov. 13 (3847)	<i>The Greek Legation to the Department of State</i> Felicitations from the Greek nation; appreciation of the United States as the benefactor of small nations; pledge of continued cooperation.	3
Nov. 14	<i>President Wilson to the British Prime Minister (Lloyd George)</i> Commendation upon Lloyd George's speech of November 12.	3 ✓
Undated [Rec'd Nov. 14]	<i>The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Appreciation for telegram of November 12; expression of hope that the two nations will be bound ever closer together.	4 ✓
Nov. 15	<i>The Secretary of State to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Uchida) (tel.)</i> Response to telegram of congratulation.	4
Nov. 16	<i>King Victor Emanuel of Italy to President Wilson</i> Salute to the people of America.	4
Nov. 16	<i>President Wilson to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)</i> Feeling of deep gratification at message which Monsieur Clemenceau sent through Mr. Tumulty.	5

TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES  
STATEMENTS AND MESSAGES, ETC.—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Undated [Rec'd Nov. 19]	<i>The British Prime Minister (Lloyd George) to President Wilson</i> Expression of thanks for the President's message of November 14.	5
Nov. 20	<i>President Wilson to King Victor Emanuel of Italy (tel.)</i> Response to His Majesty's message of November 16.	6
Dec. 11	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Greek Minister (Roussos)</i> Expression of thanks for felicitations from the Greek Government.	6

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"

1917 Aug. 4	<i>The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Secretary of State</i> Proposal for the establishment of a bureau for the study and preparation of the questions likely to be proposed at the Peace Conference.	9
Sept. 15	<i>Confidential Memorandum on Preparatory Work for Peace Conference</i> Plan for inviting specialists in various fields to supply in condensed articles such information as U. S. negotiators may need at Peace Conference, these articles to be accompanied by appendices containing pertinent documents, statistics, quotations, etc. (Footnote: Information that memorandum appears to have been prepared in the Department and may be the one referred to in Colonel House's letter of September 20, 1917.)	10
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Queries to be considered prior to Conference.	11
Sept. 20	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State</i> Colonel House's plans to be in Washington and desire for conversation concerning work planned for him in regard to proposed organization.	12
Oct. 27	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)</i> Need for creative study of disarmament problem; inquiry as to whether the Secretary considers it advisable to have matter studied in War Department and as to who could be assigned to study it.	12
Nov. 1	<i>The Secretary of War (Baker) to Mr. Walter Lippmann</i> Suggestion that General Bliss might study disarmament problem, with possible help of General Enoch H. Crowder.	13
Nov. 5	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)</i> Belief that Secretary Baker's suggestion is ideal.	14
Nov. 5	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Anticipation of an opportunity for a complete understanding as to how the Department can be of service to Dr. Mezes in his work.	14

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Nov. 9	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Plans to be in Washington the next week and to get in touch with the Secretary in regard to matter mentioned in the Secretary's letter of November 5. Draft of an outline of subjects to be dealt with in the Inquiry (text printed).	14
Nov. 10	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to Mr. Walter Lippmann</i> Preliminary outline of subjects to be dealt with in the Inquiry (text printed); memorandum of needs as to data and proposals on various subjects (text printed).	16
Undated	<i>A Preliminary Survey</i> Concerning ways in which the Inquiry can be of help to the Peace Conference.	17
Nov. 19	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Request for a statement of the agreement once contemplated between the United States and the other American republics mutually guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity.	22
Nov. 21	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Text of the proposed pan-American agreement requested by Dr. Mezes; request that it be kept confidential.	22
Nov. 23	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Intention to make a draft of the principles involved in the pan-American treaty and submit it to the Secretary for consideration as a general plan that might be studied by the Inquiry.	25
Nov. 23	<i>The Secretary of War (Baker) to Mr. Walter Lippmann</i> Growing conviction that Germany must be made livable to her own people after the war but that resources can be supplied to her only upon assurances that they will be used in the interest of civilization.	25
Dec. 11	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Division Chiefs of the Inquiry</i> Outline of the organization of the Inquiry.	26
Undated [c. Dec. 15]	<i>Memorandum on the Context of the Inquiry</i> Analysis of probable course of events as already indicated.	27
Undated	<i>The Inquiry.—Report of Progress to December 15, 1917</i> Covering the general assignments of personnel, theory upon which work is planned, and research already under way.	34
Dec. 19	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to Colonel E. M. House</i> Belief that it would be feasible for the Inquiry to make an analysis of the problem of internal reconstruction following the war, and to prepare a number of alternative programs which could be placed at the disposal of the President.	39
Undated	<i>The Inquiry.—Memorandum Submitted December 22, 1917</i> Exposition of the war aims and peace terms suggested by the present situation, including an evaluation of the position of the Allied and Associated Powers in terms of their assets and liabilities.	41

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1917 Dec. 28	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to Colonel E. M. House</i> List of the questions of international law which seem to come within the sphere of the State Department rather than that of the Inquiry.	54
1918 Jan. 16	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Director of the American Geographical Society (Bowman)</i> Expression of appreciation for office space made available to the Inquiry and for assistance given by the staff of the Society.	55
Mar. 20	<i>Report on the Inquiry: Its Scope and Method</i> Statement of the scope and method of the Inquiry, with a list of topics of research and a tentative list of issues to be studied.	55
Apr. 17	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to Dr. S. E. Mezes and Mr. D. H. Miller</i> Outline of questions which may be expected to arise at the Peace Conference.	72
Apr. 17	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Suggestion that it might be wise to make studies of the countries of South and Central America in case they should come up for discussion at the Peace Conference.	76
Apr. 22	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Explanation that plan had been to postpone studies of South and Central America until the current work had progressed further, since the present budget would not be adequate for a simultaneous investigation; estimate of expenditure necessary to make such studies at once. Outline of some of the data needed for South America.	77
Apr. 24	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Request that the President make an allotment of the amount of money that would be necessary to extend the work of the Inquiry to South America at once, if he approves of the work.	81
May 7	<i>The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House</i> Information that the President approves the continuation and expansion of the work of the Inquiry and will furnish the necessary funds.	82
Undated	<i>Report on the Inquiry, May 10, 1918</i> Giving the sections into which the work had been divided and the status of each section.	82
May 16	<i>Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)</i> Report that the work of the Inquiry goes along steadily but that there is a dearth of men of sufficient genius to deal with certain problems, especially those relating to Russia, the Balkans, Turkey, and Africa.	97
June 7	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Transmittal of French outline of preparatory work. Suggestion that Dr. Mezes impress upon those working with him the importance of an unbiased treatment of the subjects under consideration.	98

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918		
June 10	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Explanation that the members of the Inquiry look upon themselves as engaged in forging instruments in aid of judgment and are in entire accord with the Secretary's idea concerning the importance of an unbiased approach.	98
July 9	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Division Chiefs of the Inquiry</i> Instruction that, in order to prevent confusion, all requests for information or assistance be submitted to him before being sent to various Departments in Washington.	99
July 10	<i>Mr. David Hunter Miller, Major James Brown Scott, and Mr. L. H. Woolsey to the Secretary of State</i> Report as to the scope and progress of the work in the field of international law which was undertaken in compliance with the Secretary's direction.	99
July 13	<i>Dr. Isaiah Bowman to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Observation that confusion mentioned in Dr. Mezes' memorandum of July 9 is due to present loose organization of the Inquiry and that the time has come for a stricter division of functions.	102
Aug. 3	<i>The Executive Officer of the Inquiry (Bowman) to Professor C. H. Haskins</i> Announcement of the composition of the Research Committee and plans for its first meeting. (Footnote: Information that identical letters were sent to certain other members of the Inquiry.)	103
Undated	<i>Memorandum on the Organization of the Inquiry</i> Showing present personnel set-up.	104
Aug. 17	<i>Dr. Isaiah Bowman to Colonel E. M. House</i> Expression of confidence in the composition and work of the new Research Committee; need for more funds in order to develop the work with stronger men and at greater speed. (Footnote: Colonel House's reply, August 22, that he had not answered Dr. Bowman's letter because he preferred to discuss the matters with him in person.)	105
Sept. 18	<i>Professor C. H. Haskins to Mr. H. Nelson Gay</i> Request that Mr. Gay prepare, for the use of the Inquiry, a full statement of the general questions which will concern Italy at the Peace Conference.	106
[Sept. 21]	<i>The Research Committee of the Inquiry to the Division Chiefs</i> List of government organizations with which the Inquiry is in touch; explanation that liaison with the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, provides means for tapping practically any source of information in the country.	107
Oct. 15	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Treasurer of the Inquiry (Miller)</i> Authorization by Colonel House of an increased monthly expenditure in order to speed up the work of the Inquiry.	108
Oct. 19	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Conclusion of Dr. Mezes and Colonel House that work on Latin America can be completed on the balance of the fund originally allotted for it.	108



AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918		
Oct. 19	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to Professor C. H. Haskins</i> Colonel House's idea that the Inquiry should now be organized in the way in which it could function most effectively when the Conference is in session and his belief that the administrative plan with heads rather than committees would be most effective. (Footnote: Information that identical letters were sent to the other members of the Research Committee.)	109
Oct. 22	<i>Professor C. H. Haskins to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Comments upon the proposed changes in organization.	110
Oct. 23	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Colonel House's request that the Secretary be advised that the present fund would bring in the minimum of essential material on Latin America but that an expenditure of about \$5,000 a month for two or three more months would bring in valuable supplementary material.	110
Oct. 25	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Chart prepared by Colonel House showing proposed organization of the Inquiry.	111
Oct. 29	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Opinion that plan of organization prepared by Colonel House is too ambitious; request that a simpler one be worked out; also that Dr. Mezes be advised that it is unlikely that anything but the main issues will be settled at the Conference and that he should make his plans accordingly.	113
Undated	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Simplified plan for organization of the Inquiry.	113
Oct. 30 (22)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: Colonel House's desire to be fully advised by cable concerning the work of the Inquiry since his departure.	115
Oct. 31	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Suggestion that Dr. Mezes come to Washington for a conference on the organization of the Inquiry.	115
Nov. 2 (10)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> From Mezes: Report on the progress of the work of the Inquiry.	115
Nov. 6	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Information that the President approves the expenditure of \$5,000 a month for the next three months in order to continue the work of the Latin American Division of the Inquiry.	116
Nov. 8	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Confirmation of telegram giving proposed list of specialists (text printed).	116
Nov. 9	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Suggestion that new plan be changed to the extent of providing a position suitable for Dr. Bowman, since the work would be seriously embarrassed without his services.	117

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 13	<i>The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> Agreement that Dr. Bowman should be included in the group.	7
Nov. 14	<i>Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State</i> Suggestion that two changes be made in list of specialists. (Footnote: Secretary's reply, November 15, agreeing to changes.)	118

CHOICE OF PLACE FOR THE CONFERENCE AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ACCOM-  
MODATION OF THE COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

1918 Oct. 28 (3)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Observations concerning choice of a place for the Peace Conference; request for advice as to the President's preference.	119
[Oct. 28] (2)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Opinion that place of meeting should be neutral; preference for Lausanne.	119
Nov. 1 (28)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Suggestion that the Secretary discuss with the President the advisability of authorizing House to secure options for accommodations for U. S. representatives at the Peace Conference, since it may be necessary to take quick action as soon as place is decided.	119
Nov. 2 (9)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Authorization to Colonel House to secure options at his discretion.	120
Nov. 5 (49)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: Suggestion that it would be advisable for McCormick to secure certain assurances from the Swiss Government in view of the present decision to hold the Peace Conference in Switzerland.	120
[Nov. 7] (11)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Belief, on second thought, that Versailles may be the best place to hold the Conference.	121
Nov. 11 (93)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Opinion that within the next few days the decision will be made to hold the Peace Conference in Paris. Proposed plan for securing accommodations for U. S. representatives.	12 <sup>2</sup>
Nov. 13 (34)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Instructions to proceed with plan for securing accommodations for U. S. delegation.	123
Nov. 14 (154)	<i>The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Earnest desire of the Belgian Government to have the Peace Conference held in Brussels.	123

# AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE

## CHOICE OF PLACE FOR THE CONFERENCE AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ACCOMMODATIONS OF THE COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 20 (130)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President and the Secretary of State: Attitude of the British Government that the question as to where the Peace Conference is to be held must be finally decided by the Inter-Allied Conference. Indications, however, that once the organizations are set up in Paris it will be difficult to move them for the final Conference.	124
Nov. 22 (141)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Report that satisfactory progress is being made in securing the Hotel Crillon for the U. S. delegates and in the physical organization of offices in quarters previously occupied by the American Red Cross at 4 Place de la Concorde.	124
Nov. 22 (5968)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Details of arrangements for taking over the Hotel Crillon.	125
Nov. 29 (200)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Arrangements for the transfer of the lease for the property at 4 Place de la Concorde from the Red Cross; tentative arrangements for taking over space in building at 3 Rue Royale.	126
Dec. 5 (2)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Colonel House: Information that so far as the British Government are concerned December 16 would be a convenient date for the first meeting of the Inter-Allied Conference but that Clemenceau has expressed view that it might be too early.	126
Dec. 7 (4)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Colonel House: The President's suggestion that arrangements for meeting of Inter-Allied Conference be postponed until after preliminary informal discussions.	127

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE

1918 [Nov. 10?] (12)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Willingness to leave for Peace Conference immediately after delivering message to Congress on December 2; question as to whether a preliminary visit to England would be wise if Italy could not also be visited beforehand.	128
Nov. 11 (90)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Opinion that landing in England is essential and that visit could be made to Italy later. Proposed time schedule for trip.	128

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 13 (100)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: British Government's invitation to the President to land in England, and assurances of warm welcome.	129
[Nov. 13] (14)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Expression of hope that it is understood that his coming to Peace Conference depends upon Prime Ministers being delegates also; assumption that he will be selected to preside.	129
Nov. 13 (101)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Desire of Allied Governments to know approximate date of the President's arrival so that plans for preliminary and final conferences can be made.	130
[Nov. 13]	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Expectation of sailing December 3.	130
Nov. 14 (107)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Information that if Conference assemblies in France, Clemenceau will preside; opinion of Americans in Paris and British and French leaders that it would be unwise for the President to sit in Peace Conference; suggestion that if the President does not deliver valedictory lecture at Oxford, he come directly to Paris and visit England and Italy later. Information that French, English, and Italian Prime Ministers will head their delegations.	130
Nov. 15 (108)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Telegram from Clemenceau to Lloyd George (text printed) expressing view that it would be neither possible nor desirable for President Wilson to sit in the Peace Conference.	131
Nov. 15 (110)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Communication from the British Ambassador in France (text printed) conveying message of the King extending invitation to President and Mrs. Wilson to be the guests of the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace during their stay in London.	132
Nov. 15	<i>Senator Key Pittman to President Wilson</i> Lists of some of the points urged (1) by those who think it would be a mistake for the President to attend the Peace Conference and (2) by those who think it will be necessary for him to attend.	132
[Nov. 16] (15)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Statement that telegram No. 107 of November 14 upsets every plan made. Belief that English and French leaders desire to exclude him for fear he will lead weaker nations against them. Request for Colonel House's independent judgment.	134

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 16 (15)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Opinion that the President should sail for France December 3 and decide upon arrival what share he will take in the proceedings.	135
Nov. 16 (16)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Information that he has constantly contended that the President should sit in Conference but that Ambassador Sharp is practically the only one who agrees. Reiteration that there is no need for a decision until the President reaches France.	135
Nov. 18 (43)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> President Wilson's reply (text printed) to be made to the invitation of the King and Queen of England, expressing regrets and hope of coming to England later.	136
Undated (16)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Announcement issued by the President (text printed) stating his intention of going to France for the purpose of taking part in the discussion and settlement of the main features of the treaty of peace. Belief that it would be unwise to come as if on another errand. Readiness to propose the Prime Minister of France as president of the Conference.	136
Nov. 19 (18)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Confidence that everything will now work out satisfactorily.	137
Nov. 19 (2380)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that if the President comes to Europe he will be expected to visit Italy and that failure to do so might have unfortunate effect.	137
Nov. 21 (135)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Information that Prince Murat has placed his residence at the disposal of the French Government to be offered to President Wilson for his use while in Paris.	138
Nov. 22	<i>President Wilson to the Counselor of the Department of State (Polk)</i> Names of those going to Europe in Presidential party; request that arrangements be made for their passports.	138
Nov. 23 (150)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President and the Secretary of State: Description of residence referred to in telegram No. 135 of November 21; advice that he has already expressed to Foreign Office his certainty that the President will be pleased with it.	139

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 23	<i>The Acting Chief of the Bureau of Citizenship, Department of State (Flournoy), to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State (Crane)</i> Explanation that President and Mrs. Wilson's passport applications have been taken, since they wished to go through the usual routine. Inquiry as to whether Secretary and Mrs. Lansing wish to have their applications taken.	140
Nov. 24 (161)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Desire for confirmation of understanding that the President intends to sail direct to France and not pass through England.	140
Nov. 25 (17)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Intention to sail direct to France.	140
Nov. 26 (181)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request for the names of the persons, other than President and Mrs. Wilson, whom the President wishes to have stay in Prince Murat's house.	141
Nov. 26	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> List of names to be cabled to Colonel House in answer to his telegram No. 181, November 26.	141
Nov. 26 (1864)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page) (tel.)</i> Plans of the President and Secretary of State to sail for France about December 4. Explanation that the President has made no plans for visiting Italy but may do so before his return to the United States.	141
Nov. 27 (184)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Suggestion that it would be more pleasant to take southern route to France and land at Marseille.	142
Nov. 27 (2415)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Urgent advice to the President not to come to Europe without visiting Italy.	142
Nov. 28 (2423)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Audience accorded to Congressman Carlin by the Pope in which the latter stated that he would receive the President most cordially should he come to Rome. Understanding from several sources that the President would be left entirely free to do as he liked should he visit Italy.	142
Nov. 29 (89)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> From the President: Conviction, after conference with Navy officials, that it would be wiser to keep to original plan and land at Brest.	143

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 4 (6519)	<p><i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i></p> <p>President Wilson's acceptance of invitation by the President of France for luncheon on December 14.</p>	143
Dec. 9 (19)	<p><i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>For the President: Outline of plans for the first few days of the President's stay in Paris; desire of a committee of laboring men and socialists to stage a demonstration for him. Statement by Clemenceau that it has become impossible to begin the formal conferences before January 3 or 4.</p>	144
Dec. 9	<p><i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>For the President: Translation of an advance copy of the address of welcome which President Poincaré expects to deliver at the luncheon on December 14 (text printed).</p>	144
Dec. 10	<p><i>The Secretary to President Wilson (Close) to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>President Wilson's request that message be sent to Colonel House (text printed) expressing acquiescence in program as outlined for his first few days in Paris, but asking if demonstration by laboring men and socialists could be avoided in some tactful way.</p>	146
Dec. 10	<p><i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>Foreign Office desire to receive advance copy of President Wilson's reply to President Poincaré's address, and also to know whether it will be delivered in French.</p>	147
Dec. 11	<p><i>The Secretary to President Wilson (Close) to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Request that advance copy of President Wilson's reply to President Poincaré (text printed) be sent to the Ambassador in France, with information that it will be delivered in English.</p>	147
Dec. 12	<p><i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>For the President: Verbatim copy of the salient points of an address which the laboring men and socialists wish to present to the President.</p>	148
Dec. 16 (1785)	<p><i>Copy of Telegram From the British Ambassador in France (Derby) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)</i></p> <p>Conversation between Clemenceau and President Wilson in which the latter expressed his very strong desire to attend the Peace Conference. Clemenceau's intention to support the President's request, and desire for views of British Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.</p>	149
Undated [c. Dec. 18]	<p><i>The Secretary to the President (Tumulty) to President Wilson</i></p> <p>Tumulty's hope that the President will consider influence Pope can wield in favor of Wilsonian ideals before declining invitation to the Vatican.</p>	150

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 21 (20)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) (tel.)</i> The President's arrangements for his trip to England on December 26.	150
Dec. 29 (42)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Schedule for President Wilson's visit to Italy; Italian Government's request that it be submitted to the President for approval.	151
Dec. 29 (5)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Italy (Page) (tel.)</i> From House: Schedule for the President's visit to Italy.	152
Dec. 30 (8)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Italy (Page) (tel.)</i> From House: List of persons who will accompany the President to Rome.	152
1919 Jan. 2 (71)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Information from Secretary of War that steamer <i>George Washington</i> sailed January 1 and will arrive at Brest about 10th and that it could make return trip with troops and be back in France about February 12. Inquiry as to whether the President will need the ship before February 12.	152
Jan. 7 (58)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Suggestion that some of the American Colony in Paris might be looked after, in view of report that propaganda against President Wilson is going on in that city.	153
Jan. 11 (65)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Description of President Wilson's visit to Italy.	153
Jan. 11 (253)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Information that the present schedule for the <i>George Washington</i> is entirely satisfactory to the President and that he hopes that if he returns on this vessel in February, the War Department will ship as many troops on her as possible.	154

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

1918 Oct. 22	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson</i> List of persons (text printed), other than members of the Inquiry, whom it might be wise to have at the Peace Conference as advisers on different subjects.	155
-----------------	--	-----



AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 6 (7)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Advice that Clemenceau and Lloyd George seemed to approve of suggestion that England, France, Italy, and the United States should each have five representatives at the Conference table and that the other belligerent powers should have from one to three. Desire for the President's opinion.	156
[c. Nov. 7] (10)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Concurrence in views with regard to representation at the Peace Conference.	157
Nov. 9	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For House from Polk: Concern of Department over revolutionary committees in Switzerland. Bitterness of Republicans toward McCall because of attitude on election day; suggestion that a Western representative such as Borah might be desirable.	157
Nov. 10 (10)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Question whether, in view of Republican resentment of McCall, it might not be wise to increase number of delegates to seven and include another Republican of the standing of Root.	158
Nov. 13 (33)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> For Grew: Notification of selection as secretary of the U. S. Commission to the Peace Conference; designation of Harrison and Patchin as assistants.	158
Nov. 15 (106)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Gratification at selection as secretary of the U. S. Commission to the Peace Conference.	158
Nov. 14	<i>Associate Justice Day, of the Supreme Court, to President Wilson</i> Regret at not being able to accept offer of a place upon the Peace Commission.	159
Nov. 16	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)</i> Unwillingness to appoint Mr. Bryan as a Peace Commissioner, as it would be thought, unjustly but certainly, that he would be too easy and would pursue some Eutopian scheme. (Footnote: Information that this letter was in reply to a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, November 14, urging the appointment of William J. Bryan as a member of the Peace Commission.)	159
Nov. 18 (119)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Suggestion that Miss Ida Tarbell be sent to Paris to keep in touch with liberal elements there and report on their activities.	160

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 20 (126)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President and the Secretary of State: Suggestion that no announcement be made concerning U. S. delegation until England, France, and Italy are committed to a definite number of delegates. Information that the French are urging that official language of the Conference be French; intention to take up matter with the British.	160
Nov. 20 (127)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: Report that staff in Paris is handicapped by illness of several members.	161
Nov. 20 (54)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> For Auchincloss from Polk: Information that the President's plan in regard to representatives of various boards seems to be to telegraph for them when needed.	162
Nov. 20	<i>Mr. Henry White to President Wilson</i> Expression of appreciation for appointment as a member of the delegation to the Peace Conference.	162
Nov. 20	<i>President Wilson to Senator Henry L. Myers</i> Belief that it would not be wise to include Mr. Bryan among the Peace Commissioners, even though it would personally gratify the President to do so. (Footnote: Information that this letter was in reply to a letter from Senator Myers, November 18, suggesting appointment of Mr. William J. Bryan.)	163
Nov. 21	<i>The Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (Pershing) to the Special Representative (House)</i> Statement concerning Inter-Allied committees and A.E. F. members (text printed), giving data requested by Major Straight, of Colonel House's staff.	163
Nov. 22 (59)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> From the President: Opinion that United States is justified in insisting upon five delegates and upon official use of English as well as French language.	167
Nov. 22 (142)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Harrison from Grew: Information that he is proceeding with provisional organization of the Secretariat on the assumption that it should be in running order when the Commission reaches Paris.	167
Nov. 22	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor (Morrison)</i> Explanation that number of delegates will be small and that special representation of particular groups would seem to be out of the question.	168
Nov. 23	<i>The Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo) to President Wilson</i> Transmittal of a letter from Mr. William McAdoo suggesting the appointment of Elihu Root to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.	169

# AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 23	<i>The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson</i> Secretary Baker's belief that he should not go abroad with the President, since Secretary of the Treasury has resigned and that post will have to be filled by a new man. Suggestion of General Bliss as a Peace Commissioner.	169
Nov. 23 (152)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Advisability of the President's securing a small body of advisers on the subjects of finance, commerce, and the use of American raw material and food.	170
Nov. 24 (159)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Assurances that he will take up with the British the matter of the use of English at the Conference, and that he is working to secure an agreement that England, France, Italy, and the United States should each have five delegates.	170
Nov. 24 (164)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Mr. Balfour's opinion that the French will not consent to English as the official language; hope of persuading the British to take a more positive position.	171
Nov. 25 (172)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Feeling that the informal assurances received from the British and French as to number of delegates are sufficiently satisfactory to justify the President in making announcement concerning U. S. delegates.	171
Nov. 25	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo)</i> Unwillingness to appoint Mr. Root, because of his reactionary attitude, as a member of the Commission to Negotiate Peace.	171
Nov. 26 (75)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> For Grew: List of members of Commission, excluding the President's party.	172
Nov. 26	<i>The Secretary of Labor (Wilson) to President Wilson</i> Transmittal of a letter from Mr. Frank P. Walsh, urging the naming of Mr. Gompers as a member of the Peace Commission.	173
Nov. 27	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of Labor (Wilson)</i> Opinion that there should be no representation of special classes or interests.	173
Nov. 27 (191)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Mr. Balfour's statement, "that delegates on panel system would suit us best"; intention to ask for explanation. Balfour's suggestion that question be taken up with Clemenceau as to use of both English and French as official languages.	173

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 29 (92)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)</i> (tel.) Corrections in list telegraphed in No. 75, November 26.	174
Nov. 30 (201)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: Informal efforts to get financial, shipping, and general economic representatives prepared for conferences; discussion of men available and suggestion that someone be sent over to represent the Alien Property Custodian. Belief that economic questions will be the basis of almost every dispute at the Conference.	174
Nov. 30	<i>Form of Credentials</i> Issued to Commissioners Plenipotentiary.	175
Nov. 30	<i>Form of Commission</i> Of individual Commissioners Plenipotentiary.	176
Dec. 2 (112)	<i>The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House (tel.)</i> For Auchincloss from Polk: Hope that the Secretary will have opportunity to take up with the President the matter of the financial representative and also the representative of the Alien Property Custodian.	177
Dec. 4 (229)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: Belief that Davis would be most satisfactory man to act as Treasury's adviser on Peace Mission.	177
Dec. 5 (1)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Request by French Government that Gompers be asked to go over soon, as his influence would be useful in Germany.	178
Dec. 5 (2)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> President Wilson's reply to an inquiry by Gompers that he saw no objection to the holding of an international labor conference and that he thought it advisable for Gompers to be in Paris in any event.	178
Dec. 7 (1)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Steps taken in building up an organization for the Commission to Negotiate Peace in order that the Commission may be in a position to begin its proper functions upon arrival.	178
Dec. 8 (3)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Navy's decision that it does not wish to handle telegraphic communications at the Paris end in view of Department's decision to handle them at the Washington end; probability that the six coding clerks being sent out by Department will be inadequate.	180
Dec. 9 (153)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Grew: Urgent advice to hold telegraphic communications situation as it is until the President's party arrives.	181

# AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 19 (53)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Grew from Phillips: Information that various persons returning from Paris seem to have the impression that large numbers of men are being appointed to American Mission because of their social prominence.	181
Dec. 19	<i>Lieutenant Ralph Hayes to the Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace (Bowman)</i> Excerpts from a confidential report made to General Pershing in which suggestion was made that General Churchill be designated as Director of Army Peace Personnel.	182
Undated	<i>Memorandum Regarding the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Explanation that the Intelligence Section is an outgrowth of the Inquiry and represents a new idea in international relations. (Footnote: This memorandum bears no indication of date or origin.)	183
Dec. 21	<i>The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Memorandum containing substance of a conference between Mezes and Grew regarding proposed designation and responsibilities of General Churchill as officer in charge of military personnel.	184
Undated	<i>Memorandum Presented to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary by General Tasker H. Bliss</i> Recommendation that the Secretary of the Commission be given a title equivalent to that of his British colleague; further recommendation that an attempt be made to eliminate all unnecessary assistant personnel.	185
Dec. 23	<i>Memorandum for the President</i> Resolution adopted by the Commissioners Plenipotentiary (text printed) recommending that the Secretary of the Commission be given a title equivalent to that of his British colleague. Proposal that he be given the title of "Supervising Director with Ministerial Rank."	187
[Dec. 23] (56)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Phillips from Grew: Résumé of facts and circumstances answering the criticism that officers have been selected by the Commission on the basis of social prominence rather than ability.	188
Dec. 27	<i>Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Colonel House's request that Mr. Grew bring up before the Commission the question of the proposed appointment of Major Birch Helms to assist in transmitting information to and from leaders of the Republican Party.	189

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 28	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Mr. William C. Bullitt</i> Information that the Commissioners disapproved the proposed appointment of Major Birch Helms.	189
Dec. 30	<i>Minutes</i> Of the meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary on Monday, December 30, 1918. (Footnote: Information that minutes of other meetings before January 31, 1919, have not been found in Department files.)	190
Dec. 30 (111)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Instructions to send official notification to British, French, and Italian Governments of the names of the American Commissioners.	191
1919 Jan. 6	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)</i> Official notification of the composition of the American Mission.	192
Jan. 10	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Secretary of State</i> Observations in connection with a statement by the Secretary of War that he hears much comment to the effect that there are too many military men connected with the Commission.	192

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING INFORMATION

1918 Nov. 8 (61)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President and the Secretary of State: Recommendation that U. S. agents be sent into Austria, Bohemia, and the Ukraine to obtain accurate and unbiased information; suggestion that Mr. Grew have charge of the work.	194
Nov. 12 (99)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Amplification of telegram No. 61 of November 8, setting forth proposed plan for dealing with whole problem of political intelligence, establishing adequate counter-espionage organization, and providing protection for the American Mission.	194
Nov. 15 (36)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> Approval in principle of plan regarding political intelligence and counterespionage organization; information that Secretary of War has undertaken to provide protection for American Mission.	196

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING INFORMATION—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 16 (112)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State</i> (tel.) List of queries to be sent to Berne, Copenhagen, and Stockholm.	197
Nov. 18 (118)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State</i> (tel.) For Polk from Auchincloss: Request for explanation of plans of the Committee on Public Information. Information that Grew is ill; intention to go ahead with plans outlined in telegram No. 99, November 12, unless instructed to await Grew's recovery.	197
Nov. 18 (47)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)</i> (tel.) For Auchincloss from Polk: Promise to find out about Committee on Public Information. Suggestion that he await a definite answer to telegram No. 99, November 12, and then go ahead with organization.	198
Nov. 19 (123)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State</i> (tel.) Intention to ask Hoover, with the assistance of Gibson, to lay foundation for political intelligence system during his visit to Central Powers; statement that Grew will supervise political intelligence section at Paris; suggestion that Gibson remain at Vienna.	199
Nov. 21 (132)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State</i> (tel.) From Grew: Names of State Department men whose services are desired for intelligence work in Central Europe; names of Army officers now available for such work; suggestion that the agents be designated by Hoover as members of the U. S. Food Administration; request for authorization to draw on Secretary of State up to \$50,000.	199
Nov. 26 (71)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)</i> (tel.) Approval of suggestion that Gibson remain at Vienna.	201
Nov. 26 (72)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)</i> (tel.) For Grew: Information that, with the exception of Gibson, the State Department men desired are not available; approval of choice of Army officers and of suggestion that they all be furnished with credentials by Hoover; authorization to draw up to \$50,000.	201
Nov. 26	<i>The Secretary of State to All Missions in Europe Except Paris</i> (cir. tel.) Instructions to telegraph to the U. S. Embassy in Paris, for Colonel House, copies of all cables dispatched to the Department which deal with political developments in the country of origin.	202
Nov. 26	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Request for allotment of \$50,000 for the organization of the political intelligence service.	202

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING INFORMATION—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 27	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Question as to whether this is the political intelligence work being planned through Colonel House in response to his cables.	202
Nov. 27 (194)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Information that Hoover is in accord with plan for securing political intelligence from the new central states and is willing to designate as members of U. S. Food Administration all men assigned to the field.	203
Nov. 29	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Statement that letter of November 26 does relate to the arrangements for gathering political intelligence which are being planned through Colonel House.	203
Dec. 5 (10)	<i>Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Patterson)</i> Enumeration of the services placed at the disposal of the Commission by the Overseas Courier Service.	203
Dec. 5 (6144)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Embassy's practice of showing all outgoing telegrams of importance to Colonel House.	205
Dec. 5 (232)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Explanation that delay in agreement among the Allies as to relief policies has made it impossible to send out political intelligence agents accredited as representatives of Food Administration, and that the only method which suggests itself is to utilize Army officers and send them out in civilian clothes as representatives of the State Department.	206
Dec. 10	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)</i> Request to be officially accredited to appropriate Departments of the French Government in order to be in a position to take up official matters on behalf of the Commission.	206
Dec. 12 (7)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Grew: Request that consuls in Allied and neutral countries and countries bordering the Mediterranean be instructed to send to the American Mission copies of reports dealing with political situation.	207
Dec. 19 (54)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Auchincloss from Polk: Notification that John Foster Dulles, representing the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, will sail December 21.	207



# AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING INFORMATION—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 20	<i>The Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Bowman) to Messrs. Beer, Day, Dixon, Haskins, Hornbeck, Jefferson, Lord, Lunt, Mezes, Seymour, Shotwell, Westermann, and Young</i> Information that arrangements have been made whereby each of the division chiefs is authorized to see nationalist leaders in order to learn views of the various groups.	208
Dec. 21	<i>The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Plans for the organization of a Division of Current Intelligence Summaries, with Mr. William C. Bullitt in charge.	208
Dec. 23	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Mr. William C. Bullitt</i> Notification of appointment as chief of the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries.	209
Dec. 31 (122)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Decision that agents going into the field for political information should go as agents of the Commission itself; that accordingly Ellis Dresel has been sent into Germany, and that a group under the leadership of Prof. A. C. Coolidge have started for Vienna.	209
1919 Jan. 9	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Explanation that Mr. Bullitt now receives incoming intelligence and each day gives each Commissioner an oral digest thereof.	210

## CENSORSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS

1918 Nov. 16 (114)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Request for a cablegram which may be shown to the British and French authorities in order to induce them to discontinue the political censorship upon U. S. press despatches.	212
Nov. 18 (42)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House) (tel.)</i> The President's reply (text printed) expressing his hope and expectation that the British and French authorities will entirely remove the political censorship upon U. S. press despatches.	212
Nov. 21 (137)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President and the Secretary of State: Communication from the French Foreign Ministry stating that censorship will be removed (text printed).	213

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## CENSORSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 22 (146)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report from press correspondents that their messages are now permitted to pass through without interference by the French censor.	213
Nov. 28 (195)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Advice that the British Government has abolished the political censorship of U. S. press despatches.	213
Dec. 17	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Conclusion that the best way to handle press relations is for the Commissioners to hold a brief meeting each day to which newspapermen will be invited; hope that Commissioners will agree to the appointment of Mr. Ray Stannard Baker to handle preparation of all press material to be issued from the Commission.	214
Undated [Rec'd Dec. 19] (29)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Polk from Auchincloss: Message for Tumulty from the President setting forth arrangements which the President has made for handling newspaper publicity, and his desire to be kept informed concerning tone and discretion of the American press.	214
Dec. 20 (67)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Report that press stories from Paris are often contradictory. Associated Press statement that U. S. delegation has resolved to advocate sinking of the surrendered warships; suggestion that Department be authorized to contradict story if it is untrue.	215
Dec. 23 (76)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Information that American Mission has not discussed the question of the surrendered warships.	216
Dec. 31	<i>The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Interview with Mr. George Adam, Paris correspondent of the London <i>Times</i> , during which Mr. Adam expressed the desire of the British newspapermen for an opportunity to meet the Commissioners.	216
1919 Jan. 2	<i>The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Letter to Mr. George Adam (text printed) stating that it is felt that if the Commissioners should appoint meetings with the British correspondents, they would also have to set a time for the French and Italian correspondents.	217

AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## CENSORSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 3	<i>The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Private Secretary of the Secretary of State (Kirk)</i> Plan to give the newspapermen a daily list of the names of those with whom the Commissioners have had conferences; inquiry as to whether it will be convenient to have an orderly call for these reports at 6:30 each evening.	218
Jan. 7 (1)	<i>The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Anxiety of newspapermen to know whether initial meeting of the Peace Conference is to be an open one at which they may be present.	218
Jan. 8	<i>The Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Information that provision will probably be made for the newspaper correspondents to be present at the first formal meeting of the Conference.	219
Jan. 9 (114)	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Bowman)</i> Request that there be placed at the disposal of Mr. Ray Stannard Baker any information in the possession of the Intelligence Section which he may desire.	219
Jan. 17	<i>The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Mr. Baker's desire that members of the Intelligence Section prepare memoranda for and make oral explanations to the press representatives; willingness of the members to do so if the Commissioners approve, despite risk involved.	220

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## AMERICAN REPUBLICS

1918 Nov. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Inquiry by Brazilian Foreign Minister as to whether it is desired that Brazil be represented at the preliminary Allied conferences; Foreign Minister's belief that he should go to the Peace Conference with the Brazilian delegation.	223
Nov. 19	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) (tel.)</i> Department's attitude that it is not essential that Brazil be represented at preliminary conferences but that it would be desirable for Foreign Minister to be present at the Peace Conference.	223

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## AMERICAN REPUBLICS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 25	<p><i>The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>Foreign Minister's opinion that Brazilian Minister at Paris should represent Brazil at the preliminary conferences; information that Foreign Minister's selection as delegate to the Peace Conference awaits President Alves' return.</p>	223
Nov. 25	<p><i>The Uruguayan Minister (Cosio) to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Inquiry as to whether U. S. and Allied Governments have considered the question of the representation at the Peace Conference of those countries which have broken relations with Germany.</p>	224
Nov. 29	<p><i>The Secretary of State to the Minister in Peru (McMillin) (tel.)</i></p> <p>Statement, for the information of the Minister, that the Associated Governments have not as yet discussed the question of the representation at the Peace Conference of those countries which have broken relations with Germany but have not declared war.</p>	224
Nov. 29	<p><i>The Secretary of State to the Minister in Panama (Price) (tel.)</i></p> <p>Statement, for the Minister's information, that the U. S. Government does not think it necessary for all the interested countries to be represented at the preliminary conferences.</p> <p>(Instructions to repeat to Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Similar telegram on the same date to the Minister in Cuba with instructions to repeat to Haiti.)</p>	225
Dec. 8 (240)	<p><i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>Promise to see if matter of Brazilian representation at preliminary conferences can be arranged.</p>	225
Dec. 16	<p><i>The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>Urgent request for information as to how invitations to Peace Conference will be issued and whether less important Allied countries may participate on their own initiative.</p>	226
Dec. 19	<p><i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) (tel.)</i></p> <p>Department's understanding that invitations will be sent out from Paris; lack of any further information.</p>	226
Dec. 21 (89)	<p><i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i></p> <p>For the Secretary of State: Substance of telegram from Ambassador in Brazil requesting information concerning invitations to Conference.</p>	226
Dec. 24 (124)	<p><i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i></p> <p>Memorandum by Uruguayan Foreign Minister (text printed) recommending that countries such as Uruguay be invited to Peace Conference with the arrangement that they shall intervene only in matters affecting America. Inquiry whether invitations are to be extended to the Central and South American countries (1) which declared war on Germany, (2) which broke relations with Germany.</p>	227

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## AMERICAN REPUBLICS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 27 (90)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Assurances that at the appropriate time the U. S. Commissioners will use their good offices with regard to Brazil's representation at the Conference; suggestion that Brazil send delegates to Paris provisionally.	228
Dec. 27 (91)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Statement that the American Commission will use its good offices on behalf of the Central and South American countries which declared war on or broke relations with Germany.	228
Dec. 27 (29)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Telegram from Montevideo, December 24 (text printed), transmitting memorandum by the Uruguayan Foreign Minister (text printed) in which he sets forth reason why Uruguay should be represented at Conference.	228
Dec. 30 (42)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Communication from Ambassador in Argentina, December 20 (text printed), explaining that Argentina bases its request for a place at the Conference upon its desire to join the League of Nations.	229
Dec. 31	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Uruguay (Jeffery) (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Foreign Minister that American Commission will use its good offices on behalf of the Central and South American countries which declared war on or broke relations with Germany.	230
Dec. 31	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) (tel.)</i> Instructions to inform Foreign Minister that U. S. Commissioners will use their good offices with regard to Brazil's representation at the Conference. Secretary's suggestion that Brazil send delegates to Paris provisionally.	230
1919 Jan. 2 (62)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Report that Argentine Chargé called to express his Government's anxiety to know if Argentina would be invited to be represented at Conference.	231
Jan. 3	<i>The Minister in Uruguay (Jeffery) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Foreign Minister's statement that his Government is greatly pleased with U. S. position regarding Uruguayan interests in the Peace Conference.	231
Jan. 7	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Peruvian Minister (Tudela)</i> Reply to Minister's inquiry concerning representation of Latin American countries which broke relations with Germany; information that American Commission will use its good offices in their behalf.	231

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## AMERICAN REPUBLICS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 7	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Panama (Price) (tel.)</i> Information, to be used in answering inquiries, that the American Commission will extend its good offices in behalf of the Latin American countries which declared war on or broke relations with Germany. (Instructions to repeat to Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Similar telegram sent on January 8 to the Minister in Peru with instructions to repeat to Ecuador and Bolivia; also to the Minister in Cuba with instructions to repeat to Haiti.)	232
Jan. 9 (161)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Request by Brazilian Foreign Minister that American Commission assist him in securing admission of four delegates from Brazil.	233
Jan. 10 (228)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Information that there seems to be a sympathetic feeling toward representation of neutral nations at any conference in which questions affecting their interests will be discussed.	233
Jan. 10 (178)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Presentation of reasons why it might be desirable to give Brazil four delegates.	234
Jan. 10	<i>The Brazilian Chargé (Moreira) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Cable from Foreign Minister (text printed) requesting Acting Secretary's intercession in obtaining acceptance at the Conference of all four of Brazil's delegates.	234
Jan. 11 (256)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Request that Brazilian Foreign Minister be informed that Secretary will try to arrange for admission of Brazilian delegates. (Footnote: Information that the Supreme Council on January 13 agreed to give Brazil three delegates.)	235

## SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

1918 Nov. 21 (1363)	<i>The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Anticipation that representations will soon be made by the Norwegian Government concerning its desire to participate in the Peace Conference in order to advance its views on certain matters.	236
Dec. 7	<i>The Danish Minister (Brun) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Copy of a note addressed by the Danish Minister at Paris to the French Government (text printed) proposing that Denmark be allowed to participate in the discussions regarding the League of Nations and all questions directly affecting Denmark.	236

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 7 (1100)	<i>The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of copy of a note addressed by the Norwegian Government to the French Government (identical with the note addressed by the Danish Minister at Paris to the French Government, <i>supra</i> ). Foreign Minister's suggestion that neutral Foreign Ministers be invited to the Conference.	238
Dec. 14	<i>The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Request of the Ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden at Paris that the attitude of their Governments in regard to representation at the Peace Conference be made known to the other Governments concerned.	239

## CHINA

1918 Nov. 15 (6282)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> Instructions to support the request of China to be represented on the Supreme War Council whenever questions concerning China and the Far East are being discussed.	241
Nov. 16	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For Third Assistant Secretary of State: Appointment of Mr. W. W. Willoughby as adviser to the President of China, to assist in presentation of China's case before the Peace Conference. Willoughby's desire for approval of appointment.	241
Nov. 18	<i>The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch) (tel.)</i> President Wilson's opinion that it would be unwise for an American to have official connection with another government in connection with peace negotiations; hope, therefore, that the Minister will discourage Willoughby's appointment.	241
Nov. 18	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Intimations by Japanese Legation that Japan might settle the Shantung question in accordance with the declaration of 1914, thus removing any necessity for China to be represented at the Conference.	242
Nov. 19 (5920)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> French Foreign Minister's attitude that China's request to be represented on the Supreme War Council should be granted only upon joint recommendation of France, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States; his opinion that there would be no objection.	242
Nov. 20	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Renewal of recommendation that Mr. Willoughby be allowed to accept appointment as adviser to the President of China.	243

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## CHINA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 21 (5956)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Foreign Office statement that as yet the French Government has not received Chinese Government's request to be represented on the Supreme War Council during discussions pertaining to the Orient.	243
Nov. 22	<i>The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that if Mr. Willoughby cannot accompany the Peace Conference delegation, the Foreign Office will probably desire to send their adviser, Dr. W. C. Dennis.	244
Nov. 25	<i>The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch) (tel.)</i> Reiteration of Department's position that no American citizen should serve as adviser to the Chinese peace delegation.	244
Dec. 13	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch) (tel.)</i> Authorization to mention to the proper authorities the desire of the Southern Chinese party that there be a representative from the South on the peace delegation.	244
1919 Jan. 4 (93)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that the Chinese Commission sailed on January 2 with C. T. Wang as delegate.	245

## FINLAND

1918 Nov. 27 (1327)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that the Finnish Government has made a request to be represented at the Peace Conference, and desires that the U. S. Government be informed of this request.	246
---------------------------	---	-----

## HEJAZ

1918 Nov. 20 (1305)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Information that King Hussein has expressed his intention of sending a representative to the Peace Conference to take part in discussions concerning the definite settlement of Arab countries; British Government's suggestion to him that he appoint Emir Feisal for this purpose.	247
Nov. 22 (1317)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Notification that Emir Feisal is proceeding to Paris as King Hussein's representative.	247



REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## LIBERIA

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 5	<i>The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that Liberia expects to be represented at the Peace Conference and would appoint, if advisable, a mixed commission of Liberians and Americans; that it would be agreeable to Liberia for U. S. Government to recommend American member or members, and that Liberia is disposed to take no action until advised to do so by U. S. Government.	248
Dec. 6 (277)	<i>The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Note from the President of Liberia to the Chargé (text printed) requesting him to ascertain the views of the Department in regard to Liberia's desire to be represented at the Peace Conference.	249
Dec. 14	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) (tel.)</i> Department's concurrence in suggestion that Liberia be represented at Peace Conference by mixed commission of three; likelihood that temporary loan could be arranged in the United States to cover actual expenses of delegation.	250
Dec. 23	<i>The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Appointment of two Liberian members and one American (H. F. Worley) as delegates to Peace Conference; intention of Secretary of Treasury of Liberia to authorize Worley to negotiate loan in United States.	251
1919 Jan. 10 (226)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Suggestion that Acting Secretary indicate to Liberian Government that it would be desirable to appoint one delegate with such assistants as may be necessary.	252
Jan. 16	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) (tel.)</i> For the President: Information that Worley has been delayed with details of loan and suggests that the Liberian delegates meet him at Paris.	252
Jan. 17 (282)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing: Notification of names of the three delegates appointed by Liberian Government; request that accommodations be arranged for them.	252

## MONTENEGRO

1918 Nov. 21 (5957)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that a request to be represented at the Conference has been addressed by Montenegro through the Ambassador to the U. S. Government.	254
---------------------------	--	-----

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## MONTENEGRO—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 21 (6794)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State</i> Note from Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs, November 14 (text printed), addressing to the U. S. Government Montenegro's appeal to be represented at the Conference.	254

## PERSIA

1918 Nov. 15 (43)	<i>The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that Persian Government is contemplating sending a commission to Washington in hope of obtaining U. S. assistance in securing a seat at the Conference.	256
Nov. 15 (464)	<i>The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State</i> Explanation that Persia bases her claim to representation at the Conference upon the heavy losses which she suffered as a result of the actual fighting which took place on her soil.	257
Nov. 21	<i>The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Secretary of State</i> Copies of translations of two telegrams from the Foreign Minister (texts printed) emphasizing Persia's need to be a voting member of the Conference and setting forth eight points which the Persian Government desires to have carried out by the Conference on its behalf.	257
Dec. 2 (26)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan)</i> Statement that the U. S. Government regards with sympathy the request of the Persian Government but that a decision cannot be communicated until after the President has reached Paris.	261
Dec. 18 (216)	<i>The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Information that British Government has indicated willingness that Persia should participate in the Peace Conference but has stated that Persian Government should approach the other Allied Governments in order to secure unanimity on the subject. Request for U. S. cooperation.	261
Dec. 21 (94)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Lansing: Request for advice as to what action should be taken in regard to request of the Persian Government.	262
1919 Jan. 7 (84)	<i>The Chargé in Persia (White) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Indication that Persia's chief desire is for economic independence.	263

# REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

## POLAND

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 12	<i>The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Inquiry as to sentiment of U. S. Government in regard to application of the Polish National Committee at Paris for permission to participate in the Peace Conference when questions concerning Poland are discussed.	264
Dec. 24	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the French Chargé (Chambrun)</i> Assurance that as soon as the position of the U. S. Government is determined the French Embassy will be informed.	264

## ROUMANIA

1919 Jan. 11 (6700)	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy, January 7 (text printed), conveying the protest of the President of the Council as a result of the report that Roumania is not to be admitted to the Peace Conference.	265
Jan. 17 (281)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Request for facts concerning report that Roumania is not to be admitted to the Conference.	266
Jan. 18 (323)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Assurance that there has never been any question regarding representation of Roumania; information that with unanimous approval she has been assigned two representatives.	266

## RUSSIA

1918 Nov. 20	<i>The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State</i> <i>Aide-mémoire</i> setting forth Russia's interests in the prospective peace settlement and the necessity that Russia receive proper representation (text printed). Request to be informed of position of U. S. Government in the matter.	267
Nov. 20	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Doubt as to the feasibility of recognizing and receiving delegates from the Omsk government, as recommended in the memorandum from the Interparty League for the Restoration of Free Russia (text printed).	268
Nov. 26	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Belief that a way must be found to solve the difficulty in connection with the representation of Russia at the Peace Conference; suggestions as to how it might be done.	270
Dec. 6 (135)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Suggestion by Russian Ambassador and Prince Lvoff that the diplomatic representatives of the old Miliukov government and other prominent Russians should be invited to the Conference.	272

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## RUSSIA—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 16 (37)	<i>The Consul General at Archangel (Poole) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For Colonel House: Plans of N. V. Tchikowski, President of the Russian Government of the Northern Region, to go to Paris.	272
Dec. 24	<i>The Secretary of Embassy at Paris (Caffery) to Captain Waller H. Lippmann</i> Copy of translation of a circular telegram, December 7 (text printed), from Mr. Klutchnikoff, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kolchak government at Omsk, asking that the interests of Russia may not be forgotten in the peace negotiations.	272
1919 Jan. 10	<i>The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State</i> <i>Aide-mémoire</i> regarding the representation of Russia at the Peace Conference, prepared by the conference of Russian Ambassadors and public men assembled at Paris (text printed).	274
Jan. 10	<i>The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State</i> <i>Aide-mémoire</i> concerning the recognition of the government of Omsk, handed by the Ambassadors of Russia to the Allied Governments (text printed).	276
Jan. 15 (43)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Advice that the British Government has received from the Russian representative in London a copy of a telegram from the Omsk government urging that their representative be permitted to be present in the Peace Conference when the Russian question is discussed.	277
Jan. 20 (55)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Information that the British High Commissioner in Siberia has asked the Foreign Office to inform Monsieur Sazonoff that the Omsk government, having heard that he is going to Paris, hope that he will act as their agent and as the agent of the other new governments in Russia and of Deniken.	278

## SWITZERLAND

1918 Nov. 21	<i>The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State</i> Note from the Swiss Government expressing its desire to be represented at the Peace Conference, or at least at those sessions which deal with subjects of interest to Switzerland.	279
Nov. 25	<i>The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)</i> Request for U. S. opinion concerning desire of the Swiss Government that its representatives be admitted to the Peace Conference.	279

REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NATIONALITIES AT THE  
PEACE CONFERENCE

## SWITZERLAND—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 29	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere)</i> Statement that attitude of U. S. Government is to receive such requests with sympathy, but that no definite position will be taken until after the Secretary of State arrives in Paris.	280
Nov. 29 (1333)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State</i> Request for expression of U. S. views on question of representation of Swiss Government at the Peace Conference.	280
Nov. 30	<i>The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)</i> Statement that U. S. Government has received with sympathy the request of the Swiss Government but is not in a position to reply until after the President arrives in Paris.	281
Dec. 5	<i>The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)</i> Information that U. S. Government has replied to Swiss Government expressing sympathy, but stating that no decision can be made until the Secretary of State has discussed the question in Paris.	281

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## THE UNITED STATES

1918 Undated [c. Oct. 29] (3)	<i>President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)</i> Conviction that there can be no real difficulty about peace terms and interpretation of the Fourteen Points if Entente statesmen are perfectly frank and have no selfish aims.	285
Nov. 16	<i>Memorandum on Plans for the Peace Conference, Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State</i> Queries to be considered.	285
Dec. 5	<i>Captain Walter Lippmann to the Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Mezes)</i> List of the most immediately pressing territorial questions.	287
Dec. 5	<i>The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State</i> Copy of a communication to the Department in regard to freedom of the seas (text printed) including, for purposes of discussion, four proposals for improving administrative methods in the application of blockades.	288
Dec. 15	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Belief that the principles of the League of Nations and of disarmament must be admitted before any other questions are considered by the Conference in order that the United States can use them in opposing transactions of expediency.	294
Dec. 16	<i>The Secretary of State to General Tasker H. Bliss</i> Concurrence in view that the principles of the peace should be settled first.	296

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## THE UNITED STATES—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 26	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Inquiry as to what steps the American Commissioners are going to take in order to secure unanimity of understanding in regard to the questions sure to come up in the Conference.	297
* Dec. 30	<i>The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Scott, Miller) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of skeleton draft of peace treaty printed <i>infra</i> .	298
* Undated	<i>Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty</i> With an appendix setting forth a discussion of questions concerning signatories to the treaty.	298
1919 Jan. 8	<i>The Commissioners Plenipotentiary (Lansing, White, House, Bliss) to President Wilson</i> List of subjects in the order in which the Commissioners believe they should be considered.	316
* Jan. 9	<i>The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State</i> Tentative draft of the proposed treaty (text printed) showing first attempt to put flesh on the skeleton draft, this installment consisting of: articles dealing with contracting powers, a suggestion as to a preamble, an article <i>A</i> ending the war and restoring peace, and an article <i>B</i> setting forth a draft of an agreement for a League of Nations.	316
Jan. 9	<i>Mr. Allen W. Dulles to the Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison)</i> Transmittal of a possible statement in regard to use of force to secure realization of territorial ambitions (text printed), with suggestion that it would be preferable if it were made as a joint declaration of the Allies or in a speech by the President.	324
Jan. 11	<i>The Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison) to the Secretary of State</i> Draft of the announcement to be made by the American Commissioners in regard to the use of force to realize territorial ambitions (text printed).	325
Jan. 12	<i>Major General F. J. Kernan to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)</i> Copy of a memorandum for the American Commission (text printed) giving some suggestions apropos of the American skeleton draft of a peace treaty.	326
Jan. 14	<i>The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State</i> Draft of article <i>C</i> of the draft treaty, entitled "Declaration for Equality of Trade Conditions" (text printed).	329

## THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCE AT LONDON, DECEMBER 1918

1918 Nov. 25 (173)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Telegram from Lloyd George (text printed) stating desire that Colonel House come to London December 1 for a conference with Clemenceau, Orlando, and himself. House's hope that he will be able to be there.	333
--------------------------	---	-----

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCE AT LONDON, DECEMBER 1918—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 30 (203)	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Information that Clemenceau called to give his solemn word that he would discuss nothing of importance with Lloyd George in London.	333
Dec. 3	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House</i> Substance of conversations with various American and British officials. Information that Captain Dennis of the American Embassy at London has made a study of English political situation; summary of his views.	334
Dec. 4	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House</i> Conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Tyrrell's intimation that British claims for indemnity by Germany would not be large; also his views regarding questions of procedure for the Inter-Allied conferences and subjects to be discussed.	338
Dec. 5	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House</i> From Wiseman: Information that at the Inter-Allied Conference at London the resolution making conclusions of Conference subject to discussion with the President was pressed through by Balfour in face of much opposition; Balfour's willingness to appeal to Colonel House to give assent to the most urgent matters.	339
Dec. 6	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House</i> Conviction that no program of procedure for Inter-Allied conferences can be agreed upon in advance and that it will be necessary for the President to have his own program.	340
Dec. 6	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House</i> From Wiseman: Understanding that Balfour would like House to intimate that the President would be glad for Reading to be in Paris during peace discussions; belief that Reading would accept position of High Commissioner on Anglo-American affairs.	340
Dec. 7 (7)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From House for the President: Summary of the proceedings of the conference held at London, December 2 and 3, between Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando; recommendations in regard to resolutions taken at the conference.	340
Dec. 8 (6)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For House: President Wilson's request that final conclusions with regard to certain of the resolutions be withheld until he arrives in Paris.	343
Dec. 10	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Decision that it would be best simply to advise Lord Derby that a summary of the proceedings had been sent to the President; information that the President had not been committed to any of the resolutions.	343

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## FRANCE

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Nov. 9 (8)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Statement by Clemenceau that it was his purpose to work in harmony with the United States in all things.	344
Nov. 15	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Remarks made by the French Foreign Office on previous peace conferences (text printed); scheme of procedure for the Peace Conference as suggested by French Foreign Office (text printed).	344
Nov. 21 (133)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> List of changes which the French Government has made in the scheme of procedure (text printed).	352
Nov. 22	<i>Memorandum by Mr. D. H. Miller on Revised French Proposals of November 21, 1918</i> Consideration of the French scheme of procedure and of the changes submitted in Colonel House's telegram No. 133, November 21.	354
Nov. 29	<i>The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State</i> Statement of the results of a study made by French Government (text printed) of problems concerning the peace preliminaries and the establishment of a general peace treaty. Request for remarks.	365
Dec. 10 (10334)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Memorandum prepared by the Secretary of Embassy in Great Britain, December 7 (text printed), enclosing a paper left by the French Ambassador at the Foreign Office (text printed) which sets forth a proposed basis of the preliminaries of peace with Germany; explanation by Counselor of French Embassy that the paper is based upon belief that a preliminary peace should be concluded without delay.	371
Dec. 10 (6213)	<i>The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Description of a trip with the Presidential party to Metz and Strassburg, where the crowds gave convincing demonstrations of loyalty toward France.	378
Dec. 24	<i>The French High Commissioner to the United States (Tardieu) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Memorandum which the French Cabinet wishes to have submitted to President Wilson (text printed) expressing opinion that the Inter-Allied councils which guarantee supplies to the Allies should not be discontinued immediately and the wish that American representatives be maintained on these councils, at least as consulting members.	379



POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## FRANCE—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 9	<i>Mr. Warrington Dawson to the Chargé in France (Bliss)</i> Memorandum of a conversation with Marshal Joffre, January 8 (text printed), in which Joffre discussed the political situation in France and some vital points in regard to the peace treaty.	380
Jan. 9	<i>The Chargé in France (Bliss) to Mr. Henry White</i> Transmittal of text received from the French Foreign Minister of the plan for the preliminary conversations between the Allied Ministers, dated January 5 (text printed).	385
Jan. 12	<i>The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State</i> Observations on the French plan for the preliminary conversations between the Allied Ministers.	396

## GREAT BRITAIN

1918 Oct. 30	<i>The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson (tel.)</i> Statement by Lloyd George that Great Britain would like the United States to become trustee for German East African colonies. Advice against such procedure; opinion that the British desire United States to accept something in order that they may more freely take what they wish.	407
Nov. 11 (91)	<i>The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> For the President: Excerpts from the London <i>Times</i> of November 9, 1918: (1) protest by Australian Premier that Australia had not been represented in settling the terms of peace, (2) reply by British Government press bureau, and (3) editorial discussing the American elections.	407
Nov. 27 (740)	<i>The Military Attaché at London (Slocum) to the Chief of Staff, War Department (March) (tel.)</i> Outline of British Government's present policy in regard to the Near East and Africa.	408
Dec. 4 (4272)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report on political situation in Great Britain: declining confidence in Lloyd George and the Coalition Government, and fear that the enemy will be let off too easily.	409
Dec. 12 (4555)	<i>The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that great damage is being done by inopportune comments by the American press on the subject of freedom of the seas.	413
Dec. 19 (4759)	<i>The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that the press is now chiefly occupied with the President's visit to Paris and that the sole question concerning which any anxiety is expressed is that of freedom of the seas.	413

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## GREAT BRITAIN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 2 (8)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> British proposal, in view of disturbances in Central Europe, that British, French, Italian, and U. S. Governments issue a joint warning that the claims of any government will be prejudiced by any attempt to occupy disputed territory by force.	415

## ITALY

1918 Nov. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State</i> Three memoranda by Mr. H. Nelson Gay relating to Italian interests (texts printed); text of letter from Mr. Gay transmitting the first of these memoranda (in regard to Africa) and stating that he is preparing a series of such memoranda at the request of the chairman of the Research Committee of the Inquiry.	416
Nov. 14 (2353)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that Italy has in contemplation the creation of five new provinces and that plans may already have matured.	442
Nov. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum prepared by Mr. H. Nelson Gay on the subject of Fiume (text printed).	442
Nov. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State</i> Copy of a letter to Colonel House relating to the present situation in Italy (text printed), and transmitting the "Daily Italian Political Notes" of November 13, 14, and 15, prepared by Mr. Gino C. Speranza, of the Embassy staff (texts printed).	447
Dec. 8 (2458)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report of political situation in Italy and of unanimity of public opinion in demanding that President Wilson visit Italy.	460
Dec. 13	<i>The Technical Adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller) to General Tasker H. Bliss</i> Opinion, in reply to Bliss' verbal inquiry, that there has been no formal modification of the Pact of London but that it may well be argued that the acceptance of the Fourteen Points must be considered to have modified the Pact insofar as it is inconsistent with the Fourteen Points.	463
Dec. 14 (15)	<i>The Chargé in Italy (Jay) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Brief résumé of political situation in Italy; statement that elaborate preparations are being made for reception of President Wilson.	463
Dec. 19 (21)	<i>The Chargé in Italy (Jay) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report on political situation in Italy and Italian reactions to events in neighboring countries.	464

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

ITALY—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 26 (29)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of rumor that some sort of treaty touching peace provisions has been arrived at between England, France, and Italy.	466
Dec. 26 (31)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Statement that it is thought that the understanding between England, France, and Italy contains an agreement to stand by each other in the essential results of the war, including territorial claims.	466
Dec. 28	<i>Captain B. A. G. Fuller to Lieutenant Colonel William B. Wallace</i> Remarks regarding the accuracy of the Russian version of the London Treaty. Memorandum concerning the Saint Jean de Maurienne conference (text printed).	466
Dec. 28 (34)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Assurances from Baron Sonnino that there exists no such treaty or understanding as that referred to in telegrams Nos. 29 and 31 of December 26.	469
Dec. 28 (38)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Ministerial crisis caused by resignation of Bissolati, Minister of War Relief, who has insisted upon acceptance of Wilsonian peace program in its entirety.	470
Dec. 28 (39)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Report of political and industrial situations in Italy; statement that visit of King of Italy to Paris appears to have had good effect upon Italian-French relations.	471
Dec. 30 (43)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Information that Cabinet crisis growing out of Bissolati's resignation is still unsolved; belief that Bissolati's following is not large; information that propaganda for Italian expansion along eastern Adriatic shore is tremendous.	472
Dec. 30 (2503)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Stewart: Information from Foreign Office that a decree is about to be issued making the Trentino for economic purposes an integral part of Italy.	473
1919 Jan. 7 (57)	<i>The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President: Profound impression created in Italy by fact of Bissolati's having seen the President; belief that Sonnino is now ready to concede more than ever before.	473

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## ITALY—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 9	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum submitted by the Italian military representative on the Supreme War Council, setting forth the views of the Italian Government on the problem of the Adriatic (text printed).	474
Jan. 11	<i>The Technical Adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller) to Colonel E. M. House</i> Opinion, in view of agreement between the Allies to effect peace settlement on the terms of President Wilson's Fourteen Points and his subsequent addresses, that any provisions of the Pact of London inconsistent therewith are abrogated by that agreement.	487

## JAPAN

1918 Nov. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Report that news of the armistice is viewed by the Japanese with detachment but that keen interest is shown in Japan's aims at the Peace Conference, chief emphasis being laid on securing recognition of Japan's paramount position in East Asia.	489
Nov. 15	<i>The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Japanese preparations for the Peace Conference; statement that it is hoped by the Japanese that a League of Nations will offer an opportunity to assert the equality of the yellow race.	489
Nov. 27 (299)	<i>The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State</i> Opinions of various Japanese leaders as to Japan's position and what she should receive by way of a settlement after the war.	490
Dec. 12 (177)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp) (tel.)</i> For House: Telegram from Embassy at Tokyo, December 2 (text printed), stating that all pro-German sentiment seems to have disappeared, at least temporarily.	492
Dec. 19	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris) (tel.)</i> Request for information concerning recent statement alleged to have been made by Okuma, indicating Japan's ambitions in South Sea Islands.	492
Dec. 21	<i>The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Information that statement by Okuma was probably made in a special interview with U. S. press representatives and not given out in Japan.	493

POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE ALLIES

## JAPAN—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement by Okuma that permanent peace cannot be achieved without first solving the question of equality of treatment of the races and the question of armaments.	493
Jan. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Belief expressed by Prince Konoye that Japan should lend no ears to a peace based on Anglo-American interests alone; fear that under a League of Nations as favored by Great Britain and America those two countries would get most of the advantages while others would be deprived of the arms to resist their economic aggression. Information that a number of publicists share Prince Konoye's views.	494

## PROPOSALS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1918 July 16	<i>Draft of Colonel House</i> Suggestion for a covenant of a League of Nations.	497
Undated	<i>President Wilson's First Draft</i> Covenant for a League of Nations.	501
Undated	<i>Tentative Draft of an Agreement for an Association of Nations</i> Prepared by Mr. D. H. Miller and sent to Colonel E. M. House on November 30, 1918, and apparently also sent to the Secretary of State.	505
Undated	<i>Note on the Agreement for an Association of Nations</i> Prepared and sent along with tentative draft, <i>supra</i> .	509
Undated	<i>Tentative Draft of a Declaration for Open Diplomacy</i> Prepared by Mr. D. H. Miller and sent to Colonel E. M. House on November 30, 1918.	510
Undated	<i>Note on the Declaration for Open Diplomacy</i> Prepared and sent along with tentative draft, <i>supra</i> .	511
Dec. 1	<i>Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House</i> Tentative draft of a Declaration for Equality of Trade Conditions, with accompanying note (texts printed).	511
Undated	<i>Amendment Suggested by Dr. S. E. Mezes</i> To the tentative draft of an Agreement for an Association of Nations.	514
Dec. 23 (111)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Desire to call attention to act of Congress, approved August 29, 1916, requesting the President to invite all the great governments to a conference to formulate a plan for a court of arbitration or similar tribunal.	515

## PROPOSALS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 23	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Desire to put forth a draft of articles of guaranty which it is believed could not be successfully opposed at home or abroad; submittal of three memoranda (texts printed): (1) the constitutional power to provide for coercion in a treaty, (2) suggested draft of articles for discussion, (3) suggestions as to an international council, for discussion.	515
Dec. 25	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Letter from Brigadier General D. E. Nolan, December 6 (text printed), transmitting a preliminary report on the subject of the League of Nations prepared by Captain H. C. Bell, who had been sent to London for the purpose.	519
Dec. 26	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Copy of letter (text printed) sent to Dr. S. E. Mezes containing comments on Dr. Mezes' tentative draft of an agreement for an association of nations.	521
Dec. 31	<i>General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State</i> Opinion that any constitution for a League of Nations should include a provision to prevent abuse of power on the part of the League in intervening in the domestic affairs of any nation.	525
1919 Undated [c. Jan. 6]	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> As to form of international agreement to prevent infringement upon territorial and political rights.	526
[Jan. 7]	<i>Draft by the Secretary of State</i> For an International Agreement.	528
Undated [c. Jan. 7 (?)]	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> On the privilege of becoming an adherent to the treaty when not a signatory nation.	531

OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION

1918 Nov. 25	<i>The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Secretary of State</i> Memorandum on international telegraphic communication (text printed), a subject which it is believed will assume an important aspect at the Conference.	535
Dec. 15	<i>Colonel E. M. House to the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)</i> Expression of interest in the memorandum on international telegraphic communication which was handed to the Secretary of State (copy of which was sent to Colonel House).	538

OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## LABOR QUESTIONS

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 16 (33)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Information that Gompers feels strongly that labor conference, if held, should be held in Paris at the same time as Peace Conference.	539
Dec. 18 (24)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Instructions to say to Gompers that the President thinks that a labor conference might very properly be held at Paris or anywhere else at any time that labor leaders deem it wise.	539
Dec. 21 (86)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Request that the President be informed that Gompers is disposed to call conference in Paris and put on the foreign governments the burden of refusing to let it take place; suggestion to Gompers that he wait and try to arrange matters with the foreign governments. Belief that it would be dangerous to hold conference in neutral country.	539
Dec. 21 (87)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the President from Gompers: Belief that the attitude of those governments which object to convening of a labor conference at the same time and place as the Peace Conference is both unjust and unwise.	540
Dec. 24	<i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i> Agreement with judgment expressed by Mr. Gompers; inquiry as to whether matter might not be straightened out in conversations with the French and English.	541
Dec. 27	<i>Major George L. Berry to Colonel E. M. House</i> Request to be assigned to act as an intermediary between the U. S. Peace Mission and the various labor groups which are to convene in Paris.	541
Dec. 30 (109)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Instructions to suggest to Gompers the advisability of naming an intermediary between the American Peace Commission and the several labor groups, informing him of Major Berry's offer of his services.	542
1919 Jan. 3 (87)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Message from Gompers (text printed) stating that he will sail from New York on January 8 and that any arrangement for intermediary should be deferred until conference with American Mission.	542

OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## LIBERIAN AFFAIRS

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Receiver of Customs of Liberia (Worley)</i> Information that diplomatic correspondence is being conducted with Great Britain and France relative to their withdrawal from the receivership in Liberia and from the proposed financial aid to be granted to Liberia by Great Britain, France, and the United States; suggestion that Liberian financial questions should properly be decided by Great Britain, France, and the United States rather than by the Peace Conference.	543
Dec. 15 (1387)	<i>The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Suggestion that the Liberian financial questions be considered at the Peace Conference.	544
Dec. 19 (52)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> For Secretary Lansing: Inquiry as to whether the Secretary would be willing to say that Liberian question is not a matter for presentation at the Peace Conference but that he would be willing to discuss it in Paris with British and French representatives.	544
Dec. 24 (67)	<i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> From Lansing: Opinion that Liberian question should be handled by the Department with British and French officials.	545
1919 Jan. 9 (287)	<i>The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Instructions given by the President of Liberia to the Liberian Commission to the Peace Conference, January 8 (text printed).	546
Jan. 16	<i>The Department of State to the British Embassy</i> Information that in the opinion of the American Peace Mission the question of the financial aid and rehabilitation of Liberia has no bearing on the questions to be considered by the Conference and should be settled directly among the governments.	547

## RULES FOR AERIAL NAVIGATION

1919 Jan. 2	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace</i> Note from French Chargé, December 11, 1918 (text printed), suggesting the advantage of having France, the United States, England, Belgium, and Italy join a convention for the adoption of rules of aerial navigation.	550
----------------	---	-----



OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## RULES FOR AERIAL NAVIGATION—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1919 Jan. 25	<i>The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Opinion of the American Commission that the subject of rules of aerial navigation is not one which pertains to the Peace Conference.	551

## THE TACNA-ARICA QUESTION

1918 Dec. 11 (18)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Information that the Government of Peru has accepted President Wilson's tender of assistance to bring about a solution of the difficulties between Chile and Peru as an offer of mediation, but that the President of Chile appears to consider it an offer of assistance only; desire to ascertain President Wilson's views in the matter and also his views as to whether the Tacna-Arica question should be laid before the Peace Conference.	552
Dec. 13 (22)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Department's opinion that the President's statement to Chile and Peru should be interpreted as merely an offer of assistance in solving the difficulty due to the disturbance in Iquique and not as an offer to mediate the whole Tacna-Arica question.	553
Dec. 13 (23)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss) (tel.)</i> For the Secretary of State: Intention of Bolivian Government to send special embassy to Washington to present the case of Bolivia for the acquisition of a port by the cession of Arica to Bolivia; desire for opinion of the President as to whether U. S. Government should signify willingness to receive special embassy and as to whether question of a port for Bolivia will come up at Peace Conference.	553
Dec. 18 (23)	<i>The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i> Statement that the President does not desire to make an offer of formal mediation to Chile and Peru, but hopes that the question may be settled by some form of arbitration; doubt that it would be advisable to lay the Tacna-Arica question before the Peace Conference.	554
Dec. 19 (56)	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i> Request for further expression of views by the Secretary as to form of arbitration to be suggested to Chile and Peru.	555
Dec. 28	<i>The Secretary of State to President Wilson</i> Transmittal of telegram No. 23 of December 13; opinion that it appears to be an inopportune time for Bolivian delegation to go to Washington but that they might come to Paris; request for expression of the President's wishes in the matter in order that the Department may be informed.	555

OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF THE PEACE  
CONFERENCE

## THE TACNA-ARICA QUESTION—Continued

Date and number	Subject	Page
1918 Dec. 30	<p><i>The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Scott, Miller) to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Observations concerning the Tacna-Arica question submitted in compliance with the Secretary's request; suggestion of a diplomatic solution based on the Treaties for the Advancement of Peace which Peru, Chile, and Bolivia have concluded with the United States.</p>	556
1919 Jan. 4 (104)	<p><i>The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (tel.)</i></p> <p>For Lansing: List of difficulties involved in attempting to settle the Tacna-Arica question by any agency other than the Peace Conference.</p>	558
Jan. 9	<p><i>The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Opinion that the difficulties listed by the Acting Secretary do not offer any obstacle in the way of the suggestion made in the memorandum prepared by the Technical Advisers on December 30, 1918.</p>	559
Jan. 9	<p><i>President Wilson to the Secretary of State</i></p> <p>Doubt as to the wisdom of a Bolivian delegation to the United States or to Paris at present.</p>	561
Jan. 11 (237)	<p><i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>From Lansing: The President's doubt as to the wisdom of a Bolivian deputation to the United States or to Paris at present.</p>	561
Jan. 16 (302)	<p><i>The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.)</i></p> <p>From Lansing: Suggestion that a diplomatic solution of the Tacna-Arica question based on the Treaties for the Advancement of Peace might be best suited to the present situation.</p>	561



## TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES



## STATEMENTS AND MESSAGES REGARDING THE TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE<sup>1</sup>

*Announcement by President Wilson of the Signing of the Armistice,  
November 11, 1918*<sup>2</sup>

MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN: The armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober, friendly counsel, and by material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.

WOODROW WILSON

---

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 11, 1918.

13. Autocracy is dead. Long live democracy and its immortal leader. In this great hour my heart goes out to you in pride, admiration and love.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119/3335m: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1918—10 a. m.

At the moment when innumerable difficulties have been surmounted and final and complete victory has been achieved, I desire to express to you the deep joy felt by the Government and people of this country and their admiration for the steadfastness, energy and valor of the British nation throughout this momentous struggle.

ROBERT LANSING

---

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Armistice, see vol. II, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted from *Official U. S. Bulletin*, vol. 2, No. 460, Nov. 11, 1918.

763.72119/3305a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the French Minister for Foreign  
Affairs (Pichon)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1918—10:17 a. m.

At this supreme moment in the history of your nation, when a complete victory has been won over the most formidable of enemies, I desire to extend to you personally and on behalf of my government the most heartfelt congratulations of the American people and a sincere expression of the joy and admiration with which they are inspired by the valor and the steadfastness of the French people.

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/2590 : Telegram

*The French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon) to the Secretary  
of State*

[Translation]

PARIS, November 13, 1918—1:30 p. m.

I am deeply touched with your telegram. The share of America in the victory you are celebrating is so great that never will any Frenchman forget it. In the run of history, the ancient alliance of our two countries was once more sealed by brotherhood in arms. The Americans and French are united in these days of rejoicing as they were in the days of fighting. I beg you to convey to the Federal Government the thanks of France and of the Government of the Republic and to accept for yourself who always evinced so much sympathy with my country my sentiments of cordial friendship.

S. PICHON

763.72119/2580 : Telegram

*The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Uchida) to the Secretary  
of State*

TOKYO [undated].

[Received November 13, 1918—5:23 p. m.]

Accept my heartiest and warmest congratulations on the triumphant conclusion of an armistice which we trust will lead to a peace, glorious for the forces of human civilization and brought [*fraught?*] with happiness to the world. Such a fruition of the prolonged struggle will not have been too dearly purchased by all the precious lives

of whose suffering and sacrifice we think with one universal pride today.

UCHIDA

---

783.72119/2679

*The Greek Legation to the Department of State*<sup>3</sup>

[Translation]

MEMORANDUM

By order of my Government I have the honour to express to the Government of the United States the joy of the whole Greek Nation on the news of the signature of the armistice which brings to an end the terrible war by the triumph of the Nations who stood for right.

The Greek Nation at this solemn hour admires and appreciates at its just value, the American contribution, which brought in at the most crucial moment of the war, has been such a strong factor in conserving freedom to the World.

The small nations, who would have been the easiest prey, and Greece surely one of them, have not only seen their freedom secured by the American intervention, but they furthermore expect to see the reestablishment of their national unity. The United States are henceforth their benefactor and they have gained their eternal gratefulness.

The Greek nation is proud and happy to have been able to co-operate in this great work. Greece wishes to assure the United States that she will continue to join her endeavours to those of the American People in order to contribute with the same devotion and faith at the construction of the magnificent edifice of the Society of Nations.

No. 3847

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918.

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the British Prime Minister (Lloyd George)*

[WASHINGTON,] 14 November, 1918.

May I not express my sincere admiration of the admirable temper and purpose of your address of the eleventh [*twelfth*] just repro-

---

<sup>3</sup>The French original bears the following notation in Secretary Lansing's hand: "Handed me by Greek Min. Nov. 14/18 RL"



duced in part in our papers.<sup>3a</sup> It is delightful to be made aware of such community of thought and counsel in approaching the high and difficult task now awaiting us.

WOODROW WILSON

---

763.72119/2591 : Telegram

*The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON [undated].

[Received November 14, 1918—5:45 a. m.]

Your generous message has given the utmost satisfaction to His Majesty's Government, and it will be read with profound appreciation throughout the British Empire. We are proud to think that in the cause of international freedom we, like our Allies, have worked and suffered, fought and conquered side by side with the people of your great country. May this unity of ideals bind us ever closer together through all the generations to whom the Great War will be no more than an ancient and glorious memory.

BALFOUR

---

763.72119/2580 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Uchida)*

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1918—6:41 p. m.

I appreciate highly your telegram of congratulation on the triumph of the united strength of human civilization over the baneful forces which aimed to rule the world for themselves alone.

The difficulties which beset us have been overcome. The enemy has been vanquished and inspired as we are by the common ideals for which we have fought, and by the teachings of the trials and sufferings which we have shared, we can now turn with hopeful confidence to the work which remains to be done.

ROBERT LANSING

---

*King Victor Emmanuel of Italy to President Wilson*<sup>4</sup>

ROME, November 16, 1918.

With a joyful heart I salute the strong people of the United States of America in this era which marks for the liberated democracies

---

<sup>3a</sup> Full text printed in the *London Times*, Nov. 13, 1918, p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Reprinted from *Official U. S. Bulletin*, vol. 2, No. 469, Nov. 21, 1918.

the triumph of the ideals for which the great American Nation under your will and firm guidance, Mr. President, took up arms on the side of the peoples fighting for their independence and a more civilized future for all mankind. In the name of the people and soldiers of Italy I express to you and your noble Nation the sentiments of earnest admiration and the fervent wish that the memory of the battles fought together may enhance the ties of lasting friendship between our peoples.

VITTORIO EMANUELE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

[WASHINGTON,] 16 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I need not tell you how deeply gratified I have been by Monsieur Clemenceau's little message to me, which you were so kind as to send through Mr. Tumulty. It was very delightful to feel that we are drawing so close together on the two sides of the water that we take the same view of the great public interest of the world with which we are dealing, and that I can count with such certainty on entering into complete cooperation with Monsieur Clemenceau, for whom I have the highest regard and with whom it will, I am sure, be a pleasure to work in every way.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The British Prime Minister (Lloyd George) to President Wilson*

LONDON [undated].

[Received November 19, 1918.]

My heartiest thanks for your cordial and kindly message. I am certain that the ideals of our two countries in regard to international reconstruction are fundamentally the same and I feel sure that at the forthcoming peace conference we shall be able to cooperate fruitfully to promote the reign of peace with liberty and true democracy throughout the world.

D. LLOYD GEORGE

763.72119/2675: Telegram

*President Wilson to King Victor Emanuel of Italy*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918—6:01 p. m.

Your Majesty's message of congratulation has given the deepest pleasure. I think that it is a cause for particular pride on the part of the people of the United States that they should have been able at the right time to assist in the great struggle in which Italy has so distinguished herself, and I am sure that I speak their heart in thanking Your Majesty with sincerest warmth for your message, and in sending in return the heartfelt salutations of our own people.

WOODROW WILSON

763.72119/2679

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Greek Minister (Roussos)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1918.

SIR: In the memoranda of November 1st and 13th received at your hands<sup>5</sup> the Greek Government tendered felicitations to the President and Government of the United States, and expressed in the most cordial terms the appreciation of the Greek nation of the effort made by the United States to cooperate in full measure with the nations fighting for the freedom of the world.

The American people join heartily with the people of Greece in their rejoicings over the signing of the Armistice which assures the triumphal issue of the great war. We have fought for the same ideal, we have suffered and bled in a common cause, and the same singleness of purpose and spirit of mutual helpfulness which united us in war must now guide us in peace in order that we may accomplish successfully the great task which still lies before us, for we must now lay the foundations of a new social order among nations wherein the small powers may be secure in their rights and thus free to develop the full measure of their national life without fear.

I beg you to convey to Your Government the sincere thanks of the Government of the United States for the friendly sentiments expressed in these messages.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

---

<sup>5</sup> Memorandum of Nov. 1 not printed.

**AMERICAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR  
THE PEACE CONFERENCE**



## ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF "THE INQUIRY"

Breckinridge Long Papers

*The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the  
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Woolsey and I have thought about and talked about a bureau to be established for the study and preparation of those questions which appear likely to be proposed at the Peace Conference. We have thought that such work should be in charge of a board to be composed of,

First, a high official of the Navy;

Second, the Naval Instructor;

Third, the head of the War College;

Fourth, some official of the Department of State to be designated by you;

Fifth, some expert on International Law—such as Mr. Scott.

Under this board, and to serve as advisers to it, should be selected persons who are experts in the different geological [*geographical*] divisions of the work: such as Professor Harper on Russia; someone on the Balkan States; someone on Turkey and Persia; someone on Japan; someone on Germany and Austria; someone on England, France and Belgium, and such others as may, from time to time, develop as either necessary or expedient.

It is felt that the bureau—if the suggestion meets with your approval—should be organized immediately but most quietly and that its existence be not made known; that it should meet, not at the Department of State, but at the War College, or some other place where it could be concealed, and that it be furnished with all books and literature which could be of any possible service to it.

Personally I feel that the Secretary of State should keep control of it and of its operations; that it should report to the Secretary of State and be under his directions. Whether this would be sufficiently insured under the membership above proposed, cannot be definitely said, but it could be made certain by adding one or more other persons to be designated by the Secretary of State or it might be assured by having it composed of five persons to be designated by the Secretary of State and to have the military and naval representatives attached

to it in an advisory capacity in the same manner as the expert advisers above indicated.

I am sorry that I will not have an opportunity to speak to you about this in person. I leave this memorandum for you and Mr. Woolsey will speak to you.

Respectfully submitted,

[B. Long] <sup>1</sup>

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/1

*Confidential Memorandum on Preparatory Work for Peace  
Conference* <sup>1a</sup>

SEPTEMBER 15, 1917.

It is impossible in selecting negotiators to represent this Government at the Peace Conference to find men who possess the full knowledge to deal with the numerous and complex questions which will arise. It is important, therefore, that they should be furnished beforehand with information and data in a condensed form upon which they can rely in the discussion of questions even though they may not be participants in all the discussions.

To accomplish this purpose experts on the various probable subjects of negotiation should be invited, with or without compensation, to prepare brief, though comprehensive articles on these subjects, explaining to the writers that the purpose is for the use of the representatives of the United States at the Peace Conference and that, therefore, their work must be kept secret.

The subjects in general would fall under the heads of History, Commerce, and International Law. History would naturally be divided under the various countries and could be developed along political, commercial, industrial and military lines. Possibly it would be found advantageous to group certain countries together in treating of their history, while colonial possessions would require special treatment. Commerce would be in a measure statistical but would involve the careful study of exports and imports, markets and trade routes. International Law would cover a wide range of subjects, relating to peace and war, such as maritime law, rules of war, neutralization of land communication, internationalization of waterways, extent of territorial waters, &c.

Outside of these subjects which fall under the three heads named, there are others which should be considered, such as disarmament, in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Brackets appear on the file copy.

<sup>1a</sup> This unsigned memorandum appears to have been prepared in the Department of State. It may be the memorandum referred to in Colonel House's letter of Sept. 20, 1917, to Secretary Lansing, p. 12.

ternational guaranties and their enforcement, arbitration, &c. Possibly, too, it would be advisable to have the constitutions and political institutions of the countries carefully analyzed and commented upon.

Following out this general plan, which, if adopted, ought to be elaborated with great care in order that the experts engaged would understand the exact limits of their respective studies, a selection should be made from the historians, political economists and jurists in this country, who are especially qualified to deal with particular subjects. Each should prepare a pamphlet of not to exceed 10,000 or 15,000 words on the topic assigned to him and these pamphlets after being submitted to the person or persons having general charge of the work of gathering information for the negotiators should be secretly printed and carefully indexed for use when occasion arises.

In addition to these condensed articles it would probably be advisable to have a collection of documents, statistics, quotations, &c., which would form appendices to the articles, but which should be indexed so that they could be readily referred to. These appendices should also be secretly printed.

Full instructions should also be prepared for each writer engaged on this work explaining the method of treatment of the subject assigned to him.

The division of subjects, the selection of writers, the issuance of instructions, the examination of articles and collected data, and the direction of printing and indexing should be in the hands of one man, who should have such assistants as he may require.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/1

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

QUERIES

How far should the United States take part in the determination of European boundaries?

How far should the United States take part in the redistribution of colonial possession?

Should the United States go further than to approve or disapprove an agreed boundary on any other ground than that it contains an element of future discord?

Should the basis of territorial distribution be race, language, religion or previous political affiliation?

---

<sup>2</sup> The original of this undated memorandum is in Secretary Lansing's hand and is accompanied by other manuscript memoranda on subjects for consideration. The latter are not printed.



Where two or more countries have political claims to a particular territory, as in Macedonia, what should be the basis of settlement? If it is determined that the preponderance of a particular nationality in the population is controlling *prima facie*, how far should conquest or enforced colonization affect such basis? (This might apply to Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig-Holstein and the region about Dantzic.)

Should colonial possessions be guaranteed to the power holding them without a limitation as to the character of the government, commercial freedom, and economic opportunity to other nations?

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/2

*Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State*

DEAR MR. LANSING: The President tells me of your conference with him yesterday as far as it related to me, and the work which you both have in mind for me to do.

I expect to be in Washington next week and I hope we may have an opportunity to talk it out, so I may have the benefit of your views and wide experience.

The memorandum which you gave the President, and which he in turn sent me, is in every way admirable and will be helpful in planning an organization.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely yours,

E. M. HOUSE

NEW YORK, September 20, 1917.

---

Inquiry files

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

[NEW YORK,] October 27, 1917.

DEAR N. D. B.: I want to write you personally for your advice and assistance.

It seems clear that the question of reducing armaments will be thoroughly agitated at the peace conference. By that time it will have become something more than a humane agitation. Economically the nations cannot support the present scale of expenditure and recover from the losses of the war. For we have to remember that a case of armaments today is immeasurably more burdensome than it was during the armed peace up to 1914. To return even to that scale would mean a radical proportionate reduction. Recognition of

---

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1a, p. 10.

this fact seems to be dawning upon statesmen in Central Europe, especially in Austria, and undoubtedly gives a certain sincerity to their repeated pleas.

I have been examining what literature is immediately available, and I can find nothing which contains a practical and technical analysis of the problem. Obviously the crux of the problem is how to prevent cheating by subtle forms of mobilization. The line between normal industry and semi-military preparation no longer exists, and as armament is relative, one naturally suspects such obvious devices as limitation of budgets, of capital ships, or the size of standing armies.

What is needed now is a creative study of the question by a group of men who thoroughly understand modern military science. These men would be required at the peace conference as technical advisers, not only on the general question of reducing armaments but on the specific strategic problems which will arise.

Won't you, if you can manage the time think this over and see whether

1. It is advisable to have the matter studied in the Department.
2. Who could be assigned to study it.

I have shown this letter to Colonel House.

Devotedly yours,

WALTER LIPPMANN

---

Inquiry files

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to Mr. Walter Lippmann*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1917.

DEAR WALTER: I have your letter of the 27th with regard to the reduction of armaments question. I agree with you that it ought to be studied from the points of view which you suggest, and that those who study it ought to be headed by someone who would be available as a conferee at the Paris Conference. Under all the circumstances I think I would rather turn General Bliss's mind loose on this subject than anybody's else. He is not at hand just now, but when he comes back I will be glad to speak to him about it and let him brood upon it, as he will do thoroughly. I think it would not be a bad plan also to have General Crowder<sup>4</sup> thinking about it, as he has a ruminating mind and will take a good deal of pleasure in learning all the literature there is on the subject; but perhaps it would be better to have General Bliss invite Crowder in to help him study it than to start

---

<sup>4</sup>General Enoch H. Crowder, Provost Marshal General, United States Army.

them independently in the matter, so that unless you want the study started sooner I will let the matter go until Bliss's return.

Affectionately yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

---

Inquiry files

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

[NEW YORK,] November 5, 1917.

DEAR N. D. B.: Your suggestion is ideal. I had not dared to hope that General Bliss would be able to give any time to the matter, and had had it in mind that General Crowder would be the best of all the men that I had known in the Department for this particular subject.

I rather expect to go to Washington next week, with the chief inducement the hope of seeing you.

Ever yours,

WALTER LIPPMANN

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/4

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1917.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES:

I hope you will be in Washington this week as you plan as I think we should have a pretty thorough understanding as to how this Department can be made serviceable to you in your work. I am sorry I have not had time to study the details more than I have but I really have not been able to accomplish very much along those lines.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/5

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 9, 1917.

[Received November 10.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I expect to spend next Monday and Tuesday, and if necessary, Wednesday and Thursday, in Washington, staying with Mr. Baruch at 1520-18th Street, telephone, North 8959. I shall get into touch with you regarding the matters mentioned in your favor of November 5th.

I am enclosing a second draft giving an outline of the subjects to be dealt with in The Inquiry that seem to be most urgent.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

[Enclosure]

*A Preliminary Brief Outline of the Subjects To Be Dealt With in the Inquiry*

- I. Suppressed, Oppressed and Backward Peoples, etc. (e. g., Poles, Bohemians, Jugo-Slavs, African regions); in each case—
  1. Past and Present: History, Geography, (Races, Maps); Government and Politics, Social Status, Economics (business, agriculture), Strategy (chiefly to judge unfounded boundary claims).
  2. Serious Proposals for Future: By whom made (nations, parties, leaders) and why; light thrown on each by data in 1, especially as to whether it would tend to establish a suitable geographic and business unit (with needed access to sea and markets) and tend, by constitution or laws (granting independence, autonomy, or civil and cultural rights) to insure sufficient freedom, security, and where feasible, unity.
- II. International Business; Commercial Freedom and Equity.
  1. Physical bases; past and present operation and regulation; serious proposals analyzed. Straits, Canals, Rivers, Ports, Railways, Cables, Wireless, Aircraft (? ?).
  2. Tariff Studies; e. g., Universal Free Trade; Most Favored Nation treatment for (practically) all; Revenue Tariffs; Open Door; Fair Access to Raw Materials; "Key" Industries and Materials.
  3. Export of capital; concessions, spheres; facts and serious proposals.
- III. Studies in International Law
  1. Surveys of positions taken by Important Nations on timely questions; also positions of text writers on them.
  2. Serious proposals for vital changes analytically presented with forward outlook; by whom made and why; e. g., for
    1. Humanizing warfare on land, on sea, in air, (weapons, gasses, mines, submarines, etc.)
    2. The Freedom of the Seas.
  3. Limitation of Armaments on land and sea.
  4. Aid to workers on II above and IV below, and to other workers.

IV. Analytical Presentation of Serious Proposals for organizing (giving structure to) a concert of the authority and force of mankind to insure a just and lasting peace.

V. Restoration: Data and Estimates, insofar as, and if accessible.

Summaries of Important Divisions that Belong Together and General Summary.

---

Inquiry files

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to Mr. Walter Lippmann*

NEW YORK, November 10, 1917.

DEAR MR. LIPPMANN: I have prepared a memorandum, which I enclose, giving a rough and approximate outline of the subjects to be dealt with in *The Inquiry*.<sup>5</sup> I have included only those which seem to be most urgent and am sending the outline to you for your consideration and suggestion when we next meet. Naturally, it only can embody a general scheme which, if finally accepted, should be kept in mind in prosecuting individual inquiries, but should not be allowed to interfere with the variations in treatment which the nature of each inquiry, and even to some extent the personality of each inquirer, would naturally render desirable. The outline is an attempt to summarize the more important points of agreement that resulted from our various conferences.

I think we made good progress at our meeting on Thursday, and have no doubt that *The Inquiry* will continue satisfactorily. I am sending copies of the memorandum to the other gentlemen who were present at the meeting.

Sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

[Enclosure 1]

*A Preliminary Brief Outline of the Subjects To Be Dealt With in the Inquiry*

[Here follows text of the memorandum, which is identical with that printed on page 15 except for the addition of the following:]

VI. The Technique of Peace Conferences (so far as accessible)

Provisions in general terms (that might keep the promise to our ear and break it to our hope) and detailed provisions: Concurrent and later action of sub-committees, and of commissions established by conferences.

---

<sup>5</sup> Attached to the file copy of this letter are two memoranda, which are here printed as enclosures 1 and 2.

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum of Needs*

- I. Data and sane proposals regarding war-breeding areas:
    1. Alsace-Lorraine
    2. Poland (including question of access to sea)
    3. Lithuanian region
    4. Czecho-Slovak (Bohemia, etc.)
    5. Roumanian Irredentist areas.
    6. Yugo-Slavia; 4, 5 and 6 possibly one study, i. e., Austro-Hungarian danger areas.
    7. The Balkans (not Roumania, but Dobruja).
    8. Italian Irredentist areas.
    9. Turkey in Europe and Asia (including Constantinople).
    10. Aegean Islands and nearby Asiatic shores.
    11. The Far East.
    12. German colonies in Africa and the Pacific; nearby colonies for comparison.
  - II. 1. Data (historical, including geographical, governmental, economic, foreign relations) regarding important nations.
    2. National aspirations (political, territorial, economic) that must or might well be reckoned with, their bases and relative strength.
  - III. Examples, and sane suggestions, of types of governmental arrangements for international areas, such as, possibly, Dantzig, Trieste, Saloniki, Constantinople, all Turkey. World organization, proposals that may be urged by responsible men.
  - IV. Laws of war on sea and land: History, sane proposals made.
    - V. Data regarding damage done on land and sea that calls for reparation, its amount, and possible ways of making reparation.
  - VI. Internationalized Trade Routes
  - VII. Business & Diplomacy
- 

Inquiry Document No. 893

*A Preliminary Survey*

[Undated.]

I.—PRACTICAL TASKS OF THE CONFERENCE IN WHICH THE INQUIRY  
CAN HELP

- 1) Establish or provide for the establishment of boundaries.
- 2) Set up or provide for the setting up of governments.

- 3) Estimate strength and weakness of doubtful states.
- 4) Draw up or provide for the drawing up of economic arrangements.
- 5) Provide for the safeguarding of minorities or of weak peoples.
- 6) Provide for equality of economic opportunity (most favored nation clause?)
- 7) Rewrite or provide for the rewriting of international law in general and as applied to specific problems—Miller, Woolsey, Scott, and State Department.
- 8) Bear in mind diplomatic history—ditto.

II.—REGIONS IN WHICH EACH TASK OF CONFERENCE IN WHICH INQUIRY  
CAN HELP WILL OR MAY HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN

- 1) *Fragments of Russia*—a) west, b) south, c) west.  
Will have to be undertaken: estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states.  
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.
- 2) *Nucleus of Russia*.  
Will have to be undertaken: estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states.  
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.
- 3) *Poland*.  
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments.  
May have to be undertaken: economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.
- 4) *Slesvig*.  
May have to be undertaken: boundaries.
- 5) *Belgium*.  
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.
- 6) *Luxembourg*.  
May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.
- 7) *Alsace-Lorraine*.  
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries.
- 8) *Trentino region*.  
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries.
- 9) *Triest region*.  
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries.
- 10) *Austria-Hungary*.  
Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, governments, economic arrangements.  
May have to be undertaken: safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

11) *Balkans.*

Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states (Albania).

May have to be undertaken: governments, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

12) *Turkey.*

Will have to be undertaken: boundaries, estimate of strength and weakness of doubtful states, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

May have to be undertaken: governments, economic arrangements.

13) *North Africa.*

May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements, safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

14) *Tropical and South Africa.*

Will have to be undertaken: safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.

15) *Far East.*

May have to be undertaken: economic arrangements.

16) *Pacific Islands.*

May have to be undertaken: safeguarding of minorities or weak peoples.

17) *Latin America.*

May have to be undertaken: boundaries, economic arrangements.

18) *Persia and Afghanistan.*19) *Spitzbergen.*

## CLASSIFIED BY TASKS.

- 1) The establishment or provision for the establishment of boundaries will have to be undertaken for Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Trentino region, Triest region, Austria-Hungary, Balkans, and Turkey.

The establishment or provision for the establishment of boundaries may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, Slesvig, Belgium, Luxemburg, North Africa, Tropical and South Africa, Latin America.

- 2) The setting up or provision for the setting up of governments will have to be undertaken for Poland and Austria-Hungary. The setting up or provision for the setting up of governments may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey.
- 3) Estimates of the strength and weakness of doubtful states will have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey.



- 4) The drawing up or provision for the drawing up of economic arrangements may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, Poland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, North Africa, Tropical and South Africa, the Far East, and Latin America.
- 5) Provision for the safeguarding of minorities or of weak peoples will have to be undertaken for Turkey and Tropical and South Africa.

Provision for the safeguarding of minorities or of weak peoples may have to be undertaken for the fragments of Russia, the nucleus of Russia, Poland, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Pacific Islands.

### III.—HOW INQUIRY CAN HELP WITH REGARD TO EACH MAJOR TASK OF CONFERENCE

#### 1) *Boundaries:*

##### a) Racial boundaries:

- i) Make a racial map of Europe, Asiatic Turkey, etc., showing boundaries and mixed and doubtful zones.
- ii) On basis of i) draw racial boundary lines where possible, i. e. when authorities agree; when they disagree select those we had best follow; when these disagree map the zone of their disagreement; study density and distribution of peoples in these zones.
- iii) Study, in each case, the stability or instability of racial distribution (e. g. Macedonia, N. E. Albania) as affected by change of political boundaries and consequent governmental action, by economic forces, by religious forces, by other cultural forces, etc., but all with stability or instability in mind.

##### b) Historic facts and national or racial aspirations as indicating boundaries (e. g. Serbo-Bulgarian '12 agreement).

##### c) Economic facts and needs as indicating boundaries (e. g. Jugoslavia or Albania or Poland or Czecho-Slovakia as a well-balanced economic unit, access to ports, and markets, i. e. minor units that should not be disrupted, etc.).

##### d) Defensive needs as indicating boundaries.

##### e) International commitments and obligations as affecting proposed boundaries.

#### 2) *Government:*

- a) Inquiry can give some account of political and economic and military strength and weakness of "states," and of what participation in government peoples have had, and an estimate of their capacity for self-government.

- b) Inquiry can give some account of "provisional governments" that have claimed to represent them.
- c) Beyond that it is a question of recognizing some provisional government, and, possibly, offering it facilities for getting started (and protection while doing so?).
- 3) *Economic arrangements.*
  - a) Inquiry can gather some data as to economic resources and needs, strength and weakness.
  - b) Inquiry can gather some data as to possible attempts to subject to economic vassalage.
- 4) *Safeguarding minorities and weak peoples.*
  - a) Inquiry can gather data showing weakness and possible aggression, and needs and methods in the matter of protection.

#### IV.—THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INQUIRY DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS

- 1) A collection of data in: a) reports; b) made maps and graphs; c) books and articles; d) collected maps, graphs, etc. All these must be made available by highly intelligent selection and indexing.
- 2) A presentation of the larger problems with regard to each problem area in the form of a discussion and evaluation of the data that bear on them, through the instrumentality of maps, graphs, and reports.
- 3) A force of trained men whose members have collected the data and made and can use the index in 1), have had part in 2), and can, on request, carry 2) further by means of 1).

#### V.—TASKS OF CONFERENCE THE INQUIRY CANNOT FURTHER AND WHERE THEY MAY BE FURTHERED

- 1) The exchange and repatriation of prisoners of war (War Department).
- 2) The restoration of devastated areas and provision for the needs of their populations.
- 3) Limitation of armaments (State, War, and Navy Departments).
- 4) International law regulating aircraft (War and Navy Departments, aided by State Department).
- 5) Allocation of raw materials, shipping, etc., during reconstruction (War Trade, War Industry, Shipping Boards).
- 6) Commercial treaties (Department of Commerce, Tariff Commission, except as stated above).
- 7) Current relations and commitments (State Department).
- 8) Drafting reports and making record (State Department with aid of Miller, Woolsey, Scott).

Paris Peace Conf. 182/6

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 19, 1917,  
[Received November 20.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It would be very helpful for me to have a verbatim statement of the agreement that was at one time contemplated between ourselves and other American republics looking towards the mutual guarantee of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and dealing, no doubt, with some other matters involved in these two guarantees. Would it be possible for you to have one of your assistants get and send me a statement of the contemplated agreement? I should, if you think best, use it as a possible form of general international agreement, without indicating that it was in contemplation an agreement for this hemisphere.

The point, of course, is that this is one of the types of international cooperation that needs study, especially as it was worked out by our own government.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/6

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1917.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: In compliance with your request of November 19th I am sending you the proposed agreement between this Government and other American Republics which was under consideration about a year-and-a-half ago. You will observe it is in the form of what might be called a "Pan American Treaty".<sup>6</sup>

I assume you understand that this is of a most confidential nature and for the present I prefer you not to show it to anyone else and certainly not without having discussed the matter with me.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure]

*Draft of Proposed Pan American Treaty*

The Governments of the United States of America, the Argentine Republic, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, etc.,

---

<sup>6</sup> For papers previously printed on this subject, see *Foreign Relations: The Lansing Papers*, 1914-1920, vol. II, pp. 471 ff.; also *Foreign Relations*, 1916, pp. 3-4.

Fully determined to maintain their territorial integrity and their political independence under republican forms of Government;

Desirous to define exactly the boundaries of their respective territories and to remove any doubts, uncertainties, or disputes that may exist as to their territorial limits, in order that their territorial integrity and their political independence under republican forms of government may be effectively, mutually and jointly guaranteed;

Anxious to settle by peaceable means all controversies that may arise between them or any of them, and by so doing to advance the cause of international justice; and

Resolved not merely to preserve peace between themselves, but also to maintain peace within their respective boundaries,

Have decided to conclude a treaty for these purposes, and to that end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the United States of America:

The Government of the Argentine Republic:

Etc., etc.,

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following articles:

#### ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties to this solemn covenant and agreement hereby join one another in a common and mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government.

#### ARTICLE II

To give definitive application to the guarantee set forth in Article I, the High Contracting Parties severally covenant to endeavor forthwith to reach a settlement of all disputes as to boundaries or territory now pending between them by amicable agreement or by means of international arbitration.

#### ARTICLE III

The High Contracting Parties further agree: First, that all questions, of whatever character, arising between any two or more of them, which cannot be settled by the ordinary means of diplomatic correspondence, shall, before any declaration of war or beginning of hostilities, be first submitted to a permanent international commission for investigation, one year being allowed for such investigation; and, Second, that if the dispute is not settled by investigation, to submit the same to arbitration, provided the question in dispute does not affect the honor, independence, or vital interests of the nations concerned or the interests of third parties.

## ARTICLE IV

To the end that domestic tranquility may prevail within their territories the High Contracting Parties further severally covenant and agree that they will not permit the departure from their respective jurisdictions of any military or naval expedition hostile to the established government of any of the High Contracting Parties, and that they will prevent the exportation from their respective jurisdictions of arms, ammunition or other munitions of war destined to or for the use of any person or persons notified to be in insurrection or revolt against the established government of any of the High Contracting Parties, provided, however, that a state of belligerency has not been recognized by any one of the High Contracting Parties.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible, in accordance with the constitutional laws and provisions of each of the contracting countries; the ratifications thereof shall be deposited at a date to be agreed upon in the office of the Pan American Union in the City of Washington, United States of America; and the treaty shall take effect as between the high contracting parties sixty days from the date of deposit of ratifications thereof.

The treaty shall continue in effect indefinitely.

In the event of one of the contracting powers wishing to denounce the present treaty, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Government of the United States of America, which shall immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other contracting parties, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying country, and then only one year after the notification has reached the Government of the United States.

This treaty is concluded for a period of        years and shall be continued for similar periods of years unless it is terminated by agreement of all the contracting parties.

The treaty may be denounced by any of the contracting parties, but the denunciation to be effective must be made in writing, one year before the expiration of the period for which the treaty has been concluded, or one year before the expiration of the period for which it has been renewed, to the Government of the United States, which shall immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other contracting parties, informing them of the date on which it was received.

The denunciation shall only have effect in regard to the notifying country, and then only one year after the notification has reached the Government of the United States.

In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention and have hereunto affixed their respective seals.

Done in the City of Washington, in the United States of America, this       day of       , in the Spanish, English, French and Portuguese languages, the originals of which shall remain in the archives of the Pan American Union and copies thereof duly certified, shall be sent through the diplomatic channels to the High Contracting Parties.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/7

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 23, 1917.

[Received November 24.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your note of November 21st and its enclosure, which I shall treat as most confidential matter.

I shall myself shortly make a draft of the principles involved in your enclosure in general terms, eliminating all references to individual nations or groups of nations, and submit it for your consideration as a general plan that might deserve study by our group, if on consideration of the draft you think it advisable so to treat it.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

---

Inquiry files

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to Mr. Walter Lippmann*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1917.

DEAR WALTER: Thank you for letting me see the copy of your letter to the President of the twenty-first.<sup>7</sup> I thoroughly sympathize with the view you express, although I had not thought of it before. I am reaching the place, or have already reached it, where I feel that every energy must be combined to make Germany livable after the war. By that I mean livable to her own people as well as to the rest of the world. If a "victorious peace" were achieved by the Allies and the German people were condemned to intolerable domestic conditions of an economic kind they would be worse, maybe, than they were before, and yet access to the resources of civilization can be tolerated only upon assurances that can be relied upon that

---

<sup>7</sup>Not found in Inquiry files.

such resources will be used in the interest of civilization when they are supplied.

Cordially yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

---

Inquiry files

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Division Chiefs of the Inquiry*

NEW YORK, December 11, 1917.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE

The organization of the Inquiry is as follows:

##### *Chairman*

##### *Executive Committee*

Director	S. E. Mezes
Treasurer	D. H. Miller
Research	J. T. Shotwell
Secretary	W. Lippmann

##### *Division Chiefs*

1. Politics and Government (including international cooperation)  
W. Lippmann
2. Economics and Business (national and international)  
D. H. Miller, 61 Broadway  
A. A. Young, War Trade Board, Washington, D. C.
3. Social Science (including history)  
J. T. Shotwell, 3755 Broadway, N. Y.
4. International Law  
J. F. Chamberlain, Columbia University
5. Geography  
Isaiah Bowman, 3755 Broadway, N. Y.
6. Strategy  
Unassigned.

##### *Collaborators*

##### *Assistants*

. . . . .

Inquiry Document No. 885

*Memorandum on the Context of the Inquiry*

[Undated—circa December 15, 1917.]

Now that a skeleton organization has been created it may be well to examine the context of the inquiry.

## I

In all human probability the war will not at any one moment suddenly terminate in a peace. Demobilization will not precede the peace conference. It is not even likely that hostilities will cease during the early stages of the discussion.

The probable course of events is already indicated. We may expect a peace propaganda from Central Europe of increasing intensity calculated as accurately as possible to allure the groups of the Allied Left at a minimum of concessions. The minimum of actual concession will be covered by formulas which approach more and more the verbal form of the war aims outlined by the Left among the Allies. As the German proposals grow in "moderation" there is a political movement in each of the Allied nations towards its own left. The object of course is the division of the coalition as between the nations and within the nations. Naturally the German peace offensive is aimed at the weak points of the Alliance. Those points are those where the aims of the Allies do not coincide and within the nations the points where the imperialist-nationalist-liberal-pacifist-cleavages are least successfully covered.

Thus, the Reichstag resolution<sup>\*</sup> immensely reduced the war spirit of Russia and opened a schism between Russia and the Western Allies. That same resolution and the propaganda which accompanied it very seriously affected what might be called the reluctant liberal support of the war in the Western Nations. The Stockholm conference plan had a similar effect, and from its failure dates the withdrawal of official labor and socialist support of the French and British governments.

It must be noted that a parallel movement exists in Central Europe. There, too, the strain within the Allies and between the Allies is serious, and each move to seduce the Left among the Allies involves a heavy pull upon the Right in Germany. How much of the concessive policy of the German government is forced by the German Left, and how much is deliberately preventive in order to forestall division at home, and how much is carefully calculated to create division abroad, it is not possible to estimate exactly. But this we do know—the German government has succeeded thus far in maintaining a unity in

---

<sup>\*</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 139.



Central Europe which is effective for military purposes and has played with considerable result for the weakening of the coalition.

The counter to this German effort has taken two forms. The first is coercive and consists in the suppression and ostracism of any opinion which is responsive to the concessive proposals from Central Europe. This policy has had some success in the Western Nations, at least temporarily, and may be even more successful in America as we become heavily engaged in France. But it is a very costly policy and in the long run, chiefly because it tends to accentuate class division into a militaristic-pacific division as well; because it corrupts the war spirit by inciting mob violence to drive out disinterested idealism; because it establishes a mood which is recklessly hostile to a constructive international policy. The other of the two methods by which the German offensive is countered reached its expression in the President's reply to the Pope.<sup>9</sup> That emphasized those purposes which have the widest possible acceptance; it repudiated those which not only divide the coalition within itself, but unify Central Europe in a tenacious defence psychology. This method unifies the Allies by attraction, immensely enlarges the constituency of the war, and because it acts to disintegrate Central Europe compels increasing concession by the Right to the Left. These concessions are, of course, minimal and deceptive, but the assumption of power by a Catholic Bavarian,<sup>10</sup> even though an aristocrat, is an important shift in the balance of political power.

In enemy and friendly nations there is at this time a fierce political struggle, not even concealed. The fact that the European Allies did not themselves reply to the Pope is not to be taken as complete acceptance by the governments of the President's reply. It is to be taken as an indication that the domestic political situations are too tense for them to risk a discriminating reply. They were compelled to avoid a debate which would have inevitably revealed grave differences of opinion.

Resistance to declarations now of "peace terms" arises from a recognition that once public opinion centers upon questions of territory, no bit of territory will seem worth the cost of war. The actual struggle is waged against the menace of the German army which has terrorized Europe and the world, and the object of the battle is either to demonstrate that the army can be beaten, or to inflict such pressure upon the German nation as would result in a radical rejection of the groups now in control of the Empire. Terms of peace are inevitably

---

<sup>9</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. I, p. 177.

<sup>10</sup> Count Georg von Hertling, Chancellor of the German Empire from Nov. 3, 1917.

secondary to this purpose. To permit them to occupy the center of discussion would cause morale to decline by a substitution of mere territorial ambitions for this greater purpose. A debate about territory now would reduce the war to the merely nationalistic objects, and inevitably split the coalition.

Ultimately the difficulty seems to be this: The war is waged by many nations against an international menace. Those who are directing that war have not centered upon this international fact but retain it in their consciousness and as part of their motive.

These divergencies of purpose in the coalition are no doubt the ultimate cause of an unco-ordinated strategy. The logic of nationalist absolutism is to stake more and more on victory, and to increase the prize as the effort requires sacrifice. The Western Allies are in the control of absolute nationalists, the stability of whose own power depends upon the realization of certain large promises. Therefore in official circles there has been a recession of interest in what may be called the program of an enduring peace, the program for which the workers, the farmers, the small capitalists and the liberal intellectuals of Western Europe and America accepted the war. This heavy emphasis on nationalist success in each country has brought its government into conflict with the governments of the Allies. As between Russia and the West it appears to have opened up an era of tragic misunderstanding. For Italy it has meant a curious isolation which appears to have led her to military disaster in a spectacular effort to secure sympathy and assistance. Thus, because the Allies distrusted Italy's political ambitions, and her unco-operative method of pursuing them, her military zone was in a measure disregarded and the supplies needed for an offensive to complete Italy's purposes were not furnished. To secure those supplies Italy appears to have overextended her front and exposed her flank. A similar political blunder upon the part of Rumania appears to have led her to disaster.

Unity of strategy, especially if the war is prolonged, will depend upon a simplification and pooling of purposes in both coalitions, the enemies' and our own. This involves a shifting of political power from those who now control all the nations of Western Europe and Central Europe so that the governments represent both in personnel, in social outlook and in patriotic purpose the middle parties. Unity will involve placating the moderate left even at the cost of opposition from the irreconcilable right. In both coalitions unity will depend increasingly upon this movement toward the left. The movement, of course, need not be parallel or at the same rate. In each country it is relative to the position now occupied by the controlling groups.

But the two movements react upon each other almost like the bidding at an auction. The price of unity is increased in each nation as the liberalism of the enemy increases. But as the governing groups have

staked themselves on particular nationalist successes, this competition in liberalism cuts under the whole social regime which they represent. They resist liberalization of purpose, and so, while they disintegrate their own people, they make it easier for the enemy to hold together.

This political situation bears most heavily on our own success in the war. Excluding for the purposes of argument the invention of some brilliant tactical or strategical novelty, the military decision must be reached on the Western Front by an attempt to exhaust Germany's reserves. No immediate spectacular success is expected. This involves an unprecedented strain on morale and resources which can be met only by the most successful kind of moral and administrative economy in Western Europe and the United States. This is to be had only by keeping political power upon the broadest basis of popular consent and by a powerful counter-offensive in diplomacy to reveal deceptive liberalism in Germany.

Without this we may expect Germany's skilful seduction to succeed sufficiently to bring about moral disunion followed by administrative waste and military weakness. Larger and larger areas of the front would then grow torpid as the Russian, Rumanian, Macedonian, Caucasus, Mesopotamian and Gaza fronts now are, and as the Italian may very possibly be.

We may assume that following the conclusion of the Italian campaign Germany will attempt this winter to force a peace discussion aimed to disintegrate the Allied morale before the opening of the spring and summer fighting. The Allies, on the other hand, will resist this peace offensive during the winter, and will this summer try to force a German retirement behind the Meuse and the Scheldt, and will begin at least a tentative invasion of Germany through Lorraine. Until this occurs a very tight hand will be kept on peace discussion in Western Europe and America. If it occurs, the military decision will have been reached and the German army's prestige will be sufficiently reduced to permit negotiation and discussion. This will be the decision. It will consist of the destruction of the submarine bases, the recapture of northern France, and a potential invasion at least of German territory. The deeper decision, however, will consist in the relative reserves of men. For when the new lines are established at the end of the 1918 campaign Germany will face the military reconquest of Lorraine at the time when the American reserve is becoming an actuality.

If such a decision is reached it will probably not be pressed to any ultimate conclusion. Negotiations will begin on the new line, and with the Allies in control of the outer world and, therefore, of all the materials essential to German reconstruction.

## II

## WHEN THE CONFERENCE ASSEMBLES

The motive which will probably control all others in the minds of European statesmen will be how to obtain the means of recuperation. Unless they are found revolutionary discontent will accompany demobilization. This will be intensified by the fact that the disbanding of armies is a slow process, and must be accompanied by violent discontent once the pressure of the enemy is removed. Slow demobilization will produce an insurrectionary spirit in those detained too long after hostilities cease. Quick demobilization will produce an economic crisis unless raw materials, transportation, markets, credit are in proper working order. The competition for these facilities will be immediate and intense, and the power to allocate them will be the strongest of all instruments of negotiation. No territory in that belt which stretches from the Baltic through the Balkans to the Persian Gulf (the chief area of debatable territory) is as immediately important as access to and use of sea-borne materials. If the Powers which control the outer communications have a policy of national autonomy and international organization to enforce, this is the only means by which it can be done. For though a military decision is obtained in the West, this great disputed belt of peoples will almost surely remain at the end of the war within the German lines.

The President has many times emphasized the fact that the supremacy of Germany throughout the Near East represents her victory thus far. This supremacy can scarcely be disputed from the East with Russia weak. The acceptance of the Reichstag Resolution by all but the extreme Pan-Germans is based unquestionably upon this fact, and it is highly significant that the German Foreign Secretary, von Kühlmann, should be himself one of the chief promoters of the Bagdad railway. The men he represents undoubtedly see that German prestige east of the French boundary assures them a mastery of the points which control the approaches to three continents.

There is, however, one overpowering difficulty in the way, and that is the blockade. The Near East, even with Russia added as an economic colony, is still an inchoate empire which would require perhaps a generation of peace and economic resource to organize. Although the enthusiasts for Mittel-Europa write as if it could be a closed economic system, soberer criticism has shown them that this is an impossibility. Middle Europe must, in the immediate future at least, draw essential supplies of reconstruction from the outer world. To pay for those supplies the lost foreign markets must be regained.

There appear to be two schools of German imperialism at the present time, represented perhaps by the Fatherland Party and by the Kühlmann-Helfferich groups. They differ considerably in tone, in domestic policies, perhaps even in spiritual values. But there is a tacit agreement on two points: (1) that Germany's immediate future is the domination of the eastern part of the continent; (2), that this domination depends upon access to the supplies of the outer world. It is upon the method of attaining the second point that they really disagree. Kühlmann and his group wish to attain it by "accommodation", by a reconciliation with the western nations which at the present time is equivalent to a surrender of the Near East to the Germans. They count shrewdly that the anti-German coalition would have even less unity of action in peace than it has had in war and that German methods of competition would be irresistible in a world that was exhausted and in a sense demoralized by inability to win when the odds were in its favor. They believe they would secure their supplies from overseas and dominate the Near East without serious resistance. The Fatherland Party, on the other hand, believes that this access to the outer world must be established by military and naval power, and maintained by constant threat of force.

That is why this party insists on retaining Belgium. That is why the struggle in Germany centers on Belgium. It is a contest between two schools of imperialism. The moderate Kühlmann school is assisted by the German Socialists because its plan of accommodation seems quicker to attain and does not imply a continuation of heavy armaments. This school consists of the really practical men of Germany who understand that recuperation is impossible without a reduction of military expenses and freedom from the threat of war.

For these reasons Belgium has become the pivot of German policy. Obviously the control of Belgium, besides its commercial advantages, would make it possible for Germany to prevent England ever again landing an army in France and would thus leave France absolutely at her mercy. This is probably even a stronger motive than the control of submarine bases. It is interesting to note that Bethmann,<sup>11</sup> who tried to preserve party unity, frequently toyed with the idea of an "administrative division of Belgium". Such a division would mean Flemish administration of the Flanders coast with the possibility at least that the Flemings could be drawn into the orbit of German influence.

Immediate recuperation through access to supplies, followed by the organization of the Near East, is the probable policy from which Ger-

---

<sup>11</sup> Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor, 1909-17.

man peace plans arise. The President's speech at Buffalo<sup>12</sup> makes clear his determination to check it, whether it takes Tirpitz<sup>13</sup> form or Kühlmann.

### III

How can this be done?

1. By a strong and independent Belgium and France.
  2. By a reorganized Austria-Hungary in which the Czechs and Croats have the political power to which their numbers entitle them.
  3. By a satisfactory settlement of the Balkans which makes Servia strong and Bulgaria satisfied.
  4. By an independent Poland able to resist German encroachment.
  5. By strong allied control over the essential parts of Turkey—Armenia, Palestine, Mesopotamia.
  6. By the creation of a trustworthy Germany.
- These may be reduced to three main lines of policy:
- A. Evacuation and restoration of the West.
  - B. Diffusion of power in the East.
  - C. Domestic reform of Germany.

What are our assets?

- I. Military power in the West
- II. Economic control of the outer world.
- III. Public opinion.
- IV. Anti-Prussian feeling in Middle Europe.
- V. War weariness.

What are our liabilities?

- I. Imperilled communications and strength of Germany's defensive.
- II. Incomplete political unity—particularism.
- III. Complexity and apparent remoteness of the issue.
- IV. War weariness
- V. Inability to apply military pressure upon Middle Europe itself.

Assuming that evacuation in the West can be had at almost any time, how are we to attain the other two objects of policy—Diffusion of power in the East and Domestic Reform in Germany?

- I. By forcing, rather than accepting, a retirement in the East, thus reducing the prestige of the German Army.
- II. By increasing the unity of control in the outer world.

<sup>12</sup> Address to the American Federation of Labor Convention, Nov. 12, 1917. For text, see Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*, vol. 1, p. 116.

<sup>13</sup> Alfred von Tirpitz, Lord High Admiral of the German Navy, 1911-16; Secretary of State for Naval Affairs, 1897-1916.

- III. By making it clear to Germans that this control is a war measure which will not be relaxed when peace comes, unless there has been reform in Germany and conclusive evidence that the submerged nationalities of eastern Europe are freed.
- IV. By friendly advances to these nationalities which encourage movements toward autonomy but do not promise independence.
- V. By keeping alive the picture of a reunited peaceful world, constantly accompanied by proof that such a world is not possible with Germany controlled as she is today.

Inquiry Document No. 886

*The Inquiry.—Report of Progress to December 15, 1917*

At present the Inquiry is organized as follows: There is an Executive Committee of four, consisting of:

S. E. Mezes, Director.  
 E. M. [D. H.] Miller, Treasurer.  
 J. T. Shotwell, Research Consultant.  
 W. Lippmann, Secretary.

The Committee has laid out the general field of research and selected the men to conduct it, who are known as Division Chiefs, with the following general assignments:

- 1) Politics and government, including international cooperation, W. Lippmann
- 2) Economics and business (national and international), D. H. Miller and A. A. Young
- 3) Social science, including history, J. T. Shotwell
- 4) International law, J. F. Chamberlain
- 5) Geography, Isaiah Bowman
- 6) Strategy, (unassigned)

Each of these division chiefs has a certain number of assistants and collaborators assigned to him, some voluntary, some paid.

This organization assembles the material, which is then deposited with Dr. Mezes, who has under his direction a staff for the filing and digesting of the material. The plan adopted here provides for an editing of the material by Dr. Mezes and Mr. Lippmann, who then pass it on to the librarian and the cataloguer. The librarian is Mr. Andrew Keogh of Yale University, and the cataloguer is Miss Wilson of the Columbia Library. The material will be very carefully sifted and filed in such a manner as to be readily available, after the scientific scheme adopted by the Belgian Institute of Bibliography. Under this system it will be possible to collect the material

on any topic in a very few minutes. The index will be as complete as it is possible to make it.

Mr. Keogh will also act as librarian of the Inquiry, assembling documents and materials on any points which are called for. He will be in a position to state where any material published is to be found, either in this country or abroad.

The administrative machinery of the Inquiry is now in running condition, and is planned so that the Central Committee is immediately in touch with the collaborators working in different parts of the country.

The personnel of these collaborators and assistants is representative of various sections of the country. We have drawn so far upon Harvard, Clark University, Smith College, Yale University, Columbia, City College, Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, University of Chicago, University of Minnesota, University of Missouri, Leland Stanford, upon the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, the American Geographical Society, and the National Board for Historical Service. The filing of the material and the bulk of the correspondence is conducted from the rooms loaned to us by the American Geographical Society. Correspondence with men who are definitely working for the Inquiry is conducted from 3755 Broadway, which is the address of the American Geographical Society. Other correspondence is conducted from the personal addresses of the members of the Executive Committee.

1. *The theory upon which the work is planned.* The actual assignment of research is laid out so that by the fifteenth of February there shall be available a certain amount of reliable but not absolutely first-hand material on what the Executive Committee has considered as the more urgent problems, based, of course, upon the President's messages. The work is now under way, so that material will be assembled quickly on urgent problems, provision at the same time being made for more intensive work over a longer period.

The Committee has picked as the region of urgency the general area from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, the colonial area of Central Africa, the problem of the economic needs of the Central Powers, now and immediately after the conclusion of hostilities, and the general problem of the "freedom of the seas." The regional studies are divided into five sections:

- 1) The Baltic provinces and Poland.
- 2) Austria-Hungary.
- 3) The Balkans, and especially the frontiers of Bulgaria.
- 4) Turkey in Asia.
- 5) Central Africa.

On these areas there will be, as stated above, available by February 15th at the latest a significant mass of material drawn from trust-



worthy secondary sources, which can then be examined more critically at a later date.

2. *Research now under way.* In accordance with the plan laid out above and supplementary to it, the following investigation is now under way:

a. A complete list so far as European newspaper sources are available of the significant official declarations and proposals made by governments bearing on the settlement of the war or on international policy. This material is arranged so that it is possible to see either all the declarations made by any one government, or all the declarations made about any particular problem by all the governments. This section is completed and is now in our files, being used as guide material for our other researches.

b. There is now under way, and will be completed by approximately the 5th of January, a careful examination of the press and periodical literature of the western powers, in order to assemble significant declarations of policy by opposition statesmen, minority parties, and important social groups.

c. There is now under way, and will be completed and brought up to date by approximately the middle of January, an examination of all the existing newspapers of the Central Powers for indications of economic and political policy now being discussed. These files will all be coordinated and kept up to date, so that any new utterance coming from a nation in which we are interested may be judged in the light of its other utterances since the beginning of the war.

d. There is now being prepared, and should be fairly well completed by February 1st at the latest, a Who's Who for the Central Powers, Russia, Poland, the Balkan States, and Scandinavia.

e. Arrangements have already been undertaken and may be completed this week for a digest of outstanding treaty obligations, so far as those can be ascertained. This material will also be collated with the declarations and proposals outlined above.

f. There is now being prepared for us, and should be completed by the first of February, a brief for each of the subject nationalities lying in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Persian Gulf. These briefs will state the grievances, the demands, the aspirations, the nature of the organizations through which the demands are made, and a Who's Who of the leaders among the subject nationalities.

g. There is now in our files a schematic chart prepared expressly for the Inquiry of the fourteen best known plans of international organization, drawn from American, British, Belgian, German, and other sources. This chart shows what provision if any is made in the different schemes for international legislative bodies, international administrative bodies, international judicial bodies, international conciliative bodies, international commercial courts, methods of reference and award, and sanctions proposed.

h. There has been prepared for the Inquiry a chart showing all important international events since 1870, by years and by countries.

i. There is now being prepared, and should be completed by the middle of January, a collection of the declarations and proposals, and the actual practice, in regard to the creation of a new Poland.

j. For each of the five areas of greatest urgency, that is, Poland and the Baltic provinces, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey in

Asia, and Central Africa, the following material is ordered, with a view to having it collected by January 15th:

1) A historical sketch of not more than 2500 words, giving the high lights of greatest pertinence to the Inquiry.

2) One or two readable and authoritative volumes, carefully indexed.

3) Brief accounts of:

The actual participation, and prevention from participation, of each race in the central and provincial government, as to office holding and education for the same.

The actual participation of each race in local government, office holding, and education for the latter.

The restrictions and restraints imposed on subject races in such matters as: the use of language; the exercise and control of religion, meetings, societies, and newspapers; change of residence; entering of occupations; maintenance of their own schools.

The political clubs of racial membership, and other race-conscious social organs.

A brief preliminary description of the structure of governments and of the inter-working of their parts, for the major belligerents, and a volume or two on government structure, carefully indexed.

k. The following material will be ready by February first, prepared by the Division of Geography. It will be based largely on secondary material, and will be capable of more critical and intensive elaboration later if desired. For Poland and Lithuania, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey in Asia, and Central Africa, the following material:

Maps and explanatory articles showing the general relief character of the country; the barriers, gateways and corridors, strategic and economic; the proportion of flat and cultivable as against steep and uncultivable land; the drainage lines; the heads of navigation for vessels of different drafts; seasonal navigation; railway crossings and terminals on rivers; reconstruction of drainage lines; regional drift of internal commerce in relation to navigable streams;

The types of soil and their distribution; special features of the soil, such as erosion and conservation; climate, showing lands favorable to white settlement, the length of the growing season, fogs, destructive storms and droughts; distribution maps and explanatory articles showing the relative importance and value of mineral deposits, degree of mineral independence, amount and source of soil fertilizers; the ultimate development and limits of present exploitation of mineral resources; the relation of the undeveloped mineral and agricultural fields to centers of labor supply; the inherent and acquired productivity of the land for agriculture; the relative regional productivity; the relation of farm lands to industrial regions and centers of food consumption;

The forest types and commercial woods; the extent and degree of the development of existing forests; ultimate forest land;

forests in relation to transportation lines and ports, to centers of lumber consumption and to labor supply; forest policy;

Fisheries; fishing stations and shore rights; consuming centers; seasonal migration of commercial species of fish;

Miscellaneous natural resources, such as the therapeutic value of the climate; mineral springs and baths; hunting and breeding grounds for wild game; historic centers of religious pilgrimages;

As to the people, maps and explanatory articles showing the present general distribution by occupation, races, languages, and religions, together with comparisons of earlier and later distributions; materials showing the general level of civilization, significant customs, and general mode of life; the existing development of material resources; the domestic commerce and routes of trade; trade outlets on land and water; foreign commerce; analytic maps of economic frontiers and barriers, of physical frontiers and barriers, of political frontiers and barriers;

Military geography, showing strategic barriers and centers of distribution; maps of colonial relations and spheres of influence of the European states.

This material will all be presented in as simple and graphic form as possible. Specialized draughtsmen have been secured capable of depicting this material.

*l.* There is now being assembled, and should be completed by the 15th of February, authoritative material on the principles which have governed the drawing of strategic frontiers in Europe.

*m.* In the field of international law, there is now being prepared a general outline of the field to be covered, and more special assignments in the order of urgency will be made this week.

*n.* In the field of economics there is now being prepared, and should be completed at the end of January, a preliminary survey of the chief sources of economic strength and weakness of the nations participating in the settlement. A study of the existing machinery, administrative and legislative, preventing free economic intercourse between the nations which might be used either to maintain pressure upon the Central Powers or to relax restrictions as between the Allies. Figures and charts are being collected showing the financial position, the shipping situation, the industrial needs, and the industrial possibilities of the major powers. A study is being prepared of the chief processes by which goods travel from the producer to the consumer in the areas of greatest interest. A preliminary survey of this should be on hand by February 15th.

*o.* A special study is planned of Russo-German commercial relations, with a view to indicating methods by which the economic penetration of Russia, due to political weakness, may possibly be prevented.

*p.* The following subjects are being investigated by specialists, and preliminary reports should be had at varying dates from the beginning of January to the middle of February:

- 1) The history of the Slavic peoples and the diplomatic history of the Near East.
- 2) Contemporary American diplomatic history in its relation to European problems.
- 3) Italia Irridenta.

- 4) German colonial policy.
- 5) German militarism.
- 6) The relation of South Germany to the Empire.
- 7) The Ukraine and Russian history.
- 8) Alsace-Lorraine.
- 9) Bohemia and the South Slavs.
- 10) Poland.
- 11) The Pacific islands.
- 12) The theory of Middle Europe.
- 13) Special research in regard to Macedonia.
- 14) Austria's claims in the Balkans.
- 15) Belgium.
- 16) Western Asia.
- 17) The history of British commercial policy, and the European treatment of native races.
- 18) British colonial policy.
- 19) German industrial democratization.
- 20) The various meanings attached to "the freedom of the seas."
- 21) A varied collection of data in regard to China, especially in its relations to the European settlement.

3. *Editing.* As this material comes in from the various sources, it will be edited by the Executive Committee and digested into the briefest possible form, so as to be both readable and graphic. In addition to the digesting, there will be briefs in regard to issues likely to be discussed at the peace conference, so that the work of different specialists may be brought to bear as compactly as possible upon the discussion. Particular care has been given to the problem of avoiding the collection of material which when collected would be unavailable because of its bulk or because of bad arrangement.

4. *Costs.* It will be possible on January first to present a budget of current expenses. It may be noted here, however, that the costs include only the bare expenses of workers whose services could not be secured voluntarily, besides the expense of clerical help and stationery supplies.

---

Inquiry files

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to Colonel E. M. House*

DECEMBER 19, 1917.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I beg to submit the following memorandum upon reconstruction:

1. The longer the war lasts and the more deeply the United States becomes involved the more complex will our internal political, economic and social problems be at the conclusion of peace.

2. Here is a partial list of issues that will have to be met:

The return of our army from France.

The demobilization of the expeditionary and home forces.

The reabsorption of these men into industry.

- The transformation of many industries from the making of war materials to normal trade uses.
- The financing of the war debt.
- The revision of tariffs.
- The administration of a vast government owned merchant marine.
- The working out of a military and naval policy adapted to the international liberation at the close of the war.
- The study of what war-created agencies like the Food Administration, the War Trade Board, etc., should be maintained, or how they should be modified.
- The study of methods for meeting and regulating the foreign trade competition which will follow the end of the war.
- The planning of a comprehensive immigration policy.
- The development of the country's education, especially along the lines of industrial technique and scientific agriculture.

3. In France, England, and Germany organs exist for working out after-the-war problems based on a realization that the return to peace will be accompanied by grave disorder unless it is skilfully and courageously planned. Once the war-motives are relaxed, governments will not be able to count so heavily on the patriotism and self-sacrifice of interested groups.

4. What appears to be needed is a disinterested analysis and forecast of these issues, together with the preparation of a number of alternative programs which can be put at the disposal of the President.

5. There are a number of ways in which this might be done. We might follow the English model and establish a Reconstruction Bureau in Washington. The objections to this are obvious. It would create an immense amount of gossip and speculation and would be besieged by dogmatists and special interests. A better way, it seems to me, would be to do it quietly, along the lines we are pursuing in collecting reference data for the peace conference. The method would have this advantage, that it would enable us to consider internal problems in their relation to international conditions.

6. In working out the organization of the Inquiry, we are canvassing the expert resources of the country as they relate to social problems. It would be entirely feasible, I believe, for the Inquiry to expand into this other field without straining it. The method of assembling data would be much the same, the machinery for editing and digesting would require no essential change. We should need a somewhat larger central office force, six or eight more men to direct the research, and from twenty-five to fifty thousand dollars to cover payments to specialists, their clerical assistants, and expenses.

7. If this method were adopted, the procedure would be about as follows:

To plot out the main issues tentatively.

To select scholars of an administrative type and divide the field among them.

- To have each of them secure a small staff, say of four or five men, who would give full time, and associated with them a larger number of collaborators working voluntarily or for bare expenses.
- To pick out key men in important trade, engineering, scientific, agricultural, and labor organizations, and stimulate them quietly to form committees in their organizations which would report needs, problems, and solutions.
- To have the reports and researches collated and edited by the directors of the research.
- The results could then be laid before the heads of departments at Washington for criticism and for preparation in the form of legislation.

[The remaining portion of this letter, if any, is missing from the Department files.]

[Filed copy not signed]

---

Inquiry Document No. 887

*The Inquiry.—Memorandum Submitted December 22, 1917*

THE PRESENT SITUATION: THE WAR AIMS AND PEACE TERMS  
IT SUGGESTS

OUR OBJECTIVES

*The Allied military situation and Berlin-Bagdad.*

The Allies have had various opportunities to destroy Middle Europe by arms, to wit: the Russian invasion of Galicia, the protection of Serbia, the intervention of Rumania, the offensive of Italy, the expedition at Gallipoli, the expedition to Saloniki, the Mesopotamian campaign, and the Palestinian campaign. The use made of these opportunities has produced roughly the following results: The Russian army has ceased to be an offensive force, and Germany occupies a large part of that territory of the Russian Empire which is inhabited by more or less non-Russian peoples; Rumania is occupied to the mouth of the Danube; Serbia and Montenegro are occupied; the Austrian and German are deep into Italian territory. As the Russian, Rumanian, Serbian, and Italian armies cannot be expected to resume a dangerous offensive, the invasion of Austria-Hungary has ceased to be a possibility. The Allies hold Saloniki, which they are unable to use as a base for offensive operations. There is danger that they may be driven from it. If they are able to hold it, and to keep it from Austrian hands, they have made a blind alley of one subordinate part of the Berlin-Bagdad project, which has always included a branch line to Saloniki, and then to the sea. By the cap-

ture of Bagdad they not only control the rich resources of Mesopotamia but have made a blind alley of the main Berlin-Bagdad line, so far as that line was aimed to be a line of communication to the Persian Gulf as a threat against India. By the capture of Palestine the British have nullified a subordinate part of the Berlin-Bagdad scheme, that is, the threat to the Suez Canal. By the almost complete separation of Arabia from Turkey, the Turks have not only lost the Holy Cities, but another threat to the Red Sea has been removed. Germany has therefore lost the terminals of her project, and if Saloniki, Jerusalem, Bagdad, and Arabia remain in non-German hands the possibilities of defense against the politico-military portions of the Bagdad scheme exist.

*The problem of Berlin-Bagdad.*

The problem is therefore reduced to this: How effectively is it possible for Germany to organize the territory now under her political and military influence so as to be in a position at a later date to complete the scheme and to use the resources and the manpower of Middle Europe in the interests of her own foreign policy? She faces here four critical political problems: 1) The Poles; 2) the Czechs; 3) the South Slavs; and 4) Bulgaria. The problem may be stated as follows: If these peoples become either the willing accomplices or the helpless servants of Germany and her political purposes, Berlin will have established a power in Central Europe which will be the master of the continent. The interest of the United States in preventing this must be carefully distinguished before our objectives can become clear. It can be no part of our policy to prevent a free interplay of economic and cultural forces in Central Europe. We should have no interest in thwarting a tendency toward unification. Our interest is in the disestablishment of a system by which adventurous and imperialistic groups in Berlin and Vienna and Budapest could use the resources of this area in the interest of a fiercely selfish foreign policy directed against their neighbors and the rest of the world. In our opposition to Middle Europe, therefore, we should distinguish between the drawing together of an area which has a certain economic unity, and the uses of that unity and the methods by which it is controlled. We are interested primarily in the nature of the control.

*The chief binding interests in Middle Europe.*

The present control rests upon an alliance of interest between the ruling powers at Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, Constantinople, and Berlin. There are certain common interests which bind these ruling groups together. The chief ones are: 1) the common interests of Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest in the subjection of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Croats; 2) from the point of view of Berlin the

present arrangement assures a control of the external affairs and of the military and economic resources of Austria-Hungary; 3) from the point of view of Vienna and Budapest it assures the German-Magyar ascendancy; 4) the interest that binds Sofia to the alliance lay chiefly in the ability of Germany to exploit the wrong done Bulgaria in the treaty of Bucharest; 5) the interest of Constantinople is no doubt in part bought, in part coerced, but it is also in a measure due to the fact that in the German alliance alone lies the possibility of even a nominal integrity for the Turkish Empire; 6) at the conclusion of the war, the greatest tie which will bind Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to Germany will be the debts of these countries to Germany.

*The disestablishment of a Prussian Middle Europe.*

It follows that the objectives to be aimed at in order to render Middle Europe safe are the following:

1. Increased democratization of Germany, which means, no doubt, legal changes like the reform of the Prussian franchise, increased ministerial responsibility, control of the army and navy, of the war power and foreign policy, by representatives responsible to the German people. But it means something more. It means the appointment to office of men who represent the interests of south and west Germany and the large cities of Prussia—men who today vote Progressive, Centrist, or Social Democrat tickets—in brief, the men who stood behind the Bloc which forced through the Reichstag resolution of July.

2. In addition to increased democratization of Germany, we have to aim at an independent foreign policy in Austria-Hungary.

3. We must aim at preventing the military union of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

4. We must aim at the contentment and friendship of Bulgaria through a satisfactory solution of the Balkan frontiers.

5. We must aim at the neutralization and the internationalization of Constantinople and the Straits.

6. We must see that the control of the two military terminals of Berlin-Bagdad remain in the hands of an administration friendly to the western nations.

7. As a result of the accomplishment of the foregoing, we must secure a guaranteed autonomy for the Armenians, not only as a matter of justice and humanity but in order to re-establish the one people of Asia Minor capable of preventing economic monopolization of Turkey by the Germans.

These being our objectives, what are our present assets and liabilities?

ASSETS

[I.] *Our economic weapon.*

The commercial control of the outer world, and the possibility of German exclusion both from the sources of raw materials and the



richer markets, and from the routes of communication, lie in our hands. The possibility of a continued commercial exclusion weighs heavily, in fact, most heavily of all, upon the German mind at present, because upon the conclusion of peace a successful demobilization is possible only as there are raw materials and markets for the resumption of German industry. Without these the army would become a discontented and dangerous body. If the possibility of exclusion from economic opportunity is associated with a vision of a world co-operation realized, the double motives of fear and hope can be used upon the German people. This is our strongest weapon, and the Germans realize its menace. Held over them, it can win priceless concessions. It should be noted that this weapon will be of special advantage after the peace conference has assembled. Our ability to protract the discussion at the industrial expense of Germany and to our own benefit, and [*sic*] will give us a bargaining power of great advantage. Skilfully handled, this asset can be used both to threaten and to lure them; and its appeal is wellnigh universal, as the utterances and comment from Germany clearly show. To the dynasty and the ruling classes, it presents the most tangible threat of revolution, because it is obvious that the danger of revolution will be enormously increased upon the conclusion of peace, when the patriotic motive subsides. To the commercial classes it presents the obvious picture of financial ruin and of disorder. To the army it presents the picture of a long period following the conclusion of the war in which government will not dare to demobilize rapidly. To the poorer classes generally it presents the picture of a long period after the war in which the present hardships will continue.

## II. *Our assets in Austria-Hungary.*

In Austria-Hungary we have a number of assets which may seem contradictory at first, but which can all be employed at the same time. There is the nationalistic discontent of the Czechs and probably of the South Slavs. The increase of nationalistic discontent among the Czechs and the possibility of some kind of Poland will tend to break the political coalition which has existed between the Austrian Poles and the German Austrians. On the part of the Emperor and of the present ruling powers in Austria-Hungary there is a great desire to emerge from the war with the patrimony of Francis Joseph unimpaired. This desire has taken two interesting forms: 1) it has resulted in the adoption of a policy of no annexations, which is obvious enough; and 2) in the adoption, evidently with much sincerity, of a desire for disarmament and a league of nations. The motive here is evidently a realization that financially Austria cannot maintain armaments at the present scale after the war, and a realization that in a league of

nations she would find a guarantee of the *status quo*. It follows that the more turbulent the subject nationalities become and the less the present Magyar-Austrian ascendancy sees itself threatened with absolute extinction, the more fervent will become the desire in Austria-Hungary to make itself a fit partner in a league of nations. Our policy must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent, and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this discontent, which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. By threatening the present German-Magyar combination with nationalist uprisings on the one side, and by showing it a mode of safety on the other, its resistance would be reduced to a minimum, and the motive to an independence from Berlin in foreign affairs would be enormously accelerated. Austria-Hungary is in the position where she must be good in order to survive.

It should be noted that the danger of economic exclusion after the war affects Austria-Hungary as well as Germany very seriously, and no amount of ultimate trade in transit to Turkey will be able to solve for her the immediate problem of finding work for her demobilized army, of replenishing her exhausted supplies, and of finding enough wealth to meet her financial burdens.

### III. *Our assets in Bulgaria.*

In regard to Bulgaria our greatest asset is the possibility of satisfying her just claims, now that the threat of an imperialistic Russian occupation of Constantinople is removed. A satisfied Bulgaria would no doubt share in the economic advantages of Middle Europe, but without a strong national grievance of her own, her exploitation for political and military purposes is improbable. To this should be added the consideration that the reverberations of the Russian revolution are sure to be felt in Bulgaria.

### IV. *Our assets in Turkey.*

In regard to Turkey our primary assets are our military successes, already commented upon above. These military successes should have a religio-political effect upon the Ottoman Turk. The great financial and economic weakness of Turkey immediately after the war and her need of assistance are also assets to be considered.

### V. *Our assets outside of Europe.*

The German colonies are obvious material to bargain with, as is Germany's exclusion from the Pacific and from Central and South America.

### VI. *The radicalism of Russia.*

It is often overlooked that the Russian revolution, inspired as it is by deep hatred of autocracy, contains within it at least three other

great motives of serious danger to German domination: 1) anti-capitalist feeling, which would be fully as intense, or more intense, against German capitalism; 2) a religious love of Russia which is spiritually antagonistic to Protestant Germany; and 3) a powerful nationalist feeling among the Moderates, who will either return to power or at least exercise a strong influence in Russia. The revolution, therefore, must be regarded not only as inherently difficult for the Germans to manage and to master, but as being in itself a great dissolving force through its sheer example. Note in this regard the reported interpellation of a deputy in the Austrian parliament, who wanted to know when the Austrian and Hungarian landed estates were to be broken up upon Bolsheviki principles, seeing that the government had recognized the Bolsheviki.

#### VII. *The Vatican.*

The Vatican has been rightly regarded as pro-German in its neutrality. But we should not be misled in regard to it as we have been misled in regard to the Russian revolution. The Germans have been skilful enough to use it. The Vatican is one of those forces in the world which require exceedingly skilful handling, and contains within it the possibility of great assistance to our cause, as is shown, for example, by the opportunity it offered the President to carry on the first successful diplomatic offensive made by the Allies since the beginning of the war.

#### VIII. *American resources.*

The fact that with time the man-power and resources of this country, added to the present forces of the Entente, render a complete and crushing military victory over the Central Powers a certainty.

#### IX. *The intangibles.*

To be counted on our side if skilfully used are certain intangibles which the President undoubtedly had in mind when he warned the statesmen of the world in his last message that they were living "in this midday hour of the world's life." These are: 1) the universal longing for peace, which under the circumstances should not be handed over to Germany as something for them to capitalize; 2) the almost universal feeling on the part of common people of the world that the old diplomacy is bankrupt, and that the system of the armed peace must not be restored. This is a sentiment fundamentally anti-Prussian in its nature, and should be capitalized for our side; 3) there is then, too, a great hope of a league of nations which has the approbation of disinterested people everywhere; 4) there is the menace of social revolution all over the world, and as a factor in it a realization by the governing political and financial groups that the meeting of the war debts is virtually insoluble without revolutionary

measures about property. In a war fought for democratic aims, these fears should be made to fight on our side.

*X. The changed direction of German policy.*

In estimating the objects of German policy, as well as the concessions which Germany offers, it should be borne in mind that her first economic and political penetration pointed due south through Italy, that later it swerved southeast towards Constantinople, Bagdad, and the Persian Gulf, and that at present, in view of the Russian debacle, its direction of easiest advance is due east. The present is the best time for Germany to seize the opportunities offering themselves there, and this may very well cause her to decide that she will accept sacrifices towards the southeast, the west, on other continents, and in distant seas, in order to assure her control of the Russian opportunities.

LIABILITIES

Balanced off against these assets are our liabilities. They are, briefly:

I. The military impotence of Russia.

II. The strategic impossibility of any military operation which will cut to the heart of Middle Europe.

III. The costs and dangers of a war of attrition on the western front, and the improbability of anything more than a slow withdrawal by the Germans, leaving behind them an absolute devastation of western Belgium and of northern France.

IV. The possession by the Germans at this time of the occupied areas.

V. The concentration of France upon Alsace-Lorraine, which opens at least as a possibility an attempt by the Germans to cause an almost complete rupture of the western alliance by offering France an attractive compromise solution. In case the Germans should decide within the next few months that they could compensate themselves in the east, they may offer France enough in the west to force either a peace or so keep a schism of French opinion as to render France impotent.

VI. In regard to Italy, our liabilities are also heavy. There is the obvious danger of social revolution and disorganization.

VII. Another liability lies in the present unwillingness of the dominant opinion of Great Britain to discuss modifications of sea power.

A PROGRAM FOR A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

*Bulgaria, Serbia, and Italy.*

Attention may first be directed to Bulgaria as a weak section of the German line. The Allies should publicly recognize Bulgaria's

just national claims and Serbia's right to independence and to access to the sea. This should be accompanied by a strong public move in the direction of Italy, emphasizing Italy's just claims to a rectification of her frontier, both for defensive and for nationalistic reasons. The abandonment by Italy of her imperialist claims can be covered by strong assurances that her territory shall be evacuated and her pressing economic needs now and after the war assured.

*Austria-Hungary.*

Towards Austria-Hungary the approach should consist of references to the subjection of the various nationalities, in order to keep that agitation alive, but coupled with it should go repeated assurances that no dismemberment of the Empire is intended, together with allusions to the humiliating vassalage of the proudest court in Europe. It will probably be well to inject into the discussion a mention of the fact that Austria-Hungary is bound to Germany by huge debts expended in the interest of German ambition. In regard to Austria-Hungary it will probably not be wise to suggest frankly the cancellation of these debts, as in the case of Turkey. Reference to their existence and to the bondage which they imply will, however, produce a useful ferment. The desire of Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of disarmament should not be ignored. The discussion should specifically be accepted and the danger of disarmament in the face of an autocratic Germany explained again.

*Germany.*

As against Germany the lines of the offensive have already been laid down by the President. There should be more explicit assertion that the penalty of a failure to democratize Germany more adequately must mean exclusion from freedom of intercourse after the war, that the reward for democratization is a partnership of all nations in meeting the problems that will follow the peace. This offensive should of course contain the explicit assurance that we do not intend to dictate the form of responsible government in Germany, and that we are quite within the justified limits of intercourse with nations if we take the position that our attitude towards a responsible Germany would be different from our attitude towards the present Germany.

*Russia.*

Towards Russia our best success will lie: 1) in showing that we are not unwilling to state war aims; 2) in a hearty propaganda of the idea of a league of nations; and 3) in a demonstration to them that the diplomatic offensive is in progress, and that the Allies are not relying totally upon force.

*France.*

For the sake of the morale of France it will perhaps be wise to indicate an interest in the solution of the problem of Alsace-Lorraine.

*The western Allies in general.*

All of the western Allies should be braced: 1) by an energetic movement for economic unity of control; 2) by utterances from the United States which will show the way to the Liberals in Great Britain and in France, and therefore restore their national unity of purpose. These Liberals will readily accept the leadership of the President if he undertakes a liberal diplomatic offensive, because they will find in that offensive an invaluable support for their internal domestic troubles; finally 3) such a powerful liberal offensive on the part of the United States will immensely stimulate American pride and interest in the war, and will assure the administration the support of that great mass of the American people who desire an idealistic solution. Such a liberal offensive will do more than any other thing to create in this country the sort of public opinion that the President needs in order to carry through the program he has outlined.

## A SUGGESTED STATEMENT OF PEACE TERMS

What follows is suggested as a statement of peace terms in case a general statement of terms at this time is desired. The different items are phrased, both with a view to what they include and exclude, in their relationship to the present military and diplomatic situation. The purpose is to make them serve both as the bases of an ultimate just peace and as a program of war aims which would cause the maximum disunity in the enemy and the maximum unity among our associates.

*Belgium.*

Belgium must be evacuated and restored by Germany, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations.

*Northern France.*

Northern France must be evacuated and restored.

*Luxemburg.*

This question should be ignored at this time and left to negotiation.

*Alsace-Lorraine.*

Every act of Germany towards Alsace-Lorraine for half a century has proclaimed that these provinces are foreign territory, and no genuine part of the German Empire. Germany cannot be permitted to escape the stern logic of her own conduct. The wrong done in 1871 must be undone.

This paragraph is phrased so as to avoid making the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France an essential aim of the United States in the war, while giving all possible moral support to France in her effort to regain the provinces. It is now our belief that the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine is highly desirable and practically essential to the successful recovery of France. It is also our belief that the relinquishment of Alsace-Lorraine would be the final seal upon the destruction of German militarism. At the same time, we recognize that America cannot insist upon fighting for Alsace-Lorraine longer than France herself is willing to fight, and therefore if Germany should offer France a compromise which France herself was willing to accept, it would be unwise for us to have a commitment on record which we could not fulfill.\*

*Italy.*

We recognize that Italy is entitled to rectifications of her boundaries on the basis of a just balance of defensive and nationalist considerations. This right was recognized in principle by Austria-Hungary before Italy entered the war and justice towards Italy is in nowise altered by any subsequent military events. We recognize also that the port of Trieste should be commercially free and that the inhabitants of the city deserve their cultural autonomy.

It is our belief that the application of this plank will meet the just demands of Italy, without yielding to those larger ambitions along the eastern shore of the Adriatic for which we can find no substantial justification.

*The Balkans.*

No just or lasting settlement of the tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be based upon the arbitrary treaty of Bucharest.<sup>14</sup> That treaty was a product of the evil diplomacy which the peoples of the world are now determined to end. That treaty wronged every nation in the Balkans, even those which it appeared to favor, by imposing upon them all the permanent menace of war. It unquestionably tore men and women of Bulgarian loyalty from their natural allegiance. It denied to Serbia that access to the sea which she must have in order to complete her independence. Any just settlement must of course begin with the evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro by the armies of the Central Powers, and the restoration of Serbia and

---

\*Mr. Miller dissents in part and submits a separate memorandum. See appendix. [Footnote in the original. The memorandum is not attached to the file copy of this document.]

<sup>14</sup>French text in R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri, *Trattati e convenzioni fra il regno d'Italia e gli altri stati*, vol. 23, p. 412.

Montenegro. The ultimate relationship of the different Balkan nations must be based upon a fair balance of nationalistic and economic considerations, applied in a generous and inves[t]ive spirit after impartial and scientific inquiry. The meddling and intriguing of great powers must be stopped, and the efforts to attain national unity by massacre must be abandoned.

It would obviously be unwise to attempt at this time to draw frontiers for the Balkan states.\* Certain broad considerations, however, may tentatively be kept in mind. They are in brief these: 1) that the area annexed by Rumania in the Dobrudja† is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should be returned; 2) that the boundary between Bulgaria and Turkey should be restored to the Enos-Midia line, as agreed upon at the conference of London;‡ 3) that the south boundary of Bulgaria should be the Aegean Sea coast from Enos to the gulf of Orfano, and should leave the mouth of the Struma river in Bulgarian territory; 4) that the best access to the sea for Serbia is through Saloniki; 5) that the final disposition of Macedonia cannot be determined without further inquiry; 6) that an independent Albania is almost certainly an undesirable political entity.

We are strongly of the opinion that in the last analysis economic considerations will outweigh nationalistic affiliations in the Balkans, and that a settlement which insures economic prosperity is most likely to be a lasting one.

#### *Poland.*

An independent and democratic Poland shall be established. Its boundaries shall be based on a fair balance of national and economic considerations, giving full weight to the necessity for adequate access to the sea. The form of Poland's government and its economic and political relations should be left to the determination of the people of Poland acting through their chosen representatives.

The subject of Poland is by far the most complex of all the problems to be considered. The present distribution of Poles is such as to make their complete unification impossible without separating East Prussia from Germany. This is probably not within the bounds of practical politics. A Poland which consists essentially of Russian and perhaps Austrian Poland would probably secure its access to the sea through the Vistula River and the canals of Germany which run to Hamburg and Bremen. This relationship would very probably involve both

---

\*A tentative map is appended. [Footnote in the original. The map is not appended to the file copy of this document.]

†In the treaty of Bucharest. [Footnote in the original.]

‡And in the treaty of San Stefano. [Footnote in the original.]



the economic subjection of Poland and the establishment of an area of great friction. If Russia is to remain weak the new Poland will lie in an exceedingly exposed position. The experiment must no doubt be made, however, but in order to assure it a fair start, it is necessary to insist at the outset upon a democratic basis for the Polish state. Unless this is loyally observed, the internal friction of Poles, Ruthenians, and Jews is likely to render Poland impotent in the presence of Germany.

*Austria-Hungary.*

We see promise in the discussions now going on between the Austro-Hungarian Governments and the peoples of the monarchy, but the vassalage of Austria-Hungary to the masters of Germany, riveted upon them by debts for money expended in the interests of German ambition, must be done away with in order that Austria-Hungary may be free to take her rightful place among the nations.

The object of this is to encourage the present movement towards federalism in Austria, a movement which, if it is successful, will break the German-Magyar ascendancy. By injecting the idea of a possible cancellation of the war debts, it is hoped to encourage all the separatist tendencies as between Austria-Hungary and Germany, as well as the social revolutionary sentiment which poverty has stimulated.

*Turkey.*

It is necessary to free the subject races of the Turkish Empire from oppression and misrule. This implies at the very least autonomy for Armenia and the protection of Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia by the civilized nations. It is necessary also to establish free intercourse through and across the straits. Turkey proper must be justly treated and freed from economic and political bondage. Her war debts to Germany must be cancelled. None of the money involved was spent in the interest of Turkey, and none of it should be regarded as a Turkish obligation. An adjustment of her pre-war debt in accordance with her territorial limitations is also required by the considerations of justice. Moreover, it will undoubtedly be feasible to arrange advances of money to Turkey in order to enable her under suitable supervision to institute and maintain satisfactory educational and sanitary conditions, and to undertake her economic rehabilitation. Thus Turkey can be freed from intermeddling and enabled to develop institutions adapted to the genius of her own people.

This will appear on the surface to be a drastic solution of the Turkish problem, but it is one which the military situation enables us to accomplish, and it can hardly be doubted that no principle of

justice requires the return of occupied portions of Turkey to the German-Turkish alliance. The cancellation of Turkey's debt to Germany is the one final way to abolish German political and commercial penetration. It is also the one method by which Turkey can be given a new start, considerably reduced in size, without power to misgovern alien races, and therefore free to concentrate upon the needs of her own population. It should be noted in this regard that only a few days ago it was announced that Germany had agreed to forego interest on the Turkish debt for a period of twelve years after the war. This implies a realization on Germany's part that if she insists upon the interest payments a repudiation is possible, carrying with it a destruction of German influence in Turkey.

*The League of Nations.*

From the nations at present engaged in resistance to Germany's effort to dominate the world there is growing a League of Nations for common protection, for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, for the attainment of a joint economic prosperity, including equal opportunity upon the highways of the world and equitable access to the raw materials which all nations need. Whether this League is to remain armed and exclusive, or whether there is to be a reduction of armaments and a cordial inclusion of Germany, will depend upon whether the German Government is in fact representative of the German democracy.

This is of course simply another statement of the alternative before Germany.

We regard all of the terms mentioned as essential to any final agreement. It may well be, however, that some of the provisions other than those relating to Belgium and northern France, the evacuation of Italy and Rumania, and the evacuation and restoration of Serbia and Montenegro, do not require assent as a preliminary to discussion at the conference. And this is due to the fact that we have the power to compel Germany's assent at the peace conference by our ability to bar her indefinitely from access to supplies and to protract the negotiations at her cost and at our own benefit.

We emphasize our belief that no surrender of this power, even by inference, should be considered until all the terms stated above are definitely agreed to, in detail as well as in principle, by Germany at the peace conference. This involves adopting as our policy the reserving of the discussion of economic peace until our political, social, and international objects are attained.

We might well adopt as our slogan "No economic peace until the peoples are freed."

Inquiry files

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to Colonel E. M. House*

DECEMBER 28, 1917.

#### INTERNATIONAL LAW

In plotting out the field of international law so far as it is likely to affect the peace conference it has become perfectly clear that there are a great number of questions for which the State Department alone could be responsible, and in order to avoid the duplication which might result from our doing ineffectively what the State Department is already in a position to do effectively, I am sending you a list of the subjects which seem to us outside our sphere:

- 1) The existing laws of war on land. The procedure for determining violation of the laws which may give rise to claims for the punishment of guilty persons, or to claims for damages and reparation on behalf of belligerent governments as well as innocent noncombatants.
- 2) The status of enemy merchant ships.
- 3) Questions of neutrality and the duties of neutral states, such as:
  - a) The use of neutral ports by belligerent ships.
  - b) The supplying of munitions to belligerents.
  - c) Censorship questions, etc.
- 4) All questions relating to the existing blockade.
- 5) All questions relating to enemy trade during this war.
- 6) All questions relating to the custodianship of enemy property.

In general, these comprise the legal questions involved in the waging of the war.

If these questions are taken over by the State Department we should confine ourselves to special studies in international law, with one object in mind—the working out of proposals for the future. Naturally this will involve a good deal of study of the present experience, but it would not involve our making ourselves expert on the legal negotiations now in progress. We should then want to consider merely legal aspects of such problems as a possible league of nations, the internationalization of the Dardanelles, the protection of racial minorities in the Balkans, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, access to the sea for land-locked states, the internationalization of certain railroads, rivers, and ports, the “freedom of the seas,” the reduction of armaments. In general one might say that our interest would be in those questions of international law which are involved in future political relations rather than in the immediate negotiations now in progress.

Inquiry files

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Director of the American Geographical Society (Bowman)*

[NEW YORK,] 16 January, 1918.

MY DEAR DR. BOWMAN: For nearly two months The Inquiry have enjoyed the hospitality of the American Geographical Society and has been generously aided by you and the members of your staff. We have been permitted to use convenient rooms, and the whole of your spacious top floor, rearranged to meet our need; have been served by your attendants; and given invaluable and expert assistance by your competent collaborators. A number of other centers have contributed highly appreciated aid in the carrying on of our work for the Government, but none has done more than you have.

May I assure you and the Councillors of the American Geographical Society of our hearty appreciation.

Very truly yours,

[File copy not signed]

---

Inquiry Document No. 889

*Report on the Inquiry: Its Scope and Method*

I.

MARCH 20, 1918

The purpose of the Inquiry is to secure command of the data which may be needed in the course of the negotiations at the peace conference. Obviously this cannot be acquired by the compilation of a new encyclopaedia or of a series of monographs. It is clear that the American negotiators will not have time to read extensive treatises. It is also clear that no treatise planned now would necessarily be in a form pertinent to the actual negotiations when they are in progress. No one can foresee at this time the order in which data will be requisitioned, nor the ideas about which the data will have to be grouped in the course of the negotiations. Whatever facts are assembled must clearly be under such control that they can be arranged and grouped and presented in almost any form at the shortest possible notice.

The first condition is the reliability of the material. Under the complex and shifting conditions, reliability means not only a critical use of the best sources but a very candid indication in each case of the degree of validity. On many points certain to be discussed there are no reliable data, though claims are often put forward by interested parties as if complete accuracy of information existed. In

these cases it will be as important to be in a position to examine such claims critically as to make final statements of fact. Where partisanship infects statistics as seriously as it does in many parts of Europe and Asia, the essence of reliability is to know as clearly as possible the character of the sources upon which assertions of fact are based.

The second condition is complete mobility of the material. The data must not only have been assembled before the conference. It must be immediately available in the course of the conference.

The third condition is simplicity and lucidity of presentation. This involves the preparation of maps, charts, graphs, statistical tables, schematic outlines, upon which a high degree of ingenuity has been exercised.

## II.

The range of topics upon which the Inquiry may be required to furnish information has expanded with the course of events. The most striking case is supplied by the disintegration of the former Russian Empire. Four months ago the plans of the Inquiry called for the study of Russia as a unitary Great Power; today Russia is a complex of nationalistic, economic, and religious questions stretching from the Baltic Sea through Central Asia to China. Should Austria-Hungary disintegrate a multitude of new issues and relationships would immediately be raised. Under these conditions it has seemed prudent to maintain a flexible program, and to lay plans for further research in anticipation of new developments.

The method of settlement laid down by the President in his addresses introduces another factor which increases the detailed variety of the topics likely to be discussed. Since the peace conference is to be conducted by open discussion, a command of fact totally unnecessary in secret negotiations is required. Where the whole world is to be the critic of the debates, the American influence will be in proportion to the depth and incisiveness with which just principles are applied to particular cases.

So far as the territorial settlement goes, the following areas are indicated as probable subjects of discussion:

- 1) On the west from Switzerland to the North Sea and from the military line to the Rhine.
- 2) The Baltic basin.
- 3) The Adriatic and its hinterland.
- 4) The Mediterranean basin.
- 5) The Balkan peninsula.
- 6) The Turkish Empire.
- 7) The Austro-Hungarian Empire.
- 8) The Polish area.
- 9) The former Russian Empire.
- 10) The whole of Asia, with the possible exception of India.
- 11) The territories of the Pacific Ocean.

- 12) The whole of Africa.
- 13) The islands of the Atlantic.
- 14) Possibly Latin America.

The decisive negotiating power will lie with the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. The influence of these powers will be increased or diminished insofar as they carry with them the support of the Russian nations, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Spain, Brazil, Argentine, and Chile, and in a lesser degree of the smaller belligerents and neutrals.

In order to understand the needs and purposes which inspire the claims put forth by the Powers, it is necessary to have an analysis of the relationship of their political, social, and economic needs to their resources and their present situation. It is important to know on whom they are dependent for supplies and who is dependent upon them, what investments, what cultural and religious affiliations, what political ideas, make them friendly or antagonistic to policies of other Powers and to proposals which may be brought forward in the interests of international order.

The nature of the claims put forward by the conferees will be determined by the views of the dominant parties at the time of the settlement as to the general character of the settlement, as to immediate national interest and need. These views will either be enlarged or diminished by the process of negotiation, as viewed in its effect upon the support of other powers, the adhesion of the second-class powers, and the interests and demands of domestic factions.

As a general rule, it is necessary, therefore, to know, in regard to each disputed area, what resources human and material it contains, what is the concrete interest of each power in the area, what political group or groups within each power are concerned in that interest. It is necessary also to know the place of that area in the general plan of each power's foreign policy. Finally, the data as to each disputed area and as to the nations with whom it has relationships must be in such form that the displacement of forces effected by any particular proposal can be estimated.

The American negotiators must be in a position to judge whether a claim put forth by a power is supported by the democracy at home, or whether it is merely a traditional diplomatic objective or the design of an imperialistic group. In the fiercely disputed areas they must be prepared freely to offer friendly suggestions either of compromise or of constructive experiment, but if these suggestions are to have much weight they must be supported by a body of reliable fact and must be presented tersely and graphically so as to carry conviction.

In addition to territorial settlements the American program involves complex covenants in respect to trade, future international disputes,

the guarantees of minority rights, of equality upon the seas, and of reduction of armaments. For a successful negotiation in respect to each proposal, it will be necessary not only to have the data that bears upon the probable effects of the proposal, but also a large number of alternative suggestions, so as to give an accommodating and experimental character to American purpose.

Finally, the American negotiators should command various well-tested programs of reform and reconstruction for the historically embittered areas. They should be in a position to propose to the torn peoples of the Balkans and Turkey or to the natives of Africa expedients of education, sanitation, financial reform, adequate police, and simply administered justice. With this end in view, comparative studies are being made of the different types of government applied to dependent and backward peoples. A careful examination is planned of the various attempts in the past to secure the rights of subject peoples. From sympathetic analyses of failure and success it is hoped that a working program may be derived.

### III. THE TECHNIQUE OF THE INQUIRY

1) The assembly of source materials. The inquiry is not purchasing a library. It is locating source materials in the various libraries of the country, keeping in its central office a card catalogue of the materials, a critique of them, and the nearest places where the actual material can be found. The librarian and his staff are instructed to draw up a scheme by which a complete reference library could be physically assembled in New York on two weeks notice. No actual arrangements have been made with the various libraries of the country, but it is assumed that whenever the time came all necessary books could be borrowed or requisitioned.

There is now working in the service of the Inquiry a group of experts each of whom commands the source material in some portion of the field. These men can be assembled at any time, are organized in groups under leaders, and are entirely competent to handle the source materials.

The Inquiry has prepared and keeps current, the declarations of statesmen, of opposition parties and of important political groups in all parts of the world, as they bear upon the settlement. These are arranged so that the total official or semi-official expression of any one nation in regard to the settlement can be studied, or the total expressions of all nations in regard to a particular topic. There is also being prepared a diplomatic history since 1870 arranged in special form so that all the documents bearing upon a topic which has been a continuing object of diplomatic interest are available.

2) The preparations outlined above have as their object the creation of an agency by which research can be carried on from time to time in the course of the negotiations. In addition data are now being collected by specialists for those problems which the present situation justifies us in believing will surely be the subject of discussion. For territorial questions these data will be arranged as follows:

In each area the smallest administrative units for which figures exist are listed on a chart and in parallel columns the latest and most reliable data are assembled. If the data are of a kind about which there is no dispute of authorities they will be designed in one fashion; if there is dispute, as for example in Macedonia, the best figures (in this case the best Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek, Austrian, German, French and Russian statistics) will be given, together with the judgment of the specialists in the employ of the Inquiry. It is planned to put upon these charts not only statistics but brief historical and political facts or comment of a significant character. Naturally, some districts will require more intensive research than others. The amount of research put upon each district depends upon its critical character, upon the number of scholars whose services can be secured, upon the time available, and upon judgment of the value of research.

Presenting all the available material in respect to an area in this schematic form and in the smallest feasible units, the immediate bearing of any frontier which can be assigned may be determined with some definiteness. Moreover, a great many possible combinations of fact can easily be made if the data are arranged in this way. Thus, for example, if the Cholm question should arise at the conference, the procedure would be to list the administrative districts in the area under dispute, say ten or twelve, extract from the chart of Polish data the facts in regard to these districts and sum them up in a table showing the ethnic composition of the area, the religious affiliations, the condition of agriculture, the industrial plants, the mineral production and mineral possibilities, the educational facilities, the railroad systems and canals which cross it, and any important historical facts connected with the area. If the program is completed and if the proper clerical and mechanical assistance is at hand, the Inquiry should be able to furnish the American negotiators with the relevant facts for a problem of this kind in two hours or less.

In each area it is necessary to have available, besides the facts as to that area, the best possible analysis of the interests of the neighboring states and of the Great Powers in any particular settlement. With this object in view, there is now in course of preparation a schematic and analytic study of the special interests, commercial, political, religious, military, of each power. These interests are sometimes expressed by treaties, sometimes by informal understanding, sometimes



they exist merely as ambitions among certain influential classes. Wherever possible, it is important that the interests of each nation should be visualized as concretely as possible and traced home to its course [*sic*].

3) Presentation of material. There are being prepared for the Inquiry a set of base maps for all the areas under discussion. Upon these base maps will be laid a large amount of the data which seems relevant, and copies of a complete loose-leaf atlas will be at the disposal of the negotiators. In addition, the Inquiry is planning, by means of a properly organized force actually at the conference, to be in a position to lay any proposal made upon a map, showing the relations of that proposal to any set of facts for which information is at hand. Thus, if a certain boundary for Poland is proposed, the Inquiry would be prepared to furnish the negotiators with maps showing the relation of the proposal to the distribution of Poles or to the location of mineral deposits, railways, etc. Besides maps, the Inquiry is planning charts and graphs showing various relationships, as, for example, the dependence of Austria upon the port of Trieste, or the relation of the trade of an independent Poland to Germany and to Austria. Provided there is a sufficient expert staff to control the underlying source material adequately, and provided sufficient draftsmen and cartographers are available, the Inquiry ought to be in a position to furnish the American negotiators with graphic representations of sets of facts in their relationships upon very short notice.

#### [IV.] TOPICS OF RESEARCH

- I) The Western Theater.
  - A) Belgium.
  - B) Luxemburg.
  - C) Alsace-Lorraine.
- II) The Italian Theater.
  - A) Trentino.
  - B) Trieste and Istria.
  - C) The Adriatic Coast.
- III) The Former Russian Empire.
  - A) The Baltic Provinces.
  - B) Lithuania.
  - C) Finland.
  - D) Poland.
  - E) Great Russia.
  - F) White Russia.
  - G) The Ukraine.
  - H) Cis-Caucasia and Trans-Caucasia.
  - I) Bessarabia.
  - ~~J)~~ J) Siberia.

- IV) Austria-Hungary.
- V) The Balkan States.
  - A) Serbia.
  - B) Montenegro.
  - C) Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  - D) Albania.
  - E) Bulgaria.
  - F) Greece.
  - G) Rumania.
  - H) The Aegean Islands.
  - I) The peninsula as a whole.
  - J) The disputed areas.
  - K) Various solutions of the Balkan question.
- VI) The Ottoman Empire.
  - A) Constantinople and Adrianople.
  - B) Anatolia.
  - C) Armenia.
  - D) Syria.
  - E) The Gulf of Akaba.
  - F) Arabia.
  - G) Mesopotamia.
  - H) The Nestorians.
  - I) The Kurds.
- VII) Persia and the Persian Gulf.
- VIII) Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism.
  - A) Russian Central Asia.
  - B) Chinese Turkestan.
  - C) Afghanistan and Beluchistan.
- IX) Africa.
  - A) General.
  - B) Northern Africa.
  - C) Central Africa.
  - D) South Africa.
- X) The Pacific.
  - A) The British possessions.
  - B) The German Pacific Islands.
  - C) Indo China and Siam.
  - D) Japan.
  - E) China.

In addition to these areas, topical research is either being conducted or material assembled on the world situation as to commerce, agricultural products, routes of trade, immigration and emigration, shipping, tariffs, commercial privileges, credit, debt, budgets, armaments, international law.

As a part of the field of international law, it is planned to have readily available all the leading precedents and authorities, together with the views expressed in diplomatic correspondence or otherwise, and also the treaties and agreements heretofore and now existing which have either a bearing upon, or may be affected by, the proceedings of the conference.

## V. TENTATIVE LIST OF ISSUES

The section of the report which follows is tentative and is submitted merely for purposes of illustration. The questions listed have at one time or another figured in the plans of the belligerents.

### I. THE WESTERN THEATER

#### A) Belgium.

##### 1) The Flemish-Walloon question.

a) Its relation to the German administrative division of Belgium during the occupation as a possible center of intrigue and interference in Belgian politics after the war.

b) The incitement of Flemish nationalism coincident with the strict control of the submarine bases.

##### 2) Antwerp.

a) The relation of Antwerp to German export and import commerce: to the Rhine trade and the German waterway system.

b) Possible methods and probable effects of discrimination against German trade with Antwerp in Belgian control, or of discrimination in favor of Germany with Antwerp in German power.

c) The effects of different proposals made by Germany for commercial treaties involving a special position in Antwerp.

##### 3) Railroads.

a) Economic and political factors involved in the control of Belgian railroads.

b) The strategic railway system of Germany aimed at Belgium: possible safeguards.

##### 4) Studies of frontier questions between Belgium and Germany in regard to Belgian territory lying across the German border.

##### 5) Methods of estimating reparation; methods of payment; conditions of evacuation.

6) Sources of supply and markets for Belgium on the conclusion of peace, looking to the reestablishment of her industry.

7) The Scheldt question.

8) Fortifications, armaments, and guarantees of neutrality.

**B) Luxemburg.**

1) The importance of the mineral resources and strategic position of Luxemburg in relation to the German Empire, Belgium, and France.

2) Probable economic and military effects of:

a) The continued neutrality of Luxemburg within the German customs area.

b) Incorporation into the German Empire.

c) Partition among Belgium, Germany, and France, or between Belgium and France.

**C) Alsace-Lorraine.**

1) Brief history to 1871.

2) The constitutional position of Alsace-Lorraine and her experience within the German Empire.

3) Detailed study of the popular vote of Alsace-Lorraine by districts in Reichstag and local elections since 1871: electoral procedure; the character of the electoral districts; political map of Alsace-Lorraine by election-districts. Such data form the basis for inferences regarding:

a) The different forms of plebiscite proposed, whether by referendum, by constituent assembly, or otherwise.

b) The necessity of international control in the case of a plebiscite.

c) The probable results of a plebiscite, either for the Reichsland as a whole or for its districts.

4) The exact delimitation of the coal, iron, and potash areas.

a) The relation of these areas to the geographical distribution of French and German sympathizers within Alsace-Lorraine.

b) The effect on German iron industry of the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine.

c) The effect on French industry of the return of Alsace-Lorraine.

d) The effect of retrocession, partition, or autonomy on the economic welfare of Alsace-Lorraine itself.

e) The tariff problem.

5) The position of Alsace-Lorraine in relation to vital railway and canal systems.

- 6) The immigration and emigration statistics of Alsace-Lorraine.
- 7) Various proposals with regard to the provinces:
  - a) The case for and against the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine: 1) with guarantees of certain economic rights to Germany; 2) without such guarantees. Political, economic, and strategic effects of retrocession; the problem of the German population.
  - b) The proposal to grant Alsace-Lorraine a larger measure of autonomy within the German Empire.
  - c) The proposal to partition Alsace-Lorraine between Bavaria and Prussia, with a view to the probable democratizing effect of such a partition.
  - d) Alsace-Lorraine as a neutralized state.
  - e) The nationalistic and strategic aspects of a possible division of Alsace-Lorraine, and its relation to the mineral areas.
- 8) The French claim to the boundary of 1814 rather than that of 1815.
- 9) The resources of the Saar valley.
- 10) The French desire for the Rhine frontier; the ethnic, economic, and strategic results of such a boundary.
- 11) The Briey-Longwy district: its resources, present ownership, and the direction of its export and import trade; the problem of strategic defense.

## II. THE ITALIAN THEATER

- A) The Trentino.
  - 1) A general ethnic, strategic, and economic study of the area from the Italian frontier of 1914 to the highest peaks of the north.
  - 2) A detailed study of the disputed triangle at the conclusion of the Italo-Austrian negotiations of 1915, with special attention to the ethnic composition of the Bozen valley, the position of the ridge crests, and the economic drainage of the area.
- B) Trieste and Istria.
  - 1) The ethnic composition of Trieste: of the environs.
  - 2) The relation of Trieste to the Austrian hinterland.
    - a) Estimate of the effect of Italian annexation and of internationalization.
  - 3) The economic affiliations of the Italian inhabitants of Trieste.
  - 4) Ethnic composition of the peninsula of Istria.

**C) The Adriatic Littoral.**

- 1) The Isonzo front: Ethnic and strategic aspects.
  - a) The possibility of a slight modification of the Italian frontier towards the east.
  - b) Görz and Gradiska as gateways.
- 2) The Dalmatian coast.
  - a) The ethnic, economic, and strategic bases of the Italian claim to the Dalmatian coast and the adjacent islands.
  - b) The Italian Jugo-Slav question on the Dalmatian coast.
- 3) Fiume: its commercial hinterland and relation to the Jugo-Slav question.
- 4) The Italian claim to a protectorate over Albania.
  - a) The relation of this claim to Serbia and to Greece.
  - b) The effect on Serbia, Albania, Greece, and Austria of the Italian occupation of Avlona.

**D) The Franco-Italian frontier.**

- 1) The Italian claim to French Savoy, with an analysis of the strategic, ethnic, and economic factors involved.

**III. THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE****A) The Baltic Provinces.**

- 1) The German landed aristocracy's aspirations and the native aspirations.
- 2) The question of German colonization.
- 3) The problem of western Russia's access to the sea.

**B) Lithuania.**

- 1) Historical and economic relationship with Poland; with Russia.
- 2) Ethnic affinity with Letts of Courland and Livonia.
- 3) Delimitation of the Lithuanian area.
- 4) The bearing of various proposals on German economic penetration of Lithuania:
  - a) Autonomy.
  - b) Annexation.
  - c) Union with Baltic Provinces.
  - d) Union with Poland.
- 5) The tariff question.

**C) Finland.**

- 1) Finland's historical experience with self-government.
- 2) German influence and interests.
- 3) The dispute over the Åland Islands; relations with Sweden.

**D) Poland.**

- 1) Frontiers: ethnological, historical, strategic, economic; a critical study of conflicting statistics and partisan claims.
- 2) Special studies of contested districts, such as Cholm and Suwalki.
- 3) The "Austrian solution" of the Polish problem.
- 4) Estimate of Poland's economic and political relations with the Central Powers under the following conditions:
  - a) The creation of an independent and united Poland with complete right of self-determination.
  - b) The exclusion of Prussian Poland, or Galicia, or both.
  - c) The inclusion of Lithuania and Courland.
- 5) The protection of Jewish and other racial and religious minorities.

**E) Great Russia.**

- 1) Political and social forces significant for the future of Russian democracy.
- 2) Access to the sea.
- 3) Economic resources; problems of reconstruction; economic treaty relations with Central Europe.
- 4) Historical, ethnological, and economic data for an estimate of the probable relations with border states in case the latter achieve independence.
- 5) The proposed federalist solution.

**F) White Russia.**

- 1) Degree and extent of national self-consciousness.
- 2) The conflict of religions, as affecting educational and political problems.
- 3) Relations with Great Russia; with other Russian border-nations; with Germany.

**G) The Ukraine.**

- 1) Historical and ethnographical frontiers.
- 2) The Little-Russian portion of Galicia.
- 3) Economic resources and relations with the Central Powers.
- 4) Odessa, the Black Sea routes, the mineral basin.
- 5) The land system, social classes, and counterrevolutionary forces.
- 6) Economic treaty relations with Central Europe.
- 7) Political and social forces making for or against constitutional stability.

**H) Cis-Caucasia and Trans-Caucasia.**

- 1) Armenian claims in Trans-Caucasia—historical, racial, and religious.

- 2) The international importance of railways passing through Caucasia.
- 3) Oil, manganese, and other mineral resources.
- 4) The racial and religious map of Caucasia, with an estimate of the results of self-determination.
- 5) Difficulties in the way of Pan-Turanianism.
- 6) The protection of minorities.

*I) Bessarabia.*

- 1) Rumania's claims, historical and ethnological.
- 2) Ukrainian and Jewish minorities.
- 3) Relation to Odessa; to control of the Danube.

*J) Siberia and Central Asia.*

- 1) Resources and potentialities.
- 2) Japanese interests in the Maritime Provinces and the Amur basin; strategic importance of Trans-Baikalia.
- 3) Central Asia: prospects of autonomy; of continued development under Russia; of Pan-Turanian agitation; agricultural possibilities, especially in cotton.

#### IV. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

*A) General data.*

- 1) Decentralization and federal autonomy.
- 2) The balance of political and ethnic forces.

*B) The place of Austria-Hungary in the project of Central Europe.*

*C) The relation of Austria-Hungary to the Russian border nations.*

*D) Special studies of the several nationalities:*

- 1) Austrians, Magyars, Czechs, and Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Italians and Ladines, Serbo-Croats and Slovenes.
  - a) Exact delimitation of each linguistic area.
  - b) Study of political experience, nationalistic aspirations, literacy, economic resources, and fecundity of each nationality.

*E) Dalmatia.*

- 1) The ethnic and religious composition, the economic affiliations, and the political relationships of the tongue of land from Ragusa to Volavitzza.

#### V. THE BALKAN STATES

*A) Serbia.*

- 1) The Serbo-Albanian frontier.
- 2) Ragusa, Durazzo, and Saloniki as ports for Serbia.
- 3) The Serbo-Bulgarian frontier.
- 4) The question of South Slav unity.



- B) Montenegro.
  - 1) The Montenegrin-Albanian frontier.
  - 2) Mount Lovcen and Cattaro.
- C) Bosnia-Herzegovina.
  - 1) Economic resources and affiliations.
  - 2) Attitude of the various ethnic and religious groups towards Austro-Hungarian domination and towards Serbia.
- D) Albania.
- E) Bulgaria.
  - 1) Political and economic sympathies.
  - 2) Demand for national unity.
  - 3) Social structure.
- F) Greece.
- G) Rumania.
  - 1) Frontier rectifications.
  - 2) Economic relations with the Central Powers.
  - 3) Land system.
  - 4) Treatment of minorities.
  - 5) Claims.
- H) The Aegean islands.
- I) The ethnic and religious composition of the peninsula as a whole.
- J) The disputed areas of the Balkans:
  - 1) Epirus.
  - 2) Macedonia.
  - 3) Thrace.
  - 4) Dobrudja.
  - 5) Pirot and the strip of Serbian territory between the Morava and the Danube, claimed by Bulgaria.
  - 6) Thasos.
  - 7) Bukewina.
  - 8) Transylvania.
  - 9) The Maritza valley.
- K) Various solutions of the Balkan question:
  - 1) Union of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Jugo-Slav state, or as a federation of autonomous states.
  - 2) Incorporation of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia into a reconstructed Austro-Hungarian monarchy as an autonomous kingdom.
  - 3) A great Bulgaria.
  - 4) An autonomous Macedonia.
  - 5) The proposal to partition Albania.
  - 6) A Rumania including Bessarabia but minus the Dobrudja.
  - 7) Provisional autonomy for contested districts, pending a referendum under supervision of the League of Nations.
  - 8) Proposals for a Balkan federation.

## VI. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

- 1) Studies of ethnic distribution, mineral resources, agricultural possibilities, irrigation projects, railway concessions, railway projects, sanitation, schools, missions.
- 2) The Capitulations.
- 3) Forms of guarantee for subject nationalities.
- A) Constantinople and the Straits.
  - 1) Topographical outlines of a possible internationalized area.
  - 2) Administrative, military, and economic questions involved in the internationalization, including terminal and port facilities, police, sanitation, municipal administration, ownership of the Bagdad Railway approaches, tunnels, etc.
  - 3) Relation of the area to the Ottoman public debt.
- B) Anatolia.
  - 1) The Greek claim to Smyrna and its hinterland.
  - 2) The Italian claim to Adalia.
  - 3) Conflicting Italian and Greek claims to the Dodecanesus.
- C) Armenia.
  - 1) Delimitation of the Armenian area; study of districts contested with Kurds and others.
  - 2) Political problems in case Armenia remains under Turkish suzerainty.
  - 3) Economic problems of an independent Armenia.
- D) Syria.
  - 1) The projected Jewish state in Palestine.
  - 2) French railway interests and political claims.
  - 3) British claims.
- E) The Gulf of Akaba.
  - 1) British claims.
- F) Arabia.
  - 1) The Arab question and the Kingdom of the Hedjaz.
- G) Mesopotamia.
  - 1) The Arab question.
  - 2) Irrigation projects; economic resources.
  - 3) The Bagdad railway.
- H) The Nestorians.
- I) The Kurds.

## VII. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF

- A) The British zone.
- B) The Neutral zone; oil fields; British claims.
- C) The former Russian zone.

## VIII. PAN-TURANIANISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM

- A) Russian Central Asia.
- B) Chinese Turkestan.
- C) Afghanistan and Beluchistan.
- D) The relation of Pan-Turanianism to Berlin-Bagdad and Berlin-Bokhara.
- E) The Pan-Islamic question.
  - 1) Pan-Islamism and the British and French colonies.
  - 2) The Arabian countermovement.
  - 3) The question of depriving Turkey of the caliphate as a defensive measure against Pan-Islamism.

## IX. AFRICA

- A) General.
  - 1) Areas in Africa available for colonization.
  - 2) Sources of supply for chief tropical products.
- B) Northern Africa.
  - 1) The British interest:
    - a) In Egypt and the Suez Canal.
    - b) In strategic control over the Moroccan coast.
    - c) In the trade of Morocco, Tunis, and Algeria.
  - 2) Libya.
    - a) The proposed extension of the hinterland.
    - b) Nullification of treaty rights of the Turkish sultan.
  - 3) The French interest in Tunis, Algeria, Morocco, and the hinterland of the Sahara.
    - a) The French railway system binding French Africa together.
    - b) Franco-Italian relations in respect to Tunis and Libya.
    - c) French and Spanish relations in Morocco.
  - 4) The Italian interest in Northern Africa.
    - a) In Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
    - b) Claim to Tunis.
    - c) Commercial interest in Egypt.
  - 5) The German interest in Northern Africa.
    - a) In the mines and the trade of Morocco.
    - b) In the shipping of North African ports.
    - c) The German policy as protector of the Mohammedans of North Africa.
  - 6) The Portuguese islands off the Atlantic coast.
  - 7) The Spanish islands.
- C) Central Africa.
  - 1) The British blocks of territory: *i*) the Nile valley group, with East Africa and Somaliland; *ii*) the Rhodesian group; *iii*) Nigeria and the West African group.

- 2) The relationship of the British possessions to those of Portugal.
  - 3) The British Cape-to-Cairo project, in its relation to German East Africa and to Belgian Congo.
  - 4) The Belgian Congo.
  - 5) French possessions and claims.
    - a) West Africa and the island of Madagascar.
    - b) The French claims in Cameroons.
  - 6) The former German colonies: Cameroons, Togo, East Africa.
    - a) German colonial policy.
    - b) Proposals for partition.
    - c) Proposals for restoration, with guarantees of fair treatment for natives.
  - 7) The Italian possessions: Eritrea, Italian Somaliland.
    - a) Italy's entry to the Sahara through Libya.
    - b) Her aspirations respecting Abyssinia.
- D) South Africa.**
- 1) British possessions, including the Union of South Africa, Swaziland, Basutoland, the protectorate of Bechuanaland, Walvis Bay.
    - a) Treaty rights for the recruitment of native labor in Portuguese East Africa.
    - b) The control of ports, including Walvis Bay and Delagoa Bay.
  - 2) The problem of Afrikaner and the native.
    - a) The relation of Afrikaner to German Southwest Africa.
  - 3) Caprivi's finger and the commerce of the upper Zambesi valley.
  - 4) Germany's interest in Southwest Africa, and her relation to the colonial possessions of Portugal.

#### X. THE PACIFIC

- A) The British interest.**
- 1) In Australia, New Zealand, Papua, and the Fiji Islands.
  - 2) In the smaller islands of Oceania.
  - 3) In North Borneo, Straits Settlements, Malay States.
  - 4) In Hong Kong, Wei-hai-wei, Yangtze valley, and the trade of China.
  - 5) In defense of Canadian coast.
  - 6) In the General naval situation in the Pacific; in the coolie question.
- B) The former German possessions.**
- 1) South of the equator, in British occupation: Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands, Samoan Islands.

- 2) North of the equator, in Japanese occupation: Caroline, Marshall, Pelew, and Marianne Islands.
- C) Indo China and Siam.
  - 1) French possessions in Indo China.
  - 2) French and British interests in Siam.
- D) Japan.
  - 1) Policies and parties.
  - 2) Interests in Eastern Asia and in the Pacific.
  - 3) The emigration question.
- E) China.
  - 1) Prospects of stable government.
    - a) Political parties.
    - b) Constitutional reforms.
    - c) Nature and form of economic assistance required.
  - 2) Relations with Japan.
    - a) Japanese demands and Chinese concessions.
    - b) Japanese spheres of influence.
    - c) Kiao-chow and Shantung.
  - 3) The Russian sphere of influence: Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia.
  - 4) British interests: Hong Kong, Wei-hai-wei, the Yangtze valley, Outer Tibet, General commerce.
  - 5) French interests in southern China.
    - a) The leased port of Kwang-chow.
    - b) Special position in Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, and Yunnan.
    - c) Railway projects.
  - 6) German interests.
  - 7) American interests and the Open Door policy.
  - 8) Other economic questions.
    - a) The Boxer indemnity.
    - b) The tariff.

---

Inquiry Document No. 890

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to Dr. S. E. Mezes and Mr. D. H. Miller*

APRIL 17, 1918.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE

- I) Territorial questions of the following classes may be expected to arise at the peace conference:
  - a) Territories whose status was fixed by agreement prior to the conference.

This covers Belgium, northern France, or any other territory in which the specific assignment of sovereignty is determined as a condition of the assembly of the conference itself.

- b) Territories under military control, to which the formula of self-determination is to be applied.

The biggest group of these territories will be those on Germany's eastern frontier. Here the essential questions to be decided are:

- 1) The auspices under which self-determination is to occur.
- 2) The area within which self-determination is to occur.
- 3) The portion of the population within the area which is to participate in the self-determination.
- 4) The right of emigrants and immigrants to participate.
- 5) The alternative proposals to be submitted to the qualified electors.

- c) New states seeking admission to the family of nations.

At the present time these would include the Ukraine, Finland, the Kingdom of the Hedjaz, other Arab states, and possibly the Caucasian republics.

- d) States within which oppressed nationalities are to be protected.

The chief example is Turkey, though the need will apply also in the Balkans, and possibly in Poland and the Russian border nations.

- e) States hitherto less than sovereign, seeking a more independent status.

This will include Persia, Afghanistan, possibly Turkey, China, and Siam.

- f) States under belligerent occupation in which no national consciousness exists.

This covers the African colonies, the Pacific islands.

- g) Spheres of influence and interest established before and during the war.

This will cover the various claims in the Far East, in Turkey, and in Africa, and may even include such matters as the Monroe Doctrine.

- h) Territories formally annexed during the war.

This will cover, among other things, Courland, parts of Rumania, and, from the German point of view, Cyprus, Egypt, and possibly Morocco.

- i) Territory claimed by belligerents to complete their national unity.

- j) Territory claimed by belligerents for its strategic value.

- k*) Territory claimed by belligerents for its economic value.
- l*) Territory claimed by belligerents on historical grounds.
- m*) Rights of way and other privileges claimed by one state in the territory of another.

This will cover such questions as Poland's and Serbia's access to the sea.

- n*) Exchanges of territory.

There probably would be a certain amount of shifting of colonial territories by common agreement.

- o*) The control of international rivers.
- p*) The control of the narrow seas.
- q*) The extension of territorial waters.

## II) Economic questions.

- a*) The release of raw materials.
- b*) The disposition of shipping.
- c*) Financial exchanges.
- d*) The relation of specific economic agreements to a general economic peace.
- e*) Most-favored nation clause.
- f*) The exploitation of resources, trade, and communications in backward regions.
- g*) The status of enemy business within national territories.
- h*) Agreements in respect to emigration and immigration.
- i*) Loans to insolvent states.
- j*) Indemnities and reparations.

## III) International law.

- a*) The status of merchant ships in time of war.
- b*) The use of the submarine as a commerce destroyer.
- c*) The embargo and national commercial monopoly.
- d*) Air-craft.
- e*) The conscription of non-selfgoverning peoples.
- f*) The reduction of armaments.
- g*) The right of intervention.
- h*) Conciliation, mediation, and arbitration.
- i*) The right of appeal from a national to an international tribunal.
- j*) Sanctions.
- k*) The definition of national honor and unfriendly acts.

## IV) Miscellaneous.

- a*) Uniformity of law and practice in commerce and labor legislation.
- b*) Naturalization laws.
- c*) Patent laws.
- d*) The validity of secret agreements.

## V) Transitional questions.

- a) Special provisions will have to be made for the period of the demobilization in respect to:
  - 1) Shipping.
  - 2) Raw materials.
  - 3) Repatriation of prisoners.
  - 4) Enemy property.
- b) Arrangements will also have to be made for the provisional administration of certain areas.
- c) Intervention to restore order may be necessary.
- d) The terms of the treaty may be repudiated as a consequence of an overturn in the government of some one of the contracting parties.

## VI) Representation at the peace conference.

- a) The belligerent Great Powers.
  - 1) Negotiations in which only directly interested parties take part.
  - 2) Negotiations subject to the general participation of the Powers.

## b) The belligerent small powers.

## c) The passive belligerents.

This covers states like China, Siam, Brazil.

## d) The nations which have severed diplomatic relations with one or some of the Central Powers.

## e) The neutral powers.

## f) The protected states.

## g) National delegations and religious organizations.

There will be present at the conference delegations from Armenians, several parties of Poles, Jugo-Slavs, Czechs, Letts, Jews, etc., etc.

## h) New nations.

## i) The Holy See.

The most difficult question here is raised by the article in the treaty between France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy in regard to the Vatican's part in the peace negotiations.

## j) Special labor delegations, as distinct from labor representatives among the peace commissioners of national states.

## VII) Procedure at the peace conference.

## a) Place of meeting.

## b) Credentials.

The previous section on representation indicates the difficulty of determining who shall be admitted to the conference.



c) The order of business.

This is of primary importance, and should be examined from every angle, because the full exercise of America's influence can only be brought to bear if a skilful use is made of the order of business.

d) Committees.

The character and personnel of these committees is of primary importance, in view of the multitude of questions before the conference.

e) The taking of evidence.

Some rules of evidence will have to be agreed upon, in order to sift out conflicting claims.

f) Voting on reports.

This is an integral part of the question of representation, and is also fundamental to what sanctions the conference shall set up. There is a critical point in regard to the element of consent.

g) Special organs of the conference.

The conference will require a large number of continuing bodies, as well as technical bodies, for the detailed settlement of many questions.

h) Provision for amendment of the treaty.

This again is a critical question in regard to the League of Nations, because on it turns the flexibility and adaptability of the settlement.

i) The question of adjournment.

It will have to be determined whether the adjournment of the conference is final or temporary. Provisions for temporary adjournment and periodic meeting may well be the practical approach to a League of Nations.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/8a

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1918.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: I had hoped before this to be in New York and to get into more direct and detailed touch with your work. That which I know of it and have seen is so excellent that I probably could contribute little in the way of suggestion. However there is one branch of study which intended to mention as of importance in view of the uncertainty as to the scope of the conference which will take up world affairs. I refer to South and Central America. It is

of course possible that these regions may not be considered at all, but I think as a matter of precaution we should give as careful study to them as to the countries of Europe and Asia, following the same general treatment along historical, ethnological, geographical and economic lines. It would be most unfortunate to be without preparation if these countries became subjects of discussion.

I am writing you this because I do not see how I can get to New York within the next few days, and I do not think work on these subjects should be postponed. Possibly you have had this same thought and have already acted upon it. If so, this letter is superfluous. But it seemed to me sufficiently important and urgent to call to your attention on the possibility that the desirability of this particular study and collection of data had not occurred to you.

With warm regards I am

Very cordially yours,

[File copy not signed]

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/10

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 22, 1918.

[Received April 24.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your note of April 17th with its valuable suggestion to the effect that there is urgent need for as careful a study along historical, ethnological, geographical, and economic lines of the problems involved in South and Central America as for those involved in the countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

We have had in mind the need of such additional studies, but in view of the financial budget on which we are operating, we had planned to postpone the South and Central American work until the European, Asian, and African work, and general studies in international economics and organization had progressed further; for on our present scale of expenditure it is only possible to take up our work serially, as a simultaneous investigation in all the fields would entail a larger monthly expenditure than we are now incurring. A consideration of the general scope of the work in brief outline will make the situation clearer.

In order to be prepared for possible eventualities when the conference assembles, facts bearing on the following problems should be gathered, digested, and held under such control that they can be promptly and compendiously presented:

- 1) Critical economic, political, and territorial problems in: *a*) Europe; *b*) The Near East; *c*) The Far East, including the Pacific Islands; and *d*) Africa.

- 2) Problems of international law, international business and economics, and international organization, which of course are world-wide.
- 3) Problems of the western hemisphere, which, though closely linked up with international law, economics and organization, and with the foreign relations, politics, and economics of the countries of the eastern hemisphere, also involve special studies.

1) and 2) above we have well in hand, though much remains to be done if our representatives at the conference are to be supplied with data which will enable them to maintain their positions as against those taken by representatives of the Central Powers, or even of our Allies, who have been in active and even bitter negotiation with one another on such subjects for so many years, and whose officials, travelers, and scholars have busied themselves with them and know the ins and outs of the problems involved with an intimate knowledge. All that remains to be done in 1) and 2), in addition to filling out in detail the data we have blocked out in substantially satisfactory general outlines, is to prepare maps and charts of the Atlantic Ocean basin, the Pacific Ocean basin, and the Indian Ocean basin, as it is over these oceans that the lines of communication run which tie together in relation to one another the eastern and the western hemispheres, and Eurasia with the continent of Africa. The omission just named we can supply before very long, and without adding to the present monthly rate of expenditure.

While on this subject, I may point out a factor in the situation that it is easy to overlook. If our government is to be prepared at the conference it will be necessary not only to accumulate an appreciable body of reports, maps, and graphic presentations of problems and possible solutions, but, even more important, to train a body of workers who can handle this mass of data and the research on which it is based, and draw out from them, as the conference progresses, just the facts that are needed to make clear the reach and significance of proposals that will be constantly made, and the exact nature of which it is quite impossible to anticipate. This means, of course, that even when the facts with regard to any problem or area have been gathered with approximate adequacy, the force must continue to deal with such data, and, by constant practice, to perfect itself in analyzing proposals of various kinds and presenting their significance in a compact and readily intelligible form, for in no other form can busy officials and conferees use them. This is the critical part of our task.

Coming specifically to the matter of expenditure, our last month's budget shows that we spent some \$7,000 for the salaries of men engaged in gathering historical, ethnographic, geographic, and economic data, and in administration; \$3,000 for the salaries of the clerical force

and for draftsmen to put the results of research in compact form on maps and diagrams; and \$3,000 in addition for supplies and incidental expenses. The continuation of such a monthly expenditure of \$13,000 (which may run to \$15,000 if rush reports are called for) would enable us to complete the gathering of data in the first and second fields above mentioned and, incidentally, to give our force practice for the quick work we shall be called upon to do at the conference itself. The cost of printing, a sizable item, is not included in this estimate, nor is the cost of getting to and attending the conference. Moreover, I am, of course, omitting any estimate of the cost of gratuitous services and equipment, contributed by universities, societies and libraries, that total much more than \$13,000 monthly.

And now as to South and Central America. We have made a careful study of the additional expenditure which would be necessary if we are to take on South and Central America at once, on top of what we are at present swinging, with the following result: We can get South and Central America up to the standard of adequacy we have attained in the European regions by August first if an additional expenditure of \$20,000, to be scattered over the three months up to August first, is authorized, and can keep this additional data alive and train a staff to deal with it competently at the conference at a cost of about \$5,000 a month from August first until the time of starting for the conference. This calculation is based on an estimate which shows that we will need for each of the additional areas—that is, for South and for Central America—about four draftsmen, one supervisor of draftsmen, a gatherer and digester of economic data, with two assistants, a gatherer and digester of political and social data, with two assistants, a man competent to make diagrams and graphs, and some additional clerical force, and expenditures for supplies and drafting expenses.

Of course I see the wisdom of your suggestion, and appreciate that in the case of certain eventualities we might proceed to the conference unprepared to deal at all adequately with problems in which Latin America would be vitally involved, and in which her support and co-operation would be of decided significance.

With cordial regards,

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

[Enclosure]

SOME OF THE DATA NEEDED FOR SOUTH AMERICA  
(Similar Data needed for Central America)

I Natural Resources

Mineral

Vegetable

- Animal
- Water Power
- Labor
- II Concessions and Investments
  - Existing
    - History
    - Legality
    - Scope
    - Nationality { of capital  
                  of management
    - Terms
    - By what political faction granted
  - Desired
    - By whom
    - History and present status of negotiations
  - Unappropriated
- III Loans
  - Where floated
  - Where held
  - By whom
    - Nationality
    - Government participation
  - Debt Service
    - To what applied
- IV Export Trade
  - Destination, volume and velocity, value
  - Character and nationality of commercial control
  - Bounties, laws, etc.
  - How financed
  - Firms engaged
- V Import Trade
  - Origin, route, volume, velocity, value, indispensability
  - How financed
  - Tariffs
  - Firms engaged, selling organization
- VI European colonies and European settlements
- VII Areas colonizable by Europeans, by Asiatics
- VIII Territorial disputes
- IX Domestic Political Groups
  - Personalities
  - Social, financial, international affiliations
  - Control of Press
  - Attitude of Intellectuals, especially in University centers
  - The controlling classes, and their basis

- X Budget analyses and tax systems
  - XI Commercial probabilities, especially in their relation to European Needs
  - XII American assets and liabilities in each state
  - XIII Exact account of participation by each state in the war
    - Neutrality awards
    - Damages suffered
    - Acts for which damages might be asked of them
  - XIV The way government works
  - XV Elections
  - XVI Islands
  - XVII Ethnography and Population Distribution and Demography
  - XVIII History
  - XIX International Law and Lawyers
- 

Paris Peace Conf. 182/10

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In view of the fact that Friday is Liberty Day I assume that there will be no Cabinet meeting.

On that account I take the liberty of sending you the enclosed letter which I received from Doctor Mezes<sup>15</sup> relative to the work of his organization and the proposal to extend that work to South America. I do this because Doctor Mezes in his letter states that it will require about \$20,000 to carry it out. My own view is that this should certainly be done, as I explained to you on Tuesday.

If you approve of the work will you be good enough to make an allotment of the amount required in order that I can inform Doctor Mezes to begin at once the collection of the data? As I said to you I intend to go to New York on Friday, May 3d, to go over the work already done and to see if it ought to be extended along certain lines.

Will you be good enough to return to me Doctor Mezes letter which I have not answered?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

---

<sup>15</sup> *Supra.*

763.72/10092 3a

*The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House*

[Extract]

MAY 7, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL: I saw the President today in regard to the expansion and continuation of the Commission of Inquiry, of which Doctor Mezes is the head. He approved thoroughly going on with the work and will furnish the necessary funds. Will you be good enough to advise Doctor Mezes of this and to have him let me know what additional funds are required and when?

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

Inquiry Document No. 882

*Report on the Inquiry, May 10, 1918*

## PART I

The work of the Inquiry consists of the following sections:

- 1) The western front—Belgium, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, from the left bank of the Rhine to the occupied part of France.
- 2) The head of the Adriatic—the Trentino, the Isonzo, Istria and Trieste, the Dalmatian coast.
- 3) Austria-Hungary—including the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav movements.
- 4) The Balkans—Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, the Greek islands, and the Greek fringe on the coast of Asia Minor.
- 5) The Ottoman Empire—Thrace, Constantinople, the Straits, Anatolia, the Armenian vilayets, Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia, the Arab states.
- 6) Persia, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan.
- 7) The former Russian Empire—the Polish area, including Galicia, Teschen, East and West Prussia, Posen, Silesia; Lithuania, Courland, Esthonia; White Russia; Ukraine; Finland; Great Russia; Siberia; the Caucasus; Mohammedan Russia; Russian Central Asia.
- 8) Rumania and Bessarabia.
- 9) Africa—Northern Africa, Tropical Africa, Southern Africa.
- 10) The Far East—Japan, China, French Indo China, Siam.
- 11) The Pacific Ocean—the Dutch colonies, the German colonies, Australasian claims, the American naval position.
- 12) South and Central America.

In addition to these analytical territorial studies, the following synthetic research is in progress:

- 13) The commercial relations of Central Europe in the east, west, and over seas.
- 14) Political and commercial developments and plans of the British Empire.
- 15) The world situation as to minerals, agricultural products, manufactures, shipping, commercially strategic lines of transportation, British, German, French, Italian firms doing foreign business, timber resources of the world, raw material possibilities, tariffs, credit.
- 16) The needs and political affiliations of the European neutrals.
- 17) Projects for educational, sanitary, and fiscal reform in backward areas, especially Turkey, the Balkans, and Africa.
- 18) A special diplomatic history of the world in its bearing upon problems of the settlement.
- 19) The diplomatic policy of each of the Great Powers.
- 20) A current collation, summary, and analysis of public commitments in all countries, affecting the settlement, together with an examination of sources upon which claims are based.
- 21) The collection and analysis of plans proposed for settling questions likely to arise at the peace conference.
- 22) International Law—the collection of treaties and precedents, statements of legal questions involved in the President's program, with particular reference to the League of Nations, the equality of trade, and equality upon the high seas.
- 23) The production of a series of maps and graphs embodying the results of research.
- 24) The collection of detailed primary reference maps on all parts of the world which may come under discussion.
- 25) The selection and planning of a library to be assembled at short notice, for use at the conference itself.
- 26) The revision and current use of all material in the archives, and the training of a corps of expert advisors and assistants competent to use this material.
- 27) The framing of plans for transforming the present staff of the Inquiry into a secretariat for the use of the peace commissioners.
- 28) Detailed critiques of reports and other material.
- 29) The central direction of the research and administration of the staff and equipment.

## PART II

In this part an attempt will be made to state the force engaged in each one of the sections named above, discriminating between volunteers and salaried employees,<sup>16</sup> together with an estimate of the

---

<sup>16</sup> In the following portion of this memorandum workers on the Inquiry were designated as volunteers or as salaried workers, with the amount of the salary specified in each case. These designations and salaries have been omitted without inserting indication of omission.



present condition of the work, the probable changes, and a forecast of the future.

1) The western front:

The work is under the direction of Dean Charles H. Haskins of Harvard University.

*Belgium.*—The political problems of Belgium are being done by Dean Haskins himself. For the summer months an assistant at a nominal salary has been authorized. Preliminary reports are at hand; a definitive report is not expected until late summer. As Dean Haskins continues his duties at Harvard, including those in the summer school, he is not able to give his full time to the subject.

*Alsace-Lorraine.*—A preliminary report by Professor E. B. Krehbiel of Stanford University (no longer a member of the Inquiry's staff), dealing with the possibilities of a plebiscite is completed, but criticism showed that more detailed study was necessary before any satisfactory conclusions could be reached.

The following studies are nearing completion under the direction of Professor Wallace Notestein of the University of Minnesota: *a*) the present government of Alsace-Lorraine; *b*) public opinion in Alsace-Lorraine, based especially upon the debates of the Reichstag and the Landesausschuss; *c*) conditions in Alsace-Lorraine since 1914, as seen in German, French, and Swiss newspapers; *d*) the recent attitude of the clergy in Alsace-Lorraine towards France and Germany.

Professor Notestein's work will terminate on July 1st.

Professor E. C. Armstrong of Princeton University is preparing a special study of the question of language and the linguistic frontier of Alsace-Lorraine, which should be ready by July 1st.

Professor W. H. Hobbs of the University of Michigan has completed a study of the boundaries of Alsace-Lorraine in their relation to mineral resources. Professor Hobbs is now doing work on irrigation in Turkey, but it is planned to terminate his engagement on July 1st.

*Economic studies of Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and France.*—Two investigations in regard to the western front are in their initial stages: *a*) the economic relation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine to Germany and France is just about to be investigated. The direction of this research will be in the hands of Professor Clive Day of Yale University, the actual research to be done by Dean Haskins and his assistant; *b*) Studies of the needs of France in relation to reconstruction are to be initiated under the direction of Dean Haskins.

A report on Luxemburg prepared by Dr. L. D. Steefel is at hand, and is regarded as satisfactory.

*The French ports.*—A preliminary report on the harbors of France, especially the Channel ports, has been submitted by Professor Day.

2) The head of the Adriatic:

*Italy.*—This work is under the joint direction of Dean Haskins and Professor Dana C. Munro of Princeton University. Good provisional material is at hand for determining ethnic and strategic frontiers for Italy.

Detailed and definitive research is being done by Professor Lunt of Haverford, and will be completed in the course of the summer.

The position of Italy in the Adriatic and her relation to the Jugo-Slavs, Albania, and Greece requires study, but has not yet been undertaken, because the force necessary has not yet been freed from other research.

It will be necessary also to undertake in the future a study of Italy's commercial position in the Mediterranean and the probable attitude of different parties in Italy towards the groups of problems which will arise at the peace conference. This is a matter of critical importance upon which the Inquiry has not yet been able to make a study.

3) Austria-Hungary.

The political problems of Austria-Hungary are under the direction of Professor Charles Seymour of Yale University. The economic problems are under the direction of Professor Day.

*Nationality questions.*—Material on the distribution of nationalities and the economic and social bases of classes and nations in Austria-Hungary may be regarded as in semi-final form.

*Internal politics.*—The internal politics of the Dual Monarchy are being studied by Professor Robert Kerner of the University of Missouri. Brilliant reports on the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav questions are at hand. Owing to the fact that Professor Kerner is himself of Czech descent and an enthusiastic Czech nationalist, it is felt that his work requires careful checking up by men of cooler judgment.

*Economic studies.*—Professor Clive Day's economic studies of the industrial organization of Austria-Hungary are illuminating and satisfactory, though by no means final. They require integration in the general economic situation of Central Europe and western Russia. Owing to the disintegration of Russia all material based on pre-war statistics with regard to Austria-Hungary stands in need of constant revision.

It is the opinion of the Inquiry that Professors Day, Seymour, and Kerner constitute an unusually strong combination which should be kept intact for the final peace conference.

*Galicia.*—The nationalist questions involved in Galicia are being studied as part of the Polish question, though the group of men working on Austria-Hungary study Galicia in its political and economic relations to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

## 4) The Balkans:

*Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania.—Greece.—Serbia.*—The work on Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania is being done by Professor W. S. Monroe of the State Normal School of New Jersey; the work on Greece and the Greeks by Professor W. S. Ferguson of Harvard University; the work on Serbia is being done by Professor Monroe insofar as it involved Bulgarian and Albanian claims.

It will be necessary, however, to study Serbia also as part of the Jugo-Slav movement, and it is planned to have Professor Kerner take this up at a later date.

It is believed that by June 1st, when Professor Monroe's engagement must be terminated, the nationalistic problems of the disputed parts of the Balkans will be carried as far as it is useful to carry them.

The biggest thing which remains to be done on the Balkans is the study of constructive proposals, such as a customs union, the Balkan Federation, an autonomous Macedonia, etc., etc. This will require detailed studies of the internal and external economic and religious life of the people, in its relation to their national claims. It is a work requiring great knowledge and insight, and the present plan of the Inquiry is to put the facts before the best men in different fields of the Inquiry, as well as before outsiders like Dean Pound of the Harvard Law School and various men who have made a lifelong study of the Balkan question.

## 5) The Ottoman Empire:

The work is under the general direction of Professor Dana C. Munro of Princeton University, who has the following men assisting the investigation in this field:

E. H. Byrne, E. P. Cheyney, E. S. Corwin, O. R. Dewing, H. L. Gray, W. H. Hall, David Magie, D. G. Munro, A. T. Olmstead, C. G. Osgood, L. B. Paton, W. K. Prentice, E. C. Richardson, H. R. Shipman, L. Van Hook, T. J. Wertenbaker, J. H. Westcott, W. L. Westermann, J. E. Wrench.

*Irrigation questions.*—A study of the irrigation possibilities of Mesopotamia is being conducted by Professor F. H. Newell, formerly head of the U. S. Reclamation Service.

The study of Turkey is of course enormously difficult, owing to the extreme complexity of the problem, the unreliability of official statistics, and the great changes caused by the war. The sources have been examined and collected, good information has been collected on concessions to various powers, and preliminary reports have been made on most of the areas.

It is necessary to say frankly, however, that in spite of the learning and hard work of the group of men under Professor Munro,

the result up to date is unsatisfactory. The Inquiry is not prepared to speak with any authority on Turkish questions. At the present time the whole work on Turkey is under close examination with a view to determining whether a drastic reorganization of personnel may not be necessary.

At least four months will be required to gain control of the needed information about Turkey, and as many more to develop a group of men who can speak with expertness. From this it must not be inferred that the elementary material on Turkey is not available. It is. What is lacking is a real appreciation of the inwardness of internal race and religious questions and their bearing upon international politics.

*The Mohammedan world.*—A study is now being made by Mr. Leon Dominian, and will be completed on June 1st, giving a conspectus of the Mohammedan world from Morocco to Central Asia. Mr. Dominian's engagement will terminate on June 1st.

#### 6) Persia, Afghanistan, and Beluchistan.

The work on Persia has been under the direction of Professor A. V. W. Jackson, assisted by Dr. A. Yohannan, and Dr. Louis Gray. Dr. Yohannan's services have been terminated, and Dr. Gray, being an invaluable man for general research, is now employed in other fields of the Inquiry.

The reports on Persia are provisional but satisfactory. They lack a certain amount of unity which Dr. Gray can supply, but nevertheless they carry the subject about as far as it is useful to carry it on the basis of the material available in this country.

#### 7) The former Russian Empire.

The work has been under the direction of Professor Archibald C. Coolidge of Harvard University. On May 1st, owing to his appointment by the War Trade Board as a special agent in Stockholm, the direction of the Russian work was taken over by Professor Robert H. Lord of Harvard University.

*The Polish area.*—In addition to the general direction of the Russian work, Professor Lord is himself doing active research on the Polish problem. For the statistical and scientific side of this work he has as his assistants Dr. Henryk Arctowski and Professor S. J. Zowski. This work has been done with a very high degree of skill, and in the opinion of the Inquiry with great success.

*The territory "indisputably Polish."*—The material for defining the area which the President described as "indisputably Polish" is provisionally completed, and definitively completed for approximately 80% of the area.

*Economic life.—Examination of various claims.*—The material on Polish economic life is provisionally completed, and definitively com-

pleted for about 40% of the area. Four months more will put the Inquiry in possession of all the material needed for discussing the delimitation of the Polish state. This will include a comparative examination of the scientific claims put forward by different groups among the Poles themselves and by German, Austrian, Russian, French, and Italian authorities.

*Polish politics.*—Professor Lord's specialty is the politics of Poland. This is a subject which requires constant reference to current events. It also requires collaboration with the men working on the politics of all the surrounding territories. The work is in healthy condition, but of course from the nature of the subject it cannot be allowed to lapse, and in the opinion of the Inquiry it should be continued without interruption to the peace conference itself.

Professor Lord, with Dr. Arctowski as his assistant, will be fully competent to act as expert advisor on the Polish question.

*Lithuania, The Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, the Don Cossacks, Siberia.*—Owing to the scarcity of men who can deal with Russian affairs, it has been necessary to cover the whole field of Russia by transferring Professor F. A. Golder from one area to another as soon as a provisional report has been completed. He has up to date done Lithuania, the Baltic Provinces, the Ukraine, the Don Cossacks, and he is at present engaged upon Siberia.

*The Caucasus.*—Professor A. I. Andrews has prepared a report on the Caucasus.

*Esthonia.*—A report on Esthonia is being prepared by Mr. Speek of the Congressional Library, and will be done in two or three months.

*Finland.*—Dr. S. E. Morison will complete a report on Finland by June 1st.

*Central Asia.*—Provisional report on the economics and ethnography of Central Asia has been submitted.

All of these reports are satisfactory compilations from official sources and other available material. No one of them, however, is definitive, and owing to the constant change of events each of them requires constant examination and revision. Nevertheless, it may be said that the Inquiry has the main outline of facts and problems in the border nations of the former Russian Empire.

*Great Russia.*—On approximately May 1st arrangements were made with Professor Lord to undertake a study of Great Russia itself, especially in its relation to the border nations and to reconstruction. For this purpose it is planned to secure the services of Dr. I. M. Rubi-now of the Federal Trade Commission, who is regarded as the best authority in America on internal Russian economics. . . .

*Agrarian problem.*—It is planned to secure from Professor V. Simkhovitch of Columbia University a study of the agrarian problem in Russia.

In order to tie together all the research in the eastern theater, Professor Day will direct further economic research and Professor Lord further political research, the two men acting in close collaboration. They will aim to analyze the relations of the different parts of Russia to each other and to Central Europe. This is a work which clearly cannot be terminated at any particular moment. After the permanent facts have been gathered, they require constant examination and illumination in the light of events.

8) Rumania and Bessarabia:

Preliminary reports by Professor W. A. Reed on Bessarabia and the Dobrudja are at hand.

9) Africa:

Work on Africa is under the direction of Mr. George Louis Beer.

*French North Africa.*—French North Africa is being studied by Professor G. F. Andrews.

*The native races.*—Mr. O. Bates, editor of the Harvard African Studies, is just beginning a special report on the native races of Africa.

*Economic problems.*—Mr. Beer himself has just completed an excellent study of the general economic problems of Central Africa. This will be a basis of a study of the legal questions involved, and for more detailed studies on maps of the resources and possibilities of each area in Africa which is subject to an exchange of sovereignty.

As Africa is likely to be a field of detailed negotiation, in which America may very well be called upon as conciliator or arbitrator, and in view of the President's statement about African colonies, it seems plain that the equipment of the Inquiry cannot be too detailed or the knowledge too intimate. No really expert student of Africa was available, and the Inquiry has therefore been compelled to pick men who could make themselves expert.

It is planned to expand Mr. Beer's work by securing for him the assistance of Professor Harris, author of "Intervention and Colonization in Africa." The practical possibilities for useful study are not likely to be exhausted within any period which can now be foreseen, and it will be of essential importance to keep those men whose study has made them expert intact as an organization for the final conference.

The work is in such condition that it would be available at any date in the next few months. Whatever other time is available for research will be profitably used in deepening and extending information and conclusions.

10) The Far East:

Work on the Far East has been under the direction of Mr. W. H. Pitkin. Mr. Pitkin's services terminate on June 1st.

*China.*—Reports on Chinese economic problems have been submitted by Dr. A. P. Winston, and others are in progress of preparation.

A detailed map showing the railroads of China has been prepared through the courtesy of the American International Corporation, and will be turned over June 1st.

Mr. Pitkin himself has submitted reports on Far Eastern policy, and upon the legal bases of the Japanese, Russian, and French spheres of influence in China.

*Japan.*—Arrangements have been made with the Honorable R. S. Miller, Consul General at Seoul, whereby he is to report information upon Japanese politics.

A preliminary economic study of Japan was handed in by Dr. James F. Abbott of Washington University, and a report on Japanese foreign policy is at hand.

*India.*—Statistical and other material for India has been compiled, and will be turned in on June 1st.

*Siam.*—Mr. Pitkin has assembled material on Siam, which is to be supplemented by surveys of the events leading up to the declaration of war and its reaction upon Siamese policy.

Part of Mr. Pitkin's staff will need to be retained. Just what part cannot be accurately stated now, since the subject is still under examination.

#### 11) The Pacific Ocean:

*The German colonies.*—A good provisional report on the German colonies in the Pacific islands by Professor Blakeslee of Clark University is at hand.

*Australasia.—Joint administration of the New Hebrides.*—Additional reports have been submitted by Dr. Preston Slosson on the position of Australasia with regard to the peace settlement, and on the joint administration of the New Hebrides. Dr. Slosson is the general assistant of Professor J. T. Shotwell, an exceedingly useful man for the general purposes of the Inquiry, and should be retained for that reason.

#### 12) South and Central America:

The research will be directed by Dr. Isaiah Bowman. As the authorization for this work was not secured until approximately May 1st, it is entirely in its preliminary stages. General plans have been drawn, and Professor Bailey Willis of Stanford University has been selected to do the economic and scientific part of the research. The active cooperation of Mr. J. H. Stabler of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the Department of State has been

secured on the political side. Various candidates for the actual research in the politics and history of Latin America are now under consideration.

For this work \$20,000 has been set aside, which is administered as a separate fund, though the overhead charges for expense and general administration are carried by the general funds of the Inquiry.

It is planned to assemble the essential material within a period of three months, and to keep it current thereafter with a reduced staff.

13) The commercial relations of Central Europe.

This is under the direction of Professor Day, whose work has already been referred to in the sections on Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the western front (#s 1, 3, 7).

In addition the National Board for Historical Service is preparing a digest of official information in regard to German and Austrian commercial policy after the war, on the basis of German newspapers and periodicals now in Washington.

14) Political and commercial developments and plans of the British Empire:

This work is being done by Professor J. T. Shotwell, with the assistance of Dr. Slosson. A preliminary draft should be completed by July 1st. The subject is so vast and subject to such constant change that no final date can be set for the completion of this work.

15) The world's economic situation:

This work is under the direction of Professor Allyn A. Young of Cornell University, who is cooperating closely with a number of government bureaus in Washington.

*Minerals.*—The world mineral situation is being studied by the U. S. Geological Survey, which has set aside a staff of six men for this purpose alone. The material on Europe is approximately completed. For most of the important minerals the whole world has been covered. The subject is splendidly in hand, and for particular problems may be regarded as complete. The final and conclusive material should be in hand in the next two or three months.

*Agricultural products.*—Information on agricultural products has been received from the Department of Agriculture for all areas likely to come under consideration. A special study of agricultural possibilities is being conducted by an expert in the Department of Agriculture, and should be completed in the course of the summer.

*Manufactures.*—The statistics of manufacturers are being prepared by the Bureau of the Census, under the direction of Professor Young, and will be completed in the course of the summer.



*Shipping.*—Arrangements for securing information as to shipping have been made, and the situation at any particular date can be obtained at short notice.

*Transportation.*—The highly important study of commercially strategic lines of transportation has been done only superficially for certain obvious cases, that is, the Bagdad railway, the Berlin-Bokhara scheme, the Danube, the Rhine, the Vistula. As soon as men are released from more immediately pressing problems, it will be highly desirable that all important transportation possibilities in Russia, the Balkans, Russian Asia, China, and South America should be examined in the light of their commercial implications.

*Firms doing foreign business.*—A list is being prepared of all British, German, French, Italian firms doing foreign business, together with the amounts of business, the character of the business, and the location of their plants. This list is being compiled as a private enterprise by a friend of Dr. Young's in the General Electric Company. A staff of about sixty people is engaged on it. It is entirely gratuitous.

*Timber.*—The necessary information in regard to timber, especially in Russia, is being prepared by Mr. Raphael Zon, an expert in the U. S. Forestry Service. This work is being done under the direction of Professor Young by the committee of men working with the War Industries Board. The information is probably available for all the more important factors at the present time, though it has not yet become organized. The material needs of course to be kept current.

*Commercial treaty arrangements.*—It is planned to produce a chart showing the commercial treaty arrangements of the world as they exist at the present time, with corrections for new developments. It is hoped that for this work the cooperation of the Tariff Commission may be secured.

*Tariffs, credit.*—Preliminary material prepared by Mr. David H. Miller is at hand. It is hoped, however, to secure more detailed information through the Federal Reserve Board.

16) The needs and political affiliations of the European neutrals:

This important work has just been started. Miss Ruth Putnam, under the direction of Professor Day, is preparing a statement of Holland's political position and of her relations to her colonies. Arrangements for work in regard to Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Spain are in their preliminary stages. It was felt that it would be unwise to use the limited force available for work of this character until the more important problems had reached a certain stage of progress. Moreover, it is believed that most valuable assistance can be obtained from the men in government service who have conducted actual negotiations with the neutrals.

It should be noted that Professor Young's service as head of the research division of the War Trade Board qualifies him to oversee the research in regard to the neutrals, and as soon as a force is available he will take up that problem.

17) Education, sanitary, and fiscal reforms in backward areas:

*Education.*—The educational problem in Turkey, Africa, and the Balkans is being studied by Professor Paul Monroe of Teachers' College, Columbia University, with special reference to the application of our own experience in the Philippines. This work is satisfactorily advanced, though of course it is inexhaustible.

*Colonizable areas in Africa—sanitary problems.*—A good study of the areas in Africa colonizable by white men has been completed by Miss Wrigley of the staff of the American Geographical Society.

Certain studies made by the Rockefeller Institute in regard to Turkey are at hand. Much remains to be done, for which at present no force is available.

*Fiscal reform.*—The subject of fiscal reform has not yet been studied.

18) Diplomatic history of the world.

The provisional draft of this has been completed. The work was carried out by the National Board for Historical Service, under the direction of Professor Greene. For clerical and incidental expenses the sum of \$300 was allotted. The printing of the report has been authorized by the Secretary of State. As the work was done under great pressure and by a widely scattered group of men, it is proposed to take time now for careful revision and editing.

19) A survey of the diplomatic policy of each of the Great Powers has been undertaken.

20) Collection of public commitments affecting the settlement.

A current file of declarations is maintained at the central offices of the Inquiry by a Columbia University student, Mr. Edward Gluck, with clerical assistance.

21) The collection and analysis of solutions for problems likely to arise at the conference.

These are gathered from all possible sources and are collated and arranged at the central offices of the Inquiry.

22) International law:

This work is under the immediate direction of Mr. David H. Miller, in collaboration with Mr. Woolsey of the State Department and Major James Brown Scott, attached to the Secretary of State. The facilities of the law division of the Carnegie Institution are employed, the bulk of the work being done in Washington.

The problems involved in the League of Nations, freedom of the seas, the reduction of armaments, and the equality of trade are of course only partly covered as yet. It is hoped that in the course of time the political and economic research in various fields can all be brought to bear on these questions. They cannot be handled with authority until research on diplomatic problems is more advanced.

23) The production of a series of maps and graphs embodying the results of research.

The map program is under the immediate direction of Dr. Bowman, who has a staff of 11 men. The following base maps will be completed by the end of May:

Baltic Basin	1:3, 700, 000
Central Africa	1:9, 000, 000
Poland	1:1, 000, 000
Austria-Hungary (preliminary)	1:2, 500, 000
Caucasus (prelim.)	1:2, 400, 000
Western Asia	1:9, 000, 000
South America (with pop. density)	1:9, 000, 000
Russia (western)	1:1, 000, 000
Balkans (revised)	1:2, 000, 000
Asia	1:9, 000, 000
Alsace-Lorraine	1:250, 000
Egypt	1:1, 000, 000
Austria-Hungary (revised)	1:2, 000, 000
Poland and Lithuania	1:4, 000, 000
Africa	1:26, 000, 000
Balkans (preliminary)	1:2, 500, 000
Russia	1:3, 000, 000
Rumania	1:1, 000, 000
Head of Adriatic	1:3, 000, 000
Danube to India	1:6, 000, 000
Russian Empire	1:13, 000, 000
Macedonia	1:1, 000, 000
Anatolia, Armenia	1:2, 000, 000
Tyrol	1:500, 000
Baltic Provinces	1:1, 000, 000
Syria and Palestine	1:500, 000
Mexico	1:2, 000, 000
Europe	1:4, 000, 000
Mediterranean	1:5, 000, 000

Block diagrams:

Albania	Trentino
Alsace-Lorraine	Isonzo

These maps are needed in quantities for the convenient summary of the research and for the exposition of problems susceptible to such expression. In addition, it is proposed to put upon graphs all material not susceptible to cartographic representation.

In addition, it is proposed to provide, at a cost of \$20 a set, 25 sets of the millionth map of Europe and western Asia produced by the British General Staff and the French Service Geographique de l'Armée. We have the best of reasons for believing that the authoritative data for the British and French governments will be embodied on these maps, and it is therefore the intention of the Inquiry to put all data which might be used as evidence at the conference upon millionth maps. This will make them readily comparable with the British and French material.

24) The collection of detailed primary reference maps:

There will be required at the peace conference a very complete reference library of detailed European maps, including all the General Staff maps and other detailed maps engraved to a large scale. Most of these will be loaned by the American Geographical Society. There are certain ones, however, which will have to be purchased abroad, and for which provision should be made soon. The approach of the peace conference itself will create a great scarcity of maps.

The disposition to be made in the future of draftsmen now available is a difficult question. A few of them will be transferred to work on Latin America and their salaries debited to the Latin American fund. In one or two cases, perhaps, different types of draftsmen will be needed as the work advances, and some of the men should therefore be dispensed with. As trained draftsmen are exceedingly scarce, and as a force of draftsmen will be needed at the conference itself, the drafting force should in principle be kept intact. The type of work needed by the Inquiry can only be developed after months of training, even of the most skilled draftsmen, and any man who has been with the Inquiry for some time represents an invested capital of experience which should be preserved.

However, should it appear by the autumn that the meeting of the conference is likely to be postponed for a long time, a recommendation for the decrease of the drafting force can be made.

25) The selection and planning of a library to be assembled on short notice.

The library is under the direction of Mr. Andrew Keogh, librarian of Yale University, who has a staff of seven. Mr. Keogh's department has two functions: 1) the preservation and indexing of all the documents and maps of the Inquiry; 2) the preparation now of lists of books which will be needed on all subjects likely to be discussed at the peace conference, together with information as to where they can most quickly be borrowed or purchased.

The Inquiry is not now purchasing a library. Only a very few indispensable books which cannot be obtained in accessible libraries are being bought. The library which will actually be used at the

peace conference exists as a paper scheme, planned on the theory that when actual negotiations begin the necessary books can be obtained.

26) The revision and current use of all material in the archives:

This is under the immediate control of the Executive Committee, who have a staff of four assistants, P. T. Moon, H. L. Gray, F. R. Flournoy, John Storck. These men are trained every day in the use of the material itself. They have grown up with the Inquiry and know all its details. They are the men who are needed to control the intricate mass of material now in the archives. As the material increases in scope, the importance of this part of the work grows. On it depends, in the last analysis, the availability of all the research being done. This staff should under any circumstance be kept intact, and in the course of the next few months should be slightly enlarged.

27) The framing of plans for transforming the present staff of the Inquiry into a corps of expert advisors and assistants competent to use this material.

An attempt is being made to work out in detail the probable organization needed at the peace conference, together with recommendation as to personnel.

28) Detailed critiques of reports and other material.

This work is done by Professor James T. Shotwell, who has as his assistant Dr. Slosson.

29) The central direction of the research and administration of the staff and equipment.

This work is performed by Dr. Mezes, Mr. Miller and Mr. Lippmann. Clerical and business force, including the photostat operators, consists of about 22 persons.

### PART III.—CONCLUSIONS

In Appendix 1<sup>17</sup> there is given a list of all the workers for the Inquiry, defining them as paid and unpaid. Among the paid recommendation is made as to those whose services can profitably be terminated, and those whose services should be continued. This list represents the minimum with which the work of the Inquiry can successfully be carried on within the next 12 months. Most of the men on the list will by that time have accumulated a fund of experience which will make them indispensable for the final conference itself, and provision should be made for keeping this force intact. Should the end of the war be delayed after next spring, it will be possible to reduce the staff very considerably by adopting the prin-

---

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

ciple that certain of the men should be regarded as on a reserve list, to be called into active service whenever needed.

By working under full pressure it would be possible to produce an intelligent result from six to twelve months hence. For the production of a result which will adequately support the case of the President in all its detailed application, the research should be regarded as continuous up to and including the time of the conference itself.

Special emphasis is put upon the necessity of training each individual man for this work. The type of intellectual effort required differs radically from any with which university life accustoms one. The mass and intricacy of the detail covered is greater than any ever attempted in the field of political science.

The discovery and applications of methods by which this mass of detail can be made readily and reliably useful to statesmen engaged in momentous negotiations requires men who have lived with the research and who know it in all its parts, and have explored all the means by which it can be arranged and presented. The Inquiry should be regarded primarily as an active organization, and not simply as a group of scholars producing voluminous reports which can be printed and used in their absence. For satisfactory results at the peace conference, a selected group of men who have done the work should be on hand to mediate between the documentary material and the peace commissioners themselves.

---

Inquiry files

*Mr. Walter Lippmann to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

[NEW YORK,] May 16, 1918.

DEAR N. D. B.: I am very proud indeed of the copy of your book that you sent me. I shall keep it in the very small box which contains things I shall want always to preserve.

The work here goes along steadily and what might be called the structural part of it is developing fairly satisfactorily. On many of the problems of first-rate importance there is a real famine in men and we have been compelled practically to train and create our own experts. This is especially true of problems connected with Russia, the Balkans, Turkey and Africa. Those are lands intellectually practically unexplored. What we are on the lookout for is genius—sheer, startling genius and nothing else will do because the real application of the President's idea to those countries requires inventiveness and resourcefulness which is scarcer than anything. I have been reading lately with much perturbation about the way in

which ignorance on the part of peace commissioners in the past has lost causes which have been won on the battlefield. It isn't difficult to win a war and lose the peace. England did it over and over again in the nineteenth century in regard to Turkey.

Won't you give my best to Mrs. Baker and the children.

Yours always,

W[ALTER] L[IPPMANN]

Inquiry files

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

NEW YORK, June 7, 1918.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: Here is the French outline of preparatory work<sup>18</sup> which is being carried out by the experts whom they have selected, and of which I spoke to you yesterday. I think that except as to division IV you cover practically everything that is in the list. However, you may find this of considerable interest.

I was very glad to have the opportunity of a conference with you yesterday and am deeply impressed with the thoroughness of the work that is being done. The one thing we must guard against is pre-conceived ideas or theories which will affect the unbiased treatment of the various subjects. I am sure you realize the necessity of this, but it ought to be impressed upon those who are working for you.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 182/11

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, June 10, 1918.

[Received June 13.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for the French outline of preparatory work. I am having it compared with our own and with similar British outlines which we have, in order to extract from it such suggestions as it may offer.

We were very glad of the opportunity for a conference with you last Thursday. It clarified our ideas in a number of important respects.

I am also glad to see that our insistence, on the prime necessity of being open-minded and unbiased, accords with your ideas. We look upon ourselves as engaged in forging instruments in aid of judgment; that is, in gathering for each region and problem a thorough, well pro-

<sup>18</sup> Not enclosed with file copy of this letter.

portioned and well organized body of facts which will aid you and other officers of the Government in determining policies. Naturally, we have had difficulty from time to time in keeping the theories of our collaborators out of the work, and in some cases it has not been wholly possible to do so. Indeed, there are regions, Austria-Hungary, for instance, and the Balkans, where it sometimes seems best to get the facts from two or more antagonistic points of view, as such points of view will be urged at the Conference, and it is well to know what they are. But that, of course, is different from admitting our own prepossessions into the study of regions and problems.

Very sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

---

Inquiry files

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Division Chiefs of the Inquiry*

NEW YORK, July 9, 1918.

In view of the number of requests it has become necessary to send to the various departments in Washington for assistance and co-operation and the confusion that has in some instances resulted, there has been criticism of The Inquiry, and I shall ask you in the future to submit to me all such requests before sending them.

S. E. M[EZES]

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/12

*Mr. David Hunter Miller, Major James Brown Scott, and  
Mr. L. H. Woolsey to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1918.

SIR: On February 11th last the undersigned were orally directed by you to undertake certain work in the field of international law relating to such questions as might be considered by the Peace Conference at the close of the present war, including, pursuant to your subsequent direction, consideration of questions of international policy in connection therewith, with special reference to the historic attitude of the United States.

Pursuant to such instructions the undersigned have the honor to report as to the scope and progress of such work as follows:

I.—A LIBRARY, INCLUDING AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, EVERY AUTHORITY WHICH MAY BE CALLED FOR AT THE CONFERENCE

There are two phases of this portion of the work. The first phase is the preparation of an inclusive list of such works, which com-



prise, chiefly speaking, collections of treaties, international agreements of a less formal character, diplomatic documents, state papers, statutes, judicial decisions, the works of prominent publicists, and of certain historians.

This collection necessarily includes Continental, Latin-American and Japanese writings as well as those of Great Britain and the United States, and also the leading periodicals during say the last twenty years, as these contain many studies of importance which are more detailed in their nature than those of the general works of authors of authority or repute.

The second phase of this portion of the work comprises the actual assembling of the library, partly, but to a limited extent, by purchase. This limitation is necessary not only for financial reasons, but also because of the fact that a large portion of the necessary collection is not available except in existing libraries. Arrangements are to be made with the chief libraries of the country for the loan of such books and documents as are not purchase[d], in order that they can be assembled in advance upon very short notice.

## II.—DOCUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES UNDER A TOPICAL ARRANGEMENT

For this purpose the field of international law has been divided into somewhat more than forty headings and under these headings are being assembled the important treaties, agreements, diplomatic documents, state papers, statutes, decisions, opinions, etc., having a bearing upon the particular topic in question. Each collection is to be arranged and edited with such brief comment as may be deemed necessary and will contain a bibliography. Such of the matter as may be in foreign languages is to be translated and the collection under each topic separately printed in convenient form by the Government Printing Office.

An essential part of this work in each case includes extracts from the periodicals mentioned above.

Generally speaking, research in this division is limited to the century commencing with the Congress of Vienna and ending with the outbreak of the war.

The headings above mentioned comprise the following:

Aborigines	Fisheries
Aliens	High Seas
Arbitration	Industrial Property
Blockade	International Co-operation
Capture	International Law
Claims	(Municipal Effect, Assent of States, etc.)
Contraband	International Organization
Debts and Obligations	Intervention
Diplomatic Agents	

Jurisdictional Immunities	Prizes
Mails	Prize Courts
Marginal Seas	Prisoners of War
Maritime Warfare	Settlement of Disputes
Military Occupation	Submarine Cables
Monroe Doctrine	States
National Character	Trade
Nationality	Treaties
National Jurisdiction	Unfriendly Acts
Neutrality	Vessels
Neutralization	Visit and Search
Official Correspondence	War
Panama Canal	

### III.—COLLECTION OF TREATIES, CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS MADE BY BELLIGERENTS AFTER AUGUST 1, 1914

The importance of these documents cannot be overrated, inasmuch as they state officially and in solemn form the views of the contracting parties at the time they were negotiated and rendered effective.

The official texts of the Allied Governments can be procured; the official texts of Germany and its allies will be more difficult to obtain, and doubtless in some cases they can not be had, because of their confidential nature. They will need to be supplied with historical notes and commentary.

### IV.—DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE AND AUTHORITATIVE UTTERANCES DURING THE WAR PERIOD

This collection chronologically arranged by countries is to be in addition to the collection in the library to be assembled of authorities containing such papers.

An essential feature of the compilations will be exhaustive indices.

While it is hoped to have these compilations printed, a somewhat obvious limitation in this regard is that they cannot be complete until the close of the war itself; consequently an arbitrary date will be fixed, and papers of the subsequent period will be found only in the subsequent authorities collected.

### V.—A MEMORANDUM OF PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NATIONS IN RELATION TO THE PROGRAM LAID DOWN IN THE OFFICIAL UTTERANCES OF THE PRESIDENT

This work is in course of preparation by the undersigned and the endeavor will be to point out

*a.* The principles and rules of international law upon which the various provisions of the Program in detail rest.

*b.* The necessary changes and advances in international law which are indicated by the various provisions of the Program.

This memorandum is to contain quotations of and references to every statement of the President having a bearing upon the questions which may arise at the Peace Conference, and also in connection therewith notes and citations of the relevant precedents and authorities legal and historical.

## VI.—SPECIAL MONOGRAPHS

While in general, monographic treatment is not deemed by the undersigned appropriate for all topics, there are certain topics, particularly those of a highly technical nature, in respect of which monographs supplementing the collection of authorities are deemed necessary. In some cases it is possible for this work to proceed in connection with the assemblage of other material, described under II. In others it needs to be postponed until the more essential work is completed.

This method of treatment is also deemed appropriate in regard to certain legal questions arising from the war but requiring detailed settlement thereafter, whatever may be the provisions of the Peace Treaty. Such, for instance, are questions involved in the repatriation of prisoners-of-war and the adjustment of property rights sequestered during the war.

### *Progress*

Within the scope of the undertaking as thus outlined, very considerable progress has been made, and the undersigned will from time to time present further special reports upon the progress of the work accompanied by such compilations, collections of material and monographs as are in completed form and available for such use as the Secretary of State may be pleased to direct.

We are [etc.]

DAVID HUNTER MILLER

*Special Assistant in the Department of State*

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

*Major, United States Reserves,*

*Attached to the Department of State*

L. H. WOOLSEY

*Solicitor for the Department of State*

Inquiry files

*Dr. Isaiah Bowman to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

NEW YORK, July 13, 1918.

DEAR DR. MEZES: May I observe, in all respect, that the state of affairs you point out in the attached memorandum<sup>19</sup> is due to the

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Mezes' memorandum of July 9, 1918, p. 99.

present loose organization of the Inquiry—possibly an excellent thing in a small democratic organization but wholly inappropriate to a large one now establishing broad relationships with almost every scientific bureau of the government.

The time has come when there should be a stricter division of functions among the officers of the Inquiry and an exact definition of status and appointments. It is a source of growing embarrassment to remain as we are.

Forgive my very direct and even blunt presentation of this matter. It saves time and it is the way I like to speak.

Very truly yours,

ISAIAH BOWMAN

---

Inquiry files

*The Executive Officer of the Inquiry (Bowman) to Professor  
C. H. Haskins*<sup>20</sup>

[NEW YORK,] August 3, 1918.

DEAR MR. HASKINS: The Executive Committee of the Inquiry announces the composition of the Research Committee, as follows:

C. H. Haskins, *Chairman*  
(History)

A. A. Young  
(Economics)

J. T. Shotwell  
(Editor)

I. Bowman  
(Geography)

Plans have been approved for a liaison between the general Inquiry and the division of international law in order that each may derive benefit from research in related fields. Dr. Shotwell, who has charge of the Diplomatic History in the division of international law, will act as liaison officer between the Research and Law Committees. In addition he will carry out a program of editorial work for the Inquiry as a whole.

The Research Committee will meet on August 9th, and at that time frame definite plans of work for the November first program, basing decisions, so far as practicable, on the judgment of the general conference of division chiefs held on August 2d.

With individual conferences on plans of mutual interest and with the free exchange of views between collaborators and members of the Research Committee, it is certain that the work of the Inquiry will

---

<sup>20</sup> Identical letters were sent to Messrs. Day, Seymour, Mezes, Miller, Young, Willis, Fenneman, Simkhovitch, Tyler, Munro, Beer, and Lord, of the Inquiry.

go forward with all possible dispatch and in a manner satisfactory to each investigator.

Any further suggestions as to plans will be gladly received before the meeting of the Research Committee on August 9th.

Very truly yours,

ISAIAH BOWMAN

Inquiry files

*Memorandum on the Organization of The Inquiry*

ORGANIZATION OF THE INQUIRY

[Undated.]

*Chief:*

E. M. House.

*Executive Committee:*

Director: S. E. Mezes

Treasurer: D. H. Miller

Executive Officer: I. Bowman

*International*

*Law*

D. H. Miller

&

staff

*Problem Areas*

I. Bowman

----

*International*

*Economics*

A. A. Young

&

staff

*Editorial Committee*

J. T. Shotwell, *Chm.*

Diplomatic History and Library

Staff

*Research Committee*

C. H. Haskins, *Chm.*

(History)

A. A. Young, *Sec.*

(Economics)

J. T. Shotwell

(Editor)

I. Bowman

(Geography)

V. G. Simkhovitch

Librarian

Regional staffs

for

West front

Austria-Hungary

Balkans

Russia

Turkey

Far East

Pacific Islands

Africa

Latin America

Inquiry files

*Dr. Isaiah Bowman to Colonel E. M. House*

[NEW YORK,] August 17, 1918.

DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: The shortest way in which I can report on the work of the Inquiry is to enclose the minutes of the first two meetings of the Research Committee and the Map Committee.<sup>21</sup> While some of the items are not self-explanatory the general nature of the work will be sufficiently clear. We are going full speed ahead and everyone is working in the highest spirit. The composition and work of the Research Committee have reestablished the morale of the whole staff.

I was unwilling to accept the responsibility for "men, money and plans" except on condition that this responsibility be fully shared by members of a research committee. In selecting the committee I was guided by the thought that it must command the respect of everyone both within and without the Inquiry. When the peace conference organization stands in the limelight, as it inevitably will, I felt sure you would wish to have the guiding committee composed of men of whom there can be not the slightest question.

Permit me to say that Dr. Mezes and I have worked together with cordial good-feeling and without the slightest personal difficulty. But I could not escape the conviction that his good nature had been taken advantage of for purposes that were not in harmony with the spirit of joint responsibility and team work that must pervade the Inquiry if its work is to be successful. Under these circumstances there were only two ways out: to resign or to fight, but not to quarrel. I could not, in view of the great importance of the Inquiry, just drop out. Mr. Miller is an exceptionally wise and big man for whom we all have the highest respect and it is to his judgment and tact that we owe the success of the reorganization plans.

We now have matured plans and cooperative decisions and these are forged without fuss or talk. We have in Dean Haskins an extraordinary man—clear-headed, direct, strong. Dr. Young is one of the ablest men I have ever known and as Secretary of the Research Committee brings a driving energy to the management of the research. Dr. Shotwell is a brilliant scholar whose wide experience and knowledge make him an indispensable critic of research plans and results. You may depend upon us all for complete devotion to the work and everyone on the team has that sense of personal responsibility which is a guarantee of success.

The Committee has scrutinized the budget with extreme care. Certain topics and areas are not yet represented. The best men we can

---

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

find ought to be engaged to fill the gaps. For example, Dr. Young's work on International Economics needs several men at once. The savings we can effect will do something in supplying the need for money. The Committee will challenge every expenditure. But I am frank to say that the work actually suffers for need of funds. The colleges and universities are carrying so heavy a burden that the Inquiry is obliged to pay more and more for its men. We feel the most urgent need for \$5000 more per month. Given that, we could develop the work with stronger men and at greater speed.

There comes to us all, who are working close to the problems, a sense of the profound need for the work of the best men and for haste in order that this country may take a fit place at the settlement.<sup>22</sup>

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

---

Inquiry files

*Professor C. H. Haskins to Mr. H. Nelson Gay*

18 SEPTEMBER, 1918.

MY DEAR GAY: You may have seen in the newspapers some mention of the fact that the Government of the United States has undertaken, under the general direction of Colonel House, a systematic collection of information for the use of the American delegates at the Peace Conference. Having recently been made chairman of the Research Committee which has charge of the collection of a large section of this material, I am desirous of having our equipment strengthened on the side of Italy. Elaborate special studies are in preparation on the linguistic and other questions connected with the Italian-Austrian frontier, and Italian interests will also come in for consideration in connection with the special studies on Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. It would, however, be of advantage if we could have at our disposal a rather full statement of the general questions which will concern Italy at the Peace Conference, the statement to be prepared by one who is fully informed of existing conditions and at the same time able to regard them objectively. You are obviously indicated as the only person qualified to prepare a statement of this kind, and we should be very grateful if you would undertake it. It could be made as full as you choose, taking up the matter under various headings in the form of an analysis of the situation and the pros and cons of the different problems, whether political, economic, or military, which will concern Italy

---

<sup>22</sup> On Aug. 22, 1918, Colonel House replied to this and another letter of the same date (not printed), ". . . I have not answered your letters because I would rather discuss the matters you raise, when I see you."

at the Peace Conference. The material will be welcomed as soon as possible, say before the end of November. If you would prefer to send a series of statements as each is ready, this would be equally welcome.<sup>23</sup>

I hope very much that you can arrange to undertake this. All such matters are naturally highly confidential, and your report should be directed through the embassy pouch to the Inquiry, 3755 Broadway, New York City.

I am slow in acknowledging various pamphlets which you have sent me concerning war matters. I have also read with interest your letter to the Harvard Library concerning the building up of an American collection in Rome. I trust you have had a good summer.

Ever sincerely yours,

CHAS. H. HASKINS

---

Inquiry files

*The Research Committee of the Inquiry to the Division Chiefs*

[SEPTEMBER 21, 1918.]

COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Kindly inform the men working under your direction that we are now in touch with the following government organizations, and that the Inquiry would be glad to receive requests for information or suggestions as to work that might be done. It is understood that all such requests or suggestions should pass through the hands of the Executive Officer.

Military Intelligence Division, General Staff  
Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce  
U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior  
U. S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture  
Bureau of Soils, Department of Agriculture  
Office of Farm Management, Department of Agriculture  
Bureau of Plant Industries, Department of Agriculture  
Division of Foreign Tariffs, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic  
Commerce, Department of Commerce  
Division of Latin American Affairs, State Department  
Foreign Trade Advisor, State Department  
Bureau of Research, War Trade Board

---

<sup>23</sup> For material concerning Italian claims forwarded by Mr. Gay in response to this request and transmitted to the Department of State through the Embassy in Italy, see pp. 417-441 and 442-447.



Division of Planning and Statistics, War Industries Board and  
U. S. Shipping Board  
U. S. Tariff Commission  
National Research Council  
Anthropology Committee  
Medical Research Committee

In the case of the Military Intelligence Division, Colonel Dunn has even offered to cable any or all of the military attachés for especially urgent information. The existing liaison between the M. I. D. and the Inquiry enables us to tap practically any source of information in the country.

---

Inquiry files

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Treasurer of the Inquiry (Miller)*

[NEW YORK,] October 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. MILLER: After an official conference Colonel House has given instructions that the work of the Inquiry should be speeded up and has authorized a monthly expenditure for this and subsequent months for the Inquiry proper of \$25,000 if necessary, with the understanding that additional employees shall be taken on only until the time when the official force proceeds to the Conference, except in such cases as it may prove quite impossible to obtain satisfactory appointees without offering them a longer term.

Very truly yours,

S. E. MEZES

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/13

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, October 19, 1918.

[Received October 21.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Before Colonel House left I had a conference with him regarding future work in the Latin American field. After going into the matter with some care we reached the conclusion that all the work that need be done in preparation for the peace conference in that field could be well taken care of on the balance of the fund originally allotted to it—about \$6000—and he asked me to arrange for the tying up of this work on that basis.

We also have before us a program of work in Latin America prepared by Professor Bailey Willis, who has been in charge of that field for us. Colonel House thought that the work proposed by Professor Willis would bring in valuable results, and the rest of us here at the Inquiry are of the same opinion, but it seemed to him that the results would hardly bear on the peace conference and should be judged on the basis of their possible utility to the Department of State rather than on the basis of the needs of the Inquiry or the peace conference. He therefore asked me to so advise Professor Willis, in order that the Professor might take up with your Department the question as to whether such work should be undertaken under its auspices.

I have so advised Professor Willis, from whom you will no doubt hear shortly, and I am sending a copy of this letter to your Mr. Stabler,<sup>24</sup> inasmuch as the work heretofore done was carried on in direct liaison with him.

Sincerely yours,

S. E. MEZES

---

Inquiry files

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to Professor C. H. Haskins*<sup>25</sup>

[NEW YORK,] October 19, 1918.

DEAR DEAN HASKINS: Colonel House asked me to let you know that he has gone to Europe for a visit of uncertain duration. Please treat this information as confidential until his arrival on the other side is noted in the press.

Before leaving he decided on a chart of organization of the Inquiry, a copy of which I am enclosing; <sup>26</sup> division heads remain unchanged. His idea was to organize the force of the Inquiry in the way in which it could most effectively work when the conference is in session and he thought it would be well for the organization to go into effect at once in order that we might practice our parts ahead of time.

He believed that the administrative plan with heads rather than with committees would prove more effective, though no doubt special committees for consultation and editorial revision or visé will be

---

<sup>24</sup> Jordan H. Stabler, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>25</sup> Identical letters were sent to the other members of the Research Committee of the Inquiry.

<sup>26</sup> Not enclosed with file copy of this letter; it was apparently similar to the chart enclosed with Dr. Mezes' letter of Oct. 25, 1918, to Secretary Lansing, p. 112.

constituted from time to time as the exigencies of situations may require.

He especially charged me with the pleasant duty of thanking the members of the Research Committee for their invaluable aid in rendering the work of the last few months effective.

This is just an outline of his message which I shall be glad to expand into fuller detail should any points remain unclear.

Cordially yours,

S. E. MEZES

---

Inquiry files

*Professor C. H. Haskins to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

NEW YORK, 22 October, 1918.

DEAR DR. MEZES: I have your letter of 19 October and note the changes in the organization of the Inquiry which you enclose therewith. It is quite clear that there is no place for committees in the kind of plan you outline. I am glad to learn that Colonel House thought the work of the Research Committee during the summer had some value.

In the copy of the chart sent me, the various fields of investigation are left swinging in the air without any connection with the officers above. It would look, however, as if the problem areas are supposed to be under the immediate direction of Messrs. Bowman and Young, and, unless otherwise instructed, I shall assume that as division chief I report to them.

I also note the omission of Luxemburg from the problem areas, where it belongs along with Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES H. HASKINS

---

763.72119/2604

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, October 23, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Before Colonel House left for Europe we discussed together the work already accomplished and the year's program for Latin America with which you are familiar.

Colonel House asked me to say to you that the work already done for Latin America, and such further work as could be done on the balance of the \$20,000 fund (which amounts to about \$6000), would

bring in the minimum of essential material for the peace conference, and that the proposed year's program went into many matters which in his judgment were valuable, and might well be called to your attention as possibly useful to your Department, but as going beyond the needs of the Inquiry or the peace conference.

He thought, however, that a part of the program involving an expenditure of \$5000 or less monthly from November 1st, and for a period of two or three months, would bring in all the material contemplated in the original program submitted to you on May 4th;<sup>27</sup> and supplement the minimum results mentioned above, and would undoubtedly be useful at the peace conference if certain questions regarding Latin America should come up, as they may.

If you think well of such an additional two or three months' program, we should of course be glad to administer the work at the Inquiry, details being arranged in conference between your Mr. Stabler and Mr. Bowman, our Executive Officer.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

Paris Peace Conf. 184/11

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, 25 October, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am sending you a copy of the chart prepared by Colonel House and submitted to you yesterday, with the modifications discussed at our conference.<sup>28</sup>

I am not sure that I mentioned yesterday Colonel House's statement to me that he thought that some seventy-five or eighty individuals should compose the force of the Inquiry, an estimate he said he had reached after discussing the matter with you.


His further thought was that while some of this force might not be needed at once, probably most of it would be in view of two facts: first, that it would have to be kept in operation or else be lost and could probably be kept in operation best as a unified body; and second, that there was no way at present of determining the order in which the different members of the force would be needed and that they could be used, if kept as one body, to get the material into more satisfactory shape than it is at present.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

<sup>28</sup> See diagram on page 112.



Paris Peace Conf. 184/12

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 29 October, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: AS I said to you orally yesterday, I think that the enclosed <sup>29</sup> is much too ambitious a programme, and I would be obliged if you would have a simpler one worked out,<sup>30</sup> in the meantime telling Dr. Mezes that it is so unlikely that anything but the main territorial, political and racial questions at issue will be settled at the peace conference and practically so certain that all detailed discussions of financial and commercial and other similar arrangements will be delegated by the conference to special conferences or commissions, that I think he ought to plan only to carry the men and materials with him which will be serviceable in settling the main questions, together of course with the necessary clerical aid.

The Department itself in the meantime can work out the necessary minimum personnel and organization.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

Paris Peace Conf. 184/12

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State* <sup>31</sup>

[Undated.]

*Secretary of Commission* (Confidential Clerk)

Grew.

*Assistant Secretary* in charge of

Harrison

Records

Drafting Experts

Translators

Clerical Force

Force to consist of

Confidential Clerk

Recording and filing clerk

2 Drafting experts

[4 Translators]

[10 Stenographers]

[6 Messengers (From Marine Corps)]

<sup>29</sup> No enclosure with file copy of this letter. See footnote 28, p. 111.

<sup>30</sup> For the program worked out by Secretary Lansing, see the following document.

<sup>31</sup> The original of this memorandum is typewritten except for the names of individuals, which have been added at the right. These are in Secretary Lansing's hand except for the words "House & Baker," which were written by President Wilson. Brackets have been substituted in all cases where parentheses appear in pencil on the original.

<i>Assistant Secretary</i> in charge of	Patchin
Codes	
Communications	
Intelligence	
Printing	
Force to consist of	
Confidential Clerk	
9 Code Clerks	
[? Subordinates on intelligence and information to be arranged.]	
[4 Telegraphers]	
[3 Expert proof-readers—(1 of French)]	
3 Photostat operators	
2 Mimeograph operators.	
[ <i>Disbursing Officer</i> in charge of Accounts.]	
[Assistant Disbursing Officer]	
[2 Clerks.]	
<i>Transportation Officer</i> in charge of	
Transportation	
Accommodations	
Supplies	
Guards	House
Force to consist of	&
2 Assistants	Baker
10 Chauffeurs (From Army)	
? Secret Service Men.	
? Guards (From Marine Corps)	
<i>Technical Advisers</i>	
3 International Law	Miller, Scott
[1 Military]	
[1 Naval]	
[1 Trade]	
[1 Claims.]	
<i>Director of Specialists</i> in charge of	Mezes
Expert information	
Cartography	
Library	
Force to consist of	
Confidential Clerk	
7 Specialists on territorial divisions	
Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.	Haskins
Italy	Lunt
Western Russia and Poland	Lord
Turkey	Young
Austria-Hungary	Seymour

Balkans		Day
Colonies		Beer
4 Assistants to Specialists	7?	
2 Cartographers	Jefferson, Obeck	[Lobeck]
4 draughtsmen		
Librarian		Shotwell
2 Assistants		

---

033.1140/246 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, October 30, 1918—9 p. m.  
[Received October 31—6: 15 p. m.]

22. For Polk from Auchincloss. Colonel House wishes Mezes to be asked to send him a cable advising him of the progress and difficulties of "Inquiry" since his departure. He wishes further to be fully advised regarding this work by cable.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/12

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: I submitted your diagram of the proposed personnel for the peace conference to the President after Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 29th. After a very brief discussion of it I left it with him for his consideration. This morning he returned the diagram to me with a letter a copy of which I enclose.<sup>32</sup>

I think it would be very well, therefore, after you have thought the matter over, to arrange to come here and see me. Possibly you could do so early next week. Meanwhile I will endeavor to work out the organization in accordance with the President's suggestion from the Department's standpoint.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/924a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1918—3 p. m.

10. From Mezes. The Inquiry is running down data to aid in disentangling aspiring peoples in Western Russia, Austria-Hungary,

<sup>32</sup> See the President's letter of Oct. 29, 1918, to Secretary Lansing, p. 113.



Trentino, Balkans, Turkey and Africa and in finding stable boundaries for them. Miller is taking over short reports and a few maps for these regions. If you need them some key men with a few draughtsmen and translators could be sent over in Bowman's charge. Have [*Had?*] a conference with Secretary Lansing on your personnel and organization chart which he is working out in touch with the President for a second conference the two of us are to have next week.

LANSING

763.72119/2604

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1918.

DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: I desire to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 23, in regard to the continuance by the Latin American Division of the Inquiry and to inform you in reply that I have discussed the matter with the President who approves of the expenditure of \$5,000 per month, beginning November 1, for a period of three months, in order to continue the work of the above-mentioned Division of the Inquiry.

I have instructed Mr. Stabler, Chief of the Latin American Division, to communicate with Mr. Bowman, the executive officer of the Inquiry, in order to arrange for a conference in connection with the continuance of the work of the Latin American Division, of the Inquiry.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 184/13

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 8, 1918.

[Received November 11.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing to confirm a telegram sent you to-day, in accordance with your request, reading as follows:<sup>33</sup>

"Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Belgium, Haskins; Italy, Lunt; Russia, Lord; Turkey, Young; Austria-Hungary, Seymour; Balkans, Day; Colonies, Beer; Cartographers, Jefferson and Lobeck; Library, Shotwell. An assistant for each specialist, making seven assistants, would help very much."

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

<sup>33</sup> For changes in this list of specialists, see Dr. Mezes' letter of Nov. 14, 1918, to Secretary Lansing, p. 118.

Paris Peace Conf. 184/14

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 9, 1918.

[Received November 12.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I had an opportunity coming up on the train yesterday to study the program we discussed in your office.<sup>34</sup> It seems to me that it meets emergency needs quite thoroughly, but I find that in the section to be under my charge there is one omission that I hope can be supplied.

There is no place for Dr. Bowman, who as you know has acted and is still acting as our Executive Officer, and who therefore does not come in under divisional specialists, cartographers, or the library force. Dr. Bowman in addition to his valuable services to us is Director of the American Geographical Society, which has furnished us with our headquarters free of charge for the last year and has extended to us many courtesies. I should not feel that I could ask him to go or ask his trustees to approve of his going under the title of Confidential Clerk, and I am writing to ask if in lieu of that position there might not be substituted the position of Chief Territorial Specialist or that of Executive Officer, which Dr. Bowman now occupies. If his services should not be available our work would be very seriously embarrassed.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

Paris Peace Conf. 184/14

*The Secretary of State to Dr. S. E. Mezes*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918.

MY DEAR DOCTOR MEZES: I have your letter of the 9th, which was delayed in reaching me as it was marked "Confidential", while "Personal and Urgent" results in immediate delivery to me.

I quite agree with you that Doctor Bowman should be included in your group and leave it to you to give him such title as seems appropriate. I would not, however, approve that you forego your confidential clerk. By all means take both.

I am investigating as to whether there will be available in the army in Paris photostat machines, as it would save considerable trouble if they have them there rather than take one from this side. As soon as I know I will inform you.

As to stenographers and translators, Secretary Baker assures me that we can obtain all we need on the other side so we are not

---

<sup>34</sup> See the undated memorandum by the Secretary of State, p. 113.

planning to take them from here—only those that can be designated confidential clerks.

I will keep you advised as to progress of arrangements so that you can make your plans accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 184/15

*Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, November 14, 1918.

[Received November 15.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am glad that the inclusion of Dr. Bowman can be effected and that the position of confidential clerk may also continue.

I should like to suggest two other alterations in the list wired you last Saturday, which was, of course, prepared hastily.

1. That the name of W. L. Westermann be substituted for the name of A. A. Young as specialist for Turkey, and as a consequence,

2. That A. A. Young be designated as specialist in economic resources and be substituted for one of the assistants to specialists.<sup>35</sup>

I need hardly say that some of the most important data affecting boundary decisions are economic, involving a knowledge of the precise location, of the value and of the amount of mineral and agricultural resources, of the drainage lines by rail and water effecting the distribution of such resources, etc. Such economic problems are thick along the northern, eastern and western limits of Bohemia and Silesia, in Galicia and, of course, in Asiatic Turkey at various places. It was with this in mind that I suggested Professor Young, who is primarily an economist, and I suggested him for Turkey in view of the large part that economic problems play there. But on reflection, I am sure it would be clearer and better to let Young go under his own colors rather than as a regional specialist for Turkey, and he is a man of too much competence and position to be asked to go merely as an assistant. The change suggested will not, of course, add to the number originally contemplated.

I note what you say about stenographers and translators and about the photostat machine.

Believe me [etc.]

S. E. MEZES

<sup>35</sup> In a telegram dated Nov. 15, 1918, Secretary Lansing replied, "Your letter fourteenth. I quite agree as to your arrangement relative to Westermann and Young."

CHOICE OF PLACE FOR THE CONFERENCE AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Edward M. House Papers : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, October 28, 1918.

3. Things are moving so rapidly that the question of a place for the Peace Conference is upon us. The French are urging Paris. The Belgians, Brussels. The only objection to Paris is that if a sharp difference should arise between one of the Allies and the French it might be embarrassing. Otherwise it is desirable. Will you not advise me as to your preference.

The Supreme War Council will not meet until Wednesday.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, October 28, 1918.]

2. Much as I should enjoy Paris I think neutral place of meeting much wiser care being taken not to choose a place where either German or English influence would be strong. My preference is for Lausanne.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

763.72119 P 43/906 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 1, 1918—12 a. m.

[Received 1 p. m.]

28. I suggest that you discuss with the President the advisability of authorizing me to use my discretion in securing options for accommodations for the American representatives at the ultimate Peace Conference. Of course, at the present time it has not been

definitely decided when or where this Conference will take place. It may be necessary however for quick action to be taken, and accordingly I would appreciate an expression of your opinion concerning this matter.

HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/906 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1918—1 p. m.

9. Your Number 28, November 1. President agrees with me that you should be authorized to use your discretion in securing options for accommodations for American Representatives at peace conference. I conclude from your telegrams that the place will be either Geneva or Lausanne. My only suggestion is that you act at the earliest possible moment and secure ample accommodations, since there is no doubt any portion can be released, if desirable, before the conference.

LANSING

---

763.72119/9087 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 5, 1918—4 a. m.

[Received 6:55 a. m.]

49. Strictly confidential for Polk from Auchincloss. For your information and for such use as you may see fit to make of it. There is little doubt that through the influence of the United States, exercised through Colonel House, the present decision to hold the Peace Conference in Switzerland was brought about. Colonel House proposed Switzerland to Lloyd George and secured his assent. Clemenceau of course was in favor of Versailles but did not argue the matter with George and Colonel House. Orlando stated Italy would vote for any place that the United States was in favor of. I suggest that these facts be pointed out to McCormick and that he be told that it would be advisable to secure informal assurances from the Swiss Government through Sulzer during the commercial negotiations now being carried on by the War Trade Board with Switzerland on the following points.

1. The Swiss Government will offer every possible facility to assist the United States Government in securing suitable accommodations in Switzerland for its representatives at the Conference.

2. The Swiss Government will permit United States Government officials to install in Switzerland a central telegraph and telephone service at such points as may be necessary for the use of the United States representatives at Peace Conference. This would involve the leasing by the United States of such telegraph and telephone lines as may be necessary and available and within the discretion of the United States authorities. The construction, maintenance and operation of such telegraph and telephone lines as may be required. It would be understood that these lines would be utilized only during the session of the Peace Conference and to be employed only for governmental business and for press agencies approved by the Government of the United States.

3. Complete freedom from any censorship by the Swiss Government of any communications sent over these lines either by United States Government officials or by press agencies approved by the United States.

If the above assurances cannot in substance be secured it would seem wise to reconsider the tentative decision already arrived at to hold the Conference in Switzerland. Please cable very promptly your views with reference to this matter as I am planning to send representatives in the very near future to Switzerland to secure options on suitable accommodations.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, November 7, 1918.]

11. On second thought it occurs to me that Versailles may be the best place for the peace conference where friendly influences and authorities are in control rather than Switzerland which is saturated with every poisonous element and open to every hostile influence in Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Referring to your number 57<sup>2</sup> your reply to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs about Austrian forces in the Ukraine I altogether approve.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

<sup>1</sup> Regarding proposed locations for the Peace Conference, see also Colonel House's telegram No. 72, Nov. 9, 1918, 4 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 485.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

763.72119 P 43/905 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 11, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received November 11—6:57 p. m.]

93. Though the decision to hold the Peace Conference in Paris has not as yet been formally taken by the Allies and the United States I feel sure that this will be done within next few days. The British Government has sent representatives to Paris who have conferred with me and who have advised me that they are planning to request the French Government to requisition for the use of the British representatives at the Peace Conference the Hotel Majestic or the Hotel Astoria and perhaps both. I would very much prefer that all of the negotiations for the acquisition of headquarters for the American representatives should be conducted by Ambassador Sharp with the assistance of the American military authorities now in Paris who have already had experience in dealing with the French authorities in the matter of requisitioning accommodations for the use of the War Department in Paris. Various plans for the accommodation of the American representatives have been proposed to me and at the present time I am inclined to think that the best suggestion that has been made is for you through Ambassador Sharp to request the French authorities to requisition for the use of the American representatives at the Peace Conference the Hotel de Crillon, together with a very much smaller hotel on the Boissy d'Anglas in the near vicinity of the Crillon.

The Crillon has accommodations for approximately 100 guests. I should estimate that the American representation including high military officials would amount to at least this number. The operation of the hotel should be placed entirely in the hands of citizens of the United States. This can easily be arranged. The smaller hotel near the Crillon could be fitted up as offices. It [I?] would also suggest that you instruct Ambassador Sharp to discuss with the French Government the acquisition of suitable accommodations for the President. I have [in] mind certain residences which may be suitable in the near vicinity of the Crillon.

I suggest that the staff of the "Inquiry" be instructed to report at once when it would be practical for them to sail for France. At the present time it seems clear to me that we should try to establish our organization in working order in Paris as near to December 1st as possible though in all probability the actual Peace Conference will not be called before December 16th because it is unnecessary and I believe inadvisable to send to Europe for the Conference either stenographers, code clerks, or any other kind of clerical assistance. Very efficient men can be obtained to do this work for [from?] the army and naval forces now in Europe. I should appreciate an

expression of your views and a statement of what action you propose to take. I have handed a copy of this cable to Ambassador Sharp.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/905 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918—1 p. m.

34. Your 93.<sup>3</sup> I quite agree with you that the best arrangement is for Ambassador Sharp to request the French authorities to requisition for the use of the American Commissioners at the peace conference the Hotel de Crillon. Possibly it could be arranged so that the offices would be in that Hotel and any overflow of people connected with the Commission could live at the smaller hotel of which you speak. Will you be good enough to take up this matter with Ambassador Sharp as soon as possible in accordance with your suggestions, notifying him that I will instruct him to take the matter up with the French Government as soon as it is officially decided to have the meeting of the conference in Paris? He might informally approach the French Government on the subject without awaiting instructions. Please explain to him also that I am taking this indirect means of communication as I do not feel I can make it official in nature until the place of meeting is formally agreed upon.

It does not seem to me advisable that the Bureau of Inquiry should leave before the rest of the force as they will not be fully equipped with stenographers and others. The President feels that we must economize in the matter of clerical force and expects to draw largely from the army supply in Paris.

Your Number 84:<sup>4</sup> I have reasons for objecting to the attendance of . . . at the peace conference, which I can explain to you better on seeing you.

LANSING

---

763.72119/2599 : Telegram

*The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State*

HAVRE, November 14, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received November 15—2:22 a. m.]

154. Hymans asks me to express the earnest desire of the Belgian Government to have the Peace Conference held in Brussels. The

---

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.



movement was begun on receipt of a telegram from Francqui<sup>5</sup> at Brussels saying that Cardinal Mercier, the National Committee, all magistrates and members of Parliament and prominent men in Belgium unanimously requested it. The King was at first not favorably impressed with the idea saying after so long a strain the social obligations it would entail would be onerous but he yielded to the wishes of the Government. While sharing the forebodings of His Majesty, I transmit the request for your consideration.

WHITLOCK

763.72119/9136 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 20, 1918—11 p. m.

[Received November 20—8:07 p. m.]

130. For the President and Secretary of State. Lord Derby has just sent word to me that he has heard from Mr. Balfour that the British Government does not feel that it is bound to consider Versailles as the place finally decided upon for the Peace Conference. They feel that this is a question which must be finally decided by the Inter-Allied Conference. Mr. Balfour points out, however, that after the various delegations have arrived in Paris, and the organizations set up there, it will be most difficult to change the meeting place of the final conference. Lord Derby believes that the British Government has, however, definitely accepted the proposal that the Inter-Allied Conference should be held in Paris. Lord Derby states that he is doing his best to hurry the French Government into the taking over of the necessary accommodations for the staff of the British Government. Lord Derby has asked the French Government to take over both the Astoria which has 130 bedrooms and the Majestic Hotel which has 450 bedrooms. He says that the rent has not yet been agreed upon.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 43/956 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 22, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received November 22—10 a. m.]

141. From Grew. I have been informed that the French Government is taking the necessary step to place the Hotel Crillon at

<sup>5</sup> Émile Francqui, head of the Belgian Comité National d'Alimentation et Secours.

our disposal. Ambassador Sharp is attending to all of these negotiations and will no doubt report direct on terms thereof. We are making satisfactory progress with physical organization of offices in quarters previously occupied by Red Cross at 4 Place de la Concorde.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/1017 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 22, 1918—9 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

5968. Referring to the Department's 34, November 13, 1 p. m. for Colonel House. I would say that I have been successful in getting prompt action by the French Government in the matter of requisitioning the Hotel Crillon for [special?] use of the American commissioners at the Peace Conference. Representations were made by Mr. Auchincloss to me that there was the greatest need for expedition in securing this property as certain arrangements affecting the hotel accommodations would necessarily have to be made prior to the actual coming over of the members of the commission. A representative of the American military governor of Paris called on me to inform me that the property would be turned over to those representing the commission on the 25th instant; just now, however, I am informed that the hotel will be formally requisitioned on the 23rd instant and representative of the Embassy is asked to be present. As to the terms of rental, duration of lease, etc., I asked Major Warburton, military attaché, to take up with the proper authorities the question of procedure in taking over the property and the estimate of the amount of rent, etc.; after seeing these authorities he has left a report with me, the substance of which is as follows: After the military governor of Paris has been notified that the property is desired for military purposes, it is thereupon requisitioned on the basis of the taxes paid upon the income derived from the property. A Military Board of Reviews examines the property and if there are any damages assesses value for same. The property is requisitioned by this board for only the time that it is actually needed and may be returned to the owners without any notice whatever. The rental assessed by the board is arbitrary and in the case of the United States Government it would be the same as that which the French or any other Government would have to pay. I shall appreciate any further instructions that the Department may desire to give in reference to the matter.

SHARP

763.72119 P 43/3 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 29, 1918—10 p. m.

[Received November 29—8:46 p. m.]

200. Grew advises me as follows with reference to tentative arrangements for leasing office space for the peace commission in addition to the Hotel Crillon already taken over by the Embassy. The transfer of the lease for the property at 4 Place de la Concorde from the American Red Cross to the commission has been arranged and is now awaiting signature. The rent of the property is now 75,000 francs a year, the lease to run for a period of 6 months after the date announced by the French Government as the official [date?] of the suspension of hostilities. Mr. Warren of the legal department of the commission has examined the terms and approves. There would, furthermore, be a charge of 40,000 francs representing less than 50 percent of the cost of the fixtures installed by the Red Cross which would thus be taken over by the commission and sold at the expiration of its occupancy. Tentative arrangements have also been made to take over four upper stories of adjoining building at 3 Rue Royale for 3 months beginning December 7th, when the lease of Red Cross expires at the rate of 2,000 francs a month. This lease may afterwards be extended. Mr. Warren has examined and approves.

I suggest that matter be handled in the same way as in the case of Hotel Crillon by direct authorization from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador to sign these leases.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/17 : Telegram*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1918—noon.

[Received 3:30 p. m.]

2. From Colonel House, December [4]. December 16th would be perfectly convenient so far as the British Government are concerned for the holding of the first meeting of the inter-Allied Conference. Balfour adds that Clemenceau expressed the view that December 16th might prove too early. Balfour suggests that it may be wise to allow a few days for informal discussions before the actual meeting of the Conference.

POLK

763.72119/2927 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

U. S. S. "GEORGE WASHINGTON," December 7, 1918—5 p. m.  
[Received December 8—12:58 a. m.]

4. Your 2, December 5, 12 noon. For Colonel House. President suggests that arrangements for meeting of Inter-Allied Conference be postponed until preliminary informal discussions have shown just what would be best in all the circumstances.

LANSING

## PRESIDENT WILSON'S TRIP TO EUROPE

Woodrow Wilson Papers

### *President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON [November 10, 1918 (?).]

12. With reference to the peace conference will it not be wise and necessary to postpone it until there are governments in Germany and Austria-Hungary which can enter into binding agreements? I feel obliged not to leave before delivering my annual message to the Congress on the second of December. I could leave immediately after that and hope that it will be possible to fix the date of meeting accordingly. Would a preliminary visit to England be wise if I could not visit Italy also beforehand? Nelson Page will tell you how busy the English propagandists are destroying our prestige and building up their own in Italy.

Referring to your number 66,<sup>1</sup> our judgment corresponds with yours. Hoover is coming over immediately to discuss the matter and propose our method of handling it.

Referring to your number 51<sup>2</sup> the plan of secret codes is being worked out between the Departments of State and Navy.

Referring to your number eight,<sup>3</sup> please express to the French Prime Minister my deep pleasure and great encouragement. He may rest assured that we will not take advantage of his generous promise unreasonably and I am sure that between us we can serve the world in the noblest way.

Do not think it would be wise to increase delegation to seven. That would involve similar increase in other delegations. Better to make another Republican selection.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

033.1140/247 : Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 11, 1918—9 p. m.

[Received November 11—2:55 p. m.]

90. Secret for the President. I believe it is essential that you land in England. You could arrange to visit Italy later and during some

---

<sup>1</sup> Vol. II, p. 628.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 344.

interim. I shall count on your sailing December 3d. This would enable you to land December 11th and remain in England the 12th and 13th reaching Paris night of 14th. The Peace Conference will probably be called for December 16th but there need be no active sessions for a week or 10 days. This time could be used for Inter-Allied conferences. Please let me know whether I can plan according to this schedule.

EDWARD HOUSE

033.1140/248 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 13, 1918—1 a. m.  
[Received November 12—9:15 p. m.]

100. For the President. Lord Derby, British Ambassador, called today and presented me the following telegram from Mr. Balfour:

"If you think invitation would be acceptable will you please express to the President the sincere hope of His Majesty's Government that should he decide to come to Europe in connection with negotiations for peace he will honor this country by landing here. I need hardly assure you of the warm welcome he will receive. Oxford University would, I know, be proud to offer him a degree. Cambridge has already done so, gladly violating in his honor its immemorial practice. I hope he [will] find time to visit both."

EDWARD HOUSE

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918.]

14. I hope that it is understood that my coming to the peace conference depends upon the prime ministers, the actual directing heads of the other governments, being also delegates. I assume also that I shall be selected to preside. I have decided that the selection of McCall <sup>4</sup> would be unwise and expect to appoint Justice Day <sup>5</sup> if he is well enough.

Referring to your number 100,<sup>5a</sup> no letter received from Curzon about an Oxford degree has reached me. Of course I cannot decline the degree but it will be impossible for me to prepare an address which I would be willing to deliver on the Romanes foundation.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel W. McCall, Governor of Massachusetts, 1916-18.

<sup>5</sup> William R. Day, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

<sup>5a</sup> *Supra.*

Referring to your number 89,<sup>6</sup> my position must of course be that the boundaries of Italy and the whole Adriatic settlement is to be decided by the peace conference in the general interest.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

033.1140/249 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 13, 1918—11 a. m.

[Received November 13—7 a. m.]

101. For the President. The Allied Governments are waiting to know the approximate date of your arrival so that plans for the preliminary and final conferences can be made. I hope it will be possible to have your answer today.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers : Telegram

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918.]

I expect to sail December 3rd.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

763.72119/9134 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 14, 1918—9 p. m.

[Received November 15—8:20 a. m.]

107. Secret for the President. If the Peace Congress assembles in France Clemenceau will be presiding officer. If a neutral country had been chosen you would have been asked to preside.

Americans here whose opinions are of value are practically unanimous in the belief that it would be unwise for you to sit in the Peace Conference. They fear that it would involve a loss of dignity and your commanding position.

Clemenceau has just told me that he hopes you will not sit in the Congress because no head of a state should sit there. The same feeling prevails in England. Cobb cables that Reading and Wiseman voice the same view. Everyone wants you to come over to take part

---

<sup>6</sup> Vol. II, p. 287.

in the preliminary conferences. It is at these meetings that peace terms will be worked out and determined just as the informal conferences determined the German and Austrian armistices. It is of vital importance I think for you to come as soon as possible. For everything is being held in abeyance.

John Davis who is here gives as his offhand opinion that you need not be present the opening of Congress. However I am for your sailing December 3d but hoping you will consider it possible to come at an early date. Clemenceau believes that the preliminary discussion need not take more than 3 weeks. The peace conferences he believes may take as long as 4 months.

We will not know until we have a meeting to discuss the method of procedure just how many delegates each country may have but I am inclined to think that they will adopt my suggestion and appoint seven with only five sitting at one time. I believe it would be well to have seven delegates with two Republicans and one of those Root<sup>7</sup> and the other McCall. This may avoid criticism and opposition. I doubt whether Justice Day would satisfy the Republicans any better than McCall and he would not be as useful. I believe it would be a mistake not to have labor represented.

If you do not deliver the valedictory lecture at Oxford I would suggest coming directly to France and going to Italy and England later. Pending your arrival we will take up the question of the method of procedure but Clemenceau promises me that no questions concerning peace terms will be brought up. He insists that you become the guest of the nation and in my opinion you cannot avoid this.

In announcing your departure I think it important that you should not state that you will sit in at the Peace Conference. That can be determined after you get here. There is reason enough for your coming because of the impossibility of keeping in touch and exercising a guiding hand at such a distance.

The French, English and Italian Prime Ministers will head their delegations.

HOUSE

---

763.72119/9133 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 15, 1918—7 p. m.

[Received November 15—4: 33 p. m.]

108. For the President. I send for your information following telegram from Clemenceau to Lloyd George.

---

<sup>7</sup> Elihu Root, Secretary of State, 1905-9.



"The coming of President Wilson naturally changes some of our plans in preparing for the Conference. It seems to me that we cannot begin the work before the President arrives. We ought to be unanimous in this respect. Besides, I think it is not a bad idea to let the German revolution settle down for a while in order that we may know before proceeding what we have before us. I would suggest to you that we draw up some preparatory memoranda, either in London or in Paris. I am ready to accept all your suggestions in this respect. If we should proceed thus, the President on arriving could make his observations without any delay and the task would find itself advanced. I expect to see Mr. Sonnino this afternoon. I do not doubt that he will assent. A particularly serious question is to know whether the President intends to take part in the Conference. I ought not to hide from you that in my opinion this seems to be neither desirable nor possible. Since he is chief of state he is consequently not on the same level as ourselves. To admit one chief of state without admitting all seems to me an impossibility."

EDWARD HOUSE

---

033.1140/250 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 15, 1918—11 p. m.

[Received November 15—7:32 p. m.]

110. For the President. I have just received the following communication from Lord Derby:

"Copy of telegram from Mr. Balfour to Lord Derby of November 15th. Very urgent. Personal. Please convey following message from the King to Colonel House for transmission to the President of the United States. 'I am delighted to hear that you contemplate shortly coming to England on your way to France. It would give the Queen and myself the greatest pleasure if you and Mrs. Wilson will be our guests at Buckingham Palace during your stay in London.'"

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*Senator Key Pittman<sup>8</sup> to President Wilson*

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On yesterday you honored Senator Gerry<sup>9</sup> and myself by seeking our opinion with regard to the general impression of the necessity of your attending the Peace Conference.

---

<sup>8</sup> United States Senator from Nevada.

<sup>9</sup> Peter G. Gerry, United States Senator from Rhode Island.

I then unhesitatingly replied that I believed that the necessity was recognized by a large majority of the members of the Senate. I now discover that there is a grave diversity of opinion with regard to the effect that such action on your part might have and it has occurred to me that you would possibly be interested in a frank recital of these various expressions.

Last night I had the pleasure of assembling at a dinner with about thirty of your closest and strongest political supporters. The assembly involuntarily and spontaneously resolved itself into an unofficial and temporary committee upon the welfare of yourself and the Democratic party. It might seem presumptuous that any Democrat should take the liberty of even suggesting the effect of the future conduct of one who has always been intuitively right and whose success has not only been beyond that of his party but supreme throughout the world. The debate and the suggestions, Mr. President, came from no presumption, but from the love that each man there has for you and the hopes that are wrapped up in your career. The following are some of the points urged most strongly by those who believe that it would be a mistake for you to attend the Peace Conference, namely:

1. That you are now held in a sacred reverence by all the people of Europe and are looked upon as a superman residing afar off in a citadel of power beyond that of all nations, and that your association at the peace table with well-understood statesmen, who are but frail men long subject to criticism and even suspicion by certain classes of peoples, would lower your dignity, mar your prestige, and encourage resistance to any ultimatum that you might find it necessary to submit to the Peace Conference.

2. That you would be involved by the numerous petty questions and details and that your position with regard to the great principles that you maintain would be obscured.

3. That in these debates and decisions upon lesser questions you would lose the moral support of peoples that you may now confidently look to in your effort to establish the great principles of international justice.

4. That our own country itself is now in the immediate and gravest period of reconstruction, and that without your guiding hand upon the rudder at all times our government may be shipwrecked.

5. That congress is in session; that your advice and your executive action may be required at any minute.

Those who believe that it will be necessary for you to attend the Peace Conference expressed these views:

1. That the adoption and establishment of your program is essential to the liberty, the peace, and the happiness of the world, and that such accomplishment is of more importance than the temporary glory of any man or group of men.

2. That there are certain facts bearing upon the diplomacy of the greater nations that may be only told verbally, and that you alone have

the power to speak them with sufficient verity to give them the fullest force.

3. That it would be unnecessary for you to wear away the strength of your armor and of your sword upon lesser questions and in minor debates; that these simpler but more tedious questions and other preliminaries could be disposed of by the Peace Conference before the great questions which will start the contest of great nations come before the Peace Conference. And that even then you need not attend the conference until it has reached such a stage of open and hopeless rupture that your dominating presence, personality and power are required to force the cessation of debate and the adoption of the only program that this country will ever stand for.

4. That it is unnecessary at this time to either declare that you will or will not attend the conference, as nothing but events can determine the necessity of the case.

5. That if the adoption of your program should ultimately require your presence at the peace table then all other considerations, both personal and political, should be cast aside.

You know, of course, that the latter expressions were mine as well as the expressions of a number of other supporters of yours who attended the dinner. I must say, however, that I have the very highest regard for the opinions of those who expressed contrary views. I have again this morning, when visiting several of the Departments, listened to similar arguments both pro and contra. Should you desire at any time to speak to any of these gentlemen with regard to the matter, I will, of course, feel at perfect liberty to submit to you their names.

Personally, I hope that if you do go to the Peace Conference you will not come back until your program is adopted. Then I know that you will come back with the recognition that you have won and are entitled to, a recognition that will not only reflect glory upon you but upon your party which hangs and depends upon you.

Very sincerely yours,

KEY PITTMAN

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, November 16, 1918.]

15. Your 107<sup>10</sup> upsets every plan we had made. I infer that French and English leaders desire to exclude me from the Conference for fear I might there lead the weaker nations against them. If I were to come to the seat of the Conference and remain outside I would be merely the centre of a sort of sublimated lobby. All weak parties

---

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 130.

would resort to me and there would be exactly the same jealousy that was excited by the Germans addressing themselves exclusively to me. I play the same part in our government that the prime ministers play in theirs. The fact that I am head of the state is of no practical consequence. No point of dignity must prevent our obtaining the results we have set our hearts upon and must have. It is universally expected and generally desired here that I should attend the conference, but I believe that no one would wish me to sit by and try to steer from the outside. I am thrown into complete confusion by the change of programme. The programme proposed for me by Clemenceau, George, Reading, and the rest seems to me a way of pocketing me. I hope you will be very shy of their advice and give me your own independent judgment after reconsideration.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 16, 1918.

15. In reply to your number 15<sup>11</sup> my judgment is that you should sail for France December 3d and determine upon your arrival what share it is wise for you to take in the proceedings. As Commander in Chief of the armed forces you have ample grounds for coming in order to solve the important questions connected with their return home. This can only be done here intelligently.

When here you will be in a position to assess the situation properly. It is impossible to do so from Washington through cables from me.

As far as I can see all the Powers are trying to work with us rather than with one another. Their disagreements are sharp and constant.

There is a tendency to delay not only the preliminary conferences but the final one. This I think is unfortunate. The sooner you announce your purpose of sailing December 3d the better. Until then no plans can be made.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 16, 1918.

16. To be more explicit as to my own opinion as to the advisability of your sitting in the Peace Conference let me say that I have con-

---

<sup>11</sup> *Supra.*

stantly contended that you should do so, but Sharp is practically the only one who has agreed with me. I see no need of reaching a decision until you arrive.

I notice in the memorandum which the French Foreign Office gave me yesterday concerning procedure and which I cabled to the Secretary of State<sup>12</sup> that they recommend only three delegates for each country. This is misleading for nothing has yet been determined and I think George and Clemenceau have different views.

EDWARD HOUSE

083.1140/250 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—6 p. m.

43. Your Number 110, November 15, 11 p. m. The President directs the following reply:

"The kind invitation from Your Majesty and the Queen, which Mr. House has transmitted, has given Mrs. Wilson and me the greatest gratification. If we were coming at once to England, we would accept it with pleasure. It now seems to be my duty, however, to go directly to France and there await the developments of the great business in hand, before making any personal plans. We hope that we shall later be able to cross the channel and have an opportunity to thank you and the Queen in person for your generous courtesies."

LANSING

Woodrow Wilson Papers : Telegram

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON [undated.]

16. I am issuing the following announcement:

["The President expects to sail for France immediately after the opening of the regular session of the Congress, for the purpose of taking part in the discussion and settlement of the main features of the treaty of peace. It is not likely that it will be possible for him to remain throughout the sessions of the formal peace conference, but his presence at the outset is necessary in order to obviate the manifest disadvantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater outlines of the final treaty, about which he must necessarily be consulted. He will, of course, be accompanied by delegates who will sit as the representatives of the United States throughout the conference. The names of the delegates will be presently announced."

<sup>12</sup> Telegram No. 109, Nov. 15, 1918, midnight, p. 344.

It would not be wise for me to come as if on another errand. There is only one errand our people would approve. If the French prime minister is uneasy about the presidency of the conference I will be glad to propose that he preside. I urge that the larger delegations be limited to five. Two other messages go to you through the State Department. I approve of your plan to employ experts on the assessment of damage done.<sup>13</sup>

[WILSON]

---

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 19, 1918.

18. I am delighted to receive your number 16.<sup>14</sup> I am confident that everything will now work out satisfactorily. You will probably be made Honorary President of the Congress and the French Prime Minister Acting President.

I am arranging with Pershing to have our army engineers make an approximate estimate of the damage done in Belgium and France.<sup>15</sup>

EDWARD HOUSE

---

933.1140/6: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 19, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received November 20—5 a. m.]

2380. The press states that the President and the Secretary of State are on their way to Paris. Learn also from members of Ministry here that they are informed from Paris that Mr. Wilson is coming to Europe. If he comes, he will be expected to visit Italy.

Both the King and Orlando have expressed great pleasure that he is coming and their belief that it be of great importance in enabling him to understand many problems.

His failure to visit Italy would have unfortunate and possibly serious effect upon our relations and would greatly increase existing tension between France and Italy.

Everyone here desirous of doing him all honor and all questions affecting official visits easily adjustable.

NELSON PAGE

---

<sup>13</sup> See Colonel House's telegram No. 17, Nov. 17, 1918, to President Wilson, vol. II, p. 575.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>15</sup> For additional correspondence on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 575 ff.

033.1140/251 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 21, 1918—7 p. m.  
[Received November 21—4:42 p. m.]

135. Secret for the President. The French Government have advised me that His Highness, Prince Murat has placed his residence at the disposal of the French Government in order that they may offer it to President Wilson for his use during his stay in Paris. I shall visit this house as soon as possible and cable you fully respecting it. Please make no announcement respecting this matter until I advise you further.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 43/2

*President Wilson to the Counselor of the Department of State (Polk)*

WASHINGTON, 22 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. COUNSELOR: I find that our party for Europe will consist, besides myself, of:<sup>16</sup>

Mrs. Wilson  
Miss Edith Benham, her Secretary  
Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson  
Mr. George Creel  
Mr. Gilbert F. Close  
Irving [*Irwin*] H. Hoover,

seven secret service men, namely:

Joseph E. Murphy  
Edmund W. Starling  
John Q. Slye  
William A. Lanvoigt  
John J. Fitzgerald  
Walter G. Ferguson, and  
John L. Sullivan;  
Arthur Brooks, my personal attendant  
Susie Booth, Mrs. Wilson's maid

Will you not be kind enough to see that the proper arrangements are made for passports? I may have one or two names to add later, but I think not.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

<sup>16</sup> The following list was transmitted to Colonel House in the Department's telegram No. 63, Nov. 25, 1918, 4 p. m., to the Ambassador in France (file No. 033.1140/251a).

033.1140/252 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

Paris, November 23, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received November 23—2:49 p. m.]

150. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. Referring further to our number 135.<sup>17</sup> Auchincloss visited today the house placed at the President's disposal by the French Government. This house is number 28 Rue de Monceau, a couple of blocks above the Boulevard Hausmann and in one of the highest parts of the city. The house, however, is not far from the street, in the center of spacious grounds, which are surrounded by a high wall. The interior of the house is beautifully furnished and is in first-class repair. On the ground floor there are the following rooms: A. Large dining room capable of seating 35 persons; B, large ballroom or salon; C, three medium-sized drawing rooms. On the second floor there are the following rooms: A, small suite of two rooms; B, small study or library; C, large study or writing-room, which could be used as the President's workroom; D, bedroom and drawing room and bath which could be used by the President; E, connecting suite of three rooms, bedroom, boudoir and sitting room which could be used by Mrs. Wilson; F, medium-size breakfast or dining room. On the third floor there are seven bedrooms and four sitting rooms, all of which are attractively furnished. There is a private garage on the grounds. I am taking steps to have proper telephonic and wire connections installed in a manner, as near as possible, similar to that at present existing in the White House. All in all I believe the house placed at the President's disposal by the French Government is as attractive a residence as there is in Paris, and I have informally advised the Foreign Office that I felt sure the President would be altogether pleased with the arrangements made in his behalf. If there are any particular points that you wish me to attend to with respect to these accommodations, I trust that you will communicate them to me in the near future. The Foreign Office have asked me not to make public the arrangements they are making for the present.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

<sup>17</sup> *Ante*, p. 138.



Paris Peace Conf. 184/17

*The Acting Chief of the Bureau of Citizenship, Department of State (Flournoy), to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State (Crane)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1918.

DEAR MR. CRANE: Yesterday Mr. Hoover,<sup>18</sup> at the White House, called me up on the telephone in regard to passports for persons connected with the President's party, who are going to France with him. He enquired about obtaining a passport for the President. I told him that I did not think that it would be necessary for the President and Mrs. Wilson to carry passports. However, he seemed to think that they would wish to have them. I told him then to put it up to the President. The President said that he and Mrs. Wilson wanted to take passports, and upon Mr. Hoover's request I went to the White House this morning and took their applications. I told Mr. Hoover that I did not think it necessary for the President to make the usual application, but he said that the President wished to go through the usual routine. As soon as the photographs are obtained, I shall have the passport made out and send it to the Secretary for signature.

Please let me know whether the Secretary wishes me to come over and take the passport applications of himself and Mrs. Lansing.

R. W. F[LOURNOY]

033.1140/253 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 24, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received November 24—10:06 a. m.]

161. Secret for the President. In your announcement quoted in your telegram number 16<sup>19</sup> you state, "The President will sail for France." I understand this to mean that you will go direct from the United States to France and not pass through England. Please confirm this.

EDWARD HOUSE

Edward M. House Papers : Telegram

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1918.

17. Referring to my despatch 16 I shall sail directly for France as you advised.

WILSON

<sup>18</sup> Irwin H. Hoover, head usher at the White House.

<sup>19</sup> *Ante*, p. 136.

033.1140/254 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 26, 1918—4 p. m.  
[Received November 26—1:34 p. m.]

181. Your number 63, November 24 [25], 4 p. m.<sup>20</sup> Please advise me of the names of the persons, other than the President and Mrs. Wilson, whom the President wishes to have stay in Prince Murat's house. It will be perfectly practical to have the President's valet and Mrs. Wilson's maid stay at the house if the President so wishes. Accommodations for those of the President's personal party whom he does not wish to have stay in the same house with him will be reserved at the Hotel Crillon.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.44/1

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 26 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In his Number 181,<sup>21</sup> House asks what members of my party Mrs. Wilson and I will wish to have stay with us in Prince Murat's house. I would be very much obliged if you would have a cable sent to him, answering his question as follows:

"The President and Mrs. Wilson would be glad to have, besides the President's valet and Mrs. Wilson's maid, the following persons stay in Prince Murat's house with them: Miss Benham, Dr. Grayson, Mr. Close, and Mr. I. H. Hoover."<sup>22</sup>

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

033.1140/6 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—1 p. m.

1864. Your 2380, November 19th. Strictly confidential, for your own information. President and Secretary of State are planning to

---

<sup>20</sup> Not printed; see footnote 16, p. 138.

<sup>21</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>22</sup> Sent as telegram No. 88, Nov. 29, 1918, 1 p. m., to the Ambassador in France, for Colonel House (file No. 033.1140/255a). In a telegram of Dec. 11, 1918, the name of Charles Swem, the President's stenographer, was added to this list (file No. Paris Peace Conf. 184.21/22b).

sail for France about December 4th. The President has made no arrangements for visiting Italy but may do so before his return to the United States.

LANSING

---

033.1140/255 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 27, 1918—11 a. m.  
[Received November 27—9:53 a. m.]

184. Secret for the President. I have talked the matter over with Admiral Benson and I suggest that you take the southern route and land at Marseille. At this time of year the chances are very much in favor of your having far milder and more pleasant weather on the southern route than on the northern one. That was our experience last year. Benson tells me that it will only take 2 days longer and that if you sail on the 4th you would arrive at Marseille on the 14th. This would bring you to Paris in plenty of time for the Conference. Will not you please let me know what you decide [to] do.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119/2802 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 27, 1918—1 p. m.  
[Received 8:33 p. m.]

2415. Department 1864.<sup>23</sup> Please say to the President for me: "For heavens sake don't come to Europe without visiting Italy before returning home."

NELSON PAGE

---

033.1140/15 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 28, 1918—12 p. m.  
[Received November 29—9:29 a. m.]

2423. Congressman Carlin of Virginia having been accorded private audience today by the Pope, states that the latter expressed

---

<sup>23</sup> *Ante*, p. 141.

most earnestly his hope that the President will visit Rome during his visit to Europe, declaring that should he come here he would receive most cordial welcome from himself and would be received by him formally or informally in accordance with whatever President's wishes might be. And further, that President would find no embarrassment there touching anything President might wish in visiting others or carrying out any program he might have.

This statement accords with what the head of the American Catholic College had already mentioned to me privately, to the effect that nothing like any conditions such as were proposed when Mr. Roosevelt came to Rome would be suggested now.

The foregoing, taken in connection with the declaration to me by Premier Orlando that the Italian Government will make no difficulties [apparent omission] the President's visiting the Pope, I understand to mean that the President will of course be absolutely free to do here as he would at home. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

---

033.1140/255b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918—2 p. m.

89. From the President. Your 184, November 27, 11 a. m. After conference with Daniels<sup>24</sup> and the people of the Navy Department who know the areas of floating mines, etc., I am convinced that it would be wiser to keep to the original plan and land at Brest.

LANSING

---

033.1140/32a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1918—7 p. m.

6519. French Ambassador stated that French Government suggested President arrive at Brest 3:30 p. m. December 12th and arrive in Paris morning of the 13th. Owing to the fact the *George Washington* is a slow boat President suggested time of arrival at Brest should be 13th and arrival Paris 14th. In response to an invitation to lunch or dine with President of French Republic, the President accepted for lunch for 14th. Please inform House and General Harts.

POLK

---

<sup>24</sup> Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy.

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/11 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State*

FORWARDED FROM WASHINGTON, December 9, 1918—5 p. m.

19. For the President. According to present plans I understand that you will arrive in Paris at 10 a. m. on Saturday December 14. Upon your arrival you will be taken at once to your residence. At 12:30 a large formal lunch will be given in your honor at the Elysees Palace by the President. A committee of laboring men and socialists headed by Albert Thomas, Renaud, Geer, and Cabrain, wishes to present you with an address at 3:30 p. m. on Saturday the 14th and to hold a monster parade in your favor at that time. This is not definite but will probably take place. On Monday December 16, a formal reception will be tendered you and Mrs. Wilson by the city of Paris at the Hotel de Ville at 2:30 p. m. and I have accepted for you.

I have told Wiseman to tell Balfour and George that you will [reserve?] Tuesday December 17, Wednesday December 18, and possibly the 19th free for conferences with them and I expect that both Balfour and George will be in Paris on the 17th. December 19 and 20th the King of Italy, the Italian Prime Minister and Baron Sonnino will be in Paris. The French and Belgian Governments are most insistent that you should make a trip to the devastated regions of France and Belgium. Accordingly the French Government are making arrangements for you to take a trip beginning December 26 which will occupy approximately 3 days through northern France and Belgium. At the same time it is planned that you should visit our army. Your trip to Italy, which I believe is necessary, might be begun on December 29 or 30th in order that you may return to Paris by January 3 or 4th for the first formal conference of the Allies. Clemenceau has told me that the English elections, the French celebrations, and the official visits to Paris have made it absolutely impossible to begin these formal conferences before January 3 or 4th.

Will you please let me know if you wish me to take any particular action with reference to the foregoing.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/10 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

LYONS, December 9, 1918—10 p. m.

For the President. The following is a translation of an advance copy of the address of welcome which President Poincaré expects to

deliver at the luncheon which he will give in your honor on the 14th instant:

"Mr. President. Paris and France were impatiently expecting you. They were longing to welcome and hail you as the eminent democrat whose words and deeds are inspired by exalted thought, as the philosopher who delights in involving universal laws from private [?], as the prominent statesman, touching the highest political and moral truths have suggested formulas that bear the stamp of immortality.

They were also passionately yearning to convey, through your person, their thanks to the great republic whose chief you are, for the invaluable assistance it has spontaneously bestowed, during this war, on the defenders of right and liberty. Even before America had resolved to intervene in the contest she had shown to the wounded, to the widows, to the orphans of France, a beneficence and generosity, the memory of which shall never vanish from our hearts. The donations of your Red Cross, the innumerable contributions of your fellow citizens, the touching activities of American women have anticipated your military and naval action and evinced little by little which way your sympathies were leaning. And from the day when you threw yourselves into the midst of the battle [garbled groups].

A few months ago you cabled to me that the United States would send to invaded France ever increasing forces able to submerge the enemy under an overwhelming flow of new divisions. And, in fact, flowing more than a year a continuous tide of youth and energy has poured on to the shores of France. No sooner had they landed, than your gallant battalions fired by their chief, General Pershing, rushed into the fight with such manly contempt of danger, such smiling disregard of death, that our old experience of this terrific war often felt incited to counsel prudence.

They have come here with the enthusiasm of crusaders leaving for the Holy Land. They are now entitled to behold with elation of heart the common achievement and to deem their courage and faith a mighty help thereto.

Eager as they were to meet the enemy, they were yet unaware when they arrived of his monstrous crimes. To obtain a proper view of the German conduct of war, they had to witness the systematically burnt down cities, the flooded mines and the crumbling factories, the devastated orchards, of many shelled and fired cathedrals, the whole device of that savage war waged against national wealth, nature, beauty, which the imagination is unable to conceive at a distance from the men and things that have endured it and that still give evidence thereof. You will have the opportunity, Mr. President, to inspect with your own eyes the extent of that disaster. The French Government will also furnish you with authentic documents in which the German general staff develops with astounding cynicism its plan of plunder and industrial annihilation. Your noble conscience will return a verdict on its guilt.

Should it remain unpunished, could it be renewed, the most splendid victories would be useless. Mr. President, France has striven, has patiently toiled, during four long years she has bled at every pore, she has lost the best of her children, she mourns for her young sons. She aspires now even as you do to a peace of justice and safety.

She did not intend that such an aggression might be renewed, when she submitted to such sacrifices. Nor did you intend to allow uncondemned criminals to lift up their heads again and to prepare new murders when America, under your strong impulse, armed herself and crossed the ocean. Keeping a true remembrance of Lafayette and Rochambeau, she came to relieve France because France herself was true to her traditions. Our common ideal has conquered. Together we have stood for the vital principles of free societies, together we must now build such a peace as will not permit the deliberate and underhand reconstruction of organisms aiming at conquest and oppression. The peace must make amends for the general hardship and sorrows of yesterday; it must be a guarantee against the perils of tomorrow. The association which has been formed, in view of the war, between the United States and the Allies and which contains the germ of the permanent institution you have outlined with such eloquence, will, from this day find its decisions of profitable use in the concerted study of just decisions, in the mutual support we all need in order to make our rights prevail. Whatever precautions we may take for the future, no one, unfortunately, can assert that we shall forever spare to mankind the horrors of new wars. Five years ago, the progress of a science and the state of civilization ought to have led to hope that no government, however autocratic, would succeed in hurling nations in arms against Belgium and Servia. Without cherishing the illusion that posterity may forever be completely safe from such collective madness, we must introduce into the peace we are going to build all the conditions of justice and probabilities of duration that we can insert in it. To such a vast and magnificent task you have chosen, Mr. President, to come and to apply yourself hand in hand with France. France expresses its gratefulness to you. She knows America's friendship. She is aware of your rectitude and nobility of thought. With full confidence she is ready to work with you.

I raise my glass, Mr. President, in yours and Mrs. Wilson's honor. I drink to the prosperity of the republic of the United States, the great friend of yesterday and of the past, of tomorrow and of all times."

SHARP

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/19a

*The Secretary to President Wilson (Close) to the Secretary of State*

U. S. S. "GEORGE WASHINGTON," 10 December, 1918.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

The President asks if you will be kind enough to have for [*sic*] following message sent in code to Mr. House in France:

"Referring to your No. 19, December 9th, the President asks me to say that while he greatly regrets the necessity for postponing the beginning of the formal business of conference until the third or fourth of January, he is of course willing to acquiesce in the programme as outlined, subject of course to such changes as may be mutually agreeable upon conference after his arrival. But he wishes

me to ask if it would not be possible, in some tactful way that would not give offence or be misunderstood, to avoid the demonstration of laboring men and socialists which you say is being planned for the afternoon of Saturday. The President fears embarrassment from any seeming identification with any single element, and recalls the criticisms already made by those interested in opposing his principles with regard to the source of the popular support which he is receiving."

[For] The President

G. F. CLOSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/14: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 10, 1918—7 p.m.

My December 9, 10 p.m. The Foreign Office desires to receive if possible an advance copy of President Wilson's reply to President Poincaré's address, also to know whether it will be delivered in French.

SHARP

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/15½

*The Secretary to President Wilson (Close) to the Secretary of State*

11 DECEMBER, 1918.

Memorandum for the Secretary of State:

Will you not be kind enough to have the following reply sent to this message from Ambassador Sharp:

"The President's reply to President Poincaré will be in English and will be as follows:

"Mr. President: I am deeply indebted to you for your gracious greeting. It is very delightful to find myself in France and to feel the quick contact of sympathy and unaffected friendship between the representatives of the United States and the representatives of France. You have been very generous in what you were pleased to say about myself, but I feel that what I have said and what I have tried to do has been said and done only in an attempt to speak the thought of the people of the United States truly and to carry that thought out in action. From the first, the thought of the people of the United States turned toward something more than the mere winning of this war. It turned to the establishment of eternal principles of right and justice. It realized that merely to win the war was not enough; that it must be won in such a way and the questions raised by it settled in such a way as to insure the future peace of the world and lay the foundation for the freedom and happiness of its many peoples and nations.



"Never before has war worn so terrible a visage or exhibited more grossly the debasing influences of illicit ambitions. I am sure that I shall look upon the ruin wrought by the armies of the Central Empires with the same repulsion and deep indignation that they stir in the hearts of the men of France and of Belgium, and I appreciate as you do, Sir, the necessity of such action in the final settlement of the issues of the war as will not only rebuke such acts of terror and spoliation, but make men everywhere aware that they cannot be ventured upon without the certainty of just punishment.

"I know with what ardor and enthusiasm the soldiers and sailors of the United States have given the best that was in them to this war of redemption. They have expressed the true spirit of America. They believe their ideals to be acceptable to free peoples everywhere, and are rejoiced to have played the part they have played in giving reality to those ideals in cooperation with the armies of the Allies. We are proud of the part they have played, and we are happy that they should have been associated with such comrades in a common cause.

"It is with peculiar feelings, Mr. President, that I find myself in France joining with you in rejoicing over the victory that has been won. The ties that bind France and the United States are peculiarly close. I do not know in what other comradeship we could have fought with more zest or enthusiasm. It will daily be a matter of pleasure with me to be brought into consultation with the statesmen of France and her Allies in concerting the measures by which we may secure permanence for these happy relations of friendship and cooperation, and secure for the world at large such safety and freedom in its life as can be secured only by the constant association and cooperation of friends.

"I greet you, Sir, not only with deep personal respect, but as the representative of the great people of France, and beg to bring you the greetings of another great people to whom the fortunes of France are of profound and lasting interest".

[For] The President  
G. F. CLOSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 851.008/2 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 12, 1918—10 p. m. [?]

[Received December 13—10 a.m.]

For the President. Mr. Renuder [*Renaudel*], at the head of a delegation representing the various groups of socialists and men of [five words missing], just left with me copy of an address which they wish to present to you at 3:30 Saturday afternoon. It is also planned to have at the same time a large parade of working men in your honor. Following is a verbatim copy of the salient points of the address which covers nearly five pages:

"The general labor confederation, strong with a million union members, the socialist party, which, at the beginning of the war, had in parliament one hundred members representing one million two hundred thousand citizens, have wished to prove to you that your hope of speaking to the masses, which had until then been silent, has not been vain. But how could they omit affirming to you that thousands and thousands of men, women and children in France, a silent mass, whose ancestors struggled so for the rights of citizens, are with you in your desire to fix the rights of nations and to realize the peace of the peoples. An immense task which will not be the work of a moment for which the statesman will only be able to sow the fruitful seeds at the peace conference, and then afterwards count on the good will of the peoples for the beneficent harvest. It is not mere chance that today brings the workers, the socialists and the democrats of France towards you. Thus, it follows, French labor believes the world must be ripe for democracy. It is with that object in view that you have laid down your fourteen articles of peace. The peoples now expect the rapid peace will record and define exactly the fourteen peace stipulations in order that the world's reconstruction may at last seriously begin."

Quotations are made in the speech from the resolutions of the London conferences of February, 1915, and February, 1918.

Complete copy of the speech will be handed you upon arrival at Brest.

SHARP

---

Edward M. House Papers

*Copy of Telegram From the British Ambassador in France (Derby)  
to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour)*

No. 1785

PARIS, December 16, 1918.

President of the Council wishes me to communicate to you immediately following part of long and satisfactory conversation which he yesterday had with President Wilson.

Latter informed him that he was anxious to attend the Peace Conference. He added that if the Conference declared that they preferred that he should not attend, he would quite understand, but he nevertheless desired that his wishes in the matter should be known.

On the President of the Council pointing out that other Heads of States might wish to attend the Conference and that difficulties might arise in consequence, President stated that he would attend as Head of the U. S. Government and not in his capacity of President. He pointed out that the case of the U. S. of America was different from those of France and England, as in the latter countries nothing could be done by the Heads of States without the approval of the President of the Council and the Prime Minister respectively, whereas in the United States nothing could be done without reference to him. He

would not dream of urging that he should preside at the Conference, as that was clearly the prerogative of Monsieur Clemenceau, but he strongly pressed that he should be permitted to be present.

The President of the Council asks me to let you know that although he was at first very strongly opposed to the idea he is now of the opinion that the President ought to be allowed to attend the Conference as a member and he himself intends to support his request. He feels sure that if it became known that the President had expressed a wish to be present and had been refused the effect would be very bad, at any rate in France. He would be grateful for your views and those of the Prime Minister with regard to the President's proposal.

[File copy not signed]

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The Secretary to the President (Tumulty) to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON [undated—*circa* December 18, 1918.]

Before finally declining invitation to visit Vatican, hope you will consider influence Pope can wield in favor of your ideals among free peoples of all countries in case an appeal to world necessary to sustain your principles. His influence of incalculable advantage. Misstep in this matter may be most hurtful. While there is political danger in visit, the larger aspects must be considered. The great issue which you are pushing forward in Europe and throughout the world will depend upon the popular sentiment behind you throughout Europe. The Vatican can help in this. We should use every instrument that can help you in this great hour. If you succeed—which is certain—visits to Vatican will be forgotten in realization of larger result.

TUMULTY

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/46b : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis)*

PARIS, 21 December, 1918.

20. The President has just arranged the following respecting his trip to England. He will leave French Channel port between 9 and 10 a. m. on December 26th and will arrange to arrive in London at approximately 2 p. m. on the same day. The following will accom-

pany him: Mrs. Wilson, Admiral Grayson, Miss Benham (Mrs. Wilson's Secretary), Mr. Close and Mr. Swem, President's man servant and Mrs. Wilson's maid, nine secret service men and three newspaper men, viz., Associated Press, United Press and International News Representatives. While he is in England he will have as his Military Aide the Commanding General of the American Troops in London, just as General Harts, Commanding General of the American Troops in Paris, acts as his Aide during his stay in Paris. Mr. Young will be in the party as Disbursing Officer. It is possible that Colonel House may go to London with the President but this has not yet been definitely decided. The President expects to stay in England on 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of December as the guest of the British Government. We understand that the arrangements for the entire party will be looked after by the British authorities. You would have been notified before this of the arrangements but they have been changed from hour to hour and it was only this morning that it was possible to ascertain definitely the President's wishes.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/69 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 29, 1918—4 p. m.  
[Received December 30—3 a. m.]

42. Italians request me submit for President's approval following plan for visit: Leave Paris in the morning arrive Rome the next day spending 2½ days in Rome, 1 day in Naples, 1 day Florence and Bologna, 1 day Venice, 1 day Milan and Turin, thus making 8 days from departure Paris to return Paris. Government desires plan only what meets with approval of the President and any suggestions modifications of above plans will be very much appreciated by Government which is awaiting a reply, before making definite arrangements.

Date of leaving Paris left for President to set. Foreign Office informs me Italian Government will send train to Paris to fetch President and take him everywhere returning him Paris duty [*duty?*].

Very confidential. Government states that for political reasons if President goes to Naples he will also visit other places named.

Sudden smallpox epidemic reported very bad in Naples but Foreign Office says President will be guest at Royal Palace there and so will not be brought contact any danger.

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/64 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

PARIS, December 29, 1918.

5. [From House.] The President will leave Paris on Wednesday evening, January 1st., arriving Rome Friday morning, stopping 2 hours at Turin enroute. He will call at Vatican. He will also call upon the American Protestant denominations in Rome, and I suggest that they meet together at one place in order that the President may make a single visit instead of several. It would be advisable for him to leave Rome on Saturday night at such an hour as to bring him to Genoa at about nine where he would lay wreath at foot of Statue of Columbus. He would then proceed to Milan and after stopping there a couple of hours will leave, via Turin without stopping there again, for Paris, arriving on Monday morning. It is understood that the Italian government has already dispatched special train to Paris for the President's party. Edward House.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/72c : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

PARIS, December 30, 1918—7:40 p. m.

8. [From House.] Your 41.<sup>25</sup> Following is list of persons who will accompany President to Rome:—President Wilson, Mrs. Wilson, Miss Benham, Admiral Grayson, General Harts, Messrs. George Creel, Arthur E. Frazier, Hoover, Close, Swem, Captains Garfield, Kimball, Knightingale, Lieutenants Jennings, Corcoran, five journalists, Foster, Rodgers, Nevin, Probert, Bender; four Secret Service men, eight War College photographers, two servants of President. This list is subject to correction. Edward House.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

033.1140/134b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1919—7 p. m.

71. For the Secretary of State from Polk: Secretary of War informs me steamer *George Washington* sailed from New York January

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

1st and will arrive in Brest about 10th. The ship would have time to make a return trip to America with troops and be back in France about February 12th. Before the War Department makes any plans it of course desires to know the President's pleasure. Will you please find out as soon as possible whether he will need the ship before February 12th, in which case the boat will be held in France to await his orders.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/95 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, January 7, 1919—8 p. m.

[Received January 9—10:30 a. m.]

58. I hear that propaganda is going on against the President in Paris and that a number of French propagandists are going prospectively to America to take part in a propaganda against him there. I have mentioned this report to my French Colleague and suggested that it be looked into. Some of the American Colony might be looked after.

NELSON PAGE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 865.00/15 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

[Extract]

ROME, January 11, 1919—6 p. m.

[Received January 12—9:30 p. m.]

65. Political: President Wilson's brief but very successful visit to Italy has been the noted event of last two weeks. He arrived Rome Friday, Jan. 4th, and left next night for Milan, thence to Genoa and Turin, returning to France Sunday night. Everywhere he received enthusiastic reception from all classes, including the more or less troublesome labor classes of the North. At Milan Executive Committee of Regular Socialists had passed resolution calling on members to pay no homage to Wilson which had no effect, President being cordially received by Socialist Mayor Caldara and by organized Socialist Labor. Turin, he was met by large and notable labor representation. This would seem to discredit and make of little value attacks on President by *Avanti*, the radical Socialist organ, especially since all other papers of every political leaning united in editorial comment

very favorable to him. Naples was disappointed, and Florence disgruntled at not receiving visit, indeed in Florentine papers there appeared no editorial comment at all. But the visit was a great success and the President's speeches have been reprinted everywhere and have made a profound impression throughout Italy. Whatever others may say, the people of Italy have unbounded confidence in him. Visit to Pope caused no hostile criticisms, the country understanding that he visited the Pope only as religious head of American Catholics, and that it had no political significance. This visit was followed by one to the representatives of the Protestant bodies in Italy.

The state luncheon given at the American Embassy in his name to Their Majesties, the King and Queen, was attended by Their Majesties, and by the principal Ministers, members of the Court, the Ambassadors of the Allies, the Mayor of Rome, and other high officials. It was the first time that Their Majesties have ever accepted an invitation to an Embassy. The luncheon was considered a great success from the diplomatic, as well as the social point of view.

NELSON PAGE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 811.001/84: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 11, 1919—7:20 p. m.

253. [From Lansing.] Your 71 January 2/7 p. m. President informs me that present schedule for *George Washington* is entirely satisfactory to him and that he hopes that if he returns on this vessel in February the War Department will ship as many troops on her as possible. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

## PERSONNEL OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE

Edward M. House Papers

### *The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

DEAR GOVERNOR: From the German acceptance of your terms which we received yesterday, it looks as if the Peace Conference might be close upon us.

Germany seems so nearly in collapse that I cannot believe that it will be necessary for a peace conference to continue more than two and a half to three months. It looks as if the Allies might be able to lay down their own terms, and if Clemenceau will cooperate with us as closely as he did last year at the Inter-Allied Conference, it will greatly shorten the life of the congress. It merely needs a little organization and some understanding amongst the principals to have matters expedited in a way that is quite unusual at such gatherings.

I am enclosing you a list of people which I hope you will think well to have come over to advise when these several subjects come before the congress. It will strengthen the American position and facilitate the work of the commissioners to have such a staff, and it will leave the commissioners free to discuss fundamentals.

I do not give the personnel of the Peace Inquiry as that is almost wholly composed of experts on technical subjects.

I am writing this on shipboard so it may return with this boat.

Affectionately yours, [File copy not signed]

ON BOARD U. S. S. "NORTHERN PACIFIC," October 22, 1918.

[Enclosure]

### *Proposed Staff of Advisers to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace*

#### ARMY

General Bliss. General Pershing.

#### NAVY

Admiral Benson and another.

#### FINANCE (Treasury Department)

Benjamin Strong, Leffingwell, Albert Strauss.



LABOR

Samuel Gompers and another.

EDITORIAL DIRECTOR

\*Frank Cobb.

COMMERCE (War Trade Board.)

Vance McCormick. Clarence Woolley.

RAW MATERIALS

B. M. Baruch and another. (Summers)

FOOD

Herbert Hoover and another.

MERCHANT SHIPPING

Hurley and another (Ask Benson) Whipple.

FUEL

Garfield and another.

AVIATION

Ryan and another.

ALIEN PROPERTY

Mitchell Palmer. Bradley Palmer.

RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION

Walker Hines. A. H. Smith (Consult McAdoo.)

WIRE COMMUNICATIONS

Walter Rogers. Chas. H. Dennis. (Chicago Daily News)

PEACE INQUIRY

Mezes, Miller, Bowman, etc. etc.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Prof. George Grafton Wilson (Brown University). (Naval)

Edward M. House Papers : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 6, 1918.

7. When Lloyd George was here I spoke to him and Clemenceau about the number of delegates each country should have at the Peace Conference. Clemenceau remarked that half of France wanted to be

\*It seems to me that it will be absolutely necessary to have a man of the dimensions of Cobb to interpret to the newspaper people the policies you stand for. It is a difficult and delicate task. The men I have suggested for Wire Communications should be under Cobb's direction. Their work should be to interpret to the world, outside of America, what Cobb interprets to the newspaper fraternity at the Conference itself. Creel, I take it, you will want to continue at home in the same capacity as now for he will never be more needed than then. [Footnote in the original.]

present and Lloyd George replied that he was lucky for all England wished to attend. Lloyd George said he would be compelled to appoint among others a man from the Colonies and a labor representative. We agreed to postpone final discussion until they had time to think about it further.

I suggested that England, France, Italy and the United States should each have five places at the table, the other belligerent powers to have representation varying from one to three places according to their relative importance. This seemed to meet with their approval. I had in mind that Germany should also have five places.

It is essential that the sittings should contain only a limited number for we have found it difficult to transact business satisfactorily at Versailles, and it was necessary for the Prime Ministers to meet in advance in order that business might be facilitated.

The smaller countries like Belgium, Serbia and Greece have been quite contented to have one place each at the Versailles sittings.

I would appreciate an expression of your opinion.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, circa November 7, 1918.]

10. Referring to your number 7.<sup>1</sup> I concur in your views with regard to representation at the Peace Conference.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

763.72119 P 43/284b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1918.

For House from Polk. Department seriously concerned over revolutionary committees in Switzerland. Fear it would be difficult to adequately protect lives of peace delegates as we could not take in our own armed force.

McCall<sup>2</sup> came out for President election day and he is being held responsible for the defeat of Weeks in Massachusetts. Republicans bitter, particularly those from Massachusetts. Under circumstances permit me to call your attention to this fact as it might change your views. Feel strongly this situation to be serious, particularly as next

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> Samuel W. McCall, Governor of Massachusetts, 1916-18.

Senate will be Republican. Don't you think a western representative such as Borah might be desirable.

LANSING

---

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 10, 1918.

10. In view of the Republican resentment of Governor McCall's attitude in the recent elections and in anticipation of a hostile Senate, would it not be well to increase the membership of the delegates to seven and include another Republican of the standing and influence of Root?<sup>3</sup>

In the event that for any reason you think it best not to name any member of the Cabinet other than Lansing, may I suggest Sharp as a desirable delegate.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

123 G 861/178a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1918—noon.

33. For Grew. After consultation with the President you are selected to act as Secretary of the United States Commission to the Peace Conference. Your assistant secretaries will be Harrison and Patchin. Cable at once any suggestions which you may have as to needs.

LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/916: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 15, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received November 15—10:31 a. m.]

106. Your 34 [33], November 14 [13]. From Grew. Wish to express my extreme gratification at selection as secretary of United States Commission to Peace Conference and am particularly happy to have Harrison and Patchin associated. Arrangements for the representatives are progressing and will take shape as plans of our Commission develop. For the present I foresee no needs which cannot

---

<sup>3</sup> Elihu Root, Secretary of State, 1905-9.

be met here except insofar as Colonel House has made recommendations from time to time, particularly the request Department his 102 regarding stationery.<sup>4</sup> It seems essential that the problems presented in telegrams 52<sup>4</sup> and 100 [99?] <sup>5</sup> concerning communication with Washington, political intelligence, etc., should be dealt with in perfect accord and I earnestly hope that the recommendations made therein may be approved as delay in setting the machinery in motion may seriously affect the eventual smooth running of the American organization.

Would be glad to have Bullitt come as soon as possible and Dresel when available.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*Associate Justice Day, of the Supreme Court, to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am deeply appreciative of the honor which you have conferred upon me in the offer of a place upon the Peace Commission.

I wish it were practicable for me to accept this opportunity for service. I am, however reluctantly, constrained to forego this privilege.

Wishing you continued success in the great work before you, I am, with high regard,

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM R. DAY

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Secretary of the Navy (Daniels)*<sup>6</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 16 November, 1918.

MY DEAR DANIELS: I am sure you know my own cordial personal feeling towards Mr. Bryan, but I would not dare, as public opinion stands at the present moment, excited and superheated and suspicious, appoint Mr. Bryan one of the Peace Commissioners, because it would be unjustly but certainly taken for granted that he would be too easy and that he would pursue some Eutopian scheme.

As I have said, this would be unjust, but I am sure you agree with me that it would be thought, and the establishment of confidence from

---

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 194.

<sup>6</sup> Replying to a letter of Nov. 14, 1918 (not printed), from Secretary Daniels urging the appointment of William J. Bryan to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

the outset in the processes of the Peace Conference on the part of our people, now too much in love with force and retribution, is of the utmost importance.

Cordially and faithfully yours,

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

763.72119 P 43/910 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 18, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received November 18—7:40 p. m.]

119. Secret for the President. I believe it is very important that we should do everything possible to establish closer relations with liberal elements here in Paris. Ray Stannard Baker has been doing work of this character but has now gone to Italy to keep in touch with liberal elements there. I suggest that Miss Ida Tarbell, who has a profound knowledge of French character and institutions and who has written a life [of] Madam Roland which is exceedingly well thought of by French scholars, be sent at once to Paris to keep in close relations with the liberal elements here and to report on their activities. Miss Tarbell is *persona grata* with the liberal elements here.<sup>7</sup>

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119/9123 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 20, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received November 20—1:38 p. m.]

126. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. Various circumstances are delaying an agreement respecting important points connected with the constitution of the Peace Conference and the procedure to be followed therein. George and the other members of the English Government are engrossed in the pending elections and will in all probability be unwilling until the elections are over to decide definitely how many delegates they will wish to nominate, and who these delegates will be. If George is defeated of course considerable confusion respecting this matter will result. If George wins he will make probably some radical changes in his Cabinet which may affect the make-up of the English delegation at the Peace Conference. In

---

<sup>7</sup> For President Wilson's reply to this telegram, see the Department's telegram No. 50 for Colonel House, Nov. 19, 1918, 4 p. m., vol. II, p. 301.

France, Clemenceau may try to limit the representative[s] to three. He would then head the French delegation and would have with him Pichon and possibly Foch, over both of whom he exercises almost complete control. If it is decided that there shall be more than three delegates Clemenceau would probably have to appoint some man like Briand<sup>8</sup> who would act independently and would have a strong following. In Italy the situation, so far as I am informed concerning it, has not taken any very definite shape. Orlando will of course head the delegation.

In view of the uncertainty in connection with this matter, I suggest that no announcement be made concerning our delegation until England, France and Italy are committed to a definite number of delegates. The French are urging that the French language be used as the official language of the Conference. Since the French are to be given the place of meeting and the presidency of the Conference, it would seem as if they should meet the convenience of England and ourselves with respect to the language to be used. At the conferences before the Armistice was signed Orlando and Pichon were the only ones that could not understand English. In addition to ourselves and the English, Clemenceau, Sonnino, the Belgian representative, the Servian representative, the Greek representative and the Japanese representative are all able to understand English. I shall take up this question with the English in order to see how they feel.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/922 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 20, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received November 20—3 p. m.]

127. Secret for Polk only, from Auchincloss. Thank you for your number 47, November 8 [18], 9 p. m.<sup>9</sup> and your number 48, November 8 [18], 10 p. m.<sup>10</sup> You may rest assured that in any matters that I have anything to do with Army and Navy will be subordinate to State Department. We are working under serious handicaps inasmuch as Grew is still sick, Ambassador is in bed with what looks like influenza; Straight,<sup>11</sup> whom we had assigned to us, has very bad case of influenza; Cobb is in London, and Lippmann is sick, and several others who have been assigned to us here are also sick. Miller ar-

---

<sup>8</sup> Aristide Briand, French President of the Council, Oct. 29, 1915—Mar. 20, 1917.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 198.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> Maj. Willard Straight, assigned to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

rived yesterday after a trip of 15 days. I will try to get an answer to your telegram number 44, November 18, 7 p. m.<sup>12</sup> and would have, but on account of the fact that Vatican are occupied with their elections, and there is no Italian representative here, it is difficult get final decision on points of this character. Please thank Shaw, Barton and Duncan<sup>13</sup> very much for all they are doing. Please do not let my wife come to Europe unless she is confident that she is physically strong enough to stand the trip.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/923 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918—7 p. m.

54. For Auchincloss from Polk. Your 118, November 18.<sup>14</sup> Department would like you to go ahead on the plan outlined in your 99 with the modifications made by our Number 36.<sup>15</sup> Suggested that Strauss<sup>16</sup> or Kent<sup>17</sup> be taken over as financial adviser . . . President said he would telegraph for some one when he was needed. This seems to be the plan they are following in regard to representatives of the various boards. President and commissioners plan to sail about December 3d. Commission has not yet been determined. Strictly confidentially, President taking with him Cary Grayson<sup>18</sup> and Creel, not Tumulty.<sup>19</sup>

LANSING

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*Mr. Henry White to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pray accept the expression of my thanks for the honor you have been pleased to confer upon me.

I sincerely appreciate the confidence in me evinced by your appointing me a member of the Delegation which is to accompany you from this country to the approaching Peace Conference in Europe. I trust that my experience of such international gatherings,

---

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>13</sup> G. Howland Shaw, Carlyle Barton, and J. Donald Duncan, of the office of the Counselor for the Department of State.

<sup>14</sup> *Post*, p. 197.

<sup>15</sup> No. 99 is printed on p. 194; No. 36, on p. 196.

<sup>16</sup> Albert Strauss, Vice Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.

<sup>17</sup> William Kent, member of the United States Tariff Commission.

<sup>18</sup> Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson, physician to the President.

<sup>19</sup> Joseph P. Tumulty, secretary to the President.

which is considerable, and my personal friendship with many of those who are to represent other countries, may be of service to you and the members of our delegation, with a view to the attainment of a just and permanent Peace, based in so far as may be possible, upon the fourteen points set forth as the basis of such a Peace, in your address to the nation and to the world of the 8th of January last.<sup>20</sup>

I am [etc.]

HENRY WHITE

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to Senator Henry L. Myers*<sup>21</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 20 November, 1918.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I think I need not tell you my own cordial feeling towards Mr. Bryan. I should have entire confidence in his principles and in his influence at the conference, but I feel that it is our duty to keep in mind, particularly at this time when all the world is a bit abnormal in its acute sensibilities, the reactions of the public mind of the several countries concerned. Mr. Bryan is soft-hearted, and the world just now is very hard-hearted. It would render a very large and influential body of our public opinion very uneasy if they thought that peace was to be approached in the spirit which they would attribute to Mr. Bryan. I think it highly important to hold opinion steady and calm, and for that reason I do not think that it would be wise to include Mr. Bryan among the commissioners, much as it would personally gratify me to do so.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

[WOODROW WILSON]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/9

*The Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces  
(Pershing) to the Special Representative (House)*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS [A. E. F.], 21 November, 1918.  
Inter-Allied Committees

1. Major Willard Straight, of your Staff, recently made a request on the First Section of the General Staff for the following information:

- (a) List of all Inter-Allied Committees upon which we have representatives.
- (b) Names of our representatives.

<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> Replying to a letter of Nov. 18, 1918 (not printed), from Senator Myers of Montana suggesting that William J. Bryan be named to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.



(c) Reference to General Orders creating or relating to these committees.

2. Inclosed herewith is a statement in duplicate giving the data requested by Major Straight. This was compiled from information received from the five Staff Sections at these Headquarters and from the heads of the Administrative and Technical Services and is believed to be complete.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

[File copy not signed]

*Chief of Staff*

[Enclosure]

*Statement of Inter-Allied Committees and A. E. F. Members*

<i>Committee</i>	<i>A. E. F. Members</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Allied Standing Committee of Congress of the Submerged Nationalities of Austria Hungary	Maj. Stephen Bonsal	W. D., S. O. 183 para. 32, 1918.
American Mission, Bureau Interallié	Capt. R. Tyler—Inf. 1st Lt. R. Norris—Inf. 2nd Lt. A. Vanderpoel, Inf. 2nd Lt. T. Riggs—Inf.	
Anglo - American Tank Commission	Lt. Col. J. A. Drain, O. D.	Agreement between British & U. S. Governments, Jan. 22, 1918.
Board to study and report on all questions of a financial character arising from use of French railway system by A. E. F.	Lt. Col. G. M. Newell— Q. M. C. Brig. Gen. W. W. Atterbury Lt. Col. E. A. Gibbs— Engrs. Lt. Col. I. A. Miller— R. T. C.	Par. 105, S. O. 102 Hq. S. O. S., 6/22/18. Letter C. G., S. O. S. (G-1) to D. G. T. 8/23/18.
Coal Program Committee of Inter-Allied Maritime Board.	Lt. Col. D. B. Wentz— Q. M. C.	Tel. from C. G., S. O. S., 10/9/18.
Comité Interallié des Bois de Guerre.	Col. J. A. Woodruff— Engrs. Maj. T. S. Woolsey— Engrs.	Letter from C. of S., A. E. F., 1/9/18.
Commission for Selection of Cemetery Sites at Pau (B. P.) &c.	Lt. F. R. Flanders—Inf.	Letter C. in C. to F. M. M., G. H. Q. 11/7/18.
Commission for Selection of Cemetery Sites at Rennes (I. et V.) &c.	Maj. H. L. Hardy— Q. M. C.	Letter C. in C. to F. M. M., G. H. Q., 11/7/18.
Commission for Selection of Cemetery Site at Tours (I. et L.).	Maj. H. L. Hardy— Q. M. C.	Letter C. in C. to F. M. M., G. H. Q., 11/9/18.

<i>Committee</i>	<i>A. E. F. Members</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Commission for Selection of Cemetery Site at Belfort (T. de B.).	Lt. H. G. Bissell—Inf.	Letter C. in C. to F. M. M., G. H. Q. 10/29/18.
Commission for Selection of Cemetery Site at Lambazellec (Fin.).	Lt. R. E. Hartwell— Q. M. C.	Letter C. in C. to F. M. M., G. H. Q., 11/8/18.
Commission Sanitaire des Pays Alliés	Lt. Col. D. P. Card— Med. C. Maj. R. P. Strong—Med. C.	
Committee of Chemical Warfare Service Supplies	Brig. Gen. A. A. Fries.	
Committee on Franco-American War Affairs	Capt. H. J. Whitehouse— A. S. S. C. 1st Lt. J. B. Walker—A. G.	
Czecho-Slovak Hdq. Paris	Maj. Stephen Bonsal (Liaison Officer)	Letter from C. in C. (G-2) 11/9/18.
Franco-American Radio Conference.	Lt. Col. L. T. Gerow—S. C. Lt. Col. L. R. Krumm— S. C. Maj. F. N. Shumaker— A. S. S. C.	
Franco-British Commission on Tombs.	Lt. Col. Chas. C. Pierce— Q. M. C.	Letter C. G., S. O. S., to C. in C., 7/9/18.
Franco-Polish Mission	Capt. Royall Tyler (Liaison Officer)	Letter from C. in C. 5/26/18.
French Committee No. 3 (Chemical Products)	Maj. R. D. Ward—C. W. S.	Telegram C. G., S. O. S., to G. P. A., 4/20/18. Letter C. C. W. S. to C. G., S. O. S. 8/12/18 and indorsements.
Inter-Allied Aviation Committee.	Maj. Gen. M. M. Patrick, Engrs. Col. Halsey Dunwoody, A. S. S. C.	Letter C. in C. to French Under Secretary of Aviation, 6/9/18.
Inter-Allied Board of Inventions.	Lt. Col. H. E. Shreeve— S. C.	
Inter-Allied Coal Committee.	Col. W. J. Wilgus—R. T. C.	Letter C. G., S. O. S. to Col. W. 10/9/18.
Inter-Allied Committee for Reeducation of War Cripples	Lt. Col. J. E. Goldthwaite, Med. C. Lt. Col. T. W. Salmon— Med. C.	
Inter-Allied Council of Armament and Munitions and Sub Committees.	Maj. Gen. W. C. Langfitt } Brig. Gen. E. Russell } Brig. Gen. J. H. Rice } Brig. Gen. M. L. Walker }	Par. 35, S. O. 267, G. H. Q. 9/24/18. S. O. 223, GHQ. 8/11/18.
Inter-Allied Economy Committee for Petroleum Products	Lt. Col. C. E. Dudley— Q. M. C.	S. O. 66, par. 50, G. H. Q. c. s. 3/7/18.
Inter-Allied Secretaryship for Study of Gasses.	Col. J. E. Zanetti—O. D.	1st Ind. C. G. S. to Capt. J. E. Zanetti, 12/8/17.

<i>Committee</i>	<i>A. E. F. Members</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Inter-Allied Surgical Congress	Brig. Gen. J. M. T. Finney—Med. C. Col. J. F. Siler—Med. C. Lt. Col. G. W. Crile—Med. C. Lt. Col. F. T. Murphy—Med. C. Lt. Col. J. P. Hutchinson—Med. C. Lt. Col. Harvey Cushing—Med. C. Maj. W. B. Cannon—Med. C.	
Inter-Allied Technical Meetings.	Maj. Geo. W. Semmes—Engrs.	Memo from D. M. E. & E. S., 8/1/18.
Inter-Allied Telegraphic Telephonic Conferences.	Lt. Col. L. T. Gerow—S. O.	
Inter-Allied Transportation Council	Brig. Gen. W. W. Atterbury	Letter C. in C. to British Min. of War, 1/15/18.
Inter-Allied Venereal Conference	Brig. Gen. W. A. Bethel—J. A. Col. W. D. McCaw—Med. C. Maj. C. H. Brent—Chap.	
Military Board of Allied Supply	Brig. Gen. C. G. Dawes Col. H. L. Hodges—Cav. Lt. Col. F. D. Griffith, Jr.—Inf. Major J. C. Roop—Engrs. Major C. W. Adams—A. S. S. C. Lt. C. B. Gibson, Jr.—F. A. Brig. Gen. C. H. McKinstry Col. A. T. Perkins—Engrs.	Par. 43, S. O. 227, G. H. Q., 8/15/18.
Organization of Czecho-Slovak Troops	Capt. E. V. Voska—Intell. C. (Liaison Officer).	Par. 103, S. O. 208, G. H. Q., 1918.
Special U. S. Commissioner of Finance in Europe (Mr. Crosby).	Maj. Stephen Bonsal (Liaison Officer).	Letter from C. in C. (G-2) 9/6/18.
Supreme War Council—American Section.	General T. H. Bliss—Genl. Staff Brig. Gen. P. D. Lochridge—Genl. Staff Col. S. D. Embick—S. C. Col. U. S. Grant, III.—Genl. Staff Col. W. S. Browning—F. A. Col. J. M. Coward—C. A. C. Lt. Col. Arthur Pollon—Cav. Lt. Col. W. B. Wallace—Inf. Maj. G. M. Exley—Q. M. C. Capt. B. A. Fuller—Inf. 1st Lt. P. A. Bedard—O. D.	

763.72119/9334 b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative  
(House)*

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1918—5 p. m.

59. Secret. For Colonel House from the President. It seems to me that we are justified in insisting on five delegates. It would be extremely embarrassing to us to have fewer than five. I do not understand that any government can be arbitrarily limited, except by agreement. I think also with you that we are entirely justified in insisting upon the English language being officially sanctioned and used at the conference as well as French. The limitation to French would greatly embarrass us, if only in the matter of constant translation, for which we haven't a suitable confidential force. You will remember that English is the diplomatic language of the Pacific. I would be very much obliged if you would cable whether it would be necessary or wise for us to bring any domestic servants with us. We are exceedingly distressed by the news of your illness and beg that you will take extra good care of yourself. We all unite in affectionate messages.

POLK

763.72119 P 43/958 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 22, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received November 22—4:46 p. m.]

142. Harrison from Grew. Your 6337 of [to] Paris Embassy, November 19, 5 p. m.<sup>22</sup> reached me November 21, 7 p. m. Warmly reciprocate your congratulations. I assume our Secretariat should be in full running order when Commission reaches Paris, so shall proceed with provisional organization subject to any changes which you may wish to introduce on your arrival. Shall draw on Pershing for personnel as office accommodations become ready and men needed. Several offices will be fully equipped on Monday and others will follow steadily. Please let me know whether you and Patchin are sailing in advance of Commission and when.

Regarding political intelligence, see telegram of [No.] 132, November 21, 6 p. m.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

<sup>23</sup> *Post*, p. 199.

Regarding counter espionage, Van Deman<sup>25</sup> has not yet received instructions, but I assume they have already been sent from Washington.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers.

*President Wilson to the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor (Morrison)*

[WASHINGTON,] 22 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. MORRISON: I have received a great many messages besides your own very interesting and persuasive message with regard to appointing a representative of labor on the Peace Commission, and have of course given the matter the most serious consideration.

I have at the same time received equally strong appeals to appoint a representative of the agricultural interests of the country, a representative of the socialistic bodies of the country, a representative of the women of the country, and many other similar suggestions. I am not putting all of these upon a par. I am merely illustrating the fact that many special bodies and interests of our complex nation have felt, and felt very naturally, a desire to have special spokesmen among the peace delegates.

I must say, however, that my own feeling is that the peace delegates should represent no portion of our people in particular, but the country as a whole, and that it was unwise to make any selection on the ground that the man selected represented a particular group or interest, for after all each interest is, or should be, related to the whole, and no proper representative of the country could fail to have in mind the great and all-pervasive interest of labor or of any other great body of humanity.

The number of delegates will be small, and I have thought that therefore special representation was out of the question.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

<sup>25</sup> Col. Ralph Henry Van Deman, assistant to the Chief of Military Intelligence.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo) to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1918.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Here is a letter from your very devoted admirer, Hon. William McAdoo, of New York.<sup>26</sup> I pass it along to you for what it may be worth. Unless your mind is already made up, it seems to me that on the whole Mr. Root is well worth considering. I know the disadvantages, but, on the other hand, the personnel of the commission as a whole might outweigh these disadvantages.

Affectionately yours,

W. G. McAdoo

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am inexpressibly grieved at the resignation of Mr. McAdoo, though I can readily understand that the terrible burdens of his work have made it necessary for him to have more rest than it would be impossible [*sic*] for him to get here in Washington continuing at the pace he has gone for the past two or three years

It seems to me that Mac's resignation changes essentially the possibility of my going abroad as a member of the peace commission. Of course, with you in Europe neither I nor anybody else is necessary to the presentation of America's case, but here at home, particularly during your absence, I can perhaps be helpful in conference with the remaining members of the Cabinet. The next two or three months are likely to present situations of uncertainty of opinion and hesitancy on the part of business and labor in process of readjustment, and while no fresh legislative policy perhaps needs to be worked out, I am persuaded that the country would feel more concerned about your own absence if two members of the Cabinet were with you now than the Secretary of the Treasury's post will have to be filled by a man new to those responsibilities.

I trust you will understand the spirit of this suggestion, but I am really deeply concerned not only to have your own stay in Europe made as free from anxiety as possible but to have the situation here kept on the even balance and public feeling and opinion kept in sympathy with both the things you are doing abroad and the policies of the economic and political readjustment here which you desire to have our peace-time establishment take.

---

<sup>26</sup> Letter of Nov. 21, 1918 (not printed), suggesting the appointment of Elihu Root to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

May I not suggest for your consideration the possibility of making General Bliss a peace commissioner? And then after the conferences have gone so far that you feel you are able to return here, and leave the details to be reduced to writing for signature, if you then thought it wise I could be sent over to join the commissioners at the windup.

Respectfully yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER

763.72119/9188 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 23, 1918—5 p. m.

[Received November 23—1:11 p. m.]

152. Secret for the President. Among the important questions which will arise not only at the Peace Conference but probably also at the preliminary Inter-Allied conferences will be those pertaining particularly to finance, commerce and the use of our raw material and food. The whole world is vitally interested in what manner we propose to use our great strength in finance and in raw material. England, France and Italy participants [*display?*] perhaps more interest in these questions than in almost any others. I suggest the advisability of your taking steps to secure a small body of advisers on these subjects either to come with you or to be ready to come over on short notice.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/9186 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 24, 1918—noon.

[Received November 24—9:20 a. m.]

159. Secret for the President. Your number 59, November 22, 5 p. m. It will be unnecessary for you to bring any domestic servants with you except your valet and Mrs. Wilson's maid.

I shall take up the matter of the use of English at the conference with the British and hope to secure their support. I am working to secure a definite agreement from the British and French that England, France, Italy and the United States should each have five places at the table, [in line with my] suggestion contained in my number 7 and accepted by you in your number 10.<sup>27</sup>

Thank you so much for your message of sympathy. I am still in bed and very weak but making satisfactory progress.

EDWARD HOUSE

<sup>27</sup> No. 7 is printed on p. 156; No. 10, on p. 157.

763.72119/9185 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 24, 1918—7 p. m.

[Received 11:51 p. m.]

164. I have just received a communication from Lord Derby stating that he has received telegram from Mr. Balfour saying that he does not think we shall be able to persuade the French to consent to English being recognized as the official language at the Conference. Mr. Balfour however sees no objection to the matter being discussed unofficially with Mr. Clemenceau. I am taking this matter up further through Wiseman who is now in Paris and hope to be able to persuade the British Government to take a more positive position.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119/9184 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 25, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received November 25—6:23 p. m.]

172. Secret for the President. My number 126, your number 59 and my number 159.<sup>28</sup> I have received no definite assurances respecting number of delegates, but I now feel satisfied from informal expression which I have received from both French and British authorities that there will be no objection to the number being fixed. Accordingly, I modify my suggestion contained in my number 126 that no announcement be made concerning our delegation until arbitrators are committed to a definite number. I now see no reason why you should not make whatever announcement you have in mind respecting our delegates.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Secretary of the Treasury (McAdoo)*

[WASHINGTON,] 25 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MAC: Of course I realize the force of the recommendation which Mr. William McAdoo urges,<sup>29</sup> but I could not think of appointing Mr. Root, because I have had more opportunities than he has had

---

<sup>28</sup> *Ante*, pp. 160, 167, and 170.

<sup>29</sup> See Secretary McAdoo's letter of Nov. 23, 1918, p. 169.



of knowing just how hopeless a reactionary he is. I think his appointment would discourage every liberal element in the world.

In haste,

Affectionately yours,

[WOODROW WILSON]

763.72119 P 43/917 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—7 p. m.

75. Your 116 November 18, noon.<sup>30</sup> For Grew. Following list of members of Commission excluding President's party:

Robert Lansing, Henry White, Commissioners Plenipotentiary.

Leland Harrison, Assistant Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; J. K. Huddle, confidential clerk to Assistant Secretary; Sydney Y. Smith, drafting expert; H. E. Fenstermacher, S. Y. Skinner, recording and filing clerks;

Philip H. Patchin, Assistant Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; R. B. Macatee, confidential clerk to Assistant Secretary; C. B. Welsh, H. C. Coney, L. W. Ronimus, L. E. Mundy, H. Goldstein, clerks;

William McNeir, Disbursing Officer of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; George H. Harris, Assistant Disbursing Officer.

Major James Brown Scott, Technical Adviser; George A. Finch, Professor Amos S. Hershey, Henry G. Crocker, Assistants to Technical Adviser; George D. Gregory, Confidential Secretary to Major Scott.

Specialists in charge of Expert Information, Cartography and Library: S. E. Mezes, Director; J. Storck, Confidential clerk; I. Bowman, A. A. Young, C. H. Haskins, W. E. Lunt, R. H. Lord, W. L. Westermann, C. Seymour, C. Day, G. L. Beer; Assistants to Specialists: W. S. Ferguson, R. J. Kerner, P. T. Moon, L. H. Gray, R. B. Dixon, Major D. W. Johnson, Captain S. K. Hornbeck, Captain William C. Farabee.

Cartographers and draftsmen: M. Jefferson, Chief Cartographer; A. K. Lobeck, C. G. Stratton, W. J. Blank, J. B. Stubbs.

Librarian, J. T. Shotwell; D. P. Frary, P. W. Slosson, Assistant Librarians.

Commissioner White's manservant.

Following ladies accompanying party: Mrs. Lansing, Mrs. Grew, Mrs. Miller, Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Mezes.

LANSING

<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The Secretary of Labor (Wilson) to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am inclosing herewith letter<sup>31</sup> just received from Mr. Frank P. Walsh,<sup>32</sup> urging the naming of Mr. Gompers as a member of the Peace Commission.

Because of the high esteem in which Mr. Walsh is held by the wage-workers of the country and his close contact with their general sentiment, I feel that you ought to have the benefit of his judgment before arriving at your conclusions.

Faithfully yours,

W. B. WILSON

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*President Wilson to the Secretary of Labor (Wilson)*

[WASHINGTON,] 27 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for sending me Walsh's letter about Mr. Gompers. Mr. Gompers needs no commendation, so far as I am concerned, but I am entirely of your opinion about the representation, or the apparent representation, of special classes or interests.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

[WOODROW WILSON]

763.72119/9190 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 27, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received November 27—6:40 p. m.]

191. Secret. For the President. Wiseman, who is here, has received a cable stating that Mr. Balfour agrees: "That delegates on panel system would suit us best." I am not entirely certain what this means. It may mean that England might appoint any number of delegates, only five of which could sit at any one time. I shall ask for further explanation of this and will advise you promptly. Wiseman also says that Mr. Balfour believes we will have considerable [difficulty?] in inducing the French to meet our views on the language question. Balfour suggested that Derby and I take up

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.<sup>32</sup> Joint Chairman of the National War Labor Board.

with Clemenceau the question of arranging the use of both English and French as the official languages of the convention. Shall I act along these lines?

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/917 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918—5 p. m.

92. Following additions and corrections to list telegraphed in my 75 of November 26, 7 p. m.:

Substitute H. A. [A. H.] Lybyer for W. S. Ferguson as assistant to specialists; William C. Bullitt, L. T. Alverson, clerk, Mrs. Auchincloss and Mrs. Benson.

LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/959 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 30, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received 6:37 p. m.]

201. Secret for Polk from Auchincloss. With the approval of the Colonel, I am informally trying to get the financial, shipping and general economic representatives of the United States in Europe prepared in some measure for the Inter-Allied conferences and the Peace Conference. At the present time I am requested to get them to ascertain as nearly as possible along what lines their British and French colleagues expect to proceed in these conferences. Of course this work is entirely informal inasmuch as none of these men have been specifically selected by the President to do this work. Most likely they are the necessary United States representatives on the spot or in prospect, who have any knowledge of these matters which are sure to be of vital importance at the Conference. At the present time the Treasury Department is well represented by Davis with whom I have had a number of long talks. . . . Hurley of course represents our Shipping Board and I am in close touch with him. Stevens, Rublee and Morrow who are in London are available for this work, but I am not sure that Hurley will be willing to call upon them as long as he is over here. Summers, provided some of his organization is left here to help him, is entirely able to look after the raw material questions. The Food Administration work is being handled by Hoover together with the general

relief work. Inasmuch as the Colonel could not see Hoover when he was here I have been working matters out with him. McFadden and Sheldon and, if necessary, Stewart, with all of whom I have been in conference, are available for War Trade Board and general commercial work. McFadden seems to me to be the ablest of these, but Sheldon has a very intimate knowledge of the situation and is most helpful. The Alien Property Custodian has no representative here and according to the list received from the Department of those coming with the President you apparently do not intend to send such a representative to Europe at this time. I strongly suggest that you get the Department to send some one over to represent the Alien Property Custodian. Would it be possible to send Bradley Palmer?<sup>83</sup> It would seem to me he would be very useful.

At lunch yesterday when a number of the above representatives were present, they urged that an attempt be made to bring them together every day to compare notes so as to afford greater coordination of their efforts. Occasionally amazingly contradictory telegrams go through to Washington and this ought to be avoided. I am taking steps informally to bring about greater cooperation pursuant to the wishes of these gentlemen. I send you the above for your information. The British are bringing over a very large body of financial and economic representatives and we have simply got to be prepared to meet them and to advise our delegates. My personal opinion has always been (and this has been reinforced by information received since I have been here) that economic questions will be at the basis of almost every dispute which will arise at the conferences and accordingly I think we ought to make some effort to prepare the facts upon which the President can adopt the policy of the United States respecting these matters. I would be glad [to] have your comment on the above.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/-

*Form of Credentials Issued to Commissioners Plenipotentiary*

WOODROW WILSON

President of the United States of America,

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:

KNOW YE, That reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity and ability of the Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of

---

<sup>83</sup> Assistant Counsel to the Alien Property Custodian.

State of the United States, the Honorable Henry White, lately Ambassador of the United States to France and Italy, the Honorable Edward M. House and General Tasker H. Bliss, United States Army, I do appoint them jointly and severally to be Commissioners Plenipotentiary on the part of the United States at the International Peace Conference to meet at Versailles, hereby empowering them jointly and severally to meet and confer with any persons invested by their respective Governments with like power and authority and with them to negotiate, conclude and sign for and in the name of the United States, any and all International Acts necessary to the conclusion of a definitive peace, the same to be transmitted to the President of the United States for his ratification, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the City of Washington, this thirtieth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand [SEAL] nine hundred and eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-third.

WOODROW WILSON

By the President:

ROBERT LANSING

*Secretary of State.*

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.001/3

*Form of Commission of Individual Commissioners Plenipotentiary*

WOODROW WILSON,

President of the United States of America,

TO ALL WHO SHALL SEE THESE PRESENTS, GREETING:

Know Ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity and Ability of ROBERT LANSING, of New York, I do appoint him as a COMMISSIONER PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of that Office according to law, and to have and to hold the said Office, with all the powers, privileges and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him the said ROBERT LANSING, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.

In testimony whereof, I have caused these Letters to be made Patent and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

Given under my hand at the City of Washington, the thirtieth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine [SEAL] hundred and eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-third.

WOODROW WILSON

By the President:

ROBERT LANSING,  
*Secretary of State.*

763.72119 P 43/959 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Colonel E. M. House*

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1918—7 p. m.

112. Secret for Auchincloss from Polk: Your 201 November 30th: Quite agree with your point of view. So far I have been unable to make any progress as to financial representative. Hope Secretary will be able to take matter up with President on trip and send wireless for Harding<sup>84</sup> or Strauss to go over; also representative of the Alien Property Custodian. Earnestly hope you will not use . . .

LANSING

763.72119 P 43/973 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 4, 1918—10 p. m.

[Received December 4—8:24 p. m.]

229. Secret for Polk only, from Auchincloss. Your 112, December 5 [2], 7 p. m. Believe Davis probably most satisfactory man to act as Treasury's adviser of Peace Mission. Understand that Crosby has cabled Treasury Department that Colonel House told him he would like to have him available for consultation on reissuing [?] matters and has asked for instructions from Treasury. Perhaps you can advise Treasury Department correctly in the light of my 201, November 30. Your advice respecting other Treasury representatives will be followed. Understand now that McFadden and Sheldon are returning to United States in the near future.

Did my wife sail with Presidential party?

Please cable what you were able to do with reference to our 222.<sup>85</sup>

EDWARD HOUSE

<sup>84</sup> William P. G. Harding, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.

<sup>85</sup> Not printed.

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/1 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1918—11 a. m.

[Received 2 p. m.]

1. French Government requested that Gompers be asked to go over soon as his influence would be useful in Germany. Has President reached a decision as to this matter?

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/1 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

U. S. S. "GEORGE WASHINGTON," December 5, 1918—9 p. m.

2. Your Dec. 5, 11 a. m. Matter attended to.

President replied to an inquiry by Gompers as to the holding of an International Labor Conference that he saw no objection to its being held. He added that he thought it advisable for Gompers to be present at Paris in any event.

LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 184/35a : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

[PARIS,] December 7, 1918.

1. From Grew. In building up an organization for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in order that the Commission upon arrival may be in a position to enter unhandicapped upon its proper functions, I have with Colonel House's approval availed myself of the offer of the Army and the Navy to place at our disposal the personnel necessary to supplement those coming from the United States. This organization is now nearly perfected and includes the following divisions or bureaus each under a chief responsible either directly to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary, or to the Secretary, or to one of the Assistant Secretaries, who in turn will be responsible to the Commissioners:

- (1) The "Inquiry."
- (2) The Technical Advisors.
- (3) The Secretariat, including the keeping of the minutes of the Conferences, expert drafting, files, registry, indexing, routing, receiving and dispatching mail, coding, transmission, answering general correspondence, et cetera.

- (4) Publicity and distribution of information, printing, et cetera.
- (5) Political and Economic Intelligence, including editing of daily bulletin.
- (6) Negative Intelligence, including counter-espionage and protection.
- (7) Executive Offices including personnel, assignment of rooms and offices, hotel management, supplies, courier service, upkeep of buildings, et cetera.
- (8) Disbursing Office.
- (9) Ceremonial office, including the receipt, distribution and return of visiting cards, formal calls, entertainments, invitations, precedence, et cetera.
- (10) Liaison and Diplomatic Intelligence, including liaison with General Headquarters American Expeditionary Force, Commanding General in Paris, French Government, Diplomatic Corps, Foreign Peace Commissions, American civilian activities, Representatives of newly formed governments, et cetera.
- (11) Medical Staff.

Up to the present we have for this purpose drawn upon the Army and Navy for a considerable number of officers, especially fitted for the particular duties allotted to them, who have been temporarily assigned to the Commission and who have necessarily been quartered provisionally in the Hotel Crillon as other quarters in Paris are practically unobtainable. Rooms in the Crillon have already been assigned to all of the persons listed in the Department's 75, November 26, 7 p. m., and 92, November 29, 5 p. m., as well as to Colonel and Mrs. House, General Bliss and staff, including several officers and assistants, Admiral and Mrs. Benson and the Admiral's staff, Major General Kernan and staff (at the request of General Bliss) and General McKinstry, and to the Secret Service men accompanying the President. All of the foregoing officials have also been assigned offices either in the Hotel Crillon or in the buildings at 4 Place de la Concorde or 3 Rue Royale mentioned in my 200, November 29th,<sup>36</sup> to which no reply has yet been received from the Department, and to which I request an early answer. Today 8 officers from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department under Captain Pier have reported to me under instructions from General Bliss and they inform me that 6 more are soon to arrive and that General Churchill is coming with 5 more, making in all 20 officers. I have received no instructions whatever regarding the assignment of these officers to the Commission and am considerably embarrassed by their unannounced arrival, having already proceeded with the organization of our political intelligence

---

<sup>36</sup> Apparently the reference is to Colonel House's telegram No. 200, Nov. 29, 1918, 10 p. m., p. 126.



section by drawing upon the personnel already in Europe according to the plans elaborated in Colonel House's 99 approved by the Department's 36.<sup>37</sup> In view of General Bliss' request that they should be quartered with the Commission I have provisionally assigned rooms to them at the Crillon and office space at 4 Place de la Concorde. Please instruct me further in the premises.

As matters now stand we are in a position to offer the Commissioners Plenipotentiary on the day of their arrival every possible facility which could have been foreseen. However the offices in the two buildings at 4 Place de la Concorde and 3 Rue Royale have now all been allotted and the available bedrooms, salons and offices in the Hotel Crillon will not permit us to expand much further unless we oblige some of the officers assigned to us to find accommodations elsewhere which is now practically impossible in Paris. I cannot foresee until the Commission arrives and enters upon its work whether further expansion will be necessary but should this prove to be the case we shall be obliged to endeavor to requisition another small hotel in the vicinity.

All of these steps have been taken after consultation with and approval by Colonel House.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

033.1140/38 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 8, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received 2:50 p. m.]

3. From Grew. In view of the Department's decision that the telegraphic communications of the Commission will not be handled by the Navy at the Washington end, Admiral Benson has informed me through Commander Ingersoll that the Navy does not wish to handle the Paris end, which would entail divided responsibility. Accordingly, upon the arrival of personnel from the State Department, the Navy will withdraw its personnel now assisting us and has already released the reserve communication personnel of the Navy now being held in London.

It is impossible to foresee how large a corps of coding clerks will be required by the Commission, but it is probable that the six men being sent out by the Department will eventually be far from ade-

---

<sup>37</sup> No. 99 is printed on p. 194; No. 36, on p. 196.

quate. I wish to bring the foregoing situation to the Department's attention.

AMERICAN MISSION

---

033.1140/33 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1918—3 p. m.

153. For Grew. Your No. 3, December 8th. I had nothing to do with the arrangements for handling telegraphic communications. Fear Navy's attitude in Paris result of resentment. Urge you to hold situation as it is until arrival President's party. Patchin can explain situation as he and Phillips were responsible for present arrangement. Think it would be most unfortunate if any radical change is made by Navy before you have an opportunity to discuss the matter with Secretary of State. Suggest you take the matter up with the Colonel immediately and have necessary officers held as it would be most unfortunate to have the mission crippled through any inter-Departmental rivalries. Show this telegram to Patchin on his arrival; he knows my views. Will take matter up with Phillips when he returns later in the week.

POLK

---

763.72119/3315e : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—4 p. m.

53. For Grew from Phillips. Merely for your information and strictly confidential. Various persons returning recently from Paris seem to be impressed by the fact that the organization of the Mission includes a good many Americans still in army who are prominent socially, although otherwise not of pronounced ability. Senators and Representatives are daily approaching the Department with requests to have their constituents, many of whom are men of ability, attached to our Mission and it might be somewhat embarrassing if the impression became general that a large number of men were being appointed because of their social prominence. I thoroughly appreciate your difficulty and the necessity of building up quickly an organization but am sure you will forgive me for this word of caution.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1/5

*Lieutenant Ralph Hayes to the Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence, Commission to Negotiate Peace (Bowman)*

[PARIS,] December 19, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. BOWMAN: Following are some excerpts from a confidential report which I made to General Pershing on the day before your party landed at Brest.

"When the party to accompany the Peace Commissioners was made up in America, the Secretary of War was to be with the President, and General Churchill, Chief, M. I. D., selected a group of experts from his department to act as a staff for Mr. Baker. Later General Churchill was informed that for the present at least, Mr. Baker was not to accompany the President; however, General Churchill was told to bring the men he had selected and, in answer to an inquiry of his, was told that the President knew of the plan to keep these military intelligence men in the party.

"There seems to be a considerable amount of feeling in the State Department that this making of peace should be a State Department affair and that whatever participation the War Department has should be distinctly under the direction of the State Department. Hence the group of men brought over with General Churchill failed to receive much of a cordial reception and are looked upon as unnecessary adjuncts. . . .<sup>39</sup> Naturally he is very partial to and enthusiastic about his own group. He says they have been carefully chosen, have available a wealth of information, and can do excellent team work.

"Would not the whole difficulty be solved by the designation of General Churchill by the Commander-in-Chief as Director of Army Peace Personnel. This would permit him:

- (1) To disengage the dead timber that has already attached itself to the Commission.
- (2) To act as a judge on further additions from the army.
- (3) To return to America whatever men from his own group he finds unnecessary here. . . .<sup>39</sup>

"My suggestion specifically would be that at a definite hour each morning General Churchill should consider applications received in the preceding twenty four hours for additional army personnel; if necessary should have me or someone else telephone G. H. Q., Tours, or the Central Records Office for information about the men concerned; and in cases where men are sufficiently qualified and where there is sufficient need here, should have me telephone forthwith to

---

<sup>39</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

G. H. Q. (direct, or through the office of General Harts, or through Tours) for necessary orders."

RALPH HAYES, 1st Lt.,  
*Liaison Officer for General Pershing.*

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.83/1

*Memorandum Regarding the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace*<sup>40</sup>

The Intelligence Section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, dealing with the territorial, economic, and political matters which come before the peace conference, represents a new idea in international relations—the idea of utilizing the expert services of scholars in determining the facts that should be the bases of the peace settlements. The Intelligence Section is an outgrowth of the Inquiry, a group of men engaged during more than a year past in gathering material for the peace conference under the direction of Colonel House. Similar organizations have been at work in France and England.

In all three countries, so far as is known, the choice of men was made irrespective of political standing, and solely with the view of securing the best scholars in their respective fields. The idea was also entertained that the meeting of these expert bodies at the peace conference would greatly diminish the cares and responsibilities of the plenipotentiaries, whose time would necessarily be filled with the active and current business of negotiation.

Actual experience at the peace conference has shown the soundness of these anticipations, since in almost every case the discussion of a question has involved the appointment of special committees who are to hear the facts and report to the Bureau. It is surprising to what an extent the impartial discussion of disputed points has led to unanimity of opinion, even on the part of nations directly interested in a given solution. The whole process marks a new stage in the development of better international relations, since it carries over into the field of international relations the good will which has always existed in the world between scholars expert in the same subject. It may be doubted whether at any time in the future complicated problems of world politics will be discussed without reference to expert bodies like those now working out the intricacies of European politics, ethnography, resources, waterways, ports, railroads, canals, topography, etc.

---

<sup>40</sup> The memorandum bears no indication of date or origin.

The experiment has been attended by some very interesting results. In the case of the American experts an appeal was made to the colleges and universities and private and public institutions of various kinds in the United States for the loan of men and material, and to all such requests the most hearty response was obtained. It became a kind of joint educational enterprise which elicited the enthusiasm and devotion of a large group of strong men at a time of need when everyone was seeking to be of the largest service to the national government.

The work of the American experts was carried on at the building of the American Geographical Society, Broadway and 156th Street, New York City, where there was made available the largest collection of carefully selected maps in the United States and the best geographical library as well, including the services of a trained staff. The building was well guarded so that during the entire time of its existence the Inquiry lost none of its material, and was able to work quietly and effectively against the day when it would be called upon for service at the peace conference.

The interest of the Administration in the work is shown by the fact that Colonel House held a number of important consultations there, and likewise the Secretary of State. President Wilson himself visited the Inquiry on October 12, 1918, meeting some of the principal men engaged upon its work and examining in some detail the material that they had gathered.

The Director of the Inquiry is Dr. S. E. Mezes, who has traveled widely in Europe and Northern Africa, and has from the first directed the activities of the staff and is now Director of the Intelligence Section of the American Commission.

The Chief Territorial Specialist and Executive Officer of the Section is Dr. Isaiah Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society, who has conducted three scientific expeditions to South America and has written extensively on South American problems. For his work in this field he was awarded the Bonaparte-Wyse gold medal of the Société Géographique de Paris about two years ago.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1/5

*The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

[PARIS,] December 21, 1918.

Would the following memorandum express your idea of the sense of our conference of this afternoon :

1) There is to be complete control over the employment of the military personnel assigned to the Commission by the Commission itself

through its Secretary. The following proposal simply arranges for the orderly and effective integration of that part of the staff borrowed from the army in so far as this integration is needed for the smooth running of purely military arrangements which the Commission may wish to have made.

(2) To this end it is proposed to designate General Churchill as officer in charge of military personnel and to instruct him to report to you in that capacity. Having been thus designated and instructed as to your wishes, General Churchill can then be held responsible for the following:

- a) That military personnel and materiel now at the disposition of the Commission be so utilized as to best serve the interests of the Commission.
- b) That additional personnel and materiel be obtained and installed promptly as required.
- c) That all contact with the military establishment in France and in the United States be concentrated in a single office, so that there may be no conflict of authority or of purpose.

3) In outlining the above it has been kept in mind that your thought seemed to be that such a plan would avoid possible question between the arrangements for securing help from the military authorities by the Inquiry and the arrangements already made by yourself with officers detailed by General Harts or by General Bliss.

4) If the suggestions contained herein are not acceptable, in no matter how small a degree, please modify in whatever manner seems advisable, since we are merely trying to put on record our common viewpoint regarding the matter.

S. E. MEZES

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/10

*Memorandum Presented to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary by  
General Tasker H. Bliss*<sup>41</sup>

The American Peace Commission should do whatever is necessary to make it clearly understood by everyone that, now that the war is finished and until it should be resumed (which God forbid), this Commission is the highest and most important governmental agency of the United States now in Europe.

It is, therefore, recommended:

(1) That approval of the Commission be given to the proposition already made that the Secretary of the Commission be given a title which will place him on the same plane of dignity as in the case of the British Commission.

---

<sup>41</sup> The copy of this document in the Department's files is undated and unsigned. It is stated in General Bliss' diary that he presented the memorandum to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary on Dec. 23, 1918.

(2) That the first few minutes of each meeting of the Commission be devoted to the transaction of routine business connected with its interior administration; that during this time (if not longer) the Secretary (by whatever title he may be designated) of the Commission be present to report what may be of interest to the Commission in regard to the organization of its assistant-personnel, &c; and that in all communications written by him which are in the nature of instructions to anyone or requests that any American official do anything, for the Commission, he precede his official signature by the formula, "By Direction of the American Peace Commission."

(3) Incidentally, it is suggested that it might be well to keep a very brief, formal record of every meeting of the Commission, stating the matters discussed and the conclusions, tentative or final, reached. Experience with the Supreme War Council indicates that this is the practice of the Allied Governments in the work of commissions of importance.

(4) It is believed that there is a tendency to overload the Commission with unnecessary assistant-personnel resulting not only in having two or more men to do one man's work but in considerable unnecessary expense charged for the maintenance of the Commission. It is possible, for example, that there may be military or other officials whose opinion may not be asked three times, if at all, by the Commission or by any member of it during its lifetime. At the Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force there is a very fine and highly trained organization devoted to the collection of data and the preparation of memoranda on military subjects of all kinds. The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France has stated that he will place at the disposition of the Commission all assistance under his control. There is a daily courier service between Paris and his headquarters. A question requiring a military opinion can be formulated today and by the first hour in the morning will be in the hands of that highly trained, specialized organization. In many cases the reply will be on its return to Paris the same night. This, undoubtedly, is the way in which such matters will be handled by the French Peace Commission. They will be referred to the French General Staff in Paris for its opinion. We have a similar and equally competent General Staff at Chaumont to pass on military questions. All that is required here is a very small and carefully selected personnel that will keep in touch with the duties of the Commission or of its individual members, will formulate the necessary questions and will have them transmitted to Chaumont. Manifestly it would be entirely unnecessary to bring that specialized staff from Chaumont to Paris and maintain it here at the expense of the Commission.

It is, therefore, recommended that the most careful scrutiny be directed by the Commission to be made by the Head of each Section as to the necessity of maintaining the personnel now under his charge.

It is further recommended that from this moment no addition be made to the assistant-personnel of the American Peace Commission except upon formal recommendation made by the Head of the Section or bureau concerned showing the necessity for the person desired and his qualifications for the position, which recommendation shall be presented to the Commission and acted upon by it.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/65

*Memorandum for the President*

The Commissioners Plenipotentiary today adopted the following resolution:

The American Peace Commission should do whatever is necessary to make it clearly understood by everyone that, now that the war is finished and until it should be resumed (which God forbid), this Commission is the highest and most important governmental agency of the United States now in Europe:

It is therefore recommended that the Secretary of the Commission be given a title which will place him on the same plane of dignity as in the case of the British Commission.

The officer of the British Commission holding the position corresponding to that of the Secretary of the American Commission has been given the title of "Superintending Ambassador". It would not seem appropriate to give the Secretary of the American Commission this title, as there would be some question as to whether he would not then rank equally with the Commissioners. It is therefore proposed that he be given the title of "Supervising Director with Ministerial Rank."

It is also recommended that the two Assistant Secretaries of the Commission be made Secretaries with the rank of Counselors of Embassy, in order that they may be in a position to deal on equal terms with their colleagues on the other peace commissions.

A telegram <sup>42</sup> has been sent to Washington to have three new commissions, bearing the seal of the United States, sent out by mail to be filled in in accordance with the foregoing recommendations, if approved by the President; but in order that there may be no delay in establishing the rank of these three officials, and in order that

---

<sup>42</sup> Not printed.



they may be correctly announced to the Office of Protocol in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is suggested that the President provisionally authorize the adoption of the titles suggested above.

PARIS, December 23, 1918.

---

763.72119 P 43/15 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS [December 23, 1918.]

[Received December 23—9:01 p. m.]

56. For Phillips from Grew. Your 53, December 19, 4 p. m. I fully appreciate your friendly word of caution and assure you that it will at all times be of great help to have you bring criticisms of our organization to my attention. As a matter of fact the criticism in this instance is quite unjustified, and I have traced similar comments, circulating in Paris, to certain persons which [*who*] without justification have been hostile to our organization from the start and which I can explain to you only in person. The situation is fully known to and understood by the Commission[ers Plenipotentiary?] who have approved of the organization as they found it. I think the criticisms which have come to you in Washington can be satisfactorily answered by the following facts:

1. We now have 66 Army officers assigned to the Commission from the A. E. F. of whom a considerable number, including interpreters, reported under direct instructions from the War Department. Of these 66 only 11 were known to me personally at the time of their selection and only 6 others were known to me even by name. Of the total number small percentage may be said to be prominent socially, although the term is of course relative and misleading.

2. These men were selected upon high recommendation after a careful examination into their records, ability and special qualifications for certain duties and not one has failed to make good in the work assigned to him. I consider that all have pronounced ability.

3. Having been guided by efficiency, not favoritism, we have refused the application of a very great number of men, who may be said to be socially prominent, on the ground that they were not of pronounced ability.

4. Those officers assigned to the Commission who may be said to be socially prominent, were selected on account of their thorough knowledge of French and their affiliations with various branches of the French Government and the diplomatic corps and various civilian activities in France. The efficiency of the organization depended upon the selection of certain men with these particular qualifications.

5. The short time given us to build up the organization before the arrival of the Commission necessitated our selecting men without consulting Members of Congress.

6. Twenty-five states of the Union are represented among the officers mentioned under heading 1.

I hope that these facts and circumstances, which can be corroborated by anyone within the Commission, will be sufficient to silence any further similar criticisms which may be brought to your attention, and I only regret that you have been caused anxiety by the reports that have reached you.

AMERICAN MISSION

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1—Helms, Birch

*Mr. William C. Bullitt to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

PARIS, 27 December, 1918.

DEAR JOE: Colonel House has asked me to request you to bring up before the Commission to-morrow morning the question of the proposed appointment of Major Birch Helms to the following position:

Major Helms to be detailed to the Peace Commission as a Special Military Attaché or Intelligence Officer to assist in obtaining information for the Commission relative to Republican sentiment in the United States.

To transmit correct and accurate data, independent of press dispatches, to Republican leaders, who may be in Paris, such as Senator Wadsworth and Mr. George W. Perkins recently, and if convenient, to arrange through proper channels for them to see members of the Commission.

To have authority to attend conferences of the Peace Commission with newspaper correspondents and also confer occasionally with members of the Commission so that correct data can be transmitted to Republican leaders in the United States independent of press dispatches.

Very respectfully yours,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1—Helms, Birch

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to Mr. William C. Bullitt*

1. Replying to your letter of December 27th, I beg to inform you that the Commissioners Plenipotentiary today disapproved the proposal to appoint Major Birch Helms as a special military attaché or intelligence officer to assist in obtaining information for the Commission relative to the Republican sentiment in the United States, to transmit correct and accurate data to Republican leaders who may be

in Paris, and to have authority to attend conferences of the Peace Commission with newspaper correspondents, and also to confer occasionally with members of the Commission so that correct data can be transmitted to Republican leaders in the United States independent of press despatches.

DECEMBER 28, 1918.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.00101/-

*Minutes of the Daily Meetings of the Commissioners Plenipotentiary,  
Monday, December 30, 1918*<sup>44</sup>

1.

The Commissioners instructed the Secretary of the Commission to prepare a telegram to the Acting Secretary of State requesting him to send out an official notification to the British, French and Italian Governments of the names of the American Commissioners to the Peace Conference.

2.

Mr. Lansing brought up the question of the status, in their relation to the Commission, of Mr. Hurley, Mr. Hoover, Mr. Baruch, and other advisors. The question arose in connection with Mr. Hurley's request for an assignment of rooms for himself and his wife at the Hotel Crillon; and also his request that the Department of State be authorized by the Commission to issue a passport to France to Mrs. Robinson, the wife of his assistant, who proposes to sail on the *Leviathan* tomorrow. The Commissioners decided that the question of the status of these officials should be submitted to the President, and directed the Secretary of the Commission to prepare a memorandum to the President on this subject. They also decided that until the status of these officials was settled, the Department of State, and not the Commission, should assume the responsibility for issuing passports for their families. A telegram to the Acting Secretary of State to this effect was prepared.<sup>45</sup>

. . . . .  
in Vienna and to make it clear that there was no camouflage connected with the sending of these agents to Austria, as they were in

---

<sup>44</sup> Minutes of other meetings before Jan. 31, 1919, have not been found in Department files.

<sup>45</sup> Following this paragraph, a portion of the minutes is missing from the Department's copy.

no sense propagandists, but merely observers. The Commissioners spoke to Mr. Baker after the meeting, and requested him to prepare a statement on the subject for their consideration.

## 6.

Mr. Lansing spoke at some length on the organization of an international council in connection with the League of Nations, which led to a general discussion of the League of Nations, the question of strategic boundaries, &c. The discussion then led to the recent election victory of Lloyd George, and the victory of Clemenceau in obtaining in the Chamber of Deputies the greatest majority vote he had ever received. It was pointed out that President Wilson alone had met with a political reserve in the recent elections at home, and that he was also handicapped by the approach of the end of his term of office.

## 7.

Mr. Grew submitted to the various Commissioners separately, after the meeting of this morning, the names of the following personnel to compose the second party of Political Intelligence Agents for Austria. Mr. Lansing, Mr. House, and General Bliss offered no objections. Mr. White was absent and could not be consulted.

Captain F. Dellschaft;	Army Field Clerk E. Vogel;
Captain Arthur Gammel;	Captain Nicholas Roosevelt;
Captain John Karmazin;	Army Field Clerk S. Snyder;
Sergeant E. H. Davison.	

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.091/5 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

DECEMBER 30, 1918.

111. [From Lansing.] Please send out official notification to British, French and Italian Governments of the names of the American Commissioners to Negotiate Peace. I suggest that this be worded in order to indicate that the President of the United States has come to Paris as a representative of the United States in connection with the Peace Conference and that the four Commissioners Plenipotentiary are associated with him. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.001/8

*The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the French Minister for  
Foreign Affairs (Pichon)*

PARIS, January 6, 1919.

EXCELLENCY: On instructions of my Government, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that President Woodrow Wilson is in France as the representative of the United States of America at the Peace Conference and that he is accompanied by the following Commissioners Plenipotentiary:

Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State;  
Honorable Henry White, former Ambassador to France and Italy;  
Honorable Edward M. House;  
General Tasker H. Bliss, United States Army.

Mr. Joseph Clark Grew, Minister plenipotentiary, is the Secretary and Supervising Director of the Commission; Mr. Leland Harrison and Mr. Philip H. Patchin are Assistant Secretaries.

With assurances [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.1/9

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the  
Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 10, 1919.

DEAR MR. LANSING: The appended telegram was wrongly routed to me, and I send it down to you without delay.<sup>46</sup>

In connection with Mr. Baker's statement that he hears much comment to the effect that there are already too many military men attached to the Commission, I think it advisable to make the following comment, in case you wish at any time to be in a position to reply to criticisms of this nature:

(1) In accordance with the wishes of the Commissioners, General Churchill recently made a survey of the entire organization with a view to reporting on the necessity of every individual now assigned to the Commission, and his preliminary report states that

---

<sup>46</sup> Telegram No. 146, Jan. 8, 1919, 6 p. m., from the Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for Lansing from Secretary of War Baker (not printed). An extract from this telegram reads: "I, of course, want to do what is necessary to facilitate the work of the Commission but am extremely reluctant to add needless military men to the Commission's personnel as I hear much comment to the effect that there are already too many."

"No appreciable reduction in personnel can be made without interfering with the work of the Commission as it is organized at present or as it is proposed to reorganize it."

(2) The officers attached to the Commission are assigned chiefly to the Executive Offices, the Secretariat, the Intelligence Section, and the Liaison Office.

(a) No one who has not seen the necessary plant of the Commission, including two hotels and an office building, can understand the great amount of administrative work handled by the Executive Offices, including the management of the hotels, transportation, courier service, mail service, requisitions and supplies, construction and repair, assignment of rooms and offices, printing, telephone service, supervising of guards, orderlies, &c., &c. I do not hesitate to say that we are understaffed rather than overstaffed in this division.

(b) The military personnel assigned to the Secretariat as translators, clerks, stenographers, etc., were almost exclusively assigned to us by direct instructions of the War Department in Washington.

(c) If there is any doubt as to the essential character of the Liaison Office—which is composed of eight officers on duty with the Commission and five giving only part of their time to the Commission's work—the answer is to be found in the appended list of requests<sup>47</sup> which have been made of that office within the last few days, and which indicate the importance of the work it is doing.

(d) The Intelligence Section is the only division of the organization which may perhaps be regarded as overstaffed, and this is due solely to the fact that twenty officers were assigned to us by the Secretary of War, himself, without our being consulted. We are now dispensing with the services of some of them, and requesting that they be relieved from duty with the Commission.

Respectfully yours,

J. C. GREW

---

<sup>47</sup> Not attached to file copy of this letter.

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURING INFORMATION

123 G 861/178 : Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 8, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received November 8—11:06 a. m.]

61. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. We are getting a mass of misinformation respecting present conditions in Austria, Bohemia and the Ukraine, practically all of which is being provided us by the English, French and Italians. We have no American sources of information. The reports received are, as they are often, colored by the self interest of the persons furnishing them. I regard it as exceedingly important that we send at once to these countries agents who will be in a position to furnish us with accurate and unbiased information respecting conditions. This work should be under the general direction of a man who is entirely familiar with German and Austrian affairs. I suggest that you constitute Grew a special representative of the Department of State to do this work. Of course he should have a number of assistants whom I can secure for him over here. If you approve of this suggestion I will take the necessary steps to set up the organization. This matter I believe is most urgent.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/979 : Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 12, 1918—midnight.

[Received November 13—1:45 a. m.]

99. Secret for the President. Referring further to our number 61.<sup>1</sup> I beg to suggest the following:

The whole problem of securing political intelligence, establishing an adequate counterespionage organization and providing protection for you and for the personnel, papers, and property of the American representatives at the Peace Conference should be dealt with, I believe, along the following lines:

#### 1. Political intelligence.

At the present time the United States officials in Europe charged with considering political and economic questions presented by the

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

termination of the war are receiving practically no dependable information concerning political and economic conditions in the following countries: Poland, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Servia, (including Yugo-Slavia), Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Turkey. From Roumania and Greece some information is obtained but it is very incomplete. I consider it essential that we at once set up instrumentalities in these localities which will furnish us with information concerning political conditions in these countries and that this information should come to us through American eyes. I do not think it will be difficult promptly to set up an organization for this purpose and I suggest that I be authorized to proceed along the following lines:

Subparagraph A. After conferring with Hoover and learning his plans for relief, to select men from among the United States military and naval forces now in Europe and from any other available sources, who shall be appointed for the time being, agents of the Department of State. These men to constitute the basis of a "political intelligence section" of the American delegation to the Peace Conference.

Subparagraph B. To despatch the men so selected as soon as practicable to do so, to points such as Warsaw, Lemberg, Posen, Prague, Berne [*Brün?*] (Moravia) Budapest, Vienna, Innsbruck or Salzburg, Belgrade, Agram, Serajevo, Sofia, Bucharest (and some point in Transylvania), Kief, Scutari, Constantinople and Odessa. One agent should be sent to each place and he should take with him one code clerk with codes, one stenographer and if necessary one interpreter. A courier service also will shortly have to be established to operate between the United States and individual agents and their base from which messages could be forwarded by telegraph to Paris.

Subparagraph C. These agents so selected not to be in any sense accredited to the countries in which they are located. The military and naval men will of course not wear their uniforms. So far as possible the governments in the localities to which they are sent will be requested to give them assistance in the conduct of their work. These men would work in close cooperation with any relief agencies set up by Hoover.

Subparagraph D. To set up at some point in the Balkans, such as possibly Bucharest, a central office to which these agents can forward (probably for the President by courier only) their reports for transmission to the United States via Paris.

Subparagraph E. To establish at Paris for the assistance of the American delegation at the Peace Conference a "political intelligence section" under the direction of Grew and such other persons as the State Department may send to help him to which would be forwarded all reports from these agents and from other agents of the Department of State already constituted in European countries.

## 2. Counterespionage organization.

I have conferred with General Nolan, the head of the United States Military Intelligence in Europe, and I believe that this work should be handed over to him and I suggest that a civil official of



the Department of State who has an appreciation of the duty of work desired done should be associated with him.

3. The protection of the President and of the American delegation at the Peace Conference and their [papers] and property.

I suggest that the most practical method of handling this problem is through the use of the military authorities working under the direction of General Nolan who is entirely familiar with the peculiar conditions presented by this kind of work in France.

Almost all of the personnel to do the work outlined in paragraph 1 can be obtained here in Europe. I should very much appreciate an expression of your views respecting this important matter. If the plan as outlined is promptly approved it can be put into operation before the Peace Conference is called.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/979 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1918—6 p. m.

36. Your numbers 61 and 99.<sup>2</sup> Plan approved in principle. Please proceed with organization of office under Grew as stated in paragraph 1 sub-paragraph E also report names and qualifications of individuals to be recommended for appointment by the Department as agents as proposed in sub-paragraphs A and C.

Believe it would be desirable for Grew to consult with Colonel Van Deman, Assistant to Chief of Military Intelligence, as to quickest and safest method of communication (sub-paragraphs B and D). Van Deman should be able to furnish codes and possibly interpreters and clerks also. Kindly report result.

Harrison suggests that meanwhile Van Deman be requested to instruct Captain Voska, Berne, to send advance secret agents immediately into Poland, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Hungary and Russia, if not already arranged, and through Italy into Servia, including Jugo-Slavia. Inform Van Deman if not already advised that instructions can now be sent in code for Military Attaché, Jassy, through Department and Legation. Appropriate instructions will be sent in that way to Military Attaché, Jassy, for despatch of secret agents into Bulgaria and Turkey.

Department will advise you further regarding paragraph 2. It is hoped that arrangements can be made for Van Deman to handle this.

---

<sup>2</sup> Both printed *supra*.

As regards suggestion paragraph 3, Secretary of War has undertaken to provide necessary protection for Commissioners, archives, et cetera.

LANSING

---

763.72119/9122 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 16, 1918—3 p. m.

[Received November 16—1:45 p. m.]

112. Queries to be sent to Berne, Copenhagen and Stockholm. Please furnish what information you can as to:

Query 1. The character of native authority prevailing in Courland, Esthonia and Finland; the national elements represented; relation of directing heads to Russian and German revolutionary parties; the prevailing opinion in these territories on the subject of their status during the Peace Conference and in the Treaty of Peace.

Query 2. What authority prevails at present in the following places: Riga, Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, Memel, Konigsberg, Danzig, Tarnopol, Czernowitz, Teschen, Pressburg? The object of this query is to secure information as to the present relation between the Poles and the nationalities with whom they are in conflict.

Query 3. Have you any information showing extent of authority of the Czecho-Slovak Government at Prague over Slovak districts of Hungary?

Query 4. Send summary of ultimatum reported to have been delivered by the Government at Jassy to the Hungarian Government.

Query 5. Are you able to say whether the National Council in Bosnia recognizes the authority of the Government at Zagreb?

Query 6. Are any Polish or Bolshevist uprisings reported in Posen, Prussian Silesia or in the neighborhood of Danzig?

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/923 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 18, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received November 18—2:55 p. m.]

118. Secret for Polk only. From Auchincloss. It is most difficult to advise Grew with reference to organization of our work unless you keep us confidentially and promptly advised respecting what plans are being made in Washington for handling particular branches of work of Peace Conference. You [*We?*] were instructed indirectly yesterday that the Committee on Public Information planned to do

work on a large scale in Paris. Please explain to me as fully as possible what their plans are. I drew up our 99<sup>3</sup> before you had advised us that Grew was to act as Secretary of the Commission. Grew is at present in bed with a mild attack of influenza. Unless you wish us to wait until he personally recovers I will go ahead with the plan outlined in our 99. Can you tell me now whether the heads of such organizations as the "War Industries Board," "War Trade Board," "Fuel Administration," "Alien Property Custodian," et cetera, are to be present at the Peace Conference and if not who is going to represent these bodies for purposes of consultation. Please advise me the date when it is planned that American staff for the Peace Conference will arrive. Please give names of principals when possible. You cabled that Miller was sailing on the third but he has not arrived. When is he coming? I should greatly appreciate your private advice on the above points at the earliest possible moment.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/923 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—9 p. m.

47. For Auchincloss from Polk. Your No. 118 November 18th.<sup>4</sup> Will take up matter at once and see what I can do to help. Have been keeping out of it. Will find out about Committee on Public Information. Know that Creel and Sisson<sup>5</sup> are going over. Sorry to hear Grew is ill. Think it will be very helpful for you to go ahead, but suggest you await a definite answer on your 99, which I will try to obtain tomorrow. Think Summers would be the best representative of the War Industries Board. No appointment has been made for War Trade Board or Alien Property Custodian. Will suggest someone be selected. Can see no object in representative of the Fuel Administration. Will cable you as soon as we have the information in regard to date of sailing of American staff and names of principals. Miller sailed the 3d or 4th. Warrin and Professor Hudson<sup>6</sup> sailed the 9th. In making plans do all you can to keep in mind that both Army and Navy are endeavoring to take some of the functions of the Department. This is natural on their part, but I hope you will keep our

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 194.

<sup>4</sup> For a further reply to Colonel House's telegram No. 118 of Nov. 18, see the Department's telegram No. 54, Nov. 20, 1918, 7 p. m., p. 162.

<sup>5</sup> Edgar Sisson, general director of the Foreign Section of the Committee on Public Information.

<sup>6</sup> Frank L. Warrin, Jr., and Manley O. Hudson, assistants to the technical advisers on international law, Commission to Negotiate Peace.

interests at heart. If any of your telegrams have not been satisfactorily answered send me a confidential message calling my attention to messages and I will have them attended to.

LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/924 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 19, 1918—7 p. m.

[Received November 19—4:16 p. m.]

123. Your telegram number 36, November 15, 6 p. m. I shall detain Hoover upon his arrival early next week and shall ask him to lay the basis for a political intelligence system during his visit to the Central Powers with Gibson's assistance. Agents will be despatched as soon as they can be chosen and approved by the Department. Grew will have general supervision of the political intelligence section here; arrangements being made for handling material effectively. I suggest that Gibson remain in Austria after Hoover's return with headquarters at Vienna to have general supervision over agents. In view of the uncertainties of communication and travel, it is important to have someone there who can move about as required under instructions from Paris. Do you not think it would be advisable for him to open the Embassy Chancery so as to have place for section of documents and codes and for installation of wireless outfit for rapid communication to Paris?

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/960 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 21, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received 8:01 p. m.]

132. From Grew. Your 35 [36?], November 15, 6 p. m. Our 99 and 123.<sup>7</sup> Have discussed matters fully with General Nolan, Colonel Van Deman, Gibson and Auchincloss. We are in entire accord as to plans. It is important to send in, as soon as possible, a number of trained men of known ability to be reenforced as rapidly as possible by others as soon as their suitability is established. Should very particularly like to have the following men from the diplomatic service, and am convinced that their usefulness in this

---

<sup>7</sup> No. 99 printed on p. 194; No. 123, *supra*.

new field will justify and greatly outweigh any temporary inconvenience to the missions to which they are now assigned: Paragraph 1, Dulles<sup>8</sup> or Herter,<sup>9</sup> whichever one can be spared; 2, Eugene Schecraft;<sup>10</sup> 3, Lithgow Osborne; 4, Norman Armour.<sup>11</sup>

I hope Department will assign these men by telegraph and direct them to report to us in Paris at the earliest possible moment.

The following Army officers are now here available. Commander in chief will detail them for service under our direction as soon as Department gives its approval:

1. Major Stephen Bonsal, who is already known to the Department;
2. Captain Royall Tyler, now in Paris, excellent French, German and Spanish; good background of international affairs; sound judgment. Has since our entry into the war been chief, American section, Inter-Allied Bureau Paris;
3. [Apparent omission] assistant military attaché at Berne. Perfect German; good judgment, active, good background on political conditions, has lived in Germany and Austria;
4. Lieutenant Frederick R. King, French and German, good general training, very friendly relations with Benes and others members of new Czecho-Slovak Government. Benes has asked that King be allowed to go with him.

The commander in chief has expressed himself as ready to assign to this work, and [*any?*] other officers who may be fitted and who are desired by us. A further list will be submitted as soon as we can look into the qualifications of men [?] are now in our possession.

Question of communication is being arranged with military and naval authorities. Military authorities have requested me furnish codes, and instead of ordinary interpreters will assign officers speaking the languages desired. A list of 250 such officers has been submitted and the commander in chief will assign as many of these men as we may require.

There is already a great shortage of clerks and none can be provided by military authorities.

Nolan of the opinion, in which we concur, that Voska's services can best be utilized in continuing his present duties directly under military intelligence section, which will cooperate in every way.

Paragraph 3 of your telegram concerning protection. Has Secretary of War telegraphed commander in chief or shall we take it up directly with military authorities as regards question of cre-

---

<sup>8</sup> Allen W. Dulles.

<sup>9</sup> Christian A. Herter, special assistant to the American Minister at Berne.

<sup>10</sup> Second secretary of embassy in Great Britain.

<sup>11</sup> Second secretary of legation in Belgium.

dentials for our agents? I assume they should not be accredited to anyone as representatives of the Department of State. I suggest therefore that each man be provided with a document from Hoover designating him as a member of the United States Food Administration, or whatever relief organizations may be established. This would be, I think, quite justifiable as any representative sent by Hoover into these countries must depend upon, in a great measure, our agents for knowledge of political conditions which will have so important an influence on relief policies.

Hoover has not arrived, but we shall consult with him upon his arrival and hope that he will have no objection.

To meet necessary initial expenses, request that I be authorized by telegraph to draw on the Secretary of State, for \$50,000 or such part of that sum as may be necessary.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119 P 43/924 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—5 p. m.

71. Your 123 November 19, 7 p. m. Suggestion that Gibson remain in Austria with headquarters in Vienna approved. Not thought advisable to open Embassy Chancery. It is presumed Hoover will open headquarters' office in Vienna and Gibson should be able to use that office in the capacity of assistant to Hoover.

LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/960 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—6 p. m.

72. Your 132, November 21, 6 p. m. For Grew. Diplomatic secretaries not available for this purpose with sole exception of Gibson.

Choice of Major Bonsal, Captain Tyler, Captain Schelling and Lieutenant King approved. They should secure codes, officers to act as interpreters, clerks and stenographers from Nolan. All should be furnished with credentials by Hoover, as you suggest.

You may draw upon me up to \$50,000.

LANSING

763.72119/3305b : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to All Missions in Europe Except Paris*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918—6 p. m.

It is of high importance that the American Embassy in Paris should be advised of the political developments as they occur in the country to which you are accredited. Accordingly you are instructed to telegraph to the American Embassy in Paris for Col. House copies of your cable despatches to the Department when in your judgment Paris should be so advised. At the end of each cable despatch you should advise the Department whether Paris has been informed.

LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/1045a

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As you are already aware, the necessity has become apparent for the establishment of a political intelligence service in connection with the American delegation to the Peace Conference and it would appear that an expenditure of at least \$50,000 would be imperative. Will you not, therefore, allot to this Department the sum of \$50,000 from the appropriation for "National Security and Defense" in order that steps may be taken in Paris immediately to organize such an intelligence service as the conditions seem to require?

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

763.72119 P 43/1046

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 27 November, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am not clear whether by the enclosed <sup>12</sup> you mean the development which we have been planning through House, in response to his cables, or not. Am I right in assuming that it is?

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

<sup>12</sup> *Supra.*

763.72119 P 43/929 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 27, 1918—9 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

194. [From] Grew: Have just discussed with Hoover whole question of political intelligence from the new central states. He is in entire accord with our plan as elaborated in my 132, November 21st and is willing to designate as members of United States Food Administration any men whom I may assign for work in the field. He himself has four or five food experts available who will cooperate with our agents. Have today received Departments 72,<sup>13</sup> and hope to get our men started immediately.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119 P 43/1046

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You are entirely correct in assuming that my letter of the twenty-sixth of November relates to the expenses of the arrangements for gathering political intelligence, which we have been planning through Colonel House in response to his telegrams.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 184.511/3

*Memorandum by the Executive Officer of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Patterson)*

PARIS, 5 December, 1918.

Memorandum No. 10

Subject—Courier Service—Plan of Operation

The Commission has attached to it a representative of the Overseas Courier Service which was established by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and which is now operated by the General Staff in the United States, and by the Postal Express Service in co-operation with the State Department and the Navy Department in Europe.

---

<sup>13</sup> *Ante*, p. 201.



This places at the disposal of the Commission the following service :—

### I.—BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA

Officer Couriers depart for and arrive from New York and Washington at intervals of about three or four days, connecting with every fast vessel. Special facilities are provided throughout for expediting in every way possible the handling of the dispatches and to provide for their safety. The service has maintained the following record since its installation :—

Number of couriers dispatched between Europe and America	80
Best time between Paris and Washington	7 days and 20 hours.
Average time between Paris and Washington	11½ days.

### II.—THROUGHOUT EUROPE

Courier service is available in Europe as follows :

#### (1) Within Paris and to Versailles.

Regular couriers operate by motorcycle between 4 Place de la Concorde, the American Embassy, 5 Rue Chaillet, Office of Colonel E. M. House, 78 Rue de l'Université, Office of the Commanding General, U. S. Troops, District of Paris, 7 Rue Tilsit, and the Office of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, leaving each point at intervals of one hour from 10:00 A. M., until 10:00 P. M.

A plentiful supply of special motorcycle and other messengers are available to handle dispatches for other points in Paris.

#### (2) Between Paris and London.

Couriers operate daily between Paris and London via train and U. S. Naval Destroyers. They leave Paris at 10:15 P. M. and leave London at 11:35 A. M. The time of transmission of dispatches is about 12 hours.

(3) Between Paris and General Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces, General Headquarters British Expeditionary Forces, and Quartier Générale of the French Army.

Regular couriers operate daily between Paris and the General Headquarters of the French, British, and American Armies. The time of transmission of dispatches are approximately as follows :

(a) Between Paris and G. H. Q., Amer. Expeditionary Forces	5 hours.
(b) Between Paris and British General Headquarters	5 hours.
(c) Between Paris and Grand Quartier Générale	2 hours.

#### (4) Between Paris and Army Post Offices in Europe.

Army Post Offices of the Postal Express Service have been established at all the principal places where American troops are located

in Europe, including the Army, Corps, and Division Headquarters, and the principal cities of France. Dispatches are forwarded between Paris and these post offices through motor dispatch riders, railway postal cars, and other agencies of the Postal Express Service.

(5) Between Paris and Berne, Switzerland.

Couriers will operate daily between Paris and Berne, leaving Paris at 8:25 P. M. and leaving Berne, Office of the American Embassy at 10:00 A. M. The time of transmission of dispatches is about 22 hours.

(6) Between Paris and Rome, Italy.

Couriers will be dispatched daily between Paris and Rome, leaving Paris at 8:25 P. M. and Rome at 11:00 P. M. The time of transmission of dispatches is approximately 36 hours.

(7) Between Paris, Brussels and the Hague.

Couriers will operate daily between Paris and the Offices of the American Embassy at Brussels and the Hague. The time of transmission of dispatches between Paris and Brussels is approximately 12 hours and between Paris and the Hague approximately 20 hours.

(8) Between Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Munich, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Belgrade, Constantinople, Odessa, Agram, Warsaw and Frankfort.

Upon the establishment by the State Department of representatives at these places, communication by courier with them will be instituted.

R. C. PATTERSON, Jr.,  
*Captain, U. S. A.*

Approved:

J. C. Grew

*Secretary.*

---

763.72/12438 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 5, 1918—7 p. m.

[Received 8:09 p. m.]

6144. Your 6499, December 3d, 3 p. m.<sup>14</sup> Embassy has been making a practice of showing all outgoing telegrams of importance to Colonel House.

SHARP

---

<sup>14</sup> See vol. II, p. 391, footnote 11.

763.72119 P 43/4 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 5, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received December 5—7 p. m.]

232. From Grew. In view of the delay in formulating an agreement among the Allies as to relief policies, it has not yet been possible to send political intelligence agents into the field accredited as representatives of Food Administration and there is at present no certainty as to when this can be arranged, although Hoover will again consider the question on his arrival London where he is now conferring with the British authorities. Since diplomatic secretaries are not available for this purpose, the only method I can suggest without further delay in establishing our organization in the field, is to obtain a release from the Army for such officers as we may select [apparent omission] the approval of the Department and to send them abroad in civilian clothes as representatives of the Department of State and I request a decision on this point. In the meantime, we have made further provisional arrangements with General Nolan as regards organization, codes, etc. and with Colonel Carty of the Signal Corps as regards communication by wireless and we have a long list of Army officers recommended by General Nolan and Colonel Van Deman for this work in the field to be sent abroad a few at a time. Our home office is now well organized and is prepared on the arrival of the Commission to issue daily printed bulletins containing digests of all political and economic intelligence and press reports received from such sources as are available but we shall of course be much handicapped by not having our own agents in the field.

In view of Gibson's assignment to Hoover, whose plans are at present indefinite, his services are not available and other arrangements will have to be made for organizing our field work.

Hugh Wilson he [*has?*] stated that Dolbeare's<sup>15</sup> health would not prevent his doing light work in Paris and if he is not needed elsewhere he would be of material value to us in our home office here.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/41a

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the  
Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

PARIS, December 10, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: In connection with the organization of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, there has been

---

<sup>15</sup> F. R. Dolbeare, second secretary of legation in Switzerland.

established a Liaison Department, whose duties it will be to keep the Commission in personal touch with all activities with which it should be familiar. For this purpose, it will be necessary for the head of this Department, Lieut. Col. R. H. Williams, Jr., to be placed in touch with various Departments of the French Government and with various Embassies and Legations. I should be infinitely obliged if you would prepare and forward to such Departments as you deem wise a letter accrediting me officially as Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and as competent to correspond directly in case of need with these various Departments. My desire is to have your official sanction and introduction before proceeding to take up matters of an official character on behalf of the Commission.

Yours very sincerely,

[File copy not signed]

763.72119/2968 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 12, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received 2:30 p. m.]

7. From Grew. Will you please request the consuls throughout the Allied and neutral countries and those countries bordering the Mediterranean to transmit to the American Mission copies of recent and all future reports dealing with the political situation or with any economic situation of sufficient magnitude to have political significance. This request is made in order that we may have at hand here the information on which to predicate comments, criticisms and the like in regard to existing conditions.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

763.72119/3315f : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—5 p. m.

54. For Auchincloss from Polk. Dulles<sup>16</sup> sails 21st via England. Representing the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, which in turn is allied with the economic organizations of the war boards and which in accordance with memorandum approved by President is to be official agency for supplying economic information to Peace

<sup>16</sup> John Foster Dulles.

Commissioners. Convinced it will be useful and hope you will support it.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.81/1

*The Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Bowman) to Messrs. Beer, Day, Dixon, Haskins, Hornbeck, Jefferson, Lord, Lunt, Mezes, Seymour, Shotwell, Westermann, and Young*

DECEMBER 20, 1918.

It has been arranged that each one of the division chiefs is authorized to see nationalist leaders and others to learn more intimately the views of the various nationalist groups. It is suggested that these relations should always be maintained in a very cordial spirit, and that our attitude should be one of receptivity. It is advised that each person maintain an impartial attitude and disclaim any information regarding policies.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/62

*The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

[PARIS,] December 21, 1918.

Subject: Organization of a division entitled the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries.

By mutual agreement and in accordance with a conference between Mr. Grew, Dr. Mezes, Mr. Bullitt, and Mr. Bowman, it is proposed to have in the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence a division entitled the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries, and to place Mr. William C. Bullitt in charge.

The plan requires for its operation a central office in charge of Mr. Bullitt where there would be received all current intelligence material, whether reports and memoranda from field agents, cablegrams from embassies, or clippings from the press. The material will be in charge of assistants selected for their ability to discard material as well as select it, so that there may be gathered each day as small an amount as possible of information of critical value to the Commission. The central office would route this material to the different specialists, and would secure the reactions of the specialists to the information obtained each day. There would thus be concentrated

each twenty-four hours the entire information that had been received, and the reactions of all specialists and intelligence officers to it. It would be from such material that Mr. Bullitt would prepare the epitomes and comments for the Commissioners which are now a part of his daily program.

The epitomes would be gathered in a special room, which would be open only to the Commissioners and to the specialists, and to designated officers and assistants of the Division of Current Intelligence Summaries. Those items of greatest importance would be starred on the list of summaries, and the material on which the starred items was based would be found in the special room. All other material would be kept in classified form in the central office of the Division, where it would be available should it be desired by any Commissioner or specialist.

According to the proposed plan the field agents in touch with the Commission would be under the direction of the administrative officers of the Section of Territorial, Economic, and Political Intelligence. Their work in the field would be directed by this Section and their reports received by its central office.

The details of the operation of the central office and the relations between it and the specialists is to be the subject of a conference between Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Bowman, and to later conferences with the specialists, in case this plan is approved by the Commissioners.

S. E. MEZES

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/66

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to  
Mr. William C. Bullitt*

[PARIS,] December 23, 1918.

In pursuance of a memorandum submitted by Dr. Mezes to Mr. Grew and approved by the Commission, you have been appointed Chief of the division entitled Current Intelligence Summaries, one of the divisions of that section of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace entitled Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence.

---

763.72119 P 43/44 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 31, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1919—6:30 a. m.]

122. [From Lansing.] After having studied the question of sending agents into the field to obtain political information, it seems to me

advisable that these men should go not as representatives of the Department of State, which would give them a diplomatic status and which might be misunderstood, but as agents of the Commission itself. We have accordingly sent Ellis Dresel into Germany to make a general survey of the situation and to return to Paris to report to the Commission within a few days.<sup>17</sup> The following men have also started for Vienna under the leadership of Professor A. C. Coolidge:<sup>18</sup> Captain Walter Davis, Captain W. A. Pashkowski, Professor Robert Kerner, F. E. Parker, Lieutenant R. C. Foster, Lieutenant F. R. King, Lieutenant H. G. Campagnoli; and also officers to act as couriers who will be selected before the party leaves Berne. Their purpose is to establish a nucleus in Vienna, and they will be joined from time to time by other men to be selected by the Commission who will be sent by Coolidge to various points in Central Europe. The Commission will report the names of these men to you for your information as soon as they are definitely selected. We already have a large list of well qualified Army officers to draw from. Their reports will be forwarded to the Department as well as to the Commission. It is intended that Army officers shall go in civilian clothes, permission first having been obtained through military channels from the governments of enemy countries to which it is intended to send them. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

763.72119/3512

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 9, 1919.

[Received January 24.]

SIR: With reference to your telegram No. 127, of January 7th, 4 p. m.,<sup>19</sup> I beg to confirm my reply of even date,<sup>19</sup> stating that the Confidential Bulletin of the Commission was discontinued after No. 7 had been issued, as it was found preferable to convey to the Commissioners by word of mouth, rather than by a printed bulletin. the intelligence received by the Commission. This is done by Mr. Bullitt, who receives all incoming intelligence and communicates a digest thereof orally to each of the Commissioners in a daily personal conference.

---

<sup>17</sup> For correspondence concerning the Dresel Mission to Germany, see vol. II, pp. 130 ff.

<sup>18</sup> For correspondence concerning the dispatch of the Coolidge Mission, see vol. II, pp. 218 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

As a matter of record, I enclose the seven issues of the Confidential Bulletin, as well as a copy of the Official Bulletin,<sup>20</sup> which preceded the Confidential Bulletin and of which only one number was published.

I have [etc.]

J. C. GREW

---

<sup>20</sup> None reprinted.



## CENSORSHIP AND RELATIONS WITH THE PRESS

851.731/118 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 16, 1918—10 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

114. Secret for the President. I suggest that you send me a cable which I can show to the heads of British and French Governments for the purpose of obtaining from them the entire suspension of the present political censorship upon American press despatches; military necessity can no longer be invoked as a defense of the drastic censorship now being exercised. There seems to be in my opinion no adequate reason why the character of the political information supplied to the American people should be dictated by the French and British Governments.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

851.731/118 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—5 p. m.

42. Your Number 114, November 16, 10 p. m. Following reply from the President:

“Please express to the French and British authorities our hope and expectation that they will entirely remove the present political censorship upon American press dispatches. Now that the argument of military necessity no longer obtains, there can be no good reason why the character of the political information supplied to our people should be determined by the British and French Governments and there is danger of a very serious revulsion of feeling on this side of the water, if such a censorship is continued. I hope that you will press the matter very earnestly and very promptly.”

LANSING

851.731/117: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 21, 1918—9 p. m.  
[Received November 21—5:05 p. m.]

137. Secret for the President and Secretary of State. I have just received the following communication from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

"You were good enough to communicate to me under date of yesterday telegram of President Wilson expressing desire that the political censorship applied up to the present to press telegrams sent from France to America be completely suppressed. I have the honor to inform you that the French Government is happy to respond to the desire of President Wilson. Dispositions will therefore be taken immediately to suppress all censorship of press telegrams sent from France to the United States. Please accept, et cetera. Signed S. Pichon."

This is of course very satisfactory. I have taken the measures up with the British authorities through Lord Derby, and I expect to have an answer from them before long. I shall advise the press correspondents informally of the action of the French Government, and request them to advise me of any further interference with their press despatches.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

851.731/116: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 22, 1918—12 p. m.  
[Received November 22—9:03 p. m.]

146. Referring further to our number 137.<sup>1</sup> I am now advised by the press correspondents that their messages to the United States are being permitted to pass through without interference by the French censor.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

841.731/2103: Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 28, 1918—12 p. m.  
[Received November 28—9:10 a. m.]

195. Secret for the President. Referring to our 137 and 146.<sup>2</sup> I am advised through Wiseman that the British Government have

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> Both printed *supra*.

abolished the political censorship of press despatches for the United States from Great Britain.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Robert Lansing Papers

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, 17 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have been thinking a great deal lately about the contact of the Commission with the public through the press and particularly about the way in which the Commission should deal with the newspaper men who have come over from the United States. I have come to the conclusion that much the best way to handle this matter is for you and the other Commissioners to hold a brief meeting each day and invite the representatives of the press to come in at each meeting for such interchange of information or suggestions as may be thought necessary. This I am sure is preferable to any formal plan or to any less definite arrangement.

I am also convinced that the preparation of all the press matter that is to be issued from the Commission is a task calling for a particular sort of experienced ability. I beg, therefore, that you and your fellow Commissioners will agree to the appointment of Mr. Ray Stannard Baker as your representative in the performance of this duty. Mr. Baker enjoys my confidence in a very high degree and I have no hesitation in commending him to you as a man of ability, vision and ideals. He has been over here for the better part of a year, has established relationships which will be of the highest value, and is particularly esteemed by the very class of persons to whom it will be most advantageous to us to be properly interpreted in the news that we have to issue. If you see no conclusive objection to this, I would suggest that you request Mr. Baker to do us the very great service of acting in this capacity.

I am writing in the same terms to the other members of the Commission.

Sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

033.1140/50 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS [undated.]

[Received December 19, 1918—10:21 p. m.]

29. For Polk from Auchincloss. 4. Please deliver the following message to Tumulty from the President.

The President has made the following arrangements with respect to the handling of our newspaper publicity while he is in Europe: Maximilian Foster is to act as liaison officer between the President and the newspaper men. He is to give out all announcements respecting the plans of the President and the Commission and all routine or special news items. Each morning at 10:30 the four members of the Commission, other than the President, are to meet all the newspaper men in one room and at that time be questioned by them. The President has designated Ray Stannard Baker to act with the newspaper men as the interpreter of the American position at the Conference, to handle the publicity of the Commission and to reflect the general spirit and purposes of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Creel is to have charge of the dissemination and spreading broadcast throughout the world [outside?] the United States of all publicity given out by the Commission. It will be the policy of the Commissioners to be very frank with the newspaper men and to give them as much information as is practicable trusting to their discretion in not publishing any information that would cause trouble or that would be indiscreet in any way. It is impossible for us over here to know whether newspaper men are respecting our confidence or not. We have no way of telling whether they publish information which was given them simply as "a steer" and not for publication. The President wishes you to keep a close look-out on the American press and to cable him freely exactly what the tone of the press is and whether any particular papers are acting in an indiscreet way. He also wishes you from time to time to make any suggestions that may occur to you to assist us in our work with the newspaper men.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184 82/2 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received December 21—10 a. m.]

67. For the Secretary of State. The press telegrams from Paris are now read with a great deal of interest and are the basis of discussion in Congress and editorial comment. The stories are frequently contradictory and sometimes obviously ridiculous. I take the liberty of suggesting that the press representatives be warned of [the danger] of speculation and if possible it might be desirable for someone in the mission to see the reports that are sent particularly by the press associations, not for the purpose of censorship, but to be in a position when desirable to inform the Department that reports are untrue so they could be contradicted.

The Associated Press under date of December 18th Paris, stated that the American delegation had resolved to advocate sinking of the surrendered warships. As a result of this story resolution was introduced in the Senate protesting against this policy. Suggest Department be authorized to contradict story if untrue.

I have warned press here against danger of accepting these press stories as facts and the danger of creating irritation against the Allies as a result of reported serious disagreements.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/2 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

[PARIS,] December 23, 1918.

76. [From Lansing.] Your 67 December 20th 2:00 p. m. The matter dealt with by the Associated Press under date of December 18th mentioned in your telegram has not been discussed here. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/3

*The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

PARIS, December 31, 1918.

Subject: An interview of British newspaper correspondents with the members of the Commission.

1. Mr. George Adam, the Paris correspondent of the London *Times*, was in to see me today to talk over the relationship of the British correspondents to the American Commission. The same subject has been broached by other British correspondents. They are very desirous of some opportunity for meeting the Commissioners. They do not ask to come in with the American correspondents at the morning sessions, but suggest an opportunity once or twice in the week of meeting the Commissioners. There will be from half a dozen to ten.

2. I would suggest that the Commission receive, at least once, sometime this week, the British correspondents, immediately following a morning meeting with the American correspondents. Mr. Adam says that the British Press Association will nominate the men and that they will all be noteworthy correspondents.

3. I have made inquiries in regard to what the British practice will be. Mr. Adam says it is the intention of the news department of the British Commission to treat all correspondents alike, extending no

special facilities to the British correspondents. But it is not intended that any correspondent shall directly meet members of the Commission. Sir George Riddell, assisted by Mr. Mair, will be here on behalf of the British Commission and will see correspondents. Access even for British correspondents to the British Commissioners can only be had by special appointment.

4. Whether the American Commission should receive the British correspondents regularly unless the British Commissioners will extend similar privileges to the American correspondents, is a subject open to question. I believe, however, that it would be not only an act of courtesy, but an expression of the democratic American approach to this whole situation if the Commission would receive the British correspondents at least once, and let them present their own case.

RAY STANNARD BAKER

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/5

*The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

[PARIS,] January 2, 1919.

Subject: Appointments of British correspondents with the commissioners.

1. In reference to the decision of the Commission in regard to making appointments for British correspondents, I have sent the enclosed letter to Mr. Adam. I think it will cover the ground.

RAY STANNARD BAKER

[Enclosure]

*The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to Mr. George Adam*

PARIS, January 2, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. ADAM: I have, in accordance with our conversation of the other day, taken up the matter of meetings of British correspondents with the American Commissioners. The present morning conferences with American newspaper men are not for the purpose of giving out news but are merely give and take conversations to bring about a clearer understanding between the Commission and the correspondents. It is felt that if the Commissioners appoint meetings with the British correspondents, they would also have to set a time for the French and Italian correspondents, and there seems, moreover, to be no arrangement by which the American correspondents will be given an opportunity of meeting the British Commissioners.

It is our desire to cooperate fully with the British correspondents, and to grant them every facility in our Press Department, and we shall undertake to give any of the correspondents who come to us, here, the fullest possible information at our disposal. I wish, personally, to make the acquaintance of as many of the British correspondents as possible.

Very sincerely yours,

RAY STANNARD BAKER

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/13½

*The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Private Secretary  
of the Secretary of State (Kirk)*

[PARIS,] January 3, 1919.

Subject: List of visitors.

1. I spoke to the Commission the other morning in regard to giving a daily list of the visitors who have called upon the Commissioners, and the names of those with whom the Commissioners have held conferences, so that the newspaper correspondents can have some idea of what is going on. This suggestion was approved.

2. Will it be convenient for you if we have an orderly call at 6.30 every evening for these reports? This is a system with which the correspondents have become familiar in connection with visitors to the White House at Washington.

RAY STANNARD BAKER

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/6

*The Chief of the Press Bureau (Baker) to the Secretary of the  
Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

[PARIS,] January 7, 1919.

1. I hear a great many newspaper men inquiring anxiously as to whether the initial meeting of the Peace Conference is to be an open one, so that they can be present. They hope that the American Commissioners will use their influence in this direction. Whatever may be the policy afterwards in regard to Committee Conferences, a formal opening meeting would help enormously in making our people feel that they were being made a part of the proceedings: and would give the correspondents an opportunity of seeing and hearing all the delegates from all of the countries.

RAY STANNARD BAKER

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/7

*The Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

[PARIS,] January 8, 1919.

I presented Mr. Baker's request to the Commissioners at the meeting this morning, and Mr. Baker also spoke to them before their meeting with the newspaper correspondents.

It did not seem practical to have the newspaper correspondents attend the initial meeting of the Allied Delegates, if that is what was meant by Mr. Baker's request. It is thought probable that provision would be made for the newspaper correspondents to be present at the first formal meeting of the Conference.

Mr. Baker has already been advised of the Commissioners' views in this matter.

LELAND HARRISON

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/9

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the Executive Officer of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Bowman)*

No. 114

Subject: Press Office.

1. In order to facilitate the work of Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, in charge of the Press Office of the Commission, I shall be very glad if you will place at his disposal such information in the possession of the Political, Territorial and Economic Intelligence Section as he may desire, it being understood that you will indicate to him how much of this information may, in your opinion, properly be published; that he will regard as confidential any other data which you may furnish him; and that he will submit to me for approval any communications to the Press which may be prepared in his office based upon information furnished by your section. I have informed Mr. Baker to the foregoing effect.

J. C. G[REW]

JANUARY 9, 1919.



Paris Peace Conf. 184.82/12

*The Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence (Mezes) to the Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

[PARIS,] 17 January, 1919.

Re: Publicity.

After consultation with the Plenipotentiaries, Mr. Baker desires that members of the Intelligence Section from time to time prepare memoranda for, and make oral explanations to the press representatives, outlining facts and problems in interesting regions, but without setting forth attitudes or policies.

While this is not a job for which we have preference, we are willing to undertake it, as desired, provided the Plenipotentiaries approve of our doing so, notwithstanding the embarrassments to themselves that are likely to be involved. I mean that in cabling this news, the pressmen will inevitably interlard it with discussions and statements of policy, which some of them will at times attribute to the plenipotentiaries, entailing embarrassment and calling for denials or more serious action.

It evidently is not for this section to decide whether that risk is to be assumed.

S. E. MEZES

**REPRESENTATION OF COUNTRIES AND NA-  
TIONALITIES AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE**



## AMERICAN REPUBLICS

763.72119/2621 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

RIO DE JANEIRO, November 15, 1918—1 p. m.  
[Received 11:45 p. m.]

Da Gama wishes to know whether it is desired that Brazil should be represented at the present Allied conferences at Versailles. In case the answer is affirmative, he will appoint Magalhaens, Brazilian Minister at Paris, who participated in earlier conferences.

Da Gama believes that he should go to the Peace Congress with the Brazilian delegation and would be glad to know whether this accords with the wishes of the American Government. He desires to learn also confidentially the probable approximate date at which the Peace Congress is likely to meet.

MORGAN

---

763.72119/2621 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1918—5 p. m.

Your November 15, 1 p. m. Department feels that it is not essential for Brazil to be represented at the preliminary conferences. Please say to Da Gama that Department considers it desirable that he should go to the peace conference and wishes to advise him for his very confidential information that it understands that the peace conference will probably meet in the middle of the month of January next.

LANSING

---

763.72119/2777 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

RIO DE JANEIRO, November 25, 1918—5 p. m.  
[Received November 25—12:45 p. m.]

Department's November 19, 5 p. m. Minister Da Gama asks me to inform you that in order to placate local public opinion, he

thinks it desirable that Olyntho Magalhaens, Brazilian Minister at Paris, should represent Brazil during the preliminary peace conferences as he has done during previous ones. He will telegraph him to that effect. He will send from here a Brazilian international lawyer to assist him.

Until President Alves comes to Rio de Janeiro, the Minister cannot confer with him and his selection as Brazilian representative at the main conference cannot be decided. The report in the press that he would go to Paris has been well received.

MORGAN

---

763.72119/3083

*The Uruguayan Minister (Cosio) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In order to answer a telegraphic inquiry just received from my Government, I am taking the liberty of addressing you to ask, in a confidential way, whether the Government of the United States and those of the Allied countries have already considered the position of the countries that have severed relations with Germany, in regard to the coming Peace Conference and whether these countries will have any participation in the proceedings of the conference and, if this is the case, in which form and to which extent they will be represented.

As you will remember Uruguay severed its diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany and seized several German vessels in Uruguayan ports.

Hoping to hear from you at your earliest convenience, I have [etc.]

PEDRO COSIO

---

763.72119/3412a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Peru (McMillin)*

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918—3 p. m.

Repeat to Quito, LaPaz, and Montevideo.

For your own information and in order to place you in a position to answer any inquiries which may be made of you by the Government of the country to which you are accredited, in regard to its presence at the Peace Conference but not for formal communication to Foreign Office, the Department sends you the following:

The question of the representation at the peace conference of those countries which have broken relations with the Imperial German Gov-

ernment but have not declared war, has not as yet been discussed by the associated governments. Until such discussion is held and some decision arrived at, it will be impossible to make any statement in this connection.

LANSING

763.72119/3412c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Panama (Price)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918—3 p. m.

Repeat to Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras.

For your own information and in order to place you in a position to answer any inquiries which may be made of you by the Government to which you are accredited in regard to its representation at the Peace Conference, but not for formal communication to Foreign Office, the Department sends you the following:

The Government of the United States, according to the information which it has at hand, understands that the date for the Peace Conference has not yet been definitely set, and it does not believe that the preliminary conferences which are to take place in France in the near future, will require the presence of representatives from all the interested governments.

Should it be found necessary to require the presence of representatives from all the belligerent governments, the United States Government will take great pleasure in transmitting such information to its representatives in those countries which have declared war against Germany.

LANSING

763.72119/2928 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 8, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received December 8—2:08 p. m.]

240. Your 141, December 7, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> You may advise da Gama that I will press this matter<sup>3</sup> and see if it can be arranged.

There is considerable opposition here to bringing into the preliminary conference but the great Allied powers and the United States.

EDWARD HOUSE

<sup>1</sup> The same telegram, except for the first paragraph, was sent on the same date to the Minister in Cuba with instructions to repeat to the Legation in Haiti.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> i. e., Brazilian representation at the preliminary conference.

763.72119/3006 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Acting Secretary of State*

RIO DE JANEIRO, December 16, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received 8:02 p. m.]

The Chamber of Deputies has requested the Foreign Office to state whether Brazil has been invited to participate in the Peace Conference. Da Gama has not yet received from Washington or Paris an answer to this question. Should be gratified to know by whom, if at all, invitations will be issued, and whether the less important Allied countries can participate on their own initiative or must await an invitation. Urgent reply requested.

MORGAN

763.72119/3006 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—7 p. m.

Your December 16, 4 p. m. Department understands that invitations to participate in the peace conference will be sent out from Paris. The Department has no further information in this regard at present and has sent substance of your cable to the Secretary of State in Paris. Assure da Gama of our most friendly interest.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Brazil/2 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received December 22—3 p. m.]

89. For the Secretary of State. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, urgently requests information as to how invitations to Peace Conference will be issued and whether less important Allied countries such as Brazil may participate on their own invitation. Embassy also states that The Chamber of Deputies have asked Brazilian Minister of Foreign Office whether Brazil has been invited. Da Gama sent personal message to me stating he would be very much embarrassed by his inability to answer inquiries and asked for your friendly assistance.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Uruguay/1: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1918—5 p. m.

[Received December 25—9:20 p. m.]

124. Doctor Brum, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, has submitted following confidential memorandum for report consideration.

"Uruguay considered very worthy of attention the reason invoked by the Allied Nations for limiting (or reducing) the number of countries which are to attend the Peace Conference in as much as the interests in debate being especially European, the presence of representative of many American countries at the conference might prejudice the interest of the Allied Powers. It must nevertheless be taken into account that at the Peace Conference there will be debated beforehand those mentioned political or financial matters which distinctly affect the countries of America. Some of these as for example Uruguay have special and direct questions to be settled with Germany as a result of their attitude towards the European conflict. It represents that the solution might be as follows:

Invite the countries which are in the situation of Uruguay to the Peace Conference arranging that they shall intervene only in the political or financial matters which affect America. In this manner due provision is made for European views; and there is not inflicted upon the countries of America solidary with the Allies, the rebuff of doing without them, and according them the same treatment as to those which remained neutral in the bravest [*gravest*] moments of the war."

American Minister in Uruguay is of the opinion that Allied Governments have been furnished with memorandum of similar nature. Diplomatic representatives of Allied Governments in Montevideo have informed Uruguayan Government that they are taking great interest in causing the matter to be brought to the attention of their Governments.

I should be glad to be informed whether: 1, those Central and South American countries which declared war on Germany are to be represented at the Peace Conference; 2, those countries such as Uruguay and Peru which broke relations with the German Government and turned over the German ships in their ports to the United States Government are to be represented in order that if the answer is in the affirmative it may appear that they gained their representation through good offices of the United States Government.

There is very strong sentiment even in those countries such as Uruguay and Peru that they should be represented at the Peace Conference and unless they are so represented they will feel aggrieved and consider that their following the lead of the United States in the World War has not been appreciated.

POLK



Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Brazil/2 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

[PARIS,] December 27, 1918.

90. [From Lansing.] Your 89, December 21, 8 p. m. Please inform Brazilian Ambassador [*Foreign Minister?*] that I fully sympathize with his difficulties and embarrassment, and that the American Commissioners will be most happy to lend their good offices at the appropriate moment with a view to arranging if possible for Brazil's representation at the Peace Conference. It would seem advisable for Brazil to send one or more delegates provisionally to Paris, as has been done by China and presumably by others of the less important allied countries. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Uruguay/1 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

[PARIS,] December 27, 1918.

91. [From Lansing.] Your 124, December 24, 5:00 p. m. The American Commission regards with sympathy the desire of the South and Central American States which declared war on or broke relations with Germany to be represented at the Peace Conference; and while no assurances can be given in advance of the preliminary meetings of the delegates of the great powers, the American Commission will at the appropriate moment extend its good offices on behalf of its Latin-American neighbors falling within the foregoing categories. If your advice is asked, the advisability might be informally suggested to them of sending one or more delegates to Paris to be on the spot in case they are to be accorded representation at the Conference. You may assure them of our friendly interest. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

763.72119/3155 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1918—8 p. m.

29. Following received from Montevideo, dated December 24, 7 p. m.:

"Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs has just submitted following memorandum for transmission to Department:

"The Swiss Legation in Argentine in charge of German interests in Uruguay has addressed Uruguayan Ministry for Foreign Affairs advising that it has re-

ceived instructions from new German Government to the effect that said German Government protests against the taking over by the Uruguayan Government the German vessels interned in the port of Montevideo. The communication adds that the German Government will not fail to exercise its rights against Uruguay at whatever time and manner it may deem convenient. This communication of the German Government shows that there is a concrete difference to be discussed and settled between Germany and Uruguay in consequence of one of the actions taken by Uruguayan Government when it broke relations with Germany. This, together with other questions arising from action taken by Uruguayan Government, would seem to indicate necessity for presence at Peace Conference of Uruguayan representation in order that such matters may be properly considered.'

Jeffery."

Department in reply has instructed Minister, Montevideo, merely to acknowledge receipt. Have you any views to express to guide Department?

POLK

---

763.72119/3121 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1918—9 p. m.

42. Following from American Ambassador, Buenos Aires, December 20.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me last night that the Argentine Government had determined to send today a telegram to the Government of the United States presumably through the Argentine Chargé d'Affaires in Washington informing it of the desire of Argentina to become a member of the League of Nations as proposed by President Wilson and requesting for that reason and for its favorable attitude towards the Allies during the war, a place at the approaching Peace Conference. The Minister stated further that in the event of there being two Conferences one to arrive at a solution of the problems arising from the present war and one to treat of the proposed League of Nations, the Argentine Government would ask to be represented only at the latter.

From his further conversation I gained the impression that this decision of the Argentine Government has been induced or at any rate accelerated by the news of the voyage [*sic*] of Count Romanones<sup>4</sup> to confer with President Wilson."

The Argentine maintained a strictly neutral position during the War, and did nothing which entitled it, in the opinion of this Department to a place at the Conference, which will discuss the solution of the problems arising from the present war (this objection would not apply, of course, to the request of the Argentine to be present at a Conference which should discuss a league of nations). Would

---

<sup>4</sup> Spanish President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

it not be appropriate that those South American countries which declared war on Germany, or otherwise materially aided the allied cause, should be represented at the Conference which will solve the problems arising from the present war, since these Nations might feel that they had gained nothing from their cooperation with the United States should the neutral nations of South America be represented as well.

POLK

---

763.72119/3194 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Uruguay (Jeffery)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1918—7 p. m.

Your December 20, 4 p. m.<sup>5</sup> You may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that the American Commission regards with sympathy the desire of the South and Central American States, which declared war on, or broke relations with, Germany to be represented at the Peace Conference; and while no assurances can be given in advance of the preliminary meeting of the delegates of the Great Powers, the American Commission will, at the appropriate moment, extend its good offices on behalf of its Latin-American neighbors falling within the foregoing categories. If your advice is asked, the advisability might be informally suggested of sending one or more delegates to Paris to be on the spot in case Uruguay is to be accorded representation at the Conference.

POLK

---

763.72119/3202 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1918—7 p. m.

Your December 16, 4 p. m. Inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Secretary of State sympathizes with his difficulties and that the American Commission will be most happy to lend their good offices at the appropriate moment with a view to arranging, if possible, for Brazil's representation at the Peace Conference. It is the opinion of the Secretary that it would be advisable for Brazil to send one or more delegates without further delay to Paris.

---

<sup>5</sup> Not printed; it transmitted the memorandum of the Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs which was forwarded by the Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in the Department's telegram No. 124, Dec. 24, 1918, 5 p. m., p. 227.

While no assurances can be given as to who will be represented at the Peace Conference in advance of the preliminary meeting of the delegates of the great powers the American Commission will extend its good offices on behalf of those of its Latin-American neighbors which declared war on, or broke relations with, Germany.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Argentina/1 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1919—2 p. m.

[Received January 3—2:30 a. m.]

62. For the Secretary of State from Polk. Argentine Chargé called today. Said his Government was anxious to know if they would be invited to be represented at Conference when world questions such as league of nations are being discussed. I replied question of representation even for belligerents had not been settled and suggested if they had reasons to advance why Argentina should be represented that they write a note setting [these] out to the United States and to the foreign governments. As soon as received will forward to you.

POLK

768.72119/3262 : Telegram

*The Minister in Uruguay (Jeffery) to the Acting Secretary of State*

MONTVIDEO, January 3, 1919—12 noon.

[Received 2:45 p. m.]

Department's December 31, 7 p. m. Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that his Government is greatly pleased with position of United States Government regarding Uruguayan interests in the Peace Conference, Uruguayan Minister in Paris has been instructed to confer freely with Secretary Lansing in relation to the subject matter of Department's December 31, 7 p. m.

JEFFERY

768.72119/3383

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Peruvian Minister (Tudela)*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Minister of Peru and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his communication of January sixth,\* in which he inquired whether any

\* Not printed.

information is available in regard to the possible participation in the Peace Conference of countries such as Peru, who severed diplomatic relations with Germany during the war, and whether in the opinion of the Department of State it would be advisable for the Government of Peru to appoint at once one or more delegates to the Peace Conference who would be ready at any moment to enter into their duties were they called upon to do so.

In answer to the Minister of Peru's communication, the Acting Secretary of State takes pleasure in giving him the following information:

The American Commission in Paris regards with sympathy the desire of the South and Central American States which declared war on or broke relations with Germany to be represented at the Peace Conference; and while no assurance can be given in advance of the preliminary meeting of the delegates of the Great Powers, the American Commission will, at the appropriate moment, extend its good offices in behalf of its Latin American neighbors falling within the foregoing categories.

It would appear, therefore, to be a wise step for the Government of Peru to send one or more delegates to Paris to be on the spot in case they are to be accorded representation at the Conference.

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1919.

---

763.72119/3194 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Panama (Price)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1919—7 p. m.

Repeat to Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras.

Department's November 29, 3 p. m. For your own information in order to place you in a position to answer any inquiries which may be made of you by the Government to which you are accredited in regard to its representation at the Peace Conference, but not for formal communication to the Foreign Office, the Department sends you the following:

The American Mission in Paris regards with sympathy the desire of the South and Central American States which declared war on or broke relations with Germany to be represented at the Peace Conference; and while no assurance can be given in advance of the pre-

---

<sup>1</sup>The same telegram, except for the first paragraph, was sent Jan. 8, 1919, 7 p. m., to the Minister in Peru with instructions to repeat to the Legations in Ecuador and Bolivia, and to the Minister in Cuba with instructions to repeat to the Legation in Haiti.

liminary meeting of the delegates of the Great Powers, the American Commission will, at the appropriate moment, extend its good offices in behalf of its Latin American neighbors falling within the foregoing categories.

If your advice is asked, the advisability might be informally suggested to the Foreign Office of sending one or more delegates to Paris to be on the spot in case the country to which you are accredited is to be accorded representation at the Conference.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Brazil/6 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1919—6 p. m.

[Received January 10—9:40 a. m.]

161. American Ambassador Brazil cables that Da Gama is disturbed by cable from Brazilian Minister at Paris which stated that Brazil would be allowed only two delegates at Peace Conference although she has apportioned four, two of whom are already in Paris and two en route.

Da Gama requests that you endeavor to save him from the serious embarrassment of selecting two from these four by assisting him to secure admission of all four of these delegates.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Uruguay/1 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, 10 January 1919—4:30 p. m.

228. [From Lansing.] Your 42 of December 30th. Commission concurs with view of Department that South American Nations which declared war or severed diplomatic relations with Germany should be represented at the Peace Conference. In this connection refer Commission's 91 of December 28th [27th] replying to your 124 of December 24th.

There seems to be a sympathetic feeling towards suggestion that neutral nations be represented at any conference in which questions affecting their interests will be discussed, but so far nothing definite has been determined or can be announced, in that regard. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

763.72119/3325 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1919—7 p. m.

178. For the Secretary of State from Polk. I have heard from da Gama, both through Morgan and the Brazilian Chargé here, that he is very much disturbed over the report that Brazil would only be allowed two delegates and that they would not be admitted until the general conference. Apparently da Gama's political reputation is at stake. Am taking the liberty of presenting one or two arguments that occur to me that would make it desirable to give Brazil most favored treatment in regard to delegates.

First: Brazil has already named four delegates. It would be humiliating to have to cut the size of the delegation.

Second: Brazil is the only power in South America that really declared war promptly and also was of material assistance in the war by active cooperation, such as sending ships.

Third: Anything that has the appearance of a slight would of course injure Brazil's prestige in South America and would be a source of gratification to countries such as Argentina and Chile that are jealous of their affiliations with this Government and the Allies.

Fourth: Brazil has stood loyally by us in practically every question that has come up in South America. Therefore, it would seem entitled to every consideration and would realize that this Government was responsible for such recognition as it receives in Paris.

Fifth: The fact that Brazil is the greatest power in South America in the war would seem to entitle it to a fair representation on account of its geographic position.

Sixth: The President elect of Brazil has never taken office owing to ill health. There is a possibility of his resigning and a new Cabinet coming in. The fact that da Gama had failed to secure adequate representation for Brazil in Paris would be used against him and undoubtedly cause his retirement from the Cabinet.

POLK

763.72119/3401

*The Brazilian Chargé (Moreira) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 10 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I beg you to allow me to refer again to the subject of the representation of Brazil at the Preliminary Peace Conferences, which Mr. da Gama is so anxious to obtain through your valuable intercession.

On December 3rd. I received a confidential cable instructing me to tell to Mr. Lansing that it would be a general disappointment in Brazil if we will not be represented at the Preliminary Conferences.

Mr. Stabler<sup>8</sup> was kind enough to transmit this message, from Mr. da Gama, to Mr. Lansing on the eve of his departure for Paris.

On the 7th. you were good enough to receive me and I had the honor to transmit to you another message from my Minister for Foreign Affairs saying that he was hoping that you would obtain that Brazil should be invited at the Preliminary Conferences, this helping considerably our Government which public opinion deemed careless in the matter. You were so kind as to cable to Colonel House transmitting the desire of my Government.

Yesterday I received a cable from Rio reading:

"Transmit to Mr. Polk following. Am requesting your intercession to obtain that Brazilian Delegation composed for be accepted at Peace Congress, its members were appointed when plans of Great Powers were not known and we could wait no longer on account of distance and public political pression [*pressure?*]. Kindly speak Ipanema. Best regards. (Signed) Gama."

His Excellency adds that I must tell you that we deem of great importance not seeing denial given to our Delegates to appear at the Conferences bearing in mind that in the classification of Powers it must also be given a thought to the economical factor and future political interests.

Reducement would be humiliating and produce resentment prejudicial to the harmony of people and ideas in this particularly difficult moment.

I remain [etc.]

A. DE IPANEMA MOREIRA

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Brazil/6: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 11, 1919—7:40 p. m.

256. [From Lansing.] Your 161, January 9th. Please request American Ambassador Brazil to inform Da Gama that I will bear matter carefully in mind and do what I can to arrange for admission of Brazilian Delegates.

For your information it is proposed at present that small powers including Brazil shall have three delegates at Peace Conference.<sup>9</sup> Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

<sup>8</sup>Jordan H. Stabler, Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>9</sup>The Supreme Council on Jan. 13, 1919, agreed to give three delegates to Brazil (file No. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/2½).



## SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

763.72119/2726 : Telegram

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

CHRISTIANIA, November 21, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received November 22—1:55 a. m.]

1363. I am reliably informed that the Norwegian Government hopes that its representatives will be enabled to participate in the forthcoming Peace Conference in which the Norwegian representatives would advance the views of this Government: (1) on all matters affecting the interest of Norway, particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; (2) on the wish of Norway to join the League of Nations; (3) and on this Government's desire to assume sovereignty over Spitzbergen. The foregoing three points are considered by the Norwegian Government to be of paramount importance to Norway and will be strongly pressed.

This Government also hopes to receive compensation for Norwegian tonnage lost during the war and that Germany will be obliged to indemnify for the loss of life among Norwegian seamen.

Negotiations are understood to be going on with a view to obtaining Swedish and Danish support for Norwegian claims in return for which Norway will support the claim of Sweden to the Aaland Islands and Denmark claim to Schleswig.

It is anticipated that formal representations along these lines will soon be made by the Norwegian Government to the belligerent Governments.

SCHMEDEMAN

---

763.72119/2951

*The Danish Minister (Brun) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1918.

SIR: I am directed by the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform you that, in view of the negotiations which are to take place in Paris for the purpose of deciding the conditions and aims of the

coming Peace Conference, the Danish Minister at Paris has been instructed to deliver a note to the French Government proposing that an opportunity should be given Denmark to participate in the discussion of the question regarding the establishment of a League of Nations and of all other questions which have a direct importance for the interests of our country.

I beg to enclose for your information a copy of the text of the note which the Danish Minister at Paris has accordingly delivered to the French Government.

I have [etc.]

C. BRUN

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>1</sup>]

*Copy of a Note Addressed by the Danish Minister at Paris to the French Government*

In the course of the World War it was proclaimed in the most diverse quarters that one of the principal objects to be sought at the conclusion of peace should be the founding of a League of Nations to assure the establishment of an international rule of law and so lay the bases of a lasting peace. It is obvious that this question is of vital importance not only for the states which have taken part in the war, but for all civilized states. On one hand, the founding of a League of Nations would tend to influence the legal relations of all states with each other; and on the other hand, it would certainly have important consequences in the constitutional, economic, and military organization of each country. For this reason it is fundamentally important for all countries that their Governments be admitted to participate, from the beginning, in the deliberations on these questions. The Royal Government which, like the whole Danish people, is animated by the keenest desire to see the problem of a League of Nations brought to a satisfactory solution, considers that it may be proper for it to take steps with a view to obtaining an opportunity to take part in the discussion of this problem as well as of every other question directly affecting the interests of Denmark. In view of the fact that, as is generally known, discussions on the procedures of the future Congress for the conclusion of peace will be opened shortly at Paris, the Royal Government has believed that it ought to apply in the matter to the Government of the French Republic with the request that the application be communicated to the other interested Governments.

---

<sup>1</sup> File translation revised.

763.72119/3267

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Acting Secretary  
of State*

No. 1100

CHRISTIANIA, December 7, 1918.

[Received January 4, 1919.]

SIR: Referring to my despatch No. 1068 of November 23rd,<sup>2</sup> I have the honor to confirm my telegram No. 1420 of the 5th inst.<sup>3</sup> and to enclose herewith copy and translation of the note addressed by the Norwegian Government to the French Government<sup>4</sup> relative to this Government's desire to participate from the beginning in the forthcoming deliberations concerning the organization of a League of Nations as well as in those regarding any other question of direct importance to Norwegian interests.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>5</sup> informed me that a copy of the note had been forwarded to the Norwegian Minister at Washington, for communication to the Department, and that similar representations had been made by the other Scandinavian Governments.

In view of the information in my possession, as reported to the Department in my despatch No. 1068, I sounded His Excellency as to the detailed nature of this Government's demands, but he was non-committal in his replies.

Mr. Ihlen stated that in his opinion it was most important for the Foreign Ministers of the neutral countries to come into personal contact with the Secretary of State of the United States, and added that if an invitation to attend the Paris Conference were extended to neutral Foreign Ministers he was sure such an invitation would be accepted with pleasure.

His Excellency also expressed the desire that if neutral Foreign Ministers were asked to attend the conference they be accompanied by the American Chiefs of Missions in the respective countries, in which connection I beg leave to confirm that the British Minister as well as the Commercial and Naval Attachés of the British Legation here, and the British representatives at Stockholm and Copenhagen have gone to London.

My impression is that the foregoing statements of the Minister for Foreign Affairs represent the result of recent negotiations with the Swedish and Danish Governments.

---

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; most of substance of despatch contained in telegram No. 1363, Nov. 21, 1918, 8 p. m., p. 236.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed; an identic note from the Danish Minister at Paris to the French Government is printed *supra*. A translation of the Norwegian note was also transmitted to the Department by the Norwegian Minister in a note of Dec. 23, 1918 (file No. 763.72119/3182).

<sup>5</sup> Nils Ihlen.

It seems to me that it would be an excellent idea for the Foreign Ministers to meet in Paris and become acquainted with the representatives of other nations and that it could but have the result of strengthening and developing friendly international relations.

It might also be a good idea to ask the Chiefs of Missions to be present at the conference in an advisory capacity, to discuss with the delegates questions concerning the countries to which they are accredited, but I would recommend that they be accompanied by a member of the War Trade Board and the Naval and Military Attachés.

As I have already reported to the Department (see my despatches No. 1029 of October 29th and 1032 of November 1st last<sup>6</sup>), the idea of the establishment of a League of Nations has been greeted with great satisfaction in this country and the press and the people are unanimous in giving expression to their enthusiasm as well as to the hope that Norway may be allowed to participate in it. There is also great satisfaction in political circles that the President is attending the conference personally, as this country has great faith in his judgment and it is felt that his presence will ensure the safeguarding of the interests of small nations.

I have [etc.]

A. G. SCHMEDEMAN

763.72119/3048

*The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State*

[Translation<sup>7</sup>]

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that on the 10th of this month the Ministers of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden jointly called on His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic and delivered to him three identic notes.<sup>8</sup>

The document states that the founding of a league intended to institute an international order of law and to establish a lasting peace is of vital importance to all civilized countries. It would not only tend to influence the juridical relations between states but its effects would be deeply felt also in the constitutional, economic and military organization of each particular country. Under these conditions the three Scandinavian Governments advance the opinion

<sup>6</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>7</sup> File translation revised.

<sup>8</sup> Danish note printed on p. 237.

that it would be proper for each of them to take steps to obtain the opportunity to take part in the deliberations of the Peace Congress bearing either on that particular question or on any other directly affecting its own interests.

Inasmuch as the deliberations on the manner of conducting the future Congress for the conclusion of peace are to open in Paris, the three Scandinavian Governments have applied to the Government of the Republic asking it to communicate their request to the other Governments concerned.

His Excellency M. Pichon answered that in compliance with their wish he would make their step known to the Governments which will be called upon to determine in the first instance the procedure of the Peace Conference, namely, the United States, England and Italy. He added in answer to an inquiry by the three Scandinavian Ministers that in his judgment the question of the League of Nations could not be decided without the advice of the neutral countries.

Be pleased [etc.]

CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

## CHINA

763.72/12349 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1918—3 p. m.

6282. Chinese Minister has informed the Department that his Government has already communicated to the French Government its request that it be represented on the Supreme War Council whenever questions involving the Far East and especially China are under discussion. You will take up the matter with the French Government and support the request of China in this respect. Please advise Colonel House of this action.

LANSING

---

893.01A/41 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 16, 1918—1 p. m.  
[Received November 16—11:42 a. m.]

For Third Assistant Secretary of State. Willoughby<sup>1</sup> has been asked to accept appointment as adviser to the President of China and to be assigned to assist in the preparation and presentation of China's case before the coming Peace Conference. He is willing to accept this appointment and after learning the general points which the Chinese Government will probably urge upon the Peace Conference, he shall leave for America and be in Washington early in January in order to discuss these points with the American Government. The appointment will not be made public for the present. Willoughby asks that you approve this appointment and I strongly urge that this approval be given.

REINSCH

---

893.01A/41 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1918—4 p. m.

Your November 16, 1 p. m. The Department was approached a few days ago by an American of international reputation as to

---

<sup>1</sup> W. W. Willoughby, adviser to the Chinese Government.

whether it would be wise for him to accept an appointment as a representative or advisor of China at the Peace Conference. The Secretary submitted the question to the President who stated, without qualification, that he considered it unwise, if not improper, for an American to have official connection with any other Government in connection with the negotiations for peace. In view of the President's decision I hope you will discourage the appointment of Willoughby or any other American for the position.

LANSING

---

763.72119/2678 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 18, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received 4:19 p. m.]

Japanese Legation has intimated in several quarters the Japanese Government may be found ready to settle the Shantung question by returning the Kiaochow leased territory to China in accordance with the original declaration of that Government in 1914<sup>2</sup> and that under such circumstances there would be no occasion for China to be represented at the Peace Conference.

REINSCH

---

763.72/12390 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 19, 1918—12 midnight.

[Received November 20—11:58 a. m.]

5920. Department's number 6282, November 15th. Mr. Pichon informs me in principle the French Government is willing to have China represented on the Supreme War Council, whenever questions involving China are concerned, but that he felt permission should be formally granted only upon the joint recommendation of France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States. He expressed the belief there would be no objection.

SHARP

---

<sup>2</sup> See telegram from the Ambassador in Japan, Aug. 15, 1914, midnight, *Foreign Relations*, 1914, supp., p. 170.

763.72119/2716 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 20, 1918—8 p. m.  
[Received November 21—2:38 a. m.]

Referring to the Department's telegram of November 18, 4 p. m. The Chinese Government will assign British and Japanese presidential advisers as counsellors to the Chinese delegation to the [Peace Conference?]. Willoughby too would go as adviser to the President detailed by him to assist the delegation and employed under substantially the same contract as that under which he formally [*formerly?*] served. In view of these facts, I beg to remove [*renew?*] my recommendation that he be permitted to accept the appointment offered to him by the President of China unless it be the desire of the American Government that American expert assistance should be eliminated on this occasion which decision would have to be explained to the Chinese Government.

Some one with the special knowledge and qualification possessed by Willoughby would be of value in facilitating close working relations between the American and Chinese delegations, whether he be attached to the American or the Chinese delegations. The fundamental importance of a right settlement of the Chinese situation in order that dangers ever [*even?*] greater than the one just overcome may be avoided in time makes desirable the presence of men possessed of thorough recent information.

REINSCH

---

763.72119/2723 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 21, 1918—12 p. m.  
[Received November 21—9:45 p. m.]

5956. Department's number 6282 November 15th. A memorandum just received from the Foreign Office states that as yet the French Government has not received request from the Chinese Government to be permitted to have a representative on the Supreme War Council for a discussion of the questions pertaining to the Orient but that I will be advised as soon as any request is made. Mr. Pichon however adds that he has been notified that the Chinese Government expects to send a delegate to the Peace Congress.

SHARP



763.72119/2741 : Telegram

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

PEKING, November 22, 1918—12 a. m.

[Received 11:43 a. m.]

Referring to my cable of November 20, 8 P. M. the President has decided not to send Japanese adviser with the Peace Conference delegation. Desires to send only Dr. Morrison<sup>3</sup> and Dr. Willoughby. If Willoughby cannot go it is likely that Foreign Office will desire to send their adviser, Dr. W. C. Dennis.

REINSCH

763.72119/2741 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1918—4 p. m.

Your November 22d, 12 A. M. and your November 20th, 8 P. M. The Department is strongly of the opinion that no American citizens should serve as advisers to the Chinese Government Peace Delegation. The delegates of the United States to the Peace Conference will be glad to confer informally with the Chinese delegation about matters affecting their interests. You will discreetly use the above information. For your guidance position as stated in Department's November 18th, four P. M. remains the attitude of this Government.

LANSING

763.72119/3302½ : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1918—2 p. m.

The Department is reliably informed that the Southern party desires that there be a delegate from the south on the peace delegation in order that the delegation may have a national aspect. Such a step might be a means of promoting closer relations between the north and the south and you may at your discretion mention the matter quite informally to the proper authorities.

POLK

---

<sup>3</sup> Dr. George Ernest Morrison, British subject, political adviser to the President of China.

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 China/6 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1919—3 p. m.

[Received January 5—8:10 a. m.]

93. Chinese Peace Commission sailed on *George Washington* 2nd. Minister Lou is greatly pleased over the appointment of C. T. Wang as delegate. Believes that it will have best influence in uniting the Northern and Southern Provinces. C. T. Wang stated that this should be not only an international but also a Chinese Peace Conference and that the breach between the two factions in China would be healed and that the Chinese delegates would stand for the principles enunciated by President Wilson.

POLK

## FINLAND

763.72119/2810

### *The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1327

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1918.

SIR: I have the honour to inform you, by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Dr. Holsti, the *de facto* representative of the Government of Finland in London, has made a request to His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Finland Government begging them to consent to the participation in the Peace Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the Government of Finland, and asking them, in the absence of a representative of Finland in the United States, to inform the United States Government. His Majesty's Government have informed Dr. Holsti that they have in mind the wishes of the Finland Government and that the United States Government would be notified of his request.

In bringing the above to the notice of the United States Government I am directed to explain that His Majesty's Government consider that this and all similar demands can only be decided by the Allies in common concert.

I have [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

## HEJAZ

763.72119/2758

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1305

### MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the General Officer Commanding in the Chief Egyptian Expeditionary Force recently reported that King Hussein had expressed his intention of sending a representative to the Peace Conference, who could enter into discussions with the Allied representatives concerning the definite settlement of Arab countries.

His Majesty's Government suggested in reply that the best course would be for the King to depute for this purpose Emir Feisal, who has been hitherto in close touch with both British and French authorities in Syria and Palestine and that King Hussein should address himself to the several Allied Powers with this view.

His Majesty's Government now learn that the King proposes to act on these suggestions.

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918.

---

763.72119/2757

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1317

### MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the memorandum from His Majesty's Embassy No. 1305 of November 20th, has the honour to inform him by direction of His Majesty's Government that King Hussein has asked His Majesty's Commissioner at Cairo to convey to His Majesty's Government the formal ratification of the fact that his son, Emir Feisal, is proceeding as his representative to Paris. The King has also asked that a similar notification may be made by the British Government in his name to the United States, French, and Italian Governments.

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1918.

## LIBERIA

763.72119/2912 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

MONROVIA, December 5, 1918—11 a. m.

[Received December 6—9:39 a. m.]

Cables have been received recently by President of Liberia from both Consul General Lyon<sup>2</sup> and Receiver General Worley,<sup>3</sup> each expressing willingness to accept appointment as delegate to represent Liberia at Peace Conference.

Following has been communicated to Legation as being attitude of President relative to his appointing delegates:

1st. Liberia expects to be represented at Peace Conference and would appoint for this purpose, if advisable, mixed commission consisting of Liberians and Americans;

2nd. Members of said commission to be not fewer than three nor more than five. In either case chairman, as well as the majority of members of commission, to be Liberian;

3d. Commission to be closely associated and to act in complete harmony with the delegates of the United States;

4th. It would be agreeable to Liberia for the Government of the United States to recommend for appointment American member or members of commission;

5th. Liberia disposed to take no action in matters relating to Peace Conference until definitely advised so to do by the Government of the United States.

President has intimated that he would be pleased if an official of the State Department familiar with Liberia's internal questions might be recommended, as indicated under paragraph 4 above, for appointment as an American member. He also desires to know particulars of the proposal of Worley to make loan available for expenses of delegates.

BUNDY

---

<sup>1</sup> This telegram, except first and last paragraphs, repeated by the Department to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in telegram No. 125, Jan. 7, 1919, 3 p. m. (file No. Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Liberia/1).

<sup>2</sup> Ernest Lyon, consul general of Liberia at Baltimore.

<sup>3</sup> Harry F. Worley, an American citizen.

763.72119/3641

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 277

MONROVIA, December 6, 1918.

Diplomatic

[Received February 4, 1919.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of a communication dated Nov. 23, 1918, received by the Legation from President Howard with reference to Liberia's desire to be represented at the peace conference.

As reported in Legation's cable of Dec. 5, 11 a. m., both Consul General Lyon and General Receiver Worley cabled to the President of Liberia their willingness to accept appointment as delegates to represent the Republic at the peace conference. These cables caused the President to address the note, copy of which is enclosed, to the Legation requesting it to ascertain what views the Department held with reference to the matter of Liberia's desire to send representatives to the peace conference.

In conversation the President assured me that the Liberian Government did not wish to take any action towards selecting or appointing delegates until it had been advised definitely by the Department what to do. After making this reservation, however, the President expressed himself as willing to appoint a mixed commission composed of Americans and Liberians to represent Liberia. Such a commission as he had in mind would have not more than five members nor fewer than three. But in any case he desired that the Chairman of the commission should be a Liberian and that the majority of the members of the commission should be Liberians. Under these propositions a commission of three or four members would have one American member, and a commission of five members would have two American members.

The President also stated that it would be entirely satisfactory to Liberia for the Department to recommend for appointment the American member or members and that the Commission would be instructed to act in complete harmony with the delegates of the United States.

The President went on further to say that the proposals he was advancing were tentative and that he was disposed to await advice from the Department before doing anything.

I asked him what Liberians he thought of appointing if it should develop that the idea of Liberia sending a commission was deemed advisable. He replied that he would probably select the following men: James J. Dossen, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Liberia; C. D. B. King, Secretary of State, and Edwin J. Barclay, Attorney-

General. . . . I am quite satisfied that the President, if called upon to appoint Liberian delegates to the peace conference, will choose the ablest men available.

In speaking of American members of the commission he intimated that perhaps it might be possible for an official of the State Department familiar with Liberia's international questions to be designated for appointment as a delegate. I of course could make no expression on this suggestion, and in fact have refrained from making any statement about any phase of this matter. I have simply informed the President that I would promptly communicate his note and his views to the Department for such action as may be appropriate. It is felt that the Legation can do nothing in the premises without the Department's specific instructions.

I have [etc.]

RICHARD C. BUNDY

[Enclosure]

*The President of Liberia (Howard) to the American Chargé (Bundy)*

MONROVIA, November 23, 1918.

SIR: From recent cablegrams respecting the state of the great World War, we are of the opinion that at a very early date the Allied Powers will appoint delegates to represent them at the Peace Conference which is to follow.

Liberia is most desirous of being represented at this momentous Conference where, it is believed, the future of the entire continent of Africa will form a very important feature. It is highly necessary that the delegates of the Liberian Government should be in complete harmony with those of the Government of the United States, and for this reason it is hoped that they may be associated in a very intimate sense with them. I have, therefore, to respectfully request you to be kind enough to place this matter before your Government immediately for an expression.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

D. E. HOWARD

---

763.72119/2912 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy)*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1918—6 p. m.

Legation's December 5. Department concurs that Liberia be represented at Peace Conference by mixed commission of three including

Worley who would also act as disbursing officer. Other questions require his presence in Europe at this time.

Suggest that copies of all necessary documents to make up Liberia's case be taken from Monrovia. Necessary records will be taken from Department files.

Typewriting machines, stenographer, and stationery supplies can be obtained here economically.

If desired temporary loan could likely be arranged here to cover actual expenses delegation obviating loan at Monrovia. Quick action necessary as Delegates are now assembling.

POLK

---

763.72119/3187 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State*

MONROVIA, December 23, 1918—7 p. m.

[Received December 27—10:05 a. m.]

In compliance with suggestions in Department's December 14th, 6 P. M. Liberian Government has decided to send mixed commission of three, including Worley, who may act as disbursing officer, to represent Liberia at Peace Conference. Liberian members will be C. D. B. King, Secretary of State, and Senator Charles B. Dunbar.<sup>4</sup> President of Liberia will designate King chairman. Legislature has passed joint resolution appropriating \$20,000 for expenses of commission and authorizing Secretary of the Treasury to make loan of this amount abroad. Secretary of the Treasury will delegate immediately by cable his authority to Worley to negotiate loan. After loan secured Liberian Government desires Worley to transfer here \$2,000.00 to pay actual expenses of Liberian delegates from Monrovia to Europe. Liberian Government agrees that typewriting machines, stationery supplies and stenographer be obtained in United States. All necessary documents here will be taken. Liberian delegates wish to know when and where to meet Worley.

BUNDY

---

<sup>4</sup> In despatch No. 282, Dec. 26, 1918 (file No. 763.72119/4119), confirming this telegram, the Chargé in Liberia wrote:

"The Legation is of the opinion that the selection of Secretary King and Senator Dunbar for this very important mission was well made. These gentlemen are among the recognized able leaders in the country and there seems to be general public satisfaction over their appointment."



Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Liberia/1: Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 10, 1919—4 p. m.

226. [From Lansing.] Your 125 January 7th 3 P. M.<sup>5</sup> I would suggest that you indicate to Liberian Government that it would be preferable to appoint one delegate with such assistants as may be necessary, one or more of whom might be Americans, the remainder Liberians.

Please advise me names of the Americans whom you will recommend for appointment.

Attitude of the President of Liberia in this matter appreciated by the American Commissioners who will be glad render any proper assistance at the Conference. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

763.72119/3187: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy)*

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1919—5 p. m.

Your December 23, 7 p. m. For President: American Commissioners cable that they appreciate your attitude toward them and will be glad to render any proper assistance at Conference.

Worley delayed with details of loan and correspondence. Suggests that King and Dunbar meet him Hotel Crillon, Paris. American commissioners have been asked to assist in finding temporary or permanent lodging and one office room.

Worley is cabling Walker<sup>6</sup> \$2,000.

Office supplies being shipped.

POLK

---

763.72119/3367: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1919—5 p. m.

282. For Secretary Lansing. Your 226, January 10, 4 p. m. At the suggestion of the Department, Liberia has designated two Liberians and H. F. Worley, American Financial Adviser of Liberia, as delegates to Peace Conference with one stenographer or assistant from the United States.

---

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, p. 248.

<sup>6</sup> Walter F. Walker, Secretary of the Treasury of Liberia.

Liberian delegates are C. D. B. King, Secretary of State, and Charles B. Dunbar, Senator, both of whom are known here as able men. Worley is now here assisting the Department in negotiations and working out financial program for the financial aid to Liberia.

Can you arrange temporary or permanent lodging and one office room for them?

The two Liberian delegates left Liberia January 13th via Cadiz.

POLK

## MONTENEGRO

763.72119/2725 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 21, 1918—8 p. m.  
[Received November 21—6:29 p. m.]

5957. Montenegrin Government has addressed a request through me to the American Government to be represented at the Peace Conference. Copy of note being forwarded by today's pouch.

SHARP

---

763.72119/2864

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6794

PARIS, November 21, 1918.  
[Received December 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copy, with translation, of a note dated November 14, 1918, from the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which is an appeal that Montenegro be represented at the Peace preliminaries.

I have [etc.]

WM. G. SHARP

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs (Popovitch) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

No. 2456

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, November 14, 1918.

MR. AMBASSADOR: The negotiations between the heads of the Governments and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Allied States being about to begin in Paris in order to prepare the peace preliminaries, the undersigned has the honor to address himself to Your Excellency in the hope that the Government of Montenegro will be represented thereat.

It is within the knowledge of Your Excellency that the right of Montenegro to take part in the Inter-Allied Conferences has been acknowledged by all the Allied Governments.

However, at the last Versailles conference the Montenegrin delegates were not mentioned, although our Government had requested in

good time to be represented. It was attempted to justify this omission on account of the military character of the decisions to be taken at Versailles, Montenegro having no army at the front. Our Government regretted this exclusion, Montenegro being since many centuries essentially a military state and nearly always at war with Turkey and Austria. There is no need to add that Montenegro in these last wars, although small, has dared to stand up against the forces of Austria and beat them in several combats, and that it was only after four years of struggle heroically supported that it succumbed for the cause of the Allies, standing alone against three enemies. In spite of all its sacrifices Montenegro, in the most glorious period of the war and in the days of the armistice, had on the Eastern front and on the Franco-Belgian front, some thousands of soldiers in the service of the Allies in the Anglo-Canadian armies, in the French army (Foreign Legion and Army of Macedonia) and in the aviation. These soldiers, under the flags of the Allies, have shown themselves heroes and have won the highest military decorations.

The Montenegrin Government had declared at the second Inter-Allied Conference, which took place at Paris in December, 1917, (meeting of the commissions), that it was ready, if its organization in France were facilitated, to get together in a very short time, under the French high command, a legion of soldiers for whose qualities it offered every guarantee. Such a request had been presented at the beginning of 1916 after the fall of Montenegro. Thousands of Montenegrins in North and South America and in the other Allied and neutral countries impatiently awaited the call to put themselves at the sides of their brothers and Allies on the European fronts.

Furthermore, history has shown the importance of the Montenegrin rock in the central Adriatic region and in its relation to the other interior regions. Montenegro therefore had every right to take a place even at the military conference. Montenegro has been and will continue always to be a devoted and faithful Ally of the Allied Powers. The Royal Government therefore has the honor to address itself to the Government of the United States with the assurance that in the negotiations about to begin at Paris to prepare the peace preliminaries the place which is its by right shall be kept for it.

With assurances [etc.]

EUGENE POPOVITCH

## PERSIA

763.72119/2645 : Telegram

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

TEHERAN, November 15, 1918—11 p. m.

[Received November 16—11:59 p. m.]

43. The Persian Government contemplating sending commission to Washington at once with a view to and hope of obtaining assistance from America in getting a seat at the coming Peace Convention. The Shah, Cabinet and all officials and the Persian public attach very great importance to such representation hoping thus to settle definitely and forever the annoying vexatious question of their sovereign integrity and independence.

British Minister who appears to be sympathetic to Persian hopes and claims informs me that London advises "question representation of neutral countries depends on views of all Allied Associated Governments who will doubtless decide according to equity, expediency, special position of each power interested and the general political situation. As regards Persia, His Britannic Majesty's Government will welcome presence of official Persian representative at the place where said congress will meet to be consulted if and when any question directly affecting Persian rights and interests comes up for discussion." British Minister remarked to me yesterday that he believed matter would be finally settled by allowing Persia representation at the Peace Convention but that she would probably have no voice or vote on general questions but only on matters affecting Persia. This would appear to be fair and just.

I beg to point out that Persia's grievance is greater than and differs from the sufferings of other neutrals in that her independence and sovereignty had been before the war repeatedly transgressed and questioned and since the war, violated by Russia, Turkey, and Great Britain; that the presence over her protest of three armies, viz, Russian, Turkish, and British, part of which did immense damage, pillaged, murdered and brought on famine, some of whom yet remain on her soil, makes her case in a category by itself.

I beg to suggest that this is the time to settle the twenty-five-century-old Persian question. Persia's hope is in America.

CALDWELL

763.72119/3488

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

No. 464

TEHERAN, November 15, 1918.

[Received January 24, 1919.]

SIR: Now that the war has reached an end the Persians are evincing great interest in the peace conference and all parties are in accord in expressing the desire that Persia should be represented there. They base their claim for such representation at a conference which will presumably be formed of representatives of the belligerent nations only on the ground that Persia, though neutral, has nevertheless suffered heavily from the war, her territory having been invaded by the armies of three belligerent powers and actual fighting having occurred on her soil on many different occasions.

Persia's desiderata are to have her independence and territorial integrity recognized by an international conference of the great powers and guarantees given that she will be allowed freely to develop internally as she thinks best for the establishment of a strong independent state that will no longer be a pawn in the international game of the large imperial powers. Persia also desires indemnities for the damage caused by foreign belligerent armies in her territory and there are some Persian statesmen who even desire that Persia should be made a perpetually neutral state by treaties between the great powers.

For the realization of their hopes Persians of all parties are looking more and more towards the United States for help. They would like to have the support at the peace conference of a strong disinterested power like the United States having no political interests in Persia, should Persian representatives be admitted there. . . .

I have [etc.]

JOHN L. CALDWELL

763.72119/3279

*The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to submit herewith, for your Excellency's prompt and kindly consideration, copies of the translation of two cipher cablegrams, which I have received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Teheran.

As these messages clearly point out, the Imperial Persian Government is appealing to the Government of the United States to recog-

nize their right of representation at the Peace Conference with the right to vote, in order that the vast losses inflicted upon Persia by the belligerent Powers, who occupied and invaded the neutral territory of Persia, be indemnified and the sovereignty and economic and political independence of Persia be secured for all time upon the firm foundation of justice which it is the unalterable purpose of your Government to embody in the Peace Treaty. My Government are assured that your Excellency's Government will clearly see the justice of this request on the part of Persia.

In my recent cablegrams I had urged my Government to take prompt action in naming their delegation to the Peace Conference giving it full instruction to co-operate thoroughly and closely with the Government of the United States and to support the American delegation with their vote in realizing the great principles enunciated by the President of the United States.

If the British Government continues to take the attitude mentioned in the enclosed cablegrams, how could Persia be given a chance at the Peace Conference to safeguard her future, and have a voice in matters discussed at the Peace Conference, which will directly and definitely concern her destiny as a sovereign nation?

May I also submit herein enclosed, an article by La Marquise de Fontenoy, published in the New York Evening *Sun*, under the date of November 19th,<sup>1</sup> which reflects to a degree the views of certain representatives of the old regime in Great Britain concerning British policy in Persia.

At this time when the United States of America is to insure the independence and sovereignty of all nations of the world, it is the aim of the sovereign state of Persia, with the help of America, to guard herself against all direct and indirect attempt upon the part of Great Britain or any other Power, to interfere with her independence and seek to use her as their "sphere of influence."

As the time, preceding the opening of the Peace Conference, is very short, may I beg your Excellency for a prompt and favorable answer which I may transmit to my Government.

Accept [etc.]

MIRZA ALI-KULI KHAN, N. D.

[Enclosure 1—Telegram—Translation]

*The Persian Foreign Minister (Aliqoli) to the Persian Chargé  
(Ali-Kuli Khan)*

TEHERAN, November 16, 1918.

Your Excellency's last cables received. Necessary instructions will be given. The thing that is immediate and important is this:

---

<sup>1</sup> Not reprinted.

as a result of conferences and steps of the Persian Government regarding right of representation at Peace Conference, I advise you as follows:

A note has been received from the British Minister to the effect that the British Government on its own part is ready to receive the empowered representative of Persia at the place where the Peace Conference will be held so that he may give information on the occasion when matters pertaining to Persia may be discussed.

It is evident that because of the great losses which, contrary to the other neutral governments, the Government of Persia has suffered during the war, it cannot imagine itself in the same position as the other neutral powers. Moreover at the Peace Conference it is possible that questions will be brought up in which the Persian Government will be deeply concerned, and the Persian delegation must defend the interests of Persia. Due to these considerations it is necessary that the Persian delegate be a member of the conference with power to vote . . .<sup>2</sup>

It is necessary that you follow up your former activities in this respect and draw the attention of the appropriate authorities to the object and to the losses suffered by the Persian Government, in order that in fulfillment of Persia's expectations, the American Government may officially recognize Persia's membership and right to vote at the Peace Conference. I expect good results from your activities.

ALIGOLI

No. 30

[Enclosure 2—Telegram—Translation]

*The Persian Foreign Minister (Aligoli) to the Persian Chargé  
(Ali-Kuli Khan)*

TEHERAN, November 18, 1918.

Through the cables gradually sent you, you are assuredly advised, concerning the objects of the Imperial Persian Government in their international policies.

After the recent events which indicated the termination of hostilities the Government deemed it advisable to convene a meeting of ministers, dignitaries, and notables of the capital, in order to consult upon the aims and policies, of Persia and resolve upon a definite plan. The above meeting, in the course of several sessions, conferred and exchanged views, and voted their opinion as follows:

Although the Imperial Persian Government adopted the policy of neutrality from the beginning of the war, and pursued it to the very end, nevertheless the territory of Persia was made a theatre of the war during the entire period of hostilities. Inasmuch as for

<sup>2</sup> Omission indicated in translation received from Persian Chargé.



this reason, Persia was subjected to violence and hardships, and suffered vast material and moral losses, the Government of Persia therefore request from the sense of Justice and fairness of the Powers the carrying out of the following articles:<sup>a</sup>

First: Persian Government delegation be admitted to the Peace Conference even though representatives of other neutral powers are not admitted. This is because of the losses inflicted upon Persia and the conflict of the belligerents upon Persian territory.

Second: The annulling and cancellation of treaties, conventions, and agreements which are in contravention of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Persia, and the obtaining of sufficient assurances on the part of powers signatory to the International Peace Treaty, in order that, in the future the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Persia be safeguarded against all interference.

Third: Persia to be indemnified for the losses inflicted upon her by any of the belligerent powers.

Fourth: The economic and [*sic*] independence of Persia.

Fifth: Revision of the treaties which have not as yet been declared null and are still in force, and the positive determination to annul the capitulations.

Sixth: Making new commercial treaties and arranging our customs tariff based on our economic independence.

Seventh: Securing co-operation for the Persian Government in revising the concessions which have not yet been made null and void, and arranging them in conformity with the principles stated in the above mentioned articles.

Eighth: The ratification of Persia's frontier lines and the restoration of Persian territory wrongfully taken.

You will see that these eight demands which the Imperial Government makes are based upon and within the scope of the fourteen principles and conditions outlined by President Wilson, all of which have been accepted in principle by all the Powers. And the Imperial Government, because of the losses suffered during the war expects that the Government of the United States of America, to which your Excellency is accredited, may not refuse to assist it in realizing these demands.

You are instructed to immediately convey these propositions to the authorities concerned, and not to fail in any action which is deemed necessary to obtain the assistance of the United States Government, and to advise me of result immediately.

I also convey for your own information the following point: The British Legation declares that the British Government is willing that the fully empowered delegation of Persia be received at the place

---

<sup>a</sup> In telegram No. 54, Nov. 25, 1918, 1 p. m., the Minister in Persia reported receipt of a note from the Persian Foreign Office giving the following eight points; he also reported that the Legation had requested a more precise statement regarding the eighth point. The substance of telegram No. 54 was repeated by the Department in telegram No. 171, Dec. 11, 1918, 5 p. m., to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for Colonel House. (File No. 763.72119/2790.)

where the Peace Congress is to be held, in order that he may furnish information whenever necessary, concerning matters relative to Persia.

It is evident that, in such a case, it is impossible for the Persian delegation to defend its country's interests; for at the Conference, questions will be taken up in which the Persian Government is both directly and indirectly interested.

The safeguarding of Persia's interests is, therefore, dependent upon the Persian delegation being a member of the Conference, and possessing the right to vote.

A similar answer is given to the British Legation.

I expect of your Excellency also to take immediate action and advise me of result.

No. 38

ALIGOLI

763.72119/3279

*The Secretary of State to the Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Kahn)*

No. 26

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of November 21, 1918, and the enclosed copies of telegrams, dated November 16th and 18th respectively, from the Persian Foreign Office relative to the appeal of Persia for representation at the Peace Congress.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States regards with sympathy the request that Persian delegates be admitted to the Peace Congress with power to take part in the discussion and determination of all questions in which Persia is interested or concerned, but a definite decision in this respect will not be communicated until after the President has reached Paris.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

763.72119/3346

*The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 216

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to advise that I have today received a cablegram from the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs at Teheran, to the effect that the British Legation has informed them that the British Government agrees with willingness that the Persian Government should participate at the Peace Conference through a duly accredited delegation, and that the British Government will

on its part assist Persia in achieving this end, but that it would be necessary that the Persian Government should make representations at the courts of the other Allied Governments in order that all these governments would be unanimous in aiding Persia to realize this object.

Accordingly, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that my Government instruct me in the above cablegram to approach your Government with the request that you will be good enough to assist Persia upon this occasion, when the friendship and sympathy of the United States of America will prove of great value in enabling Persia to be represented at the Peace Conference with the right to vote, in order that the many wrongs suffered by Persia during one whole century, including those suffered during the period of the war, shall be righted, and the economic and political independence and sovereignty of Persia as well as her future prosperity be secured upon the foundation of justice provided in the great principles of the United States of America.

I will be thankful if at your earliest convenience you will be good enough to send a favorable answer to this note which I may telegraph to my Government.

Accept [etc.]

MIRZA ALI-KULI KHAN, N. D

---

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Persia/3 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to  
Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1918—9 p. m.

[Received December 22—12 noon.]

94. For Secretary Lansing: Have received note from Persian Chargé d'Affaires<sup>4</sup> stating that he is in receipt of cablegram from Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to effect that British Legation, Teheran, has informed him that British Government is willing that Persia participate in Peace Conference through accredited delegation and will assist to this end but that Persian Government should approach other Allied Governments in order to secure unanimity on this subject.

Chargé further stated that he has been instructed to approach our Government with request to assist Persia to be represented at Peace Conference with right to vote. Full text note forwarded in pouch. Please cable advising what action taken.

POLK

---

<sup>4</sup> *Supra.*

763.72119/3334 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Persia (White) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TEHERAN, January 7, 1919—8 p. m.

[Received January 8—4:05 p. m.]

84. My telegram number 52 [54?], November 25, 1 p. m. eighth point.<sup>5</sup> Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me this refers only to the Russian frontier especially in the Caucasus where Persia would like to recover Nakhchivan and other former Persian towns. Mirza Hussein Khan, member of the commission to the Peace Conference, is anxious to recover several islands in the Persian Gulf now controlled by Great Britain, but the Persian Government will probably not raise the question. Persia desires above all else her economic freedom.

WHITE

---

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, p. 260.

## POLAND

763.72119/2651

### *The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic informs me that the delegate of the Polish National Committee at Paris recognized by the Allies has applied to him for permission to participate in the peace conference when questions bearing upon Polish affairs are taken up.

M. Stephen Pichon, who has had occasion to appreciate the favorable sentiments and well balanced mind of M. Pilz, answered that he was personally in favor of that request, warranted besides by the action taken on the similar request of the Czecho-Slovaks, but that the Allied Governments should be consulted before a final answer could be given.

I am therefore instructed to acquaint Your Excellency with M. Pilz' application, and to ask that you kindly let me know as soon as you can the sentiment of the federal government on the subject.

Be pleased [etc.]

JUSSERAND

---

763.72119/2651

### *The Acting Secretary of State to the French Chargé (Chambrun)*

WASHINGTON, December 24, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a Note from the French Ambassador, dated November 12, 1918, advising that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic states that the delegate of the Polish National Committee at Paris, recognized by the Allies, has applied to him for permission to participate in the peace conference when questions bearing upon Polish affairs are taken up, and requesting to be informed as to the sentiment of the United States government on the subject.

In reply I have the honor to say that as soon as the position of the United States on this question is determined you will be promptly informed.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

## ROUMANIA

Paris Peace Conf. 183.7/2 : Telegram

### *The Chargé in France (Bliss) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 11, 1919—12 a. m.

6700. Following joint telegram from Allied Ministers at Jassy dated Bucharest January 7th :

"The President of the Council has summoned us this morning to inform us of the violent emotion which he felt upon receiving a telegram from Carnavon [?] according to which Belgium and Servia would alone be admitted to the Peace Conferences with the four great powers of the Entente. We have taken it upon ourselves to declare that such information cannot but be inaccurate. Mr. Bratiano replied that the fact is that 'Roumania is treated like a poor wretch deserving pity and not like an Ally who has a right to justice.' He repeated that up to the present time we had not been permitted to declare that the treaty of 1916 remains in full force. He confirmed that if Roumania does not receive satisfaction on this point his Government would have to withdraw. He gave us the following statement (see my telegrams making this declaration) [words missing] from which it is our duty to bring to the most serious attention of our Governments the following considerations :

First, In circumstances which it is superfluous to recall, the Entente has not been in a position to fulfill her engagements undertaken towards Roumania under the Treaty of August 17th 1916. In the first place the Saloniki offensive that was to begin a week before the entrance into war of Roumania did not take place. Nevertheless Roumania exceeding her obligations, risked her all at the appointed date with absolute loyalty. Besides she kept up the fight after the complete falling down of Russia whose aid was promised her [words missing] the Entente and although the new Russian Government had declared war on Roumania the Allies having done nothing to prevent or smooth down the conflict.

Two, [*Second*,] It is absurd, as we have already pointed out, to assimilate the situation of Serbia with that of Roumania. First Serbia had war thrust on her whilst Roumania was drawn into it by us on the faith of the promises of the Entente. Then Serbia has ever been in touch with the Allies which had harbored her Government and her army while Roumania, on the contrary, finding herself in a total isolation between two foes and in such a state that it was absolutely impossible, as was recognized by all allied representatives, for her to withdraw her troops into Russia.

Third, As to the Bucharest treaty which one might be tempted to invoke to declare our promises null and void, we recall that it never had any legal value considering that it was voted by

an unconstitutional parliament; that it has never been sanctioned by the King nor ratified despite all the means of intimidation employed by the enemy and the sufferings resulting therefrom to the country.

Fourth, This view point which is clear upon the evidence is of unanimous opinion. We must put our Governments on guard against personalities that have lost all touch with their country for many months and whose language is inspired by party spirit or by mental reservations of personal ambitions. Our Governments must realize that the question today is to know whether the Entente will maintain its influence in this country which by the very nature of things and in virtue of our principles will number tomorrow eighteen million inhabitants or will alienate it by what everybody here would consider revolting injustice and an act of evident bad faith. We confirm that in the present circumstances Mr. Bratiano's withdrawal would precipitate the country into anarchy whilst we are obliged to appeal to his aid to restore order in Russia."

BLISS

Paris Peace Conf. 183.7/3 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1919—4 p. m.

[Received January 18—8:30 a. m.]

281. Referring to telegram from Allied Ministers to Roumania dated Bucharest January 7th<sup>1</sup> as to whether Roumania is to be excluded from the Peace Conference and Servia and Belgium admitted. Please advise me of facts and ask Mr. Lansing what instructions, if any, should be sent Mr. Vopicka from the Department.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.7/3 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 18, 1919—1:50 p. m.

323. [From Lansing.] Your 281 January 17th 4 p. m. There was never any question regarding representation of Roumania at the Peace Conference. With unanimous approval she has been assigned two representatives.

Same information sent to Vopicka through Embassy here, referring to joint telegram from Allied Ministers Jassy, dated Bucharest January 7th. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

<sup>1</sup> See telegram No. 6700, Jan. 11, 1919, from the Chargé in France, *supra*.

## RUSSIA <sup>1</sup>

763.72119/2749

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honour to enclose herewith an *Aide-Mémoire* with regard to the position of Russia in the forthcoming peace proceedings. The spirit of sympathy and justice, which has throughout animated the United States in its attitude towards Russia, leads me to believe that your Government will find a way to have the interests of the Russian people properly protected.

With this in mind, I respectfully request that the questions brought forward will be given favourable consideration and that I be informed of the position which the Government of the United States will feel inclined to take in this matter so vital to the whole future of my country.

I avail myself [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure]

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The signing of the Armistice by German representatives has brought the armed struggle to an end and a period of general settlement has been initiated. With all the uncertainty, under conditions prevailing, as to the forms of the forthcoming peace proceedings, a new order of things and relations between people is to result which will determine the future of nations for many years.

The interests of Russia in this prospective settlement are of a character most important and vital:

It is in the East, where the greatest changes in territorial and national adjustment are to take place, most of which either affect Russia directly or materially influence her future development.

Russia's role in the world struggle has made her a heavy partner to the great international arrangements of war finance and economics, the regularization and adjustment of which is imminent.

The vast territories invaded, with their millions of inhabitants, have been subject to untold suffering, spoliation and reprisals.

The Central Powers are holding nearly two million Russian prisoners of war.

<sup>1</sup> See also *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, pp. 568, 571, 646-647.



During the Bolsheviki period an ingenious net work of economic obligations had been imposed upon Russia by Germany for the purpose of peaceful conquest.

The sacrifices, which Russia contributed to the war, appear to justify that no discrimination should be applied toward a people unhappy enough to be the first victim of the social disease now threatening the world. It would be incommensurate with the momentous import of issues, which are to determine the fate of the country for the next generations, to be guided by considerations due to incidental and temporary disability. In order to be stable and complete the settlement has to account with the just interests and participation of Russia. Arrangements, which might be regarded in the future as unfair to the Russian people, would carry the prospect of trouble and disquietude.

Certain general principles might be formulated, which in a spirit of fairness and justice would determine the treatment which Russia is to receive in the peace proceedings:

1. No questions, directly affecting Russia, to be settled definitely without her cognizance and consent.
2. Russia to participate on terms equal and similar with regard to reparation and restitution due to spoliation and reprisals.
3. Russian prisoners of war to receive treatment equal.
4. No financial or economic arrangements, for readjusting the past or providing for the future, to be entered upon, which would not include Russia in full and equal participation.
5. In all covenants, establishing the basis of future relations, Russia to receive full participation.

In order to render justice to the Russian people and to safeguard their interests in the future peace proceedings, Russia has to receive proper representation. The mere supposition to the contrary is inconceivable. With Russia's voice unheard a wrong would persist—a source of permanent ill-feeling. In order to meet the imperative necessity of providing for a representation of Russia, difficulties of a formal character, arising from the disabled state of the country, should be overcome.

NOVEMBER 20, 1918.

---

763.72119/2752

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 20 November, 1918.

MY DEAR LANSING: I have read the enclosed, of course, with genuine interest, but is it feasible, in view of the present at least temporary

disintegration of Russia into at least five parts, Finland, the Baltic Provinces, European Russia, Siberia, and the Ukraine, to have Russia represented at the peace table, or to admit a part of her by recognizing and receiving delegates from the Omsk government?

Cordially and faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

[Enclosure]

#### MEMORANDUM

The Interparty League for the Restoration of free Russia has been formed in New York at the beginning of 1918, when it became evident that the Bolsheviki groups in Russia were the tools of the German Government and are leading the country to social and political anarchy and national disintegration. The League is composed of different political groups in America, of Social Democrats, Social Revolutionists, Popular Socialists and Liberals, which means all the political shades of Russia with the exception of the Monarchists and the Bolsheviki. The programme of the League is the establishment of a democratic republic in Russia and the convocation of the Constitutional Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. The League was active in shaping Russian and American public opinion in this country through different publications, through mass meetings, lectures, conferences in all the greatest cities of America.

The Interparty League considers as its privileges and duty to present to the American Government its wishes and desires in regard to the relations of America and the Allies toward Russia, and the League is fully convinced that it is expressing thereby the will of all those political parties in Russia which are the leading forces in the great work of establishing a free democratic Russia.

It is of great importance for the restoration and liberation of Russia that the American Government should recognize the coalitional Omsk Government which is a settled Government of a part of Russia and the first successful and solid step to the establishment of an orderly free government in all Russia.

It is imperative that Russia shall get a full representation at the Peace Conference, as a free and independent country. America and all the Allies can never forget or ignore the fact that the Russian people and the Russian armies had sacrificed immeasurably in blood and wealth during the first years of the war for the freedom of the world and safety of civilization.

The repatriation of the Russian prisoners from the Central Powers to Russia must be accomplished under the supervision of a body representing the Russian Democracy.

It is the most solemn will of the Interparty League and undoubtedly of all Russians and Russian-Americans that the Clause of the Armistice according to which the German armies should remain temporarily on Russian soil, as the guardians of order in Russia, should be declared as void and annulled. Russia and the Russian people cannot accept without protest the humiliation that German armies shall become the police force of Russia and the protectors of the population against internal struggles and excesses.

Interparty League for the Restoration of Free Russia.

The Committee.

DR. SERGEI INGERMAN, *Chairman*

ALEX. CHERNOFF, *Secretary*

DR. NAHUM SYRKIN

MAURICE KASS

MICHAEL SWARIKS

H. SLUTZKY

S. STAAK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Russia/3

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, November 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your note of November 20 in which you ask if it is feasible to have Russia represented at the peace table or to admit a part of her by recognizing and receiving delegates from the Omsk Government.

The whole question is certainly difficult but perhaps not more so than we may have to solve in other cases. To begin with, ought we not consider that we have taken a lead in regard to Russia? We resisted extraordinary pressure to sanction a purely military intervention; we have steadily declined to recognize separate movements or governments. We have said we wish to serve Russia, not to use her, and have expressed a constant desire to help wherever we may find ourselves able to do so. To my mind, we have defined conditions which we should not chance obscuring in the later discussion of intricate problems of peace.

I confess I have been perplexed by the many complications. It is, however, evident that if the associated governments undertake for themselves to settle Russia's affairs and judge the interests of the Russian people from the Baltic to Vladivostok and from the Persian frontier to Finland, the responsibility is heavy. I believe we must

devise a means to bridge the difficulty and am confident that if we make the attempt in advance we shall save much confusion later.

First of all, I would suggest we inform the French, British, Italians and Japanese that we will use our best efforts to see to it that Russia's interests are safeguarded and that we propose to urge that Russian questions be considered as parts of a whole and not as separate problems resulting from what may prove, for the most part, temporary disintegration. At the beginning of the war, no army excelled in spirit that of Russia; no army to the same extent perforce replaced its lack of artillery by the devotion of simple men. Russia played a part as a great nation in staving off the early victory of Germany and to that extent her people have earned a right to assistance and counsel in their present attempts to establish control of their own affairs.

The second point I would suggest, would be a statement that only delegates from a Constituent Assembly or from some general government of Russia based on democratic principles will be admitted as signatories to the peace treaty; that in the interim approved representatives from existing elements of order in Russia will be welcomed to appear before the conference and will be heard on all questions relating to their affairs and where Russian interests may be concerned. A special section of the conference would be charged exclusively with Russian affairs and with the duty of ascertaining the wishes of the people of various parts of Russia. In this way the full session of the conference will be able to speak on Russian affairs not only with knowledge but also after a sympathetic effort to obtain a basis of authority.

I believe a third point should be insisted upon, namely, that in distinguishing between representatives of order and any others, we do not at all oppose socialistic movements or governments as such but only where they are definitely undemocratic and unrepresentative of the majority will.

Finally, it seems to me vital that we should not only offer but carry out immediate economic assistance wherever we can come in contact with elements desiring to maintain democratic principles. In other words, while we must set our faces sternly against anarchy and the class tyranny and terror of Bolshevism, we must at the same time cut to the root of the sore and relieve the misery and exhaustion which form such a fertile soil for its rapid growth.

I have ventured to write you at such length only because it has proved impossible to state the problem more briefly and I shall be grateful to know what your judgment may be.

Faithfully yours,

[File copy not signed]

763.72119/9354a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1918—9 p. m.

135. Russian Ambassador has sailed for Paris and Prince Lvoff<sup>2</sup> is leaving today for England. Both are concerned over the question of the Russian representative at the Peace Conference. Their suggestion is that the diplomatic representatives of the old Miliukov Government and permanent [*prominent?*] Russians such as Lvoff should be invited. Department said matter would be settled in Paris.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Russia/5 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Archangel (Poole) to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

ARCHANGEL, December 16, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 17—9 a. m.]

37. For Colonel House. Maklikoff<sup>3</sup> has telegraphed Tchikowski<sup>4</sup> from Paris saying that while the absence of a proper Russian Government excludes Russia from official representation at the Peace Conference it is hoped to have certain unofficial representatives and it would be well in Maklikoff's view if Tchikowski were among these. The latter has replied that he will come if he can arrange to commit his duties at Archangel to other hands. He hopes that General Meuller who is now on the way here from Rome can replace him. He could then reach Paris before the end of January.

Noulens<sup>5</sup> left here yesterday.

POOLE

Paris Peace Conf. 183.9 Russia/6

*The Secretary of Embassy at Paris (Caffery) to Captain Walter H. Lippmann*

PARIS, December 24, 1918.

DEAR CAPTAIN LIPPMANN: As of possible interest to Colonel House's Mission, I enclose herewith two copies and two translations

<sup>2</sup> Prince George E. Lvoff, Russian President of the Council of Ministers from March to July, 1917.

<sup>3</sup> V. A. Maklikoff, appointed by the Russian Provisional Government as Ambassador to France.

<sup>4</sup> N. V. Tchikowski, President of the Russian Government of the Northern Region.

<sup>5</sup> Joseph Noulens, French Ambassador to Russia.

of a circular telegram addressed by Mr. Klutchnikoff to the Russian Embassy at Paris, asking that the interests of Russia may not be forgotten in the peace negotiations.<sup>6</sup>

Very sincerely yours,

JEFFERSON CAFFERY

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

*The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kolchak Government  
at Omsk (Klutchnikoff) to the Russian Embassy at Paris*

OMSK, December 7, 1918.

1585. Kindly transmit the following declaration of the Russian Government to the French Government and through our Ambassadors and Ministers in Europe to the Governments to whom they are accredited: the war of four years against the German coalition has terminated by the complete triumph of those who sought to guarantee the peoples against violence and arbitrary power. Fate has not allowed Russia, exhausted by the excessive burden of a long struggle, to continue to fight in the ranks of the Allies until the joyful day of victory but she celebrates this victory with the Allies and awaits the beneficial results which will accrue therefrom for all the universe and for the Russian people overwhelmed with suffering. Russia notes with profound satisfaction that her supreme efforts for the common cause as well as her innumerable and bloody sacrifices have not been forgotten; the Allied Powers have forced Germany to cancel the "Treaty of Brest", they have obliged her to evacuate the Russian territories and to cease the destruction of national property in Russia. The Russian Government is happy to express the warm sentiments of gratitude which this generous act of the Allies awakens in the heart of the Russian people. Russia, who aspires to the reunion of her territories separated from the Mother Country, perceives in this act the hope of having her voice heard in the peace negotiations and of collaborating in the organization of the life of the peoples on new and unchangeable bases of a close and honest friendship. The foundations of the reconstitution of Russia are already laid. The Russian Government relying on the true national sentiment which has just been awakened is working for the reconstitution of the State having for its principles Liberty, equality, and true democracy. The Russian Government knows that the Allied Powers are guided in their acts by the high ideals of equity and international solidarity, and will accept with gratitude their assistance in her work for the regeneration of Russia; for Russia cannot and must not re-

<sup>6</sup> A similar telegram received by the Russian Embassy in Washington was transmitted to the Department of State by the Russian Chargé (Ughet) on Dec. 18, 1918 (file No. 763.72119/3278).

main in the present state which threatens the civilized world with further great commotions, and which might deprive for a long time the peoples already exhausted with fatigue of the benefits of peace and the victors of the fruit of their victory.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/101

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 10, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Following our recent conversation, I have the honour to forward to you the original (in French) as well as the paraphrase in English of an *Aide-Mémoire* regarding the representation of Russia in the Peace proceedings. This *Aide-Mémoire* has been prepared by the Conference of Russian Ambassadors and public men, assembled at present in Paris, and is handed over to the respective Governments. In its substantial part this document coincides with a *Mémoire* which I left with you.

Summarizing briefly, we are fully aware of the fact that a plenipotentiary official representation of Russia is dependent upon the recognition of a Government of Russia. Nevertheless we are firmly convinced that the practical question of participation of Russians in the Peace proceedings ought not to be deferred until such recognition takes place. Obviously, before being officially vested with plenipotentiary powers, no Representatives are in a position to sign binding agreements. However, in the preliminary stage it is mainly the general character of solutions which is going to be determined. More so, the very platform of the future proceedings, on the broad and generous principles brought forward by the United States, anticipates agreement and understanding, and not outvoting or majorisation.

A proper participation of Russians would contribute to eliminate such procedures and decisions which, in the future, might be regarded by the Russian people as unjust and unfair. The very absence of Russians would perpetuate in the future as a permanent source of ill-feeling.

That is why I was so emphatic in advocating the idea of admitting Russians at the earliest stage of the future proceedings, when even in the position of spokesmen, that is representatives who would be entitled to discuss all forthcoming questions from the Russian point of view and whose voice should be considered as Russian opinion.

I mentioned to you the encouraging fact of unity of view of different Russian factions, from moderate conservatives to national

socialists, with respect to the Russian international situation and her position in the coming settlement. It is this unity of national opinion as well as the fact that the Assembly of Ambassadors and public men now in Paris is connected with all the centers of national movement in Russia, which happily contributes to the possibility of favourable decisions.

Accept [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure]

### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Russia is entitled to participate at the Peace Conference on conditions equal with the Allied Powers.

This is not only her privilege as of a nation which has so heavily participated in the war, borne enormous sacrifices and thus largely contributed to the final issues. The participation of Russia is as well a matter of concern to the Allies & to the whole world, because a peace concluded with the exception of Russia and without due consideration to her rights and her lawful interests, would not secure the stability of the forthcoming settlement which has been the chief aim of this war.

A Plenipotentiary Representation of Russia encounters difficulties for the moment because there is not a Government in Russia officially recognized by the Allies. However, the progress of the consolidation of authority in Russia gives all reason to anticipate that before the ratification of Peace Treaties the unification of Russia will be a fact accomplished.

But even in the present preliminary phase of Peace proceedings, while no binding decisions are as yet taken, but problems outlined and the general character of solutions determined, the non-participation of Russia would present inconveniences of not minor importance.

To meet these conditions, the Ambassadors of Russia in the Allied and Cobelligerent countries, on the suggestion of the authorities at Omsk, have assembled in Paris and with the collaboration of eminent Russian public men, whose participation has met full approval of Omsk, have proceeded to organize preparatory work for the forthcoming Peace negotiations.

The Assembly of Russian Ambassadors and public men is prepared to take part at once in the present phase of Peace proceedings by designating for this purpose qualified Representatives.

PARIS, January 6, 1919.



Paris Peace Conf. 861.00/102

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 10, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to transmit herewith an *aide-mémoire* concerning the recognition of the Government of Omsk. This document is being handed by the Ambassadors of Russia to the Allied Governments.

Accept [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure—Translation<sup>1</sup>]

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Russia does not possess a Government officially recognized by the Allies. The latter await the definitive result of the struggle which is going on between the Bolshevik tyranny and the helpless majority of the people who have been taken unawares. The Allies are faced with the question: on which side is to be found the real Russia. Nevertheless, the liberation of the Russian people is drawing near. The tragic period of disintegration and dissolution is ended. It has given way to the work of reconstituting the vital forces of the people and the creation of a center of national unification. At the present moment, such centers of regeneration have been formed in the East, the North, and the South of Russia. The Governments which have arisen in different parts of the country, for the moment isolated from one another, are beginning to rally and to consolidate their powers. They are all striving for the same goal of reviving Russia and the sovereignty of the Russian people.

The Government of Omsk, which was set up before the others, is laboring toward that object with an untiring energy and with success in its efforts to group all the local governments about itself. Having set as its goal the reconstitution of the Russian State, and having solemnly given a pledge to grant to the Russian people, after the reestablishment of order, the opportunity to express freely their will and to determine their destiny, it has proclaimed itself as the Government of all the Russias.

This Government has now existed for eight months. It is true that in the interval changes have taken place within it, but this fact has not had any influence whatever on its orientation and has not checked the progress and consolidation of its power. The rich and vast regions, which are included under its administration, are purged of the Bolsheviks and its machinery of government has been defini-

---

<sup>1</sup> Translation supplied by the editor.

tively formed. Its authority and its strength are growing from day to day. It has created a well disciplined army. One hundred and thirty thousand Russian soldiers, aided by the Allies, are successfully fighting on a front of a thousand kilometres. The strength of this Government and its capacity in operation are manifested by victories won over the enemy.

Nevertheless, the consolidation of power in Russia could advance even more vigorously if the Allies were disposed to cooperate by the official recognition of the Government of Omsk as the government of all the Russias. This recognition would be for Russia one of the most effective means of assistance. It would make easier her liberation from the Bolshevik tyranny and would make possible the free expression of her will.

---

763.72119/3457

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>8</sup>

No. 43

#### MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government have received from the Russian representative in London a copy of a telegram from the Omsk Government, urging that when the Russian question is discussed at the Peace Conference, their representatives should be permitted to be present. The telegram states that the list of the representatives of the Omsk Government is being prepared, and urges that the discussion of the Russian question should be delayed until they are able to arrive at Paris. It is understood that the situation in Russia and the policy of the Allies in regard thereto will be discussed at an early meeting of the Conference, and no doubt a decision will then be taken as to the recognition of the Omsk Government. A decision in favour of recognition would grant the principle of representation at the Conference, and the delegates would thereby be placed on a different footing to their present one. His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris has been directed to inform the French Government of the request from the Government of Omsk and of the views of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1919.

---

<sup>8</sup> Transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Department's telegram No. 316, Jan. 20, 1919, 2 p. m.

763.72119/3454

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State\**

No. 55

## MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of His Majesty's Government and with reference to the memorandum from this Embassy No. 43 of January 15th, that His Majesty's Government have received a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Siberia stating that the Omsk Government have heard that Monsieur Sazonoff is going to Paris and that they have expressed the hope that he will act as their Agent and as the agent of the other new Governments in Russia as well as of Deniken.

The British High Commissioner has requested the Foreign Office to cause the wish of the Omsk Government to be conveyed to Monsieur Sazonoff.

WASHINGTON, January 20, 1919.

---

\* Transmitted to the Commission to Negotiate Peace in Department's telegram No. 497, Jan. 30, 1919, 4 p. m.

## SWITZERLAND

763.72119/2764

### *The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation <sup>1</sup>]

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: At the request of my Government I have the honor to transmit the following note to Your Excellency:

The Government of the Swiss Confederation at the moment of the termination of the war regards it as its right and duty not to stand aloof from the settlement of a certain number of questions in which Switzerland, like other States, is directly interested.

The Swiss people could not understand that those questions could be handled in a conference at which their Government was not represented, and rules set up without Switzerland's cooperation could not possess with us the high value and absolute prestige with which we should like to see the international law of the future vested, with special regard to the institutions intended to secure a just and lasting peace. Furthermore, among the international questions which present themselves, there are some which have a direct and immediate bearing on Switzerland.

Under the circumstances, the Government of the Confederation has the honor to express a wish that its representatives be admitted into the conferences that are to be opened or at the very least those which will deal with topics in which Switzerland has interests of a general or private character.

I take [etc.]

HANS SULZER

763.72119/3082

### *The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: By a recent note the Minister of Switzerland to Italy expressed to the Royal Government the desire of the Swiss Government that all the representatives of the Swiss Confederation be admitted to take part in the works of the Peace Conference, or at

---

<sup>1</sup> File translation revised.

least that they attend those sessions in which questions interesting Switzerland both in a general way and in particular, will be discussed.

Baron Sonnino has answered informing that the Italian Government hasn't so far taken any decision upon what concerns the procedure regarding the Peace Conference, and that inasmuch as questions of a general nature interesting not the belligerents alone, are concerned, he thought it necessary to proceed in accordance with all the Governments interested.

While communicating to me what precedes, Baron Sonnino adds that he would much appreciate knowing what the opinion of the American Government is on this point. And I would therefore be much obliged to you for putting me in a position to give an answer to my Government on the subject.

I thank you in advance, and beg to remain,

Yours very sincerely

MACCHI DI CELLERE

---

763.72119/3082

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Italian Ambassador  
(Macchi di Cellere)*

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant respecting the desire of the Swiss Government that representatives of the Swiss Confederation be admitted to take part in the coming Peace Conference.

In reply I beg to inform you that the attitude of this Government when approached by neutral Governments with requests for participation in the Peace Conference on matters of interests to them is to receive such requests with sympathy. No definite position, however, will be taken upon such requests until after the Secretary of State reaches Paris.

I am [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

---

763.72119/3064

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1333

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour to inform him, by direction of his Government, that the Swiss Government have expressed a desire to be represented at the Peace Conference or at

such meetings of it as deal with questions affecting general or particular Swiss interests. This raises the whole question of the participation of neutrals.

His Majesty's Government would be grateful for an expression of the views of the United States Government on this question.

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918.

---

763.72119/2764

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of November 21, 1918, together with its enclosure, regarding the wish of your Government to be appropriately represented at the coming conferences, especially those dealing with topics in which Switzerland has interests of a general or private character.

In reply, I beg to inform you that this Government has received with sympathy the request of the Swiss Government and it is not in a position to give a final reply until after arrival of the President in Paris.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

---

763.72119/3064

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

WASHINGTON, December 5, 1918.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Great Britain, and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the latter's memorandum, No. 1333 of November 29, 1918, regarding the question of the participation of the Swiss Government, and other neutrals, at the Peace Conference.

In reply the Secretary of State begs to inform the Chargé d'Affaires that the United States Government has replied to the Swiss Government expressing sympathy, but stating that a final decision could not be made until the Secretary of State had an opportunity to discuss the question in Paris.



**POLICIES AND PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED  
STATES AND THE ALLIES**





## THE UNITED STATES

Woodrow Wilson Papers

### *President Wilson to the Special Representative (House)*

[WASHINGTON, undated—*circa* October 29, 1918.]

3. Can be no real difficulty about peace terms and interpretation of fourteen points if the Entente statesmen will be perfectly frank with us and have no selfish aims of their own which would in any case alienate us from them altogether. It is the fourteen points that Germany has accepted. England cannot dispense with our friendship in the future and the other Allies cannot without our assistance get their rights as against England. If it is the purpose of the Allied statesmen to nullify my influence force the purpose boldly to the surface and let me speak of it to all the world as I shall. League of nations underlies freedom of the seas and every other part of peace programme so far as I am concerned. I am ready to repudiate any selfish programme openly, but assume that the Allies cannot honorably turn the present discussions into a peace conference without me. Please do not use wireless.

[WOODROW WILSON]

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/15

### *Memorandum on Plans for the Peace Conference, Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1918.

#### QUERIES

1. What nations are to be represented at the Peace Conference?
2. Are all the belligerents?
3. If not, on what basis is a distinction to be made?
4. If all belligerents are to be represented, is the number of Commissioners to be the same for every country?
5. On the assumption of five or seven Commissioners for each country, and at least 25 countries being represented, the conference would consist of 125 or 175 members. Would not that be too cumbersome?

6. What is to be the scope of the Treaty of Peace and with what subjects should it deal?

7. Is it expedient to go further than to establish boundaries, declare adherence to general principles as set forth in the Fourteen Points, create future conferences to work out the details in separate treaties and for restitution for damages done, and provide for certain forms of immediate relief?

8. Ought or ought not neutral nations to be invited to participate in conferences dealing with such subjects as

a League of Nations,  
Freedom of the Seas,  
Disarmament,  
Internationalization of Waterways and possibly Land Routes,  
and  
Rules of War on Land and Sea and in the Air?

9. Would it be better for the belligerents to adopt such supplemental treaties and provide for adherence by other nations?

10. Should there be any general recognition of labor in the general treaty or in the supplemental treaties?

11. Should there be any general declaration as to commercial or economic interests or the statement of any general principle such as the "open door" or "most favored nation" clause?

12. In the event that protectorates are created, what special privileges, if any, should be granted the protecting nation?

13. On what basis should Russia be recognized at the Peace Conference?

14. Should Finland, Esthonia, Lithuania, Ukrania and Caucasia be received as independent states at the Conference?

15. Are questions affecting the sovereignty of Schleswig-Holstein, Luxemburg, Spitzbergen, &c, to be considered?

16. If so, should not Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden to be represented?

17. If so, should the determination be included in the Peace Treaty or in supplemental treaty?

18. Is it not essential to have prepared an outline of the Peace Treaty and a general scheme of supplemental treaties before the Conference assembles?

19. Will it not be expected that the United States as the proposer will lay before the Conference a complete and detailed plan for a League of Nations?

20. Has such a plan been prepared and does it follow the British or French scheme or differ from both?

21. How far can a provision in the treaty as to making war in support of the League be binding upon the United States in view of the constitutional delegation of the war power?

22. Is it possible to go as far as guaranties, if their enforcement requires the use of force, without infringing on the constitutional war power?

23. In what order should the subjects be taken up by the Peace Conference?

24. What should be the general order of procedure?

25. Should there be appointed first a committee on program?

26. What instructions should be issued by the President to the American Commissioners?

27. What power, if any, should be granted the Commissioners to make recommendations for immediate action by the Governments in order to relieve present needs?

28. How far should treaties and agreements as to territory made since the war began be considered in reaching a final settlement of boundaries? (Particular reference to the London Agreement of 1916 [1915?] as to Italy, and the division of German colonial possessions in the Pacific by Great Britain and Japan.)

29. Should the colonial possessions of Germany in Africa be disposed of in the Peace Treaty?

30. What voice should the present provisional governments of the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs have in the general terms of peace?

31. What particular declaration should be made as to "freedom of the seas"?

32. What particular declaration should be made against "economic barriers"?

33. Should any declaration be made as to labor? If so, what declaration?

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/9

*Captain Walter Lippmann to the Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Mezes)*

[PARIS,] December 5, 1918.

I am noting for your information the most immediately pressing territorial questions:

1. The extension of the boundaries of Lorraine to include the frontiers of 1814. In the last few weeks this has become a very serious political question. It will probably be raised in a form by which the valley of the Sarre is treated as part of the indemnity.

2. The question of neutralizing the left bank of the Rhine has become of first-class importance.

3. The problem of the mouth of the Scheldt.

4. The Italo-Jugoslav frontier.
5. The corridor by which Bohemia and Jugoslavia secure physical contact will be pressed by Benes.
6. The Czechs will ask for Teschen as necessary to their communications with the Slovak territory and because of the mines. They are involved in a dispute with the Poles on the matter.
7. The Czechs will suggest that the Ruthenians of northern Hungary be made into an autonomous state and attached to them in order that physical contact with the greater Roumania may be secured.
8. The dispute between the Serbs and the Roumanians in respect to the Banat is a real one at the present time.
9. Very serious troubles have occurred in Lemberg between the Poles and the Ruthenians, raising in an acute form the problem of eastern Galicia.
10. Greek propaganda is very active in regard to northern Epirus, Thrace, Dodekanese and Smyrna.
11. There is a very strong movement, especially in England, to return Sleswig-Holstein to Denmark.
12. Our data bearing upon the control of the Baltic should be assembled immediately, especially with relation to Finland, the Aland Islands, Danzig and Libau.
13. The most acute immediate problem in Asia Minor turns on Franco-British relations in Syria and negotiations in regard to it are now in progress.

WALTER LIPPMANN  
*Captain, U. S. A.*

763.72112/109553

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 5, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing, for your consideration, a copy of a communication which I have just made to the Department in the regular way in regard to the "freedom of the seas". I venture to think that the suggestions contained on pages 8 and 9 of the enclosure<sup>1</sup> may point the way to some sort of an agreement with our friends here who are very loath, as you have not failed to learn from other sources, to yield anything of what they conceive to be their rights at sea. In a speech which he delivered on December 1st Admiral Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, made the statement "that the best guarantee which mankind had been able to advise [*devise*!]

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 293, the portion beginning, "In conclusion I venture to suggest. . . ."

for the peace of the world and the security of freedom was the power of the British Navy". As a matter of fact the British Navy has been running a twentieth century war at sea with sixteenth century rules and regulations and administrative ideas. I have a feeling that consideration for this "freedom of the seas" matter should begin at the starting point of all our difficulties, that is to say the shipment and seizure of goods, and if we then worked upwards we should eventually develop a system of procedure which would be reasonable, fair, and which could be made acceptable to all interests.

Trusting I shall have the great pleasure of seeing you while you are abroad, I am [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

[Enclosure]

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*<sup>2</sup>

[No.] 7144

LONDON, November 26, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the Department, the following observations in regard to what is commonly called the "Freedom of the Seas" based upon four years personal and constant contact with the various British departments charged with actual responsibility under the blockade regulations, and American claimants whose interests have been at stake:

For present purposes I avoid all consideration of the doctrine that free ships make free goods, the theory of the continuous voyage, and the like, and I confine myself exclusively to facts of navigation and commercial intercourse. The result of my observations is that the shipper and owner of goods during the war now ended has been far less concerned respecting nice distinctions of international law than with the practical questions of administration. He could accommodate himself to the requirements of the blockade and to the theory of the continuous voyage, but he was constantly harassed by uncertainty as regards administrative method, and if this method had been less rigid, if it had been recognized not merely in theory but in practice that the neutral shipper not only had certain rights, but was entitled to a degree of consideration, we should have heard much less than we did about infractions of international law.

I do not complain about the absence of it; indeed I rather imagine that any country with an inflamed state of public opinion to reckon with would find it difficult to maintain a certain sense of proportion in the lower official circles unless those circles were given definite metes and bounds by which their action must be governed. In any

---

<sup>2</sup> Filed separately under file No. 763.72112/10901½.

case, it is a fact that whatever may have been the views of the higher officials in this country during our years of neutrality, the people who actually seized goods and who disposed of them, always proceeded with the idea firmly fixed in their minds that one of the objects of the war was to build up a prize fund to be distributed afterwards among the men and officers of the Navy. It was difficult to find any one of lower rank than a Cabinet officer who could realise that the true purpose of the seizing of goods was exclusively to prevent aid and comfort reaching the enemy; they were always obsessed with the notion that there was a high patriotic purpose involved in building up a prize fund. Obviously under these circumstances it was very difficult for them to release goods which once came into their possession.

The first great complaint of American shippers was that while American goods were subjected to scrutiny, delay, and confiscation if shipped to the neutral countries of Europe, the British shipper was encouraged to establish relations with these countries, and, in fact, carried on an enormously greater trade with them than ever before in British history. Thus for example the exports from Great Britain of cotton yarn grew as follows:

		1914.	1915.	1916.
To Sweden	lbs.	1, 812, 500	2, 035, 900	1, 968, 500
Norway		2, 541, 400	4, 065, 800	5, 391, 600
Denmark		1, 427, 100	3, 633, 700	5, 834, 200
Holland		43, 147, 300	59, 746, 000	64, 232, 000

Exports of cotton waste and piece goods increased as strikingly. Exports of woollen tissues were forwarded as follows:

		1914.	1915.	1916.
To Sweden	Yards	193, 700	247, 200	1, 181, 100
Norway		223, 500	309, 400	2, 150, 900
Denmark		734, 300	1, 359, 600	6, 258, 800
Holland		3, 102, 300	2, 139, 100	6, 280, 100

How carefully British foreign trade was guarded is also shown in the subjoined figures as stated in the House of Commons on October 31, 1918:

#### A. WOOL, WOOLEN YARN AND WOOLEN MANUFACTURES.

Country.	Aggregate Imports from all sources, less all Exports, 1913, i. e. amount retained for home consumption.		Aggregate gross imports from Great Britain, 1917.	
	Tons.		Tons.	
Norway		4, 103		2, 665
Sweden		11, 481		2, 187
Denmark		5, 383		3, 657
Holland		9, 442		7, 609
Switzerland		10, 112*		11, 693

\* Gross imports. In the case of Switzerland gross imports in 1913 afford the proper criterion, as Switzerland is manufacturing for the Allies. [Foot-note in the original.]

**B. COTTON, COTTON YARN AND COTTON MANUFACTURES.**

Norway	10, 005	10, 452
Sweden	27, 532	10, 248
Denmark	13, 293	9, 253
Holland	48, 435	29, 461
Switzerland	45, 309*	34, 203

While this successful British business was being carried on, British Department officials found it extremely difficult to answer legitimate inquiries on behalf of American traders with much more than monosyllabic replies. Even the diplomatic correspondence of the Department of State, while couched in the courteous language so characteristic of the Foreign Office, was singularly lacking, when particular cases were being examined, in explanations which tended to make matters entirely clear, or in offering solutions which, in the nature of things, could be acceptable. In general, the official attitude until we came into the war was: "Come into our Prize Court, make such claims there as you may be disposed to make, and await the sentence which will be passed upon you".

During the early days of the war ships were captured right and left, and investigations followed. Ships were not detained because of any specific complaint or knowledge with regard to a particular ship, but systematically and upon the general ground that an eastbound ship was necessarily an object of suspicion. To avoid delays to vessels it was then proposed that ships leaving the United States should be inspected by British agents while being loaded with a view to giving them knowledge of material facts. The owners of the goods paid heavy fees to have these surveys made yet after they had been made the delays continued in the same way merely in order that the conclusions of the British surveyor at the port of departure might be verified at Kirkwall or somewhere else.

During the first two years of the war neutral shippers endeavored over and over again to ascertain, in advance, whether contemplated transactions would meet with British opposition, and were unable to obtain any satisfaction. The cynical suggestion was constantly made that they could ship their goods and could rely upon the fairness of British methods. Usually the ships were detained and the goods were either seized or long delayed, or, in many instances were allowed to reach the intended destination on the signing of an agreement that they would not be disposed of except with the consent of the Foreign Office. In practice it was within the legal power of the British Minister in Copenhagen, Stockholm or elsewhere to give the final word, even after the discharge of American goods in warehouse in those coun-

---

\*Gross imports. In the case of Switzerland gross imports in 1913 afford the proper criterion, as Switzerland is manufacturing for the Allies. [Foot-note in the original.]



tries, as to whether or not they might be delivered to the intending purchaser.

While matters were thus proceeding there was building up in the United States an enormous body of opinion adverse to British methods arising from innumerable transactions of the above general types.

It was not until January, 1916, after I had had repeated conversations with the various personages concerned, that the Foreign Office agreed to put into effect what was called a system of granting "Letters of Assurance". Under this system the intending shippers consulted the British authorities in the United States, acquainting them with the commercial details, and if these details were satisfactory they received a "Letter of Assurance" which gave them reasonable security that the transaction could be completed without Prize Court difficulties. Unfortunately, even then the British Government refused to issue "Letters of Assurance" that were absolutely final, and always reserved the right to review their own decisions thus casting a considerable degree of doubt over the whole system. However, without the slightest question, it eased up the situation and had it been put into effect at the outbreak of the war, would have prevented the development of those tense relations between the two countries which we all felt up to the moment when America entered the war.

Furthermore, there was great complaint that while the British Government set up the Netherlands Oversea Trust in Holland, and effected similar arrangements in other neutral countries, requiring that all goods sent to those countries should be consigned to the Trust or its equivalent, it assumed no reciprocal responsibility to hold goods harmless that were consigned in accordance with its prescriptions. It was fair to assume that if the American shipper consigned his goods precisely as indicated to him he should be guaranteed against delay and confiscation, but nevertheless, time after time, goods which had been consigned in accordance with the British rule were detained, were brought from Holland to England to be placed in the Prize Court, and even if eventually released and allowed to be delivered to the purchaser after a long and exasperating delay and a multiplication of costs, all of these costs had to be borne by the owners of the goods rather than by the Government which created them.

In cases where the British Government was clearly wrong in detaining goods, and recognized that the goods were innocent, it invariably declined to support the charges incident to its own operations. It declined to assume any responsibility for delays visited upon ships, declined compensation for demurrage, and, on the other hand, vessels or goods which were delayed and brought into British ports were required to pay local charges, pilotage, demurrage, and the like, precisely as though they had sought the British port in the usual course

of business. When the Admiralty Marshal released goods against which no ultimate legal complaint was lodged, a tax of £1 was collected for rendering this service. These may seem small matters, but their cumulative effect upon commercial opinion in neutral countries was very great indeed.

I am quite convinced that administrative rules might have been devised, and as respects the "Letters of Assurance" were devised eventually, which had they been effective from the very beginning of the war would have protected every substantial interest of the British Government, and which, at the same time, within certain limitations, would have enabled shippers to carry on business without anxiety or loss, and it was largely the failure of those in authority to realise this that created the feelings of dissatisfaction which compelled the exchange of diplomatic Notes in which the Department set forth so ably the American point of view.

In conclusion I venture to suggest that any future rules of the sea in time of war should set out in considerable detail administrative directions fair alike to all concerned, and I offer the following proposals for purposes of discussion :

1. Nations enforcing a blockade policy must openly state the terms on which their own merchants are allowed to do business with neutral nations adjacent to the blockaded Power, and must extend to non-combatant nations the privilege of trading on conditions equally favorable.

2. Modern conditions make it entirely impossible to search vessels at sea, or to depend upon the evidence contained in the ship's documents as proof of the destination and ownership of the goods. It is necessary for the ascertainment of material facts that ships should be searched in port, and there is no reason why this search should not be carried out at the port of departure rather than at a port of detention. Vessels whose owners do not desire to take advantage of an opportunity to be searched in the port of departure would naturally have to accept the consequences of this attitude.

3. The importance of Prize Courts in any future war should be greatly reduced by legal recognition of "Letters of Assurance" which should be granted by a belligerent Power on the voluntary submission to its representatives of information respecting ownership and destination of goods about to be shipped. "Letters of Assurance" once granted should be final and conclusive. Refusals to grant "Letters of Assurance" should be subject to review by some competent international tribunal operated under equitable rules.

4. When detentions are recognized as unjustified or as the result of error, the nations responsible should immediately pay compensation for demurrage and the like, and assume responsibility for their own acts in such manner as to admit of settlements without such interminable delays as now seem to be inseparable from claims against governments.

The essence of my proposals is that decisions respecting the rights of ships and goods in time of war shall, in general, be determined

before and not after the voyage is begun or the delivery undertaken; that the losses of legitimate traders shall be limited, in general, to deprivation of a contemplated profit rather than condemnation of the property involved; that when decisions are made by the administrative power of a belligerent nation applicable to proposed voyages or commercial transactions which are regarded by the Power whose nationals are affected as in violation of neutral rights, there shall exist an international Court of some kind to pass immediately upon an appeal in order that the course of legitimate commerce may be impeded and delayed as little as possible.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.112/3

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This afternoon, at your apartments, I had a brief conversation with you on the subject of the desirability of the prompt determination of the question of the extent to which the American Commission, in its studies, is to be guided by abstract principle and the extent to which such principle may properly yield to considerations of expediency. I want to give you an illustration of cases in point which I am constantly running into.

A change in an existing frontier may be demanded for either of two general reasons:

- 1) It is right, from the point of view of the interests of the peoples immediately concerned, to do so;
- 2) It is expedient, from the point of view of the interests of the world at large, to do so.

I shall not discuss the question as to whether an expediency for the whole world may not constitute a right for the world, even though adverse to the immediate rights of the peoples concerned; because, as I take it, our problem just now is to try to find out how these rights of the peoples directly concerned can be reconciled with what is expedient for the world.

I find that, for example, a frontier line for northern Italy can be drawn in substantial accord with the Pact of London<sup>\*</sup> and which follows a natural line of racial cleavage such as contemplated in President Wilson's Declarations,—practically, all Italians on one side and all aliens on the other side.

---

<sup>\*</sup> Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

I find that, following a similar line of racial cleavage, a Czecho-Slovak State may be created with a practically homogeneous population of 8,500,000 people. A certain proportion of Germans and Magyars will be included, but so small is the number at any one point that colors on the map cannot be employed to distinguish them.

But, in the first case, a demand will be made for a much advanced frontier on the ground that, in order to be prepared for the next war, there must be a scientific, strategic frontier. This will include a certain alien population radically antagonistic to the Italian one.

In the second case, a strategic frontier is demanded which will include some 2,500,000 Germans and Magyars in compact bodies (besides some 600,000 Germans and 250,000 Magyars referred to above as scattered through the Czecho-Slovak State).

Now, if we have to consider strategic frontiers as such, we are committed to a mere revision of the Marquis of Queensbury rules for the European prize-ring. And our work will be futile in our own life time. If we make the probability of future wars our guiding principle we must remember that any of the small states thus created, by amalgamating with some other one may upset all of our strategic calculations.

The first object, and naturally so, of our European associates, is to secure certain territorial adjustments. Our first and only object is to secure certain principles.

If the territorial adjustment is to be the first matter considered, the Americans will be at a great disadvantage. Such adjustments are a matter of barter and trade. One of our associates says to the others, "I will concede you this if you will concede me that." We have nothing of that sort to concede to any one. Therefore, at the very beginning, some of our principles must come to the front as the only thing that we can oppose to these transactions of barter and sale when they do not conform to our sense of justice.

And so, in my judgment, some of our principles should and must come up for consideration before anything else. It may mean a hard struggle, but I am inclined to think that the struggle will be hopeless for us if we allow everything else to be settled first.

To come back to what I intended to say: one of our principles or ideals is a league of nations. Its object is to do all that is possible to prevent war. Its necessity and justification are based on the fact that not all nations can have scientific, strategic frontiers, such as military men demand. Belgium has not and cannot have such a frontier. A sort of league was formed to protect such frontiers as she has. That league failed because it was not of the kind that we now have in mind.

If we believe that such a league can be formed and will be effective we ought to secure the recognition of its principle at the outset. This will smooth the path of negotiation. When one interest demands the inclusion of an alien and racially antagonistic population, in order to secure a strategic frontier, the reply will be that the league of nations is the strategic frontier of every nation which has no other. This would entirely meet the cases which I mentioned above by way of illustration.

Therefore it seems to me that first of all the principles of the league of nations and of rational disarmament must be admitted, or we are committed to a re-weaving of the Penelope's web that has been unravelled by every Congress in Europe for the past 250 years.

What have we Americans to do with that?

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.112/3

*The Secretary of State to General Tasker H. Bliss*

PARIS, December 16, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL BLISS: I am greatly obliged to you for your letter of yesterday giving your views as to strategic and ethnological boundaries and the necessity of asserting and establishing the general principle of the peace at the very outset. With your opinion I am entirely in accord. We are face to face with jealousies and selfishness which have drawn the map of Europe in the past. It will be attempted again unless I am greatly mistaken and it will be a struggle to prevent the victor's desires from being the guiding influences.

I am convinced that the two principal governments, with which we are to deal, have come to a working understanding and will endeavor to frustrate any plan which will defeat their ambitions. We are peculiarly strong because we have no territorial cravings, no selfish interests to serve. If they could succeed in tarring us with that stick, they would gain a decided advantage. I believe that it will be attempted by tempting us with an African colony or starting a controversy in regard to the Pacific islands. Possibly a protectorate over Armenia or Palestine will be the bait. Whatever it is, I feel sure that we will have to be on our guard, since nothing would be so pleasing to the diplomats of those countries as to be able to point to the United States and say that our unselfishness was a sham and we really wished territorial acquisition. If they can do this our pre-eminence would be lost and we would be unable to carry out our program.

You are certainly right, therefore, when you assert that the principles of the peace are first of all to be settled. With those agreed to we can discuss the details under proper limitations.

America's unselfishness and devotion to justice must be maintained, and we must not be led away into any discussion at the outset which will impair the reputation which we have won.

Faithfully yours,

[ROBERT] LANSING

---

Paris Peace Conf. 184/68

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I assume that the delegations of other important nations to the Peace Conference will act as units in the discussions and votes of the Conference. Certainly, the only hope that the American delegation will have in securing the war aims of its country lies in its following the French motto and being "one and indivisible".

May I ask what steps we are going to take in order to secure this unanimity of understanding?

I have no doubt that the moment the Peace Conference assembles the question of terms with Germany will be taken up. The Allies, for example, know exactly what they are going to ask in the way of territorial cessions. Their demands will be immediately accompanied by their reasons and arguments. Are we agreed that the Alsace-Lorraine of 1871 shall be ceded? or, the Alsace-Lorraine of 1814? or, Alsace Lorraine extended by an economic boundary? or, Alsace Lorraine with the boundaries of Marshal Foch? Are we agreed on a principle with which we will meet a demand for the cession of the entire left bank? How are we going to get the President's views or instructions on such questions?

These and many other questions stare us in the face, some as being certain to be presented to us immediately on the opening of the Peace Conference and the others following in due time. Is there no way by which we can begin to formulate these questions now and come to a common and cordial understanding as to the attitude that we are going to take? Of course when we hear all arguments we may change our mind on various points, but we must start out with the idea of changing the minds of others to coincide with ours, which is exactly what they will do with respect to us.

Soon after the other delegations arrive, we will be lunching and dining with individual members of them and, if we do not know better than we now do what each of us thinks on important subjects, we will be expressing radically different views about the same thing.

I think that our present course is dangerous, dangerous to the point of threatening the success of the Commission.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Scott, Miller) to the Secretary of State*

[PARIS,] 30 December, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Herewith in accordance with your directions is a skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty,<sup>4</sup> intended as suggestive of some of the questions which may arise and of the difficulties connected with them. We did not understand that you wished more than an outline of essentials at this time.

As an appendix to the draft, will be found a discussion of questions concerning signatories to the Treaty.

Very sincerely yours,

JAMES BROWN SCOTT  
DAVID HUNTER MILLER

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/15

### *Skeleton Draft of Peace Treaty*

#### I.—ENUMERATION OF HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

See Appendix <sup>5</sup>

#### II.—PREAMBLE STATING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND RULES OF LAW TO BE OBSERVED BY HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

#### III.—NAMES OF COMMISSIONERS PLENIPOTENTIARY, CREDENTIALS, AND POWERS

#### IV.—ARTICLE DECLARING REESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

#### V.—ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS

1. Nature and purpose
2. Machinery and procedure
3. Sanctions
4. Adherence of non-signatories

<sup>4</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 304.

## VI.—OPEN DIPLOMACY

1. Publication of future treaties and international understandings
2. Publication of all existing treaties and international understandings
3. Status of non-published treaties
4. Procedure of publication
  - (a) Time
  - (b) Place
  - (c) Deposit

## VII.—ECONOMIC STIPULATIONS

1. General
  - (a) Discrimination
  - (b) Most-favored-nation Clauses
  - (c) Reciprocity
  - (d) Open door
  - (e) Equality of economic opportunity
2. Contiguous states
3. Self-governing dominions
4. Colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence

## VIII.—FREEDOM OF SEAS

1. Time of peace—public ships—private ships
  - (a) Marginal seas and coastal waters
  - (b) Lakes, straits, canals, international rivers
  - (c) Access to the sea
  - (d) Fisheries
  - (e) Revenue, sanitation, and police
  - (f) High seas
2. Time of war
  - Effect of proposed association of nations upon laws of maritime warfare

## IX.—LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS AND BUDGETS

1. Military
2. Naval
3. Aërial
4. Submarine

## X.—HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

1. Status
2. Amendment



## XI.—EFFECT OF PEACE TREATY ON EXISTING TREATIES

## XII.—BOUNDARY AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

## 1. Alsace-Lorraine

(a) The return to France of the Alsace-Lorraine of 1815–1870.

(b) The further rectification of frontier proposed by Marshal Foch (this line does not coincide with the line of 1814).

## 2. Belgium–Germany

Belgium will ask for some changes in the German frontier, so as to include some districts claimed to be Belgian.

## 3. Belgium–Holland

Belgium will ask for changes in the Dutch frontier and a revision of the status of the Scheldt. As Holland is a neutral, the question of the consideration by the Peace Conference of such request is presented.

## 4. Luxembourg

(a) The question is one of future status rather than of boundary.

(b) Commercial relations, Luxembourg having been included in the German Zollverein.

(c) Certain German rights of management of the railways of Luxembourg rest in part upon the Treaty of Frankfort of May 10, 1871 (Articles Additionels).<sup>6</sup>

## 5. The Rhine Provinces

These provinces, with the bridgeheads on the Rhine, being in occupation of the United States and the Allies, provision for their future will be necessary in the Treaty of Peace.

## 6. Denmark–Germany

The proposed restoration of Schleswig may involve:

(a) The status of the Kiel Canal.

(b) Rights of navigation in the Little Belt.

## 7. The Aland Islands

Now a part of Finland, the question of their cession to Sweden is raised, involving the continuance of former agreements as a non-fortification, and to some extent, the control of the Baltic.

## 8. Poland

With the former Russian Province of Poland, the territory of the new state may include:

(a) Cession from Germany

(b) Districts in Russia

(c) Districts in Austria

The whole question of the Vistula and of the future of Dantzig is involved.

<sup>6</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXII, p. 77; see also *ibid.*, pp. 92 and 110.

## 9. Bohemia

Territory of Austria and of Hungary.

The statements recently presented by the Czecho-Slovaks include demands which present:

- (a) A possible conflict with the Poles.
- (b) A suggestion of the incorporation of Eastern Galicia.
- (c) A territorial connection with Jugo-Slavia over territory admittedly non-Slavic.
- (d) Internationalization of various railroads and rivers.

## 10. The Adriatic

- a. The Italian-Jugo-Slav boundary
- b. Montenegro
- c. Albania
- d. Possible rights of the hinterland in Trieste, Fiume, etc.

## 11. Jugo-Slavia

Extent of territory in Austria and in Hungary (aside from boundary with Italy)

## 12. Balkan boundaries

Roumania, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece (*inter se*)

## 13. Roumania—Hungary

Transylvania

## 14. Constantinople and the Straits

## 15. Turkey

- a. Armenia
- b. Syria
- c. Palestine
- d. Arabia
- e. Mesopotamia
- f. Future of Turkey  
(British, French and Italian spheres of influence, and Greek claims)

## 16. Finland—Russia boundary

Finland has made some efforts for a rectification of this frontier in her favor.

## 17. Russia

Finland and Poland are not here included.

Bessarabia has become united to Roumania.

It is deemed impracticable to attempt a list of the possible boundary and territorial questions which may be involved in Russia.

## 18. Dodecanese

These islands, held by Italy, will be claimed by Greece. They are assigned by the Pact of London<sup>7</sup> to Italy.

<sup>7</sup> Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

## 19. Egypt

Formerly tributary to Turkey; a protectorate was declared by Great Britain December 18, 1914. The new status, when recognized, will bring up questions of:

- (a) The Egyptian debt (so far as secured by the Turkish tribute).
- (b) The various rights of the Powers under the capitulations, and possible modifications thereof.

## 20. Morocco

- a. Franco-Spanish relations.
- b. The international status of Tangiers
- c. Consular jurisdiction
- d. Algeciras Act.

## 21. Cyprus

"Occupied and administered" by Great Britain under treaty of June 4, 1878,<sup>8</sup> Cyprus was annexed to Great Britain November 5, 1914.

## 22. Spitzbergen

Internationally a sort of no man's land.  
Reported to be occupied by British Naval forces.  
Discovery of high grade iron ores is also reported.

## 23. Persia

The status and perhaps the boundaries of Persia may be raised in connection with the existing unfortunate situation of that country.

## 24. Abyssinia

Some Italian dissatisfaction exists regarding the Treaty of 1906,<sup>9</sup> which guaranteed the status of Abyssinia, and this question may in some form be presented.

## 25. Liberia

It is understood that some of the Powers are dissatisfied with the present administration of the Government of Liberia, and it is not impossible that some agreement may be proposed regarding this country.

## GERMAN COLONIES

## 26. Kiau Chau

Leased to Germany by China for 99 years in 1898 and declared a protectorate of the German Empire.

Occupied by Japanese and British forces in November, 1914, and reported to be under administration of Japan since that time. Reports are that China will request its restoration to her.

<sup>8</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXIX, p. 744.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XCIX, p. 1069.

## 27. Samoa

The islands of Savai and Upoly became German dependencies in 1899–1900. They are now held by New Zealand.

## 28. Pacific islands north of the equator

Of these groups the Caroline, Pelew, and Marianne Islands (Ladrones) were acquired by Germany from Spain in 1899.

The Marshall Islands have been in German possession since 1885.

All of these islands excepting the small island of Nauru, which is being developed by a British Company, are now held by Japan.

## 29. Pacific islands south of the equator

This group of possessions consisting of the German part of New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the German Solomon Islands, have been in German possession since 1884–5.

They are now held by Australia.

## 30. German colonies in Africa

## 1. Togo

Partly under British and partly under French administration.

## 2. The Cameroons

Partly under British and partly under French administration.

## 3. Southwest Africa

Under the administration of the Government of the Union of South Africa.

## 4. German East Africa

Partly under Belgian administration, and otherwise under control of Great Britain.

## XIII.—INDEMNITIES

Under this title are considered all payments by way of restitution, reparation, etc. to be made by the Central Powers.

Questions suggested are:

## 1. The amounts claimed:

*a.* By Belligerents.

*b.* By Neutrals.

## 2. The amounts which the Central Powers can pay.

## 3. The character of claims which are allowable.

## 4. The correctness of the amounts claimed of each allowable character.

## 5. The method of payment.

## 6. The time of payment.

7. The nature of the liability, that is, joint, several or joint and several. e. g. is Germany liable for reparation due from Austria?
8. Securities and guarantees.
9. The Powers to whom payment is to be made:
  - a. Belligerents
  - b. Neutrals
10. Priorities and Apportionment:
  - a. As to Powers.
  - b. As to character of claims.
  - c. As to method of payment.
  - d. As to time of payment.
11. Distribution of sums paid or to be paid, among nationals.
12. Possible means of financing payments.
13. Administrative machinery.
14. Territory formerly of the Central Powers as to which no liability may attach (e. g. Bohemia, Jugo-Slavia) which would thus probably have the lowest taxation in Europe.

#### XIV.—DURATION OF TREATY

1. As a whole
2. Separable parts
3. Revision
4. Denunciation or abrogation

#### XV.—ADHERENCE BY NON-SIGNATORIES

1. To entire treaty
2. To separable parts

#### XVI.—RATIFICATION

1. Exchange
2. Deposit
3. Act of adherence by non-signatories

#### XVII.—SIGNATURES

### *Appendix*

#### SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY OF PEACE

The assumption upon which the following observations are based is that there will be a general treaty ending the state of belligerency; a treaty which will include the President's Program as well as the settlement of the war.

Within the limits thus set forth, the determination of the Powers to be signatories to the Treaty of Peace may be approached as follows:

I. The following belligerents opposed to one or more of the Central Powers should be signatories:

- |                  |                   |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Belgium       | 11. Italy         |
| 2. Brazil        | 12. Japan         |
| 3. China         | 13. Liberia       |
| 4. Cuba          | 14. Nicaragua     |
| 5. France        | 15. Panama        |
| 6. Great Britain | 16. Portugal      |
| 7. Greece        | 17. Roumania      |
| 8. Guatemala     | 18. Serbia        |
| 9. Haiti         | 19. Siam          |
| 10. Honduras     | 20. United States |

*Exclusions:*

The above list of belligerents does not include all of the Powers which have been at war with the Central Powers. Each of the exclusions must be separately explained:

*a. Costa Rica*

Costa Rica is not included, for the reason that no government exists in that country which is recognized by the United States.

*b. Montenegro*

Montenegro is not separately included, for the reason that it now seems probable that Montenegro will be included in the greater Serbia which is to be established by the Yugo-Slavs. The shifting of political power in Montenegro might call for some reconsideration.

*c. Russia*

Russia is not included, although from the point of view of the Allies, the peace negotiations conducted with the Central Powers by persons purporting to represent the Russian people have never had any validity, and the resulting treaties are to be regarded as wholly null and void since the armistice with Germany, if not independently of it. No government is recognized to exist in Russia which could join in the execution of the Treaty of Peace on behalf of the Russian people.

*Inclusions:*

Each of the inclusions in the above list must be separately explained, for no general principles are applicable to all of them.

1. Belgium

As an active belligerent vitally interested in many of the larger problems of the settlement, Belgium's inclusion calls for no comment.

## 2. Brazil

Though not very active as a belligerent, Brazil is interested in some of the problems of the settlement, particularly in German immigration to South America, and her position among Latin-American Powers necessitates her joining in the execution of the Treaty of Peace.

## 3. China

The termination of German influence in the Far East would alone be sufficient to warrant the inclusion of China, even if her position did not require her assent to any agreement made respecting Far Eastern affairs. Some difficulty may arise because of the uncertain position of the Chinese Government and of the contest between the North and South, and interim developments must be taken into account for this reason.

## 4. Cuba

Though a minor and somewhat inactive belligerent, Cuba has identified herself with the policy of the United States in the war, and must, therefore, be included.

## 5. France

The inclusion of France calls for no comment.

## 6. Great Britain

The inclusion of Great Britain need be discussed only with reference to Egypt.

The Egyptian Government seems to have broken relations with Germany and Austria in 1914 by dismissing their diplomatic representatives. The British Protectorate in Egypt has been recognized by France, Belgium, Servia, Greece and Portugal. In the declaration of the Protectorate, the British Government announced that "as regards foreign relations, His Majesty's Government deem it most consistent with the new responsibilities assumed by Great Britain that the relations between Your Highness' Government and the Representatives of Foreign Powers should henceforth be conducted through His Majesty's representative in Cairo." It seems probable that in line with this announcement, the British Government will deem itself competent to represent Egypt in the execution of the Treaty of Peace.

## 7. Greece

The reasons for the inclusion of Greece are obvious, and call for no comment.

#### 8.10. Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras

The position of Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras will be that of inactive, minor belligerents, with slight interest in the general peace, beyond the preservation of their own independence. Their participation in the Peace Conference would seem to be an interest of the United States, and consequently they should be signatories to the Treaty of Peace. If not represented at the Peace Conference, these Powers might well be excluded from participation in the execution of the Treaty of Peace.

#### 11. Italy

The inclusion of Italy is for obvious reasons and calls for no comment.

#### 12. Japan

The inclusion of Japan is for obvious reasons and calls for no comment.

#### 13. Liberia

The special interest of Liberia in the Central African situation calls for her inclusion and her special relation to the United States should assure this to her.

#### 14. Nicaragua

The position of Nicaragua with reference to her inclusion is like that of Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras.

#### 15. Panama

If the Treaty of Peace should include any provisions affecting the use of the Panama Canal, Panama might very well claim a special interest which would necessitate her inclusion, apart from her position as a minor and inactive belligerent.

#### 16. Portugal

As an active belligerent, with special interests in Africa, Portugal's inclusion calls for no comment.

#### 17. Roumania

The refusal of the Allies to recognize the validity of the treaties made at Bucharest with the Central Powers by the Roumanian Government, and the Roumanian Government's repudiation of those treaties as soon as it was freed from German domination, make it clear that Roumania is still to be regarded as a belligerent, and her vital interest in many of the important problems of the settlement calls for her inclusion as a signatory to the Treaty of Peace.

#### 18. Serbia

As one of the active and principally concerned belligerents, the reasons for Serbia's inclusion are obvious. The Government of Greater Serbia has perhaps established for itself a position which will warrant



its being accepted as the representative of the Yugo-Slavs. Greater Serbia will probably include Montenegro, though this may still be open to reconsideration to be based upon interim developments.

#### 19. Siam

Though an inactive belligerent, Siam's interest in the Far Eastern and Pacific situations clearly justifies her inclusion.

#### 20. United States

The inclusion of the United States is for obvious reasons.

II. Of the Central Powers, the following States may be signatories to the Treaty of Peace:

1. Austria
2. Bavaria
3. Bulgaria
4. Germany
5. Hungary
6. Turkey

#### *General observations:*

All of the Central Powers are interested in the big problems to be covered in the settlement, and all should be represented. The President's Program seems to involve their participation in a general Peace Conference. The Germany of the future may have little interest in the particular arrangements affecting Turkish territory, but Germany and Turkey will share with other states a common interest in the public law of the future. While the United States is not at war with Bulgaria and Turkey, the practical situation does not preclude her joining in a general Treaty of Peace which deals with the adjustment of their relations with Powers which are at war with them.

The chief difficulty in dealing with the Central Powers and in relying on their execution of the Treaty of Peace arises out of the extreme uncertainty of the relative strength of political groups in Germany and in what was formerly Austria-Hungary. To guard against the possibility of having the participation of these Powers in the execution of the Treaty of Peace later repudiated by some political group which might consider itself not to have been represented, and therefore not bound, it may be necessary to insist that the agents who act for Germany and Austria and Hungary in signing the Treaty of Peace, shall derive their authority directly from a constituent assembly or from all political parties in each country at the time. If complete anarchy should prevail in Germany, with no prospect of its abatement, it might become necessary to execute treaties with the other Central Powers, leaving the situation with Germany open until order can be established.

*Specific observations:*

The participation of these states in the execution of the Treaty of Peace calls for separate comment as to each:

**1. Austria**

It is now doubtful whether any Government exists in Austria, capable of representing the Austrian people. The possibility of a complete disappearance of Austria as an independent state is also to be mentioned. If the Peace Conference should recognize the annexation of German Austria by Germany, there would be no occasion for Austria's executing the Treaty of Peace as a signatory.

**2. Bavaria**

Even though separatism in Germany should not proceed so far as to lead to Bavaria's complete independence of the rest of the Empire, the independent role recently assumed by the Bavarian Government, as well as its historic position in the Empire, seems to justify the separate inclusion of Bavaria among the signatories. This would seem also to be a desirable precaution to be taken against the possibility of a future separatist movement in South Germany. Developments may have to be awaited, before such a decision can be reached.

**3. Bulgaria**

Though it has recently undergone a radical change in form, the Bulgarian Government now seems stable enough to represent the Bulgarian people, and their adherence to any general regime in the Balkans is essential.

**4. Germany**

At this time, no political group in Germany seems to have sufficient political power or responsibility to represent the German people and to bind them to the Treaty of Peace. Interim developments must be awaited.

**5. Hungary**

The dissolution of the union between Austria and Hungary seems to have been effectively and finally accomplished as a result of the declaration of the Hungarian Diet of 17 October, 1918, and that of the Karolyi Government of 2 November, 1918. It will doubtless be recognized during the progress of the Peace Congress, and the position of Hungary in Europe together with her interest in many of the problems of the settlement seems to involve her being a signatory.

**6. Turkey**

Though its territory will doubtless be changed by the Peace Conference, it seems probable that some jurisdiction will be left to a Turkish

Government which should be included among the signatories to the Treaty of Peace.

III. The neutral countries which have been invaded may be signatories:

1. Luxemburg
2. Persia

*General observations:*

Both of these countries will doubtless present claims for damages suffered during invasion, and some measures may be necessary in each to uproot German influences established during the occupation.

*Specific observations:*

1. Luxemburg

The future independent existence of Luxemburg is so uncertain that no definite statement can be made as to its being a signatory. Its spokesmen are quite certain to be heard at the Peace Conference, but if it is to be joined to some other state by action taken during the Peace Conference, its consent might be manifested in some separate way without its executing the Treaty of Peace. On the other hand, if Luxemburg is to continue its independent existence, whether under neutralization or not, it seems desirable that it should be a signatory.

2. Persia

The situation in Persia is likely to be covered by provisions in the Treaty of Peace. The independence of Persia was mentioned in the Treaties which the Central Powers purported to conclude with Russia. In May, 1918, Persia denounced the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which had been previously denounced by the Bolshevik Russian Government. It seems improbable that the independent status of Persia will be discontinued by the Peace Conference, and her assent to any provisions in the Treaty of Peace affecting her ought to be manifested by her as a signatory.

IV. The new Powers, created or recognized to exist by the Peace Conference, should be signatories. These may include:

1. Albania
2. Bohemia (Czecho-Slovak State)
3. Finland
4. Iceland
5. Poland

*General observations:*

If the new states are recognized by the Peace Conference, their joining in the covenants as signatories to the Treaty of Peace would

be desirable. Presumably, their spokesmen will have been heard by the Conference, though they may have had no formal representation. Some such states may be placed under some sort of international tutelage which might make it undesirable to give them the position of signatories.

Practical difficulties may arise in making sure that these new States are represented in executing the Treaty of Peace in such a way that their act will not be repudiated by rival political groups, and this may have to be safeguarded by assurances that all responsible political groups participate in the representation at the time of signing.

*Specific observations:*

1. Albania

The attempt to establish a State of Albania in 1912-1914 met with such incomplete success that it seems not inaccurate to put Albania into this class of possible new States. Whether it will exist in the future as a separate political entity, and whether it will be left by the Peace Conference free from such outside control as will make it a dependent government, are too uncertain for any statement to be made as to Albania's being a signatory to the Treaty of Peace.

2. Bohemia (Czecho-Slovak State)

The recent recognitions of the *de facto* government by the United States and the Allies, and their success in gaining control of their Government, make it practically certain that their State will be recognized at the Peace Conference. Nor do uncertain political groupings among them present any obstacle to this new State's being a signatory to the Treaty of Peace.

3. Finland

The independence of Finland rests upon a very different practical and historical basis from that of other separatist movements in Russia. Finland's independence has been recognized by several States, and likely to be recognized also at the Peace Conference if the civil war which has been raging in Finland is brought to an end. Even if it is not represented at the Conference, the recognition of an independent Finland would call for her inclusion as a signatory to the Treaty of Peace because of her intimate interest in many problems of the settlement.

4. Iceland

It is very uncertain whether Iceland is independent. The recent declaration of the "independence" of Iceland seems to have been agreed to by the Danish Government, though an independent Iceland has not been recognized by any other country. Iceland's interest in

the problems to be discussed at the Peace Conference is remote, and it seems probable that the Conference will not be called upon to take any action which would necessitate either the recognition of Iceland or her joining in the execution of the Treaty of Peace as a signatory.

#### 5. Poland.

The existence of a Polish State is certain to be recognized by the Peace Conference. The only difficulty in including Poland among the signatories to the Treaty of Peace will arise out of the disturbed political situation among the Poles. It may be necessary to insist that the various political parties in Poland should take part in a choice of the representatives who will bind the new State by executing the Treaty of Peace.

#### *Exclusions:*

The large number of nationalist groups which are now making claim to political independence will doubtless ask a hearing at the Peace Conference. Whether any new States will be recognized, as desired by these respective groups, is so uncertain that it seems unnecessary to have them included among possible signatories to the Treaty of Peace.

In Russia, particularly, separatist movements have been numerous. The Ukraine has succeeded in establishing some measure of independence, and purported to deal independently at Brest-Litovsk. Georgia claims an independent existence, which the Germans and Russians purported to recognize in the agreements drawn up at Berlin, 27 August, 1918. Other groups in the Caucasus have attempted to set up the Don Republic, the Tartar Republic, the Republic of Turkestan, the Republic of Kazan and the Yokatsk Republic. The independent Moldavian Republic in Bessarabia purports to have been united with Roumania. In Siberia, some groups are claiming independence also. Lithuania, Courland, Livonia and Esthonia, all possessing some degree of local autonomy, have an uncertain future.

In Turkey also separatism has been at work. The separate kingdom of Hedjaz has to some extent been recognized by Great Britain, and independence is claimed for Armenia. It is possible that an independent State may be created in Palestine, but also possible that all of the peoples redeemed from Turkish domination will desire some connection with existing States.

In Austria the recent establishment of the so-called Silesian Republic is to be mentioned.

It seems unlikely that any of these nationalist groups will be included as signatories to the Treaty of Peace whatever plan is adopted for their expression of their assent to provisions for their future.

V. Some technically neutral Powers which have broken diplomatic relations with the Central Powers may be signatories to the Treaty of Peace. These include:

1. Bolivia
2. Ecuador
3. Peru
4. Uruguay
5. Salvador

*General observations:*

While none of these Powers has actually gone to war with the Central Powers, some of them have rendered valuable assistance to the associated Governments. Uruguay particularly has aided the United States. The position of these Powers differs very little from that of Guatemala, for instance, which will probably be a signatory because a technical belligerent. On 4 February, 1917, the United States appealed to these Governments to discontinue relations with the Central Powers,<sup>10</sup> and in view of the subsequent discontinuance of such relations by these Powers, this appeal constitutes a recognition of their interest in the problems involved in the Peace.

*Exclusions:*

1. Santo Domingo has not been included because her foreign relations are completely controlled by the United States.

VI. The more important neutrals may be signatories to the Treaty of Peace. These include:

- |              |                 |
|--------------|-----------------|
| 1. Argentine | 7. Norway       |
| 2. Chile     | 8. Paraguay     |
| 3. Colombia  | 9. Spain        |
| 4. Denmark   | 10. Sweden      |
| 5. Holland   | 11. Switzerland |
| 6. Mexico    | 12. Venezuela   |

*General observations:*

If the general Treaty of Peace is to include the agreements establishing the international regime of the future, these important neutrals ought to be admitted as signatories. It may be desirable to devise a scheme by which they can act as signatories to certain parts of the Treaty of Peace, those covering the League of Nations and Declarations of Public Law. But the extent of the interest of these neutrals is not so limited. Many of them are interested in the payments to be exacted from the Central Powers, for they and their

---

<sup>10</sup> See the Department's circular telegram of Feb. 3, 1917, 1 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 108.

nationals have suffered damages as the result of the conduct of the war, particularly by Germany. To this extent practically all of those named, except perhaps Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela will be directly interested in the provisions for the settlement of the war.

*Exclusions:*

The following States have been omitted from the above list of possible signatories:

- |                  |               |
|------------------|---------------|
| 1. Abyssinia     | 5. Monaco     |
| 2. Afghanistan   | 6. Nepal      |
| 3. Andorra       | 7. Oman       |
| 4. Liechtenstein | 8. San Marino |

1. Abyssinia

Abyssinia has no place in the Society of Nations though classed as independent.

2. Afghanistan

Afghanistan's foreign policy is practically controlled by Great Britain.

3-8. Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nepal, San Marino and Oman

If Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nepal, Oman and San Marino are to be considered as members of the Society of Nations, they are all of negligible importance.

*Inclusions:*

1-2. Argentine and Chile

The place occupied by Argentine and Chile in Latin America is so important that their adherence to the League of Nations is essential, if it is to embrace Latin America. Both are interested in German influence in South America, and in the problems arising out of the interruption of their commercial relations with various countries during the war.

3. Colombia

Colombia has only the general interest of Latin American countries in a League of Nations, and the Public Law of the future.

4. Denmark

With other Scandinavian countries, Denmark shares a vital interest in many of the problems growing out of the settlement of the war, and she has a special interest in the settlement of the future of Schleswig.

5. Holland

As a neutral which has borne much of the inconvenience and burden of the operations of the war, with her interests in boundary ratifica-

tions which may be sought by Belgium and Germany, Holland is a necessary signatory. Holland also has a special interest in whatever may be done in regard to the River Scheldt.

#### 6. Mexico

While Mexico has slight interest in the problems arising out of the settlement of the war, it is perhaps to the interest of the United States that any scheme for a League of Nations should have the assent of Mexico.

#### 7. Norway

Norway's particular interest is in receiving payment for her shipping which had been sunk during the war, and in the future of sea law.

#### 8. Paraguay

Paraguay has only the general interest of Latin American countries in a League of Nations, and the Public Law of the future.

#### 9. Spain

Spain has a special interest in the indemnity problems arising out of the conduct of the war, as well as sharing with other States an interest in the establishment of a League of Nations. Spain still claims interest also in Morocco.

#### 10. Sweden

Sweden has a special interest in the Aland Islands, in Finland, and in other territorial problems of the Baltic. She has a special interest also in the indemnity problems arising out of the conduct of the war, and she shares the general interest in the organization of Europe.

#### 11. Switzerland

Military operations of various countries have cast heavy burdens on Switzerland with reference to interned armies, which gives Switzerland a special interest in the settlement of the war. As a small state desiring to be assured of continued access to the sea, and of protection against European neighbors, she is particularly interested in the League of Nations.

#### 12. Venezuela

The interest of Venezuela in the Peace does not differ from that of other minor Latin American countries.



*The Commissioners Plenipotentiary (Lansing, White, House, Bliss)  
to President Wilson*<sup>11</sup>

JANUARY 8, 1919.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In compliance with your desire to be furnished with a list of the subjects which, in our opinion, should be taken up first at our conferences, we beg to suggest that we now proceed to consider the following questions in the order given below:

1. Representation.
2. The League of Nations.
3. Reparation.
4. New States.
5. Territorial Adjustments.
6. Colonial Possessions.

We are [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING  
HENRY WHITE  
E. M. HOUSE  
TASKER H. BLISS

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/13

*The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 9, 1919.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We are sending you this morning the first instalment of the attempt on our part, in accordance with your instructions, to put flesh on the skeleton draft of a proposed Treaty, previously submitted, which had the good fortune to meet with your approval.

You will observe that the present articles deal with the Contracting Powers divided into the three classes of belligerents, those which have, and those which have not severed diplomatic relations with belligerents; a suggestion as to the nature and extent of a preamble, an Article A, which should probably be the first of the Treaty, ending the war, restoring peace, and reestablishing peaceful relations between contracting countries.

Under the caption of Article B you will note a draft of an Agreement for a League of Nations, closing with some articles on open diplomacy.

Other tentative drafts calculated to put flesh upon the skeleton draft, to use your own happy expression, will follow at short inter-

---

<sup>11</sup> Reprinted from Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Garden City, N. Y., 1922), vol. I, p. 197.

vals, and we hope that both those submitted and those to follow will at least serve as a basis of discussion.

We are [etc.]

DAVID HUNTER MILLER  
JAMES BROWN SCOTT

[Enclosure]

*Draft Treaty*

THE CONTRACTING POWERS

Belgium, Brazil, China, Cuba, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Portugal, Roumania, Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, Siam, and the United States of America,<sup>12</sup> together with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Salvador, Santo Domingo, Uruguay, and also the new States of Czecho-Slovakia, Finland, and Poland,<sup>13</sup> on the one hand,  
and Bulgaria, German Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Turkey<sup>14</sup> on the other hand,

Having determined upon the restoration of peace and of peaceful relations between them, and being also desirous of establishing enduring bases for the peace of the future, have invited the participation in this common duty of the other Contracting Powers, Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Holland, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela.<sup>15</sup>

Animated, as they all are, by the desire to conclude a just peace, which shall remove the differences which have hitherto divided the States and their peoples, and

Resolved to lay the foundations for a close, intimate, and enlightened cooperation of States and their peoples based upon the principles of justice common to all civilized States and peoples, and

Recognizing that the happiness of peoples and the security of States depend upon those principles of justice, among which the following are obvious and fundamental:

1. That the government of every State derives all its just powers from the consent of the governed.
2. That every State has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence.
3. That every State has the right to independence.

<sup>12</sup> A marginal note reads, "Omitted: Costa Rica, Montenegro, Russia."

<sup>13</sup> A marginal note reads, "Omitted: Hedjaz."

<sup>14</sup> A marginal note reads, "Omitted: Bavaria, Lichtenstein."

<sup>15</sup> A marginal note reads, "Omitted: Abyssinia, Albania, Afghanistan, Andorra, Monaco, Nepal, Oman, San Marino, Tibet."

4. That every State is in law and before the law the equal of every other State belonging to the League of Nations.<sup>16</sup>

5. That every State has the right to territory within defined boundaries and to exercise jurisdiction over this territory.<sup>17</sup>

6. That every State entitled to a right is entitled to have that right respected by all other States.

7. That international law is at one and the same time both national and international: national in the sense that it is the law of the State and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles.

8. That international covenants and agreements are entered into and are to be observed according to standards of honor and good faith, not differing from those which should prevail among individuals.

Acknowledging an equal right to all States and special privileges to none, in accordance with those principles of justice and rules of law applicable to States and their peoples, to the end that armaments on land and sea and also the burden and expense of military budgets may be diminished, and

Substituting for the secret agreements of the past the open diplomacy of the future, which can only obtain in an atmosphere of justice, confidence and mutual good will,<sup>18</sup> and

Pledging their good faith and their honor to the maintenance of the new order of things created by them,

The Contracting Powers have named as their Commissioners Plenipotentiary the following:

(Here names of all Contracting Parties arranged in alphabetical order of the countries in the language of the Agreement, and placing the names of the Commissioners under each country.)

The said Commissioners Plenipotentiary having assembled in Versailles and having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form,

Have therefore agreed upon the following Articles:

#### ARTICLE A.

The Contracting Powers now at war with other Contracting Powers, and the Contracting Powers whose peaceful relations have been severed with other Contracting Powers because of the war, de-

<sup>16</sup> A query in pencil appears in the margin opposite "League of Nations."

<sup>17</sup> A marginal note in Secretary Lansing's hand reads, "Coastal waters and high seas?"

<sup>18</sup> A marginal note in Secretary Lansing's hand indicates a possible substitution of "exist when" for the words "obtain in an atmosphere of," and insertion of "prevail among nations" following "good will."

clare that immediately upon the date at which the present Agreement by its terms becomes effective, the status of peace is re-established between those Powers actually at war, that thereupon the peaceful relations are to be restored which have been broken by other Contracting Powers because of the war, and that that intercourse usual between all States and their peoples in time of peace is to be resumed from and after the said date and is to be conducted by all Contracting Powers in their mutual relations in accordance with the principles expressed in the preamble and in the specific provisions of this Agreement.

#### ARTICLE B.—AGREEMENT FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1. The Members of the League of Nations shall be the Powers signatory to this Agreement, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained.

2. The Council of the League of Nations shall consist of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Member Powers accredited to the Government of Belgium, and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, who shall be the presiding officer at the meetings of the Council.

3. A quorum of the Council shall consist of nine tenths of the Members thereof.

4. The Council by majority vote shall make their rules of procedure.

5. The meetings of the Council shall be held at the seat of Government of Belgium, but the place of any meeting may be otherwise fixed by majority vote of the Council. The Council by similar vote shall fix the time of their meetings, but a regular meeting of the Council shall be held at least once in each calendar year, and a special meeting thereof shall be held when requested by any Member Power.

6. The Council at their first meeting and every four years thereafter shall, by majority vote, choose from among their number a Standing Committee which shall consist of the representatives of seven Powers, whose representatives shall constitute the Standing Committee for the ensuing four years.

7. Any decision or vote of the Standing Committee may be made only by four or more votes.

8. The Standing Committee shall make its own rules of procedure and shall name a Secretariat.

9. The Secretariat shall have charge of the archives and of the correspondence of the Council and of the Standing Committee.

10. The archives and correspondence of the Council and of the Standing Committee shall be open at all times to every Member Power.

11. All expenses of the Council, of the Standing Committee, and of the Secretariat shall be borne equally by the Member Powers.

12. No determination or vote of the Council shall be effective if disapproved within ten calendar days after the date thereof by vote of the Standing Committee.

13. Each Member Power severally covenants and guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political independence of any other Member Power.

14. Any interference with a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft proceeding over the high seas, which interference is not affirmatively sanctioned by the law of nations, shall be deemed an impairment of political independence within the terms of Article 13.

15. No act of a Member Power shall be deemed a breach of the covenant and guaranty contained in Article 13 unless determined to be such a breach by majority vote of the Council after an opportunity has been given for a hearing upon the question. Upon such hearing, the Council shall endeavor to bring the Parties to a friendly arrangement and otherwise shall determine by majority vote both as to the fact and as to the time of such breach, if any, and any such determination, subject to the provisions of Article 12 shall be conclusive upon all Member Powers.

16. In the event that any Member Power shall breach the covenant and guaranty contained in Article 13, such breach of covenant and guaranty shall *ipso facto* operate as a suspension of this Agreement in so far as it applies in favor of the offending Power and furthermore as a suspension of the obligation of all covenants and guaranties in favor of the offending Power, contained in all treaties, conventions, and other agreements heretofore entered into between the offending Power and all other Member Powers.

17. A breach of the covenant and guaranty contained in Article 13 shall constitute an act unfriendly to all other Member Powers and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, consular, and other official relations with the offending Power, and shall through the Council exchange views as to the measures necessary to restore the Power, whose sovereignty has been violated, to the rights and liberties which it possessed prior to such violation and to prevent further violation thereof.

18. The Member Powers recognize as a binding principle that the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any extrinsic Powers.

19. The Member Powers severally covenant that the terms of any award or decision in a dispute to which they are Parties, made by any Arbitral or Judicial Tribunal to which the same has been referred, shall be faithfully and honorably performed.

20. The Member Powers severally covenant to submit to a Permanent International Commission, for investigation and report, all disputes between them, of every nature whatsoever, which cannot be solved by direct diplomatic negotiation, other than disputes, the settlement of which is in fact achieved upon reference thereof to an arbitral or judicial tribunal; and they likewise covenant not to resort to any act of force or to begin hostilities or to declare war pending the investigation and report of said Commission.

21. Each Member Power shall, by appointment made within one month after ratification by it of this Agreement, designate one Commissioner as a Member of the Commission mentioned in the preceding Article. Each Member Power may remove at any time, before investigation begins, the Commissioner appointed by it, appointing his successor upon the same occasion. Any vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

22. The Commission sitting in the investigation of a dispute and reporting thereon, shall consist of those Commissioners appointed by the Parties to the dispute, together with a like number of Commissioners chosen, one by each Party, and together with one Commissioner chosen by agreement of the Parties.

23. Failing any designation, appointment or choice under Article 21 or Article 22, such designation, appointment or choice as the case may be shall be made by vote of the Standing Committee.

24. The expenses of the Commission in any investigation and report shall be paid by the Parties to the dispute, in equal proportions.

25. The Commission, in any investigation and report, shall make their own rules of procedure.

26. In case of failure to agree upon the diplomatic solution of a dispute the Member Powers, Parties to the dispute, shall submit it to said Commission for investigation and report. The convocation of the Commission may be made by any Party. The Commission shall by preference sit in the country in which there are the greater facilities for the investigation, and the Member Powers shall furnish all the means and facilities required for the investigation and report. The report of the Commission shall be presented within a year counted from the date at which the Commission shall declare, by a declaration filed with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, that its work is begun, unless a prolongation of the time shall be accorded by the Parties. This report, which is purely advisory and does not bind the Parties as to any question at issue, shall be prepared in various originals, one of which shall be presented to each of the Parties and the other shall be presented to the Standing Committee.

27. After presentation of the report mentioned in the preceding Article, six months time will be given to renewed negotiations in

order to bring about a solution of the question in view of the findings of said report; and if after this new term the Parties should be unable to reach a friendly arrangement, they will proceed to submit the dispute to arbitration under the terms of any convention in force between them which they agree covers the question or questions investigated; if not so submitted to arbitration, and thereby amicably adjusted, any Party may proceed to submit the dispute to the Standing Committee for consideration during a period of three months.

28. The Member Powers severally covenant that while Parties to a dispute which is pending, and during the periods mentioned in Articles 26 and 27, they will not do or omit any act the commission or omission of which would tend to prejudice the position or final rights of any other Party to the dispute, and that the terms of a *modus vivendi* shall be agreed upon, preserving the rights of the Parties, pending and until the final determination of the dispute. In any case where the Parties are unable to agree upon the terms of such a *modus vivendi*, the terms thereof shall be formulated by the Commission and a *modus vivendi* embodying these terms shall be executed by the Parties and carried out by them in good faith.

29. Any decision or conclusion of the Commission and the terms of its report shall be adopted by a majority thereof.

30. When a dispute is submitted to the Standing Committee for consideration under the terms of Article 27 the Member Powers severally covenant that the Standing Committee may:

- (a) Name and direct one or more Powers to mediate between the Parties to the dispute.
- (b) Name and direct one or more Powers to use good offices in bringing about a friendly adjustment of the dispute.

31. When a dispute has been submitted to the Standing Committee for consideration under the terms of Article 27, any Party thereto may offer to submit the dispute under a *compromis* to be settled by the Standing Committee, to be heard and finally determined by Arbitrators to be named by the Standing Committee.

32. The Member Powers severally covenant that while Parties to a dispute which is pending or which is under consideration of the Standing Committee, they will not declare war or commence hostilities, or commit any hostile act, against any other Party thereto; and further severally covenant that in no such case will they declare war or commence hostilities, or commit any hostile act against a Power which offers to submit the dispute for arbitration under the terms of Article 31.

33. In the event that any Member Power shall breach any covenant or provision of this Agreement, such breach shall *ipso facto* operate

as a suspension of this Agreement in so far as it applies in favor of the offending Power, and furthermore, as a suspension of the obligation of all covenants and guaranties in favor of the offending Power, contained in all treaties, conventions, and other agreements theretofore entered into between the offending Power and all other Member Powers.

34. A breach of any covenant or provision of this Agreement shall constitute an act unfriendly to all other Member Powers, and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, consular, and other official relations with the offending Power, and shall, through the Council, exchange views as to any measures necessary to be taken.

35. No act of a Member Power shall be deemed a breach of a covenant or provision of this Agreement unless determined to be such a breach by majority vote of the Council after an opportunity has been given for a hearing upon the question. Upon such hearing the Council shall endeavor to bring about a friendly arrangement, and otherwise shall determine by majority vote both as to the fact and as to the time of such breach, if any, and any such determination, subject to the provisions of Article 12, shall be conclusive upon all Member Powers.

36. Any war or menace of war is a matter of interest to the Member Powers, which the Council shall by offer of good offices or of mediation or otherwise attempt to terminate or avert.

37. In the case of a dispute in which both a Member Power and a non-Member Power are Parties, if each non-Member Power concerned shall consent by a declaration in writing, delivered to the Standing Committee, to be deemed *ad hoc* a Power signatory to this Agreement, all the provisions in this Agreement regarding disputes between or among Member Powers shall be applicable.

38. In case of hostilities threatened or commenced between a Member Power and a non-Member Power, the Member Power concerned may entrust its interests to the Council; in such case the course of action of that Member Power shall be determined by majority vote of the Council, subject to the provisions of Article 12, and the Member Powers agree, through the Council to exchange views as to the measures necessary to support and protect that course of action.

39. The Council shall from time to time consider and recommend to the respective Member Powers for approval, declarations of rules and principles of the law of nations.

40. Every Treaty and every other International Agreement to which a Member Power is a Party, and which is in force at the date of the signature of this Agreement, and which has not heretofore been made public in its entirety, shall within six months after the date of signature of this Agreement be made public in its entirety, or shall otherwise be and be deemed abrogated.



41. Every Treaty and every other International Agreement hereafter made, to which any Member Power shall be a Party, shall be made public in its entirety within not more than thirty days after the same shall become binding, or shall otherwise be and be deemed abrogated.

42. The provisions of the foregoing Articles shall not apply to a Treaty or other International Agreement made by a Member Power while engaged in war, in which case the Treaty or other International Agreement shall be made public in its entirety within not more than thirty days after the conclusion of peace or shall otherwise be and be deemed abrogated.

43. Within the terms of the three foregoing Articles a Treaty or other International Agreement shall be deemed to have been made public in its entirety only when a true and complete copy thereof shall have been filed with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

44. Any non-signatory Power desiring to adhere to this Agreement, may deposit a declaration of adherence with the Council; such declaration shall become effective and such Power shall for all purposes be deemed a signatory Power hereto from ninety days after the deposit thereof, unless within such period of ninety days, more than three Member Powers shall dissent therefrom by depositing with the Council a notice of such dissent, in which case neither the declaration nor its deposit shall be effective.

45. Any Member Power may withdraw from this Agreement by depositing a notice of such withdrawal with the Council. The withdrawal shall have effect only in regard to the notifying Power.

46. Any provisions in Treaties or other Agreements between or among the signatory Powers which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement are and shall be deemed abrogated.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 840.014/1

*Mr. Allen W. Dulles to the Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Harrison)*

[PARIS,] January 9, 1919.

Subject: Statement regarding use of force to realize territorial ambitions.

With reference to the memoranda you left with me yesterday,<sup>19</sup> I quote below the text of a possible statement in regard to the use of force to secure an immediate realization of territorial ambitions.

"It has come to the attention of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace that force is still being resorted to for the purpose

---

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

of securing an immediate realization of territorial ambitions. This has often caused needless bloodshed and the interruption of ways of communication necessary to the welfare of the peoples concerned. The American Commission desires, therefore, to make clear that the employment of force to create a 'fait accompli' may tend to raise rather than dispel doubts as to the justice of the territorial claims involved."

In my opinion, it would be preferable that any such statement should be a joint declaration of the Allies or included in a speech of the President's rather than be made "ex cathedra" by the American Commission alone.

The French military authorities in Budapest have recently indicated to the Hungarians the boundaries which should be considered as a temporary line to separate them from the Czecho-Slovaks. In case it is feasible to draw such temporary lines of division in all disputed territories in connection with the above statement, the force of the statement would be greatly increased.

ALLEN W. DULLES

---

Paris Peace Conf. 840.014/3

*The Assistant Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 11, 1919.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In accordance with your instructions given out at this morning's meeting, I beg to quote below the draft of the announcement which is to be made by the Commissioners, and which was submitted to the President yesterday.

It is my understanding that you intend to take this matter up at the meeting tomorrow, Sunday, with the British and French representatives, with the view to ascertain whether they propose to take the same or similar action in the matter.

The proposed announcement reads as follows:

"It has come to the attention of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace that force is still being resorted to for the purpose of securing an immediate realization of territorial ambitions. The American Commission desires, therefore, to make clear that the employment of force to create a 'fait accompli' may tend to raise rather than dispel doubts as to the justice of the territorial claims involved."

Respectfully,

[File copy not signed]

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/14

*Major General F. J. Kernan to the Secretary of the Commission  
to Negotiate Peace (Grew)*

PARIS, 12 January, 1919.

1. Herewith are two copies of a memorandum I am submitting for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. This memorandum was drawn up by me after a conference with Mr. D. H. Miller and Major J. B. Scott, to whom I am also sending copies.

F. J. KERNAN

*Major General, U. S. A.*

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace*

PARIS, 12 January, 1919.

Subject: Some suggestions à propos of the American skeleton draft of a Peace Treaty.<sup>20</sup>

In the skeleton draft of a Peace Treaty, drawn up by direction of the American Commissioners to Negotiate Peace, the topics embraced under Sub-heads IX and X, paragraph 2, appear to justify suggestions from the undersigned. It is probable that these topics, as well as others embraced in this skeleton draft, may be brought up for consideration before the Peace Conference by the American Commissioners, even if that must not occur as a matter of certainty. Should these topics be actually taken under advisement by the Conference, it seems plain that a definite project in respect to the same should be in some respects mapped out in advance, and that this detailed work is a legitimate task for the personnel designated to assist the Commissioners in their larger work. Not knowing of any concrete propositions under Sub-heads IX and X, and on the assumption that such may not be in existence, the following suggestions are offered for such consideration as may be deemed worth while.

Sub-head IX contains four topics under the caption: "Limitation of Armaments and Budgets", namely, (1) Military, (2) Naval, (3) Aerial, (4) Submarine. It seems quite obvious that this whole subject of "Limitation of Armaments and Budgets" is so interwoven with the other question of a "League of Nations" and so dependent thereon that no profitable treatment is possible until the larger subject, upon which this one hangs, has taken shape and has been in some definite manner agreed upon. I, therefore, pass by Sub-head IX to Sub-head X, namely, "Hague Convention and other Inter-

<sup>20</sup> *Ante*, p. 298.

national Agreements". Under this sub-head two topics are listed, i. e., (1) Status, (2) Amendment. As The Hague Convention and other similar agreements represent an attempt at partial codification of international law, and as they deal largely with the rules that come into active operation during time of war, their present consideration with a view to revision and re-enactment is well worth serious thought. It may be argued that the rules of land and sea warfare and the rights and obligations of neutrals during a state of war will be fundamentally affected by the organization of a new agency such as the League of Nations to Insure Peace. It seems plain, however, that ordinary forethought compels us to recognize the possibility of future wars, no matter what may be the outcome of the attempt to create a League of Nations, and to take steps in the light of that forethought. International rules, as they obtain in time of peace for the government of intercourse during such times, suggest no pressing need of attention at the hands of this great Peace Conference. On the other hand, we are just emerging from the greatest war in the history of mankind where the rights and obligations of neutrals and the rules of land and sea warfare have undergone the most searching test in modern times. In this war, not only have matters hitherto subjected to rule through The Hague and similar conventions, and through the growth of customary law, been put through the fire of experience, but agencies practically unknown in former wars have been brought into play. The use of poisonous gases, bombardment from aerial machines, and the submarine are new agencies of great importance whose extensive use began with the present war and in respect to which no authoritative rules can be said to exist. In one way or another scarcely one of the old rules remains unbroken and hence their revision has become a matter of urgent necessity, a revision which would naturally include rules to cover the employment of such new agencies as this war has developed.

It may be said that the deliberate consideration of such a revision as is indicated above would require a longer time than the Peace Conference would probably have at its disposal and that therefore the wisest course would be to postpone the matter until the Peace Treaty is concluded and the world has settled back into a normal state of intercourse. Such a course, it appears to me, would throw away a vast fund of experience and an alert condition of public mind in all civilized countries, which, taken together, make the present hour extraordinarily advantageous for a full examination and recasting of the rules of land and sea warfare and the rights and obligations of neutrals. There are in Europe today men who have worked on submarines and men who have been employed in every way for their destruction; there are men who have directed the employment of

bombing aerial machines as well as others who have actually conducted the bombardments, and also men who have knowledge of the effects of this species of warfare; similarly, there are men who have undergone life in prison camps and others who have had charge of such camps; and so throughout all the varied experiences on land and sea which this war has given rise to at all seasons of the year and in many lands scattered around the world. Whoever undertakes today the task of revision suggested in this memorandum would have all this experience, this fresh knowledge and this keen interest at his disposal. The rules have been through the crucible of war and are now plastic and ready for moulding into new and better shapes. But if several years shall have elapsed, the members gathered at a new Hague Convention will approach their task with much of this valuable experience dissipated or grown cold, the rules reset and hardened in their old forms and the public mind, turned into new channels, will have a much lessened interest in this most important matter. Again, if the time which shall elapse between the first meeting of the great Peace Conference and the signing of its final agreements should prove too short for a complete and satisfactory revision, which would form a part or an appendix to the Treaty of Peace, the work done in this direction would not be lost but would be a valuable aid to any future conventions which may take up the subject matter. For these reasons, I am convinced that the time is most opportune for undertaking the task indicated above, and assuming that this may be done, a procedure somewhat as follows is suggested as one which might produce good results.

Let each of the Delegations of the great powers represented at this Peace Conference appoint a committee with instructions to codify the rules of warfare on land and sea and the rights and obligations of neutrals in war times. Such a committee should be made up of a carefully selected personnel representing men learned in international law in all its aspects, and of Officers of the Army and of the Navy, and should be sufficiently large to break up into sub-committees, each of these to deal with the several branches into which the whole subject matter may naturally divide. We should thus have the matter considered simultaneously by committees representing the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and Italy. Their completed work would, by each committee, be submitted to its proper Peace Delegation, and the latter might then refer the several schemes thus produced to a new committee, made up substantially upon the lines of the original committees, except that upon this final committee would be representatives of each of the Great Powers concerned and the completed work of this composite committee would be submitted to the Conference as a whole for adoption, rejection, or modification, as might be well.

If it is objected that such a course in the time probably at the disposal of the Peace Conference would result in an imperfect agreement or code, it may be answered that much would be embodied therein of future value and as no finality attaches to this any more than to any other international agreement, the weak points could be detected at leisure and future Hague Conferences could, in the calmer atmosphere of peace, make such modifications as time and reflection would seem to justify.

If these suggestions commend themselves at all it may be added that no time should be lost in getting to work and that every means at the disposal of each of the concerned powers should be placed at the disposal of the several committees. Moreover, a like procedure upon other subject matters might be profitable, always supposing that satisfactory concrete projects have not already been evolved. For example, where it appears as inevitable, or probable, that boundaries as they existed before the outbreak of the war will have to be changed, committees of experts might be formed to study the just location of new boundaries taking into account the political, historical, economical, strategical and ethnological factors of each problem. And so of the League of Nations if, as yet, the American Commissioner's propositions have not been reduced to precise terms.

F. J. KERNAN  
*Major General, U. S. Army*

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.1/15

*The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State*

[PARIS,] 14 January, 1919.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have the honor to enclose herewith four texts of draft of Article C of the Draft Treaty, a portion of which was transmitted to you on the 9th instant.

In the preparation of this paper we have had various conferences with Professor A. A. Young, and he is in agreement with us as to the paper.

Very sincerely yours,

DAVID HUNTER MILLER  
JAMES BROWN SCOTT

[Enclosure]

#### ARTICLE C.—DECLARATION FOR EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS

The Powers signatory to the Agreement for a League of Nations declare as a part of said Agreement: <sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Marginal notes in the original memorandum are here printed in brackets following each paragraph.

1. For the purposes of this Declaration every dominion, colony, protectorate, dependency, or possession having now a tariff system in any measure distinct from that applicable to the country with which it is politically connected, shall be regarded as a State.

[Note: A distinction between what may be called, "Economic units" and "Units of sovereignty" must be recognized.]

2. While for every State there may be freely adopted and from time to time freely changed, a system of export and import prohibitions and duties, port dues, traffic rates, inspection methods and fees, and other trade charges, and also laws and regulations embodying the same or relating thereto, any and every such system, law and regulation shall at any given time as to the rest of the world be fixed and single, and shall also at any given time as to the rest of the world be equal and without discrimination, difference, or preference, direct or indirect.

[The general rule of Equality and of the Open Door.]

3. Every State shall accord to the vessels of other States as favorable treatment as respects tonnage dues, harbor and port charges, facilities for stationing, loading and unloading, and other similar and corresponding charges and facilities as it accords to vessels whose home ports are within its territory.

[Equality as to vessels, etc., going farther than the most favored nation principle.]

4. Every State shall accord to goods exported therefrom in the vessels of other States, or imported therein in such vessels, as favorable treatment as respects export and import prohibitions and duties, inspection methods and charges, traffic rates, trade charges of every kind, internal taxes, and other similar or corresponding matters, as it accords to similar goods exported therefrom or imported therein in vessels whose home ports are within its territory.

[Equality as to cargoes, etc., going farther than the most favored nation principle.]

5. Export and import duties and other trade charges shall be without discrimination or preference, direct or indirect, based upon the place of intermediate or original origin, or of intermediate or ultimate destination of vessel or of goods.

[This would affect such duties as the French "Surtax d'entrepot" and United States differential duties on imports via Canada.]

6. No State shall grant direct or indirect bounties on exports.

[An anti-dumping clause.]

7. Nothing in this Declaration contained shall be deemed to limit or affect the rights or privileges of any Member Power relating to its coasting trade.

[The Coasting Trade.]

8. No existing national law or regulation, and no existing international agreement or arrangement shall be deemed to be affected by any of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Declaration.

[This limits the effect of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 to the future.]

9. While for the purposes of this Declaration the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, and the Dominion of New Zealand are each to be regarded as States under the provisions of Article 1, they may, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, make preferential arrangements, *inter se* and/or with Great Britain.

[Preference within the British Empire.]

10. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, States whose territorial limits are wholly or partly within the continent of Europe may enter into agreements *inter se* in the nature of Customs Unions covering contiguous territory.

[Customs Unions in Europe.]

11. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, agreements in the nature of Customs Unions, covering territory within the American continents, may be entered into.

[Customs Unions under the Monroe Doctrine.]

12. A State engaged in trade or commerce shall not in respect thereof have or be deemed to have any of the rights, privileges, immunities, duties, or obligations of sovereignty.

[The State as a trader.]

13. No part of the revenues of any State, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any other State, its citizens or subjects.

[A prohibition of a limitation on independence through finance. See similar language in the Anglo-Russian Convention of Aug. 31, 1907, regarding Thibet.]

14. In each and every State there shall be adequate protection of fair and legitimate international trade, and adequate protection against the use of unfair methods of competition in international trade. To this end the Member Powers agree to bind themselves by the provisions of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, with Final Protocol, signed at Washington, 2 June, 1911,<sup>22</sup> which is hereby incorporated in and made an integral part of this Declaration.

[The United States is a party to this Convention.]

15. (The Member Powers agree to bind themselves by the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic

---

<sup>22</sup> *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. III. p. 2953.



Works, signed at Berlin, 13 November, 1908,<sup>23</sup> which is hereby incorporated in and made an integral part of this Declaration.)

[This is not suggested as an American proposal but as a proposal likely to be made by Great Britain, the Power chiefly interested. Its adoption would be contrary to the policy of the United States expressed in the Copyright Act of 1909, Vol. 35, Stats. at Large, page 1078, substantially requiring copyrighted books in English to be printed from type set within the United States.]

NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL ADVISORS REGARDING THE FOREGOING DECLARATION FOR EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS (Article C)

Provisions for an International Trade Commission, regarded as a desirable, if not an essential part of a Declaration of this character, are under preparation.

---

<sup>23</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cii, p. 619.

THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCE AT LONDON,  
DECEMBER 1918

763.72119/9189 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 25, 1918—11 p. m.  
[Received November 25—8:28 p. m.]

173. Secret for the President. I am in receipt of the following telegram from Lloyd George:

"Monsieur Clemenceau is coming to London on the first of December, and I earnestly hope that you will be able to come also as a number of urgent questions require discussion. As I shall not be able to attend any conferences in Paris before the election on the 14th of December, this is specifically important. I am inviting Senor Orlando alone."

I have advised Lloyd George that I am still in bed, but that I hope that my doctor will permit me to go to London on or about December first for the conference in question. I am feeling better but am still weak, and I will not be able to tell before Thursday or Friday of this week whether I can make the journey.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119/9191 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 30, 1918—7 p. m.  
[Received November 30—5:04 p. m.]

203. Very secret for the President. Clemenceau called on me this afternoon. He said that he had come to give me his solemn word of honor that he would discuss no question of any importance with George in London. He said that the meeting was of no importance whatever and that he thought that George had asked him to come over simply for electioneering purposes. He said that he thought it most inopportune to call a meeting of this sort on the eve of your departure for France. He added that if Great Britain adopted during the conference a grasping attitude, France would oppose it. France, he stated, would be always willing to submit her claims to the judgment of the

conference. Our conference lasted only 15 minutes inasmuch as today has been my first day out of bed. Clemenceau said he would stay in London only 2 days.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

*Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House*<sup>1</sup>

LONDON, December 3, 1918—evening.

During general conversation with Butler Wright<sup>2</sup> at Embassy this morning he stated that great labor meeting here last Saturday night was somewhat disorderly, and resolution receiving most applause was one in favor of withdrawal of all allied troops from Russia. Conference with Norman Davis in which he discussed situation of Italy; the annual interest payment of Italy to Great Britain is now \$100,000,000, and to the United States \$50,000,000, which in his opinion cannot be met by Italy at least for some time except out of fresh loans. Davis believes that question of cancellation of advances by United States and Great Britain to belligerents will be actively raised during preliminary negotiations, and said that Bonar Law had made suggestions to him regarding such cancellation.

Regarding Hoover relief plan<sup>3</sup> Davis said that position of British Treasury will be that Great Britain will not participate financially except to extent of supplies furnished by herself such as textiles, and by her colonies, and that such participation would be perhaps 20% of total values. Further regarding relief plan Davis said that some countries such as Belgium would pay for supplies furnished, but as to others where payment impossible he doubted legality of direct loans from United States, particularly in such instances as Poland, and thought financing might be done out of President's fund. Davis said attitude of British Treasury learned by him from conversations with Keynes would be that indemnities to be paid by Germany should be limited to reasonable amounts. Davis belief based on reports through Holland is that Germans believe in so large indemnity being demanded that apathy and pessimism prevail and that after examination and report he is preparing we should prevent excessive exactions which would mean German economic slavery. Davis opinion from some investigation made by him of damage to home buildings in Northern France, not including buildings or property of any other character, might be \$300,000,000. to not exceeding \$500,000,000.

---

<sup>1</sup>This and the following four telegrams are reprinted from David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris, With Documents* [1924-26], vol. I, pp. 25, 30, 33, 36, and 37.

<sup>2</sup>J. Butler Wright, counselor of embassy at London.

<sup>3</sup>See vol. II, pp. 627 ff.

He thought tentative Belgium indemnity figure published this morning of two hundred seventy million pounds would be somewhat of a shock to French ideas. Davis has talked freely with Monnet<sup>4</sup> who Davis says is very close to Clemenceau and represents his views and Monnet says the French idea regarding a League of Nations has as basis the idea that the security of France against any attack should be guaranteed by Great Britain and the United States; furthermore that any development by the United States of its foreign trade before France has opportunity for trade preparation will make us as well as the idea of League of Nations unpopular; that Clemenceau's attitude in discussion with President Wilson will be one of acquiescence in general principles of League of Nations, but of continuous questioning as to details; and that Clemenceau will ask the President to formulate economic and financial proposals in which the French are particularly interested. Davis idea is that regarding financial and economic proposals it would be great advantage to us if both Great Britain and France should be required to formulate them in advance for consideration by the United States. Davis mentioned that a letter from Bonar Law received today stated that no further loans would be made by Great Britain to France or Italy. In the former case because France could get along without them, and the latter case, because Italy could get along with last loan of fifty million pounds just made by Great Britain, but Davis thinks that this attitude of Great Britain is taken for bargaining purposes and might be relaxed later. Davis mentioned enormous stock of coffee held in Genoa from which Italians proposed not supplying even our needs with view of making Genoa greatest coffee market in Europe. Keynes of British Treasury told Davis that he Keynes has prepared a complete report of all financial data containing probable British proposals which Keynes will show to Davis as soon as approved by British Cabinet and which I hope to see shortly.

Note to Balfour was delivered about 2:30.<sup>5</sup> Wiseman says that Drummond's<sup>6</sup> first reaction to this note was along financial lines, Drummond saying that if United States is to furnish the large part of the relief supplies the United States should finance it. This last confirms what Davis states.

At Premiers' conference yesterday Wiseman says it was resolved that Kaiser should be proceeded against, and that this was cabled to you;<sup>7</sup> also he says decided in favor of large indemnities as that

---

<sup>4</sup> Jean Monnet, French financial expert.

<sup>5</sup> Vol. II, p. 646.

<sup>6</sup> Sir Eric Drummond, private secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> See note from the British Embassy to the Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, p. 653.

question has become politically here of great importance. This last statement of Wiseman is not in accord with views of British Treasury expressed by Keynes to Davis. Wiseman said that British public feeling was in a very sensitive condition just at this time which he thought would tend to lessen soon and in talking of conference between the British, French and Italians he said in a half laughing way in answer to my inquiry as to what was going on QUOTE Yesterday they hanged the Kaiser and got big indemnities agreed upon, and today I suppose they are arranging to present a united front to President Wilson (end QUOTE). Wiseman expressed following views as to President's visit: If President adopts conciliatory and moderate attitude in first discussions with Premiers and avoids statements prepared by person whose name was not stated but obviously Creel President's position will be much stronger and if following this President's proposals are rejected by Great Britain and France prestige of President will increase still more. In other words Wiseman thinks that the first positions taken and statements made by President will be of greatest importance. Will see Tyrrell<sup>8</sup> tomorrow impossible today but talked with Eustace Percy<sup>9</sup> with Wiseman present. Percy will be assistant to chief as yet unnamed of League of Nations division of British organizations at Peace Conference which is one of their six main divisions. Percy I think represents British attitude in his view that all detailed questions of settlement should be considered first, and that questions such as League of Nations and international control could only be adjusted when all details of settlement had been gone over to the point of a draft treaty. I suggested to Percy as expressing my own views that perhaps same procedure would not apply in case of preliminary discussions between friends as would be necessary at Peace Conference in the imposition of terms upon enemies and the suggestion of agreements to neutrals. I further suggested to Percy the question of straits and asked how assuming first that some form of international control was to be adopted and assuming second that such international control was to be under a League of Nations if established could questions of detail regarding Constantinople be worked out before question of League of Nations had been determined. To this Percy replied with other hypotheses which I think indicate the present British ideas as Percy has been working on nothing but League of Nations for some time past. Percy's hypotheses were first that the international control of straits was by a mandatory of League of Nations, second that that mandatory was United States, and third we as similar mandatory have charge of Macedonia. He then elaborated possibility of agreement by the

---

<sup>8</sup> Sir William Tyrrell, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>9</sup> Of the British Foreign Office.

United States to accept such a trust and thought that in this way if similar agreements were generally reached the League of Nations would very largely have its functions determined without any attempt to formulate general principles. He went so far as to suggest that if the formulation of general principles were attempted the Panama Canal would come in the same class as the Straits to which I replied pleasantly as expressing my personal views that such a grouping seemed hardly among the possibilities. I regard Percy's conversation as an effort to convey to me without stating them as such some of the British ideas which have been formulated, and that his Panama Canal suggestion was an attempt to show difficulties in the way of idealistic principles of United States.

Captain Dennis at Embassy under Colonel Slocum <sup>10</sup> has made study of English political situation. Views of Dennis follow:

Labor element has some features of danger but tendency to Bolshevism is not apparent; political feeling in England is running high, and among the opposing leaders is bitter; a noticeable feature which must be taken into account is the intense anti-German feeling of the women; the Labor Party are giving thorough support to Henderson <sup>11</sup> although he is not regarded as an able leader and Barnes <sup>12</sup> who is the only Labor leader staying with the Coalition is regarded as mediocre. Dennis guesses the Labor Party will get less than one hundred seats but says that the agreements of the whips have resulted in favoring the Conservatives even in places where Liberal sentiment predominates such as Scotland; so that the chief single unit behind the Coalition in the next Parliament will be a Conservative bloc, and the Liberal Party as such will be largely destroyed. Dennis says that British public opinion at the present time is in a condition of nerves bordering almost on hysteria owing to the long strain of the war followed by the relief at its end and the excitement of a general election coming at the same time. Dennis had a talk today with Steed foreign editor of the *Times* who told Dennis that there was practically a deadlock between the French and British on the one hand and the Italians on the other at the conferences, and that the Italians had written a letter to Milner <sup>13</sup> demanding German East Africa which Steed was going to see Milner about tonight. From what Dennis told me of his conversations with men in the Foreign Office whom he knows I am convinced that a general if not a complete report was made by the British Foreign Office subordinate officials on the British program about last Friday for submission to Cabinet which had a long meeting on Saturday. Dennis said that air of Tyrrell and other men at Foreign Office on last Friday

---

<sup>10</sup> Military attaché.

<sup>11</sup> Arthur E. Henderson, Secretary of the British Labour Party.

<sup>12</sup> George N. Barnes, Minister without Portfolio in the British War Cabinet.

<sup>13</sup> Sir Alfred Milner, British Secretary of State for War.

was one of relief that their work had been completed in the preparation of this report coupled with some anxiety as to how their work would be received.

Dennis was present at Labor meeting which filled Albert Hall last Saturday night with an overflow which filled Albert Hall on Sunday night and there was at these meetings two distinct tendencies first to accomplish aims by orderly political methods and second perhaps equally strong to accomplish aims by general strike, and that feeling in favor of withdrawal of troops from Russia appears to be almost chief sentimental aim partly from ignorance and partly from resentment of Henderson's treatment regarding Stockholm conference. I recommend that you direct that report of Dennis regarding English political situation and his interviews here be forwarded to you daily.

Wiseman tonight has no information as to reported Italian demand for German East Africa but he saw Balfour at four o'clock who said that first reading of note regarding relief seemed to present important questions and he would take it to meeting with French and Italians as they were to present proposal regarding that situation. Wiseman said relief matter will now doubtless await President's arrival and this was also view of Hurley who told me this evening that President had cabled directing non-delivery of note to Balfour and that Hurley would show me cables tomorrow.

Regret that my cabling today has been delayed by difficulties in hotel accommodations interrupting dictation.

---

*Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House*

LONDON, December 4, 1918—afternoon.

Tyrrell in conversation today intimated that British claims for indemnity by Germany would not be very large saying that Britain and America were more alike in this regard than any other two Powers, and mentioned necessity of both countries seeing that claims were just. Still Tyrrell seemed to think that just claims would be larger than German ability to pay but was not very definite about this.

Regarding questions of procedure he considers that those relating to interallied conferences are the only ones now important and that questions regarding procedure of the peace conference itself can be considered later. He assented to the view expressed by Wiseman that proposed agenda for the interallied conferences should be drawn up for submission to you in order that same might if you approved be submitted to President. Tyrrell said that the para-

graph in yesterday's communication to you from British regarding the fixing after President's arrival of the date of his conferences with the Allies was due to the desire of the French to have the President view the devastated regions in France before the conferences commence. Tyrrell's division of the classes of subjects to be discussed was first reconstitution of the world and second indemnities although he did not indicate any order of discussion but his grouping would include under one heading all the questions of every nature except indemnities. Tyrrell wants to establish contact between the various individuals connected with our delegation and with British who have to do with the same subjects, for example he would like their man working on Poland to be in contact with our expert on Poland, and so on through the list, and he is to give me a complete statement of British personnel with their assignments in order that I may discuss these questions with you. Will have further conference on procedure with Tyrrell and Crowe<sup>14</sup> tomorrow.

---

*Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House*

LONDON, 5 December, 1918—2 p. m.

Following for you from Wiseman (STARTS)

Reference telegram from Foreign Office of 4 December sent you through Derby<sup>15</sup> I think you should have following additional information. The resolution making conclusions of conference subject to discussion with President was pressed through by Balfour in face of considerable opposition and annoyance on the part of others. Later Balfour agreed to appeal to you to give assent to the two most urgent matters. Both of these proposals are to set up purely informative commissions which I should not think would bind any government to any particular policy. In the matter of the Adriatic I am told that the position is really dangerous and there may be a clash between Italian and Jugo-Slav forces unless we take hold of the situation. If you have not already done so I would venture to advise you to assent to these two proposals both on the grounds of practical urgency and in order to avoid any feeling of annoyance on the part of certain important persons which would not improve their relations with the President. I have discussed this question fully with Miller.

---

<sup>14</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>15</sup> Not found in Department files; for summary of the resolutions of the Inter-Allied Conference at London, see Colonel House's telegram of Dec. 6, 4 p. m., forwarded to the Secretary of State as Department's telegram No. 7, Dec. 7, 1918, 11 a. m., p. 340.



*Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House*

LONDON, 6 December, 1918.

Conference with Tyrrell and Crowe convinces me that no program of procedure for interallied conferences can be agreed on in advance and that it will be necessary for the President to have his own program of subjects to be discussed and of the order of discussion. I have this belief despite the expressed assent of Tyrrell and Crowe to the necessity of such a program but this assent was coupled with implied postponement until after arrival of President.

---

*Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House*

LONDON, 6 December, 1918—evening.

Following for you from Wiseman (STARTS) I understand Balfour has telegraphed you suggesting that it would help him if you would intimate that the President would be glad for Reading to be in Paris during peace discussions. Owing to political difficulties I do not think Reading can be a delegate, but believe he will accept the position of High Commissioner on Anglo-American affairs, but Balfour thinks there will be opposition even to that appointment.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/18: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1918—11 a. m.

7. From House. December 6, 4 p. m. Secret. For the President. Sonnino, Lord Derby and Clemenceau have each given me a separate account of the proceedings of December 2d and 3d at the conference held in London between Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando. The following is a summary of these proceedings:

1. Meeting held December 2, 11 a. m.

Resolution A. Regret expressed my absence on account of illness and Mr. Balfour directed to transmit conclusions of conference to me.

Resolution B. Establishment of Inter-Allied Commission, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, each to have three delegates thereon and Japan one delegate, to examine and report on amount enemy countries are able to pay for reparation and indemnity; form of payment also to be considered. The Commission to meet in Paris provided the United States Government agrees. Each government to compile its claims for reparation which will be referred for

examination by Inter-Allied Commission to be nominated when claims are prepared.

Resolution C is British, French and Italian Governments agree that Kaiser and principal accomplices should be brought to trial before international court. Telegram respecting this was sent to Washington on December 2d (I assume that you have already seen it and therefore do not quote it).<sup>16</sup> Immediate action to be taken in this matter provided President Wilson agrees, otherwise matter to be left for discussion after President Wilson arrives.

[Resolution] D. British, French and Italian Governments agree that before preliminaries of peace shall be signed an Inter-Allied Conference be held in Paris or Versailles, the date thereof to be set after the arrival of the President. France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States should each be represented by five delegates. British colonial representatives to attend as additional members when questions directly affecting them are considered. Smaller allied powers not to be represented except when questions concerning them are discussed. Nations attaining their independence since the war to be heard by Inter-Allied Conference.

## 2. Meeting December 2d, 4 p. m.

Resolution A. British, French and Italian Governments authorize Foch to renew armistice on December 10th for 1 month.

Resolution B. British, French and Italian Governments empowered Admiral Wemyss on condition that forts at entrance to Baltic are demolished to satisfaction of Allied Naval Commission to waive military competition [*occupation?*] of said ports.

Resolution C. British, French and Italian Governments approve requirements of Admiral Beatty<sup>17</sup> that while interned in British ports, German flag shall be hauled down on board German men of war.

Resolution D. British, French and Italian Governments agree to formation of Inter-Allied Commission of four Admirals, American, British, French, Italian, to inquire and report on existing situation and advise as to future activities to eliminate trouble in Adriatic territories occupied or to be occupied by Allied forces, not including those mentioned in article three of Austrian armistice terms, such as Corfu, Spalato, Fiume, et cetera.

## 3. Meeting December 3d, 11:15 a. m.

Resolution A. Proposed conference between Foch and Chief of British Staff respecting arrangements of British portion of Army of occupation agreed to by British Government.

Resolution B. Expenses of occupation of Austria to be arranged for by Italian Commander-in-Chief and General Franchet d'Esperey. When military proposals are formulated they are to be submitted to Governments concerned through Foch.

Resolution C. British, French and Italian Governments agreed theoretically not to object to international labor or any other con-

<sup>16</sup> See note from the British Embassy to the Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, p. 653.

<sup>17</sup> Admiral of the Fleet Sir David Beatty, Commander of the Grand Fleet.

ference in relation to peace conference being held provided that until peace is signed it is held in a neutral country.

4. Meeting December 3d, 4 p. m.

Resolution A. Exact question of victualing and supplying enemy, allied and neutral countries in all its aspects including the use of enemy merchant vessels is referred to the following for examination and report: Clementel and Bouisson representing the French; Reading and Maclay representing the British; Crespi and Villa representing the Italian; Hoover and Hurley, if available, representing the United States.

Resolution B. British troops in any part European Turkey to remain under command of General Franchet d'Esperey. Rest of British army under General Milne may be transferred to Caucasus or elsewhere upon agreement being reached between countries concerned. If so transferred, British army will cease to be under command of d'Esperey.

Resolution C. British, French, and Italian Governments agree that conclusions of conference should be regarded as provisional only and subject to the United States accepting those which require immediate action or do not concern United States.

With respect to resolution taken at meeting December 2, 12 Noon, I am advising the governments concerned: 1, that eliminating the word "Indemnity" from resolution B the United States agrees; 2, that resolution C should be discussed after your arrival. With these exceptions I suggest that the United States agree to these resolutions. With respect to resolutions taken at meeting December 2, 4 P. M., I have discussed the naval and military features with General Bliss and Admiral Benson and am stating to the governments concerned that the United States agrees to these resolutions. With respect to resolutions taken at meeting December 3, 11 A. M., I suggest that you authorize me to state that the United States agrees to these resolutions. With respect to resolutions taken at meeting December 3, 4 P. M., I have suggested to Lord Derby that instead of following the procedure outlined in resolution A that a food section of the Supreme War Council serve with representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy thereon and that substantially the plan suggested in my number 188<sup>18</sup> as substantially amended be adopted. With this exception, I suggest that you authorize me to state that the United States agrees to these resolutions. I would appreciate an expression of your views as soon as possible.

POLK

---

<sup>18</sup> Vol. II, p. 636.

Paris Peace Conf. 182/18 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>19</sup>

U. S. S. "GEORGE WASHINGTON," December 8, 1918—5 p. m.

6. Your Number 7, 11 a. m.<sup>20</sup> For Colonel House. The President requests that final conclusions with regard to all the resolutions taken at the Conference in London on the 2d of Dec. 11 a. m., be withheld until his arrival in Paris and regards this as imperative to prevent misunderstandings.

He is satisfied with your position with regard to the resolutions passed at the subsequent meetings of the Conference except that he reserves judgment as to restricting labour conference to a neutral country where hostile influences are more likely to have free access.

LANSING

---

Paris Peace Conf. 182/19 : Telegram

*Colonel E. M. House to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 10, 1918—7 p. m.

Your December 8, 5 p. m., serial number 149 [152?] from the Department, December 9, 9 p. m. [*a. m.?*]<sup>20</sup> answering my 233.<sup>21</sup> Secret for the President. After sending you my number 233, I concluded that it would be best simply to advise Lord Derby that I had communicated summary of these proceedings to you. I have not committed you to any of the resolutions.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

<sup>19</sup> Transmitted to Colonel House as Department's serial No. 152, Dec. 9, 1918, 9 a. m.

<sup>20</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>21</sup> Forwarded to the Secretary of State as the Department's No. 7, Dec. 7, 1918, 11 a. m., p. 340.

## FRANCE

Edward M. House Papers: Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, November 9, 1918.

8. In conversation with Clemenceau this morning he stated that it was his purpose to work in harmony with the United States in all things. He asked Pichon who was present to be a witness to the promise that he would never bring up any matter at the Peace Conference that he had not first discussed with us, and the inference was clear that if we disagreed he would yield to our wishes and judgment.

He declared that it was not our financial and economic assistance that France wanted as much as our moral approval. He thought we had opened a new and more splendid ethical era and France wished to stand with us in upholding it. He thought the United States and France were the only nations willing to make an unselfish settlement.

He asked that this conversation and promise be held in confidence.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers: Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

PARIS, November 15, 1918—midnight.  
[Received November 16—10:18 a. m.]

109. Following are remarks made by the French Foreign Office on previous peace conferences:

"1. The offices of President and Secretary are both of great importance and appertain invariably to the power where the plenipotentiaries are assembled.

NOTE: President, yes.  
Secretary, ?

2. The plenipotentiaries for each power are few in number in order to facilitate negotiations, avoid lengthy discussions and diversion of views between delegates of the same power and indiscretions.

---

<sup>1</sup>The interpolations called "Notes" are typed in red ink and do not appear in telegram No. 109 as originally received by the Department.

3. The representatives of the states are either the Chancellor or Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs."

NOTE: I do not understand this.

Following is scheme of procedure as suggested by French Foreign Office:<sup>2</sup>

"SCHEME OF PROCEDURE

[I.]

A. The Peace Congress is composed of representatives of the belligerent powers which have taken actual part in the war. Exceptionally other powers may be convened in so far as questions interesting them directly may be made the subject of debates thereat and only in regard to such questions.

NOTE: Japan? Brazil? Portugal?

B. The powers shall be exclusively represented at the Congress by plenipotentiary delegates to the maximum number of three, the latter may be accompanied by technical counsellors.

NOTE: Does this mean at the sittings? If so, is there no limit as to numbers?

I favor 5 commissioners and a limit on advisers.

C. The order of precedence among the members of the Congress is the French alphabetical order of the powers (rule consecrated by custom).

NOTE: Approved.

D. The Congress shall be opened under the provisional presidency of the President of the Council of Ministers of the country where it is sitting, the verification of the powers of the members of the Congress shall be proceeded with immediately by a committee composed of the first plenipotentiary of one of the Allied or Associated Powers and of the first plenipotentiary of one of the adverse powers.

NOTE: Approved.

E. Following the verification of the powers of the members the Congress shall nominate its permanent president and two vice presidents.

NOTE: Shall not the Government where the meeting is held name the president?

How are the vice presidents to be named?

F. A secretarial bureau designated of the members of Congress shall be presented to the latter's approval by the president who shall assume control and responsibility thereof. The office of this

---

<sup>2</sup> For modifications of the proposals, see Colonel House's telegram No. 133, Nov. 21, 1918, 6 p. m., *infra*.

bureau shall be to establish the protocol of the sitting, to file the archives and provide the administrative organization of the Congress and generally assume the regular and punctual working of the services entrusted to it.

The chief of this bureau will be given the guardianship and responsibility of the protocols and archives of the Congress which shall always be accessible to the members thereof.

NOTE: Approved.

G. The press reports of the progress of the Congress shall be assured daily, official communiqués prepared by the Secretariat and published each day at the same hour. The members of the Congress undertake formally not to give out any other communications concerning the operations of the Congress.

NOTE: General approval, provided there is opportunity for complaint and change in the event it is not satisfactory.

H. The French language is recognized as the official language for the deliberations and the acts of the Congress. The members thereof are free to present their remarks or verbal communications in any language they may choose subject to their giving out immediately a French translation thereof.

NOTE: I think that this is probably necessary, provided English as well as French stenographers report the oral statements and oral French statements are put at once into English.

Personally I favor both French and English be declared official languages.

I. All documents destined to be included in the protocols shall be written out and read by the members of the Congress who shall have had the initiative thereof; when not made out in French they shall be accompanied by a translation; no proposition can be presented to the Congress otherwise than by one of the plenipotentiaries and on behalf of the power represented by him.

NOTE: Generally approved.

J. The members who may be desirous of submitting propositions must do so by writing and deposit same at the previous sitting in order to facilitate discussion thereof, except where amendments are concerned and not material propositions.

NOTE: I think that the rule should be to deposit at a previous meeting or at least 48 hours before a sitting with Secretary who shall deliver copies to all delegates 24 hours before sitting.

K. Petitions, missions, remarks or documents addressed to the Congress by persons other than the plenipotentiaries shall be re-

ceived, classified and summarized by the Secretary who shall deposit same in the archives of the Congress.

NOTE: Rules as to printing and distributing should be made.

L. The discussion of questions will be preceded by a first and second reading in order to establish first, the agreement upon the principles, and subsequently, allow the definition of details.

NOTE: I do not understand this.

M. Subject to the acceptance of the Congress, the plenipotentiaries are entitled to authorize their technical counsellors to present directly technical explanations upon any particular question when such explanations may be deemed expedient. The technical; any particular question may be entrusted by the Congress to a committee composed of technical advisers of the plenipotentiaries charged with the mission of presenting a report to the Congress and of proposing solutions.

NOTE: Approved.

N. All the decisions of the Congress shall be taken unanimously, except in regard to question of, unless in that second the minority should put on record a formal protestation.

NOTE: Query.

O. The protocol drawn up by the secretarial bureau shall be printed and distributed as provisional agreement proofs to the plenipotentiaries; this previous communication will take the place of the first reading and in the event of no modification being demanded, the text thereof shall be considered as approved.

NOTE: Should not protocol be passed upon at next meeting by Congress.

P. A committee shall be formed to record the acts adopted by the Congress. This committee shall only have cognizance [garbled group] the Congress and shall be solely in charge of the recording of the text of the decisions adopted and of presenting same to the approbation of the Congress. It shall be composed of six members each forming part of the plenipotentiaries and comprising, one Frenchman, one of English tongue, one of Italian tongue, one of Portuguese tongue, one of Slav tongue, one of German tongue.

NOTE: How is committee to be named?

## II. REPRESENTATION OF THE POWERS AND OF THE STATES

The question of the participating powers in the Congress present certain delicate problems. First of all, the belligerents, shall form part thereof, properly speaking: France, Great Britain, Italy, United States, Japan, Belgium, Servia, Greece, Portugal, Montenegro.



A place must also be reserved to the theoretical belligerents: China, Brazil, South American states (Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, which might be represented by the United States to avoid crowding,) Liberia.

Then will come the question of the new States recognized by the Allied Powers: Poland, Bohemia.

Some determination must also be taken in regard to our Allies who have treated with the enemy (without our recognizing these treaties): Roumania, Russia.

What form of representation shall we accept for the states in formation, non-recognized by us: Yugo-Slavs, Finns, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Esthonians, Lettons, Arabs, Armenians, Jews of Palestine?

Certain regulations interesting neutrals having to be examined by the Congress, it is expedient to provide for the presentation and protection of their interest: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Spain, Persia, Ethiopians, Mexico, Argentine, Chile, and other neutral American states, (Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador—in a state of severance of diplomatic relations—and Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, San Salvador, Venezuela.)

NOTE: Query?

Finally, the enemies: Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, Bavaria, German-Austria, Magyarie.

Evidently there can be no idea of allowing neutrals to discuss territorial rearrangement, indemnities and guarantees but on the other hand it is impossible to exclude them from the debates concerning the future international organization to which their adhesion is desired.

NOTE: Ought not claims of neutrals against belligerents to be provided for in some way? Otherwise full justice will not be done.

### III. PROCEDURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATIONS

Provision will have to be made for a first unofficial examination by the great powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, United States) of the questions to be discussed, examination which will lead to the preparation between them of the preliminaries of peace and the whole mechanism of the Congress of peace.

NOTE: This has the old element of danger which existed in the Concert of Powers, and yet to prevent confusion some method of the sort must be adopted.

It smacks of "secret diplomacy" and will doubtless invite that criticism by the smaller countries.

The work should evidently be divided among preparatory commissions formed only by plenipotentiaries (with the assistance of legal experts, financial, geographic, military, naval, industrial, and commercial experts, possessing consultative vote.)

NOTE: Is this work limited to the four powers?

It may be foreseen that the three general plenipotentiaries who will deal with the settlement proper of the war will appoint as assistants one or two representatives more particularly qualified to study the principles of the league of nations, that is to say, the stipulations of general public law which shall constitute the second great task of the Congress.

The three general plenipotentiaries (in accordance with the precedents mentioned herein above) might be for France: The Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Generalissimo.

The necessity of defining the [*and*] limiting the delegations of the powers is imperative in order to avoid for instance the individual representation claimed by the important English colonies (a principle which cannot be allowed, for why should not a similar claim be presented by each of the different States composing the federation of the United States.)

NOTE: I quite agree as to this in principle, and I have the impression that the suggestion of 7 members originated with the British, so that Canada, Australia and South Africa might each have a representative, though Great Britain would maintain the majority of 4 members.

#### IV. PRINCIPLES AND BASES OF NEGOTIATIONS

Similarly to the Congress of Vienna, leading principles should be proclaimed:

A. Right of peoples to decide their own destinies by free and secret vote (combined with the principle of a certain homogeneousness of the states, principally applicable to Bohemia, Tyrol, Istria, Dalmatia, Luxemburg as aforesaid.) In other regions, sectionings will have to be carried out in view of the discordance between the administrative frontiers and the limits of the peoples which they divide: A. Such is the case for the Polish countries incorporated in Prussia or Austria, for the Lithuanian countries incorporated in Prussia or Russia in Europe, for the countries incorporated in the Ottoman Empire, on account of the confluence of the ethnical and religious groups, and of the difficulty of applying the criterion of equal and secret vote.

NOTE: Does not this also apply to Alsace-Lorraine, the Russian provinces, &c.?

B. Release from treaties concluded between them of such groups of states which by the fact of their admission to the Congress shall waive their right thereto: This principle is entirely in accordance with the ideas of President Wilson.

NOTE: This applies as I read it to all agreements made prior to or during the war—Russia, Italy, Japan and Great Britain in regard to Pacific Islands.

Such a declaration has the advantage of freeing the Allies from any previous imperialist aims: the necessity of abolishing the agreements with Russia (which would comprise the cession of Constantinople to that power) would in itself [assure?] the adoption of such a measure.

As to Italy, should she not adhere thereto, it would be difficult to see how she could be admitted into the discussion: having previously to her entry into the war presented to the Allies minutely detailed conditions for the advantages she desired to derive therefrom, she would only be entitled to discuss the affairs of the others if she herself allowed discussion upon her own extensions.

NOTE: We must not forget the hostility and jealousy between France and Italy, and that this is France's plan.

Finally, this Congress, like all those which have preceded it, should adopt a basis of discussion. It cannot, like the previous ones, lean upon the stipulations of a treaty, inasmuch as hitherto the Powers have only concluded armistices (with Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Germany, which cannot serve as a basis discussing a peace treaty.)

One single basis seems to exist at the present time: it is the solidary decision of the Allies upon their war aims, formulated January 10th 1917, in answer to the question of President Wilson, but it is rather a program than basis of negotiations.

It would therefore seem indispensable that the Prime Ministers and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the four great powers meet previously at Versailles to settle between them the affairs which the Congress shall have to deal with (that is to say, the preliminaries of peace) and the order in which they shall be discussed as well as the condition of the sittings of the Congress and its operations.

In a general way the questions to be discussed are segregated in two main series: First, settlement proper of the war, second, elaboration of the league of nations.

This distinction would limit to the parties really interested the discussion of the essential and immediate questions to be settled and, wards the interest of a large number of states to discuss the general

principles of the organization of the world to which their participation has been covenanted [*sic*].

#### A. SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR

##### 1. Political stipulations.

###### A. New states.

1. Already recognized (Poland, Czecho-Slovaks).
2. In course of formation (Yugo-Slavs, Russian countries, etc.)

###### B. Territorial questions (restitution of territories, territories neutralized for the purpose of protection).

NOTE. What does the last clause refer to? Protectorates? Neutral States?

1st. Alsace-Lorraine, (8th Wilson proposition); Belgium, (7th Wilson proposition); Italy, (9th Wilson proposition).

2d. Frontiers (France, Belgium, Servia, Roumania, etc.)

3d. International status of means of communication, in particular those of Central Europe, rivers, railroads, canals, ports.

###### C. Oriental question, (12th Wilson proposition); Turkey, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia.

###### D. Colonies, (5th Wilson proposition).

###### E. Extreme east, (Kiaochou, etc.)

NOTE: Does this cover Pacific Islands? German owned concessions in China?

##### 2. Military and naval stipulations.

Military guarantees on land and sea, number of troops, dismantling of fortifications, reduction from war factories, territorial occupations, etc.

NOTE: Is this disarmament? If so, how about naval forces? Sec. 5 under B ("League of Nations")

3. Stipulation of indemnities, reparation of war damage on land and sea, restitutions, reconstitutions, compensations in kind, reimbursement of expenditure illegally imposed (C. R. B.)

4. Economic and financial stipulations: raw material, economic regime, settlement of accounts.

5. Stipulations of private law. Settlement of private credits. Liquidation of sequestrations.

6. Reestablishment of the conventional regime upset by the war.

## B. LEAGUE OF NATIONS

## (Stipulations of general public law)

1. League of nations (14th Wilson proposition).
2. Freedom of the seas (2d Wilson proposition).

NOTE: Does this include a revision of the Rules of War on land, on sea, and in the air?

3. International economic regime (3d Wilson proposition).

NOTE: Should there not be some arrangement for codifying the principles of international law?

4. Publicity of treaties (1st Wilson proposition).

NOTE: Should not the subject of international arbitration be reviewed in connection with a league of nations?

5. Limitation of armaments (4th Wilson proposition)."

I should appreciate very much if you will be good enough to telegraph me as soon as practicable any modifications, additions or suggestions you may care to make to me upon the above scheme of procedure.

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/9182 : Telegram

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 21, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received 7:08 p. m.]

133. The French Government has made the following changes in scheme of procedure submitted in my number 109:<sup>3</sup>

Article N under I should read:

"For matters not concerning the treaty of peace properly speaking between belligerents, but the general new organization intended to bring about the peace of the world, the decisions of the Congress must be unanimous. (This applies also to question of procedure, unless the minority registers a formal protest). ["]

Fifth [*Fourth*] paragraph under II should read:

"It is necessary that a decision be reached with regard to our Allies who have treated with the enemy without our recognition of these treaties; Roumania and Russia; the interest of the latter country could be defended by an invitation to Allied committee with which Russian advisers could be associated. ["]

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

Eighth [*Seventh?*] paragraph under number II should read as follows:

"Finally, the enemies; Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, Bavaria, German-Austria and Magyarie. The conditions of the participation of enemy states should be defined: for example, it would not be admissible for the twenty-five states of the German Empire to avail themselves of the rupture of the bond of federation to pretend to register each one a vote in the deliberations and votes."

Second paragraph under number III should read as follows:

"The work must evidently be divided between preparatory commissions composed solely of members chosen amongst the plenipotentiaries with the addition of technical, legal, financial, geographical, military, naval, industrial and commercial experts, having a consulting vote."

Fifth paragraph under number III should read:

"The necessity of defining and limiting delegations of the powers is imperative. While at the same time reconsidering engagements made by the British Government with regard to its principal colonies, it would be well to define precisely the limits of this special representation, which should be embraced in the total British representation."

Clause A under IV should read:

"Right of peoples to decide their own destinies by free and secret vote combined with the principle of the guarantee of the rights of minorities. A certain homogeneity of states should be reserved [*preserved?*] however. The principle to be applied to Bohemia, perhaps to the Tyrol, to the south of the Brenner, to Dalmatia, to Luxemburg, et cetera. ["]

The fourth paragraph of B under IV omitted, it should read:

"Another principle could be introduced with advantage at the very start: that of the holding [?] of merchant vessels and colonial territories in the possession of the powers on August 1st, 1914. This would avoid the dangerous campaign waged by the Germans and supported by certain imprudent and suspected elements amongst the Allies, tending to the neutralization of the great African colonies for the purpose of making a kind of universal domain for commercial intercourse. ["]

The following paragraph omitted under IV. Should follow after paragraph beginning "Finally this Congress," et cetera.

"Nor can the fourteen propositions of President Wilson be taken as a point of departure because they are the principles of public right which may inspire the negotiations, but which do not possess the concrete character indispensable for approaching the precise regulations of concrete stipulations."

Under A—Settlement of the War—article 7 is added reading as follows:

“Stipulations of a moral nature, recognition by Germany of the responsibility and preferences of its rulers, which would emphasize the ideas of justice and of responsibility, and would legitimize the measures of punishment and precaution taken against her. Solemn repudiation of the violation of the right of nations and of the crimes committed against humanity.”

EDWARD HOUSE

---

*Memorandum by Mr. D. H. Miller on Revised French Proposals of November 21, 1918*<sup>4</sup>

This memorandum concerns the French Note received November 21, 1918,<sup>5</sup> which is somewhat changed in form from the note previously received and made the subject of cable serial number 109 of November 15, 1918.<sup>6</sup>

It will be more convenient to consider the French Note in an arrangement somewhat different from that therein adopted, and the subject matter thereof in general, before proceeding to discuss the detailed suggestions of the French Government.

The theoretical similarities between the coming Peace Congress and the Congresses of Vienna, of Paris, and of Berlin, are to be viewed in the light of the great differences in the practical state of affairs now existing as compared with that existing at any of the previous periods mentioned.

The situation will be set out in detail in order to emphasize the limited scope of the precedents of Vienna, of Paris, or of Berlin. In each of those cases the negotiations were solely for the purpose of reconciling the differences between well-known and established powers, and the chief difficulties in procedure arose from the difference in strength and in interest of the Powers in particular questions. It is true that at Vienna relations of the German states were to be adjusted, and were adjusted in the formation of the North German Confederation; but even there the Powers were dealing with entities whose pre-existing status, although unsatisfactory, was not in doubt. At the present time the problem of the Peace Congress, while it includes problems similar to those of the previous conferences mentioned, includes also the bringing of order out of chaos in practically all of Europe east of the Rhine, and north of the Danube, as well as restoration and

---

<sup>4</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, p. 28.

<sup>5</sup> French text printed *ibid.*, p. 4; it is summarized in telegram No. 133 from Colonel House to the Secretary of State, *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 344.

a new life in various other parts of Europe and Asia, and beyond this the regulation of Africa for the future. The conditions of some of these communities is such as to render it impossible to say as regards millions of people whether any government, even *de facto*, exists, and if so, of whom it is composed.

The Powers opposed to the Central Powers may be grouped in six classes:

- a. Great Powers, actual belligerents.
- b. Minor Powers, actual belligerents.
- c. Other powers which declared war against Germany, but which have taken no actual part in the fighting.
- d. Powers which have broken relations with Germany.
- e. Russia and Roumania.
- f. Invaded neutrals: Luxemburg and Persia.

The classification is based on the international pre-war situation and status, and before alluding to subsequent complications, it is necessary to make some observations on the various classes above mentioned.

The first class is composed of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan. But even in this class there is distinction, for Japan is not primarily, or particularly, interested in many of the general questions of Europe, although she is vitally interested in the Pacific.

The second class comprises Belgium, Portugal, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. Here again the classification is not altogether satisfactory, for Montenegro has been practically out of the war since 1915, and may now be regarded as bound up with Serbia, or, more properly speaking, with the question of Jugo-Slavia.

The third group comprises China, Siam (mention of Siam is omitted in the French Note), Liberia, Cuba, Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama and Brazil. The whole question of the Far East is involved in the belligerency of China and Siam. The other states have a negligible interest in the particular results of the war. It is obviously of great importance to the United States that the Latin-American Powers should receive the consideration which they expect. It is, of course, true that Liberia, Cuba, Haiti and Panama, are practically under the direction of the United States, and this might also be said of Nicaragua, but this fact is hardly one which can by us be emphasized according to the suggestions of the French Note, which will be noticed in detail hereafter. One complication may be mentioned, and that is that the United States does not recognize the existing government of Costa Rica. Probably a participation with Costa Rica in a peace conference, and certainly signature of a treaty to which Costa Rica was a part, would be *ipso facto* recognition of the Tinoco government.



Egypt and six other countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Salvador and Santo Domingo, have broken relations with Germany. Of the Latin-American countries mentioned, Uruguay, in particular, has done what she could to further the interests of the United States, and, indeed, has committed acts which Germany might very properly, if she had so chosen, have regarded as acts of war. The French Note speaks of countries in the third class as theoretical belligerents (*Belligérants théoriques*). Whatever may be the European view, it cannot be the position of the United States that countries such as Brazil, a belligerent, and Uruguay, not a belligerent, have been concerned in the conflict merely theoretically.

In addition to the foregoing complications on the side of the Powers opposed to Germany, the striking situation in Russia is one that compels attention. At least two new states have arisen out of the territory formerly Russian, namely Finland, which has been recognized by some of the Powers, and Poland, which will become a full-fledged entity by the action of the Peace Congress itself.

Detailed mention is unnecessary of the other separatist movements through Russia, as their permanence, internationally speaking, must still be regarded as doubtful, even in the case of the Ukraine. It is to be observed in connection with the Russian situation that two treaties, with various supplements, have been concluded between Finland and Germany, and also two treaties between Finland and Austria-Hungary, and that no mention of any of these treaties is made in either of the agreements of armistice severally made by those two Powers with the United States and the Allies.

Luxemburg and Persia have been mentioned for the sake of completeness, as their interests will be required to be considered at the Congress.

On the side of the Central Powers the practical and technical situations are at least equally confused. Turkey continues an existing government, although doubtlessly greatly to be changed in extent and form, a change involving the question of the Straits, which is of interest to the whole commercial world. Bulgaria remains a separate entity, although she has become a Republic. It appears that Austria-Hungary is already dismembered, that Hungary is a separate state, and that German Austria is attempting to be. The South Slav question may perhaps be regarded as one pertaining to Italy and Serbia, but the Powers opposed to Germany recognize that Bohemia is independent, and associated with them although its territory forms part of Austria and of Hungary as they existed before the war.

In Germany the actual situation is not sufficiently known to be intelligently discussed. Reports of the existence of independent governments are numerous, and how far the authority of the existing *de facto* government at Berlin extends, or how long it will continue,

are questions impossible of answer. The complexity of this situation is not lessened by the reports of *quasi* hostilities between Germany and the Poles in the neighborhood of Posen. The technical situation as to the international status of Germany is one which is perhaps even more uncertain than the actual situation. The German Constitution is certainly not in operation, unless, perhaps, in some provisional form existing in the absence of dissent; and even whether the German Kaiser has, or has not, definitely abdicated, is not known.

The task of the coming Peace Congress is one of such magnitude, and is one so different from anything that has ever confronted the world before, that precedents in procedure should be used with great caution, in view of the actual and technical uncertainties to which allusion has been made.

Departing from the arrangement under the headings of the French Note, the points therein discussed will be considered under different titles:

#### PRELIMINARIES TO THE PEACE CONGRESS

It is an essential part of the American program that there shall be open discussion at the Peace Congress between the representatives of the Central Powers and of those opposed to them, of the conditions of peace, and it is an essential prerequisite of that open discussion that a complete agreement as to the peace terms should be reached among the powers opposed to the Central Powers.

It is very properly pointed out in the French Note that the questions to be discussed fall into two general classes, viz.: First, those relating to the settlement of the war, strictly speaking, and, second, those concerning international relations of the future, which are grouped in the French Note around the question of the society of nations. In respect to both groups of questions the preliminaries to the Peace Congress are of the highest importance. Unity among the powers opposed to the Central Powers is essential, and that unity can be reached by discussion and agreement among them.

In regard to the particular questions growing out of the war and necessarily involved in its termination, real agreement may be reached at informal conferences in each case and discussion among the powers respectively interested in particular questions; such agreement should extend, not only to matters of principle, but to matters of detail, and after the agreement as to matters of principle is reached, memoranda embodying the agreement in full detail should be drawn up as a proposal to be presented and supported at the Peace Congress for the approval not only of the powers directly interested, but of all the powers opposed to Germany.

This method of procedure differs more in form than in substance from that proposed in the French Note. Its theory would be that

instead of preliminary discussion among the four Great Powers, to which discussion other powers would, as the case might require, be invited, such discussion would, as to any particular question, be among all the powers directly interested in that question, among which would, in every case, be the four Great Powers. That the representatives at these discussions should have the assistance of technical advisors, as suggested in the French Note, is obviously desirable.

It is to be observed that this method of procedure would accord with the approaching visit of the President to Europe, for the questions of principle involved in any particular matter might thus be agreed upon with his approval, leaving a detailed memorandum based upon those principles to be drawn up in each case for general approval and subsequent presentation at the Congress itself.

It may clarify this suggestion as to procedure to consider a specific instance: the case of the restitution of Belgium. Discussion of this subject would proceed between the representatives of Belgium and of the Great Powers. Upon their agreement on matters of principle, a detailed memorandum would be drawn up for the approval of those Powers, and for the subsequent approval of the powers associated with them. This memorandum would form the basis of discussion at the Peace Congress with the representatives of the Central Powers.

In matters of a more general nature, which while peculiarly of interest to certain powers, are of great interest to others, and of some interest to all the world, a somewhat different procedure would be necessary. Such a question is that of the future of Central Africa. In such a case a preliminary and informal discussion among the Great Powers alone would facilitate an agreement with the smaller powers directly interested, such as Belgium and Portugal, and, subsequently, with the other powers which are indirectly concerned.

A somewhat similar method is essential regarding the public law of the future. As to these questions, which may be conveniently considered as pertaining to a society of nations, a preliminary discussion among the four Great Powers and Japan is obviously desirable, for it is essential that these Powers should be in accord in any plan looking toward the peace of the world in the future; and it is probable that any plan approved by these five Powers would subsequently be approved and joined in, not only by the other powers opposed to Germany, but by the neutral powers whose assent would be asked at the Peace Congress itself.

The first step of all, however, in determining the procedure of the preliminaries to the Congress is an informal conference as to such procedure among the four Great Powers. More than one exchange of notes on the subject would probably result in a greater delay than

is permitted by the time available; furthermore, such preliminary conference in considering and determining the questions of preliminary procedure might also consider and determine the questions more directly relating to the procedure of the Peace Congress itself, its date of meeting, the powers to be represented, the number of delegates from each power, and other details which will be subsequently mentioned.

#### BASES OF NEGOTIATIONS

The statements of the French Note on this subject cannot be considered to be in accord with the views of the Government of the United States.

The bases of negotiations can only be deemed to be the fourteen points enumerated by President Wilson in his speech of January 8th, 1918,<sup>7</sup> as subsequently modified, which, as so modified, have been agreed to, not only by the governments of Great Britain, of France and of Italy, but by the Governments of Germany, of Bulgaria and of Turkey, and by the former government of Austria-Hungary. Of these fourteen points, the tenth point relating to Austria-Hungary was expressly qualified by President Wilson in his note to Austria-Hungary of October 18th [19th], 1918,<sup>8</sup> and the Allied Powers reserved complete liberty of action as to the second point relating to the freedom of the seas. There are also certain other supplementary bases of negotiations contained in the armistice agreement between the United States and the Allied Powers and Germany. These are contained particularly in items 15 and 19 of the armistice agreement,<sup>9</sup> the former relating to the Treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, and the latter relating to reparation by Germany.

The statements in the French Note that the fourteen points of the President cannot be taken as bases of negotiation, and that the only bases are contained in the declaration of the Allied Powers of the 10th of January, 1917,<sup>10</sup> can in no event be supported. It is hardly necessary to point out that the declaration of January 10th, 1917, which is mentioned in the French Note, has never been agreed to by the United States, and the memorandum of the Allied Powers, quoted in the American Note of November 5th, 1918,<sup>11</sup> is conclusive of this whole subject.

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications

<sup>7</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 368.

<sup>9</sup> For text of the armistice agreement, see Colonel House's telegram No. 46, Nov. 4, 1918, 9 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 463.

<sup>10</sup> See telegram No. 1806, Jan. 10, 1917, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, *ibid.*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 468.

which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress in January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress on January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored, as well as evacuated and made free. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air."

Among the subjects mentioned at the conclusion of the French Note are to be found, however, all of the subjects mentioned in the fourteen points of President Wilson; to these are added a few others, which it is unnecessary to consider in detail in this memorandum. There are doubtless certain subjects of a comparatively minor character which are not mentioned in the fourteen points of President Wilson, which will require consideration by the Peace Congress. The possible addition of such subjects to those contained in the fourteen points of President Wilson would be a subject proper for consideration by the representatives of the Great Powers in their discussion of the preliminaries to the Peace Congress, particularly as it is very probable that suggestions of still other subjects not mentioned in the French Note will be made by powers interested. Possible illustrations are the questions of Spitsbergen, of the Aaland Islands, and of the reduction of the Chinese Indemnity growing out of the Boxer rebellion.

The French Note proposes a declaration by the Peace Congress as to the rights of peoples to decide their own destinies; the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of formulating any such declaration is shown in the French statement itself, which admits that the right is to be combined with the principle of a guaranty of the rights of minorities and is not only subject to a certain homogeneity of state, but is wholly impossible of application in certain regions. The principle as expressed by the French Note is one which, if generally stated, might be the genesis of innumerable future disputes, and possible future conflicts in and out of Europe. The disastrous effect of such vague generalities is illustrated in the case of Russia, and a specious attempt to use such a principle to justify their own wickedness was made by the Germans in the case of Belgium.

It is to be supposed that any treaty engagements of the Allied Powers, particularly those with Russia, and with Italy, made during

the war, which may be inconsistent with the principles enunciated by President Wilson, have been in fact, if not technically, abandoned by the Allied Powers, in view of their announced agreement with those principles above quoted; accordingly, the United States could not consider, in advance, the theoretical possibility of such a supposed position on the part of Italy, as is mentioned in the French Note.

The French Note suggests the desirability of a declaration of the principle of the integrity of home and colonial territory possessed by the Powers (meaning doubtless the Allied Powers), on August 1, 1914. While the African colonies are mentioned in this connection in the French Note, it would appear that the declaration would also have reference to the question of Ireland. The point involved in the suggestions of such a declaration is one of policy and discussion thereof is deemed to be outside the scope of this memorandum.

#### REPRESENTATION OF POWERS AND STATES AT THE PEACE CONGRESS

According to the views as to procedure, previously expressed, the question of representation of powers and of states discussed in the fourth point of the French Note would be determined at the preliminary conferences outlined. It may, however, be proper to present some views on this subject.

In the first instance the powers to be represented at the Peace Congress, on the one side, should be those at war with Germany (aside from Costa Rica and Montenegro). The principles enunciated by President Wilson, as well as the interests of the United States, require that the smaller states, even those not active participants in the war, should participate in the Congress *ab initio*. Included among the states considered to be at war with Germany would be Roumania, as her treaty of peace with the Central Powers is now a nullity, and also Bohemia, in view of the attitude taken toward the Czecho-Slovaks by the United States and the Allied Powers, as well as the expressions of the former government of Austria-Hungary, contained in the note to the United States dated October 30th, 1918.<sup>12</sup>

Costa Rica could not be admitted because the government of that country is not recognized by the United States.

The position of Montenegro is anomalous, but it would seem more prudent to consider Serbia as the sole representative of the south Slavs, at least until developments in that region have progressed further.

Another member of the Congress would be Poland, whose future status as an independent power has been assured by the United States and the Allied Powers.

---

<sup>12</sup> See note No. 5348, Oct. 30, 1918, from the Swedish Minister, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 429.

Finland will at some point be a necessary member of the Peace Congress, as German influence over that country must be destroyed, and the treaties between Finland and Germany, and between Finland and Austria-Hungary annulled, although no mention is made of them in the armistice agreements.

In view of the existing circumstances in Russia, and until a favorable change therein, it would seem impracticable to admit formally to the Peace Congress any representatives, either of Russia as a whole, or of any of its nationalities which may have attempted to set up separate governments. The suggestion in the French Note of an inter-allied committee for the protection of Russian interests, which would be aided by Russian advisers, seems feasible and worthy of adoption, subject, of course, to future developments. In view of the recent declaration of the Ukraine Republic favoring a federalized Russian state, such development may take place before the Peace Congress meets.

Albania has not such an international status as to warrant admission to the Peace Congress, but its interests should be protected by a committee of the powers on which the United States should be represented.

It is to be pointed out that powers may be admitted to representation in the Peace Congress during the course of the Congress itself, and that the hope of such admission will be a strong inducement toward the establishment of settled governments. Accordingly, in any case of doubt, caution rather than haste is desirable.

The rights of Luxemburg and of Persia, both invaded by the Central Powers, must be protected by membership in the Peace Congress.

Furthermore, justice and the interests of the United States require that the Latin-American countries which broke relations with Germany, and which did, from a practical viewpoint, all that was in their power to promote the interests of the United States during the war, should be regarded as entitled to representation in the Peace Congress. To draw a technical distinction which will exclude such a power as Uruguay from participation in the settlement of the war, in which her whole support has been given to the United States, would disregard substance and be consistent only with formality.

Finally the Peace Congress in proceeding, as it will, to the discussion of those questions involving the future public law of the world, will become a congress, which after settling the matters directly arising from the war, will admit the neutral powers of the world to participation in its discussions of peace for the future. National groups not forming states, such as the Armenians, the Jews in Palestine, and the Arabs, would doubtless be received and heard through

their representatives by Committees of the Congress, but could not be admitted to the Congress as member Powers.

The qualifications and limitations of representation of the British dominions, which appears to be desired by the Government of Great Britain, could doubtless be determined at the preliminary conferences, upon the subject of procedure.

As to the representation of the Central Powers, the situation is in some respects uncertain. Turkey and Bulgaria, and perhaps Hungary, are now in a position to appoint plenipotentiaries. It seems very doubtful whether even a *de facto* government exists in Austria, outside of Bohemia. As to Germany the possibility of a dissolution of the union of the twenty-five states which have formed the German Confederation must be recognized. If the present reports of the program for the election of a constituent assembly in Germany, on February 2nd, 1919, are well founded, a unified government in Germany, with a definite constitution, will seem probable; but at present it is impossible to speak definitely of the technical situation of the German government from an international point of view.

#### PROCEDURE OF THE PEACE CONGRESS

The third item of the French Note is entitled, "Scheme of Procedure," and is divided into sixteen numbered articles,<sup>13</sup> comment upon which will be limited to those of which the numbers are mentioned.

To a considerable extent these sixteen articles as drawn in the French Note are based upon the rules of procedure of the Berlin Congress of 1878.

I. The question of the Powers to be represented at the Congress has previously been discussed, and the views expressed are not in accord with the French view that representation should be limited to Powers having effectually taken part in the war.

III. If the English language is adopted as the official language of the Congress, the order of precedence among the members will be that of the alphabetical order in the English language, with the exception that in matters of personal precedence, the first place would obviously be accorded to President Wilson.

IV. The verification of the Powers of the members of the Congress is of greater consequence and importance than the French Note appears to allow it. The committee to examine these Powers should be composed of representatives of several Powers, including the Great Powers and some others.

---

<sup>13</sup> In the "Scheme of Procedure" as outlined in Colonel House's telegram No. 109, Nov. 15, 1918, *ante*, p. 344, and modified in No. 133, Nov. 21, 1918, *ante*, p. 352, the 16 articles are labeled "A, B, C," etc.



VII. While it may not be possible, for lack of space, to provide that the sessions of the Congress shall be open to the public generally, there is at least no reason why accredited representatives of the press should not be present to give such account of its proceedings as they see fit.

VIII. Assuming that the Congress will take place at Versailles, and that on occasion President Wilson will be present, it would be very graceful for the French Government to suggest that English should be the official language of the Congress. In this connection it may be observed that it would be impossible for President Wilson to be a delegate in any ordinary sense of the word, and he might well be chosen as Honorary President of the Congress, the actual President being M. Clemenceau.

IX. A modification in this article would follow from the change in the official language.

XI. In modification of this article it is suggested that the petitions, etc., received by the Congress, should be distributed among the member powers in the form of printed copies.

XIV. The French Note provides that at the Peace Congress unanimity shall be required in voting upon questions relating to the Society of Nations, but not as to questions of procedure in the absence of protest. The original French Note provided on this point for the necessity of unanimity on all questions except those of procedure. Doubtless the change was made in order to permit that the decisions of the Powers opposed to Germany regarding the settlement of the war would not require the assent of any of the Central Powers.

The whole point is one of great difficulty. Doubtless no State should or could be constrained to become a member of the Society of Nations without its consent, but on the other hand, there would seem to be no reason why agreement upon questions involved in the Society of Nations should be defeated by the dissent of one or two minor Powers.

In lieu of the suggestion of the French Note in this Article, a provision might be inserted, that in questions relating to the Society of Nations any Power might record its dissent from the conclusion which, unless otherwise provided, would bind those States which did agree.

XVI. The Committee on Style proposed by this Article should consist of seven members instead of six, the additional member being one to whom the Spanish language is native.

No mention is made in the rules of procedure suggested in the French Note, of the appointment of committees by the Peace Congress, other than the Committee on Style. The advisability, and it

may even be said, the necessity of the appointment of such committees seems obvious, and it is accordingly suggested that one of the rules of procedure might provide that committees may be appointed from the plenipotentiaries present, representing at least three Powers, to consider such questions as the Congress may determine, the members of the committees in the absence of objection, to be named by the President of the Congress. It might further be provided that technical advisers not plenipotentiaries might sit as members of such committees without vote.

D. H. M[ILLER]

Respectfully submitted this  
22nd day of November, 1918.

---

763.72119/3043

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government has just informed me that, with a view to expediting the peace preliminaries, which any way can not be actually determined until after the arrival in Paris of the President of the United States, it had taken up a preliminary study of the various problems bearing upon that very important question.

In compliance with the instructions I have received, I have the honor to communicate herewith to Your Excellency a statement of the results of that examination. My Government would be glad to know whether the plan of studies suggested by it, and the principles upon which they rest, meet with the general approval of the American Government. It would be also very desirous of being informed of all the remarks which you might see fit to offer.

Be pleased [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>14</sup>]

The French Government, upon examination of the precedents of the Congresses of Vienna 1814–1815, Paris 1856, and Berlin 1878, has taken up the various problems raised by the determination of the peace preliminaries and the establishment of the general peace treaty by the Congress which is to meet at Versailles.

The arrival of President Wilson in Paris in the middle of December will enable the four great powers to agree among themselves

---

<sup>14</sup> File translation revised.

without any discussion with the enemy upon the conditions of the peace preliminaries to be imposed severally on him.

The examination will first apply to Germany and Bulgaria, with which it is to our interest to negotiate at once in order to promote on the one hand the disunion of the countries which compose the first named; and on the other hand, as to the second country, avoid the dangerous Bulgarian intrigues at home and abroad.

The peace preliminaries with Germany will furthermore shape the way for the settlement of the main territorial restorations: Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, the Slav countries, Belgium, Luxemburg, the cession of the German colonies, the full recognition of the protectorates of France over Morocco and of England over Egypt, the provisional acceptance of the Constitution of new independent states made up of the territories of the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as well as the conclusion of treaties between the Allies and Bulgaria and on the subject of Turkey, the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest treaties, and of all the previous conventions with Russia and Roumania.

The speedy establishment of peace preliminaries with Germany raises the question of a future regime. Even now one may notice the antagonism of the Centralist tendency, which was that of the Hohenzollern Prussian Administration, the National Liberals and the Socialists, to the Federalist tendency (represented by the dynasty and administration of the secondary states and by the deputies to the Reichstag). We are interested in favoring Federalism and furnishing a basis for it by elections held under universal suffrage and by promoting the manifestation of differences through the clauses of the treaty. Indeed, we cannot negotiate except with a Constituent Assembly freely elected by universal, secret, and direct suffrage.

The peace preliminaries with Bulgaria will likewise define the main lines of the respective territorial status of the Balkan countries.

The question of peace preliminaries with the other two enemy powers presents itself in a different aspect. With respect to Austria-Hungary it is not even existent, since that power has disappeared; it will then be within the province of Congress to admit on an even basis the two new states that have already been recognized: the Czecho-Slovaks and Poland, and to listen to the claims of the Jugo-Slav state now forming. As for the country of the Magyars (formerly Hungary, stripped of the Slovaks, Roumanians of Transylvania, and Croatians), and Austria (German), the objections of growing out of their interpretations suggest exclusion.

The same, of course, applies *a fortiori* to Turkey whose complete reorganization, accompanied by intervention in her internal regime (which on principle is barred with respect to other states), is worthy

of consideration. It seems preferable to leave to the Congress the discussion of the fate of those nationalities, for if peace preliminaries were signed with them, it would be tantamount to pledging ourselves at once to maintain the Ottoman Empire, that is to say, a rule which for a century has perpetrated its abuses, crimes, and causes of discussion among the great civilized states. Furthermore, where could the power authorized to ratify in the name of Turkey be found? Is it not better that the Allies should determine the fate of the territories lying within the former Ottoman Empire without the encumbrance of negotiations with that Empire?

After reaching an agreement as to the peace preliminaries, the representatives of the Great Powers will have to come to an agreement on the principles of the representation of the several belligerent, neutral, and enemy states at the Peace Congress. They will take up in succession the cases of the actual and theoretical belligerents, the newly recognized states, and the states in formation, the former Allies who have concluded treaties with the enemy but whose treaties have not been recognized by us (Russia and Roumania), the neutrals, and the enemies. Among the belligerents, it will be proper to distinguish between the small and the great powers in respect to the number of plenipotentiaries and of admission to the sessions. The great victorious powers alone will attend all its sessions, the small powers being called only to sessions designated for their special affairs. As for the neutrals and states in formation, they may be called when their own interests are at stake.

The number of plenipotentiaries will be limited to avoid congestion and confusion in the debates; the Great Powers may designate from three to five plenipotentiaries, the small powers from one to two, the neutral and forming states only one. As the decisions are to be taken by a majority vote, and as the representation of a state is but one unit, it is not necessary that any state should have as many representatives as a power of the same category, as provided by the precedents of the congresses of the nineteenth century: each state may freely choose the number of its delegates within the limits above cited.

It seems that the labors of the Congress should be divided into two main series: The settlement of the war properly so-called, and the organization of the Society of Nations. The examination of the second question no doubt calls for the settlement of the first. Furthermore, the settlement of the concrete questions should not be confounded with the enforcement of the stipulation of general public law. Besides, that distinction is made necessary by the fact that the enemy has no right to discuss the terms that will be imposed upon him by the victors, and that the neutrals will only be called in excep-

tional cases to attend the sessions where the belligerents will fix the peace terms, while all the peoples, whether belligerents, neutrals or enemies, will be called to discuss and take part in the principle of the Society of Nations.

On the other hand those principles of President Woodrow Wilson's which are not sufficiently defined in their character to be taken as a basis for a concrete settlement of the war, even if appealed to as they have been admitted by the Allies, will resume their full strength in the matter of the future settlement of public law, and this will remove one of the difficulties that might obstruct the Allies.

The procedure of the Congress will also be determined at the preliminary meetings in the second half of December: Election of the President, appointment of the secretarial forces (charged with the duties of drawing the protocols, filing the archives, preparing daily communiqués, provide for the administrative organization of the Congress and the regular operation of the services), written motions read at the previous session discussed jointly (so as to bring about an agreement on the principle and afterwards work out the details), printing of the protocols, organization of a drafting committee, etc.

The program of the labors will then be determined, for in all the previous congresses the stipulations of a treaty (the Paris treaty of May 30, 1814, at the Vienna Congress; the protocol signed at Vienna on February 1, 1854, at the Paris Congress; the treaty of San Stefano signed March 3, 1878, at the Berlin Congress), had served as a basis while the Congress of 1919 has no fixed basis before it: indeed neither the four armistices signed with Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Germany, nor the answer of the Allies of January 10, 1917,<sup>15</sup> jointly making known their war aims to President Wilson, nor the President's fourteen propositions which are principles of public law can furnish a concrete basis for the labors of the Congress.

That basis can only be a methodical statement of the questions to be taken up which may be classified as follows:

#### FIRST—SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR

##### A. Political stipulations.

###### 1. New states:

- (a) Already recognized (Bohemia)
- (b) Being formed (Jugo-Slavia, Russian States, etc.)

###### 2. Territorial questions: restitution of territories. Neutralization for protection purposes.

- (a) Alsace-Lorraine (8th Wilson proposition)
- (b) Belgium (7th Wilson proposition)

---

<sup>15</sup> See telegram No. 1806, Jan. 10, 1917, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 1, p. 6.

- (c) Italy (9th Wilson proposition)
- (d) Boundary lines (France, Belgium, Serbia, Roumania, etc.)
- (e) International regime of means of transportation, rivers, railways, canals, harbors.
- 3. Eastern questions (12th Wilson proposition)
- 4. Colonies (5th Wilson proposition)
- 5. Far East

**B. Military and naval stipulations.**

Military guarantees on land and at sea. Number of effectives, dismantling of fortifications, reduction of war manufactures, territorial occupation.

**C. Indemnities stipulations:** Reparation for war damage on land and at sea, restitution, reconstruction, compensation in kind, reimbursement of expenses unlawfully imposed. "(C. R. B.)"

**D. Economic and financial stipulations:** raw materials, economic systems, settlement of accounts.

**E. Stipulations of private law:** settlement of private debts, liquidation of sequestrated property.

**F. Punishments to be inflicted on account of acts of violence and crimes committed during the war in violation of public law.**

**G. Stipulations of a moral character:** Recognition by Germany of the responsibility and premeditation of her rulers justifying the measures of penalization and precaution taken against her. Solemn disavowal of the breaches of international law and of the crimes against humanity.

**H. Restoration of the conventional regime broken by the war.**

**SECOND.—ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS**

**A. Stipulations of general public law.**

**B. Guarantees and penalties.**

**C. Freedom of the seas (2nd Wilson proposition).**

**D. International economic regime (3rd Wilson proposition).**

**E. Publication of the treaties (1st Wilson proposition).**

**F. Limitation of armaments (4th Wilson proposition).**

**G. International arbitral organization of the Hague.**

**H. Society of Nations.**

The program of labors being thus defined, there would be left only to make a logical distribution determining their order and the conditions under which commissions should study them as to territorial and political affairs and committees as to general international questions.

**A. Commissions.**

- 1. Polish affairs.
- 2. Russian affairs.

3. Baltic nationalities.
4. States sprung from former Austria-Hungary.
5. Balkan affairs.
6. Eastern affairs.
7. Affairs of the Far East and the Pacific.

B. Committees.

1. Committee on Jewish affairs.
2. Committee on the international river navigation (Rhine, Danube, Scheldt, Elbe) practice of the society of nations.
3. Committee on international railways (railways of the 45th parallel from the Adriatic to the Baltic, Bagdad trans-African railways from Capetown to Cairo and from Capetown to Algiers).
4. Committee on public law (free determination of the peoples combined with the rights of the ethnical and religious minorities).
5. Committee on international labor legislation. (A very important question, the initiative, management and settlement of which must not be left to the Socialists.)
6. Committee on law relative to patents and trade-marks.
7. Committee on punishment for crimes committed during the war.

It may be remarked that a certain number of the questions that are raised have to be settled directly amongst the great powers without calling upon any committee to discuss them; this applies to colonial affairs which essentially concern England and France. It also applies to indemnities, for outside of the torpedoing from which the British fleet mainly suffered, Belgium and France alone are entitled to indemnities on account of the systematic devastation suffered by them. (The states which have become independent and those which have secured considerable territorial enlargement would have but a slight claim to indemnities.) It also applies to economic and financial stipulations, the amount of which will be determined by the great powers but the mode of payment of which alone will be discussed by the peace treaty.

The Congress finally could place itself as has sometimes been done in the past under the invocation of some of the great principles leading to justice, morals and liberty, which would be proclaimed at its very opening and even before fixing the procedure (concerning which an unofficial agreement only would have been reached): right of self-determination of the peoples, right of the minorities, suspension of all previous special agreements arrived at by some of the Allies with a view to the fullest freedom of examination by the Congress, declaration that the home country and colonial territory held by the Allies on August 1, 1914, shall not be touched, solemn repudiation of all the vio-

lations of international law and of humane principles, and disqualification of enemy delegates who have signed violated instruments or are personally guilty of violations of the law of nations or of the crimes against humanity.

The foregoing sums up the plan of study and the principles suggested by the French Government.

---

763.72119/3276

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 10334

LONDON, December 10, 1918.

[Received January 4, 1919.]

SIR: Adverting to my confidential telegram, No. 4478 of December 10, 1918, 4 p. m.,<sup>16</sup> I now have the honor to enclose, herewith, copies and translations of a paper recently left at the Foreign Office by the French Ambassador entitled "Projet de Préliminaires de Paix avec l'Allemagne", and copies of a Memorandum prepared by Mr. Gunther, of my Staff, stating how he obtained this document, and giving a report of the conversation held with him on the 7th instant by the Counsellor of the French Embassy, Monsieur de Fleuriau. I have already transmitted copies of both to Colonel House.

As set forth in my telegram above mentioned I have reason to believe that the French Ambassador has not yet been formally authorized to communicate this document to us and our possession of it, therefore, should for the present be kept secret.

I have [etc.]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure 1]

*The Secretary of the Embassy in Great Britain (Gunther) to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

Several days ago hearing incidentally that some "Notes on the Indemnity" had been left at the Foreign Office by the French Ambassador, I made informal enquiries of friends in the French Embassy as to whether it would be possible for me to be furnished with a copy thereof or their substance. The next day the Counsellor of the Embassy asked me to come there, said that he would have a copy made, explaining that the "Notes" or Project was given to the Foreign Office informally, and extra-officially.

To-day the Counsellor, M. de Fleuriau, came to see me and left with me the paper, herewith attached. He re-emphasized the informal

---

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.



character of this Project and added that it had been devised and drawn up by M. Cambon and himself and was therefore merely their own plan. My own opinion, however, is that this document has the approval of the French Foreign Office and is a feeler or "Ballon d'essai" launched in this manner to prepare the ground in advance of the Peace Conference.

M. de Fleuriau explained that various reasons impelled M. Cambon and himself to the belief that a Preliminary Peace should be concluded without delay and thus terminate the present anomalous period of neither war nor peace. The Germans are clearly not able to fulfill the terms of the Armistice within the time limit, and on the sixteenth [*eighteenth?*] of this month the Armistice would therefore have to be extended. Before all conditions could be carried out it would probably have to be extended again. Owing to the unforeseen length of the Armistice and the disadvantages to them the Germans would have good grounds to claim and press for the determination of a more definite status. The French demands too for prompt demobilization will become more insistent as time goes on. M. de Fleuriau drew the parallel of 1870 when it was not illegal for the French to trade with the enemy, while since the Decree of October 1914 it has been, and therefore is so through the duration of the Armistice as well.

Both the Ambassador and he believe that the question of feeding Germany should be settled without delay, not so much for the need of food among the German people as for the moral support that the supplying of it would give to the Government at the time in power in Germany. It was necessary therefore to determine which group of the present "Directorate General" in Germany should be thus favored.

He concluded by saying that he feared no real work could be accomplished by the Peace Conference before January 1st, as the preliminary meetings would as usual be discursive and ceremonial, and reminded me that neither M. Cambon nor himself desired to claim the authorship of the "Project" herewith enclosed.

F. M. GUNTHER

LONDON, December 7, 1918.

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*Proposed Basis for the Preliminaries of Peace With Germany*

There are for us three essential problems to be solved in order to reconcile the necessary guarantees and International Law:

I.—Guarantees on the left bank of the Rhine (military neutralization, without political intervention);

II.—Complete restoration of Poland (for she is irreconcilable with the Kingdom of Prussia);

III.—Future administration of Germany (in conformity with the right of peoples to self-determination) :—

#### I. TERRITORIAL CLAUSES

The following stipulations will indicate the new German frontiers, in the way of restoration of the provinces which Prussia had unjustly incorporated either to its territory, or to that of the former German Empire.

(a) Restitution to France of the Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine torn from France in 1815 and 1871, with the slight rectifications of frontier indicated by Marshal Foch (along the valley of the Queich, the Rhine to Landau, extended by the ridge bounding the basin of the Sarre on the North).

(b) Surrender to the reconstituted State of Poland of the Polish districts of Prussia (see Mr. Balfour's remarks at the Versailles Conference) of Posnanian and Upper Silesia, as well as access to the Baltic (Upper Silesia, which has not belonged to Poland in modern times, should be allocated to her because it is Polish but cannot be by way of restitution. For the same reason all the southern districts of Eastern Prussia which are by language and race Polish, though forming part of the historic Duchy of Prussia, the successor of the Teutonic Knights.

(c) Restitution to Denmark of the Danish territories of Slesvig.

(d) Rectification of the Belgian Frontier in the district of Malmedy.

(e) Freedom of the economic union of Luxembourg from every tie with Germany (the provision in the Treaty of Frankfurt<sup>17</sup> which took from the Compagnie Française de l'Est the control of the railways of Luxembourg will be replaced by a clause restoring to that Company the said control).

(f) Cession by the German Government of its sovereign rights over the German possessions overseas.

(g) Recognition by Germany of the French Protectorate in Morocco in its entirety and with suppression of all rights derived for Germany from the Treaty of Algieras<sup>18</sup> and other treaties.

(h) Recognition by Germany of the British Protectorate in Egypt.

(i) Recognition by Germany of the States established out of the territories of the former Empires of Russia and Austria-Hungary in the same way and under the same conditions as the Allies.

(j) Abrogation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk<sup>19</sup> and of all agreements concluded with whatever authorities constituted in or in the

<sup>17</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXII, p. 77.

<sup>18</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1495.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

name of territories or peoples comprised in the former Russian Empire including Finland.

(*k*) Abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest<sup>20</sup> and of all previous agreements with Roumania (a new treaty with this country through the medium of the Allies not being necessary since Germany has no common frontier with Roumania and since a treaty concluded under Allied auspices would appear to establish a sort of protectorate over Roumania).

(*l*) Security given by Germany to the Allies (except the United States) of her adhesion to the clauses, which will be communicated to her of the peace treaties concluded between the Allies, the Turkish Empire and Bulgaria.

(*m*) Cession by Germany to the Allies by an arrangement to be come to within six months of all concessions granted to German subjects in the Turkish Empire.

## II. REPARATIONS, RESTITUTIONS AND GUARANTEES

In a general way, all damage resulting from the war, either in Allied territories which have been occupied by German troops and which have been subjected to bombardment by the German Fleet or by German aircraft, or damage at sea, by reason of German action, must be made good at the expense of the German Government.

Neutral States may, at their request be admitted to the benefit of this stipulation.

### (*a*) *Restitutions.*

I.—Germany will restore to France five billions of francs of which two billions will be in gold, with compound interest (1871–1919).

The two billions in gold must be paid within a month.

The three billions of francs, in French francs or by means of exchange accepted by the French Government, within six months.

The compound interest, for the period 1871–1919, on that sum of five billions will be settled in fifty annuities.

II.—Germany will redeem, in francs at the rate of 1.25 frs per mark, the property in marks belonging to Alsatians, Lorrainers, (officials or private persons) or French persons, prisoners of war, interned, those deported or inhabitant, living in invaded countries, exactly as handed to her by the French Government.

III.—Germany will restore to France within three months, the amount of the taxes, duties, war contributions, fines, levied during the war on private individuals and communities.

Requisitions, expropriations, labor in kind or in service will be settled within six months.

<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

IV.—Restitution within one month of cash, deeds, securities of all kinds, including ledgers, accounts, minutes, archives, etc.

V.—Restitution within                    in kind identical or its equivalent—by substitution—of raw materials, building materials, ships, tools, manufactured articles, works of art destroyed or removed during hostilities, public or private collections.

VI.—The German Government must take with regard to her nationals all measures indicated by the French Government, as capable of effecting the restitutions reviewed in the preceding articles in a rapid and complete manner.

(b) *Repairs.*

I.—Property built or non-built, damaged, laid waste or destroyed will be put in order at the expense of Germany.

II.—Personal property of all kinds, securities, etc., taken away or destroyed the loss of which has been recognized by the French Government—if the equivalent cannot be returned under the terms of Article V of Chapter A.<sup>21</sup>—will be indemnified at their current value as mutually agreed upon.

III.—The total cost of the present war will be paid by Germany by 1975 by means of fifty-six annuities, estimated and calculated in Schedule No. —.

*Means of Restoration.*

I.—Germany will furnish a list of the property of her nationals in foreign countries. Of these properties she must requisition those indicated to her by the French Government so as to put them at their disposal, as a means of payment.

II.—Germany will make known the orders and options placed by her in foreign countries, on raw materials, appliances, manufactured articles of all kinds, and the French Government can then benefit by these options and orders for which the payment will be guaranteed by Germany and will be credited to her pro rata in settlement.

III.—Germany will renounce all concessions which she obtained from her Allies, and will instruct the Government (?) to give notice of that renunciation as it sees fit.

She will compile a list of all existing concessions to her account or that of her dependants in the other countries. The Government (?) reserving to itself the right with the consent of the grantor, to substitute itself for the German Government or its subjects.

IV.—Germany will annul all measures taken on her territory or in the countries administered by her during the war to the prejudice of the French, (distrainments, sequestrations, forced sales, expropriations, etc.) and will make good in money or other means indicated by the

---

<sup>21</sup> Reference is to V under "(a) Restitutions," above.

French Government the damage caused by these measures to the said citizens.

V.—Germany will annul all measures of a legal or administrative character, which by reason of the duration of the war, would be disadvantageous to French citizens, such as accounts falling due, prescriptions on securities and dividend warrants, etc.

VI.—Germany will deliver at the request of the French Government and at the points on the frontier chosen by the latter within the limits of the maximum quantities named in schedule No.— a consignment of raw materials and products semi-manufactured (coal, metallurgic coke, zinc, wood-logs and cut wood, sugar, etc.).

The price of these materials and products will be fixed each year by the Commission provided for in the said schedule No.— This price free of all customs dues and taxes will be charged to the total of the sums due from Germany to France, in fulfillment of the present arrangements.

*(c) Guarantees.*

I.—For the payment of the German debt the States of Germany will yield jointly and severally in pledge thereof the receipts of their customs, ports, railways, canals, mines, forests, monopolies, etc.

Germany will fix an export duty on exported products, of German origin or manufacture. This duty will be payable in the currency of the receiver country. The total will be remitted direct, according to a proportion to be fixed, to the Allied creditor Governments.

II.—A special mortgage will be fixed on the revenues collected on the left bank of the Rhine (general taxes, customs, railways, property of all kind).

III.—An International Commission will control the revenues set apart for the pledge and will guarantee the payment by the enemy at fixed periods. Its composition and functions are determined in schedule No. —.

IV.—In case of non-performance of one of the above clauses or delay in payment at the times fixed, the International Commission of the German Debt will have power to fix terms or delays with or without a moratorium, to accord with the surrenders partial or complete, as provided in Annexe No. —.

On the other hand, special pledges (such as maritime duties, import charges, etc.) will be agreed upon which in the same case of non-performance or delay can be seized effectively, at the request of the International Commission of the German Debt, by forces designated for that purpose by the Allies.

*(d) Various Clauses.*

I.—**ENEMY PROPERTY IN FRANCE.** The French State reserves to itself the right to confiscate, failing indemnification, all interests that enemy

subjects may have preserved in French territory or in the countries under French protectorate and which are at present under sequestration.

The indemnity detailed in the preceding paragraphs will be a charge upon the German Government and will be deducted from the sums due by that Government to the French Government by reason of the war.

II.—FRENCH PROPERTY SOLD IN GERMANY. The sales of French interests and property effected by the application of special war legislation will be, at the request of the former owner of the property, annulled or its status established as it was before the war. The owner will be liable with regard to the actual holder, even in good faith, only for the indemnities for improvements, fixed in case of disagreement, by the Tribunal established by Article X. If the French owner accepts the sale, he can establish the price before the Tribunal established by Article X. The sums arising from the sale or fixed by the Tribunal will be paid to the rightful owner, by the intermediary of the Office of Compensation and Verification, as is provided in Article X.

### III. ECONOMIC CLAUSES

These clauses are in accordance with the impossibility of passing at once from a state of war to a state of peace. Their object is to institute and define a transitory state which will lead to the ratification of the preliminaries, the date of the end of the state of war, and will end at the ratification of the final treaty of peace, the date of the commencement of peace.

(a) During this period the Allied Powers will maintain the control established during the war on exportations, importations and navigation. This control will, by common consent, be progressively reduced with a view to preparing the complete resumption of the freedom of commercial transactions and navigation. The Allied Governments agree to make use of for that purpose, of the Allied Council of Maritime Transport, of Alimentation, of Munitions and various articles and purchases of war and finance. A special agreement will fix the powers of these Councils, for the period of transition.

(b) The Allied Governments will guarantee through the medium of the competent Allied Councils, the importations into Germany of stores and supplies indispensable for the German population. For this purpose, the German Government guarantee the equitable distribution on German territory of the articles thus imported and it places the German commercial fleet under the direction of the Allied Council of Maritime Transport. German technical delegates will carry on the liaison between the German Executives and the Allied Councils, where they may be admitted for the discussion of affairs concerning Germany.

- (c) These stipulations will be communicated to the Neutral Powers.
- (d) Economic administration of German territories occupied by the Allies.
- (e) The supply to the blast furnaces of Alsace-Lorraine of German coke, (there furnaces are worked on Westphalian coke, which is unobtainable elsewhere).

#### IV. GENERAL GUARANTEE

- (a) As safe-guard for the carrying out of the Preliminaries of Peace, occupation of German territory.
- (b) Special military administration of the German territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

---

762.72/12506 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 10, 1918—9 p. m.  
[Received December 11—6:50 a. m.]

6213. On the invitation of the French Government, I spent Sunday and Monday at Metz and Strassburg respectively. I traveled with the Presidential party, which was followed in another train by large numbers of deputies and Senators. All my colleagues of the diplomatic corps also made the trip. The size of the crowd at both places, particularly at Strassburg, as well as the enthusiasm of the people, furnished a spectacle which none of the party was prepared to see. President Poincaré's declaration in his speech at Metz in which, referring to the scene which he had witnessed in the streets of that city, that the plebiscite was an accomplished fact, was abundantly borne out by every feature of the demonstration in both cities. This enthusiasm was so genuine, being shown not only by everybody coming to the city, from the neighboring country, but by residences and commercial houses which were one mass of flags, that no doubt could exist as to the sentiments which there prevail for France. I could like[n] the scene[s] to nothing better perhaps than to say that they resembled family reunions of members long separated. At Strassburg, the crowds in numbers were beyond anything I have ever seen, every street [garbled group] place being literally packed with people from the smallest children to the most aged ones, the latter of whom must have contrasted such scenes with those of the German occupation of nearly 50 years ago. Before the reviewing stand a procession aggregating several miles in length composed of civic organizations, thousands of gaily bedecked Alsatian girls, some in the ancient costume of the land, passed by to the music of many bands.

Thousands of soldiers of General Gourand's army also passed in review. Some of these bore the tattered flags of their regiments, while others commanded the cumbersome tanks ending up the procession. A number of special ceremonies characterized the visit in both cities, in a number of which President Poincaré made eloquent speeches attesting the significance of the great victory and the mutual affection which has so long bonded together the people of Alsace Lorraine and the mother country of France. In all the speeches made by the local officials, of [both?] America and President Wilson came in for a most generous recognition for the part taken in the liberation from German domination of these cities. All in all it was a convincing demonstration to all those present of the feeling of loyalty which must overwhelmingly exist in those lost provinces towards France.

SHARP

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The French High Commissioner to the United States (Tardieu)  
to Colonel E. M. House*

PARIS, December 24, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: The Cabinet this morning have agreed on the terms of the following memorandum, which they asked me to forward to you to be submitted to the President before he leaves for London.

Believe me [etc.]

ANDRÉ TARDIEU

[Autograph note by Colonel House:]

Tardieu was anxious for you to get this before you reached London. He said Clemenceau was very interested in it.

E. M. H.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Agreed Upon by the French Cabinet*

The French Government is considering how to deal, in consultation with the associated Governments, with the economic problems during the transitional period after the war.

The French Government's aim is to avoid too deep a perturbation in the social life of nations and to prevent some of them having suddenly to face a disadvantageous situation, solely caused by the war.

Up to the present, the supplies for the Allies are mostly guaranteed through interallied organizations that are connected with either the Allied Food Council or the Inter-allied Maritime Transport Council or the Programme Committees.



The French Government realizes that these organizations must be modified so as to be adapted to the new conditions deriving from the cessation of hostilities; however, they want to expose to President Wilson that, in their opinion, these councils cannot be suppressed without all the Allies incurring a great danger before they could discuss of new steps that would be found opportune.

Therefore the French Government expresses the earnest wish that American Representatives be maintained until further notice in these councils, at least as consulting members.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 851.00/2

*Mr. Warrington Dawson*<sup>22</sup> to the *Chargé in France* (*Bliss*)

JANUARY 9, 1919.

Yesterday afternoon I went by appointment to call on Marshal Joffre,<sup>23</sup> and I repeated to him a remark the Secretary of State had made in conversation with me concerning the Marshal's popularity in America and America's opinion of his services in the war. I told him that I had asked the Secretary's permission to repeat this.

The Marshal's eyes filled with tears, and he asked me to express to the Secretary of State his deep gratitude and to say that such a tribute from America, conveyed by the lips of the Secretary, atoned to him for the hours during which he had seemed to be overlooked and forgotten.

He then spoke to me at length on conditions in France and in Germany. At the end of this conversation, which lasted more than an hour, I asked his permission to inform the Secretary of all he had said. He replied that he would be happy to have me do so. He asked me to present his respects to the Secretary and say he would be much honored if he could have a personal interview with him; but that in any event he begged permission to remain in contact with the Secretary through me.

Appended is a report of the Marshal's conversation, as written out by me from memory immediately after leaving him. A long intimacy having made me familiar with the Marshal's opinions, train of thought, and usual phraseology, I can say that this is an accurate rendering in condensed form of his words on this occasion.

WARRINGTON DAWSON

---

<sup>22</sup> Confidential adviser and special assistant to the American Embassy in France.

<sup>23</sup> Joseph J. C. Joffre, Marshal of France; Commander in Chief of the French Armies, 1914-16.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by Mr. Warrington Dawson of a Conversation With  
Marshal Joffre*

PARIS, January 8, 1919.

I beg to report the following remarks made to me to-day by Marshal Joffre:

M. CLEMENCEAU AND THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS

"President Wilson's visit has proved to be a very fortunate thing, and his influence has already made itself felt. I am told that M. Clemenceau himself has calmed down somewhat, and is disposed to more reasonable views since being in contact with Mr. Wilson's intellect and personality. Clemenceau has never been a partisan of the Society of Nations. England appears to be, with reserves as to the Freedom of the Seas, and Italy also, with reserves as to the Jugo-Slav question. Both may have cause to regret, in the future, that their adherence was not prompter and more complete, especially England when she sees America across the Atlantic with a fleet larger than her own. But whereas England and Italy are agreeable to the principle, M. Clemenceau holds out in the name of France, while not appearing to know just what he wants in the stead of the Society of Nations. The fact of saying 'I don't want that' does not constitute a very complete programme at a time like this.

THE POSITION OF THE CABINET

"M. Clemenceau's political position appears to have been consolidated, of late, on the strength of his having won what he calls 'his war'. But there has not been an organized opposition, no leader has come forward and contested his power. His opponents have not disarmed, however, and it would not be surprising if he were overthrown within the next month or two.

"Briand<sup>24</sup> is the only likely successor I have heard mentioned. He is an able, while not a really strong, man. He has the advantage of more polished ways than Clemenceau; he never breaks out in gross personal denunciations at awkward junctures. But he has the defect which is unfortunately characteristic of our statesmen—making whatever promises may be useful for tiding over difficulties. France needs at this juncture a leader following a clear, open policy, who will furthermore dare say 'No' in the face of Parliament when he feels it right to do so.

---

<sup>24</sup> Aristide Briand, French President of the Council, Oct. 29, 1915–Mar. 20, 1917.

"If Clemenceau were appointed French Peace Plenipotentiary, as he desires, and he were then overthrown in Parliament, strange complications would follow.

#### THE PREMIER MUST HEAD THE FRENCH PEACE DELEGATION

"With a Constitution and customs like ours, the Prime Minister must head the French Peace Delegation. Clemenceau would sit not in his personal capacity, but as the head of our Government; so that if he were replaced as Prime Minister, he would have to be replaced as Peace Plenipotentiary also.

"Furthermore, Clemenceau's nature makes it impossible for him to brook anyone else's authority or to admit of divided authority. He would sit only as absolute master of France's representatives. Perhaps this has been the cause of reports spread to the effect that France will have but one Delegate, strictly speaking, with official Secretaries the first of whom would be M. Pichon, and another M. Berthelot.<sup>25</sup> These reports seem to have more consistency than those according to which France would be represented by four or five equally eminent men. M. Bourgeois<sup>26</sup> is an opponent of M. Clemenceau on many points, though a sufficient degree of harmony between them might be maintained if Bourgeois is willing to recognize Clemenceau's superiority. But Briand, as Clemenceau's chief rival for power, could not be expected to bend before his absolute will. I have heard Tardieu's name mentioned as a possibility. There has been talk of Foch, but I do not know with what degree of likelihood. I myself have not been approached in any way, nor do I believe that M. Clemenceau, owing to his personal hostility towards me, would allow me to serve with him. Our views are so different that I should be singularly embarrassed, if the question were put to me; I should have to reserve my independence of judgment, and Clemenceau would not admit of that from any member of the Delegation.

#### TWO VITAL POINTS FOR THE PEACE TREATY

"In my opinion, the Peace Treaty should include two vital points. First, the Allies must not only state all that they demand of Germany, they must foresee and mention specifically the means they will adopt if necessary for forcing Germany to comply to the very end. Secondly, mention must be made of the Society of Nations, and its application must be prepared in such respects as can be immediately realized.

---

<sup>25</sup> Philippe Berthelot, Director ad interim of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>26</sup> Léon Bourgeois, French President of the Council, 1895-96; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1896, 1906.

## THE ATTITUDE TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS GERMANY

"I believe that the Germans sincerely want to get the negotiations over and to sign peace as soon as possible. While they have haggled and delayed over clauses of the armistice, there have been genuine material difficulties in their way. After peace is signed, they will probably haggle and seek to delay over executing the peace conditions. But they are eager to end the present state of affairs; and we are in a position to make them respect the conditions they have accepted, as well as to avert the possibility of another war. What we want is a stable German Government to affix its signature to the treaty, even though that Government should last only for a time. Some clauses will take as long as twenty or thirty years to fulfill; but we can enforce respect of the treaty, once it has been properly signed.

"Of the two factions now fighting for control in Berlin, Ebert<sup>27</sup> is preferable to Liebknecht,<sup>28</sup> since the partisans of the latter are Bolsheviks. But we must allow the country to seethe without interference until it can settle down and recover from its own unrest. We should commit the gravest of mistakes if we were to send an inter-allied army to Berlin, even for purposes of pacific occupation.

## THE QUESTION OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

"The question of annexing the Left Bank of the Rhine ought not to be agitated at present. Any attempt to settle the definite status of those provinces would be not only premature but a mistake. The Allied armies must occupy the territory during all the years which will pass before the clauses of the Peace Treaty are fulfilled. That alone should be considered. To this end, it would be well for the occupied provinces to have provisional autonomy under our military supervision. We certainly could not allow them to be attached to the new German State and hold elections to send representatives to the German parliament. At the end of twenty or thirty years, the status could be definitely decided, whether annexation to France, or reversion to Germany, or complete autonomy, or a protectorate. Meanwhile, Germany could continue to claim the provinces theoretically if she wished—as she probably would.

"I must say here, however, that only the Rhine as a frontier can offer to France absolute security against future aggressions. But we cannot and must not violate the principle of the Freedom of Peoples.

---

<sup>27</sup> Friedrich Ebert, chairman of the German Socialist Party; Chancellor of the German Provisional Government from Nov. 9, 1918.

<sup>28</sup> Karl Liebknecht, leader of the German Spartacist Movement.

## TWO GRAVE SITUATIONS IN FRANCE

"There are at this moment in France two situations giving rise to the gravest concern: one is the slowness of demobilization, and the other is inadequacy in transportation facilities.

## THE SLOWNESS OF DEMOBILIZATION

"We have not yet worked out any effective system for demobilization. Early in October, more than a month before the Armistice was signed, the Director of one of the Divisions of the Ministry of War sent in to the Minister a report recommending that plans for demobilization be drawn up without loss of time. M. Clemenceau turned down the suggestion, saying: 'I am making war.' The Armistice came so suddenly that everybody was taken by surprise; and save for the fact that a few old soldiers are being released, our demobilization is no more advanced to-day than it was then.

"A spirit is arising in the army which will develop to serious proportions unless the cause is remedied very soon. There is no insubordination as yet, but there are both impatience and discontent. Hundreds of thousands of French soldiers, kept on a war footing and having nothing particular to do, see the industries of peace reviving for others while they themselves are debarred from earning money. They cannot understand such a condition of affairs, and they say so in writing to their families; who, in turn, become exasperated, lacking the support and the companionship of the men. This is playing precisely into the hands of the Socialists, who will not fail to make the best of it in favor of their own agitation.

"The only remedy is prompt and effective demobilization, which we have no reason to fear since Germany is now powerless militarily.

## THE INADEQUACY OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

"The second grave situation I have mentioned adds further complications to the first. We are exposed to shortness of food and of materials not because we lack either, for our stocks are sufficient while not abundant, but because of difficulties in transportation. The rolling stock is insufficient; but far worse, there is not enough labor.

"Last July, the question became acute. The Ministry of Public Works asked the Ministry of War to lend some tens of thousands of men, amounting roughly to forty thousand, from the Reserves of the Territorial Army, to help with the railroads. While unskilled at the start, these men gradually learned their new business, and did much towards relieving congestion. But now they are to be released, because they are for the most part old men belonging to the only classes

which will be demobilized. They cannot be replaced by the former railroad men who have since been serving in the army, because those men remain mobilized. The only solution found has been to call for volunteers from all classes of workmen and agricultural laborers. 30,000 have already responded; 60,000 are needed, and will probably be found. But this will be entirely unskilled labor, the technical education of a large number of men will be begun during a crisis when a maximum of skilled effort is needed.

"We must have better distribution in France if we are to avoid a very serious shortage of necessaries. In the reconquered regions of the north and east, that shortage already exists, and the congestion is aggravated by the policy of using nothing but military means in the army zone. We are also obliged to feed Germany to the extent of her absolute requirements, though the Allies must of course come first; by exposing Germany to want, we should expose ourselves to many complications.

"In closing, I shall give you a homely example of existing difficulties.

"I am short of vinegar for my household, and have had trouble in buying it. Three months ago, my brother at Perpignan sent me a barrellful of his own making. It did not reach me. I wrote and inquired. At the end of a month, he shipped another barrel to me. That did not come, so I wrote again. He sent me a third shipment, six quarts not by freight but by parcels post, packed according to regulations. That was a month ago, and the parcel has not yet reached me any more than either of the barrels.

"The story is not trivial, because there are similar instances in almost incalculable numbers, affecting to a greater or lesser degree the population of our entire country, and promising to grow much worse."

Respectfully,

WARRINGTON DAWSON

---

Henry White Papers

*The Chargé in France (Bliss) to Mr. Henry White*

PARIS, January 9, 1919.

SIR: I have the honor to send you herewith enclosed the plan of the preliminary sittings of the Allied Ministers which I have just received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the French text accompanied by an English translation.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

[Enclosure—Translation <sup>29</sup>]*Plan of the Preliminary Conversations Between the Allied Ministers*

JANUARY 5, 1919.

A preparatory meeting of the members of the Supreme Council of Versailles is necessary in order to settle several questions of form and substance.

1. Representation of belligerent and neutral States at the different stages of the negotiations.
2. Leading principles and the order in which questions should be examined.
3. Organisation of the work.

As soon as these points have been settled by the Great Powers, the States invited may be requested by the French Government to notify the names of their Delegates. It will then be possible to enter upon the study of the preliminaries.

## I.—REPRESENTATION OF STATES

1. *Number of Plenipotentiaries.*

- 5 for each Great Power (Great Britain, United States, France, Italy, Japan).
- 3 for each small belligerent Power (Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam), or Power with a special interest (China, Brazil).
- 2 for each recognized new State (Poland, Czecho-Slovak Republic).
- 1 for each small Power theoretically belligerent (Cuba, Panama, Liberia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa-Rica, Haiti, Honduras), or having simply broken off diplomatic relations (Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador).
- 1 for each neutral State.
- 1 for each State in process of formation (the list of which will have to be settled).

As for the question of the representation of the Dominions, it was decided in London on the 3rd December, 1918, that their Delegates should be admitted as additional members (on the conditions in respect of numbers and participation adopted for small belligerent Powers).

The conditions of an eventual representation of Russia are of a special kind, and must likewise be settled by the Allied Ministers.

<sup>29</sup> The translation here printed is that of Appendix A to the Minutes of the Council of Ten, session of Jan. 12, 1919, 4 p. m. (BC-A1). The Minutes are printed in vol. III; both Minutes and Appendix are filed under file No. Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/2. Cf. also André Tardieu, *The Truth About the Treaty* (Indianapolis, 1921), p. 88, where Tardieu states that he had been asked by M. Clemenceau to prepare this general plan of procedure.

Montenegro is also in a special situation on account of a recent decision of the Skuptchina to unite with the Serbians, the Croats, and the Slovenes in order to form a great Yugo-Slav State.

## *2. Conditions of the Delegates' Participation.*

The Great Allied and Associated Powers to be represented as of right at all sessions and commissions.

The small Allied Powers, or Powers with special interests, and new powers to be represented as of right at all sessions in which questions regarding them are discussed.

Neutrals and States in process of formation to have possible representation, either orally or in writing, at sessions devoted to the study of their interests and desiderata, if summoned thereto by the Great Powers.

## *3. Representation of Enemy Powers.*

There can be no question of Enemy Powers being represented before the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed on the terms of the preliminaries of peace.

Thereafter we do not know, in the present and coming situation of Enemy States, who could validly negotiate on behalf of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Can we treat, either with these Powers considered as a whole or with the different States which hitherto constituted them (the same question confronts us in the case of States in process of formation), before they have established workable Governments and Constituent Assemblies?

Besides, one may imagine a different solution for Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary.

If it be considered that the present German governmental congeries is, strictly speaking, able to treat on behalf of Germany (the question is analogous for Bulgaria), this is certainly not the case of Austria-Hungary, which no longer exists.

So far as the latter is concerned, the problem involved should be taken up successively with—

- (a) States already recognised—Bohemia, Poland;
- (b) States in a process of formation—Yugo-Slavs (represented either by a special Delegate or by Serbia, with which, as well as with Montenegro, they have fused, by the formation of a common Ministry), Magyaria, German Austria (new States whose frontiers and status cannot be definitely determined until after fixing the frontiers of the new States, already recognised, born of the former Dual Monarchy).

As for Turkey, she cannot evidently be called upon to treat on behalf of all the populations which composed her, since the Allied



Powers precisely intend to free them from the secular oppression of the Turks.

#### 4. *Technical Delegates.*

Owing to the great number of problems and to the special character of certain types of questions, States will be entitled to choose Technical Delegates apart from their Plenipotentiaries.

This decision will obviate the necessity of setting up a panel, drawn from a larger number of Plenipotentiaries, which would tend to increase excessively the number of the latter, and to complicate discussions.

## II.—PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

The Conference is entrusted with the task of preparing, through the settlement of the war, the new organisation of international relations, in accordance with the general principles stated in President Wilson's speech of January 8, 1918,<sup>30</sup> and in his speech of September 27, 1918,<sup>31</sup> as well as in the Allies' reply of November 5th, 1918.<sup>32</sup>

Consequently, the order of the debates might be as follows:

### 1. *Establishment of the Leading Principles.*

- (a) Publicity of treaties.
- (b) Freedom of the seas.
- (c) International economic system.
- (d) Guarantees against the revival of militarism and limitation of armaments.
- (e) Responsibility of the authors of the war.
- (f) Restitution and reparation.
- (g) Solemn repudiation of all infringements of the law of nations and of principles of humanity.
- (h) Right of self-determination of the peoples combined with the rights of minorities.
- (i) International arbitral organisation.
- (j) Statute of the League of Nations.
- (k) Guarantees and penalties.

### 2. *Territorial Problems.*

Establishment of frontiers between belligerents, newly-formed States, and neutral countries, determined according to—

- (a) The right to self-determination of peoples.
- (b) The right of nations, whether weak or strong, to be in principle on an equal footing.
- (c) The right of ethnical and religious minorities.
- (d) The right to guarantees against an aggressive renewal of militarism (rectification of frontiers, military neutrality

<sup>30</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 316.

<sup>32</sup> The Allies' reply is quoted in note No. 286, Nov. 5, 1918, to the Swiss Minister, *ibid.*, p. 468.

of certain regions, internationalisation of certain highways, freedom of the seas, etc.)

### 3. *Financial Problems.*

Determination of the financial responsibilities of the enemy according to the right of plundered and devastated countries to obtain—

- (a) Restitution.
- (b) Reparation.
- (c) Guarantees for payment derived from an international organisation.

### 4. *Economic Problems.*

Institution of an economic system which will secure to nations which have suffered most from the enemy's aggression, guarantees by means of international control—

- (a) On exports.
- (b) On imports.
- (c) On sea transport.

And by preparing for the future—

- (i) The economic basis of international relations.
- (ii) The economic sanctions which the League of Nations must have at its disposal to enforce peace.

### 5. *Working of the League of Nations.*

These three classes of problems once solved, in pursuance of the aforesaid order and principles, the two results aimed at will have been severally and jointly attained:—

- (a) The settlement of the War will have been achieved.
- (b) The main foundations of the League of Nations will have been laid.

Two points will still have to be considered:—

- (1) How to secure the working of the League of Nations.
- (2) How to codify such measures arising out of the leading principles stated in paragraph 1 as would not have been applied in the solution of territorial, financial, and economic problems (e. g., publicity of treaties, international arbitral organisation, &c.).

## III.—ORGANISATION OF THE WORK

### 1. *Regulations.*

Rules for the conduct of the proceedings of the Preliminary Peace Conference, and subsequently of the Congress, will have to be established.

These rules will formulate the decisions taken regarding the representation of States, the conduct of debates, the selection of a Bureau, of a General Secretariat, of a Drafting Committee, &c.

Draft regulations have been prepared by the French Government.

## *2. Commissions and Committees.*

In order to avoid delay in the proceedings of the Preliminary Peace Conference, and afterwards of the Peace Congress, Commissions of Plenipotentiaries and Committees of Technical Delegates will be formed at once.

The following seem to be the main questions which should be dealt with forthwith in this preparatory way:—

1. League of Nations.
2. Polish affairs.
3. Russian affairs.
4. Baltic nationalities.
5. States born of the late Austria-Hungary.
6. Balkan affairs.
7. Eastern affairs.
8. Far Eastern and Pacific affairs.
9. Jewish affairs.
10. International river navigation (Rhine, Danube, Elbe, Scheldt, and Vistula).
11. International Railways (45th parallel: Adriatic to Baltic, Bagdad, Cape-Cairo and Cape-Algiers, Trans-African Railways).
12. Public legislation ensuring to peoples the right to self-determination, combined with the rights of ethnical and religious minorities.
13. International Legislation on Labour.
14. International Legislation on Patents and Trade-Marks.
15. Penalties for crimes committed during the War.
16. Economic system.
17. Reparation.
18. Financial questions.

## IV.—SUGGESTIONS RELATING TO THE ORDER IN WHICH TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS SHOULD BE EXAMINED

Among the territorial and political problems it is necessary to discriminate between—

Those which first require solution.

Those which only require subsequent treatment, because the previous settlement of the first ones should facilitate their solution.

Those in respect of which a certain delay is, on the other hand, more convenient.

Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the questions might be examined in the following order:—

*1. Territorial Settlement with Germany.*

This is the paramount problem which dominates all others, while the terms of its settlement will re-act on the whole Peace Settlement.

The French Government have prepared a draft in this connection, which embodies the principles, and may serve as a basis and a starting point for the discussions of the Powers.

One general clause will contain the antecedent acceptance by the various States of Germany of the settlements to be made subsequently by the Allies with all the other States.

*2. Organisation of Central Europe.*

Questions arising out of the disappearance of Austria-Hungary, and the constitution of the different States which have sprung up out of the former Dual Monarchy.

(a) Recognised States—

Poland.

Bohemia.

(b) States in process of formation—

Yugo-Slavia.

Magyaria.

German Austria.

*3. Eastern Questions—*

(a) Liberation of Nationalities oppressed by the former Ottoman Empire.

Armenia.

Syria and Cilicia.

Arab States.

Palestine.

(b) The regime of Constantinople is a separate question.

(c) Determination of the frontiers of the Ottoman States.

The existence of a population with a Turkish majority in the western and central portions of the Asia Minor Peninsula implies the preservation of a Turkish State; that population wishes to be governed by a National Government, and the Allies are bound by their principles to take into account the wishes of the peoples.

*4. Status of the Balkan Peoples* (Frontiers of Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece, Serbia.)

This is a most complicated question and one likely to give rise to the most heated discussions; it appears preferable to deal with it after reaching a settlement of the great German, Austrian, and Eastern problems, which clear the ground of a certain number of difficulties and leave the Powers a greater freedom of action.

### 5. *The Russian Problem.*

By dealing lastly with this question, time will be given for the nationalities to organise themselves, at least partially, so that they may be able to formulate their wishes in more regular circumstances, and to make progress with the necessary understandings between the different ethnical groups.

## V.—DIRECT UNDERSTANDINGS

In order to alleviate the labour of the Conference and to facilitate the settlement of some special questions, the following practice might be laid down in principle:—

A direct understanding (or at least an attempt to come to a previous agreement) between belligerents, neutrals, and States in process of formation on matters which specially affect their own interests, but only concern other Powers secondarily, would precede any discussion of the questions by the assembled Plenipotentiaries.

This might, for instance, be done in the case of Slesvig (between Denmark and Germany); the Aland Isles (a previous understanding between Sweden and Finland); the questions of the Scheldt and of Limburg (between the Netherlands and Belgium); the Banat of Temesvar (between Roumania and Serbia); and perhaps even Yugo-Slavia (between Serbia and Italy).

In the case of an agreement being reached between the principal States concerned, the discussion at the Conference, for the general and final settlement of the question, would be greatly facilitated.

Should the parties fail to come to an understanding, the Conference would take the matter up again as a whole.

## VI.—DRAFT REGULATIONS

### 1.

The Conference assembled with a view to fixing the conditions of Peace, first in Peace Preliminaries and then in Final Peace Treaty, includes the Representatives of Allied or Associated Belligerent Powers.

Belligerent countries with general interests (Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Japan) take part in all Sessions and Commissions.

Belligerent countries (Belgium, Brazil, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, the Czecho-Slovak Republic, the States of Latin America) take part in the sessions where questions which concern them are discussed.

Neutral Powers and States still in process of formation may be summoned to take part, either orally or in writing, on being invited by the Powers with general interests, in the sessions specially devoted to examination of the questions which concern them directly, and only in so far as those questions are involved.

## 2.

The Powers are represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates, as follows:—

Five for each belligerent Power with general interests (Great Britain, United States, France, Italy, Japan).

Three for each belligerent Power with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, China, Greece, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam).

Two for each new State (Poland, Czecho-Slovak Republic).

One for each belligerent Power which has not effectually taken part in the war (Cuba, Panama, Liberia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras).

One for each Power in a state of diplomatic rupture with enemy Powers (Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador).

One for each neutral State.

One for each State in process of formation.

The British Dominions are admitted to a representation, consisting of Delegates attached to the British Plenipotentiaries, on the same conditions as Powers with special interests which have been belligerent since the beginning of the war.

Each delegation of Plenipotentiaries may be accompanied by Technical Delegates, duly accredited, and by two stenographers.

N. B.—The conditions of the representation of Russia, as well as the position of Montenegro, will be the subject of special decisions.

## 3.

The Delegates take precedence according to the French alphabetical order of the list of Powers.

(Agreed to.)

## 4.

The Conference will be opened by the President of the French Republic; immediately thereafter, the President of the Council of French Ministers will be invested, for the time being, with the Chairmanship.

(Agreed to.)

A Committee composed of the chief Plenipotentiaries of the Allied or Associated Powers shall proceed at once to verify the credentials of all members present.

## 5.

After the aforesaid verification, the Conference shall at once appoint a permanent President and four Vice-Presidents, chosen in alphabetical order.

## 6.

A Secretariat, on the lines of that of the Supreme War Council, not drawn from among the Delegates proper, will be submitted to the approval of the Plenipotentiaries by the President, who will be in control of and responsible for it.

This Secretariat will be entrusted with the task of drawing up the Minutes of the Proceedings, of classifying the records, of setting up the administrative organisation of the discussions, and, generally, of ensuring the regular and punctual working of all services assigned to it.

The Head of the Secretariat will be in charge of and responsible for all Protocols and Records.

The Records will be open at all times to the Members of the Conference.

## 7.

The work of the Conference will be made public by means of daily official bulletins prepared by the Secretariat and issued every day at the same hour. The bulletins will be previously placed for examination at the disposal of the members of the Conference two hours at least before publication.

Any member of the Conference will have the right to request an alteration in the text of the bulletin. If a difference should arise, the point will be settled at the beginning of the next session.

The Powers here represented and their Delegates expressly undertake to abstain from making any other communications concerning the labours of the Conferences.

## 8.

The French language is acknowledged as an official one for the discussions and resolutions of the Conferences.

The Delegates will be entitled to make observations or oral communications in any language which they choose, on condition that a French translation be thereafter immediately provided. In that case, if the initiator so desire, the original foreign text may be appended to the official report.

## 9.

All documents which are to be included in the official Minutes

will be put in writing and read out by the Plenipotentiaries who have brought them forward.

If such documents be written in any language other than French, a translation should be attached.

A document or proposal may be brought forward only by one of the Plenipotentiaries and in the name of the Power which he represents.

10.

Plenipotentiaries who may wish to make a proposal should, in order to facilitate its discussion, give notice thereof at the previous session. This does not apply to proposals relevant to questions on the Agenda, or arising out of the pending discussions.

Exceptions to this rule are, however, permissible in the case of amendments, or secondary questions, though not in that of substantive proposals.

11.

All petitions, memoranda, observations, or documents forwarded by any person other than the Plenipotentiaries, will be received and filed at the Secretariat.

Such communications, when possessing a political interest, will be briefly summarised in a list to be distributed among all Plenipotentiaries. This list will be kept up as, and when, similar communications are received.

All such documents will be preserved in the Records.

12.

The discussion of all questions requiring a settlement will include a first and a second reading. The first one will serve for general discussion and will aim at reaching an agreement in principle. After the questions have been discussed in their essential features, the second reading will be taken, at which the details may be considered.

13.

Plenipotentiaries will have the power, subject to the approval of the Conference, to permit their Technical Delegates directly to submit technical explanations on any given points in regard to which such explanations may be deemed useful.

If the Conference sees fit, the technical examination of any particular question may be entrusted to a Committee composed of Technical Delegates, whose duty it will be to furnish a report and suggest a solution.



## 14.

All decisions are to be taken unanimously; the minority, therefore, will not be bound to submit a majority vote.

Nevertheless, the resolutions of the majority which are concerned with questions of procedure, but do not involve main issues, are to be regarded as decisions of the Conference, in any cases where the minority may not deem it necessary to lodge a formal protest.

## 15.

The official Minutes, as drawn up by the Secretariat, will be printed and distributed in proof among the Delegates at the earliest possible moment.

In order to expedite the work of the Conferences, the communication thus made in advance will take the place of a formal reading of the previous Minutes at the opening of each session.

If no alteration be requested by the Plenipotentiaries, the text is to be considered as approved, and entered in the official records.

If any alteration be requested, its text will be read out by the President at the opening of the next session.

In any case, the Minutes should be read out in their entirety, if one of the Plenipotentiaries so request.

## 16.

A Drafting Committee will be formed for adopted resolutions.

This Committee will deal only with settled points, and will be entrusted solely with the drafting of decisions taken and with submitting the text to the Conference for approval.

This Committee will consist of six members, not included in the Plenipotentiary Delegates, as follows:—

One Member whose mother tongue is	French.
.....	English.
.....	Italian.
.....	Portuguese.
.....	Slav.
.....	German.

---

*The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State* <sup>33</sup>

[PARIS,] 12 January, 1919.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed please find Observations on "Plan des Premières Conversations Entre Les Ministres Alliés à Partir du

<sup>33</sup> This letter and its enclosure are reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, pp. 241-254.

13 Janvier 1919,"<sup>34</sup> prepared in accordance with your suggestion of the 10th instant for the use of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

We are,

Very sincerely yours,

DAVID HUNTER MILLER

JAMES BROWN SCOTT

[Enclosure]

*Observations on "Plan des Premières Conversations entre les Ministres Alliés à partir du 13 Janvier, 1919"*

The plan for "first conversations" between the Allied Ministers commencing January 13, 1919, deals with the following subjects:

- I. Representation of States.
- II. Principles and Methods.
- III. Organization of the Work.
- IV. Order proposed for the examination of territorial and political problems.
- V. Direct understandings.
- VI. Proposed rules of procedure.

The plan is divided into two parts: the first relating to what may be called preliminary matters, embraced under the first three headings, to be discussed and determined by the Supreme Council of Versailles; the second division including the remaining headings and relating to the Conference, its procedure, and its work after the preliminary matters have been disposed of by the Council of Versailles and the Conference constituted, as it were.

#### I.—REPRESENTATION OF STATES

This is divided into (1) Number of Plenipotentiaries, (2) Participation of Delegates, (3) Representation of Enemy Powers, (4) Technical Delegates.

The result of the first section regarding Number of Plenipotentiaries may be tabulated as follows:

5 for the Great Powers:

Great Britain (with a special provision regarding the Dominions)

United States

Italy

France

Japan

3 for the small belligerent Powers:

Belgium

Portugal

Serbia

Greece

Roumania

Siam

<sup>34</sup> For text of the "Plan des Premières Conversations . . .", in translation, see *supra*.

## 3 for Powers with special interests:

China

Brazil

## 2 for newly recognized states:

Poland

Czecho-Slovakia

## 1 for the small theoretical belligerent Powers:

Cuba

Panama

Liberia

Guatemala

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

Haiti

Honduras

*It is to be noted that the Government of Costa Rica is not recognized by the United States.*

## 1 for states which have broken relations with Germany:

Bolivia

Peru

Uruguay

Ecuador

*Santo Domingo and Salvador are omitted in the plan.*

## 1 for each neutral state.

*These are not named in the French plan but are twelve in all, as follows:*

Norway

Sweden

Denmark

Holland

Switzerland

Spain

Argentina

Paraguay

Chile

Colombia

Venezuela

Mexico

## 1 for each state in process of formation.

*No list of such states is given.*

Reference is also made in the plan to the special situation of Montenegro and to the necessity of the determination of the questions regarding the representation of Russia.

Discussion of the second section regarding Participation of Delegates, will be found in connection with the consideration of the proposed rules of procedure.

As to the third section, Representation of Enemy Powers, no comment is required at this time.

The fourth section, dealing with Technical Delegates, is of very great importance and should be the subject of careful consideration. Without attempting to analyze the questions which must be presented to an international conference of this kind and which inevitably arise in the course of its proceedings, it is obvious that there are two classes—the one of a general and a political nature, which can only be decided by the States themselves through delegates exercising political powers; the other technical, to be examined by persons familiar with the subject matter who are to put at the disposal of their respective delegations and the Conference the means by which the general purposes may be accomplished. They may be called scientific understudies. They do not possess or exercise political power, but examine

and report on questions or phases of questions submitted to them, deriving whatever representative power they may possess from their respective Plenipotentiaries, addressing the Conference with its permission, if it provides for their participation, and under the supervision and control of their Plenipotentiaries. In recommending the selection of technical delegates, the plan follows the example, and is no doubt guided by the experience of the most recent international conferences—the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899, in which twenty-six States were represented, and the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907, in which forty-four participated. The technical delegates greatly facilitated the work of these two bodies, and it is believed that a considerable number of persons who took part in the Second Hague Conference in that capacity are attached to various commissions and, with the addition of other highly trained persons at present in Paris, may render similar services in the approaching Conference. The provision concerning technical delegates seems to be an integral part of the French plan, inasmuch as in the third division provision is made for the appointment of commissions to consist of Plenipotentiaries and committees to be composed of technical delegates, and in the very last article of the proposed rules for the Conference a drafting committee is composed, to consist of six technical delegates to the exclusion of Plenipotentiaries.

## II.—PRINCIPLES AND METHODS

This division, it will be observed, consists of three sections, the first dealing with the principles which are to control the discussions; the second, numbers 2, 3, and 4, with the problems confronting the Conference, denominated, respectively, territorial, financial, and economic; and the third with the operation of the Society of Nations, forming a fifth and final section of this division.

These provisions speak for themselves and need not be analyzed, as they are, with the exception of the first sub-section, an enumeration, not a discussion of the problems. In regard to this first sub-section, it will be observed that the organization of the Society of Nations is last but one of the group of "directing principles." It is obvious, however, that, if a League or Association of Nations is to be formed and to possess certain powers to be exercised in the interest of the contracting States, this subject should be first considered, inasmuch as the acceptance of this principle and the nature and power of the League or Association will necessarily affect many, if not all, other questions. This does not mean, however, that the work of the Conference should be postponed, in order to take up and to decide this principle, for commissions and committees can be appointed to consider the other matters contained in the program. As, however, they

depend upon the nature of the League or Association, they cannot assume definite shape until the League or Association has been accepted in principle and an agreement reached upon its nature and the scope of its powers. The plan appreciates apparently the importance of the League or Association, as appears from the fifth of the sub-divisions, but instead of leaving the matters mentioned in the concluding paragraphs of this section for later discussion, they should, it is believed, be considered at the very beginning of the Conference and in connection with the constitution and operation of that organization.

### III.—ORGANIZATION OF THE WORK

This division consists of two sections: first, the rules of procedure of the Conference, a draft project of which forms the subject matter of the sixth division of the plan and will not be discussed in this place; second, an enumeration of the principal questions to be discussed by the Conference and to be submitted to commissions composed of Plenipotentiaries and to committees composed of technical delegates. As this is an enumeration, not an analysis, and is not accompanied by discussion or expression of opinion, it does not seem necessary to do more in this place than to call attention to it.

An agreement reached upon the subject matter contained in these three divisions by the Supreme Council of Versailles would enable the Conference to meet and to proceed to its own organization, to arrange its program, and to devise rules for its procedure. As previously stated, divisions four, five, and six deal with this phase of the subject.

### IV.

This section is entitled, "The Order proposed for the Examination of Territorial and Political Problems." All the problems mentioned in this section will necessarily be discussed by the Conference. They are all important and there will no doubt be a divergence of opinion as to the order in which they shall be approached or discussed. They are in the order of the plan arranged as follows:

- (1) Territorial adjustment of Germany.
- (2) Organization of Central Europe.
- (3) Oriental Questions.
- (4) Situation of the Balkan peoples.
- (5) The Russian Problem.

### V.—DIRECT UNDERSTANDINGS

The method of procedure contained in this very important division has, it is believed, met with general approval and is likely to be fol-

lowed by the Conference when it meets and is organized for work. By means thereof many questions of general importance, but which have a special interest for certain Powers or groups of Powers could be discussed by their representatives outside of the Conference. In some instances at least an accord would be reached which then could be laid before the conference for its modification or approval, inasmuch as the special would inevitably have to yield to the general interest. Doubtless these special questions, even when only two Powers seem to be concerned would be discussed with representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, as representing in a way the general interest, especially so outside of the Conference. Even in the examples given by the plan of special interests, which could be discussed between the respective parties, it is believed that the general interest would have to be represented, as it is very difficult to see how any agreement of a satisfactory nature could be reached without consulting the larger and general interests that must necessarily be involved. This is evident from the following examples, to be found in this part of the plan:

“Schleswig (between Denmark and Germany); the Aland Islands (previous understanding between Sweden and Finland); the question of the Scheldt and of Limburg (between the Netherlands and Belgium); the Banat of Temesvar (between Roumania and Serbia); perhaps even Jugo-Slavia (between Serbia and Italy).”

## VI.

The proposed rules of procedure consist of sixteen articles, the first two of which deal with the question of representation calculated to give effect to the principles laid down in the section entitled, “Representation of States,” which the plan presupposes has been approved by the Supreme Council of Versailles. The table contained in the first division is applicable to the second article of the proposed regulations. The first two articles, however, are a decided improvement in form, inasmuch as the classification of the States into big and little, so annoying to most of the States, for only five at present can claim to be great Powers has been discarded and, in lieu thereof, they are grouped according to a general principle accomplishing the same purpose, but in language and in terms consistent with the equality of States. Thus, five belligerent Powers—France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States—have a general interest, and as such are recognized as possessing a general as distinct from a specific or particular interest, and are therefore entitled to take part in all sessions and in all commissions. The other belligerent Powers having what may be considered a special interest, in the sense that they are particularly interested in certain questions, are therefore entitled to take part in the sessions of the Conference in which these matters are discussed. In

like manner, the plan recognizes that neutral Powers, as well as States in process of formation, are interested in certain phases of the program, and it is therefore provided that they participate either orally or in writing, upon invitation of the five Powers having a general interest in the sessions of the Conference devoted to the discussion of such questions.

Article three provides that the Powers are to be alphabetically arranged according to their French names. To this there is no objection, as it has proved to be a very successful manner of avoiding conflicts as to precedence. The question, however, arises as to the proper name of some of the countries. For example, Brazil is technically known as the United States of Brazil, yet it appears as Brazil; the United States is properly denominated the United States of America, yet it appears as *Etats-Unis*, although in the Second Peace Conference of 1907 it was denominated "America, United States of." Then, too, Great Britain appears as England—the French whereof is *Angleterre*, which would place that country at the head of the list and enable it first of all to express its opinion upon the taking of votes. There may be no objection to this latter phase of the question, but England does not exist internationally except as a part of Great Britain, and in the Second Hague Peace Conference, to speak only of this international gathering, it appeared as *Grande-Bretagne*, not as *Angleterre*. While these may be considered details, it is of importance to the Conference and to the world at large that a contracting party be officially designated, so that the agreement may be seen to be binding upon it without the necessity of explanation.

Article four provides that the Conferences, meaning thereby the Conference or Congress, shall be opened by the President of the Republic. This is customary in Republics. The Prime Minister of France is immediately thereafter to assume the provisional presidency. It is in accordance with custom that a high official, usually the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country in which the Conference meets, takes the chair provisionally. Even in conferences not called by the country in which they meet, as in the case of the two Hague Conferences, the Minister of Foreign Affairs opens the meeting, but yields to a President chosen by the Conference, doubtless by pre-arrangement among the delegates. In the case of the Hague Conferences, the presiding officer was not a delegate from Holland, but the First Delegate of Russia.

It is next provided that the full powers of the delegates shall be referred to a committee composed of the First Plenipotentiaries of each of the Allied or Associated Powers. This is especially necessary in a case of this kind, where the Powers must be in good and due

form, and to prevent the admission of a community which is not as yet recognized as a State or in the form in which it presents itself.

The fifth article thereupon provides that after the verification of the Powers, a definitive President and four Vice Presidents shall be chosen "in alphabetical order." While the meaning of this is not quite clear, it would seem that the author of the plan under discussion contemplated the choice of a President from among the five Powers having a general interest, and that the Vice Presidents should be chosen from among each of these Powers, to rank according to the alphabetical order of the French names of the countries. The author of the plan doubtless contemplates that the permanent President shall be a representative of France, inasmuch as the Secretariat chosen outside of the delegations will be "presented to the approval of the Plenipotentiaries by the President, who is taxed with the responsibility and control thereof."

On the supposition that the permanent President is to be a representative of France and the Vice Presidents chosen from the five Powers having a general interest, each of the remaining four would have a Vice President, and Great Britain (Angleterre) would have the first Vice President, who would therefore be the Presiding Officer in the absence of the President. The question of the alphabet is therefore not without its importance.

Article six organizes the Secretariat in the manner already stated. Its duties are those of a Secretary's office, with the very important provision that the archives shall always be open to the members of the Conference.

The next article deals primarily with the question of publicity, providing that official "communiqués" are to be prepared by the Secretariat and made public at the same hour every day. Two hours before publication, they are to be open to the examination of the members of the Conference. Each member of the Conference has the right to have a change made in the "communiqués" and to have a statement of that fact made at the beginning of the next meeting.

Finally, both the Powers represented and their delegates formally renounce the right to make any other communications concerning the labors of the Conference.

From this statement of the terms of Article seven it is apparent that the United States should be represented in the Secretariat by an intelligent person, competent in such matters, possessing judgment, discretion, and an accurate knowledge of French, inasmuch as the American delegation would of necessity be forced to rely in great part upon the information which he should communicate to its members regarding these matters.

The plan now comes to the question of language and, given its origin, not unnaturally provides that French shall be the official



language both for the deliberations and the acts of the Conferences. This is in accordance with custom, but it has never been satisfactory to delegates of other languages. An attempt is made to meet this objection, as in the case of other conferences, by allowing delegates to present their observations or oral communications in the language of their choice, on the condition that a French translation thereof be immediately made. It is further provided that, if the speaker desires it, the text of his observations or communications may be annexed to the minutes in the language in which they were delivered. It has been the custom of international conferences meeting in Europe to adopt French as the official language, even although the conferences were held in countries where French was not the official language. The Congress of Vienna (1814-15), the Congress of Berlin (1878), and the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Conference of Algeiras of 1906 are recent examples. In the present instance, the French Government will no doubt insist that the reason is all the stronger, inasmuch as the participating Powers are meeting in France. This argument will no doubt be more satisfactory to them than to the other delegates, and whatever argument is used, the adoption of one official language to the exclusion of others is not likely to be agreeable to those whose language is not adopted. The question, however, is very delicate and it is called to the attention of the American Commission without recommendation.

Articles nine and ten deal with the method of presenting documents and of laying propositions before the Conference, and it is believed that, if French be adopted as the official language, there is no objection to them, as they are calculated to facilitate the conduct of the proceedings by requiring that the text of the documents and the motions be presented in advance of their discussion, and that no motion, unless connected with a proposition or springing out of it or in amendment of it, be made without being previously presented and read by the Plenipotentiaries, who alone are authorized to present a document or to make a proposition in behalf of or in the name of the Power they represent.

It is the experience of international conferences that many documents and projects are presented to them by unauthorized persons. Article eleven provides that these shall be received by the Secretariat and only those of them communicated in summary form to the Plenipotentiaries which seem to have a political interest, justifying this action. For purpose of reference, however, these documents are to be placed in the archives.

Article twelve of the proposed rules requires a first and second reading of the proposition submitted. In the first the general principle will be discussed; in the second the details.

The thirteenth Article takes up the question of Technical Delegates, who may be authorized by the Plenipotentiaries with the consent of the Conference to present technical explanations upon questions or phases thereof which may seem to render such explanations useful. It next states that the matter may at the instance of the Conference be submitted to a committee composed of technical delegates to present a report and proposed solution. The possibility of such a method of procedure seems so obvious as not to require comment. The Plenipotentiaries must deal with the question of principle and they ought to be authorized to appoint assistants to deal with the details and applications of the principle.

It may also be in the interest of the Conference as a whole to have the matter or series of matters referred to a committee composed of technical persons in order to free itself from details of this kind and to save the time and energy of its members for the larger problems.

The fourteenth Article requires the rule of unanimity without, however, binding the minority in a case where opinion is divided. There are, however, many questions of procedure which do not affect principle. In this case it is provided by the article in consideration that the view of the majority will prevail unless the minority should make a formal protest.

The next Article, fifteenth, likewise deals with a matter that can properly be called one of procedure, requiring that the protocols be printed and distributed to the delegates as soon as possible; that their distribution shall take the place of the reading of the minutes and that if no modification in the text of the minutes is requested by the Plenipotentiaries the protocol is to be considered approved and is deposited with the archives. Should a change be requested in the text it is to be read by the President at the beginning of the next session and the entire protocol is to be read upon the request of any Plenipotentiary.

The last and 16th Article raises a question of very great importance. The experience of International Conferences shows that propositions adopted, however carefully prepared, require editing. The experience of international conferences also shows that the drafting of texts is a highly technical matter, and that it should be confided to a commission for this purpose. The Plan, therefore, proposes that a drafting committee (*comité de rédaction*), composed of six technical delegates, be appointed, representing each of the following languages: French, Portuguese, English, Italian, Slav, and German. This arrangement is open to the objection that Germany will not be a member of the Conference.

Again, it will be observed that only one person is to represent the English-speaking peoples. The presence of a technical delegate

from Great Britain would no doubt satisfy that country. It is doubtful whether such a choice would be pleasing to the self-governing Dominions; it is certain that neither Great Britain nor the self-governing Dominions would be satisfied if the representatives of the English language upon the committee happened to be an American. In any event, the United States would not care to be represented in the delicate matter of language by a person whose chief interests are concerned with the destinies of the other branch of English-speaking peoples.

But supposing the difficulty of language to be overcome, another important one presents itself. Changes in the wording of a text often affect form as well as substance, when only the former is intended. The presence of one or more Plenipotentiaries would therefore be desirable upon the Committee. The Second Hague Peace Conference met and overcame these difficulties. It appointed a drafting commission composed of the chief plenipotentiary of each of the participating powers. This commission formed a sub-committee composed of some of the plenipotentiaries and of technical delegates, under the presidency of the late Mr. Renault. The texts were presented to this committee as they were voted by the Conference and given form and precision. Any changes in meaning were noted and sometimes changes affecting substance were made, as they seemed desirable. The texts as thus drafted were submitted to the drafting commission, approved by it, reported to the Conference in plenary session, and approved unanimously by that body. It is believed that the 16th Article should be modified so as to overcome some of the objections to it in its present form, and that the experience of the most recent international conference should be profitably availed of.

DAVID HUNTER MILLER  
JAMES BROWN SCOTT

12 JANUARY, 1919.

## GREAT BRITAIN

Edward M. House Papers : Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to President Wilson*

PARIS, October 30, 1918.

In my private conversation with Lloyd George yesterday he said that Great Britain desired the United States to become trustee for German East African colonies. That Great Britain was unwilling that they should be turned back to Germany for the reason that the Germans had used such inhuman methods in their treatment of the natives. He said Southwest Africa and the Asiatic islands belonging to Germany must go to the South African Federation and to Australia respectively; that unless this was done Great Britain would be confronted by a revolution in those dominions.

He thought Great Britain would have to assume a protectorate over Mesopotamia and perhaps Palestine. Arabia he thought should become autonomous. France might be given a sphere of influence in Syria.

My feeling as to his suggestion regarding German East Africa is that the British would like us to accept something so they might more freely take what they desire.

George also thought the Allies should get together before the Peace Conference and thresh out their differences. He believed the Peace Conference itself need not last longer than 1 week. The preliminary conference he thought could be finished in 3 or 4 weeks.

I strongly advise against this procedure and for reasons which will be obvious to you.

EDWARD HOUSE

---

763.72119/9124 : Telegram

### *The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, November 11, 1918—2 p. m.

[Received 4:43 p. m.]

91. For the President. Hunter [*Hughes*], Australian Premier, in a letter to the *Times* of November 9, 1918, states that he has remained

[in] London for the purpose of representing Australia in the settlement of the terms of peace.<sup>1</sup> He says:

"The first intimation I received that the terms of peace had been discussed at Versailles, was conveyed in the document which I received which notified me that they had been definitely settled. Neither imperial war cabinet nor the individual representatives of the dominions, or at any rate of Australia were consulted in any way."

To this the British Government press bureau in the same copy of *Times* replies:

"The terms of peace were exhaustively discussed by the war cabinet and communicated to the Australian Government before the conference at Versailles and nothing had been agreed upon at that conference inconsistent with the general conclusion of the war cabinet."

There is no denial that the terms of peace have been effectively outlined.

Leading editorial of *Times*, November 9th, discusses the American elections, pointing out that their importance is psychological rather than concrete.

"They will not change the President's policy but they will, to some extent, affect the atmosphere by removing certain misapprehensions and strengthen the 'united front' and will help to bring the President's ideals into still closer touch with opinions in America and in all allied countries."

EDWARD HOUSE

763.72119/2874½ : Telegram

*The Military Attaché at London (Slocum) to the Chief of Staff,  
War Department (March)*

LONDON, November 27, 1918.

[Received 7:40 p. m.]

740. Confirming general idea in despatch 6835, Foreign Office unofficially informs Embassy the following outline of Government's present policy, which has not been communicated to France and Italy because England wishes to consult America first. These plans also indicate differences in details between Lloyd George and Foreign Office.

Near East. New Arab State, Palestine. Armenia, Albania and Persia need[?] ship administrative help of European or American states under mandate League of Nations; thus Great Britain in Mesopotamia, America in Palestine, Constantinople and the straits; France

<sup>1</sup> In regard to this letter, see also telegram from the consul general at London, Nov. 9, 1918, 12 a. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 490.

probably in Syria; Turkey under control League in [apparent omission] Anatolia. Greek and Italian claims in Asia Minor to be disregarded. England favors large Albania, to block Servian and Greek advance, prefers American protectorate but is willing Italy should act.

Africa. Former German colonies not to be returned. South Africa to receive German Southwest Africa. France claims Cameroons, half Togoland without defined policy but perhaps under mandate League of Nations. England claims strip of Cameroons, other half Togoland; all German East Africa under League unless America assumes task. France probably may object to America in Liberia but English favorable. Belgian Congo under League with revision acts of Brussels<sup>2</sup> and Berlin<sup>3</sup> to apply also to all tropical territory. Second section follows.

Inform State Department. C. G. A. E. F. France informed.

SLOCUM

763.72/12507 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 4, 1918—6 p. m.  
[Received December 11—11:12 a. m.]

4272. Your 6913, March 16, 6 p. m.<sup>4</sup> See military attaché's 748, December 4th to Military Staff.

Lack of confidence in Lloyd George and Coalition Government which has been noticeably increasing has recently assumed serious proportions. For some days influential section of the press has brought all the power of its leading articles to bear in an endeavor to bring out a statement of the Government's policy with regard to the expulsion of enemy aliens, the payment of an indemnity by Germany and the treatment of the Kaiser and others who are generally considered responsible for bringing about the war and Germany's illegal methods of warfare. The Prime Minister has as yet carefully refrained from tying himself to any definite policy or making any firm statement on these matters. In recent editorial the *Daily Mail*, always a strenuous supporter of Lloyd George, practically threatened to forsake him unless he gave satisfactory undertakings with regard to these particular problems, which the Northcliffe press considers of supreme importance. Should this group of newspapers desert the coalition it would only be supported by the *London Chronicle*, a newspaper recently bought for a large

<sup>2</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVI, p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

sum by a few personal friends of the Prime Minister, and which has as yet no great influence, and by the *Daily Telegraph*, which has always been a pronounced unionist organ. The other opposition sections continue to play the old tune on the strings of the inadvisability of a general election at this time. The practical disenfranchisement of the army and control of nomination by a Coalition committee which exacts pledges from Coalition or Liberal Coalition candidates under the threat of vigorous opposition. These various forms of dissatisfaction have crystallized into a pronounced opposition which makes the result of the election more and more precarious. There is little doubt, however, that the coalition will succeed in winning the seats necessary for a majority, although they may fall somewhat short of their ambitions. It is not likely that those sections which have hitherto supported Mr. Lloyd George will go back on him completely at the last moment, chiefly because there is no other party leader to whom they would be willing to turn their support. Their present attitude is more in the nature of a threat and an attempt to draw from the Prime Minister some definite statement of policy, and a promise to carry through certain reforms which they hold much at heart to the majority of thinking men. The questions which the popular press is placing in the foreground should take a more or less secondary place, but their appeal for the mass of voters, especially in view of the increased panel, is very great. The difficulties in the way of settling, at the present time, a hard and fast program for dealing with these problems is not fully appreciated. While these are all obviously matters which must be settled at the Peace Conference and in conjunction with the other Allied nations, there is great impatience on the part of people in the country who fear that the enemy are to be let off too easily. Lloyd George has already hinted at the difficulties in the way by stating that Germany will not be allowed to pay her indemnity by the defaulters cheap goods or dumping manufactured articles in this country to the prejudice of British trade. Great enthusiasm has been shown over the visit of Foch and Clemenceau to this country and obviously every effort is being made to strengthen the Entente between France and Great Britain in order that any possible friction before or during the coming Conference may be prevented. The President's visit to Europe continues to excite the greatest interest, there have been lengthy accounts of the opposition in the American Senate and of the bitterness and distrust with which the Republicans are said to view the entire procedure. No pronouncement of opinions have been given in this country and the desire for the President's visit to England is undoubtedly sincere and strong.

On November 28th the Labor Party issued election manifesto demanding a peace of international cooperation free from economic war, and international labor charter incorporated in the league of free peoples, democratic freedom for Ireland and India and self-determination for all subject peoples within the British Commonwealth, no conscription and free speech, land nationalization, building at state expense, one million new houses, public education free to all, payment of the war debt by special levy on capital together with heavily graduated direct taxation of incomes, nationalization and democratic control of public services, such as mines, railways, shipping, electricity, usual extension of trade unionism and a higher status for labor, better pay and pensions for the soldier. John Hodge, Minister of Pensions, has been called on by his trade union to retire from the Government, and though probably unopposed at the coming election, he will be unable to resume his place in the Ministry. The breaking away of Labor from the Government is almost complete, in some constituencies the Liberals will support a Labor candidate. Henderson having referred a dispute between two Labor nominees to a ballot of Labor Party members, mostly miners in the constituency, the extremist nominee was officially indorsed by plurality of 4,000. The Labor meeting at the Albert Hall was finally held on November 30th, and a second meeting was held on December 1st. The first object of both meetings was support to League of Nations, and the speakers urged the Labor Party to watch the proceedings of the Peace Conference in order to make sure that the result should be a true league of free peoples. The second object was to raise funds for the conversion of the *Weekly Herald* into a daily paper which would be the chief Labor daily. The Bolshevik element made but little demonstration, though in accordance with the official Labor program both meetings demanded immediate restoration workers' International Agreement as strongest safeguard to future peace. As the Labor Party during this election will have no daily newspaper, the *Daily Mail* has offered for its use one column daily. The publication of an announcement by Reuter's correspondent in Washington that Mr. Gompers and five other members of the American Federation of Labor would attend the Labor conference to be held in Paris concurrently with the Peace Conference has been received in Labor circles with immense interest as the first indication of official recognition of the proposed concurrent conference to which Webb and Henderson attach great importance.

Although Secretary Redfield's<sup>1</sup> request to American exporters to pursue a policy of forbearance at this time has received a certain

---

<sup>1</sup> William Redfield, Secretary of Commerce.



amount of favorable comment because of its altruistic character, the question has been raised as to whether it is practicable. Many prominent British trade officials consider that Government's statement will not represent the real attitude of American trade, which they expect will be as eager for business as is the case in this country.

Certain large groups of American trade consider it likely that there will be an attempt here to buy commodities such as timber, metals, and other articles, through a central organization.

Nests of British trades in different lines are intriguing for control of the situation, although it cannot be said as to whether they will succeed there is already a tendency to break away from the idea of central economic control, providing there are definite obstacles to successful operation of unified control, British interests will be quick to alter their course. The whole situation is being watched very intently by different branches of British trade.

There is undoubtedly a certain feeling that we may be over ambitious about the future of our merchant marine, the fact that the American Government has not permitted the transfer of International Merchant [*Mercantile*] Marine vessels to British ownership has not received any extended comments in the press except that it is a matter of significance; this is looked upon, however, as crucial point. There seems to be a difference of opinion on the part of various well informed American investigators as to what is the real British trade attitude toward America. It is the opinion of the commercial attaché to this Embassy that British public opinion is strongly in favor of friendly cooperation with the United States in trade matters as well as in other matters, and he feels that the most prominent officials in the Government share this view. At the same time it must be considered that various trade interests are anxious to take full advantage of the situation in order to gain as strong a position as possible, but evidences even of a large number of cases of this kind should not lead to the feeling that Great Britain is not preparing for a liberal adjustment of trade matters at the Peace Conference. It is necessary to give careful attention to all the various trade ambitions which are arising so rapidly in this country, but it should be realized at the same time that with careful handling there is no major reason why harmony cannot be found. There is a very great desire to have trade return to normal channels as soon as possible. Moreover Labor is strongly in favor of a liberal settlement. Questions of trade policy have apparently not been uppermost in the public mind in the election campaign, though they are undoubtedly foremost in the minds [of] special interests.

LAUGHLIN

763.72/12519 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 12, 1918—3 p. m.

[Received 10:14 p. m.]

4555. Your 6913, March 16, 6 p. m.<sup>s</sup> and see telegram 770, December 11th from military attaché to Mil-Staff.

Side by side with reports from the United States of the enthusiastic celebration of "Britannia's Day" throughout the country, the London press of the 9th instant, prints articles from their American correspondents on what they state to be the President's insistence on the so-called American doctrine of the freedom of the seas and the determination of the United States to reply to any reluctance on the part of Great Britain to fall in with our views by an outbuilding program of at least two keels to one. Articles of this nature which are not the product of the imagination of the Washington and New York correspondents of newspapers such as the *Times* and the *Morning Post*, but are based on utterances of the American press are in the highest degree mischievous. They are tending to stir up feeling in both countries on a subject which need not be controversial, and to increase the complexities of the peace settlement. Opinion in this country is uniformly sensitive on anything that has to do with policy touching the sea, and is especially quick to take unreasoning fright at any such project not clearly defined. It would be greatly to our advantage if the comment of the responsible American press on this subject could be minimized until after the President has had an opportunity to express himself to the members of the Allied Governments he will meet in Europe. There is a very uneasy and even ominous feeling growing here largely based on misapprehension, I am convinced, which has arisen only during the past few weeks chiefly from inopportune and uninstructed American comment.

LAUGHLIN

763.72/12568 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Davis) to the Acting Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 19, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 20—3:25 a. m.]

4759. Your 6913, March 16th 6 p. m.<sup>s</sup> and see telegram 787 December 18th from military attaché to military staff. The voting in

---

<sup>s</sup> Not printed.

the general election was marked by a singular apathy, it is only the women voters who appear to have turned out in force. The Labor Party also asserts that its vote was cast at nearly full strength. During the last week many people appeared to become somewhat disgusted at the actions of both the Coalition and Liberal candidates and many voters therefore refrained from voting at all. The days of the campaign were marked by considerable bitterness, and some rather biting personalities between the Prime Minister and Mr. Asquith, but these were only caused by the heat of the contest and should have no permanent effect. Prophecies as to the outcome of the election are varied and for the present quite worthless inasmuch as the votes are not counted until December 28th on account of the return of the soldiers' votes cast in France, many of which have not yet been received. The press is chiefly occupied with the President's visit to Paris, of which long accounts are given. The sole question concerning which any anxiety is expressed is that of the freedom of the seas. The American and British attitudes on this point have [been] exhaustively considered and exposed at length. For the most part criticism is withheld pending some definite statement of the President's views on this matter which are being very anxiously awaited. Should they not coincide with the views of the Conservative Party here there will be considerable protest. The Conservative view as set forth by the *Morning Post* and other leading organs is that by peculiar position of this country and its absolute dependence upon the control of the seas and waterways leading to its outlying possessions no new doctrine can be acceptable which in any way diminishes its control over transportation to and from the possible enemy. It is pointed out that the science of warfare has changed to such an extent that nations now fight almost en masse and that practically every commodity imported and exported has a direct bearing on the prosecution of hostilities. The British view is that a strict control over transportation should be made possible, and a blockade should be permissible as effective as any large navy can make it. There is little pronounced objection to diminishing the size of the British fleet providing it maintains its superiority to those of the other powers. A considerable increase of our own Navy might be looked upon with suspicion in some quarters but I think not by the majority as long as good Anglo-American relations are assured at any rate. Interest centers in the future international laws of sea control and blockade rather than in the relative size of our armaments.

. . . . .

763.72119/3282

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 8

## MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that His Majesty's Government propose that the following general warning should be issued by the British, French, Italian and United States Governments, in view of the disturbances now going on in certain parts of central Europe:—

In view of the fact that the final decisions of the Peace Conference may not be arrived at for some time to come, and that in the various districts armed unpleasantnesses for the possession of certain areas, which are in dispute between the different nationalities, have unfortunately taken place, the associated Governments wish to make it known to the different nationalities concerned that any attempt to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Conference by seizing or occupying such areas with armed force, will not only not assist the cause of those who have recourse to such methods, in the eyes of the associated Governments at the Peace Conference, but will certainly tend to prejudice it.

Telegrams in this sense have been addressed to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Rome, and it is understood that a similar communication has been made to the United States Secretary of State in Paris.<sup>10</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1919.

---

<sup>10</sup> In a memorandum dated Jan. 31, 1919 (not printed), the Department informed the British Chargé that his memorandum had been communicated to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

## ITALY

Inquiry files

### *The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Some little time ago Mr. Henry Nelson Gay, a well known American gentleman here in Rome, who is greatly interested in historical matters here, showed me a letter<sup>1</sup> which he had received from Professor Charles H. Haskins, Chairman of the Research Committee [of] Inquiry, formed, as stated therein, under the direction of Colonel House for the preparation of material for the use of the American Delegates to the Peace Conference, requesting Mr. Gay to prepare such material relating to Italian interests.

Mr. Gay is the possessor of the historical library of the Risorgimento Period in which, as I recall it, Professor Thayer states he wrote the life of Cavour.

He has brought me this afternoon three copies of the first batch of material prepared by him. This relates to Italian interests and claims in Africa, and he has requested that a copy be forwarded to Professor Charles H. Haskins, Chairman of the Research Committee of Inquiry, and to the President, and I have suggested that a copy be forwarded directly to Colonel House, which copy is going to Paris in the same pouch with this.

Mr. Gay states that this present statement regarding Africa is absolutely confidential, consisting in large part, of an Italian official communication of the Government which has been made known to no other Embassy and which has been given with the understanding that the American Delegates will regard it as absolutely confidential. Because of its confidential character, I am sending it in the form of this confidential letter instead of in an ordinary despatch.

Other material relating to Italy's claims and interests in the Adriatic and Mediterranean will be forwarded as soon as Mr. Gay is able to prepare them.

Without undertaking, in any way, to assume responsibility for these papers, I feel that they will prove of great interest and also of much use.

Always [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

---

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 106.

[Enclosure]

*Mr. H. Nelson Gay to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

PALAZZO ORSINI, ROME, November 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PAGE: Referring to our previous conversation, when I showed you a letter which I had received from President Charles Haskins, of the Research Committee, formed under the direction of Colonel Edward M. House for the preparation of material "for the use of the American Delegates at the Peace Conference," requesting me to prepare such material, I would say that I am preparing a series of memoranda upon Italian interests.

Unfortunately, the request has reached me at a late date, but the memoranda will be sent out in sections as rapidly as possible.<sup>2</sup>

The present statement regarding Africa is absolutely confidential, consisting in large part of an Italian official communication of the Government, which has been made known to no other Embassy, and which has been given with the understanding that the American Delegates will regard it as absolutely confidential.

As my own views with regard to Italy's economic requirements coincide with the general lines of the communication, my prefatory statement is favorable to Italy's claims.

In accordance with your suggestion that a copy of this material be sent directly to Colonel House, I would be glad if you would send the material accompanying this letter to him at Paris by the first courier, and I shall be glad to avail myself of the opportunity to forward other material as I am able to prepare it.

I am sending a copy of this memoranda also to President Charles Haskins, at No. 3755 Broadway, New York City.

Believe me [etc.]

H. NELSON GAY

[Subenclosure 1—Memorandum]

## PART I.—ITALIAN CLAIMS

## FOREWARD

The following brief official pronouncement was recently made by the Italian government to the author of these Memoranda, regarding the causes of Italy's intervention and her purposes in the present war. No one who is intimately acquainted with the course of events in 1914 and 1915, and who understands the character of the men who

---

<sup>2</sup> Only the memorandum here printed as subenclosure 3 (the section regarding Africa) is attached to the file copy of this letter; the memoranda printed as subenclosures 1 and 2 are taken from Inquiry Document No. 261; a fourth memorandum is printed on p. 442, as enclosure to letter of Nov. 15, 1918, from the Ambassador in Italy. No further memoranda on the subjects listed in the outline on p. 421 have been found in Department files.

are governing Italy would question the sincerity or the accuracy of the general statements which it contains. But as the application of general principles to concrete cases is not infrequently open to varied interpretation, so in the case of Italy's purposes and interests the honest application of general principles of nationality and of international economic equity to the complex racial and economic conditions created by twenty centuries and more of civilization and human struggle, such as those prevailing in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, is far from clear, and notwithstanding the sincere desire of Italy and the Allies to establish just conditions at the Peace Conference, the delimitation of frontiers must encounter difficulties of unquestionable gravity.

*Italian Official Pronouncement.* "The purpose of Italy in this war is identical with that so justly set forth by President Wilson: to obtain a peace truly equitable and lasting.

In order to attain this end it is necessary that so far as possible all causes of future conflict between neighboring peoples be eliminated, particularly causes of unjust territorial possession calculated to excite hostility, and requiring the maintenance of large armaments. . . .<sup>3</sup> Italy in her intervention on the side of the Allies proposed for herself no aims of imperial conquest. She entered the war in 1915 voluntarily, for ideal ends of justice and liberty. She was not threatened by either belligerent, but entered voluntarily at a moment when fortune was showing herself distinctly unfavourable to the Allies. She entered for highly moral ends that are in full harmony with the general principles of law and of liberty, namely to exercise her inalienable right of completing her national unity and to secure the just territorial conditions essential to solid national defence.

It is proper also to recall here the fact that at the very outset of the European conflict, through the declaration of neutrality which she made in view of Austria-Hungary's violation of the spirit and the letter of the Triple Alliance\*, Italy took a firm stand against the policy of aggression and domination which inspired the Central Empires. Her declaration of neutrality freed France from all danger of attack on the south-eastern frontier, thereby liberating the French army of the Alps for service elsewhere, and rendering possible the victory of the Marne which was the first formidable blow delivered against Germany's plans of hegemony.†

\* Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

† In articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, both of which have been published, the purely defensive character of the Alliance is clearly established; while the publication of article 7 places Austria's attack upon Serbia in 1914 in its true light as a breach of the pledges to Italy made in the Treaty, which was thereby wittingly annulled by Austria. Article 7 expressly provided that both Austria and Italy should use all their influence to maintain the *statu quo* in the Balkans; and that in case of the impossibility of maintaining it, neither should occupy new territory without first coming to an agreement with the other. By her wilful violation of Servian territory without first notifying Italy, Austria betrayed Italy with regard to both of these provisions. [Footnote in the original.]

† The following extract from a speech made by Senator Marconi at a banquet at the Waldorf Astoria in 1917, further emphasizes the importance for

Italy by historical tradition and as prompted by her national and juridical spirit is firmly opposed to hegemony or domination by whomsoever exercised; she aims solely to establish for herself and for others conditions of reciprocal and reasonable national safety by which disarmament may be obtained and by which a situation of equality of opportunity may be created for the moral and material progress of all nations."

*Public Opinion in Italy.* The declaration of entire absence of imperialistic aims, made by the Italian government in this pronouncement, may be accepted with confidence, for any imperialistic policy would disastrously fail of support among the vast majority of the Italian people. If the Italians ever suffered from megalomania the disease was contracted from German contagion, was of brief duration and has long since been cured. They have traditions neither of Napoleonic conquest nor of British imperialism to beacon them mistakenly into paths of unjust domination. In the grave hour of peace negotiations, when the temptation to the victors of enforcing peace conditions that will sow the seeds of future conflict, the public opinion of Italy will be found to be on the side of moderation, of conciliation and of fair play. Italy herself will expect to make, as well as to receive, concessions in the Adriatic in the establishment of boundaries suitable for naval defence. In the adjustment of the economic situation in Asia Minor Italy will be ready to support the policy of the open door, but if spheres of influence are to be mapped out there she will expect fair treatment from the other Great Powers; the question for her will be not of quantity, but of proportion—that is, fair treatment calculated to maintain her proportionate power and her prestige, and to satisfy the economic needs created by her natural in-

---

France of Italy's declaration of neutrality: "On August 2nd. 1914, three days before England declared war upon Germany, the Italian government decided for neutrality. The news was immediately communicated to our *chargé d'affaires* at Paris, since the ambassador was absent. The telegram arrived at one o'clock in the morning. Without delaying a moment the *chargé d'affaires* went to the president of the council, Viviani, at that very undiplomatic hour. When he entered, the president turned pale and started back, feeling sure that only the decision of Italy to throw in her lot with Germany would have caused the Italian diplomatist to come to him at that hour; upon reading the telegram, the president could not restrain his emotion.

[“] In less than half an hour Viviani had already ordered the mobilization of almost a million men whom France would otherwise have been obliged to keep upon the south-eastern frontier to protect herself from a possible attack on the part of Italy. That million of men arrested the advance of the Germans, won the battle of the Marne, and saved France from being crushed under the savage heel of German militarism. Had there been the least vacillation, the least hesitation on the part of Italy, had there been one Italian statesman who attempted to do one tenth part of what Bismarck did when he altered the words of the famous telegram of Ems, by that means bringing about the Franco-Prussian war, France would not have dared to withdraw a single man from the Italian frontier, and the history of the world would be differently written. Is there anyone who, after what I have said, can doubt that this action of Italy was the decisive factor in the war?” [Footnote in the original.]



crease of population and by her rapid industrial development.\* In North Africa she will expect from France and England the rectification of conditions which seem to her manifestly unjust. (Cf. Part 1., Section (c). Chapter 3.)<sup>4</sup>

*Italy's Attitude Toward America.* The attitude of France toward Italy during the past months has been the subject of much bitter comment even among the most Franco-ophile Italians; it may be due to administrative influences at the Quai d'Orsay rather than to initiative on the part of the present French government, but it is considered a logical continuation of that semi-hostile policy toward Italy which France has followed during the past half-century and which drove Italy into the Triple Alliance. As this subject will be treated in one of the Memoranda which follow (cf. Part 2, Section c).),<sup>5</sup> it is sufficient at this point to note the fact that today France does not possess the confidence of Italy. Certainly one of the problems of the Peace Conference will be that of establishing so far as possible relations of mutual trust between these two great Latin peoples—such relations being indispensable as a guarantee of the future maintenance of European peace.

Toward England Italy turns with greater confidence—and it is to be noted that Italian friendship for England arouses French jealousy—but it is to America that the Italian people look for entire disinterestedness in the consideration of Italian interests. Today (November 30, 1918) America occupies a unique position in Italian public opinion. President Wilson has placed the consideration of international questions on high moral ground; American idealism is beginning to be understood in Europe; and it is the belief in America's sense of absolute justice that has created among the Italian people the expectation that through her efforts rather than through those of any other of the Allies the Great Peace of the world can be made a lasting peace.

*Italian Interests.* To the superficial observer it may appear that harmony of views as to precisely what Italy's interests require, is wanting among Italians. In reality, however, there are no differences of fundamental purpose or opinion. Italian national unity must be completed. Italian boundaries such as will insure strong defence by land and by sea must be secured. Italy's legitimate economic interests must be protected.

---

\* During the twelve years ending in 1913 Italian imports and exports both doubled. During these same years steel products septupled, chemical products nearly tripled, exports of cotton textiles quadrupled. Italy's economic development will be dealt with at length in Part 1, Section c). [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> Subenclosure 3, p. 431.

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department files.

Elements of anti-Italian propaganda abroad have endeavored to make it appear that Italy has changed her policy of late and reduced her territorial claims. This is entirely false—manifestly false as will appear from the following Memoranda. From the first Italy's claims have been based upon the three fundamental considerations just stated, considerations which are based upon geographical and race conditions which are not susceptible of change. Her claims today are what they were four years ago, and the fine consistency of the speeches of Baron Sonnino, minister of foreign affairs during this entire period, bears witness to a national consistency under circumstances of widely fluctuating international fortunes, such as is possible only in a cause of which the basis is international justice. The writer of these Memoranda has interviewed at length many political leaders who have freely criticised various phases of Sonnino's conduct of foreign affairs, but their views on the fundamental lines of Italy's claims and interests are identical with Sonnino's own.

The precise frontiers by which Italy's commonly recognized rights and interests may be secured, must be determined largely by technical considerations—and their discussion demands at many points special technical knowledge.

These Memoranda have been prepared as a contribution to the understanding of these boundary interests and of political questions in the Mediterranean, and are reinforced by important unpublished Italian official statements and statistics—several of them of a technical nature.

For convenience they are submitted under classification as follows:

**Part 1. Italian Claims.**

**Foreward.**

**Section a).** Completion of nationality—Claims based on race; language; history; sentiment of nationality; trade requirements imposed by geographical conformation.

**Chapter 1).** Trentino—Upper Adige.

2). Julian Venetia (Eastern Friuli, Trieste, and Istria).

3). Fiume.

4). Dalmatia.

**Section b).** Competition [of] nationality—Claims based upon necessities of national defence.

1). By land.

2). By sea.—Problem of the Adriatic.

**Section c).** Requirements of foreign commerce.

1). Adriatic Sea—Albania.

2). Asia Minor.

3). Africa.

**Part 2. Difficulties in actuating these claims.**

- Section *a*). Just claims of other nationalities, conflicting with the just claims of Italy.
- b*). Unjust imperialistic claims of other nationalities, conflicting with the just claims of Italy.
- c*). Jealousy of increase in Italy's strength harboured by other Great Powers in Europe.

H. NELSON GAY

[Subenclosure 2—Memorandum]

**PART I.—ITALIAN CLAIMS**

**SECTION *a*).**—COMPLETION OF NATIONALITY.—Claims based on race; language; history; sentiment of nationality; trade requirements imposed by geographical conformation.

*Speeches of Sonnino.* Even at the cost of the repetition of some ideas already set forth in the official pronouncement quoted, it is important to review briefly Sonnino's declarations regarding Italian interests made during the past eighteen months in speeches delivered before parliament. They will serve to refute completely any charges of mutability in Italy's purposes, and may be considered as a proper point of departure for a detailed examination of the grounds of Italy's claims for the completion of her national unity through a readjustment of her boundaries to the north and east. On June 20, 1917, Sonnino declared:

"If a lasting peace is to be assured, it is necessary that Italy obtain secure national frontiers—an indispensable condition for her full independence. Our national programme is the same as that proclaimed in 1859 and in 1866, namely the union and independence of the Italian people which they of their own free volition demand—and this is absolutely necessary if Italy is to prove in Europe a secure and permanent factor in the maintenance of peace and in the advancement of civilization.

Far from us be any thought of oppression or subjection or humiliation of any race of any state, near or distant, great or small. Our aim is to cooperate in the establishment of the equilibrium of power which is the condition and the guarantee of reciprocal respect, and in bringing about mutual concessions—essential elements of liberty and equity in the society alike of individuals and of peoples.

Our aspirations are, I repeat, for liberty and security, both for ourselves and for others. We have no desire to acquire frontiers that would constitute a menace to a neighbor or a peril to anyone, but simply frontiers that will serve as a bulwark to the independence of our Country and a guarantee of its pacific civic progress."

In his speech of October 25, 1917, Sonnino again referred to Italy's aims:

"The guarantees for the maintenance of peace must be sought in the very conditions of peace themselves—conditions of equity exhibiting all possible regard for the just aspirations of the peoples. . . ."

The Allied Nations have entered the war with the high ideal purpose of defending and re-establishing international justice and the rights of the peoples which have been so barbarously violated. But they cherish also their individual aims which, far from being inspired by imperialistic designs as has been malignly insinuated, look on the contrary toward the legitimate application of the general principles of international justice and of the rights and liberties of the peoples. France, victim together with Russia of that aggression of 1914 which has few parallels in the world's history, seeks the recovery of the provinces which were violently torn from her in 1871. And Italy is fighting equally for the recovery of her own natural frontiers, for the liberation of her brothers oppressed under a foreign yoke, and to secure for herself in the Adriatic the conditions essential to her existence and to her legitimate defence."

And in his speech of February 23, 1918, Sonnino further elucidates Italy's ideals and policy:

"An underhand campaign of foreign propaganda has attempted to insinuate that Italian aspirations are inspired by conceptions of imperialism, of anti-democracy, of anti-nationalism, etc. This is all absolutely false. Such insinuations have been possible only because of an absolute ignorance of real conditions. Our revindications from Austria are based on claims of ethnography and of legitimate defence by land and by sea. The ethnographical grounds are self-evident and are consecrated by the indomitable Italian spirit of our unredeemed provinces. And the grounds of legitimate defence by land and by sea are equally clear. In considering frontiers for defence, wherever one encounters a mixed population a just delimitation can be obtained only through mutual concessions and reciprocal sacrifices; otherwise conditions will be created containing the germs of future conflicts.

It is with this conception that are inspired Italy's revindications, which according to our firm conviction, are calculated to insure for the future that confident collaboration in the political and economic field which it is the vital interest alike of Italy and of the Jugo-Slav nationality to establish upon a solid foundation.

We aspire only to that minimum of safety on our military and naval frontiers which is a postulate essential to liberty and political independence, rendering possible both normal disarmament and the pacific development of our resources and our business activities without constant preoccupation over the danger of surprise and attempts at domination on the part of our neighbors. We ask for no privileged situation from which to attack others, but simply for those conditions which are indispensable for our own reasonable safety."

---

\* Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

The favorite method in discussion adopted by those who would oppose Italy's national revindications is that of confusing the two claims which Sonnino has here clearly set forth as absolutely distinct, though both absolutely essential for the future of Italian nationality. As Sonnino says, for Italy's national revindications "the ethnographical grounds are self-evident"; and the "grounds of legitimate defence by land and by sea are equally clear". The grounds of defence, however, of necessity include the annexation of some territory occupied by non-Italian peoples, and it is by attacking these claims of Italian defence as if instead they were claims of Italian ethnography, that Italy is misrepresented as putting forth unjust pretensions and therefore as possessed of imperialistic ambitions. One might as well attack the occupation of the Panama Canal Zone by the United States on ethnographical grounds, ignoring the fact that America's claims to it are based in no sense upon grounds of ethnography, but upon grounds of national defence and upon grounds geographically imposed by considerations of economic development.

The "unredeemed" European territory to which Italy lays claim may be divided for convenience of treatment into four territorial sections, of which the first comprises the Trentino and the Upper Adige. In each of the four divisions, the consideration of national defence is combined with the various other considerations of nationality, but as national defence is separately treated at length in a later section (cf. Part 1. Section *b.*),<sup>1</sup> this consideration will be but briefly touched upon in the four divisions of the present section.

### *Chapter 1.—Trentino and Upper Adige.*

The Upper Adige and the Trentino occupy the upper and middle basins of the Adige, an Italian river of about 250 miles in length, which has its sources in the Rhaetian Alps and empties its waters into the Gulf of Venice. The Upper Adige and the Trentino, though by Austria separated as administratively distinct, form geographically one region, of which the vital interests are geographically common. The Upper Adige covers 7,280 square kilometres, the Trentino 6,356 square kilometres. Together they contain about 600,000 inhabitants, of which some 410,000 are Italian by race, language and sentiment, and 190,000 German. By the possession of this region Austria, contrary to all natural laws, thrust a deep angular salient of its political boundaries like a wedge into the Italian territory of Lombardy and Venice, rendering impossible Italy's sound military defence, and gravely injuring the economic interests of both of the Upper Adige-Trentino region, and of the region of the Lombardo-Veneto. Geographically the most northern

---

<sup>1</sup> Not found in Department files.

point is the Vetta d'Italia (Top of Italy) 47°, 5', 30''; the most southern the Corno d'Acquilio, 45°, 40', 20''; to the east the Cornetto di Confine 29°, 59', 30'' (east of Ferro); to the west Monte Murterèl 28°, 3' (east of Ferro).

The purely Italian characteristics of this region are unmistakable. On the north it is bordered by the highest ridges of the Alps, the watershed which divides the streams flowing north and emptying their waters through the Danube into the Black Sea, from those flowing south, emptying into the Gulf of Venice and the Adriatic Sea; the division delineated by Nature is clear and absolute, the division between two worlds differing in physical aspects, climate and trade interests, and inhabited by two distinct races, distinct by blood, language, tradition, character and sentiment. The impressions of the traveller crossing the Alpine summits from the German side have been well described by one of the most fervid apostles of Italy's claims to this region: "Whether the traveller approach from France, or from Switzerland, or from the German and Slav countries, as soon as he has crossed the crest of the Alps, whether by tunnel or under the open sky, and begins to descend swiftly along the fast-flowing rivers, he feels the same certainty in his soul—This is Italy—. No sooner do the waters begin to flow to the south than the fair land discloses herself, beautiful as some supernatural vision. These are her vineyards and her flowers, her streams and her perfumes. The mountains rear themselves less loftily, the valleys descend like rays, the hills spread out towards the plain, the plain infinite and remote is lost to view as it stretches towards the Adriatic. And from this immense descent, from this flow of a thousand streams and rivers towards the Italian sea, there presents itself before ones eyes as before those of the mind, the unquestionable truth: The whole extent of the Adige is Italian territory, even though from its Alpine source to the hills of Verona the black and yellow banner of the Hapsburgs may wave above it."

*Military Defence.* In the possession of this strategic region by Austria lies the chief explanation of the long duration of the Triple Alliance—which was repeatedly renewed in absolute violation of the general feeling of the Italian people. Austria, a state of about fifty-one million inhabitants, would have been, even without the advantage of this unnatural domination of Italian territory, militarily much stronger than Italy, a nation of about thirty-six million inhabitants; but by the possession of this territory of the Upper Adige and the Trentino which contain numerous mountain passes leading down into the plains of Lombardy and the Veneto, Austria held the gates of Italy, and the latter was completely at her mercy. The first sound line of defence for Italy under these conditions was the Adige, and in case of a war single-handed against Austria she would have been

obliged at the outset to take up her position on this river, abandoning all of the Friuli and almost all of the Veneto, comprising altogether about 20,000 square kilometres containing 3,000,000 inhabitants—that is a fifteenth part of her territory and a twelfth part of her population. Italy, therefore, had only to choose between this perpetual peril of invasion and her position in the Triple Alliance.

The natural frontier of Italy to the north, that determined by Nature and offering the strongest line of military defence—strongest both because of its geographical conformation and because it is the shortest—is that which follows the highest ridge of the Alps, being, as has been said, the watershed dividing the German streams flowing to the north from the Italian streams flowing to the south; for the most part it is the boundary by which the Austrians have generally distinguished between the Nordtirol and the Südtirol. This natural frontier of Italy extends from Monte Murtaro (above Bormio di Valtellina) along the crest of the highest chain for a distance of about 240 kilometres to Monte Paterno and is pierced by three passes only, those of Rèsia (Reschen), the Brennero (Brenner) and Dobbiaco (Toblach)—and by five foot paths. From the point of view of military defence contrast this natural frontier with Italy's present political frontier, which breaks from the great chain at Monte Murtaro, descends in an irregular line to Lake Garda, almost to Verona, and then rambles off to the north and east along the lower ridges of the Venetian Alps, with innumerable corrugations, until it rejoins the great chain beneath Monte Paterno. This unfortunate political frontier, which is 370 kilometres in length, is pierced by forty-two passes and foot paths, among which are thirteen important passes: the Stelvio (above Bormio), Tonale (above Edolo), Ponte Caffaro (above Idro), Garda (above Peschiera), Borghetto (above Verona), Pian delle Fugazze (above Schio), Val d'Arsa (above Asiago), Primolano (above Bassano), Monte Cop-polo (above Fonzaso-Feltre), Caprile and Falcade (above Agordo), d'Alemagna and Monte Piano (above Pieve di Cadore). The reality of the perpetual menace which the possession of these numerous passes by a foreign power constituted against Italy was proved in May 1916, when Austria made her great Trentino offensive with half a million men, and barely missed breaking through into the Venetian plain in the rear of the Italian armies of the Isonzo.

Italy now claims in this region as a right her natural frontier of the great chain in the Upper Adige, which she has recovered by the valor of her armies—a frontier of 240 kilometres with only three great gates in the high Alps to defend, in place of the old insecure frontier of 370 kilometres with its thirteen great gates close upon the plain.

Under Monte Paterno this natural frontier which Italy claims, joins the existing political frontier of the Carnic Alps, and proceeds eastward towards the northern limit of Julian Venetia. For about seventy-five kilometres the existing political frontier coincides almost perfectly with the natural defensible frontier of the Carnic Alps, and only slight modifications would be required if this frontier should be retained; for the last twenty-five kilometres, however, beginning north-west of Moggio, the political frontier abandons the natural frontier (at the double pass of Meledis) and bends to the south-east leaving to Austria the whole of the upper valley of the Fella, with Malborghetto. But the discussion of this portion of Italy's northern frontier more properly belongs to the study of Julian Venetia (Part 1, section *a*, chapter 2.)<sup>8</sup> and to that of the general problem of national land defence (Part 1, section *b*, chapter 1.)<sup>8</sup>

It should be added here that some Italian military authorities argue that the Carnic Alps do not form the real limits of Italy, and claim that Italy's new frontier should be fixed farther north to coincide with the high ridge of the Tauern Alps, and should include the upper basin of the Drave as far as Kreuz Ech and the Conca di Tarvis. But this question may best be considered in the general study of national land defence.

*Population.* Of the Italian population of 410,000 in the Trentino and Upper Adige, about 370,000 inhabit the Trentino and about 40,000 the Upper Adige; in other words the population of the Trentino is almost exclusively Italian, whereas in the Upper Adige it is today only about one-fifth Italian. The situation in the Upper Adige is therefore not dissimilar to that of portions of Alsace-Lorraine, where German immigration and violence have partially usurped territory which is geographically non-German.\* Nor have Austrian methods in the Südtirol (Upper Adige-Trentino) differed substantially from German methods in Alsace-Lorraine. It should be kept in mind that Austria has had a free hand in this region for a century and has used her domination to Germanize in every manner possible, and to eliminate Italian blood and sentiment—and she has aggravated her methods with particular violence during the past ten years. She has allowed no Italian schools in bilingual cities and has absolutely deprived thousands of Italian children of even elementary education in many rural districts. She has violated her own constitution and prevented her subjects of Italian race from voicing their

<sup>8</sup> Not found in Department files.

\*Interesting studies have been made upon the Latin origin and character of the older German-speaking elements (Ladini) of the Upper Adige and also of the Nordtirol, as well as of portions of Switzerland, etc. Giulio Sironi, *La stirpe e la nazionalità nel Tirolo*. Milano, L. F. Cogliati, 1918. Giorgio Del Vecchio. *Il "Ladino" al bivio*. Roma, 1912. [Footnote in the original.]



claims of redress for their violated rights. If Italy were to adopt in the Upper Adige for ten years the methods used there by Austria during her hundred years of occupation, it is not an exaggeration to say that the German inhabitants of even the least Italian portion of that region would no longer be in a majority.

But taking the Upper Adige even as it is, Italy's claims to it appear to be perfectly valid. Geographically—for reasons of military defence and for necessities of economic life—the Upper Adige must be considered as one with the Trentino; and so considered the population of the entire region is more than two-thirds indisputably Italian—namely about 410,000 out of a total of 600,000.

If one institutes a comparison between these figures and those of Alsace-Lorraine the contrast is striking, for after nearly a half-century of German domination in the geographically French provinces of the Rhine, only a fourth, or at most a third of the population has remained French in language and customs.

A similar comparison might also be made between the Upper Adige-Trentino region and that of northern and western Bohemia.

*Language.* The language of the entire Trentino is Italian. Of the 13,477 Germans inhabiting this region, 5,000 inhabit the ten villages: Provés, Lauregno, S. Felice, Senale (in Val di Non), Tródena and Anterivo (in Val d'Avisio), Luserna (on the southern boundary close to the Sette Comuni Vicentini), and Fierozzo, Frassilongo and Palú (in the Alta Valle della Féršina). These German villages are all bilinguist, their inhabitants speaking Italian as well as their German dialect. The other 8,500 Germans are scattered throughout the region, being government officials, or soldiers, or persons dependent upon them for their living.

In the Upper Adige the prevailing language is German, although in several districts it is Italian, and in others the inhabitants are bilinguist. The Italian population is thus distributed, according to statistics compiled by Antonio Toniolo and published in the *Archivio per l'Alto Adige*, Vol. 11: in the city of Bolzano 5,370; in the Capitanato di Bolzano 11,916; in the Capitanato di Merano 7,732; in the Capitanato di Silandro 417; in the Capitanato di Brunico 5,908—a total of 32,000. The remaining 8,000 or 9,000 Italians are not Austrian citizens and are scattered throughout the region. To these 40,000 Italian inhabitants may be added some 15,000 Italian temporary emigrants which are not included in the preceding statistics, but which, prior to the war were employed for eight or nine months of each year in the Upper Adige.

*Industry and Trade.* The natural commercial outlet for the Trentino and Upper Adige is the Lombardo-Venetian plain; indeed the movement of trade for this mountain region has been geographically imposed by Nature with peculiar rigor. For the Upper Adige

one document may suffice to illustrate general trade conditions. In 1864 the Chamber of Commerce of Bolzano, traditionally the principal commercial organization of the whole region of the Upper Adige, voted to demand from the central government separation from the province of Innsbruck and union with the Veneto, its natural market. There was no political motive in the demand, for all the territory involved was then under Austrian rule; the motive was purely commercial and the conditions which inspired it were geographical—the same in 1864 as they are today, for geography does not change. Two years later the Venetian plain passed to the dominion of Italy, while the mountain region remained to Austria; political considerations thus entered to raise an artificial barrier—the unnatural Austro-Italian frontier of 1866—between the Upper Adige and its natural market and to obstruct commercial action and development; however, many of the products of the region, notwithstanding the difficulties artificially imposed, insisted upon finding their geographical outlet—the Veneto.

Principal among these products is lumber, which naturally follows the course of the rivers, all of them Italian rivers, on which it floats down to its geographically imposed market—the Lombardo-Venetian plain. Forests are among the richest resources of both the Upper Adige and the Trentino, covering nearly 40% of the territory of the former and 48% of that of the latter, whereas in Italy forests are relatively scarce and lumber is in great request. In the Trentino alone the annual production of lumber is valued at over four million crowns, almost all of which has been exported to Italy. Had not the Austrian government opposed obstinately every project of construction of roads and railways connecting the Trentino with the Lombardo-Veneto, production and importation could have been largely increased to the mutual advantage of both the mountain regions and of the Italian plain.

Cattle-raising, which is carried on as one of the most important interests in the Upper Adige and the Trentino, has always been closely allied with the interests of the rest of northern Italy, but during the last fifty years the unnatural Austro-Italian frontier and the grazing and commercial obstructions imposed by Austria have greatly hampered the cattle-raisers in their affairs. For centuries the graziers were accustomed in the hot season to drive their herds from the Lombardo-Venetian plain up into the mountains of the Trentino and the Upper Adige, and as the winter approached to bring them back again to the plain. By the artificial territorial division of 1866, and the consequent tariff and sanitary restrictions, Austria gravely injured the grazing interests of those regions—an injury which the annexation of the Trentino and the Upper Adige to Italy will now rectify for the future. In 1910 the Upper Adige

possessed 112,000 head of cattle, 75,000 sheep, 21,000 swine, 7,500 horses; the Trentino 98,000 head of cattle, 26,000 sheep, 38,000 goats, 27,000 swine, 9,000 horses; in the Trentino at this date the number of sheep and goats was less than half that possessed thirty years earlier. Grazing in these regions can be vastly augmented.

Another great benefit which annexation will secure to the Trentino and the Upper Adige is that of industrial development. Water power constitutes a source of immense wealth which under Austrian domination has been almost totally neglected. In the Upper Adige and the Trentino it reaches 43.5 horse power per square kilometer, which is the maximum of all the territory of the Alps. In Switzerland it reaches only 36 horse power. At present only 66,000 horse power is utilized in the Upper Adige and the Trentino together, while 494,000 remains to be employed. These figures are based upon Austrian statistics. In the past the firm and deliberate policy of Austria has been to obstruct through defective means of communication and in every other way possible the industrial development of this region, to the benefit of the other provinces of her Empire. An additional reason for this iniquitous policy was the aversion of the Austrian government to the creation of industrial centres which would establish masses of workmen close to her unnatural boundaries in Italy.

An increase in resources of water-power will be of great advantage to Italy, a country in which the lack of coal has always been a serious handicap to industrial development.

The wine-growing interests of the Upper Adige and the Trentino are most important. In the Alto Adige the average annual production of wine (1902-1911) was 328,000 hectolitres; in the Trentino the annual average (1907-1910) was 942,000 hectolitres. Annexation to Italy will greatly injure these interests unless immediate action is taken by the Italian government to facilitate exportation. The wine produced in this region is in considerable part of an inferior quality which has hitherto found a good market in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, but which could not compete with the finer wines in Italy.

On the other hand silk-growing will greatly benefit by the annexation to Italy, which has always been the great market for Trentino cocoons, of which the annual production has amounted in value to ten million crowns.

Fruit-growing interests are also important and these should find a market in Italy equal to that previously enjoyed in the Central Empires.

Mining resources are considerable in both the Upper Adige and the Trentino and the improved means of communication which this region should obtain from Italy, which has nothing to fear from their

construction, will certainly lead to an important revival of mining development, which was languishing under Austrian domination.

[Subenclosure 3—Memorandum]

## PART I.—ITALIAN CLAIMS

### SECTION c).—REQUIREMENTS OF FOREIGN COMMERCE

#### *Chapter 3).—Africa.*

The readjustment of colonial boundaries in Africa is a subject which during the progress of the war has been excluded from public discussion in all the Allied countries, as if by common consent. This general silence upon African post-bellum problems is in itself eloquent testimony to the difficulties which their solution is certain to encounter, difficulties which the Allies have wisely preferred to face after the defeat of the common enemy; upon African problems the Powers, in view of their individual interests often conflicting, are bound to disagree, and a general settlement can be reached only by mutual concessions.

Italy's colonial interests in Africa are in extent secondary to those of England and France, but as bearing upon her own future they are of vital importance to her; Italy's African interests are those of national defence, of equilibrium of power in the Mediterranean, and of economic development.

Italy's earliest ventures in African colonization were disastrous and they were so because they were in advance of their time, undertaken before the economic life of the nation was such as to require colonial expansion, before economic conditions were such as to ensure national support. Italy's colonial policy was a policy of national foresight and of faith in the future, but thirty-three years ago this policy was beyond the economic strength of the country and in advance of national opinion. It then seemed imperialistic; it was imperialistic except to the eye of faith; and imperialism did not then, as it does not now, meet with the approval of the liberty-loving Italian people.

But economic conditions have undergone a remarkable transformation in Italy within the last three decades. In the twenty years which preceded the occupation of Libya (1911) Italy made greater progress in foreign commerce than any other country in the world—the United States and Germany not excepted.

Her progress in sanitary improvements and regulations has been equally noteworthy and has, furthermore, exerted a profound influence upon social and economic conditions. In a half-century dating from 1863 the death-rate in Italy has been brought down from 3

per cent. to about 2 per cent., a decrease representing the saving of 250,000 lives annually. The natural effect of this enormous saving has been to bring about a much larger increase in the population of Italy in late years, the excess of births over deaths now amounting to about 400,000 a year.\* This increase has been such that the growth of Italy's economic resources has been unable to meet the consequent growth of labor, and extensive emigration has been the necessary result. In 1894 emigrants numbered 225,323 according to official statistics; in the three years 1911-1913, they averaged about 675,000; emigration tripled in twenty years.†

Italy claims that, as a nation which exports man-power on such a vast scale, she has a right to make provisions by which this current of emigration may be directed in part to territory under her own control, in order that she herself may share in the profit of her emigrants' industry. Colonization based on legitimate emigration is sound democratic national policy—not imperialism. The laborer brings prosperity to the country to which he devotes his energies; he does not exploit the land for an absentee investor, but he himself adds to its value by his own labor.

With profitable colonies in Africa possessed of rational political boundaries that will offer guarantees of sound economic development, Italy believes that she can retain for herself a part of her emigration, thereby vastly strengthening her own economic position, while at the same time benefiting and enriching the regions of Africa that come under her control. And in the democratic character of her colonization, in the importation into her colonies of her own man-power, she will notably differentiate her colonial policy from that of France and England. The possibilities of Italian colonization in North Africa may be judged from a glance at the population of the French colony of Tunis, where there were 109,000 Italians in 1911 against 46,000 Frenchmen.

But Italy's aspirations to a betterment of her colonial position in Africa are derived not only from necessities of emigration, but also from considerations imposed by her healthy economic development (cf. Part 1. Section c. Introduction),<sup>9</sup> and from the necessity of strengthening her naval defence on the south and of maintaining the balance of power in the Mediterranean. It is to be noted that a considerable portion of Italy's African claims calculated to secure these ends are only claims for the recovery of what she once already pos-

---

\* Cf. H. Nelson Gay. *Fifty years of Italian Independence. The Nineteenth Century*. January 1912. [Footnote in the original.]

† Cf. *Annuario Statistico Italiano*. Roma. 1911 (p. 22.) 1916 (p. 36.) [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>9</sup> Not found in Department files.

sessed in the earlier years of her colonial policy. The new territory requested adjoins the colonies already under her control, so that the result will be the logical consolidation of her African power. The following confidential Memorandum, which has been furnished to the writer for the use of the American peace delegates, under pledge of the strictest reserve and with the assurance that it represents not only the views of the Italian Minister of the Colonies, but also the official position of the Prime Minister and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sets forth clearly the imperative considerations of the balance of power; the figures given in this Memorandum also reveal the comparative moderation of Italy's claims.

For England the Mediterranean is a thoroughfare by which to reach her colonies and a highway for her commerce; for France the Mediterranean coast is one of her three bases for her sea-power; for Italy the Mediterranean is all, and she must see that the balance of power is maintained there and the liberty of the seas assured, or her own independence of action is lost.

As to the character of the colony of Libya, it should be borne in mind that Tripoli lies at the very threshold of Italy. From Syracuse the distance to Tripoli is the same as that to Rome and less than half of that to Turin; from Naples the distance to Tripoli is a little more than that to Turin. If the Tripolitania is eventually widely settled by Italians, this vast African territory will become almost as integral a part of the Kingdom of Italy as the islands of Sicily and Sardinia.

The proposed readjustment of the boundaries of Libya would add some 600,000 square kilometres to that colony, and about 50,000 inhabitants; while the acquisition of Giubaland, English Somaliland (which has been neglected and half-abandoned by the English), French Somaliland and the Farsan islands would further add to Italy's possessions 309,000 square kilometres and about 677,500 inhabitants. In all Italy would hold in Africa 2,667,609 square kilometres occupied by about 2,305,500 inhabitants. This area is little more than a quarter of that held by the French before the war; it is less than half of that held by England before the war and less than a quarter of that which England will hold if she retains possession of Germany's African colonies captured in the course of the war; the African population of Italy's colonies would be less than a fifteenth of that of either the English or the French colonies before the war.

Furthermore the boundaries established by the proposed rectifications are those delimited by geographical features and by considerations imperatively imposed by trade routes, and it is claimed that they will eliminate the causes for future international disputes and conflicts.

*Section c).—Chapter 3).—Confidential Memorandum.*

Italy's aspirations for a rational settlement of her colonial possessions in the revision of the map of Africa which will be made at the Peace Conference, are supported by a combination of claims closely united with one another:

1. Upon rights existing prior to the war.
2. Upon rights created by the war.
3. Upon necessities consequent upon the war.

## 1.

The rights existing prior to the war are based upon a series of diplomatic agreements undertaken in furtherance of Italy's colonial programme which has been imposed by the rapid economic development of New Italy and which was first conceived by a great, clear-sighted statesman, Francesco Crispi.

a). In the formation of our two East African colonies, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and in our action in Ethiopia, the first steps were taken with the convention signed on November 15, 1869 by the Sultans of Assab and by Prof. Giuseppe Sapeto for the acquisition of that territory; with the law relating to Assab of July 5, 1882; with the occupation of Massowah of February 5, 1885; with the convention of the protectorate over the Sultan of Aussa of December 9, 1888, approved by the law of April 10, 1890; with the assumption of the protectorate over the Sultans of Obbia<sup>10</sup> and the Migiurtini<sup>11</sup> (Uadi Nogal) of February 8 and April 7, 1889 notified to the signatory Powers of the General Act of Berlin on May 16 and November 19, 1889; with the notification to the Powers on November 19, 1889 of the assumption of the protectorate over the stretches of East African coast lying between the ports recognized in 1886 as belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar (the ports of Benadir);<sup>12</sup> with the convention of August 12, 1892<sup>13</sup> for the concession to Italy on the part of the Sultan of Zanzibar of the ports of Brava, Merca, Mogadiscio and Uarsceich (Benadir), the final epilogue of long negotiations from 1886 to 1891 with the Sultan of Zanzibar, with England and with the British Society of East Africa. These ports with the territories annexed were secured for Italy by the Italo-British accord of London of January 13, 1905,<sup>14</sup> approved by the law of July 2, 1905.

<sup>10</sup> E. Hertslet, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3d ed. (London, 1909), vol. III, p. 1124.

<sup>11</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXI, p. 133.

<sup>12</sup> Hertslet, *The Map of Africa*, vol. III, p. 1125.

<sup>13</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXV, p. 630.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. xcvi, p. 129.

The concluding diplomatic steps regarding Ethiopia were initiated by Italy with the signing of the treaty of Uccialli of May 2, 1889<sup>15</sup> and with the communication of Art. 17 of that treaty providing for the Italian protectorate over Ethiopia, to the Powers who had signed the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885 in accordance with Art. 34 of that Act. The Powers duly acknowledged receipt of the notification.

These diplomatic acts were followed by the protocols exchanged between Italy and England of March 24, and April 15, 1891<sup>16</sup> and of May 5, 1894<sup>17</sup> for the delimitation of their respective spheres of influence in East Africa, in the regions of the Red Sea, the Sudan, the Indian Ocean (Giuba), Ethiopia and the Gulf of Aden; by these protocols the entire region of Ethiopia was recognized as within Italy's sphere of influence.

The Italo-Britannic protocols mentioned were the result of about a quarter of a century of perseverance in colonial and diplomatic effort which had been directed to the end of bringing all Ethiopia, with the consent of England and France which had duly acknowledged receipt of our communication regarding the protectorate, within the sphere of Italy's action, reuniting Abyssinia in a politico-economic whole with Eritrea to the north and with Italian Somaliland to the south; another objective was that of obtaining the occupation of the Sudanese province of the Taca (Cassala).

But aside from Italy's historical claims upon this territory on colonial and diplomatic grounds, this portion of East Africa included within the line established by the above mentioned protocols from Ras Casar to the mouths of the Giuba, may well be considered Italian Africa because of the immense contribution to the knowledge of this and contiguous regions made by Italian explorers—of the regions of Abyssinia, of those of the peninsula of the Somali, of those of the sources of the Nile, of the vast regions of the Sobat, the White Nile, the Lakes Rodolfo and Stefania, and the territory to the south of Ethiopia.

It will suffice to name only the most noted: Guglielmo Massaia, Giuseppe Sapeto, Orazio Antinori, Giovanni Miani, Carlo Piaggia, Romolo Gessi, Pellegrino Matteucci, Giuseppe Maria Giulietti, Alfonso Maria Manari, Gaetano Casati, Gustavo Bianchi, Antonio Cecchi, Giovanni Chiarini and last of all Vittorio Bottego whose two great expeditions of 1893 and 1896 have solved the last three great problems of African geography which directly interest Ethiopia, namely the exploration and study of the courses of the Giuba, the Omo (middle and lower) and of the Sobat.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXI, p. 733.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXIII, p. 19.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXVI, p. 55.



All this great work, colonial, diplomatic, geographico-scientific, conducted with firm faith and great sacrifices was abruptly interrupted by the unfortunate battle of Adua on March 1, 1896 which took place at the very time that Vittorio Bottego was on the Dawa carrying forward the geographical conquest of the south-western regions of Ethiopia.

By the treaty of peace of October 26, 1896 with Ethiopia<sup>18</sup> Italy agreed to the abrogation of the Treaty of Ucciali and proclaimed the independence of Ethiopia as a sovereign and independent state.

By the Italo-Egyptian convention of December 25, 1897 the fortress of Cassala was ceded to Egypt.

The agreement of London of December 13, 1906 between Italy England and France<sup>19</sup> while guaranteeing the integrity of Ethiopia, placed it under the patronage of these three Powers which have undertaken to safeguard its interests; France its railway interests (the Gibuti-Addis-Abeba railway); England its interests on the waterways flowing into the Nile; Italy the economic development of the two Italian colonies of Ethiopia—Eritrea and Somaliland.

This is what remains to Italy after almost half a century of colonial work.

b). The Franco-British declaration of London of March 21, 1899,<sup>20</sup> supplementing the Anglo-French convention of June 14, 1898,<sup>21</sup> is the epilogue of all the preceding conventions relative to the hinterland of Libya.

This declaration, dividing the hinterland between England and France to the exclusion of Italy, ignores our Mediterranean interests; and although subsequently under political necessity it has been implicitly accepted by us, nevertheless justice demands that out of regard for the economic life of our two Libyan colonies there should be re-established, at least in part, the equilibrium of interests which has been gravely prejudiced to our injury.

The declaration of London of March 21, 1899 reopened in Italy the wound, not yet healed, that had been inflicted by the treaty of Bardo of May 12, 1881,<sup>22</sup> by which the protectorate over Tunis was given to France.

## 2.

It is equitable that among the nations which have borne the burdens of the war together, any advantages accruing from the war should be distributed in proportion to the contribution which each according to his own resources has brought to the common victory.

<sup>18</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXVIII, p. 481.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XCIX, p. 486.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XCI, p. 55.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXII, p. 247.

On this basis there can be no question as to Italy's rights as derived from her conduct at the outbreak of the great war and during its progress: *ex facto oritur jus*. A simple outline of events will suffice. At the outbreak of the world war Italy on August 1, 1914 declared her neutrality, and on May 24, 1915 herself entered the conflict; on every occasion she has, within the limits of her power, put forth her full strength in assistance of the Allies, particularly in the most difficult phases of the war; our fleet, by preventing the Austrian fleet from issuing forth from the Adriatic Sea, has indirectly contributed to the safe transport of troops and supplies along the African coasts; the occupation of Libya carried out by Italy at a heavy sacrifice of blood and treasure and maintained in the face of a Tripolitan rebellion fomented by Turks and Germans, has prevented the enemy from manoeuvring from an otherwise secure Mediterranean base against all three of the Allies—Italy, France and England; the effective watch kept by Italy in Eritrea and in Somaliland on the confines of Ethiopia which was a centre of Austro-Turco-German agitation and intrigue, notwithstanding the *coup d'état* of September 27, 1917 which overthrew the Ethiopian sovereign Ligg Jasu, prevented hostile action undertaken against the Allies by Ethiopia and Arabia from having dangerous consequences—and this while France and England were fighting also in Africa in order to possess themselves of Germany's colonies there, and while Italy had on her own borders the whole Austrian army.

### 3.

The grave problems which will present themselves immediately after the war should also be considered. If we wish that the peace which follows the present terrible conflict shall be just, equitable and lasting and shall correspond to the high ethical ends for which President Wilson has declared himself, it is necessary for us to foresee and avoid all possible future disagreements among the Allies of today, in order that these may remain allies of tomorrow, reestablishing upon new foundations future reciprocal good relations of peace and alliance in Africa as well as in Europe, eliminating all elements which may give rise to disagreements and conflicts.

In order to reach this end the most efficacious means is that of rendering impossible any clash of interests even between friendly and allied powers, and this may be done through the establishment of colonial possessions having clearly defined boundaries and constituting a homogeneous whole, organic and independent.

As France in the possession of Morocco, Algiers and Tunis has one uninterrupted zone in the Mediterranean which extends also to the Atlantic and the Gulf of Guinea; and as England possesses a

vast unbroken zone also, beginning with Egypt in the Mediterranean and extending (thanks to the English conquest of German East Africa) without interruption to Cape Colony; and as both of these Powers will still further round out their African dominions; thus it is only right that Italy also should, as well as her Allies, secure for herself an analogous, sound colonial position.

#### 4.

Let us examine now the practical means by which Italy may obtain such a position in her African possessions.

a). The Italian colonies of East Africa, Eritrea and Somaliland (including the protectorates of North Somaliland, that is of Obbia and of the Migiurtini) are situated respectively to the north and south of Ethiopia which in itself constitutes the great economic hinterland. Contiguous to Eritrea to the south of the province is the French protectorate of the coast of the Somali (Gibuti); contiguous to Italian Somaliland (protectorates) to the north is English Somaliland (Zeila); and contiguous to Italian Somaliland (Benadir) to the south is Giubaland (Chisimajo).

In consequence Ethiopia is shut in to the west and south-west by the line of the Anglo-Italian protocols of March 24 (mouths of the Giuba-Italian Somaliland) and of April 15, 1891 (Ras Casar-Eritrea), and to the north, east and south-east by Eritrea, by French Somaliland, by English Somaliland and by Italian Somaliland. It is therefore clear that in order to make a homogeneous, organic, independent block of Italy's possessions around Ethiopia, it is necessary only that the protectorate of French Somaliland which extends along the coast, together with English Somaliland and Giubaland be added to Italy's two colonies, and that Ethiopia be put under the exclusive influence of Italy.

From France and England would be requested the revision of the convention of London of December 13, 1906 for Ethiopia with return to the dispositions of the Italo-Britannic protocols of March 24 and April 15, 1891 and of May 5, 1894, which put Ethiopia within the exclusive sphere of influence of Italy which would naturally respect Ethiopia's integrity.

From France would be requested the cession of the French protectorate over the Somaliland coast (Gibuti) and of the railway to Addis Abeba; and from England the cession of English Somaliland and Giubaland.

Special agreements with France and England would fix respectively Italy's obligations for the cession of the railway Gibuti-Addis-Abeba, for facilitations to France in the establishment of a French naval station on the route to Madagascar and to Tonkin, for guarantees to England regarding the Ethiopian waters flowing into the Nile, and

for the regulation of all other necessary relations between the three Powers.

France and England would find special compensations for themselves in the political readjustment of other regions in Africa.

The acquisition by Italy of the territory of Gibuti and of the only railway penetrating into Ethiopia, Gibuti-Addis-Abeba, will furnish the fulcrum of the readjustment of Italy's colonial interests in East Africa; for Gibuti is the only port by which supplies of arms and ammunition can enter Ethiopia and it is therefore, as it has been hitherto, a permanent peril for our two colonies, Eritrea and Somaliland (especially for the first of these) and for the English possessions of the Sudan, and a perpetual cause of friction for Italy and also for England with Ethiopia itself and with France, and hence a permanent source, present and future, of disturbance in the good relations between the Allied Powers, as well as an impediment to the free development of our colonization, and to the economic growth of our two colonies within their boundaries and beyond in the territory of Ethiopia.

By the acquisition of Giubaland Italy would come into possession of Chisimajo, the only port, properly so called, on the long stretch of its possessions on the Indian Ocean from Guardafui to the mouths of the Giuba, namely about 1,700 kilometres, a port which, indeed, as early as 1886 was ceded by the Sultan of Zanzibar to Italy, but which was later lost through the complications of political events.

By the acquisition of British Somaliland, and thereby of the ports of Zeila, Bulhar and Dongareta, Italy would complete her possessions, controlling all the outlets from Abyssinia together with Gibuti, Oboc, Tagiura (now French) Massaua, Assab, Alula, Obbia and the ports of Benadir (Italian) and Chisimajo (now English).

b). Italy being one of the Mussulman Powers bordering on the Red Sea cannot remain indifferent to the question of the equilibrium of power in the Red Sea and of the political conditions of Arabia which faces Eritrea.

We ask therefore that no Power shall occupy Arabia, that commerce and commercial penetration be free, that the Holy Places of Islam in Higiaz be in Mussulman hands and that the Farsan islands upon the coast of the Asir be occupied by Italy.

c). In Northern Africa (Libya) that there may be reestablished, to a minimum degree, the equilibrium which was disturbed to the damage of Italy by the Anglo-French agreements of March 21, 1899 regarding the Libyan hinterland, and that our two colonies there be given a chance to breathe, we ask for the benefit of Tripolitania in order to establish communications between the three Italian oases, Ghadames, Ghat and Tummo, that France grant to us the principal caravan route between Ghadames and Ghat, free passage over the

caravan route Ghadames—Fort Polignac—Ghat, possession of the route from Ghat to Tummo; and the right to establish consulates and agencies in the zones occupied by France.

From England we ask, for the benefit of Cyrenaica, a rational boundary line on the side of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan—a boundary starting from Ras Gebel Sollum and which shall include within the territory of Cyrenaica not only the oasis of Cufra already recognized by England as pertaining to Italy, but also the oasis of Giarabub, which is now claimed by Egypt notwithstanding the fact that it contains the Holy Places of the Senussi brotherhood which has its seat in Cyrenaica.

5.

France is a country of about forty million inhabitants occupying an area of 536,464 square kilometres; England (The United Kingdom) is a country of about forty-six million inhabitants occupying an area of 314,433 square kilometres; Italy contains about thirty-six million inhabitants occupying an area of 286,610 square kilometres. The simple statement of these figures will be sufficient to make it clear that Italy's African possessions are altogether inferior to what she should have in proportion to her own area and population; even before the conquest of Germany's colonies, French possessions in Africa covered an area of 9,253,084 square kilometres with a population of about 35,590,000; English possessions (exclusive of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) 5,676,679 square kilometres with a population of about 36,430,000; Italian possessions 1,758,609 square kilometres with a population of about 1,578,000.

With the addition of the new territory which would come to Italy through the acquisition of French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Giubaland and the Farsan islands and through the rectification of the borders of Libya, Italy's increase of territory would amount to about 909,000 square kilometres with a population of about 725,500, making Italy's African total 2,667,609 square kilometres with 2,305,500 inhabitants—figures which indicate an enormous disproportion in comparison with those of France and England. This disproportion would become even more accentuated by the annexation of Germany's colonies by these two Powers. England by the acquisition of the Togo and of the Camerun in part, of German South-west Africa and German East Africa would, if one includes Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (and if one excludes the populations of the Camerun and the Togo which cannot be estimated) reach an African colonial area of 10,787,279 square kilometres with a population of 58,680,000.

France with a part of the Togo and of the Camerun, of which the population cannot be estimated, would reach an area of 9,975,084 square kilometres with a population of 35,590,000.

The difference in possessions in favor of France and of England when compared with Italy shows France in possession of 7,307,475 square kilometres in Africa more than Italy with 33,284,500 inhabitants in excess of those dwelling in Italy's possessions; whereas England's possessions surpass Italy's by 8,119,670 square kilometres and 56,374,500 inhabitants. These figures are approximate, but very eloquent.

## 6.

Given these facts, and without taking into consideration the advantages to be derived by France and England through other extensions of their territories in Asia, the solution which Italy proposes—namely some slight advantages for Libya and for its free development, together with the union of French Somaliland and of English Somaliland and Giubaland to its two colonies of Eritrea and Somalia, and the exclusive sphere of influence in Ethiopia for Italy—is seen to be for the most part no more than a just revendication of long years of colonial activities and of earlier diplomatic agreements laboriously secured; it provides for a logical political and economic colonial settlement, eliminating for the future all causes of jealousy such as has been several times exhibited by France in the past, and removing possibilities of conflict and disagreement between the allied Powers in Africa; furthermore it permits Italy, a nation possessed of a rapidly increasing population, to consolidate its resources, procuring for itself the necessary raw materials, augmenting its production, acquiring its own economic independence and the military security of its colonies.

"It provides in general for a territorial settlement of Italy's colonial dominions within the geographical limits best adapted to the economic development of its present colonies, and it provides guarantees against the territorial expansion of other Powers such as would compromise the development and safety of Italy's colonies."

This is the programme of Italian public opinion.

If this programme should not be realized, Italy, after her colossal sacrifices made for the war, and after the treasures of blood and of money expended in Africa, would come out of the conflict reduced in strength and deprived of the means for developing the potent energies of her national life, which counts little more than half a century but which looks with deep faith to the future.

A solution of "imperialism" with an appetite for dominion is not asked, but simply an equitable solution of equilibrium required by the necessities of life, of development, of lasting peace—a solution which will permit Italy to labor and to prosper without doing injury to anyone.

865.01/1 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 14, 1918—11 p. m.

[Received November 15—12:21 p. m.]

2353. Learn that Italy has in contemplation creation of 5 new provinces, Dalmatia, Trieste, Trentino, Gorizia, Bolzano. They may have already matured plans.

NELSON PAGE

763.72119/2623½

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to my letter of November 12, 1918, I have again been requested by Mr. Gay to forward to you the enclosed memorandum relating to Fiume, which I do with much pleasure.

Mr. Gay informs me that he feels sure this memorandum referring to the strained relations between Italians and Jugo Slavs in the City of Fiume will be of immediate interest to you.

Always [etc.]

THOS. NELSON PAGE

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Supplied by Mr. H. Nelson Gay*

## PART I.—ITALIAN CLAIMS

## SECTION a).—COMPLETION OF NATIONALITY

*Chapter 3).—Fiume*

*Treaty of London.* The question of the future of Fiume is one of the most complex and most delicate which will be presented at the Peace Conference. The population of the city in an overwhelming majority is Italian by blood, language, character and sentiment. But out of regard for the economic necessities of another proposed nationality, Italy renounced her rights to Fiume in the Treaty of London of 1915.<sup>23</sup> At that time Russia advocated the creation of two nationalities of Slavs which would each require an economic outlet on the Adriatic Sea; one of these was to have consisted, roughly speaking, of the catholic Slavs, of which Croatia would have furnished the major region with Fiume as its port; the other,

<sup>23</sup> Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915.*

consisting of southern Slavs including Servia, was to have its ports in the Southern Adriatic.

*Changed Situation.* Today, however, the readjustment of European nationalities is proposed in quite a different combination, providing for the creation of a united Jugo-Slav state, to which the possession of Fiume is no longer essential as an outlet in the Adriatic; the proposed Jugo-Slav state, which will include Croatia, will possess an abundance of other ports in this same sea, notably Spalato and Cattaro, which will be more than sufficient to care for all the commercial needs toward which the most sanguine Jugo-Slav can aspire. It would seem, therefore, to be no longer necessary to violate the great national principle of ethnography in the case of Fiume. This is the point of view of the vast majority of the inhabitants of Fiume, who protest against being sacrificed without reason to what they claim can now be considered only as Jugo-Slav imperialism. Their spokesman is the delegate plenipotentiary of the city of Fiume, Doctor Gino Antoni, who after an interview with the Italian Prime Minister Orlando has sent out through him the following note to the Governments of the Allies:

"I beg Your Excellency to communicate and explain to the Governments of the Allies the following declarations.

At this moment of its liberation from the Hungarian Government the City of Fiume with its territory, which for centuries by statutory right has constituted a *corpus separatum* of the crown of Santo Stefano, declares through its legitimate representatives—the municipality and the national council—its own autonomy and independence.

And under the protection of that principle by which the future settlement of peoples must be made, according to the articles of the programme set forth by the President of the United States of America, namely the principle that each people is free to dispose of its own destinies, Fiume has determined to unite herself to her Mother Country, Italy.

At the same time she demands from the Italian Government that during the present period of transition there be afforded to Fiume the protection necessary to effectively safeguard her institutions and her national rights."

Doctor Antoni received his mandate as plenipotentiary of Fiume by solemn vote of the municipality and of the national council of the city, and his credentials have been accepted by the Italian Prime Minister Orlando. Subsequently on November 13, in company with Doctor Antonio Vio, mayor of Fiume, Andrea Bellen, ex-vice-mayor of Fiume, and several other notabilities of the city he has been officially received in Campidoglio by Prince Colonna, mayor of Rome. On this occasion Mayor Vio made the following declaration—referring to the Roman origin of Fiume:

"Mr. Mayor. The Wolf which nursed Romulus and Remus gave life also to our Fiume, now reborn to liberty. Upon the Campidoglio



I repeat our oath: *Fiume shall be Italian*. Let this oath sworn by us before the Mayor of Rome be our oath sworn before Italy and before the World."

Mayor Colonna replied: "Your oath solemnly pronounced here in Campidoglio, before Rome and before Italy, I receive with the heart and faith of an Italian and a Roman, confident in the justice of the rights of nationality, which the blood shed on the fields of battle render[s] today sacred and inviolable for all civilized nations."

*Juridical Position of Fiume.* These firm and passionate declarations of the population of Fiume at this critical hour gain additional significance when viewed in the light of the city's history. The origin of Fiume (the ancient Tarsatica) dates from the times of the Roman Empire and marks the eastern boundary of Roman Italy, as is shown by a vallum of which the ruins still remain. The city and its territory have never belonged integrally to Croatia, and only for nineteen years, from 1848 to 1867, were they subjected forcibly against their will to Croatian domination. In 1766 Fiume, which was always a *libero comune italiano* (from 1526 a free port) was annexed by the Empress Maria Theresa to Hungary through Croatia; but only three years later, in consequence of fiery protests from the inhabitants of Fiume, the imperial diploma of annexation was modified to the effect that Fiume be annexed directly to Hungary as *corpus separatum*; and as such, almost as a state within a state, the city has remained until this present day,\* when at last it has been able to break every connection with Hungary, and declare itself entirely independent (October 30, 1918).

*Revolution.* The events of the past few days have been rapid and dramatic. During the night of October 28 the Hungarian authorities fled from Fiume. On the morning of the 30th. a Croatian government established itself at Fiume taking possession of the city in the name of the National Council of Zagabria which three days before had arbitrarily declared Fiume an inalienable part of the new Jugo-Slav state (without Fiume's consent). On that same day the Italians of Fiume in open revolt against the Croatian government

---

\*According to the preamble of the Statuto signed in 1872: "Until the relations between the internal administration of the city, of the port and of the district of Fiume (*separatum sacrae regni coronae corpus*) shall be definitely regulated by a law framed for the purpose, the present Statuto shall remain in force." The law contemplated was never agreed upon and the Statuto therefore continued to hold until October 1918.

Paragraph 3 of the Statuto provided that: "Since Fiume forms a separate corpus annexed to the crown of Santo Stefano, its boundaries can be altered only by a law to which Fiume shall first give its adhesion."

Paragraph 127 provided that: "The present Statuto shall be revised or modified only with the knowledge of the representatives of the free city of Fiume and of its district."

The juridical position of Fiume as a *corpus separatum* is therefore beyond all question. *Statuto della libera città di Fiume e del suo distretto*. Fiume, Emidio Mohovich, 1872. [Footnote in the original.]

that had been imposed upon them, issued the following Proclamation announcing the voluntary annexation of the city to the Kingdom of Italy. This Proclamation was prepared on the 29th. by a National Italian Committee consisting of 250 citizens representing all parties and all classes; on the 30th. it was approved in solemn session by the municipality and that afternoon acclaimed by a monster procession (estimated at 20,000 people) which paraded the streets carrying Italian banners:

*Proclamation:* "The Italian National Council of Fiume, assembled this day in full session, declares that by that right through the exercise of which all peoples have risen to national independence and liberty, the City of Fiume which has hitherto been a *corpus separatum* constituting a national Italian commune, now assumes the peoples' right of auto-decision.

Basing its action upon this right the National Council hereby proclaims Fiume united to the Mother Country, Italy.

The Italian Council considers as provisional the condition of affairs which dates from October 29, 1918, and places its decision under the protection of America, mother of liberty, awaiting the sanction of Fiume's action by the Peace Congress.

For the National Council of Fiume

Fiume, October 30, 1918.

The Executive Committee:

Dott. Antonio Grossich, Dott. Silvino Gigante, Giovanni Schittar, Dott. Elpidio Springhetti, Adolfo Gotthardi, Dott. Salvatore Bellasich, Annibale Blau, Francesco Codrich, Dott. Lionello Lenaz, Dott. Isidoro Garofolo. ["]

This Proclamation was issued, it should be borne in mind, before the completion of Italy's great victories over the armies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was carried to Trieste overland by patriots of Fiume at great personal risk, and from Trieste to Venice by these same men by sea under cannon fire.

At the urgent request brought by these Fiumani a small Italian naval squadron under Admiral Renier left Venice at once for Fiume with orders to "protect Italians and the interests of Italy". This squadron has since remained in the port of Fiume, while Jugo-Slav troops occupy the city. The situation is very strained; the Italian flag has been insulted by the Slavs, but afterward saluted by them under pressure from the Italian admiral; the Jugo-Slav flag has been torn down by the Fiumani, and then raised again with proper honors. Both Italians and Slavs, conscious of the fact that the eyes of the world are fixed upon all such delicate international situations as theirs, and that acts of violence and indiscretion will prejudice the future claims of those who commit them, are both making strenuous efforts at moderation—efforts for the continuation of which every care should be exercised.

*Population.* Twenty years ago eighty per cent. of the population of Fiume and its territory was Italian. In 1912, according to Hungarian statistics, which certainly do not err in favor of Italy, fifty-eight per cent. of the population was Italian, namely 30,000 in a population of 52,000; of the remaining forty-two per cent. 7,000 were Hungarians, 13,000 Slavs (namely Croatians, Servians, Slovenes and Slovaks) and 2,000 of miscellaneous nationalities.

In 1880 the Hungarians numbered but 379; the recent rapid increase in their numbers has been largely due to the importation of government employees, and to the adoption of various other artificial means to which the Hungarian government had recourse in its efforts to Hungarianize the city. The Hungarians in Fiume are not a stable but a shifting population.

The Slav population is also in very considerable part a growth of recent years, particularly of the last ten years. The Slavs are employed largely in the menial occupations, being longshore-men, cab-drivers, servants, unskilled workmen, etc. But very few of them vote in the elections (perhaps one hundred in all); many of them have not taken out papers of citizenship; hardly any have an interest in civic affairs; the Slavs feel and represent little indeed of the civic life of Fiume.

*Language.* The language generally spoken in the city is Italian—the accent resembling the Venetian. Both Hungarian and Slav inhabitants of Fiume are for the most part bilinguals and speak Italian.

*Economic Considerations.* The economic life of Fiume is vigorous and rapidly increasing: in 1911 its port imports amounted to 184,928,228 crowns in value, and its exports to 185,884,954 crowns. Of the exports a value of 25,945,751 crowns went to Italy, that is an amount more than double that sent to any other country. In imports Italy stood third on Fiume's list, being surpassed by the East Indies and the United States.

In contrast with these figures are those of Croatia's portion of the total commercial transactions of Fiume—imports and exports together; in 1912 Croatia's portion amounted to only four per cent. of the total.

A very important commercial consideration in the future destiny of Fiume is that of its rivalry with Trieste. If both cities are held by the same country this rivalry can be justly regulated to the advantage of the two ports themselves and to the hinterland which they both serve, namely to German Austria, Bohemia, Hungary and the Jugo-Slavs. But if they are held by two different states, a commercial war between them, with differential railway rates etc. will be inevitable and permanent, and will be a source of future inter-

national irritation. The two cities have been well described as being from an economic point of view, one and indivisible.

*Island of Veglia.* With the destiny of Fiume is bound up that of the Island of Veglia, with which its local commerce is closely associated, and of which the population is 86 per cent. Italian.

763.72119/2624½

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

ROME, November 15, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing you herewith a copy of a letter which I have just sent to Colonel House relating to the present situation of Italy, regarding the other side of the Adriatic, especially with respect to the City of Fiume, which you will remember was left out of the London Pact by Baron Sonnino who afterwards, as I informed you, claimed considerable credit for his courage in relinquishing a part of "Italy's territory."

I am sending you a telegram giving succinctly the steps by which Fiume declared itself an Italian city.<sup>24</sup> At present the town is held by the Croats, while the harbor is held by an Italian squadron under Admiral Renier and both the Italian and the Jugo-Slav flags are flying in the town. The question as to whether or not this somewhat critical situation will result in a clash will be settled long before this letter reaches you.

I will keep you duly informed telegraphically of everything relating to this Italo-Jugo-Slav-Franco-Serb question.

Always,

Yours sincerely,

THOS. NELSON PAGE

[Enclosure]

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Special Representative (House)*

[ROME,] November 15, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: I am sending you by this pouch reports made to me daily since the tenth instant by Mr. Gino C. Speranza, who is now attached to this Embassy, which he terms "Daily Italian Political Notes," and which are made up in part from the leading Italian papers and in part from his knowledge of the situation here, obtained through many sources.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> See telegrams No. 2363, Nov. 16, 1918, 11 a. m., and No. 2376, Nov. 18, 1918, 11 p. m., from the Ambassador in Italy, vol. II, pp. 294 and 296.

<sup>25</sup> No enclosures with file copy of this letter. The "Daily Italian Political Notes" for Nov. 13, 14, and 15, 1918, filed separately under file No. 763.72/12510, are here printed as subenclosures.

Speranza has been doing work of this kind for the Embassy for over a year. He is an American gentleman whose father was an Italian, and was for years a professor at Columbia University and, as I recall it, at Yale also. He is a writer of ability and a close and thoughtful student of Italian politics, and although I do not always agree with him in his views, and deductions, I always respect his views and know that they are those of a man who is not only thoroughly reliable but in a certain way better informed, perhaps, on these subjects than any other American in Italy. I may add that he is as absolutely American in every respect as you or I.

So much by way of introduction.

The most interesting elements in the situation here, since the signing of the armistice, are the, perhaps not unnatural, but certainly very changed tone of the Italian press regarding Italy's claims and rights along the northern and eastern Adriatic, and a certain tone which I will not term imperialistic, but has a tendency in that direction; secondly, the sub-current of feeling against France because of her alleged opposition to Italian ideas regarding the regions mentioned and her alleged part in stirring up opposition to Italy therein. It is said by many persons here that France instigated the Jugo-Slavs along the eastern Adriatic to seize the Austrian ships and mount their flags on them; to organize Jugo-Slav municipalities in cities along that coast and declare themselves units of the Jugo-Slav Government in process of formation, or as they claim, actually formed, and in general to resist Italy.

Without undertaking to go into the merits of what territories will be eventually assigned to one or the other, it is not unnatural that the Italians should feel that the sudden change within twenty-four hours on the part of a lot of Austrian subjects who were engaged in warfare against Italy to a body who termed themselves Allies and take possession not only of ships but of important points which must fall immediately into Italy's hands as the result of her victories, is not wholly a patriotic move, but is also a political move to deprive her of the fruits of her victories.

On the other hand, the Italian idea, as expressed in the public press here with more and more openness and resolution, is certainly for a greater expansion on the part of Italy than had formerly been openly promulgated. I believe that it is claimed that they are only asking now what was accorded to Italy by the secret Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, with the exception of Fiume, which they now claim as coming within the principle of auto-decision, because Fiume has declared in favor of Italy as her mother country.

'The press has been quite full of "the revolution" at Fiume by which that City has returned to Italy.

The facts relating to this matter are being set forth in a paper prepared by Mr. H. Nelson Gay<sup>26</sup> which will go forward in this pouch and which will give a careful and full account of the episode and of the situation there at present, tintured perhaps somewhat by Italian predilection. Succinctly, the facts appear to be that a Committee terming itself the National Committee of Fiume, consisting of some 250 Italians by race prepared a proclamation on the 29th of October which was ratified on the 30th at the municipality, which it appears has always been an Italian institution. Five young Irredenti Italians left that night for Trieste by automobile, arriving before Trieste had declared itself for Italy. There they obtained a tug and motor boat and proceeded to Venice where they duly arrived after having been fired on, it being supposed that they were Austrians. At Venice they obtained an audience with the Italian Chief of Staff, Admiral Thaon de Revel, from whom they requested assistance and protection, which was granted and an Italian squadron was immediately sent under Admiral Renier to Fiume, where it was received, according to report, with tremendous enthusiasm. The squadron is still in the port while the town is in the hands of Jugo-Slavs with a Croatian governor to whom the Hungarian governor turned over such authority as he could when he left. The Italian flag was torn down but was afterwards, on the demand of the Italian Admiral, replaced and saluted by the Jugo-Slavs. The Jugo-Slav flag was in turn torn down by Italians but this also was afterwards replaced with due honors by order of the Italian Admiral. I am informed that both sides are endeavoring to act with moderation and in such a way as not to precipitate a crash. The Italian Committee, appointed there a sort of a delegate plenipotentiary, who was also given authority by the municipality of Fiume to come to Rome representing that city and after visiting General Diaz he came to Rome and has been received by Premier Orlando and the *Sindico* of Rome, Don Prospero Colonna, at the Campidoglio, where speeches were exchanged declaratory of the resolution of Fiume to become an integral part of Italy and of Italy to accept this crown.

On yesterday I sent you a copy of a telegram sent to Washington<sup>27</sup> stating that the Italian Chief of Staff, Admiral Thaon de Revel, has requested the American, French, English and Italian fleets to send ships to Spalato. This telegram is all that I know of that matter. I feel, however, that the situation is in a certain sense critical because in the present state of excitement there is danger of

---

<sup>26</sup> *Ante*, p. 442.

<sup>27</sup> Telegram No. 2351, Nov. 14, 8 p. m., vol. II, p. 293.

a clash and such an incident would certainly be charged here to French influence.

Baron Sonnino will, I hope, talk fully with you about all these matters while he is in Paris, though it is almost too much to hope. In any event, however, you will be able to form from what he says a fairly accurate idea of what Italy hopes to accomplish in the direction of expansion, and possibly even of control of the Adriatic. No one has ever yet quite ventured to speak of making the Adriatic a *mare clausum*, but I think some of those who write about the subject have it in their minds as a possibility, though I imagine those who are wise and far-sighted would consider such a thing impracticable, if not impossible.

I hope that you see personally the telegrams which I am sending every day now because they cover many points which I do not afterwards develop in my letters.

This whole question of the other side of the Adriatic, and of the entire Balkan peninsula, ought to be studied carefully and by persons as free from any excessive predilection as possible as the arrangement of the lines of the Balkan countries is possibly going to be the most difficult, complex, and, indeed, perilous part of the work of the Peace Congress.

Always,

Yours very sincerely,

THOS. NELSON PAGE

[Subenclosure 1]

*Daily Italian Political Notes*

ROME, November 13, 1918.

1. The very rigor of the conditions of armistice imposed upon Germany is proof eloquent, in Italian opinion, of the completeness of the victory of the Allies and of the United States. They involve, in substance, the expelling of the Hohenzollerns, "the abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine, the evacuation of invaded territories, the establishment of three military bridgeheads on the Rhine, the nullification of the Brest-Litowski and Bukarest treaties, the cession of the best part of the German fleet, the evacuation of German colonies and the return of the gold stolen; they also compel Germany to beg for bread. . . ." <sup>28</sup> Certainly, as the Rome *Messaggero* says, "Our dead and our mutilated are vindicated."

On the other hand, the appeal by Solf to Secretary Lansing following almost immediately upon the signing of the armistice and the President's speech to Congress in announcing the successful close

<sup>28</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

of the war are considered by Italian opinion as clearly defining the position not only of the United States, as distinguished from that of the Allies, but the policy of the new Germany towards our Country. Such American position is taken to be that of moderator and conciliator and such German policy is interpreted as aimed at making Germany found her hopes of reconstruction more and more upon America. The only doubt among Italians is how sincere is the German policy and possibly, how far she can "play us;" that is, whether Solf's appeal is a request to American magnanimity and humanity or the beginning of a campaign to create differences between the United States and the Allies. For the feeling is growing among Italian observers that while Germany is undoubtedly undergoing a tremendous internal transformation, it is doing so in almost as orderly and meticulous a manner as she prepared for war, or, in other words, that the old "efficiency" is still at work, and that under an apparently revolutionary outward change old mental attitudes still prevail, both as regards keeping the racial unity of the Germans compact, and of securing dominance by creating dissensions among her adversaries.

2. With the quieting down of the rejoicing and excitement over victory and peace, Italian thoughtful opinion begins to look forward to the great problems which confront the new and completed Italy. "Victory having assured us freedom" writes the Radical *L'Unita*, "we have now the opportunity of devoting ourselves without obstacles from without to the great task of the internal reforms of our country. . . .<sup>29</sup> The war is ended, but a new struggle begins—a longer, harder and harsher struggle. Are we ready to meet the new duties?"

The general Italian answer to this seems to be that the first duty of the people is to observe order and to labor mightily, and the first duty of the Government to promptly solve the problems of alimentation and demobilization. Unemployment on a vast scale, following demobilization, is the great danger to be avoided. "There will be no unemployment—there cannot be unemployment," comments the *Popolo Romano*, "if those principles are immediately applied to the transportation of industries which have been suggested by experts in order to place Italy in the position of being able to meet her own industrial and agricultural needs." The financial problems can only be met by at once providing for the increase of Italian exports; agriculture must be encouraged to intensify production by supplying it with farm machinery, seeds and fertilizers. . . .<sup>29</sup> As regards industries, the lathes which produced munitions must be employed at once in the labor of manifold small industries to supply the articles

---

<sup>29</sup> Omission indicated in the original.



which heretofore were imported. The larger industries must find their new activities in home demands, including building trades, agriculture and metallurgical current needs. But all this is possible only if the Gov'ts will at once assure the country of raw materials, coal and cotton. Italy, on her part, has a few "prime materials" indispensable to other countries and these she must use for her exchanges. New tonnage is the supreme demand. "If existing shipyards are insufficient, Italy must improvise new ones as America has done, and thousands of workmen, discharged by the factories can find employment in such dry docks."

3. The Italian press announces that the Italian authorities, pursuant to the terms of the armistice, have taken over the control of Austria's railroads, of the principal highway junctions and of the passes "towards the German frontier." The chief of traffic of the Italian State railroads, Comm. Berrini, has taken charge of the reorganization of railroad traffic in the liberated territories.

4. The Italian Supreme Military Command, "in view of the politico-military situation" has drawn a new boundary for the War Zone in northern Italy, which took effect at midnight on November 10, 1918. The exact boundary along every sector is given by the daily press.

5. The "plenipotentiary delegate" of the city of Fiume, Dr. Gino Antoni, after his interview with Premier Orlando, has addressed a Note, through such Premier, to the Allied Governments which recites that, immediately after freeing itself from the Austro-Hungarian yoke, "the city of Fiume with its territory constituting from ancient times and upon statutory bases a 'corpus separatum' of the Crown of St. Stephen proclaimed its autonomy and independence through its legal representatives, the Mayoralty and the National Council.["] It adds that pursuant to the Wilsonian principle of the rights of people to self-decision, said city has resolved to annex itself to its mother country, Italy. It closes by asking the Italian Government to extend the "necessary protection in this period of transition."

It is to be noted that under the Pact of London this "corpus separatum" would be on the boundary of the new Italian frontier in the region known as the "Julian Venitia."

Premier Orlando has telegraphed to Hon. Zanella, deputy of Fiume (refuged in Italy) expressing Italy's admiration for that city's "ardent and active patriotism."

. . . . .

GINO C. SPERANZA

[Subenclosure 2]

*Daily Italian Political Notes*

ROME, November 14, 1918.

1. The Italian press points out that the formula used by Charles I of Austria-Hungary in resigning his imperial and kingly position is unprecedented in constitutional or revolutionary annals. He proclaims that he "withdraws from the affairs of state" and then leaves for an unknown destination; but he does not use the word abdication or any equivalent.

2. The new Military Clauses to the Austro-Hungarian armistice contains nothing of note as modifying substantially the conditions of the original document. But some Italian correspondents from the front claim that Austro-Hungary (through its military representatives) is already raising objection to and trying to give peculiar and restricted interpretation to certain clauses of the armistice, evasions and objections which seem to some Italians to indicate the equivocal diplomacy which the enemy will attempt at the peace conference. Thus it is reported that the Austrian claims that certain of the Italian conquests are illegal because they took place between 3 p. m. of November 3rd and 3 p. m. of November 4th, the date agreed on for the suspension of hostilities, the Austrians now claiming that the armistice took effect on the signing thereof, to-wit, at 3 p. m. of the 3rd of November. It is said that this point was raised at the armistice conference by General Ziverkowsky and refused by General Badoglio who insisted on the Italian interpretation of Article I of the armistice. The report is important, if at all, as possibly showing the spirit of the enemy in any future peace discussion and the necessity of guarding against it.

3. The matter of the relief to and of organization of the liberated and the conquered Italian provinces is receiving much attention by Italian public men. As regards the conquered or "redeemed" territories it is probable that they will be divided into four provinces with at least four Prefectures: at Trento, Trieste, Bolzano and Gorizia. Practically since the war began the Italian Government has been actively planning and organizing every branch of Government in and for the territories to be annexed to Italy, the work being largely undertaken by the Segretariato degli Affari Civili of the Italian Supreme Military Command, under the very able direction of Dr. Agostino d'Adamo, ex-secretary at the Ministry of the Interior and a man with whom this Embassy has established friendly relations.

As to the condition of the Italian provinces which the enemy had invaded, reports agree that the enemy has destroyed or removed everything of any value. Here are some important examples: at

Portogruaro station all the great depots and the junction railroad system have been blown up; the railroad line from Portogruaro to Cervignano is practically wholly out of commission. Tossalta, Latisana and other railroad stations in the Veneto are destroyed. Most of the bridges across the Tagliamento and the Stella, Turgnino, Corno and Anssa streams are still serviceable. The civilian population has been despoiled of everything by very methodical methods of looting; conditions are especially hard at Portogruaro, San Dona, San Giorgio, Torre and Zuino, where medicines, doctors, bread and even water are sorely needed, reservoirs and wells having been destroyed by the enemy. Supplies, it is said, can be most easily sent by water to the "ports" of Portogruaro and Anssa.

Deputy Giulio Alessio on his return from a visit to the liberated provinces has published a long account of what he saw there. He says that the conditions in the districts of Conegliano, Oderzo, Vittorio and of the Province of Adene "are very grave." First the Germans, then the Hungarians and lastly the Austrians successively deprived the population of all they owned from foodstuffs to metal articles, from wood for fuel to the cattle—stocks with which these districts were splendidly supplied. All means of transportation and of traffic have either been removed or are in need of repairs.

Deputy Alessio considers the urgent needs as follows: the immediate feeding and physical protection of the civilian populations, local relief agencies, Italian and Allied, however worthy being insufficient and unable to reach the most needy who are scattered in not easily accessible farm districts. Transports are most urgently needed. The need for the return of the local civilian officials is also great for the re-establishment of civil order, but a difficulty is found to this in the fact that many such ex-employees are now employed at such higher salaries elsewhere and are not willing to return; the Government must find a way of compelling them.

The Government is also urged to greater activity in the ascertainment of the damages caused by the war and the enemy and the establishment of financial credits on a patriotic and now [*less?*] speculative basis. The financial difficulties are made worse by the enormous quantity of Austrian paper in circulation there and the adjustment of such paper to Italian Currency values.

As to the actual physical reconstruction, Deputy Alessio suggests the employment of the Italian engineering troops which have rendered such splendid services in the line of public works during the war.

3. [4?] The Dalmatian question is assuming daily more importance among Italians and feeling is waxing warmer and more intense. It is a complex and delicate problem towards whose solution there seems little disposition on either side to be calm. We can only here present, from day to day, as they come up some of the Italian arguments. It appears

that the Jugo-Slavs are exercising a kind of police power over some of the towns claimed by or aspired to by the Italians. In whose name, asks Italian opinion, do such Jugo-Slavs attempt to exercise such power and by what right? For it must be borne in mind constantly that up to the present time the Jugo-Slavs have not been recognized as a State, but merely as a movement for the organization of a State.

Again, the Italians are claiming rights on towns not included in the Pact of London, such as the City of Fiume and Zara. They justify this and their claims to occupy them on the ground that the Pact of London antedates not only the acceptance but even the announcement of the Wilsonian principle of auto-decision which is to-day the basic principle for the establishment of a durable and just peace. That Pact, moreover, was agreed upon when there was no Allied or American policy favoring or contemplating the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary and was based on principles of equilibrium rather than of justice. But now that the Hapsburg Empire is destroyed an entirely new situation arises in which Italy has distinct and worthy claims. Races now count more than political equilibriums and the principles of racial liberty and of auto-decision cannot be invoked, say the Italians, by every racial group except those of Italian origin and Italian aspirations. It is pointed out that in the case of the Italians the "territorial boundaries coincide with the ethnical boundaries" a splendid proof that the "racial nationalism" of the Italians has maintained itself inviolate even when under foreign oppression. Upon this theory not only Fiume is claimed, but Spalato, Arbe and Trani also should "re-enter into the Italian family."

One important fact in the current situation is that everywhere the Italian armies are welcomed in the occupied formerly Austrian territories because of the order they bring and the liberal government they establish. Even in the new Tyrolese Republic at Insbruck the near presence of Italian troops appears welcome. This capacity for prompt and yet not oppressive establishment of order by the Italian military commanders is an element of practical importance which should not be excluded for the purely political aims of other nations; that is, if Italy, at this moment, is the only Power which can bring order and relative freedom of Government in debatable frontier centres, the Allies should not, it seems, stop her simply because of the fear that she might refuse later to evacuate them. The supreme thing at this moment would seem to be the necessity of maintaining order and preventing disorder.

Certainly, the Italian Government makes no attempt to conceal its aid to the movement among the Italians in Dalmatia to assert their rights and make known their desire to be united to Italy. The Italian destroyer *Andace* has gone to Zara with supplies for the population and disembarked police forces which were received with

great enthusiasm. Yesterday at the Campidoglio in Rome the Mayor, Prince Colonna, with a number of Italian Senators and Deputies officially received Dr. Gino Antoni, "Delegate of the City of Fiume to the Italian Government." Dr. Antonio Vio, Mayor of Fiume, Andrea Bellen, ex-Mayor of Fiume, and a number of municipal officers of that city who expressed the desire of their constituents to be annexed to Italy.

As further evidence of activity in this line, the Italian Institute for Colonial and Commercial Expansion and the Commercial Museum of Venice have joined in a call for a national gathering at which to study various Adriatic problems, economic and political.

But of special interest would seem the reports coming from the front on the attitude of the Italian troops regarding the general question herein discussed in outline. What the soldiers think is a very important item in the present situation and it is an item upon which there has been little reliable information. "The Italian Army" justly observes an Italian daily, "is not a military machine but a conscious organism which reacts to current situations with great promptness." Recent newspaper correspondence from the front, whose reliability we cannot gauge, say that the soldiers feel keenly the problem of Italy's boundaries and that among the thinking elements such interest is based on the consciousness that Italy, by her victories, has risen to a position of guardian and of leader among the small States arising out of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire and also of a really Great Power in the responsible duty of helping to assure the peace of Europe. As such she needs in a very real sense to have absolutely safe strategic boundaries, for at the north she will have the pressure of a probably greater Germany and to the east the danger of a number of Slav States in the unstable process of formation.

Lastly the soldiers are the best reporters of the real feeling of the "liberated populations;" they are the first to enter the new territories, they see the actual situation before political and diplomatic machinations and intrigues, local and external, are set in motion, and can really feel the pulse of the people. For this reason it would seem most advisable to get all information possible as to their point of view.

GINO C. SPERANZA

[Subenclosure 3]

*Daily Italian Political Notes*

ROME, November 15, 1918.

1. Deputy Perolini, who is a sort of Republican whip in the Italian Chamber, made a speech the other day in which he stated that the

old "truce" between the Republicans and the Monarchy was at an end now that Italy's unification had been completed. The "truce" dates back to the decision by the greatest practical political leader of Italian Republicanism—Francesco Crispi, who though a Mazzinian, labored in the building up of monarchical Italy on the well-known theory that "the Republic would divide us while the Monarchy unites us." The practical importance of Perolini's declaration is very limited except as a "sign of the times." The Italian Republican Party is a mere ghost of a political organization, and the danger of any political upheaval in Italy, if it exists, is not to be sought among the Republicans. On the other hand, the popular demonstration yesterday when Victor Emmanuel III arrived in Rome seems an eloquent proof of how strong and spontaneous is the popular affection for the King. The demonstration, wholly unofficial, showed the temper of the people, at least in Rome. As one paper puts it: "To-day the King represented to all the Head of the State, the personification of the *Patria* in its new union, its new larger expansion, its greater prestige and more widespread respect of to-day. . . ." That is why the crowds to-day were so large and their enthusiasm beyond description. . . .<sup>a</sup> Although the Constitution grants to the Crown the prerogative of declaring war, our King did not take it upon himself to decide upon this war; he merged his aspirations with those of the people, and at the right moment he expressed the will of the people."

2. It is officially announced that the Italian Parliament will open on November 20th, the Cabinet being expected to be present in full except possibly the Foreign Minister who is in Paris and may be detained there at the Versailles Conference on the Allied peace proposals. The official announcement of the opening simply states that the Government will make some communications to the two Houses. The session is expected to be a brief one and to be devoted largely to a patriotic expression of national approval and resolve to profit by the great opportunities opened to the nation. So far only one Deputy has entered his name to discuss the Government's communication, the regular Socialist, Turati. The budget will have to be approved and a number of legislative measures regarding the organization of the redeemed provinces in relation to the national organization will be submitted by the Cabinet for discussion and approval. A certain activity of political groups is evidently aimed at "bucking up" the government against any weakness or compromise in case the extreme or revolutionary elements should attempt to make trouble. The *Fascio* in the Senate and the *Intesa Democratica* in the Chamber have passed resolutions to such effect. Interest centres as to what will be done to establish the parliamentary representative for the redeemed provinces. The

---

<sup>a</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

most recent precedent is that of 1866 when, after the armistice of Cormons, the Veneto was annexed to Italy. In that case after the treaty of peace was signed with Austria under which such new provinces became an integral part of the Kingdom of Italy, a plebiscite was decreed. The result of the plebiscite was an overwhelming decision in favor of annexation to Italy. The Italian Parliament then adjourned and parliamentary elections were ordered to take place in such new provinces, while the Crown appointed a number of most prominent citizens of those territories as members of the Italian Senate. The elections were held and on December 15th the King Victor Emmanuel II, opened a new session of the Italian Parliament (IX Legislative Session) at which the deputies and senators from the new provinces participated.

The extreme parties are also active, though there seems to be little question that the report of the Socialist and labor riots at Milan, are greatly exaggerated. Yesterday representatives of the Regular Socialists of the Communist and Anarchical elements, and of labor organizations met in Rome and after protesting against "the systematic persecution of the Confederated Chamber of Labor from which soldier-members are forcibly excluded from entering to discuss their economic interests" passed resolutions asking the Government to stop such "persecutions," demanded a general amnesty for all political crimes, the abolition of the censorship and the re-establishment of the right of assembly. It was further decided to call a general meeting of labor organizations to protect and organize against the activities of reactionary forces.

The Executive Committee of the Press Correspondents' Association of Rome also passed resolutions against the "arbitrary decisions of the Italian censorship" and asking for its suppression.

The Italian Republican Party has called a national party gathering at Florence for December 8th and 9th.

3. The real and most serious question before the Italian Parliament is and will be the urgent matter of solving the complicated and delicate problems connected with demobilization and the adjustment of the nations to the new peace situation. There are the clearest signs that the Government is not only having difficulties in this trying line, but has not been sufficiently foresighted and forearmed. The difficulty is complicated by the efforts of the old bureaucracy and of the "organisms" created by the war to keep control of the situation by trying to undertake the handling of these problems without any adequate preparation or technical ability. This struggle to hold on to office to the great detriment of the nation is well summarized by Deputy Cabrini in an article in the Rome *Epoca*. "Not only the organisms created for the war are making desperate efforts to survive the war's

end, but in the various Ministries which have had to put up with such organisms furious struggles are breaking out to capture for their respective and old established departments the functions of such war-organisms which heretofore enjoyed a certain autonomy. While this struggle waxes . . . <sup>32</sup> old organisms which antedate the war, are attempting, under external pressure, to re-establish their functions, but without success because the end of the war finds them suffering from the same defects which rendered them impotent . . . <sup>32</sup> to exercise any influence upon those events which disturbed our body-social during the period of Italian neutrality." Deputy Cabrini appeals to Premier Orlando to imitate [*initiate?*] the New Italy, now completely united, by chopping off at the root the ancient evils and handicaps of the Italian bureaucracy.

4. A correspondent to the Italian press from the Italian Army Headquarters gives the following summarized information regarding the situation at Fiume: When, on October 28th, the constitution of the new Jugo-Slav State, including Fiume, was proclaimed at Zagabria, the Italians of Fiume immediately protested, declared their intention to annex their City to Italy and appealed for Italian intervention to prevent disorder. The Italian Admiral Rainer went into Fiume harbor on the cruiser *Emanuele Filiberto* and established relations with the municipal authorities. On November 4th he landed, welcomed by the Italians, but being received frigidly by the Jugo-Slavs Committee at the City Hall he ordered the Italian flag raised, and, shortly thereafter said flag having been torn down, he gave the opponents just one hour to replace it honorably in default of which he announced that he would "resort to energetic measures." The flag was replaced. This incident is ascribed to the activities of an intransigent element among the Croats and is alleged to have been the only outward sign of turbulence in Fiume.

On or about November 11th, two French torpedo boats approached the Adamich pier in the Fiume harbor; the Croats invited the Commander of one of these French boats to pay his respects to their so-called "government" but the French captains instead visited Admiral Rainer aboard his flag ship and a few hours after such French boats left the harbor. Another Italian cruiser, the *Terruccio*, has since arrived at Fiume and received an enthusiastic welcome. The correspondent concludes by saying, "Aside from the incident above described, there does not exist a real and fundamental dissension; and no one has any interest to create one."

5. The press discusses some of the questions which are supposed to be engaging Sonnino and the other Allied representatives at Versailles to-day. "To fix the preliminaries of peace," writes the Milan *Corriere*

<sup>32</sup> Omission indicated in the original.



*della Sera*, "means to fix the major lines of the future economic, political and territorial situation of to-morrow's world." The conferees at Versailles have to settle all the complicated and delicate problems upon which hangs the future international situation and in this respect their decisions are more important than those which await the Peace Conference itself which will, largely, accept what the Conferees at Versailles agree upon.

A fundamental preliminary question to be decided is "who will be admitted to the Peace Conference and who will be excluded?" To understand the difficulty of even the preliminary question, it is enough to consider the present condition of two of the belligerents of 1914—Russia and Austro-Hungary. The component parts of the latter will have to be represented; and yet the old Austro-Hungary is still a "diplomatic fiction" which may create difficulties in the very task of liquidating it. As regards Russia, her people are certainly entitled to participate in the Peace Conference, as are also the German people now that the Hohenzollerns have been sent away, but who shall be accepted as their real and reliable representatives? That is the question.

GINO C. SPERANZA

763.72/12500 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ROME, December 8, 1918—12 a. m.

[Received December 10—1:15 a. m.]

2458. Political. All consulates report political situation calm, though everywhere prompt settlement Italy's rights in Istria and Dalmatia urged by press. The approaching arrival of President Wilson in Europe, and his hoped for arrival in Italy, has been the question of the past weeks, and continues to be the leading article in all newspapers. To-day, press announced that President Wilson would spend several days in Paris and come immediately to Italy. This news emanating from telegram from London. Embassy has received letters from municipalities and been approached from all quarters regarding the reception and entertainments of President while in Italy, and Mayor of Rome has committee for decoration of the City but is awaiting definite announcement before work is begun. Italian opinion unanimous in demanding President's visit, not merely for effect, but because Italian people desire opportunity to express national [apparent omission] and welcome to the President of United States.

Vatican has shown disposition to bring about meeting between President and Pope, making it clear that he would be at liberty to make his call either formal or informal. Clerical paper *Corriere Docilia* [*d'Italia?*] article entitled "Welcome Wilson" by Field-Bishop of Italian Army says: President should come to [apparent omission] so as to realize Italians are not militaristic and to understand tolerant and universal spirit among Italians, which he claims [is] due to Catholic education, that possibly in America some persons have spoken ill of Pope, that in Italy many do, and for that reason President should see him and form his own opinion.

Italian chambers closed session November 30th to be reconvened during January. The Senate will reconvene December 12th, it having adjourned to await return of Orlando and Sonnino from England and France. Official Socialists objected to closing before delegates to Peace Conference were named. Minister [of] Finance, in reply, pointed out Parliament had voted full confidence in Government which meant confidence in Government's choice of men. Strong movement in certain quarters to have Bissolati representative at conference. Regular Socialist Deputy Modigliani at last sitting, attacked Government's program for lack of definiteness and insufficiency proposals relative to the reform measures. Bissolati spoke of Italy's legislation in regard to relief and aid to wounded soldiers and families as ahead of any legislation same character in Europe.

Pro-war Socialists blocked National conference in Rome November 30th discussing largely Socialist part at coming Peace Conference. Among resolutions adopted was that Italian Socialist Union collaborated with Socialist and Labor parties who were signatories to London Socialist and Labor conference; that organized labor be represented at coming Peace Conference; that all debates at said Conference be published; that all national units be permitted decide their destinies and that such decisions be guaranteed by international agreement; that League [of] Nations be formed; that secret diplomacy be abolished; that all labor questions be internationalized.

Ministers Bissolati and Berenini have withdrawn from the Socialist Party which was pressing for the calling of a constituent convention in Italy. Press earnestly advocating Italy's asserting herself as one of victors in war and gathering fruits thereof.

Italian warships are now at Constantinople. Italian authorities have occupied, there, the Palazzo di Venezia, naval units are in waters of Dodecanese Islands, meanwhile Italian program in Adriatic is developing. Italian troops occupied Sebenico, November 6th, Zara, November 7th. Naval contingents in Dalmatia have been strengthened by reinforcements from army, Islands of Premuda, Selve, Isola Grossa, Pago, Ulbe, and Zuri, all of Dalmatian Archipelago, also Veglia, Arbe, and Lussin have been occupied. Naval and army con-

tingents occupied Fiume, November 15th in conjunction with Allied troops. Official reports state bulk of Austro-Hungarian fleet disarmed. Mine fields along enemy coast being cleared and Austro-Hungarian merchant marine being put in navigable condition. Engineering forces Italian army reestablishing communications in liberated and annexed territories. Railroad and telegraphic service being rapidly reestablished. Situation along this coast somewhat less critical, but still far from settled. Italians claim French influence against Italian interests.

Signor Segre, formerly Commissioner of Refugees in Italy and citizen of Trieste, states immigration of Austrian and German elements to Trieste has been carried on systematically by enemy during the last weeks; that such immigrants arriving at the rate of 1,000 per diem; that only way to prevent this plan of enemy to Austrianize and Germanize Trieste and other Italian cities on Adriatic is for Italian Government absolutely to close present military frontier for definite period so that Government may make inventory of all movable and personal property which is now being removed or claimed by unlawful owners.

Admiral Calvilleni at popular gathering November 30th at Fiume is reported to have said in speech that diplomatic discussions were under way regarding rights [of] Fiume, but that such discussions were merely debates of diplomats and political men; that Fiume was Italian and would remain so; that no intermeddling could in any way damage Italian rights. A massed meeting at Rome November 30th in theater where many Government representatives were present, urged immediate annexation of Fiume to Italy. Sarajevo. Jugo-Slav ministry still appears uncertain, though last reports make it wholly composed of Servian ministers. Much uncertainty exists regarding relations between Hungarian Government and Croat National Council. General Boroëvic, formerly in supreme command of Austro-Hungarian armies on Italian front, still appears to be commander-in-chief of Jugo-Slav army. King Nicholas of Montenegro has publicly declared he prefers Serb-Jugo-Slav Federation to militaristic kingdom which would result in Servian domination. For Colonel Buckey's report Dalmatian conditions, see my 2445.<sup>34</sup>

Economical. The Venice consulate reports food conditions growing worse, due necessity diverting supplies to Trieste, Trent and liberated provinces. Catania reports high prices continue though food slightly more plentiful. Milan reports no improvement in food situation and increased speculation. Genoa reports prices incredible and [?] with coal and slight reduction in prices. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

---

<sup>34</sup> Vol. II, p. 320.

Tasker H. Bliss Papers

*The Technical Adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Miller) to General Tasker H. Bliss*

PARIS, 13 December, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL BLISS: Referring to your verbal inquiry, conveyed to me by Colonel Embick,<sup>35</sup> as to some possible modification of the Treaty of London, I feel sure that there has been no formal modification of this paper by the parties thereto.

The conferences at Rome between the Italians and the Jugo Slavs, while from a technical point of view, unofficial, so far as the Italian Government was concerned, were undoubtedly deemed by the Jugo Slavs to modify the Pact of London in a practical sense.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, it may well be argued, and I may say it is my opinion, that the Note of the Allies quoted in the communication of the President of 5 November, 1918, to the German Government,<sup>37</sup> which accepted (with certain reservations) the Fourteen Points of the President, must be considered to have modified the Pact of London in any respect in which the same is inconsistent with the Fourteen Points of the President; for the Note of the Allies is signed on behalf of the British, French, and Italian Governments, the parties to the Pact of London.

Yours faithfully,

DAVID HUNTER MILLER

Paris Peace Conf. 865.00/1: Telegram

*The Chargé in Italy (Jay) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 14, 1918—12 noon.

[Received December 15—4:30 p. m.]

15. Following for your information. Embassy is sending daily by telegraph full report on general situation to Paris.<sup>38</sup> Political situation. Following is only a brief summary. At Rome elaborate preparations are being made for reception of the President. Articles are being printed in the papers regarding his visit here, although instructions regarding his visit have not yet been received here. Press announces that President will make a formal visit to Pope. Embassy has confined itself to state that while it hopes President

<sup>35</sup> Col. Stanley Dunbar Embick, member of the American section of the Supreme War Council; assistant to General Bliss on the Commission to Negotiate Peace.

<sup>36</sup> Bears the marginal notation in General Bliss' hand: "Any procès Verbaux? If so can we get them?"

<sup>37</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 468.

<sup>38</sup> Daily telegraphic reports not printed.

can find it possible to come to Italy, no definite plans have been made yet.

A great deal of discussion continues regarding Italy's relations with Jugo-Slavs. Opinion crystallizing on absolute necessity of firm policy. An article published with a map with opinion of Italian Military Staff showing boundaries which as stated are just sufficient for the security of Italy, and at the same time allowing Jugo-Slavia a coast line between Dalmatia and Istria. The press has given much space to finance and economic questions.

Polish Committee at Rome announces Polish Army composed of Austro-Hungarian prisoners made by Italy rapidly progressing. In all the total is about 30,000 men. One regiment of 4,000 men ready to leave at once for Poland.

There is still much discussion as to the question of continuing Italian propaganda. Gallanga, in charge of the same, who is alleged to have opposed it last summer on Jugo-Slav aspirations, has resigned to majority of opinions in favor of continuing, as it is believed that Italy is in need of being properly understood by the outside world. The consul reports from Southern Italy state political conditions generally quiet. In Naples smallpox causing anxiety. The reports from Northern Italy state conditions though entirely against recent Government, monopolies still continue. Convention Republican Party in Florence apparently made effect, and everywhere is expressed great enthusiasm on the approaching visit of the President, except in extreme Socialist circles as represented by *Avanti*.

JAY

---

Paris Peace Conf. 865.00/3 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Italy (Jay) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 19, 1918—5 p. m.

[Received December 21—9:50 a. m.]

21. Clemenceau's interview granted Italian Deputy Raimondo published Rome *Messagero* Dec. 17th produced unfortunate impression Italian press public opinion. Belief vaguely expressed here however approaching event will reestablish French-Italian cordiality.

General Piccione, Italian Army expert mountain fighter, left yesterday Italian Army headquarters with Czech-Slovak President Masaryk having been appointed by Prague Government commander-in-chief Czech-Slovak Armies. Italian press says he will organize new Bohemian Army including Czech-Slovak troops French front and two Czech-Slovak divisions organized here by Italian generals Boriani and Rossi. Italian Colonel Cagini commanding first contingent Czech-Slovak troops organized in Italy cabled to Czech Premier

Kramarz from Budajogice "As we crossed the frontier Republic we send greetings Czech-Slovak Nation," to which Kramarz replied thanking welcoming representatives Italy.

Press announcement of formation new Jugo-Slav Ministry composed Slovene-Croat-Serb representatives followed in Italian press by despatch from Belgrade stating Pasic refused presidency such new Ministry. Italian press doubts stability such new Ministry. Italian press doubts stability such ministerial coalition, Rome *Tribuna* alleging it represented agreement heads of Governments rather than agreement among peoples affected. Rome *Messaggero* today comments Pasic's refusal symptomatic as he represents adherence Serbian Dynasty while majority Croats want republic. Milan *Corriere Sera* December 17th quotes from Croat newspaper *Kroatska Drzava* that Kuderabek of Prague appointed Czech Slovak Commissioner by the "Jugo Slav Port of Fiume." Also quotes announcement departure from Zagabria of Serb battalion which left Fiume November 17th when Allies landed and now transferred to Portore south of Buccari.

Premier Orlando filed this Embassy report alleged Montenegrin elections which ousted King Nicholas tending to show grave irregularities and illegal interference at Arbe Island and Sebenico. Summary thereof follows today's Embassy report.

Tentative opinion heretofore reported this Embassy possible unofficial Italian-Hungarian Entente finds some indirect evidence in today's Embassy report following.

Paris despatch to Rome *Epoca* states President Wilson will arrive Rome sometime between December 29th and January 2nd and will visit Pope.

Preliminary conference organization new Italian Catholic Party closed yesterday. Reported plans must be now approved by Pope. Italian press generally welcomes new Catholic Party believing it will be patriotically nationalistic with largely social program. New Nicaraguan Minister to Vatican presented yesterday credentials. He was until recently Minister of Monaco principality to Vatican. Pope had long conference with Belgian Monseigneur Tiberghien just returned from Belgium on visit inspecting war devastations. Naples *Mattino* believes new Italian loan will be floated January.

Italian commission ascertaining war damages actively working. Press reports Italian maritime losses approximated already 1,000,000 tons with several billions loss of merchandise. Devastations lootings on land alleged to exceed in destructiveness and exceeds losses Belgium and invaded French departments. Italian devastated area less than  $\frac{1}{15}$ th all Belgium but occupied by population numbering about  $\frac{1}{6}$ th entire Belgian population with important industrial towns. Looting in cities and country systematical and unlimited especially by

General Varr. I personally doubt accuracy of the reports in preceding paragraph.

JAY

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/17 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 26, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received December 28.]

29. I hear from Italian source which should be reasonably well informed that some sort of "treaty" touching peace provisions has been arrived at between England and France and Italy. Will endeavor to verify.

NELSON PAGE

Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/18 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 26, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 28—4:30 p.m.]

31. My 29 [of] which Paris informed. I learn that same report I sent has been sent by my colleagues. It is thought that the treaty or understanding between England, France and Italy contains an agreement to stand by each other in the essential results of the war including territorial claims such as the French and Italian claims. Paris informed.

NELSON PAGE

Tasker H. Bliss Papers

*Captain B. A. G. Fuller<sup>39</sup> to Lieutenant Colonel William B. Wallace<sup>40</sup>*

VERSAILLES, December 28, 1918.

DEAR COLONEL WALLACE: I heard this morning from Jones, with respect to the accuracy of the Russian version of the London Agreement, as published in the London *Times*.<sup>41</sup> He had submitted the

<sup>39</sup> On the staff of the American Permanent Military Representative on the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

<sup>40</sup> Secretary to General Bliss.

<sup>41</sup> For a translation of the Russian version of the Treaty of London, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 497.

copy I furnished him to General di Robilant,<sup>42</sup> who had gone over it with Sonnino. He tells me that the Russian version agrees with the Italian, save at two points. The wording of Note 1, Article 4, as given by the *Times*, differs from the Italian version, as does also that of Article 15, which deals with the exclusion of the Vatican from peace negotiations. There seems to be some mystery as to what these differences are. I am told that they are unimportant, but I cannot at present find out in what they consist.

I telephoned Dwight<sup>43</sup> this afternoon, asking him to inform Colonel Grant<sup>44</sup> that there is no gossip current here regarding the sending of the Italian troops to Libya. I am told, however, that for the last three months the Italians have been massing troops at Rhodes and at last reports had about 10,000 men there.

I enclose two copies of the memorandum about the Saint Jean de Maurienne conference.

Yours sincerely,

B. A. G. FULLER

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum Concerning the Saint Jean de Maurienne Conference*<sup>45</sup>

VERSAILLE, December 28, 1918.

The Saint Jean de Maurienne conference was held on April 19th, 1917, in a railway carriage at Saint Jean de Maurienne. There were present Lloyd George, Ribot, Boselli, and Sonnino, who were later joined by Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, Raggi, Italian Ambassador at Paris, Major General Sir G. M. W. MacDonough, Lieut-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, Signor di Martino and Count Aldrovandi.

The first subject discussed was that of Italian aspirations in Asia Minor.

In order to understand clearly the purpose of this conference it should be remembered that the so-called London Agreement of April 26th, 1915, between Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia, promised to Italy an equitable share in the division of Turkey in Asia. Italy was to receive territory in the neighborhood of Adalia, where she had already acquired rights and interests under an Anglo-Italian treaty. At the same time the Russian claims to Constantinople had already been under discussion between France and Great Britain and the conversations between the two governments had resulted in the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 9th, 1916.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Italian Permanent Military Representative on the Supreme War Council.

<sup>43</sup> Harry G. Dwight, Army Field Clerk on staff of General Bliss.

<sup>44</sup> Aide to General Bliss.

<sup>45</sup> Filed also under file No. 763.72/12623.

<sup>46</sup> For text, see *Current History*, vol. xi, pt. II (1920), p. 499; also Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), p. 614.



There had also been recent discussions between Balfour and the French and Italian ambassadors with a view to delimiting the Italian sphere in Asia Minor. These, however, had failed owing to the irreconcilable nature of the French and Italian claims. Italy demanded inclusion within her sphere of Mersina and Adana, but the French refused to renounce their claims to either place. The British Foreign Office was not disposed to include Smyrna in the Italian sphere and proposed, instead, an arrangement giving Italy a sphere starting at the Gulf of Scala Nova on the west, including Konia, and thence running east and striking the French sphere near Ulukishla and thence coming down to the Mediterranean coast near Anamur. The Italians, however, refused to accept this scheme.

At the Saint Jean conference Lloyd George, I have reason to believe, submitted a new plan drawn up by the British General Staff, which gave Italy a sphere including Smyrna and a second hinterland sphere bounded by a line running from a point south of Adramyti, on the Gulf of the same name, north to Balikesri and thence to Kutaya, thence south, excluding the Bagdad Railway, to Eregli, excluding Konia, and thence south to the coast to a point just west of Mersina. This arrangement would give the Turkish state which was to have been allowed to exist in a portion of Asia Minor, free access to the sea through the port of Selefkah and would have enabled the Italians to construct branch lines from the Bagdad Railway to the coast.

Ribot had no objections to such an arrangement. Sonnino, at first, seemed satisfied with it, but after consulting experts made difficulties and increased his demand. He claimed that if only one or two Allies could realize their aspirations in Asia Minor at the end of the war Italy should be given compensation elsewhere. His idea seems to have been that although Great Britain, France and Russia might be able to realize their aspirations in Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia, Italy was not likely to be so fortunate in Asia Minor.

Sonnino put forward the following motion in French, the text of which I have seen and been able hastily to translate:

"It is understood that if an agreement should be reached at the Peace Conference such that the three powers are unable to share equally in the total or partial possession of the territories considered in the above convention, an understanding shall be reached establishing the compensation due to the power which may be obliged to content itself with a sphere of influence only, to make up for the difference between such a simple sphere of influence (to be recognized by Turkey and the Allies or by the Allies alone) and actual territorial possessions."

Lloyd George, however, objected to this. He pointed out that Italy was doing nothing to help in the war against Turkey, whereas

Great Britain had in Turkey 300,000 troops, exclusive of Salonika operations. He felt that if Italy had ambitions in Asia Minor she ought to contribute to their realization. He offered to concentrate a greater portion of the British forces in Palestine against Turkey and help Italy realize her aspirations, provided that Italy would send infantry to Salonika to replace the British infantry on the Macedonian front. Sonnino, however, refused and declined even to submit the proposition to his government or to Cadorna. Lloyd George, I am told, then hinted that Sonnino was trying to obtain, by blackmail elsewhere, what Italy was not making any effort to earn in Turkey. He refused to consider the question of compensation elsewhere, for Italy, but agreed that at the end of the war Italian claims would be discussed. He then put forward a resolution, the English text of which is as follows:

"It is understood that if at any time when peace is declared the total or partial possession of the territory contemplated in the agreement come to between France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, as to disposal of parts of the Ottoman Empire, cannot be fully accorded to any one or more of these powers then the interests of the powers concerned will again be taken into equitable consideration."

This resolution, after much discussion and amendments, which have been included in the text, was accepted.

Sonnino, however, raised another difficulty. He pointed out that the plan proposed by the British General Staff did not include Konia, which, however, had been included in Balfour's proposal.

Lloyd George replied, that the General Staff scheme was an entirely new plan and was much more generous to Italy, as it included Smyrna and the territory west of Mersina in the sphere accorded Italy. Konia was excluded in order to give it to Turkey as the new capital. Sonnino, however, insisted and finally Lloyd George agreed to consult the British Cabinet, and to have further negotiations with Sonnino regarding the matter. He also promised to send Sonnino a map embodying the British General Staff's plan.<sup>47</sup>

---

Paris Peace Conf. 700.65/1 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 28, 1918—1 p. m.

[Received December 29—8:30 p. m.]

34. My 29 and 31 December 26th. In conversation this evening, Baron Sonnino assured me in reply to direct question that no treaty,

---

<sup>47</sup> For text of the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, see *Current History*, vol. XI, pt. II (1920), p. 500; Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 619; and Italy, R. Ministero degli affari esteri, *Trattati e Convenzioni*, vol. 23 (Rome, 1930), p. 467.

agreement, or understanding has been made between Italy and other Allies such as referred to in above mentioned telegrams. He further stated that no agreement or understanding was arrived at between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italians such as I mentioned to the President as having been made about the time of Congress of Rome. He added that possibly individuals may have discussed and tried to arrive at some such understanding, but nothing resulted and the Italian Government knows of no such understanding.

The Servian Minister here also declares that no such understanding as last mentioned exists between Jugo-Slavs and Italians. He says the report refers to conversations had between Deputy Torri and General Mola, Italian military attaché at London, on the part of Italy and Steed<sup>48</sup> on the part of Jugo-Slavs. These resulted only in an agreement that no question of territorial lines should be discussed at the said Congress of Nations.

NELSON PAGE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 865.002/2 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 28, 1918—7:15 p. m.

[Received December 29—2:30 p. m.]

38. Italian press announces resignation Bissolati, Minister of War Relief, though not yet officially confirmed. Causes of resignation according to available press reports vary from disagreement with Sonnino on Adriatic question to disagreement with entire Cabinet, he insisting acceptance Wilsonian peace program in its entirety and spirit. Resignation heavy blow to Orlando Cabinet creating embarrassments which Premier will find difficult to satisfactorily overcome. Unless Bissolati is induced to reconsider other resignations likely follow. Ministerial situation thus created very uncertain may result in either further strengthening Sonnino's policy regarding Italian Adriatic claims or making Bissolati head growing movement in Italy of earnest sincere application Wilsonian principles even in solving the Italian national problems. Ministerial crisis may also have untold effect readmitting into Cabinet parliamentary element which never heartily supported war. Orlando undoubtedly working hard to prevent ministerial break up and though he may partially or wholly succeed adjustment can be only temporary.

NELSON PAGE

---

<sup>48</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, foreign editor of the London *Times*.

Paris Peace Conf. 751.65/1 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 28, 1918—8 p. m.  
[Received December 29—9:20 a. m.]

39. For your information political press much interested in enthusiastic reception King of Italy in Paris. Apparent effort being made to use this visit to ameliorate tension in Italian-French relations due to Jugo-Slav and other questions. Internal questions very much to fore in all current discussions, education system receiving special attention. Compulsory education law now being considered by important meeting called for purpose in Rome. Much interest and space given to discussion of Jugo-Slav questions in the *New Europe Magazine* as showing England opposed to Italian aspirations.

Regarding industrial situation, Italians urging Allies consider prompt supply coal in large quantities as most effective means meeting post-bellum situation. Bissolati, Minister of Pensions and prominent pro-war Socialist, has resigned from Cabinet, owing according to report Bari, differences with Sonnino. Former considered to support President's entire program. Possible other ruptures may follow and possibly even Cabinet crisis may result later unless matter patched up.

Genoa consulate reports some signs of political unrest particularly due to military representatives of other countries remaining in Italy, though this not considered imminent danger. Feeling between military of the several countries is always liable to show itself and at several points in Italy there have been times when they were very near to conflict. This includes always a danger.

King's visit to Paris appears to have had good effect in smoothing Italian-French relations though Italy watching keenly France's attitude toward Jugo-Slav and Near East questions.

Venice reports much Italian propaganda going on with reference to Italy's claims to Fiume. This evident also here. Press meantime reports situation in Flahavhan [*sic*] continues unsettled and pregnant with possible further trouble.

Turin reports Italian soldiers returning from France creating feeling great resentment among working classes due to treatment by French of Italian soldiers in France. Naples has had an important meeting throughout week, of seven hundred employees of the Postal Telegraph and Telephone systems at which plans were discussed for amelioration condition employees. Press reported an outbreak of smallpox in Naples apparently still on increase.

Consuls in Southern Italy report continued increase in prices and much speculation in foodstuffs. Venice reports the situation of the poor very difficult due to high prices and scarcity of food though news from Trieste and farther east state food conditions those regions much better.

I returned to Italy on Sunday 22d reaching Rome 23d after stay of 10 days in Paris on duty attending President's visit to Europe.

NELSON PAGE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 865.00/7 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, December 30, 1918—3 p. m.

[Received January 1, 1919—4:30 p. m.]

43. Italian Cabinet situation growing out of Bissolati's opposition to Sonnino's program and consequent resignation still unsolved and uncertain. Reasons for resignation appear to be difference with Sonnino over Adriatic and disapproval over Orlando's alleged half-heartedness in real application Wilsonian principles to Italian national and international problems. As portion of press backing Sonnino and Orlando skillfully avoiding or making issue [*sic*] and as press backing Bissolati is considerably censored in its rather generic expression of views, a confidential statement from Bissolati himself has been given me. Bissolati's actual following in the country is not believed very large. At present the propaganda for Italian expansion along eastern Adriatic shore is tremendous, but [*and?*] influential. Milan's *Corriere Della Sera* is favoring him. Orlando considerably embarrassed will endeavor conciliation, but this not likely without substantial concessions to Bissolati's views. Meanwhile executive committee Italian Reform Socialist Party passes resolution forbidding in effect any Reform Socialist from joining Cabinet as Bissolati's successor.

Pro Dalmatia Day celebrated yesterday in principal cities of Italy. Imposing procession at Rome with enthusiastic gatherings largely under organization of Italian universities. Representatives demand freedom of all Italian cities of Dalmatia. Similar gatherings Naples, Florence, Genoa. It looks as though all this is with at least consent of Government which finds itself apparently distrusted by British election and the favor with which the foreign propaganda is received here.

NELSON PAGE

763.72119/3238 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Acting Secretary of State*

ROME, December 30, 1918—4 p. m.  
[Received December 31—10:48 a. m.]

2503. [From Stewart.] 57. Informed by Italian Foreign Office decree about to be issued making the Trentino for economic purposes integral part Italy. Boundaries of Trentino for purposes this decree will be boundaries laid down in Austrian armistice. Blockade still exists covering all Adriatic ports, so that safe conducts are necessary before vessels can enter them. Subject to raising this blockade and after issuance of proposed decree, American shippers can consign to Trent under same regulations apply to other Italian ports. Will advise you when decree is issued. Stewart.

NELSON PAGE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 865.00/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

ROME, January 7, 1919—7 p. m.  
[Received January 9—3:50 p. m.]

57. Urgent for the President. Bissolati's having seen the President, has made a profound impression here. I had a conversation with Baron Sonnino late this afternoon which indicates, as possible, important changes his position. Both he and Orlando, whom I had seen earlier in the day, were manifestly much impressed and even anxious over this situation. Sonnino reiterated his arguments as to the means of redeeming Italy from peril of menace from inner waterway of Eastern Coast, and to my suggestion that provision might be made to prevent possibility of this menace and secure freedom of really Italian cities under guarantees, he argued the impossibility of such a provision being effective and cited the present condition of terror in Montenegro, whose independence is being destroyed under a presumingly free choice by her people, and added that the King had told the President something of the situation. On this I having first made plain that I had no part in the peace proceedings and no authority to speak for the President, or anyone. I asked Sonnino why he did not give up his contention about Dalmatia, which does not appeal to others and try to secure the freedom of the really Italian cities and the independence of Montenegro. I said "You are the one

who can bring Italy and America together, and settle one of the most difficult obstacles to the peace." He appeared struck by this, and said that if Montenegro which has always been free and withstood the Turks so long were given independence, and were given Cattaro, which is necessary to her, it would certainly make a difference to Italy. I told him I did not know the President's views on the present Montenegrin situation beyond the general sympathy with the aspirations of peoples to be free, but personally had much sympathy with Montenegro and believed the recent so-called election in Montenegro to have been a sham.

I think Sonnino is ready in view of recent manifestations to concede much more than ever before.

NELSON PAGE

---

Paris Peace Conf. 186.3411/154

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 9, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Here is a copy of the paper about which I spoke to the Commission yesterday afternoon. It was handed to me by General di Robilant, the Italian Military Representative with the Supreme War Council. He gave it to me with the evident intent that I would transmit it to the War Department in Washington and give it other circulation among Americans. He tells me that it represents the official views of the Italian Government on the problem of the Adriatic. He says that his Government has received a report from its military attaché in Washington in which the latter says that he found a sentiment in the American State Department and Navy Department rather inclined to be favorable to the Italian views; but that he found the contrary to be the case in the War Department.

If this document represents the official Italian view, you will note that the claims of that government are based solely on an assumed revival of war in the not distant future. You will also note the statement that Italy entered the war practically for the sole purpose of making the annexations now claimed. I do not suppose that the American Government, in making large loans of money, in the contribution of large quantities of supplies, and in furnishing the slight direct military assistance which it did to Italy, had for a moment in mind the fact that it was doing all this solely for the purpose of enabling Italy to make these conquests.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

[Enclosure]

*The Italian Military Representative on the Supreme War Council  
(di Robilant) to the American Military Representative on the  
Supreme War Council (Bliss)*

## THE ITALIAN PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC

### PREFACE

The many arguments which have been put forward in favor of New Italy's right to extend its sovereignty over some strips of the eastern coast of the Adriatic are, by now, generally known. These arguments were an inducement for Italy to enter into the huge fight, which has raged over Europe for four years, and if, at the time they were the very objects of the war, their fulfillment ought to be today the reward for the tremendous sufferings which the country has undergone.

These arguments may be roughly divided in two classes: some of them appeal to sentiment, others are based upon facts. This distinction makes it clear that whilst some of our claims (those based on sentiment) although quite legitimate and fair could not, by themselves be strong enough as a deciding argument at the peace conference; others (those based on facts) represent such indispensable needs that failure to get these recognized would deprive Italy of the fruits of her great victory, would cripple her prospects, and definitely prejudice the possibility of a quiet and prosperous future, such as the new destinies indicated by this war offer to our race. This is why Italy cannot but insist on them.

### PART I.—SENTIMENTAL ARGUMENTS

#### *Historical Reasons.*

Danielli in his book "Dalmatia" has thus epitomized the Italian character of Dalmatia at the end of his chapter on Dalmatian history:

"Already in the third century before Christ, did the Romans, then at war with the Carthaginians, understand how necessary it was to them to rule the Adriatic, and that in order to do so they needed to dominate its Eastern Coast. It was thus that after the end of the first Punic War they started in 229 B. C. the first of these ten Illyrian wars which in the year 78 B. C. brought the entire region East of the Adriatic under their rule.

"The whole of Dalmatia belonged to Rome for nearly six centuries without interruption: it went then to the Italian Kingdom of Odoacre and to the Italian Kingdom of the Ostrogoths: and finally to the Empire of the East when Italy was reconquered. Venice had possession of the whole of it from the end of the XV century to the end of the XVIII century except for such temporary and partial losses



which occurred in her struggles with the Turks. Venice never gave up the islands and the towns on the Dalmatian coast not even during those short periods during which Dalmatia was partially Croat or Hungarian.

"Only at the end of the XVIII century Dalmatia came under the rule of the Austrian Monarchy and only in as much as it was made an heir to the territory of the Venetian Republic. Dalmatia remained therefore even then all one with Italy. It was included in Napoleon's ephemeral Kingdom of Italy, from which it was only temporarily severed to form the provinces of Illyria. It then was restored unto Austria together with Venice and it is only from 1866 until today that it has existed politically severed from the Italian peninsula.

"Therefore not only by nature art and civilisation, but also through its history, Dalmatia essentially pertains to Italy."

### *Geographical Reasons.*

To summarize all the conditions orographical, hydrographical, geological, climatic, etc., which determine the geographical characteristics of Dalmatia would be beyond the scope of a short article. Such a study would involve a lengthy reference to numerous books dealing with the various aspects of this question and its consequences would be to show that even the Austrian and German geographical experts admit that indisputably Dalmatia belongs to Italy.

In this connection, a reference to Danielli's great book is of interest. On page 8 he thus expresses himself:

"Now Dalmatia both as regards its mainland and neighbouring isles consists of a low lying territory at the foot of the slopes descending from a high plateau. Thus its clearly defined characteristics which differentiate it from those of the interior of the continent have impelled all authorities, ancient and modern, Italian or alien, to affirm that Dalmatia is geographically a unit completely divorced from the remainder of the Balkan peninsula in spite of territorial continuity".

### *Ethnic Reasons.*

Venetian Domination ended by the inclusion of these provinces in the "Serenissima" (i. e. Venetian Republic) of which they became the most solid bulwark containing the most loyal population. Language, religion, dress, buildings, all have testified during past centuries as they do today, to the fact that Dalmatia has become, as she is at present, absolutely Italian. Latin civilization spread itself from that country as far as Croatian, Hungarian and Turkish barbarism permitted; but none of these has ever been able to establish themselves on the Adriatic, which remained notwithstanding an Italian lake.

Then came on the scene Austria after the Treaty of Campoformio (1797). The moving episodes of this period, the profound grief of the population of Dalmatia, when the sacred Winged Lion of St. Mark was forced to yield to the two-headed eagle of the Hapsburgs,

are related in history. But if the lion disappeared from the flags it remained imprinted in the monuments and hearts of the people!

Dalmatia remained fundamentally and faithfully Italian.

To overcome this resistance but one course was open to Austria; this was to denationalize Dalmatia. The long odyssey of the Italians persecuted by officials in their homes, in their churches by a new semi-barbaric race, which urged on and favoured by Austria violently infiltrated itself and pushed aside the Italian elements, has been consecrated in literature.

And it should be emphasized that in Dalmatia, since the time of the Venetian Republic the Italians have retained control of the public offices, municipalities, learned professions, commerce and industry, in one word, they have been the dominating element in the intellectual life and commerce of the community, while manual and agricultural labour has always been left to a great extent to the Croatian and Slav elements, in a broad spirit of conciliation, civilization and colonization.

Under the astute Austrian policy artificial Slavo-Croat immigration, which was started towards 1848 and reached its maximum after 1860, was encouraged by every means available, while an underhand contest was conducted aiming at the exclusion of the Italians from public positions and from the moral and intellectual status which they had held during centuries past.

Such a policy necessarily resulted in an increase of the number of the Slavs and a diminution in that of the Italians. Austrian statistics are falsified and ingeniously exaggerated to the detriment of Italian interest. According to what they quote in 1865 there were 384,000 Serbo-Croats as against 55,000 Italians, while according to the last Austro-Hungarian official statistics the total Dalmatian population would be of about 627,000 inhabitants of whom only about 20,000 Italians.

In the Dalmatian "capitanati" included within the armistice line the total population is of 294,900 inhabitants, which includes 280,900 Slavs or Slav-speaking folk, viz. the Morlacchi\* amounting to about 93,000 and 14,000 Italians. In the "capitanati" not comprised within the same line on a total population of 333,000 inhabitants, 329,000 would be Slavs or Slav-speaking people (viz. the 100,000 Morlacchi) and 4,000 Italians.

The arbitrary proceedings and the systematic falsification of the official statistics at the disadvantage of the Italian element are well

---

\*Note 1. These Morlacchi (abbreviation of Moor-Walachians) are of purely Romanic and Latin race, like the Kutzo-Walachians of Pindus, who have such a pronounced national physiognomy. The most rigorous impartial ethnological studies demonstrate that this population is not Slav, as the Slavs themselves differentiate them from themselves and from the Italians. [Footnote in the original.]

known; it is likewise notorious that the latter element, following the most recent and accredited demographic investigations, is composed of over 80,000 inhabitants. The official figures ought to be accordingly rectified as follows:

In the Dalmatian "capitanati" included within the armistice line there would be about 93,000 Morlacchi and 56,000 Italians against 145,000 Slavs; in the "capitanati" not included within the above mentioned line there would be about 100,000 Morlacchi and 29,000 Italians against 204,000 Slavs properly speaking.

Besides, even if we admit the diminution of the Italian elements in the population shown by the Austro-Hungarian statistics, we should still ask ourselves this question: Does immigration, when, in a given region, it results in a majority over the pre-existing population necessarily confer the rights of sovereignty on the new-comers? The answer is, yes, perhaps when the case involves countries sparsely inhabited by barbaric races, or belonging to a civilisation definitely inferior, that is, when immigration presents the characteristics of a real and effective colonization, but certainly not if the case is one of a race of a civilization inferior to that of the population of the territory in question, even if the latter is in the minority; certainly not if the said minority keeps all its own national characteristics and finds itself strong enough to infuse these in the majority, by process of assimilation; when it keeps and spreads its own language and control of its industry, its commerce, retains its civil powers and carries on nearly exclusively learned professions.

Far less should such an immigration confer rights, when it is the result not of a natural and necessary expansion but is the outcome of political phenomena and of the policy of an unnatural government.

The nature of the very recent proceedings, which are causing the Italians to renounce their nationality may be gathered from the reports received of the action taken against our compatriots at Spalato, at Sebenico and at other places by the newly appointed successors to the sovereignty of Austria.

#### *Moral Reasons.*

Is it possible that Europe will agree to denying to victorious Italy the fruits of their great victory? Is it possible that after so much blood has been freely shed that the reward for which she so valiantly staked her existence should be taken away from her? Is it possible that, in compliance with the principles set forth by Wilson, a formula could be found to condemn a race, even if numerically reduced, to be subject to the rule of a civilization still semi-barbaric, while that race claims a millenium of Latin civilization?

The Italian minority is merely a fruit of methodical coercion carried on by means of prisons and gallows, of systematic expropriation, of unending persecution conducted with bureaucratic methods zealously applied by a brutal police.

After the enforcement of the notorious Language Ordinance, which in 1912 eliminated the Italian Language from public offices in Dalmatia, nothing remained to complete the political destruction of the Italians.

In conclusion we feel confident that in the case of Dalmatia, the questions of this artificial and enforced immigration of Slavs and of the violent methods adopted towards the Italians, will receive the same consideration as will the analogous problems of Alsace-Lorraine.

## PART II.—ARGUMENTS BASED ON FACTS

### *Military Geographical Arguments.*

In order thoroughly to understand the extremely poor strategical and tactical situation which nature has provided for Italy on the western coast of the Adriatic, it is useful to recall some geographical features which cannot be modified by art, craftsmanship or human will.

On the eastern coast there is a wonderful advanced barrier of reefs and islands which, like an impassable screen, protect the mainland and the lines of communication along the coast. On the western coast there is a low beach undefended and exposed to aggression and invasion of every kind. On the east navigation in still waters is possible no matter from what quarter the wind blows; on the west there is no shelter and sailing becomes difficult and risky as soon as ever the sea gets rough. On the east, harbours, wide recesses and good anchorage are to be found anywhere; on the west, landing is generally impossible and it is difficult for ships to find a haven or a shelter.

On the east, the coast rises in cliffs each of which is a splendid observation post dominating a wide surface; on the west, the land (with the exception of Gargano and Conero) lies absolutely flat and low and any far-reaching observation on the sea is impossible except through aviation, which, however, can only be active under favourable weather conditions.

On the east, the sea is clear and deep and mines can be used with difficulty; on the west, the waters are muddy and shallow and seem made on purpose to favour the terribly insidious work of submarine weapons.

On the east, there is every favourable condition for torpedo boats and submarines to lie in ambush, while on the west, the coast is so flat and straight as to exclude even the possibility of any stealth.

Even marine currents are favourable to the Dalmatian coast, since they move from south to north along the eastern coast of the Adriatic; on reaching the Ancona parallel they turn from east to west and wind again southwards along our coast. Consequently, any mine which is torn from its anchorage or thrown into the current on the eastern coast is automatically brought to us to cause death and destruction.

At daybreak when the light dawns on a fleet which may have crossed the Adriatic in the dark with a view to attacking the opposite coast, any ships coming from the west would be blinded by the rising sun and find the high eastern coast still entirely clad in darkness, whilst a fleet coming from the east would have the sun at its back and thus be in an ideal position as far as the light is concerned, while the Italian coast would lie helpless before her under the rising sun.

An eastern fleet, always screened by islands, unseen and protected from any attack, can transfer her ships from north to south or vice-versa from Pola to Cattaro, i. e. along the greater part of the Adriatic coast, sheltered from mines and submarines, whilst the Italian fleet, on leaving Brindisi, is immediately sighted and can be chased, completely unsheltered, up to Venice.

#### *Military Strategical Arguments.*

1) Italy possesses only two naval harbours in the Adriatic, i. e. Brindisi in the south and Venice in the north; they are 750 kilometres apart, and neither of them could hold a large fleet. The geographical structure of the coast between those two points prevents the building of a large central naval harbour.

It is consequently impossible for the Italian fleet in the Adriatic to keep together in one anchorage according to sound strategical principles (as for instance in the case of the British Fleet at Scapa Flow, or the French Fleet at Corfu) but her fleet must be divided between Brindisi and Venice, with some ships even at the outside port of Taranto which is not in the Adriatic at all.

This is not entirely due to lack of space at the naval bases in the Adriatic above referred to, but also to the fact that if the whole of the fleet were gathered at Brindisi, it could not, on account of the distance, reach the northern Adriatic in time to prevent an enemy attack against the coast, and likewise, if it were gathered in Venice, it would be impossible to reach the southern coast in time. In both cases a fleet belonging to the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic could always have a free choice both of time and place for an attack; this could be carried out and the fleet could then

retire in good time behind the splendid barrier of Dalmatian reefs and isles before the Italian fleet could reach the spot and deliver battle.

2) The Italian Fleet being necessarily split up between Brindisi and Venice, the enemy in possession of the central part of the Dalmatian shore from Zara to Spalato, including Sebenico's splendid naval harbour, could at any time come out into the open sea to deliver battle. The Italian Fleet coming partly from Venice and partly from Brindisi would then necessarily be compelled to meet with only one part of its forces the whole of the enemy's ships, and would be obliged to accept battle before being able tactically to join the rest of its forces.

Hence ensues the absolute naval submission of the western coast fleet to the fleet from the east coast. Such submission could be expressed as follows: "it would be impossible to attack the eastern fleet on the open sea under equal conditions" or else: "it would be impossible to avoid the strategical and tactical superiority of the enemy even if, on the whole, he were numerically inferior".

3) Even if, at the expense of many milliards, Italy should decide to make Venice and Brindisi into naval bases, each roomy enough to harbour a large fleet, and if after having done so, she should decide to develop her Adriatic Fleet and make it double the enemy's fleet in the same sea, even then, she would have no possibility of forcing the enemy to battle on equal conditions. In fact, whilst the enemy's fleet, on reaching the Italian coast is at any time in a condition to bombard thickly-peopled cities, to break up railways and roads, telegraphic, telephonic and optical connections, to prevent movement of troops towards the north during mobilisation, possibly to land small bodies of troops, and having done so, to retire to its base; on the contrary, the Italian fleet, on reaching the eastern coast would meet a barrier of reefs, isles and mined channels which form an inviolable line of defence of the enemy's mainland, and which screen and protect any shifting of the enemy's fleet northwards or southwards, thus enabling him either to avoid the battle or to issue from the North or South from behind the defensive barrier, attacking the Italian fleet from the back on the open sea, cutting it off from its base and keeping up the battle long enough to bring it near to exhaustion. That is to say, it would be impossible to reach by an attack either the enemy's coast or the enemy's fleet, and it would also be impossible to get back in time to our bases if the enemy should decide to prevent it.

Without any further consideration, it appears plainly that "in regard to the naval problem the possibility of absolutely mastering the strategical situation belongs to him who possesses the eastern coast of the Adriatic". Italy will never feel secure in the Adriatic unless

she can at least obtain possession of the central part of Dalmatia and its protecting and adjoining isles.

Only this possession will enable her:

*a)* to protect the central part of the Italian coast from Brindisi to Venice, enabling her fleet to be on the spot in time before the enemy should reach it either from the North or from the South.

*b)* to prevent the enemy from moving freely and secretly southwards or northwards behind a barrier of isles, without emerging into the open sea, should he intend avoid a battle.

*c)* to attack the enemy on his coasts, on his line of communication, to disturb his mobilisation movements from South to North, either on sea or on land, if operations should compel him to carry his troops towards the northeastern Italian frontier.

*d)* to reverse the present naval strategical situation which enables the enemy to have his fleet all on one spot wherever he pleases, and compels Italy to have hers split up in the places apart and very far from each other; allowing Italy, therefore, to have her fleet all on one spot in the centre of the Adriatic whilst compelling the enemy to split his forces partly towards the north and partly towards the south. We need consider the possibility that owing to the latest development of modern naval warfare, large ships may disappear, thus rendering useless large fleets and large naval bases. Torpedo boats, submarines, motor boats, light ships and all else which has combined to substitute insidious naval warfare for the classical battle on the seas, have only one object, i. e. the destruction of a fleet; if big ships cease to exist all means of an attack on big ships would also automatically disappear; they would be transformed and used as weapons against the enemy's maritime trade.

But even if the whole problem did only consist in insidious warfare, what would ever be the position of the nation possessing a flat and low coastline, with no protection, with shallow waters readily mined, with no isles, as against the nation disposing of a wonderful maze of shelters of all kinds, of numberless channels, of first class observation points scattered all over, of deep waters, havens safe against any sea, and where sailing is possible in still waters whatever may be the weather? If insidious warfare should substitute surface warfare, more than ever would Italy's position of inferiority be obvious and unbearable as against the position of the nation possessing the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

Neither is it correct to consider that the heirs on the Adriatic to the Austrian Kingdom have no fleet at present, nor that they have no intention of building one in the near future. By the Campoformio and Luneville Treaties Napoleon had imposed on Austria the neutralization of the Adriatic. This did not prevent Austria from being, sixty years later, a naval power, capable of conducting a successful naval campaign. The same might happen again notwithstanding any present promise. But even if such promises were kept indefinitely,

we learn through history that only groups of nations have the possibility of sustaining a war. In the event of a possible future coalition against Italy, Austria's heirs, even if without a fleet themselves, could certainly put their wonderful coast at the disposal of the fleet of their Allies, which would amount to the same thing as far as Italy is concerned.

Now, it was largely for the very object of solving definitely the wretched situation which from a strategical point of view she had on the Adriatic that Italy went to war against Austria. Even if the old enemy has disappeared, the geographical conditions which are the basis of this naval problem still remain unchanged.

It is owing to these geographical conditions that Italy in order to be safe within her own frontiers, must possess Dalmatia from Zara to Spalato, as well as the isles in front of the coast and adjoining it, i. e. the Lussinian and Curzolan islands. In fact, the possession of these islands would be worthless if heavy enemy artillery could make the anchorage and transit along them unsafe and even impossible.

It is therefore clear that Italy's claims, such as are shown in the London treaty have not arisen from imperialistic claims but simply from military necessity. It is not from the desire of conquering the territory of others, but simply owing to absolute need for our own future safety that we must ask today to be guided by what has proved a historical experience from the time of ancient Rome to the time of the Venetian Republic, and thence up to the present day. That is to say, we must ask to be given the key to the strategical and military situation in the Adriatic, i. e. Dalmatia with its isles, which have always belonged to every Adriatic power which has been in a position to rule its own destiny.

Even if, from a general point of view, Italy's claims had not, in respect of others, a more righteous case, it is indubitable that Italy has at least won the right to priority over Austria's heirs, who up to the last moment have staunchly supported the Hapsburg cause against the Entente.

#### *Military Legal Arguments.*

Let us now consider the problem in the light of recent events, which intended to revive entirely the Austrian Fleet, i. e., the fleet of the defeated enemy under a new flag, thus snatching from us the main advantage of our victory, which consisted in the wiping out of the fleet of our old enemy in the Adriatic, where there is no room for two.

The Austrian fleet has been passed on [to] the Jugo-Slavs through a deed which has been signed on the one side by the legal representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, but on the other side by absolutely unknown individuals who had no legal right to be recognized



as representing a State which, up to the present time, has not been established. In fact, if we are to consider the Jugo-Slavs as forming a new State, legally established on a legal basis, we must remark that a new State cannot definitely arise either from a defeat or from a victory, and still less from an armistice. It can only be established by the final decisions of a peace treaty, and by the final settlement which the Powers will agree to give to the world at large and especially to Europe.

It seems therefore quite obvious that as long as peace has not been concluded and the new map of Europe has not been definitely traced, there can be no doubt about the non-existence of a Jugo-Slav State, whose frontiers, territory, form of government, responsible Chief of Chiefs, laws, and all else that is essential to the existence of a State, are so far absolutely unknown.

Consequently, since a Fleet cannot but be a prominent feature of a State organization, there cannot be a fleet where there is no State. There cannot be a Jugo-Slav fleet as long as there is no Jugo-Slav State, that is to say, as long as peace is not signed.

The fleet which some call Jugo-Slav, is therefore both from a legal and naval standpoint [nothing] else but the defeated Austrian fleet which, in order to escape capture or surrender has arbitrarily and illegally changed its flag.

It is absolutely immaterial as far as the legal side is concerned whether the flag was changed before or after the armistice between Italy and Austria. If it was changed before it is still doubtless that it was Austria's fleet, (namely, the fleet of the State which was at war) which changed its flag. Now International Law forbids any belligerent to change its flag during war, and since the armistice had not been signed, we were undoubtedly still at war. No one can therefore admit as legally valid any change of flag which has taken place under such conditions. On the other hand, if the flag was changed after the armistice, it is plain Fraud since the conditions of the armistice provided explicitly that the enemy's fleet, i. e., the Austrian Fleet should be surrendered at Venice, which has absolutely not been done.

Truly both the Italian Navy and the Italian Nation deserved a better reward for their heroic bravery, and this reward, as far as the Navy is concerned, has been snatched from them through a mean and illegal intrigue. The case has been quite different in regard to the defeated German fleet. In hearing of the solemn and stern ceremony of the surrender of the German fleet to the British Navy one cannot but feel heartbroken that a similar reward was denied to our Navy, which surely had gained a full right to it through sacrifice and splendid valour.

Great honour is certainly due to our race which, in order to avoid conflicts and not to hamper the weary and complicated work of settling peace, has made it possible for the Italian Government not to insist on claiming this satisfaction, but in no case and for no reason must this be considered as a definite renunciation, when it simply means that Italy is patiently waiting for Justice.

In fact, having completely defeated her enemy, Italy has full right to claim that the Adriatic should be cleared of the enemy fleet. If this is not effected, all the sacrifice and bloodshed of the past years will have been in vain since, after such a long and terrible war, Italy would still be faced by the former unchanged conditions. It is really inconceivable that the fruits of victory as far as the Navy is concerned should be nullified simply by adding a blue stripe to a red and white flag. This is not enough to destroy more than three years' war effort of a Nation of 40 millions, since the changing of a flag does not alter the crews; and those very men who have been fighting us bitterly up to the last, may be our bitter opponents in the future.

It is therefore necessary, to ensure in the future a safe peace, both to Italy and to Europe that the fleet of the vanquished enemy should be surrendered to the victor, or failing this, that it should be destroyed.

Even if this second alternative should prevail at the Peace Conference, there is one point which has to be made clear and for which we have to stand. We have lost through mean fraud and enemy treachery two of our finest ships: *Leonardo da Vinci* and *Benedetto Brin*, blown up in harbour by Austria's criminal agents. Only for Justice sake those two ships must in any case be replaced. Consequently, even if the Peace Conference should not endorse the proposal that the defeated Austrian Fleet should be delivered to Italy, (a fair and proportionate part being allotted to the Allied Navies who have fought by our side), and decides that it should merely be destroyed, it will be necessary that at least two dreadnoughts should be given to us in exchange for the two which were treacherously blown up by the enemy.

Italy claims the *Prinz Eugen* and the *Tegetoff*.

#### *Military Political Arguments.*

Besides, what can be the aim of this Jugo-Slav fleet which has so obstinately insisted and succeeded in remaining on the Eastern Adriatic coast, notwithstanding all clauses of the Armistice? Against whom can it be a weapon or a threat? Evidently not against France or against England, nor yet against the United States. There is therefore only one Nation left against whom under another flag and another name, the long inheritance of hatred sown by Austria on the Adriatic shores, shores which once belonged to Venice and which still bear the marks of its splendour, would be directed. This Nation is Italy.

Now Italy has fought this terrible war in order to break at last the long tradition of hatred. It is impossible that after having achieved victory she may agree to have in existence, under another flag, that very fleet which has been a constant menace to two generations of sailors and of patriots. Nor is it enough to take the fleet from Austria (i. e. the Jugo-Slavs); they must give up also Dalmatia and its isles and naval bases, without which this huge conflict would remain fruitless for us, leaving our future safety and prosperity in a precarious position and constantly threatened as they have been ever since Dalmatia ceased to be politically one with Italy.

Mere neutralisation or internationalisation of Dalmatia would also be worthless. Both these measures could only be fictitious and temporary remedies which would not solve the serious Adriatic problem and would only bear the germs of new and painful future conflicts.

The question cannot be compromised. If we, who have gallantly and faithfully fought with our Allies for right and justice, are at fault, let us pay for it. But if we have brought our fair contribution to Victory, let us have the prize to which we have a full right, and let us break without quibbles and compromises, the chain which would, throughout the future, handicap our prosperity and our peaceful growth.

#### *Economical Arguments.*

Free business intercourse and trade, as well as industrial and maritime expansion will be the essential factors of this growth.

Let us see what the conditions in regard to this provided for Italy by the Treaty of London, i. e. by the compromise which was made in 1915 between the Italian and the Russian Governments.

Whilst Italy obtained recognition of her rights only to one commercially and economically important port, the Slavs were granted possession of at least seven ports of economic importance, since they are the outlets of wide hinterlands. They were thus practically given all the commercial outlets on the East coast of the Adriatic except Trieste.

These ports are Fiume, Spalato, Metcovich, Cattaro, Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno. Trieste is not a port whose sphere of action does particularly extend to the Western Balkans.

The ports of Istria and those of Zara and Sebenico have, on account of geographic conditions, merely a local function. Zara and Sebenico cannot compete in any way with Spalato. On the contrary, from every one of the above mentioned seven ports important lines of penetration diverge and every one of them is the natural outlet to wide Balkan territories.

An absolute and substantial economic predominance has thus been ensured to the Slavs.

## CONCLUSION

This memorandum, which has been prepared by the General Staff of the Navy, only deals with the Adriatic problem from a naval point of view and does not consider the military side of the question, nor any of the many other points which are all equally essential to Italy's growth.

Its object is to show that for historical, geographical, ethnical, moral and legal reasons, as well as on account of urgent naval necessity, our Nation cannot but claim at the Peace Conference the full and uncontested control of Dalmatia as an indispensable condition of the country's peaceful and prosperous development in all fields. The Treaty of London is a minimum below which it is impossible to fall, whilst it admits of higher claims proportionate to the function which Italy has had in the League of civilized nations which were associated in the strife against the Central Powers. This function has proved to be so much above any expectation of our Allies that it opens new horizons for our Nation which cannot escape notice by our statesmen, who would certainly not willingly renounce the duty of setting them forth and insisting on them at the right moment.

The Navy willingly repeats Attilio Tamaro's fine words: "No imperialism nor any wish for military domination pushes us towards Dalmatia, but seek her in order to eliminate any possibility of future enemy threats to us, and to assert the predominance of our own civilisation which will make the Adriatic into a lake on which trade intercourse will grow peaceful, active and uninterrupted even should war ever break out elsewhere. Any man who is willing to attain this object ought to support an Adriatic programme in harmony with Italy's supreme interests, since any man who has a clear conception of geography, history and of the real conditions of the peoples who at present are aiming towards the Adriatic must be intimately and firmly convinced, that as long as the Adriatic problem has not been fully solved so as to exclude the possibility of any naval threat to Italy, our country will necessarily have a new Adriatic problem to solve whenever international difficulties arise in Europe."

---

*The Technical Adviser to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Miller)  
to Colonel E. M. House*<sup>49</sup>

11 JANUARY, 1919.

SIR: In response to your inquiry relative to the Pact of London of April 26, 1915, I have the honor to state as follows:

Pursuant to the correspondence between the President and the Allies, including the memorandum of observations by the Allied Govern-

---

<sup>49</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 237.

ments, quoted in the note of the President of November 5, 1918,<sup>50</sup> agreement was reached that peace should be effected upon the terms stated in the Address of the President of January 8, 1918, (The Fourteen Points)<sup>51</sup> and the Principles enunciated in his subsequent addresses, subject only to certain qualifications mentioned in said correspondence.

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that any provisions of the Pact of London of April 26, 1915, which may be inconsistent with the agreement above mentioned, reached between the Allies (including Italy, France, and Great Britain) and the United States, were by that agreement abrogated and are no longer in force.

I am [etc.]

DAVID HUNTER MILLER

---

<sup>50</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 468.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

## JAPAN

763.72119/2583 : Telegram

### *The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, November 13, 1918—8 p. m.  
[Received November 13—5:44 p. m.]

The news of the armistice is viewed by the Japanese press and people with a detached attitude. Satisfaction is professed but without enthusiasm. Newspaper comments reveal a keen interest in Japan's aims at the Peace Commissioner [*Conference?*], chief emphasis being laid on the necessity of securing recognition of Japan's paramount position in Eastern Asia. The advance in quotations on the stock exchanges both at Osaka and Tokyo were not anticipated and indicates a general feeling of optimism in economic circles. The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs met today when it is reported Japan's peace terms which have been drafted by the Foreign Office in collaboration with the War and Navy Departments and the appointment of a new Ambassador were discussed.

MORRIS

---

763.72119/2636 : Telegram

### *The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

TOKYO, November 15, 1918—11 p. m.  
[Received November 16—10:08 a. m.]

An adjourned meeting of the Advisory Council has been called for next Tuesday, to consider further the plans for Japan's participation in the Peace Conference. The Minister for Foreign Affairs announced today that he anticipated two conferences, one for the actual signing of peace with the Central Powers, and another early next year for a more conclusive settlement of international question[s]. Chinda or Matsui will probably act alone for the present but the government contemplates sending to the second conference a special mission consisting of a number of Army and Navy experts and members of the permanent diplomatic service and headed by a statesman of recognized prestige. The Navy has already decided upon Admiral Takeshita as its chief representative. Who the others to be selected are, particularly the head of the mission, is much debated. My British colleague is show-

ing unusual interest in the subject and has discussed it with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He favors Viscount Kato who seems also to be the most popular choice in Japan, but his appointment is doubtful for political reasons.

It is hoped by Japanese that the organization of a League of Nations will offer an opportunity to assert the equality of the yellow race, a question which underlies all discussions on the subject. With this in mind plans are being seriously discussed for an immediate alliance with China so that the two nations may work in harmony at the Conference.

Mister Norman, counsellor of the British Embassy has been chosen as one of the advisers of the British Bondholders Commission and leaves for London next week. He has had long experience in Japanese and Near Eastern affairs.

Peace celebrations are being planned by the authorities in the larger cities.

MORRIS

---

763.72119/3171

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

No. 299

TOKYO, November 27, 1918.

[Received December 23.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, supplementing my despatch No. 285 November 5, 1918,<sup>1</sup> a number of translations<sup>1</sup> made in this Embassy of comments in the Japanese Press and current magazines on matters connected with the position of Japan at the forthcoming Peace Conference and other related questions. While these comments are of the same character and scope as the earlier ones that have already been forwarded they show more fully and definitely what the Japanese public expects and desires in the way of a settlement after the war.

Mr. Kiroku Hayashi, M. P., considers the disposal of Kiaochow Bay the foremost among the questions affecting Japan exclusively. The abandonment of this territory by Germany he declares is of paramount importance for the preservation and peace of the Far East. He is, however, one of those who believe that the question of restoring [it?] to China should not be left to the Peace Conference, as it is a matter that concerns only China and Japan.

Dr. Mutsumami, of the Imperial University, has no doubt that the two countries, being of the same race and having a common medium of writing, can reach a satisfactory solution by themselves as to its disposal.

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Dr. Terao, a leading authority on International Law, voices a widely prevailing desire in proposing that Japan secure a lease on Tsingtao for a certain period, keeping in mind the object of restoring it to China eventually.

Baron Shibusawa, Japan's eminent financier, wants for Japan a recognized position of absolute superiority in China. He declares that, while the relations of other powers to China are those of interest, the relations of Japan are more vital, affecting her existence, and therefore she cannot place her interests on a par with those of other powers.

Mr. Oishi, a former leader of the Kenseikai Party, asks for special recognition only in respect to Manchuria and Mongolia, so that Japan can make herself secure from the possibility of post-bellum economic rivalries of the powers in those regions.

With regard to Siberia, the *Yamato* advocates that Japan insist at the Peace Conference on having Vladivostock converted into a free port; that the Chinese Eastern Railway be placed under Japanese control; and that other Siberian Railways under the joint control of the Allied Powers.

With regard to a League of Nations, Mr. Hayashi believes that, while it will be a gratifying achievement for the sake of the world's peace, care must be taken to remove artificial barriers that may hinder the peaceful development of individual nations. The preservation of the territorial *status quo* indefinitely will be, he states, a source of affliction to nations with limited areas that contemplate future development, the progress of mankind and the development of states will thus be obstructed. Indeed the idea that the League of Nations will circumscribe rather than assist weak and poor nations in achieving their manifest destiny is widely prevalent among Japanese publicists.

The limitation of armaments does not meet with much favor in Japan. The *Kokumin* asserts that it is doubtful whether Great Britain and America will consent to break up their warships and use the steel for other purposes, and points out that the Japanese Army is to Japan what Navies are to Britain and America. Even Baron Shibusawa advises the nations to be ready for America, the Champion of Democracy, lest she make it a part of her policy to check Japan's military expansion in the future.

There is in fact general fear of America's growing power, and distrust of her motives. The *Chuwo* warns America that if she becomes conceited and attributes the defeat of the enemy to her own strength, assuming at the same time a positive attitude in world affairs, she will be doomed as Germany is now doomed. If she recklessly attempts to display her strength, this journal concludes, the result will be the **unhappiness of mankind.**



The conviction is general that Japan has much at stake in the deliberations of the Peace Conference, not only in respect to the specific terms that affect Japan exclusively, but also in regard to general questions of post-bellum reconstruction. It is argued that Japan must take a leading part in the problems that affect the Far East, particularly in view of the fact, as the *Kokumin* points out, that the fate of the Yellow Race depends upon the attitude of Japan. While Japan has not been formerly [*formally?*] entrusted with representing the Race, this journal observes, it is a question whether China's voice will be effective, because the value of her part in the war is not generally recognized, and also because her war aims are not clear.

I have [etc.]

ROLAND S. MORRIS

862.20294/21 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1918—8 p. m.

177. For House. The Department is in receipt of a telegram dated the 2nd instant from the Embassy at Tokyo reading as follows:

"Department's November 30, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> regarding German propaganda. Reference Embassy's quarterly report number 3.<sup>2</sup> Since the collapse of the Central Powers, all traces pro-German sentiment have at least temporarily disappeared, showing that its former strength was at the same time its weakness. That is to say, this propaganda was largely the work of militarists and German educated university professors, whose prestige depended upon preserving institutions of a German pattern and therefore it became thoroughly discredited as soon as it could no longer be demonstrated that Germany was worthy of emulation or expedient to cultivate on account of her strength. In this connection it is significant that none of the Peace Conference delegates on the part of Japan are classed as belonging to the German school. At the present moment I can trace no influences here which would indicate German origin. Morris."

POLK

763.72/12570a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—4 p. m.

Press reports give summary of recent statement alleged to have been made by Okuma, indicating Japan's ambitions in South Sea Islands. Please cable substance of statement, indicating reason for

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

statement, date, occasion upon which made, and such other information as you may be able to obtain. Please mail full text in first pouch.  
POLK

---

763.72/12571 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, December 21, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 21—12:37 p. m.]

Your telegram December 19, 4 p. m. Since the publication of the interview reported in my telegram of November 3, 1 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> Okuma has made no public statement with reference to Japan's ambitions in the South Sea Islands. Reports in the American press are probably based on a special interview granted their representative which were [*was*] not given out in Japan.

MORRIS

---

763.72119/3248 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>4</sup>

TOKYO, January 2, 1919—9 p. m.

[Received January 2—6:47 p. m.]

In a contribution to the *Kokumin* of January 1st, Marquis Okuma states that permanent peace cannot be achieved without first solving the question of the equality of treatment of races and the question of armaments. He asks how America proposes to treat in future the alien races in her territory, and expresses the hope that American public opinion will adopt a generous attitude toward this question. At the same time he insists that Japanese emigrants be freely allowed to enter every country. He further hopes that in order to act [*secure*] a permanent peace the powers will avoid severe tariff wars. In connection with the question of armaments, the Marquis asks how America's new naval program and Great Britain's insistence on naval supremacy can be reconciled with the declarations of these countries. He hopes that the press reports to the effect that Congress has disapproved of President Wilson's fourteen fundamental terms are without foundation.

MORRIS

---

<sup>3</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 661.

<sup>4</sup> Forwarded to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, Jan. 6, 1919, 3 p. m.

763.72119/3308 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOKYO, January 7, 1919—1 p. m.  
[Received January 7—11:05 a. m.]

Marquis Saionji, Japanese Peace Ambassador, accompanied by his personal suite consisting of Prince Konoye, Mr. Saionji, his heir, Dr. Minucle, his physician, Mr. Matsuoka, secretary, Mr. Akzuki, formerly Ambassador to Austria Hungary, Viscount Motono, son of the late Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Ito, son of the late Prince Ito, will leave for France on the *Tamba Maru* sailing on January 14th via Suez and due to arrive Marseilles early in March.

Prince Konoye, in a contribution to *Japan and the Japanese*, a fortnightly magazine, urges that Japan should lend no ears to a peace based on Anglo-American interests alone, because economic imperialism with which these powers threaten the world is no less a menace to the free development of nations than military imperialism. He therefore regrets that Japanese are inclined to accept without discount or examination the democracy and humanitarianism advocated by British and American statesmen. While not opposing a league of nations based on justice and humanity in the strict sense, he thinks that if one such as favored by America and Great Britain is formed, the two powers will have the lion's share of the advantages, while others, deprived of the arms to resist their economic aggression, will be obliged to submit to the lead of these two powers. If Great Britain closes her colonies to foreign countries, how can Japan maintain her existence with her limited territory, slender resources and poorly equipped factories? Under such circumstances Japan will be obliged to assume the same attitude as Germany before the war and destroy the *status quo*. Prince Konoye further insists that the discriminatory treatment accorded to yellow race in America and British colonies must be removed. It is worthy of note that Prince Konoye's views are shared by a number of publicists.

MORRIS

# PROPOSALS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS



## PROPOSALS FOR A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

*Draft of Colonel House, July 16, 1918*<sup>1</sup>

### SUGGESTION FOR A COVENANT OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

#### PREAMBLE

International civilization having proved a failure because there has not been constructed a fabric of law to which nations have yielded with the same obedience and deference as individuals submit to intra-national laws, and because public opinion has sanctioned unmoral acts relating to international affairs, it is the purpose of the States signatory to this Convention to form a League of Nations having for its purpose the maintenance throughout the world of peace, security, progress and orderly government. Therefore it is agreed as follows:

Article 1. The same standards of honor and ethics shall prevail internationally and in affairs of nations as in other matters. The agreement or promise of a Power shall be inviolate.

Article 2. No official of a Power shall, either directly or by indirection on behalf of his Government, be expected or permitted to act or communicate other than consistently with the truth, the honor and the obligation of the power which he represents.

Article 3. Any attempt by a Power, either openly or in secret, whether by propaganda or otherwise, to influence one Power or nation against another shall be deemed dishonorable.

Article 4. Any open or direct inquiry regarding the acts or purposes of a Power may be made by another Power as of course, and shall be regarded as an act of friendship tending to promote frankness in international relations, but any secret inquiry to such end shall be deemed dishonorable.

Article 5. Any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the League of Nations, and to the Powers, members thereof.

Article 6. The Ambassadors and Ministers of the Contracting Powers to X and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of X shall act as the respective delegates of the Powers in the League of Nations.

---

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York—London, 1928), vol. II, pp. 7-11.

The meetings of the delegates shall be held at the seat of government of X, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of X shall be the presiding officer.

If the delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of Y or Z, in which case the Ambassador or Minister to X of the country in which the meeting is held, shall be the presiding officer *pro tempore*.

Article 7. The Delegates shall meet in the interests of peace whenever war is rumored or threatened, and also whenever a Delegate of any power shall inform the Delegates that a meeting in the interests of peace is advisable.

Article 8. The Delegates shall also meet at such other times as they shall from time to time determine.

Article 9. The Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and may appoint committees to inquire and report. The Delegates shall constitute a Secretariat and fix the duties thereof and all expenses of the Secretariat shall be paid by the Contracting Powers as the Delegates may determine. In all matters covered by this article the Delegates may decide by the votes of a majority of the Contracting Powers represented.

Article 10. An International Court composed of not more than fifteen members shall be constituted, which shall have jurisdiction to determine any difference between nations which has not been settled by diplomacy, arbitration, or otherwise, and which relates to the existence, interpretation, or effect of a treaty, or which may be submitted by consent, or which relates to matters of commerce, including in such matters, the validity or effect internationally of a statute, regulation or practice. The Delegates may at their discretion submit to the Court such other questions as may seem to them advisable.

The judges of the International Court, shall, both originally and from time to time as vacancies may occur, be chosen by the Delegates. A judge of the International Court shall retire from office when he shall have reached the age of seventy-two years, and may be so retired at any time by a vote of two thirds of the Delegates, but in case of retirement of a judge from office, the salary paid to him shall be continued to be so paid during his natural life.

A judge may be removed by a vote of two thirds of the Delegates. The International Court shall formulate its own rules of procedure.

Article 11. Any difference between nations relating to matters of commerce and which involves the validity or effect internationally of a statute, regulation or practice, shall, if the Power having adopted such statute, regulation or practice so request, be submitted to its highest national court for decision, before submission to the International Court.

Article 12. The highest national court of each Contracting Power shall have jurisdiction to hear and finally determine any international dispute which may be submitted by consent for its decision.

Article 13. The Contracting Powers agree that all disputes between or among them or any of them of any nature whatsoever which shall not be settled by diplomacy and which are not within the provisions of Article 10 shall be referred for arbitration before three arbitrators, one to be selected by each party to the dispute and one to be chosen by two arbitrators so selected, or in the event of their failure to agree to such choice, the third arbitrator shall be selected by the Delegates.

The decision of the arbitrators may be set aside on the appeal of a party to the dispute, by a vote of three fourths of the Delegates, if the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, and by a vote of two thirds of the Delegates if the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous, but shall otherwise be finally binding and conclusive.

When any decision of the arbitrators shall have been set aside by the Delegates, the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitration before three arbitrators, chosen as heretofore provided, but none of whom shall have previously acted as such and the decision of the arbitrators upon the second arbitration shall be finally binding and conclusive without right of appeal.

Article 14. Any Power which the Delegates determine shall have failed to submit to the International Court any dispute of which that Court has jurisdiction as of course, or failed or neglected to carry out any decision of that Court, or of a national court to which a dispute has been submitted by consent for decision, or failed to submit to arbitration any dispute pursuant to Article 13 hereof, or failed to carry out any decision of the arbitrators, shall thereupon lose and be deprived of all rights of commerce and intercourse with the Contracting Powers.

Article 15. If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities before submitting a dispute with another Power as the case may be, either to the International Court or to Arbitrators, as herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities in regard to any dispute which has been decided adversely to it by said Court or by Arbitrators or pursuant to Article 12 hereof, as the case may be, the Contracting Powers shall not only cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power as in Article 14 provided, but shall also arrange to blockade and close the frontiers of that power to commerce and intercourse with the world.

Article 16. As regards disputes between one of the Contracting Powers and a Power not a party to this Convention, the Contracting Power shall endeavor to obtain submission of the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other state will not agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration the Contracting



Powers shall bring it before the Delegates. In the latter event the Delegates shall in the name of the League of Nations invite the state not a party to this Convention to become *ad hoc* a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to arbitration and in such case the provisions hereinbefore contained shall be applicable to the dispute both against and in favor of such state in all respects as if it were a party to this Convention.

Article 17. If the state not a party to this Convention will not accept the invitation to become *ad hoc* a party, the Delegates shall inquire into the dispute and shall make a recommendation in respect thereof.

Article 18. If hostilities shall be commenced against the Contracting Power by the other state before a decision of the dispute, or before the recommendation made by the Delegates in respect thereof, or contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers will thereupon cease all commerce and intercourse with the other state and will also arrange to blockade and close the frontiers of that state to commerce and intercourse with the world and any of the Contracting Powers may come to the assistance of the Contracting Power against which hostilities have been commenced.

Article 19. In the case of a dispute between states not parties to this Convention, any Power may bring the matter before the Delegates, who shall tender the good offices of the League of Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute.

If one of the Powers, party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to submit its interests and cause of action in regard thereto wholly to the control and decision of the League of Nations, that Power shall *ad hoc* be deemed a Contracting Power. If no one of the Powers, parties to such dispute, shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall take such action and make such recommendations to their Governments as will preserve peace and prevent hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article 20. The Contracting Powers unite in several guarantees to each other of their territorial integrity and political independence, subject, however, to such territorial modifications, if any, as may become necessary in the future by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations, pursuant to the principle of self-determination and as shall also be regarded by three fourths of the Delegates as necessary and proper for the welfare of the peoples concerned; recognizing also that all territorial changes involve equitable compensation and that the peace of the world is superior in importance and interest to questions of boundary.

Article 21. The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that permanent peace will require that national armaments shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with safety, and the Delegates are directed

to formulate at once a plan by which such a reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall not be binding until and unless unanimously approved by the Governments signatory to this Covenant.

The Contracting Powers agree that munitions and implements of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise and that publicity as to all national armaments and programmes is essential.

Article 22. Any Power not a party to this Convention may apply to the Delegates for leave to become a party. The Delegates may act favorably on the application if they shall regard the granting thereof as tending to promote the peace and security of the world.

Article 23. A. The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Convention abrogates all treaty obligations *inter se* inconsistent with the terms thereof, and that they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms hereof.

B. Where any of the Contracting Powers, before becoming party to this Convention, shall have entered into any treaty imposing upon it obligations inconsistent with the terms of this Convention, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

---

*President Wilson's First Draft*<sup>2</sup>

COVENANT

PREAMBLE

In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by the prescription of open and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect of all treaty obligations in the dealings of all organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to this covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt this constitution of the League of Nations.

Article I. The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreement shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates which shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. The meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat of government of H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the presiding officer of the Body.

Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet temporarily at the seat of government of B. or of S., in which

---

<sup>2</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 12-15.

case the Ambassador or Minister to H. of the country in which the meeting is held shall be the presiding officer *pro tempore*.

Article II. The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have power to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquire into and report upon any matters which lie within the field of their action.

They shall organize a Secretariat to act as their ministerial agency, and the expense of the maintenance of the Secretariat shall be borne as they may prescribe.

In all matters covered by this Article the Body of Delegates may decide by a majority vote of the whole Body.

Article III. The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdiction or boundary.

Article IV. The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishment and maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the Delegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such a reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be binding when, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatory to this Covenant.

The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private profit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes.

Article V. The Contracting Powers agree that all disputes arising between or among them of whatever nature, which shall not be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, shall be referred for arbitration to three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of the parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several parties and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their

number others of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of Delegates.

On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and conclusive.

When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside the dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding and conclusive without right of appeal.

Article VI. Any power which the Body of Delegates shall declare to have failed to submit any dispute to arbitration under the terms of Article V of this Covenant or to have refused or failed to carry out any decision of such arbitration shall thereupon lose and be deprived of all rights of commerce and intercourse with any of the Contracting Powers.

Article VII. If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute involved to arbitrators as herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been decided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein provided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that power to commerce or intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object.

Article VIII. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and those Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is rumoured or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power

shall inform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of peace is advisable.

The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine.

Article IX. In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved hereby binds itself to endeavor to obtain the submission to the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will not agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body of Delegates. The Delegates shall in such case, in the name of the League of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become *ad hoc* a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of disputes to arbitration shall be in all respects applicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as if it were a party to this Covenant.

In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall accept the invitation of the Delegates to become *ad hoc* a party, it shall be the duty of the Delegates immediately to institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances disclosed.

Article X. If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against the Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report, and recommendation by the Delegates in regard to the dispute, or contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon cease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall also unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointly any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. The Contracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combining their armed forces in its behalf.

Article XI. In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the Delegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League of Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute.

If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to submit its interests and cause of action wholly to the control and decision of the League of Nations, that state shall *ad hoc* be deemed a

Contracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute, shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall of their own motion take such action and make such recommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities and result in the settlement of the dispute.

Article XII. Any Power not a party to this Covenant may apply to the Body of Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard the granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of the World, they may act favourably on the application, and their favourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant.

Article XIII. The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant and Convention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms hereof.

In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to the League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this covenant, have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

---

763.72119/5234½

*Tentative Draft of an Agrément for an Association of Nations* <sup>3</sup>

1. The Association of Nations shall be composed of the signatory Powers, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained.

[The rule of majorities is so prominent in this plan that it must be considered whether small nations shall have an equal voice.]

---

<sup>3</sup>This and the following three documents were prepared by Mr. D. H. Miller. They were sent to Colonel E. M. House on Nov. 30, 1918, with a covering note reading as follows:

"Herewith are tentative drafts of the following:

A. Agrément for an Association of Nations.

B. Declaration for Open Diplomacy.

"In each case the paper is accompanied by a note of its contents.

"The tentative drafts have been prepared with a view of suggesting questions which may arise in connection with discussion of their general subjects.

"A tentative draft of a Declaration for Equality of Trade Conditions is in course of preparation, and a similar paper regarding Freedom of the Seas will be prepared after further conferences with Admiral Benson."  
(See Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, p. 148, note a.)

The first two documents seem also to have been sent to Secretary Lansing, and his manuscript comments on the Tentative Draft of Agrément for an Association of Nations, written in pencil on the margin of the original, are here printed in brackets following the section of the text to which they refer.

2. The Representatives of the Powers in the Association of Nations shall be their Ambassadors or Ministers at the seat of Government of x and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of x, who shall be the Presiding Officer at the meetings of the Representatives of the Powers.

[Suppose the x Govt was the offender then where would the representatives meet?]

3. The Representatives of the Powers shall by majority vote fix their rules of procedure. Unless otherwise voted, their meetings shall take place at the seat of government of x. The Representatives of the Powers by a similar vote shall also fix the time of their meetings, but a regular meeting shall be held at least once in each calendar year.

4. A meeting of the Representatives of the Powers shall be held upon request of any member Power.

5. The territorial integrity and political independence of each member Power are guaranteed by the other member Powers, severally and mutually.

[Does this statement offer sufficient elasticity for natural growth?]

6. The member Powers recognize the principle that national armaments should be limited to the requirements of international and domestic security, and the Representatives of the Powers shall consider provisions for carrying into effect this principle.

[Does this declaration get us anywhere? Who is to determine the requirements?]

7. Any dispute between or among the member Powers which is not adjusted by agreement,\* shall be submitted to the Representatives of the Powers, who shall by majority vote appoint from among their number a Council, which shall include among its members the Representatives of those Powers concerned, and which shall inquire into and make report upon the facts and circumstances of the dispute and a method of adjustment thereof. The report of such Council shall be completed within not more than six months from the date of their appointment.

[\* Diplomatic arrangement.

Who submits the dispute? § 12.

How long should diplomacy be given?

To whom is the report made?

Is any action to be taken on the report and how?]

8. The method of adjustment proposed in the report of such Council shall be a final determination of the dispute, unless a Power concerned shall dissent therefrom within a time therein limited.

[Suppose the report requires action by one or both of the Powers, & no action is taken then what?]

9. If a Power concerned shall dissent from the method of adjustment proposed in the report of the Council, the report of the Council and the facts and circumstances of the dispute shall be considered by the Representatives of the Powers, who may by a vote of three-fourths of all of the Representatives of the Powers, determine the method of adjustment of the dispute.

[Suppose no method can secure a  $\frac{3}{4}$  vote then what?]

10. The Representatives of the Powers may at any time during the pendency of a dispute submitted, determine by a majority vote any measure that is necessary to be taken or omitted for the protection of any interests during the pendency of the dispute and before its adjustment.

11. Each Power agrees to carry into effect any determination of the Council or of the Representatives of the Powers, as the case may be, in any dispute in which it is concerned: the Representatives of the Powers shall determine by majority vote whether any Power has refused or neglected to carry out any determination of the Council or of the Representatives of the Powers, as the case may be; the consequence of such refusal or neglect so determined shall be the suspension between that Power, its citizens and subjects, and the other member Powers, their citizens and subjects, of all treaty privileges and of all diplomatic, commercial and economic intercourse.

[Time limit]

12. Any notice in connection with any dispute between or among member Powers may be given, and the submission of any such dispute may be made, by any Power concerned.

[Why not by any power?]

13. Any war or menace of war is a matter of interest to member Powers, which the Representatives of the Powers shall by offer of good offices or otherwise, attempt to determine or avert.

[Does this mean after a meeting and discussion of the body?]

14. Any dispute in which both a member Power and a non-member Power are concerned may be referred by any Power concerned to the Representatives of the Powers; and if each non-member Power concerned shall consent to be deemed *ad hoc* a Power signatory hereto, the provisions of this Agreement regarding disputes between or among member Powers shall be applicable.

[Ought there not to be adhering members?]

15. In case of hostilities threatened or commenced between a member Power and a non-member Power, the member Power concerned may entrust its interests to the Representatives of the Powers; in such case the course of action of that member Power shall be determined by a majority vote of the Representatives of the Powers,



and the member Powers agree to support and protect that course of action.

[Suppose the member Power is the aggressor then what?]

16. Any dispute arising from events happening before the date of signature of this Agreement, may at any time be reserved from the operation hereof, by any Power concerned.

17. The Representatives of the Powers shall constitute a Permanent International Court, of which not less than seven nor more than eleven members shall sit in any case, including always the Representatives of those Powers litigant. The Permanent International Court shall formulate its rules of procedure and shall have jurisdiction to hear and finally determine any dispute between States submitted to it by consent of the Powers concerned. Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article, the members of the Permanent International Court to sit in any case may be agreed upon by the Powers concerned, or in the absence of such agreement, shall be selected by a majority vote of the Representatives of the Powers.

[I am opposed to this method of constituting a court. This is confusing executive & legislative functions with judicial, which is unwise.]

18. Any decision or judgment of the Permanent International Court shall be deemed a determination of the Representatives of the Powers.

19. The Representatives of the Powers shall from time to time consider and recommend to the respective Governments for approval, declarations of rules and principles of the law of nations.

[Is this to have no binding force? If it is not, ought there not to be provision for a Congress of Nations, say every 5 or 7 yrs?]

20. Any non-signatory Power desiring to adhere to this Agreement, may deposit a declaration of adherence with the Presiding Officer of the Representatives of the Powers; such declaration shall become effective and such Power shall for all purposes be deemed a signatory Power hereto from ninety days after the deposit thereof, unless within such period of ninety days, more than three member Powers shall dissent therefrom, by depositing with said Presiding Officer a notice of such dissent, in which case neither the declaration nor its deposit shall be effective.

Nothing in this Article contained shall limit or modify the provisions of Article 16 hereof.

[System of black balling. Ought not the reasons to be given?]

21. Any member Power may withdraw from this Agreement by depositing a notice of such withdrawal with the Presiding Officer of

the Representatives of the Powers. The withdrawal shall have effect only in regard to the notifying Power.

[Should not there be a time for notice?]

22. Any provisions in treaties or agreements between or among the signatory Powers which may be inconsistent with the provisions hereof, are and shall be deemed abrogated.

[Can this be done in this way? Who is to pass on inconsistency?]

---

763.72119/5234½

*Note on the Agreement for an Association of Nations*

The annexed tentative draft of an agreement for an Association of Nations <sup>4</sup> makes no mention of the following matters, which are to be separately considered:

- A. Open Diplomacy.
- B. Economic Equality.
- C. Freedom of the Seas.

The statement as to limitation of armaments (Article 6) is hardly more than an announcement of principle.

The provision for legislation in international law (Article 19) gives to the Representatives of the Powers authority only *ad referendum*.

Guarantees of territorial integrity and political independence are formulated in Article 5.

The chief difficulties in connection with the subjects of the annexed tentative draft for an Association of Nations are:

- 1. Its membership.
- 2. The voting strength of the Powers.
- 3. Its powers in adjusting disputes.
- 4. The sanctions or means of enforcement of the decisions reached.

These will be considered in order.

The question of which will be the signatory Powers in the first instance requires of course the unanimous consent of those Powers which do sign, for no Power can be constrained to sign.

As to Powers subsequently becoming members, the provision (Article 20) permits any four Powers to exclude a proposed member but does not require affirmative assent for admission but affirmative dissent for exclusion.

No attempt is made to distinguish between the voting strength of the various member Powers.

As to the settlement of disputes between member Powers, the Power Of Decision in its last analysis is lodged (Article 9) with three-

---

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*.

fourths of the Representatives of the Powers, and in the case of a dispute with an outside Power (Article 15) the power to prescribe a course of action is lodged with the majority of the Representatives of the Powers.

Chiefly with a view of not permitting stale claims, Article 16 permits the reservation of existing disputes.

A judicial decision of disputes by a limited number of judges is permitted by Articles 17 and 18, in cases submitted by consent.

The sanctions for the decision of disputes between member Powers (Article 11) are the cessation of all intercourse, whereas by Article 15 a member Power is to be supported in a dispute with a non-member Power, which the Power last-named will not settle amicably.

Power to make necessary decisions during the pendency of a dispute between member Powers is given to a majority of the Representatives of the Powers by Article 10.

A vital point in the scheme is contained in Article 21, which by giving a general and unlimited right of withdrawal gives the most practical form of protection to every great Power against any action or threatened action of any group of other Powers.

The effect of any such Agreement on the Monroe Doctrine and on the relations of the United States with Latin American Powers, is suggested for consideration.

---

*Tentative Draft of a Declaration for Open Diplomacy*<sup>5</sup>

The Powers signatory to the Agreement for an Association of Nations declare as a part of said Agreement:

OPEN DIPLOMACY

1. All treaties and international agreements heretofore made and now in force, to which any signatory Power is a party, shall be made public in their entirety within not more than thirty days after said Agreement for an Association of Nations shall become binding.

2. Every treaty and international agreement hereafter made, to which any signatory Power shall be a party, shall be made public in its entirety within not more than thirty days after the same shall become binding, or shall otherwise not be deemed valid or enforceable.

3. The provisions of Article 2 shall not apply to a treaty or international agreement made by a signatory Power while engaged in war, in which case the treaty or international agreement shall be made public in its entirety within not more than thirty days after the conclusion of peace or shall otherwise not be deemed valid or enforceable.

---

<sup>5</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, p. 155.

*Note on the Declaration for Open Diplomacy*<sup>6</sup>

The annexed tentative draft of a Declaration for Open Diplomacy<sup>7</sup> contains provisions for publicity which are made to apply to existing as well as to future treaties and international agreements.

As regards treaties and international agreements made by a Power at war, the time in which publicity is to be had is extended until thirty days after the conclusion of peace instead of thirty days after the conclusion of the treaty or agreement, but in either case invalidity is the effect of the failure to make public.

---

*Mr. D. H. Miller to Colonel E. M. House*<sup>8</sup>

Herewith is a tentative draft of a Declaration respecting Equality of Trade Conditions. The attempt primarily has been to indicate the difficulties and points of divergence which must or may arise.

D. H. M[ILLER]

PARIS, 1 December, 1918.

[Enclosure 1]

*Tentative Draft of a Declaration for Equality of Trade Conditions*

The Powers signatory to the Agreement for an Association of Nations declare as a part of said Agreement:

## EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS

1. For the purposes of this Declaration every colony, protectorate, dependency or possession of one of the signatory Powers now having a tariff system separate from its home Power, shall be regarded as a State.

2. While every State is free to adopt and from time to time to change its system, laws and regulations of import and export tariffs, port dues, tariff rates, inspection methods and charges, and trade charges of every kind, any and every such system, law and regulation shall at any given time as to the rest of the world be fixed and single, and shall also at any given time as to the rest of the world be equal and without any discrimination, difference or preference, direct or indirect.

---

<sup>6</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, p. 154.

<sup>7</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>8</sup> This paper and its two enclosures are reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, pp. 162-167.

3. Existing preferential arrangements between or among States, including those in the nature of Customs Unions, may be continued notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2.

4. While for the purposes of this Declaration the Dominions of Canada and of New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa and the Colony of Newfoundland are each to be regarded as States under the provisions of Article 1, they may, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, make preferential arrangements, *inter se* and or with Great Britain.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, States whose territorial limits are wholly or partly within the continent of Europe may enter into agreements *inter se* in the nature of Customs Unions.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 2, States whose territorial limits are wholly or partly within the continents of North America and South America may enter into agreements *inter se* in the nature of Customs Unions.

7. No part of the revenues of any State, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any other State, its citizens or subjects.

8. A State engaged in trade or commerce shall not in respect thereof have or be deemed to have any of the rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligations of sovereignty.

[Enclosure 2]

### *Note on the Declaration for Equality of Trade Conditions*

The annexed tentative draft of a Declaration for Equality of Trade Conditions<sup>9</sup> perhaps only emphasizes the very great difficulties of the whole subject.

Inevitably the difference between "economic units" and what may be called, "units of sovereignty," must be recognized. The text is not one of continuous territory, for Alaska is a part of the United States, Ireland of the United Kingdom, and Algeria of France. Article 1 adopts the general definition that regardless of sovereignty, a "unit" with a separate tariff system is a separate economic unit.

Article 2 states the general rule of equality and of the Open Door.

While possibly there might be substantially general agreement on Article 2 for the future, there are many existing trade arrangements which would conflict with its language, strictly applied. For example, there are so-called, "frontier arrangements" in Europe, and there are various other kinds of reciprocal trade arrangements, sometimes between neighboring countries and sometimes not. These will not be

---

<sup>9</sup> *Supra*.

enumerated, but instances are the United States and Cuba and the United States and Brazil.

Accordingly by Article 3 the continuance of existing preferential arrangements is permitted.

By Article 4 permission is given so far as the self-governing Dominions of Great Britain are concerned, for the continuance and even extension of the British policy of preference within the Empire. So far as an extension of this policy is concerned, it perhaps can hardly be defended on principle, and the provision has been inserted under the theory that it is a political necessity.

It will be observed that by Articles 2, 3 and 4 future arrangements in the nature of reciprocity treaties would generally not be permissible.

The question of customs unions or free trade between two or more economic units is one which is extremely complex and one which it is very difficult to treat generally. No objection could be seen, for example, to such an arrangement between countries situated as Sweden and Norway, or as Spain and Portugal, or among the Central American States or the South American Republics; and, indeed, such an arrangement might be highly advantageous in such cases as Finland and the rest of Russia and the Balkan States, *inter se*. On the other hand, a similar arrangement between China and Japan would be flying in the face of the policy of the Open Door, and the existence of such conditions between Great Britain and India could only be regarded as exploitation by the former country of the latter.

A general solution of these difficulties has been attempted by Articles 5 and 6, which would permit agreements of customs unions within Europe and within America respectively but not within Africa or Asia and not between States situated in different continents outside of America.

Article 7 is intended to prevent what may be regarded as substantially a pledge of the sovereignty of a State. Its language is drawn from the agreement between Great Britain and Russia in respect of Tibet.<sup>10</sup>

The progress of States toward what is vaguely called "Socialism" or "Nationalization of industry" requires the formulation of rules of international law not now existing. It is the law in the United States that a State which engages in a commercial transaction cannot, when in Court, escape the general rules of law by reason of its sovereignty, although it may not be sued. Considering the enormous possibilities of this subject for the future, it is believed that a State should neither be benefited nor burdened by the rules attached to the question of sovereignty when commercial transactions are involved. Article 8 has been drawn with this end in view. It should

---

<sup>10</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 1, p. 552.

be added that the rule therein formulated would, in respect of commercial transactions, place a neutral State in time of war in the same situation as one of its citizens or subjects. The whole question is one of great interest to the United States in view of its present ownership (through the medium of a corporation) of a very large merchant fleet.

It has been considered that the question of concessions will require at least local and perhaps detailed statement in connection with the particular countries.

#### GENERAL NOTE:

Under any agreement of such nature the national economic policy of each country will remain for its own decision, and bounty systems, nationalization of industries and Socialism generally will in fact permit a country to attempt to favor its own trade or even to destroy that of another. A State monopoly, run deliberately at a loss, may produce results more disastrous than the German cartel system and provoke counter measures.

---

#### *Amendment Suggested by Dr. S. E. Mezes to the Tentative Draft of an Agreement for an Association of Nations*<sup>11</sup>

### I

The Representatives of the Powers, at their first meeting, and every six years thereafter, shall, by majority vote, choose from among their number an Executive Committee composed of the Representatives of seven Powers, whose Representatives shall constitute the Executive Committee for the ensuing six years.

No determination of the Representatives of the Powers shall be effective if disapproved within ten days after the date thereof by a majority vote of the Executive Committee.

### II

The Representatives of the Powers, at their first meeting, shall, by majority vote, choose from among their number an Executive Committee of five (?) members, each of whom shall hold office for a term of six (?) years and until his successor is chosen.

---

<sup>11</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. II, p. 486.

It is stated *ibid.*, note a, that II is the amendment as originally submitted by Dr. Mezes, while I is the amendment as revised by Mr. Miller during discussion with Dr. Mezes on December 23.

Text of the Tentative Draft of an Agreement for an Association of Nations is printed *ante*, p. 505.

The successors of the members of the Executive Committee, either for a like term of six years or for an unexpired portion of a term, as the case may be, shall be chosen in like manner.

No determination of the Representatives of the Powers shall be effective if disapproved within ten days after the date thereof by a majority vote of the Executive Committee.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 512/1 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received December 25—11 a. m.]

111. As showing the attitude of the Congress at that time, I desire to invite your attention to the appropriation of \$200,000 included in the act making appropriation for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes approved August 29th 1916 authorizing and requesting the President to invite at an appropriate time, not later than the close of the war in Europe, all the great governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of formulating a plan for a court of arbitration or other tribunal to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for adjudication and peaceful settlement and to consider the question of disarmament and submit their recommendations to their respective governments for approval et cetera. The full text of this paragraph of the act may be found on page 16 [618] of Statutes of the United States, first session of the sixty-fourth Congress.<sup>12</sup>

POLK

---

Woodrow Wilson Papers

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*<sup>13</sup>

PARIS, December 23, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The plan of guaranty proposed for the League of Nations, which has been the subject of discussion, will find considerable objection from other Governments because, even when the principle is agreed to, there will be a wide divergence of views as to the terms of the obligation. This difference of opinion will be

---

<sup>12</sup> 39 Stat. 618.

<sup>13</sup> Of the three enclosures printed with this letter only enclosure 2 accompanies it in Woodrow Wilson's papers. Enclosures 1 and 3 are printed from Hunter Miller's papers.



seized upon by those who are openly or secretly opposed to the League to create controversy and discord.

In addition to this there will be opposition in Congress to assuming obligations to take affirmative action along either military or economic lines. On constitutional grounds, on its effect upon the Monroe Doctrine, on jealousy as to congressional powers, &c., there will be severe criticism which will materially weaken our position with other nations and may, in view of senatorial hostility, defeat a treaty as to the League of Nations or at least render it impotent.

With these thoughts in mind and with an opposition known to exist among certain European statesmen and already manifest in Washington I take the liberty of laying before you a tentative draft of articles of guaranty which I do not believe can be successfully opposed either at home or abroad.

I do not see how any nation can refuse to subscribe to them. I do not see how any question of constitutionality can be raised as they are based essentially on powers which are confided to the Executive. They in no way raise a question as to the Monroe Doctrine. At the same time I believe that the result would be as efficacious as if there was an undertaking to take positive action against an offending nation, which is the present cause of controversy.

I am so earnestly in favor of the guaranty, which is the heart of the League of Nations, that I have endeavored to find a way to accomplish this and to remove the objections raised, which seem to me today to jeopardize the whole plan.

I shall be glad, if you desire it, to confer with you in regard to the enclosed paper<sup>14</sup> or to receive your opinion as to the suggestions made. In any event it is my hope that you will give the paper consideration.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

[Enclosure 1]

*The Constitutional Power To Provide for Coercion in a Treaty*

DECEMBER 20, 1918.

In the institution of a League of Nations we must bear in mind the limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States upon the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Government in defining their respective powers.

The Constitution confers upon Congress the right to declare war. This right, I do not believe, can be delegated and it certainly cannot

---

<sup>14</sup> In *The Peace Negotiations* (Boston and New York, 1921), p. 50, Mr. Lansing indicates that the "enclosed paper" consisted of the three memoranda here printed as enclosures.

be taken away by treaty. The question arises, therefore, as to how far a provision in an agreement as to a League of Nations, which imposes on the United States the obligation to employ its military or naval forces in enforcing the terms of the agreement, would be constitutional.

It would seem that the utilization of forces, whether independent or in conjunction with other nations, would in fact by being an act of war create a state of war, which constitutionally can only be done by a declaration of Congress. To contract by treaty, to create a state of war upon certain contingencies arising would be equally tainted with unconstitutionality, and would be null and inoperative.

I do not think, therefore, that even if it was advisable, any treaty can provide for the independent or joint use of the military or naval forces of the United States to compel compliance with a treaty or to make good a guaranty made in a treaty.

The other method of international coercion is non-intercourse, especially commercial non-intercourse. Would a treaty provision to employ this method be constitutional?

As to this my mind is less clear. The Constitution in delegating powers to Congress includes the regulation of commerce. Does non-intercourse fall within the idea of regulation? Could an embargo be imposed without an act of Congress? My impression is that it can not be done without legislation and that a treaty provision agreeing in a certain event to impose an embargo against another nation would be void.

Even if Congress was willing to delegate to the Executive for a certain purpose its powers as to making war and regulating commerce, I do not think that it can constitutionally do so. It is only in the event of war that powers conferred by the Constitution on Congress can be so delegated and then only for war purposes. As a state of war would not exist at the time action was required, I do not believe that it could be done, and any provision contracting to take measures of this nature would be contrary to the Constitution and as a consequence void.

But, assuming that Congress possessed the power of delegation, I am convinced that it would not only refuse to do so but would resent such a suggestion because of the fact that both Houses have been and are extremely jealous of their rights and authority.

Viewed from the standpoints of legality and expediency it would seem necessary to find some other method than coercion in enforcing an international guaranty, or else to find some substitute for a guaranty, which would be valueless without affirmative action to support it.

I believe that such a substitute can be found.

[Enclosure 2]

*Suggested Draft of Articles for Discussion*

DECEMBER 20, 1918.

The parties to this convention, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and preventing future wars between one another, hereby constitute themselves into a League of Nations and solemnly undertake jointly and severally to fulfill the obligations imposed upon them in the following articles:

## A

Each power signatory or adherent hereto severally covenants and guarantees that it will not violate the territorial integrity or impair the political independence of any other power signatory or adherent to this convention except when authorized so to do by the decree of the arbitral tribunal hereinafter referred to or by a three-fourths vote of the International Council of the League of Nations created by this convention.

## B

In the event that any power, signatory or adherent hereto, shall fail to observe the covenant and guaranty set forth in the preceding article, such breach of covenant and guaranty shall *ipso facto* operate as an abrogation of this convention in so far as it applies to the offending power and furthermore as an abrogation of all treaties, conventions and agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the offending power and all other powers signatory and adherent to this convention.

## C

A breach of the covenant and guaranty declared in Article A shall constitute an act unfriendly to all other powers signatory and adherent hereto, and they shall forthwith sever all diplomatic, consular and official relations with the offending power, and shall through the International Council, hereinafter provided for, exchange views as to the measures necessary to restore the power, whose sovereignty has been invaded, to the rights and liberties which it possessed prior to such invasion, and to prevent further violation thereof.

## D

Any interference with a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft proceeding over the high seas, which interference is not affirmatively sanctioned by the law of nations shall be for the purposes of this convention considered an impairment of political independence.

[Enclosure 3]

*Suggestions As to an International Council, for Discussion*

DECEMBER 21, 1918.

An International Council of the League of Nations is hereby constituted, which shall be the channel for communication between the members of the League, and the agent for common action.

The International Council shall consist of the diplomatic representative of each party signatory or adherent to this convention at . . . . .

Meetings of the International Council shall be held at . . . . ., or in the event that the subject to be considered involves the interests of . . . . . or its nationals, then at such other place outside the territory of a power whose interests are involved as the Supervisory Committee of the Council shall designate.

The officer charged with the conduct of the foreign affairs of the power where a meeting is held shall be the presiding officer thereof.

At the first meeting of the International Council a Supervisory Committee shall be chosen by a majority vote of the members present, which shall consist of five members and shall remain in office for two years or until their successors are elected.

The Supervisory Committee shall name a Secretariat which shall have charge of the archives of the Council and receive all communications addressed to the Council or Committee and send all communications issued by the Council or Committee.

The Supervisory Committee may draft such rules of procedure as it deems necessary for conducting business coming before the Council or before the Committee.

The Supervisory Committee may call a meeting of the Council at its discretion and must call a meeting at the request of any member of the Council provided the request contains a written statement of the subject to be discussed.

The archives of the Council shall be open at any time to any member of the Council, who may make and retain copies thereof.

All expenses of the Supervisory Committee and Secretariat shall be borne equally by all powers signatory or adherent to this convention.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.111/28

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I send you herewith a preliminary report on the subject of the League of Nations<sup>15</sup> which, possibly, you

---

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

may find of some interest. The copy of the letter to me from General Nolan,<sup>16</sup> which precedes the report, will explain its origin.

I received yesterday a second and fuller report, being an analysis of propositions for a League of Nations and for Disarmament, which I am now having copied and which I hope to be able to send to you before the end of the week.<sup>17</sup>

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

[Enclosure]

*Brigadier General D. E. Nolan to General Tasker H. Bliss*<sup>18</sup>

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F., December 6, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL BLISS: Pursuant to your instructions, I am forwarding herewith a preliminary report on the various schemes proposed for a League of Nations and Disarmament.<sup>19</sup> This report was prepared by Captain H. C. Bell, whom I sent to London for the purpose.

Captain Bell found in London a collection of schemes published in 1917 under the title, "The Framework of a Lasting Peace". His report therefore omits all material contained in this book, a copy of which is forwarded with the report. The report contains some information of a confidential character. This was secured largely through the courtesy of the Military Attaché at London and his assistants, Major Winthrop and Captain Dennis, who gave generous and valuable assistance wherever opportunity offered.

Owing to the brief period of time which it was possible to allow for the preparation of the report no attempt has been made to digest or compare the various schemes. I have therefore ordered Captain Bell to continue his study of the subject along these lines and to make such additions to the report as may be possible.

A number of books on the subject have been ordered and will be forwarded to you as soon as received. Lists of these and of other books of minor value accompany the report.

In sending Captain Bell to London I directed him to form what estimate he could of the feeling existing there with regard to the League. His impressions are as follows. A large amount of thought and of study have been devoted to the subject for the last year or two, and the interest has greatly increased during the last few months. On the other hand there is no stabilised public opinion on the subject. There are very marked divisions of opinion existing everywhere, so

---

<sup>16</sup> The enclosure to this document.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed; the report was transmitted to the Secretary of State by General Bliss on December 26 (file No. Paris Peace Conf. 185.111/101½).

<sup>18</sup> Filed separately under file No. Paris Peace Conf. 185.111/101½.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

that American proposals are not likely to be confronted by any unified opposition. There is however very general agreement on the idea that the League must be developed gradually and that any attempt to form an actual world state would be premature and probably disastrous. The League must be based above all on an understanding between Great Britain, France and the United States. There is no apparent feeling that the co-operation of Italy is necessary. It is also plain that Great Britain is not prepared to relinquish her sea power. The attitude of the Government is not entirely clear, but there is reason to believe that it regards the whole proposition rather cynically. It has had various experts working on the matter for some time, including Mr. Balfour's committee, which made its report last March. Careful studies of the various aspects are being made at the present time.

I shall of course furnish you with copies of everything that Captain Bell is able to produce here.

Yours very truly,

D. E. NOLAN  
*Brig. Gen., General Staff*

Paris Peace Conf. 185.111/29

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Yesterday Dr. Mezes handed to me a Tentative Draft of an agreement for an Association of Nations which seems to be a modification of one submitted to you by Mr. Miller.<sup>20</sup>

I discussed his draft with Dr. Mezes at the time he handed it to me and subsequently wrote him a letter of which I hand you, attached hereto, a copy. I do this with the idea that possibly the interchange of ideas among the members of the Commission may result in a general clarification and harmony of view on important questions.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

[Enclosure]

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Chief of the Section of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Mezes)*

PARIS, December 26, 1918.

DEAR DR. MEZES: I have before me your Tentative Draft of an "Agreement for an Association of Nations". I have studied it with the greatest interest. I shall make some comments and I shall

<sup>20</sup> Apparently the Miller draft printed on p. 505. Dr. Mezes' draft not found in Department files.

make them in the light of an incident that I am going to relate to you.

In my comparative youth I served on the staff of a very wise old General. His mind was very active and he was constantly dictating memoranda of things that he had it in mind to do, reforms to accomplish and all that sort of thing. Almost the first day that I joined him he sent me one of these memoranda, on a rather important subject as I now remember it, and asked me to make any suggestions that occurred to me. From a feeling of modesty not always characteristic of youth it did not occur to me that he really wanted my criticism; so I returned his memorandum with a careful analysis showing its excellent points and only suggesting some rearrangement. It promptly came back to me with the statement that he knew the good points in his memorandum better than I did; that what he wanted to know was the bad points; and that, to know them, he wanted my criticism, even that suggested by well-intentioned foolishness or ignorance, because that could do him no harm and might suggest something useful.

So I am going to suggest, haphazard, whatever occurs to me.<sup>21</sup>

1.) *Paragraph 2, Clause 1:*—The Capital selected will probably be that of a smaller government. It will not have a diplomatic representative from each of the powers, because many of them have no interests there. The powers that have interests there, appoint diplomats to attend to those interests, qualifications for which work may not call for the best kind of men for the League of Nations. The other powers will, presumably, appoint their best men specially for the latter work. One set of diplomats will have other work than that of the League of Nations; the other set can devote themselves exclusively to this work of the League.

It has been objected against having specially assigned delegates versus the regular diplomats at this Capital, that the former will, for a good part of the time, have no ostensible function. If there is anything in what I have said above, a part of the diplomatic body will, in effect, be specially selected for the purposes of the League and will have nothing else to attend to. Moreover, for some years, at least, the delegates will have no lack of work in trying to get some degree of order into this distracted world.

But, to my mind, the real objection is this. We cannot expect any near change in the diplomatic system or methods of the world. Most of the diplomats will be men trained from their youth, until they have become hide-bound, in governmental ideas and in the ideas of governing classes. That is the very thing that we most want to get away

---

<sup>21</sup> References to specific paragraphs and clauses apparently are not to the original "Tentative Draft of an Agreement for an Association of Nations" printed on p. 505, but to a later revision; see footnote 20, p. 521.

from. A diplomat from the United States is the only one, of the large powers, that could realize my conception of the requirements. He is not trained in a system where all his ideas have been fitted to a Procrustean bed. And his appointment has to be approved by an elected representative body.

I would, rather, suggest for consideration that the delegates must be specially approved by the Legislatures of their respective countries, and that they must be eminent in their countries for their knowledge of history, of the Law of Nations and, above all, for their proved intelligent interest in the problems of humanity. This is the more necessary since Paragraph 17 makes the Representatives constitute an International Court.

2.) *Paragraph 2, Clause 2*:—I am afraid of this provision as it stands. At the moment when we hope to establish the League, the number of great, really civilized powers will be pitifully small. Yet with them rest the issues of world-peace and world-war. It is of vital importance to minimize the chances of having any one of them secede from the League. Disguise it from ourselves as we may, the basic idea of the League is to begin some form of government for the world in which the ideas of the best class of men in the great civilized powers shall dominate, because the ideas of that class of men will be subject to a more or less wise restraint and, in my judgment, a wise self-restraint is going to be the saving grace of the League. But I see nothing in your provision to prevent the government of the world from passing into the hands of the lesser advanced peoples or, at least, being to some extent controlled by them. It would be a risk to the interests of such nations as the United States and Great Britain that we cannot expect them to take.

3.) *Paragraph 2, Clause 3*:—You do not provide affirmatively for an approval of the Executive Committee. Do you mean that approval results *ipso facto* from the lapse of ten days without action? In that case, disapproval might be given in 24 hours but approval must always wait ten days. Yet, there might be a case of unanimous action of the Representatives of the Powers and where prompt steps to carry it into effect may be imperative.

Passing from that point, would it not be well to make the provision much more elastic and leave it to the wisdom of the Representatives to meet the requirements of each case? In that case, I should suggest a much longer time limit, within which approval or disapproval is to be given, assuming that a thing manifestly good will be promptly approved and a thing doubtful will receive a longer consideration before it is either approved or disapproved.

4.) *Paragraph 3*:—If the Executive Committee provided for in Paragraph 2 can be made to fully represent the interests of the large,



advanced powers, I should prefer to have the Executive Committee regulate everything that approximates routine.

5.) *Paragraph 5*.—I am afraid of the word "guarantee". Moreover, it is conceivable that the League itself, in the adjustment of some dispute, may infringe on the territorial integrity of some power.

Finally, "territorial integrity and political independence" cannot be "guaranteed" except by an agreement to make war when necessary to maintain the guarantee. The United States may make war to do this, but it depends on the will of the Congress then in existence.

Nor do I believe that a guarantee is a *sine qua non* for the present. If a solemn covenant or promise by all the nations to respect territorial integrity and political independence is threatened to be violated, thereby bringing on danger of a great war, the United States may be trusted to live up to her "gentleman's agreement" as a member of the League.

6.) *Paragraph 6*.—I do not like the provision "national armaments should be limited to the requirements of international . . .<sup>22</sup> security, and the Representatives of the Powers shall consider provisions for carrying into effect this principle". There is only one way to carry the principle into effect, and that is to disarm. And the burning question is, "has not this war made us reasonably ready for it?" If not, God help us.

I am of those who believe that disarmament and a League of Nations go hand-in-hand. When a dozen men sit around a table to discuss questions fraught with all sorts of possible irritation and it appears that some of them have a pistol in each pocket and a knife in their belts, while others have penknives and fire-crackers or nothing at all, the first and sole question is disarmament. There can be no fair and free discussion of anything till that is settled. The American principle, I am inclined to think, is a League of Nations with equal representation. How can you have equal representation with some nations weak and others with millions of trained soldiers or fleets of battleships or both? You must remember that a League of Nations will be born not only from a feeling of incipient international confidence and trust but also from the existing feeling of international distrust. The problem would be bad enough, but not thoroughly bad, if it were a League entirely of wolves or entirely of sheep. It will be a problem indeed, if you try to make it one of wolves and sheep.

And what will the United States have gained from the war if this is to be the result? A League having some nations armed to the teeth will be dominated by those nations. That is what they will

<sup>22</sup> Omission indicated in General Bliss' letter.

be armed for. And what part will the United States play in such a League? If she is going to play with wolves she must have fangs and claws as long and as sharp as theirs. But, as I conceive it, we fought the war more for the purpose of avoiding this necessity than for any other one thing. If we want to play with the wolf without becoming one ourselves we must pull all his fangs and trim all his claws. The wolf is militarism and thus far we have pulled only one fang.

I think we can have a League in only one or the other of two forms: a general League of Nations disarmed for purposes of international war, or a League of four or five heavily armed nations who will impose their will upon the world and who will keep the peace among themselves only so long as each thinks that it is getting its share of the rest of the world.

Personally, I have not much fear of the result. If we do not settle it, the peoples behind us will. And if our inaction or criminal stupidity forces them to act it may be, almost of necessity will be, by a revolutionary upheaval of all governments that may, for a time at least, eclipse our present civilization. My hope is that the Americans will have the courage to lead the people and, if I understand at all the President's views, I believe we will. Our peace terms with Germany should provide as far as is humanely possible against a revival of German militarism, and we should then and at once demand its abolition everywhere.

In the subsequent paragraphs I suggest that careful scrutiny be given to each one that touches on the Constitutional rights and powers of the Congress of the United States. For example, under Paragraph 11 Congress would have to cede to the League its constitutional power and duty to regulate Commerce. I do not see how Paragraph 15 can be effective unless Congress does what it cannot do,—delegate its power to make war to the League. Such things might cause adverse action by the Senate on any treaty.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.111/30

*General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State*<sup>23</sup>

PARIS, December 31, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In drawing up the provisions which, when accepted, will constitute a sort of Constitution or Articles of Agree-

---

<sup>23</sup> A copy of this letter was sent on the same day to Mr. D. H. Miller with the added note: "It don't do to merely guarantee territorial integrity & political independence. Internationalists in Russia are ready to guarantee that. T. H. B." (See Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 26.)

ment for a League of Nations, I think that there is one which should be drawn with special care and embodied. The absence of it would, I apprehend, provoke perhaps fatal criticism in the United States.

A domestic revolution always results in very great, though it may be temporary, disorder. The nature of the struggle often causes it to be carried on with little regard, sometimes, to strict international rights. Especially in these days of intimate commercial relations between States there may be done things that will be claimed by interested parties to be violations of treaty rights. Powerful interests will be invoked in favor of intervention.

Moreover, growing friendly relations between States will be represented by cordial friendly personal relations between the Representatives of States who sit about the council table of the League of Nations. Among such persons there may be an undue readiness to listen to appeals from some one to save his government from destruction. It has often been urged as an objection against a League of Nations that the more successful it is the more inevitable will be its tendency to keep everything on the dead-level of the *status quo*. I think that a wise self-restraint will be the saving grace of the League. Yet, the more its governments approximate each other in character the more will be the tendency to co-operate in efforts to prevent changes in any one of them.

Therefore, I think that some provision should be made to prevent abuse\* of power on the part of the League in intervening in the domestic affairs of any nation. I do not deny that there may be justifiable causes for such intervention; but a treaty with no guarding clause such as I have suggested will have a hard gauntlet to run in the United States.

Cordially yours,

TASKER H. BLISS

---

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State as to Form of International Agreement To Prevent Infringement Upon Territorial and Political Rights* <sup>24</sup>

[UNDATED—circa January 6, 1919.]

There are two forms of agreement which may be employed in effecting a union of the nations to prevent aggressions and international wars.

One is a joint guaranty of the parties to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of every party to the agreement.

The other is a covenant, several rather than joint in nature, not to violate the territorial integrity and political independence of any party to the agreement.

---

\* This is not accomplished by a mere provision guaranteeing territorial integrity and political independence. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>24</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, p. 125.

The first form binds a party to do a certain thing; the second form binds a party not to do a certain thing. The first requires action if necessary; the second requires inaction.

Under the positive guaranty the parties would be bound, under certain conditions, to employ coercion either of a martial or of a commercial character.

Under the negative covenant the violation of its undertaking by one of the parties would be self-operative, constituting an unfriendly act against all other parties, since the offending party would assume a right relinquished by others. It could be provided that the abrogation of treaties and the severance of diplomatic and consular relations should follow as a matter of course, and the necessity of positive action for the restoration of rights violated left discretionary with the parties in council assembled.

Opposition to the positive guaranty has appeared in the various quarters at home and abroad. Governments in general appear loath to bind their countries to definite action which may necessitate the use of their armed forces or compel an interruption of their commerce and trade. Numerous objections have been raised, some valid, some invalid, and these objections are seized upon and used by those who disbelieve or are hostile to a League of Nations.

In the United States the positive guaranty is also opposed for national reasons. Its opponents declare that the treaty-making power cannot take from Congress the war-making and commerce-regulating powers delegated to it by the Constitution; that to agree to joint coercion of an American republic would permit an interference with American affairs by European nations and destroy the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism; and that to bind the United States to unite in coercive measures would be violative of the traditional policy of the United States to abstain from "entangling alliances" with European governments. There can be little doubt but that these arguments have won many supporters in Congress and among the people at large.

The negative covenant, which would seem to be effective in reaching the end sought, has internationally the advantage that no power could give a satisfactory explanation of refusing to make it. It has also the same basis as the so-called "Peace Treaties" in its self-denying character, to which most nations are parties.

From the purely American opposition it removes the argument of unconstitutionality, of infringement of the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism, and of any abandonment of abstention from foreign alliances.

Hunter Miller Papers

*Draft by the Secretary of State for an International Agreement* <sup>25</sup>

[JANUARY 7, 1919.]

ARTICLE III—PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES

*Clause 1*

In the event that there is a controversy between two or more members of the League of Nations which fails of settlement through diplomatic channels one of the following means of settlement shall be employed:

1. The parties to the controversy shall constitute a joint commission to investigate and report jointly or severally to their Governments the facts and make recommendations as to settlement. After such report a further effort shall be made to reach a diplomatic settlement of the controversy.

2. The parties shall by agreement arrange for the submission of the controversy to arbitration mutually agreed upon or to the Arbitral Tribunal hereinafter referred to.

3. Any party may, unless the second means of settlement is mutually adopted, submit the controversy to the Supervisory Committee of the International Council; and the Committee shall forthwith (a) name and direct a special commission to investigate and report upon the subject; (b) name and direct a commission to mediate between the parties to the controversy; or (c) direct the parties to submit the controversy to the Arbitral Tribunal for judicial settlement, it being understood that direction to arbitrate may be made at any time in the event that investigation and mediation fail to result in a settlement of the controversy.

*Clause 2*

No party to a controversy shall assume any authority or perform any acts based upon disputed rights without authorization by the Supervisory Committee, such authorization being limited in all cases to the pendency of the controversy and its final settlement and being in no way prejudicial to the rights of the parties. An authorization thus granted by the Supervisory Committee may be modified or superseded by mutual agreement of the parties, by order of an arbitrator or arbitrators selected by the parties, or by order of the Arbitral Tribunal if the controversy is submitted to it.

---

<sup>25</sup> In *The Peace Negotiations*, p. 62, Mr. Lansing stated that "The first two articles of the 'International Agreement,' as I termed the document, were identical in language with the memoranda dealing with a mutual covenant and with an international council which I had enclosed in my letter of December 23." These two memoranda are printed *ante*, pp. 518 and 519.

*Clause 3*

The foregoing clause shall not apply to cases in which the constituted authorities of a power are unable or fail to give protection to the lives and property of nationals of another power. In the event that it becomes necessary for a power to use its military or naval forces to safeguard the lives or property of its nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of another power, the facts and reasons for such action shall be forthwith reported to the Supervisory Committee which shall determine the course of action to be adopted in order to protect the rights of all parties, and shall notify the same to the governments involved which shall comply with such notification. In the event that a government fails to comply therewith it shall be deemed to have violated the covenant and guaranty hereinbefore set forth.

ARTICLE IV—REVISION OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL AND CODIFICATION OF  
INTERNATIONAL LAW

*Clause 1*

The International Council, within one year after its organization, shall notify to the powers signatory and adherent to this convention and shall invite all other powers to send delegates to an international conference at such place and time as the Council may determine and not later than six months after issuance of such notification and invitation.

*Clause 2*

The International Conference shall consider the revision of the constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal and provisions for the amicable settlement of international disputes established by the [I] Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907, and shall formulate codes embodying the principles of international law applicable in time of peace and the rules of warfare on land and sea and in the air. The revision and codification when completed shall be embodied in a treaty or treaties.

*Clause 3*

The International Council shall prepare and submit with the notification and invitation above provided a preliminary program of the International Conference, which shall be subject to modification or amendment by the Conference.

*Clause 4*

Until the treaty of revision of the constitution and procedure of the Arbitral Tribunal becomes operative, the provisions of the [I]

Treaty signed at The Hague in 1907 shall be continued in force, and all references herein to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be understood to be the Tribunal constituted under the [I] Treaty but upon the treaty of revision coming into force the references shall be construed as applying to the Arbitral Tribunal therein constituted.

#### ARTICLE V—PUBLICATION OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

##### *Clause 1*

Each power, signatory or adherent to this convention, severally agrees with all other powers hereto that it will not exchange the ratifications of any treaty or convention hereinafter entered into by it with any other power until thirty days after the full text of such treaty or convention has been published in the public press of the parties thereto and a copy has been filed with the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

##### *Clause 2*

No international agreement to which a power, signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, shall become operative or be put in force until published and filed as aforesaid.

##### *Clause 3*

All treaties, conventions and agreements, to which a power, signatory or adherent to this convention, is a party, and which is in force or to come into force and which has not been heretofore published, shall within six months after the signature of this convention be published and filed as aforesaid or abrogated or denounced.

#### ARTICLE VI—EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL PRIVILEGES

The powers, signatory and adherent to this convention agree jointly and severally not to discriminate against or in favor of any power in the matter of commerce or trade or of industrial privileges; and they further agree that all treaties, conventions and agreements now in force or to come in force or hereinafter negotiated shall be considered as subject to the "most favored nation" doctrine, whether they contain or do not contain a clause to that effect. It is specifically declared that it is the purpose of this article not to limit any power in imposing upon commerce and trade such restrictions and burdens as it may deem proper but to make such impositions apply equally and impartially to all other powers, their nationals and ships.

This article shall not apply, however, to any case, in which a power has committed an unfriendly act against the members of the League

of Nations as defined in Article [I] and in which commercial and trade relations are denied or restricted by agreement between the members as a measure of restoration or protection of the rights of the power injured by such unfriendly act.

---

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State on the Privilege of Becoming an Adherent to the Treaty When Not a Signatory Nation*<sup>28</sup>

[UNDATED—circa January 7, 1919(?)]

It seems to me that it is especially desirable for the success of the League of Nations that every independent state in the world should become a member and share in the burdens and assume the responsibilities which membership imposes.

In order to bring this about the means of becoming a member by a nation which is not a signatory ought to be made easy. That is the authority should be given for a government to deposit with the Secretariat of the International Council an instrument of adherence accompanied by approving declarations of the act formally issued by at least three members of the League. Every member of the League should be forthwith notified of the act and if, within thirty days after notification, a member of the League has not filed a protest to the adherence, the nation filing the instrument of adherence shall be notified that it is a member of the League and shall become subject to all the provisions of the Treaty as fully as a signatory power.

In the event that a member of the League protests against the adherence of an applicant nation, then the matter of admission to the League shall remain in abeyance pending favorable action by a three-fourths vote of the International Council.

To further safeguard the League from the admission of unstable and therefore undesirable members it might be provided that the instrument of adherence of no government shall be received unless at least ten members of the League have diplomatic relations with it or have formally recognized it as the *de jure* government of the nation seeking membership. Such a provision would prevent beligerent governments from attempting adherence and avoid premature application by revolutionary or provisional governments.

The benefits obtained by the provisions of the Treaty, namely, the protective covenant of sovereign rights, the interposition of the International Council, the recourse to the Arbitral Tribunal, etc., should

---

<sup>28</sup> Reprinted from Miller, *My Diary*, vol. III, pp. 127-128.

It is stated *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 66, note b, that "Another paper which I suppose was handed with Mr. Lansing's memorandum to the President was entitled 'Memorandum on the Privilege of becoming an Adherent of the Treaty when not a Signatory Nation.'"



be limited to members of the League. If provisions are inserted in the Treaty which directly or indirectly confer any of these benefits on a nation which is not a member of the League, even though the denial of the benefit might disturb the peace of the world, a nation would be in a more advantageous position by remaining outside the League, for it would in no way be bound to observe the self-denying provisions of the treaty. In a word, a non-member would possess the privileges and assume none of the obligations.

To make the League universal the policy should be—No benefit without the responsibilities.

[Additional papers concerning proposals for a League of Nations, beginning with President Wilson's so-called "First Paris Draft" of January 10, 1919, will be found in subsequent volumes.]

**OTHER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA OF  
THE PEACE CONFERENCE**



## INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION

763.72119/2871½

*The Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am attaching a memorandum, which I hope you will have time to read. The subject matter is sure to come up at the Conference and will probably assume an important aspect. As you know I have been Chairman of a Committee which has been making investigations along this line. Other members of the Committee are Major-General Squires, U. S. A., Captain Todd, U. S. N., and Mr. Rogers, of the Committee on Public Information. Mr. Patchin has been serving as Secretary. A Special Committee appointed by this Committee is making some extensive investigations and will soon report, including some recommendations. These will be forwarded to you in due time, but I feel that the subject is one of such importance and so little understood generally that you may be glad to get a short memorandum which will touch some of the important phases.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

[Enclosure]

### *Memorandum on International Telegraphic Communication*

#### I.—THE REMOVAL OF ALL ECONOMIC BARRIERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EQUALITY OF TRADE CONDITIONS.

(a) The cable and the radio are the avenues through which rapid economic, industrial and financial exchanges are effected. Their present management is a barrier and their free use to the citizens of all countries is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of equality of trade conditions. The terms and conditions of their use necessarily affect the partiality or impartiality with which business can be transacted between the citizens of different countries.

(b) These terms and conditions include:

1. Rates of service, which should be equal for the citizens of all nations and should not discriminate in favor of the nationals of the country operating the system.

2. Volume of messages to be carried each day, which should be equably arranged so that the nationals of the operating country may not have an allotment of words per day so large as to exclude the possibility of use by nationals of other countries. Also, the number of words per day of business of nationals foreign to the controlling country should not be limited to such a small number as to prevent being sent the volume of business which the citizens of the sending country might desire.

3. The hours of the day (particularly in the case of radio because of the change in static) during which messages will be received for transmission should be so arranged as to permit the transmission of messages to the citizens of all countries, if they are filed. The difference of clock time in different countries and the consequent difference in time of opening and closing of banks, bourses, exchanges, etc., permits of manipulation of messages so as to favor those emanating from the citizens of the controlling power. This should be prohibited.

These terms and conditions can be so arranged as to permit the full and free transmission of messages to and from the citizens of all nations with perfect impartiality. It applies to press messages as well as to those of regular commerce. Through the press messages the citizens learn, in the newspapers, of the citizens of other countries, learn their customs, business methods, their mode of life, their habits and their thoughts. Through them peoples learn to know peoples and a stimulation is given to travel, commerce and reciprocal business.

(NOTE—As our example of discrimination against foreign business the British cable to Rio de Janeiro is pointed out. The press allotment from London is:

English origin, 1500 words—United States origin, 150 words. The rate is—per word—English origin, 12¢—U. S. origin, 50¢. This is a sample of a barrier.)

(c) Exclusive rights (whether by treaty or grant) to land cables—or to lay them in territorial waters—tends to maintain the *status quo*, to continue the national control and to encourage discrimination against rivals in international trade. All such exclusive rights should be abolished and territorial waters and cable landing rights thrown open to the citizens of all nations on an equal basis.

(d) Radio stations, their sites, erections, equipment and operation should be controlled or supervised by the Government of the country in which they are located. The development of the radio is reaching such a high degree and its availability becoming so general that an uncontrolled and universal use of radio communication through a multiplicity of stations with a variety of equipments will gradually lead to a confusion which may become complete. In cable and telegraphic communication transmission is along a wire which is susceptible of control. In radio communication transmission is through ether which is common property and not susceptible

to control. The only way to bring order out of wireless operations is to subject the sending apparatus to such degree of supervision as will insure its proper use. An international agreement, something on the order of the Postal Union, in which each government in the world agrees to supervise the operation of all radio stations located in the lands and waters under its jurisdiction would eliminate all individual operations and make for a universal, systematic and free communication through the commonly owned medium, ether.

(NOTE: The development of the radio has reached a higher stage today in the United States than in any other country. Experiments during the war have reduced the wireless to a high degree of science. Other countries will gradually arrive at the state at which we have arrived and may surpass us. While we are in the ascendancy we can generously and graciously take the initiative in a movement to establish regularity by universal governmental agreement, even going so far as to internationalize continental stations and such insular stations as are necessary or convenient for the relaying of messages across large bodies of water. In the last sentence particular reference is made to the Pacific Ocean and certain strategically situated islands which are either or both radio and cable stations and which are variously under the jurisdiction of the United States, England, France, Japan, ex-German under Japanese occupation and ex-German under British occupation.)

## II.—THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(a) Cable and radio apparatus assume an international importance under a League of Nations. They are the only rapid means of communication between the members of such a League and between the citizens and subjects of each of them. They should be controlled by the League. If such were the case no hostile messages and no disturbing intrigues could be carried out through these means. Equable arrangements could be made which would ensure the common use of the world's system for the common good.

(b) Unless England is to continue to be the manufacturer and consequently the controller of cables some arrangement must be made to make available to the United States and other nations the supply of a certain quality of gutta-percha which alone is serviceable for insulating submarine cables and which is found only in the Malay Peninsula—else a substitute must be discovered. As it is today England controls the supply of insulation, consequently of cable manufacture,—and also the manufacture of cable instruments.

To permit of the laying of cables wherever wanted and their free operation the League of Nations must—

1. Make England its mandatory to manufacture and sell cables and instruments to any nations, or

2. Make available the British gutta-percha supply and internationalize all present and future patents on cables or cable instruments.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

---

Breckinridge Long Papers

*Colonel E. M. House to the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

PARIS, 15 December, 1918

[Received January 7, 1919.]

MY DEAR MR. LONG: I thank you for your letter of the 26th ultimo, enclosing a copy of a memorandum on International Telegraphic Communication, which you handed to Mr. Lansing.<sup>1</sup> I shall read this memorandum with great interest, as the subject is one I am very much concerned about, and I trust that something can be worked out at the Conference along the lines that you have indicated.

With very best wishes, I am,

Faithfully yours,

E. M. HOUSE

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

## LABOR QUESTIONS

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/3 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 17—11 a. m.]

33. For the Secretary of State. For your information. Had talk with Gompers and found him a little disturbed because labor was not represented on Peace Mission. Feeling on his part not very deep. He said he would not go to Paris however unless he had some reason for being there as he could not be in a position of waiting around. Feels strongly that Labor Conference, if held, should be held in Paris at the same time Peace Conference, in which case he would go.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/3 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 18, 1918.

24. Your 33, December 16, to Ammission. You will say very confidentially to Mr. Gompers that the President's views were that a labor conference might very properly be held in Paris or in any other place at any time that the leaders of labor deemed it wise; that is, he believed that they should feel entirely free to do what they conceived best. Please inform Gompers that this, of course, is for his own information and not for general use.

LANSING

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/5 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 22—3 p. m.]

86. For the Secretary of State. Your 24, December 18. Please tell the President that Gompers is disposed to call a labor conference



to be held in Paris and put the burden on the foreign Governments of refusing to let it take place. I gave him the President's message and suggested to him that it would be better to wait and try to arrange matter with the foreign governments as they might now see the advisability of holding this conference in Paris.

It seems to me that it would be very dangerous to hold conference in neutral country as there would be a chance of its being captured by the extremists and Bolsheviks. Please let me know if any progress is being made in these negotiations so I can keep Gompers quiet.

As soon as he issues call for a conference he and his associates will go to Paris. Am forwarding for him today a message to the President.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/6 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1918—10:30 p. m.

[Received December 22.]

87. For the President from Gompers. The attitude of those governments which interpose objections or place obstacles in the way of my issuing for American Federation of Labor, invitation to labor for concurrent international conference at the same time and place where the official peace commissioners are to meet, is not only unjust but most unwise and calculated to react most injuriously. If the labor conference is not permitted to take place at Paris, the Italian, British, French and our own so-called radicals will be given the seeming justification to demonstrate that freedom of assemblage and speech is denied by the governments claiming to be democratic; they will charge the American labor movement with having deceived labor of the world into the belief that an opportunity would be afforded to discuss world labor problems and to aid in their rational solution. Persistence in this course by Allied Governments may make impossible American labor coming to Paris and there rendering assistance. Indeed the American Federation of Labor will be humiliated and made the laughing stock of the world. If objection is removed American labor delegation myself included can leave United States soon and remain in Paris until official Peace Conference convenes and be of some service and thereafter meet with the labor conference and help to guide the conference aright.

POLK

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/7

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, 24 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I entirely agree, and I believe you do, with the judgment expressed by Mr. Gompers in the enclosed letter.<sup>1</sup> Would it not be possible for you to have frank conversation with the French authorities and representatives of the English Government in order to straighten this matter out? The only wise and prudent course, indeed the only expedient course, is to allow these people to hold their sessions when and where they will and I am clear in the judgment that if they are forced to sit in a neutral country their discussions and conclusions will certainly be dominated by dangerous radical elements.

Faithfully yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/8

*Major George L. Berry to Colonel E. M. House*

PARIS, 27 December, 1918.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: Confirming my conversation with you relative to the matter of the coming Labor Conferences in France between the representatives of organized labor of the several countries of the Allies, I beg to now request that if it is found possible that I be assigned to the work of intermediate between the United States Peace Mission and the several labor groups which are to convene in this City.

I desire again to draw your attention to the fact that I am personally acquainted with the representatives of labor in England, Belgium, France, Italy and Germany, aside from being personally acquainted with the representatives of every International Labor Union of the United States and the members of the Mission from the American Federation of Labor shortly to arrive in France under the leadership of Mr. Samuel Gompers. These men are associates of mine with whom I am thoroughly acquainted. I am now on leave from the International Pressmen's Association of which I am the President.

I am unassigned to any military duty at this time having arrived in France as a casual. Therefore, I am sure that it would be possible to have the assignment which I request and if this is found possible, I am sure that I shall be able to render service that will justify the confidence of you and your colleagues.

Very sincerely yours,

GEO. L. BERRY

---

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

Paris Peace Conf. 185.161/Sa : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 30, 1918.

109. [From Lansing.] Please suggest to Gompers the advisability of naming some person to act as an intermediary between the American Peace Commission and the several labor groups in Europe and the United States. In this connection you might inform Gompers that a letter has been received from George L. Berry offering his services for this purpose, but no steps will be taken by the Commission until Mr. Gompers has expressed his views. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

033.1140/94 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1919—7 p. m.

87. Your 109, December 30, 1 p. m. For the Secretary of State. Gompers requests that following message be transmitted to you.

“With the American Federation of Labor delegates I sail from New York on Cunard Steamship *Carmania* Wednesday, January 8th and will come to Paris in few days after arrival in London. Any arrangement for intermediary should be deferred until conference with American Mission.”

POLK

## LIBERIAN AFFAIRS

763.72119/3154½

### *Memorandum by the Receiver of Customs of Liberia (Worley)*

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1918.

It seems to be generally understood that there will be a meeting of the Delegates of the Allied Nations prior to the assembling of the Peace Conference for the purpose of coming into agreement on a program and plan of procedure.

Diplomatic correspondence is now being conducted with Great Britain and France relative to the withdrawal of those Governments from the present Receivership in Liberia and from participation in the proposed financial aid to be granted to Liberia by the United States for rehabilitating and developing the natural resources of that Republic. This loan-credit is granted to Liberia in much the same way that others have been granted to the other Allied Nations.

Because of difficulties of transportation the Delegates from Liberia will be somewhat late in assembling.

From correspondence recently received from Great Britain, it would appear that an attempt will be made to have the whole subject of Liberian questions brought up for settlement at the Peace Conference and possibly at the prior meeting of the Allied Delegates.

It is respectfully suggested that the Delegates of the United States be advised of these facts and that they be asked, on behalf of Liberia, to urge that the administration of Liberia's international obligations and affairs are now in the hands of the United States and Great Britain and France, and that the financial assistance to Liberia as well as her future status and relations with the United States Government are proper questions for decision by those three nations only, and to express to Great Britain and France the hope that affirmative replies may be received from those two nations to the diplomatic correspondence now being conducted.

Attention should also be invited to the fact that Liberia is an independent entity; a member of the Allied Nations and has contributed of what she has for the common cause and has suffered likewise in commerce, trade, revenue, and by bombardment; and that Liberia should not be considered in connection with captured German colonies in West Africa or any possible readjustment of territory.

It might also be stated that the Liberian question is not one to be considered in connection with those of West Africa; that the United States has no designs on West Africa in general, but has a very real, continuing and increasing interest in Liberia.

Other items which might be called to the attention of the American Delegation are outlined in detail in three other memoranda which I have submitted to the Department on this same subject under even date.<sup>1</sup>

I trust the cable may be used for this purpose.

Respectfully submitted,

H. F. WORLEY

---

763.72119/3047

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 1387

MEMORANDUM

His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by direction of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that His Majesty's Government have received and considered the Memorandum from the State Department (undated) which was received at this Embassy on the 19th November last, on the subject of Liberia.<sup>2</sup> His Majesty's Government appreciate the force of the United States' contention and suggest, therefore, that the subject might be considered with other analogous questions at the approaching Peace Conference. The United States Embassy in London, who have enquired the views of His Majesty's Government on the proposals, have been informed similarly.

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1918.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 882.51/9 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received December 21—3:30 p. m.]

52. Confidential for Secretary Lansing. We are now corresponding with Great Britain and France relative to the withdrawal of these Governments from the present receivership in Liberia and from par-

---

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For the substance of this memorandum (sent also to the French Embassy), see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, p. 545.

ticipation in the proposed financial aid to be granted to Liberia by the United States for rehabilitating and developing the natural resources of that republic. Our loan credit of five million dollars was granted to Liberia in much the same way that others have been granted to the other Allied nations.

Recent communications from Great Britain indicate that an attempt will be made to have the whole subject of this Government's intended assistance to Liberia brought up for settlement at the Peace Conference.

We cannot but feel that the British and French are seeking to bring this before the Peace Conference in an effort to promote their political ambitions in Liberia whereas the refunding of the 1912 loan by the American Government has no bearing whatsoever on the questions coming before the Peace Conference. It is evident from all conversations with British and French representatives that their Governments are fearful that the United States is planning a protectorate in Liberia to the exclusion of British and French commercial interests. They have been informed on various occasions that the refunding of the loan has no political bearing, but is merely in the interest of good government in Liberia, and that free opportunity for every one will be maintained.

We wonder whether you will be willing to say now that this is not a matter for presentation at the Peace Conference, but that you would be willing to discuss it in Paris with British and French representatives.

Memoranda outlining in detail other items which might be called to the attention of the American delegation can be transmitted to you by pouch.

POLK

---

763.72119/3150 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 24, 1918—5 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

67. [From Lansing.] Your 52, December 19, 4 P. M. I share your views that refunding of 1912 loan to Liberia has no bearing on questions coming before the Conference. I am inclined to think therefore, that it should not be discussed here but that this question should be handled by the Department with British and French representatives. Lansing.

AMERICAN MISSION

763.72119/4109

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 287

MONROVIA, January 9, 1919.

Diplomatic

[Received March 12.]

SIR: For the information of the Department I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the instructions which have been given by the President of Liberia to the Liberian Commission to the peace conference.

These instructions not only cover all points which the Liberian Government considers likely to come under the deliberations of the peace conference, and which are conceived to be matters of prime interest to the Republic, but they also cover questions which probably will not be treated by the peace conference. This latter class of questions relates to matters to be taken up with the British and French Governments respectively. The advisability of opening negotiations on these various questions is to be determined, I understand from the President, after the Liberian delegates have consulted the American Commission with reference to them.

It is the desire of the President that the Liberian delegation closely associate itself with the American Commission and work in complete harmony with it on all matters affecting Liberia. On this point the President laid great emphasis in several conferences at which I was present by his invitation just before the Liberian delegates left Monrovia.

I have [etc.]

RICHARD C. BUNDY

[Enclosure]

*President Howard of Liberia to the Members of the Liberian Commission to the Peace Conference (King, Dunbar, Worley)*

MONROVIA, January 8, 1919.

GENTLEMEN: Pursuant to your appointment as Members of the Liberian Commission to the Peace Conference, I have the honor to instruct you to make representations upon the following points:

1. Compensation for the loss of life of Liberian citizens by enemy action within and without the confines of the Republic.
2. Compensation for damage to or destruction of public and private property within the Republic owned by aliens.
3. Compensation for indirect losses caused by submarine activity:
  - (a) Loss of property in Allied ships by the sinking of vessels with merchandise and produce in shipment to and from Liberia.

- (b) Establishment of submarine zone curtailing the services of the Spanish Steamship Line, thus causing the loss of head-money revenue to the Republic.
- (c) Loss due to the suspension of trade.

4. The holding as part security for claims of damages against Germany by Liberia of the proceeds from the liquidation of German property.

5. Readjustments of boundaries on both the English and French frontiers so as to include in Liberia territory claimed and recognized as Liberia's prior to the Franco-Liberian Treaty of 1892<sup>3</sup> and the Anglo-Liberian Treaty of 1885.<sup>4</sup> In the event that a readjustment cannot be secured upon this basis, you are instructed to insist upon a ratification according to the Franco-Liberian Treaty of 1892, and the Anglo-Liberian Treaty of 1904.<sup>5</sup>

The *thalweg* of all rivers forming the natural boundaries of the Republic shall be insisted upon as the political boundaries.

6. With respect to the final disposition of the German Cable which touches Liberia, you shall insist upon the right of Liberia to be consulted, and Liberia will not be bound by the terms of any arrangement to which she has not given her approval.

7. Seizure by the French of the German launch "Malimba" on the Liberian bank of the Cavalla River.

8. Elimination of the French Inspector-General of Hygiene.

9. Refunding of the Loan of 1912 and the dissolution of the Receivership, and the replacing of same by American Agents attached to the Treasury Department.

10. Confirmation of the offer made to the United States Government in 1908 for the establishment of a coaling station in Liberia.

11. Liberian Prize Court. Claims; Liberian goods seized by (a) Enemy Vessels, (b) Allied Vessels, (c) Neutral Vessels.

12. Cancellation of the Charter of the Liberian Development Company.

13. Negotiations of new Commercial Treaties upon the basis of the best interests of the Republic as disclosed by the economic principles established by the Peace Conference.

14. Repatriation of Joshua Phillips.

15. On all these points you will seek the advice and co-operation of the American Delegates.

D. E. HOWARD

763.72119/3047

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

The Department has given careful consideration to the suggestion of the British Government embodied in the Embassy's memorandum

<sup>3</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXIV, p. 626, and vol. LXXXV, p. 639.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. LXXVI, p. 88.

<sup>5</sup> Possibly a reference is intended to the convention of Jan. 21, 1911 (see *ibid.*, vol. CIV, p. 181), which in turn refers to the "provisional" boundary laid down by the Anglo-Liberian Boundary Commission of 1902-3.



of December 15, 1918, that the financial aid and rehabilitation of Liberia might be considered with other analogous questions at the approaching Peace Conference, and has submitted these views by cable to the Secretary of State in Paris. A reply has now been received to the effect that in the opinion of the American Peace Mission this subject has no bearing on other questions which will be considered by the Peace Conference and should be settled directly among the Governments.

The Liberian question is not one affecting or involving West Africa. Liberia is an independent nation, a member of the Allied group of Nations, and is not to be considered in connection with captured German colonies in West Africa or any possible readjustment of territory.

The United States, as the next friend of Liberia and sponsor for the loan of 1912,<sup>6</sup> has always been looked to for the establishment of the necessary reforms in Liberia and the performance of the obligations of that Republic under the Loan Agreement and in international affairs. This has been difficult in operation under the financial entente. In consequence the Government of Liberia has not been able to accomplish many things which it had hoped to accomplish, the desirability of which has been mutually agreed upon by the United States, British and French Receivers.

The time has now arrived when the United States desires to give favorable consideration to the repeated appeals of Liberia and to those of the 12,000,000 colored people of this country, who have evidenced a renewed interest in Liberia's affairs and are petitioning that the United States Government, as the founder of Liberia and for other historic reasons and ties, should give more definite assistance than has been extended in the past.

At the time of the exchange of notes and negotiations for the re-funding of the loan of 1912, this Government invited the British Government to take part in the receivership. Events have now proved that multiple control of Liberian financial affairs has not given the expected results and benefits to the people of Liberia and this Government does not now anticipate that His Majesty's Government will interpose any objection to the new proposal, as outlined in the memorandum of the Department of State, handed to the British Chargé d'Affaires on November 19th, which is undertaken solely in the interest of Liberia itself. It should be emphasized that the new proposal of this Government is in no way to be regarded as indicating that the United States has the slightest desire or intention of establishing a protectorate over Liberia but rather purposes to maintain its historic position as Liberia's next friend.

---

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1912, pp. 667 ff.

Realizing that the development of the State will depend upon the opportunities of trade and commerce, this Government is particularly anxious that equal opportunity for trade and investment be afforded to foreign capital subject to proper safeguards and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of Liberia.

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1919.

## RULES FOR AERIAL NAVIGATION

Paris Peace Conf. 185.14/1

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1919.

[Received January 19.]

SIRS: I have the honor to enclose, for your information, a copy of a note dated December 11, 1918, from the Embassy of the French Republic, suggesting the advantage of having France, the United States, England, Belgium, and Italy join a convention for the adoption of rules of aerial navigation.

I have [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

[Enclosure]

*The French Chargé (Chambrun) to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government reminds me that the International Conference held in Paris in 1910 for the adoption of rules of aerial navigation could achieve nothing but a draft of a convention which has not been signed.

On the other hand, a French Commission, profiting by the experiences gained in the war has drafted another text not so lengthy but also in better harmony with the present conditions of aviation.

Under those circumstances the Government of the Republic believes that there would be advantage in having France, the United States, England and Belgium and Italy agree to draw up jointly a convention which would then be submitted to the other allies and to which the neutral states might in turn be permitted to adhere.

Should the Federal Government concur in this view, the French Government would be glad if one or more representatives were appointed to attend a limited conference which would meet in Paris at the earliest possible date.

I shall be thankful to you if you will kindly enable me to report how this proposal was received by the Government of the United States.

Be pleased [etc.]

CHARLES DE CHAMBRUN

Paris Peace Conf. 185.14/4a

*The Secretary of the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Grew) to the  
Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 25, 1919.

SIR: With reference to the Department's communication of January 2, 1919, transmitting copy of a note from the French Embassy suggesting the advisability of the adoption of rules of Aerial navigation, I have the honor to inform you that it is the opinion of the American Commission that the subject is one which does not pertain to the Peace Conference. In view of the many matters pressing for immediate consideration, it appears undesirable to undertake the consideration of this question at the present time.

I have [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

## THE TACNA-ARICA QUESTION <sup>1</sup>

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/4 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)*

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1918—8 p. m.

[Received December 12—10:17 a. m.]

18. For the Secretary of State. With reference to the statements of the Presidents of Peru and Chile which have been sent to you today <sup>2</sup> I wish to inform you that the Peruvian Minister on December 9 left the following memorandum at the Department:

"The Minister of Peru is instructed to advise the Honorable the Secretary of State that the Government of Peru accepts the mediation of the President of the United States and that the President of Peru will shortly communicate this acceptance by cable <sup>3</sup> in reply to the message of the President of the United States.

The Government of Peru however does not desire that the mediation should assume the character of an American Continental mediation.

It has accepted the mediation of the President of the United States because the Government of Peru considers the President of the United States to be the initiator and the supporter of those principles which are to be asserted at the general peace conference."

In view of the position assumed by the Government of Peru in considering the President's statement as an offer of mediation and the statement of the President of Chile who appears to consider that the United States has only offered assistance and not mediation as set forth in the cable of December 9, 4 p. m. from the Embassy at Santiago, it is desired to ascertain the views of the President as to whether he wishes to make a further offer of formal mediation to both countries accepting the Peruvian interpretation or whether he desires that both countries be informed that the tender of all possible assistance to bring about an equitable solution of the matter is to be

---

<sup>1</sup> For papers previously printed regarding the Tacna-Arica question in 1918 and 1919, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. I, pp. 123-163.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Peruvian and Chilean replies to President Wilson's tender of assistance to bring about a solution of the difficulties between Chile and Peru. The President's offer is contained in the telegram of Dec. 4, 1918, 6 p. m., to the Ambassador in Chile, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. I, p. 126. The Peruvian reply is quoted here; for the Chilean reply, see the telegram of Dec. 9, 1918, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in Chile, *ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

understood as referring only to the present difficulties between the two countries due to the disturbance in Iquique and not as an offer to mediate the whole Tacna and Arica question. It is also desired to ascertain the views of the President as to whether the Tacna Arica question should be laid before the Peace Conference or whether the United States Government alone should attempt to find a solution for this question which has now come to a head.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/1: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1918—4 p. m.

[Received December 14—2 p. m.]

22. For the Secretary of State. Department's December 11, 8 p. m. Department feels that the interpretation which should be put upon President's statement to Peru and Chile is that the statement is merely the tender of all possible assistance to bring about an equitable solution of the present difficulties between the two countries due to the disturbance in Iquique and that the statement is not meant to be an offer to mediate the whole Tacna Arica question.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/2: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in France (Bliss)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1918—5 p. m.

[Received December 14—9:20 a. m.]

23. For the Secretary of State. Department informed by Legation at La Paz that it is the intention of the Bolivian Government to send a special embassy to Washington for the purpose of congratulating the Government of the United States on the outcome of the war and for the purpose of presenting the case of Bolivia for the acquisition of a port. The Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that the case of Bolivia is precisely similar to that of Servia, that it is necessary for Bolivia to occupy a position which will enable it to communicate and carry on commerce with the outside world without having to obtain the consent of another country. The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that there was a very considerable body of opinion in Chile in favor of the cession of Arica to Bolivia and he claims that a similar body of opinion exists in part [*Peru?*] but that it is less

articulate in Peru because of Peruvian grievances against Chile. Regarding the Tacna Arica question he pointed out that with Bolivia placed between Chile and Peru, the peace of South America would be more secure. He stated that the Bolivian Government is anxious to have the United States take the initiative in the settlement of the problem either by making specific suggestions for settlement to the countries involved or by calling a conference of the three to be held under the presidency of the Secretary of State or by any other method deemed suitable by the Secretary. If under the rules to be adopted by the Peace Conference nations other than those which have actually participated in the war are to be allowed to send representatives, it is the intention of the Bolivian Government to send delegates to the Conference; these delegates will bring to the attention of the Conference the problem herein referred to unless the United States has in the meantime taken steps looking toward a settlement. The Bolivian Government would prefer to have the proceedings for the settlement initiated and presided over by the United States. The opinion of the President is desired as to whether this Government should signify a willingness to receive a special embassy from Bolivia and as to whether the question of the desire of Bolivia for a port is to be taken up at the Peace Conference.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/4: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 18, 1918—[12 p. m.]

23. Your Number 18, December 11, to Embassy. I have conferred with the President in regard to the acceptance of mediation by the government of Peru. Neither of us understood that actual mediation in regard to Tacna-Arica controversy was contemplated, only a suggestion that the present difficulty might be harmonized.

The President does not desire to make a further offer of formal mediation to both countries accepting the Peruvian interpretation. I would suggest that you orally express to the Chilean Ambassador the President's hope that the question may be settled by some form of arbitration, especially at a time when the whole world is looking toward the avoidance of force in the adjustment of international controversies.

I doubt very much the advisability of laying the Tacna-Arica question before the Peace Conference here.

LANSING

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/5 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1918—6 p. m.

[Received December 21—1 p. m.]

56. Your 23, December 18, 12 p. m., Department's 18 of December 11, 8 p. m. and 20 [22] of December 13, 4 p. m. No offer of mediation was contemplated or made. Both Chile and Peru clearly understand that the United States only offered its good offices if desired by both parties, to aid in settlement of present difficulty. No suggestion has ever been made to either party that the Tacna-Arica matter be laid before Peace Conference.

The Chilean Ambassador has already been informed by me that the Government of the United States feels that a settlement of [this?] question should be made. I would be pleased to have a further expression of your views in regard to form of arbitration to be suggested. Do you feel the arbitrator or arbitrators should be from this country?

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/2

*The Secretary of State to President Wilson*

PARIS, 28 December, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Tacna-Arica controversy between Chile and Peru is bound to be a vexatious one, and the enclosed telegram \* setting forth a Bolivian solution makes it even more complex because there is a measure of justice and reason in the Bolivian desire for a seaport and for territory separating the rivals, Chile and Peru. I doubt very much, however, whether any influential or considerable number of public men in either country would favor the Bolivian suggestion. Bolivia would have to rely upon the United States to obtain such a cession. The general principle for such settlement is one which we have declared, but to obtain it I fear we would gain the dislike of both Chile and Peru.

Meanwhile we are being asked about an arbitration, what sort we prefer and whether the tribunal should have an American on it. The decision of the tribunal, however just, will be resented by one party at least. The whole situation is charged with trouble which it will be hard to avoid.

---

\* No. 23, Dec. 13, 1918, 5 p. m., to the Chargé in France, p. 553.



My own opinion in regard to this telegram is that, because of your absence from Washington, it would appear to be an inopportune time to send a delegation from Bolivia to the United States, but that, in view of the possibility of questions arising as to the general organization of the world in connection with the Peace Conference, it might be well to send two or three delegates to Paris, who could, while watching the course of events, informally discuss the Arica matter with you. I do not think the question should come before the Peace Conference.

Will you be good enough to tell me your wishes in the matter so that I can advise Mr. Polk?

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT LANSING

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/10

*The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace (Scott, Miller) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 30, 1918.

An expression of opinion is requested as regards the form of arbitration to be suggested and as to the countries from which the arbitrator or arbitrators of the dispute, presumably that between Chile and Peru concerning the status of Tacna and Arica, shall be chosen.

The correspondence submitted, herewith returned, does not give the facts of the incident at Iquique, the apparent cause of the present trouble. It shows, however, that the Department of State has offered its good offices, not formal mediation—although Peru appears to have considered the offer as such,—that the Department of State has informed both Chile and Peru that no formal offer of this kind was made, that the United States has suggested that the Tacna and Arica affair between the two countries be settled, and, finally, that it is of the highest importance that a dispute between the two countries should not result in an appeal to force at a time when so many nations are meeting in a peace conference.

In compliance with the request for an expression of opinion, the undersigned submit the following observations:

Tacna (including Arica) has a larger area than Massachusetts, with a population of 38,000, as against 3,300,000 for Massachusetts. Compared with Alsace-Lorraine, Tacna is half as large again (9,000 square miles and 5,600 square miles) with a population of about one-fiftieth of that of the French provinces (38,000 and 1,900,000).

Tacna is a mining district; it has substantially no agricultural interests; a great part, perhaps a majority of the population are mine laborers from Chile. The chief town, Tacna, has a population of say 12,000.

The population of Tacna, in 1895, or approximately at the time of the expiration of the ten-years period mentioned in the Treaty of 1883<sup>5</sup> was about 24,000.

It may well be argued that the question involved in the Tacna-Arica dispute is rather financial and territorial than one concerning the rights of peoples or one to which the principle of self-determination is relevant. Indeed the financial character of the question was recognized to some extent by both Chile and Peru in the Treaty of Ancon of 1883.

It should be added that Bolivia has acquired by treaty with Chile certain rights in the Tacna district and that these rights should and doubtless will be guarded and preserved in any final adjustment of the dispute between Chile and Peru.

The great concern of the United States seems to be to prevent, especially at the present time, a resort to force on the part of Chile and Peru, and for this reason proposes a settlement of the entire question between the two countries. In view, however, of the difficulty, the nature, the scope, and the extent of the controversy; the difficulty, greater, if possible, of framing the issues to be submitted and determining in its minutest details the procedure to be followed, the care to be exercised in the choice of the arbitrators if their decision is to be accepted by each of the litigant nations as a final settlement of the dispute, it is believed that some less comprehensive solution of the matter should be attempted at this time, inasmuch as the desideratum is not so much immediate settlement of the dispute as to prevent the outbreak of war.

The undersigned therefore venture the suggestion that the attention of Chile and Peru be called to the fact that each of them (as well as Bolivia) has concluded with the United States a Treaty for the Advancement of Peace,<sup>6</sup> by virtue whereof they have pledged their good faith to submit their disputes to a Commission in Inquiry, and that during the session of such commission, which may be of a year's duration, neither of the parties shall commit a hostile act or resort to war with the other. It is true that neither of these countries has concluded such a treaty with the other, but Chile negotiated such a convention with Argentina and Brazil. Admitting that such action on their part would not decide the question submitted, inasmuch as the report of the commission has only the effect which the countries may care to give it, it would preserve peace and would subject either the Iquique incident or the question of Tacna and Arica, or both, to a prolonged and ostensibly impartial investigation, leaving the two countries to take up and to consider the question of arbitration or final

<sup>5</sup> Treaty of Ancon; for translation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1883, p. 731.

<sup>6</sup> Treaty with Bolivia, Jan. 22, 1914, *Foreign Relations*, 1915, p. 30; with Chile, July 24, 1914, *ibid.*, 1916, p. 46; with Peru, July 14, 1914, *ibid.*, 1915, p. 1279.

solution of the matter when the resentment produced by the Iquique incident should have passed.

The suggestion is frankly diplomatic, not judicial, inasmuch as the undersigned believe that diplomacy is better fitted to adjust the question in its present form than an award of an Arbitral Commission or the decision of an International Court of Justice.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT  
DAVID HUNTER MILLER

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/8 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace*

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1919—9 p. m.

[Received January 6—4:10 p. m.]

104. For Lansing. Your 23, Dec. 18, 12 M. The Peruvian Minister in Washington has informed the Department that his Government considers that the "matter in dispute" alluded to by the President of the United States cannot be other than the territorial controversy between Chile and Peru arising from the non-compliance of Chile with the stipulation of the treaty of Ancon.

The severance of consular relations between Chile and Peru was of course the coming to a head of the territorial question which has agitated these countries for years. It is clear that to maintain peace in South America, a definite settlement of this question is necessary; otherwise disturbance[s] like the present between Chile and Peru are at any time possible and in the event of war Ecuador would probably attack Peru from the north and it is conceivable that other countries might be drawn into the conflict. The Ecuadorian newspapers have been praising what they call Chilean rejection of mediation or of interference in any form by the United States.

The difficulties of attempting to settle the boundary dispute between Chile and Peru by any other agency than that of the Peace Conference would seem to be as follows:

1. It is very doubtful whether Chile would accept mediation or arbitration of the Tacna-Arica question, the judgment United States alone offer it.

2. The newspapers of Peru are making a campaign with the end in view of securing the return to Peru of the Province of Tarapaca,

which was taken by Chile in the war of the Pacific. It is certain that Chile will not consent to any arbitration proposed by the U. S. Government, which should include the protocols of Tarapaca.

3. If the United States succeeded in being accepted as an arbiter, it would be certain that whatever the decision rendered, the U. S. would be exceedingly unpopular with Chile or with Peru, or with both.

4. It is very probable that any arbitral decision would have to be enforced hereafter and in that event, it would be far better to have other countries associated with the United States in the enforcement.

5. The interests of other South American countries are so closely related to hostile feeling of either Chile or Peru that an impartial Pan-American settlement of the question would be difficult.

If it is considered that submitting this South American question to the Peace Conference would be injurious to the hegemony of the United States in this hemisphere and would be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, would it be advisable to intimate to Chile and Peru that they should await the end of the Conference, in order that they might then make use of the machinery which [it] is expected the Conference will provide for the settlement of international questions.

It is believed that a hint to the Peruvian Government would result [in] that Government's asking the Peace Conference to take up the boundary question. If the associated powers decided to arbitrate the question, Chile could not well withhold her consent. If the Peruvian Government proceeded in this matter, the suggesting of such a course by the United States Government would be avoided and it would be a question for consideration, whether such action would be a departure from the Monroe Doctrine. There have been other and Latin American boundary disputes which have been arbitrated by European powers upon the request of the countries involved; the present case, however, may result in the request of arbitration by Peru and in the compelling of Chile to consent. If this action were taken by the countries taking part in the Peace Conference, it might be considered European intervention in an American question, and therefore action contrary to what it has been our policy to permit in the past.

An expression of your views in this matter would be appreciated by the Department, as it is believed that an assumption of a definite policy is urgently necessary.

POLK

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/10

*The Technical Advisers to the Commission to Negotiate Peace  
(Miller, Scott) to the Secretary of State*

#### MEMORANDUM

Referring to dispatch 104, urgent, January 4th, from the Acting Secretary of State and considering the request for an expression of opinion as to whether this dispatch modifies in any way the memorandum submitted by the undersigned on December 30th last,

relating to the Tacna-Arica question, the following observations are submitted:

Dispatch 104 very clearly points out the difficulties in the way of any settlement of the boundary dispute between Chile and Peru by any other agency than that of the Peace Conference itself. These difficulties seem formidable and are not to be minimized.

On the other hand, it appears to the undersigned that it would be unfortunate if this question, which is purely American, should prove to be such a one as can find no preliminary solution and would therefore of necessity, or at least by reason of the action of Peru, be submitted to the Peace Conference, at which Peru would doubtless be represented as one of those countries which have broken relations with Germany, and Chile represented as a neutral.

It is obvious under such circumstances that a certain sympathetic interest would exist in favor of Peru; an interest which that country doubtless well recognizes.

It does not seem to the undersigned that the difficulties which have been mentioned offer any obstacle in the way of the suggestion ventured in the memorandum of December 30th last. Indeed it would seem that that suggestion, which, if adopted, would preclude consideration of the matter at the Peace Conference, is one which might be to the interest of the United States to make, as perhaps avoiding any question of any possible prejudice to the American views and interests relating to the Monroe Doctrine.

It may well be, and perhaps should be, assumed that the suggestion will not be accepted by Peru, and perhaps under these circumstances it is not inappropriate to consider what further action, if any, might then be taken by the United States.

If not premature at this time, it may be suggested that there would still remain to the United States the possibility of presenting informally to the Governments of Chile and Peru its views as to the bases upon which direct negotiations between the two countries might be commenced and even concluded on the question, and without elaborating any discussion of such bases, it is perhaps appropriate to refer to the previous memorandum of the undersigned foreshadowing the view that such bases might be found in the financial bearings of the dispute, recognized in the Treaty of Ancon, of 1883.

As of possible interest in connection with the subject matter of dispatch 104, a copy of the official translation of the "Rose Book" of Chile is transmitted herewith.<sup>7</sup> This pamphlet contains, in the

---

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to House Inquiry Handbook No. 6 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), which is a translation of Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, *Comunicaciones cambiadas entre las Concillerias de Chile y el Perú sobre la cuestión de Tacna y Arica (1905 á 1908)* (Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Barcelona, 1908).

nature of an appendix, an abstract and parallel study of the papers contained in the "Rose Book" of Chile.

DAVID HUNTER MILLER  
JAMES BROWN SCOTT

9 JANUARY, 1919.

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/9

*President Wilson to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, 9 January, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I doubt the wisdom of a Bolivian deputation either to the United States or to Paris at the present juncture. They are apt to get lost in the mixup here anyway, and I should not like to have them come and feel more disappointed than if they had stayed at home.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

WOODROW WILSON

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/2 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 11, 1919—1 a. m.

237. [From Lansing.] Your 23 December 13, 5 p. m. The President doubts the wisdom of a Bolivian deputation either to the United States or to Paris at the present juncture. Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

Paris Peace Conf. 723.2515/8 : Telegram

*The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State*

PARIS, January 16, 1919—10 a. m.

302. [From Lansing.] Your 104, January 4, 9 p. m. regarding the controversy between Chile and Peru. It appears clearly from the information contained in the above mentioned telegram that the difficulties in connection with the settlement of the dispute between Chile and Peru by any other means than the Peace Conference itself are indeed formidable. On the other hand I feel that it would be unfortunate if this question which after all is purely American should be submitted in the first instance for solution at the Peace Conference where it is probable that Peru would have the advantage of representation as a country which has severed relations with Germany whereas Chile would be represented as a neutral.

The great concern of the Government of the United States in connection with this matter is to prevent especially at the present time a resort to force on the part of the two countries involved and for this reason it has ardently desired some final settlement of the entire question. In view, however, of the nature of the controversy and the difficulties of reaching a definite solution in the immediate future it seems that perhaps a less comprehensive adjustment of the matter should be attempted. It is suggested therefore that the attention of Chile and Peru be called to the Treaties for the Advancement of Peace which each of them as well as Bolivia has concluded with the United States by virtue of which the respective countries have agreed to submit their disputes to a Commission of Inquiry and that while this commission is in session neither party shall commit a hostile act or resort to war with each other. Although neither of these countries has concluded a treaty of this nature with the other and although the procedure outlined above would not decide the question submitted as the report of the commission does not bind either party, such action would tend to preserve peace and at the end of the prolonged and ostensibly impartial investigation the question of arbitration or final solution could be resumed under less strained conditions.

The suggestion outlined above is purely diplomatic, not judicial and accordingly appears to be better suited to the present situation. I shall be glad therefore to be informed of any views which you may communicate to me on the matter.<sup>8</sup> Lansing.

AM[ERICAN] MISSION

---

<sup>8</sup> For additional papers regarding discussion of the Tacna-Arica question in connection with the Paris Peace Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. I, pp. 148-160, *passim*.

## INDEX





## INDEX

- Aaland Islands, Swedish claim to, 236, 300
- Abyssinia, 302, 314
- Adriatic problem, 64-65, 301, 339, 341, 419, 421, 442-447, 450, 453-456, 460, 461-462, 471, 472, 473, 474-487
- Aerial navigation convention, French proposal for consideration by peace conference, 550-551
- Afghanistan, 73, 87, 314
- Africa (*see also* Liberia), 36-38, 70-71, 73, 89, 93, 97, 302, 303, 314, 337, 338, 348, 407, 409, 431-441
- Agenda of the peace conference. *See* Policies and proposals for peace under France, Great Britain, Japan, and United States; International labor conference and Representation on U. S. peace commission under Labor; Italy: Territorial and boundary claims; League of Nations; Liberia: Settlement of Liberian questions; Tacna-Arica dispute: Peace conference; Wilson, Woodrow: Policies and proposals for peace.
- Albania, 65, 86, 311, 362, 408, 409, 421
- Alsace-Lorraine, 47, 49, 49-50, 63-64, 84, 287, 297, 300, 373, 378-379
- American Commission to Negotiate Peace. *See* Commission to Negotiate Peace.
- American Expeditionary Forces, assistance at peace conference. *See under* Commission to Negotiate Peace.
- American Geographical Society, use of facilities by the "Inquiry," 35, 55, 117, 184
- Andorra, 314
- Arbitration, 554, 555, 556-558, 558-559
- Argentina, question of participation in peace conference, 229-230, 231, 313-314, 314, 348, 398
- Armament reduction, discussions, 12-14, 299, 326, 491, 493, 524
- Armenia, 43, 69, 312, 348, 362-363, 408
- Armies of occupation, 341, 342, 383
- Armistice, 1-6, 341, 489
- Announcement by President Wilson, *Nov. 11, 1918*, 1
- Congratulatory messages, 1-6
- House, Col. E. M., to President Wilson, 1
- United States (*see also* Wilson, Woodrow, *infra*), exchanges with France, 2; Great Britain, 1, 4; Greece, 3, 6; Japan, 2-3, 4
- Armistice—Continued.
- Congratulatory messages—Continued.
- Wilson, Woodrow (President):
- Messages from—
- House, Col. E. M., 1
- Italy, King of, 4-5; reply, 6
- Messages to—
- British Prime Minister, 3-4; reply, 5
- French Ambassador, 5
- Japanese attitude, 2-3, 489
- Renewal, 341
- Asia Minor, 419-420, 467-469
- Australia, alleged noninclusion in settlement of peace terms, 407-408
- Austria: Participation in peace conference, question of, 308, 309, 348, 353, 356, 363, 366, 387; U. S. mission of investigation, 150-191, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200-201, 210
- Austria-Hungary (*see also* Austria), study by the "Inquiry," 33, 36-38, 43, 44-45, 48, 52, 56, 67, 85
- Baker, Newton D. (Secretary of War), declination of appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 169-170
- Balkan problem, 36-38, 50-51, 67-68, 73, 86, 93, 97, 301
- Baltic provinces of former Russian Empire, 36-37, 65, 88, 312
- Bavaria, question of participation in peace conference, 309, 348, 353
- Pelligerents, question of representation at the peace conference, 157, 225, 227, 228, 229-230, 231, 232-233, 285, 305-308, 345, 347-348, 355, 361, 386, 392, 393, 397-398, 401
- Belgium: Brussels as seat of peace conference, proposal for, 119, 123-124; participation in peace conference, question of, 265, 266, 305, 347, 355, 386, 393, 397; study by the "Inquiry," 32, 49, 62-63, 73, 84; territorial claims, 300
- Berlin-Bagdad railway, 31, 41-42, 43
- Bliss, Gen. Tasker H.: Appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 170, 175-176, 192; observations on proposed League of Nations agreement, 521-526
- Bohemia. *See* Czechoslovakia.
- Bolivia: Desire for seaport, 553-554; participation in peace conference, question of, 224-225, 232-233, 313, 348, 356, 386, 393, 398, 554, 556, 561

- Brazil, question of participation in peace conference, 75, 223-224, 225, 226, 228, 230-231, 233, 234-235, 306, 348, 355, 356, 386, 393, 398
- Bryan, William J., opposition of President Wilson to suggested appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 159-160, 163
- Bulgaria: Participation in peace conference, question of, 309, 348, 353, 356, 363, 366, 387; study by the "Inquiry," 33, 42, 43, 45, 47-48, 50-51, 68, 86
- Censorship, U. S. desire for removal of restrictions on U. S. Government and American press despatches from peace conference, 121, 212-214
- Central Powers, question of representation at peace conference, 308-310, 348, 353, 356-357, 363, 387-388
- Chile (*see also* Tacna-Arica dispute), question of participation in peace conference, 313, 314, 348, 398, 560, 561
- China, 72, 73, 75, 90, 241-245, 302, 306, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398, 490-491, 492
- Relations with Japan, 242, 490, 490-491, 492
- Representation at peace conference, 241-245, 306, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398
- Delegation: Participation of both factions, 244-245; U. S. disapproval of proposed American adviser, 241-242, 243, 244
- Japanese attitude, 242
- Study by the "Inquiry," 72, 73, 75, 90
- Supreme War Council, question of representation on, 241, 242, 243
- Territorial questions, 72, 242, 302, 490-491
- Clemenceau, Georges. *See under* France.
- Colombia, question of participation in peace conference, 313, 314, 348, 398
- Commission to Negotiate Peace (*see also* Wilson, Woodrow: Trip to Europe):
- Accommodations in Paris, 119-120, 122, 123, 124-126, 167, 179-180, 190, 193
- American Expeditionary Forces, assistance (*see also* Relations with U. S. Army and Navy, *infra*): Clerical, 122, 123, 193, 200, 201; counterespionage, 168, 194, 195-196, 196; courier service, 186, 202-205; military intelligence, 179-180, 182-183, 184-185, 186, 193; political intelligence agents, 191, 194-195, 200, 201, 206, 210; protection, 157, 194, 196, 197, 200; representation on Inter-Allied committees, 163-166; telegraph facilities, 206
- Commission to Negotiate Peace—Contd.
- Censorship of U. S. Government and American press despatches, attitude, 121, 212-214
- Commissioners plenipotentiary: Credentials, 175-177; number, discussions concerning, 128, 156-157, 158, 160-161, 167, 170, 171, 173; official notification of names to French Government, 191-192; selection, correspondence concerning, 129, 157-158, 159-160, 162-163, 168-170, 171-173, 191; unanimity of views, necessity for, 297-298; Wilson, President, views, 159-160, 163, 168, 171-172, 173
- Information, arrangements for securing, 179-180, 190-191, 194-211
- Counterespionage, 194, 195-196, 196
- Liaison, 207
- Political intelligence agents, 179-180, 190-191, 191, 194-195, 196, 199-203, 205, 206, 209-210
- Territorial, economic, and political intelligence section, 183-184, 208-209, 210-211
- U. S. diplomatic missions, cooperation, 197, 202, 207
- "Inquiry, The." *See* "Inquiry."
- Organization and personnel (*see also* Commissioners plenipotentiary and Information, *supra*; *also* "Inquiry"), 128, 155-211, 214-215, 219-220.
- Advisory staff, 155-156, 162, 198
- Appointments on basis of social prominence, criticism, 181, 188-189
- Clerical assistance, 193, 200, 201
- Communications, 128, 180-181, 195, 199, 200, 203-205, 206
- Economic and financial experts, 170, 174-175, 177, 190
- Military personnel, inadvisability of reduction, 192-193
- Press relations, 156*n*, 197-198, 214-215, 219-220
- Secretary, 158, 167, 185, 187-188, 192
- Survey of Republican sentiment in United States, proposed, 189-190
- Policies and proposals. *See* United States: Policies and proposals for peace.
- Press relations, 156*n*, 197-198, 212-220
- Censorship, efforts to secure removal of British and French restrictions on American press despatches, 212-214
- Cooperation with press, 214-215, 218-220; status of British correspondents, 216-218
- Erroneous press reports, 215-216

- Commission to Negotiate Peace—Contd.  
 Protection, 157, 194, 196, 197, 200  
 Relations with U. S. Army and Navy  
 (*see also* American Expeditionary  
 Forces, *supra*), 128, 161, 167, 178-  
 179, 180-181, 182-183, 184-185,  
 186, 192-193, 196-197, 198-199,  
 200, 206  
 Representation of U. S. depart-  
 ments and war agencies, 174-175,  
 177, 190, 198, 207-208
- Communications: Arrangements at  
 peace conference for courier and  
 telegraphic service, 121, 128, 180-  
 181, 195, 199, 200, 203-205, 206; pro-  
 posal for inclusion of proposed in-  
 ternational telegraphic communica-  
 tion agreement in peace conference  
 agenda, 535-538
- Costa Rica, question of participation in  
 peace conference, 305, 348, 355, 361,  
 386, 393, 398
- Cuba, question of participation in peace  
 conference, 225-226, 232-233, 306,  
 348, 355, 386, 393, 398
- Czechoslovakia (Bohemia): Participa-  
 tion in peace conference, question  
 of, 264, 311, 348, 356, 361, 366, 386,  
 387, 393, 398; relations with Italy,  
 464-465; territorial questions, 301
- Dalmatian problem, 65, 67, 421, 442,  
 454-456, 460, 461-462, 472, 473, 475-  
 483, 486-487
- Damages, war, proposed U. S. estimate,  
 137
- Date of peace conference, discussions,  
 129
- Day, William R. (Associate Justice of  
 Supreme Court), declination of ap-  
 pointment as U. S. peace commis-  
 sioner, 159
- Delegations to peace conference. *See*  
 Representation.
- Denmark: Participation in peace con-  
 ference, question of, 236-237, 239-  
 240, 313-314, 348, 398; restoration  
 of Schleswig, question of, 236, 288,  
 300, 373
- Dominican Republic, question of par-  
 ticipation in peace conference, 313,  
 348, 356, 398
- Economic questions: Consideration by  
 peace conference, proposed, 170, 174-  
 175; French views on inclusion in  
 peace treaty, 377-378, 389; inclu-  
 sion in draft agreement for League  
 of Nations, 511-514, 530-531; Japa-  
 nese views, 493, 494; study by the  
 "Inquiry," 10, 15, 18, 38, 43-44, 74, 84,  
 85, 87-88, 89, 91-93; U. S. policies  
 and proposals, 299, 329-332
- Ecuador, question of participation in  
 peace conference, 224-225, 232-233,  
 313, 348, 356, 386, 393, 398
- Egypt, question of participation in peace  
 conference, 302, 306, 356
- Estonia, question of participation in  
 peace conference, 312, 348
- Ethiopia (*see also* Abyssinia), 348
- Financial questions, discussions at In-  
 ter-Allied Conference at London,  
*December 1918*, 334, 335-336, 338,  
 340
- Finland: Participation in peace confer-  
 ence, question of, 246, 301, 311, 348,  
 356, 362; territorial questions, 65,  
 73, 301
- Fiume, status of, 65, 421, 442-447, 449-  
 450, 452, 453, 459, 462, 471
- Food relief, 128, 174-175, 334, 335, 338,  
 342, 372
- "Fourteen points." *See under* Wilson,  
 Woodrow: Policies and proposals  
 for peace.
- France (*see also* Wilson, Woodrow:  
 Trip to Europe), 2, 5, 84, 98, 119,  
 120, 121, 122, 123, 124-126, 128, 130,  
 131-132, 149-150, 156-157, 160, 161,  
 167, 171, 173, 264, 333-334, 335, 341,  
 344-406, 409, 545, 550-551
- Arrangements for accommodation of  
 peace commissions, 122, 123, 124-  
 126
- Clemenceau, Georges (Premier): As-  
 surances of cooperation with  
 United States, 128, 131, 333-334,  
 344; attitude toward President  
 Wilson's presence at peace con-  
 ference, 130, 132, 149-150; re-  
 marks of Marshal Joffre concern-  
 ing, 381-382
- Exchange of felicitations with United  
 States on conclusion of the armi-  
 stice, 2, 5
- Inter-Allied conference previous to  
 peace conference: French atti-  
 tude, 341, 350, 357-359; plan of  
*Jan. 5, 1919*, text and U. S. ob-  
 servations, 385-406
- Joffre, Marshal, remarks, 380-385
- Policies and proposals for peace, 131-  
 132, 149-150, 156-157, 160, 161,  
 171, 173, 264, 344-406, 409, 545,  
 550-551
- Organization of peace conference:  
 Language, official, 161, 167, 171,  
 173, 346, 364, 394, 403-404  
 Order of business, 348-349, 350,  
 367-368, 388-389, 390-392,  
 399-400  
 Plenipotentiaries, 131, 132, 149-  
 150, 156-157, 160, 161, 344-  
 345, 345, 353, 367, 386, 393,  
 397-398  
 Procedure: Suggestions, 344-354,  
 369-370, 389-392; U. S. ob-  
 servations, 354-365, 397-406

## France—Continued.

- Policies and proposals for peace—Con.
- Organization of peace conference—Continued.
- Representation of countries and nationalities, 264, 345, 347-348, 352-353, 355-357, 361-363, 367, 386-388, 392-393, 397-399, 401-402
- Principles and bases of negotiation: Aerial navigation convention, 550-551; Alsace-Lorraine, 378-379; economic questions, 377-378, 379-380, 389; "fourteen points," attitude toward, 353, 359-360, 368; indemnities, 370, 374-377; integrity of home and colonial territory, 361, 370; League of Nations, attitude toward, 335, 350, 352, 367-368, 369, 389; Liberian questions, 409, 545; release from treaties, 550, 360-361, 370; responsibility for the war, 354; self-determination and rights of minorities, 349, 353, 360, 370; settlement of the war, 350, 351, 365-367, 368-369, 372-374
- Seat of peace conference at Paris or Versailles, discussions concerning, 119, 120, 121, 122
- Study by the "Inquiry," 47, 49-50, 84, 98
- Treaties. *See* Treaties: Secret.
- Freedom of the seas, 285, 288-294, 299, 320, 359, 360, 413, 414, 505*n*

## Germany:

- Domestic reform, need for, 25-26, 33-34, 43
- Economic weapons of the Allies, 43-44, 53
- Influence in Japan, 492
- "Middle Europe," 31, 41-43, 45
- "Peace offensive," 27-30
- Political conditions, 356-357, 366, 383
- Preliminary peace with Allies, French suggestions concerning, 372-378, 383
- Protest against seizure of German shipping in Uruguayan ports, 227, 228-229
- Representation of Germany at peace conference, question of, 308, 309, 348, 353, 356-357, 363, 366, 387
- Shipping, German, protest against seizure in Uruguayan ports, 227, 228-229
- Study by the "Inquiry," 25-26, 27-28, 30, 31-34, 41-44, 45, 47, 48
- Territorial questions, 90, 300, 302-303, 337, 338, 373, 391, 407, 409
- War aims and policy, 27-33, 42-43, 47
- Wilhelm II, former Emperor: Abdication rumors, 357; proposed trial of, 335, 341

- Gompers, Samuel W.: Appointment as labor representative on U. S. peace commission, suggested, 156, 173; trip to international labor conference, 178, 411, 539-540, 542
- Good offices, U. S. *See under* Tacna-Arica dispute.
- Great Britain, 1, 3-4, 5, 47, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 150-151, 156-157, 160-161, 256, 259, 260-261, 261-262, 277, 280-281, 288-294, 335-336, 336-339, 340, 341, 349, 407-415, 519-521, 543, 544, 545
- Accommodations at peace conference, 122, 124
- Exchange of felicitations with United States on conclusion of armistice, 1, 3-4, 5
- Lloyd George (Prime Minister), 160-161
- Policies and proposals for peace, 47, 124, 126, 335-336, 336-337, 338, 407-415, 519-521, 543, 544, 545
- Dominions, participation in decisions, 407-408
- Freedom of the seas, attitude, 47, 413, 414
- Indemnities, 335-336, 338
- Inter-Allied conference, 124, 126, 341, 407
- League of Nations, attitude toward, 336-337, 519-521
- Territorial questions: General, 407, 408-409; Liberia, 409, 543, 544, 545; warning against use of force to achieve immediate territorial ambitions, 415
- Trade interests, 411-412
- Political situation, 337-338, 340, 409-411, 413-414
- Procedure for peace conference, attitude, 336
- Seat of peace conference, attitude, 120, 124
- Shipping, neutral, detention and seizure of, 288-294
- Size of delegations to peace conference, attitude, 156-157, 349
- Treaties. *See* Treaties: Secret.
- Visit of President Wilson, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 150-151
- Greece: Claim to Dodecanese Islands, 301; exchange of felicitations with United States on conclusion of armistice, 3, 6; participation in peace conference, question of, 306, 347, 355, 386, 393, 397
- Guatemala, question of participation in peace conference, 225, 232-233, 307, 348, 355, 386, 393, 397, 398
- Haiti, question of participation in peace conference, 225-226, 232-233, 307, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398
- Hejaz, question of participation in peace conference, 247, 312

- Honduras, question of participation in peace conference, 225, 232-233, 307, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398
- Hostilities, termination on *Nov. 11, 1918*. *See* Armistice.
- House, Col. E. M. (*see also* "Inquiry": Organization and personnel): Appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 175-176, 192; draft of agreement for League of Nations, 497-501; telegram of felicitation to President Wilson, *Nov. 11, 1918*, 1; trip to Europe, 109
- Hungary, question of participation in peace conference, 309, 353, 356, 363, 366, 387
- Iceland, question of participation in peace conference, 311-312
- Indemnities and reparations (*see also* War: Damages), 303-304, 334-335, 335-336, 338, 340-341, 370, 374-377
- "Inquiry, The," 9-118, 122-123, 183-184, 416-441, 442-447
- Arrangements for trip to Paris, 122-123, 123
- Creation of, proposed, 9-11
- Department of State, relations with, 9, 18, 21, 22, 25, 54, 81, 99-102, 108-109, 110-111
- Expenses, 39, 78-79, 81, 82, 91, 105-106, 108, 110-111, 116
- Headquarters, 9, 35, 55, 117, 184
- Organization and personnel (*see also* Reorganization, *infra*): Executive committee, 26, 34, 35, 104; House, Col. E. M. (chief), 12, 115; Mezes, Dr. S. E. (executive director), 14-15, 34, 184; personnel, 96-98; proposals, 9-11, 12, 13-14; suggestions and charts, 26, 34
- Relations with U. S. Government departments: State, 9, 18, 21, 22, 25, 54, 81-82, 90, 99-102, 108-109, 110-111; War, 12-14, 21, 108; other, 9-10, 21, 99, 102-103, 107-108
- Reorganization and development into intelligence section of U. S. peace commission:
- Accomplishments, 183-184
  - Arrangements for trip to Paris, 122-123, 123
  - Progress of reorganization, 105-106, 109-110, 111-112
  - Proposal and outlines for reorganization, 102-104, 111-112
  - Views of Dr. Mezes, 116-117, 118; of President Wilson, 113; of Secretary of State, 113-115, 115, 117-118
- Reports: Progress, 16, 34-39, 55-72, 82-98; status of the war, 41-49; terms of peace, suggested, 49-53
- "Inquiry, The"—Continued.
- Scope:
- Armament reduction, 10-11, 12-14, 15, 58, 94
  - Economic questions, 10, 15, 18, 38, 57, 74, 83, 91-93
  - General suggestions, 15-16, 16-21, 27-34, 55-76, 77-81, 98-99
  - Germany, post-war situation, 25-26, 33-34
  - History, 10, 93
  - International law, 10, 15, 18, 38, 54, 62, 74, 78, 83, 93-94, 99-101
  - International organizations and League of Nations, 16, 36, 44-45, 46, 76, 83, 94; study of proposed Pan American treaty in relation thereto, 22-25
  - Italian boundary and territorial claims, 50, 64-65, 85, 106-107, 416-441, 442-447
  - Latin America, 76-77, 79-82, 90-91, 108-109, 110-111, 116
  - Peace conference, representation and procedure, 75-76
  - Study of British and French outlines of preparatory work, 98
  - Territorial and political questions, 9, 10-11, 15, 17, 18-21, 35, 36-38, 38-39, 56-57, 58, 60-61, 62-74, 82, 84-97, 106-107, 115-116
  - U. S. post-war reconstruction, 39-41
  - Wilson, President, attitude toward, 12, 82, 113, 184
- Inter-Allied committees, A. E. F. representation on, 163-166
- Inter-Allied conferences:
- French plan of preliminary conversations between Allied Ministers, 385-396; U. S. observations, 396-406
  - London, *December 1918*, between France, Great Britain, and Italy, 333-343
  - Absence of Colonel House due to illness, 333, 334; noncommitment of United States to conclusions reached, 343
  - British political situation, 337-338, 340
  - Clemenceau, Premier, attitude, 333-334
  - Discussions and conclusions:
    - Adriatic situation, 339, 341
    - Armies of occupation, 341, 342
    - Armistice renewal, 341
    - Financial questions: German reparations and indemnities, 334-335, 335-336, 338, 340-341; U. S. and British advances to belligerents, 334
    - Food relief, 334, 335, 338, 342

## Inter-Allied conferences—Continued.

London, *December 1918*—Contd.

## Discussions and conclusions—Con.

Inter-Allied conferences at Paris or Versailles previous to signature of peace preliminaries, proposed, 338-339, 340, 341

International labor conference, 341, 343

Italian demand for German East Africa, 337, 338

Kaiser, former German, trial of, 335, 341

League of Nations, 335, 336-337

Peace conference procedure, 336-337

Versailles or Paris, proposed, prior to peace conference, 124, 126, 127, 129, 338-339, 340, 341, 350, 357-359, 385-396, 407

International telegraphic communication, proposal for inclusion in agenda of peace conference, 535-538

Italy, 4-5, 6, 29, 47, 50, 64-65, 85, 106-107, 128, 128-129, 130, 131, 137, 142, 142-143, 150, 151-152, 153-154, 279-280, 337, 338, 339, 341, 416-488

Attitude toward United States, 420

Consideration by the "Inquiry," 29, 47, 50, 64-65, 85, 106-107

Delegation to peace conference, 461

Exchange of felicitations with United States on conclusion of armistice, 4-5, 6

Inter-Allied conference, 341

Official statement regarding Italy's purposes in the war, 418-419

Policies and proposals for peace. *See* Territorial and boundary claims, *infra*.

Political conditions, 447-449, 450-460, 460-461, 463-466, 470-472, 473-474

Relations with Czechoslovakia, 464-465; with Yugoslavia, 339, 341, 443, 448, 455, 459, 462, 464, 465, 470, 483-486

Representation of Switzerland at peace conference, Italian request for U. S. views, 279-280; U. S. reply, 280

## Territorial and boundary claims:

Adriatic (Albania, Dalmatia, Fiume, Gorizia, Trieste), 64-65, 419, 421, 442-447, 448-450, 452, 453-456, 459, 460, 461-462, 471, 472, 473, 474-487

Africa, 337, 338, 417, 420, 431-441, 467

Asia Minor, 419-420, 467-469

## Secret treaties regarding:

Treaty of London, *Apr. 26, 1915*, 442, 447, 448, 452, 455, 463, 466-467, 469-470, 486; U. S. attitude, 463, 487-488

## Italy—Continued.

Territorial and boundary claims—Con. Secret treaties regarding—Contd.

St. Jean de Maurienne conference, *Apr. 19, 1917*, 467-469

Study by the "Inquiry," 50, 64-65, 85, 106-107; reports by H. Nelson Gay, 416-441, 442-447

Trentino, 64, 421, 424-431, 442, 453-454, 462

Views of President Wilson, 130

Treaties. *See* Secret treaties under Territorial and boundary claims, *supra*.

Visit of President Wilson, 128, 128-129, 131, 137, 142, 142-143, 150, 151-152, 153-154, 460-461, 463-464, 464, 465

War, purposes in, 29, 418-419

Japan, 2-3, 4, 72, 90, 242, 489-494

Armistice: Attitude, 489; exchange of felicitations with United States on conclusion, 2-3, 4

Attitude toward United States, 491, 494

Delegation to peace conference, 489-490, 492, 494

Policies and proposals for peace, 242, 489-494

Armaments, 491, 493

Economic questions, 493, 494

Emigration of Japanese, 493

League of Nations, 490, 491, 494

Racial equality, 490, 492, 493, 494

Territorial questions, 242, 489, 490-491, 492-493

Relations with China, 242, 490, 490-491, 492

Representation of China at peace conference, attitude, 242

Study by the "Inquiry," 72, 90

Jews, 348, 362-363

Joffre, Marshal, remarks concerning peace conference, 380-385

Yugoslavia: Conflict with Italy over territorial claims, 339, 341, 443, 448, 455, 459, 462, 464, 465, 470, 483-486; representation at peace conference, 348, 366, 387

Kaiser, former German: Abdication rumors, 357; proposed trial of, 335, 341

Labor, 75, 131, 144, 147, 148-149, 153-154, 156, 168, 173, 178, 341-342, 343, 411, 461, 539-542

Demonstrations during President Wilson's trip to Europe, 144, 147, 148-149, 153-154

International labor conference, proposed, 178, 341, 343, 411, 539-541, 542

Labor—Continued.

Representation on U. S. peace commission, question of, 75, 131, 156, 163, 173, 178

Wilson, President, views, 147, 168, 173, 178, 343, 539, 541

Language of the peace conference, discussions, 161, 167, 170, 171, 173-174, 346, 364, 394, 403-404

Lansing, Robert (Secretary of State): Appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 175-176, 176-177, 192; suggestions regarding agreement for League of Nations, 515-519, 526-532

Latin American republics (*see also specific countries*), 76-77, 79-82, 90-91, 108-109, 110-111, 116, 223-235

League of Nations, attitude toward, 229, 231

Representation at peace conference, U. S. attitude: Belligerents, 223-224, 225-226, 228, 230, 232-233, 233, 234-235; countries which severed diplomatic relations with Germany, 224-225, 227, 228-229, 229-230, 231-232, 233; neutrals, 229-230, 231, 233

Study by the "Inquiry," 76-77, 79-82, 90-91, 108-109, 110-111, 116

Latvia, question of participation in peace conference, 348

League of Nations, proposed (*see also under* United States: Policies and proposals for peace), 44-45, 46, 53, 68, 76, 83, 94, 191, 229, 231, 236-240, 319-324, 335, 336-337, 367-368, 369, 389, 490, 491, 494, 497-532, 537-538, 559.

Adherences, question of, 531-532

Consideration by—

"Inquiry," 44-45, 46, 53, 68, 76, 83, 94

U. S. peace commission, 191

Draft texts and comments by—

Bliss, Gen. Tasker H., 521-526

House, Col. E. M., 497-501

Mezes, Dr. S. E., 514-515

Miller, D. H., 505-514

President Wilson, 501-505

Secretary of State, 515-519, 526-532

Technical advisers to U. S. peace commission, 319-324

International telegraphic communication, proposed control of, 537-538

Principles for inclusion: Association of nations, 497-510, 514-515, 515-519, 521-530; economic equality, 511-514, 530-531; freedom of the seas, 320, 505*n*; open diplomacy, 510-511, 530

Views of Allied and neutral governments: France, 335, 350, 352, 367-368, 369, 389; Great Britain, 336-

League of Nations, proposed—Contd.

Views of Allied and neutral governments—Continued.

337, 519-521; Japan, 490, 491, 494; Latin American republics, 229, 231; Scandinavian countries, 236-240

Liberia, 248-253, 302, 307, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398, 409, 543-549

Representation at peace conference, 248-253, 307, 355, 393, 546-547

Instructions to Liberian commission by Liberian President, 546-547

U. S. assistance: Accommodations in Paris, 251, 252, 253; inclusion of American member in commission, 248, 249, 250-251, 251, 252; loan, 248, 251, 252

Settlement of Liberian questions at peace conference, proposed, 302, 409, 543-549

Attitude of Great Britain, 543, 544, 545; of United States, 544-545, 547-549

Instructions to Liberian commission by Liberian president, 546-547

Liberian preference for direct negotiations with France, Great Britain, and United States, 543-544; U. S. concurrence, 545, 547-549

Liechtenstein, 314

Lithuania: Participation in peace conference, question of, 312, 348; study by the "Inquiry," 65, 88

Lloyd George, 160-161

London conference of *December 1918*. *See under* Inter-Allied conferences.

Luxemburg: Participation in peace conference, question of, 300, 310, 348, 356, 362; study by the "Inquiry," 49, 63, 84; suggestion as to status of, 373

McCall, Samuel W., consideration for appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 129, 131, 157-158

Mexico, question of participation in peace conference, 313-314, 315, 348, 398

Mezes, Dr. S. E. (*see also* "Inquiry": Organization and personnel), amendment to proposed League of Nations agreement, 514-515

"Middle Europe," 31, 41-43, 45

Miller, D. H., drafts and notes on League of Nations agreement, 505-514

Minorities, 478-479

Monaco, 314

Monroe Doctrine, 73, 559, 560

Montenegro: Participation in peace conference, question of, 254-255, 305, 308, 347, 353, 361, 387, 398; political situation, 462, 465, 473-474; study by the "Inquiry," 50, 68

Morocco, 73, 302, 373



- Nepal, 314
- Netherlands, question of participation in peace conference, 313-314, 314-315, 348, 398
- Neutrals, question of participation in peace conference, 229-230, 233, 238, 240, 256, 259-260, 280, 281, 286, 310, 313-315, 348, 362, 393, 398, 401
- New states, question of participation in peace conference, 287, 310-312, 348, 356, 361-362, 386, 393, 398, 401
- Nicaragua, question of participation in peace conference, 225, 232-233, 307, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398
- Norway, question of participation in peace conference, 236, 238-240, 313-314, 315, 348, 398
- Occupation, armies of, 341, 342, 383
- Oman, 314
- Open diplomacy, 299, 316, 323-324, 510-511, 530
- Pacific islands, discussions concerning, 71-72, 73, 90, 303, 492-493, 537
- Palestine, proposals regarding, 312, 407, 408
- Pan American treaty, proposed: Draft text, 22-25; study by the "Inquiry," 22, 25
- Panama, question of participation in peace conference, 225, 232-233, 307, 348, 355, 386, 393, 398
- Panama Canal, 307, 337, 424
- Papacy, question of participation in peace negotiations, 28, 46, 75
- Paraguay, question of participation in peace conference, 313-314, 315, 348, 398
- Persia, 69, 73, 87, 256-263, 302, 310, 348, 356, 362, 408
- Participation in peace conference, question of, 256-263, 302, 310, 348, 356, 362
- British attitude, 256, 259, 260-261, 261-262
- Demands based on the "fourteen points," 260, 263
- U. S. support, Persian desire for, 256, 257-259, 260, 262; U. S. attitude, 261
- Study by the "Inquiry," 69, 73, 87
- Peru (*see also* Tacna-Arica dispute), question of participation in peace conference, 224-225, 227, 231-233, 313, 348, 356, 386, 393, 398, 560, 561
- Poland: Participation in peace conference, question of, 264-265, 312, 348, 356, 361, 366, 386, 387, 393, 398; territorial questions, 33, 36-38, 42, 51-52, 66, 73, 74, 87, 300, 373
- Portugal, question of participation in peace conference, 307, 347, 355, 386, 393, 397
- Presidency of peace conference, discussions, 129, 130, 137, 345, 402, 403
- Press relations at peace conference (*see also under* Commission to Negotiate Peace), 346
- Publicity of treaties, 299, 316, 323-324, 510-511, 530
- Reparations and indemnities (*see also* War: Damages), 303-304, 335, 335-336, 338, 340-341, 370, 374-377
- Representation at peace conference, discussions concerning (*see also specific countries*):
- Belligerents, 157, 225, 227, 228, 229-230, 231, 232-233, 285, 305-308, 345, 347-348, 355, 361, 386, 392, 393, 397-398, 401
- Central Powers, 157, 308-310, 348, 353, 356-357, 363, 387-388
- Countries which severed diplomatic relations with Central Powers, 224-225, 227, 228, 229, 229-230, 231, 232, 233, 313, 348, 356, 362, 386, 393, 398
- Labor, question of, 75, 131, 156, 168, 173, 178
- Neutrals, 229-230, 233, 238, 240, 256, 259-260, 280, 281, 286, 310, 313-315, 348, 362-363, 386, 393, 398, 401
- New states, 287, 310-312, 348, 356, 361-362, 386, 393, 398, 401
- Size of delegations, 128, 131, 136, 137, 156-157, 158, 160-161, 167, 170, 171, 173, 233, 234, 235, 248-249, 250-251, 252, 285, 345, 393, 397-398
- Unrecognized governments, 272, 274, 275, 348, 386, 393, 398
- Wilson, President, presence at peace conference. *See under* Wilson, Woodrow: Trip to Europe.
- Root, Elihu, suggested appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 131, 158, 169, 171-172
- Roumania: Participation in peace conference, question of, 265-266, 305, 307, 393, 397; study by the "Inquiry," 29, 50-51, 67, 68, 73, 89
- Russia, 27, 29, 31, 45-46, 47, 48, 56, 65-67, 69, 87-89, 267-278, 301, 305, 312, 356, 362
- Participation in peace conference, question of, 267-278, 301, 305, 312, 356, 362
- British attitude, 277
- Desire for representation, 267-268, 269-270, 273, 275, 276
- Difficulties resulting from political situation: Participation of unofficial representatives, suggested, 272, 274-275, 277, 278; recognition of Omsk Government, question of, 269, 270, 276-277
- U. S. attitude, 268-269, 270-271

Russia—Continued.

Study by the "Inquiry," 27, 29, 31, 45-46, 47, 48, 56, 65-67, 87-89  
Treaties. *See* Treaties: Secret.

Salvador, question of participation in peace conference, 313, 348, 356, 398  
San Marino, 314

Scandinavian countries, question of participation in peace conference, 236-240

Schleswig, 236, 288, 300, 314, 373

Seat of peace conference, discussions concerning Brussels, Paris, and Switzerland, 119, 120-121, 122, 123-124, 157

Secretariat for U. S. peace commission. *See* "Inquiry": Reorganization.

Self-determination, principle of, 51, 73, 349, 353, 360, 370, 443, 445, 448, 452, 455, 557

Serbia: Participation in peace conference, question of, 265, 266, 307-308, 347, 355, 386, 387, 393, 397; study by the "Inquiry," 33, 47, 50, 67, 74, 86

Siam: Participation in peace conference, question of, 308, 355, 386, 393, 397; study by the "Inquiry," 72, 73, 75, 90

Spain, question of participation in peace conference, 313-314, 315, 348, 398

Spitzbergen, status of, 236, 302

St. Jean de Maurienne conference, *Apr. 19, 1917*, 467-469

Subject nationalities, study by the "Inquiry," 15, 18-21, 34, 36-37, 42, 52-53, 58, 73

Supreme War Council, 119, 241, 242, 243, 386

Sweden, question of participation in peace conference, 239-240, 313-314, 315, 348, 398

Switzerland, 119, 120, 120-121, 157, 279-281, 313-314, 315, 348, 398

Participation in peace conference, question of, 279-281, 313-314, 315, 348, 398

Appeal, 279; U. S. reply, 281

British and Italian requests for U. S. views, 279-280, 280-281; U. S. replies, 280, 281

Seat of peace conference at Geneva or Lausanne, proposed, 119, 120, 120-121, 157

Tacna-Arica dispute between Chile and Peru, proposed solutions, 552-562

Arbitration, 554, 555, 556-558, 558-559

Bolivian proposal to send delegations to Washington and peace conference at Paris to present claim for seaport, 553-554; U. S. attitude, 555-556, 561

Commission of inquiry under Bryan treaties for advancement of general peace, 557-558, 562

Tacna-Arica dispute, etc.—Continued.

Direct negotiations, 560

League of Nations, 559

Peace conference, question of submission to, 554, 555, 556, 559, 560, 561

U. S. good offices: Peruvian acceptance of "mediation," 552, 554, 555, 556; restriction of offer to assistance in connection with disturbance at Iquique, 552-553, 554

Tarbell, Ida M., suggested assistance to U. S. peace commission, 160

Treaties, conventions, etc.:

Aerial navigation, proposed, 550-551

Bryan treaties for advancement of general peace, cited, 557, 562

Bucharest, cited, 50, 265-266, 374

Hague conventions, 299-300, 326-329

International telegraphic communication agreement, proposed, 535-538

Pan American treaty, draft, 22-25

Peace treaty, proposed. *See under* United States: Policies and proposals.

Publicity of, 299, 316, 323-324, 510-511, 530

Secret: Treaty of London, *Apr. 26, 1915*, between France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, 75, 287, 294, 301, 360-361, 442, 447, 448, 452, 455, 463, 466-467, 486, 487-488; St. Jean de Maurienne conference, *Apr. 19, 1917*, 467-469

Trentino, status of, 64, 421, 424-431, 442, 453-454, 462, 473

Trieste, status of, 50, 64, 421, 442, 453-454, 462

Triple Alliance, 418, 420, 425-426

Turkey: Participation in peace conference, question of, 301, 309-310, 348, 353, 356, 363, 366-367, 387-388; study by the "Inquiry," 33, 36-38, 43, 45, 52-53, 69, 73, 86-87, 93, 97, 118

United States:

Plans and preparations for peace conference. *See* Commission to Negotiate Peace; "Inquiry"; Language of the peace conference; League of Nations; Seat of peace conference; Wilson, Woodrow: Trip to Europe.

Policies and proposals for peace (*see also* "Inquiry": Scope; League of Nations; Wilson, Woodrow: Policies and proposals), 285-332, 354-365, 397-406, 535-537

Armament, limitation of, 299, 326

Conference: Order of subjects for consideration, 316; procedure of conference, U. S. observations on French suggestions, 354-365, 397-406; representation of countries and nationalities, 285, 286

## United States—Continued.

- Policies and proposals for peace—Continued.
  - Economic and trade situation, 299, 329-332
  - Freedom of the seas, 285, 288-294, 299, 320
  - Hague conventions and other international agreements, revision, 299-300, 326-329
  - Indemnities, 303-304
  - International telegraphic communication, 535-538
  - League of Nations, 286-287, 295-296, 298, 316, 319-324
  - Publicity of treaties, 299, 316, 323-324, 510-511, 530
  - Territorial questions: "Principle vs. expediency," 294-298; summaries, 287-288, 294-298, 300-303; warning against use of force to achieve immediate territorial ambitions, 324-325
  - Treaty of peace, proposed:
    - Drafts, 298-304, 316-324, 329-332
    - Observations, 304-315, 326-329
    - Signatories: Belligerents, 305-208; Central Powers, 308-310; countries which severed diplomatic relations with Central Powers, 313; neutrals, 313-315; new states, 310-312
  - Unanimity of views of U. S. peace commissioners, necessity for, 297-298
- Uruguay: Participation in peace conference, question of, 224-225, 227, 228-229, 230, 231, 313, 348, 356, 362, 386, 393, 398; seizure of German ships in Uruguayan ports, 227, 228-229
- U. S. Department of State: Communications facilities for peace commission, 128; diplomatic missions in Europe, cooperation with peace commission, 202, 207; memorandum regarding U. S. plans and proposals for peace, 285-287; relations with the "Inquiry," 9, 18, 21, 22, 25, 54, 81-82, 90, 99-102, 108-109, 110-111
- U. S. Navy, assistance to U. S. peace commission, 122, 128, 180-181
- U. S. War Department:
  - American Expeditionary Forces. *See under* Commission to Negotiate Peace.
  - Relations with the "Inquiry," 12-14, 21, 108
- Vatican: Participation in peace negotiations, discussions, 28, 46, 75; visit of President Wilson, 142-143, 150, 152, 154, 461, 463, 465
- Venezuela, question of participation in peace conference, 313-314, 315, 348, 398
- War: Damages in Belgium and France (*see also* Reparations), proposed U. S. estimate, 137; Italy's purposes in, 29, 418-419; responsibility for, 341, 354; status of, memoranda by the "Inquiry," 41-49
- Warfare, discussions relating to codification of rules of, 326-329
- White, Henry, appointment as U. S. peace commissioner, 162-163, 175-176, 192
- Wilson, Woodrow (President) (*see also under* Armistice: Congratulatory messages), 12, 28, 31, 48, 82, 83, 101-102, 113, 119, 121, 122, 128-154, 159-160, 162, 163, 168, 171-172, 173, 191, 239, 260, 285, 336, 353, 359-360, 368, 381, 410, 460-461, 463-464, 465, 493, 501-505
- Address in reply to President Poincaré's welcoming speech, text, 147-148
- Attitude toward the "Inquiry," 12, 82, 113
- Commissioners plenipotentiary to peace conference, views on number and selection, 159-160, 163, 168, 171-172, 173
- Inter-Allied conference, suggestion concerning, 127
- Policies and proposals for peace: Attitude toward Germany, 31, 48; "fourteen points," 83, 101-102, 260, 285, 353, 359-360, 368, 463, 493; League of Nations agreement, text of President Wilson's first draft, 501-505
- Presence at peace conference. *See under* Trip to Europe, *infra*.
- Reply to the Pope's appeal for peace, cited, 28
- Seat of peace conference, opinion concerning, 119, 121
- Trip to Europe, 122, 128-154, 162, 191, 239, 336, 381, 410, 460-461, 463-464, 465
- Arrangements: Accommodations in Paris, 122, 131, 138, 139, 141; itinerary, 128-129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 140, 141-143, 144, 150-151, 162; passports, 138, 140; presidential party, 138, 140, 141, 150-151, 152, 162; speech of welcome by President Poincaré and President Wilson's reply, texts, 144-146, 147-148; U. S. S. *George Washington*, 143, 152-153, 154
- Labor and Socialist demonstrations, 144, 147, 148-149, 153-154
- Presence at peace conference, views of—
  - Democratic supporters, 132-134
  - France, 130, 149-150, 153

Wilson, Woodrow—Continued.

Trip to Europe—Continued.

Presence at peace conference,  
views of—Continued.

Great Britain, 130, 131-132, 336

House, Col. E. M., 135-136

Norway, 239

President Wilson himself, 129,  
134-135, 136-137

Secretary of State, 191

Wilson, Woodrow—Continued.

Trip to Europe—Continued.

Visits to—

France, 129, 131, 135, 136, 137-138,  
139-142, 143-149, 153, 381

Great Britain, 128, 129, 131, 132,  
136, 150-151, 410

Italy and the Vatican, 128, 128-  
129, 131, 137, 142, 142-143,  
150, 151-152, 153-154, 460-  
461, 463-464, 465















UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



31 966 979

JX 233	U.S. Dept. of State.
.A3	Foreign Relations of the
1919	United States
V.1	Diplomatic papers.
cop. 2	
	<i>Amos J. John</i>
	<i>7740 J. Carter</i>
824	JUN 23 1970

U.S. Dept of State

1568 333

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO



31 966 979