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
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
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PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the direct supervision of S. Everett Gleason, Chief of the Foreign Relations Division, with the assistance of Ralph R. Goodwin in planning and direction.

Mr. Goodwin prepared the documentation on the participation of the United States in the United Nations and on policy regarding non-self-governing territories outside the United Nations trusteeship system. Neal H. Petersen compiled the sections on policy with respect to regulation of armaments and collective security, national security policy, and foreign policy aspects of the development of atomic energy. Marvin W. Kranz compiled the sections on international economic collaboration and United States programs for foreign assistance and foreign relief. William Slany prepared the documentation on United States policy with regard to the Polar Regions.

The Publishing and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of the volume. The index was prepared by Francis C. Prescott.

Valuable assistance by the historians of the Department of Defense and of the Atomic Energy Commission is gratefully acknowledged.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs*

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below :

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These

volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY : SELECTED PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Beginning with the year 1950, *American Foreign Policy*, a companion series to *Foreign Relations of the United States*, provides systematic coverage of the principal messages, addresses, statements, and reports made in a given period that indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States. For the immediately preceding years, 1945-1949 inclusive, the present series, *Foreign Relations*, will provide under this heading a brief indication of certain major documents in these categories. The present listing covers the years 1946 and 1947. It does not purport to be complete, of course, and as a rule items dealing primarily with United States relations with particular countries will be noted in the compilations for those countries. Many of the items cited below are also referred to in appropriate compilations in the various volumes for the years 1946 and 1947, which are organized as follows :

- 1946, volume I, General ; The United Nations
- volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers
- volume III, Paris Peace Conference : Proceedings
- volume IV, Paris Peace Conference : Documents
- volume V, The British Commonwealth ; Western and Central Europe
- volume VI, Eastern Europe ; The Soviet Union
- volume VII, The Near East and Africa
- volume VIII, The Far East
- volume IX, The Far East : China
- volume X, The Far East : China
- volume XI, The American Republics
- 1947, volume I, General ; The United Nations
- volume II, Council of Foreign Ministers ; Germany and Austria
- volume III, The British Commonwealth ; Europe
- volume IV, Eastern Europe ; The Soviet Union
- volume V, The Near East and Africa
- volume VI, The Far East
- volume VII, The Far East : China
- volume VIII, The American Republics

I. MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN 1946 AND 1947

1946

- Statement by the President (Truman) on Demobilization. January 8, 1946. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962) (hereinafter cited as *Public Papers: Truman, 1946*), pp. 15-16.
- Message of the President to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947. January 21, 1946. (Released January 21, 1946. Dated January 14, 1946.) *Ibid.*, pp. 36-87.
- Directive of the President Concerning the Shipment of Wheat and Coal to Liberated Countries. January 25, 1946. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress Transmitting Financial Agreement with the United Kingdom. January 30, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 97-100.
- Statement by the President Announcing Emergency Measures To Relieve the World Food Shortage. February 6, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-108.
- " . . . we have pinned our hopes to the banner of the United Nations": Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) delivered to the Overseas Press Club in New York and broadcast by radio. February 28, 1946. Department of State *Bulletin* (hereinafter cited as *Bulletin*), March 10, 1946, pp. 355-358.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress Transmitting a Statement on Foreign Loan Policy. March 1, 1946. *Public Papers: Truman, 1946*, pp. 137-138.
- Address of the President in Chicago on Army Day. April 6, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 185-190.
- Directive of the Secretary of State (Byrnes) on Organization and Procedure for the Development and Promulgation of United States Policy With Respect to Occupied Areas. Effective date, April 8, 1946. Released to the press on April 17, 1946. *Bulletin*, April 28, 1946, pp. 734-735.
- Address of the President Before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. April 15, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-202.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress Transmitting Bill for Inter-American Military Cooperation. May 6, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 233-245.
- Radio Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) on the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers. May 20, 1946. *Bulletin*, June 2, 1946, pp. 950-954.
- Military Assistance to China: Letter from the Secretary of State (Byrnes) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Rayburn). June 12, 1946. *Ibid.*, July 21, 1946, pp. 125-126.
- Military Assistance to China: Statement by the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) before the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives. June 19, 1946. *Ibid.*, June 30, 1946, pp. 1115-1117.
- Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton) on the approval by the President of an act of Congress, introduced by Senator Fulbright of Arkansas, which authorized the Department of State to use some of the proceeds from surplus-property sales abroad for exchanges of students and other educational activities (Public Law 584, 79th Cong., 2d sess.) August 1, 1946. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1946, pp. 262-263.
- White House Statement on Palestine and on the Problem of Displaced Persons in General. August 16, 1946. *Public Papers: Truman, 1946*, p. 421.
- Restatement of United States Policy on Germany: Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) at Stuttgart, Germany. September 6, 1946. *Bulletin*, September 15, 1946, pp. 496-501.

- Statement by the President on Foreign Policy. September 20, 1946. (The statement was made in connection with the resignation of Henry A. Wallace as Secretary of Commerce.) *Public Papers: Truman, 1946*, p. 431.
- "U.S. Aims and Policies in Europe": Address delivered by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) at the American Club in Paris. October 3, 1946. *Bulletin*, October 13, 1946, pp. 665-668.
- Situation between Kuomintang Government and Communist Party: Joint Statement by the President's Special Envoy to China (Marshall) and the Ambassador to China (Stuart). Made in Nanking and released there to the press on October 8, 1946; released to the press in the United States on October 10. *Ibid.*, October 20, 1946, pp. 723-724.
- Address by the President in New York City at the Opening Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. October 23, 1946. *Public Papers: Truman, 1946*, pp. 457-463.
- Statement by the President on a Bipartisan Foreign Policy. November 11, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 477-479.
- United States Policy Toward China: Statement by the President, released to the press by the White House on December 18, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 499-505.
- The President's News Conference on the Termination of Hostilities of World War II. December 31, 1946. *Ibid.*, pp. 512-514.

1947

- Annual Message of the President to the Congress on the State of the Union. January 6, 1947. (As delivered in person before a joint session.) *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963) pp. 1-12.
- The Situation in China. Statement of General of the Army George C. Marshall. (Released January 7, 1947.) *Bulletin*, January 19, 1947, pp. 83-85.
- Special Message to the Congress: The President's First Economic Report. January 8, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 13-39.
- Annual Budget Message of the President to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1948. January 10, 1947. (Released January 10, 1947. Dated January 3, 1947.) *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 55-97.
- "We Must Demonstrate Our Capacity in Peace": Address by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) delivered before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs in Cleveland, Ohio, on January 11, 1947. *Bulletin*, January 19, 1947, pp. 87-90, 104.
- Participation of the United States in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and in the International Monetary Fund. Report, to October 31, 1946, by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, transmitted by the President to the Congress on January 13, 1947. Excerpts in *Bulletin*, January 26, 1947, pp. 152-154.
- Letter From the President to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) Concerning Unification of the Armed Services. January 16, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 99-100.
- Trade Agreements Negotiations: Exchange of Letters Between Senator Hugh Butler, of Nebraska, and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton). (Letters dated December 19, 1946, and January 16, 1947, released January 17, 1947.) *Bulletin*, January 26, 1947, pp. 161-163.
- Defense of "Pipeline" Contracts for Sale of Lend-Lease Supplies: Letter from Under Secretary Clayton to Senator Styles Bridges, of New Hampshire,

- Chairman of the Subcommittee on Deficiency Appropriations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. January 17, 1947. (Concerns specified industrial goods that were on order on V-J Day, September 2, 1945, when the lend-lease supply program was terminated.) *Bulletin*, February 23, 1947, pp. 343-344. (See also a letter from Chester T. Lane, the Lend-Lease Administrator, to Senator Bridges, February 13, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 344-346, 360.)
- National Defense and National Reputation. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton) delivered before the Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense in Washington, January 25, 1947. *Ibid.*, February 2, 1947, pp. 202-207.
- Report to Congress on Foreign Surplus Disposal. Letter of transmittal from the Secretary of State (Marshall) to the President pro tempore of the Senate (Vandenberg) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Martin). January 30, 1947. *Ibid.*, February 9, 1947, p. 255.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Extension of the Second War Powers Act. January 31, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 107-113.
- Cooperation with Congress on Bipartisan Foreign Policy. Letter from the Secretary of State (Marshall) to Representative Charles A. Eaton, of New Jersey, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. February 3, 1947.—Resolution on Powers, Duties, and Scope of the Foreign Affairs Committee. February 5, 1947. *Bulletin*, February 16, 1947, pp. 283-284.
- Message of the President to the Congress Transmitting His First Annual Report on United States Participation in the United Nations. February 5, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 118-122.
- Sale and Transfer of Non-Demilitarized Combat Matériel. Letter of transmittal from the Secretary of State (Marshall) to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. February 11, 1947. *Bulletin*, February 23, 1947, pp. 322-327.
- Freedom of Information: The Role of the State Department. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton), delivered before the Inland Daily Press Association in Chicago, Illinois, on February 11, 1947. *Ibid.*, February 23, 1947, pp. 352-357, 367.
- Statement by the President Urging Extension of Authority To Ship Emergency Supplies to Europe. February 13, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, p. 128.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress Requesting Appropriations for Aid to Liberated Countries. February 21, 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.
- World Order and Security—Youth's Responsibilities. Washington's birthday anniversary remarks delivered by the Secretary of State (Marshall) at Princeton University on February 22, 1947. *Bulletin*, March 2, 1947, pp. 390-391.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on United States Participation in the International Refugee Organization. February 24, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 150-151.
- Post-UNRRA Relief: Purpose and Method. Statement made by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on February 25, 1947. *Bulletin*, March 9, 1947, pp. 440-442.
- International Broadcasting Foundation of the United States: Proposal by the Department of State. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton) to the Secretary of State (Marshall), March 1, 1947, *Ibid.*, April 6, 1947, pp. 618-623.
- The Good Neighbor Policy—An Application of Democracy to International Affairs. Address in Mexico City by the President of the United States. March 3, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 164-166.

- International Understanding: An Undeveloped Human Resource. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton), delivered before the American Association of School Administrators, in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on March 3, 1947. *Bulletin*, March 16, 1947, pp. 500-503.
- Address by the President on Foreign Economic Policy, delivered at Baylor University. March 6, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 167-172.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine. March 12, 1947. (As delivered in person before a joint session.) *Ibid.*, pp. 176-180.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Export Controls. March 19, 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.
- The American Position on International News and International Libel. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton), delivered before the Foreign Press Association at New York City, March 19, 1947. *Bulletin*, March 30, 1947, pp. 591-595.
- Congressional Hearings on a Draft Charter for an International Trade Organization. Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) made before the Senate Finance Committee on March 20, 1947. *Ibid.*, March 30, 1947, pp. 587-590, 595.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on United States Participation in the World Health Organization. March 21, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, p. 182.
- Proposed International Interchange and Information Act. Letter of transmittal from the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the President pro tempore of the Senate (Vandenberg) and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Martin), accompanying a proposed cultural-exchange act, March 21, 1947. *Bulletin*, April 6, 1947, pp. 624-626.
- Congressional Hearings on Trade Agreements Act. Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) before the House Committee on Ways and Means, March 26, 1947. *Ibid.*, April 6, 1947, pp. 627-631.
- The Inter-American System: A Solid Foundation for the Challenge of the Future. Excerpts from an address by the Director (Briggs) of the Office of American Republics Affairs, Department of State, delivered before the Pan American League in Miami, Florida, on April 14, 1947. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1947, pp. 769-770.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Control of Trade in Arms and Munitions of War. April 15, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 204-206.
- Post-UNRRA Relief Program. Statement by the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 15, 1947. *Bulletin*, April 27, 1947, pp. 755-757, 766.
- Our Domestic Economy and Foreign Affairs. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp), delivered before the Economic Club of New York in New York City on April 16, 1947. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1947, pp. 758-763.
- Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Remarks by the President at a Meeting With the American Society of Newspaper Editors. April 17, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 207-210.
- Report of the Radio Advisory Committee to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton). April 19, 1947. *Bulletin*, May 25, 1947, pp. 1039-1041.
- Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 10-April 24, 1947. Address by the Secretary of State (Marshall), broadcast on April 28, 1947. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1947, pp. 919-924.

- Joint Statement of the President of the United States and the President of Mexico Following Discussions in Washington. May 1, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, p. 230.
- The Economic Commission for Europe: Toward Beneficial Employment of Human and Material Resources. Opening address by the American Delegate (Clayton) before the initial meeting of the new Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva on May 2, 1947. *Bulletin*, May 18, 1947, pp. 977-978.
- Some Aspects of Our Policy in Greece and Turkey. Address by the Deputy Director (Villard) of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State, at Charlotte, North Carolina, on May 5, 1947. *Ibid.*, May 18, 1947, pp. 997-1001.
- The Requirements of Reconstruction. Address by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) before the Delta Council at Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8, 1947. *Ibid.*, May 18, 1947, pp. 991-994.
- Meeting of the Committee on Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification. Statement by the United States Representative on that Committee (Jessup), made at Lake Success, New York, on May 13, 1947. *Ibid.*, May 25, 1947, pp. 1026-1029.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Military Collaboration With Other American States. May 26, 1947. (Released May 26, 1947. Dated May 23, 1947.) *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 255-257.
- Request for Presidential Authority To Detail Military and Naval Missions. Statement by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on June 3, 1947. *Bulletin*, June 15, 1947, pp. 1175-1177.
- Position on a United States of Europe. Letter from the Secretary of State (Marshall) to the Chairman (Vandenberg) of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 1947. *Ibid.*, June 22, 1947, p. 1213.
- European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery. Remarks by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made on the occasion of commencement exercises at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. *Ibid.*, June 15, 1947, pp. 1159-1160.
- Statement by the President on Palestine. June 5, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, p. 266.
- Extension of Second War Powers Act Requested. Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) made before Subcommittee 4 of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives on June 6, 1947. *Bulletin*, June 15, 1947, pp. 1173-1175.
- Address by the President of the United States Before the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. June 11, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 272-276.
- The People's Stake in Maintaining Peace. Address by the Counselor of the Department of State (Cohen), delivered at Long Beach, California, on June 12, 1947. *Bulletin*, June 22, 1947, pp. 1230-1235.
- The Future of Foreign Trade. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) before the American Marketing Association at New York City on June 12, 1947. *Ibid.*, June 22, 1947, pp. 1235-1240.
- Regret Expressed That Yalta Commitments Remain Unfulfilled in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria: Statement by the President Upon Ratification of the Peace Treaties With These Countries. June 14, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 277-278, or *Bulletin*, June 22, 1947, p. 1214.
- New Era Anticipated for Italy: Statement by the President Upon Ratification of the Treaty of Peace With Italy. June 14, 1947. *Ibid.*

- American Traditions in Today's Foreign Policy. Address by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, on June 15, 1947. *Bulletin*, June 22, 1947, pp. 1221-1224.
- Universal Training—A Support for Foreign Policy. Address by the President at commencement exercises at Princeton University, June 17, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 281-285, or *Bulletin*, June 29, 1947, pp. 1294-1297.
- Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. Adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947, and released to the press on July 11, 1947. *Bulletin*, August 3, 1947, pp. 216-221.
- Reiteration of Position on Program for International Information and Educational Exchange. Letter from the Secretary of State (Marshall) to Representative Karl E. Mundt, of South Dakota, June 19, 1947. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1947, p. 1315.
- Statement by the President on the Economic Effects of Foreign Aid. June 22, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 301-302.
- Remarks Broadcast by the President on the Second Anniversary of the United Nations. June 26, 1947. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Operations Terminated. Letter to the President from the Director General of UNRRA (Rooks), received on June 30, 1947. *Bulletin*, July 13, 1947, pp. 106-107.
- A Stable and Prosperous World Is Important to America's Well-Being. Remarks by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made before the Women's National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on July 1, 1947. *Ibid.*, July 3, 1947, pp. 83-84.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on the Control and Administration of the United Nations Headquarters in New York City. July 2, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 321-322.
- Action Urged on the Information and Educational Exchange Act. Statement by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 2, 1947. *Bulletin*, July 13, 1947, pp. 105-106.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands. July 3, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 322-323.
- Independence Day Address Delivered by President Truman at the Home of Thomas Jefferson. July 4, 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 323-326.
- Statement by the President on the Report of the Cabinet Committee on World Food Programs. July 5, 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 326-327.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Admission of Displaced Persons. July 7, 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 327-329.
- Directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation (Clay), Regarding the Military Government of Germany, July 11, 1947. *Bulletin*, July 27, 1947, pp. 186-193.
- Statement by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (MacArthur) in Tokyo on the policy decision announced by the Far Eastern Commission, July 12, 1947. *Bulletin*, August 3, 1947, pp. 221-222.
- A Program for Preservation of Our National Interests and of European Civilization. Address by the Secretary of State (Marshall) delivered before the Governors' Conference at Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 14, 1947. *Ibid.*, July 27, 1947, pp. 184-185.

- Concern Expressed on Resettlement of Displaced Persons. Statement by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made on July 16, 1947, before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House Committee on the Judiciary. *Bulletin*, July 27, 1947, pp. 194-197.
- Statement by the President Upon Signing Resolution Authorizing Approval of Trusteeship Agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. July 19, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 346-347.
- The President's Midyear Economic Report to the Congress. July 21, 1947. Excerpts, *Ibid.*, pp. 347-355.
- Fact-Finding Mission to China and Korea. Statements by the Head of the Mission (Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Special Representative of the President with the rank of Ambassador), July 22 and August 24, 1947. *Bulletin*, September 7, 1947, pp. 476-477, 483.
- Executive Order 9877: Functions of the Armed Forces. July 26, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 359-361.
- " . . . there has always been a Marshall plan in effect for the Western Hemisphere. The foreign policy of the United States in that direction has been set for one hundred years, known as the Monroe Doctrine." Statement by the President at his news conference on August 14, 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 383-384.
- Statement by the President on Myron C. Taylor's Mission to the Vatican. August 15, 1947. *Ibid.*, p. 384.
- Civil Freedom, Mutual Trust, and Cooperation Are Bases for Strong Inter-American System. Statement by the Chairman (Marshall) of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, at Petropolis, Brazil. August 20, 1947. *Bulletin*, August 31, 1947, pp. 414-415.
- "Our Common Goal Is To Arouse and Invigorate the Faith of Men . . ." Exchange of letters between President Truman and Pope Pius XII., August 6 and 26, 1947. *Ibid.*, September 7, 1947, pp. 478-480.
- Public Opinion and World Affairs. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Benton) at Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts, on September 2, 1947. *Ibid.*, September 14, 1947, pp. 522-526.
- Economic Rehabilitation Is Collective Responsibility. Address by President Truman delivered before the final session of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, at Petropolis, Brazil, on September 2, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 428-432, or *Bulletin*, September 14, 1947, pp. 498-501.
- Successful Conclusion of the Inter-American Conference. Joint Address by the Secretary of State (Marshall) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (Vandenberg), broadcast on September 4, 1947. *Bulletin*, September 14, 1947, pp. 501-505.
- Address by President Truman Before a Joint Session of the Congress of Brazil. September 5, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 432-435.
- Interim and Long-Term Problems of European Reconstruction. Statement by the Secretary of State (Marshall), September 10, 1947. *Bulletin*, September 21, 1947, p. 590.
- Geneva Draft of ITO Sets a Practical Pattern for World Trade. Address broadcast from Paris on September 10, 1947, by the Chairman (Clayton) of the United States Delegation to the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment held at Geneva. *Ibid.*, September 21, 1947, pp. 592-594.

- The Power and Responsibilities of Freedom. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) delivered before the International Council of Women in Philadelphia on September 11, 1947. *Bulletin*, September 21, 1947, pp. 595-599.
- Voice of U.S.A. Reaches Far East Through New Transmitter in Manila. Department of State press release, September 11, 1947. *Ibid.*, September 28, 1947, pp. 646-648, with related materials.
- Faith and Fidelity—American Pledge to the United Nations. Address by the Secretary of State (Marshall) delivered before the American Association for the United Nations at New York on September 14, 1947. *Ibid.*, September 21, 1947, pp. 539-543, 546.
- A Program for a More Effective United Nations. Address by the Chief of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Marshall), delivered before the opening session of the General Assembly on September 17, 1947. *Ibid.*, September 28, 1947, pp. 618-622.
- Statement by the President on the report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation. September 25, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 438-439, and (with related materials) *Bulletin*, October 5, 1947, pp. 681-690.
- The President's News Conference Following a Meeting With Congressional Leaders (on the critical economic situation in Western Europe). September 29, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 445-448.
- New Communist Manifesto Must Not Deflect Program for Aid to Europe. Statement by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), October 8, 1947. *Bulletin*, October 19, 1947, p. 769.
- Statement by the President on Receiving Secretary Krug's Report "National Resources and Foreign Aid." October 18, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 474-475.
- America's Stake in Europe. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour), delivered before the Boston Conference on Distribution, Boston, Massachusetts, on October 21, 1947. Excerpt in *Bulletin*, November 2, 1947, pp. 863-866, 877.
- The Problem of the Reconstruction of Europe. Remarks by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made before the Herald-Tribune Forum in New York City on October 22, 1947. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1947, pp. 856-857.
- The President's News Conference Announcing the Calling of a Special Session of the Congress. October 23, 1947. Radio Address of the President to the American People on the Special Session of the Congress. October 24, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 475-479.
- U.S. Rejects Resolutions Limiting Free Flow of Information: Remarks by the U.S. Representative (Austin) at the Seat of the United Nations, made on October 23, 1947, before the First Committee (Political and Security) of the General Assembly. Excerpts in *Bulletin*, November 2, 1947, pp. 869-874.
- European Recovery—A Project for America. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) delivered before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, on October 23, 1947. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1947, pp. 857-862.
- Relief Assistance Provided for China: Agreement Signed Granting Food and Other Aid. Text of Agreement Signed at Nanking on October 27, 1947, Between the United States of America and the Republic of China Concerning U.S. Relief Assistance to the Chinese People. *Ibid.*, November 9, 1947, pp. 913-915.

- Statement by the President on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. October 29, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, p. 480.
- Statement by the President Making Public a Report "The Impact of the Foreign Aid Program Upon the Domestic Economy." November 1, 1947. *Ibid.*, 1947, p. 481.
- America's Stake in European Reconstruction. Address by the Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell), delivered before the National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation, St. Louis, Missouri, on November 6, 1947. Excerpt in *Bulletin*, November 16, 1947, pp. 942-948.
- Statement by the President Making Public a Report "European Recovery and American Aid." November 8, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 485-486.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress Transmitting Report on Assistance to Greece and Turkey. November 10, 1947. *Ibid.*, 1947, pp. 486-487.
- Effects on World Economy of Long-Range and Interim Aid Programs. Statement by the Secretary of State (Marshall) made before a joint session of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on November 10, 1947. *Bulletin*, November 23, 1947, pp. 967-972.
- America's Challenge in World Affairs. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour), delivered before the Academy of Political Science in New York City on November 12, 1947. *Ibid.*, November 23, 1947, pp. 974-978.
- American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe. Address by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson), delivered before the Academy of Political Science in New York City on November 12, 1947. *Ibid.*, November 23, 1947, pp. 996-1000.
- Statement by the President on the Government's Employee Loyalty Program. November 14, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 489-451.
- Foreign Aid and Reconstruction: "The Future of the Free Nations of Europe Hangs in the Balance." Excerpts from the Special Message of the President to the Congress on the First Day of the Special Session. November 17, 1947. *Bulletin*, November 30, 1947, pp. 1022-1023. Full text in *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 492-498.
- The Problems of European Revival and German and Austrian Peace Settlements. Address by the Secretary of State (Marshall) delivered in Chicago on November 18, 1947. *Bulletin*, November 30, 1947, pp. 1024-1028.
- Special Message of the President to the Congress on Extending the Maritime Commission's Authority To Operate, Sell, and Charter Vessels. December 1, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, p. 503.
- Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process. Address delivered by the Director (Russell) of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, at Harvard University on December 4, 1947. *Bulletin*, December 28, 1947, pp. 1253-1258.
- Aid Essential to European Integrity and Independence. Address by the Chairman (Clayton) of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, broadcast from Habana on December 8, 1947. *Ibid.*, December 21, 1947, pp. 1211-1213.
- Peace and Understanding—The Desire of All Mankind. Address by the Secretary of State (Marshall) delivered before the Pilgrims Society in London on December 12, 1947. *Ibid.*, December 21, 1947, pp. 1201-1203.
- Tensions in the United Nations. Address by the U.S. Representative (Austin) at the Seat of the United Nations, delivered before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations at Chicago, December 17, 1947. *Ibid.*, January 4, 1948, pp. 14-19.

- Special Message of the President to the Congress on the Marshall Plan for United States Aid to European Recovery. December 19, 1947. *Public Papers: Truman, 1947*, pp. 515-529, or *Bulletin*, December 28, 1947, pp. 1233-1243.
- The London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers: November 25-December 15, 1947. Report by the Secretary of State (Marshall), broadcast from Washington on December 19, 1947. *Bulletin*, December 28, 1947, pp. 1244-1247.

II. THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN 1946 AND 1947

Major appointments in the Department of State during 1946:

- William L. Clayton, of Texas, as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (a new post established by Public Law 590, 79th Cong., 2d sess.)
- Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, U.S.A., as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.
- Willard L. Thorp, of Connecticut, as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
- Charles Fahy, of New Mexico, as Legal Adviser of the Department of State.
- William L. Langer, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence (from April until July).
- William A. Eddy, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence (beginning in August).

Major retirements and appointments in the Department of State during 1947:

- James F. Byrnes, of South Carolina, retired as Secretary of State on January 21, 1947. For the text of letters by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes, see the *Bulletin*, January 19, 1947, pp. 86-87.
- George C. Marshall, of Pennsylvania, was commissioned as Secretary of State on January 8, 1947, and entered upon duties on January 21, 1947. For biographical information, see the *Bulletin*, February 16, 1947, pp. 305-307.
- Dean G. Acheson, of Connecticut, retired as Under Secretary of State on June 30, 1947.
- Robert A. Lovett, of Texas, was commissioned as Under Secretary of State on May 28, 1947, and entered upon duties on July 1, 1947.
- William L. Clayton, of Texas, retired as Under Secretary of State for Economics Affairs on October 15, 1947.

Other major appointments in the Department of State during 1947:

- John E. Peurifoy, of South Carolina, as Assistant Secretary of State for Administration.
- Garrison Norton, of New York, as Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and Communications.
- Norman Armour, of New Jersey, as Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
- Charles E. Saltzman, of New York, as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

Charles E. Bohlen, of Massachusetts, as Counselor of the Department of State.

Ernest A. Gross, of New York, as Legal Adviser of the Department of State.

W. Park Armstrong as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.

Major legislation concerning the Foreign Service:

An Act To Improve, Strengthen, and Expand the Foreign Service of the United States and To Consolidate and Revise the Laws Relating to its Administration, Approved August 13, 1946. (Public Law 724, 79th Cong., 2d sess.) For the text of a statement by the President upon signing the Foreign Service Act, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946*, pp. 412-413. For the text of statements by the Secretary of State (Byrnes) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Russell) on the occasion of the coming into effect of the Act, see *Bulletin*, November 24, 1946, pp. 947-949.

Establishment of the National Intelligence Authority:

Directive of the President on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities. January 22, 1946. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946*, pp. 88-89.

A chart showing the organization of the Department of State as of July 15, 1946, is printed in the *Bulletin*, September 1, 1946, facing page 429. A similar chart as of October 31, 1947, is printed *ibid.*, December 14, 1947, facing page 1196. The names of the principal officers are listed in the appropriate editions of the *Congressional Directory* and the *United States Government Manual*.

For information on the Personnel Security program of the Department of State, see the statement issued on October 7, 1947, by the Director of the Office of Controls (Robinson), and for the text of Security Principles of the Department of State and Hearing Procedure of the Personnel Security Board, see the *Bulletin*, October 19, 1947, pp. 780-783.

For illustrations and information on the relocation of the Department of State at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., see *ibid.*, November 30, 1947, pp. 1035-1039.

For detailed information on the organization, personnel, and activities of the Department and the Foreign Service, see the *Bulletin* (issued weekly) and the following serial publications of the Department of State:

The Biographic Register.

Foreign Service List.

International Information and Education Exchange Program.

Report to the Congress on the Lend-Lease Operations, Transmitted by the President.

For information on treaties and agreements, see

Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), published since 1946 as a sequel to the Department of State *Treaty Series* and *Executive Agreement Series*.

Treaties in Force.

For detailed information on these publications as well as on numerous others of a more specialized character, see *Publications of the Department of State, October 1, 1929 to January 1, 1953* (Washington, D.C., 1954).

III. PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the extensive documentation provided in this volume and in other volumes of *Foreign Relations*, there is systematic coverage of American participation in international conferences and organizations in the following publications of the Department of State:

The United States and the United Nations. Annual reports by the President to the Congress. (Title since 1948: *United States Participation in the United Nations*.)

List of International Conferences and Meetings, With Annotations.

Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, Including the Composition of U.S. Delegations and Summaries of the Proceedings.

International Organizations in Which the United States Participates.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- AAA**, Agricultural Adjustment Act
AAF, Army Air Forces
a/c, aircraft
ACC, Air Coordinating Committee
ACC, Allied Control Council
ADA, Atomic Development Authority
ADP, Airport Development Program
AEC, (United Nations) Atomic Energy Commission
AF of L, American Federation of Labor
A-H, Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, John R. Hilldring
AMG, Allied Military Government
A-P, Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, John E. Peurifoy
ARA, Office of American Republic Affairs, Department of State
ATC, Air Transport Command
A-T, Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp
The Bank, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
BC, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, Department of State
Be, beryllium
BOAC, British Overseas Airways Corporation
BOT, British Board of Trade
Brit Amb, British Ambassador
BW, Biological warfare
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CCA, United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCS, Combined Chiefs of Staff
CDT, Combined Development Trust
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CIRTEL, circular telegram
CPC, Combined Policy Committee
DA, Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
Del, Delegation
Delga, indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation to the second session of the United Nations General Assembly, September–November 1947
Depcirtel, Department circular telegram
depel, Department telegram
DRE, Division of Research for Europe, Department of State
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECEFP, Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
EE, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ERP, European Recovery Program
ESC, Executive Secretariat of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee
EUR, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization
FE, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FEA, Foreign Economic Administration
FLC, Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
FO, Foreign Office
FoMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
ForOf, Foreign Office

- FonSec**, Foreign Secretary
- Frito**, indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation to the second session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, April 10–August 22, 1947
- The Fund**, The International Monetary Fund
- GA**, General Assembly of the United Nations
- Gadel**, indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation to the second session of the United Nations General Assembly, September–November 1947
- GSC**, General Staff Corps
- H.J. Res.**, House Joint Resolution
- HR**, House Resolution
- IA**, Division of Special Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- IC**, Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
- ICAO**, International Civil Aviation Organization
- ICEF**, International Children's Emergency Fund
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- infotel**, information telegram
- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IRO**, International Refugee Organization
- IS**, Division of International Security Affairs, Department of State
- ITO**, International Trade Organization
- ITP**, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JSSC**, Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Le**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- L/T**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser, Treaty Affairs, Department of State
- L/UNA**, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser, United Nations Affairs, Department of State
- Martel**, indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while at the fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, November–December 1947
- MD**, Munitions Division, Department of State
- mfn**, most favored nation
- MID**, Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army
- MP**, Member of Parliament
- MPR**, Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia)
- MSC**, Military Staff Committee of the United Nations Security Council
- mytel**, my telegram
- NAC**, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
- NE**, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- NEA**, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
- NEI**, Netherlands East Indies
- NKVD**, People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union)
- NOE**, Division of Northern European Affairs, Department of State
- NSC**, National Security Council
- OA**, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- OIR**, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- ONI**, Office of Naval Intelligence
- PCA**, Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, Department of State
- PD**, Passport Division, Department of State
- PJBD**, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States–Canada
- PPS**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- PSC**, Belgian Social Christian Party
- Pu**, plutonium
- RAC**, Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments
- reDeptel**, reference Department's telegram
- reEmbs**, reference Embassy's telegram
- reftel**, reference telegram
- reLegtel**, reference Legation's telegram
- Rep**, Representative
- reurtel**, reference your telegram
- RL**, Division of American Republics Analysis and Liaison, Department of State

- RSC**, Records Service Center, Department of State
- SACMED**, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
- SA-M**, Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, Michael J. McDermott
- SANACC**, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
- SCAP**, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan
- SC**, Security Council
- SC**, Secretary's Staff Committee, Department of State
- S.J. Res.**, Senate Joint Resolution
- SPA**, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
- S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- S/P.V.**, (United Nations) *Conseil de Sécurité Procès-verbaux Officiels*
- SSR**, Soviet Socialist Republic
- SWNCC**, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
- SYG**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- TAC**, Interdepartmental Trade Agreements Committee
- Telmar**, indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while at the fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, November-December 1957
- Toito**, indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation to the second session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, April 10-August 22, 1947
- TRC**, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State
- TrustCo**, Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
- TVA**, Tennessee Valley Authority
- TWA**, Trans World Airlines
- UE**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- UKDel**, United Kingdom Delegation
- UNAEC**, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
- UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
- UNGA**, General Assembly of the United Nations
- UNLC**, United Nations Liaison Committee, Department of State
- UNRRA**, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
- UP**, United Press
- urtel**, your telegram
- USA**, United States Army
- USAEC**, United States Atomic Energy Commission
- USDel**, United States Delegation
- USN**, United States Navy
- USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations
- VD**, Visa Division, Department of State
- VHB**, very heavy bomber
- WDGS**, War Department General Staff
- WE**, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State
- WHO**, World Health Organization

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ERRATA

Page 119, footnote 4. Final sentence should read: "For text, see the *New York Times*, September 15, 1947, p. 3, or *Department of State Bulletin*, September 21, 1947, p. 539."

Page 235, line 13: "Lord Inverchapel".

Page 235, footnote 2 in center of page, last line: "see editorial note, p. 228".

ORGANIZATION AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

*Executive Order No. 9844, April 28, 1947, Establishing the United States Mission at the United Nations*¹

By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 619) and as President of the United States, and for the purpose of defining further the functions of the Representative of the United States in the United Nations, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Representative at the seat of the United Nations, the Deputy Representative to the Security Council, Representatives in the Economic and Social Council and its Commissions, the Trusteeship Council, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments and the Military Staff Committee, and representatives to organs and agencies of the United Nations hereafter appointed or designated and included within the United States Mission to the United Nations herein provided for, together with their deputies, staffs and offices, shall be known as the United States Mission to the United Nations.²

¹ From March 19, 1946, when the offices of the United States Representative at the United Nations, the United States Representative on the Economic and Social Council, and their staffs were formally opened at the Seat of the United Nations in New York, these were known collectively as the United States Delegation to the United Nations (for documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.). After one year's experience in staffing and servicing the United States representation to various United Nations activities, including the General Assembly session held in New York in the autumn of 1946, it was considered desirable to refine further the organization of these New York offices, and the result was this executive order of April 28, 1947.

² The United States Representative at the Seat of the United Nations was also the United States Representative on the Security Council of the United Nations, on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments; these posts were thus held concurrently, and the incumbent was Ambassador Warren R. Austin. According to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, the United States Representative at the United Nations also functioned as Senior United States Representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, when the General Assembly was in session, except when the Secretary of State was present.

At this time (April 1947) there was no incumbent United States Representative on the Economic and Social Council, and Leroy D. Stinebower of the Department of State was serving as Acting United States Representative; subsequently in July 1947 Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, was appointed to fill this vacancy. In February 1947 Francis B. Sayre had been appointed United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

For other United States representation to United Nations organs, subsidiary organs, commissions, committees, and the specialized agencies, see *The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948).

2. The Representative of the United States at the seat of the United Nations shall be the Chief of Mission in charge of the United States Mission to the United Nations. The Chief of Mission shall coordinate at the seat of the United Nations the activities of the Mission in carrying out the instructions of the President transmitted either by the Secretary of State or by other means of transmission as directed by the President. Instructions to the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations shall be transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On request of the Chief of Mission, such Representatives shall, in addition to their responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, serve as advisers in the United States Mission to the United Nations.

3. The Chief of Mission shall also be responsible for the administration of the Mission, including personnel, budget, obligation and expenditure of funds, and the central administrative services; provided that he shall not be responsible for the internal administration of the personnel, budget, and obligation and expenditure of funds of the United States Representatives in the Military Staff Committee. The Chief of Mission shall discharge his responsibilities under this paragraph in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Secretary of State may from time to time prescribe.

4. This order shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 28, 1947

123 Herschel V. Johnson

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1947.

The absence during the month of July of Ambassador Warren R. Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations and Chief of Mission of the United States Mission to the United Nations, raises the question of designating a Deputy Chief of Mission to act in his stead during such absences. It is therefore proposed that Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson be designated as Deputy Chief of Mission, in order that he may act as Chief of Mission during the month of July and at such other times as Ambassador Austin may be absent.¹

¹The appointment of Ambassador Johnson as Deputy Chief of the United States Mission to the United Nations was a move to rationalize the organization of the Mission in light of the failure of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to set up a position of Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations. (It was not until 1949 that the position of Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations was established by an executive order under the authorization of legislation that amended the Act of 1945.)

The position of Deputy Chief of Mission created in July 1947 is not to be confused with that of Deputy to the United States Representative at the United Nations; the latter position had been established in March 1947, and John C. Ross held the post at this time.

There is attached a proposed letter² for your signature to Ambassador Johnson, designating him as Deputy Chief of Mission.

This designation is proposed pursuant to Executive Order 9844 establishing the United States Mission to the United Nations and providing for its direction and administration.

I recommend the appointment of Ambassador Johnson as proposed in the attached draft letter.

G. C. MARSHALL

² Not printed.

501.BB/7-2447

*The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) to
Mr. John Foster Dulles*¹

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1947.

DEAR MR. DULLES: As Alger Hiss' successor in the Office of Special Political Affairs,² I should like to say that I was delighted to learn that you would be willing to serve as a Representative on the U.S. Delegation to the next meeting of the General Assembly. Please feel free to call upon me at any time for any information or service which you might need—one of our principal jobs is to see that everything possible is done to permit the Delegation to function with maximum effect.³

Regarding your note of July 24 to the Secretary,⁴ I wonder if it would not be profitable for me to call at your convenience in New York to bring you up to date on the matters expected to arise in the General Assembly and the state of our preparation and tentative plans for Delegation organization.

¹ Mr. Dulles was one of four persons who had been nominated by President Truman for consideration by the Senate for appointment as United States Representatives to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to be held in New York September 16. For a list of the four Representatives and five Alternate Representatives comprising the United States Delegation, see p. 4.

² The Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) was the Office in the Department of State chiefly responsible for handling United Nations affairs, in close coordination with the geographic Offices. SPA was made up of three divisions: International Organization Affairs (chiefly matters pertaining to the General Assembly), International Security Affairs (primarily Security Council matters), and Dependent Area Affairs (matters relating to Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories). Alger Hiss was Director of SPA from its inception in 1945 until early 1947; Dean Rusk became the incumbent on March 5, 1947.

³ In preparation for the General Assembly session, SPA drafted numerous position papers based on the principal agenda items as known at the time. These were organized on a Committee basis into a series of papers, "the SD series" (State Department position papers, as opposed to "the US series" which generally were the same papers as modified by discussions at United States Delegation meetings at New York). Thus, a paper relating to trusteeship matters would carry the symbol SD [State Department]/A [General Assembly]/C.4 [Committee 4]/[the appropriate number in the series]. By 1948 the SD series had become formalized as the Department's official instructions to the United States Delegation.

⁴ Not printed.

If you could indicate an hour on any day next week which would be convenient, I'd greatly appreciate it.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

501.BB/9-247

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie)

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1947.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that the President of the United States of America has appointed the following as Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

Representatives: The Honorable George C. Marshall
The Honorable Warren R. Austin
The Honorable Herschel V. Johnson¹
Mrs. Anna Eleanor Roosevelt²
The Honorable John Foster Dulles

Alternate Representatives:³ The Honorable Charles Fahy⁴
The Honorable Willard L. Thorp
The Honorable Francis B. Sayre
The Honorable Adlai Stevenson⁵
Miss Virginia C. Gildersleeve⁶

When it is possible for the Secretary of State, the Honorable George C. Marshall, to attend sessions of the General Assembly, he will serve in the capacity of Senior Representative of the United States.

In the absence of the Secretary of State, the Honorable Warren R. Austin will serve as Senior Representative of the United States.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ In a memorandum of May 23 to Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk noted that Ambassador Johnson had been recommended for appointment to the United States Delegation by the Department as "a professional foreign service officer of great experience and ability" (501.BB/5-2347). This was the first time that a professional foreign service officer was named to the United States Delegation. Another departure from the 1946 practice was the absence of Congressional representation on the Delegation.

² Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt had served on both United States Delegations to the two parts of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946.

³ As established in 1946 at the time of the first General Assembly meeting in London, the practice of the United States Delegation was that Alternate Representatives had the same standing as the Representatives.

⁴ Charles Fahy had been Legal Adviser of the Department of State until July 1947.

⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson had served in a senior capacity as an adviser to both United States Delegations in 1946.

⁶ Dean Virginia C. Gildersleeve, Barnard College, at Columbia University, New York, was appointed as a representative of prominent groups of civic-minded American women. She never served, however, and was replaced by Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, U.S. Army (Ret.), and until August 31, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.

IO Files¹: US/A/M(Chr)/45²

Minutes of the First Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York,³ September 12, 1947, 10:30 a. m.⁴

CONFIDENTIAL

Present: Ambassador Austin	Mr. Stevenson
Ambassador Johnson	Mr. Ross
Mrs. Roosevelt	Mr. Sandifer ⁵
Mr. Dulles	Mr. Winslow ⁶
Mr. Fahy	Mr. McKeever
Mr. Thorp	Mr. Power
Ambassador Sayre	

DELEGATION ASSIGNMENTS

Ambassador Austin opened the meeting remarking that since all of the Delegates were veterans in United Nations matters there was no need for any introductory statement on the task that lay ahead.

He read the tentative assignment of Committee work of the Delegates (SD/A/156, Annex II⁷). He stated that the Secretary wished to consult the Delegation on these Committee assignments and that if any one were especially interested in some agenda item, and desired to have his assignment changed, he should make his views known to the Secretary. Otherwise, it would be assumed that the Delegation assignments would be as set forth in the document. He understood Dean Gildersleeve was ill and, therefore, had tendered her resignation.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DELEGATION

Mr. Sandifer observed that everyone was already familiar with the general procedure and the nature of the documentation. He noted that instead of formal, signed instructions, the Delegation had been given position books with recommendations which actually consisted of the United States Government's agreed position as of the present time. In

¹ Short title for the Master Files, Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

² There is a carefully recorded set of minutes of United States Delegation meetings, beginning with 1946. These carry the symbol US/A/M(Chr)/[number]. There is also a separate set of "Delegation Decisions" (US/A/M[number]).

³ Headquarters of the United States Delegation was the United States Mission, located at Two Park Avenue.

⁴ Two other meetings of the Delegation were held on September 12; these dealt with substantive questions relating to items on the agenda of the General Assembly. Ambassador Austin chaired these three meetings because Secretary of State Marshall did not attend until the fourth meeting, on September 13.

⁵ Durward V. Sandifer, Special Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation.

⁶ Messrs. Winslow, McKeever, and Power were officers of the United States Mission.

⁷ See Doc. US/A/443, September 23, p. 11.

certain cases, the positions had not yet matured, as with the Palestine and Greek questions which were still under study. Further documentation will be provided as the Assembly progressed. Moreover, it would be endeavored to indicate for each case the degree of clearance and firmness of the relevant papers. This could be made clear in the Delegation discussions. Each Delegate had been supplied with position papers for each Committee. In addition, the Advisers for the respective Committees had much larger and more extensive background books which would be made available to the Delegates as the various questions came forward. This arrangement had been made largely in the interest of convenience so that Delegates would not be bothered with the extremely bulky documentation which had been prepared for all of the Committees.

Mr. Sandifer referred to the statement in SD/A/156 on the organization and procedure of the Delegation. He described the Principal Executive Officer's function of supervising and coordinating the substantive material to see that it had been properly prepared; that the positions were matured, and were presented to the Delegation for consideration. He⁸ also had the responsibility for seeing that the problems which arose in New York were presented in the Department for decision. He described the Executive Officer as the managing officer of the Committee, and the right-hand of the delegate. It would be the Executive Officer's responsibility to see that all documents were properly prepared and to assist the Delegates at the plenary and committee sessions.

Since Committee 1 had a large number of complex subjects on its agenda, there was a long list of advisers but these would, in practice, be broken down into working teams. The Executive Officer of Committee 1 was to serve as a general manager of various working teams in coordination with Mr. Sandifer. In the case of other Committees, the Executive Officer was to serve him as an adviser. Mr. Wainhouse was to serve as a deputy for Mr. Sandifer with respect to Committee 1. The specialist advisers would be in charge of the preparation for the specific agenda items. Mr. Sandifer also pointed out that when the Department was asked for instructions, these should be cleared through Mr. Sandifer.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether, in view of the fact that the Secretary would be present, the former procedure of consultation with the Department would be continued. Mr. Sandifer replied that the Secretary would want to talk with the Delegation about this question. He understood the Secretary was not sure how much time he could spend in New York. Since he could not give continuous attention to all of the Assembly questions, the Secretary would prefer to use the

⁸ The Principal Executive Officer.

Department for all of the staff work. Therefore, normally, it would be expected that questions would be referred to the Department. Although the Secretary desired that the Delegation consult with him, he did not want to assume the continuous responsibility for reviewing and deciding all questions.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether it was Mr. Sandifer's understanding that there was no change in the procedure of clearance with Washington that, in short, the presence of the Secretary did not bring the Department to New York. Mr. Sandifer said that this was his understanding but that the Ambassador would want to take up this question with the Secretary.

Ambassador Austin emphasized that it was necessary for the Delegation to have complete coordination in order that it might run smoothly. Mr. Sandifer commented that certain confusion had arisen last year from the fact that Secretary Byrnes had been in town for the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings. Accordingly, rather complicated procedures had arisen. He pointed out that Secretary Marshall worked on the basis of staff work.

Mr. Sandifer explained the general role and nature of the Advisers.

MISSION FACILITIES

Mr. Winslow welcomed the Delegation on behalf of the permanent Mission. He explained the shortage of local transportation, stating that transportation would be available on a pool basis for Delegates at all reasonable hours, seven days a week. He cautioned against excessively long trips outside the immediate business area but assured the Delegates that all of their transportation requirements would be made if they placed them with the dispatcher. Ambassador Austin emphasized that the Delegates must have no concern about such minor details as moving around freely, and instructed all transportation needs of the Delegation should be met promptly.

COMMITTEE SCHEDULES

At Ambassador Austin's request, Mr. Power explained the tentative schedule of Committee meetings as planned by Secretary-General Lie's office. These would provide that Committee 1 and the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Palestine should meet once a day each, six days a week. It was also planned that Committee 5 would have almost daily meetings. However, the Committee 5 and the Headquarters Committee, Committees 2 and 3 and Joint Committees 2 and 3 are to be planned in such a way that they would not conflict. The Secretary-General's proposal was that meetings should be held on a six-day a week schedule. Night meetings were not planned for the present.

[Here follows further discussion of the facilities of the United States Mission.]

IO Files: US/A/Inf/2-Rev.4

*United States Delegation Information Paper*¹UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS*Representatives*

- The Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary of State*
- The Honorable Warren R. Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations and Representative in the Security Council, Ambassador
- The Honorable Herschel V. Johnson, Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council, Ambassador
- The Honorable Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
- The Honorable John Foster Dulles

Alternate Representatives

- The Honorable Charles Fahy
- The Honorable Willard L. Thorp, United States Representative in the Economic and Social Council, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- The Honorable Francis B. Sayre, United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council, Ambassador
- The Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson
- Major General John H. Hildring, USA (Ret.)

Advisers

- Theodore C. Achilles, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- The Honorable Paul H. Alling, Ambassador of the United States to Pakistan
- LaVerne Baldwin, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- The Honorable Ralph A. Bard, Deputy United State Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments, United States Mission to the United Nations.
- Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief, Division [of] International Security Affairs, Department of State
- The Honorable Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State
- Philip M. Burnett, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- William I. Cargo, Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

¹ This is the final official Delegation list with list of Staff of Advisers; although dated November 19, it is inserted here for convenience of reference.

*When it is possible for him to attend, will serve as Senior United States Representative on the Delegation. In his absence, Ambassador Austin will serve as Senior United States Representative. [Footnote in the source text.]

- The Honorable William Dawson, Special United States Representative on the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, Ambassador
- Erle R. Dickover, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- Dorothy Fosdick, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
- William A. Fowler, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- James Frederick Green, Associate Chief, Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
- William O. Hall, Director, Office of Budget and Planning, Department of State
- Major General Hubert R. Harmon, United States Air Force, United States Representative on Military Staff Committee, United States Mission to the United Nations
- Admiral H. K. Hewitt, United States Navy, United States Representative on Military Staff Committee, United States Mission to the United Nations
- Louis K. Hyde, Jr., Adviser on Economic and Social Council Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations
- Laura Iredale, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Gerald Keith, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- Gordon Knox, Adviser on Security Council and General Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations
- Samuel K. C. Kopper, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
- Robert I. Kull, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- John Maktos, Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- Carl Marcy, Acting Legislative Counsel, Department of State
- Harley A. Notter, Adviser, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
- Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council and General Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations
- Sidney E. O'Donoghue, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations
- David H. Popper, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
- Lieutenant General M. B. Ridgway, United States Army, United States Representative on Military Staff Committee, United States Mission to the United Nations

- John C. Ross, Deputy to the Representative at the Seat of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United Nations
- Durward V. Sandifer, Special Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
- Eric Stein, Division of International Security Affairs, Department of State
- Leroy D. Stinebower, Deputy United States Representative in the Economic and Social Council, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State
- Donald C. Stone, Assistant Director in charge of Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget
- Paul B. Taylor, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Elwood N. Thompson, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
- David W. Wainhouse, Assistant Chief, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- The Honorable Avra Warren, Minister of the United States to New Zealand
- H. Bartlett Wells, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
- Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State
- Murray M. Wise, Assistant Chief, Division of Central America and Panama Affairs, Department of State

Principal Executive Officer

- Durward V. Sandifer, Special Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State

Special Assistant

- David H. Popper, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Assistants

- Elizabeth Ann Brown, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- Betty C. Gough, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

Secretary-General

- Richard S. Winslow, Secretary-General, United States Mission to the United Nations

Deputy Secretary-General

- Thomas F. Power, Jr., Deputy Secretary-General, United States Mission to the United Nations

Special Assistant

Lee B. Blanchard, Special Assistant to the Secretary-General,
United States Mission to the United Nations

Information Officer

Porter McKeever, Chief, Office of Public Information, United
States Mission to the United Nations

Assistants

David Wilson, United States Mission to the United Nations
Frank Standley, Office of the Special Assistant for Press Rela-
tions, Department of State

Public Liaison Officer

Chester S. Williams, Public Liaison Officer, Office of Public Infor-
mation, United States Mission to the United Nations

Assistants to the Delegates

Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the
Secretary, Department of State

William H. A. Mills, Special Assistant to the Representative at the
Seat of the United Nations, United States Mission to the United
Nations

IO Files : US/A/443

United States Delegation Working Paper

[NEW YORK,] September 23, 1947.

ORGANIZATION OF DELEGATES FOR WORK OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Secretary, Chairman of the Delegation

Ambassador Austin, Deputy to the Secretary as Chairman of the
Delegation, and Acting Chairman in his absence.

General Committee

Ambassador Austin

Ambassador Johnson

Committee 1 (Political and Security)

The Secretary

Ambassador Austin

Ambassador Johnson

Mr. Dulles

NOTE: Principal responsibility on certain subjects has been assigned
to other Delegates. See attached list of assignment of Com-
mittee 1 subjects.

Committee 2 (Economic and Financial)

Mr. Thorp

Committee 3 (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural)

Mrs. Roosevelt

Committee 4 (Trusteeship)

Mr. Dulles

Ambassador Sayre

Committee 5 (Administrative and Budgetary)

Ambassador Austin

Mr. Stevenson

Committee 6 (Legal)

Mr. Fahy

Committee on Palestine

Ambassador Johnson

General Hilldring

Headquarters Committee

Ambassador Austin

ASSIGNMENTS OF SUBJECTS ON COMMITTEE 1

The Secretary—Chairman of the Delegation

General responsibility; specific responsibility as circumstances require

Ambassador Austin—Deputy to the Secretary as Chairman of the Delegation, and Acting Chairman in his absence

Report of the Security Council

Atomic Energy

Conventional Armaments

Implementation of Article 43

U.S.S.R. Resolution on "Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War"

Ambassador Johnson

Palestine

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece

Mr. Dulles

Voting procedure in the Security Council

Interim Committee on Peace and Security of the General Assembly

Korea

Greece—assistance to Ambassador Johnson

Mrs. Roosevelt

U.S.S.R. Resolution on "Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War"—assistance to Ambassador Austin

Mr. Fahy

Indians in South Africa

Spain

Mr. Thorp

Revision of Italian Peace Treaty

General Hilldring

Korea—assistance to Mr. Dulles

Palestine—assistance to Ambassador Johnson

Mr. Stevenson

Membership

GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS

I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE, SEPTEMBER 1947

Editorial Note

Numerous addresses and statements relating the foreign policy of the United States to the goals and purposes of the United Nations were made in 1947 by high-ranking United States Government officials, including the President; these are printed in whole or in part in the Department of State *Bulletin* and in *The United States and the United Nations Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948). These official pronouncements tended increasingly to reflect the anxiety of Government leaders concerning "the vicious circles" of deepening political and economic crises throughout the world, and came to focus specifically on the Second Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which convened at New York on September 16. Official United States policy regarding needful United Nations action in the worsening international situation was embodied in an address made by Secretary of State Marshall to the General Assembly on September 17 (for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 19 ff.). The speech, entitled "A Program for a More Effective United Nations," outlined a series of proposals concerning how to deal firmly with actual or threatened aggression in certain parts of the world (Greece and Korea) and to cope with constitutional difficulties—within the Organization itself—that hampered constructive action by the United Nations (the voting impasse in the Security Council, the proposal to set up an "interim committee" of the General Assembly). The documents that follow are illustrative of some of the thinking that went into the United States effort to formulate foreign policy, at that time, within the context of United Nations action.

IO Files

Memorandum by Miss Dorothy Fosdick of the Office of European Affairs to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1947.

Subject: U.S. Policies at the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly

At a recent meeting of the General Assembly steering group (composed of SPA, the four geographic offices and LE), Mr. Rusk¹ stated that, in addition to the items now on the provisional agenda for the General Assembly, thought is being given in the Department to proposals that the United States itself might wish to bring before the General Assembly, in line with the basic objectives of our foreign policy.² Mr. Rusk then presented three tentative proposals, as follows, which no doubt will receive further consideration in the Department, and which I want to bring to your attention:

1. *Commission of the Assembly on Indirect Aggression.* We might advocate at the next session of the Assembly that a permanent commission be established to investigate threats, wherever they occur in the world, against the integrity of states through infiltration, subversive actions of minorities or other measures falling short of outright armed aggression. Such a commission, composed of twenty-one states, might be formally constituted at the fall Assembly and be asked to report to a special session in March, 1948. This proposal would afford a concrete way of approaching the problem of Russian aggression in southeast Europe. The discussion in the Assembly on this proposal would afford an opportunity for stating the case against Russian infiltration and assault on the integrity of such states as Greece, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Austria.

2. *Action for the Control of Atomic Energy.* We might request the General Assembly at its fall session to call upon the Atomic Energy Commission to produce a draft treaty for the control of atomic energy, such treaty to be ready for submission to a special session of the General Assembly early in 1948. This proposal would clarify the status of negotiations for the control of atomic energy. At present, public opinion has the impression that some progress is being made in this field, when, as a matter of fact, a complete impasse prevails.

3. *Mutual Assistance Pact.* We might supplement the provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter by proposing a worldwide treaty of mutual assistance, along the lines of the Act of Chapultepec, under Article 51 of the Charter. It would be the purpose of such multilateral mutual assistance treaty to complement the proposed twenty-one state commission on aggression by infiltration, since the treaty would deal with overt aggression. The treaty would provide that in case of armed conflict, the parties to the treaty would automatically support each other. This might prove a further deterrent to a potential aggressor,

¹ Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

² For reference source materials on this Departmental effort in July, August, and September, prior to the meeting of the General Assembly, see footnote 1, p. 166.

and also strengthen the hands of less powerful states attempting to combat infiltration.

I agreed that we would give further thought in EUR to these proposals and to others which might usefully be made by us to the General Assembly. Do you think it might be worthwhile to convene a meeting of the Division Chiefs in EUR for a frank discussion of these proposals? ³

³ Further discussion between interested offices in the Department resulted in a memorandum by Mr. Rusk to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), dated July 23, p. 567.

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1947.

Subject: U.S. Program in the Forthcoming Session of U.N. General Assembly

1. I believe it would be most worthwhile for the U.S. at the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly, to make a clear-cut statement which would re-state U.S. policy and objectives in the U.N. and would point out how our attempts to carry out that policy and to build up the U.N. have been consistently frustrated by the obstructionist policies and tactics of the U.S.S.R.

This statement, which should be moderate and regretful in tone, should give a history of our efforts and of how they have been blocked. It should point out the relation between the Soviet position in the U.N. and the way in which the Greek-Turkish aid program and the Marshall Plan have been handled. It should also refer to our views and intentions on the provision of armed forces and other matters (including atomic energy, if things work out that way).

I am deeply convinced that such a statement should *not* include any language to the effect that the frustrations in the Security Council have led us to the conviction that that body should not be used as a forum for dealing with political disputes.

2. With respect to an affirmative set of proposals designed to carry on from the statement, I think the presentation of such proposals would be desirable, if, *but only if*, they had substantive merit.

3. With respect to the first suggestion advanced by Mr. Rusk in his memorandum to Mr. Lovett,¹ I have the following comments:

(a) Under present circumstances, there is real advantage, in my opinion, in having in continuous existence a U.N. body to which all

¹ *Post*, p. 567.

questions of principle relating to crucial issues of international relations can be presented, without running into the problems raised by the specific nature of the Security Council's competence and by its voting procedure. There would also, as Mr. Rusk suggests, be advantage in focusing world attention on methods of indirect aggression, through the deliberations of such a U.N. body.

(b) Whether such a standing committee should also have broader powers than those suggested by Mr. Rusk should be considered. It might, for example, be desirable to make such a committee a forum to which individual nations could bring problems which, on the face of them, are not readily susceptible of effective treatment in the Security Council.

(c) Accordingly, while I am not yet convinced that the U.S. should present a proposal along the lines of Mr. Rusk's first suggestion, I do feel that it is worthwhile to have this suggestion elaborated on an urgent basis in order that its probable advantages and disadvantages can be more accurately weighed.

4. I cannot now see any affirmative program which the U.S. could introduce, except one based on Mr. Rusk's first point, which would have sufficient value in itself to justify advancing it.²

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

² On August 7 the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) submitted to the Under Secretary of State a Policy Planning Staff Paper (PPS/5, printed p. 594) containing the staff's views of the Rusk proposals for the adoption of a United States program for the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly. With specific reference to United States policies that were subsequently carried out at the United Nations, the relevant parts are sections 3, 4, and 5.

II. THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING THE PLACE OF MEETING OF THE THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1948

IO Files: US/A/735

United States Delegation Position Paper

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 29, 1947.

PROPOSAL TO HOLD THE THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN EUROPE

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position of the United States with regard to a French proposal, supported by a number of other delegations, that the third regular session of the General Assembly (1948) be held in Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should support this proposal on the following grounds:

a. It is desirable to make the influence of the United Nations felt more strongly in Europe.

b. At the second part of the first regular session of the General Assembly the United States voted for a Ukrainian proposal to hold the second regular session of the General Assembly in Europe, as a result of the understanding with the Soviet Union that a final decision with respect to location of the permanent headquarters in the United States would be taken before the end of the second part of the first regular session.¹

c. Since the permanent headquarters will presumably be under construction in September 1948, it would be appropriate to hold the third regular session in another city. A decision to this effect would not now have any bearing upon the location of the permanent United Nations headquarters.

2. The United States should indicate that it has no strong preference as to the city in Western Europe which is to be chosen as the site for the 1948 session. The United States should favor a resolution which does not mention a specific location in Europe but which provides that the choice shall be made by the Secretary-General in consultation with the member States.

COMMENT

1. At a meeting of Under Secretary Lovett's Staff Committee in the Department prior to the opening of the General Assembly, there was unanimous agreement that the United States should support in principle the holding of the third regular session in Europe. However, the United States should retain freedom of action to give careful and fair consideration to objections if raised by the Secretary-General on administrative and financial grounds.

The United States Delegation has been advised informally by the Secretary-General's Office that the Secretariat can service a session in Europe; that the increased cost of holding such a session in Geneva would be approximately \$1,200,000; but that the cost in other cities might be lower provided funds were contributed by the government concerned especially in Paris. Paris and Brussels have both been mentioned as possible sites. The Secretariat believes that accommodations would be adequate in any of these three cities. It would prefer that any resolution offered on this subject should not specify the city concerned, in order that the Secretary-General may retain some bargaining advantage in dealing with the government concerned, hotels, local transportation and other business agencies.

¹ For relevant public documentation regarding this aspect of the headquarters site problem, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 112, footnote 62.

Holding the next session of the General Assembly in Europe would result in an increased cost to the United States for the transportation and servicing of the Delegation. This can be compensated for to some extent by restricting the size of the Delegation.

IO Files : US/A/762

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 31, 1947.

In answer to my inquiry, Mr. Jebb¹ confirmed previous conversations with Hector McNeil and other members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the effect that the British are definitely against the next meeting being held in Europe. He did not speak so strongly on the matter as did Mr. McNeil and others yesterday.

H. RAYNOR

¹ H. M. G. Jebb of the United Kingdom Delegation.

IO Files : US/A/803

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 3, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Morgenstierne, Norwegian Delegation
Dr. J. H. van Royen, Netherlands Delegation
Mr. Hayden Raynor, United States Delegation

At lunch today both of the above[-named] gentlemen stated it would be a mistake for the next General Assembly to be held in Europe. Dr. van Royen in particular expressed the view that assuming a continuance of present Soviet tactics in the Assembly, the holding of the meeting in Europe would have a definitely harmful rather than beneficial effect. Mr. Morgenstierne stated however that he fully expected to be outvoted on this matter in his own delegation. Dr. van Royen also added that it would be a most difficult thing for a western European state to oppose the plan and he intimated that the Netherlands despite its feeling probably would be unable to do so.

IO Files : US/A/829

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 3, 1947.

At Mr. Raynor's request I sought out Parodi¹ after the General Committee meeting this afternoon to tell him that the seriousness of the British concern at the next session being held in Europe was forcing our delegation to give further consideration to the question, and that it looked as if we might have to follow a policy of very strict neutrality about it.

He then said he wanted to talk to me privately and, when we were alone, asked my frank opinion as to the fear expressed by the British that holding the Assembly in Europe would result in a serious decline in United States interest in the United Nations. He said the French were most anxious to avoid any such development, that this was the only argument advanced by the British which worried them, and that if we shared the British point of view about it they would not wish to push for having the next session in Europe. I gave him my frank opinion that holding the session in Europe would mean less publicity and interest in the United States for developments during that session but that it would by no means seriously lessen American interest in the United Nations.

THEODORE C. ACHILLES

¹ Alexandre Parodi, Permanent Representative of France at the United Nations.

IO Files : US/A/874

United States Delegation Position Paper

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] November 12, 1947.

FRENCH-SWEDISH RESOLUTION ON PLACE OF MEETING OF THE THIRD
REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. *United States Position*

The United States should vote in favor of this Resolution, which proposes that the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly be held in Europe. The resolution requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with a committee of nine members designated by the President of the General Assembly, to choose the city where the session shall be held.

If, as is probable, a rather spirited debate takes place on this issue, the United States Representative may consider it advisable to make a brief statement indicating the position of the United States.

2. *History in Committee*

On November 3, the General Committee recommended to the General Assembly that the French-Swedish proposal be considered by the General Assembly in plenary session, and that the budgetary and administrative implications of the proposal be referred to the Fifth Committee for consideration and report. The Secretary-General subsequently informed the Fifth Committee that, compared to estimated costs at headquarters, the additional costs of holding the session in Geneva amount to \$1,336,344, and at a site other than Geneva, to \$1,482,562. These figures were referred by the Fifth Committee to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which revised and reduced them to an additional cost of \$901,875 for a session in Geneva and of \$1,047,875 for a session elsewhere in Europe. With some reservations, the Secretary-General accepted the Advisory Committee's estimates. By a vote of 46-0, with 2 abstentions, Committee 5 agreed that these cost figures should be transmitted to the Assembly. In the course of discussion in the Committee, representatives of the following States spoke against the proposal to hold the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly in Europe: China, Nicaragua, Cuba, Uruguay, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The proposal was supported by the delegates of Sweden, Belgium and the Philippines.

3. *Possible Developments in the Plenary Session*

The French Delegation may be expected to lead the fight for holding the Third Regular Session in Europe, in the hope that the site finally chosen might be Paris. The United Kingdom Delegation, supported by the delegations of the Dominions, will probably oppose strenuously any effort to hold the next General Assembly in Europe. The British will presumably stress the administrative and budgetary difficulties involved in holding the session away from headquarters at this particular time, although there is reason to believe that they are also motivated by fear that Communist propaganda agencies in Europe may exploit the opportunity provided by an Assembly held in Paris for a strenuous propaganda campaign.

It is impossible to predict the outcome of this discussion in the Assembly, and it would not be surprising if the vote on the Resolution were close.¹

¹ After quite extensive debate beginning on November 14, the General Assembly on November 15 adopted the French-Swedish resolution (32-15-5), the United States voting affirmatively; for the discussion in the General Assembly, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. II, pp. 896 ff.; for text of the resolution, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions*, p. 153. Subsequently the General Assembly appointed a committee of nine members to choose the city in Europe where the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly was to be held. This committee consisted of Australia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ethiopia, India, Lebanon, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, and Uruguay; Paris was selected.

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SEAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE HEADQUARTERS AND INTERIM HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENTS; THE PROPOSED GENERAL CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS; THE QUESTION OF FINANCING CONSTRUCTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS¹

501.AC/4-1747 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, April 17, 1947—6 p. m.

PRIORITY

360. At meeting of delegation SYGs April 16 Secretariat officials, at Argentine request, reported on status of negotiations between US and UN on headquarters arrangements. Secretariat reported that US intention on section 27 relating to privileges and immunities for resident representatives to UN was that full diplomatic privileges should be granted only to persons of ambassadorial and ministerial rank, and a few other members of the staff.²

There was strong, unanimous criticism made by representatives of 25 delegations present that the phrase in section 27 stating that privileges and immunities would be granted to "such resident members of their (resident representatives) staffs as may be agreed upon by the SYG, USA, and government of the member concerned" would be so narrowly interpreted by U.S. The intended interpretation was obviously a surprise to those present.

U.S. member was requested to make known to me and, through me, the Dept, the opposition of the delegations represented to the proposed text and US plan to limit number on staffs of representatives to whom diplomatic privileges and immunities would be granted. Unanimous agreements was that missions accredited to US in Washington

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 60-116.

² For citations to references in this paragraph, see footnotes to memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Fahy), April 23, *infra*.

On June 20, 1946, officers of the Department of State and the Secretariat of the United Nations reached agreement on a text for a draft headquarters convention regarding the location of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations in the United States, section 27 of which read :

"Every person accredited to the United Nations by a Member as the principal resident representative of such Member or as a resident representative with the rank of ambassador or minister plenipotentiary, and such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon between the Secretary-General, the United States of America and the Government of the Member concerned, shall[,] whether residing inside or outside the zone, be entitled in the territory of the United States to the same privileges and immunities as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it. In the case of Members whose governments are not recognized by the United States of America, such privileges and immunities need be extended to their representatives, or persons on the staffs of such representatives, only within the zone, at their residences and offices outside the zone, in transit between the zone and such residences and offices, and in transit on official business to or from foreign countries."

and to UN in NY should receive identical privileges and immunities and for corresponding members of their staffs. SYGs of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Poland, Greece, and Netherlands stated that they were certain their governments would oppose a limitation of this nature. Polish representative noted it was a rare occasion when Polish and Argentine representatives agreed heartily.

Netherlands and Australian representatives observed that probable result of such an article would be numerous evasions, mentioning specifically that staffs would secure immunity from customs by importing goods in name of resident representative. Another type of evasion suggested was that all or nearly all of officers of mission would be designated as ministers, thus mocking law.

Secretariat also reported that it was State Department view that agreement should be submitted to Congress in form of joint resolution to be approved by Congress prior to its submission to the next GA. Opposition and concern were expressed by several SYGs that agreement might be approved by Congress before submission to GA, thereby facing GA with *fait accompli* or making extremely difficult a recommendation by GA that Congress reverse its action. It was the sense of the meeting that it would be preferable to postpone Congressional action until the text had been reviewed by GA.

Secretariat representative (Schreiber) defended text of agreement, pointing to probable delays if question were reopened. However, he indicated that support indicated by delegation representatives would strengthen hand of SYG in remaining negotiations with US.

US made no comment on foregoing, simply agreeing to transmit views.

The question of privileges and immunities for members of missions to UN has explosive possibilities for US. Solid front presented by other delegations may place US in very embarrassing position. Permanent delegations attach more importance to this than to many substantive issues. Implication for other delegations is clearly that US considers UN to be on a subordinate plane to foreign missions accredited to US. Such a position has inference that US places less emphasis on UN than on relations with individual governments and therefore appears to be an unwillingness to support fully the UN. In addition to the important policy consideration thereby involved, Dept should consider difficulty that will be experienced by delegation in dealing with other delegations for whom lack of diplomatic status is a ranking condition.

Now that all permanent delegations here have learned of the US position, the issue will certainly come to the fore and will be a constant irritant from this point forward.

Recommend that Department give serious consideration to implications of a restricted interpretation of privileges and immunities and

that I be authorized in contemplated definitive negotiations with SYG Lie to concede that the privileges and immunities to be granted to the missions of the members accredited to the UN should be substantially the equivalent of those granted to the foreign missions in Washington.

In return for such concession by US we may find it easier to achieve our objective in the matter of deportation of undesirable employees of Secretariat.

AUSTIN

L/UNA Files

Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Fahy) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1947.

Subject: United Nations Headquarters Agreements

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a brief survey of the situation as it now stands. More elaborate background material and documentation are contained in the book entitled "Arrangements Respecting Permanent Headquarters of the United Nations"¹ which was prepared for you as part of the documentation for the second part of the first session of the General Assembly.

Status of Negotiations

At the first part of the first session, the General Assembly passed on February 13, 1946, a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General (with the assistance of a committee composed of persons appointed by ten member governments) to negotiate the appropriate arrangements between the United Nations and the United States. The General Assembly submitted a "Draft Convention" to the Secretary-General for his use in the negotiations as a basis for discussion.

Formal negotiations in June 1946 resulted in the draft of June 20, 1946 which, as indicated in an exchange of letters between Dr. Kerno² and myself, was to be regarded purely as a working draft.

The official report of the negotiations was published in the attached UN Document A/67, with text of the draft agreement as Annex I and the exchange of letters as Annex II.³

In the course of discussions with Dr. Kerno, the United States took the position that it would prefer to have the arrangements in the form of an executive agreement to be authorized by joint resolution of the Congress rather than by a treaty to be acted on only by the Senate. An opinion from the Acting Attorney General approving the legality of

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, footnote 34, p. 81.

² Ivan S. Kerno, U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs.

³ United Nations Doc. A/67 is not printed in the *Foreign Relations* series; it may be found in depository libraries of the United Nations.

this procedure was obtained under date of August 20, 1946 and was published as Annex III of Document A/67.⁴

It was originally hoped that the agreement would be negotiated in final form during the fall session of the General Assembly. However, the late date of the decision as to location of the permanent headquarters made this impractical. The General Assembly adopted a resolution on December 14, 1946 authorizing the Secretary-General to negotiate the appropriate agreement and stating that in such negotiations he "shall be guided by the provisions of the draft agreement" of June 20, 1946. It was stipulated that the agreement should not come into force until approved by the General Assembly although the Secretary-General was authorized to make, without further approval, interim arrangements with respect to the temporary headquarters.

Further negotiations were held on February 13 and 14, 1947 with Mr. Feller⁵ and Dr. Saba⁶ of the Secretariat and representatives of the City and State of New York as well as the Department of Justice. These negotiations were based on the Department's revised draft of January 14 (of which a copy is attached)⁷ together with additional proposals which were submitted informally at the meeting. The negotiations were followed by correspondence and telephone conversations on various points. As a result, there is now tentative agreement⁸ on all matters except the following:

Remaining Questions To Be Negotiated

(1) *Applicability of United States deportation laws to personnel of the United Nations and delegations.* This is discussed separately in my memorandum for the Acting Secretary of March 28, of which a copy is attached.⁹ The Acting Secretary has indicated his approval of the course suggested, except that he apparently does not feel we should

⁴ For text of this opinion, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 8, 1946, p. 1068.

⁵ Abraham H. Feller, General Counsel and Principal Director, Legal Department, United Nations Secretariat.

⁶ Hanna Saba, Director of Division of Privileges and Registration of Treaties, Legal Department, United Nations Secretariat.

⁷ Not printed. This draft, with earlier preliminary drafts and accompanying documentation relating thereto, is in L/UNA Files in folder "Headquarters Agreement General—1947."

⁸ Incorporated in a newly revised draft dated March 20, not printed. The draft is found in the source described in the footnote immediately preceding.

⁹ Not printed. The relevant section of the memorandum read:

"2. The Agreement provides in Sections 11 and 13 that personnel of the United Nations, of the delegations of member governments and of the specialized agencies shall have the right of access to the headquarters district without regard to immigration restrictions. The Visa Division has expressed some concern as to this provision, and I agree that this Government should reserve the right to require persons to leave who abuse their special privileges of entry.

"There have already been two cases where the United Nations has requested visas for appointees to the Secretariat whose records indicate that they might be expected to engage in subversive activities prejudicial to the public safety of the United States. In the first case, the appointment was withdrawn by the

Footnote continued on following page.

confine the matter to deportation activities endangering the public safety.

(2) *Status, pending settlement by arbitration, of regulations governing the headquarters which may be adopted by the United Nations but contested by the United States.* This is discussed in the same memorandum. The Acting Secretary has indicated that, if we yield on this point, we should do so *ad referendum*.

(3) *Diplomatic privileges for resident representatives of Member Nations.* As regards representatives to the United Nations, Section 15¹⁰ provides that full diplomatic privileges shall be accorded to principal resident representatives, resident representatives with the rank of ambassador or minister, and such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon. As regards representatives to specialized agencies, full privileges are accorded only to principal resident representatives with the rank of ambassador or minister. This is all we thought we agreed to at the last conference in New York, but Dr. Saba of the Secretariat seems to think we agreed that representatives to specialized agencies should be treated the same as those to the United Nations. Unfortunately he has relayed this impression to representatives of the specialized agencies.

Unless we are to make full privileges available to virtually all of the officers of delegations to the United Nations, I believe we should adhere to the present draft with respect to resident representatives to specialized agencies, for they may actually occupy very junior positions in the permanent delegations of their governments.

Footnote continued from previous page.

Secretary-General at the request of the Acting United States Representative. In the second case a similar request has been made and the Secretary-General has stated that the appointment will be cancelled.

"The present draft of Section 13 includes a provision that although immigration restrictions may not prevent the entry of official personnel, the United States retains the right to cause such persons to leave the country on account of any activities constituting cause for deportation under United States laws and in which such persons might engage otherwise than in their official capacity. This provision has been rejected by the United Nations, in the attached letter of March 11 [not printed, L/UNA Files] from Dr. Saba, Director of the Division of Privileges and Registration of Treaties, in which he says that he has submitted the matter to the Secretary-General.

"Dr. Saba proposes, instead, that the Secretary-General write a letter, of which he attaches a draft [not printed, L/UNA Files], to the effect that the Secretary-General will investigate all cases of United Nations personnel about whom the United States complains with a view to applying such administrative penalties as may be required, including, if necessary, dismissal. In my opinion, this would not be a satisfactory arrangement. It would leave the Secretary-General as the sole judge as to whether the privileges of staying in this country should be withdrawn.

"3. I suggest, if you approve, that I arrange with Senator Austin that he or I, or both of us, see the Secretary-General personally and seek to impress upon him the reasons for our original proposal and the importance which we attach to it. I think we should be prepared to modify it, if necessary, to the extent of making it applicable only to deportation on account of activities endangering the public safety of the United States."

¹⁰ The substance of section 27 of the drafts of June 20, 1946, and January 14, 1947, are incorporated into section 15 of the March 20 draft.

Your telegram 360 of April 17 raises the question whether we should grant full diplomatic privileges and immunities to officers of delegations to the United Nations on the same basis as they are granted to officers of diplomatic missions in Washington. At the time of the negotiations last summer, it was our feeling that the creation of a large group enjoying diplomatic privileges in a relatively small community in Westchester or Fairfield County would create a serious public relations problem, since the local citizens would not understand why so many foreigners should be entirely above the law. The representatives of the United Nations appreciated this point of view, which was strongly held also by the representatives of the States of New York and Connecticut. At that time we were also faced with vigorous local opposition to the establishment of the headquarters on any basis.

Now that the headquarters are to be in New York City, the political and public relations aspects may be quite different. The feelings of suburban citizens cannot, of course, be ignored since many of the members of delegation staffs will live in the suburbs. I think, however, that we might consider some extension of the class entitled to full diplomatic privileges. Such an offer might, as you point out, be especially useful from the bargaining point of view in handling the very difficult question of deportation discussed above. As a matter of courtesy we should first consult the New York City and State authorities and perhaps also those of Connecticut and New Jersey where many of the representatives will live.

If we do extend the class entitled to full diplomatic privileges, we should probably be prepared to make some concessions also with respect to delegations to the specialized agencies, which would not involve a very significant number.

Assuming that our provision with respect to deportation is accepted, its applicability to persons enjoying diplomatic privileges is not entirely clear. In the case of diplomats accredited to this Government, diplomatic privileges would seem to involve immunity from deportation laws as well as others, although it is always possible to send diplomats home by declaring them *persona non grata*. Since representatives to the United Nations or specialized agencies are not accredited to this Government, we cannot technically declare them *persona non grata*. Section 15 of our proposed draft¹¹ states that the privileges accorded to representatives of member nations by the United States are to be "the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it." The phrase "subject to corresponding conditions and obligations" was the subject of some discussion at our last

¹¹ That is, the March draft.

meeting with representatives of the United Nations.¹² So far, they have neither accepted nor rejected it, although Mr. Feller seemed personally inclined to accept it.

On the assumption that full privileges would be confined to the small class contemplated in the present draft, I had thought it best not to raise the question of deportation laws as applied to them. If, however, we are to grant full privileges to all officers on delegation staffs, this problem becomes more important and perhaps we should try to have the minutes of the negotiations show that the quoted phrase permits revocation of privileges for those who abuse them, with the result that they would then become subject to the deportation provision.

(4) *Use of broadcasting facilities for other types of communications.* There is some disagreement as to the extent to which the United Nations should be allowed to use its own radio facilities for point-to-point communication. Mr. DeWolfe, Chief of the Telecommunications Division, has been handling this directly with the telecommunications officials of the United Nations. I believe we can leave this to be settled by the experts.

(5) *Changes in form.* Since the negotiations of February, we have prepared a new draft of the agreement which rearranges the order of the sections and makes a number of minor changes in wording. This is the draft of March 20, 1947 which is attached. I do not anticipate any serious objections to this revision which is intended to be one of form only. It is being submitted informally to the Secretariat, the Department of Justice and New York City and State representatives for comment.¹³

(6) *Annexes.* Completion of one or more annexes defining certain rights of New York City with respect to public utilities and similar matters can probably be worked out satisfactorily by direct negotiation between the city and United Nations authorities.

Further Steps

The following steps remain to be taken:

(a) Completion of negotiations on the outstanding questions referred to above. The first three are the only ones which, I believe, will require your personal participation and that of the Secretary-General.

¹² The qualification "subject to corresponding conditions and obligations" was especially desired by this Government so that persons covered by section 15 would not receive broader privileges and immunities than would diplomatic envoys accredited to the President of the United States, and that such persons, like diplomatic envoys, could be declared *personae non gratae* and made subject to recall.

¹³ The text was sent to the United Nations Secretariat on April 23, via a letter by Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser, to Dr. Kerno, the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, not printed (501.AD/4-2347).

(b) Signature of the agreement by the Secretary of State and the Secretary-General in the form finally agreed upon.

(c) Transmission of the agreement as signed to the Congress (after clearance through normal channels of the Bureau of the Budget) together with a draft of joint resolution authorizing the President to put the agreement into effect. The latest draft for such a resolution is attached.¹⁴ It is important that the resolution be adopted at the current session.

(d) Approval of the agreement by the General Assembly at its next regular session.

(e) Putting the agreement into effect by exchange of letters between the United Nations and the United States.

(f) Conclusion of interim arrangements with respect to temporary headquarters. The Secretary-General has been authorized to do this by the resolution of last December, and the President would be authorized to do it by the proposed joint resolution. This step could, therefore, be taken any time after passage of the joint resolution.

General Convention

The first part of the first session of the General Assembly, in addition to proposing specific arrangements between the United Nations and the United States, proposed a "Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations" (commonly referred to as the "General Convention"¹⁵ to distinguish it from the specific agreement with the United States) which was recommended for adherence by all member nations. It is designed to define the privileges and immunities of the United Nations and its personnel in all member nations. Contrary to the wishes of the United States, the General Convention was put in final form before the Headquarters Agreement had been negotiated. As a result there is some overlapping and inconsistency between the two. However, the Headquarters Agreement provides that both shall be given effect wherever possible and that, in case of absolute conflict, the Headquarters Agreement shall prevail.

The United States Delegation expressly reserved its position with respect to the application to United States nationals of the provisions of the General Convention creating immunity from income tax on United Nations salaries and immunity from national service.

It is proposed to submit the General Convention to the Congress for authorization by joint resolution, separately from the Headquarters Agreement although the hearings on the two documents may well be

¹⁴ Not attached to file copy.

¹⁵ For texts of the resolution of February 13, 1946 (Resolution 22(I)) and accompanying draft general convention on privileges and immunities of the United Nations, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of the First Session*, pp. 25 ff.

combined. The proposed submission has, for several months, been held up in the Treasury Department, but that Department's comments as finally received present no serious obstacles, and it is expected that the Convention will be submitted to the Congress in the near future.

Summary of Headquarters Agreement

Attached as a separate document is a brief summary of the latest draft of the Headquarters Agreement.¹⁶ This also shows the corresponding section numbers of the draft of June 20 which is the only one that has become an official United Nations document.

¹⁶ Both the draft and the summary are dated March 20, 1947, neither printed. Both documents are in L/UNA Files, in folder "Headquarters of the UN: Headquarters Agreement General—1947."

501.AC/5-747

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Webb) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to Mr. Byrnes' letter of November 1, 1946,¹ transmitting a draft of joint resolution which the Department proposed to submit to the Congress, concerning the accession of the United States to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, and to subsequent correspondence with respect thereto.

As the result of conferences between representatives of the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget, it is understood that certain revisions of the joint resolution have been agreed upon, as herein below indicated, and you are accordingly advised that there would be no objection to the submission of the Convention and the joint resolution to the Congress, subject to these revisions:

1) The addition to the draft joint resolution of a provision as suggested by Justice and Treasury² to cover the interpretation of the Convention and PL 291 so that neither will be construed to restrict the other, but that in case of conflict the Convention will apply.³

¹ James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State from July 1945 to January 1947. His letter of transmittal of November 1, 1946, is not printed; accompanying enclosures, not attached to the covering letter, have not been found in the Department of State's files. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, footnote 47, p. 98.

² During the period November 1946–May 1947 the Bureau of the Budget had carried on correspondence with the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department as indicated, not printed.

³ Public Law 291, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (December 29, 1945). "An Act to extend certain privileges, exemptions and immunities to international organizations and to the officers and employees thereof . . ." (cited as the "International Organizations Immunities Act"). 59 Stat. 669. For documentation regarding the interest of the Department of State in the enactment of this legislation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. I, pp. 1557 ff.

2) Clarifications by State during committee hearings on the Convention as to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to render advisory opinions in disputes and the relation of this jurisdiction to the present jurisdiction of the U.S. Customs and other courts.

3) Assurances by State that it will seek to secure treatment of other international organizations on an equal basis with the United Nations. It would be preferable that such treatment be made applicable through amendments to PL 291 or through a single convention applicable to all specialized international agencies rather than in a separate convention negotiated with each agency. It is understood that State has already suggested such an "omnibus" convention to United Nations authorities.

4) The addition to the draft joint resolution of a clause reserving the position of the United States on Section 18(c) of the Convention dealing with immunity from national service obligations.

The Department will note the comments of the Secretary of the Treasury relating to Section 18(b) of the Convention which would provide income tax immunity to all employees of the United Nations. The foreign policy considerations which may lead the Department to recommend such tax immunity, even for U.S. nationals, are appreciated. It is suggested, however, that, if the Department recommends such immunity, it be prepared to assure the Congress⁴ that the U.S. delegation to the General Assembly will support a system for the contribution to the United Nations of tax equivalents by United Nations employees. Such a system would prevent the creation of a "tax-free" group of individuals, and would put United Nations employees in the position of contributing to the support of the Organization. The Department, moreover, may consider it desirable, in the event the Congress is not receptive to the recommendation of tax immunity, to suggest the inclusion in the joint resolution of a section which would amend the Internal Revenue Code so that U.S. nationals contributing to an internal system of tax equivalents in the United Nations could credit the payment of such contribution against their tax obligation to this Government.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES E. WEBB

⁴The words "to assure the Congress" were underscored by a Department of State officer who also added a marginal notation: "in the hearings."

501.AC/5-1247

*The Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
(Martin)*¹

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: There is transmitted herewith a copy of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations² which was approved by the General Assembly by a resolution adopted on February 13, 1946, proposing the Convention for accession by each member of the United Nations. This agreement is designed to implement Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations which read as follows:

Article 104:

"The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes."

Article 105:

"1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.

"2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

"3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose."

The Convention is submitted to you with the request that the Congress give consideration to the passage of a joint resolution authorizing the President to accede to it on behalf of the United States. A draft of a proposed joint resolution is enclosed.

The Convention gives certain privileges and immunities to the United Nations, as an organization, and to its employees and representatives of Member states who are designated in their respective capacities to the United Nations. Many of the privileges and immunities for which provision is made in the Convention have already been conferred upon the United Nations by virtue of the provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act, approved December 29, 1945 (Public Law 291, 79th Congress, 1st Session). In some respects, however, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations goes beyond the terms of the International Organizations Immunities Act. Thus, there is provision in Section 19 for giving

¹ The same letter, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent to the President pro tempore of the Senate.

² Not printed.

the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General of the United Nations, their spouses and minor children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law. There is provision in Section 22 for extending certain limited privileges and immunities to experts on missions for the United Nations. In other respects the Convention is less liberal than the provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act. For example, section 11 (b) and (g) limit the free entry privilege to "personal baggage", a term which is narrower in scope than the term "baggage and effects", as used in Section 3 of the Act. The effect, therefore, of approval of the enclosed draft resolution will be to supplement or replace certain provisions of the International Organizations Immunities Act, and the draft joint resolution provides that in the case of absolute conflict the provisions of the Convention shall prevail.

Since our acceptance of this Convention will give effect to Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Department of State believes that the Convention should be submitted to Congress for its approval by joint resolution.

At the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in February 1946 the United States Delegation voted for the General Assembly resolution opening the Convention on Privileges and Immunities for accession by each member of the United Nations. At that time Senator Vandenberg³ reserved the position of the United States with respect to provisions in the Convention regarding tax immunities and regarding national service exemptions in these words:

"I rise only to make the position of the delegation of the United States perfectly plain in regard to the reports of the fifth and sixth Committees. We have reserved our position in respect of tax immunities in regard to the reports of both Committees. The Constitution of the United States gives the American Congress sole power to exempt American citizens from taxation. The distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom made a very interesting and moving appeal in respect of rival allegiances, and suggested that a man cannot serve two masters. Quite in the spirit in which the able delegate of the United Kingdom spoke, the delegation of the United States does not propose to serve two masters. Its master is the Constitution of the United States. This does not, however, mean that the attitude of the Government of the United States is not totally at one with a cooperative attitude, and wholly hospitable in regard to all cooperation which we, as the host country, shall undertake to give to this great institution when it goes upon its way. Indeed, even so far as privileges and immunities are concerned, I am very happy to say that the last session of the American Congress has already passed a statute which includes,

³ Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, of Michigan, was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

I should say, about 95 percent of the things which the report and the general convention from the sixth Committee anticipate.

"The delegation of the United States also reserves its position in respect of national service exemptions under the general convention reported by the sixth Committee. This again is due to the fact that the Constitution of the United States permits no authority other than the American Congress to deal with this matter, and we are not in a position to prejudge that ultimate consideration.

"With these exceptions, we have been very happy to accept the balance of the report of the fifth Committee, and we are very glad to vote, with these reservations, for the general convention.

"So far as the special convention is concerned, we shall abstain from voting, because the special convention is one to which the Government of the United States will be a party, and we consider it would be inappropriate for us to prejudge the case here.

"In this entire attitude, I want to repeat that the purpose and the intention, and heartfelt desire, not only of the delegation of the United States, but of the American people, I am sure I speak with complete justification, is to extend every consideration, and to give every possible cooperation, to the United Nations Organization as it proceeds upon the greatest and most hopeful adventure in the history of human kind."

With respect to the question of income tax immunity for officials of the United Nations, I wish to point out that Section 116(*h*) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, exempts alien employees of public international organizations from the payment of a Federal tax on income received from such international organizations.

United States nationals employed by international organizations, however, are subject to the Federal tax on income received from the United Nations. Section 18(*b*) of the enclosed Convention would extend this tax exemption now granted alien officials of international organizations to American nationals who are officials of the United Nations. It would also grant immunity from state income taxes on such income both for aliens and United States citizens.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has considered whether or not officials of international organizations, regardless of their nationality and place of residence, should be exempt from national taxation. The Assembly concluded at its first session in London that "there is no alternative to the proposition that exemptions from national taxation for salaries and allowances paid by the Organization is indispensable to the achievement of equity among its Members and equality among its personnel". This proposition was accepted unanimously, the United States Delegation abstaining. The Convention which is submitted herewith was also approved unanimously by the General Assembly, although the United States Delegation reserved its position with respect to the question of tax immunity as noted above.

In view of the general policy of the United States, to give its full support to the United Nations, it is the opinion of the Department of

State that this Government should comply with recommendations of the General Assembly wherever it can do so without prejudice to overriding considerations affecting the vital interests of the United States. For this reason, the Department hopes that the Congress will not insist on a reservation that tax immunity should be inapplicable to United States nationals.

With respect to Section 18(*e*) of the Convention which would give officials of the United Nations immunity from national service obligations, I believe it would be well for this Government to reserve its position. Under the terms of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 aliens attached to foreign missions in the United States were exempted from registration under certain circumstances. Since the Selective Training and Service Act has now expired the question at this time of immunity from national service for officials of the international organizations is not of immediate concern. I think it would be well for this Government, however, to reserve its position as to United States nationals and aliens who have declared their intention of becoming citizens, so that if in the future it becomes necessary to provide again for national service we will be free to determine at that time the extent to which national service immunities should be extended to Americans who are employed by the United Nations. A provision to that effect is incorporated in the attached draft resolution.

The special convention which Senator Vandenberg mentioned in the next to last paragraph of the afore-quoted statement is a reference to a proposed agreement between the United Nations and the United States concerning the administration and control of the area in the United States selected for the permanent headquarters of the United Nations. That agreement is now in the process of being negotiated between representatives of the United Nations and representatives of this Government. When agreement has been reached the text will be submitted to the Congress for its approval. This draft agreement, in its present form, provides, among other things, for extending diplomatic privileges and immunities to principal resident representatives of Member states and such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon between the Secretary-General, the United States, and the Government of the Member concerned.

The enclosed Convention extends full diplomatic privileges and immunities only to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Assistant Secretaries General (Section 19). Lesser officers of the United Nations (Section 18), experts on missions for the United Nations (Section 22), and representatives of Members other than those covered in the above-mentioned site Convention (Section 11), are not to receive full diplomatic privileges and immunities. The immunities which these officers, experts, and representatives are to receive are extended to them while they are performing their official functions.

Section 11 lists in paragraphs (a) through (f) certain specific privileges and immunities which representatives of Member states are to enjoy. Paragraph (g) states that they are to have "such other privileges, immunities and facilities not inconsistent with the foregoing as diplomatic envoys enjoy, except that they shall have no right to claim exemption from customs duties on goods imported (otherwise than as part of their personal baggage) or from excise duties or sales taxes." It is the view of the Department of State that this paragraph provides only for privileges with respect to matters other than those specified in the foregoing paragraphs (a) through (f), and does not provide for additional privileges in respect of such matters. Thus, immunity from legal process is confined to the limited immunity granted by paragraph (a) and could not be extended under paragraph (g) to provide the complete immunity which is enjoyed by diplomatic envoys.

Article VII of the Convention authorizes the United Nations to issue *laissez-passer* to its officials. Section 24 of Article VII provides:

"These *laissez-passer* shall be recognized and accepted as valid travel documents by the authorities of Members, taking into account the provisions of Section 25."

This language does not authorize or require, and is not interpreted by the Department of State as authorizing or requiring the United Nations or any Member state to issue or accept a document which is a substitute for a passport or other documentation of nationality; it provides only for a certificate attesting to the United Nations affiliation of the bearer in respect to travel and will be accepted by the United States as such a document. Thus Article VII, if approved, will not amend or modify existing provisions of law with respect to the requirement or issuance of passports or of other documentation evidencing nationality of citizens or aliens.

The fact that the United Nations has selected the United States for its permanent headquarters may cause certain specialized agencies to make their permanent headquarters in the United States. When the decision of those agencies as to their permanent headquarters is known, it may be necessary for the Department of State to ask the Congress to give its approval to a further agreement defining the privileges and immunities of those organizations in so far as it may be advisable to grant them privileges and immunities beyond those provided in the International Organizations Immunities Act. The Department hopes that extensive amendment of Public Law 291 can be deferred until such time as the need for privileges and immunities on the part of international organizations throughout the world shall have become clarified. In this connection, you may be interested to know that the Secretary General of the United Nations has been instructed to make a study of the privileges and immunities of specialized agencies and to

open negotiations with them in order to systematize their privileges and immunities.

Since the United Nations has decided to make its permanent headquarters in the United States and is now considering plans for the construction of its buildings, the Department of State believes that approval of the enclosed Convention is a matter of some urgency.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report.

A similar letter is being sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives [*sic*].

Sincerely yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

[Enclosure]

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

WHEREAS on June 26, 1945, the President signed the Charter of the United Nations and on August 8, 1945, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, ratified the same; and

WHEREAS Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter provide that the United Nations shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity, privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly by a resolution adopted on February 13, 1946, approved and proposed for accession by each Member of the United Nations a Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations;

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized to accept on behalf of the Government of the United States the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, a copy of which is appended and made a part hereof, and to issue a proclamation setting forth that the aforesaid instrument is accepted by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with its law and shall have full force and effect in the United States and its territories and possessions, except that the United States reserves its position with respect to Section 18(c) regarding immunity from national service obligations in so far as that section may apply to United States nationals or persons who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States.

That in so far as any provisions of this Convention and the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669), as applied to the United Nations relate to the same matter, the two provisions shall wherever possible be treated as complementary to each other so that both provisions shall be applicable and neither shall narrow the effect

of the other; but in any case of absolute conflict, the provisions of the Convention shall prevail.

501.AC/5-747

*Paper Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs*¹

JUSTIFICATION FOR SUBMITTING GENERAL CONVENTION IN FORM OF
JOINT RESOLUTION

The document under consideration is supplementary to a previously existing treaty obligation, that is, the obligation which this Government undertook in Article 105 of the Charter. The General Convention is necessary to spell out the details of this undertaking. It is more appropriate to carry out the provisions of a treaty by a procedure in the nature of an agreement, rather than by another treaty. The situation is similar to that of the military agreements to be concluded under Article 43 of the Charter. The Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this matter in connection with the United Nations Participation Act (P.L. 565, 79th Cong.) states:

“During the debate in the Senate on the Charter last July, there was considerable discussion as to whether the military agreements should be considered as treaties or whether they might be approved by the Congress through the joint resolution procedure. The preponderant view was that the latter procedure was preferable since the agreements would be entered into for the purpose of giving effect to the obligation assumed by this country under article 43 of the Charter to make available to the Security Council the armed force necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Under this view, the precise details of the obligation—such as the exact amount of the forces to be contributed and the places where they are to be stationed—is not a matter for treaty consideration but for legislative sanction by the Congress under its constitutional powers to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.” (Sen. Rept. No. 717, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.)

As you know, the law was enacted authorizing the President to negotiate these agreements subject to the approval of Congress by appropriate act or Joint Resolution.

The present situation is similar in that the basic policy decision has already been made pursuant to the treaty process, and now that we come to the detailed provisions, they are, by their subject matter, appropriate for legislative action.

¹ Although this document was drafted by the Assistant Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs on March 5, it is included at this point because it describes the Department's reasoning in deciding to submit the General Convention in the form of a joint resolution. Presumably submitted for the information of Dean Rusk, who had just assumed direction of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

It is true that it has been the practice of this Government to regard conventions as synonymous with treaties, so far as procedural requirements are concerned. However we feel that this is not a legal requirement, and that the circumstances of the present instrument warrant a departure from this practice.

The arrangement here under discussion was negotiated in London under the name of a "Convention", which is the term used in Article 105, paragraph 3 of the Charter. The United States participated in the negotiations as one among fifty other States. Later on the Headquarters Agreement was negotiated between the United States and the United Nations, and this instrument was designated an "agreement" on the suggestion of the United States. This was because the contents of the agreement deal in general with matters which fall more particularly within the province of the Congress, under our Constitution, as distinguished from those which pertain to the President in the conduct of foreign relations. Upon consideration it appeared very clear that the same considerations apply to the General Convention. In general character the two documents are similar and treat of the same subject matter in some cases. If we had negotiated the instrument on a bilateral basis we would doubtless have tried to have it designated as an "agreement" for the purposes of our own constitutional practice. However it is difficult to press such a point in a large international gathering where the States all have their own constitutional problems, all of them different.

We do not think that the name which a document is given should govern its legal effect. It is the substance that counts. The substance of both these instruments concerns matters essentially within the competence of Congress, and we feel they should be treated alike, through joint action of both Houses.

So far as precedents are concerned, we find that the names by which documents are called are not necessarily controlling, even in our own domestic practice. For example, by Act of 1872 and again in 1934 the Congress authorized the Postmaster General, with the approval of the President, to conclude postal treaties or conventions. (17 Stat. 304 and 48 Stat. 943). Pursuant to this authorization the Postmaster General concluded in 1874 the Treaty concerning the formation of a General Postal Union, which is officially designated as a treaty in the *Statutes at Large*, volume 19, page 577. Similarly, in 1934 the Postmaster General concluded the Universal Postal Convention, pursuant to the legislation of the same year. (49 Stat. 2741). A number of other postal conventions have been concluded pursuant to the same legislation. (Cf. Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, 50 Stat. 1657; Parcel Post Conventions between the United States and France, 49 Stat. 3322; between the United States and Norway, 49 Stat. 3042.)

Another precedent having a very close similarity to the present case is that of the acceptance by this Government of membership in the International Labor Organization. This was done by the President on August 20, 1934 and proclaimed on September 10, 1934 pursuant to a Joint Resolution of Congress of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1182, 2712). The Constitution of the International Labor Organization is, of course, a part of a treaty, or a series of treaties, namely the Treaty of Versailles and the other peace treaties which followed World War I.

In all the above cases the instruments were designated as "treaties". The fact that the treaty procedure was not followed in our own domestic ratification process does not derogate from their status as fully binding international agreements, nor from the fact that the other parties probably regard them as treaties.

It should be noted that this is not the ratification process in the usual sense of the word. It is rather a simple act of acceptance of an instrument already approved by the General Assembly and opened for accession by the Member states. In this the situation resembles that of the International Labor Organization, which was also a simple acceptance, by authority of a joint resolution of a multilateral instrument designated as a treaty.

501.AC/5-2347 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Officers

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1947—11 : 30 a. m.

A United Nations press release of May 5, 1947, states that a United Nations *laissez-passer* will be issued to officials in the United Nations Secretariat, including Judges and members of the International Court of Justice, when they are journeying outside the continental limits of the United States and that it will serve as a valid travel document in Member States which are parties to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Special travel certificates will be given to experts who are travelling on United Nations business without being staff members.

The *laissez-passer* is described as being bound in blue leather, with the United Nations emblem embossed in gold on the cover showing the seal of the United Nations radiating light, and surrounded by a rainbow. The document contains 30 pages of a new prismatic, forgeproof paper, on the first page of which will be a photograph of the official to whom issued and will bear the United Nations seal; other pages will contain spaces for visas. The *laissez-passer* will be valid for a prescribed period, usually one year, and will be printed in the five official languages of the United Nations, English, French, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish. The authority for issuing the *laissez-passer* is found in

Article VII of the draft Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on February 13, 1946.

Section 24 of Article VII, of the Convention states:

“The United Nations may issue United Nations *laissez-passer* to its officials. These *laissez-passer* shall be recognized and accepted as valid travel documents, by the authorities of Members, taking into account the provisions of Section 25.”

The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was submitted by the Department on May 12, 1947 to the Congress for approval by joint resolution with the statement that the following interpretation would be given to Article VII, Section 24:

“This language (used in Section 24) does not authorize or require, and is not interpreted by the Department of State as authorizing or requiring, the United Nations or any member state to issue or accept a document which is a substitute for a passport or other documentation of nationality; it provides only for a certificate attesting to the United Nations affiliation of the bearer in respect to travel and will be accepted by the United States as such a document. Thus Article VII, if approved, will not amend or modify existing provisions of law with respect to the requirement or issuance of passports or of other documentation evidencing nationality of citizens or aliens.”

American diplomatic and consular officers, until notified to the contrary, will be guided by the statement last quoted and should not place any kind of non-immigrant visa in the spaces provided for visas printed in a *laissez-passer* issued by the United Nations.

MARSHALL

501.AC/6-1047

*Memorandum by the Acting Legislative Counsel for the Department of State*¹ (Sandifer) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1947.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

In the course of a conversation with Senator Vandenberg yesterday afternoon, I raised the question of the Foreign Relations Committee

¹ The position of Legislative Counsel for the Department of State was announced on February 4, 1947. The Department of State *Bulletin* stated that the Legislative Counsel “will provide legal guidance to various offices and divisions in the Department concerned with legislative action and will assist in the preparation of proposed legislation and coordinate its presentation to the Congress. His office will be responsible within the Department for the coordination of reports, comments, expressions of opinion, and communications to Congress concerning proposed legislation, treaties, and conventions.”

The office of the Legislative Counsel was attached to that of the Legal Adviser.

taking action on the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities before the end of this session. I remarked that it might be embarrassing for the United States Delegation to have to go to the General Assembly in September without this Convention having been accepted by the United States.

Senator Vandenberg reiterated his insistence on the reservation on the question of tax immunity and on exemptions from military service. I told him that I thought that the reservation on military service would not cause any particular difficulty, but that the reservation on tax immunity would raise a very serious problem. He said that he had not been convinced that there was any valid basis for according a favored position to American citizens employed by the United Nations.

It seems clear that he will insist on the reservations in the Committee. He suggested that we might get some other member of the Committee to present the State Department's position. He also suggested the possibility of having action on the Convention begin in the House since it is to be approved by Joint Resolution.

DURWARD V. SANDIFER

*Statement by the Secretary of State, June 26 1947, on the Occasion of the Signing of the Permanent Headquarters Agreement*¹

The second anniversary of the signing of the Charter of the United Nations at San Francisco is a fitting occasion for the signature of this agreement defining the arrangements for the establishment of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations.

The United States is conscious of the honor which has been bestowed upon it by the selection of a site for the headquarters in this country. It is also conscious of its obligations as the host of the United Nations to make arrangements which will be satisfactory in every way so that the United Nations may carry on its great work under auspicious conditions.

¹ Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, July 6, 1947. Secretary Marshall made a trip to Lake Success, N.Y., temporary headquarters of the United Nations, for the express purpose of the signing. For text of the agreement, released to the press on the same date, see *ibid.*

The principal issues to be resolved in the last stage of the negotiation, April-June, related to the application of United States immigration and deportation laws to personnel of the United Nations and national delegations to the United Nations and their staffs, and to the privilege of diplomatic residence in the United States (sections 11-15). The final text embodied a precision as to the rights and obligations of both the United States and the United Nations not reflected in earlier drafts.

A useful short summary of the history of the negotiation and the issues involved from the United Nations point of view is contained in the relevant report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the General Assembly in U.N. Doc. A/371, September 3, 1947, found in depository libraries of the United Nations and in L/UNA Files, Department of State.

It is not merely the Federal Government which is in the position of host to the United Nations. The State and City of New York share this honor with all our people. Representatives of the State and City participated in negotiation of this agreement, and the Legislature of the State has enacted enabling legislation. Before the agreement comes into effect it will, of course, be submitted to the Congress of the United States and to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In this, as in other matters, it will continue to be the central purpose of the United States foreign policy to advance and strengthen the United Nations, so that we may, in the words of the Charter, "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."

501.AD/6-3047

*The Secretary of State to President Truman*¹

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1947.

THE PRESIDENT: There is enclosed for your consideration and for transmission to the Congress, if you approve, an Agreement between the United States and the United Nations regarding the control and administration of the Headquarters of the United Nations in The City of New York.²

This Agreement has been signed on behalf of the United States by the Secretary of State and on behalf of the United Nations by the Secretary-General. By its terms, it is to be brought into effect by an exchange of notes duly authorized pursuant to appropriate action by the Congress of the United States and by the General Assembly of the United Nations which is to convene in September.

[Here follows a short summary of relevant events that took place between January 1946 and the conclusion of the agreement.]

I desire at this time, to invite your attention to certain provisions of the Agreement.

Article III, which concerns law and authority in the headquarters district, is the result of a careful attempt to grant to the United Nations the freedom from certain types of regulation which is necessary to assure that the Organization may exercise its functions and fulfill its purposes without restraint, and in all other respects to preserve the normal operation of federal, state and local law.

Section 7 states that the federal, state and local law of the United States is generally applicable within the headquarters district and that

¹ This message was transmitted to the Congress by President Truman under cover of a letter dated July 2; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1947, p. 78.

² See footnote 1, p. 42.

federal, state and local courts have jurisdiction over acts done and transactions taking place in the headquarters district. The United Nations is given authority by Section 8 to make regulations within the headquarters district for the purpose of establishing conditions therein necessary for the fulfillment of its functions. Federal, state or local laws which are inconsistent with such regulations shall be inapplicable to the extent of such inconsistency. However, any question which the American authorities may have as to whether such regulations go beyond the necessities of the United Nations, and which cannot be settled by agreement, may be resolved by arbitration or by reference to the International Court of Justice.

The headquarters district, which consists of an area of six city blocks, is to be inviolable as provided in Section 9(a). This means that federal, state or local officers shall not enter the district to perform official functions therein except with the consent of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This inviolability is similar to that which is extended to diplomatic missions in Washington. It does not transfer sovereignty over United States territory to the United Nations.

Section 9(b) makes it clear that the headquarters district is not to become a refuge for persons avoiding arrest.

It is necessary for the United Nations to be assured that persons having legitimate business with the Organization can have access to the headquarters district. Thus, Section 11 provides that the federal, state or local authorities are not to impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district by certain limited categories of persons set forth in that Section.

Section 13(b), however, makes it clear that persons who abuse these privileges may be deported either in accordance with the deportation laws of the United States (subject to the approval of the Secretary of State) or may be required to leave the United States in accordance with the customary procedure applicable to diplomatic envoys accredited to the United States. Section 13(b) makes it clear that the United States may issue limited visas valid only for the area comprising the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity.

Other provisions of the Agreement concern such matters as telecommunications facilities (Section 4), police protection (Article VI), diplomatic privileges and immunities for a limited group of representatives of foreign governments (Section 15), the settlement of disputes arising under the Agreement (Section 21) and the disposition of the headquarters if it should cease to be used for the headquarters of the United Nations (Section 22).

In most cases the obligations assumed by the United States under the Agreement are made the responsibility of the "appropriate American authorities" who are defined in Section 1(b) as "such federal,

state or local authorities in the United States as may be appropriate in the context and in accordance with the laws and customs of the United States, including the laws and customs of the state and local government involved." Section 25, however, makes it clear that the ultimate responsibility for compliance with the Agreement on the part of the United States rests with the Federal Government.

The Agreement provides, in Section 20, for such supplemental agreements with the appropriate American authorities as may be necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Agreement. Thus, detailed arrangements with respect to police and fire protection and similar matters may be made directly with the local authorities. I suggest that the joint resolution authorizing the President to make the Agreement effective, include authorization to the local authorities to enter into such supplemental agreements subject, except in emergency or in case of routine matters, to the approval of the Secretary of State.

This Government has taken a leading role in the creation of the United Nations. The enclosed Agreement will make clear to the United Nations that the United States is prepared to discharge fully its responsibilities as the host of the organization on which rest the hopes of the world for lasting peace.

Respectfully submitted,

G. C. MARSHALL

Editorial Note

A draft joint resolution prepared by the Department of State to authorize the President to bring the headquarters agreement into effect was introduced in the Senate by Senators Ives and Wagner, of New York. The Senate added one amendment as follows (the bracketed portions being House amendments to the Senate revision) :

"Sec. 6. Nothing in the agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right of the United States [to safeguard its own security and] completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity [, as to be defined and fixed in a supplementary agreement between the Government of the United States and the United Nations in pursuance of section 13(3) (e) (*sic*) of the agreement,] and such areas as it is reasonably necessary to traverse in transit between the same and foreign countries. Moreover, nothing in section 14 of the agreement with respect to facilitating entrance into the United States by persons who wish to visit the headquarters district and do not enjoy the right of entry provided in section 11 of the agreement shall be construed to amend or suspend in any way the immigration laws of the United States or to commit the United States in any way to effect any amendment or suspension of such laws."

The legislative background of the amendment in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was described in Senate Report No. 559 in a section entitled "Principal Issues Considered by the Committee in Connection with the Headquarters Agreement":

"It is clear that the United States cannot tell the other member nations who should or who should not represent them at the seat of the United Nations and cannot claim any right of veto over the Secretary-General's appointment of personnel to the staff of the United Nations. In general, the United States, as host country, must permit access to the headquarters on the part of all persons who have legitimate business with the Organization. This involves inevitably the admission of a number of aliens, some of whom would not normally be admissible under immigration laws of the United States.

"The principal problem considered by the committee was how this right of access to the headquarters could be granted in a manner which would not prejudice the security of the United States against infiltration on the part of subversive alien elements.

"The agreement, in sections 11 and 13, grants the right of entry of representatives of members, officials of the United Nations, and other persons having business with the United Nations. Two important protections are, however, provided in section 13: (1) The United States may require such persons to have visas and may limit the visas which it issues so as to be valid only for transit to the headquarters district and sojourn in its immediate vicinity; (2) in case any such persons abuse their privileges in activities outside their official capacity, they become subject to deportation. In order to be sure that this remedy will be applied in a fair manner, it is provided that deportation proceedings are to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, that full hearings must be granted to the interested parties, and that the limited class of persons enjoying diplomatic status may be required to leave only in accordance with diplomatic procedure.

"It is the opinion of the committee that these provisions adequately protect the security of the United States and that the United Nations could not be expected to maintain its headquarters in this country if the United States were to impose restrictions upon access to the headquarters district which would interfere with the proper functioning of the Organization.

"In order to remove any doubt as to the meaning of these provisions, the committee adopted an amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 144 making it clear that there is no amendment, or obligation to amend, the immigration laws in any way except to give effect to the rights referred to above."

Senate Joint Resolution 144 was approved by President Truman on August 4 as Public Law 357; for text of the joint resolution and text of the headquarters agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1676, or 61 Stat. 756. Relevant Congressional documentation, 80th Congress, 1st session, includes Senate Report No. 522, Senate Report No. 559, House Document No. 376, and House Report No. 1093.

501.AD/8-447

The Legal Adviser (Fahy) to the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs (Kerno)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1947.

MY DEAR DR. KERNO: As you no doubt have learned, the Congress approved during the last hours of its recent session a joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States to bring into effect on the part of the United States the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States concerning the headquarters.¹ I enclose a copy of the S.J. Res. 144 in the form in which it was enacted.² The resolution has not as yet been signed by the President but I anticipate he will sign it within the next few days.³

The General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which we submitted to the Congress with the request that it authorize this Government to accede to the Convention, received favorable consideration in the Senate but was not acted upon in the House of Representatives.⁴ In view of the action of the Senate and of the consideration already given by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, I believe we may expect final favorable consideration when the present Congress reconvenes in January 1948.

I am enclosing a copy of S.J. Res. 136, the legislation which would authorize this Government to accede to the General Convention, and a copy of the Senate Committee Report⁵ which covers both S.J. Res. 136 and S.J. Res. 144. You will observe that the Senate felt that this Government should reserve its position with respect to those sections of the General Convention concerning the immunity of American nationals from national service and the exemption of American nationals from income taxes.⁶

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES FAHY

¹ In a letter from the Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Martin) on July 24, not printed, the Department had urged upon the Speaker its views as to the importance of getting S.J. Res. 144 passed by the then-expiring session of Congress. The Secretary wrote: "It is desirable from the standpoint of the United States as well as the United Nations that the arrangements for the permanent location of the United Nations in the United States be established. Otherwise there will continue doubt, detrimental both to us and to the United Nations, as to the status of the headquarters and the position of ourselves as host nation. Plans cannot be brought to fruition regarding the headquarters until these matters are settled. This is not merely a question of physical facilities but the even more important matter of status and stability in other respects." (501.AD/7-2447)

² Enclosure 2, not printed.

³ The President did in fact sign the bill on the same day, August 4.

⁴ In his letter of July 24 to the Speaker, the Secretary of State had also urged enactment of S.J. Res. 136, a companion measure to the headquarters agreement, which would approve the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (501.AD/7-2447).

⁵ Enclosure 3, Senate Report No. 559, 80th Cong., 1st sess.

⁶ See the Legal Adviser's letter of September 11 to Dr. Kerno, p. 53.

[Enclosure 1]

S.J. RES. 136—80TH CONGRESS⁷

Resolved, etc., That the President is hereby authorized to accept on behalf of the Government of the United States the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, a copy of which is appended and made a part hereof, and to issue a proclamation setting forth that the aforesaid instrument is accepted by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with its law and shall have full force and effect in the United States and its Territories and possessions, except that the United States reserves its position with respect to section 18(b) regarding exemption from taxation on salaries and emoluments paid by the United Nations insofar as that section may apply to United States nationals, and with respect to section 18(c) regarding immunity from national service obligations insofar as that section may apply to the United States nationals or persons who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States.

That, insofar as any provisions of this Convention and the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669), as applied to the United Nations relate to the same matter, the two provisions shall wherever possible be treated as complementary to each other so that both provisions shall be applicable and neither shall narrow the effect of the other; but in any case of absolute conflict, the provisions of the Convention shall prevail. Nothing in article VII of the said Convention with respect to *laissez-passer* shall be construed as in any way amending or modifying the existing or future provisions of United States law with respect to the requirement or issuance of passports or of other documents evidencing nationality of citizens or agents, or the requirement that aliens visiting the United States obtain visas.

⁷ This extract from S.J. Res. 136 is the authorizing portion of the proposed resolution.

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19230¹

*Memorandum by Mr. Carl M. Marcy of the Office of the
Legislative Counsel*²

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1947.

COMMENT PAPER

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES
REGARDING THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS: REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE PROBLEM

The Secretary-General under instructions from the General Assem-

¹ Folder "Committee 6, Privileges and Immunities of Member States and Staffs".

The IO documentation located in Lot 71-D 440 was retired to the central files from the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs ("the IO Files") in 1971.

² This was a briefing paper prepared for the information of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly for use at the General Assembly session that was to convene at New York in September. Mr. Marcy was subsequently attached to the Advisory Staff of the Delegation.

bly (Document A/271, 13 December 1946) was authorized "to negotiate and conclude with the appropriate" American authorities "an agreement concerning the arrangements required as a result of the establishment of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations in the City of New York". In these negotiations he was to be guided by the provisions of the draft Agreement set forth in Document A/271. These negotiations have now been completed and the United States Congress has authorized the President to bring the Agreement into effect on the part of the United States in accordance with its terms. (See attachment, S.J. Res. 144.)³ Since the report of the Secretary-General on the negotiations with the United States and upon the resolution as passed by the Congress is not yet available, a definitive recommendation as to the position which the United States Delegation should take with respect to the report cannot be made. It is expected, however, that the Secretary-General will recommend that the General Assembly accept the Headquarters Agreement.

Pending the coming into force of the Agreement, the Secretary-General was authorized by the Assembly to conclude arrangements with the United States to determine on a provisional basis the privileges, immunities and facilities needed in connection with the temporary headquarters of the United Nations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) It is recommended that the United States Delegation take the position that the Agreement, as approved by the United States Congress, should be accepted by the General Assembly without change.

(2) If the question arises as to whether the United States is ready to extend privileges and immunities to the United Nations at its temporary headquarters, it is recommended that the United States Delegation state that it is ready to make arrangements to extend such privileges and immunities as may be appropriate.

DISCUSSION

The Agreement as signed on June 26 by the Secretary of State and the Secretary-General provides in Section 28 that it is to be brought into effect by an exchange of notes authorized respectively by the United States Congress and the General Assembly. The attached resolution (S.J. Res. 144) constitutes such authorization for the President of the United States. The General Assembly must give similar authority to the Secretary-General.

³ Not printed.

The attached resolution contains in addition to the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States several provisions which are necessary in order to enable the United States Government to give effect to the Agreement (see Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5). It also contains in Section 6 a provision which may be construed as a limitation upon the Agreement as negotiated by representatives of the United States and the United Nations and as signed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary-General on June 26, 1947. Section 6 provides that nothing in the Agreement is to weaken the right of the United States to safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than the Headquarters District and its immediate vicinity. It also provides that Section 14 of the Agreement is not to be construed as amending in any way the immigration laws of the United States. Section 6 was added by the Congress. Its addition was necessary in order to assure the support of certain Congressmen who were fearful that the Headquarters Agreement might be used as a device for evading United States immigration laws or endangering our national security. It is possible that some Members of the United Nations may object strongly to this provision and it may be necessary for the United States Delegation to defend it.

In this connection it may be recalled that Section 24 of the draft Convention on the Headquarters submitted by the General Assembly contained a provision which stated that Article IV, concerning communications and transit to and from the zone, "shall not prevent the Government of the United States of America from taking precautions in the interests of national security, providing that such precautions shall not have the effect of interfering with the rights preferred to in Sections 19 (free access to the zone), 20 (transit of representatives of Members to the zone), and 21 (transit of press representatives to and from the zone)".

Attention is invited to Section 5 of S.J. Res. 144 which authorizes the President to make effective with respect to the temporary headquarters, on a provisional basis, such of the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement as he may deem appropriate.

THE GENERAL CONVENTION ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was submitted to the Congress with the request that the President be authorized to deposit the United States accession to the Convention.

The Senate in S.J. Res. 136 (copy attached)⁴ authorized the President to accede to the Convention on behalf of the United States subject to the reservations contained in Section 1 of the Senate resolution concerning tax exemptions on the salaries of American nationals employed by the United Nations and regarding immunity from national service obligations. Hearings on the resolution were held before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. That Committee indicated that it would insist on the same reservations as the Senate with respect to taxation and immunity from national service obligations. The adjournment of this session of the Congress prevented final consideration being given to the resolution concerning the General Convention. It is believed, however, that final favorable consideration may be expected when the Congress reconvenes in January 1948.

⁴ Attachment not printed, but see text on p. 48.

*The United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
(Kerno) to the Legal Adviser (Gross)*¹

LAKE SUCCESS, 27 August 1947.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the letter sent to me by your predecessor, Mr. Charles Fahy, on 4 August 1947, with reference to the action taken by the Congress during its last session with respect to the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States concerning the headquarters of the United Nations, and the General Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations.

I have also received a copy of Public Law 357, authorizing the President of the United States to give effect to the Agreement concerning the headquarters of the United Nations.

The Secretary-General will report to the General Assembly on the action taken by the United States authorities on the headquarters Agreement, and will inform the Assembly that, in view of the action of the Senate and of the consideration already given by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, it may be expected

¹ Dr. Kerno's letter not found in Department of States files; this text is from annex IV of U.N. Doc. A/371. Ernest A. Gross became Legal Adviser of the Department on August 15.

that final favourable consideration will be given to the General Convention when the present Congress re-convenes in January 1948.

I have noted that in respect of the General Convention, the Senate, after consideration of its text, has directed that the United States reserve its position with respect to Section 18(b), regarding exemption from taxation on salaries and emoluments paid by the United Nations in so far as that section may [be?] applied to United States nationals, and with respect to Section 18(c), regarding immunity from national service obligations in so far as that section may apply to United States nationals or persons who have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States. These reservations are evidently of considerable importance and, if maintained, would have very serious effects in particular on the status of United Nations officials and on the financial position of the Organization.

My special attention was also drawn to that part of the Senate resolution which deals with Article VII of the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations with respect to the *Laissez-passer*. If Article VII of the Convention were to be interpreted in a restrictive manner so as to oblige a United Nations official coming or returning to the United States to be in possession of his natural passport, the significance of the *Laissez-passer* as an international document would naturally be reduced to a simple identification card and not the valid travel document as defined in Section 24 and in the discussions which have taken place on that subject in the General Assembly.

No reservations or restrictive interpretations have been signified to the Secretary-General by any of the Members who up to now have acceded to the Convention and in fact the *Laissez-passer* has already been utilized by various members of the Secretariat during their travels for the Organization, National visas have been affixed, in several instances to the *Laissez-passer* and the document has been accepted and recognized by the authorities of several States.

In view of the fact that the Headquarters of the United Nations is established in the United States and that practically all of the United Nations officials return to the United States after their trips, an interpretation by the United States of Article VII of the Convention different from that given to it by the States who have acceded so far to the Convention would affect to the greatest extent the significance and the usefulness of the *Laissez-passer*.

You will undoubtedly recognize the importance of this problem. Would, therefore, the United States consider it desirable to have conversations on this or on the other subjects relating to the General Convention with the Secretariat before the next session of the General Assembly? I would be very glad to appoint representatives for this purpose.

DR. IVAN KERNO

501.AD/8-2747

The Legal Adviser (Gross) to the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs (Kerno)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1947.

MY DEAR DR. KERNO: I refer to your letter of August 27, 1947, concerning action taken by the United States Congress during its past session on the Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States and on the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

I have noted your comment that the reservations, which the United States Senate has suggested with reference to Sections 18(b) and 18(c) of the General Convention, would have very serious effects on the status of United Nations officials and on the financial position of the Organization. The position of the United States on these two provisions has always been clear. The United States Delegation at the first part of the first session of the General Assembly in London indicated, when the General Convention was under consideration, that the question of whether immunity from national taxation and national service could be extended to American nationals employed by the United Nations was a question which was for the determination of the United States Congress. The Congress has not completed action on the Convention as yet but I have no reason to believe that the House of Representatives will reach a different conclusion in this regard than the Senate.

The question of the meaning of Article VII of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which concerns the issuance of *laissez passer*, is troublesome. I feel that the wording of that Article is not clear and have noted that at one stage in the drafting of the General Convention the word "passport" was used but that in the final draft the phrase *laissez passer* is used.

I appreciate the difficulties which may be caused by any confusion in the meaning of this provision and suggest that this matter be discussed with our Delegation when it is in New York for the General Assembly.

In connection with the questions which you have raised, I think you may be interested in the following excerpt from the Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on this subject:

"The main issue raised in the committee hearings with respect to the general convention on privileges and immunities centered about section 18(b) which provides that officials of the United Nations shall be immune from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the United Nations. The committee recognizes that certain inequal-

ities in the salary scales within the United Nations would inevitably result if the nationals of different states employed as members of the Secretariat are subjected to widely divergent rates of taxation by their own governments. This might lead to difficult problems of morale within the Secretariat. On the other hand, the committee considered it undesirable to create within the United States a group of nationals not subject to the normal responsibilities of citizenship. Even though American members of the Secretariat have obligations to the United Nations, they still retain their citizenship and they derive many benefits from the United States. As such, the committee members believe they should be called upon to contribute in the form of taxes to the work of our Government as other American citizens.

"While the committee agreed that there could be no objection to any arrangement which might be made within the United Nations Secretariat to equalize the tax burden imposed upon staff members, it was believed that the United States should reserve its position with respect to section 18(b) relating to tax immunity. The committee recommends that the terms of the resolution be revised accordingly.

"Still another issue related to article VII of the convention authorizing the United Nations to issue *laissez-passer* to its officials. Section 24 of article VII provides 'these *laissez-passer* shall be recognized and accepted as valid travel documents by the authorities of members, taking into account the provisions of section 25.'

"The committee was assured that this language does not authorize or require the United Nations or any member state to issue or accept a document which is a substitute for a passport or other documentation of nationality. It provides only for a certificate attesting to the United Nations affiliation of the bearer in respect to travel and will be accepted by the United States as such a document. Article VII, in other words, would not amend or modify existing provisions of law with respect to the requirement or issuance of passports or of other documents evidencing nationality of citizens or aliens. To make this point perfectly clear, the committee approved a second amendment to the resolution, which is quoted in a later section of this report."

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST A. GROSS

501AD/8-2747

The Legal Adviser (Gross) to the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs (Kerno)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1947.

MY DEAR DR. KERNO: I have received your letter of August 27, 1947, referring to the Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States and suggesting that certain provisions of that Agreement might be brought into effect with respect to the temporary headquarters of the United Nations.

Your refer in this connection to the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 which authorized the Secretary-General "to

negotiate and conclude arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the United States of America to determine on a provisional basis the privileges, immunities and facilities needed in connexion with the permanent headquarters of the United Nations". I assume that although the words "permanent headquarters" are used in this resolution that in fact the resolution should have referred to the "temporary" headquarters.

Although at one time it was our feeling in the Department of State that certain provisions of the Headquarters Agreement could be brought into effect at the temporary headquarters by the issuance of an executive order without the support of other documents, I have some doubt as to whether an executive order should be issued until there has been an exchange of notes between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary of State which would specify the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement that would be applicable as between the United Nations and the United States. This seems important because if the United States is asked to extend to the United Nations at its temporary headquarters the provisions of Article III concerning the inviolability of the Headquarters area, for example, the United Nations should, on its part, agree to "prevent the (temporary) headquarters district from becoming a refuge" as provided in Section 9(b) of the Headquarters Agreement.

I think that you will agree that this is a matter which can be worked out quickly between representatives of this Government and the United Nations.

As you know, Mr. Fahy, my predecessor as Legal Adviser, will be one of the United States Delegates to the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly. He has agreed to act as the Department's representative in arranging for an exchange of notes which might serve as a basis for this Government to bring into effect certain provisions of the Headquarters Agreement at the temporary headquarters.

I do not know whether you will wish to undertake such negotiations prior to the consideration by the General Assembly of the Headquarters Agreement. My own feeling is that if we were to conclude such negotiations prior to Assembly consideration of the Agreement we might to some extent prejudice consideration of the Agreement by the Assembly. My own inclination would be to postpone the negotiations until after the General Assembly has considered the Headquarters Agreement. This is a matter which you may wish to discuss with Mr. Fahy.

I hope that it will be possible for me sometime during the sessions of the Assembly to come to New York and make your acquaintance.

Sincerely yours,

ERNEST A. GROSS

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19230 ¹

*Memorandum by Mr. Carl M. Marcy of the United States Delegation
Staff of Advisers to the Principal Executive Officer of the Delegation (Sandifer)*

[NEW YORK,] September 12, 1947.

Subject: Headquarters Agreement and Privileges and Immunities

Mr. Fahy and I discussed this morning the advisability of having our political officers informed as soon as possible that we want the Headquarters Agreement approved by the General Assembly without change. As you know, the Agreement has been approved by the Congress and it would be most unfortunate if it were necessary for us to go back to Congress next year with a different agreement. Political officers should be informed that the privileges and immunities granted to the United Nations in the Headquarters Agreement are most certainly broader than those which would be acceptable to our Congress next year.

¹ Folder "Committee 6, Privileges and Immunities of Member States and Staff".

501.AC/9-2247

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles Fahy of the United States Delegation
to the Legal Adviser (Gross)*

[WASHINGTON, ?] September 22, 1947.

Subject: Implementation of Headquarters Agreement

I refer to your letter dated September 11, 1947 to Dr. Kerno ¹ in which you stated that I would act as the Department's representative "in arranging for an exchange of notes which might serve as a basis for this Government to bring into effect certain provisions of the Headquarters Agreement at the temporary headquarters".

Do you also want me to act in drafting an exchange of notes which would bring the Headquarters Agreement itself into effect?

As you know, Section 28 of the Headquarters Agreement (copy attached) ² provides that it is to be brought into effect by an exchange of notes between the appropriate United States and United Nations authorities. That exchange of notes could take place as soon as the General Assembly has approved the Headquarters Agreement and indeed it would be helpful if we could so indicate during discussion of the Headquarters Agreement.

In connection with possible negotiations as to the matters to be covered in such an exchange of notes, which will of course be cleared

¹ *Ante*, p. 54.

² Not printed.

with the Department in draft form, I would like to receive the Department's views on the application of Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement.

It would probably be appropriate in the exchange of notes to define by class or number those members of the staffs of permanent resident representatives who are to "be entitled in the territory of the United States to the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it [the United States] ³ accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it".

As you will recall, Section 15 reads in part that the privileges and immunities referred to above are to be given to "such resident members of their [the principal resident representative's] staffs as may be agreed upon between the Secretary-General, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Member concerned".

The following alternatives seem open :

(1) We could refuse to negotiate now, pointing out that we must negotiate separate agreements with each Member state. This would be stalling.

(2) We could agree to extend diplomatic status to all officers of Missions as listed in the attached United Nations booklet. This would give the same status to Missions to the United Nations as we now give to Missions accredited to this Government.

(3) We could seek a compromise between the preceding extreme positions and determine the persons to receive diplomatic status either upon a numerical ground or upon the basis of rank, or upon a combination of number and rank.

As a basis of negotiations, it is suggested that I be authorized to proceed upon the basis of alternative (3) above. If so authorized, an arrangement somewhat as follows might be made and I would appreciate your comments thereon :

"In order to implement Section 15, paragraph two of the Headquarters Agreement, the United States Government, without prejudicing its freedom in the future to withdraw the privileges and immunities herein granted and to condition the grant of the privileges and immunities referred to in Section 15 upon agreement between the Secretary General, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Member concerned as provided in that Section, will extend to resident members of the staffs of principal resident representatives to the United Nations, if they have at least the rank of a Second Secretary of Legation, or its equivalent, the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it [the United States] accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it, *Provided, however,*

(1) That Member states which have seats upon the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship

³ Brackets in this document appear in the source text.

Council shall not have more than *fifteen persons* on their staffs entitled to the privileges and immunities specified in the aforementioned Section 15;

(2) That Member states which have seats on not more than two of the above listed Councils shall not have more than *ten persons* on their staffs entitled to the aforementioned status; and

(3) That Member states which do not have a seat upon any council shall have not more than *five persons* on their staffs entitled to the aforementioned status.

The United Nations agrees that it will, in consultation with the United States, make arrangements for keeping the United States currently informed of the names of the individuals entitled to such status."

It would be most helpful if I could have the Department's comments within the near future, since we are under considerable pressure from other delegations in this regard.

L/UNA Files

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to Mr. Charles Fahy of the United States Delegation*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, October 6, 1947.]

As suggested in the second paragraph of your memorandum,² I would appreciate it very much if you would draft the exchange of notes to bring the Headquarters Agreement itself into effect as well as the exchange of notes which would make it applicable to the temporary headquarters.

As regards the implementation of Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement, with respect to the temporary headquarters, I would like to suggest the following:

(a) I assume you will consider the desirability of consulting the representatives of the City and State of New York who were concerned with the negotiation of the Agreement as well as the local officials at Lake Success.

(b) As regards the three alternatives which you mention for determining who is to receive full diplomatic status:

(1) I agree that the first alternative—insisting on separate agreements with each of the delegation[s]—is undesirable with respect to the provisional arrangements applicable to the temporary headquarters.

(2) Your second alternative—inclusion of all officers of missions—would seem too generous, at least for the start of negotiations, although I would see no serious objection to receding to it if, in your judgment, this seems desirable in the course of negotiations. It is my understanding that this would not place missions to the United Nations on the

¹ This text is based on a draft which, although dated September 29, apparently incorporated revisions in drafting effected during October 1-6.

² Mr. Fahy's memorandum of September 22 is printed *supra*.

same footing as missions to the United States, since diplomatic status for the latter includes clerical and other personnel as well as "officers".

(3) I agree that a position between the extremes of the first and second alternatives is the best to take at the outset, but I would suggest that you consider modifying your third alternative so as to base it purely on rank rather than on a combination of rank and number. It seems to me that the imposition of maximum numerical limitations has the following disadvantages:

(i) It would be difficult to agree on any numerical limitations that will not seem arbitrary and unsatisfactory as applied to individual delegations, unless they are so generous as to be almost meaningless. In this connection I note that the numerical limits suggested in your draft would not seem to exclude any of the officers listed in the first part of the delegation list attached to your memorandum except in the cases of Argentina, China and the Philippine Republic, plus the members of the Military Staff Committee if military staffs are not to be separately provided for.

(ii) The limits might be deemed inequitable as regards the five delegations having representatives on the MSC unless separate provision is made for them.

(iii) Objections might also be made by members represented on the Atomic Energy Commission and the Conventional Armaments Commission who do not get any greater allowance than those who are represented only on the ECOSOC or the Trusteeship Council.

(iv) Difficulties of interpretation may apply in the case of those who have diplomatic status independently by reason of being also attached to embassies in Washington.

(v) Embarrassing situations may develop where a member ceases to be represented on one of the Councils but does not wish to make a corresponding reduction in force.

Incidentally, I am advised that much of the pressure for full diplomatic privileges has been manifested at meetings of the Secretaries General of the delegations. For this reason, it might be expedient to make sure that whatever definition is adopted would include them. The Protocol Division has some question about the term "Second Secretary of Legation or its equivalent". It is suggested that in lieu of the language "of the staffs of principal resident representatives to the United Nations, if they have at least the rank of a Second Secretary of Legation, or its equivalent" the following language might be used "of the staffs of principal resident representatives to the United Nations holding positions of trust and responsibility as officers of their respective governments".

It is further suggested that after the words the following language be included in the Agreement as a protection to the United States:

"The Government of the United States reserves the right to decline to extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to any individual who does not, in its opinion, meet with the foregoing qualifications".

(c) I would also suggest revising the clause beginning "without prejudicing its freedom" to read somewhat as follows:

“ . . . on a provisional basis and without prejudicing the rights of the United States, or of any member of the United Nations, in respect of the negotiation of definitive agreements between the Secretary General, the Government of the United States and the governments of such members, as contemplated under Section 15(2) of the Headquarters Agreement”.³

The purpose of this change is to make clear that the Secretary General, in agreeing to the proposed classification, would not be prejudicing the rights of the members to claim a broader classification when the tripartite agreements contemplated by Section 15 are negotiated and thus to relieve him of the necessity of getting the individual concurrences of the affected members. There is some question in my mind whether under the terms of the Agreement it would be possible for the Secretary General and the United States to dispose of the question alone. As far as any unilateral right of the United States to withdraw the privileges is concerned, I should think this would be adequately covered by the words “subject to corresponding conditions and obligations” in Section 15 and by the deportation provisions of Section 13(b).

You may also wish to consider clarifying the language with respect to:

(1) *Status of families and domestic servants.* Mr. Stokes says that, according to his recollection, the minutes of the negotiations which he believes Mr. Marcy has with him in New York will show that it was contemplated that families should be included and that domestic servants were either to be excluded or their status was left in doubt.

(2) *Status of the United States Mission.* I assume that we do not want diplomatic privileges for the members of our mission. This raises the question whether they should be expressly excluded in the Agreement or whether the United States should merely file with the SYG a general waiver of immunity as applied to members of the United States Mission. I would be glad to leave this to your discretion.

I attach, for your consideration, a redraft embodying the suggestions made in this memorandum.

[Attachment]

DRAFT

In order to implement Section 15(2) of the Headquarters Agreement, the United States Government, on a provisional basis and without prejudicing the rights of the United States, or of any member of the United Nations, in respect of the negotiation of definitive agreements between the Secretary General, the Government of the United States and the governments of such members, as contemplated under Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement, will extend to resident

³ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

members of the staffs of principal resident representatives to the United Nations holding positions of trust and responsibility as officers of their respective governments, the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as it [the United States] accords to diplomatic envoys accredited to it.

The United Nations agrees that it will, in consultation with the United States, make arrangements for keeping the United States currently informed of the names of the individuals entitled to such status.

The Government of the United States reserves the right to decline to extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to any individual who does not, in its opinion, meet with the foregoing qualifications.

501.BB/10-1447 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State at the United Nations to the Acting
Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED
URGENT

[NEW YORK,] October 14, 1947—7: 17 p. m.

Delga 32. From Sandifer to Rusk for Barron.¹ Re telephone conversation between Bevans² and Marcy. Draft Legal Committee Report to GA on Headquarters Agreement³ contains paragraph reading as follows:

“With regard to Section 28, it was agreed that the notes exchanged for the purposes of bringing the Headquarters Agreement into force should be limited to effecting this purpose and should not contain any other matter having any effect by way of interpretation or otherwise on the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement”.

Draft note from Austin to Lie would contain language as follows: “Pursuant to instructions from my government and in accordance with authority granted by Congress, I wish to propose . . .” that the Agreement come into effect.

¹ Dean Rusk was Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, the Department of State office charged with responsibility for United Nations affairs. Bryton Barron was Assistant for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, and Chief of the Treaty Branch.

² Charles I. Bevans was Assistant Chief of the Treaty Branch, Office of the Legal Adviser.

³ On October 3, Subcommittee 1 of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, having before it the Secretary-General's report of the headquarters agreement negotiation printed in U.N. Doc. A/371, began considering the question of whether the General Assembly should authorize the Secretary-General to exchange notes with the United States Government in order to try to bring the agreement into force. Following introductory remarks by Dr. Kernö, the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, and Charles Fahy, United States member on the Sixth Committee (Mr. Fahy had been appointed an alternate representative of the United States to the Second Session of the General Assembly), in which they outlined the history of the headquarters agreement, the subcommittee made the decision to consider the agreement on an article-by-article basis.

Language referred to above grew out of discussions as to whether reference should be made to Section 6 of Public Law 357.⁴ The Report referred to above also contains language reading as follows:

"Copies of Public Law 357 passed by the US Congress have been transmitted semi-officially by the Legal Adviser of the State Dept to the Assistant SYG, the Assistant SYG placed copies thereof at the disposal of the Subcommittee. While approving this action by the Secretariat, the Subcommittee were, however, of the opinion that it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the UN to take official cognizance of this resolution of Congress on the ground that the Agreement alone contained the obligations between the parties and that the actual contents of the resolution of Congress was a domestic matter for the US."

USDel would appreciate your comments on suitability of above language, bearing in mind whether Section 6 does in fact place a restriction upon the Headquarters Agreement and the undesirability of raising this question again with the Legal Committee if it can be avoided. [Sandifer.]

MARSHALL

⁴ For text of section 6, see p. 45.

501.BB/10-1547: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 15, 1947—10:51 p. m.

PRIORITY

Delga 34. From Sandifer to Rusk for Barron. Reference to Delga 32, October 14. After lengthy and heated discussion in Subcommittee 1 of Sixth Committee of matters referred to in Delga 32, October 14, and matters discussed by Bevans and Marcy in telephone conversation of October 15, subcommittee agreed to include in its report only the following language:

"In submitting the text of the Headquarters Agreement the Secretary General also submitted a covering report (A/371) which, amongst other things, showed that the Congress of the United States had taken the action necessary to authorize the Secretary of State to bring the Agreement into force. The subcommittee confined its study to the text of the Agreement, etc."

A separate paragraph of the report will read as follows:

"With regard to Section 28 of the Headquarters Agreement, the subcommittee was of the opinion that the notes exchanged for the purposes of bringing the Headquarters Agreement into force should be limited to effecting this purpose and should not contain any other matter having any effect by way of interpretation or otherwise on the provision of the Headquarters Agreement."

It was the sense of the Committee, however, that these notes might properly refer to the act of the appropriate United States official "being duly authorized by act of the United States Congress".

USDel hopes Dept will find this language acceptable. It was accepted only after long and at times acrimonious debate and in our opinion represents the best language we are likely to get without serious difficulties being encountered. We feel that the language agreed upon probably leaves open the question of the effect to be given to Section 6 of Public Law 357 if a dispute should ever arise as to its effect upon the Headquarters Agreement. Since Public Law 357 was actually before the Committee as part of an official document (A/371), it seems likely that if a dispute should ever arise any judicial body considering the matter would take Public Law 357 into account in its decision.¹

Marcy will telephone Bevans before 11 a. m. October 16 to discuss this matter. [Sandifer.]

AUSTIN

¹ An exchange between Mr. Fahy and the United Kingdom representative on (and chairman of) the subcommittee (Beckett) at the subcommittee's meeting on October 16 was summarized in United Nations unclassified summary No. 1029 of October 16:

"Fahy pointed out that the United States would have to bring the Agreement into effect subject to the authority given the President by Public Law 357 and that the General Assembly should not go into the question of whether the Agreement was affected in any way by the action of Congress or the General Assembly resolution. He said that a statement by the Committee to the effect that the Agreement alone constituted the total obligation was a conclusion of law which the Committee was not competent to make. If in the future a disagreement should arise as to the effect of the Act of Congress, the judicial body settling the matter would determine the question. Beckett (UK) said that the Subcommittee did not have cognizance of the law and that therefore the Agreement alone, which had been considered, must contain all the obligations. Fahy said that 'he did have cognizance' of the Act of Congress and that when the United States brings the Agreement into effect, for its part, it must be under the authority of the Act of Congress. It was finally agreed that no mention would be made of Public Law 357, thereby presumably leaving to future determination, if the question should ever arise, the question of the effect of Public Law 357 upon the Agreement."

In a memorandum to the Deputy Legal Adviser (Tate) on November 12, Mr. Marcy discussed this exchange:

"Mr. Fahy made it very clear to the subcommittee studying the Headquarters Agreement that when the United States adheres to the Headquarters Agreement it must do so under the authority granted to it by the Congress. At one point during the discussion Mr. Beckett of the UK said that as far as he was concerned he 'had no cognizance of the act of Congress and that its substance was a domestic matter'. Mr. Fahy in reply said that 'he *did* have cognizance of the act of Congress' and the United States for its part had to act in accordance with the legislation." (501.AD/11-147)

L/T Files¹

*Draft of Note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations*²

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to Section 28 of the Agree-

¹ In folder entitled "United Nations Headquarters Lake Success June 26, 1947 Folder No. 1."

² A hit over this draft, dated October 16, from Bryton Barron, Chief of the

ment between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, which provides for bringing that Agreement into effect by an exchange of notes. Reference is made also to the provisions of United States Public Law 357, 80th Congress, entitled "Joint Resolution Authorizing the President to bring into effect an agreement between the United States and the United Nations for the purpose of establishing the permanent headquarters of the United Nations in the United States and authorizing the taking of measures necessary to facilitate compliance with the provisions of such agreement, and for other purposes", which was approved by the President of the United States of America on August 4, 1947.

Pursuant to instructions from my Government, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America is prepared to apply the above-mentioned Headquarters Agreement subject to the provisions of Public Law 357.

I have been instructed by my Government to propose that the present note and your reply note concurring therein be considered as bringing the Headquarters Agreement into effect on the date of your note.

Footnote continued from previous page.

Treaty Branch, Office of the Legal Adviser, to Carl Marcy with the United States Delegation at New York, read:

"Pursuant to your telephone request of today, there is attached a draft of a note which we believe should be followed literally in informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the readiness of the Government of the United States of America to bring the Headquarters Agreement into force."

IO Files: US/A/719

United States Delegation Position Paper

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] October 28, 1947.

REPORT OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE ON THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES

1. *United States Position*

The United States should vote in favor of the report on the Headquarters Agreement of Committee Six, which was unanimously approved by Committee Six. The report has attached to it a simple draft resolution authorizing the Secretary-General on his part to bring the Agreement into effect.¹

¹ The report of the Sixth Committee is printed as U.N. Doc. A/427, October 27, 1947, and is found in depository libraries. Except for its introduction and concluding recommendations, the report consists of the report of Subcommittee 1, dated October 17, which is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Sixth Committee* (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Sixth Committee*), pp. 339 ff., annex 11a. The concluding portion of the report of the Sixth Committee itself is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings* (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Plenary*), vol. I, pp. 467 and 468.

It would be appropriate for the United States representative to make a brief statement when this item is reached on the agenda. A copy of a proposed statement is attached.

2. *History in Committee*

The Headquarters Agreement was considered paragraph by paragraph in a Subcommittee of the Sixth Committee. Principal discussion concerned the relationship between the Headquarters Agreement, which has been approved by the United States Congress, and the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations which has been approved by the Senate but not, as yet, by the House of Representatives. It had originally been contemplated that both of these documents would be approved by the United States at the same time since they are closely related.² There was also some discussion of the number of persons in missions accredited to the United Nations who should receive diplomatic status. The terms of the agreement leave this question open to negotiation between the Secretary-General and the United States.

3. *Possible Developments in Plenary Session*

It is not anticipated that there will be any opposition to the adoption of the Sixth Committee report and resolution on this matter. A statement along the lines of the attached draft might be made by the United States representative.³

² The Subcommittee described this situation as "The most complicated question which the Sub-Committee had to consider In order that the United Nations can be satisfied that its position with regard to its headquarters is satisfactorily assured, it should be in a position to know that the United States is or will shortly be a party to the General Convention [on Privileges and Immunities] and upon what terms." (GA (II), *Sixth Committee*, p. 342)

³ Attached draft statement not printed. In the course of discussion and approval of this position paper by the U.S. Delegation at a meeting of the Delegation on October 29, "Mr. Fahy pointed out that There had been detailed consideration of the agreement in a Sub-Committee. One of the interpretations of the agreement had been opposed by Mr. Fahy at the conclusion of this consideration. He only wanted to mention the right of the U.S. to deport a person if, outside of his official activities, he were engaged in dangerous activities. This was the most touchy problem in connection with the convention. The report stated that it was understood that this right of deportation would be used only in the most serious circumstances. Mr. Fahy said he took the position that the U.S. would be reasonable in this matter and did not object." (Minutes of Meeting of U.S. Delegation, October 29, 1947, IO Files, Doc. US/A/M (Chr) 73)

Mr. Fahy's statement to the General Assembly on October 31 is printed in GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I, pp. 468-469. The General Assembly on the same date approved a resolution (Resolution 169 (II)) consisting of two parts. Part A authorized the Secretary General to bring the Headquarters Agreement into effect (the text accompanies the resolution). Part B stated: "*The General Assembly Decides* to recommend to the Secretary-General and to the appropriate authorities of the United States of America to use section 16 of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations as a guide in considering—under sub-section 2 and the last sentence of section 15 of the [Headquarters Agreement]—what classes of persons on the staff of delegations might be included in the lists to be drawn up by agreement between the Secretary-General, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Member State concerned." (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions 16 September-29 November 1947*, pp. 91 ff; text of Part B appears on p. 92.)

501.AD/11-147

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

No. 4482

[NEW YORK,] November 1, 1947.

The United States Representative at the Seat of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the unanimous approval of the report on the Headquarters Agreement of Committee 6 (Document A/427) by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 101st plenary meeting on October 31, 1947. The report has attached to it a simple draft resolution authorizing the Secretary-General on his part to bring the agreement into effect in the manner provided in Section 28 thereof.

Section 28 provides that the Agreement shall be brought into effect "by an exchange of notes between the Secretary-General, duly authorized pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the appropriate executive officer of the United States, duly authorized pursuant to appropriate action of the Congress."

A copy of a draft note which it is proposed to send to the Secretary-General is enclosed herewith.¹ If the proposed note meets with the Department's approval, it will be discussed with representatives of the Secretary-General.²

¹Not printed. The text is identical with that of the draft prepared by the Department on October 16; see p. 63.

²As noted, the text submitted here by the Mission was the same as that drafted in the Department on October 16. There was, however, a difference of opinion between the Mission and the Department as to whether it would be satisfactory, from the United States point of view and in deference to the United Nations, to substitute "in accordance with" or "in pursuance of" for "subject to" in the reference to Public Law 357 in paragraph two of the proposed United States note. The Mission disliked the term "subject to" and expressed a desire to have some negotiating latitude in respect to this. It is probable that the Mission's opinion was conveyed over the telephone rather than being recorded in a written communication.

Carl Marcy, Acting Legislative Counsel, in a memorandum to Mr. Tate, the Deputy Legal Adviser, on November 12, expressed the Department's view: "First, that to be honest with Congress we must use the phrase 'subject to'; second, that the casual reader or historian when examining the exchange of notes will, if he encounters the words 'subject to', have adequate notice that he must look at the Congressional Act before going further." (501.AD/11-147). In a telephone conversation on November 13 between Mr. Marcy in Washington and Mr. John Maktos, Adviser on the United States Delegation Staff in New York, the Mission was informed that the Department would send out an instruction "within a day or two stating that the Department would prefer 'subject to' but that [the Mission] would be given discretion to substitute 'pursuant to' or 'in accordance with' if necessary." (Memorandum, Maktos to Fahy, New York, November 13, IO Files in folder "Ad Hoc Committee on Headquarters Report of the Secretary-General [1947]"). Whatever action the Department or the Mission may have taken subsequently, and nothing of record has been found in the Department's files, the words "subject to" were used in the final text; and in telegram 1589 to New York, December 8, the Acting Secretary of State stated that "Dept. especially appreciates Fahy's accomplishment during difficult negotiations obtaining acceptance specific wording desired by Dept., making clear that application agreement shall be subject [to] provisions US Public Law 357." (501.AD/11-2147)

It is desirable that the exchange of notes take place before the termination of the Second Session of the General Assembly. It would be appreciated if the Department would give this matter the earliest possible consideration.³

³ The text of the note which the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) exchanged with the Secretary General on November 21 was exactly the same as the text prepared in the Department on October 16 with the exception of the last paragraph, which at the request of the Secretary General was changed to read: "I have been instructed by my Government to propose that the present note and your note of this date be considered as bringing the Headquarters Agreement into effect on the date hereof." The documentation of this change consists of telegram 1220 from New York, November 15 (501.AD/11-1547), and Department of State's instruction 263 to New York, November 20 (501.AD/11-1547), neither printed.

Texts of the notes exchanged on November 21 are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1947, pp. 1180 and 1181; 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3437; and in United Nations Treaty Series, vol. xi, pp. 38 ff.

Editorial Note

Concerning the general question of the status of the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, vis-à-vis the United States, and with particular reference to action by the United States Senate in July reserving the position of the United States in respect to section 18(b) of the Convention, relating to tax immunity (see letter, Gross to Kern, September 11, page 54), Adlai Stevenson, United States Representative on the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, made the following statement to that Committee on November 4, 1947:

"I want to point out that the Congress of the United States, our legislative body, has not adhered to the convention of privileges and immunities. It has not granted exemption from federal taxation of a United States citizen working for the United Nations. However, this matter has not been concluded by the Congress. It is there now. It has been rejected by the Senate, the upper body, and it is pending in the House. It is not a certainty that the Congress will not grant tax immunity; that the United States will not join those other States who have already granted tax immunity, although there are relatively few among them among the membership of the United Nations.

"I want the members of the Committee to know and understand the best I can the principle—the problem we are confronted with. The Delegation of the United States at the United Nations represents the executive branch of the government, not the legislative branch. We are, therefore, in a measure, restricted in the opinions that we express and in the action which we propose to take, by the principles that are established from time to time by our legislative branch. The attitude of Congress historically in this country as to tax immunity springs from profound roots. It is not capricious; it is not in any sense a result of any lack on their part of willingness to cooperate with the United

Nations. It springs from a profound principle in the origins of the government of my country, which was expressed many times historically, that there shall be in this country equal rights for all and special privileges for none, that there shall be no class of citizens who enjoy rights, titles of nobility, etc. It found its root with anchorage in our origins from continental Europe. Translated into modern terms it is difficult for the legislative branch of my government to give tax immunity in accordance with the privileges and immunities which have been proposed here, because it would create a class of people within the United States who enjoy a special privilege.

" . . . I can assure the Committee that the executive branch of the government will renew, and most emphatically, its recommendations that in this case American employees of the United Nations should be granted tax immunity and that it should adhere to the treaty.¹ It is quite possible that that may come about. As I see it, the matter is not foreclosed. It is just one branch of our government that has acted upon the matter during the sessions this winter." (501.AC/3-148)

For the Fifth Committee's report on the problem of tax equalization and the text of the resolution approved by the General Assembly on November 20, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings*, pages 1176 ff. As was done in 1946, those Members that had not yet acceded to the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities were requested "to take the necessary legislative action to do so in order to exempt their nationals employed by the United Nations from national income taxation. . . ." (*ibid.*, page 1178).

¹ Omission indicated in source text.

L/UNA Files

*The Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Thompson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1947.

Subject: Financing Construction of United Nations Headquarters

Pursuant to your request I am submitting a statement of the considerations which have led the Department to conclude that construction of the United Nations headquarters should be started promptly and that the United States should make the proposed interest-free loan.

At a time when we are so vitally concerned with the reconstruction of devastated Europe, the expenditure of United States funds and use of United States materials for the construction of office buildings for the United Nations may invite some criticism. These and other important considerations may be urged in favor of continuing to operate in the present temporary headquarters, inconvenient and inadequate as

they are, until construction costs may be lower, materials more easily available and Member Nations in a better position to contribute their respective shares promptly. Faced with the factors outlined below, however, the Department has concluded that the importance of concrete demonstration of the faith of this Government and of the other Member Nations in the permanence of the United Nations and of its establishment on our soil outweighs considerations which might otherwise operate in favor of delay.

Psychological and Political Factors Bearing on Confidence in Future of United Nations

The desirability, from the point of view of the United States, of beginning promptly, or alternatively, postponing construction of the headquarters has been considered in the light of the general international situation as reflected in the United Nations. Recent deterioration of relations between the Great Powers has led to serious concern among the Member Nations as to whether the Organization will survive. In this atmosphere, any action which might be misconstrued as showing lack of confidence on the part of the United States in the permanence of the United Nations might add immeasurably to the growing pessimism among governments and especially among peoples, perhaps including those of this country. Failure of the United Nations to proceed promptly with the construction of the permanent headquarters because the United States preferred postponement, would thus have demoralizing political and psychological repercussions out of proportion to the possible advantages of delaying construction. The reaction would probably be the sharper since all the necessary steps toward construction have been taken except for determining the method of financing.

Possibility of Reopening Decision To Locate Permanent Headquarters in United States

Another factor with which the Department has been concerned is the possible reopening of the controversy over the permanent site which preceded the decision to locate the permanent headquarters in this country. Although an actual reversal of this decision is not anticipated, the mere consideration of such action might have serious effects from the point of view of the United Nations and of this Government.

The United States has from the outset attached great importance to the location of the permanent headquarters of the United Nations in this country. Although our delegations to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and to the first meeting of the General Assembly abstained from taking a position on the question of the location of the headquarters, they made it very clear that the United States

would welcome warmly a decision to locate in this country. The United Nations' decision to do so was made in the light of the unanimous concurrent resolution adopted by the Congress on December 10 and 11, 1945, inviting the Organization to make its headquarters in the United States.

When the choice of the precise site within the United States was to be made at the second part of the first General Assembly session last fall, the Soviet bloc, apparently regretting its previous support of location in the United States, came out in favor of Europe and, in particular, Geneva. The United Kingdom, however, and several other countries which had previously favored Europe, now took the position that it would be a fatal blow to wholehearted United States participation in the United Nations if the latter were to move its headquarters to Europe. The very fact that the USSR apparently wanted the headquarters in Europe, probably induced some states to oppose any such proposition.

Difficulties in reaching agreement on a specific location were finally resolved when Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and The City of New York offered to make the East River site available without cost. The Assembly promptly accepted the offer and authorized the Secretary General to acquire the land, undertake demolition, and, with the assistance of a Headquarters Advisory Committee, to prepare plans for the construction and financing of the headquarters. The site was acquired after the Congress had passed the necessary legislation exempting the gift from Federal Gift tax; demolition of existing structures has been completed with the exception of a small office building which is suitable for use by the United Nations.

Preliminary construction plans have been completed through the joint efforts of internationally famous architects from several Member Nations. There is every indication that these plans will be approved without objection at the current session; they have already been modified to reduce the estimated cost from \$85,000,000 to \$65,000,000.

There are indications that many delegations will favor holding the next General Assembly in Europe, probably Paris. Other delegations are strongly opposed to such a proposal on the ground that the influence of the United States in the Assembly would be decreased and that of the Soviet Union correspondingly increased. A recent confidential despatch indicates that Mr. Bevin himself feels very strongly on this matter, being of the opinion that the whole move to hold the next Assembly in Europe is a Soviet maneuver designed to get the United Nations away from the influence of the United States and from the United States press.

In spite of such doubts, the United States delegation has taken the position that we will be glad to have the next Assembly held in Europe. This, however, has been on the assumption that the construction of the permanent headquarters would be definitely under way so that there could be no question of the European session affecting the ultimate question of the permanent location.

Certainly a decision to postpone construction would greatly increase the possibilities of the entire matter being reconsidered. This would involve a serious threat not merely to the prestige and leadership of the United States in the United Nations but to the growth and strengthening of the entire Organization, the morale of the Secretariat and the faith of the Member Nations in the future of the Organization itself.

Importance of Maintaining Co-operation of New York City

The City of New York, in addition to acquiring, at its own expense, and conveying to the United Nations a substantial portion of the site needed to round out the properties acquired with Mr. Rockefeller's gift, has authorized and is ready to proceed with plans involving the expenditure of some \$20,000,000 by the City for the development of the approaches and improvement of the surroundings.

The Mayor has expressed to Senator Austin his serious concern as to whether he can maintain the necessary support to carry through this essential program unless there is unmistakable evidence that the headquarters will be promptly constructed. He made these representations in connection with an urgent request that the Department try to arrange for financing through the International Bank, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or the Export-Import Bank so that it would not be necessary to wait for Congressional action at the forthcoming regular session. (Conversations with officials of these agencies have clearly indicated that they lack authority to make the loan.) The Mayor felt that New York City's part of the project might be jeopardized if it were necessary to wait even a few months before construction could start. If construction were to be postponed until 1949 or perhaps several years more, it may be assumed that the situation with regard to the City's participation would be much more precarious.

Alternative Methods of Financing

Assuming, as it appears we must, that it is important to begin construction of the headquarters promptly, the question remains how such an operation can be most appropriately financed. The Department has given careful consideration to this question in consultation with the Treasury Department, the Bureau of the Budget and other interested Federal agencies. The whole matter was again reviewed at a meeting in the Secretary's office on September 4.

Financing by outright Member contributions seems to be out of the question in view of the dollar shortage.

At the request of the United States, the Secretariat carefully explored, among financial circles in New York City, the possibilities of a private loan. The Secretary General reached the conclusion that the most favorable private arrangement obtainable would be one under which the loan would be confined to \$25,000,000 out of the total of \$65,000,000, the balance being met by having the United States pay up at the outset its entire share of the total cost (approximately \$26,000,000), the other Members paying \$14,000,000 at once and the balance of their shares when the private loan was to be paid off at the end of ten years. Interest would be at approximately 3 per cent.

Any plan of private financing on reasonable terms must of course be confined to a portion only of the total cost, the remainder being made available in cash. This involves either a special advance by the United States or a call on other Member Nations for additional dollars which they are not in a position to furnish. Protection of the legal position of the lenders would involve difficult arrangements for the waiver of the United Nations' immunity from suit and possible additional complications in the architectural program to satisfy the lenders that the buildings would be adaptable for other use in the theoretical contingency of a foreclosure. Furthermore, there are indications that many Members would consider it harmful to the prestige of the United Nations if it were under obligation to private financial interests.

Advantages of an Interest-Free Loan

In view of such considerations, the Treasury Department advised this Department that the most appropriate arrangement would be a loan by the United States Government. Although the Department at first had in mind an interest bearing loan, the ultimate conclusion, in agreement with the Treasury Department, was that a loan without interest would not only have the advantage of constituting an acceptable gesture of hospitality to the United Nations, but would probably in the long run actually be to the advantage of the United States from a strictly financial point of view. The Department concluded that the waiver of interest would greatly strengthen the hands of the United States Delegation in resisting the inevitable efforts to call upon the United States for the payment of a bigger share of the costs of construction than its share of the regular budget of the United Nations.

The argument has often been made to the effect that the United States derives an economic advantage from the expenditure in this country of nearly all the regular budget of the United Nations. The United States has been able so far to avoid an increased contribution on this account; we are in fact working for a decrease. The principal

argument of the United States has been that it would not be consistent with the sovereign equality of Members if the Organization were dependent upon one Member for an excessive proportion of its revenue. This argument, however, will not carry so much weight in connection with the construction of the headquarters, since it will be urged that this is an isolated transaction not establishing any precedent. Other Members may call this Government's attention to the generosity which has already been evidenced by a private citizen and by The City of New York. Attention may also be called to the fact that substantially the entire cost of construction will be expended in the United States to the benefit of American business and American labor and also that this Government would have a substantial additional cost on account of travel and communications expense if the headquarters were located elsewhere. (The Department estimates this amount at \$300,000 a year if the headquarters were located at, say, Geneva.)

It appears that the definite economic advantages accruing to the United States as a result of the location of the headquarters in this country—entirely apart from any consideration of the desirability of a generous gesture by the host state—would fully justify the United States Government in making a special contribution towards the construction of the headquarters. If this contribution is made in the form of a waiver of interest, it has the great advantage of not prejudicing the position of the United States with regard to its contributions to the budget of the Organization. The loan would be repaid in annual installments out of the regular budget of the United Nations.

Status of Question in the United Nations

While the question of financing was being considered in this Government, the Headquarters Advisory Committee which had been named by the General Assembly to assist the Secretary General in preparing architectural and financial plans for the construction of the headquarters discussed the matter at several meetings. Senator Austin, the United States Representative and Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Ross, who sat for him on some occasions, were careful to avoid committing this Government in any way. The alternatives of outright cash contributions from Members, a private loan and a United States Government loan were fully discussed. The Committee was of the opinion that a United States Government loan would be the best solution and requested the Secretary General to ascertain from the Government of the United States whether it would be prepared to make such a loan.

After the interdepartmental consultations referred to above, it was decided that the United States Delegation should not take any initia-

tive in favoring one method of financing as against another but that the only practicable course to follow if construction were to be started in 1948 would be a United States Government loan. With reference to an inquiry addressed to the United States by the Secretary General, the Department, with the approval of the President, authorized Senator Austin to notify the Secretary General that the President would be willing to request the approval by the Congress of an interest-free loan not exceeding \$65,000,000 repayable in annual installments from the ordinary budget of the Organization. A copy of Senator Austin's letter to this effect, dated October 29, is attached. Its delivery was announced to the press.¹

The *ad hoc* Committee on Headquarters, created by the current session of the General Assembly, has unanimously adopted a resolution authorizing the Secretary General to negotiate an agreement for such a loan. This action will presumably be ratified at the next plenary meeting.²

[Attachment—Copy]

[NEW YORK,] October 29, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. LIE: I wish to reply to your request for information concerning the extent to which the Government of the United States might be willing to assist in financing the costs of construction of the United Nations headquarters.

The Government of the United States would be prepared to enter into negotiations with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to concluding a loan agreement whereby an interest-free United States Government loan would be made available for the purpose of financing all or part of the cost of constructing the United Nations headquarters. It would be the understanding of my Government that such a loan would be for an amount not exceeding \$65,000,000. Further, it is understood that the loan would be extended for a period to be determined by negotiation with the Secretary-General and would be repayable in annual installments from the ordinary budget of the United Nations.

Such a loan would, of course, require the approval of the United States Congress. The President of the United States would be willing to request the approval of such a loan by the Congress upon conclusion of negotiations between the Secretary-General and my Govern-

¹ Documentation and events described in this memorandum are fully covered in L/UNA Files in a folder entitled "Financing Construction of United Nations Headquarters."

² The General Assembly took action on November 20 authorizing the Secretary-General to negotiate a loan agreement with the United States; see GA (II), *Plenary*, pp. 1187-1194.

ment. It is assumed that the General Assembly will at this session make the necessary decisions and give the necessary authorizations required to proceed with the construction and financing of the headquarters.

Sincerely yours,

[WARREN R. AUSTIN]

Editorial Note

Negotiations were conducted in November and December between Charles Fahy and officials of the United Nations Secretariat to conclude an interim headquarters agreement, such an instrument being necessary because the United Nations had not yet moved into its permanent headquarters. Agreement was quickly reached that certain provisions of the Headquarters Agreement should be invoked (subject to stated conditions) as "necessary and appropriate to enable the United Nations to carry on its functions at the temporary headquarters" and were to have "full force and effect" with respect to the temporary headquarters; the articles included sections 1 (except subsection *a*), 4, 7-17, and 19 of the Headquarters Agreement. It having been agreed in November and at the initiative of the Secretary-General that no exchange of notes was necessary in order to bring the interim agreement into force, this instrument took effect on December 18, 1947, immediately upon signature by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) and the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie); for text, see 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3439, or United Nations Treaty Series, volume XI, pages 347 ff.

THE DETERIORATING POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: THE WARMONGERING RESOLU- TION

501.BB/9-1747: Telegram

*The Secretary of State at the United Nations to the Acting Secretary
of State*

US URGENT

[NEW YORK,] September 19, 1947—2: 26 p. m.

Delga 3. For State Special Rusk¹ from Sandifer.² Official text of resolution proposed to GA by Vyshinsky³ on Sept 18 follows:

"1. The United Nations condemn the criminal propoganda for a new war, carried on by reactionary circles in a number of countries and, in particular, in the United States of America, Turkey, and Greece, by the dissemination of all types of fabrications through the press, radio, cinema, and public speeches, containing open appeals for aggression against the peace-loving democratic countries.

2. The United Nations regard the toleration of, and—even more so—support for this type of propoganda for a new war, which will inevitably become the third world war, as a violation of the obligation assumed by the Members of the United Nations whose Charter calls upon them 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace' and not to 'endanger international peace and security, and justice' (Article 1, paragraph 2; Article 2, paragraph 3).

3. The United Nations deem it essential that the Governments of all countries be called upon to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalties, the carrying on of war propoganda in any form, and to take measures with a view to the prevention and suppression of war propoganda as anti-social activity endangering the vital interests and well-being of the peace-loving nations.

4. The United Nations affirm the necessity for the speediest implementation of the decision taken by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 on the reduction of armaments, and the decision of the General Assembly of 24 January 1946 concerning the exclusion from national armaments of the atomic weapon and all other main types of armaments designed for mass destruction, and considers that the implementation of these decisions is in the interests of all peace-loving

¹ Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

² Durward V. Sandifer, Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly.

³ Andrey Y. Vyshinsky, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly.

nations and would be a most powerful blow at propaganda and the inciters of a new war."⁴

Dept's comments would be appreciated.⁵ [Sandifer.]

MARSHALL

⁴ For text of the Vyshinsky speech, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings* (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Plenary*), vol. I, pp. 81-106.

⁵ One of the earliest exchanges of views between the Delegation Staff of Advisers and the Department of State occurred on September 25 (probably by telephone) between Elwood Thompson of the Delegation Staff and Dean Rusk of the Department, and information about this exchange of views was recorded on September 26 in a memorandum by Mr. Thompson to John C. Ross of the Delegation Staff (IO Files, U.S. Delegation Records for the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, in folder "Committee 1 Measures Against Propaganda and Inciters of a New War"). According to this memorandum, Mr. Thompson had conveyed to Mr. Rusk the preliminary view (of the Delegation experts concerned) that "Probably the US should take up separately in the debate on the Vyshinsky resolution the first three paragraphs on propaganda, and the last paragraph on atomic energy and armaments." Mr. Rusk had responded that "there had been some tentative thought in the Department that the first three paragraphs of the Vyshinsky resolution probably should be referred by the Assembly for consideration by the Conference on Freedom of Information [this U.N.-sponsored conference was due to convene at Geneva in March 1948]." The Department's preliminary thinking also envisioned a U.S.-sponsored or -supported resolution urging greater speed in dealing with atomic energy and conventional armaments, which would cover Point 4 of the Vyshinsky resolution.

IO Files : US/A/377

*Memorandum by Mr. H. Bartlett Wells of the United States Delegation
Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 19, 1947.

COMMENTS ON VISHINSKI SPEECH

Referring to Vishinski's speech Gilberto Amado of Brazil said to me that yesterday was a great day for the democratic outlook on life: when a foreign representative could rise in an international meeting in Moscow and speak freely regarding Stalin and the other leaders of the Soviet Government in terms similar to those used by Vishinski yesterday, the principle of freedom of speech would have received world-wide acceptance. The United States has shown that it understands and accepts the principle; now it is up to the Soviet Union to do likewise.

Frye, a Reuter's correspondent, informed me that there were, among the press at least, two schools of thought regarding Vishinski's speech—one which held that it was intended to take offensive, and another which held that it was spoken from a defensive position. He was in agreement with the latter school.

He said that he felt its principal purpose was concentrated in the charge of war-mongering activities on the part of persons and organs

within the United States. Vishinski evidently hoped to appeal to the European countries which, while generally opposed to the Soviet Union, have, nevertheless, a consuming fear of war. Frye referred particularly to the Swedes in this connection, saying that they have expressed great alarm over what they describe as widespread talk of war in the United States. Frye (British) believes that on the one hand the American public has not so intimate an acquaintance with what modern war on one's own soil means, and that on the other hand the European public does not realize the purely individual and personal character of the occasional exaggerated statements made by Americans of some prominence.

BARTLETT WELLS

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232 ¹

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation

[NEW YORK,] September 22, 1947.

In the course of a conversation this morning, Mr. Cordier ² told me that he thought the General Committee was quite taken by surprise by the action of the United States in not opposing the inclusion in the agenda of the Soviet Resolution. This was especially noticeable because of the strong line which Mr. Gromyko had taken with respect to the United States items on the Interim Committee and on Korea. ³

Mr. Cordier's impression was that the reaction created by this action on the part of the United States Delegation was a very favorable one.

¹ Folder "Committee 1, Measures against Propaganda and Inciters of a New War".

² Andrew W. Cordier, Executive-Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

³ Documentation on the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an interim committee of the General Assembly is found on pp. 166 ff.; for documentation regarding Korea, see vol. VI, pp. 596 ff.

501.BB/9-2447 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, September 24, 1947—2 p. m.

2915. From limited available sources various strata Soviet life, following appears preliminary reactions Vyshinsky's GA speech. While everything he said has been published *ad nauseam* in recent months, publication as official high-level speech here has apparently caused

considerable concern over imminent possibility of war. Various reports indicate housewives queuing up for sugar, laying down extra supplies of potatoes, and buying or bartering to obtain extra warm clothing. This concern similar to that of year ago which finally reached such proportions Stalin found it necessary dispel war fears in his reply to correspondent Werth.

SMITH

501.BB/9-3047: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

Moscow, September 30, 1947—5 p. m.

2953. Following is our evaluation present Soviet tactics as exemplified by Vyshinski's GA speech, smear campaign against American officials and all-out propaganda efforts discredit our motives and falsify our intentions.

Overwhelming voting strength of US and like-minded countries in GA re veto, Greece, etc. places before Kremlin fundamental decision whether remain member UN. We are sure Kremlin would prefer to remain member for prestige and propaganda reasons, and because of advantages continuing obstructionism. Furthermore, Soviet withdrawal would convince even most confirmed wishful thinkers Kremlin desires only one thing, two worlds now in hope obtaining one Soviet world later. Also believe Kremlin does not feel it has battered down enough countries yet to break with UN. On other hand, if it is to remain in UN, it feels necessity of getting out of essentially negative and defensive position into which it has been forced. Faced with this dilemma present tactics seem to have following objectives:

1. Give impression that if matters do not work out more favorably for Kremlin there is imminent possibility of war, in hope that smaller countries will become so fearful of being caught in a war between democratic and communistic forces that they will abstain from vote for American UN proposals. In this way Kremlin hopes that decisively favorable votes on important resolutions opposed by Soviet Union can be brought to minimum, and clear-cut action frustrated.

2. Sabotage economic recovery by making smaller govts hesitant to accept American "imperialistic aid" and by keeping European businessmen and people generally so apprehensive of future they will refrain from making investments or long-range construction and recovery plans.

3. Make Congress wary of voting credits which would be regarded as hopeless in view of fear of war and general unrest in Europe. Note in this connection reported statements Congressman Taber in Athens.

4. Increase the apprehensions of its own people and thus bolster its internal control and discipline.

This campaign will go on in crescendo until it either obtains its objectives or fails. In latter case Soviet Union and satellites may withdraw from UN or allow détente to develop pending development new tactics.

We add our convictions USSR is not prepared for and does not want active war in presently foreseeable future. However, Kremlin knows we do not want war and will in no case be aggressor; consequently it feels it can with impunity deliberately create "war scare" to serve its political ends.

SMITH

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs (Kotschnig)*²

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1947.

Mr. Free³ will bring with him tomorrow the draft of a speech⁴ which gives quite clearly the position we believe might be taken in response to the Vyshinsky speech. We did not attempt to clear this speech throughout the Department as we realize that the Delegation in New York and particularly Mr. Bohlen will have a lot to say about the approach that should be taken.⁵

There is one point, however, on which we all agree down here and that is that it would be a mistake to meet Mr. Vyshinsky's resolution by a counter resolution. For this reason, no attempt is being made in the Department to revise in any way the resolution drafted by Chester Williams.⁶

¹ Folder "Committee 1, Measures against Propaganda and Inciters of a New War."

² Mr. Kotschnig's conversation was with the Principal Executive Officer of the U.S. Delegation Staff of Advisers (Sandifer) in New York.

³ Lloyd A. Free, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs.

⁴ Not printed; IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/221, October 1. Mr. Free took this paper to New York and presented it—as a preliminary position on the issue—to the "Working Team" of the Delegation Staff handling the question of the Vyshinsky resolution.

⁵ During the first two weeks or so of October, several drafts of a proposed statement were prepared; and by the third or fourth draft the text bore little resemblance to that incorporated in the Department's preliminary draft. Charles E. Bohlen was Counselor of the Department and at this time was attached to the Advisory Staff of the Delegation.

⁶ Chester S. Williams, Public Liaison Officer of the Office of Public Information, United States Mission to the United Nations. This text was transmitted originally from the Mission to the Department in telegram Delga 9, September 27, 4 p. m., not printed. It was a short statement that apparently had no distribution, either in New York or in Washington, except to Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

IO Files : US/A/559

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Foster Dulles of the
United States Delegation*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 2, 1947.

Subject: Dr. Aranhas's Views on United States-United Nations
Relations

Participants: Dr. Aranha, Brazilian Delegation ¹
Dr. Muniz, Brazilian Delegation
Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States Delegation
Mr. David Wainhouse, United States Delegation ²

Several days ago Mr. Aranha expressed a desire to talk to me about the Interim Committee. He stated then that if the Brazilians could lead off on the subject it would very likely constitute a cue for the other Latin American States to follow the Brazilian lead. I invited Dr. Aranha for lunch today and asked him to bring along one other member of his delegation to discuss the matter of the Interim Committee. He came with Ambassador Muniz. Mr. Wainhouse also was present at the luncheon.

Dr. Aranha, observing an advanced copy of Mr. James Byrnes' book on the library table, asked me if it was not my belief that Mr. Byrnes' ³ policy is not the cause of the present United States-U.S.S.R. tension. I replied that I was not at Yalta and Potsdam and did not know what had transpired there. It was clear that Mr. Aranha had the subject of United States-U.S.S.R. tension very much on his mind.

Dr. Aranha started the conversation by saying, as we sat down at the luncheon table, that he wanted to speak frankly and informally. He asserted that the League of Nations died because both France and Great Britain used it as an instrument of their own national policies. The United States, he went on to say, is using the United Nations in the very same way. He predicts that unless the United States ceases to use the United Nations as an instrument of its foreign policy, the United Nations would die as the League had died.

Dr. Aranha was deeply disturbed by our attitude towards the candidacy of the Ukraine for the Security Council.⁴ He believes that the Russians are correct in insisting that the understanding reached at London to the effect that there would be two Eastern European Members on the Security Council is being violated by the United

¹ Dr. Aranha was also President of the Second Session of the General Assembly.

² Advisory Staff.

³ James F. Byrnes was Secretary of State, July 1945-January 1947. The reference is presumably to Mr. Byrnes' account of his tenure in that office, found in his memoir, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947).

⁴ For documentation relating to U.S. policy concerning elections to United Nations offices and organs, see pp. 100 ff.

States. He saw our support of India for that post as a breach of that understanding. He went on to say that from the United States standpoint it is really better to have on the Security Council a Member like Ukraine than it is to have a Member like India, for with the Ukraine voting with Russia, it was really only an expression of one Member. Everybody would understand that. From the standpoint of the welfare of the United Nations as a whole, however, it was more important to adhere to the understanding reached at London, than to disaffect Russia from the United Nations.

Dr. Aranha stated that he was very much puzzled by United States policy towards the United Nations, and United States policy towards the U.S.S.R. He wanted to know whether our intention is to drive Russia out of the United Nations. He wanted to know further whether our aim is to go to war against Russia. If that is the case, the Latins were with us, but all they wanted to know is if that was the case.

Dr. Aranha was critical of the fact that we were using the United Nations to air our conflicts with the U.S.S.R. He referred to the United Nations as a hospital where sick problems are brought of an international nature and character not where divergencies of views between two countries are brought. At this point I stated that the world was a pretty sick place and maybe the United Nations was the hospital for it. Dr. Aranha repeatedly asserted that the Latin American States are not only willing to support the United States but are ready to do so. The great trouble is that the United States has failed to inform the Latin American States as to what our policy is. He cited by way of illustration the United States Resolution on Greece.⁵ All of the Latin America was prepared to vote for that resolution. Several days later the Latin American States learned that the United States had changed its mind, and that it would support the French amendment to its own resolution. That kind of a change was never conveyed to him. (Whenever Dr. Aranha referred to "we" or "us" it was not clear in my mind whether he meant himself as President of the Assembly, as Brazilian Delegate to the United Nations, or as the Latin American States as an entity. He used that word "we" or "us" interchangeably.) Dr. Aranha kept repeating the importance of keeping the Latin American Representatives informed of American policy in the United Nations. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind or in the minds of any of the Latin Americans that the United States is the moral and spiritual and economic leader of Western civilization; that the Latin Americans are prepared and are only too eager to follow the American lead, but because of our failure to keep them informed a number of embarrassments had arisen for the Latin Americans since the Assembly opened.

⁵ For documentation regarding the Greek border question, see vol. v, pp. 816 ff.

I explained to Dr. Aranha that while I was not a member of the administration and speaking entirely unofficially, that he was wrong about the thought that we had any intention or desire, first, to go to war against Russia or to use the United Nations as an instrument of American foreign policy against the Soviet Union. Moreover, I said that Dr. Aranha's thought that we were trying to drive the Russians out of the United Nations was equally wrong and far from our desire or intention. The problem as I expressed it to Dr. Aranha is simply the matter of how far the Soviet Union can spread its system of despotism and the police state throughout Europe and perhaps the rest of the world. To us as the leader of freedom and liberty that issue was very important. It is our understanding that the smallest states of Europe desire to live their own lives and to live under a system of government of their own choosing. The issue presented in Greece is just that. The United States has no desire to force its moral, spiritual and economic assistance upon smaller nations who themselves have no desire to maintain a system of freedom. The protection of Greece as an independent State which is now being threatened by its Northern Neighbors under the control of Russia represents to us one of the fundamental principles which we under the Charter are obliged to protect, as is every other Member. Unless the small States are free of this domination there is little chance that they will survive in the coming years without a close adherence by all nations, particularly by us, to the principles and the obligations of the Charter. I stated that we had no desire to force freedom upon countries who do not themselves desire it, and that we are perfectly able to take care of ourselves, if the rest of the world prefers to get along without us. We are not like the Russians who are endeavoring to impose a police state upon others. We are only acting through the Charter in the thought that the Members of the United Nations are desirous of living a life of their own. The notion that we are using the United Nations as an instrument of our national policy is totally wrong and misleading.

I stated that there must be some confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the Latin American States. I reminded Dr. Aranha that it was he who told us that he was not a candidate for the presidency of the General Assembly. At this point Dr. Aranha asserted that it was his own Government that created the confusion on this subject. I went on to say that with the assurance that he, Dr. Aranha, gave us that he was not a candidate we committed ourselves to Dr. Evatt, only to discover that the Latin American States were solidly supporting Dr. Aranha for the presidency. This was a matter of great embarrassment to us for it appeared to all of the others that we had abandoned our Latin American friends which, as Dr. Aranha knows very well, is not the case.

[Here follows a reference to the election of a Trusteeship Council slate.]

I pointed out to Dr. Aranha that there is no doubt in the minds of any of the American Delegation that the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere was an important and essential factor in the peace of the world. The voting power of the Latin Americans, if not combined with the strength of the United States, was artificial and could have as bad results in the Assembly as the veto in the Security Council but together we had a right to some forty percent of the voting strength in the United Nations. We must, however, use that voting strength with great restraint. To this Dr. Aranha agreed.

Dr. Aranha stated that he was going to have luncheon with General Marshall on Saturday and that he would speak as frankly to him as he had to us on the subject.

Not one word was said about the Interim Committee, which was the purpose of the luncheon.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/365

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 16, 1947.

Subject: War Mongering

In the course of a conversation this afternoon with Justice Wold,¹ he referred several times to the war of nerves and quite frankly admitted that it was very frightening to him and to Scandinavians generally. The article in the *New York Times* this morning with respect to the German army in the hands of the Soviets had made a great and apprehensive impression on him.

On the question of the war mongering resolution presented to the Assembly by the Soviet Union, Justice Wold expressed the opinion that it had been placed on the agenda simply and purely for propaganda reasons, and that was all the Soviets desired or hoped to get out of it. He said that it was done for the propaganda effect in Western Europe, and that it was having the effect which the authors intended.

HAYDEN RAYNOR

¹ Justice Wold, Norwegian Delegation.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/445

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 17, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Joseph Bech, Luxembourg Delegation¹
 Mr. P. H. Gore-Booth, United Kingdom Delegation
 Mr. Elwood Thompson, United States Delegation

In the course of general comments on the work of Committee 1, discussion turned to the question of tactics being used by Eastern Europeans in the Committee.² Mr. Bech said he did not see how he could do more to control the committee than he was doing, since he regarded himself not as the speaker of the house in a legislature but simply as the presiding officer in a group of states. When he spoke to any delegate he said he did not regard himself as speaking to an individual but, rather, to a sovereign government.

ELWOOD THOMPSON

¹ Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

² From September 25 to October 13, the First Committee had before it the item regarding threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece; from October 14 the Committee's attention had been devoted to the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an interim committee. For the official Committee record, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee* (hereafter cited as GA (II), *First Committee*).

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹*Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*

[NEW YORK,] October 18, 1947.

Herewith is original of the latest draft of your statement² on the Vishinsky resolution, together with the manuscript material.

[Here follows a discussion of Senator Austin's schedule, with a view to setting aside time for working on the formulation of a statement with regard to the Vishinsky resolution.]

As indicated in the attached notes dictated this morning there are rumors of amendment of the Vishinsky resolution. This is to be expected in the general atmosphere of wanting to compromise. I have a very strong hunch at the moment that we do not want to get involved in discussions and argumentation at the moment on the pros and cons. I think our objective should be a simple and clear-cut defeat of the

¹ Folder "Committee 1, Measures against Propaganda and Inciters of a New War".

² Not printed.

resolution with as little debate as possible. If you agree with this conclusion I think it is very important that we indicate this line to our political liaison officers as early as possible on Monday morning,³ so that they can in turn spread the word. With this in view I would appreciate it if you could give either Sandy⁴ or me clearance on this point the first thing Monday morning.

JOHN ROSS

³ October 20.

⁴ Durward V. Sandifer.

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹

Memorandum by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 19, 1947.

Subject: Warmongering

You will have noted several memos I have written in the last 24 hours² indicating that there is a strong feeling developing in the Assembly, even extending to countries such as Canada and Australia, to the effect that the Soviets must not be voted down on everything in this Assembly. They must be allowed something in an effort to relieve the great tension which has developed.

The Canadians and Australians feel that warmongering, provided the Soviet resolution is turned about, is a subject on which this could be accomplished.³ We have attempted to talk them out of this position, along the lines of the memos to which I have referred, but I am quite satisfied they are unconvinced.⁴

The point of this memo is to suggest that at Flushing tomorrow you find an opportunity to discuss this matter with Mike Pearson of Canada,⁵ and also with Dr. Evatt of Australia.⁶ I cannot overempha-

¹ Folder "Committee 1, Measures against Propoganda and Inciters of a New War".

² These memoranda are not printed; they are deposited in the IO Files, US/A/C.1 series.

³ Both Canada and Australia were considering offering amendments to the Soviet resolution.

⁴ Mr. Raynor had passed along the information that the United States experts felt that the Soviet resolution should be defeated outright rather than amended or turned about, because otherwise "the result would be that the Moscow radio could blare forth 24 hours a day, 365 days a year on this theme: the Soviet Union attacked the United States for warmongering; the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning warmongering, et cetera." (IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/390, October 19, 1947)

⁵ Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

⁶ Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, and Chairman of the Australian Delegation to the General Assembly.

size the importance of these discussions in the event that we attempt to follow up the line which I understand has been decided upon.⁷ If countries such as Canada and Australia are not with us, we will be in a weak position indeed.

⁷ See Minutes of 24th Meeting of the U.S. Delegation, October 21, *infra*.

IO Files : US/A/M(Chr)/68

Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, October 21, 1947, 9:15 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of persons (31) present.]

Measures To Be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War

Ambassador Austin read the document "Soviet Resolution on Measures to be Taken Against Propaganda and the Inciters of a New War", (US/A/C.1/395, October 20) as a draft of a statement which he might make in Committee I.¹

Mr. Dulles commented that he thought the statement on the whole was a very good one.

Ambassador Austin stated that several Members had a different view on how the Soviet resolution might be handled. The Canadians had an amendment offering recommendations for the conditions that were asserted to exist. He read the draft resolution which might be proposed as a substitute by the Canadian Delegation (US/A/C.1/394) which read as follows:

The United Nations condemn all propaganda containing incitement to war or civil strife and urge member governments to take every possible step to promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations on the basis of the Purpose and Principles of the Charter.

Ambassador Austin said he had told Mr. Pearson that the Soviet resolution attacked a fundamental principle on which the United States could not compromise. Also he had said that the Soviet resolution must be seen as a whole. It was an attack on the United States, therefore the United States could not yield anywhere along the line. Accordingly, Mr. Pearson had said he would put in a substitute resolution instead of an amendment.

¹ Not printed. The Committee was scheduled to begin consideration of this item on October 22. For summary of the Austin statement as made to the committee on October 23, see GA (II), *First Committee*, pp. 192-195.

There also was a possible Australian amendment, the official text of which had been made available to the Delegation (US/A/C.1/397), which he read.²

Ambassador Austin said that when the above resolution had been shown to him by the Australian Delegation, he had said to them that, as warm friends of the United States, they should help us knock out this type of resolution. He had continued that he would be very sad if it were introduced and that he thought they should take a stand beside their friends. He thought that the French were favorable toward the Australian resolution.

Mr. Achilles said that the French had not made a decision on this matter yet. He added that they doubted that the United States was following the right line if it confined itself to opposing the Soviet resolution without considering alternatives. Mr. Raynor added that the United Kingdom felt the same way. Mr. Dulles said the Latin American countries also felt the same way.

Mr. Osborn said the Canadian resolution would condemn Winston Churchill and the Yugoslav Peasant Party at the present juncture. He doubted that the United States wanted to do that. Ambassador Austin said he did not like the Canadian resolution.

Mr. Bohlen said that the Canadian resolution had no merit or substance save that it would blacken the United States. He pointed out that a voice of warning raised against a danger would be taken as warmongering. He pointed out that this was virtually the same as Hitler's tactics and had become a classic way of stifling those who spoke out against dangers that were evident. He stated he would rather compromise on other issues, if compromise with the Soviets had to be made. He thought that the Soviet warmongering resolution should be defeated on its merits as bad principle and bad policy. He thought there had not been enough explanation of the United States position made to other delegations. He noted that Hector McNeil (United Kingdom) had not shown signs of moving far on the previous day in conversations which he had had with him. Mr. McNeil did not seem to be troubled by the implications of the resolution.

[Here follows further discussion of the subject.]

Mr. Sandifer expressed the opinion that an artificial attitude was developing with respect to a need for a Soviet victory. Such a victory should be won only on sound principles. He pointed out that the Soviets had actually won two victories, as for instance the previous day in the Assembly, and in the recent votes in Committee IV. He thought it was artificial to think that the situation could be solved by any resolution on this subject. He said there was nothing that the other Members of

² This text is found in GA (II), *First Committee*, p. 575, annex 13b.

the United Nations would take which would conciliate the Soviets. It seemed that some of the delegations felt that they could not explain at home their opposition to a resolution which posed propaganda for war, however. He said he sympathized with the defeat of the Soviet resolution and thought that the Canadians should be told they were off on the wrong track in trying to make a concession in this matter. Ambassador Austin inquired what the Delegation vote would be if the Canadian resolution were offered, or if the Australian resolution were offered. He concluded that the Delegation was in agreement that the primary effort should be to achieve an outright rejection of the Soviet resolution. The question of whether or not to support a substitute resolution would be considered further in the light of subsequent developments.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

IO Files : US/A/C.1/406

*Memorandum by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 21, 1947.

Subject: Warmongering Discussions and Developments During the
Day

Early this morning Dr. Evatt had the Australian amendment put into the Secretariat despite pleas made to him on the way to Flushing by Colonel Hodgson¹ who urged him not to take this step without discussing the matter further with Senator Austin. Early in the day, I do not know whether this was before or after the resolution was put in, I saw Mr. Harry¹ and told him how unhappy we were about this whole matter.

After the amendment had been put in, Mr. Achilles spoke with Dr. Evatt and urged that it be changed from an amendment, which would have to be voted on first, to a separate proposal in order that the Russian proposal could be defeated out of hand before this was taken up. Dr. Evatt refused to entertain this suggestion, stating that the whole point was to have his amendment considered and accepted favorably before the Russian so that it would not be necessary to take up the Russian proposal at all.

I spoke very earnestly to Mr. Ignatieff² about our views in general on this question, and specifically as to the points made about the Canadian proposal in our delegation this morning. Dr. Evatt has man-

¹ Australian Delegation.

² Canadian Delegation.

aged to obtain the second place on the speaker's list which Canada thought it had, and the Canadians now will probably wait for a while before doing anything. I believe they will also wish to discuss the matter further with us before doing anything.

HAYDEN RAYNOR

IO Files: US/A/C.1/418

*Memorandum by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 22, 1947.

Subject: Warmongering

Canada

Several conversations during the day between Mr. Pearson and Mr. Ignatieff of the Canadian Delegation and Mr. Raynor and Mr. Achilles of the United States Delegation disclosed the following information: The Canadians have decided to put in their resolution somewhat revised so that it now reads as follows:

"The United Nations condemn all propaganda inciting to aggressive war or civil strife which might lead to war, and urge members to promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations on the bases of the purposes and principles of the Charter."

The Canadians now intend to speak first at tomorrow afternoon's meeting. The speech will be delivered by Mr. Ilsley if he arrives on time, otherwise by Mr. Pearson.

The Canadian speech which was shown to us is a strong attack on the Soviet position. It charges that the Soviet objective is propaganda rather than doing anything about warmongering, it attacks particularly government controlled propaganda, and includes a denunciation of propaganda designed to incite class warfare in its "civil warmongering" section.

New Zealand

I spoke to Mr. Wilson of the New Zealand Delegation and outlined to him our thinking on this problem. He feels strongly that a counter resolution of some type such as the Australian proposal should be supported.

The Commonwealth in General

Mr. Ben Cockram of the United Kingdom Delegation who follows the dominions for his delegation and also for the British Embassy in Washington told me that he had made a very careful canvass of do-

minion sentiment. He says all of the dominions favor some type of counter-resolution such as the Australian resolution. He says this is a sentiment that is shared right through the dominion delegations from top to bottom. He also confirmed that the United Kingdom Delegation, although it had first felt otherwise, now also shared this view.

He said that the statement by former Governor Earl¹ relative to dropping atomic bombs had apparently made quite an impression on the dominion delegations, and he thought in part was the cause of the present position. He told me that both Evatt and the Canadians would make strong speeches; a very strong one would be made by Evatt if Vyshinsky's was especially strong.

He indicated that while it had not been quite decided whether McNeil or Shawcross would speak for the United Kingdom, it was probable that Shawcross would, in which event it was obvious that the address would be extremely critical of the Russians in connection with this matter.

HAYDEN RAYNOR

¹ Presumably a reference to George H. Earle, former Governor of Pennsylvania.

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/70

*Minutes of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, October 24, 1967, 9:15 a. m.*

SECRET

[Here follow discussion of the Greek situation and some discussion of the war-mongering resolution.]

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that all¹ were agreed that the Russian resolution should be rejected outright, but that the question now under discussion was what the reaction would be when an alternative resolution was presented. Ambassador Austin recalled that the Delegation had authorized him to fight the Russian resolution, and that after it had been defeated there would be time to consider what should be done. Mr. Bohlen repeated that there was no disagreement in regard to fighting the Vyshinsky resolution and that the question was to anticipate our future action. Ambassador Austin replied that there was a difference of opinion on future procedure. The fact that a tentative United States draft resolution² was now presented to the Delegation suggested that we might take the leadership in proposing an alternative. He felt strongly that someone else should do it.

¹ i.e., in the U.S. Delegation.

² Not printed; IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/426, October 23. The operative part of the draft resolution read:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS all forms of propaganda, particularly that controlled by governments or their political instruments, carried on by fabrication

Mr. Fahy remarked that the matter should be referred to the Conference on Freedom of Information, and that any other solution would appear to be a Soviet victory even if it was contained in a separate proposal. Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out that she would be speaking, probably the same day, against the Yugoslav resolution on slanderous information in the Third Committee. This was a resolution with the same underlying purpose, but much less direct in its approach. Any implication that we would compromise on the Vyshinsky resolution would undercut the effect of her speech, which stressed the element of principle and of non-interference with freedom of expression. She asked that there be no compromise until after her speech had been made.

Ambassador Austin proposed that the Delegation fight to victory on the Russian resolution without compromise and that it not disclose its future position until after defeat of the Russian position. Mr. Bohlen stressed the importance of frank conversation with other delegations to impress on them the reason why we view the situation with so much gravity. Otherwise, he stated, many Europeans would be inclined to compromise with the Russians.

As the meeting ended, Mr. Dulles stated that it was hard to see what kind of resolution we could accept unless it was one which merely referred the matter to the Conference on Freedom of Information. He felt he could find holes in any of the drafts³ presented for the Delegation's consideration.

The meeting adjourned at 10:05 a. m.

Footnote continued from previous page.

or distortion or suppression of the truth and designed to foster unrest, fear or hatred, and CALLS upon all members of the United Nations

1. To intensify their efforts to remove the root causes of war through cooperative action to solve their economic and political difficulties, and

2. To encourage the free, truthful and accurate reporting of all developments affecting international relations."

This presumably was one result of a memorandum addressed on October 22 by Harley Notter of the Advisory Staff to Ambassador Austin and Messrs. Sandifer and Ross, in which Mr. Notter reported: "As of this morning it appears that the prevailing mood of the members of the General Assembly is even firmer than yesterday in favor of adopting some kind of resolution, especially one which would turn the tables on the Soviets. Our own position that the Soviet resolution must be defeated is therefore not so much in question, on its merits, as it is regarded as inadequate. A review of our position is advisable." (Memorandum is in IO Files in folder "Committee 1 Measures Against Propaganda and Inciters of a War.")

³ Also available for the information of the Delegation were less formal drafts prepared by Mr. Notter and Mr. Achilles of the Advisory Staff and a revision of the text contained in Doc. US/A/C.1/426 by Adlai E. Stevenson, Delegation member. (Drafts are found in source cited in immediately preceding footnote.)

IO Files: US/A/C.1/441

*Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. LaVerne Baldwin of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 24, 1947.

Subject: Warmongering

Participants: Mr. Finn Moe, Norwegian Delegation
Mr. Sverker Astrom, Swedish Delegation
LaVerne Baldwin, United States Delegation

NORWEGIAN VIEWS: I informed Mr. Moe of our adamant position both against any amendment and the resolution itself, stating that we considered there was no innocuous resolution of this character and that should any resolution be passed, it would accuse us in the eyes of the world of being war mongers. He inquired whether we would then vote against the Australian amendment, which I answered in the affirmative.

He continued, pointing out that our position at this late moment was obviously going to embarrass several delegations who had either committed themselves to support one amendment or another, or who had openly made known their position in that respect; he would question the fact that we had delayed so long in announcing our position and wondered whether it would not be more satisfactory for the amendments to be withdrawn by their originators rather than to invite delegations to vote against them; he did not feel that many such negative votes would be cast. I pointed out that of course it would be possible to abstain on an amendment or even to vote for it but to vote against the final resolution. I promised to keep him informed of any developments in this regard during the course of the day. He expressed his interest and desire in this respect.

Our delegation in Committee I was promptly informed.

SWEDISH VIEWS: I also informed Mr. Astrom of our position as above. He said hesitantly that he felt we had chosen the wrong moment to announce such a strong position and should certainly have done so long, long before if that were to be our position. He pointed out the same resultant position as had Mr. Moe, inquired whether we had attempted to have the amendments withdrawn, to which I replied that Evatt was out of town. He also asked how the U.K. delegation felt on the matter, on which I was not informed. He also requested to be kept advised of developments.

He took the personal liberty of pointing out to me that we might be subject to severe criticism in the U.N. for taking this position admitting of no tolerance, which might perhaps be less acceptable to other delegations than the temporizing one of accepting some type of amendment; further the Russians could of course use our position just

as much if not more so for propaganda purposes than if we were to accept amendments. He pointed out that the Australian proposal was completely unacceptable to the Soviets and changed the Soviet resolution to such an extent that the Soviet name could hardly be attached to it. I mentioned that I understood there were numerous delegations who felt that we should not throw out every Russian proposal but should rather twist them to be acceptable to us where possible to avoid a complete blackout of the Soviet proposals; we had nevertheless arrived at our decision in this question after long discussion and firm decision and considered it necessary for the reasons I had cited.

Mr. Astrom took the further liberty of stating that we were perhaps open to the charge of inconsistency in that war mongering was one of the charges against Goebbels and his group and was specified in the Nuremberg Act and had been one of the principal features of the Nuremberg Trials; in the U.N. we were an active sponsor in Committee 6 of a proposal for a convention which would cover war mongering. I pointed out that the latter was obviously a more detailed legal matter, to which he agreed saying that of course it would necessarily include considerable study and definition in detail, but he would like to call our attention to the fact that our different positions both in the U.N. might very well become the subject of criticism. I replied I would delve into the issue and let him know.

We agreed to keep in touch during the day.

501.BB/10-2547 : Telegram

The Chargé in Norway (Huston) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

OSLO, October 25, 1947—3 p. m.

481. Foreign Minister Lange, who is returning to New York by air October 30 as head [of] Norwegian delegation at UNGA, expressed to me yesterday deep pessimism regarding growing antagonism between great powers, notably US and Russia. Saying virtual stalemate had already been reached, he expressed conviction international life was approaching stage of "complete paralysis" which might have most serious consequences if principal powers should fail [to] find common ground of agreement on some of more vital issues. Principal points made by Lange in lengthy discussion were:

1. Norwegian policy in UN is directed toward maintenance of original conception of principles on which organization founded, *id est*, big power agreement. This explains Norwegian voting. It is popularly believed Norway's attitude is determined by "fear of Russians" but this is not true; it is based on hope of promoting agreement of great powers and desire to avoid closing door on big power accord.

2. Lange is aware Norwegian voting, particularly on Greek question, is not "appreciated" by US delegation and others including some Norwegians. Discussing point made in Norwegian delegate's speech at time of vote on US resolution to effect [that] Greece was point of clash between big power interests, Lange recognized that US desire to enable Greeks to be masters in own country corresponded to interests of Norway and other western countries but said he could not help feeling there was "something else" that was direct clash of US-Soviet interests and that "each wanted to get there first". He admitted interference across frontier of Greece's northern neighbors but believed this outside influence only aggravated already bad situation and that even if frontier were sealed there would still be civil war in Greece. There were considerations he had in mind "when I wrote Langhelles speech".

3. Lange, whom Embassy considers entirely western minded and friendly to US, criticized American attitude on following points:

(a) US delegation gave impression it had come to GA "with mind already made up", with patience already exhausted and with premature admission of defeat in endeavors [to] reach common viewpoint with Soviets. Lange admitted "Russians are very difficult fellows to get along with—it may even be impossible to get along with them" and described them as troublesome, trying, uncooperative, adding everyone's patience was wearing thin but he felt US patience had given out before abandonment of all hope of avoiding fatal *final* division was justified.

(b) He could not escape feeling "Americans were trying to drive Russians out of UN". His observations and conversations with Gromyko had on other hand led him to conviction Russians would not "quit UN" as UN was too valuable to Soviets as propaganda instrument.

(c) US intransigence with respect acceptance Ukraine for seat in Security Council as representative Slav bloc was unfortunate not only because it stiffened Soviet antagonism but represented bad tactics psychologically from American point of view.

HUSTON

501.BB/10-2647 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, October 26, 1947—10:43 p. m.

1095. For Bohlen from Ross. Following is text of draft compromise resolution worked out today by the Australian, Canadian and French delegations and telephoned to me this evening.¹ This will be discussed in delegation meeting Monday morning.² The three delegations concerned plan to introduce this resolution at the outset of the 11:00 meeting.

¹ For official text, see GA (II), *First Committee*, p. 577, annex 13f.

² October 27.

"WHEREAS

In the Charter of the UN, the peoples expressed their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors;

WHEREAS

The Charter also calls for the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, all members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate action for such observance of fundamental freedoms

The GA

1. CONDEMNNS all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever countries conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.

2. REQUESTS the Government of each member to take appropriate steps:

(a) To promote by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them friendly relations among nations based on the purposes and principles of the Charter;

(b) To encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace;

3. DIRECTS that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information with a recommendation that the conference consider methods for carrying out the purposes of this resolution."

[ROSS]
MARSHALL

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Durward V. Sandifer, Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 27, 1947.

Mr. Rusk called me this morning during the course of the Delegation meeting to give me Mr. Lovett's² views, arrived at in consultation with Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bohlen, concerning the joint resolution submitted by Australia, Canada, and France as a substitute for the Russian war-mongering resolution (A/C.1/224, US/A/C.1/446).³ The text of this resolution had been telegraphed to the Department last night.

¹ Folder "Committee 1, Measures against Propaganda and Inciters of a New War".

² Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State.

³ See telegram 1095 from New York, October 26, *supra*.

Mr. Rusk said that Mr. Lovett would like to see three changes in this draft:⁴

1. In paragraph 1 it would be desirable to eliminate the passage "held likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace". The words "likely to provoke" are undesirable as being too broad, and the whole passage is undesirable as suggesting the possibility of a legitimate reaction by members to verbal threats. It might also have an adverse effect on the right of collective self-defense.

2. There should be added at the end of the introductory clause of paragraph 2 a provision that action should be in accordance with constitutional practices and policies. This point was regarded as very important by the Department.

3. In paragraph 3 the words "with a recommendation that" should be deleted and the words "for consideration of" substituted.

If agreement could not be reached on the inclusion of these changes, a statement of the United States position should be made for the record particularly on points 1 and 2.

With these changes, the Delegation was authorized, if developments in the Committee made it necessary, to vote for the resolution, even if it were impossible to obtain agreement on the changes suggested.

I communicated this information to the Delegation which was still in session. There was a difference of opinion among the Delegates as to the position which should be taken by the Delegation on the resolution. At the conclusion of the consideration of the question the Chairman, Senator Austin, announced that he would proceed in accordance with the instruction from the Department transmitted by Mr. Rusk by telephone, taking account also of certain other suggestions made in the course of the Delegation discussion. It was agreed that this should not be treated as a Delegation decision, Mr. Dulles particularly requesting that the record show that he did not concur in the decision to support the resolution.⁵

I called Mr. Rusk back to report to him the action taken, and the fact that some of the Delegates were opposed to the resolution, particularly Mr. Dulles, Mr. Fahy, and General Hilldring. Mrs. Roosevelt was concerned about its relation to the French substitute resolution on the Yugoslav item in Committee 3. She did not agree with the Department's instruction that she should support this resolution.

⁴ See Doc. US/A/C.1/446/Rev. 1, *infra*.

⁵ The minutes of this Delegation meeting, not printed, are contained in Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/71, October 27, IO Files.

IO Files: US/A/C.1/446/Rev. 1

*United States Delegation Working Paper*¹

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] October 27, 1947.

DRAFT COMPROMISE RESOLUTION PREPARED BY AUSTRALIAN, CANADIAN
AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS[U.S. Delegation changes indicated by striking out and underscoring.]²

WHEREAS

In the Charter of the United Nations the peoples expressed their determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors;

WHEREAS

The Charter also calls for the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, fundamental freedoms including which includes freedom of expression, all Members having pledged themselves in Article 56 to take joint and separate action for such observance of fundamental freedoms

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. Condemns all forms of propaganda, particularly propaganda controlled by Governments or their political agencies, in whatsoever countries conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or to encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression.

2. Requests the Government of each Member to take appropriate steps within its constitutional limits

(a) To promote by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them friendly relations among nations based on the purposes and principles of the Charter;

¹ The United States amendments were offered by Ambassador Austin on October 27, when the First Committee, after several votes, reached unanimous agreement on the text of a draft resolution to be recommended to the General Assembly. This text (printed in U.N. Doc. A/428, October 28) was substantially the same as that submitted in the draft Australian, Canadian, and French resolution, except that section 2 of the operative part of the resolution included the words "within its constitutional limits" and section 3 was shortened to read simply "Directs that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information." (Text also in GA (II), *Plenary*, p. 745.) Committee discussion is recorded in GA (II), *First Committee*, pp. 242 ff. The Committee draft was adopted by the General Assembly without discussion on November 3 (GA (II), *Plenary*, p. 746). For official text, Resolution 110 (II), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions*, p. 14.

² Brackets appear in the source text.

(b) To encourage the dissemination of all information designed to give expression to the undoubted desire of all peoples for peace;

3. Directs that this resolution be communicated to the forthcoming Conference on Freedom of Information; ~~with a recommendation that the Conference consider methods for carrying out the purposes of this resolution~~ as being relevant to the discussion of item 2(d) of the provisional agenda.

THE UNITED STATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS: THE UNITED STATES POSITION REGARDING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE

I. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING ELECTIONS TO CERTAIN ORGANS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS¹

501.BC/8-147

*Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs*²

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 1, 1947.]

U.S. SLATES FOR ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, AND TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL³

THE PROBLEM

At the second regular session of the General Assembly, which will be convened on September 16, 1947, it will be necessary to elect three states to non-permanent membership on the Security Council, and six states to the Economic and Social Council, to replace states whose terms of office will expire December 31, 1947. It will also be necessary to elect two members of the Trusteeship Council, in order to attain an equal division between states which administer trust territories and states which do not, in accordance with Article 86 of the Charter, since the U.S. trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands has been approved. (For present composition of these Councils, see Table, pages 3 and 4.)⁴

¹ For previous documentation regarding this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 117 ff.

² The Office of Special Political Affairs was charged with responsibility for U.N. affairs in the Department of State.

³ In line with procedures established in the Department in 1946 (see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 251 ff.), the groundwork in formulation of policy regarding slates was accomplished by a Departmental team known as the "Membership Team." Minutes of meetings of the Membership Team are in Department of State files 501, 501.BB, and 501.BC.

⁴ Printed herein, p. 102.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the U.S. slate for non-permanent membership on the Security Council consist of Czechoslovakia; Uruguay, with Cuba* as a second preference; and Canada.

2. It is recommended that the U.S. slate for election to the Economic and Social Council consist of Brazil;* Poland; Iran, or as a second preference, Siam; Sweden; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and the United Kingdom.

3. It is recommended that the U.S. slate for election to the Trusteeship Council consist of the Philippine Republic and Denmark.

4. It is recommended that no commitments for United States support for election to these Councils be made to the representatives of any foreign countries prior to September 1, 1947† and that, whenever possible, commitments be avoided until the United States Delegation to the General Assembly reaches New York. It is further recommended that if such representatives should approach the Department seeking United States support, the Officers concerned should respond in accordance with the following formula:

(a) In answer to all inquiries, it should be emphasized that no final decisions have been made, and that they will probably not be taken until the Delegation reaches New York.

(b) If an approach is made by a representative of a country which the Department plans to support, a statement may be made to the effect that the United States is giving serious consideration to its candidacy.

(c) If an approach is made by a country whose candidacy the United States would definitely oppose, its representative should be informed that there is no present prospect of support for it.

It is further recommended that, unless special circumstances suggest the desirability of a contrary course in a particular case, states which may be admitted to membership in the United Nations at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly not be considered for election to these Councils at this time.

*Subject to the qualification that the United States is generally disposed to support any candidate agreed upon by the Latin American Republics. For further elaboration, see Discussion below. [Footnote in the source text.]

†With the exception of the Philippine Republic, to which a commitment has already been made as regards the Trusteeship Council. [Footnote in the source text.]

TABLE

PRESENT MEMBERSHIP ON UN COUNCILS AND PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS ON U.S. SLATES

PRESENT MEMBERSHIP	PROPOSED SLATE
<i>Security Council</i>	
Permanent Members:	
China	
France	
U.S.S.R.	
U.K.	
U.S.	
Non-Permanent Members	
Term Expires December 31, 1948:	
Syria	
Colombia	
Belgium	
Term Expires December 31, 1947:	
Australia	
Brazil	
Poland	
	Two-Year Term:
	Canada
	Uruguay or Cuba
	Czechoslovakia
<i>Economic and Social Council</i>	
Term Expires December 31, 1949:	
Venezuela	
Lebanon	
Turkey	
Byelorussian S.S.R.	
U.S.	
New Zealand	
Term Expires December 31, 1948:	
Netherlands	
Canada	
Chile	
China	
France	
Peru	
Term Expires December 31, 1947:	
Cuba	
Czechoslovakia	
India	
Norway	
U.S.S.R.	
U.K.	
	Three-Year Term:
	Brazil
	Poland
	Iran or Siam
	Sweden
	U.S.S.R.
	U.K.
<i>Trusteeship Council</i>	
Administering States	
Australia	
Belgium	
France	
New Zealand	
United Kingdom	
Non-Administering States	
China	
U.S.	
U.S.S.R.	
Term Expires December 31, 1949:	
Iraq	
Mexico	
	Additional Members:
	(Three-Year Term)
	Philippine Republic
	Denmark

DISCUSSION

1. *Security Council*

Under Article 23 of the Charter, the General Assembly each year elects three non-permanent members to the Security Council for a term of two years, "due regard being especially paid, in the first instance, to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographic distribution." A retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election.

Subject to the condition that members be capable of making an important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Department, on the basis of the current membership of the United Nations, has in the past considered it desirable to include among the six non-permanent members of the Security Council:

- One member of the British Commonwealth
- One country from Eastern and Central Europe
- One country from Northern, Western, and Southern Europe
- Two countries from the other American Republics
- One country from the Near East and Africa

(SC-171/8, November 15, 1945)

This distribution was attained in the elections held at London at the first part of the First Session of the General Assembly and was continued in the elections held at New York last October, when Syria, Colombia, and Belgium were elected to the Council for a two-year term to replace Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands.

If the existing balance among the non-permanent members is to be retained, Australia, Brazil, and Poland must be replaced by a member of the British Commonwealth, a Latin American State, and an Eastern European State, respectively.

(a) Successor to Australia:

In deciding upon a replacement for Australia, it is to be noted that the categories listed above provide no representation for the Pacific-Far Eastern area except for China, a permanent member of the Security Council. For this reason, some consideration has been given to the question whether a Commonwealth State from this area (New Zealand) or India would have a prior claim over other members of the British Commonwealth. *New Zealand*, however, still has two years to serve on the Economic and Social Council, while the uncertain political status of India would appear to preclude its consideration as a candidate for the Security Council at this time. Moreover, it does not appear appropriate at this time to consider the substitution of one of the two other Far Eastern members of the United Nations, Siam or the Philippine Republic, for a British Commonwealth State. At a later date, after other members are admitted to the United Nations, it may be necessary to reconsider the distribution of seats in the Security Council.

The question remains as to which member of the British Commonwealth should succeed Australia. *South Africa* should probably be eliminated from consideration as a candidate because of its unpopular position in the Indian-South African controversy and in the matter of the status of Southwest Africa. *Canada*, although remaining a member of the Economic and Social Council until December 31, 1948, appears most suitable, by virtue of its political orientation and importance, to replace Australia on the Security Council.

(b) Successor to Poland

The possible Eastern and Central European candidates include Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. The Department would not desire to support a constituent Soviet Republic or Yugoslavia for membership on the Council. On the other hand, *Czechoslovakia* would serve a useful function because of its ties with both the East and the West.

(c) Successor to Brazil:

Unless there are strong reasons to the contrary, the United States should support any candidate agreed upon by the Latin American Republics for the remaining seat on the Council. Uruguay and Cuba are suggested as the two most important Latin American states (except for Argentina) which will not hold other posts on United Nations Councils after December 31, 1947. *Cuba* retires from the Economic and Social Council at that time. *Uruguay*, which the United States unsuccessfully supported for election to the Economic and Social Council in 1946, proved to be a poor candidate; but its election to the Security Council at this time would provide a good geographic balance on the Council, since Colombia is the other Latin American member. For this reason, Cuba is listed as a second preference.

The remaining Latin American states not now members of any United Nations Council are Argentina, Panama, Guatemala, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Honduras, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

2. *Economic and Social Council*

Under Article 61 of the Charter, the General Assembly each year elects six members to this Council for a term of three years. A retiring member is eligible for immediate re-election.

The current membership of the Economic and Social Council is indicated in the Table on pages 3 and 4 [earlier in this document].

The existing geographic balance in the Council is as follows:

The Five Major Powers

Four Latin American Republics (Chile, Cuba, Peru, Venezuela)

Two Eastern European States (Czechoslovakia, Byelorussian SSR)

Two Western European States (The Netherlands, Norway)

Three Members of the British Commonwealth (Canada, India, New Zealand)

Two Near Eastern States (Lebanon, Turkey)

This distribution, attained in the elections in New York last October, differs from that of the First Economic and Social Council, elected at London in January 1946, and may be further modified as new members are admitted to the United Nations.

The *United Kingdom* and the *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* should be re-elected without difficulty, in view of the common agreement on the desirability of representation for all of the Five Major Powers on the Economic and Social Council.

(a) Successor to Cuba

Brazil is recommended as the preferred U.S. candidate because it is considered desirable that one Latin American state of leading economic importance (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico) should always be represented on the Council. None of these sits on the Council at this time. Because of this consideration, the U.S. would not wish to support this year a small, economically unimportant and relatively underdeveloped Latin American Republic, although in general it is disposed to accept any candidate agreed upon by the Latin American states.

Brazil has already informed this Government that it is a candidate for the Economic and Social Council. It may be noted that Argentina has also expressed its interest in serving on the Council.

(b) Successor to Czechoslovakia

Of the Eastern European states, *Poland* is the logical replacement for Czechoslovakia, although the Czech representative in New York has raised the question of the re-election of Czechoslovakia with the U.S. Delegation. However, except in the case of major powers, it has previously been felt that immediate re-election is, in general, undesirable as it would result in deferring membership unduly for many states. Moreover, the fact that Czechoslovakia is our choice for the Security Council precludes its consideration here. Yugoslavia has previously served on the Council (term expired December 31, 1946) and has made known its interest in serving on the Council again. Present U.S. policy does not indicate support for Yugoslavia at this time. One Soviet Republic, Byelorussia, was elected to the Council in 1946.

(c) Successor to India

Iran is recommended as the U.S. candidate. It has not yet served on any of the Councils. *Greece*, which previously served a one-year term on the Council, has requested that the U.S. support its candidacy this year. However, in view of the program of U.S. aid to Greece and the fact that Turkey is already a member of the Council, it would not appear desirable to support Greece for this post.

Because there is only one member (China) on the Economic and Social Council representing the Far East, some consideration should be given to the substitution of a Far Eastern state for Iran. Since the Philippine Republic desires, and enjoys U.S. support for, election to the Trusteeship Council, *Siam* would appear to be the only other eligible Far Eastern State. It is therefore listed as a second choice on the slate.

It may be necessary to consider the re-election of India to this post, or alternatively, the election of South Africa.

(e) [*sic*] Successor to Norway

Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Luxembourg appear to be the possible Western European candidates. Belgium is now on the Security Council and resigned last year from the Economic and Social Council in order that the Netherlands could be elected to that Council. *Sweden* appears to be exceptionally well suited for membership on the Council because of its economic importance and its moderate, progressive economic and social policies. However, if the Scandinavian states agree upon a different candidate (e.g., Denmark), the U.S. might reconsider its position on Sweden, subject to the necessary changes in the slates for the other Councils.

3. Trusteeship Council

Article 86 of the Charter provides that the Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

(a) those members administering trust territories;

(b) such of the five major Powers as are not administering trust territories; and

(c) as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of Members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

The Trusteeship Council was brought into existence by the General Assembly at the second part of the first session in New York last December, following the approval of eight trusteeship agreements submitted by Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. These five states thus became administering members of the Council. The automatic membership of China, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. under Article 86 (b) made it necessary to elect two additional members of the council to achieve the required equal balance between states administering trust territories and states not administering trust territories. Mexico and Iraq were elected to these two seats.

The existing geographic balance in the Council is as follows:

The Five Major Powers

Two members of the British Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand)

One Western European State (Belgium)

One Near Eastern state (Iraq)

One Latin American state (Mexico)

Since the United States draft trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands has been finally approved, it is necessary to elect two additional members to the Council.⁵

⁵ For documentation concerning this subject, see pp. 258 ff.

The United States Delegation, considering the slate for the Council last December, agreed that if more than two members were to be elected at that time, the third candidate should be either Denmark or the Philippine Republic. The choice of a fourth member at that time lay between India and an Eastern European state from the Soviet bloc. (US/A/169; US/AM(Chr. 32).⁶

A commitment has already been made to support the candidacy of the *Philippine Republic* for the Council.

It has been recommended that our candidate for the second new seat be a Western European state, preferably Denmark, with consideration being given to the question whether, since Belgium is now an administering member of the Council, a better geographic balance would not be attained by placing an Eastern European state on the slate. It should be noted, however, that the Eastern European states voted against the approval of the eight trusteeship agreements last December, and that the U.S.S.R. did not participate in the first meeting of the Council this spring.

4. *Procedure in the General Assembly*

If, after two ballots, it becomes clear that there is no prospect for immediate election of the United States candidate or candidates, the Delegation should be free to support alternative candidates after consultation with the Department.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 242 and 244.

IO Files: US/A/283

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. David H. Popper of the Division of International Organization Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1947.

Mr. Kotschnig¹ said that the Czechs seemed aware of the fact that we had them in mind as a candidate for election to the Security Council. He said that they did not want the job. He also expressed the view that it might be better not to push the Czechs for this post, since they could only function in the Security Council as Soviet puppets, whereas in the Economic and Social Council and other less political agencies they were permitted to exercise a certain measure of freedom. Mr. Kotschnig was therefore inclined to believe that the end result might be better even if we elected Yugoslavia to the Security Council.

¹ Walter Kotschnig, Acting Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs, at this time was at the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN).

At a Membership Team meeting on August 7, Mr. Popper relayed Mr. Kotschnig's remarks to those present. He suggested that consideration be given to this point of view and that whatever the reaction of the Team, we should be prepared for a possible refusal from the Czechs to serve on the Security Council. In this case, he felt it might at some time be necessary to consider whether we would support Yugoslavia or the Ukraine for a Security Council seat.

Mr. Llewellyn Thompson (EE)² was of the opinion that Czechoslovakia should be retained on the slate. Even though the Czech representative on the Security Council were to lose all his independence, Mr. Thompson stated, the spectacle of a Czech representative aping the Soviets would have a salutary effect from our point of view on the attitude of the Czech Government and people. Furthermore, Mr. Thompson and others felt that it was possible that the Czech representative might exercise a moderating influence on the Russians in the Security Council. The discussion was inconclusive.

² Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.

501.BB/8-2747 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1947—6 p. m.

379. Dept suggests you take following position re Lie¹ proposal for Big Five meeting Friday to discuss GA slates:

1. Suggest you tell Lie we feel meeting at this time may be somewhat early in view lack of info on composition of delegations. You should make clear US reserves its freedom to consult with other members; does not wish to make a binding agreement as feels Big Five should not present other UN members with a *fait accompli* on slates; and regards meeting as chiefly exploratory and informational.

2. On substance of Soviet proposal, Dept feels you should oppose strongly Poland (Modzelewski²) for GA President. This could be based on principle competency should determine and names sufficient chief delegates not yet known to make selection. In your discretion, you could hint that among chief delegates already named are persons of greater competence. (For your background we have in mind persons such as Spaak³ or Aranha,⁴ if available, and Evatt.⁵) Dept feels you

¹ Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

² Zygmunt Modzelewski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

³ Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian diplomat, President of the General Assembly at the First Special Session of the General Assembly in April and May 1947.

⁵ Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister.

should oppose Masaryk⁶ for Committee 1 Chairmanship on basis an Eastern European state should not hold chairmanship Committee 1 for two consecutive sessions. We feel allocation of four places on General Committee to Eastern European states inequitable, since it gives six of 55 members four of fourteen seats on Committee, and in first Assembly only held three places. You should point out clearly London record indicates no commitments made re distribution 2nd GA posts (Deptel 188, April 28, to USUN).⁷ While Gromyko endeavored to get Big Five agreement to Poland as President second session, no commitment was made except an expression of willingness to consider Poland's candidacy on merits at second session.

3. In line with US position at London, Dept will continue to support allocation to Eastern group of three posts General Committee to be divided this session as follows: two vice-presidents (USSR and probably Byelorussia), and one committee chairman (preferably Czechoslovakia). Would also agree to one committee vice-chairmanship and one rapporteurship. US has not reached any decision re GA committee slates, though you may, in your discretion, indicate we might support Masaryk for chairman Committee 2 or 3.

4. Dept would oppose candidacy Ukraine for SC. You may state, in your discretion, US considering Czechoslovakia for SC and Poland for ECOSOC.

LOVETT

⁶ Jan Masaryk, Czech Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Not printed. The "London record" presumably refers to the conversations held in London between the Five Powers at the first part of the First Session of the General Assembly, regarding election of slates, etc. For documentation regarding these matters, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 117-250 *passim*.

501.BB/8-3047: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, August 30, 1947—3 p. m.

794. With reference to Department's 379, August 27, 6 p. m., conversation last night with Secretary General Lie and four other permanent members SC regarding GA slates was general in nature with individual views as indicated below:

1. *Russia*. Gromyko¹ asked other permanent members to consider Russia's desire that Chairman Polish Delegation² be elected president GA. I told him that I was confident that my government would not be

¹ Andrei A. Gromyko, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations.

² Mr. Modzelewski.

able to support Poland for this position and said that in general we felt the personal qualifications of the individual should be a major factor in selections for all GA posts. Gromyko did not contest this idea in principle but said that he thought Modzelewski was thoroughly competent. Lie expressed opinion that Modzelewski was technically well qualified for the job. Lie also mentioned Jan Masaryk, Evatt and Aranha as individuals whom he thought should be seriously considered. He was lukewarm in his comment on Aranha because of his deficient knowledge of both English and French which he said was a serious handicap in running the Assembly. Gromyko then suggested Jan Masaryk for Committee I. I told him that our view was that the chairmanship of the first committee should not be held by a representative of an eastern European state twice in succession and remarked that the short special session when the Canadian was chairman could hardly be taken into consideration. Gromyko's attitude throughout the discussion was friendly to the entire group and apparently reasonable. I told him that I would consult with the Department and give him later a more specific statement as to exactly what support we could give to eastern European states for GA posts. With respect to the SC, Gromyko said that his government would like for the Ukraine to take Poland's place. I told him that my government preferred Czechoslovakia. He immediately countered that Czechoslovakia did not want the job and would support the Ukraine. The discussion was inconclusive on this point but Gromyko received no encouragement from any of the other members for the Ukraine candidacy. Referring to Poland's going off the SC, he said that in the Russian view it was essential that Poland be given some other position and suggested that she might go on ECOSOC. I told him that I thought it likely that my government would support Poland's candidacy for ECOSOC.

2. *Great Britain.* Cadogan³ stated that he had no instructions whatever from his government regarding GA or SC slates. . . .

3. *China.* The Chinese representative had little comment to make during the discussion on slates, but said that he thought Evatt's candidacy should be very seriously considered for the presidency of the Assembly. I gather that the Chinese Government may have committed itself to some measure of support for Evatt, although Dr. Tsiang⁴ admitted in reply to a question from Lie that his government was not definitely committed. He also mentioned the desire of India to succeed Australia on the SC and indicated that if any other support for India were forthcoming that she would likewise have Chinese support. I told him quite frankly that our government would have to support

³ Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations.

⁴ Permanent Representative of China at the United Nations.

the candidacy of Canada at this time for succession to Australia. Cadogan, Lie and I all suggested to the Chinese that India could well afford to wait another election and that if her claims were pressed there would be the rival claims of the Philippines to consider. The Chinese [representative] did not press the matter but remarked that it was very important for the Far East to be represented at least part of the time on the SC by some country in addition to China. He realized that it would not be possible to have continuously on the SC two East Asiatic representatives, but felt that there should frequently be two of these countries represented on the Council.

France. Mr. De la Tournelle, the French representative, said that he had no instructions and he took very little part in the discussion on slates.

I informed the group that my government was not willing to give any firm commitments at the present time regarding slates and that we must reserve our entire freedom to consult with other members than the Big Five. There was no criticism of this attitude and, in fact, Cadogan, Gromyko and the Chinese all said that their governments would do the same thing. There was unanimity of opinion that the agenda of the GA was overloaded and Gromyko urged strongly that thought be given to screening the agenda in the General Committee in order to postpone to the next regular session of the GA many of the items. Cadogan and Lie both strongly supported this view and I agreed that the agenda was too overloaded to offer any possibility of thorough examination of all the items. Lie feels that it is essential for the agenda to be reduced. It was arranged that this group should meet again at Lie's house in the evening after the SC meeting on the afternoon of Tuesday, September 9.

JOHNSON

501.BC/8-1947 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1947—6 p. m.

579. Careful consideration given by Dept Urtel 695 Aug 19¹ India's interest in membership TC. Prior firm commitment to support Philippines for one of two vacancies precludes U.S. support for second Asian member. You may in your discretion inform GOI sense of foregoing. For your background, balance of colonial vs. anti-colonial states would be disturbed by addition two Asian nations to TC. Dept therefore favors neutral state for second vacancy.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

IO Files : US/A/292

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Sandifer)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1947.

Mr. Johnson¹ called to give me a report on the meeting last night of the Big Five with Mr. Lie to discuss the question of slates.

I. *General Committee*²

President.—Mr. Johnson said that Senator Austin said that our position on the Presidency had not been finally determined. He indicated that if Mr. Spaak came and would be available through most of the session we would support him. If Mr. Spaak is not available our present preference would be for Mr. Evatt or Mr. Aranha. However, we would not decide our position as between these two until we had information as to the measure of support for them.

Vice Presidents.—Mr. Johnson reported no special comment on this except to say that Gromyko insisted strongly on two Committee chairmanships for Eastern Europe. In other words he was not willing to accept a Vice Presidency. I told Mr. Johnson that we had considered this question very carefully and that we felt very strongly that two Committee chairmanships gave an entirely unjustifiable strength to the Eastern European countries in the actual work of the Assembly. We are willing to go along with three places on the General Committee for Eastern Europe but we are completely opposed to two Committee chairmanships. He said that he agreed and that he thought that there was support for this position among the other countries.

Committee 1.—Gromyko asked for the Chairmanship of Committee 1 as one of the two chairmanships he wanted for Eastern Europe. There was unanimity among the other four in rejecting this request. Senator Austin said that we would prefer Evatt or Aranha for this post depending upon the outcome of the election to the Presidency.

Committees 2 and 3.—Gromyko would prefer a Polish representative as Committee Chairman over Masaryk. He apparently has some

¹ At this time the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN) was headed by Senator Warren R. Austin who was United States Representative at (the Seat of) the United Nations with the rank of ambassador. He also functioned as Senior Representative of the United States to the General Assembly and Head of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (in the absence of the Secretary of State), and as United States Representative on the Security Council. Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson was Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, and in this position functioned in effect as the second-ranking officer at the United States Mission (there being no position at this time of Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations).

² Apparently intended to be the first of two memoranda in which Sandifer reported a telephone conversation with Ambassador Johnson, regarding elections to the General Committee (this memorandum) and to the Security Council (the second memorandum); for the second memorandum see *infra*.

hope that Masaryk may be elected to the Presidency. However, he would prefer to have the Polish representative as Chairman of Committee 3 (since he considers this a more important Committee in this Assembly). Mr. Johnson suggested that it might be possible to shift Iran to the Second Committee. On our slate it had been listed tentatively for Committee 3. He thought that since we would insist on cutting the Russians down to one Committee chairmanship, we might agree to have them as Chairman of Committee 3.

Committee 4.—No comments on this Committee.

Committee 5.—Mr. Johnson said that Mr. Malik³ of Lebanon had been suggested as a possibility for this Committee. I did not understand clearly whether this was Mr. Johnson's suggestion or whether it originated at the meeting. I told him that I thought that Mr. Malik was primarily a philosopher and seemed to be quite unfitted for this Committee. He said that he did not know Mr. Malik's personal qualifications. I reminded Mr. Johnson that our slate had called for a Canadian Chairman which might be Mr. Ilsley,⁴ Finance [*Justice?*] Minister. He referred in that connection to the suggestion that had been made for the *Ad Hoc* Committee for Palestine.

Committee 6.—Mr. Johnson said that there was general agreement that it was important that the Chairman of Committee 6 should be a jurist. No particular state or name was suggested.

"Ad Hoc" Committee for Palestine.—It was suggested that Mr. Pearson⁵ of the Canadian Delegation would make a good Chairman for this Committee. Mr. Lie supported this proposal strongly. Senator Austin pointed out that there might be some difficulty in suggesting an alternate Delegate for a position of this importance.

Mr. Gromyko did not bring up the question of the Stettinius commitment.⁶

I reminded Mr. Johnson that our slate had called for three Latin American places on the General Committee, one of which would be Mexico for Vice President. He said that he thought there would be no difficulty in getting appointment to three places for Latin America. I told him I thought there might if we did not succeed in heading off two chairmanships for Eastern Europe.

³ Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister to the United States.

⁴ J. L. Ilsley.

⁵ Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

⁶ It has not been possible to clarify the reference to the "Stettinius commitment." Discussions relating to elections to the General Committee held at London in January 1946, when Mr. Stettinius led the U.S. Delegation to the first part of First Session of the General Assembly, are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. 1, pp. 117-250, *passim*.

IO Files: US/A/293

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Sandifer)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1947.

Council Slates

Mr. Johnson¹ said that Gromyko was adamant in his insistence on Ukraine for the Security Council. Gromyko said flatly that Czechoslovakia would not take the post. Mr. Johnson thought that if we are to continue to support Czechoslovakia, we must have assurance from her that she would take the post if elected. He said that if we are to continue our refusal to support a constituent republic,² we must decide whether we will support Yugoslavia. He thought that any action to support Yugoslavia, even to voting for her, would have a very serious adverse effect on our Greek case in the General Assembly.³ I told him that that was definitely my view but that the question of whether our alternative position would be to support Czechoslovakia had not yet been settled.

Mr. Johnson said that if the Department should decide definitely not to support a constituent republic under any circumstances, we might have to refuse to support any satellite state and take some other Eastern European state such as Turkey. I asked him if he did not think this would cause a bitter fight with Russia and he said it certainly would. He said he thought the British might be willing to refuse under any circumstances to vote for a constituent republic.

¹ Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson.

² That is, the Ukraine or Byelorussia.

³ For documentation regarding this matter, see vol. v, pp. 816 ff.

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹

Memorandum by the Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation (Sandifer) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 13, 1947.

Subject: United States Candidate for President of the General Assembly

Discussion

The slate agreed upon in the Department for the Presidency of the General Assembly was Spaak (Belgium), Evatt (Australia), and Aranha (Brazil) in that order. This was with the understanding that before making this known to other delegations we would assess the

¹ Folder "Slates".

extent of support for Evatt and Aranha. Spaak has recently told our Embassy in Brussels that he did not wish to be a candidate for re-election because of the principle of rotation and the uncertainty of his being able to stay through the Session because of his situation at home.

Mr. Evatt is known to have the support of the British Commonwealth States, some of the Scandinavian States, and probably a number of other countries. He established himself at San Francisco as the champion of the smaller powers, and has wide popular support. Because of his drive and energy Mr. Evatt would undoubtedly be a good President. He would be effective in rallying world opinion in support of strong and affirmative General Assembly action.

Mr. Aranha, who was President of the Special Assembly Session on Palestine last spring, is also a good chairman, although his command of languages is not perfect. He is a man of experience and poise and definitely friendly to the United States. Aranha desires the presidency but a telegram from Rio de Janeiro, dated September 12, states that the Brazilian Foreign Office is not soliciting the election of Aranha for two reasons: to respect the principle of rotation of the office and to avoid prejudicing the possibility of Brazil's election to the Economic and Social Council. We have not been able to obtain a complete picture of Latin American views on Aranha's candidacy.

*Recommendations*²

1. That the United States Delegation support Evatt for President of the Assembly, and that Evatt be informed of this promptly.

2. That the United States support Aranha for the Chairmanship of Committee 1.

3. That a high official of the United States Delegation (preferably the Secretary or Senator Austin) explain to Aranha our reasons for supporting Mr. Evatt, stressing our support for the principle of rotation in office but placing the highest personal emphasis upon our conviction that Aranha is indispensably needed for the difficult and valuable service in this important Assembly as Chairman of Committee 1, where the decisions on so many far-reaching issues will be worked out. His ability and experience are urgently needed there.

Concurrences

Advisers from Geographic Offices and Executive Officers

Mr. Rusk³ Mr. Johnson Mr. Bohlen⁴

² These recommendations were formulated in a meeting of the senior advisers of the United States Delegation Staff on September 13. Minutes of this meeting are in the IO Files, Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/41, not printed.

³ Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs and a member of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers.

⁴ Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State and a member of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers.

IO Files : US/A/294/Rev.1

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 14, 1947.

UNITED STATES SLATE FOR THE GENERAL COMMITTEE

DISCUSSION

The General Committee of the General Assembly consists of the President of the Assembly, seven Vice Presidents (which by general understanding include the Big Five) elected as States, and the Chairmen of the six Main Committees of the Assembly, elected as individuals.

The geographic distribution agreed upon in the Department, taking account of the distribution in the First Session, is as follows: three Latin American States; three Eastern European States (one Committee chairmanship, and vice-presidencies of the Assembly for the USSR and one other Eastern State); one British Commonwealth State (plus the United Kingdom); two Near or Middle Eastern States (probably Iran and an Arab State); one Western European State; and the remaining Permanent Members of the Security Council.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *For President of the Assembly:*

Evatt (Australia). See attached memorandum.¹

2. *For Vice Presidents of the Assembly:*

China, France, U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S., Mexico, Ukraine

3. *For Chairman of Committee 1:*

Aranha (Brazil)

Possible alternative candidates if Aranha does not agree to be a candidate:

Berendsen (New Zealand)²

Bech (Luxembourg)³

4. *For Chairman of Committee 2:*

Adl (Iran)⁴

5. *For Chairman of Committee 3:*

Modzelewski (Poland)

¹ *Supra.*

² Sir Carl A. Berendsen, New Zealand Minister to the United States and Chairman of the New Zealand Delegation to the General Assembly.

³ Joseph Bech, Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Luxembourg Delegation to the General Assembly.

⁴ Mostafu Adl, Minister of State and Chairman of the Iranian Delegation to the General Assembly.

6. *For Chairman of Committee 4:*

Delegate of a Latin American State (On the understanding that we will support the candidate put forward by the Latin Americans themselves.)

7. *For Chairman of Committee 5:*

Unden (Sweden)⁵

8. *For Chairman of Committee 6:*

Delegate of an Arab State (On the understanding that we will support the candidate put forward by the Arab States provided that in making their selection those States realize the need for a competent jurist to fill this post.)

9. *Chairman of "Ad Hoc" Committee on Palestine:*

Pearson (Canada)

It is recommended that the Delegation be authorized to adjust this slate for all Committees except Committee 1 in the light of the desires and intentions of other countries, provided that the general geographic distribution established in this slate is not altered.

⁵ Osten Unden, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Swedish Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/50

Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 15, 1947, 10 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follow the list of persons (32) present and a statement regarding the minutes.]

Explaining that the election of Assembly officers would take place the following day, Mr. Sandifer said that Secretary-General Lie had asked the five permanent representatives to meet with him at 5 p. m. that day to see whether an area of agreement on the slate could be reached. Introducing the United States slate (US/A/294/Rev.1),¹ as drawn in Washington and adjusted in the light of the situation in New York, Mr. Sandifer explained that the one change from preliminary plans involved substitution of a Near Eastern state (Iran) for a British Commonwealth state in a committee chairmanship, thus making it possible for an Arab state to be represented on the General Committee.

Regarding the General Assembly presidency, Mr. Sandifer said that Prime Minister Spaak of Belgium had dropped out by his own wish, and that Foreign Minister Aranha of Brazil had indicated he did not

¹ *Supra.*

wish to be a candidate. No conversation had yet been held with Dr. Evatt of Australia. For the vice-presidencies, in addition to the five permanent members, the Delegation had assured Mexico of support for its candidacy, taking the position that a vice-presidency for the Ukraine (which had been chairman of Committee 1 at the last regular General Assembly) would constitute over-representation, since it was believed that Eastern Europe should hold only one chairmanship.

Regarding Committee 1, he informed the meeting that Dr. Aranha had felt he could not stand for the chairmanship of this, either. As between Berendsen (New Zealand) and Bech (Luxembourg), it was clear that if Evatt was supported by the Delegation for the presidency and elected, it would be impossible to support a dominion candidate for Committee 1 chairmanship; therefore, support of Bech was recommended.

For the Committee 2 chairmanship, Mr. Sandifer said there was general Delegation agreement on Adl (Iran). The Russians had specifically indicated a desire to have the chairmanship of Committee 3 for Poland. It was felt that the Delegation should defer to them in this matter, since it was opposing them on so many other issues. He said he had heard that some states were starting a movement to have Mrs. Roosevelt² elected chairman of Committee 3. In the past, permanent members had not held committee chairmanships, in addition there was the fact of Russian interest in this position and the fact that the permanent members were already represented on the General Committee. Mrs. Roosevelt herself, he added, felt no desire to have the chairmanship, feeling she could represent the United States more effectively and speak more freely as simply the United States Representative.

On Committees 4 and 5, Mr. Sandifer said the Department's position, in view the support for Mexico for the vice-presidency, would be to defer to the desires of the Latin-American countries, after making clear to them that the Delegation hoped they would propose highly qualified men. The Delegation had also tentatively told the Arabs it would support their candidate for the chairmanship of Committee 6, he said. General support for Pearson (Canada) for chairman of the Palestine *ad hoc* committee had been evidenced, Mr. Sandifer reported. Canada was willing to permit Pearson to serve, instead of the chairman of the Canadian Delegation.

Ambassador Dawson³ said the Latin-American delegations were holding a caucus at 3 p. m., and suggested that he see Aranha as soon

² Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

³ Ambassador William Dawson, Special Representative of the United States on the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, and at this time a member of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers.

as possible and urge him to do everything he could at the caucus to see that the Latin-Americans chose competent men for the chairmanships. He also said he would see the Mexican foreign minister for the same purpose. The Secretary inquired whether Aranha was definitely out as president, and Ambassador Austin said he was. Both Spaak and Aranha were strongly influenced by the theory that those who had previously held General Assembly presidencies should not stand for the presidency or a committee chairmanship. Brazil, he said, would be an active candidate for the Economic and Social Council, and he believed the United States intended to support Brazil. Aranha had been told by other Latin-American representatives, the Ambassador said, that they would not only support but push him. He intended to satisfy them and cause them to give up this pressure by arguing that by so doing they would be supporting the doctrine laid down yesterday. The line-up in the General Assembly must be one, Aranha held, in which a large majority showed very strong support for the doctrine enunciated by the Secretary the day before, and Brazil could be more useful in the ranks on this issue. In this connection, Aranha wished to know definitely whether the Delegation would support Evatt for president; and whether the Delegation intended to support someone such as Bech for Committee 1. Aranha was trying to cement the thing, the Ambassador said, so that there would be strong backing for the United States doctrine pronounced yesterday.⁴

Regarding support of Modzelewski (Poland) for chairmanship of Committee 3, Ambassador Austin reported that the Soviet Union had started with request of the General Assembly [presidency] for Modzelewski; the United States had said no; the U.S.S.R. then wanted him for chairman of Committee 1; again the United States said no. For Committee 2 the U.S.S.R. had supported Masaryk (Czechoslovakia) or Adl (Iran). When it became clear, however, that the United States preferred Iran for Committee 2 but would agree to the Soviet candidate for Committee 3, the Soviets indicated they would prefer to push Modzelewski rather than Masaryk for this place. Mrs. Roosevelt said she thought support for Modzelewski for the chairmanship of 3 would be a good move.

Mr. Dulles⁵ asked whether agreement with the Soviets on Modze-

⁴ Allusions in this paragraph to "doctrine enunciated by the Secretary the day before" apparently refer to the speech made by Secretary Marshall in New York on September 14 in opening a nationwide observance of United Nations Week. The Secretary of State dealt with the crisis of confidence in the United Nations both within and without the Organization occasioned by the near-paralysis of the Security Council through use of the veto; and he indicated that United States policy would seek to meet this situation by invoking to the utmost the moral and political authority of the General Assembly. For text, see the *New York Times*, November 15, 1946, p. 3.

⁵ John Foster Dulles, Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

lewski implied agreement by them in return on other things, but Austin replied that it did not, that the U.S.S.R. was intransigent on other issues.

Mr. Stevenson ⁶ at this point inquired whether there was anything in a rumor that there would be some support for Mrs. Pandit ⁷ for president. The Secretary replied that there was. The Secretary said he had been advised last night by Wang (China) ⁸ that China felt if any complications arose over the presidency—although the Secretary did not expect any—it would ask the United States to consider seriously the possibility of nominating Mrs. Pandit. The Chinese wanted to do as much as possible, Wang had explained, to keep those people on our side of the fence. The Secretary said he felt Mrs. Pandit was very capable. Mr. Stevenson said he had heard this rumor from the Latin-Americans, and Mr. Sandifer said he had heard it too, but not recently. Mr. Sandifer then said that a canvass of the Department had indicated that Evatt, Aranha or Spaak would be much more helpful to our interests. He indicated also that since time was important, it was necessary to speak to Evatt and Bech as soon as possible. When no contrary views were expressed, the Secretary asked Ambassador Austin to see Evatt. Ambassador Austin and Mr. Sandifer suggested that Ambassador Johnson might be able to see Evatt at the Security Council meeting, but when Mr. Dulles offered to speak to Evatt at the meeting of the Council of [on] Foreign Relations, that afternoon, the Secretary asked Mr. Dulles to make the approach at that time. Ambassador Johnson was to be asked to speak to Bech.

Security Council Slate

On the Security Council slate, there was agreement with the proposal for Canada to replace Australia, and Uruguay or Cuba to be the Latin-American representative. Mr. Sandifer explained, regarding the candidacy of Czechoslovakia, that the Russians had stated flatly their support of the Ukraine as a candidate, and that they had said Czechoslovakia would not run and would not accept if elected. He reported the Department's strong feeling that the Delegation should support Czechoslovakia, and that special reasons made it hesitant about supporting the Ukraine or certain other East European states.

Mr. Bohlen, explaining the principle of proportional representation on the Security Council, said that if Czechoslovakia withdrew, the question would rise of supporting Ukraine or Yugoslavia. He felt very strongly that under no circumstances should the Ukraine be sup-

⁶ Adlai E. Stevenson, Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation.

⁷ Mme. Vijaya Lakashmi Pandit, Chairman of the Indian Delegation to the General Assembly.

⁸ Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Chinese Delegation to the General Assembly.

ported, since no state should be on the Security Council whose independence or sovereignty left something open to question. When the United States voted for inclusion of the Ukraine in the United Nations, at San Francisco, he recalled, it had been specifically on the basis of the Ukrainian war effort. India had also been included at that time although not fully independent. To put on the Security Council a unit whose actions were bound by a central government would hurt the Security Council's prestige, he felt. The Delegation should oppose Ukraine positively if necessary.

The question of Yugoslavia was complicated by the fact that we were charging Yugoslavia with acts of aggression, Mr. Bohlen said. He did not feel, however, that it would be necessary for the Delegation to speak against Yugoslavia, since the ballot would be secret; he felt it would be possible simply to accept the majority vote on Yugoslavia, after voting against her. He believed this would be preferable to stating bluntly that Czechoslovakia was the only East European state we would accept, for that would mean departure from the regional principle.

In reply to the Secretary's question whether the Czech stand had been communicated only through the U.S.S.R., Mr. Sandifer said Czechoslovakia had itself expressed uneasiness to the Delegation. Mr. Bohlen explained the Czechs did not want to be put on the spot in the Security Council, being forced to go along with the Soviets. The Secretary inquired whether the United States charges of aggression against Yugoslavia might not prompt Soviet charges regarding our moves in Greece. Mr. Sandifer thought that such counter-charges would not be taken seriously. Mr. Dulles felt if Czechoslovakia did not want to be a candidate, it should be dropped, for persisting would only indicate to the Russians that the United States thought this was a soft spot, and that the Soviets would then take steps to harden it.

When Mr. Sandifer posed the alternatives of supporting Czechoslovakia, abstaining, or moving out of Eastern Europe, the Secretary inquired about Pakistan. Mr. Sandifer said some Near Eastern country would be a possibility, mentioning Turkey. It was pointed out in the discussion, however, that Turkey had expressed reluctance to serve on the Security Council. Mr. Sandifer felt a strong position should be taken favoring Czechoslovakia, feeling that the Russians rather than risk not having any East European country on the Security Council, would accept Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Austin said this was a very troublesome question, especially because of the U.S.S.R. difficulty in having limited forces in the Security Council. He did not know if the time had come to step out of Eastern Europe and suggest another country. It would be only decency to make clear that this was the alternative, in that case he felt.

Mr. Ross⁹ did not think the position should be stated negatively. It should be said that we would support Czechoslovakia in Eastern Europe; if the Czechs did not wish to stand, we could turn to the Philippines, India, or Pakistan. He did not feel Yugoslavia should be accepted even through abstaining.

Mr. Bohlen again advocated telling the U.S.S.R. we would positively support Czechoslovakia, that we would actively oppose the Ukraine, and abstaining on discussion of Yugoslavia but voting against it. Mr. Fahy¹⁰ agreed on Czechoslovakia and Ukraine, but felt the Delegation should say openly it opposed Yugoslavia, and if Czechoslovakia refused to stand for the Security Council we should go outside East Europe to India or Pakistan. The Secretary felt from what had been said that it would be better to indicate nothing to the U.S.S.R. about Pakistan, otherwise the U.S.S.R. would approach Pakistan first and claim credit. Mr. Henderson felt if we were going to go outside Eastern Europe, we should support India rather than Pakistan. India had voted as much with Russia as with us, he said, and its presence on the Security Council would constitute a vote half the time for the Russian bloc. He thought we should tell Russia that if it were not Czechoslovakia we would support India. Russia would find it very difficult to oppose India.

Mr. Bohlen then restated the formula that appeared to find acceptance; support of Czechoslovakia unless it was unwilling; opposition to the Ukraine; acceptance of the majority vote on Yugoslavia.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

⁹ John C. Ross, Deputy to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) and a member of the Delegation Staff of Advisers.

¹⁰ Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser of the Department of State and Alternate Representative on the United States Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files : US/A/327

*Memorandum by Ambassador William Dawson of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 15, 1947.

LATIN AMERICAN CAUCUS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF ARANHA FOR PRESIDENCY OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY; COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH EVATT; CAUCUS APPROVES MEXICO FOR VICE-PRESIDENCY AND CHILE FOR CHAIRMANSHIP OF COMMITTEE 2

Shortly after his arrival in New York on Sunday, September 14, Aranha communicated with Ambassador Austin and told him that a caucus of Latin American delegates was to be held on September 15, at 3:00 p. m., in the offices of the Mexican Delegation and that before

attending the caucus he wished to ascertain the United States position with regard to his (Aranha's) candidacy for the presidency of the General Assembly.

After discussing the matter with the Secretary, Ambassador Austin saw Aranha at about 6:30 p. m. on Sunday and informed him of our proposed slate as set forth in Secret US/A/294/Rev. 1, of September 14.

Aranha accepted the situation gracefully, stating that he would withdraw in favor of Evatt, that he wished to cooperate with us in every way, that the Secretary's speech had made a great impression on him, and that he considered it very important that the President of the Assembly be elected by an imposing majority.

At this point, Ambassador Johnson and I arrived and there was some discussion with regard to the Committee chairmanships which should be allotted to the Latin American group in order to give it the customary representation (three members) on the General Committee. It was arranged that I would see Aranha before 1:00 p. m. on Monday and give him further information concerning this matter.

As agreed at the United States Delegation meeting on the morning of September 15, I saw both Aranha and Torres Bodet (Mexico)¹ between noon and 1:00 p. m. and informed them that it was contemplated that Mexico would have our support for a vice presidency and that the chairmanships of Committees 4 and 5 would be available for Latin American candidates. I stressed the urgent need for competent men for these posts from the standpoint both of the work of the General Assembly and Latin American prestige. Both Aranha and Torres Bodet informed me that Chile had been campaigning actively for the chairmanship of Committee 2 and both expressed the hope that the post might be available in lieu of Committee 4 or 5. I said that this might prove difficult. Torres Bodet inquired whether two committee chairmanships would be available if Aranha were elected President of the General Assembly. I replied that Aranha had informed me of his intention of making a statement which would clarify this matter. Torres Bodet inquired whom we would support if Aranha were not a candidate and I mentioned Evatt.

Shortly after 6:00 p. m., I phoned the Mexican Delegation and on learning that the meeting had just come to an end I talked with Torres Bodet and asked if I might see him. He said that he was leaving at once, that the meeting had been inconclusive, that there was nothing he could say except that there had been strong general support for Aranha, and that another meeting was scheduled for the morning of September 16.

¹ Dr. Jaime Torres Bodet, Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs and Head of the Mexican Delegation to the General Assembly.

Almost immediately after this conversation, Aranha called me to say that he wished to talk with me urgently. I went at once to the Brazilian Delegation where I saw Aranha, Muniz,² and Amado. Aranha told me that he had made every effort to induce the Latin American group to give up his candidacy and to support that of Evatt. He said that he had led off with a general statement (copy attached)³ declining the honor, that Torres Bodet had followed expressing appreciation for his attitude, but that a number of other delegates (including those of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Panama) had spoken insisting on his candidacy. He said that he spoke twice again in an effort to persuade his colleagues—once using the argument that in the light of Secretary Marshall's speech it was essential that there be a united front of democratic elements—and the second time stating that the United States Delegation favored Evatt. His arguments were, he said, of no avail and the upshot of this phase of the meeting was that a committee consisting of the delegates of Argentina, Cuba, and Mexico were designated to see Evatt, ask him frankly how many votes he could count on, and induce him to withdraw, if, as was anticipated, he was assured of less strength than Aranha. I was informed that this committee planned to see Evatt at tonight's reception and that the Latin American group would meet again at 10:00 a. m. tomorrow (Tuesday) at Flushing.

Aranha assured me repeatedly that he had made every effort possible to induce his colleagues to accept his withdrawal and to support Evatt. Muniz said that no one could have fought more vigorously against himself than had Aranha. According to their account, arguments adduced by other delegates in favor of Aranha's candidacy included the following: That most of them had instructions from their Foreign Offices to support Aranha; that in response to bids for support, no Latin American country had promised Evatt its vote; that the re-election issue could be dismissed since Aranha had presided merely over a brief special session called to prepare the way for a question which was a leading item on the agenda of the present session; and that the very nature of this crucial session made it particularly appropriate that it be presided over by an impartial and disinterested Latin American.

It appears that one or more delegates remarked that the United States Delegation had failed to consult the Latin American delegations before deciding to support Evatt, and that one delegate (the Colombian, I believe) implied that in withdrawing his candidacy Aranha was playing up to the United States. We shall probably come

² Ambassador João Carlos Muniz, Brazilian Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

³ Not printed.

in for some criticism on this score and I think that, as appropriate occasion offers, we may well point out that we did consult Aranha who was the person most directly concerned. Incidentally, in my afternoon conversation, I made it a point to remind Aranha in the presence of Muniz and Amado that a determining factor in our plan had been our belief that Aranha would accept Committee 1 and could render the maximum service in this post, which would probably prove more important than the presidency of the General Assembly. I referred also to the Brazilian Government's great interest in election to ECOSOC. I inquired whether this had been discussed in the caucus. Aranha said that it had not been discussed but that Brazil was absolutely sure of Latin American support and election.

According to Aranha, the caucus approved the candidacy of Mexico for a vice-presidency and decided to support Chile for the chairmanship of Committee 2 and Alfaro (Panama)⁴ for that of Committee 5 (this, however, only in case Aranha were not elected to the presidency of the General Assembly).

WILLIAM DAWSON

⁴ Dr. Ricardo J. Alfaro, Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Panamanian Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files : US/A/351

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 16, 1947.

Participants: Ralph Harry, Australian Delegation¹
S. Sen, Indian Delegation²
John C. Ross, United States Delegation

During the interval preceding the election of the president, Mr. Harry came up to me in a very discouraged frame of mind at the turn of support from Evatt to Aranha for the presidency. There was more than a little note of suspicion in his remarks that our support for Evatt was not very sincere. He said that since we had pledged our support he assumed that we would follow through. He implied, however, that if the only votes Evatt got were those of the United States and a few others it would not look as though our support had amounted to very much.

Harry went on to say, somewhat cryptically, that the Indians had been supporting Evatt and were in a good position to swing all the

¹ R. L. Harry, First Secretary of the Australian Permanent Delegation at the United Nations.

² B. R. Sen, Minister of the Indian Embassy at Washington.

Middle and Near Eastern votes. However, in the situation as it had now developed, it appeared that there might be a deadlock between Aranha and Evatt; there had been several indications that Madam Pandit might have a very good chance as a dark-horse candidate and the Indians would probably not be slow to take advantage of any such opportunity.

Harry stated that the Indians were rather "sore" at the United States because we had not included India on our slate for any office. Harry went on to say that if in reconsidering our slate in the present situation of confusion there was anything we could do for the Indians he thought this might serve the purpose of holding the Indians and the Middle and Near Eastern group in line in support of Evatt's candidacy.

I told Harry I didn't know that we could do anything at all along this line but I would see.

I subsequently found Sen and asked him what the thoughts of his government were in the present situation regarding elections. He said his delegation wanted a place on the General Committee. They were very disappointed that the United States did not have them on its slate for any office.

They had not at all considered the possibility of the presidency. In the present confused situation, however, they saw they might have a chance. What they wanted was a vice-presidency rather than a committee chairmanship because they wanted to avoid spreading themselves too thin.

Sen, almost immediately afterwards, checked with his delegation and confirmed the accuracy of the statements he had made to me.

I reported to Ambassador Johnson and discussions within the U.S. Delegation revealed that it would be possible for the United States to support India for Committee 5.

I thereupon informed both the Australians and the Indians and they were both very pleased at United States action.

Following the election and Evatt's defeat, I made very clear to Colonel Hodgson of the Australian Delegation that our support had not wavered. I gave him, in strict confidence, the background of the conversation on Sen with Aranha which led to initial withdrawal and had made it possible for us to support Evatt. I also made it clear that our support of Evatt had been as strong as we could possibly make it. The fact that Aranha had come back into the race had not been a result of any influence we had used with any of the Latin Americans.

I think this last conversation served the purpose of clarifying doubts and suspicions which quite obviously still lingered in the Australian minds.

IO Files : US/A/360

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 16, 1947.

Participants: Andrei Gromyko and Aides, U.S.S.R. Delegation
Mr. Stevenson, United States Delegation
Mr. Bohlen, United States Delegation
Mr. Raynor, United States Delegation

Mr. Gromyko asked Mr. Stevenson and one of his aides asked Mr. Raynor to discuss this matter ¹ during the recess. The aide stated that the Soviet Union desired the Ukraine for Chairmanship of Committee 3 and Poland for the Vice Presidency. Mr. Gromyko in his conversation did not press this point. The aide also implied very clearly that [in] the informal consultation of permanent members with Mr. Lie the night before, which the United States did not attend, there had been agreement to the above.

Following our discussion with Mr. McNeil ² and the meeting of American advisers and taking into account the strong Arab desire for Mr. Malik to have the Chairmanship of Committee 3, we told Mr. Gromyko that while we had undertaken to support Poland for this committee and would continue to do so if he insisted, we felt it might be wiser to try to elect Poland to the Chairmanship of Committee 5. In so doing we explained to Mr. Gromyko that because of the load it would be carrying and of the importance at this time of budgetary considerations, we considered Committee 5 next in importance in this Assembly to Committee 1.

Mr. Gromyko, after some consideration, replied that he could not consider this switch as we had agreed to support Poland for Committee 3, and while he admitted that Committee 5 was of importance to us and to a considerable extent also to the Soviet Union, it was not of importance to a smaller state like Poland and that he believed Poland would not be interested in Committee 5.

Thereupon we assured Mr. Gromyko that we would continue our support of Poland for Committee 3 but warned him that in the light of the support which Mr. Malik had in the Assembly, we did not feel that this election would be by any means an easy one.

¹ States for elections.

² See *infra*. Mr. Hector McNeil was Minister of State (Foreign Office) in the British Government and second-ranking official on the British Delegation to the General Assembly.

IO Files : US/A/362

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 16, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Hector McNeil, Acting Chairman, United Kingdom Delegation
Adlai Stevenson, United States Delegation
Mr. Charles Bohlen, United States Delegation
Mr. Hayden Raynor, United States Delegation

Immediately following the adjournment of this morning's Plenary Session, Mr. McNeil asked Mr. Stevenson and me to sit down with him to discuss the matter of the slate for this committee [General Committee]. His slate was quite at variance with our views on the matter. We were in agreement as to the President and having the five permanent members as Vice Presidents, and also as to Mexico occupying another Vice Presidency. The United Kingdom slate, however, contained the name of Cuba for the Vice Presidency.

We were in agreement as to the candidacy of Bech (of Luxemburg) as Chairman of Committee 1. The British desired Poland placed on Committee 2 and maintained this position despite our protestations that the Soviets had made the most strenuous kind of plea to have the Chairmanship of Committee 3. As to Committee 3, Mr. McNeil expressed a strong preference for Mr. Malik of the Lebanon. The British list contained Sweden for Committee 4. They were willing to have a Latin American, probably Panama, for Committee 5 and made a rather strong point of India being given the Chairmanship of Committee 6. We discussed in some detail the difficulties which this slate would give us and particularly referred to the Soviets' desire for three seats on the General Committee, to which we had concurred. Mr. Hector McNeil made a rather strong point as to the desirability of giving the Soviets only two seats on the General Committee. We agreed to take the British suggestions up with our Delegation and to discuss the matter again with Mr. McNeil as soon as possible.

Following a meeting of the Advisers of the Delegation with Mr. Bohlen following a consultation with Mr. Gromyko and several of his advisers, this matter was again discussed with Mr. McNeil during lunch. We explained to Mr. McNeil that the Soviets were unwilling to agree to Poland being switched from Committee 3 to some other committee such as 5 and that we therefore felt compelled to continue to support Poland for the third committee.

The British reluctantly agreed to go along on this and most reluctantly agreed to go along on the Ukraine for the seventh Vice Presidency, following our agreement to drop Iran from our slate in

favor of India. This resulted in the slate which was elected by the Assembly during the afternoon, with the exception of course of the vote for Cuba instead of the Ukraine for the seventh Vice Presidency.¹

¹ Regarding the September 16 elections, see delegation memorandum of September 18, Doc. US/A/347, p. 130.

IO Files: US/A/336

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of the United States Delegation

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 17, 1947.

Participants: Honorable Hector McNeil, United Kingdom Representative to the General Assembly
Gladwyn Jebb,¹ United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly
John Rob,² United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly
Adlai Stevenson, United States Delegation

Hector McNeil invited me to lunch today to discuss elections to the Security Council. He expressed the view that Czechoslovakia would prefer not to be elected to the Security Council for obvious reasons and also because it preferred to be reelected to the Economic and Social Council. He is *personally* sympathetic with this position and seems to attach considerable importance to Czechoslovakia's continuation on the Economic and Social Council.

As an alternative to Yugoslavia or Ukraina he proposed, *personally* and without consultation with the Foreign Office, India, because (1) he does not believe U.S.S.R. entitled necessarily to two places on the Security Council; (2) he sees no satisfactory alternative to Czechoslovakia; (3) India wants the position to further her effort to gain Asiatic leadership, and (4) India might be the least unpalatable to U.S.S.R. of the States outside the Eastern European block.

He asked for some reaction from the American Delegation by Thursday afternoon because he had not submitted this proposal to Bevin³ and deemed it useless to do so if we were hostile to his idea.

His Delegation does not support him in this entirely. Although I gathered that some of them, at least, share his views that the U.S.S.R. is not necessarily entitled to two seats on the Security Council and are sympathetic to the position of Czechoslovakia, they have some misgiving about the behavior of India on the Security Council were she

¹ H. M. G. Jebb, Principal Adviser of the British Delegation to the General Assembly.

² J. V. Rob, Private Secretary to the Minister of State (McNeil).

³ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

elected, and even greater misgiving about finding a suitable alternative if India was not elected.

I also gathered that the United Kingdom Delegation does not consider the Ukraine intolerable as a candidate for the Security Council. Further, there seems to be a feeling in their Delegation that by supporting India for the Security Council and Czechoslovakia for reelection to the Economic and Social Council, they would not only antagonize U.S.S.R. but also Poland which aspires to Czechoslovakia's seat on the Economic and Social Council.

McNeil was quite candid about the division in his Delegation and his reluctance to pursue his idea further without an indication of our position. He concluded by saying that he had not consulted Canada with regard to their view of the effect of his proposal on Canada's candidacy for the Security Council, i.e., two Dominions.

In this conversation McNeill also indicated to me that Argentina was making a strong bid for the Economic and Social Council and that his Delegation might have to support her for "bread and butter" reasons.

On the matter of financing the Headquarters building McNeil's "confident guess" was that the Cabinet would prefer to go ahead if a private or Government-dollar loan was forthcoming from this country so that the immediate dollar demand on the United Kingdom would be minimized. He did not seem to feel strongly about the "indignity" of a private loan.

IO Files : US/A/347

United States Delegation Working Paper

MEMORANDUM

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 18, 1947.

DEVELOPMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE ELECTION OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE DURING THE COURSE OF THE ASSEMBLY SESSIONS ON SEPTEMBER 16¹

1. After the opening session of the Assembly, on the morning of September 16, Advisers to the United States Delegation held a caucus in the Main Assembly Hall at Flushing. Among the salient facts revealed in a generally confused situation were the following:

a. Ambassador Austin had talked with Brazil's Ambassador Muniz, who was extremely upset by our support for Evatt.

¹ For the official proceedings, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings* (hereafter cited as GA(II), *Plenary*), vol. I, pp. 9 ff.

b. The Arab and Near Eastern States would cast their votes for Evatt but the Arabs were extremely desirous of electing Malik (Lebanon) as Chairman of Committee 3. They did not wish to have a Polish Chairman in a Committee which might deal with the refugee problem.

c. The Big Five Meeting which had been scheduled for 5:00 p. m., September 15 was delayed by the Security Council meeting until late in the evening. Ambassador Austin did not attend. The Soviets put forward at that meeting demands for Vice Presidencies on the General Committee for Poland and the U.S.S.R.; for the Chairmanship of Committee 3 for the Ukraine; and for the Vice Chairmanship of Committee 4 for Byelorussia; the rapporteurship of Committee 2 for Czechoslovakia; and the rapporteurship of Committee 6 for Yugoslavia. Mr. Gromyko was reported as determined to secure a Chairmanship for Manuilsky.² Having failed to get the Chairmanship of Committee 1 for him, Gromyko was now asking for the Chairmanship of Committee 3.

d. The British slate, which had been communicated to Hayden Raynor, was as follows:

For Vice Presidents, the Big Five, Mexico and Cuba;

For Chairman of Committee 1, Bech;

For Chairman of Committee 2, Poland;

For Chairman of Committee 3, Lebanon;

For Chairman of Committee 4, Sweden;

For Chairman of Committee 5, India;

For Chairman of Committee 6, Panama.

The British thus proposed to reduce the representation of the Eastern bloc on the General Committee to two states.

e. Mr. Adlai Stevenson, having discussed the Russian slate with Gromyko, reported that the latter was insisting on having the Chairmanship of Committee 3, although he would agree to give it to Poland, with a Vice Presidency for Manuilsky. Mr. Stevenson thought that Gromyko might be persuaded to shift Poland to the Chairmanship of Committee 2. Ambassador Dawson was strongly of the opinion, however, that because of our embarrassment in the matter of Aranha, we must support the choice of the Latin Americans—Chile—for the Chairmanship of Committee 2.

2. In the light of this information, it was agreed to try to meet the desires of the Latin Americans, the Arab States, and the British in as great a degree as possible by revising the United States slate as follows:

Committee 1 Luxembourg;

Committee 2 Chile;

Committee 3 Lebanon;

Committee 4 Iran or, possibly Sweden;

Committee 5 Poland (but only if the Russians agreed);

Committee 6 Panama, or Sweden or Canada (if Aranha were elected President)

² Dmitri Z. Manuilsky Chairman of the Ukrainian Delegation to the General Assembly.

3. Since Gromyko refused to consider the Chairmanship of Committee 5 for Poland, the United States slate was again revised shortly after 2:00 p. m., September 16 as follows:

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| Committee 1 | Luxembourg; |
| Committee 2 | Chile; |
| Committee 3 | Poland; |
| Committee 4 | Panama or, if Aranha were elected President, New Zealand; |
| Committee 5 | India; |
| Committee 6 | Syria. |

In a luncheon conversation between Hector McNeil and Stevenson, who were joined by Sandifer, the British agreed to this slate.

4. After the election of Aranha, Panama was dropped from our slate, and the remaining candidates for Committee chairmen were elected without difficulty.

501.BB/9-1847

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (Woodward¹)

[WASHINGTON,] September 18, 1947.

In the absence of Assistant Secretary of State Armour, I received a long distance telephone call from Ambassador Pawley² in which he said that there was considerable Brazilian concern that the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations organization had not voted for Dr. Aranha for the Presidency of the General Assembly. Ambassador Pawley said that he had made the following explanations informally to the interested Brazilians but that he wished to have some official confirmation of these explanations from me, if they were correct.

Ambassador Pawley said that he had surmised that the principal explanation was that the U.S. Government had the impression that Dr. Aranha was not willing to accept the Presidency. Moreover, Ambassador Pawley said that he assumed this distinction would normally be shared sufficiently by various countries so that a citizen of one country would not normally expect to be elected to the position two times in a row.

I told Ambassador Pawley that it was my understanding that his explanations were exactly correct, that our Delegation was committed to the support of another candidate before it had any reason to believe that Dr. Aranha might be willing to accept the Presidency. I com-

¹ Robert F. Woodward.

² William Pawley, Rio de Janeiro.

mented that, of course, our Delegation and our Government was very pleased now that Dr. Aranha had accepted the nomination and had been elected to the Presidency of the Assembly.

IO Files: US/A/402

*Memorandum by Ambassador William Dawson of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 21, 1947.

CANDIDACY OF ARGENTINA FOR SECURITY COUNCIL

When I saw Aranha this afternoon with regard to another matter, he took occasion to bring up the question of Argentina's candidacy for the Security Council. He said that Argentina has the backing of sixteen Latin American countries and of a number of non-American countries, including probably the Arab bloc. He gave me to understand that he considers Argentina's chances excellent and that in his opinion we would do well to give its candidacy our blessing.

I have the distinct impression that Aranha is working actively for Argentina. Arce¹ was, I believe, the first to speak in the Latin American caucus against Aranha's withdrawal from the race for the General Assembly presidency, and Argentina is no doubt supporting Brazil for the Economic and Social Council.

Carias (Honduras)² and Padilla Nervo (Mexico)³ have informed Ambassador Johnson that their respective Delegations are committed to support Argentina for the Security Council, and Carias referred to sentiment in Latin American circles in favor of Argentina, largely on the ground that it has had no important United Nations post thus far.

There seems good reason to believe that Argentina has strong Latin American backing and will probably emerge as the Latin American candidate for the Security Council when the group again holds a caucus. (The group has not met since it last got together to discuss Aranha's candidacy for the General Assembly presidency).

On the other hand, there are indications that Argentina's candidacy may meet with considerable opposition in other quarters. It will presumably be opposed by the Slav bloc and perhaps by a number of Western European States. The United Kingdom and France are reportedly at best lukewarm towards Argentina.

¹ Dr. José Arce, Permanent Representative of Argentina at the United Nations and Head of the Argentinian Delegation to the General Assembly.

² Dr. Tiburcio Carias, Chairman of the Honduran Delegation to the General Assembly.

³ Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Mexican Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

After a conference with Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Bohlen, it was decided to take no action today and to await further developments before indicating to the Latin American group or to Aranha that we will support any candidate upon whom the Latin American Delegations may agree.

We have thus far made no statement and given no indication concerning our own views as regards a Latin American candidate for the Security Council and in general we have been hesitant to initiate discussion of the matter, lest we be pressed for an expression of our views or lest whatever we say may be misconstrued. The only Latin American candidate prominently mentioned to us by Latin American Delegates as having their support or as being likely to be the Latin American choice is Argentina.

[Further discussion follows.]

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/54

Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 22, 1947, 9:15 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follow the list of persons (32) present and a discussion of three agenda items.]

Security Council Slates

Ambassador Austin then raised again the question of elections to the Security Council. Events had suggested, he said, the possibility of reversing the Delegation position. Recalling the Delegation view maintaining support for Czechoslovakia as the East European country to replace Poland on the Security Council and the refusal to accept any other East European country, he read from a memorandum of conversation (US/A/412) with Papanek,¹ in which the latter had "literally pleaded" that the Delegation help keep Czechoslovakia off the Security Council. Papanek, according to the memorandum, had said Czechoslovakia on the Security Council would have to act as a "complete puppet", "following the party line" and hurting public opinion in Czechoslovakia. He had said that the Czech Delegation could not say publicly it did not wish to be on the Security Council, but had argued that on the Economic and Social Council his country could help maintain contact with the West. He had said also that Czechoslovakia was under Russian pressure to sit on the Security Council, but it had appeared unclear as to whether the United States had switched from the Ukraine or was merely considering whom to back.

¹ Not printed.

Ambassador Johnson reported that, at Ambassador Austin's direction, he had told Gromyko that Czechoslovakia should serve or that no East European country would be supported.² There was a doubt in his mind, however, he said, whether the Delegation was really wise in trying to keep an East European state off the Security Council simply because it could not get Czechoslovakia. He observed that the United States was engaged in bitter political warfare against the Soviet Union, and said he agreed 100 per cent with that policy, but that until the United States had broken with the Soviet Union, there was a moral obligation to carry out the agreement made with the U.S.S.R. regarding the continuous presence of two East European countries on the Security Council. Ambassador Johnson sympathized with those to whom the Ukraine was repugnant, but was not sure but that it would be worse to oppose the Ukraine. He felt the issue which should be made the occasion for such a step should be another one. Therefore, he felt the Delegation might reconsider the matter. If the Ukraine went on the Security Council, it would at least be known exactly where we stood, for the Ukraine would simply be an echoing voice. There would be no question of trying to influence the Ukraine, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. He repeated that it was necessary to carry out the obligations in commitments made to the U.S.S.R. during the organizational period of United Nations and noted that Yugoslavia and Byelorussia were the only other alternatives. The Delegation could not possibly vote for Yugoslavia in view of the United States changes [*charges?*] against that country.

Summing up the positions previously accepted: strong support for Czechoslovakia; no pressure on Czechoslovakia if it refused; firm opposition to the Ukraine, Yugoslavia or Byelorussia; support of India, if Czechoslovakia was out, without mention of this previously to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador Austin asked whether the Delegation wished to review the question of firm opposition to Ukraine. He said he was just going to leave it with the Delegation for consideration.

Mr. Stevenson asked whether Masaryk had been consulted in the matter, in view of Papanek's statement, and when this statement was made. The Senator said it had been made the day before. Mr. Stevenson then said he echoed Ambassador Johnson's view on the Ukraine, but asked whether discussion with Masaryk might not be advisable, since what Papanek said seemed somewhat at variance with what Masaryk had indicated.

Ambassador Johnson raised the question of Argentina's Security Council candidacy, which he called a corollary to the case of Czechoslovakia. He had canvassed the Latin American delegations, he said,

² This point had been discussed at a Delegation meeting on September 19, minutes not printed (Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/53).

including Aranha (Brazil), and there was no doubt in his mind that the bulk of them supported Argentina and thought it would be a good thing if the United States did likewise. He had made it clear to Aranha that the Delegation would consider sympathetically any candidate generally supported by the Latin Americans. No caucus of the Latin Americans on the subject had been held as yet, but the feeling among them seemed to be that Argentine Security Council membership was in the logic of the situation. Several had said they felt Security Council membership would have a sobering effect on Argentina. Aranha had said he felt Argentina was unquestionably the greatest power in Latin America and that it would be a good thing to get it definitely on our side by support.

Mr. Bohlen explained that the Department's opposition to the Ukraine had nothing to do with the fact the United States was engaged in political warfare with the Soviet Union. It was based rather on the fact that the Ukraine was not independent of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Johnson agreed entirely, but pointed out that the United States voted for Ukraine to be in the United Nations. What is the good of throwing an East Asiatic country at Russia and saying take this if not Czechoslovakia, he asked. He merely thought the situation should be reconsidered, and that the fact that the Ukraine had no real independent existence should not necessarily be decisive. Mr. Stinebower³ added that the Ukraine had already been elected to the Economic and Social Council, and that Byelorussia had since been elected to replace it, and that the United States had thus already committed itself that any independent country was eligible to United Nations Councils. We would have to narrow the grounds for exclusion, he felt, and would have to be careful what kind of argument we used against the Ukraine. Mr. Stevenson agreed. He also agreed with Mr. Bohlen's general reasoning, but did not see how the Security Council was different from other United Nations Councils.

Mr. Bohlen said the Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted into the United Nations not on grounds of their independence but on other grounds. India and the Philippines had been admitted similarly, without possessing full independence at the time. To be accepted into the United Nations it was not necessary for a country to be fully independent. In reply to Mr. Stinebower's point, he recalled the special qualifications clause for Security Council membership. The Ukraine did not have constitutional independence, being bound by decisions of a central government.

Ambassador Johnson then indicated he felt if the Ukraine was to

³ Leroy D. Stinebower, member of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers.

be opposed that the Delegation should be prepared to state the reason, publicly.

Mr. Bohlen said the Department would prefer Yugoslavia to the Ukraine because there was hope that the situation there was a temporary phenomenon, whereas the Ukrainian status was permanent. Yugoslavia enjoyed all the prerogatives of an independent nation, he pointed out.

The meeting adjourned at 10:30.

ROGER MANN

IO Files: US/A/430

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 22, 1947.

Participants: Dr. H. V. Evatt, Australian Delegation
Col. W. R. Hodgson, Australian Delegation
Mr. Adlai Stevenson, United States Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation

Colonel Hodgson asked me where we stood on our slate for the Economic and Social Council. I evaded his question by telling him that we had not yet formulated a definite slate and asked him where his Delegation stood.

The Colonel said that Australia was going all out for a place on the Economic and Social Council. This had been talked over with Evatt who is strongly for it.

On the Security Council, the Colonel said Australia was opposed to any of the Eastern European countries.

The Colonel was interrupted at this point by a member of the Indian Delegation and I joined Dr. Evatt and Mr. Stevenson who were discussing the same subject.

Evatt expressed himself in even stronger terms than Hodgson with regard to Australia's desire to get on the Economic and Social Council. He confirmed that Australia was strongly against any of the Eastern European countries for the Security Council.

While we were talking, Hodgson joined us and reported that the Indian Delegate who had interrupted our earlier conversation had just told him that it had been decided with Madame Pandit at lunch that India was withdrawing from the Economic and Social Council race and wanted to go out strongly for the Security Council.

In summary, it was quite apparent that a deal between Australia and India is in the making whereby Australia will strongly support India for the Security Council and India will support Australia for the Economic and Social Council.

Before our conversation ended, I asked Evatt if he would tell me frankly how he felt about accepting the Chairmanship of the Palestine Committee.

Evatt replied that he would not want to get caught in a situation similar to the one in which he found himself in the election for the Presidency. He was not an active candidate; he was certainly not going to be a candidate against Mr. Pearson of Canada.

On the other hand if there were a substantially unanimous desire to put him in this place, he would accept it. I gathered from this conversation that Evatt would like the job and feels there is important work to be done; on the other hand, he does not want to run the slightest risk of a rebuff of any kind.

501.BC/9-2447 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1947—1 p. m.

US URGENT

416. Personal for: Ambassador Austin from Armour.¹ Reports from the Delegation suggest increasing support among the Latin American Delegations for the candidacy of Argentina for a seat on the Security Council. If this trend continues it seems likely that the conditions established in our 412 Sept. 19 will shortly have been fulfilled and that you will be free to inform the Argentine Delegate² of our intention to support his Government for election.³

We are seriously concerned and are exerting every endeavor to persuade the Argentine Government to join the International Emergency Food Council. You are of course fully conversant with the important position Argentina occupies as a supplier of cereals and other food stuffs to a famine ridden Europe.

It seems to us therefore appropriate, particularly in light of Dr. Arce's personal respect for you, that when you approach him giving assurances of our support in the Security Council election you should bring the conversation around to Argentina's key position as a supplier of food and our confidence that a Government now on the point of election to great international responsibility in the UN should be equally ready to assume other important responsibilities in the IEFC. It should be apparent also to Dr. Arce that should Argentina join this

¹ Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

² Dr. José Arce.

³ Telegram 412 not printed. The Department had instructed the Delegation that "you should tell the Latin American group that USDel will give most serious and sympathetic consideration to the candidate of their choice." (501.BC/9-1847)

latter organization, European Members of the United Nations would be predisposed by such action to vote for Argentina for the Security Council. [Armour.]

Repeated to Buenos Aires for information only.

LOVETT

IO Files : US/A/473

*Memorandum of Conversations, by Ambassador William Dawson
of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 25, 1947.

ARGENTINE CANDIDACY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL

I saw Aranha early this morning and inquired as to any further developments with regard to Argentina's candidacy for the Security Council. He repeated his previous statement to the effect that Argentina had fourteen Latin American votes. I asked if any other Latin American candidate were in the field. He said that no other country had announced its candidacy but that Uruguay and Peru were possibilities. He said that it was of course important that any Latin American candidate have pretty solid Latin American backing and be assured of election.

I asked him if he could tell me what Latin American countries were committed to Argentina. He said that he had a list but not with him. I inquired whether the reported backing of fourteen countries was based on information furnished by Arce. Aranha said that it was but that in a considerable number of cases he had confirmed the information personally.

I reminded Aranha of our desire to be informed as to the Latin American choice and of our statement that we would give no advance commitment of support but would of course give sympathetic consideration. Since Aranha had already mentioned Tuesday, September 30, as the probable date for the holding of the elections, I inquired whether it would be possible for him to hold a caucus or obtain information at an early date which would give us a more definite picture. He said that he would get the Latin American group together today.

This afternoon, Aranha informed me that he had gathered most of the group in his office at Lake Success immediately after lunch, that he had ascertained the position of certain others, that he could now assure me that Argentina is clearly the preferred Latin American candidate, that he has definite information as regards the attitude of seventeen Latin American countries backing Argentina, and that the only ones remaining to be heard from are Guatemala (whose Delegate had previously expressed to me a preference for Uruguay), Peru and

Uruguay. Aranha believes (and I am disposed to agree) that both Peru and Uruguay will join the group in supporting Argentina. I am inclined to believe also that Guatemala will fall into line.

As I had been in some doubt as to whether Panama and Venezuela would view Argentina with much favor, I inquired specifically as to the attitude of both countries. Aranha said that both the Venezuelan and Panamanian Delegates were definitely for Argentina. He added that Alfaro (Panama) had made the statement that in fact there was a commitment last year on the part of the Latin American group to support Argentina this year. Aranha noted also that Belt,¹ who had mentioned Cuba's candidacy at one time, is now for Argentina.

Aranha stated that the Arabs will vote for Argentina and he expressed the belief that as matters stand Argentina should obtain forty votes (enough to elect it on the first ballot).

¹ Dr. Guillermo Belt, Cuban Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

IO Files : US/A/479

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 25, 1947.

Mr. Pearson was worried over the effect on Canada of India's efforts to get a seat on the Security Council. He stated that Canada had been anxious to avoid any intercommonwealth contest for the seat and some weeks ago had been assured by Bajpai¹ that India had no interest in the Security Council. It now appeared that the Indian Government had left the question to Mrs. Pandit's decision, and that she was all out for a seat.

He expressed confidence that the Western European states would vote for Canada, and the Arabs for India. He inquired as to the Latin American attitude. After consulting Ambassador Dawson, I later advised him that Aranha expected the Latin American states to vote almost solidly for Canada. Pearson said he would also have a word with Aranha.

He expressed reluctance to see Czechoslovakia forced on the Security Council and felt that the Ukraine would be the lesser of the two evils.

Canada would vote for Argentina.

Pearson also commented that the Russians seemed to be very much on the defensive and anxious to resume the offensive but that they were having difficulty in finding means of doing so.

¹ Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General, Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

IO Files : US/A/487

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador William Dawson of
the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 25, 1947.

In connection with our discussion today of the Latin American candidacy for the Security Council, Aranha inquired as to our other candidates. I told him they were Canada and Czechoslovakia. He said that he would work with the Latin American group to assure support for both countries. He expressed particular interest in Canada, to which country Brazil has been committed for some time. I told him (pursuant to a conversation with Mr. Raynor) that it would be well to line up Latin American support for Canada promptly before any of the group committed themselves to India which may be soliciting votes. With regard to Czechoslovakia, he said the Czechs had told a number of Latin American Delegations they do not want to be on the Security Council (for the same reasons given us). I said that we were nevertheless maintaining Czechoslovakia on our list and that we hope it will be elected.

As respects the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, I told Aranha I would endeavor to let him have our definitive lists tomorrow. He knows, of course, that we are supporting Brazil for the Economic and Social Council. He consulted his instructions and said that Denmark is the only country to which Brazil is already committed for the Economic and Social Council. He expressed the opinion that India should be re-elected, since, if it fails of election to the Security Council (and he considers Canada much the more desirable candidate), India with its 300,000,000 inhabitants will otherwise not be on any Council. I told him that I did not believe that we could support India or for that matter any country outside of the Big Five for re-election. He said he thought that in the particular case of India an exception ought to be given serious consideration.

Aranha inquired whether there would be a place on our slate for the Trusteeship Council for a Latin American country. I said I was quite sure this would not be the case.

IO Files : US/A/488

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador William Dawson of
the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 26, 1947.

Pursuant to Aranha's request of last evening, I called on him this afternoon to give him our Economic and Social Council and Trusteeship Council slates as follows (checking first with Mr. Raynor) :

Economic and Social Council: Brazil, Denmark, Iran, Poland, U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom

Trusteeship Council: Philippines and Norway

Aranha took note, interposed no objection, and indicated that he intended to bring the slates to the attention of the Latin American group.

He requested that our Delegation put in a word for Brazil (for Economic and Social Council) with the Delegations of Iceland, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Siam. I told him we would be glad to do this.

In the course of our conversation, Aranha said that he had a letter from Evatt urging Australia's candidacy for Economic and Social Council and that Mme. Pandit had requested support for India for the Security Council or, failing this, for re-election to the Economic and Social Council. He said that both candidacies might well complicate the situation. He referred to the strongly expressed desire of the Czechs not to be on the Security Council and suggested that, if they were dropped, India might replace them. I said that the Russians would presumably not be satisfied with this; that we were keeping Czechoslovakia on our list; and that, as respects India, it had fared extremely well in the distribution of United Nations posts, that it might well wait a year before resuming a place on some United Nations Council, and that in its new status it would have plenty of domestic problems to occupy its attention. With regard to Australia, I said that with Canada and New Zealand already on Economic and Social Council the election of a third Dominion (and particularly one so close geographically to New Zealand) probably offer difficulties, and that in any case, as far as we were concerned, we were already firmly committed to Brazil, Denmark, Iran, and Poland.

IO Files : US/A/489

*Memorandum by Ambassador William Dawson of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 26, 1947.

ARGENTINE CANDIDACY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL

Ambassador Austin saw Arce at Lake Success at about 11:00 a. m. today and, after informing him of our decision to support Argentina for the Security Council as the preferred candidate of the Latin American group, discussed with him the desirability of Argentina's adhering to the International Emergency Food Council and the Food and Agriculture Organization (along the lines suggested in the Department's recent telegram). Ambassador Austin had to resume at once his post as Chairman of the Headquarters Committee but got word to me through Mr. Ross that Arce had suggested that our Ambassador in Buenos Aires see President Peron personally with regard to Argentina's adherence and in so doing mention the effect of such action as a contribution to the struggle against Communism. I conveyed this message to Mr. McClintock¹ by telephone.

Shortly after his interview with Ambassador Austin, Arce approached me and told me of their conversation, expressing his gratification. He said that he would telegraph his Government today concerning the desirability of prompt adherence to the two organizations. I took advantage of the opportunity to tell Arce (and Muñoz² who was with him) that I was sure they understood that we were not making a deal or driving a bargain, that we were of course not tying any strings to our support of Argentina as the preferred Latin American group candidate, and that in referring to the matter of adherence to the International Emergency Food Council and the Food and Agriculture Organization we were merely making a friendly suggestion in what we considered Argentina's own interest. Arce and Muñoz said that Ambassador Austin had made this plain and that they would make it plain to their Government.³

¹ Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk).

² Rodolfo Muñoz, Counsellor of the Permanent Delegation of Argentina to the United Nations.

³ The substance of this memorandum was transmitted by the Department to the Embassy in Buenos Aires in telegram 908, to Buenos Aires, September 26, 6 p. m. The Ambassador was requested to see President Peron personally and to stress to him that Argentina's participation in the International Emergency Food Council (IEFC) would have "considerable effect in combating spread of communism in Europe and elsewhere in the world." (501.BC/9-2647)

Arce said that he would be very happy to discuss adherence and Argentine cooperation with Mr. Thorp when the latter returns from Washington and that they might lunch together for the purpose.

WILLIAM DAWSON

IO Files: US/A/515

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 30 [29], 1947.

Participants: Dr. Evatt, Australian Delegation
Senator Austin, United States Delegation
Mr. Ross, United States Delegation
Mr. Raynor, United States Delegation

Following earlier conversations between several members of the United States Delegation and Dr. Evatt, and as agreed in our delegation meeting this morning,¹ it was arranged for Senator Austin to speak to Dr. Evatt around 3 o'clock this afternoon. Senator Austin confirmed the information previously given to Dr. Evatt and other Australians that due to other commitments made by us prior to our knowledge of Australia's desire for a seat on the Economic and Social Council, we could not add Australia to our list of candidates. It was further explained, however, that we were most sympathetic to the Australian desire for a seat on this council and hoped that they would be successful.

Senator Austin also told Dr. Evatt that Australia would be our first alternate choice in the event that one of our original candidates loses out and felt it would be possible for us to switch to Australia at the appropriate time following the initial ballot if this should occur. Dr. Evatt asked if it would be possible for us to let this be known to the other delegations and we told him that we would. He also requested, and after consultation we agreed, that in any list of our candidates for the Economic and Social Council that we gave to anyone we would add the name of Australia at the end in brackets.

¹The question of Australia's candidacy for the Economic and Social Council was discussed at some length at this Delegation meeting, minutes not printed (Doc. US/A/M(Chr)/56, September 29). Text of a letter from the Australian Delegation Chairman, Mr. Evatt, to the Secretary of State, dated September 26, is included in the minutes.

IO Files: US/A/510

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harley A. Notter of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 29, 1947.

Mr. Hadow¹ told me near three o'clock today in the lounge at Lake Success that he and his colleagues had noted during the day a rapid development (a) against the geographic principle, and (b) also against "blindly" voting any longer for a set number of satellites.

He mentioned as a fact that some Latin-American states were likely to vote for India rather than Canada for the Security Council. The risk that Canada might lose worried the British very much. The British were boosting India and Canada, and they hoped we could stiffen support for Canada. Czechoslovakia might not be elected to the Security Council he believed, because of the (b) factor above. The British were pressing Australia for the Economic and Social Council.

As to the Economic and Social Council, we spoke further at five o'clock in the driveway at Lake Success. He replied to my question that Mr. Evatt had taken Mr. Austin's conversation "very well" and was "happy" to have our support on the second ballot if someone or other of our slate failed to win. He said "Mr. Evatt is anxious now for the news to be spread"—whereupon he leaped into his waiting motor.

¹ R. H. Hadow, Adviser, British Delegation.

IO Files: US/A/521

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 30, 1947.

STATUS OF SLATES FOR COUNCIL ELECTIONS¹I. SECURITY COUNCIL BALLOTING AT PLENARY SESSIONS, TUESDAY,
SEPTEMBER 30

1. Argentina and Canada were elected on the first ballot, receiving 41 votes each, the two-thirds majority required for election being 38 with 57 ballots cast.

2. On this ballot the Ukraine received 33 votes; India, 29; Czechoslovakia, 8; Uruguay, 8; Ethiopia, 1; Greece, 1; Guatemala, 1; Philippine Republic, 1. Under the rules, voting then proceeded on the

¹ For the proceedings of the General Assembly in the elections to Councils on September 30, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I, pp. 320 ff.

Ukraine and India for the one remaining position. Six further ballots as follows were taken before a vote adjourning the further balloting until Wednesday morning:

<i>Second ballot</i>		<i>Fifth ballot</i>	
Ukraine	29	Ukraine	33
India	24	India	23
<i>Third ballot</i>		<i>Sixth ballot</i>	
Ukraine	29	Ukraine	34
India	25	India	22
<i>Fourth ballot</i>		<i>Seventh ballot</i>	
Ukraine	30	Ukraine	33
India	25	India	23

3. The United States slate for this election was Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Argentina, with the understanding that our vote would be switched to India if Czechoslovakia dropped out. The United States vote was cast for India on all ballots following the first one. The fact of our support for India was given in response to all queries concerning our position after the first ballot.

II. EXTRACT FROM AGENDA MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION ON ITEMS ARISING AT THE PLENARY SESSIONS ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30

4. "*Election of Three Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council.* The election is by secret ballot, with a two-thirds majority required. There are no nominations. The United States will vote for *Argentina, Canada and Czechoslovakia.* If Czechoslovakia is eliminated from the ballot through failure to gain a sufficient number of votes, or if it appears that it is impossible for Czechoslovakia to gain a seat, the United States will shift its support to India at the appropriate time."

5. "*Election of Six Members of the Economic and Social Council.* The method of voting is the same as that used for the Security Council. The United States slate consists of *Brazil, Denmark, Iran, Poland, U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom.* If any vacancy should develop on our list, either through voluntary withdrawal of one of our candidates or its elimination in the course of the balloting, Australia would be the first state to which we would shift our support.

NOTE: Other alternative candidates, if more than one of the states on our slate is not elected, will depend on the outcome of the Security Council election and of the first ballot on the Economic and Social Council. Selection would be made from India, Czechoslovakia and Siam if they are in the running."

6. "*Election of Two Members of the Trusteeship Council.* The election is held in the same manner as that for the Security Council and for the Economic and Social Council. Our candidates are *Norway and the Philippines.*"

III. UNITED STATES SLATES FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL AND TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Security Council

Elected on first ballot, September 30

Argentina

Canada

Eligible Candidates

Ukraine

India

*Economic and Social Council*²

Brazil

Poland

Denmark

U.S.S.R.

Iran

U.K.

(Australia, contingent upon the development of
a vacancy in the slate)

*Trusteeship Council*³

Philippines

Norway

² In balloting on October 1, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Soviet Union, and Poland were elected to the Economic and Social Council; see *ibid.*, pp. 329 ff.

³ The General Assembly balloted on the election of additional members to the Trusteeship Council on October 1, with no result; see *ibid.*, pp. 334 and 335.

IO Files: US/A/528

*Memorandum by Mr. Murray M. Wise of the United States Delegation
Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK] September 30, 1947.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION LIAISON WITH LATIN AMERICAN
DELEGATIONS

During the past few days criticisms have reached us, particularly through Castro of El Salvador,¹ Correa of Ecuador,² and Carias of Honduras, to the effect that there is not enough consultation between the United States and the Latin American Delegations, and that the United States Delegates are not represented at the Latin American caucuses. There has also been some criticism that the United States

¹ Dr. Hector David Castro, Chairman of the Salvadoran Delegation to the General Assembly.

² Dr. José A. Corréa, Secretary General of the Permanent Delegation of Ecuador to the United Nations.

Delegation is not taking enough initiative with the Latin American Delegates on certain questions such as Slaters and the Palestine question.

In so far as I or any other member of Ambassador Dawson's team is aware, we have received no invitations either direct or indirect to be present at Latin American caucuses, and I am not sure that it would be advisable to be present. In fact I can see how it would be detrimental in the long run. I believe the Latin American resentment referred to in the first paragraph may stem primarily from the fact that they desire to be consulted or have closer contact with the United States Delegates rather than to Advisers.

Last year during the Assembly I was approached in Washington by certain Ambassadors from the Central American countries who stated that they believed an error being made at the General Assembly was that of not having Ambassador Austin call the Latin Americans together periodically, state the United States position with respect to the problems on the Agenda, and then call for discussions which would lead to more united decisions among the American Delegations. It was stated that quick and brief conversations in the corridors, the lobbies, or in Committees or General Assembly sessions was inadequate and not particularly agreeable to the Latin American Delegates.

The foregoing has been given a great deal of consideration but no practical way of having Latin American heads of delegations consult directly with the United States Delegates of high rank has been found. Furthermore, developments are so fast sometimes that time does not permit conversations of the nature apparently desired by the Latin Americans.

MURRAY WISE

501.BB/9-3047 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1947—8 p. m.

US URGENT

434. For US Delegation to General Assembly. Department has noted impasse in balloting between Ukraine and India for Security Council and considers it of great importance that USDel continue to support India. We should not shift our vote contrary to conviction and judgment merely to precipitate decision or to line up with winner. Eastern European bloc failed to provide acceptable candidate partly because one of its Members is now participating in aggressive acts in defiance of UN, partly because two other Eastern European Members are in fact component parts of USSR and share that country's failure during

past year to meet satisfactorily its obligations as member of SC, and partly because the only candidate we could accept declined to assume SC responsibilities.

Under these circumstances, only acceptable course of action left open to us is to support suitable candidate from outside of Soviet bloc.

LOVETT

IO Files : US/A/M(Chr)/57

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, October 1, 1947, 9: 15 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follow the list of persons (33) present and a discussion of the voting for Security Council membership in the General Assembly on September 30.]

Ambassador Austin said that late in the previous day's meeting he had talked with Faris Bey El-Khoury of Syria ¹ who said in effect that there were twelve votes for India and inquired whether it was possible to move ten. If not, would the United States stick with India? Was the United States willing to run the risk of making the United Nations look ridiculous? The Ambassador said that he had replied that the United States position would not be known until the next day. Thus the matter stood. He calculated that if India had the Arabs, the Dominions, the United Kingdom, and the United States, it conservatively had a solid nineteen votes. If all the Latins went the other way and did not shift in the next one or two ballots then no matter what was said they were strongly for the Ukraine.

Mr. Dulles said the Latin Americans were voting as a bloc in their own interests. Ambassador Austin observed that the Ukraine would win on the next ballot if the Arabs made up their minds to change. He would not be surprised to see them shift. It was difficult for a great country to shift at this stage, however, and he was sorry we had taken the position we did. He thought it was bringing nothing but harm to the United States and that it was going to be accused of blocking the Soviets. He noted that the question had been decided two weeks ago and said that he personally could not change with a good conscience, although he had first taken a position in favor of the Ukraine. He thought that the United States should stand firm and, if asked, should say it was going to stay with the Indian candidacy.

Mr. Stevenson inquired whether India could be persuaded to withdraw and thus prevent an aggravation of the situation. Mr. Raynor reported that the United Kingdom discovered yesterday afternoon that

¹ Chairman of the Syrian Delegation to the General Assembly.

India was going to stand firm. Mr. Kopper reported that the Middle East and Far East Offices of the Department desired that the present slate be supported.

Mr. Sandifer said that the press had a statement from Mrs. Pandit saying that India would have to stand firm because otherwise a whole area of the world would be unrepresented.

Secretary Marshall turned to Senator Vandenberg² and remarked that he had sat in on the Rio discussions³ and asked his opinion on the present matter. Senator Vandenberg replied that he had no comment, for he was not sufficiently familiar with the question. He said that he would be inclined to look for a candidate upon which all could unite and asked about the possibility of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Sandifer replied that it was not possible to vote for Czechoslovakia because under the rules only the two top runners-up could be voted for to elect the last Member of the Council.

The Secretary said that the decision involved whether or not the United States should use its influence to try to break the Latin American bloc. He did not think that should be done. He thought there was a limited chance for such a move to succeed. He did not think the Delegation should try to persuade India to drop out. That would be a very complicated maneuver with dangerous possibilities. He thought a vote should be cast for India and nothing be said about it.

Mr. Ross observed that the Delegation needed flexibility in case of a deadlock. The Secretary replied that he expected a deadlock. Mr. Stinebower inquired if a deadlock arose whether about seven of those who were voting for India might be induced to abstain. Mr. Dulles said that he did not think the situation could be met by devious methods. He observed wryly that it seemed that United States support was the kiss of death in the General Assembly, for there were twenty votes against the United States.

The Secretary said that better preparation on the slates was needed for the next Assembly. He thought it would be most unfortunate if we entered a situation in which there was a small chance of succeeding as in the present one which painted the United States very badly.

Mr. Stevenson thought that the situation had been made difficult because the United States had pushed Czechoslovakia for the Security

² Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, was present apparently as a guest. Senator Vandenberg had been a Representative of the United States to the General Assembly at the London and New York meetings of the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946.

³ The reference is to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security which met at Rio de Janeiro August 15-September 2, 1947. Senator Vandenberg was a United States delegate to the conference. For documentation on this conference, see vol. VIII, pp. 1 ff.

Council against its will. Ambassador Austin said that that was the real trouble.

The Secretary inquired what was suggested if on two ballots the deadlock were not broken. Mr. Dulles said that he would stay with India until further developments made it necessary to reconsider. He said he did not feel that after going so far he would desert India.

The Secretary said that as matters now stood the United States would vote for India and, if asked, it must say that it is voting for India.⁴

[Here follows brief discussion of another subject.]

⁴The October 1 balloting in the General Assembly continued the deadlock between the Ukraine and India; see GA (II), *Plenary*, pp. 328 and 329.

IO Files : US/A/549

*Memorandum by Ambassador William Dawson of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 2, 1947.

REASONS MOTIVATING LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT OF UKRAINE FOR
SECURITY COUNCIL; ESTIMATE OF SITUATION ACCORDING TO PRESENT
INFORMATION

The following summary is based on conversations had with a considerable number of Latin American Delegates by the members of the ARA team and reported in individual memoranda:

Although several Latin American Delegates disclaim knowledge of any deal or even profess to believe that no deal was made, there can, I think, be no doubt that an agreement was reached with the Russians. I think that Arce and Aranha both had a hand in this and one Latin American Delegate mentioned the Guatemalan and Venezuelan Delegations as having played a role.

However, I do not believe that this deal is the sole reason for the continuing Latin American support of the Ukraine.

Knowing that William Sanders of the Department is a close friend of Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo (Director General of the Pan American Union who was in Flushing on Tuesday), I called him up this afternoon and said that we should be interested in any information regarding Lleras Camargo's estimate of the situation. Sanders said that as luck would have it he had had a talk with Lleras Camargo this afternoon and that the latter had expressed the view, based on conversations with a number of Latin American Delegates at Flushing, that in supporting the Ukraine the Latin American group was actuated primarily and essentially by its respect for the principle of regional

representation. Sanders said that Lleras Camargo had mentioned no other motive.

Arguments based on respect for a principle bear considerable weight with many Latin Americans— . . . In this particular case, they may have some more selfish interest based on apprehension lest failure to elect a Slav state might establish a precedent which could eventually have the effect of depriving the Latin American group of its present representation on the Security Council (as was, I believed, mentioned this morning by Mr. Stevenson in reporting his conversation with a Mexican Delegate).

Other considerations which may affect the thinking of some Latin American Delegates are those noted by Ambassador Corrigan, namely that failure to elect a Slav non-permanent member would stiffen the Soviets in their opposition to any liberalization of the veto and that certain Latin Americans wish to avoid anything that might tend to sharpen the conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Although I think that the Latin American group is definitely on our side, I believe also that not a few Latin Americans are concerned over the developing situation. Even some of our loyal friends, being less familiar than we are with the Soviet mentality and attitude, probably feel that an occasional friendly gesture towards Russia might have a generally beneficial effect from the standpoint of the United Nations.

Finally, I am inclined to believe that Aranha not only played a part in the deal with the Russians but has advocated continued support of the Ukraine. His motives are probably respect for the principle of regional representation and his personal desire to see this session of the General Assembly prove a great success. Incidentally, a tendency to favor compromise and avoid conflict is characteristic of Brazilian diplomacy in general and of Aranha in particular (as he demonstrated at the 1942 Rio Conference).

To sum up: I believe that the attitude of those Latin American Delegations which support the Ukraine may be attributed in varying degree to some or all of the following motives: A deal with the Slav bloc for votes for Argentina; respect for the principle of regional representation, coupled with the feeling that this principle is in the Latin American interest; the belief that failure to give the Slavs a non-permanent member would sharpen the United States-U.S.S.R. conflict to the detriment of the United Nations; and Aranha's personal interest in a successful session.

Just how many Latin American Delegations are voting for India is not known. The number is estimated to be from 4 to 8. Wise has information to the effect that at the present time the following countries are for India: Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. Arce told me this morning that

he has voted consistently for India but is not letting people know this. (It should be noted that Wise's information is not firsthand and that it is not definitely known that all of the seven countries listed are actually voting for India). It seems likely however that, if we were interested in persuading them to do so, ten or more Latin American Delegations might be prepared either to vote for India or to abstain from voting.

WILLIAM DAWSON

IO Files : US/A/554

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 2, 1947.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to the slates question.]

Security Council Elections

Mr. Papanek asked me what our views were about finding a solution to this problem. I told him that so far the problem was one which baffled us completely. He protested, perhaps a little too earnestly I thought, that the Czechs did not understand the situation. He said they had indicated the day before that they were willing to take the assignment and then had apparently been thrown overboard for reasons which they did not know or understand.

IO Files : US/A/555

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 2, 1947.

I inquired of Mr. Cockram¹ if he or the British Delegation had any idea as to how the present impasse with respect to the Security Council elections might be broken. He said their present thinking was that the matter should be allowed to simmer for the time being. His feeling is that as the support for the Ukraine is unprincipled support and has no quality of adhesiveness, it is likely to melt away as committee work progresses, assuming the Russians pursue their normally obnoxious practices in the various committees.

He told me the British were supporting Siam for the Trusteeship Council. He dodged the question as to whether they are supporting Norway and I suspect they may have voted for Costa Rica inasmuch as

¹ B. Cockram, Adviser from the Commonwealth Relations Office and on the British Delegation Staff of Advisers.

Mr. Hadow was advocating the Costa Rican case strongly about the lounge during the day. It therefore seems that this surprise move may have at least in part been engineered by Mr. Hadow.

Mr. Cockram indicated that the British remained firmly opposed to the candidacy of the Ukraine. They continue, as from the start, not to view as seriously as we have the question of the Eastern group losing its second seat. I also do not believe their opposition to the Ukraine is based so much on principle as ours is. Although it is in part attributable to that, it is more a matter of extreme dislike for Mr. Manuilsky. Mr. Cockram, for instance, referred to the travesty which would result if a State was elected to the Security Council, the foreign minister of which, who theoretically would be directing its policies on the Security Council, had been censored for partiality in Committee 1 last year by a vote of 45 to 6 as happened to Mr. Manuilsky.

The British confirm information received from various other sources that as late as 5 p. m. on Monday the Czechs and the Poles were letting it be known that Czech was the Eastern European candidate. In fact, the British say they had it in writing from the Russians at about 5 that afternoon and that around 7 Gromyko denied it and stated their candidate was the Ukraine.

The British have checked with the Indians and are convinced that the Indians have no question whatsoever of withdrawing. They seem to be not at all displeased to see that the Indians have maneuvered themselves in this Assembly, at least on this issue, into a position of opposition to the Soviet Union.

IO Files: US/A/557

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET [NEW YORK,] October 3, 1947.

Mr. Henderson¹ called Mr. Bohlen this morning to inform him of the Department's latest thinking on India's candidacy for the remaining position on the Security Council. Since Mr. Bohlen was in a meeting in the Secretary's Office, I talked with Mr. Henderson. Mr. Henderson said that he had discussed this matter with Acting Secretary Lovett this morning. The results of their conversation were as follows:

1. Mr. Lovett agreed with Mr. Henderson that the United States should "stick tight on India". The Acting Secretary did not think that we should switch around nor should India be used as a pawn with a view to a possible substitution of Czechoslovakia or another country

¹ Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

by one means or another. He felt that since we have indicated our support for India we should stand firm on it.

2. Mr. Lovett and Mr. Henderson suggested that the United States might make it clear either in a public statement or in a statement in the General Assembly that the United States was prepared to have the Soviet Union and two of its component republics in the United Nations to sit in the General Assembly, but had never agreed at Yalta that any nation such as the U.S.S.R. could have what amounts to two seats on the Security Council. Mr. Lovett and Mr. Henderson thought that Mr. Bohlen might give consideration to making a suggestion to the Secretary along these lines and making clear our position at Yalta. In addition, such a statement might make clear that we had not deserted the principle of geographic representation, but since Czechoslovakia did not choose to run, and since there were no other suitable candidates from the Eastern European area, we decided to support India.

3. Mr. Henderson said that Mr. Lovett did not feel in a position to decide whether the United States Delegation should actively campaign for India's candidacy. The Acting Secretary did not feel completely conversant with this aspect of the situation. They felt, however, that the United States should be straightforward and open in its support of India. Mr. Henderson said that his own office felt that we should give as much support to India in our discussions with other delegations as we had in the cases of other candidates we had supported. He felt that India should obtain no more support nor no less than these.

IO Files: US/A/564

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador William Dawson of
the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 3, 1947.

Participants: Padilla Nervo, Mexican Delegation
Costa du Rels, Bolivian Delegation¹
William Dawson, United States Delegation

Padilla Nervo (Mexico) approached me this morning in the lounge and started at once to discuss Ukraine-India deadlock.

Although I understand that his views have already been made known to our Delegation through Ambassador Austin and Mr. Stevenson, I repeat the substance of his remarks for the record. (I understand also that our position has been explained to Padilla Nervo.)

He said that the deadlock is weakening the authority and prestige of the General Assembly and may weaken the case for the Interim Committee since people may be inclined to question the usefulness of such a Committee if the General Assembly itself cannot avoid such

¹ Dr. Aldolfo Costa du Rels, Chairman of the Bolivian Delegation to the General Assembly.

situations. He feels that some way out of the impasse must be found as soon as possible.

While he did not suggest a solution, he said that failure to elect a Slav state would weaken the position of advocates of liberalization of the veto, since Russia would be left alone on the Security Council.

Padilla Nervo remarked also that the Latin American group thinks it a mistake to "aggravate the United States-U.S.S.R. conflict by action on any issue not vital." He said that he could not see how the election of the Ukraine could really hurt our interests. He added that he did not of course pretend to know the whole picture but that, if the United States has some vital interest in the matter, he would appreciate being so informed. While he did not say so explicitly, the implication was that, if we were "vitaly interested", he would be prepared to reconsider his position.

In a somewhat later conversation, Costa du Rels (Bolivia) expressed concern over the effect of the deadlock on the prestige of the United Nations. He said that he understood that the Latin American group would probably hold a meeting early next week (Monday or Tuesday) at which the matter would be considered.

WILLIAM DAWSON

IO Files : US/A/569

Memorandum by the Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation (Sandifer) to Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson of the United States Delegation

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 4, 1947.

I understand from Mr. Rusk that during the course of a discussion of other matters in the Secretary's office, Ambassador Austin raised the question of what our reply should be to Padilla Nervo's inquiry as to the reasons for our supporting India for the Security Council and opposing the Ukraine. After some discussion the Secretary indicated that Ambassador Austin might give a reply to him along the following lines, briefly summarized :

1. We have good reasons for supporting India in place of Ukraine.
2. The Ukraine is not an independent state although admitted to membership in the United Nations.
3. There is a difference in the qualifications for membership in the United Nations and for membership in the Security Council (Article 23).
4. Our experience during the past year with reference to the maintenance of peace and security does not incline us to put the Ukraine in the position of having a vote in the Security Council at this time.

5. We would have been glad to accept Czechoslovakia as a member of the Security Council, showing that we do not oppose the geographic allocation to Eastern Europe of two seats on the Security Council. This possibility was frustrated by the Czechs and the Russians themselves although we had been led to believe until shortly before the opening of the Security Council elections that both countries would acquiesce in the election of Czechoslovakia.

6. Normally we would accept Yugoslavia as a member of the Security Council but as that state is now engaged in acts of aggression against a member of the United Nations in violation of the Charter, we do not consider it appropriate to support its election to that organ of the United Nations having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.

7. We consider that India is a state well qualified for membership in the Security Council under all the qualifications laid down in the Charter. Furthermore, she is located in the general geographic area in question.

8. We did not urge the Latin American states to vote for India because we did not want to be in the position of exerting pressure to that end. However, since the Mexican Delegation has inquired concerning our position, we want you to know that we think there is an important difference between India and the Ukraine in relation to their election to membership in the Security Council.

IO Files : US/A/585

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 6, 1947.

I asked Mr. Cockram how firm he felt the British were in their support for Siam for the Trusteeship Council rather than the Philippines. I indicated to him our hope that the Philippines would be successful in getting this seat.

Mr. Cockram indicated there was some difference of opinion on this in the British Delegation and that he among others could not understand why they were supporting Siam rather than the Philippines. He will raise this matter with his Delegation.

501.BC/10-647

*The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
(Henderson) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1947.

DEAR CHIP: As Sam Kopper has no doubt told you, I tried to get in touch with you by telephone on October 3 to discuss some aspects of the support that we are giving to India's candidacy for the Security Council. Mr. Kopper has summarized my conversation with him in his memorandum of October 3, US/A/557.

It seems to me upon reflection that although we have quite properly emphasized the unsuitability of the Ukraine as a candidate for the Security Council and have thrown our support to India's candidacy as a desirable alternative, we may not have given sufficient consideration to the positive grounds that exist for American support to India's membership on the Security Council. I have in mind the following considerations:

1. Present membership SC does not include representative South Asian region which is of growing importance to world picture.
2. Country of India's size and potential political and economic structure should be represented on at least one of main UN bodies.
3. India has shown tendency this session GA to follow fairly independent and moderate course.
4. India at present time is at foreign policy crossroads. Stimulated by foreign powers interested in creating chaotic conditions in colonial world of Asia and Africa, India could conceivably become dangerous disruptive force. Alternatively, India's genuine interest in dependent peoples could, given friendly collaboration between India and countries sincerely interested in political and economic advancement [of these] peoples, play a stabilizing role in South Asia. India's election to SC with support of U.S. would tend to orient India in latter direction.

It is hoped that you will be able to make use of the foregoing consideration in supporting the Indian candidacy.

Sincerely yours,

LOY W. HENDERSON

IO Files: US/A/598

*Memorandum by Ambassador William Dawson of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 9, 1947.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR PHILIPPINE CANDIDACY FOR TRUSTEE-
SHIP COUNCIL

Several days ago, Romulo¹ said that he had definite information that Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala and

¹ Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, Permanent Representative of the Philippines at the United Nations.

Bolivia had not voted for the Philippines for the Trusteeship Council. He requested our assistance in the matter.

I have now spoken to Delegates of the five countries, telling them what Romulo had said. All of the several Delegates expressed great surprise and said immediately that they had voted for the Philippines. Several of them stated their belief that the Latin American group was voting solidly for the Philippines.

WILLIAM DAWSON

IO Files : US/A/614

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 10, 1947.

Trusteeship Council Election. I asked Mr. Cockram if the British had changed their position on this matter and if they would now be willing to vote for the Philippines. He replied that they had not changed to that extent but that they were now reconciled to the election of the Philippines. In answer to my inquiry, Mr. Cockram indicated that this meant they would not campaign actively from here on against the Philippines.

[Here follows brief comment between the two advisers regarding voting by the new Dominions of India and Pakistan.]

IO Files : US/A/618

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Bartlett Wells of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 14, 1947.

Ambassador Primo Villa Michel¹ felt that "in the end the United States would have its own way with regard to the Security Council election; it always does. You get hold of a notion and insist upon it no matter what anybody else contends." I asked whether he had observed an inclination of states to weaken in their support of the Ukraine for this Council, and he replied, "Oh, yes, there will undoubtedly be quite a few who shift." He indicated vaguely that there had been some suggestions of compromise (something which Carias of Honduras, with whom I had spoken earlier, had also referred to, saying Gromyko had mentioned to him the possibility of going back to Czechoslovakia), and said that if such a possibility were reopened, he thought Czechoslovakia would this time be found amenable to election.

¹ Dr. Villa-Michel was a Representative on the Mexican Delegation.

He continued by saying that the principle that each geographic group should select its own candidate for Council seats was basic with "us"; the Latin American region as a whole, because once it were to fall Latin America might lose one of its two seats on the Security Council, which must be held at the cost of whatever effort might be called for.

H. B. WELLS

IO Files :US/A/M(Chr)/67

*Minutes of the Twenty-Third Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, October 17, 1947, 9: 15 a. m.*

SECRET

[Here follows list of persons (35) present. After consideration of two agenda items, the discussions proceeded to the question of election of members to the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The Delegation was informed by Mr. Sandifer that there was talk among General Assembly delegates of changing Rules 94 and 95 of the General Assembly concerning elections in order to end the impasse. Inconclusive Delegation discussion followed.]

Mr. Dulles said that a prolongation of this deadlock was bad for the prestige of the United Nations. We should decide whether the issue was vital. If not, then we should not continue the deadlock with the Soviets. If it were vital then, if guidance were given to the Latin Americans, we might break it. To let the deadlock continue to be appraised as unnecessary and useless aggravation of the situation is unwise. If the matter is a vital one, then we should fight it out and win. However, we should not fight the Soviets on non-essentials.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Dulles had any suggestion. Mr. Dulles replied that it was his personal view that the Ukraines should be allowed to be elected, but he was willing to go along on taking a licking. To defeat the Ukraine looks like a squeeze on the Soviets. It would be bad to have a great mass of little defeats poured on this way. He did not want to see the Soviets get out of the United Nations. It was useful to have them here if for no other reason, because of the contacts. He saw no justification for not being able to make up our mind.

Mr. Stevenson said he favored suspending or adopting new rules. This might open it up to Czechoslovakia. If that can't be done, he said he had felt all along that we should tell Mrs. Pandit that we were going to vote for the Ukraine and do so.

Mr. Fahy said the situation in India troubled him. He did not think we should let them down because that would have a bad effect on India. So he preferred to vote for India. If there were a deadlock, then he would open the Rules. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she agreed.

The Secretary said that he agreed with Mr. Dulles. This was not a great issue. He was opposed to fighting the Russians on small things. This was not related to a great issue, and he did not want to press the Latin Americans on small things. He felt later that we would have to put the pressure on them on important issues. He hoped that the Russians would turn to Czechoslovakia. The way to go was to follow a change in the Rules.

Mr. Bohlen said that all of the Commonwealth States, the Arabs, and some others were for India. So it is not just a question of the United States against the Soviets.

The Secretary said that the Rules should be changed first and then we would proceed.

Mr. Sandifer said he was not clear about the matter of changing the Rules. He said that can't be done unless someone takes the initiative. The President of the Assembly has decided not to proceed on the Rules matter first. He said he understood we were going to vote once more and hold to India for the present. The Secretary said that was his understanding.

[Here follow special reports by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) and the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas), guests of the Delegation, on conditions in the countries to which they were accredited.]

IO Files : US/A/690

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 23, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director, NEA
Mr. Joseph Satterthwaite, Deputy Director, NEA
Samuel K. C. Kopper, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

In a telephone conversation with Mr. Henderson and Mr. Satterthwaite this evening, I learned that

(a) They feel very strongly that it is essential for us to continue to support India for election to the vacant position on the Security Council.

(b) They believe that to withdraw our support from India at this time would seriously affect our prestige not only in India but also in Latin America and elsewhere, since it would indicate a weakness on our part on an important issue.

(c) Mr. Henderson believes that India is more entitled to a position on the Security Council than the Ukraine. He pointed out that all of

the South and Middle Asian area is without representation. Latin America, with a population far less, has two representatives, Western Europe has two, and Eastern Europe has one; while North America also has two.

(d) Mr. Henderson believes that it would be most unfortunate to withdraw our support from India when it is common knowledge that the Ukraine is being supported by the Latin American States only because of a "deal" and not on the basis of any principle.

(e) NEA believes that instead of withdrawing our support from India, we should clearly and firmly indicate to other nations our intention to continue supporting India down the line.

SAMUEL K. C. KOPPER

501.BC/10-2447 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1947—6 p. m.

US URGENT

509. We are disturbed at report in your 1079 October 24¹ that Sweden has been prominently mentioned as an alternative candidate for SC. We feel election of Sweden to this post at this time would be unfortunate since it would tend to confirm impression that Sweden is very close to if not actually in the Soviet bloc. Because of pro-Soviet attitude of the Swedish Foreign Minister this tendency would probably be accentuated were Sweden elected to the SC. You should in consequence in response to inquiry indicate to other Delegations our definite preference for India and our disinclination to see Sweden elected at this time.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

501.BC/10-2747

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)
to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 27, 1947.

MR. LOVETT: I find here particularly in Washington and even in the Department considerable lack of understanding of the situation with regard to the election in the Security Council and the Ukrainian and Indian deadlock.

The whole criticism that has appeared publicly and even the doubts expressed in the Department appear to be based on a number of com-

plete misconceptions. In New York, I was unfortunately absent when the first deadlock occurred and general distorted versions as to our position and the causes of the deadlock were spread in the papers. The following are the misconceptions:

First, that the United States is blocking the election of the Ukraine. This is completely untrue. The United States has not campaigned against the Ukraine in the slightest degree. The countries, namely, the Latin Americans, on which the United States would have maximum influence are with possibly three or four exceptions voting solidly for the Ukraine. Of the 25 votes received by India, according to our information all but two or three are voting their conviction and preference for India. These votes are composed of the British Commonwealth, 5; the Arab States, 7; the other Mohammedan countries—Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, 3; three Far Eastern countries, China, Siam and the Philippines. Thus, had the United States initially voted for the Ukraine, the Ukraine would not be elected and it is very doubtful that should we switch our vote to the Ukraine that she would be elected.

It might also be pointed out that two of the permanent members of the Security Council, Great Britain and China, are voting against the Ukraine and for India. It is therefore surprising in the circumstances that the United States should be tagged as responsible for the deadlock or working against the Ukraine. The real cause of the deadlock is a deal made behind our backs by the Latin American countries with the Soviet Union—in my opinion an added reason, in addition to those of substance, why the United States should not support the Ukraine whose only chance of election is based on the kind of deal of which we generally disapprove.

The second false assumption is that in voting to admit the Ukraine and White Russia we were confirming their status as “independent states”. This again is not true since at the time of the adoption of the Charter two other nations not enjoying independence, namely, India and the Philippines, were entered as regular members. There is nothing in the Charter which says that membership is the equivalent of a recognition of full independence. Article 23 of the Charter lays down specific qualifications for membership on the Security Council of which the geographic principle is the *secondary*.¹ Language in Article 23 was the subject of much debate in San Francisco and an amendment that membership alone in the United Nations was the sole qualification for membership in the Security Council was overwhelmingly voted down in the Commission.

The Ukraine is by the constitution of the USSR bound by the decisions of the central government, and thus to vote for the Ukraine would be to support one nation having by its own constitution two

¹ Mr. Bohlen attached the text of this article, not printed.

votes in the Security Council. This is quite a different principle from the practical question that any eastern European state would vote along with Russia. I fully agree that this issue has been magnified far out of its proportion, but I do not think the impression should be allowed to circulate in Washington that this was caused by the United States. It was caused by some twenty nations voting their conviction on India and the majority of the Latin American countries for voting for the Ukraine because of a deal they made with the Soviet Delegation.

I am giving you this spiel simply because I think at least if we are going to be criticized for our position, it should not be on a thoroughly false basis. In fact our position is: (1) we do not question the eligibility of the Ukraine; (2) having voted in the first instance in accordance with the geographic principle for Czechoslovakia, we then voted our preference for India over the Ukraine whose qualifications under Article 23 we doubted.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

IO Files : US/A/848

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ray L. Thurston of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[New York,] November 8, 1947.

At the reception given by our Delegation last night for the Delegations of Near Eastern countries I asked Mrs. Pandit how she liked Moscow. She made a wry face and said that everything was most difficult there and that although she should not reach conclusions on the basis of only one month's residence in the Soviet Capital, she was already disillusioned. She said that she and her brother had changed their minds a great deal in the last year in respect to the USSR. She was particularly disturbed because in Moscow she had no opportunity whatsoever to talk with Russians and met only with members of the diplomatic corps. She went on to say that she was extremely grateful to Ambassador and Mrs. Smith who had been most kind to her, and she added that the American Embassy had been most helpful to her daughter, Chandraleka, on a number of occasions.

With further reference to her feelings about the Russians, she told how Vishinsky had approached her with respect to the voting on Argentina in the Security Council and advised her not to vote for that country and later found that the USSR was supporting the Argentine. In the light of this experience she was very angry because of Vishinsky's speech in the political committee a couple of days ago in which he said that one test of cooperation between the Soviet Union and other

countries would be the willingness of the Assembly to elect the Ukraine to the Security Council. Mrs. Pandit left the definite impression that India does not wish to withdraw from its candidacy of the Security Council.

IO Files : US/A/885

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ray L. Thurston of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 12, 1947.

I asked Mr. Vellodi¹ what had prompted the Indian withdrawal. He said that, frankly, India's only chance of election had been the possible switch of some of the Latin American votes. After Mrs. Pandit's criticism of Argentina in connection with the question of Spain, it seemed to the Indians that additional support from the Latin American group would not be forthcoming. He added that Mrs. Pandit also felt that the deadlock between India and the Ukraine was blocking the work of the Assembly.

Asked how the newspapers got a premature story on the Indian withdrawal, Mr. Vellodi rather bitterly said that Aranha had "spilled the beans" to the press without authorization. He said that the Indian Delegation had planned to announce the withdrawal in tomorrow's plenary session, and that they would have told the United States and United Kingdom Delegations today of their decision.²

¹ M. K. Vellodi of the Indian Delegation.

² For the proceedings of the General Assembly in regard to the election of the Security Council non-permanent member on November 13, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I, pp. 749-751. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was elected.

On the same date the Philippines and Costa Rica were elected to the Trusteeship Council, the latter after the withdrawal of Norway (GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I, pp. 751-753).

II. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS: UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND FOR A STUDY OF VOTING PROCEDURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL¹

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/86

Department of State Position Paper

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1947.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND SECURITY

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine what action should be taken to bring about the adoption of measures to enable the General Assembly more effectively to discharge its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security. The attached resolution² providing for the establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly has been prepared to meet that problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation should take the initiative and press by all proper means for the adoption of the proposed resolution.
2. In the event a majority of the Members favors the proposal in principle but desires modifications thereof in certain particulars which would not impair the essentials of the proposal, the United States Delegation should accept such modifications.

COMMENT

1. This proposal is the product of the study undertaken at the instance of SPA looking to the development of an affirmative program in the General Assembly to meet the situation created by the stalemate in the Security Council and by indirect aggression in Eastern Europe. A suggestion for three possible proposals was made: (1) a commission on indirect aggression; (2) a mutual defense pact under Article 51; and (3) future policy on atomic energy. The Policy Planning

¹ For documentation related to this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 117 ff. For related developments, see documentation on the United States and the United Nations: The United States initiative, September 1947, *ante*, pp. 14 ff.

An important documentary reference source on this subject is found in Department of State Lot File 71-D 440, Box 19232, Folder "Committee 1, Interim General Assembly Committee on Peace and Security" (in the section carrying the tab "Background").

² Not printed. The draft printed in Doc. US/A/C.1/143, September 18, p. 174, is virtually identical with the one mentioned here.

Committee looked with favor on a standing committee on peace and security which might give some attention to indirect aggression. It opposed action on the mutual defense pact at this time and reserved for further study the question of future policy on atomic energy. The proposal, therefore, is a projection of the principal recommendation of the Policy Planning Committee.

2. The proposal is for the creation of a continuing committee of the General Assembly for a one-year period with authority to deal with situations impairing friendly relations (Article 14), to consider and report upon measures to make more effective the purposes and principles of the Charter with particular reference to acts of indirect aggression undermining the independence of states, to recommend the calling of special sessions, and to report on the desirability of establishing the Committee on a permanent basis. This is aimed directly at broadening the efforts of the United Nations to deal with threats or potential threats to the peace by developing the resources of the General Assembly. It would meet the urgent need created by the presently restricted basis of Security Council action, and at the same time allow time for further study of the need of further permanent machinery.

3. The proposal has the advantage of making the facilities of the General Assembly continuously available to all its members. The existence of such a Committee as is here proposed might, for example, have made unnecessary the Special Session of the General Assembly on the Palestine problem.³ A forum of this character would strengthen the machinery for peaceful settlement and give responsibility for such settlement to all Members of the United Nations.

4. The proposal might be attacked by certain Members as unconstitutional and by others as an oblique attack on the veto. Others might assert that this is an invasion of the Security Council's jurisdiction. These arguments are without merit.

The General Assembly clearly has authority under Articles 11 and 14 to take action of the kind proposed. If the General Assembly can exercise jurisdiction over these matters at regular sessions, it can also deal with these matters through an organ of its own creation at other times. While the authors of the Charter did not contemplate that the General Assembly would be in constant session, they did not rule out the possibility that the General Assembly, or an organ of its own creation, could sit in constant session for the performance of the functions with which it is constitutionally charged. It has authority under Article 22 to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Nor can the proposal be characterized

³ For documentation on this subject, see vol. v, p. 999.

as a circumvention of the veto. The creation of the Interim Committee with the duties and responsibilities set forth in the Draft Resolution is a proper exercise of the General Assembly jurisdiction. The proposal is a logical and legitimate development of the powers of the General Assembly under the Charter, and would not disturb the natural and proper functions of the Security Council.

IO Files: US/A/C.1/134

United States Delegation¹ Position Paper²

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 11, 1947.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA ITEMS DEALING WITH VOTING IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL³

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the United States position with respect to:

a. Item 24 of the Provisional Agenda for the second session of the General Assembly, inserted at the request of Argentina and calling for "convocation of a general conference under Article 109 of the Charter to abolish the privilege of the veto".

b. Item 3 of the supplementary list of agenda items for the second session of the General Assembly inserted at the request of Australia which reads as follows: "The resolution of the second part of the first session of the General Assembly in relation to the exercise of the veto in the Security Council and the extent to which the recommendations contained in that resolution have been carried out."

c. Any other item which may appear on the General Assembly agenda dealing with the subject of voting in the Security Council.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should early in the debate state its belief, based on experience to date, that the abuse of the rule requiring unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in non-procedural decisions is preventing the Council from meeting its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. This is especially true in cases arising under Chapter VI and in the admission of new members.

¹ For information regarding the composition and organization of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly (due to convene on September 16), see pp. 3-13.

² This was also Department of State Position Paper SD/A/C.1/87, Revision 1.

³ For previous documentation regarding the question of voting in the Security Council, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 251 ff.

2. The United States has concluded that the most practicable method for improving this situation is a liberalization of the voting procedure in the Security Council. As one means of attaining this objective the United States is ready to support improvement through interpretation consistent with the Charter, but not necessarily limited by the Four Power Statement made at San Francisco.⁴ As another means it would be willing to accept the elimination of the unanimity requirement with reference to (a) matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter; (b) applications for membership in the United Nations; (c) the election of a Secretary-General. The United States would oppose the elimination or limitation of the unanimity requirement in decisions under Chapter VII or in decisions to amend the Charter.

3. In view of the fundamental importance of this matter the United States considers that any proposals designed to accomplish the objective of liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure, including possible amendment of the Charter, should be preceded by a careful study.

4. The Delegation should propose or support the establishment of a committee of the General Assembly to carry out the study proposed in paragraph 3. The Committee should meet promptly after the adjournment of the General Assembly and should report its findings and recommendations to the next regular session or to a special session if in its opinion a situation arises of such urgency as to warrant its recommending to the members the calling of a special session for that purpose. The terms of reference of the Committee should exclude recommendations eliminating limiting the rule of unanimity in decisions under Chapter VII and in decisions to amend the Charter. It would be preferable if this restriction could be brought about on the initiative of other Delegations. In the event of the establishment of an interim committee on peace and security by the General Assembly, it would be appropriate for such a committee to undertake this study. Otherwise, a separate committee should be established.

5. The Delegation should make it clear that it considers the above procedure preferable to a General Conference under Article 109. It gives promise of attaining the desired result without the disturbance to the basic fabric of the Charter inherent in the calling of a General Conference at this time.

6. The Delegation should state the view of the United States that measures should be pressed concurrently in the Security Council to

⁴ For the Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments and France on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, June 7, 1945, issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1945, p. 1047; for documentation regarding the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, April 25–June 26, 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 1 ff.

bring about improvement within the existing provisions of the Charter through revisions of or additions to the rules of procedure. The action recently inaugurated by the United States was intended as a step in that direction.

IO Files : US/A/M (Chr) /48

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 13, 1947, 10 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follow the list of persons (36) present and a discussion of the first agenda item.]

Voting Procedure in the Security Council

In introducing this subject, Mr. Thompson stated that the veto had to date been used eighteen times in the Security Council, ten times since the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution in December 1946, calling upon the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with a view to ensuring that the exercise of the veto would not impede the functioning of the Security Council, and recommending the adoption by the Security Council of practices and procedures which would improve the operation of the Council. Pursuant to that resolution, the United States, in August of this year, made certain proposals in the Security Council for procedural rules and interpretations. Mr. Thompson traced the history of these discussions on the problem of voting in the Security Council at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, and pointed out that at San Francisco certain members of the United States Delegation, particularly Senators Connally and Vandenberg, were of the opinion that the veto should not apply in proceedings of pacific settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter. He referred to a recent letter of the Secretary to Senator Vandenberg,¹ in which the

¹ The letter, dated July 28, read as follows :

"DEAR SENATOR VANDENBERG : I am glad to have this opportunity to give you the views of the Department of State on Senate Concurrent Resolution 23 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 24, as requested by you in your letters of July 10.

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 23 would express the view of the Congress that action should be taken under the provisions of the United Nations Charter to propose and adopt amendments and revisions that will strengthen the United Nations as an instrument to prevent war and maintain world peace. Senate Concurrent Resolution 24 indicates the desire of the Congress that the President immediately take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to Article 109 of the Charter for the purpose of enabling the United Nations to enact, interpret, and enforce world law to prevent war.

"The Charter is not regarded by the Department as a perfect instrument. No comprehensive agreement which is acceptable to all parties can be regarded as perfect by any one of them. Nevertheless, it is the firm policy of this Government, as you know, to work for the improvement of the Charter in the light of experience.

"International political conditions are such that the Department does not regard fundamental revision of the Charter as feasible at this time, nor con-

Secretary expressed the hope of the United States Government that the five permanent members of the Security Council might find it desirable in the future to clarify and to modify the unanimity requirement in its application to matters dealing with settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter. The United States objective, Mr. Thompson stated, was to make the Security Council a more effective body. As one means of obtaining this objective, the United States was willing to support any improvement through interpretation consistent with the Charter but not necessarily limited by the Four Power statement made at San Francisco. As another means, it would be willing to accept the elimination of the unanimity requirement with reference to (a) matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter, (b) applications for membership, and (c) the election of a Secretary-General. The United States believed that a committee should be created which would study and make recommendations on proposals for such improvements.

Ambassador Austin remarked that there existed a hazard in any effort to amend the Charter which was not inherent in an effort to amend the voting rules of the Security Council. He stated that it was entirely within the power of the Security Council, by a vote of seven members, including the five permanent members, to transfer a question from the category of substantive matters to that of procedural matters. In his view, the principle of unanimity was sound, and he was not convinced as yet that it should not be applied both to changes in the rules and amendment of the Charter. There was no occasion, he

siders it wise at present for this Government to take the initiative in this regard. Such action in the prevailing international conditions might be interpreted as a lack of faith in the United Nations on our part, and it might thus further increase the difficulty of obtaining agreed solutions of the many complex problems now confronting the United Nations.

"The Department hopes that suitable practices and procedures may be developed, by common agreement under the Charter and in the light of experience, to reduce uncertainties and differences of opinion in the application of the voting formula in the Security Council. It especially hopes that the five permanent Members of the Security Council may find it desirable in the future, in full agreement among themselves and with other Members, to clarify and to modify the unanimity requirement in its application to matters dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter. Efforts to these ends are considered practical within the processes of step-by-step progress. To attempt more would risk the difficulties to which I have alluded, and, in the absence of full agreement by all the five permanent Members on any important amendment of the Charter, would fail of fruition. As you know, a general conference of the United Nations can be called for the purpose of reviewing the Charter without the concurrence of the five permanent Members of the Security Council, but any alteration of the Charter requires the ratification of two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including the permanent Members of the Security Council.

"For these reasons the Department does not favor positive action of Senate Concurrent Resolution 23 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 24 at this time.

"Due to the urgency of the matter, this letter has not been cleared with the Bureau of the Budget, to which a copy is being sent.

"Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL"

(Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232, Folder "Committee 1")

held, for amendment of the text of the Charter, since the United States objective may be obtained by the above-mentioned transfer. The rule-making activity of the Security Council should be stimulated.

Mr. Dulles expressed his agreement with the Department recommendations and stated that emphasis should be placed on interpretation rather than on amendment. Ambassador Johnson thought that this was not a good psychological moment to push for an amendment and that an effort should be made to keep the rules of procedure fluid.

The Secretary recalled the pressure exerted by various groups and by the Congress in this matter. He also agreed that hasty action might lead toward disruption of the United Nations. Ambassador Johnson raised the question of the consistent violation by the Soviet Union of its undertaking in the Four Power Statement that the veto should not be used for frivolous purposes.

Mr. Notter emphasized the grave risk which in his view was involved in the United States position. In his opinion, the Four Power Statement was a part of the Charter fabric and to disturb it was to disturb the basis on which this fabric was woven. Ambassador Austin agreed with Mr. Notter that the risk in trying to obtain agreement on procedural and non-procedural categories was smaller than that involved in an effort to obtain an amendment of the Charter. Mr. Fahy thought that all the United States proposed was a study by a committee; this did not involve a threat to the universality of the United Nations.

The Secretary said that it may happen that at some time the United States would find itself in a minority and that it is necessary to think in terms of twenty to thirty years.

Mr. Bohlen disagreed with Mr. Notter on the question of the risk involved. He did not believe that the consideration of this question would induce the Soviets to walk out of the United Nations, particularly because they were in a position to block any effort for an amendment. In his view, the risk was that the United Nations would cover up actions inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter in the same manner as the League of Nations had done.

INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PEACE AND SECURITY

Mr. Sandifer explained that the main purpose of the United States proposal for the establishment of such a Committee was the desire to improve the effectiveness of the General Assembly, particularly in the light of the inability of the Security Council to take action in a number of cases. He referred to the draft resolution before the meeting (SD/A/C.1/86).²

² See text incorporated in Doc. US/A/C-1/143, September 18.

Mr. Dulles considered the proposed resolution as an important step required by experience. Answering the Secretary's question as to what objections to the establishment of the Committee might be expected, Mr. Dulles said that it could be argued that it constituted an effort to circumvent the Security Council and the veto. Mr. Sandifer stated that the effectiveness of this objection might be reduced if the proposal was presented as being designed to develop the broad powers of the General Assembly and improve its functioning. Messrs. Fahy, Stevenson and Ambassador Sayre expressed their agreement with the proposal but Mr. Stevenson remarked that it would increase the budget of the Organization. Mr. Rusk stated that a preliminary estimate of the close cost ranged up to \$2,000,000.

Mr. Bohlen declared that the Soviets would probably attack the proposal as a usurpation of the Security Council's power by the General Assembly; this was indicated in an article published in a Communist paper in Prague by a member of the Communist Internationale, in which it was said that all discussions in the United Nations relating to the interpretation of the Charter were due to the fact that the United States was being impeded by the "valiant action" of the Soviet Union in its attempts to use the United Nations for its imperialistic purposes.

Mr. Bohlen opposed the proposal that the Committee should consider the subject of indirect aggression. Such activities were very hard to pin down, and the Commission might come out with a white-wash of individual actions. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the Committee would attempt to develop a code of conduct in connection with this matter rather than to deal with individual acts of indirect aggression. It was agreed that the text of the resolution might be improved so as to indicate clearly that the Committee would deal with principles and not with specific cases of indirect aggression.

[Here follows discussion of other items on the agenda.]

IO Files : US/A/392

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 17, 1947.

In the lounge during lunch today, I asked Mr. Falla¹ if he knew the reaction of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Secretary's speech.² He was reserved in his reply, stating that he had heard little

¹ Paul S. Falla, United Kingdom Delegation.

² Regarding the Secretary of State's address to the General Assembly on September 17, see the editorial note, p. 14.

discussion of it but did, however, say that he personally questioned whether our proposition for an Interim Committee of the Assembly was constitutional. I explained to him that in our view it was clearly constitutional.

Specifically, on the constitutional question, Mr. Falla asked how we could overcome the definite concept in the Charter of the distinction between the Assembly meeting only once a year and the Security Council being in continuous session. He also expressed the thought that from the psychological point of view we may be expected to have found less opposition if we had not termed the proposal a committee on peace and security—if we had simply said interim committee of the General Assembly and eliminated the words peace and security which he thought brought out into sharp focus the possible conflict of jurisdiction with the Security Council.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/143

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 18, 1947.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM COMMITTEE
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PEACE AND SECURITY

The General Assembly, convinced of the need for the study, review and more effective implementation of the responsibilities conferred upon it by the Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security and for the peaceful adjustment of situations likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations,

Resolves That:

1. An Interim Committee is created, composed of all the Members of the United Nations, each Member to have one representative. The Secretary-General shall, within fifteen days of the close of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, convene the Interim Committee which shall serve until the beginning of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly. The rules of procedure of the General Assembly shall, so far as applicable, govern the proceedings of the Interim Committee and its subcommittees. The Interim Committee shall elect its own chairman, vice-chairman, rapporteur, and such other officers as it may deem fit.

2. The Interim Committee shall have the following powers and duties:

(a) It may consider such situations and disputes as may be brought to its attention: (1) by Member States pursuant to Article 14; (2) by the Security Council pursuant to Article 11(2). It may bring situations

to the attention of the Security Council pursuant to Article 11(3). It shall report on such situations and disputes to the General Assembly and, in appropriate cases, to the Security Council, along with such recommendations as it may adopt. It shall consider and report to the General Assembly upon measures for making more effective the purposes and principles of the Charter, and upon such other matters as may be comprehended by Articles 11(1) or 14. The Committee shall take into account the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duties and functions assigned by the General Assembly or the Security Council to any committee or commission such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission on Conventional Armaments.

(b) The Interim Committee shall study and report to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly on the advisability of establishing on a permanent basis a standing committee of the General Assembly to consider problems related to peaceful adjustment and the maintenance of international peace and security in so far as these fall within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly.

(c) The Interim Committee may recommend to Member States the calling of a Special Session of the General Assembly to deal with any matter which in its judgment requires such action.

(d) The Interim Committee shall perform such other functions and duties as the General Assembly may assign to it.

3. The Interim Committee is empowered within the scope of its powers and duties to ascertain and record facts and, to this end, conduct investigations and appoint commissions of inquiry whenever it may deem it useful and necessary for the performance of its duties. The Secretary-General shall enter into suitable arrangements with the proper authorities of any State in whose territory the Interim Committee or subcommittees or commissions may wish to sit or to travel and shall provide necessary facilities and assign appropriate staff thereto.

IO Files : US/A/397

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] September 18, 1947.

Mr. Gladwyn Jebb and I had a long talk in the Lounge at Flushing this noon.

General

Mr. Jebb said that the British were interested in knowing the exact significance of the Secretary's proposals¹ as some members of the Delegation were concerned and he thought Mr. Bevin might likewise be

¹ Refers presumably to the Secretary of State's speech to the General Assembly on September 17.

concerned as to whether by making these proposals we were in effect intending to precipitate a showdown with the Soviet Union or to accelerate its departure from the United Nations. I assured Mr. Jebb that we had no such intention in mind.

In answer to my inquiry, Mr. Jebb indicated that it was unlikely that Mr. Bevin would get to New York during the current meeting.

General Assembly Committee on Peace and Security

Mr. Jebb stated that the United Kingdom Delegation had sent a recommendation to London, urging support in principle for our proposal and rendering to the Foreign Office the opinion of the Delegation that it was clearly constitutional. Mr. Jebb said that, of course, this recommendation meant approval in principle and that there might be many points in connection with the terms of reference etc. on which they might have ideas varying in one degree or another from our views. Mr. Jebb seemed to be under some misapprehension as to exactly what our proposal was. For instance he was surprised when I explained to him that we envisaged that questions could be brought to the committee under Article 14 of the Charter. He thought our use of the words "peace and security" would restrict the committee to exactly what those words mean. He also asked questions designed to clarify in his own mind exactly how we felt our proposal related to the Security Council. I believe any doubts he may have had on this score were clarified.

Mr. Jebb then raised two questions of a more fundamental nature with respect to this proposal. He inquired (*a*) if we had considered the possibility that the making of this proposal might result in Soviet withdrawal from the United Nations; (*b*) what our attitude would be with respect to the proposal in the event (1) the Soviets took a position similar to their position on the Trusteeship Council that the creation of the committee was illegal and that therefore they would not participate, and (2) that similar action was taken by the satellites.

With respect to (*a*) above, I told Mr. Jebb that we had thought about this question, and that we thought it was now unlikely that the proposal would bring about Soviet withdrawal. My impression was that Mr. Jebb concurred in this opinion. With respect to (*b*), I told him that I had not heard the specific point either as to (1) or (2) raised in our discussions of this proposal, but that speaking unofficially, I thought there was no doubt but that what we would feel the committee should be created nevertheless.

Veto

Mr. Jebb implied that the British would not be able to go as far as we did in connection with the veto. He thinks the wisdom of relinquishing the veto in Chapter 6 is very questionable. I explained to him in

some detail our general concept of approach to this problem. There is no difference in our fundamental objective of achieving liberalization in the implementation of the voting provisions of the Charter through interpretations, etc.

[Here follows consideration of other agenda items.]

IO Files : US/A/M(Chr)/53

Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 19, 1947, 9:15 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of persons (27) present.]

Draft Resolution on the Establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly on Peace and Security

Mr. Dulles reported that the Delegation advisers had been restudying the draft resolution on the establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly on Peace and Security, and had drafted a slightly revised text (US/A/C.1/143).¹ The principal change was the elimination of the language which specified that one of the principal purposes of the Committee was to study the problems connected with "acts designed to subvert the political independence and territorial integrity of a State" (SD/A/C.1/86), which had appeared in an earlier draft.² This had been eliminated because it appeared that it was going too far to indicate that a principal purpose was policing the U.S.S.R. While, undoubtedly, the Committee would have to watch that sort of thing, it was not thought to be a good idea to specify it in the resolution. Rather, it was preferred to give the Committee general power to make more effective the purposes and principles of the Charter, as set forth under Article 14.

Ambassador Austin inquired why Article 10 of the Charter was omitted from the draft resolution since that mentioned the power of the Assembly to make recommendations and since Articles 11 and 14 had been mentioned.

Mr. Dulles reported that it had not been thought that the General Assembly could delegate to a Committee its powers under Article 10. The Committee was to study and to bring to light facts but primarily it was to consider them and to report upon them to the General Assembly. The final action must be that of the General Assembly.

Ambassador Austin said he had in mind action by the General Assembly after the Committee reported, having made recommendations

¹ September 18, p. 174.

² Document SD/A/C.1/86, not printed.

to the General Assembly, the Security Council, or Members. He said he would not pursue his question if the matter had been carefully studied.

Mr. Ross expressed the opinion that Article 10 was a broad catch-all Article and that recommendations should be made under Articles 11 and 14. Ambassador Austin inquired whether we were limiting ourselves by omitting Article 10.

Mr. Dulles observed that he thought that the Articles relating to peace and security were Articles 11 and 14. Those were the ones to which Article 10 referred. He pointed out that the General Assembly has the right to discuss matters including the powers and functions of any organ. He noted that if the General Assembly discussed the functions of the Security Council, trouble would arise. Ambassador Austin said he would not press the matter since Article 10 had not been passed over without adequate thought.

Mr. Stevenson inquired whether the same reasoning had been used to omit Article 13(a). Mr. Sandifer pointed out that this Article had been omitted in the State Department draft. Mr. Dulles observed that it had not been desired to interfere with other bodies.

Mr. Fahy expressed the opinion that Article 13(a) was quite significant, pointing out that the first part of the Article granted to the General Assembly authority to make recommendations for the purpose of "promoting international cooperation in the political field". Mr. Dulles said he saw no objection to adding Article 13(a)'s phraseology as cited by Mr. Fahy. Mr. Wainhouse explained that Article 13(a) had been omitted because the second part of the Article referred to the progressive development of international law and its codification, and that that matter was already being handled by a United Nations body. Mr. Dulles observed that the objection could be avoided by splitting the Article.

Mr. Sandifer said that there might be no objection to including Article 13(a); however, he pointed out that in preparing a resolution, it had not been thought desirable to give the Interim Committee unlimited jurisdiction, and Article 13(a) was a very broad statement. However, he recognized that citation of this Article might appeal to some States as making the resolution more restrictive.

Mr. Dulles expressed the opinion that mention of Article 13(a) would strengthen the resolution and make it easier for some States to support it. He suggested that a phrase might be inserted in paragraph 2(a) "or which relates to promoting international cooperation in the political field as contemplated in Article 13(a)".

Ambassador Austin inquired whether the draft before the Delegation was a tentative one. Mr. Dulles replied that he would like sufficient approval of the draft to be able to submit it without having to come

back to another Delegation meeting. He continued that paragraph "e" of the draft resolution had also been altered so that the Interim Committee had the authority to record facts. Reference to the working capital fund had also been eliminated because it was agreed that the financial consequences of the resolution would have to be submitted to Committee 5 in any event. It was also not thought desirable to highlight the inevitable fact that there would be considerable expenditure connected with the Committee's work.

Mr. Ross, referring to paragraph 2(a), noted there was no reference in Article 14 to Members bringing situations to the attention of the General Assembly. He inquired whether it had been considered undesirable for the Assembly to delegate broader powers to the Committee. Ambassador Austin inquired whether the phrase "may be brought to its attention" at the beginning of paragraph 2(a) was intended to be an addition to the provisions in Article 14. Mr. Dulles said that he thought Mr. Ross had raised a good point since under Article 14, it would be in the competence of the General Assembly, upon its own initiative, to deal with any situation. Ambassador Austin inquired how the Committee could do business if, in actual practice, a Member were not to bring a situation to the attention of the Committee. Mr. Dulles stated that the thought was that the Committee would not deal with a situation if it were not important enough for a Member to bring it before the Committee. He continued that his impression was that when dealing with this Interim Committee, it was better not to give it too much power of initiative or to send it roving too widely. The Committee should not go into a situation that was not important enough to be brought to its attention by some Member.

Mr. Ross observed that it was certain that there would be strong objection from the U.S.S.R. to the Interim Committee proposal. Since some Delegations have doubts as to how far the Interim Committee should be authorized to go, he thought it would be tactically wise to leave the wording as broad as possible in order to leave some room for compromise. Ambassador Austin reported that Cadogan had inquired whether the United States had considered what should be done if the U.S.S.R. and its satellites did not participate in the Committee. He wondered whether the United States was going to assume this risk and continue on none the less.

Mr. Dulles observed that there might be a parallel to the Trusteeship Council on which the Russians had not participated. He continued that the resolution might provide that the Committee could consider such situations as may come to its attention under Article 14. Mr. Fahy suggested using the phrase "within the purview of Article 14".

Mr. Sandifer observed that the question had been exhaustively discussed in the Department. The thought was that the new agency should

not be given the status of an alter ego of the Assembly but an agency which was being created to which Members could bring questions. The character of the Committee would be changed if it were given its authority in its own right to take up any case it desired. Mr. Dulles said that he assumed that everyone agreed that such was not the United States desire. Mr. Ross said that he did not see to what point we might recede in case of need and feared that the resolution might be tying the United States hands too tightly. He thought the same observation applied to the phraseology which said that the Committee could consider such situations and disputes as may be brought to its attention "by the Security Council, pursuant to Article 11(2)". He doubted the wisdom of starting out by imposing specific limitations.

Mr. Dulles said that he was willing to sponsor the resolution either on the basis of the restrictive, precise definition or the broader general grant of powers. However, he would rather put in a fairly conservatively drafted resolution to avoid the charge that the United States was trying to give all the Assembly's powers to an interim body rather than to ask for a large grant for which the United States might be attacked.

Mr. Thompson suggested that there was not only the possibility of receding but the resolution might be broadened if other Delegations thought that were desirable. He raised the question whether the resolution before the Delegation should be introduced as it stood or whether it might be fully discussed later since it was certain to be a controversial matter. He thought it might be wise to discuss the matter before putting it before the Committee. Mr. Ross observed that the course to be followed would depend on an estimate on the amount of support to be received. He reported that those Delegations to whom he had talked were strongly in favor of the United States proposal and, therefore, he believed it would receive general strong support.

Ambassador Austin expressed the opinion that contact with other Delegations on this question would stir up a good many views. He thought that there should be some very thorough interviewing with other Delegations before a definite position was taken, and he thought that even before a text was agreed upon, that the Delegation should be certain regarding the position of other Delegates.

Mr. Raynor reported that the United Kingdom Delegation had recommended to London that it be authorized to support the United States proposal on the Interim Committee.

Mr. Sandifer said that in considering the course of action and use of the draft text, the members of the Delegation should keep in mind the scope and nature of the Committee as it had been set forth in the Secretary's speech. He expressed some doubts on how long a delay should take place before informing other Delegates of what the

United States ideas were. He noted that a good many people did not understand the scope and tenor of the United States proposal, and thought that the sooner they were informed, the sooner their thinking would be shaped. As it stood, the other Delegations were thinking in a vacuum, and that might give rise to doubts and objections. He observed that the substance of the resolution could not be clearly altered if the Interim Committee were to accomplish what the United States had in mind.

Ambassador Austin said that he did not think that a decision could be taken at the moment since it was a very important step in the development of the United Nations. Although assuming that what Mr. Sandifer had said was true, that time was important, yet, in the interest of agreement and possible improvement, he thought that the Delegation should regard the draft document US/A/C.1/143 as a preliminary draft to be studied with colleagues in the General Assembly and to be reconsidered in two or three days after reactions had been obtained. Then, in the light of these reactions, the matter could be re-examined.

Mr. Dulles expressed the opinion that contact should be made with other Delegations with a view of educating them but he doubted whether the precise text should be discussed. He noted that there might be confusion if drafting changes had to be made later or were accepted from other Delegations. He thought that the discussion should be about the general idea rather than the detailed text which should be taken up in the proper committee.

Mr. Fahy expressed the opinion that the United States must present a draft and give a detailed explanation to Committee 1 to demonstrate that the Interim Committee was not intended as a full substitute for the General Assembly. He noted that Norway, on the previous day, had wondered whether the General Assembly was to be replaced by the Committee. He agreed that Delegates from other Members should be given general explanations not a precise draft.

Mr. Bohlen expressed the opinion that the United States must submit the draft on this question but at the same time agreed that the areas of doubt in the minds of other Delegations should be discovered. Recalling the questions which had already been posed, he noted that the chief query had been whether the United States was trying to set up a substitute for the Security Council. He thought the preamble of the resolution should make clear that this was not the intention; it should refer to the area of action which the Charter gave to the General Assembly; and make it clear that it was not intended to modify the Charter nor to alter the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The preamble could be elaborated to state that the General Assembly has certain powers under the Assembly

[*Charter?*] and to enumerate those powers. He thought that this failure to spell out the powers of the Assembly to show that they were legalized under the Charter had given rise to considerable doubts. Another point that needed to be clarified was who made the decision whether a new case should go to the Security Council or to the Interim Committee. He thought this matter ought to be considered in the Delegation. He raised the question whether the Interim Committee took over if the Security Council failed or whether a matter might go first to the Interim Committee.

Ambassador Johnson stated that it was his understanding that the Interim Committee should not consider matters demanding enforcement action. The Committee should have jurisdiction only on those things which the Security Council or a Member referred to it. Mr. Bohlen agreed that no action under Chapter VII of the Charter was envisaged as coming to the Interim Committee. Ambassador Johnson suggested that this point should be spelled out since a number of the smaller Delegations were not clear on it. He thought that it would also be useful to paraphrase the Charter in the preamble of the resolution to make it clear what the Committee could and could not do. Mr. Bohlen reiterated that he intended that the preamble should make clear that the Interim Committee was not infringing on the Security Council. Mr. Dulles agreed that it would be desirable to make such changes in the preamble.

Ambassador Austin polled the Delegation to inquire whether it desired to consider US/A/C.1/143 as a basic paper for the purpose of drafting a definitive resolution postponing such final resolution for a number of days. The Political Officers were requested to indicate to him how long a period of delay there should be. This proposal was unanimously approved by the Delegation.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

IO Files : US/A/C.1/148

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 23, 1947.

REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM
COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Conscious of the responsibilities specifically conferred upon it by the Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 11), the promotion of international cooperation in the political field (Article 13), peaceful adjustment of any matters likely

to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations (Article 14);

Deeming it necessary for the effective performance of these functions to establish a Committee for study, inquiry and discussion on its behalf during the period between the adjournment of the present session and the convening of the next regular session of the General Assembly (Article 22);

Recognizing fully the primary responsibility of the Security Council for prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24);

Resolves that

1. An Interim Committee is created composed of all the Members of the United Nations, each Member to have one representative;

2. The Interim Committee shall assist the General Assembly by performing the following duties and functions:

a. To consider, as it may determine, such situations as may come to its attention within the purview of Article 14, or be brought to the attention of the General Assembly by the Security Council pursuant to Article 11(2), and to report thereon, with its recommendations to the General Assembly;

b. To consider and to make recommendations to the General Assembly upon general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 11(1) and to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political field under Article 13(1) (*a*);

c. To consider whether occasion may require the calling of a special session of the General Assembly and if it deems that such session is required, to so advise the Secretary-General.

d. To conduct investigations and appoint commissions of inquiry within the scope of its duties and functions as it may deem useful and necessary.

e. To study, report and recommend to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly on the advisability of establishing a committee of the General Assembly on a permanent basis to perform the duties and functions of the Interim Committee with any changes considered desirable in the light of its experience.

f. To perform such other functions and duties as the General Assembly may assign to it.

3. In discharging its duties and functions, the Interim Committee shall at all times take cognizance of the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it shall also take duly into account the duties and functions assigned by the General Assembly or by the Security Council to any committee or commission, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

4. The provisional rules of procedure of the General Assembly shall,

so far as applicable, govern the proceedings of the Interim Committee and such subcommittees and commissions as it may set up. The Interim Committee shall elect its Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Rapporteur and such other officers as it may deem necessary. The Interim Committee shall be convened by the Secretary-General within 15 days following the close of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, and it shall continue to serve until the beginning of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly.

5. The Secretary-General shall enter into suitable arrangements with the appropriate authorities of any Member State in whose territory the Interim Committee or its subcommittees or commissions may wish to sit or to travel. He shall provide necessary facilities and assign appropriate staff as required for the work of the Interim Committee, its subcommittees and commissions.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/181

United States Delegation Working Paper

[NEW YORK,] September 24, 1947.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ¹

1. *Objection*

The establishment of a new subsidiary organ of the General Assembly sitting continuously with jurisdiction over certain matters relating to international peace and security is contrary to the system of separation of powers between the Security Council and the General Assembly contemplated by the Charter. The General Assembly under the Charter was given jurisdiction over matters affecting international peace and security on the assumption that it would be in session only once a year except for special sessions (Article 20). The proposal to establish such a committee would, in effect, extend the jurisdiction of the General Assembly not by altering its scope but by altering the normal period when it may exercise its jurisdiction. The establishment of such committee would constitute an invasion of the Security Council jurisdiction.

Answer

(a) Article 28 provided that the Security Council shall be so organized as to function continuously. Article 20 states that the General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. There is nothing in the Charter that

¹ It should be noted that this paper proposes to deal with objections of constitutional nature only. [Footnote in the source text.]

would prevent the General Assembly from remaining in session for the entire year. While the Security Council must sit continuously, it is left to the General Assembly to regulate the duration of its sessions according to its volume of business, the General Assembly being the master of its own procedure (Article 21). Consequently, there is nothing in the Charter which would prevent the General Assembly from sitting continuously or from creating a standing subsidiary Committee under Article 22.

(b) The establishment of the Committee cannot be considered as constituting an invasion of the Security Council jurisdiction. In the field of pacific settlement the Security Council deals with disputes or situations the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security. Under Article 35 a State is given a choice of bringing this type of controversy either before the Security Council or before the General Assembly. According to Article 35(3), the proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of such matters are "subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12."² Under Article 11(2) the General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations or by the Security Council or by a State which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35(2) and except as provided in Article 12 may make recommendations in regard to any such questions. The Committee, according to its terms of reference, would be able to consider disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security only within the limits of the General Assembly jurisdiction in this field and under the following conditions and with the following limitations:

1. If such dispute or situation is brought before the Committee by the Security Council itself in accordance with Article 11(2). Even in this case the continued jurisdiction of the Committee as a subsidiary Committee of the General Assembly would be subject to the provisions of Article 12. Moreover, in any event the Committee would be able to make recommendations only to the General Assembly. If the Security Council is in any way apprehensive of its jurisdiction, it would, of course, be free not to bring its controversy before the Committee.

2. If such dispute or situation is specifically referred to it by the General Assembly itself. In this case again the Committee would be able to make recommendations only to the General Assembly.

² Article 11(2) provides that when "action" is necessary the General Assembly shall refer the question to the Security Council either before or after discussion, and Article 12 provides that where the Security Council is already exercising its functions in respect of such matter the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations unless the Security Council so requests. [Footnote in the source text.]

Outside of these two instances, the Committee can only deal with situations brought under Article 14 as likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations which are within the typical jurisdiction of the General Assembly. It can hardly be said that this might be construed as a usurpation of the Security Council powers.

The field of "action" under Chapter VII ("action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression") is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Security Council. The Charter does not mention the Assembly as an organ in this field. Article 11 provides that where "action is necessary with respect to questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" such question shall be referred by the General Assembly to the Security Council. Consequently, the Committee could not exercise any functions in this field.

(c) Only in one instance under the terms of the United States draft resolution have the Members direct access to the Committee. They may bring before the Committee disputes or situations regardless of origin under Article 14 and the Committee may consider and recommend measures for their peaceful adjustment. The Charter did not contemplate that the Security Council would deal with this type of controversy unless it was regarded as a dispute within the meaning of Article 33. Moreover, the Committee may direct its recommendations *only* to the General Assembly.

(d) Article 11(1) contemplates that the General Assembly will consider general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 13(1)*a* provides that the General Assembly shall initiate studies and makes recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political field. Obviously these spheres of activities of the General Assembly require thorough study and preparation before the General Assembly can make adequate recommendations. One of the most important functions of the proposed committee would be to operate as a studying group and collect the necessary materials for Assembly action. This function, too, in no way encroaches upon the Security Council powers since it lies outside of the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

2. *Objection*

The establishment of a standing committee of the General Assembly is a device to circumvent the operation of the veto in the Security Council.

Answer (See also the answer to the fourth objection below.)

As pointed out above, the General Assembly has jurisdiction in certain questions relating to the maintenance of international peace

and security. The purpose of this Committee is to make more effective the carrying out of some of the more important responsibilities of the General Assembly within the Charter. Without such Committee the General Assembly is unable to deal adequately with the important responsibilities which devolve upon it according to Articles 11, 13, 14 and 35. This does not affect the voting procedures in the Security Council. The primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is safeguarded by the provisions of Article 12. The Security Council remains the only organ authorized to provide for "action" within the meaning of the last sentence of Article 11(2). None of the powers envisaged for the committee encroaches upon this exclusive authority of the Security Council.

3. *Objection*

The constitution of such Committee by the General Assembly amounts to an illegal delegation of powers on the part of the General Assembly to a subsidiary organ.

Answer

The Charter accepts the principle of delegation of powers in that it provides in Article 22 that the General Assembly may constitute subsidiary organs. A number of such subsidiary organs have already been constituted, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, the Committee on the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, the Headquarters Advisory Committee and others. All these subsidiary organs have functioned regardless of whether the General Assembly was in session. It is essential that an organ like the General Assembly have unquestioned authority to constitute subsidiary committees to assist it in the performance of its duties. The proposed Committee would not possess powers excessive to a subsidiary committee for the following reasons:

(a) Every Member of the United Nations will be represented on the Committee.

(b) The most important and effective remedy given to the General Assembly is its power to make recommendations to its members and to the parties to a controversy. The Committee would not possess such power, which is reserved for the Assembly itself. Nor would the Committee have power to make recommendations to the Security Council or any other United Nations organ, which power too is reserved to the General Assembly.

(c) The principal activities of the Committee under Article 14 and Article 11(1) and 13(1)a would be to study, prepare, investigate and follow up matters for General Assembly action and to make recommendations to the General Assembly only. In this sphere of activities

the question of delegation does not arise since the Committee's work is of ancillary and ministerial character, designed to serve as a basis for recommendations by the General Assembly itself. In order to be able to ascertain facts the committee is to be given authority to appoint commissions of inquiry. It might be argued that the power to appoint such commissions is too important to be passed on by a blanket authorization to a subsidiary committee such as the proposed Committee, and that at the most the authorization should be confined to specific cases. However, obviously the Committee would not be in a position to make intelligent recommendations without being able to obtain the necessary facts. Thus, if it should be denied the authority to appoint commissions of inquiry whenever this becomes necessary in the course of its proceedings, it would either have to wait until the next regular session of the General Assembly and at that time ask the General Assembly for a specific authority to appoint such commission; or it would have to recommend convocation of a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of obtaining such specific authority. Either of the two alternatives is impracticable and would defeat the very purpose of the establishment of the Committee. Moreover, all that the Committee could do under the United States draft resolution would be to appoint a commission of inquiry and recommend to the states concerned that they cooperate with the commission and facilitate its functioning. Such commission of inquiry, for instance, would not be entitled to enter the territory of any state in order to conduct an on-the-spot investigation without the consent by the government of such state. This is due to the fact that the very basis of the powers of the General Assembly and of any of its subsidiary organs is the power to recommend only. To say this, however, is not to depreciate the strength of the General Assembly's opinion of what should be done; rather it is to say that as a matter of law members are free to choose to respond, or not.

4. *Objection*

Even if the language of the Charter does not prohibit the establishment of a standing committee, such establishment would be a doubtful constitutional practice. It would amount to a major and drastic change in the structure of the organs of the United Nations, the need for which has not been demonstrated by its 20 months' experience.

Answer

The experiences gathered in the many months of the both parts of the First Session, as well as the experience from calling of the Special Session, are sufficient to demonstrate a pressing need for more adequate preparation of the sessions of the General Assembly which would be the principal function of the proposed Committee.

Furthermore, the experience with the Palestine Special Session has clearly brought out the fact that there exists a reluctance on the part of the members to assemble in a special session. For this and for the other reasons indicated above, the special sessions could not perform the functions contemplated for the standing committee. Finally one of the important functions of the proposed committee is to consider on the basis of the experience of this year whether a permanent standing committee to perform these other functions should be established.

5. *Objection*

It will be argued that the Members, in order to obtain access to a vetoless forum, will label their controversies in the language of Article 14 rather than in accordance with their true character as controversies endangering international peace and security. In this way, they will appear before the Committee rather than before the Security Council.

Answer

Even if there should develop such tendency, any Member of the Security Council, and for that matter any Member of the United Nations and the Secretary-General could at any time draw the attention of the Security Council to the controversy which in his view endangers peace and should be dealt with by the Security Council. If the Security Council accepts this view and puts the matter on the agenda, the jurisdiction of the Committee becomes subject to the provisions of Article 12 for the period during which the Security Council is dealing with it. Furthermore, as indicated above, the Security Council remains the only organ to provide for "action" in accordance with the last sentence of Article 11 (2).

IO Files : US/A/C.1/131

*Minutes of a Meeting With Members of the United Kingdom
Delegation, New York, September 24, 1947*

CONFIDENTIAL

Participants:	Mr. Hector McNeil	} United Kingdom Delegation
	Sir Hartley Shawcross	
	Sir Alexander Cadogan	
	Mr. Gladwyn Jebb	
	Mr. W. E. Beckett	
	Mr. V. G. Lawford	
	Mr. P. S. Falla	
	Mr. E. E. Tomkins	

Mr. John Foster Dulles	} United States Delegation
Mr. Dean Rusk	
Mr. Elwood Thompson	
Mr. David Wainhouse	
Mr. Charles Noyes	
Mr. Hayden Raynor	

GENERAL ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE AND THE VETO

This meeting was arranged at the request of the British side in order to exchange views on the two questions listed above. In view of the slightly late arrival of Messrs. McNeil, Shawcross and Cadogan, the meeting opened with a presentation by Mr. Beckett of a formula which he had in mind which he thought would accomplish our purpose and at the same time be completely legal from the point of view of the Charter. This plan was for the General Assembly to remain in session most of the year, operating however only through one committee, Committee 1. An outline of Mr. Beckett's views is attached.¹ This will be submitted later as an addendum to this document.

Mr. Jebb then described certain reservations which he has to Mr. Beckett's plan. His main point is a feeling that it at least strains Article 20 of the Charter, which states that the General Assembly shall hold an annual meeting. A copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Jebb outlining his views is attached. It will be noted that Mr. Jebb however feels that it would be legal for this Assembly to decree that its Committee 1 continue to exist during the interim period and he believes that there would be no question of the legality of Committee 1 then establishing whatever necessary Sub-committees or working parties which might be needed.

After the arrival of Messrs. McNeil, Shawcross and Cadogan, Mr. Dulles gave a comprehensive review of our background thinking which led to the proposal for the creation of an Interim Committee of the Assembly. He stressed the following two reasons:

a. Public opinion in this country, which is crying for some revitalization of the United Nations.

b. The acute need during this abnormal period to have some continuing body of the Assembly which can study and report on important questions requiring Assembly attention in view of the fact that there are too many major questions at issue at the moment for the Assembly to handle at its regular session.

In Mr. Dulles' exposition he stressed the importance we attach to this committee handling matters referred to it under the purview of Article

¹ Not attached.

14 of the Charter. He also stressed that we have no rigid ideas as to the exact method which should be employed to accomplish the aims of strengthening the Assembly which we have in mind. He mentioned the point that we look on the whole proposition as an experiment and thus provided for it to exist for only a year and to include in its terms of reference the responsibility of studying and reporting on the desirability of some such arrangement being permanent. In his discussion Mr. Dulles explained our view that we felt it was unwise for the General Assembly itself to remain in session for a long time in view of the impossibility under such circumstances of the leading political personalities of the world attending long meetings. He explained that the General Assembly's strength is primarily based on its moral authority which in turn in world opinion depends to a considerable extent on the presence in the Assembly of leading world political figures.

In making a point as to a committee of the type we have in mind being able to do advance study and preparatory work on problems coming before the Assembly, Mr. Dulles cited the example of Korea² on which no one other than the Great Powers involved had probably given much thought and how it would have been desirable for this to have been studied by a committee of the Assembly in a preparatory way prior to the meeting of the Assembly itself. Mr. Dulles outlined the theory that when the Charter was drafted no one had expected that problems such as Korea and Austria might have to be referred to the United Nations for settlement in view of the inability of the Great Powers to agree. He said that now the United Nations might be faced with a great variety of such problems.

Sir Hartley Shawcross inquired if we envisaged members having the right to raise questions directly with this committee and Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative but explained that we felt the right of the Assembly to make recommendations to Member States on the other hand was such a fundamental right that the Assembly should not delegate this.

Sir Hartley then inquired if we envisaged the committee resulting generally in a by-passing of the Security Council. Mr. Dulles replied in the negative, stating that while there might be some degree of competition between the two bodies he thought it might not extend beyond the stage of healthy competition. He explained our thesis that on the contrary the Security Council would be strengthened as we could at least hope that the existence of this Assembly body might result in more efficient operation of the Security Council (the Soviet attitude in the Security Council might be more reasonable).

²For documentation on the Korean question, see vol. VI, pp. 596 ff.

Mr. Dulles also argued that there was an area of cases, such as Spain and the United Kingdom-Egyptian case,³ which in so far as the Security Council was concerned could be termed borderline cases and which probably never should have been brought to the Security Council as no direct threats to the peace were involved. He said the committee could handle this type of case and thus keep the decks of the Security Council free to handle the critical problems for which it was designed.

Mr. McNeil then raised the question as to whether it was legally possible for Member States to remit problems directly to a committee rather than to the Assembly. Mr. Dulles replied that we felt it was and explained our feeling that a body such as the Assembly could delegate such powers as studying, investigation, reporting, that in our view the only type of power which it could not delegate was its own power of judgment or discretion. Sir Alexander Cadogan expressed agreement with this view.

Mr. McNeil inquired if we envisaged the committee having the power to appoint investigating committees and Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative. The British did not appear to challenge this.

Mr. McNeil inquired if we felt the committee had the right to call special sessions and Mr. Dulles said "Yes".

Sir Hartley Shawcross at this point returned to the question as to whether the idea could not be carried out in a better way by some form of adjournment of the Assembly such as adjournment *sine die*. There was considerable discussion on this point.

Finally Sir Hartley raised the political aspect of the question, asking what our views would be on the desirability of creating the commission should the Soviet Union pursue the policy it did on the Trusteeship Council and refuse to participate because it felt the creation of the committee was illegal. He also said we should consider the possibility of certain other States taking the same course of action. We admitted that if this contingency arose, the committee could not be expected to function entirely in the way that we had in mind, but we did feel that nevertheless it should be created in the hope that at some later date any dissidents would join up. Mr. Dulles, in talking to this point, said that he now had some hope that the Soviet might decide in the relatively near future to participate in the work of the Trusteeship Council.

Before adjourning there was a very brief discussion of the veto. The major point raised by the British was to ask the question whether we would consider that a veto had been exercised in the case where

³ For documentation on these issues, see vol. v, pp. 761 ff. (the Anglo-Egyptian controversy) and *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. v, pp. 10-23 and *ibid.*, 1947, vol. iii, pp. 1053 ff. (the Spanish question).

there were seven favorable votes and four Great Power negative votes. Dean Rusk replied that we would feel that this type of situation would constitute a veto.

After the meeting Mr. Jebb and others on the British side expressed the hope that this group could meet again in the very near future to continue this discussion.

[Annex]

MEMORANDUM FROM MR. JEBB

My own reactions to Mr. Beckett's note on "One way of carrying out Mr. Marshall's plan for an Interim Committee" are as follows:

(1) I am not sure that the idea of creating a permanent Assembly which would virtually be in continuous session is not in itself a violation, or at any rate a straining, of Article 20 of the Charter.

(2) I should have thought that a simpler way of achieving the same object, and one moreover which might be more in accordance with the Charter, would be for the General Assembly, before ending its present session, simply to decree that its Committee I should continue in being until the opening of the next Session in September 1948.

(3) This action, which might, I suggest, be justified under Article 22, would of course mean that the body established would have its own powers of recommendation: but it would have ample powers of discussion and there would be nothing to prevent its forming sub-committees or working parties.

(4) It would, in addition, no doubt have also to be laid down in the Resolution of the Assembly establishing the continuing existence of Committee I, that any matter which was, after the end of the present session, referred to the General Assembly by any Member or any non-Member under Article 14 or Article 35, should be considered immediately and in the first instance by Committee I.

In the event of two-thirds of the Members of Committee I being of the opinion after discussion that any matter so referred to the General Assembly should be the subject of immediate attention by the Assembly itself, it will be open for that Committee so to inform the Secretary-General who would then have to dispatch the necessary telegrams to all Member States, and on receipt of the necessary majority (which would be automatic) summon a special session of the General Assembly.

(5) It is for consideration whether, if such a procedure were adopted, it might not be desirable for the Assembly to perpetuate, at any rate for a year, its own general Committee with the object of deciding exactly what subjects referred to the General Assembly should be discussed by Committee I, or which, on the other hand,

might more profitably be left over for consideration at the regular General Assembly in September. The General Committee might also suitably be given rather wide powers in regard to the establishment of priorities, and might be instructed to confer with the Secretary-General from time to time on this important subject.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/165

United States Delegation Working Paper

[NEW YORK,] September 26, 1947.

RESOLUTION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

PROPOSED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Conscious of the responsibilities specifically conferred upon it by the Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 11), the promotion of international cooperation in the political field (Article 13), peaceful adjustment of any matters likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations (Article 14) ;

Deeming it necessary for the effective performance of these functions to establish a Committee for study, inquiry and discussion on its behalf during the period between the adjournment of the present session and the convening of the next regular session of the General Assembly (Article 22) ;

Recognizing fully the primary responsibility of the Security Council for prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24) ;

Resolves that

1. An Interim Committee is created composed of all the Members of the United Nations, each Member to have one representative ;

2. The Interim Committee shall assist the General Assembly by performing the following duties and functions :

a. To consider, as it may determine, such situations as may come to its attention within the purview of Article 14, or such questions as are brought before the General Assembly by the Security Council pursuant to Article 11(2), and to report thereon, with its recommendations to the General Assembly.

b. To consider and to make recommendations to the General Assembly upon general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 11(1) and to initiate

studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political field under Article 13(1) (a).

c. To consider whether occasion may require the calling of a special session of the General Assembly and if it deems that such session is required, to so advise the Secretary-General.

d. To conduct investigations and appoint commissions of inquiry within the scope of its duties and functions as it may deem useful and necessary.

e. To study, report and recommend to the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly on the advisability of establishing a Committee of the General Assembly on a permanent basis to perform the duties and functions of the Interim Committee with any changes considered desirable in the light of its experience.

f. To perform such other functions and duties as the General Assembly may assign to it.

3. In discharging its duties and functions, the Interim Committee shall at all times take cognizance of the responsibilities of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it shall also take duly into account the duties and functions assigned by the General Assembly or by the Security Council to any committee or commission, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

4. The provisional rules of procedure of the General Assembly shall, so far as applicable, govern the proceedings of the Interim Committee and such subcommittees and commissions as it may set up. The Interim Committee shall elect its Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Rapporteur and such other officers as it may deem necessary. The Interim Committee shall be convened by the Secretary-General within 15 days following the close of the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, and it shall continue to serve until the beginning of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly.

5. The Secretary-General shall enter into suitable arrangements with the appropriate authorities of any Member State in whose territory the Interim Committee or its subcommittees or commissions may wish to sit or to travel. He shall provide necessary facilities and assign appropriate staff as required for the work of the Interim Committee, its subcommittees and commissions.¹

¹ This text was transmitted to the United Nations Secretariat and was printed as U.N. Doc. A/C.1/196, September 26.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/222

*Minutes of a Meeting With Members of the United Kingdom
Delegation, New York, September 30, 1947, 11 p. m.*

CONFIDENTIAL

Present: Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. H. M. G. Jebb of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. W. E. Beckett of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. P. S. Falla of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. C. D. W. O'Neill of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation
Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the United States Delegation
Mr. David W. Wainhouse of the United States Delegation
Mr. Harley A. Notter of the United States Delegation
Mr. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation

GENERAL ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE

At the beginning of the meeting, the British handed to us the attached memorandum relating to legal questions on our proposal. The memorandum was not discussed as such, but most of the points contained therein were made during a detailed review which followed [discussion?] of our resolution. The memorandum is attached as Annex 1.

General Discussion

Sir Hartley Shawcross then opened a preliminary general discussion by reaffirming that the United Kingdom was committed to support our proposal in principle, and stated that they had been especially impressed by the public opinion arguments used by Mr. Dulles in our previous meeting. He said the British had desired this meeting in order to review the proposal in detail in order to put it in a form most likely to be adopted, a form which would meet the objections most likely to be raised, and which would secure favorable votes from states which might otherwise be in the doubtful column. He expressed the view that the objections would generally fall into two categories—(a) general constitutional doubts, and (b) a feeling that this would be a duplication of the Security Council.

Article 35

Sir Hartley Shawcross then raised the question as to whether the omission of reference to Article 35 in our draft resolution was intentional. Mr. Dulles replied that while we had not intended to preclude the spirit of this Article, we had felt its specific inclusion was unnecessary, that we had eliminated it in order to stress the articles in which

the powers of the Assembly with respect to peace and security matters had their origin, and that Article 35 did not fall in that category.

General Review of our Proposal

Mr. Dulles said he thought that by reading the outline of the functions of the committee as contained in his present draft of his opening statement, this and other matters might become clearer. He said that in his statement he made the following four points in this connection:

(1) Preparatory functions—Studying and reporting to the General Assembly on Article 14 items on its agenda.

(2) Follow-through functions (such as Greece, Palestine and Korea).

(3) General principles pertaining to peace and security—Article 11—cooperation in the political field (Article 13). Mr. Dulles mentioned that under this general heading, questions such as indirect aggression and the Soviet concept of the press containing matters hostile to other states could be included.

(4) A study and recommendations as to whether a committee of this type should be made permanent.¹

In this general discussion, Mr. Dulles asked the British what they thought of an argument for general use in our presentation running along this line: All of the other fields covered by the General Assembly, such as economic and social, trusteeship, budgetary and financial are prepared for in advance by sub-organizations such as the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the various commissions of ECOSOC, and the Advisory Committee on the Budget, except political problems falling under Committee 1. As a result, when the Assembly meets, Committee 1 is overloaded and the General Assembly itself neglects other matters in order to take care of the heavy load of Committee 1. The British thought this was a fair and valid argument.

There was general agreement on both sides to our statement in answer to their inquiry that even if the Security Council worked perfectly, this committee would still be useful.

The British agree with our thought that the committee should be a committee of the whole.

During the discussion, and in answer to British questions, Mr. Dulles stated that we visualized the preparatory functions of the committee to be as broad as the General Assembly functions in this field, and thus that they would cover disputes as well as situations.

Also in answer to questions, Mr. Dulles stated our view to be that matters primarily falling under Security Council jurisdiction should not be handled by the committee unless the Security Council has failed

¹ Mr. Dulles' opening statement to the First Committee on October 14 is found in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee*, pp. 129 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (II), *First Committee*).

to act and such matters have been removed from the agenda of the Security Council. He added, however, that we would be careful not to preclude the right of the committee to discuss such matters.

French Attitude

Mr. Jebb reported that the French liked the follow-through function of the committee and the idea of assigning to the committee matters which the Security Council fails to settle. Mr. Jebb had not discussed with the French our idea on preparatory functions and he was not prepared to speculate on what the French reaction to our ideas on this might be. Mr. Jebb added that the French felt the committee should not be authorized to make investigations in cases where the Security Council has already made investigations. Of more importance, Mr. Jebb reported that the French apparently rather firmly feel that the committee should be precluded from dealing with Security Council matters until after such matters have been removed from the agenda of the Security Council. Messrs. Jebb and Shawcross, however, seem to feel that the French might be willing to accept some phraseology along this line: "Without prejudice to the powers of the General Assembly under Article 10 the Interim Committee shall not handle matters which are before the Security Council."

The Rules of the Committee

There was some discussion on this question but no definitive conclusion reached. There was a consensus, however, that certain key rules such as the rule to the effect that important decisions such as establishing a commission of inquiry should take a two-thirds vote should be set forth in the resolution itself.

The Resolution Itself

Paragraph 2A of the Resolution—There was considerable discussion of the wording of this paragraph, and the general consensus was that the terms of reference should include Article 11(2), 14, 35 and possibly the peace and security part of Article 10, although this was not as clear as the feeling on the other articles. There was agreement to consider wording along this line: "To consider in its discretion such questions submitted to the General Assembly within the purview of Articles 11(2), 14, 35 (and possibly the peace and security part of 10), and to report thereon with its recommendations to the General Assembly." The British made special points that the wording should not preclude member states being able to bring in matters under 11(2) and that this right should not be limited to reference from the Security Council as our draft is now written.

Paragraph 2B seems to be satisfactory.

Paragraph 2C—The British raised the question as to whether the Interim Committee itself could call a special session, and we admitted that it could not and hence our wording as its calling for recommendations to the Secretary-General who would then have to poll the members in the usual way.

Paragraph 2D—The British raised the legal question on the right of the Assembly to send out an investigating committee and referred again to what the word action in Article 11 means. They suggested the possibility of obtaining an advisory opinion of the court on this matter in the form of a question along this line: "Is the creation of an investigating committee action under Article 11(2) of the Charter and therefore precluded?" We attempted to persuade the British that this matter was abundantly clear, and that an advisory opinion was unnecessary. There was a general feeling that this question of interpretation was of more immediate import in our Greek Resolution than in this resolution (I am writing a separate memorandum on this point.)*

Paragraph 2E—The British feel this paragraph is good. They think it is especially desirable as a hedge in the event the Slav group do not participate in the work of the committee.

Paragraph 2F—The British raised the question of the committee being able to perform wider functions than those of peace and security. They referred particularly (Mr. Jebb) to an idea now being discussed in Committee 5 that there should be some body established to set priorities on United Nations activities in order to keep the budget within reasonable bounds. They felt this committee would be especially desirable in this connection because its decisions would have behind them the weight of the representation of the full membership of the Assembly. We argued that the terms of reference of this committee should be confined to peace and security matters under the frame of reference set forth in the preamble. The British, I believe, are inclined to agree, but a little reluctantly. They urged that we support having some group established on the priority question just mentioned.

Paragraph 5—The British pointed out an error in that as the paragraph is now drafted it seemed to imply that the whole committee might indulge in traveling.

Paragraph 3—Mr. Jebb made inquiry with respect to the meaning of our use of the words "take cognizance". It was agreed that this paragraph would need amendment in the light of whatever formulation is decided upon to meet the French position with respect to the Security Council.

*See US/A/C.1/223. [Footnote in the source text. Mr. Raynor was the drafter of these minutes.]

Annex 1

UNITED KINGDOM MEMORANDUM ON AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM COMMITTEE

The American proposal has now been formulated, as in the attached paper A/C.1/196 of the 26th September.²

2. It is not altogether clear from the draft Resolution what are the functions exactly which it is intended to confer on the Interim Committee. In paragraph 2(a) and (b) it is to be noted that the Interim Committee does not appear to be entrusted with investigating disputes or situations brought to the attention of the General Assembly by a Member or by a non-Member State under Article 35, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2. Further it does not appear to be entrusted with the consideration of questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before the General Assembly by a Member of the United Nations under Article 11(2). These omissions cannot be accidental because Article 11(2) is referred to in connection with a question referred by the Security Council. One might at first sight be tempted to suppose that it was the idea of the United States to exclude from the consideration of the Interim Committee disputes and situations, arising out of the differences between individual States, except when they had been sent to the General Assembly by the Security Council, and, apart from this, to confine the Committee to the consideration of the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security (Article 11(1)). As, however, cases under Article 14 are certainly brought within the purview of the Interim Committee by the United States resolution, and as presumably a dispute between two States may be brought under Article 14, it is rather difficult to see exactly what the intention is. Moreover, from the practical point of view it is hardly likely that the Security Council will formally refer matters to the General Assembly since that would require the concurring vote of all the 5 Great Powers. There is no mention in the United States proposals of the specific class of cases where the Security Council has been unable to reach a decision (either because of the veto or otherwise) but has not taken the step of referring the matter to the General Assembly.

3. Paragraph 2(d) of the United States Resolution calls for some special consideration in order to form an opinion whether it is or is not within the power of the General Assembly to conduct investigations and appoint Commissions of Enquiry when it is dealing with situations or disputes relating to the maintenance of international peace (Article 11(2)) or likely to impair the general welfare or

² This is the United Nations text of United States Doc. US/A/C.1/165, September 26, p. 194.

friendly relations amongst nations (Article 14, or under Article 35(1) and (2)). This question involves the interpretation of the phrase "any such question on which action is necessary" at the end of Article 11(2). It should be noted, however, that there is no similar qualification to Article 14. The view of the United States Delegation is thought to be that the word "action" at the end of Article 11(2) refers to enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and if this is correct it would seem that the General Assembly, acting under Article 11(2) has much the same power as the Security Council itself has when acting under Chapter VI. There seem strong arguments in favour of this view, namely (1) in Article 11(2) the word "action" is contrasted with recommendation to the State or States concerned or to the Security Council or both; (2) In Article 35(1) and (2) there is a choice of referring disputes and situations either to the Security Council or to the General Assembly. Under Chapter VI the Security Council has power to make recommendations for appropriate procedure and methods of adjustment (Article 36) or to recommend terms of settlement (Article 37). The General Assembly may (Article 11(2)) make recommendations to the State or States concerned, and under Article 14 may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation. It seems difficult, therefore, to suppose that the powers of the General Assembly were supposed to be less than those of the Security Council under Chapter VI.

4. The General Assembly, like the Security Council, must endeavour to settle disputes and adjust situations in accordance with the principles of international law and justice. And no Body can fulfil this function unless it is in a position to inform itself of the true facts, and for this purpose a Commission of Enquiry may be necessary. It is, of course, true that the General Assembly did appoint a Commission of Enquiry for the Palestine question; but the Palestine question was referred to the General Assembly under Article 10 of the Charter, and was not therefore necessarily a matter involving the maintenance of international peace and security. There would seem, however, to be very strong arguments in favour of the view that the General Assembly has this power as a preparatory measure to making a recommendation, and that paragraph 2(d) of the United States Resolution is consequently *intra vires*. It has not been possible to trace in the minutes of the San Francisco Conference any definite indication of the meaning attached to the word "action" at the end of Article 11(2); a United Kingdom draft presented to the relevant Sub-Committee, however, at one stage contained after "action" the parenthesis "(by the Security Council)". A further argument may be deduced from the 4-Power memorandum circulated at San Francisco, although it must be emphasized that this memorandum relates only to the Security Council. But

in relation to the Security Council it was argued that the sending of Commissions of Enquiry might give rise to a "chain of action" leading ultimately to the necessity of the use of force, and therefore a decision to appoint a Commission of Enquiry was a matter in regard to which the veto should apply. It may be said that since there is no veto in the Assembly, the Assembly should not be able to appoint Commissions of Enquiry in relation to matters referring to the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. If doubts seem to be felt on part 2(*d*) of the United States Resolution in particular, and if these doubts might endanger the passing of the Resolution by the two-thirds majority, it might be advisable to propose that an advisory opinion of the International Court should be obtained on this particular provision, and that the portion of this provision should be subject to the opinion of the Court being to the effect that it was *intra vires* the powers of the Assembly.

6. The second method of approach is given in the attached note by the Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.³ In a word the suggestion is that the Assembly should, by one means or another, prolong its own session so as virtually to make it continuous, and that during the operation of this session only one Committee will function and there will be no plenary meetings unless the President of the Assembly, at the request of this particular Committee, so decides. Moreover, the powers of the Committee so established would not be laid down in detail (as in the Marshall Plan) but would simply be indicated as all those which accrue in any case to the General Assembly.

7. The great advantage of this scheme would be that the powers of the new body created would not be specifically defined, and it would be left quite unclear, for instance, whether it had or had not the power to send out Commissions of Enquiry. If, therefore, during the first year of its establishment such a suggestion were made, and if we and other States came to the conclusion that it was inadvisable, it would be open to us, should we so desire, to argue against the despatch of any Commission, and even in the last resort not to take part in it on the ground that its establishment was *ultra vires*.

8. The disadvantage from a technical point of view to this proposal seems to be that whereas under the Charter (Article 28(1)) the Security Council is to function continuously, the General Assembly (Article 20) "shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require". What is clearly contemplated by this last Article, therefore, is a session of a few weeks, or at the moment [*most?*] a few months, once a year, and by exception certain other special sessions. A proposal, therefore, to put the General Assembly into what virtually would be "continuous session" might well be held, and will

³ Not attached to this copy.

be held if what M. Sobolev says is right, by the Slavs to violate Article 20 of the Charter.

9. Yet a third and rather different method of approach would be that which was understood as being put forward by Dr. Evatt. Unless we are wrong, this would mean establishing a Committee by one or other of the means referred to above but limiting its powers to the discussion of matters previously referred to the Security Council on which the Security Council, either by the exercise of the veto or for any other reason, had been unable to arrive at a conclusion. In practice we think the result which Dr. Evatt desires would probably be realised even if there was no such limitation on the powers of the Interim Committee, for the reason that if there are two parties to the dispute, if one party brings the matter before the Assembly the other Party is very likely to put it down on the Agenda of the Security Council, and if so, as the result of Article 12(1) the Interim Committee would have to desist from dealing with the matter until the Security Council had finished. The difficulty, however, of putting in any express limitation is that it appears to be contrary to the spirit of the Charter, which most clearly in Article 35 (1) and (2) gives Members the choice of taking their disputes either to the General Assembly or to the Security Council, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for security does not mean first in point of time. The primary responsibility of the Security Council rests principally on the fact that the Security Council alone has the enforcement powers under Chapter VII, and secondly in the fact that if both organs are seized of the same dispute the General Assembly gives way until the Security Council is finished.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/234

Minutes of a Meeting With Members of the United Kingdom Delegation, New York, October 7, 1947, 10 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

Present : Mr. Hector McNeil of the United Kingdom Delegation
Sir Hartley Shawcross of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. H. M. G. Jebb of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. W. E. Beckett of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. P. S. Falla of the United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation
Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the United States Delegation
Mr. David W. Wainhouse of the United States Delegation
Mr. Charles Noyes of the United States Delegation
Mr. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation
Mr. Eric Stein of the United States Delegation

GENERAL ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE AND THE VETO

A. INTERIM COMMITTEE

United Kingdom Discussions with the Chinese and Canadians

Mr. Beckett reported that in the course of discussions with the Chinese the latter pointed out that the Committee would have discretion in determining whether a matter should be placed on its agenda. Even after the Committee has placed a matter on its agenda this would not affect the right of the General Assembly to refuse to place the same matter on its own agenda. The Chinese also think in terms of the preparatory and "follow-up" functions of the Committee and agree that the Committee in the exercise of the preparatory functions would have the power to ask Members to accord to its facilities for investigation. The carrying out of the investigation would depend upon the consent of the Members concerned. It was agreed that this was also the understanding of the United Kingdom and United States Delegations. The United Kingdom Delegation suggested to the Chinese that the Interim Committee should not even discuss a matter appearing on the agenda of the Security Council even though the General Assembly itself might have the power to do so. The Chinese agreed to this view, according to the British.

In their discussions with the United Kingdom Delegation the Canadians expressed preference for a broader jurisdiction of the Interim Committee which would not be restricted to peace and security matters. Mr. Dulles pointed out that under the U.S. draft resolution there is no restriction on the power of the General Assembly to refer to the Committee any matter it deems suitable for consideration by the Committee. However, as a matter of policy it might be better if the Committee would deal with matters arising under the Articles set forth in the U.S. resolution.

Should the Committee Jurisdiction Be Restricted to Matters Relating to Peace and Security? French Objections

Sir Hartley expressed the view that it would be desirable to restrict the jurisdiction of the Committee to matters relating to peace and security and to questions specifically referred to the Committee by the Assembly. Otherwise, there will be a danger that trivial matters will be brought before the Committee for the sole reason that the Committee would be available as a forum. In the absence of the Committee such matters would never come before the General Assembly and would be left for settlement by the parties. Mr. Jebb thought that this solution might allay the French fears that the question of Viet Nam could be brought before the Committee. Mr. Raynor raised the question whether under this narrowed definition of jurisdiction the Committee

could deal, for instance, with the problem of Austria, should the treaty negotiations definitely collapse. Sir Hartley and Mr. Jebb thought that the Austrian situation could be considered as affecting peace and security because of the failure of the U.S.S.R. to evacuate its troops from Austria. Mr. Thompson stated that if the Committee should be restricted to matters relating to peace and security other delegations might raise some questions as to the invasion of the Security Council jurisdiction. It was for this reason that the terms "peace and security" were omitted from the Committee title. Mr. Dulles asked whether the French could not be satisfied by the adoption of a rule in the Committee requiring a two-thirds vote for placing an item on the agenda. He thought, however, that this would be too restrictive. Mr. Wainhouse emphasized the importance of retaining the Committee jurisdiction under Article 14 which goes beyond the peace and security matters. It was agreed that a restriction of the Committee jurisdiction to matters relating to peace and security would not guarantee that problems such as Viet Nam could be kept out of the Committee since it might always be argued that such problems do in fact relate to peace and security, and this argument might well obtain the backing of the required majority. It was further agreed that a rule requiring a two-thirds majority for placing a matter on the Committee agenda would be too restrictive. Mr. Dulles stated that, as he himself has pointed out to Mr. de Murville, an effort to frame the Committee jurisdiction so as to bar the Viet Nam problem from the Committee would in the end be not effective as such problem would "overflow" in some other organ; such effort is in its end result comparable to the Soviet use of veto.

Sir Hartley suggested that the discretion of the Committee in selecting items for its agenda should be emphasized by inserting in the resolution a clause providing that the Committee will "consider in its discretion such matters which it deems sufficiently important or urgent to require preparatory study". The Interim Committee would from time to time select matters suitable for preparatory consideration from the matters submitted to the General Assembly.

Sir Hartley agreed that the Committee jurisdiction should not be restricted to matters relating to peace and security and that the Committee should be able to deal with any question under Articles 11(2), 14 and 35. Sir Hartley then suggested that the talks with the French be carried on with a view to convince them to accept this definition of Committee jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction of the Committee under Article 11(1) and 13(1a)

The British believe that the Committee should not possess general jurisdiction under these Articles for two main reasons: (a) because the studies under these Articles are not of an urgent character and do

not require focusing of public opinion such as the specific situations which would be dealt with in the Interim Committee under Articles 11(2), 14 and 35; (b) such studies would be of an academic nature requiring an entirely different type of expert personnel. Moreover, the work of the committee on specific cases could easily be bogged down by such broad studies which would impair the effective discharge of its main function as a forum designed to focus world opinion to specific situations.

In the British view the General Assembly might direct the Secretariat to conduct such studies, or the General Assembly could perhaps remit to the Interim Committee certain aspects of the study, but the Interim Committee should not be given jurisdiction to undertake such studies of their own initiative. Mr. Dulles emphasized that the General Assembly has an affirmative duty under Article 13(1a) to undertake studies for the promotion of international cooperation in the political field and that it has thus far failed to take any steps towards the implementation of this task. Mr. Wainhouse and Mr. Raynor stressed that one of the main reasons for inserting the reference to Article 13(1a) and 11(1) in the U.S. draft resolution was to provide for a possibility to raise the question of indirect aggression before the Interim Committee; the Committee could use the services of the Secretariat experts and could perform its functions in this field through sub-committees so that this work would not interfere with its main purpose of dealing with specific situations. Mr. McNeil thought that a blanket jurisdiction under the above two Articles was risky and that some other State might bring before the Committee under this heading such items as war mongering, the Marshall Plan, etc. Mr. Dulles said that one of the reasons for this approach to the problem of indirect aggression was the desire on the part of the United States to limit the number of proposals advanced by the United States Delegation in this General Assembly which could be considered as being directed against the U.S.S.R. For this reason the United States Delegation prefers the broad clause of Article 11(1) and 13(1a) to a specific provision for indirect aggression or to a specific reference of this problem by the General Assembly to the Committee. Mr. McNeil felt that the general principles on indirect aggression are sufficiently clear and that no public attention could be attracted to abstract issues before the Committee; this would defeat the main purpose of bringing the matter before the Committee. Mr. Wainhouse thought that it would definitely be advantageous for the Committee first to spell out in detail the principles relating to indirect aggression without focusing the study on specific situations and that after such principles are developed it might be easier to deal with such situations as the problem of Hungary. Mr. McNeil would not favor even a specific

reference of this type of problem by the General Assembly to the Committee. An inconclusive discussion ensued as to whether the Committee would select less important items submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly thus "clearing the deck" for Assembly consideration of the more important matters; or whether the Committee should select the more important items for a thorough study which would assist the General Assembly in dealing with such items when it convenes.

Mr. Dulles suggested that more thought be given to this aspect of Committee jurisdiction and that the United States Delegation will carefully consider whether it would accept an amendment to its proposed resolution which would exclude the jurisdiction of the Committee under Article 11(1) and 13(1a).

B. VETO

General Position in the Current Session of the General Assembly

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Thompson referred to the speech of Secretary Marshall and stated that owing to the complexity of the voting problem in the Security Council all proposals for a liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure should be referred to a committee for study and report to the third session of the General Assembly in 1948. The General Assembly study might stimulate the efforts of the Security Council to improve its own procedures. Mr. Dulles believed that the establishment and operation of the Interim Committee might also have an effect on the Security Council's work in this field. The British agreed that this might be the best position to take, but they had some doubts as to whether the smaller nations which are hostile to the veto would be amenable to such solution. Mr. Beckett said that a liberalized "gentleman's agreement" among the great powers would be probably the only way to obtain success; the efforts in the Security Council are the most realistic method from the viewpoint of final success. Mr. McNeil emphasized that Mr. Bevin would be most reluctant to agree to any step on the subject of veto which might be seized upon by the Soviets as a reason for their withdrawal from the United Nations. He said that the British have repeatedly stated that they would oppose any amendment of the Charter at this time and that he believed that the United States had made similar statements. It was agreed that discussions will be carried on particularly with the Australians and with the Chinese with a view . . . that all proposals for a liberalized voting procedure should be referred to a committee for further study and report in 1948. Mr. McNeil expressed a strong belief that a special committee should be established for such study and that the study should not be referred to the Interim Committee; the special committee should be composed of jurists or "semijurists". Mr. Dulles

stated that a decision on this matter would depend on the final character of the Interim Committee.

[Here follows discussion of a draft resolution on the veto introduced by the Chinese in the First Committee, during which it was decided "that an effort will be made to convince the Chinese that their and other proposals should be referred to a committee for study and that no action should be taken thereon in the current session of the Assembly."]

Possibilities of U.S.S.R. Withdrawal from the United Nations

Mr. Dulles asked Mr. McNeil whether he knows of any indication of the Soviet intention on this subject. Mr. McNeil stated that while he does not possess any information it has been his "personal guess" that the Soviets do not intend to withdraw. He was somewhat shaken in this view by Mr. Bebler's outburst in today's meeting of Committee 1 on the Greek question. He noted that Mr. Gromyko very ostentatiously congratulated Mr. Bebler on his speech and that Mr. Vishinsky was present in the Committee meeting. Nevertheless, he felt that the Soviets do intend to stay in the United Nations, but he expressed the belief that we should not press for far reaching action on the veto. "If we get the Interim Committee we will do well", and we should not take risks on the veto question. Mr. Dulles agreed that it is most important not to give the Soviets any decent excuse to withdraw from the United Nations. Sir Hartley thought that we should not precipitate a crisis on the veto. In his view an argument could be made that a proposal such as that contained in Section C of the Chinese resolution, while not amounting to a modification of the Charter, is designed to "terrorize" a permanent member so that it would not use the veto. Mr. Dulles pointed out that a similar argument could be used against the Interim Committee to the effect that the veto was intended to protect the minority and that therefore a veto in the Council proceedings should finish the consideration of a matter. He agreed that with Korea and the Interim Committee on the agenda, we should proceed with caution. In this connection Mr. McNeil suggested that in the general debate on the Interim Committee we should state that in our view the veto problem should be passed to a committee for study and report in 1948.

Meeting adjourned at 1:00 a. m.

(The discussion on membership is contained in a separate memorandum—US/A/C.1/285).

IO Files : US/A/C.1/303

United States Delegation Working Paper

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 10, 1947.

VIEWS OF VARIOUS DELEGATIONS ON THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE

Attached herewith is a brief summary of the views of various delegations on the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an Interim Committee. The summary is based on views expressed in the General Debate and in conversations with members of the U.S. Delegation up to October 9, 1947. It should be noted that a majority of the conversations have taken place shortly after the Secretary's speech in the General Assembly and before the disclosure of the full details of the U.S. proposal. Intensive conversations with the members of the Delegations of the United Kingdom, Canada, and France have been carried on. More liaison work must be done on this subject.

On the basis of present information, members of 17 delegations expressed a more or less qualified approval of the general idea of the U.S. proposal; 3 delegations indicated possible support; 10 delegations were reported as undecided and hesitant; 6 delegations were clearly opposed; and 20 delegations remain to be contacted for their views.

The breakdown according to geographic areas would appear to be as follows:

WESTERN EUROPE

Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom favor the general idea of the U.S. proposal, while France appears to be lukewarm.

THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Sweden is taking a negative attitude, with Denmark and Norway undecided. There is no report on Iceland.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are reported definitely in favor of the U.S. proposal; Peru might support it; Chile has shown interest; there is no expression of opinion from the 14 remaining Latin American countries.

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA

Turkey and Greece have expressed approval of the U.S. proposal, with Iran and Ethiopia having indicated that they might support it. Afghanistan is inclined to support it but is still undecided as is India,

Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon. There is no report on Liberia, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, or Saudi Arabia. The Arab States have requested more information, but their ultimate position appears to be dependent upon their reaction to the U.S. position on Palestine.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the Union of South Africa favor the U.S. proposal, with the last showing some hesitation.

FAR EAST

China, while not enthusiastic, will give the U.S. proposal its support. The Philippine Republic and Siam have expressed unqualified approval.

[EASTERN EUROPE]

The Eastern European group will of course oppose the U.S. proposal.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/379

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 16, 1947.

During a conversation with Justice Wold,¹ I gained the distinct impression that while he continues to be convinced that theoretically and constitutionally some proposal along the lines of ours is desirable, that he and the other Scandinavians are becoming more and more apprehensive over stating their convictions on the matter. The speeches by the Soviet Union and the Satellites against the proposal seem to have had the effect on countries such as the Scandinavian states which the Soviets intended. These states, in my judgment, are becoming more and more frightened.

In this connection Justice Wold says it's not a matter of voting. He said you could get the votes, but what would that mean if there is not some agreement in principle on the part of all. He seemed to feel there was some doubt that the Soviet Union would even participate in the work of the Subcommittee. As to the Subcommittee, he said he hoped it would have the widest terms of reference and not be restricted simply to drafting terms of reference for the Interim Committee. I told him that we could see no point to duplicating the substantive debate in the Subcommittee which has already taken place in Committee I.

HAYDEN RAYNOR

¹ Norwegian Delegation.

501.BB/10-1747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, October 17, 1947—11:41 a. m.

1040. Following is text of UK proposal on establishment of GA Interim Committee introduced first committee (A/C.1/215, October 16):

“THE GA

Conscious of the responsibility conferred upon it by the Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security (Articles 11 and 35) the peaceful adjustment of any situation likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations (Article 14);

Believing that the effective performance of these functions necessitates the establishment of an interim Committee for the study, enquiry and discussion of such matters on its behalf during the period between the adjournment of the present session and the convening of the next regular session of the GA;

Recognizing fully the primary responsibility of the SC for prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24);

Resolves as follows:

1. There shall be established an interim committee, composed of one representative of each member of the UN, for the period between the closing of the present session and the convening of the next regular session of the GA.

2. The functions of the Interim Committee shall be

(a) To consider such matters as may be referred to it by the present session of the GA and to report thereon to the GA;

(b) To consider any dispute or any situation which may be placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the GA by any member acting in virtue of Articles 11(2), 14, or 35 of the Charter provided always that the committee previously determines by a two-thirds majority any matter so discussed to be both urgent and important;

(c) To consider whether occasion may require the summoning of a special session of the GA and if it deems that such session is required so to advise the Secretary-General in order that he may obtain the views of members thereon;

(d) To conduct investigations and appoint commissions of enquiry within the scope of its functions provided that the decision to take such action is approved by two-thirds of the members of the committee and if the investigations or enquiry are to take place elsewhere than at the headquarters of the UN, the state or states in whose territory they are to take place consent thereto;

(e) To report to the next regular session of the GA on the advisability of establishing a permanent committee of the GA to perform

the duties and functions of the Interim Committee with any changes considered desirable in the light of experience.

3. The Interim Committee shall not discuss any matter which is on the agenda of the SC.

4. Subject to paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d) above, the provisional rules of procedure of the GA shall, so far as they are applicable, govern the proceedings of the Interim Committee and such subcommittees and commissions as it may set up.

5. The Interim Committee shall be convened by the Secretary-General within fifteen days following the close of the second regular session of the GA. It shall meet as and when it deems necessary for the conduct of its business.

6. The Secretary-General shall provide the necessary facilities and assign appropriate staff as required for the work of the Interim Committee, its subcommittees and commissions of enquiry."

MARSHALL

Editorial Note

On October 18, after five days of debate (GA (II), *First Committee*, pages 129-179), the First Committee voted to appoint a subcommittee "for the purpose of examining the United States proposal, any amendments thereto, and other proposals on the same subject, and reporting thereon to the Committee, along with any recommendations it thinks fit" (*ibid.*, page 611, annex 17b). The Soviet Union refused to participate in the subcommittee.

IO Files: US/A/C.1/401

Memorandum by Mr. Eric Stein of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 21, 1947.

Participants:	Mr. Dulles	Mr. Popper
	Mr. Rusk	Mr. Stein
	Miss Fosdick	Mr. Taylor
	Mr. Marcy	Mr. Thompson
	Mr. Notter	Mr. Wainhouse

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING HELD ON OCTOBER 20 ON THE INTERIM COMMITTEE

Mr. Dulles asked whether the proposed Interim Committee was contemplated as a technical study group or whether it should function for the purpose of crystallizing world opinion through discussion like the

General Assembly itself. If the second alternative is adopted, he anticipated objections both from legal and policy standpoint. The political objections arise primarily out of fear that the discussions in the Committee will accentuate the U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict and perpetuate the wrangling and name-calling. He suggested a test which the Interim Committee might follow in selecting matters for its agenda: The Committee should consider only major matters with which the General Assembly could not adequately deal without prior preparation through study and investigation, such as the Korean and Palestinian question.

Mr. Dulles said that the Committee's decision whether it should take up a matter should be made by a simple majority since a requirement of a two-thirds majority might lead to the formation of a bloc within the Committee which could exercise a type of a veto; however, if there is a strong pressure for a two-thirds majority requirement, Mr. Dulles was inclined not to make it a fighting issue.

Mr. Dulles also pointed to the opposition among our friends to the jurisdiction of the Committee under Articles 11(1) and 13(1a) and raised the question whether and to what extent we should be ready to abandon this function of the Committee. Mr. Wainhouse suggested that we should do all in our power to retain the jurisdiction both under Articles 11(1) and 13(1a) and, if pressed, we might abandon the reference to Article 13(1a). Mr. Dulles then inquired what specific studies are envisaged under the two provisions. Mr. Rusk mentioned the possible activities of the Comintern, and Mr. Notter referred to Soviet pressure on Turkey and certain forms of Soviet economic penetration in the Balkans. He also mentioned that in the exercise of its jurisdiction in this field, the Committee could evolve more detailed principles with a view to improving the techniques for pacific settlement of disputes through the means indicated in Article 33(1). Mr. Dulles mentioned also the development of the provisions of Article 36(3), and indirect aggression. Mr. Stein recalled that Sir Hartley referred in this connection to indirect aggression, "general principles governing the summoning of international conferences" and the principles of non-intervention. Mr. Dulles thought that at least some of these topics might fall in the field of development of international law. Some discussion ensued as to which of these topics could be dealt with under other Articles within the proposed jurisdiction of the Committee. Mr. Notter emphasized that if we should agree to dropping the study functions of the Committee, it could be argued that its character as a competitor of the Security Council would become more pronounced. Mr. Dulles suggested that the Interim Committee could be entrusted with the task to prepare a working plan for the studies under Articles 11(1) and 13(1a) rather than to undertake the studies themselves. Mr. Rusk agreed with this suggestion and said that an appro-

appropriate provision could be added to the clause requiring the Committee to report on the desirability of the establishment of a permanent Interim Committee.

It was agreed that we will oppose the Canadian proposal to extend the Committee's preparatory functions to items other than those relating to international peace and friendly relations. Mr. Rusk emphasized that one of the dangers of such extension would be that the Committee might turn into a permanent organ investigating the activities of the Secretary-General and other organs of the United Nations. However, we might accept the Canadian suggestion that the Committee should consider and report to the General Assembly on the implementation of resolutions referred to it by the General Assembly. Mr. Dulles suggested that this provision could be spelled out in paragraph 2(f) of the United States resolution although this paragraph in its present form appears to cover the Canadian suggestion.

Referring to the United Kingdom draft resolution, Mr. Wainhouse said that this resolution fails to provide for recommendations or for reports by the Committee to the General Assembly in connection with the Committee's preparatory function. It was agreed that the Committee must be given express authority to "report" or make "proposals" to the General Assembly; however, we will not insist on the use of the word "recommendations".

ERIC STEIN

IO Files : US/A/C.1/481

Memorandum by Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers to All Political Officers

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] October 30, 1947.

It is suggested that conversations with other delegations concerning the United States position on the "veto" should begin at once. In these conversations you may find useful the general guide lines set forth below.

The United States believes that liberalization of the voting procedure would make the Security Council more effective. As stated by the Secretary in his opening speech to the General Assembly, the abuse of the veto in the Security Council has made such liberalization essential. Therefore, the United States would be willing to agree to the elimination by whatever means may be appropriate of the veto under Chapter VI of the Charter (pacific settlement), and in voting on applications for membership. The United States however is opposed to any alteration of the veto under Chapter VII, or in the process of amending the Charter. Concerning other decisions to which the veto may now be

applicable, the United States will indicate its position as occasion may require in the course of the study proposed below.

As to the means of securing liberalization of the voting procedure, the United States wishes to go as far as possible through the development of practices and procedures in the Security Council agreed to by all its members.

However we recognize that such changes will probably not go far enough to solve the problem. It will be necessary for the General Assembly to study what can be accomplished through Charter interpretation and by changes that may require Charter amendment. The issues arising out of substantial changes in the voting procedure of the Security Council are so complex and so important to the future of the United Nations, and there is such a divergence among the members, that a year's study is essential prior to decisions on the issues involved. Moreover the United States hopes that the General Assembly study will stimulate the efforts of the Security Council itself to improve its voting practices.

Our position on the veto in this Assembly constitutes an important step forward in the direction of liberalizing the veto from the basic position which we took last year. Last year we were unwilling to support steps looking toward the amendment of the Charter although we expressed hope that in the future the permanent members might agree among themselves and with other members to modify the veto under Chapter VI. This year, the United States continues to stand by its conviction concerning the necessity of agreement among the major powers in taking decisions under Chapter VII and with respect to amendment of the Charter; however the United States is prepared to support, after careful study,¹ the liberalization of the veto under Chapter VI and on membership questions by any appropriate means including modification in the attitude expressed in the Four-Power Statement and amendment of the Charter.

The United States will make every effort to find a common ground among the permanent members of the Security Council so that any

¹ A "Comment Paper" of some length with four annexes setting forth the United States position on General Assembly items dealing with voting in the Security Council had been prepared for the information and guidance of the Delegation (IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/228/Rev. 1, October 21, 1947). The main paper describes the need for a basically new U.S. position for liberalization of the voting procedure in the Security Council in terms of ". . . experience to date, that the abuse of the rule requiring unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in non-procedural decisions is preventing the Council from meeting its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security." Specific remedies enumerated in the document to which this footnote is appended are described in detail in the comment paper, along with careful consideration of how to implement the new U.S. position both in the Security Council and in the current session of the General Assembly. The annexes contain *inter alia* an historical account of the former U.S. position on the voting problem and new draft rules recently proposed by the United States in the Security Council's Committee of Experts.

recommendations resulting from the General Assembly's study will have their approval as well as the overwhelming support of the members of the United Nations. The acceptance and support by the United States of such recommendations, however, will not necessarily depend upon their approval by all the permanent members.

The United States believes that the General Assembly should include in its study both a survey of the changes that should be made and the methods of their accomplishment. Accordingly we shall suggest that proposals submitted by members concerning the "veto" be referred to a special committee (presumably the Interim Committee would be appropriate), which would make the necessary study and report to the next session of the General Assembly.

The United States is not at this time abandoning the Four-Power Statement of June 7, 1945. However, the United States believes the General Assembly's study should not be limited by the Statement; in the event of a conflict between the recommendations resulting from the study and interpretations of Article 27 contained in the Four-Power Statement, the United States would be willing to consider changes from the attitude expressed on that Statement.

The United States would agree to a resolution limiting the terms of reference of the Committee, so as to exclude recommendations eliminating or limiting the requirement of unanimity under Chapter VII and in amending the Charter.

The United States considers a study by a committee preferable to a general conference under Article 109 as requested by Argentina. The study by a committee offers a possibility of attaining the desired result without the disturbance to the basic fabric of the Charter inherent in the calling of a general conference at this time, where the range of proposals for change in the Charter would be virtually unlimited.

Pending study by a committee, the United States does not plan to urge the adoption by the current session of the General Assembly of specific proposals either for interpreting or amending the Charter. The United States delegation hopes other delegations will share its belief that the debate in Committee I will be most useful if directed to establishing the proposed committee study rather than to determining, in advance of the study, the merits of the specific proposals. The United States also hopes that other delegations, aware that Committee I will begin its discussion of the veto near the end of its long and difficult agenda, will likewise prefer to refer for study substantive proposals on voting in the Security Council.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/488

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elwood N. Thompson of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 31, 1947.

Participants: Mr. W. E. Beckett, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. P. S. Falla, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Elwood Thompson, United States Delegation

In separate conversations with each, Mr. Falla and Mr. Beckett expressed the following opinions today concerning the handling of the veto item in Committee 1:

Mr. Falla said that, as we already knew, his delegation generally favored the idea of a study of the veto problem during the coming year. He said he doubted the desirability, however, of assigning the study to the Interim Committee if the Eastern bloc did not participate in the Committee's work. He said that without having discussed the matter with his delegation he personally thought perhaps the study should be referred to the Security Council and its Committee of Experts. I told Mr. Falla that it seemed to us that the Interim Committee was the logical group to carry on such a study. Mr. Falla was called to the telephone before we had a chance to discuss further his suggestion that the study be referred to the Security Council and its Committee of Experts.

Mr. Beckett, upon hearing the personal suggestion of Mr. Falla's that the study be referred to the Security Council and its Committee of Experts, said that did not seem practical to him since obviously Mr. Evatt and others interested in modifying the veto would not accept it. Mr. Beckett said the Interim Committee seemed the logical place to carry on the study, especially since we had been able to get the "study concept" accepted as part of the Interim Committee's terms of references. He commented on the fact that the USSR may not participate in the Interim Committee and observed that the time may come when someone will raise the question as to whether the USSR should have the right to vote in the United Nations if the USSR declines to participate in such activities as the Korean, Greek, and Interim Committees, and then declines to pay its share of the cost of these activities. He referred to Article 19 of the Charter, which says "A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions of the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member."

Mr. Beckett asked whether I would not be present at the meeting Monday night with the British on the veto and I told him that I doubted it since I would now be dividing my time between the General Assembly and the Washington Office, in place of Mr. Rusk who would be staying on with the Delegation.

ELWOOD THOMPSON

501.BB/11-347 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, November 3, 1947—9:54 p. m.

1139. The following draft resolution was approved November 3 by 9-0, four abstentions (Australia, Argentina, Lebanon, and Norway), by the GA Sub-committee of Committee I discussing the establishment of the Interim Committee:¹

“The GA conscious of the responsibility specifically conferred upon it by the Charter in relation to matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security (Articles 11 and 35), the promotion of international cooperation in the political field (Article 13), and the peaceful adjustment of any situations likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations (Article 14);

Deeming it necessary for the effective performance of these duties to establish an Interim Committee to consider and report with its conclusions on such matters to the GA during the period between the closing of the present session and the opening of the next regular session of the GA.

Recognizing fully the primary responsibility of the SC for prompt and effective action for the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 24);

Resolves that

1. There shall be established, for the period between the closing of the present session and the opening of the next regular session of the GA, an Interim Committee on which each member of the GA shall have the right to appoint one representative.

2. The IC, as a subsidiary organ of the GA, established in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter, shall assist the GA in the performance of its functions by discharging the following duties:

(a) To consider and report with its conclusions to the GA on such matters as have been referred to it by the GA;

(b) To consider and report with its conclusions to the GA on any

¹ For the report of the subcommittee, see GA (II), *First Committee*, pp. 614 ff., annex 17g.

dispute or any situation which, in virtue of Article II(2), or of 35 of the Charter, has been proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the GA by any member of the UN or brought before the GA by the SC, provided the Committee previously determines the matter to be both important and requiring preliminary study. Such determination of the Committee shall be made by a majority of two-thirds of those present and voting, unless the matter is one referred by the SC under Article II(2), in which case a simple majority will suffice;

(c) To consider, as it deems useful and advisable, and report with its conclusions to the GA on methods to be adopted to give effect to that part of Article II(1) which deals with the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, and to that part of Article 13(1) (a) which deals with the promotion of International cooperation in the political field;

(d) To consider, in connection with any matter under discussion by the IC, whether occasion may require the summoning of a special session of the GA and, if it deems that such session is required, so to advise the SYG in order that he may obtain the views of members thereon;

(e) To conduct investigation and appoint commissions of inquiry within the scope of its duties, as it may deem useful and necessary, provided that decisions to conduct such investigations or inquiries shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. An investigation or inquiry elsewhere than at the headquarters of the UN shall not be conducted without the consent of the state or states in whose territory it is to take place;

(f) To report to the next regular session of the GA on the advisability of establishing a permanent committee of the GA to perform the duties of the Interim Committee as stated above with any changes considered desirable in the light of experience.

3. In discharging its duties, the IC shall at all times take into account the responsibilities of the SC under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as the duties assigned by the Charter or by the GA or by the SC to other Councils or to any committee or commission. The IC shall not consider any matter of which the SC is seized.

4. Subject to paragraphs 2(b), and 2(e) above, the rules of procedure of the GA shall, so far as they are applicable, govern the proceedings of the IC and such Sub-committees and commissions as it may set up. The IC shall, however, have authority to adopt such additional rules as it may deem necessary provided that they are not inconsistent with any of the rules of the GA. The IC shall be convened by the SYG, not later than six weeks following the close of the second regular session of the GA. It shall meet as and when it deems necessary for the conduct of its business.

5. The SYG shall provide the necessary facilities and assign appropriate staff as required for the work of the Interim Committee, its Sub-committees and Commissions."

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/75

*Minutes of the Thirty-Third Meeting of the United States Delegation,
New York, November 5, 1947, 9:15 a. m.*

SECRET

[Here follow the list of persons (34) present and a discussion of three agenda items.]

Interim Committee

Mr. Dulles referred to the report of the sub-committee on the Interim Committee. He said that Mr. Wainhouse had very ably and patiently carried this committee work through. He thought that the sub-committee had produced the best intellectual piece of work that he had seen in the United Nations meetings including those at San Francisco. This was partly due to the fact that the Soviets were not participating. The report was satisfactory to the United States except for the provision that a two-thirds vote was needed for the interim committee to add a matter to its agenda. He thought that the controversy was likely to evolve around that issue. The United States had taken the position that we would accept the two-thirds provision in the interest of getting the committee report adopted. If a bloc were used to create a veto, the majority could so report at the next Assembly asking for a change in procedure. Some of the members were likely to precipitate a fight. There was risk that if the fight were too bitter a two-thirds vote would not be found for the Interim Committee. He said that Messrs. Evatt and Arce were making plans for a fight in their usual *prima donna* way. He said that he was going to tell Mr. Evatt that if we support the committee report we would be glad to let him make the opening speech on it although logically Mr. Dulles said he himself should do so.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

Editorial Note

The First Committee resumed discussion of the proposal to establish an interim committee of the General Assembly on November 5, upon receiving the report of its subcommittee. On November 6, the First Committee accepted the subcommittee's report by a vote of 43 to 6, with 6 abstentions. After the vote, the Soviet Representative (Vyshinsky) stated to the First Committee that the Soviet Union "would not take part in the work of the Interim Committee, because the Charter did not provide for its establishment." (GA (II), *First Committee*, pages 307-336.)

IO Files : US/A/831

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Thomas F. Power, Jr., Secretary-General of the United States Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 6, 1947.

Mr. Cordier¹ expressed to me this evening grave concern and considerable pessimism for the future of the United Nations because of today's announcement by the U.S.S.R. and her satellites of the boycott of the Interim Committee. He thought it raised a serious possibility that the Russians were intent on wrecking the United Nations by striking a grievous blow at the General Assembly. He thought that serious consideration should be given to finding a way out of the impasse at once before the situation is frozen.

He suggested that some thought be given to the possibility of holding two special General Assembly sessions on approximately January 15 and May 15. These could be either a substitute for or in addition to the Interim Committee. Thus the Assembly could be in special session for approximately the first six months of 1948.

As an alternative, the Assembly might utilize its Rule 6 which provides that it may decide at any session to adjourn temporarily and resume its meeting at a later date. Under this, the Assembly could reconvene on about the same dates mentioned above on a skeleton basis, thereby remaining in virtually a continuous session.

The legality of the special sessions or the continuous session would be unquestionable. The Soviets would have to attend the meetings unless they were determined to flagrantly and bluntly break the United Nations. Although he recognized there was a risk of forcing the issue, Cordier thought the situation should be faced. Moreover, he thought the suggestions would have the further value of saving face, both for the Russians and ourselves. The United States and the majority of the Assembly would not have to abandon their position on the constitutionality of the Interim Committee which could be continued, and the major purposes of the Interim Committee could still be achieved under the special or continuous session techniques.

At the outset of our conversation, Cordier thought that such a proposal could probably not be put forward by the United States but might be supported by one of our friends. However, after further discussion, he suggested that it might actually be preferable for the United States to propose such a course, taking a bold step to demonstrate clearly that the United States meant to make full use of the United Nations and make it unmistakably clear that the United States was committed to United Nations's success.

¹ Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IO Files : US/A/846

United States Delegation Working Paper

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] November 10, 1947.

REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY¹1. *United States Position*

1. The United States should vote in favor of the Committee resolution for the establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly.

2. Since the United States was the originator of the resolution, the United States Representative should make a statement in support thereof in the plenary, if it appears that speeches will be made against it.²

3. The question should be considered an "important" one within the meaning of Article 18 and the adoption of the resolution should therefore require a two-thirds majority. Owing to the wide support for the resolution, this point is not likely to be debated.

2. *History in Committee*

In the extended general debate, a majority of the speakers in the Committee, while approving in principle of the United States draft resolution, agreed that it should be carefully studied in the light of certain doubts raised by some members as to its Charter validity and political advisability. The Eastern group opposed the resolution as a flagrant violation of the Charter. By a vote of 38-0, with the Eastern group not participating in the voting, the Committee appointed a subcommittee composed of 15 members to study the United States proposal and any amendments thereto. The U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia refused to take part in the subcommittee's work and remained absent throughout its proceedings.

The subcommittee held sixteen meetings in the course of which it subjected the United States proposal, with numerous amendments, to a careful scrutiny. The modified draft of the United States proposal was approved in the sub-committee by a vote of 9-0 with 4 abstentions.

In the debate on the subcommittee's report in Committee 1, all speakers with the exception of the representatives of Egypt and of the

¹ For this report, see GA (II) vol. II, pp. 1553 and 1554, annex 16.

² For the statement by Mr. Dulles on November 13, see *ibid.*, pp. 755 ff. A statement by the Soviet Representative (Vyshinsky) is found *ibid.*, pp. 763 ff. Mr. Vyshinsky again reiterated the opposition of the Soviet Union to the establishment of an interim committee of the General Assembly, closing his statement with the words ". . . the USSR will not take part in the work of that organ" (*ibid.*, p. 781).

Eastern group declared that any initial doubts in connection with the United States proposals have been dispelled, and supported the subcommittee's resolution. The U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia continued in their violent attacks against the establishment of the Interim Committee. The Committee approved the draft resolution by a vote of 43 to 6, with 6 abstentions with two members absent. After the vote, the Eastern group announced that they will boycott the Interim Committee as an illegal organ. Mr. Vyshinsky also refused to agree to the United Kingdom proposal that the Assembly obtain an advisory opinion on the legality of the Interim Committee from the International Court of Justice.

[3.] *Possible Development in Plenary Session*

It may be expected that the Slav States will carry their fight against the resolution into the plenary session. It is unlikely that the United Kingdom will renew its proposal for an advisory opinion of the Court. In view of the overwhelming support for the resolution in the Committee, no serious difficulties are anticipated.³

³ On November 13, after having debated through one meeting and part of a second (GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, pp. 753-822), the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 41 to 6, with 6 abstentions, the resolution for the establishment of an interim committee of the General Assembly as recommended by the First Committee in its report. For text of the resolution, Resolution 111(II), see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions*, pp. 15 and 16 (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Resolutions*).

IO Files: US/A/C.1/588

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elwood N. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Political Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1947.

Sir Hartley Shawcross in a brief conversation while here for his Press Club address said he anticipated the veto study proposed by the United States probably would be done by the Interim Committee. He thought this would be interesting in view of the Russian stand that Eastern Europe would not participate in the committee, since they presumably will want to participate in the veto study. He did not in the course of the conversation commit himself definitely to a study or to the proposition that a study should be conducted by the Interim Committee but seemed favorable to the general idea. He did not raise some of the questions and alternatives concerning the study that had been mentioned earlier informally by members of the British Delegation.

Sir Hartley, as have other members of the British Delegation, raised the question of the implications of refusal by the Eastern Europeans

to contribute financially to the support of programs with which they disagree. He had no particular solutions to offer.

IO Files : US/A/C.1/606

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Foster Dulles of the
United States Delegation*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 15, 1947.

I had told Mr. Gromyko about a week earlier that I would be glad, before the veto item was reached on the Political Committee Agenda, to tell him what we had in mind. Mr. Wainhouse arranged a meeting which took place in the Delegates' Lounge at 1:15 p. m. on Saturday, November 15.

I said that it was our idea that no definitive action should be taken at this session of the Assembly. The matter was too complicated and there was too little time to arrive at considered views as to the substance of the question. We did, however, think that the matter should be studied between now and the next session. Gromyko interrupted to ask "Studied by whom?" I said by the Interim Committee or possibly a subcommittee of the Interim Committee or a special committee. I went on to say that the United States was opposed to any amendment of the veto in relation to really substantive action by the Security Council which might affect the interests and position of any Member state. We did, however, think that there was an area, particularly under Chapter VI, where Security Council action was, in a broad sense, procedural, not involving substantive rights as to the merits of a case, and that we were prepared in such a matter and organizational matters to explore the possibility of trying to find some better procedures which would enable the Security Council to function more efficiently. I said that, of course, not much could be done without the approval of all Permanent Members as there could not be a Charter amendment without such approval and that there ought preferably to be agreement of all the Permanent Members with reference to procedural matters, and that we hoped that any study over the coming year would involve consultation between the Assembly and the Security Council and between the Permanent Members.

Mr. Gromyko said that in their opinion the whole matter of veto should not be considered at all by the Assembly and that it should be dropped from the agenda. I said that whatever one might think that was a result which would be quite impractical in view of the number of states who were insistent that something should be done. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet position was that there should be no change whatever in voting procedures and rules, and that the

Soviet Delegation was not prepared to consider the matter. He said obviously consideration by the Interim Committee would be particularly objectionable because of their attitude toward the Interim Committee.

I said that I wanted to emphasize that the United States was not attempting to bring about a change of Security Council voting procedure which would enable the Security Council to take action which might seriously prejudice the Soviet Union. We realize that no great power would willingly submit itself to that sort of dictation under conditions where political considerations might play a part in the decision. I said that the United States probably would not be willing to do that even though it might feel that it was unlikely that a majority of the Security Council would seek to act against the United States. I could understand that the Soviet Union would be particularly sensitive about this matter, and I wanted to reassure him as strongly as possible that our attitude did not involve any trick or stratagem designed to use the Security Council against the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko said he was glad to hear that.

Our talk ended at 1:30, having lasted about fifteen minutes.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

IO Files : US/A/C.1/605

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 17, 1947.

Participants: Sir Hartley Shawcross, United Kingdom Delegation
Sir Alexander Cadogan, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Gladwyn Jebb, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Charles Fahy, United States Delegation
Mr. Theodore Achilles, United States Delegation

The British seriously question the advisability of referring the Veto to the Interim Committee for study. They feel that what would be studied would not be the veto but Russian conduct in abusing the Veto and that any discussion of it without the Russians would be pointless. They feel the only real hope of avoiding misuse of the Veto lay in a closer approach between the positions of the permanent members on specific questions. To refer such a study to the Interim Committee would not only not help in this respect but would render Russian non-participation in the Interim Committee even more certain. They also doubted that the Russians would participate in any separate committee set up to study the Veto.

The British felt the best course would be to permit a general debate and then either to pass no resolution or to pass one merely asking the Security Council to take note of the views expressed in the Assembly.

The British inquired how we felt about the big five consultations on the Veto and were advised that we saw no objection but felt that it was the smaller countries which were most interested and that they should be given some means of discussing and studying the question.

The British wondered how far we intended to press our proposal that vetoes should not be exercised under Chapter VI. They foresaw great embarrassment for us should some contentious issue arise, concerning a Latin American question for example, upon which congressional and public opinion would expect us to vote our convictions, even if our position constituted a veto. They inquired how we planned to avoid exercising a veto, i.e., whether we expected to abstain or, if a vote were taken in which we were the only permanent member voting in the negative, we would call for a new vote and change our vote. We expressed preference for the latter and Cadogan said after long consideration that he thought this would be the only practical course. They also felt that if two, three, or four permanent members voted negatively on a question and seven members voted affirmatively, each of the negative votes would constitute a veto.

The British said that rather than have the permanent members renounce the right to veto under Chapter VI they would prefer to see Article 27, paragraph (3) either modified by voluntary understanding or amended to provide that parties to a dispute should refrain from voting under Chapter VII as well as Chapter VI.

They would like very much to discuss the whole question with Mr. Dulles and our advisers this afternoon or this evening.

NOTE: The above conversation took place at luncheon. Much less opposition to a study by the Interim Committee was indicated by Shawcross and Cadogan to Raynor this morning and by Cadogan to Dulles this afternoon. It is accordingly believed that their position is not yet fixed.

THEODORE ACHILLES

IO Files : US/A/C.1/610

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Bernard Bechhoefer of the
United States Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 17, 1947.

Participants: Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States Delegation
Sir Hartley Shawcross, United Kingdom Delegation
Sir Alexander Cadogan, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. R. L. Harry, Australian Delegation
Mr. E. N. Thompson, United States Delegation
Mr. Charles Noyes, United States Delegation
Mr. Bernard Bechhoefer, United States Delegation

After the adjournment of the afternoon meeting of Committee I on November 17 which commenced consideration of the subject of the veto,¹ a long discussion took place with the above participants, the most important features of which were as follows.

Mr. Shawcross informed Mr. Dulles that the United Kingdom Delegation contemplated introducing a resolution calling for consultation of the permanent Members in an effort to secure agreement on problems in connection with the Security Council voting procedure. Mr. Shawcross expressed the view that a resolution to refer the matter to the Interim Committee would be bitterly opposed by the U.S.S.R. and would be an added cause of friction. Since, according to his view, nothing could be accomplished without the agreement of the U.S.S.R. such a resolution would merely lessen the possibilities of securing agreement and would delay, rather than hasten, any solution of the problem. Mr. Shawcross further believed that any possibility of U.S.S.R. participation in the Interim Committee would be eliminated as a result of reference of the veto to that Committee. His resolution would express regret at the frequent exercise of the veto, would call attention to responsibilities of the permanent Members as set forth in the previous General Assembly resolution, and would invite the permanent Members to attempt to secure agreement in order to improve the operations of the Security Council.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the study in the Interim Committee might create pressure on the U.S.S.R. which would lead to U.S.S.R. agreement on some constructive proposals in the Committee of Experts or at the least would result in greater moderation on the part of the U.S.S.R. in using the veto. He pointed out that for a period of six months after the previous General Assembly resolution, which the U.S.S.R. had strongly opposed, there was only one veto.

Mr. Harry stated that Mr. Evatt would support reference of the

¹ There was only a cursory discussion (GA (II), *First Committee*, pp. 482-484).

matter to the Interim Committee provided that the resolution indicated the desire of the General Assembly for the elimination of the veto under Chapter VI and in connection with applications for membership as suggested in the speech of the Secretary of State on September 17.

Mr. Shawcross agreed to show the United States Delegation in advance any resolution which the United Kingdom intended to submit on this subject.

BERNARD BECHHOEFER

Editorial Note

At the meeting of the First Committee on the morning of November 18, Mr. Dulles submitted a draft United States resolution regarding voting in the Security Council as follows:

"The General Assembly, in the exercise of its power to make recommendations relating to the powers and functions of any organs of the United Nations (Article 10);

Requests the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of resolution 111(II) of the General Assembly of 13 November 1947, establishing that Committee, to:

1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;

2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;

3. Report with its conclusions to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General by 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Members and to the General Assembly.

Requests the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another on the problem of voting in the Security Council in order to secure agreement among them on measures to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions." (GA (II), *First Committee*, pages 622 and 623, annex 18b)

In introducing the resolution, Mr. Dulles said that he thought it necessary to indicate the attitude of his Government on two special points:

"(1) The United States did not consider the statement made by the four sponsoring Powers and France at San Francisco on 7 June 1945 as a treaty binding it for all time. It was at most a statement of the general attitude of those Powers. That statement had been based upon a series of assumptions which had proved false in the light of experience. In the circumstances, the United States did not feel de-

barred from seeking some means of improving the voting procedure in the Security Council. Nevertheless, it would not abandon its original attitude until some new and better solution had been found, and one which in its opinion would be satisfactory.

“(2) As to the policy pursued by the United States as a member of the Security Council, the fact that its efforts to improve procedure in the Council were being deployed within a limited sphere should not be interpreted as meaning that the United States was opposed to the problem being studied on a wider basis in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, it realized that no amendment of the Charter could be effected without the agreement of the five permanent members, and that the Assembly would have to act very cautiously. The study the Assembly would undertake would doubtless enable it to understand the problem better, and would improve relations between the Council and the Assembly. The present voting procedure could undoubtedly be made more flexible in many respects without modifying the voting rules laid down in Article 27, and in any event many aspects of that procedure should be maintained.” (*Ibid.*, pages 486 and 487)

IO Files : US/A/C.1/609

Memorandum by Mr. LaVerne Baldwin of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] November 19, 1947.

VOTE IN COMMITTEE I ON RESOLUTION FOR STUDY OF SECURITY COUNCIL
VOTING ¹

The vote in Committee I this morning, paragraph by paragraph and by a show of hands, was as follows:

Paragraph 1: Approved 44-6-0 with the four Scandinavian countries voting in favor and the Russian bloc against. All the six opposed raised their hands very quickly.

Paragraph 2: Approved 35-7-11. Norway, Sweden and Denmark voted in favor; Chile joined the Russian bloc in opposition; Iceland abstained in accordance with its announced position in the Committee; other abstentions included the Arabic States. The Russian bloc was hopelessly confused on this paragraph, since Gromyko was slow in raising his hand; Poland and Yugoslavia were noticeably much later in raising their hands to the amusement of Arce and others nearby which forced Bebler to smile.

Paragraph 3: Approved 43-1-8. The four Scandinavian States voted in favor; Bebler of Yugoslavia again crossed his signals not

¹ Discussion of the United States draft resolution on the question of voting in the Security Council, begun in the First Committee on the morning of November 18, continued through a long afternoon meeting on the same day. The United States proposal came to a vote on the morning of November 19. (GA (II), *First Committee*, pp. 484-523)

observing that Gromyko was not voting. Bebler was therefore the only one opposed, the other Russian bloc members abstaining.

On the whole resolution the vote was 36-6-11, with the four Scandinavian States voting in favor, the Russian bloc against.

LAVERNE BALDWIN

IO Files : US/A/955

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes of the United States
Delegation Staff of Advisers*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 20, 1947.

VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS ON THE VETO DURING COMMITTEE 1 MEETINGS:
ON NOVEMBER 18 AND 19, 1947

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Hartley Shawcross advised us before the meeting on November 19 that they had just received a telegram from Bevin in which Bevin's reaction to the American resolution was very negative. The particular point which Bevin disliked was the reference of this matter to the Interim Committee. He appeared to think that this was an unnecessary and unwise provocation of the Russians in view of the fact that they had already announced their boycott of the Interim Committee. Sir Hartley was obviously embarrassed by the speech he made the previous day. He intimated he would probably be forced to vote No or at least abstain on the first paragraph of the United States resolution. He indicated he would probably vote for the last paragraph. He gave us no indication as to what he would do on the resolution as a whole. He inquired whether it would be possible to secure unanimous agreement on a resolution consisting of the preamble and the last paragraph. We told him we could not possibly agree to that at this late stage in the discussion, particularly when we knew there were a lot of other delegations who wanted to go a great deal further than the first paragraph of our resolution went, and were withholding their proposals because of the existence of ours.

The question came up during this discussion whether or not the Russians would be willing to conduct Five-Power negotiations in accordance with our last paragraph on the question of the veto. We intimated to Sir Hartley that before he took any decision as to how to vote, it might be well to find this out. Sir Hartley considered for a while whether to have a private conversation with Gromyko on this point, or whether to ask him openly in the Committee. During the discussion with Mr. Dulles, he talked with Gromyko and asked him this question point-blank. Gromyko's answer was a flat No, and that

he would object strenuously to all parts of the American resolution. (Yugoslavia abstained on the final paragraph of the United States resolution.) After that conversation, Sir Hartley apparently made up his mind not to raise any questions and to disregard Bevin's telegram, because he said nothing and supported the United States resolution as a whole.

[Here follows further discussion of the subject.]

CHARLES P. NOYES.

IO Files : US/A/954

United States Delegation Position Paper

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] November 20, 1947.

REPORT OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON THE CONVOCATION OF A GENERAL CONFERENCE UNDER ARTICLE 109 OF THE CHARTER TO AMEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE VETO ¹

AND

RESOLUTION OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN RELATION TO THE EXERCISING OF THE VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THAT RESOLUTION HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT

A. United States Position

1. The United States should vote in favor of the Committee Resolution, which requests the Interim Committee of the General Assembly : to (a) consider the problem of voting in the Security Council; (b) consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to cooperate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem; and (c) report with its conclusions to the Third Session of the General Assembly; and which further requests the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another on this problem.

2. Since the United States introduced the Resolution, it would be appropriate for the United States Representative to make a brief statement in support thereof in the plenary if it appears, as seems likely, that speeches will be made against it. Since the resolution does not contain substantive recommendations, but merely requests further study, if possible, debate should be reduced to a minimum. The United States should not initiate nor participate in a debate on the substantive issues.

¹ The First Committee report is printed as U.N. Doc. A/501, found in United Nations depository libraries. The report was read *in toto* to the General Assembly by the rapporteur of the First Committee on November 21; see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, pp. 1218-1220.

3. The question should be deemed an "important" one within the meaning of Article 18 and the adoption of the Resolution should therefore require a two-thirds majority. This point will probably not arise since in Committee 1 only the States of Eastern Europe voted against the Resolution.

B. History in Committee

The United States Representative in Committee 1 emphasized that the Resolution was a moderate one intended to ensure that "the next Assembly would approach the problem with better understanding and less antagonism toward a coordinate body". The Eastern European States bitterly opposed the Resolution, taking the extreme position that the only acceptable action of the General Assembly would be to drop the matter from the Agenda.

The USSR, while supporting the general principle of consultation among the permanent Members of the Security Council, rejected that principle in connection with this subject on the ground that no changes in the voting formula of any nature would be acceptable to it. Despite such statements in the debates, none of the Eastern European States, excepting Yugoslavia, voted against the last paragraph of the Resolution which requested the permanent Members of the Security Council to consult with one another on the problem of voting.

Since the United States Resolution provided for further study of the problem, the representative of Argentina did not submit a resolution to give effect to his request for convocation of a general conference under Article 109. Likewise, the representative of China decided not to ask for a vote in Committee 1 on a substantive proposal which had previously been submitted, it being understood that the Chinese proposal would be referred to the Interim Committee.

Because a number of States were unable to support the first paragraph after the preamble of the United States Resolution, while favoring the second paragraph, the representative of Egypt requested that paragraphs be voted separately.

The preamble received 44 affirmative votes and 6 negative votes (the Eastern European States) with no abstentions. The first paragraph after the preamble received 30 affirmative votes and 7 negative votes (Eastern European States and Chile) with 11 abstentions. The second paragraph received 43 affirmative votes and 1 negative vote (Yugoslavia) with 8 abstentions. (Eastern European States and three Arab States). The Resolution as a whole received 36 affirmative votes and 6 negative votes (Eastern European States) with 11 abstentions. (Five Arab States, India, Yemen, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Sweden, Iceland), 4 absent including the Philippines.

C. Possible Developments in Plenary Session

It seems probable that a request will be made that the paragraphs of the resolution be voted on separately.

It is possible, but unlikely that the United Kingdom may seek to secure unanimous agreement on a resolution which omits the second paragraph after the preamble of the Committee Resolution. The United States must oppose any such effort not only because of its position in support of a study by the Interim Committee but also because Argentina and other States desiring changes in the present voting formula withheld their more drastic proposals on the understanding that the study would take place in the Interim Committee.

In all probability the Eastern European States will continue to oppose the resolution in the plenary debates and will raise in their speeches all the substantive issues. The United States should avoid participating in the discussion of the substantive issues.

It is possible that some of the States which abstained would vote affirmatively in the Plenary Sessions if the United States position were further explained to them.

IO Files: US/A/971

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 21, 1947.

Participants: The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel
 Mr. Hector McNeil, Minister of State
 Mr. W. D. Allen, Counselor of the British Embassy
 A-A: Mr. Norman Armour
 EUR: Mr. Reber
 SPA: Mr. Robert McClintock

Immediately prior to receiving the British Ambassador and the Minister of State, Mr. Armour¹ had received an urgent telephone call from Mr. E. N. Thompson at Flushing, who said the British had just informed Mr. John Foster Dulles that they had received instructions from Foreign Secretary Bevin to ask the United States Delegation to withdraw its Resolution on the Veto which had already been adopted by Committee I by a vote of 36 to 6 with 11 abstentions. Mr. Thompson said that Mr. Dulles had protested to the British Delegation that it was impossible at this late stage for the United States Delegation to accede to this request. Mr. Thompson added that the

¹ Mr. Armour was Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

British Ambassador had been instructed to call on Mr. Armour to repeat the request.

Lord Inverchapel did not participate in the discussion, which was led by Mr. McNeil. In expressing regret that the views of the British Foreign Secretary had been made known at such a late moment, Mr. McNeil said that Mr. Bevin strongly felt that it was unwise to charge the Interim Committee with a study of the veto question because the Soviet Union thought the Interim Committee was unconstitutional and for that reason had stated it would not participate therein. Mr. Bevin felt that if there were any slight hope of eventually lessening the rigor of the veto power held by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council this could be worked out more probably by study in the Security Council or some other organ than the Interim Committee which the Russians thought was *ultra vires*. Mr. Bevin, as did the Department of State, hoped that by some "code of conduct" agreed upon by the Big Five there might eventually be agreement on a more limited use of the veto. Mr. McNeil added the thought that although the Russians had admittedly been most obstructive in the Security Council they had at least during the past year agreed to one notable change: namely, the mutual agreement to permit abstentions by the Big Five as not implying vetoes under the Charter requirement that on questions of substance the Permanent Members of the Council must concur except in cases in which they are themselves involved in a dispute.

The American position was stated to Mr. McNeil in the following terms:

The United States had sought to introduce a compromise resolution calling for a study of the veto problem. In fact other delegations had wished to submit much more strongly worded resolutions but had been deterred in this desire because the American resolution seemed to meet the requirements of the situation. For us now to withdraw our resolution without any prior notice would seem in fact disloyal to those delegations whose views on the veto were very strongly held and to the two thirds majority of the United Nations which had supported our resolution. (It was noted that the United Kingdom's Delegation had voted *for* the United States resolution in Committee I.)

It was pointed out that General Marshall in his speech of September 17th had clearly indicated the American position regarding both the study of the veto question and the constituting of the Interim Committee. Now to withdraw our resolution would indicate to many governments that the United States was backtracking on its own program and that it lacked confidence in the Interim Committee which was in a sense its own creation. Furthermore the Interim Committee was still open to adherence by the USSR. It was not the action of the United States or the General Assembly which had resulted in Russian refusal to participate in the Interim Committee.

At this point in the conversation Mr. Armour was called from the room and returned with a message telephoned by Mr. Thompson from the Assembly Hall in Flushing to the effect that Mr. Dulles had been called upon to speak and that he had reaffirmed the United States position on its veto resolution. Mr. McNeil said that this settled the matter and that it was now too late to have any hope of succeeding in carrying out Mr. Bevin's instructions. Mr. McNeil added that he would take it on himself to go against his instructions, which were to abstain on the veto resolution if the American position remained unchanged, and that he would instruct the United Kingdom Delegation to vote for the United States veto resolution and to speak in its favor.

The conversation then turned very briefly to the question of the Bermuda base. Lord Invershapel expressed warm appreciation to Mr. Armour for the manner in which the State Department had initiated steps in that negotiation.

The substance of this conversation was immediately telephoned to Mr. Thompson for Mr. Dulles in New York.²

R. McCLINTOCK

²The General Assembly considered the First Committee report on Security Council voting at parts of morning and afternoon sessions on November 21 (GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, pp. 1218-1272) and, in paragraph-by-paragraph voting, adopted the resolution contained in the report. The Soviet Representative (Vyshinsky) then requested that a vote be taken on the resolution as a whole. This was done, and the General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 38 to 6, with 11 abstentions. For text of the resolution, Resolution 117(II), which is virtually identical with the draft submitted by the United States to the First Committee on November 18 (see editorial note, p. 18), see GA (II), *Resolutions*, p. 23.

III. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE QUESTION OF ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THE UNITED NATIONS¹

501.AA/6-2347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1947—6 p. m.

2694. Dept would appreciate your discussing promptly exploratory basis with Jebb² or appropriate officer on question of UN membership problem with objective of ascertaining British thinking on this difficult question. Please telegraph results.

¹For previous documentation regarding this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

²H. M. G. Jebb, Counsellor, British Foreign Office.

Following for your info and possible use in your discretion your discussion FonOff:

UN still has before it five applications rejected by SC last year: Eire, Portugal, Transjordan, Albania and Mongolian Peoples Republic. Applications have been recd recently from Hungary and Italy. Almost certainly applications will be recd from Finland, Rumania and Bulgaria. Also, possible application may be filed by Austria. Although less certain likewise possible Burma may apply this year. In this connection you should inquire if Brit feel any other application likely this year.

Last year we voted favorably on applications Eire, Portugal and Transjordan and opposed and voted against applications Albania and Outer Mongolia. Also last year we proposed blanket arrangement under which all applications would be accepted. Brit throughout membership discussions were very lukewarm to this blanket arrangement, feeling particularly strong in their opposition to the Albanian application but indicated they would go along with us on this proposal reluctantly. This failed, however, due unwillingness Soviet Union accept it. There is every indication Soviet opposition to membership of Eire and Portugal is strong. This at first based in SC merely on reason that diplomatic relations with Soviet Union not maintained. At General Assembly Soviet Del broadened its reason for opposition by stating that it was based on record of these states in World War 2. U.K., U.S. and other Delegations countered this by stating it was not a Charter reason. Soviets also strongly opposed application of Transjordan but there is slight ground for believing this opposition not quite as firm as in cases of Eire and Portugal.

Recently in SC, Brit and Australian Reps have made statements that this year the rejected applications should be considered prior to consideration of new applications. GA passed resolution calling on SC to re-examine the rejected applications. There appears to be general feeling among SC members shared by UN Secretariat that enemy states can not be admitted until peace treaties become effective. This position probably correct, but we have hoped it would not become formalized in view possible contingency we might want to press for membership of Italy, for example, should there be deliberate and prolonged delays in ratification and hence effectiveness of treaty.

We continue favor admission Eire, Portugal and Transjordan. Considered on individual merits we continue to oppose admission of Albania and Outer Mongolia, feeling more strongly with respect to former than latter.

We strongly favor admission Italy earliest opportunity having in mind importance of effect within Italy. Until recent developments, we

had felt same with respect to Hungary.³ We would favor application from Finland.⁴

As to Rumania, Bulgaria and, presently, Hungary, we have not definitely determined our position. While we appreciate that wording of preambles of treaties may make opposition to satellite applications difficult, we have always placed emphasis on word "enabling" and have believed following effectiveness of treaties we have reserved full freedom then to consider such applications on their merits. We do not feel language of preambles commits us to support Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania any more than language of Potsdam did Soviets with respect Eire and Portugal. Recent serious developments in these countries may be sufficient grounds on which to base opposition. This must be weighed against concept of ultimate universality of membership which we sponsored last year and question whether it is better to have dubious states in rather than out. This is one of points on which we would especially like to have views of FonOff.

Status Austria especially difficult. There seems practically no possibility of treaty being consummated⁵ prior to membership action this year and also there is no ref to Austria in statement made by participating powers on membership at Potsdam.⁶ We feel it would be most unfortunate for former enemy states, such as Bulgaria, to be admitted UN prior to a state, victim of aggression, such as Austria. Dept believes Austria should file application and has suggested this to Austrian Govt. If some overall blanket arrangement on admission is worked out, it might be possible to include Austria in such arrangement. In any event, if application on file and considered by Membership Committee, by SC and by GA, opportunities could thus be provided for statements to be made relative to responsibility for delay on Austrian treaty which this Govt or others of like mind might wish to make and which might be helpful to Austria.

Tentatively it seems to us, in view strong position of Sovs with respect to Eire and Portugal, only hope of accomplishing admission of these states, as well as Italy and, if possible, Austria, is to attempt again to work out some blanket arrangement by which a group of states would be admitted, after first opposing on merit the dubious candidates. If that could be done, we might be willing to abstain on

³ This refers to the change of regime in Hungary at the end of May, which resulted in a virtual ending of democratic government; for documentation regarding United States interest in this situation, see vol. IV, pp. 260 ff.

⁴ Toward the end of March, the United States had in fact communicated informally with the governments of Hungary, Austria, Italy, and Finland, through the U.S. legations in these countries, encouraging them to submit applications for admission to the United Nations "promptly" (telegram 87 to Helsinki, April 2, File No. 501.AA/4-247).

⁵ For documentation on this subject, see vol. II, pp. 577 ff.

⁶ Text in *Foreign Relations*, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. II, p. 1509 (section X of the Potsdam Communiqué).

applications of Albania and Outer Mongolia. In case of Outer Mongolia, we may, in any event, abstain unless China opposes this year. We feel position of China on Outer Mongolia should be accorded careful consideration.

If blanket approach should be tried, question would arise as to whether to attempt to reach agreement with Soviets for favorable action on all applications, or merely on the group rejected last year, or on some other combination, such as last year's group plus Italy, Finland and possibly Austria. In this connection you could point out there are five states U.K. and U.S. would undoubtedly support (Eire, Portugal, Transjordan, Italy and Austria), five states Soviets would support (Albania, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania) and one state (Finland) or two, if Burma applies, which might receive support of both. This suggests that possibility of success of blanket arrangement covering all of these states may be better than last year when Soviet candidates were in minority. It could also be argued that under circumstances it might be better tactics to remain firm on individual candidates and see if any blanket offers are proffered by Soviets.

In your conversations you should make clear in cases where we have so indicated that our position [is] quite tentative. We intend in near future to engage in consultations with other Govts. For your own info only, we would like to have tentative Brit thinking before beginning other consultations.

Also, please make special point ascertaining when Brit intend [to] introduce Burmese application.⁷

MARSHALL

⁷ Repeated to the Mission at New York as telegram 276, June 23.

501.AA/6-2647 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 26, 1947—7 p. m.

3520. We discussed with Jebb FonOff Deptel 2693 [2694], June 23, and give below FonOff current thought on US membership problems which Jebb says have not been cleared in Inter-Departmental Committee or Cabinet, but which he has every reason to believe represent British Government thought at the moment.

British thought seems to parallel ours except possibly in the case of Albania and Austria. Unless Albania accepts international court jurisdiction Corfu matter and unless she also accepts majority decision Greek Frontier Commission, British will veto her application for

membership even as part of blanket arrangement. While agreeing on the desirability of admitting Austria prior to the admission of former enemy states, British feel Austria cannot qualify under charter for membership UN as she is not a free agent.

British would have no objection, however, if Austrian application is presented and even go along with the idea that possibly good would result from statements in membership committee SC and GA when considering application. Present British thinking is, however, that if Austrian application came to a vote, British would abstain on grounds Austria [is] constitutionally unqualified.

British FonOff thought is that on basis concept of ultimate universality of membership and with idea that dubious states would be less nuisance inside than outside UN, British would vote for, or at least not veto, applications of all applicants expected provided there resulted no change in proportional Soviet vote. They are inclined to prefer to fight each individual case out on its merits in the first instance, having their say with the idea that eventually some blanket arrangement may come forth proffered possibly by Soviets. Like the Department and for the same reasons, British emphasize word "enabling" in preambles of peace treaties as reserving full freedom after effectiveness of treaties then to consider each application on its merits.

On this basis they have following feelings in individual cases in addition to those on Albania and Austria outlined above: UK, like US, wants Italy admitted as soon as possible and before enemy states if possible. They feel, however, that question of whether ex-enemy states can be admitted prior to effective date of peace treaty is academic in respect of Italy, as USSR might be expected to veto Italy if her admission were sought prior to that of satellites.

British are inclined to associate Hungary with Rumania and Bulgaria, but to think her not quite so dubious.

British would like to set up Finland as a Soviet balance against Eire and Portugal. If Soviets blackball latter, British would blackball Finland.

Although agreeing that position of China on Outer Mongolia should be given careful consideration, British in first instance would oppose her admission on grounds (1) that independence has not been proved by evidence submitted; and (2) that although she has expressed interest in ECFE and applied for admission in ITU, she has not encouraged diplomatic relations with countries other than the Soviets.

In the early stages at least British in respect of Bulgaria will insist that she accept the Greek Frontier Commission decision and comply with Article 2 of the peace treaty.

Jebb hopes that in committee, procedure will be evolved whereunder all new applications may be considered; otherwise he fears a preponderance of Soviet-dominated applicants.

Jebb laid great stress on the fact that should Burma apply for admission, the Burmese themselves would submit the application. British thought is that Hindustan [Hindu India] will be heir to India [the Indian Empire] in UN and that Pakistan will apply for admission. India office thinks Pakistan may apply¹ before the September Assembly but Jebb thinks otherwise, estimating that Burma, Pakistan and possibly Ceylon may apply some time next year.

DOUGLAS

¹ India was deemed to be the successor state to British India for purposes of membership in the United Nations (although the Secretary-General of the United Nations did not make a formal judgment on this matter until August 12). However, when Pakistan as a "new" state did make application for admission to the Organization, the Security Council waived the preliminary investigation normally made by its Committee on Admission of New Members.

501.AA/6-2647: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1947—4 p. m.

2867. Dept would appreciate your having another conversation with Jebb re UN membership, making following points: (1) Dept greatly appreciates receipt frank indication Brit thinking and hopes for contd exchange info this subject, on which we believe views of Brit and ourselves seem in accord in broad outline. (2) Dept can well understand Brit feeling with respect to Albania and, in fact, shares it to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, we hope Brit would think several times before they would allow this to prevent a blanket arrangement if otherwise there would be assurance of success for such an arrangement. (3) In event Austrian application filed and comes to vote, hope Brit will seriously consider affirmative vote rather than abstention. In this connection we place emphasis on Austria having been a victim of aggression rather than an enemy state and on fact of undue delay in conclusion of peace treaty. Also, Austria has certain definite attributes of statehood, such as (a) its Govt recognized by foreign nations, (b) has exchanged accredited diplomatic representatives with foreign nations, (c) Austrian courts exercise jurisdiction within Austria, (d) Austrian Govt can enact legislation which, other than constitutional laws, is effective unless disapproved by all members of Allied Council, (e) international agreements can be concluded by Austrian Govt unless vetoed by all four occupying powers. Certainly these attributes of statehood possessed by Austria are greater than those possessed by two present members UN, although this argument one

¹The same, *mutatis mutandis*, to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

which probably can not be used publicly. (4) Inform Jebb that in connection contingency peace treaties may not be ratified prior UN membership action, Dept studying question whether, based on co-belligerent status latter part of war, distinction should be made in favor of Italy as contrasted other former enemy states. Brit views this point would be helpful. (5) Dept does not follow Brit reasoning Finland might be set up as balance against Eire and Portugal. Dept inclined on merit to support Finland's application and feels Finland may be a state which might be supported by Sovs and U.S. and U.K. This would require careful examination, however, in event Finnish treaty ratified and treaties for countries such as Italy not ratified prior UN membership action. In such event Dept realizes some plan such as Brit suggest might be necessary but it is inclined to feel Sovs will not be as keen for admission Finland as for Balkan satellites. (6) Dept does not understand, and would appreciate your asking Jebb for clarification of point in penultimate paragraph Urtel 3520 that all new applications be considered, otherwise apprehensive of preponderance Sov-sponsored applications.

MARSHALL

501.AA/7-847 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1947—4 p. m.

3720. We had today further discussion with Jebb re UN membership (Deptel 2867, July 3) with results as follows. Subject is still being discussed at technical level with inter-departmental committee meeting to take place next week. Following are official views only. Matter has not been considered at Cabinet level.

1. Albania submission of Corfu incident court will be considered *sine qua non* to admission UN even under blanket arrangement. If Albania continues publicly to flout recommendations of SC, British think harm rather than good would be done by admitting her under any conditions to UN. As part of a blanket arrangement, they would be prepared to drop requirement that Albania accept majority decision Greek frontier commission but would insist she stop shooting at Greeks.

2. As of interest Jebb says that David Owen, Assistant Secretary UN, who is returning from ECAFE meetings Shanghai says Chinese are determined to blackball Outer Mongolia.

3. Further consideration will be given to possible Austrian application and we will be informed.¹

4. Italy. Jebb admits that co-belligerent status might improve Italy's position but fears USSR would counter by claiming co-belligerent status from Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and possibly Finland. British, like ourselves, favor earliest possible date admission Italy. If it becomes obvious that USSR will prevent Italian treaty from becoming effective, Jebb thinks we should reclaim our freedom of action and sign separate treaty with Italy.²

5. Finland. Jebb says British have informed USSR they are prepared to ratify Finnish treaty whenever Soviets wish. Matter rests therefore with USSR. UK still has however he says, complete freedom of action with respect admission of Finland UN and it is inconceivable British could agree to admission Finland unless Eire admitted. Portugal is not so important. So long, therefore, as Soviets veto Eire, UK will veto Finland. Jebb thinks Finland is too close to USSR to go counter to USSR policies and therefore could not appropriately be considered neutral even though Finnish people might desire to be so.

6. In respect of new applications British preoccupation is basically to prevent increase in Soviet influence. We will report again following inter-departmental meeting next week.

DOUGLAS

¹ The Embassy reported further on July 12 that "Jebb has discussed further in Foreign Office question admission Austria UN (Mytel 3720, July 8). There are differences of opinion in Foreign Office but controlling view at moment is that Austria is not free agent and therefore not eligible. Cadogan [Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations] has been instructed to discuss matter with us but present British position is to abstain if issue comes to vote." (Telegram 3815 to London, July 12, file No. 501.AA/7-1247)

² For documentation regarding questions relating to the Italian peace treaty, see vol. III, pp. 515 ff.

501.AA/7-847 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1947—3 p. m.

834. Please discuss promptly exploratory basis with FonOff UN membership question with objective and emphasis ascertaining Chinese thinking on this difficult question. Infotels giving background on Dept and Brit views being sent you.

In addition to five old applications of Portugal, Eire, Transjordan, Albania, and Mongolian People's Republic, there are three recently received applications from Italy, Austria, and Hungary. Additionally,

applications from Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland are expected and possibly Burma will apply.

We are especially interested in Chinese views re MPR. Are recent events as for example the border clash or Soviet attitude on Dairen, etc. apt to affect China's attitude toward admission MPR? We should be interested in grounds on which China would support or oppose MPR application. As indicated in reference infotels, we do not favor on the merits admission MPR though for your info only our present thinking is we may abstain from voting unless China opposes admission.

Info given re US position on other specific applications should be confined to statement that we favor applications of Eire, Portugal, Transjordan, Italy, and Austria, and of Finland and Burma, if recd, and that we oppose Albania.

In your discussion you should indicate our present thinking is that applications should be discussed in SC Membership Committee¹ one by one on their merits and that we are not now thinking of proposing blanket arrangement covering all or some applications such as we unsuccessfully attempted last year. From your discussions please report your impression of Chinese thinking re blanket arrangement.

¹ At a meeting on July 8, the Security Council undertook to re-examine the applications for membership in the United Nations of Albania, Outer Mongolia, Transjordan, Eire, and Portugal, in pursuance of the recommendation of the General Assembly in its resolution of November 19, 1946. At the same meeting the Security Council instructed its Committee on the Admission of New Members to examine the matter and to present a report by August 10. (United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year*, pp. 1229-1232; hereafter cited as SC, 2nd Year)

501.AA/7-1147: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NANKING, July 11, 1947—9 p. m.

URGENT

1508. ReDeptel 834, July 8, 3 p. m. Foreign Office states it is not yet prepared to discuss its views on applications for membership to United Nations with exception of Mongolian Peoples Republic but will do so in the next few days and advise Embassy.¹

¹ Regarding Outer Mongolia, the Department on July 10 had received a message from the Chinese Embassy "as of from the Chinese Foreign Office," as follows:

"The question of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations may arise again in the near future. Recently Outer Mongolia has shown no indication of any disposition to accept its responsibilities under the United Nations charter and China would therefore strongly oppose Outer Mongolia's admission to the United Nations. China hopes that the United States will maintain its previous position of opposition to the admission of Outer Mongolia." (501.AA/7-1047)

Foreign Office states that Chinese delegate to Security Council has already been instructed to vote against admission of Outer Mongolia on the grounds that the recent Peitashan incident² clearly indicates Outer Mongolia is at present incapable of acting as an independent sovereign nation. Vice Minister added that Chinese delegate had already informed American delegate to Security Council of Chinese views and had received assurances that the US would take a similar stand.

STUART

² For documentation regarding this matter, see *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. VII, pp. 546 ff. The incident involved an apparent penetration by Outer Mongolian troops 200 miles into Chinese territory in Sinkiang province to Peitashan, where the local garrison was subjected to a coordinated attack by ground and air elements.

501.AA/7-1147: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1947—8 p. m.

309. Following views on applications to be considered by SC Committee on Membership¹ are for your general guidance if, contrary to our expectations, substantive discussion in the Committee should take place on July 14 or immediately thereafter. More specific and detailed information re Dept's attitude on these applications will be forwarded in next few days.

Paper on procedural problems before Committee on Membership will be pouched to USUN July 12, together with necessary additional background information.

1. *Albania*—US is inclined to oppose Albania's admission even more strongly than last year, on following grounds:

a. Albania's failure to agree that it will honor treaties and agreements to which US and Albania are parties. (This was the basis of our opposition last year.)

b. Albania's refusal thus far to agree to reference of Corfu case to ICJ, in accordance with SC recommendation.

c. The conclusion of a majority of members of the United Nations Balkan Investigation Commission that Albania has been responsible for assistance to the Greek guerrillas, and the refusal thus far of the Albanian authorities to take part in the work of the Subsidiary Group of that Commission, throw doubt upon the peace-loving character of the present Albanian regime.

¹ By this date the Security Council had received from Hungary, Italy, and Austria new applications for admission to membership in the United Nations, and these had been referred to the Membership Committee. By early August the Committee had received from the Security Council additional new applications from Romania, Yemen, and Bulgaria.

2. *Mongolian People's Republic*—US member on Committee should adopt a negative attitude toward application of MPR, on the following grounds:

a. Information at our disposal indicates that MPR is not in fact an independent state.

b. Despite requests for information about the MPR made during the proceedings of this Committee last year, many of the essential facts bearing on its qualifications for membership are lacking.

c. MPR maintains diplomatic relations with no country other than the Soviet Union.

3. *Trans-Jordan*—As result of developments since this application was considered last year, the US should now have no hesitation in supporting this application.

4. *Eire*—US should continue its support.

5. *Portugal*—US should continue its support.

6. *Hungary*—Prior to resignation of Prime Minister Nagy, Hungary submitted application for membership. This action was apparently stimulated by advice orally conveyed to the Prime Minister by the American Minister, on instruction by Dept, that we would welcome Hungary's early application. As result of recent political events in Hungary, we are not prepared at this moment to take a definite position on the Hungarian application.

7. *Italy*—The US should strongly state its support, on the merits, for Italy's admission. However, despite Italy's cobelligerency, Italy's application will certainly be opposed at present by the Soviets on the ground that the peace treaty has not yet come into force. Approval will clearly be impossible, except as contingent on admission of one or more of the Eastern European Satellites.

8. *Austria*—The admission of Austria at this time will be difficult because of the failure to conclude a treaty and the continued occupation of the country by the Four Powers. US should nevertheless strongly support Austria's application on the merits, explaining that Austria was a victim of aggression rather than an enemy state and that there has been undue delay in conclusion of the Austrian treaty. We should make every effort to have the Austrian application placed on a footing above, or at least equal to, that of any Eastern European Satellite.

MARSHALL

501.AA/7-1447: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 14, 1947—8 p. m.

3850. British hope to keep situation in respect of membership applications UN on fluid basis and have instructed Cadogan to make no irrevocable commitment re any applicant. What British fear, according to Jebb, is commitment which might be made subsequently embarrassing by intervening "atrocities" of applicant.

DOUGLAS

501.AA/7-1747: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Mission at the United Nations

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1947—8 p. m.

315. Dept suggests that at convenient time within next few days USUN talk over informally with Soviet Del question of admission of new members to UN.

Suggest you present our position along following lines and inquire as to Soviet views.

a) Our attitude re Albania and Mongolian People's Republic, as set forth in Deptel 309, July 11, 1947.

b) Our intention to support applications of Trans-Jordan, Eire, Portugal, Italy and Austria. As to Italian application, you might stress formal recognition of Italian cobbelligerency in Potsdam communique by US, USSR and UK, her willingness to collaborate with UN in all international undertakings, and imminence of completion of ratification of peace treaty. As to Austria, you should recall that she was recognized as victim of aggression in Moscow Declaration rather than enemy state and that there has been undue delay in conclusion of Austrian treaty. If Austria's independence is questioned, you might state that we believe she has essential attributes and institutions of a sovereign state though temporarily sharing administration of various governmental functions with representatives of occupying powers.

c) We are still considering our attitude on the applications of Rumania and Hungary, but question their eligibility and feel strongly that it would be basically unjust not to admit Austria and Italy before these states.

It would be helpful if in course of conversation you were able to ascertain any information on likelihood of applications from Finland and Bulgaria.

You may also wish during this week to mention our views on membership applications to delegations of non-permanent SC members.

MARSHALL

501.AA/7-2647 : Telegram

The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

VIENNA, July 26, 1947—10 a. m.

652. British representatives here acting on instructions from London have this week conveyed to Austrian Foreign Office British reaction to Austrian application for admission to UN. According to British their remarks were in following sense.

Begin summary. Unfortunate and regrettable that Austria's application was submitted on US advice without prior consultation with British. British earnestly desire see Austria admitted to UN at earliest appropriate moment but feel admission prior to conclusion treaty would require straining apparent meaning of Article II paragraph one and Article IV paragraph one of UN Charter. Also in Moscow discussions on Austrian treaty, agreement was reached on statement in preamble that four powers will be able support Austria's application after treaty concluded (implying that unable sooner).

Austria's application places British in difficult position because they do not wish to oppose it and also do not wish to support it since that would give countries such as Spain opportunity to argue British were basing their position on political consideration rather than terms of charter.

Australia also regrets premature Austrian application fearing admission might serve as precedent for early admission Japan.

In view [of] foregoing, British plan on Austrian application is to vote for admission if Soviets do not oppose it but to refrain from voting if Soviets do oppose it. This plan, however, might be modified if US should advance new reasons for immediate admission of Austria.

End summary.

ERHARDT

501.AA/8-747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1947.

1332. Following statement was made by Hayden Raynor US member in Membership Committee Security Council on August 4, and released to the press:

"The United States warmly supports the application of Italy and believes that Italy well merits admission at this time to the United Nations.

"In comparison with other ex-enemy states, Italy is in an entirely unique position. This statement is based on two major premises: first, Italy was declared to be a co-belligerent in the war against Germany in a joint statement issued to the world on October 13, 1943 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. You will

note the Soviet Union was a party to this declaration. I emphasize that no other ex-enemy state was granted this status of co-belligerency.

"The second reason for the unique position of Italy is the fact that it is to all intents and purposes not restricted whatsoever as to sovereignty. The Allied Commission was terminated on January 31, 1947. I should add that this termination was approved by the Soviet Union as well as by the other powers. At the time the statement was made that the need for the Allied Commission—which in paraphrase means the need for control—no longer existed.

"The situation today is that all Allied control over Italy has been relinquished with the exception of Venezia Giulia and Udine. In those areas there is still a small military occupation force of British and American troops. This should be considered, however, only as a token occupation. They are situated on the northeast frontier of Italy for the purpose of insuring a peaceful solution to the boundary problem existing in that area. They are not there for the purpose of controlling Italy. A corollary of what I have said is that military government has been entirely withdrawn from Italy except for the areas cited and for small administrative forces necessary for its support.

"The next point I would like to make is that the Italian peace treaty has been ratified by all of the Great Powers whose ratification is necessary to bring it into force except for the Soviet Union. It has also been ratified by a substantial vote of the Italian Parliament. It would be patently unjust—in fact a travesty on justice—to deny to the Italian people, who have done so much since becoming a co-belligerent both to assist the Allies and to develop their democratic processes of government, membership in the United Nations simply because the peace treaty has not been ratified by one Great Power. Italy made a splendid record in her period of co-belligerency. She has established democracy within her own borders. She has shown faithful respect for the obligations assumed under the treaty of peace, and she has shown a willingness to collaborate with the United Nations in all international contacts and with the specialized agencies which she has already joined. In the opinion of my Government, Italy's goodwill and her eligibility for membership in the United Nations are beyond question. I urge most strongly that this Committee recommend to the Security Council her admission to the United Nations."¹

MARSHALL

¹ See United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Special Supplement No. 3, Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members*, p. 45, appendix 9. The United States also submitted to the Membership Committee statements regarding Albania, Hungary, Austria, Romania, and Bulgaria; see *ibid.*, appendices 3, 8, 11, 12, and 13, respectively. Further, the United States made a general statement regarding the admission of ex-enemy states and Austria, *ibid.*, appendix 7; and general remarks about Eire and Portugal, *ibid.*, pp. 15-16 and 16-17.

501.AA/8-1347: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

HELSINKI, August 13, 1947—3 p. m.

386. It was President's view and other high officials that Finland's Peace Treaty should first go into effect and then Finland would apply for UN membership (Embtel 372, August 1¹). Finnish Government consequently decided against applying now.

HAMILTON

¹ Not printed.

501.AA/8-1547

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1947.

Participants: Ambassador Tarchiani
Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary
Mr. Dowling, SE
Mr. Thompson, SPA

The Italian Ambassador called at his request today to express, he said, Count Sforza's² sincere appreciation for the financial agreement signed yesterday. The Ambassador said that Count Sforza was particularly gratified by the statement which I had made at the time of the signing.³

Tarchiani then referred to Italy's application for membership in the United Nations which is now being considered by the Membership Committee of the Security Council.⁴ He said that the Italian Government appreciated the support given by the United States⁵ but was somewhat concerned since the Security Council discussions seemed to be leading up to a Soviet veto. He mentioned that other procedural possibilities might offer a way to permit Italy's admission to the United Nations, at least when the treaties had come into effect.

I told the Ambassador that the question of Italy's admission was, of course, a matter regarding which it was difficult to make any prediction. He had said there had been some talk of a blanket admission,

¹ Drafted by Walter C. Dowling, Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs.² Count Carlo Sforza was Italian Foreign Minister.³ For information regarding the "Memorandum of Understanding", signed at Washington, August 14, 1947, see editorial note, vol. III, p. 956.⁴ See the Ambassador's Memorandum of August 15, *infra*, probably left with the Department at this time.⁵ In a separate note of even date the Ambassador expressed to the Acting Secretary of State the appreciation of the Italian Government for this support (501.AA/8-1547).

but this seemed to me to be out of the question both as concerns procedure under the Charter and as concerns this Government's attitude towards some of the countries now applying for admission. I added that in any event if the USSR were to block Italy's entry into the United Nations it would have to veto Italy specifically as all applications would apparently have to be voted on individually.

After some further discussion the Ambassador agreed with me that this was a problem which would have to be worked out in the light of subsequent developments since we did not yet know exactly what attitude the several members of the Security Council would take. I assured Tarchiani that we were in entire sympathy with Italy's eagerness to get into the United Nations and that we would give every consideration to the matter.

501.AA/8-1547

Memorandum by the Italian Ambassador (Tarchiani) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

The Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the Acting Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that the recent trend of discussions within the Membership Committee of the Security Council for Italy's admission to the United Nations—and especially the attitude of the U.S.S.R. Delegate, which may lead to a veto—is a cause of deep concern to the Italian Government and people.

The Department of State is fully aware of the difficult debate [that] occurred within the Italian Constituent Assembly for the ratification of the Peace Treaty. During such debate, the main argument on the Government's side, and perhaps the determining one leading to the approval of ratification, was that Italy acquired, even though at a high price, the right of immediate participation in the body of the United Nations. A denial of admission at the present time to the United Nations would undoubtedly place the Italian Government in a very serious position not only with the Constituent Assembly, but with the entire Nation as well. A feeling of deep disappointment would overtake those centers of public opinion on which the Italian Government is most relying for carrying out their policy of understanding and international collaboration.

The Italian Government therefore cherishes the hope that the Government of the United States, which has already shown, since the start, to favor Italy's admission to the United Nations, will take all

possible action in her favor at the Security Council for attaining this purpose. Naturally the Italian Government would be glad indeed were it possible to reach a formula agreeable to all Powers concerned, permitting to reconcile the arguments expounded in the Membership Committee, without impairing Italy's admission by action of the United Nation's General Assembly of next September.

The Italian Government firmly hopes that Italy will be spared a new wound that might have grave political repercussions.

WASHINGTON, August 15, 1947.

501.AA/8-1647 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Mission at the United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1947—3 p. m.

US URGENT

357. Dept has been considering US attitude if, as expected, Soviets after SC debate on UN membership vote against recommending admission of Eire, Portugal and Transjordan as well as five new applicants.

In this event Dept proposes that immediately after SC has voted on each individual application, US should introduce resolution along following lines:

"The SC has given careful consideration to the requests for admission to membership of (applicants rejected by SC).

"In view of differences of opinion as to the application to the states mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the criteria for admission to the UN set forth in Article 4 of the Charter, and in order to prevent these differences from causing further indefinite delays in the admission of states which a number of members of the SC deem qualified for membership:

"The SC requests the GA to consider the qualifications of the above-mentioned applicants and will, in this instance, immediately recommend to the GA the admission of any of the above-mentioned applicants which the GA shall have considered qualified for admission."

In introducing this resolution, US should state that it will maintain in GA same position re each applicant as it took in SC, unless changed circumstances in the interim justify a change in our conclusions as to its qualifications.

Draft statement to be made in SC on introduction of above resolution will be brought to New York by Hayden Raynor.

Applicants approved by SC (probably only Yemen) should be handled in a separate resolution.

Dept assumes you will vote on applications in accordance with US views expressed in SC Membership Committee, favoring Eire, Portugal, Transjordan, Italy, Austria and Yemen and opposing Albania, Mongolian People's Republic, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.¹

LOVETT

¹ Subsequent consideration of these matters by United Nations organs was affected, of course, by the entering into force of certain of the peace treaties.

Editorial Note

The above telegram remained the basic instruction for the United States Representative throughout Security Council discussion of admission of new Members on August 18, August 21, September 24, September 29, and October 1, the specific United States effort during this period being directed to the introduction on August 21 of the draft resolution printed in telegram 357, August 16 (withdrawn the same day), a request on September 24 for Council reconsideration of the Italian application (rejected initially by the Security Council on August 21 because of the adverse vote of the Soviet Union), and the making of supporting statements as appropriate. The Council failed to take favorable action except in the cases of Yemen and Pakistan.

With the refusal of the Security Council to recommend nine of the applicant states, the General Assembly at its Second Regular Session adopted a resolution on November 17 in which *inter alia* it found that certain of these states (Eire, Portugal, Transjordan, Italy, Finland, and Austria) were "peace-loving . . . within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter"; and requested the Security Council to reconsider their applications "in the light of this determination of the Assembly." In the legislative history of this resolution in the First Committee, it was the United States that proposed the statement regarding Austria. (GA (II), *Resolutions*, page 18.)

IV. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING THE APPORTIONMENT OF EXPENSES OF THE REGULAR (ADMINISTRATIVE) BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION¹

IO Files : US/A/C.5/89

United States Delegation Working Paper

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK,] October 16, 1947.

PRINCIPLE OF A CEILING IN THE CONTRIBUTIONS SCALE

The United States Representative on Committee 5 is under instructions to introduce a resolution which would secure adoption by General Assembly of the principle that no one Member should contribute in normal times more than one-third of the cost of the administrative expenses of the United Nations. General opposition is expected to the adoption (at least at this time) of the principle of a ceiling and in particular to the adoption of the principle of a ceiling of 33.33 per cent.

It will be helpful if the political officers will explore this question with the other Delegations so that we may know how far we can go at this session and what approach we should use. At the moment we believe the best opportunity will arise when Committee 5 considers revision of Rule 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.

BACKGROUND

In accordance with Rule 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure the Committee on Contributions, a body of ten experts serving in their individual capacities, is instructed to "advise the General Assembly concerning the apportionment under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the expenses of the Organization among Members, broadly according to capacity to pay". The Committee has no other specific terms of reference, although the first part of the first session of the General Assembly drew the Committee's attention to considerations which were recommended by the Preparatory Commission. The pertinent parts of the Preparatory Commission's recommendations are attached as Annex I. Although relative capacity to pay is the major consideration in the Preparatory Commission's recommendations and in Article 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, adoption of the ceiling principle has not been foreclosed.

The United States has maintained from the beginning that no one Member should pay a preponderant share of the United Nations expenses, although it took a leading part in support of the concept of capacity to pay as a major factor in establishing a scale. Last year

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 461, 499.

Senator Vandenberg stated firmly in Committee 5 that in normal times no one country should contribute more than one-third to the administrative expenses and inserted a reservation to this effect in the Committee's report to the General Assembly (A/274).

Congressional interest in this question dictates that the United States Delegation do its utmost at this session to secure adoption of the ceiling principle. The recent announcement that a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations has been appointed, because of the heavy United States obligations, to investigate how the United Nations and other international organizations spend their funds and account for them is further indication that the Delegation must move forward in this matter.

U.S. ARGUMENT

In an organization of sovereign equals, in which each member has an equal vote on program and expenditures, it is inappropriate for any one Member to pay a preponderant share. Conversely it is an unhealthy situation for the organization itself to be unduly dependent for financial support on any one member. The Secretary-General made the point last year in the Fifth Committee that such a condition would be unhealthy from the standpoint of the Secretariat.

This concept of broad financial support is partly recognized by the adoption by the General Assembly, by implication, of a "floor" in the scale of contributions. Eight Members are each assessed .04 per cent although their relative capacities to pay are not all equal. The concept of broad support has not, however, been implemented by clear recognition of the principle of a maximum at the other end of the scale.

The United States recognizes the obvious need of taking account of relative capacities to pay. If the budget were nominal, each Member, having an equal voice, could be expected to pay an equal share. The United Nations budget is too large, however, to admit of equal contributions if membership is to be universal. Nevertheless, the fact that the budget is large does not justify complete disregard of the factor of sovereign equality.

Other Delegations may argue that the present assessment of 39.89 per cent for the United States is already a compromise between an assessment based solely on relative capacities to pay and an assessment based on equality of financial obligations. (Last year the Committee on Contributions reported a scale of relative capacities to pay based on available statistical data which indicated that the United States had a relative capacity to pay of 49.89 per cent.) This argument can be met on two grounds. (1) The calculations made by the Committee on Contributions last year were admittedly not precise because of the absence of comparable statistical information for each country and because of

the impossibility of comparing the national incomes of highly industrialized societies with the national incomes of agricultural societies.

(2) Even though the present United States contribution may be at a rate which is below its theoretical relative capacity to pay, it does not, in the opinion of the United States Government, reflect adequately the concept of sovereign equality. The United States position is that 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent would be high enough to take adequate account of the greater United States capacity to pay on the one hand and would not on the other hand, in the words of the Preparatory Commission recommendations, be so low as seriously to obscure the relation between its contributions and its capacity to pay. If each Member were assessed on the basis of sovereign equality, the assessment for each Member would be 1.75 per cent.

It might also be pointed out that contributions by the permanent members of the Security Council should not be too widely divergent. France and China are each assessed 6 per cent; the U.S.S.R., 6.34 per cent; and the United Kingdom, 11.48 per cent.

POINTS TO STRESS

In discussing this problem with other Delegations, it is desirable to find out:

1. If there is a willingness to recognize the principle of a ceiling in normal times.
2. If a maximum of 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent is an acceptable ceiling.
3. If support would be given to the formal recognition of the principle of a ceiling by amendment of Rule 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.

The present Rule 43 now reads in part as follows:

The Committee on Contributions shall advise the General Assembly concerning the apportionment under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the expenses of the Organization among Members, broadly according to capacity to pay.

It might be amended by adding to this sentence either:

and taking account of the principle that normally no single Member shall contribute more than one-third of the total contributions for administrative expenses.

or

within maximum and minimum limits which shall be determined by the General Assembly.

The addition of the principle of a ceiling and a floor to Rule 43 is appropriate since this rule already gives capacity to pay as a guide to the Contributions Committee. To include a specific percentage such as 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ might be resisted on the grounds that a substantive matter was being placed in a procedural rule. However, an expression of views on this question would be helpful.

It should be emphasized that the United States is not pressing for an immediate application of a 33.33 per cent ceiling. As Senator

Vandenberg stated in Committee 5 last year and as the United States Representative has stated on two occasions in Committee 5 this year, the United States is willing to pay the additional contribution which is represented by the difference between 33.33 and 39.89 per cent because the United States recognizes the serious economic difficulties which face other Members at this time. It is to be expected, however, that the current economic difficulties in the rest of the world will decrease. Indeed, with economic recovery, increased industrialization of many countries, and the addition of new Members to the United Nations, the position of the United States on a scale of relative capacities to pay may be expected steadily to decline.

In talking with other Delegations it is important to stress the fact that the United States recognizes that operational expenses as distinguished from administrative expenses would require a greater contribution by those Members which are in a position to pay large amounts. For example: United States accepted an assessment of 45.75 per cent of the IRO budget. If only 75 percent of the IRO contributions are actually subscribed, as is possible under its constitution, the United States contribution would be more than 61 per cent.

The report of the Committee on Contributions has already been examined and approved by Committee 5. In this Committee the United States Delegation agreed to recommend to the Congress that it appropriate 39.89 per cent of the total contributions assessed in 1948.

FURTHER BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Additional background material will be found under Tab 1(*f*) of the Instruction Book in the position paper entitled "Member Contributions to the United Nations" (SD/A/C.5/58) and under Tabs 6(*c*), 6(*d*), and 6(*e*) of the Committee 5 Background Book.¹ The statement of the United States Representative on the report of the Committee on Contributions made on October 4² in Committee 5 is attached for further reference.³

R. KULL

¹ None printed.

² The summary record of the United States statement made on October 4 is found in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Fifth Committee*, p. 44.

³ A proposal to amend Rule 43 along the lines of providing for maximum and minimum limits for contributions by Members was submitted to the Fifth Committee by the United States, and was considered by the Committee at a meeting on November 6. Adlai Stevenson spoke for the United States. After some deliberation the Committee decided at the same meeting to defer consideration of this item along with a proposal submitted by the Chairman of the Contributions Committee. For the Committee's discussion, see *ibid.*, pp. 350-357; Mr. Stevenson's exposition of the U.S. view is found *ibid.*, pp. 350-351.

However, in its report to the General Assembly on the scale of assessments for the 1948 budget (U.N. Doc. A/462), the Fifth Committee included, at the request of the United States member, the conviction of the United States that in an organization of sovereign equals no single member should pay more than 33⅓ per cent of the regular (administrative) budget.

THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, APRIL AND MAY 1947

[For documentation on the issue at the United Nations concerning Palestine, see volume V, pages 999 ff.]

NEGOTIATION OF THE TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR
THE FORMER JAPANESE-MANDATED ISLANDS IN THE
PACIFIC CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, APRIL 2, 1947¹

890.0146/1-2147

The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Secretary of State

No. 45

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1947.

SIR, I have the honour to refer to Mr. Acheson's note of the 6th November 1946 enclosing the draft of a strategic area trusteeship agreement setting forth the terms on which the United States Government is prepared to place the Japanese Mandated Islands under Trusteeship.²

¹ For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 544 ff.

² For text of the draft trusteeship agreement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 17, 1946, pp. 889 ff. On November 6, 1946, President Truman announced that the United States was to submit this draft agreement formally to the Security Council for its approval "at an early date"; for text of the President's statement, see *ibid.*, p. 889, or *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, p. 674. At the same time, the Department sent to the diplomatic missions of the other members of the Security Council (in Washington) and of the Philippines Republic and New Zealand, for the information of these Governments, copies of the draft trusteeship agreement; these notes are not printed. On January 15, 1947, similar communications were transmitted to the Governments of Belgium, Colombia, and Syria, these states having been members of the Security Council since November 6 when they were elected.

On December 11, 1946, the Soviet Embassy submitted a note dated December 7 in reply; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, p. 710. The view was expressed that Security Council consideration of the United States draft trusteeship agreement should be delayed until the peace settlement with Japan.

On December 27, 1946, the British Embassy informed the Department that the Foreign Office was "urgently engaged" in obtaining the informal views of the Australian and New Zealand Governments. The Embassy expressed the hope that this Government could defer presenting the draft agreement to the Security Council until a further communication had been received from the Embassy. (See memorandum of telephone conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss), December 24, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 711.)

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom appreciate the action of the United States Government in submitting the draft to them for information, and welcome the announced intention of the United States Government to seek the approval of the Security Council for the draft agreement as an earnest of United States support for the implementation of the Trusteeship principle. His Majesty's Government feel impelled, however, to state that they regard the action of the United States Government as a declaration of intention which cannot take effect in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan³ and consider that it would be premature at this stage to place proposals formally before the Security Council. In particular, from the point of view of His Majesty's Government, such action by the United States would be open to the serious practical objection that it would confuse the issue about trusteeship for the former Italian Colonies.⁴

In the meantime His Majesty's Government wish to discuss with the United States Government certain textual points in the draft under reference. A memorandum setting forth the comments of His Majesty's Government on the points in question is enclosed herein.

I have [etc.]

INVERCHAPEL

[Enclosure]

1. *Preamble*

In the second recital the reference should presumably be to Article 77(B), since the United States are in possession of the islands by virtue of the war and are not a Mandatory Power.

2. *Article 8(1)*

The purpose of this clause is apparently to control the immigration of potential enemy agents. It conflicts, however, with Article 83(2) and 76(D) of the Charter, and appears to be inconsistent with the "open-door" policy which the United States has insisted upon in regard to the United Kingdom mandates and in Western Samoa.

3. *Article 8(111)*

In the view of His Majesty's Government this clause strains Article 76(D) of the Charter.

4. *Article 13*

His Majesty's Government wish to suggest the following re-wording:

"The provisions of Article 87 and 88 of the Charter shall be applicable to the trust territory, provided that the administering authority

³ For documentation regarding United States policy with respect to a peace settlement with Japan, see vol. VI, pp. 446 ff.

⁴ For documentation on this subject, see vol. III, pp. 569 ff.

may at any time inform the Security Council, in accordance with Article 83(111) of the Charter, that Security considerations do not permit the exercise of the functions of the trusteeship council in regard to specific areas."

His Majesty's Government attach particular importance to the point that if any areas are closed for security reasons they shall be closed so far as civil aviation is concerned on a nondiscriminatory basis to civil airlines of the United States as well as to those of other nations.

5. *Article I*, which describes the area as a strategic area, when read in conjunction with Article XIII, might be interpreted as meaning that, as distinct from individual islands and the territorial waters round them, the United States would close the complete area and so disrupt sea communications. His Majesty's Government feel there would be no basis in international law for such action, and doubt whether that is the interpretation which the United States Government would in practice apply. They would, however, welcome clarification on this point.

890.0146/1-2147

The Australian Ambassador (Makin) to the Secretary of State

No. 26/47

WASHINGTON, 21 January 1947.

SIR, I have the honour to refer to Mr. Acheson's note of November 6th, 1946, enclosing, for the information of the Australian Government, a draft of a strategic area trusteeship agreement setting forth the terms upon which the Government of the United States is prepared to place the Japanese mandated islands under trusteeship.

My Government has given careful consideration to the draft agreement, and has at this stage certain general comments to offer. In the view of the Australian Government, the ultimate solution of the question of the Japanese mandated islands lies in their being controlled by the United States. At the same time the Australian Government does not regard this as an isolated question but as an integral part of a comprehensive settlement for the entire Pacific ocean area. To isolate the question of mandated islands from the settlement with Japan as a whole is, in the opinion of my Government, an approach almost untenable both politically and juridically.

With the fullest desire, therefore, to support the ultimate objective of the United States, the Australian Government regards both the timing and the procedure as erroneous, and believes that the course proposed by the United States will have the effect of adding to the difficulties of achieving their objective.

The United States Government recently undertook, in a message transmitted through its Ambassador in Canberra, to support the claim of Australia to be a principal party in the negotiation of the Japanese settlement. In view of this the Australian Government finds it difficult to understand the approach made by the United States Government on the question of the mandated islands, which appears to disregard Australia's vital interest in the disposal of the territories concerned.

I have [etc.]

For the Ambassador:

ALFRED STIRLING

890.0146/1-2147

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1947.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note of January 21, 1947, commenting upon Mr. Acheson's note of November 6, 1946 with reference to the terms upon which the United States Government is prepared to place the former Japanese Mandated Islands under trusteeship.

The United States Government regrets that it does not share the view of the United Kingdom Government that the action proposed by the United States cannot take effect in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan and that it would be premature at this stage to place proposals formally before the Security Council.

As to whether the proposed action can take effect in advance of the Peace Treaty with Japan, the United States Government does not consider that there is any barrier to the placing of these islands under trusteeship in accordance with the Charter whenever the Security Council approves the draft agreement. The islands never did belong to Japan, which, moreover, as a result of the war, has ceased to exercise any authority therein. Further, it was agreed at Cairo and Potsdam, and reaffirmed in the instrument of surrender accepted by the powers responsible for Japan's defeat, that Japan should be deprived of any authority in these islands. Moreover, practically all the states which might conceivably have an interest in the disposition of the Japanese Mandated Islands are either members of the Security Council or, as in the case of the Philippines and New Zealand, have been provided with information about the United States proposals. For these reasons, the United States considers that the conclusion of the trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands can be properly dealt with now by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter and does not depend upon, and need not await, the general peace settlement with Japan.

As to whether it would be premature at this stage to place proposals formally before the Security Council, the United States Government believes that such formal presentation should be made at an early date. These islands were administered for nearly a quarter of a century under a mandate of the League of Nations and, therefore, they appear clearly to belong in the category described in Article 77 (a) with regard to which the spirit and intent of the Charter indicated the early placing under trusteeship. Moreover, the General Assembly Resolution of February 9, 1946, expressly invites "the states administering territories now held under mandate" to undertake practical steps to place such territories under trusteeship. The United States is not, of course, a mandatory over the former Japanese Mandated Islands, but it has been administering them *de facto* and, therefore, considers it a duty to do its part in giving prompt effect to the Assembly Resolution. The United States believes that it should proceed with this program in order that other governments and peoples may know the reasons underlying the United States proposal. There would also seem to be sound, practical grounds why, in the interest of the inhabitants and the general stability of this area, a definitive arrangement should be provided for as soon as possible rather than delay it to an indefinite date in the future. Finally, it will be recalled that the President, in his announcement of November 6, 1946, stated that the draft trusteeship agreement would be submitted to the Security Council for its approval at an early date, and any further delay might be likely to lead to misunderstanding.

The United States Government notes, however, that the Government of the United Kingdom considers that, from its point of view, such action by the United States would be open to the "serious practical objection" that it would confuse the issue about trusteeship for the former Italian colonies. The United States Government has no desire to contribute to any confusion of the issue about the Italian colonies. It does not see any obvious or direct connection between the two categories of territories in question. Although the territories in both categories are under military occupation, the status of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, having been for many years under an international mandate and never having been under the sovereignty of Japan, appears to be entirely different from that of the Italian colonies in these respects.

However, after its proposal has been formally placed before the Security Council the United States would be quite willing to consider acceding to any reasonable postponement of consideration and action if this were deemed to be desirable or convenient by other members of the Council although, as stated before, it does not feel that action by the Council need necessarily be deferred until the negotiation of the Peace Treaty with Japan.

In view of the foregoing, the United States Government believes that there should be no serious objection to its announced plan to make an early formal submission of the draft agreement to the Security Council, and hopes that the United Kingdom Government will be convinced of the desirability of this course.

The observations made by the United Kingdom Government on certain textual points in the United States draft proposal is made the subject of comment attached hereto. These comments will be elaborated more fully when the terms are presented to the Security Council.¹

Accept, [etc.]

G. C. MARSHALL

[Attachment]

OBSERVATIONS ON TEXTUAL POINTS RAISED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT IN MEMORANDUM ENCLOSED IN NOTE OF JANUARY 21, 1947

1. *Preamble*

By its second recital the United States, of course, does not claim to be in the islands as a mandatory power but it recognizes that it is administering islands which formerly were under mandate. These islands were militarily taken from Japanese forces, but since, in our view, they did not belong to Japan, they could not legally be taken away from Japan. Hence, they do not completely fit the category of Article 77(b) (enemy territory). However, no difficulty is seen in clarifying the point that the United States is not in these islands now as a mandatory power.

2. *Article 8(1)*

The United States considers that in a strategic agreement security factors take precedence over economic factors. Moreover, it is not believed that there is any inconsistency with the provisions of the Charter. It is not the intention of the United States to seek any economic advantage for itself but merely to provide the necessary protection for areas which may need to be closed.

3. *Article 8(111)*

The United States considers that the proposed regulation on traffic rights to aircraft flying into and out of the trust territory is precisely in accord with the Chicago Aviation Convention and that the same situation would apply whether Article 8, paragraph 3, were included in the draft or not.

¹ With the exception of the paragraph pertaining to the former Italian colonies, substantially similar notes were transmitted on the same day to the Soviet Ambassador (Novikov) (890.0146/12-746) and the Australian Ambassador (Makin) (890.0146/1-2147).

4. *Article 13*

This proposal appears to state the position somewhat more precisely in terms of Article 83(3) of the Charter and will be carefully studied by the United States.

5. *Article 1 and Article 13*

The United States takes the view that the territory to be placed under trusteeship by the draft agreement is the same area as that under mandate to Japan and that the territorial waters included in the trust territory would be determined by customary interpretations of international law.

890.0146/2-1447 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1947—6 p. m.

47. In view of statement at my last press conference that we expected to present trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands to the SC about February 17, it is suggested that you forward it to the SYG for transmittal to the SC for approval under Article 83 of the Charter.¹

MARSHALL

¹The decision on this time-table was the result of meetings and memoranda-writing in the Department during the weeks of early February, at the same time that drafting was being done on the February 12 notes. About February 10, the Secretary of State granted simultaneous approvals to the draft notes and the draft of a statement to be made by Ambassador Austin in formally presenting the draft trusteeship agreement to the Security Council.

For text of the letter from the United States Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations (Lie) dated February 17, 1947, enclosing the text of the draft trusteeship agreement and requesting Security Council consideration of the agreement at an early date, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 8*, annex 17.

890.0146/2-2047

*The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State*¹

[Translation]

The Soviet Government has carefully considered your note of the 13th [12] of February of this year and has arrived at the conclusion

¹ Forwarded to the Secretary of State under cover of a note from the Soviet Ambassador (Novikov) dated February 20. In transmitting the Soviet communication to the Secretary, the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) noted: "The present note is . . . a complete reversal of position" (501.BE/2-2747).

that it is not worthwhile to postpone the question about the former mandated islands of Japan and that the decision of this question comes within the competency of the Security Council.

As regards the substance of the question, the Soviet Government deems that it would be entirely fair to transfer to the trusteeship of the United States the former mandated islands of Japan, and the Soviet Government takes into account, that the armed might of the U.S.A. played a decisive role in the matter of victory over Japan and that in the war with Japan the U.S.A. bore incomparably greater sacrifices, than the other allied governments.²

² The Acting Secretary of State in a note of March 6 to Ambassador Novikov said:

"The United States Government is pleased to learn that the Soviet Government concurs in the view that the question of trusteeship for the former Japanese Mandated Islands comes within the competence of the Security Council and that the Soviet Government deems that it would be entirely fair to transfer the former Japanese Mandated Islands to the trusteeship of the United States. The United States Government also takes note of the expressions contained in Mr. Molotov's note concerning the role of the armed forces of the United States in the victory over Japan." (890.0146/2-2047)

501.BE/2-2147 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, February 21, 1947—6: 25 p. m.

186. UK prepared to make statement on US trusteeship agreement. Lawford (UK)¹ told USDel on Feb. 21 that Cadogan² would be prepared to state the British position on the US draft trusteeship agreement on former Japanese mandated islands at the SC meeting on Feb. 25. He indicated unofficially that statement merely would reaffirm Britain's previously voiced opinion that action on the US proposal should await the signing of the Japanese peace treaty.

AUSTIN

¹ V. G. Lawford, Adviser on the United Kingdom Delegation Staff.

² Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent British Representative to the United Nations.

Editorial Note

The United States Representative formally submitted the United States draft trusteeship agreement for the Pacific islands formerly mandated to Japan to the Security Council on February 26, making a detailed statement at the same time. For the text of Ambassador Austin's statement, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security*

Council, Second Year, pages 408 ff. (hereafter cited as SC, *2nd yr.*), or Department of State *Bulletin*, March 9, 1947, pages 416 ff.

Amendments were offered by the Soviet Union at the February 26 meeting and by the United Kingdom and Australia at a meeting on March 12. For the three Soviet amendments and accompanying statement by the Permanent Soviet Representative to the United Nations (Gromyko), see SC, *2nd yr.*, pages 414 and 415; see also *ibid.*, pages 474-477, 479, and 480, and *post*, pages 275 ff. The two United Kingdom amendments are found in SC, *2nd yr.*, pages 644 and 662.

The Australian amendment proposed the addition of a completely new article, as follows:

"This agreement is subject to confirmation in the interim or final treaty of peace between Japan and the allied Powers victorious in the war against Japan, it being understood that by such treaty Japan shall be required to surrender all its rights, if any, relating to the control and administration of the present territories, and such territories shall be formally detached from any form of control by Japan." (*Ibid.*, page 516)

Almost immediately Ambassador Austin gave notice to the Council that "at the proper time" he would raise a point of order against the Australian amendment.

501.BC/3-1447

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] March 13, 1947.

PROBLEM OF VOTING ON THE TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT

If any of the other members of the Council should press their amendments to a vote, we shall be faced with the necessity of deciding whether or not to use our veto.

There are three different possibilities:

First, We could announce in advance that because we were an interested party and had a veto, we would abstain on all votes so as to permit the Security Council to reach a decision without our participation. We would of course reserve our right as the other party to the agreement to decline to accept the agreement if the Security Council should insist on any amendments which we were unable to accept.

A *Second* alternative would be to make no commitment in advance but to watch for the affirmative votes in each case and abstain only

¹ Mr. Noyes was Special Adviser to Ambassador Austin for Security Council matters.

if seven members vote in favor. The same reservation would be necessary here if the United States should have abstain.

The *Third* alternative would be to vote against any amendments we disliked regardless of whether or not it amounted to a veto.

It seems to me there are fairly substantial objections to deciding to follow the third alternative policy. In my opinion, it would lower the prestige of the United States and would be quite inconsistent with our broad policy on the problem of the veto in the Security Council for the United States to put itself in the position of using its veto to protect itself from an amendment. There is clearly no need to do so since, as the other party to the Agreement, we have the right to reject the agreement as a whole if we cannot accept particular amendments. It would seem to me to be far wiser to follow a policy which would not include the use of the veto to effect our purposes in obtaining the approval of this Agreement.

The second alternative has the advantage of avoiding the issue completely unless it actually arises. In my opinion, it is unlikely that seven members of the Security Council will support any of the proposed amendments if the United States states in advance that it cannot accept them. This alternative has the disadvantage of laying us open to the charge that we have vetoed the amendment even though it was not our veto alone which prevented the amendment from carrying. (Viz. The alleged use of our veto last summer against Albania's application for membership.)

The first alternative has the advantage of obtaining public credit for a decision which we would have made *not* to use our veto under any circumstances in this proceeding. It seems to me that if we make up our minds that we will not use our veto, there is everything to gain and little to lose by making this fact public. A decision to do this might also help us in connection with a possible vote on Gromyko's third alternative since it would highlight for other members of the Council the reasons why we did not want to accept Gromyko's proposed amendment.²

CHARLES P. NOYES

² A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Department under cover of a letter of March 14 from Mr. Noyes to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk). Noyes stated that both Ambassador Austin and the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Johnson), "after a preliminary discussion," favored the first alternative in the memorandum "on the ground that it sacrifices nothing in reality and that it gives us a high moral position." Noyes said that the United States Permanent Delegation at New York was anxious for the Department's views on this question "before the meeting on Monday [March 17], and I shall call you sometime on Monday morning about it." (501.BC/3-1447)

501.BC/3-1747

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Dean Rusk, SPA

Mr. Charles P. Noyes, U.S. Delegation, New York,
Adviser to U.S. Representative on the Security
Council and General Matters

Mr. Rusk said that he had been able to obtain a high-level decision from both the State Department and the Navy Department on the question raised in Mr. Noyes' memorandum (attached).² Both Departments were agreed that Mr. Austin abstain from voting if any of the amendments proposed to the United States draft agreement should be put to a vote, provided that Mr. Austin stated clearly in advance of the vote that the United States would not be able to accept these proposed amendments. Mr. Noyes remarked that in this sense the United States, as the other party to the agreement, would maintain the right to reject the agreement, if certain amendments were insisted upon by the Security Council. Mr. Rusk agreed that that was the correct interpretation. He added that the United States would not use the veto to deny to the Security Council the right to express its view with regard to proposed amendments.

Mr. Rusk stated that this policy of abstaining did not apply to the point of order which might be raised in connection with the Australian proposal. Mr. Noyes said that this was understood and that the United States would be able to vote on the subsidiary legal question raised by the point of order. Mr. Noyes said that he was informed that the President of the Security Council (Aranha) would himself raise the point of order. Since the United States did not rest its whole case on the Australian proposal on the point of order, he felt that Mr. Austin might wish to deal with both the procedure and the substance of the question at the same time. If the legal point came up as a separate matter, however, the United States could vote on it, Mr. Noyes said.³

¹ Apparently (on the basis of drafting information), the record of this conversation was made by William I. Cargo of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs.

² *Supra*.

³ It was felt by some members of the Security Council, including the President of the Council, that the Australian amendment raised an important constitutional point regarding the competence of the Security Council in strategic trusteeship matters.

It was the United States view further that the amendment called into question the effectiveness of the instrument of surrender of September 2, 1945, as a means of extinguishing Japanese authority over the mandated islands legally and permanently. Actually this issue was first raised in the Security Council on March 7 when the Council began its debate on the draft trusteeship agreement and before the Australian Delegate submitted his amendment. The United States view that the Japanese mandate was terminated by the surrender was stated by Ambassador Austin at that time. (SC, 2nd yr., pp. 464-472)

Mr. Rusk again stated with regard to substantive amendments that Mr. Austin could abstain from voting and make a flat statement of the United States position as previously indicated and that this would be satisfactory to both the Navy and State Departments. In concluding he remarked that Mr. Fahy, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Forrestal⁴ had all been consulted on this question.

⁴ Charles Fahy was Legal Adviser of the Department of States; James Forrestal was Secretary of the Navy.

800.014/3-1747: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, March 17, 1947—9 p. m.

248. Re [new] draft of proposed Australian amendment¹ to draft trusteeship agreement for Japanese mandated islands follows:

“Article 17: This agreement will enter into force on the date on which the interim or final treaty of peace between Japan and the Allied Powers victorious in the war against Japan becomes binding on Japan, it being understood that by such treaty Japan shall be required to surrender all its rights (if any) relating to the control and administration of the present territories, and such territories shall be formally detached from any form of control by Japan.”²

AUSTIN

¹ Early in the meeting of the Security Council on March 17 the Australian Delegate introduced a modification of the Australian amendment of March 12, the text of which follows in this telegram. As stated by the Australian Delegate, the revised amendment was designed to erase the constitutional difficulties presumed to exist in the first version. (SC, *2nd yr.*, pp. 520 and 521)

² For the lengthy statement made to the Security Council by Ambassador Austin on March 17 regarding the revised Australian amendment, see *ibid.*, pp. 523-530. The United States view was that the amendment still raised constitutional and legal questions, described by the Ambassador at one point in the following:

“Every line of this amendment is in direct opposition to the Charter [of the United Nations]. In the first phrase of this amendment, we undertake to take away from the United Nations its very functions. The United Nations has the sole, exclusive, and supreme authority over trusteeship. . . . the second phrase of this statement is a gross assumption of authority. The United Nations has no authority under the Charter to make peace terms. It is not given any commitment with respect to the treaty of peace between Japan and the victorious powers.” (*Ibid.*, pp. 524 and 525)

890.0146/3-1947

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of
Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Alfred Stirling, Minister, Australian Embassy
Mr. John M. Allison, Acting Chief of NA
Mr. Arthur Richards, Assistant Chief, British Commonwealth Division

As a result of discussion among DA, EUR and FE, it was decided to request Mr. Stirling of the Australian Embassy to come in and discuss the whole question of the Australian attitude toward the U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands.¹ Mr. Stirling came in at 4:30 this afternoon. He stated that he was not entirely familiar with the problem but did have a general knowledge of the question.

It was explained to Mr. Stirling that Australia's insistence on her proposed amendment to the effect that the agreement would not enter into force until the date on which the interim or final peace treaty became binding on Japan was a real source of concern to the Department. Reference was made to the statement of the Australian representative on the Security Council that the sole purpose of this amendment was the support of the principle that belligerents against

¹ The text of a draft telegram to New York dated March 19, which was never sent, throws light on Department thinking prior to the conversation recorded here.

"1. While Australia proposed new Article 17 to US draft trusteeship agreement as revised at SC meeting Monday is totally unacceptable as you so effectively made clear we are concerned over embarrassing necessity of publicly defeating Australia and UK. We would like, if possible, to persuade Hasluck [Australian Representative at the United Nations] to withdraw amendment or give him opportunity to save his face in final showdown.

"2. Please remind Hasluck that US has consistently informed Australian Government on several occasions that it recognizes Australian position and interests in Pacific and will assist Australia to become a principal participant in the peace settlement with Japan. While we cannot publicly confirm this policy at this time we are happy to do so privately.

"3. You may tell Hasluck that if he is unwilling to withdraw his amendment you will state before final vote that US, of course, recognizes Australia's natural interest in all problems relating to Pacific and the valiant part played by Australia in Pacific War and that US equally recognizes the great contribution made by Australia to the trusteeship principles of the Charter and in implementation of these principles in New Guinea trusteeship agreement. Furthermore, you may inform him that US will gladly agree at peace conference to proposals or support a treaty article to following effect: (a) that treaty extinguishes any rights and interests which Japan may have in mandates system as one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in First World War and in former Japanese Mandated Islands as a former mandatory power, and (b) that treaty takes note that by instrument of surrender that Japan has lost all rights, titles and control in former Japanese Mandated Islands and in any Japanese islands which may be detached." (890.0146/3-1947)

Japan were entitled to participate in the peace settlement and that the disposition of these islands was part of such a settlement. It was emphasized that in view of the fact that representatives of all members of the Far Eastern Commission had been invited to the Council table it would seem that at least all the active belligerents against Japan were taking part in the proceedings.

Mr. Stirling was told it did not therefore seem to the Department that any legitimately interested parties were being ignored and that it was felt an outsider listening to the Australian statement might very well come to the conclusion that Australia had some ulterior reason for wishing to delay consideration of the agreement. In view of official Australian statements that it did not have any objection to the U.S. occupying the Mandated Islands as administering power, the Department naturally had no doubts itself of the Australian position but wanted to point out how the present Australian action might be misconstrued by unfriendly persons. It was further emphasized that the Department had no desire or intention of bypassing any of the powers properly concerned in the final settlement with Japan. Reference was made to previous confidential assurances that the U.S. Government would support the full and equal participation of Australia in any consideration of a peace treaty with Japan and this assurance was reiterated.

Mr. Stirling was told that it was evident from expressions of opinion at the Security Council Meeting on March 17 that if a vote were to be taken the Australian proposal would be defeated but that the Department hoped it would not be necessary to press the matter that far. The hope was expressed that the Australian Government might see fit to reconsider its action and might desire to instruct its representative on the Security Council not to press for adoption of the proposed amendment or even to withdraw it.

Mr. Stirling was informed that the Department was distressed that in this matter it was necessary to oppose Australia and the United Kingdom, two of its best friends, but that the Department was firmly convinced of the rightness of its position and that it would continue to press for approval by the Security Council of the Trusteeship Agreement without the Australian Amendment.

501.BE/3-2147

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office
of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Norman J. O. Makin, Ambassador, Australian
Embassy
Mr. Stirling, Minister, Australian Embassy
Mr. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State
Mr. Humelsine, ODA

On the question of trusteeship for the mandated islands on which the Australians had opposed us in the UN, Ambassador Makin said that the Australians had decided to come around to our way of thinking and would back up our position 100%. A statement to this effect will be made at the next Security Council meeting on the United States trusteeship agreement for the mandates. The Australians stated that Mr. Austin had been slightly critical and they felt that they would like Austin to know that this Australian statement is going to be made by their delegate. They thought it would be suitable for Mr. Austin to say something nice about it.¹

¹ For the text of the Australian statement, see *infra*.

501.BC/3-2147

*Statement To Be Made by the Australian Delegate to the Security
Council at Its Next Meeting To Consider the United States
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese-Mandated Islands*¹

1. Since the question of the future of Japanese mandates first arose in the Council, the Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia have desired to make certain that the proposal of the United States to assume strategic trusteeship of these islands is endorsed by the nations which made substantial contributions to victory over Japan.

2. On the merits of the question of disposing of the mandates the attitude of Australia has never been in doubt. Over and over again the Australian Minister for External Affairs has indicated that Australia supports the proposal to make the United States the sole and exclusive trustee over these island territories which were gained at such sacrifice by the United States. I want to make it clear at the outset that the Australian Government for its part has consistently supported

¹ The Australian statement was made on March 28, substantially as in this text; see SC, *2nd yr.*, pp. 627 and 628. Ambassador Austin expressed the appreciation of the United States Government immediately following (*ibid.*, p. 628).

and now warmly supports in the interests of peace and security the control and administration by the United States of the Japanese mandated islands and is in accord with the view that the United States should continue *de facto* administration.

3. The method of securing the United States objective which was proposed by Australia and the United Kingdom as most just and democratic was to approve the proposed agreement but to postpone its operation until the successful belligerent nations had met formally together for the making of a peace settlement with Japan.

4. This attitude was adopted both by Australia and the United Kingdom not for the purpose of delaying the question of disposing of the islands but solely for the purpose of maintaining the vital principle that all terms of what may fairly be called "the final settlement with Japan" should be approved not by a few nations only but by all the nations who contributed to the overthrow of this enemy with substantial military forces. These nations included some who were not members of the Security Council.

5. The position has been materially altered since the proposal of Australia was supported by the United Kingdom. The Security Council has agreed to Australia's suggestion that the nations which fought against Japan shall be admitted to the Security Council itself for the purpose of stating their views on the United States trusteeship proposal.² The result of this will be to extend the Security Council for the time being into a small replica of the conference of nations which would be entitled as a matter of justice and democratic right to participate in the final settlement with Japan.

6. This being so, the Security Council is now in a position to be assured that it would be in accordance with the wishes of the belligerents against Japan that the proposal of the United States should in principle be given effect to.

7. For these reasons and in the interests of a unanimous decision Australia and the United Kingdom have decided not to press the proposed Article XVII.

8. Therefore having regard to the Security Council's approval of Australia's desire to widen the representation of nations before this Council so as to include all the nations who contributed with military forces in the war against Japan and also to the fact that the Council so enlarged and broadened will fully endorse the United States proposal, my instructions are to support it.

² The Representatives of Canada, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Philippine Republic took their Seats at the Council table on March 17.

800.014/3-2447

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Associate Chief of
the Division of Dependent Area Affairs (Green)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1947.

Mr. McIntyre¹ telephoned this morning and asked whether I had seen the paper which the Australian Ambassador had left with Mr. Acheson on Friday afternoon. I replied that I had not yet seen the paper, although I had been informed by telephone of the substance of the conversation. Mr. McIntyre said that he wanted to explain one point which the Ambassador may not have made perfectly clear. The Ambassador's paper stated that the Australian Government presumed that the British Government would agree to the withdrawal of the proposed amendment to the United States trusteeship agreement. However, the Australian Government had not yet had time to obtain the concurrence of the British Government to this procedure. The paper should be read, therefore, with the understanding that the Australian Government was *seeking* the agreement of the British Government. It was possible that the British would prefer to revise the proposed amendment or to approach the problem in a slightly different way. In other words, British concurrence in Australia's willingness to withdraw the proposed Article 17 should not be taken entirely for granted. I thanked Mr. McIntyre for this information and said that I would communicate it to other officers in the Department concerned.

Mr. McIntyre asked whether I knew when the Security Council would next consider the trusteeship agreement. I said that I understood that this depended on the schedule of Senator Austin who had come to Washington in connection with the Department's budget hearings. Mr. McIntyre said that Mr. Hasluck in New York would welcome any information concerning Senator Austin's plans. I told Mr. McIntyre that I would make inquiries and call him as soon as I had any information on this point.

¹ L. R. McIntyre, First Secretary of the Australian Embassy.

890.0146/4-2447

*Summary of Trusteeship Agreement Negotiations in the Security Council, New York, April 2, 1947*¹

[Extract]

During a long session on April 2, 1947, the Security Council reconsidered the entire agreement article-by-article. In voting on proposed amendments, the United States Representative followed the rule of casting a vote when the United States vote would be in the affirmative, and abstaining from voting in cases wherein the United States did not favor the proposal before the Council. Thus, he abstained from voting on proposals to revise Article 8(1) and Article 15. Prior to the voting on each of these Articles, the United States Representative declared that the United States would not veto the amendment. In advance of his first abstention, he stated that, "On questions such as this, it is perfectly clear—to us anyway—that the United States, where it may be obliged in view of its responsibilities to withdraw the tender of an agreement, should certainly not exercise a veto in the Security Council also". Prior to his second abstention he said, "The United States being a party to the agreement, all I can do is, with the utmost modesty, state that an amendment in the nature of that proposed . . .² probably could not be accepted by the United States as a party to the agreement". At the close of the session, the Security Council approved unanimously the United States draft agreement as a whole including three minor revisions which were accepted by the United States Representative with the consent of the United States Government. The three amendments are as follows:

Article 3.—An amendment proposed by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to delete the words "as an integral part of the United States". Upon accepting this amendment at the 116th Meeting of the Security Council, the United States representative said *inter alia*: "In agreeing to this modification, my Government feels that it should affirm for the record that its authority in the trust territory is not to be considered in any way lessened thereby."

Article 6(1).—An amendment proposed by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and revised in the Council, to add after the words "toward self-government", the words "or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the

¹ Extract from memorandum entitled "Negotiations of the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands between the Security Council of the United Nations and the United States of America," which was drafted in the Department of State on April 24, and was transmitted to President Truman under cover of a letter from the Secretary of State dated July 2 (FW 890.0146/4-2447). The proceedings in the Security Council for this date are found in SC, 2nd yr., pp. 642 ff.

² Omissions throughout the document are indicated in the source text.

peoples concerned.” In accepting modification in Article 6(1) at the 116th Meeting of the Security Council, the United States Representative declared that “the United States feels that it must record its opposition not to the principle of independence, to which no people could be more consecrated than the people of the United States, but to the thought that it could possibly be achieved within any foreseeable future in this case.”

Article 6(1).—An amendment suggested by the Representatives of New Zealand and India and introduced on behalf of the latter at the 124th Meeting of the Security Council, to delete the word “local” from the phrase “in local government;”. The observation of the Representative of India at the 124th Meeting in behalf of this deletion was that in certain countries the word “local” connotes municipal government, and that surely would not be the intention of the Representative of the United States.

In the final consideration of the United States trusteeship proposals, the original text of Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 19 was approved in each case without objection or comment. The American Representative, Mr. Austin, requested that Article 7 be perfected as follows:

“In discharging its obligations under Article 76(*e*), of the Charter, the administering authority shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the trust territory freedom of conscience, and, subject only to the requirements of public order and security, shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the trust territory freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; freedom of worship, and of religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.”

Mr. Austin stated: “The significance of this perfection of the Article is that it moves up freedom of conscience so that it will not be subject to the requirements of public order and security.” The approval of the trusteeship agreement with the three minor amendments and this slight change followed the withdrawal or rejection of several other proposed amendments as follows:

Preamble—Discussions on the Preamble concerned three alternative versions—suggested by Poland, the Netherlands, and the United States—of an amendment proposed originally by the Representative of Poland at the 116th Meeting of the Security Council. This proposal was to add the following phrase to paragraph four: “Whereas Japan has violated the terms of the above-mentioned mandate of the League of Nations and has thus forfeited her mandate . . .” The United States Representative endorsed this proposal, but the amendment was reconsidered at the 124th Meeting. The Netherlands Representative proposed that the amendment read “Whereas, as a result of the signature by Japan of an act of unconditional surrender, the mandate held by Japan for these islands has come to an end.” As a compromise, the United States Representative proposed the following wording:

"Whereas the mandate, held by Japan for these Islands has come to an end." After failure to reach agreement on these alternative proposals, the original wording of the Preamble was approved unanimously.

Article 8(1).—The United Kingdom Representative proposed an amendment to Article 8(1) to delete the phrase "except the administering authority", holding that the inclusion of those words would give preferential position to the United States which did not seem to be in strict accordance with Articles 83(2) and 76(d) of the Charter. He asked whether that phrase in Article 83(3) "without prejudice to security considerations" would not really give the United States sufficient safeguard. After replying to this question in the negative, the American Representative stated for the record: ". . . the United States Government has no intention, through this clause or any other clause, of taking advantage for its own benefit, and to the detriment of the welfare of the inhabitants, of the meager and almost non-existent resources and commercial opportunities that exist in the scattered and barren islands. The nature of this proposed clause is dictated by the fact that these islands are proposed as a strategic trusteeship area and by the obligations which the administering authority will assume under the Charter 'to further international peace and security' and to insure that the territory itself 'shall play its part' in the maintenance of international peace and security."

Article 13.—The United Kingdom Representative proposed a redraft of Article 13 to read:

"The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter shall be applicable to the trust territory, provided that the administering authority may at any time inform the Security Council, in accordance with Article 83(3) of the Charter, that security considerations do not permit the exercise of the functions of the Trusteeship Council in regard to specific areas."

He did not insist on this amendment, however, because the United States Representative stated for the record that the United States contemplates that notification shall be made to the Security Council whenever the proviso that is contained in Article 13 comes into use.

Article 15.—Extended debate took place before reaching agreement on Article 15. Two formal amendments to this article were presented by the Representatives of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet amendment was to make Article 15 read as follows: "The terms of the present agreement may be altered and amended or the terms of its validity discontinued by decision of the Security Council." The Polish amendment was to modify Article 15 to read: "The terms of the present agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated except as provided by the Charter." The United States indicated a willingness to accept the following text as a compromise: "The terms of the present agreement shall not be altered, amended, or terminated except by agreement of the administering authority and the Security Council." The rejection of the Soviet and Polish amendments was followed by the acceptance of the original wording of Article 15.

Proposed Article 17.—An issue debated at length in the Security Council was embodied in an amendment proposed by Australia to add an Article 17 to the agreement which would have delayed its coming into force until the effective date of the peace treaty with Japan. The view thus expressed was supported by the United Kingdom and by New Zealand. The United States Representative argued most forcefully against this proposal which would have left the agreement in suspense for an indefinite period. As a basic contention of the United States Government, he emphasized throughout the debates that the matter did not depend upon, and need not await, the general peace settlement with Japan. Following this widening of the Council's discussions to include representatives of Canada, India, the Netherlands, and the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of stating their views on the United States trusteeship proposals, the Australian Representative withdrew his proposal.

According to Article 16 of the agreement, the Security Council having approved its terms of trusteeship, only the approval by the United States in accordance with its constitutional process is now required to bring the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands into force.³

³ In a letter of July 2 to President Truman, the Secretary of State recommended that the Congress be requested to take action to authorize the President to accept the Agreement and bring it into effect (FW 890.0146/4-2447). This the Congress did in the enactment of a Joint Resolution on July 18 (61 Stat. 397), the President approving the Agreement the same day. For text of "Trusteeship agreement for the former Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific, designating the territory as a 'strategic area' and the United States as administering authority pursuant to the provisions of chapter XII of the Charter of the United Nations," see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1665, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3301, or United Nations Treaty Series 189.

UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM; THE QUESTION OF TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION UNDER ARTICLE 73(e) OF THE CHARTER

Editorial Note

From 1946 on, United States policy regarding dependent territories was formulated within the context of the Charter of the United Nations, the relevant sections of the Charter being Chapter XI (Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories: Articles 73 and 74), Chapter XII (International Trusteeship System: Articles 75-85), and Chapter XIII (The Trusteeship Council: Articles 86-91). With specific reference to non-self-governing territories outside the trusteeship system, the relevant chapter was Chapter XI, and within Chapter XI the governing article was Article 73. Broadly speaking, this had to do with the transmission of information regarding the non-self-governing territories by the administering power to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In 1946 important questions of interpretation immediately arose as to what type of information should be transmitted and what should be done with it by the United Nations once it was received. Of basic importance also were questions regarding interpretation of Article 77 in Chapter XII; for example, did this article hold a mandate for the assimilation of non-self-governing territories in general to the trusteeship system? Out of the controversy engendered at the United Nations by these issues emerged the groupings of states that came to be known as the "colonial" and the "anti-colonial" powers.

United States consideration of the problems of non-self-governing territories in 1946 was, at the outset, intimately connected with discussions relating to the establishment of an international trusteeship system, and the setting was the first meeting of the General Assembly at London in January-February 1946. Thereafter, with the trust territories set up, the two matters tended to become separated, and questions relating to non-self-governing territories outside the trusteeship system received special consideration for their own sake. This situation was reflected in the organization of the Fourth Committee (Trusteeship Committee) at the New York meeting of the General

Assembly in October–December 1946, when two subcommittees were established—one to handle matters relating to Trust Territories, the other to entertain questions relating to all other dependent territories. The principal issue at New York on the non-self-governing territories outside the trusteeship system is described in some detail in the document that follows.

501.BB/8-2147

*Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Dependent Area Affairs*¹

CONFIDENTIAL
CDA-467a

[WASHINGTON,] July 29, 1947.

DRAFT POSITION PAPER FOR USE OF UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
Ad Hoc COMMITTEE CONVENED FOR AUGUST 28, 1947, REGARDING
FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH RESPECT TO INFORMA-
TION ON NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER
ARTICLE 73(e) OF THE CHARTER

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine (1) what functions the General Assembly should perform or should be allowed to perform with respect to information from non-self-governing territories submitted under Article 73(e); and (2) what machinery or procedures, if any, should be employed to permit the General Assembly to carry out these functions effectively. This problem will be dealt with at the meeting, called for August 28, of the *ad hoc* committee of the General Assembly which was created by a Resolution of the General Assembly on December 14, 1946.

This paper deals only with questions of policy and is based on the following assumptions with respect to the legal questions involved:

1. That the General Assembly can, under Articles 10, 13, and 14 of the Charter and in view of the obligations set forth in Article 73, discuss and make recommendations relating to (a) the powers and functions of the Secretary-General with respect to information transmitted under Article 73(e), and (b) the substance and adequacy of the information so transmitted; and

2. That the General Assembly may, under Article 22, establish such subsidiary organs (e.g., standing committees) as it deems necessary for the performance of these functions.

¹ Drafted by O. Benjamin Gerig, Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, and Emil J. Sady, Specialist in Dependent Area Affairs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the functions of the General Assembly, with respect to information transmitted under Article 73(e), should be as follows:

(a) to make recommendations regarding the functions of the Secretary-General under Article 73(e);

(b) to discuss freely any question of procedure or substance relating to the information itself, either on a functional basis or, if any delegation wishes, as regards individual territories;

(c) to make recommendations with respect to procedural matters; and

(d) to make recommendations of a substantive character, for practical purposes, only on functional or topical subjects and not with respect to individual territories.

2. That the General Assembly machinery for carrying out these functions should be as follows:

(a) The Secretary-General should prepare, after consultation with the specialized agencies, (1) a summary and analysis of the information on a functional or topical basis; (2) suggestions for improving the reports; (3) suggested recommendations as to the adequacy of existing conventions and possible need for new conventions; and (4) suggested recommendations as to research, technical assistance and other programs wherein the specialized agencies might be able to render useful services.

(b) A subcommittee of Committee IV should, with the assistance of representatives of the Secretariat and of specialized agencies, examine the data and suggestions in 2(a) above with a view to formulating reports and resolutions for presentation to Committee IV and the General Assembly.

(c) A standing committee of the General Assembly for this purpose is unnecessary. If, however, a proposal to create such a standing committee is adopted over United States objections, a rule should be proposed preventing reelection of elective members of the committee in two successive years.

DISCUSSION

Pertinent Provisions of General Assembly Resolution

The Resolution on "Transmission of Information Under Article 73(e) of the Charter" adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946 provides in part for the following:

a. Invites the Secretary-General to convene, some weeks before the second session of the General Assembly, an *ad hoc* Committee composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Members transmitting information under Article 73(e) of the Charter (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France*, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and

*The French Delegate entered a reservation in the General Assembly to the effect that he could not undertake that his government would send a representative to the *ad hoc* Committee. [Footnote in the source text.]

United States of America) and of representatives elected by the General Assembly on the basis of equitable geographical distribution (Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Philippines, USSR, and Uruguay).

b. Invites the Secretary-General to request certain specialized agencies to send representatives in an advisory capacity to the meeting of the *ad hoc* Committee; and

c. Invites the *ad hoc* Committee to examine the Secretary-General's summary and analysis of the information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter with a view to aiding the General Assembly in its consideration of this information, and with a view to making recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the procedures to be followed in the future and the means of ensuring that the advice, expert knowledge and experience of the specialized agencies are used to the best advantage.

These provisions of the resolution were the subject of protracted debate in Subcommittee 2 of Committee IV and in the full Committee itself.² The United States, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom sponsored a compromise resolution which was approved by the subcommittee. This resolution omitted reference to the establishment of the *ad hoc* Committee and to any functions by the General Assembly with reference to information transmitted under Article 73(e). It did, however, provide for an analysis as well as a summary of this information by the Secretary-General, and for the assistance of the specialized agencies with respect to non-self-governing territories. This compromise resolution was subsequently defeated in the full Committee in a Sunday morning meeting called for another purpose, and the above outlined provisions proposed by Cuba, approved. The General Assembly sustained the Committee's decision on this question by a vote of 28 to 15, with 7 abstentions. The states favoring these provisions included those within the Soviet influence, the Arab States, the Asian States (including the Philippines), Canada, and 12 Latin American States. Those opposing were seven of the eight states which had submitted information on non-self-governing territories (New Zealand abstaining), the Scandinavian states, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Ecuador, and Uruguay.

The discussion was chiefly significant in revealing the divergence of view as to the scope of Chapter XI of the Charter between, on the one hand, the governments which have large responsibilities for the administration of non-self-governing territories, and, on the other hand, Members who have no such responsibilities and whose attitudes are further influenced by their own previous experience of dependent

² For the summary record of discussions in the Fourth Committee and in the Committee's Subcommittee 2, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Fourth Committee* (hereafter cited as GA (I/2), *Fourth Committee*), Part I and Part III.

status and/or their desire to acquire prestige through championing the cause of dependent peoples.

The United States maintained that creation of the *ad hoc* Committee was permissible under Article 22 of the Charter and Rule 100 of the Rules of Procedure, but voted against its establishment on the ground that it would be wiser not to proceed with a proposal which, in the minds of some members, went beyond their commitments under Article 73(e). While the colonial powers consistently emphasized the distinction between trust and other non-self-governing territories and interpreted Article 73(e) as strictly limiting the functions of the United Nations with respect to non-self-governing territories under the sovereignty of Members, the Chinese, Soviet, and Indian Delegations were aggressive in their attempts to soften as far as possible the line of distinction drawn by the Charter between trust and non-self-governing territories. Thus when a Chinese proposal, empowering the Trusteeship Council to receive and examine the information from non-self-governing territories, was defeated, China, India, the Soviet, and Arab States supported a Cuban Resolution for an *ad hoc* committee with membership, like that of the Trusteeship Council, equally balanced between colonial and non-colonial powers. Also significant in this connection was the hope expressed by the Polish Delegation that non-self-governing territories would eventually be transformed into trust territories and a resolution introduced by India (but ruled out of order by the Chairman of Subcommittee 2) that the Secretary-General inquire of states administering non-self-governing territories whether they were willing, acting on Article 77(c), to place any of these territories voluntarily under the international trusteeship system.

Situation of the United States

Since the membership of the *ad hoc* committee established by the General Assembly will be equally balanced between the colonial powers and the United States on one hand, and, on the other hand, the states which, during the General Assembly meetings, took a very broad view of the function of the United Nations with respect to non-self-governing territories, the position of the United States with respect to Chapter II is likely to be decisive in the *ad hoc* committee.

The United States last August transmitted to the Secretary-General, pursuant to Article 73(e) information on Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, the Panama Canal,† Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. This was done without prejudice to the territories on which information would in future be sent. It will be the Secretary-General's

†The Republic of Panama objected to the transmittal by the United States of information on the Canal Zone, and in view thereof, the United States agreed that it would not transmit information in future on this territory without consulting the Republic of Panama. [Footnote in the source text.]

summary and analysis of this information, including of course that transmitted by seven other states, which will be examined by the *ad hoc* committee.

Functions Which the General Assembly Should Exercise With Respect to Information Under Article 73(e)

There are three basic, alternative positions which the United States might take on this question. These are as follows:

Alternative 1: That the General Assembly, while being free to discuss anything, would limit its recommendations to (a) the form in which the information is sent and the subject matter which should be included; (b) the procedure for transmitting this information to ensure its most effective use "for information purposes", and (c) the various aspects of the Secretary-General's functions under Article 73(e). Thus, the General Assembly might recommend that certain subjects be treated more comprehensively in the reports in order to satisfy the informational requirements of the various organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It may suggest that copies of the reports be deposited in the library of the Secretariat and sent to Members of the United Nations and to the specialized agencies. It might request the Secretary-General to summarize and analyze the information in such a way as to ensure its effective use for information purposes.

Such a position would be based on the idea that the General Assembly should restrict its functions closely to the original intent of Article 73(e), namely that the reports were for "information" and not for "recommendation on substance", an idea which was considered but rejected at San Francisco on grounds of domestic jurisdiction. This would have the advantage of preventing the colonial powers from being pilloried constantly by the so-called anti-imperialist states, whose motives may not be entirely disinterested, as to how they are giving effect to Assembly recommendations. It would have the disadvantage of making the United States and other administering powers to appear to be somewhat on the defensive as to alleged or real conditions existing in the territories under their jurisdiction. It would also align the United States with the more conservative colonial powers and subject this government to criticism as being an "imperialistic" power. Even if the so-called colonial powers were successful in securing adoption of this alternative in the *ad hoc* Committee, the recommendation of the Committee might be defeated in the General Assembly and a wholly unacceptable substitute resolution adopted instead.

Alternative 2: That the General Assembly should, in addition to the functions set forth in Alternative 1, be authorized to make recommendations on any question of a procedural or substantive matter re-

lating to information transmitted under Article 73, but that, as a means of making its recommendations effective, the General Assembly should make recommendations only with respect to functions (e.g. economic, social, and educational matters) and not with respect to individual territories. This would have the advantage of permitting the General Assembly to offer its advice and assistance on a constructive and non-political basis and would enable its recommendations to tie in very effectively with the existing committee structure of the General Assembly and with the organizational structure of the specialized agencies. Furthermore, this position would probably be supported by the colonial powers, since it would avoid the possibility of any government being embarrassed by recommendations designed to throw a political spotlight on any individual territory within its domestic jurisdiction.

Although certain states, such as India and the Soviet Union, may not, for political and propaganda reasons, be satisfied with this proposal, it is believed that it would appeal to a sufficiently large number of non-colonial powers as being fair and appropriate to permit its adoption and would greatly enhance the international prestige of the United States. If the United States were to initiate such a proposal, it would take the "wind out of the sails" of the so-called anti-imperialist powers.

Alternative 3: That the General Assembly should, in addition to the functions set forth in Alternatives 1 and 2, make such recommendations as it considers advisable, whether on a functional basis or with respect to an individual territory, on the basis of information transmitted under Article 73. Such a generous and unrestricted proposal by the United States would have the advantage of building United States prestige in the United Nations and among dependent peoples as being a country which does not fear criticism or comment on its territorial administration, either existing or planned. It would take the initiative away from the so-called anti-imperialist powers—Soviet Union and India—and permit the United States to capture leadership as a protagonist of dependent peoples, a role befitting the American tradition. The disadvantages of this position are (a) that opposition within the United States to reporting under Article 73(e) might follow any critical recommendation with respect to one of our territories; (b) that the other colonial powers might modify on paper their constitutional relationship with their territories in order to avoid reporting altogether, a threat already made by France; and (c) that it would be impractical for the General Assembly to inform itself adequately about any particular territory to permit it to make useful recommendations.

RECOMMENDED POSITION

It is recommended that the United States should initiate or support a proposal along the lines of Alternative 2, defining the functions of the General Assembly, with respect to information transmitted under Article 73(e) as follows:

a. That the Assembly should make recommendations whenever advisable with respect to the functions of the Secretary-General under Article 73(e);

b. That Members of the Assembly should feel free to discuss any question of procedure or substance relating to the information itself, either on a functional (i.e., topical) basis or, if any delegation wishes, as regards individual territories;

c. That the Assembly should make any recommendation it considers desirable with respect to procedural matters; and

d. That the Assembly should, for practical purposes, and in order to avoid needless political controversy, confine its recommendations of a substantive character to broad recommendations on functional or topical subjects and not with respect to individual territories.

The United States should make it clear that it does not oppose recommendations relating to conditions in individual territories out of any desire to protect its own territorial administration or that of any other government. It should emphasize that it welcomes any discussion of conditions in its own territories, and that such discussion, if conducted in the right spirit, will be as effective as a recommendation which the General Assembly might be unable to carry out in a territory within the domestic jurisdiction of any of its members.

General Assembly Machinery for Carrying Out Recommended Functions

It is clear that the recommended functions of the General Assembly will require considerable preliminary study and analysis of the information before recommendations can be formulated and acted upon by Committee IV of the General Assembly and by the Assembly itself. However, this preliminary work could be done without creating a standing committee of the General Assembly to meet between sessions. In the event such a standing committee is proposed, the United States should oppose it on the grounds that the procedure recommended below makes the establishment of such a new body unnecessary. If the proposal to create the committee is adopted, the United States should strongly urge adoption of a rule prohibiting reelection of a government to serve on the committee for two successive years.

Whether or not the standing committee is created, the following procedure should be followed in order to facilitate General Assembly consideration of this information:

a. The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to transmit to the Secretary-Generals of specialized agencies copies of the reports and to prepare, after consultation with them, (a) a summary and analysis of the information on a functional basis (e.g. finance, commerce and industry, food and agriculture, labor, health, and educational and cultural); (b) suggestions for improving the reports (e.g. more uniform and adequate reporting in certain fields); and (c) recommendations as to the adequacy of existing conventions and the possible need for new conventions in certain topical fields; and (d) suggested recommendations with respect to immediate research and other programs in which the respective international organizations might be able to render useful services. In the near future, specialized agencies, such as the ILO and the FAO, should be asked to give an indication of the information they need on non-self-governing territories, with a view to the possible inclusion in one report of the informational requirements of all international bodies and thus to avoid duplication of effort and excessive costs for the Members which administer non-self-governing territories.

b. A subcommittee of Committee IV should examine the information transmitted under Article 73(e), the summary and analysis, and the suggestions and recommendations, and, on the basis of these, should formulate resolutions for presentation to Committee IV and the General Assembly. Representatives of the United Nations Secretariat and of the specialized agencies should attend the meetings of the subcommittee and Committee as observers and should assist members of the Committee as may be necessary.

IO Files¹: US/A/M(Chr)/51

*Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 15, 1947, 3 p. m.*²

SECRET

[Here follow the list of persons (31) present and a discussion of preceding items on the agenda of the meeting.]

Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories

Mr. Green³ reported that there had been a sharp cleavage between the colonial and anti-colonial powers in the recent meeting of the *ad hoc*

¹ Short title for the Master Files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

² For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to the second regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, see pp. 3-13 ff. The General Assembly convened at New York on September 16, 1947.

³ James F. Green, Associate Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, and Adviser, U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff.

Committee on the Transmission of Information under Article 73e.⁴ The delegates of the U.S.S.R., China, Philippines, India and sometimes the Arab States took the position that Chapter XI implied that the United Nations should have broad supervisory powers with respect to non-self-governing territories. The U.S.S.R. has argued quite frequently for immediate independence. Of the administering powers, the French, Dutch and Belgians had taken the most recalcitrant attitude, while the British, Australians, New Zealanders and Danes had been willing to accept a broad interpretation of Chapter XI, subject to the maintenance of their sovereign position. The United States, he continued, had tried to provide constructive leadership and to rally the moderate states by stressing the need for concrete proposals. Such proposals had in the past won a large measure of support. He explained that the position paper (US/A/C.4/34)⁵ had been based on the first draft of the *Ad Hoc* Committee report supplemented by a conversation with Mr. Gerig, who sat for the United States. He said the paper was very preliminary and subject to clearance by the Navy and Interior departments.

There were three issues involved, he explained: (1) the kind of information that should be transmitted; (2) what the Secretary-General should do with the information; and (3) what the General Assembly should do with it. The Charter was very precise on the first issue. Despite the fact that political information had been deliberately left out of Article 73e, there had been a concerted effort to include political information. Mr. Gerig had agreed to include political information in the United States reports but only as a voluntary transaction. This stand was endorsed by the other administering powers. The United States had submitted a draft outline including an optional section on general information. This had been unanimously accepted. The second issue was more difficult since the Charter left this open. Article 73e was stretched somewhat at London when the Secretary-General was requested to prepare summaries and analyses. The United States had insisted that the Secretary-General's use of supplemental documents be subject to the approval of the administering power concerned, and that the Secretary-General should not analyze political information. Use by the Secretary-General, for the purposes of comparison, of data on independent states had been approved by the *Ad Hoc* Committee,

⁴The *Ad Hoc* Committee met at Lake Success August 28–September 12, 1947. The Committee was composed of 16 members, eight representing governments transmitting information under Article 73(e)—Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and eight representing Member Governments elected by the General Assembly—Brazil, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, the Philippines, the Soviet Union, and Uruguay. For text of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Fourth Committee* (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Fourth Committee*), annex 4a, pp. 202 ff.

⁵*Infra.*

but had not been very popular with non-reporting states, who saw dangerous implication for themselves. It was generally agreed by the United States that the General Assembly could discuss any matter relating to dependent countries. The United States position papers for the *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that the General Assembly should also have power to make recommendations of a functional character but not to individual states. The *Ad Hoc* Committee had also recommended the establishment by the General Assembly Committee 4 of a Special Committee, but left to the Assembly whether it should meet during or before the next General Assembly.

Mr. Dulles called attention to the difficulty of deciding, in the light of United States foreign policy as a whole, the extent to which the United States should work along with the Western European colonial powers and the extent to which it should come out for dependent peoples. The U.S.S.R., he noted, had refused membership on the Trusteeship Council, but was striving to develop the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which exercised jurisdiction over a wider group of territories, into a serious competitor of the Trusteeship Council. This would make it possible for the U.S.S.R. to stir up more trouble. The U.S.S.R., he recalled, had usually been able to muster a substantial majority against the United States position in such matters. United States Committee IV delegates ought to have a general indication of the United States policy on the fundamental problem.

Ambassador Sayre noted that Mr. Gerig had done an excellent job in the *Ad Hoc* Committee in protecting the interests of the United States. He felt that the position paper went about as far as the United States could go at the moment. He had no doubt that the Soviets intended to make the best of the propaganda potentialities of this issue. Mr. Dulles agreed that Mr. Gerig had done an excellent job in thwarting the extreme tactics of the anti-colonial bloc and at the same time in avoiding identification with the colonial powers. This, said Mr. Dulles, should continue to be the United States policy in the future. He added that it was generally possible for the Russians and Indians to rally Committee 4 against the United States.

Ambassador Sayre pointed out that the great difference between the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the Trusteeship Council lay in the matter of sovereignty. Chapter XI entailed no surrender of sovereignty. Mr. Green replied affirmatively when asked by Ambassador Austin if reports had been received on seventy-four territories. Mr. Fahy held that the United States position was legally sound, but that it would be risky to go further. The United States could not take the position that the information submitted could not be discussed by the General Assembly. Functional recommendations were also proper. Citing Article II(7), he added that the United States was also right in resisting any

effort to have the General Assembly make recommendations to Members with respect to their non-self-governing territories. This position should not be abandoned unless the International Court of Justice decided otherwise. It could not be fairly criticized as a conservative interpretation of the Charter.

The meeting adjourned at 5 : 30 p. m.

ROGER MANN

IO Files : US/A/C.4/34

United States Delegation Working Paper

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] September 15, 1947.

INFORMATION TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73(e) OF THE CHARTER
REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: REPORT OF THE *Ad Hoc*
COMMITTEE

(Preliminary Draft: Subject to Clearance)

THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take with respect to the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on non-self-governing territories.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Delegation should, in general, initiate and support a constructive approach toward the problems of non-self-governing territories. It should reaffirm the traditional American policy of promoting the advancement of dependent peoples to the end that they may achieve the form of self-government or independence which they are desirous and capable of maintaining.

2. The Delegation should avoid associating itself with either the more conservative colonial powers or those intent upon the immediate liquidation of colonial empires. With respect to the latter, the Delegation should oppose efforts to give the General Assembly functions in all non-self-governing territories similar to those which it exercises in trust territories.

3. The Delegation should, in accordance with the foregoing recommendations, support the five resolutions recommended by the Committee.¹ It should oppose efforts to alter these resolutions in any of the following ways:

¹The five resolutions are briefly described in the next paragraph. Complete texts are found in GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 211 ff., with an account of the Committee's drafting work on pp. 206-211.

1. To expand the standard form to be used in the preparation of information into an obligatory questionnaire and to include such objectionable items as immigration;
2. To make information on government institutions obligatory or subject to analysis by the Secretary General;
3. To broaden the resolution on supplemental information to include use of political information and information not approved by the governments concerned, and to delete from this resolution provision for comparisons between dependent areas and independent States; and
4. To permit the General Assembly, or the proposed Special Committee on non-self-governing territories, to make recommendations with respect to individual territories, to examine petitions, or to determine whether a Member should transmit information on any particular territory.

COMMENT

The Committee adopted, with the support of the United States and largely upon its initiative, the following draft resolutions for consideration by the General Assembly:

1. Provisional standard form for the guidance of Members in the preparation of information;
2. Use of supplementary documents by the Secretary General;
3. Voluntary transmission of information regarding the development of self-governing institutions in non-self-governing territories;
4. Collaboration with the specialized agencies; and
5. Creation of a special committee of the Fourth Committee of the Assembly to examine information transmitted under Article 73(e).

The U.S.S.R. launched bitter attacks against the colonial powers, part of which was directed against United States administration of Puerto Rico. The following Soviet proposals, supported by the Philippines, India, China, and Egypt, were defeated:

1. That the information transmitted was inaccurate;
2. That information on local government is obligatory and should be analyzed by the Secretary General;
3. That information from sources not approved by the governments concerned should be summarized by the Secretary General; and
4. That the United Nations should visit, and receive petitions from, non-self-governing territories.

The United States Delegation, by initiating constructive proposals, was able to split the non-colonial powers and to disassociate itself from the more conservative approach of the colonial powers. It supported the idea of comparing conditions in non-self-governing territories with those in independent States on scientific grounds, i.e. as being helpful in evaluating conditions and in revealing the basic causes of certain problems in non-self-governing territories.

Editorial Note

At this time there were before the Fourth Committee other questions regarding non-self-governing territories, apart from the issue of transmission of information under Article 73(e), that were of interest to the United States. These are described briefly in the document that follows, with particular reference to the position taken upon them by the United States.

IO Files : US/A/C.4/54

Memorandum by the Principal Executive Officer of the United States Delegation (Sandifer) to All Political Officers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 8, 1947.

It would be appreciated if Political Officers would explain to other Delegations, but without campaigning for their support, the views of the United States Delegation with respect to the principal items before the Fourth Committee. Controversy has arisen over each item with regard to the interpretation of Chapters XI and XII of the Charter. The "anti-colonial" Delegations have sought consistently to stretch and misinterpret the Charter in order to embarrass the Members which administer trust territories or other non-self-governing territories. The United States Delegation has endeavored to resist every effort made to distort Chapters XI and XII, and to put forward constructive concrete proposals.

*Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru*¹

The Soviet Delegation has raised the question of the "states directly concerned"² in Nauru. Our Delegation will take the same position it did last year, namely, that there is no need under Article 79 of the Charter to define the "states directly concerned", since every Member will have full opportunity at the General Assembly to put forward its views on the draft terms of trusteeship. Only the Members which are submitting the agreement—Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom—need to be considered "states directly concerned" for the purposes of Article 79. Approval of the Nauru agreement without specification of the "states directly concerned" will, of course, not prejudice the rights of any state to claim to be a "state directly concerned" in relation to subsequently proposed trusteeship agreements or any alteration or amendment of the Nauru agreement.

¹ For documentation regarding the conclusion of the first trusteeship agreements in 1946, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 544 ff.

² The issue of "states directly concerned" is discussed in detail in the documentation cited in footnote 1 above.

The Soviet Delegation has also argued that the administering authority of a non-strategic trust territory cannot establish bases there without the consent of the Security Council. The United States Delegation will maintain, as it did last year, that Article 84 of the Charter makes it clear that the administering authority of any trust territory, whether a strategic area or a non-strategic area, is obligated not only to provide for local defense and the maintenance of law and order, but also to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. It may be noted that the Article of the Nauru agreement relating to defense is identical with that of the New Guinea agreement approved by the Assembly last year.

The Indian Delegation has proposed the inclusion of a new article which would provide that the present agreement should remain in effect for a specific period, and then be subject to review. Similar proposals last year were opposed by the United States, and defeated, on the ground that the Charter does not require a time-limit on a trusteeship agreement and that, in any event, termination of a trusteeship agreement is possible at any time upon agreement between the administering authority and the General Assembly.³

*South West Africa*⁴

Mr. Dulles has stated in Committee 4 (USUN Press Release No. 253) that while there is very little difference between the Danish and Indian resolutions on South West Africa,⁵ our Delegation favors the Danish resolution for the following reasons:

(a) the Indian resolution implies that a mandatory power is re-

³ The proposed Nauru trusteeship agreement was approved by the General Assembly on November 1 after a relatively uneventful passage through the Fourth Committee, and the General Assembly, the Soviet Union making the same reservations as with the trusteeship agreements in 1946; see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 25-28, 98-104, 108 and 112-133 (annex 3 and appendages), and United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. I, pp. 569 ff. (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I).

⁴ In a resolution of December 14, 1946, which had the support of the United States, the General Assembly had requested the Union of South Africa not to incorporate the mandated territory of South West Africa into the Union, and further had recommended that the Union Government place the territory under the United Nations trusteeship system. For the legislative history of this resolution, see GA (I/2), *Fourth Committee*, Part III, pp. 99 ff.; and United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings* (hereafter cited as GA (I/2), *Plenary*), pp. 1559 and 1560, annex 76, and pp. 1323 ff. On September 25, 1947, the South African member of the Fourth Committee had informed the Committee that although the Union Government would not submit to a trusteeship agreement it would, in respect of its administration of South West Africa, "maintain the *status quo* in the spirit of the Mandate" (GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, p. 4). The South African Government, he said, "would transmit information annually. Information relating to 1946 was now in the hands of the Secretary-General" (*ibid.*, p. 4).

⁵ On October 1, India and Denmark submitted to the Fourth Committee resolutions that were in general agreement substantively, both calling upon the Union Government to place South West Africa under the trusteeship system; for texts, see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 197 and 200, annexes 3h and 3l respectively.

quired by the Charter to submit a trusteeship agreement for a mandated territory;

(b) the Indian resolution includes a time-limit for the submission of a trusteeship agreement for South West Africa; and

(c) the Danish resolution provides a means by which the report on South West Africa can be considered by the United Nations.

Our Delegation has consistently taken the position that Article 77 of the Charter does not *require* any Member to place any territory under trusteeship.⁶ This is, in our view, the clear intention of the San Francisco Conference and the only tenable interpretation of the Charter. This point of view has been supported by a relatively small number of Members, while the contrary view has been advocated by the Soviet bloc, the Arab Delegation, and several Latin American delegations. While the Indian resolution does not state specifically that the Charter requires the submission of a trusteeship agreement, its language implies this so clearly that our Delegation cannot vote for the resolution.

While the Danish resolution requests South Africa to submit a trusteeship agreement "soon", the Indian resolution urges this action by the next session. It would be desirable to avoid setting a dead-line in order that this question will not have to be debated in even sharper form next year.

Committee 4 has debated at considerable length the question as to what should be done with the report on South West Africa already submitted by South Africa. Our Delegation and many others have taken the position that this report cannot be considered as falling under Article 73(e) of the Charter, since South West Africa still has a special status as a mandated territory. On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that this report should be forwarded to the Trusteeship Council, particularly without the consent of South Africa, since the Council's functions are limited to trust territories. A desirable compromise might be a consideration of the report by the Fourth Committee, as originally suggested by Mr. Dulles,⁷ or, as proposed in the Danish resolution, by a Subcommittee patterned on the Trusteeship Council, but including the Union of South Africa.⁸

⁶ The summary record of Mr. Dulles' statement of the U.S. position to Subcommittee 2 of the Fourth Committee on November 28, 1946, reads as follows:

"The placing under trusteeship of former mandated Territories was not compulsory. It had been acknowledged in London [in January-February 1946] that the Charter allowed for other solutions, for instance, independence, as in the case of Transjordan . . ." (GA (I/2), *Fourth Committee*, Part III, p. 49)

⁷ Mr. Dulles had made this suggestion to the Fourth Committee on the first day of its consideration of the subject of South West Africa, on September 25. (GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, p. 4)

⁸ For a summary of the legislative history of the South West Africa question subsequently in the Fourth Committee and in a subcommittee of the Fourth Committee, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, pp. 1537 ff., annex 13, entitled "Consideration [by the Fourth Committee] of proposed new trusteeship agreements, if any . . ."

Report on the "Ad Hoc" Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73(e)

As Ambassador Sayre has stated in the Fourth Committee (USUN Press Release 244 and 251) the United States is genuinely concerned about the political, economic, and social advancement of all non-self-governing territories to the end that they may achieve the form of independence or self-government which they are desirous and capable of maintaining. The United States is opposed, however, to seeing assimilation of Chapter XI of the Charter to Chapter XII, which would result in the United Nations' being given the same powers of supervision over non-self-governing territories as it exercises over trust territories. Indeed, we feel that efforts of the "anti-colonial" power to interpret Chapter XI so as to imply that the administering powers do not really have full sovereignty or jurisdiction, and that the United Nations can enforce certain "obligations", can only impair the fulfillment of the true purposes of Chapter XI.

This effort to distort Chapter XI of the Charter will be manifested in several different ways. The Soviet Delegation has announced that it will introduce proposals, which were defeated in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, by which the General Assembly would send visiting missions to non-self-governing territories and would receive petitions relating to such territories. Moreover, the Soviet and other Delegations will attempt to amend Resolutions 1 and 3 proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Committee to state that the transmission of information on *political* conditions is required under Article 73(e) of the Charter. Our Delegation will take the position that while the United States is willing voluntarily to transmit information on governmental institutions in territories under its administration, it cannot accept the views that transmission of such information is compulsory, or that it should be analyzed by the Secretary-General.

question of South West Africa." After considering the original Indian and Danish resolutions with a number of amendments, a subcommittee drafted two revised resolutions which, except for the presence of a more rigid time-limit clause in the revised Indian resolution, were identical in every respect, including omission of the "clear intention" clause in the original Indian resolution. Over the opposition of the United States and others, the Fourth Committee adopted (27-20-4) the revised Indian resolution, together with a Polish amendment that restored the preambular paragraph stating that it was the clear intention of the Charter that mandated territories should be placed under trusteeship.

In the General Assembly's consideration of the resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee (the revised Indian resolution), the United States strongly supported two amendments offered by Denmark that were designed to eliminate the "clear intention" clause and to effect a more flexible statement of a time-limit. (For text of Ambassador Sayre's statement in plenary meeting, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I, pp. 577 ff.) The United States also requested that the issue be voted on as an important question under Article 18 of the Charter, requiring a two-thirds vote in approval (*ibid.*, p. 581). The revised Indian resolution as amended by the Danish amendments was approved by the General Assembly on November 1 (41-10-4).

The last paragraph of Resolution 2 proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommends that the Secretary-General may also use, under defined conditions, official publications and documents published by intergovernmental or scientific bodies. It further recommends that the Secretary-General may also use, for purposes of comparison, comparable official, statistical material about sovereign states. For your background information, this last paragraph was inserted by the administering states in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, in order to provide a counter-move against the "anti-colonial" powers. The latter will make strenuous efforts to remove this last paragraph, since it may cause them embarrassment, by comparing conditions in non-self-governing territories with those in neighboring independent states. The Delegation will resist any effort to delete this paragraph on the ground that, if it is desired to provide comparable data for scientific purposes, the comparison should be on as broad a basis as possible.

Indian Resolution on Placing Non-Self-Governing Territories Under Trusteeship

The Delegation of India has submitted a resolution⁹ which proposes that the Members which administer territories referred to under Article 77(c) of the Charter should place under trusteeship such of those territories as are not to be given immediate self-government. The Delegation will vote against this resolution on the ground that it implies that submission of trusteeship agreements for these territories is compulsory rather than voluntary under the Charter, and that the United States is not prepared to place under trusteeship any of the territories which it administers. A position paper (US/A/C.4/53) on the subject is being circulated today for consideration by the Delegation.¹⁰

⁹ For text, see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 217-218, annex 5a.

¹⁰ Not printed.

Editorial Note

On October 13 at an afternoon meeting of the Fourth Committee, Mr. Dulles made the following statement:

"[He] did not wish to stress the constitutional aspect of the Indian representative's draft resolution, since from the point of view of the Charter it seemed to be constitutional. The trusteeship system had not been designed to include only the former mandated territories. The Charter enumerated three categories of territories which might be placed under the trusteeship system. The Italian colonies, for example, were at present being considered from that point of view. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in 1946, the United States delegation had suggested that some of the Italian colonies should indeed be placed under this system. Trusteeship had also been

proposed for Jerusalem in the report by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Neither sub-paragraph 1*b* nor sub-paragraph 1*c* of Article 77 should be regarded as a dead letter.

Every draft resolution should satisfy two essential tests: it should be based on a thoroughly moral standpoint; and it should be based on fact, not fiction. By omitting territories of the category mentioned in Article 77, sub-paragraph 1*b*, the Indian representative's proposal failed to meet those tests. It was for that reason that the United States delegation could not support the Indian representative's proposal.

While territories of the category mentioned in Article 77, sub-paragraph 1*b*, might be dealt with under Article 107, there was no reason for the General Assembly not to express its hope that those territories would be placed under trusteeship, as the Japanese Islands had been. If the omission of such an expression from the resolution was for reasons of convenience, the moral authority of the resolution was undermined.

Paragraph 3 of the Indian draft resolution was open to doubt. Since the Charter had been adopted, three States, at present Members of the United Nations, had achieved their independence without the intervention of the Trusteeship Council. They were India, Pakistan, and the Philippine Republic. Yemen also had attained independence and membership of the United Nations without the intervention of the Trusteeship Council. It was hoped that territories such as Hawaii and Alaska would soon attain to statehood, again without the intervention of the Trusteeship Council. It had been thought that trusteeship would prove advantageous to Korea, and that had been agreed upon in Moscow on 27 December 1945; but, the people of Korea were opposed to trusteeship, and the United States delegation had asked for the immediate independence of Korea, and had placed that item on the agenda of the First Committee.

The United States delegation regarded the colonial system as obsolete, and wished to see it abolished. It welcomed the presence of former colonial territories as Member States of the United Nations, and appreciated the constant effort of the Indian delegation to secure the extension of the trusteeship system. The present resolution, however, was an unsatisfactory means of attaining that end." (GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, page 81)

On October 14, the Fourth Committee voted on the amended Indian resolution (see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pages 217-218, annex 5*a*), and the resolution was approved (25-23-3), the United States voting against. In this connection Mr. Dulles made a second though very brief statement in opposition, explaining the United States position in light of the Indian amendment (*ibid.*, page 90).

The resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee was defeated (24-24-1) by the General Assembly in plenary meeting on November 1. (*In favor*: Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia. *Against*:

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay. *Abstained*: Venezuela.) In its fairly brief consideration of the matter, the General Assembly heard a statement of some length by Mr. Dulles explaining the strong opposition of the United States to the resolution (GA (II), *Plenary*, volume I, pages 657 ff.)

For the legislative history of the resolution, see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pages 78-92 and 217-219, and GA (II), *Plenary*, volume I, pages 651 ff. A Cuban amendment, which was introduced during the plenary discussion and which was accepted before the final vote was taken on the resolution as a whole, changed the wording of a passage in the second preambular paragraph from "... the International Trusteeship System . . . provides the surest and quickest means of enabling the peoples of dependent territories to secure self-government . . ." to "... provides a sure and quick means of enabling"

501.BB/10-1447 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 14, 1947—4: 54 p. m.

URGENT

Delga 31. Special for Gerig from Green.¹

1. Recent decisions taken in Comm 4 on resolutions proposed by *Ad Hoc* Committee raise serious question as to position which GADel should take in plenary meeting.² Resolutions 2, 3, and 5 were drastically amended, to disadvantage of Members administering non-self-governing territories, by votes of 22-18, 20-19, and 23-19 respectively. Effect of amendments is as follows:

Resolution 2, para 6, now provides that the SYG may, for purposes of comparison between data relating to the various non-self-governing territories and their metropolitan areas (rather than relating to the territories and *all* independent states), use official statistical material as is available in the statistical services of Secretariat and as may be agreed upon between SYG and Member concerned.

¹ Seen in draft by Mr. Dulles and Ambassador Sayre.

² For the summary record of the deliberations of the Fourth Committee in respect to the five resolutions, see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 66 ff. For the *Ad Hoc* Committee text for which the United States voted affirmatively, see *ibid.*, pp. 212 and 213; for text of the resolutions adopted by the Fourth Committee on October 10 and which the United States voted against, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, p. 1547 (Report of the Fourth Committee).

Resolution 3, after referring to Article 73(b) of Charter, states transmission of info re results achieved in matter of participation of local populations in work of local organs of adm is entirely within spirit of Article 73 and recommends administering states to transmit such info.³

Under Resolution 5 proposed Special Comm is created by, and its non-administering Members elected by, GA rather than Comm 4; its tenure is 2 years rather than unspecified; its recommendations are not limited to procedural matters and functional fields; and its time of meeting is specified as some weeks before GA.⁴

These decisions were taken only after prolonged debate in which US, UK, and other Delegations presented in clearest and strongest manner possible their interpretation of character and purposes of Chapter XI of Charter, and emphasized limitations of Article 73(e). It is clear that Soviet bloc, Arab States, India, Pakistan, Philippines, and many Latin American countries are determined to continue embarrassing administering Members by misinterpreting Chapter XI.

2. Amended Resolutions 3 and 5, taken together, have far-reaching implications for US and other administering Members. On one hand, an administering Member which does not transmit information on participation of local populations in local organs of government will be censured next year for disregarding a recommendation of the GA. On other hand, any such information transmitted will be subject to censure in recommendations of Special Comm.

3. As Dept is aware, functions of UN under Chapter XI have been steadily expanded from first part of first session of GA through second part and *Ad Hoc* Comm to present session. End of this process is not yet in sight. Fact that Soviet Del did not submit, contrary to its original announcement in Comm 4, proposal that UN should provide for visits to non-self-governing territories and examination of petitions relating to them suggests that this further extension of UN supervision is being postponed until next year.

4. GADel would appreciate Dept's recommendations as to tactics to be employed in plenary meeting. Possible courses, together with preliminary observations, are outlined in paras 5 and 6 below. Dept will

³ For the *Ad Hoc* Committee text on which the United States voted affirmatively, see *ibid.*, p. 213; for text of the resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee, against which the United States voted, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, pp. 1547 and 1548. The amended resolution was moved by the Soviet Union in the Fourth Committee on October 11 and adopted by a vote of 20-19 (GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 72, 76); see also *ibid.*, p. 217, annex 4h.

⁴ The *Ad Hoc* Committee text of Resolution 5 is found in GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, p. 214; the United States supported this draft. This text was amended by the Fourth Committee on October 11 on the motion of the Indian delegate (GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. II, p. 1548); the U.S. voted against the amended resolution. For discussion in the Fourth Committee, see GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 76 ff.; see also *ibid.*, pp. 215 and 216, annex e.

For statements by the United States delegate, Ambassador Sayre, see *ibid.*, pp. 69, 70, 75, 76, and 77.

wish to consider whether it desires a real showdown over Chapter XI this year or would prefer wait until next session when pressure against administering Members will be even heavier. Question also arises as to whether GADel should seek to have the five resolutions considered "important matters" under Article 18 of Charter requiring adoption by two-thirds vote. This involves larger issue as to whether it is in long-term US interest to enlarge list of these "important matters". In any event it might be difficult to argue for two-thirds vote, since resolution constituting *Ad Hoc* Comm was adopted last year by majority vote.

5. Two possible courses which seem feasible are as follows:

(a) GADel could submit amendments, for consideration at a plenary meeting, with a view to restoring original wording of Resolutions 2, 3, and 5. This procedure would indicate US willingness to cooperate in implementing Article 73(e) so long as implementation follows moderate, compromise resolutions agreed upon by *Ad Hoc* Comm. It would involve, however, long debates on technical points and perhaps a complicated series of votes.

(b) GADel could vote in favor of Resolutions 1 and 4 and against Resolutions 2, 3, and 5. We tentatively favor this procedure as it would enable Gadel to salvage two most useful resolutions and probably to eliminate two—Resolutions 3 and 5—which were not wholly satisfactory even in original form. It would involve long debates but these debates could be focused on resolutions rather than amendments.

A third course, which seems less desirable, is the following:

GADel could oppose all five resolutions on ground that balance attained in *Ad Hoc* Comm has been completely upset by actions of Comm 4. This procedure would enable GADel to argue case on general principles and to focus debate on interpretation of Chapter XI. It would have disadvantage, however, of making GADel appear to take a recalcitrant "all or nothing" attitude.

6. If resolutions were adopted in present amended form, GADel could take one or more of following positions, each of which deserves careful consideration in terms of long-range US interests:

(a) GADel, perhaps invoking Article 2(7) of the Charter, could state reservations as to legality of recommendation contained in Resolution 2 and of any recommendations made by proposed Special Comm under amended Resolution 5, and could state that such recommendations cannot be legally and morally binding on administering Members.

(b) GADel could warn that, because of misinterpretation of Chapter XI underlying amended Resolutions 2, 3, and 5, US cannot state at this time that it will be willing to transmit any information on Govt (Section I, D of Standard Provisional Form annexed to Resolution 1) with respect to territories it administers.⁵

⁵ The United States had approved the text of Resolution 1 as voted both in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and in the Fourth Committee.

(c) GADel could propose that GA seek an advisory opinion of ICJ as to proper interpretation of Article 73(e) of Charter especially with respect to interpretation of "for information purposes" and transmission of information on political conditions.

7. Whatever course it is determined that GADel should pursue in plenary meeting, it will be necessary (a) to explain this course with great care in background conferences with press, and (b) to bring some pressure to bear on Latin American and other Delegations to support US position. (Because many other items on the agenda, especially those before Comm 1, have been more urgent, political officers have not sought support of other Delegations on Comm 4 matters.) If two-thirds vote is required in plenary meeting, support of only half the Latin American Delegations would almost be sufficient to enable GADel to defeat any or all of the five resolutions. If only majority vote is required, much wider support would be needed. In order that future GADel course may be explained to press and to other Delegations, Dept's recommendations should be received if possible by end of week. [Green.]

MARSHALL

IO Files : US/A/C.4/65

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council (Sayre)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 16, 1947.

By chance I passed General Romulo¹ in the hallway this morning and engaged in a short conversation with him about the position of the Philippine Delegation with respect to its activities with regard to trusteeship in Committee 4. After a few preliminary remarks I asked General Romulo why the Philippine Delegation is so consistently voting against the United States in that Committee.

General Romulo replied: "Why is the United States following so reactionary a course in Committee 4?" He said that in all the other Committees the Philippine Delegation was consistently voting with the United States; but that in Committee 4 the United States throughout had taken sides with the colonial powers and was following so reactionary a course that the Philippine Delegation, under his instructions, was voting consistently against the United States. He said that as a result of the course which the United States is following in that Committee, it is losing its prestige and leadership among the Oriental peoples and that he felt sorely disappointed in the course we are following. He said that he had several times been tempted to take the floor and express his feelings along this line but that he disliked doing so and had not yet taken that step.

¹ Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, Chairman of the Philippine Delegation.

I replied that the United States is seeking to gain its objectives, i.e., the promotion of the welfare of self-governing peoples, by methods which are practical because we want practical results and not merely high-sounding phrases. I said that I felt that the tactics now being pursued by the non-colonial powers most unwise in order to gain the objectives which they desire. The result in Committee 4 has been to stimulate and produce cleavage between the colonial and non-colonial powers. The various resolutions pushed by the non-colonial powers have been so formulated or so phrased as to needlessly irritate or awaken fears in the minds of the colonial powers. This is the last way to secure steps on the part of the colonial powers to increase the number of territories put under trusteeship and to promote the welfare of non-self-governing peoples. I said that the Soviets have been pressing along such a program and I felt unhappy that General Romulo and other non-colonial delegations should allow themselves to be used in this way.

General Romulo expressed strong disagreement. We agreed to talk the matter over further next week. General Romulo said that he felt so strongly about this matter that he would like to talk further with me and also with Secretary Marshall.

I feel that there is a situation here which needs attention and that further conversations should be pursued.

FRANCIS B. SAYRE

501.BB/10-2347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT

[NEW YORK,] October 23, 1947—11:50 a. m.

Delga 39. Special for Gerig from Green. With reference to voting procedures re five resolutions on information transmitted under Article 73(e) (Delga 31, para 4), UK and France favor attempting to have GA determine that Resolution 5 is one of "important questions" under Article 18 of the Charter requiring decision by two-thirds vote, but leaving other four resolutions to be determined by majority vote. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Sayre support this approach and disagree with tentative views of Dept, reported in telephone conversation yesterday afternoon, that GADel should seek to have GA determine that all five resolutions require two-thirds vote. Reasons for limiting such action to Resolution 5 are as follows:

1. Any effort to have all five resolutions declared "important questions" would quite possibly fail and permit Resolution 5, which offers greatest threat to administering Members, to be adopted by majority

vote. Administering Members will be in much stronger position to argue for decision on Resolution 5 by two-thirds vote if they do not press for similar procedure for other four resolutions.

2. Strong case can be made for declaring Resolution 5 subject to two-thirds vote, since present amended text proposes establishment of an apparently permanent organ comparable in composition and in some functions to TC.

3. Effort to have all five resolutions subject to two-thirds vote may be contrary to long-term US interests re Charter as a whole. It would be better to favor decisions by majority vote wherever possible and to discourage efforts to give minority blocs "veto" in GA.

Dept's views requested urgently.¹ [Green.]

MARSHALL

¹The Department approved the Delegation's suggestions in a telegram of October 27.

IO Files: US/AM(Chr)/72

Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, October 28, 1947, 9:15 a. m.

SECRET

[Here follows list of persons (28) present.]

REPORT OF THE FOURTH COMMITTEE ON THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Ambassador Sayre referred to document US/A/705.¹ He pointed out that the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Committee 4 had agreed on five resolutions, four of which were concerned with information transmitted in accordance with Article 73(e) of the Charter. The United States and others had agreed on a compromise between the colonial and non-colonial powers, but when the *Ad Hoc* Committee had reported to Committee 4 the resolutions had been amended in a way which was unfortunate from the point of view of the United States. Ambassador Sayre referred to resolution No. 1 regarding the handling of information when submitted. There had been no serious amendment to this. Resolution No. 2, regarding the furnishing of political information, which may be found in document US/A/706,² presented difficulties. Ambassador Sayre read paragraph 6:

¹ Not printed. It was a delegation position paper dealing in very general fashion with the Report of the Fourth Committee on the Transmission of Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories (the five resolutions).

² Not printed. It contained the text of Resolution 2 as adopted by the Fourth Committee, and the text of a proposed amendment to be submitted by the United States to the General Assembly in plenary meeting. The amendment simply restored the original text recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Subsequently, it was in fact submitted jointly with Brazil, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Uruguay.

6. That for purposes of comparison between data relating to the various non-self-governing territories and their metropolitan areas, the Secretary-General should be authorized, in addition, to include in his summaries and analysis all relevant and comparable official statistical information as is available in the statistical services of the Secretariat and as may be agreed upon between the Secretary-General and the member concerned, giving appropriate citation of sources.

Ambassador Sayre pointed out that the original recommendation had been that information coming in might be compared with similar information from other places even if these were independent. The non-colonial powers had objected to being compared with colonial states. They didn't want an examination by the United Nations into conditions in non-colonial territories. The non-colonial powers and the Soviets inserted the comparison between non-self-governing territories and their metropolitan areas. The United States delegation wants to return to the original form. There could be valuable comparisons made between similar areas.

Ambassador Sayre referred to resolution No. 3 (US/A/707)³ concerning the voluntary transmission of information regarding development of self-governing institutions in the non-self-governing territories. He pointed out that Article 73(e) of the Charter specifically omitted political information. The non-colonial powers have been fighting ever since to get it in. The United States voluntarily submitted political information regarding its own colonies but has maintained that there could be no binding obligation to submit such information. The non-colonial powers want to remove the word voluntary from the enacting clause. Thus Resolution No. 3 recommends transmitting political information. If this is not sent in next year then the non-colonial powers will come in with a condemnation.

Mrs. Roosevelt inquired why such information would not be transmitted. Ambassador Sayre replied that it was perfectly all right for the United States. The United Kingdom, however, takes the position that once such information were transmitted it would be open to dangerous attack. It was part of an attempt by the non-colonial powers to set up a regime as much as possible like the trusteeship regime.

Mrs. Roosevelt referred to the paragraph in US/A/707 reading "Considers that the transmission of information relating to the results achieved in the matter of the participation of local populations in the work of local organs of administration is entirely in conformity with the spirit of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and recommends those states responsible for non-self-governing territories to transmit

³Not printed. Read here footnote 2 above, substituting "Resolution 3" for "Resolution 2."

such information". She said that to her that meant that the state responsible was to say how progress has been made in local governments. If it meant what it said, then she couldn't see the harm in it, so she would like to have this explained.

Ambassador Sayre read Article 73(e) from the Charter. He said that we don't object to sending information but we do object to its being obligatory. He said that the resolution No. 3 was the first step in a drive to set up a body roughly comparable to the Trusteeship Council but concerned with colonial territories whose sovereignty resides in the colonial power. Mrs. Roosevelt observed that she was not sure this was not a good thing. She referred to the bad conditions in places where the United Kingdom had been for a hundred years and she thought they might profitably be looked at. She couldn't help wondering what the United Kingdom had been doing there for a hundred years. She did not see anything improper, looking at it as a man in the street, although she said she did not know much about the question. She supposed that something might be found in our own colonies. She asked why we should stand against something that will improve the colonies. Mr. Sayre replied that we want to find the most practical and constitutional methods within the Charter. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she saw the Charter did not give authority for this but she could not see that the thing was wrong itself and that we should oppose it on that basis. She just could not see this. Mr. Sayre replied that the United States have always favored improving colonial conditions in the framework of the Charter.

Mr. Dulles commented that the trouble was we only had one word for the Assembly to use, the word "recommend". No one knows the limits of that word. It is used in the most flagrant cases, as in the case of Greece. Other times it is used when we really mean to say that it would be nice to do certain things. The colonial powers are afraid of being treated as was Yugoslavia for its attack on Greece, or South Africa for its attitude on South West Africa. This language was causing a great deal of trouble in several cases and there needed to be a distinction between a Charter violation and indicating that something was a good thing to do. Mr. Dulles recalled that he had previously said that the General Assembly had the right to make recommendations reflecting the moral judgment of the world as well as a moral obligation. If this Assembly could say that something would be a good idea, but there was no obligation, the difficulty could be resolved, but we are using the same language for strong recommendations as for weak ones.

Mrs. Roosevelt commented that the original resolution which was attached to US/A/707 was probably safer, but it was hard for a layman to understand why we were opposing resolution No. 3. Ambassador Sayre pointed out that we were trying to get as much

information as possible. Everyone but the United Kingdom would agree to an amendment to the original resolution.

Mr. Notter referred to the Dumbarton Oak talks regarding the word "recommend". The Soviets had a ruthless adherence to logic. Time and time again in formulation groups the Soviets had insisted upon putting the word with the highest power in the Charter on the ground that lesser power was carried with it, so this did not mean that the General Assembly had to "recommend" every time it wanted to "resolve" on something. It can do the lesser things since it can make a recommendation. He noted that in connection with the first resolution that the non-colonial powers would have to do a complete about-face and this might present difficulties.

At this point Ambassador Austin interrupted the discussion to turn to the Interim Committee item on the agenda. The discussion of the Fourth Committee topic is resumed later in these minutes.

[Here follows discussion of the question of requirement of two-thirds majority for inclusion of items on the agenda of the Interim Committee.]

The meeting returned to a consideration of this item.⁴

Ambassador Sayre continued that we wanted to do everything that can be done for the colonial peoples. At San Francisco the United States had taken the lead in this respect. In the *Ad Hoc* Committee at this session, we had taken the lead as far as seemed possible to do so. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she thought that if a vote could be gotten on the original resolution, which was attached to US/A/707, that this should be done. She had not realized that this would be possible. Mr. Sayre replied that the United Kingdom was going to vote against the resolution under any circumstances. There had been many conferences with the other powers and he believed that the votes [were?] to be had for the amended form of Resolution 3. Ambassador Austin inquired whether Ambassador Sayre saw any great difference in the meaning of the two texts, if it were not for a suspicion which underlay them. He asked if there were really any great difference. Ambassador Sayre replied that there was all the difference in the world to a technician but not to a layman. Mrs. Roosevelt said that she saw the difference. She said that she was not worried about the United Kingdom, she was not a bit worried about their not liking the resolution, but she saw that Resolution No. 3 was not possible under the Charter.

Ambassador Austin asked whether there was any objection to attempting to secure the amendments to Resolution No. 3 which were attached to US/A/707. There being no objection, it was decided that the United States would submit the amendments to that resolution.

⁴ i.e., Report of the Fourth Committee on the Transmission of Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Ambassador Sayre continued with Resolution No. 5 (US/A/708) concerning the creation of a special committee on information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter. Mr. Sayre pointed out that this had the same background as the preceding resolution.

At this point Ambassador Austin and Mr. Dulles had to leave to attend a meeting.

The non-colonial powers, Ambassador Sayre continued, wanted to set up a body to consider information under 73(e). The *Ad Hoc* Committee was in favor of setting up a small committee which should not make recommendations regarding special conditions in specific countries. The Soviets had introduced an amendment to set up a permanent committee which would be very much like the Trusteeship Council. So it was important that a two-thirds vote should be required for setting up this committee, because it was not possible for a two-thirds vote to be mustered in favor of this resolution. Enough votes could be mustered for the original *Ad Hoc* Committee resolution No. 5, which is contained in US/A/708.⁵ Although many colonial powers were against an *Ad Hoc* Committee on 73(e) information, they will agree to it in the original form for reasons of practical politics. This would be doing the most that could be done under the Charter, and Ambassador Sayre recommended that we should agree. He recommended that the delegation should submit the proposed amendments. Mrs. Roosevelt and Mr. Fahy said that they agreed. Mr. Stevenson concurred. Accordingly, Secretary Marshall said that the delegation should follow that course.

Ambassador Sayre pointed out that he was confident that resolution No. 5 needed a two-thirds vote in the Assembly and he thought we should insist on this.

[Here follows consideration of another subject.]

⁵ Not printed. It contained the text of Resolution 5 as adopted by the Fourth Committee, and the text of a proposed amendment to be submitted by the United States to the General Assembly in plenary meeting. The amendment simply restored the original text recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Subsequently, it was in fact submitted jointly with Brazil, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Uruguay.

IO Files : US/A/743

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States Representative
on the Trusteeship Council (Sayre)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 29, 1947.

Participants: Raja Sir Maharaj Singh, Indian Delegation
H.E. Mr. Liu Chieh, Chinese Delegation
Mr. Awni Khalidy, Delegation of Iraq
Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, United States
Delegation

I met with Raja Singh, Ambassador Liu Chieh, and Mr. Khalidy for luncheon today to discuss pending questions with regard to the South West African resolution and the *Ad Hoc* Committee resolutions which were passed in the Fourth Committee.

[Here follows very brief discussion of the South West Africa resolution.]

We turned next to a consideration of the five resolutions passed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. I spoke of our concern that action should be confined strictly within the limits of the Charter; for the weakening of the Charter must mean eventually the weakening of the United Nations. I spoke of the hope of the United States that all groups might find agreement and muster the necessary votes required in the plenary session upon the basis of a return to the five resolutions as originally passed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee before the Assembly meeting.

Raja Singh said that he could not agree to the proposal of returning to the five original *Ad Hoc* resolutions. He said that this would mean a wiping out of all the work which they had achieved in the Fourth Committee and that he could not persuade his own people to abandon everything they had stood and fought for in the Fourth Committee.

Ambassador Liu said that he felt the force of my presentation of the situation but that he could not sign in advance an agreement to go back to the original five *Ad Hoc* Committee resolutions because this would mean a repudiation of everything done in the Fourth Committee. He said that he might be found voting with us in the plenary session when it came to a vote, but that he could make no promises in advance. With respect to the Fifth Resolution, he said that he would be agreeable to the Resolution being changed so as to provide for an annual, rather than a permanent, committee; but that in his opinion it should be appointed, as was done last year, by the General Assembly rather than by the Fourth Committee.

Mr. Khalidy also said that he did not feel able to agree to come along with our group, although he might be found voting for at least some of our amendments.

In the subsequent discussion, Mr. Khalidy expressed regret that the United States "was following such a reactionary course". He said that there exists a feeling among many of the smaller states that the United States, instead of taking a position of independent leadership, was acting merely as one of the colonial powers opposing progress and blocking the promotion of the welfare of dependent peoples.

I explained that this was not at all the fact and sought to show that what the United States is seeking is a program to promote the welfare of non-self-governing peoples which is practical and which is constitutionally within the limits of the Charter. I said that the two alternatives were either, on the one hand, to frame measures which are constitutional and practical and for which sufficient votes can be mustered to secure their passage, or, on the other hand, to propose measures of an idealistic nature for which so few votes could be secured that the net result would be the passage of no resolution at all.

Our discussion was on a most friendly and rather intimate basis. I believe that some of the ideas which I expressed did reach their mark.

FRANCIS B. SAYRE

IO Files: US/A/709

*United States Delegation Working Paper*¹

RESTRICTED

[NEW YORK.]

INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Draft Statement for Possible Use in the Plenary Meeting

It is with genuine regret that the United States Delegation finds itself unable to support all the five resolutions with respect to the implementation of Article 73(e) of the Charter which the Fourth Committee has laid before the Assembly for adoption. The United States is prepared to support Resolutions 1 and 4 as adopted by the Fourth Committee. It is also prepared to move the adoption of Resolutions 2, 3, and 5 in the form in which they were reported by large majorities from the *Ad Hoc* Committee, which consisted of an equal number of administering Members and non-administering Members. My Government is convinced, however, that those three resolutions, as now modified by narrow majorities in the Fourth Committee, would take the United Nations so far beyond the Charter framework that they should not be adopted by this Assembly.

¹This paper, although dated October 27, is inserted here because it contains the substance of statements made to the General Assembly on November 1 and November 3 by Ambassador Sayre; see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. I, pp. 668, 669-671, 720, 721, and 735-737. At the end he submitted a motion that the voting procedure be conducted under Article 18 of the Charter as an important question requiring a two-thirds majority. This motion was carried (29-22-5) on a roll-call vote (*ibid.*, p. 743).

In view of the importance which my Government attaches to these resolutions, I wish to explain as frankly and clearly as possible the position of the United States Government in regard to them.

At the outset, let me call attention to the carefully qualified provisions of Article 73(e) :

1. The information to be transmitted is defined as "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories". The possibility of including political information was discussed at San Francisco and, after careful consideration, was deliberately rejected.

2. The transmission of the information is made subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require.

3. The information is to be transmitted "for information purposes".

The Assembly is most certainly aware that in spite of these limitations of the Charter the United States desires to give the widest practicable application to Article 73(e). At the last session of the General Assembly, the United States initiated a proposal that information transmitted to the Secretary General for information purposes might be analyzed and classified as well as summarized by the Secretary General for the information of the General Assembly. It has cooperated in a loyal and constructive spirit with the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. My Government went beyond the strict requirements of the Charter by voluntarily transmitting information on governmental institutions in the non-self-governing territories administered by the United States. It has taken these steps in the hope that all members of the United Nations would cooperate in a constructive but reasonable application of Chapter XI. The United States Government, however, has reluctantly been driven to the conclusion that certain delegations are apparently willing to sacrifice the possibilities of practical achievement in this field by making demands which invade and apparently transgress the constitutional rights and relations of members to the territories they administer. If this approach is followed and further developed in the future, it is not only likely to frustrate the positive work that could and should be done in the interest of the inhabitants of all these territories, but it may actually cause resentments and perhaps a resort to invoking the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter.

The United States Delegation is hopeful and confident that the Assembly will perceive and realize that unusual wisdom and restraint should characterize our actions with respect to Chapter XI, which was drafted as a declaration of policy with such thought and care at the San Francisco Conference. The careful balance there achieved should not be upset by either the administering or the non-administering powers.

Next, may I briefly refer to each of the specific resolutions before us. Resolution 1 should, I believe, be supported unanimously by this Assembly. It stands virtually in the form agreed to and adopted in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It proposes the use of a standard form carefully worked out to serve as a basis for the annual reports required under Article 73(e) and suggests an optional category of material which, while going beyond the strict requirements of that Article, would undoubtedly prove useful and serviceable.

The second resolution, as adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee by a vote of 12 to 1, included a paragraph authorizing the Secretary General to include in his summaries and analyses such relevant and comparable data in the statistical services of the Secretariat as may be agreed upon by the Members concerned. The purpose of this paragraph was to provide, as a basis for scientific investigation, that comparisons might be made of conditions in *similar* areas, whether dependent territories or sovereign states. Matters such as health, or labor, or agriculture, are not confined to non-self-governing territories. They affect a whole continent, a whole region, or, in many instances, the whole world. These problems cannot be adequately analyzed unless it is possible to make comparisons, not merely between one dependent territory and another but, as appropriate, between dependent territories and sovereign states affected by the same particular problem. The Fourth Committee, however, by a narrow margin of 22 to 18, modified the resolution to provide that comparisons should be made only as between the non-self-governing territories and the metropolitan areas of the nations which administer them. My Delegation does not consider that a comparison limited to eight more or less industrialized countries would have any great practical value. Since, under the *Ad Hoc* Committee's resolution, a Member must consent to the use by the Secretary General of the data in question, how can there be any objection to the adoption of a resolution which will permit any member to agree to its use for purposes of comparison? The United States Delegation feels, therefore, that in its present form, the second resolution, which ignores the international character of economic and social problems, is unacceptable. It moves, therefore, an amendment (A/) which would restore the original text adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

Now let us examine the third resolution which relates to the transmission of information on self-governing institutions in non-self-governing territories. As recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, this resolution states that the voluntary transmission of such information is entirely in conformity with the spirit of Article 73 of the Charter and should, therefore, be duly noted and encouraged. My Government, which as a matter of fact had included such information in the reports which it transmitted under Article 73(e), appreciated this acknowl-

edgment of the voluntary action which it and other Governments had taken. While it had some misgivings as to the language used in referring to this voluntary action as being "in conformity with the spirit of Article 73", it felt that the use of the word "voluntary" and the general tone of the resolution permitted the United States to support the resolution. The *Ad Hoc* Committee's vote on this resolution, which had been submitted by China, Cuba, and India, was adopted without a dissenting voice among the fourteen Members. What happened to this resolution in the Fourth Committee? A Soviet amendment, adopted by a majority of one (the vote being 20 to 19), deleted the word "voluntary" from the final paragraph of the resolution and substituted, in place of the more proper language of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, "noting" and "encouraging" the voluntary transmission of this information, a "recommendation" that this information be transmitted. The effect intended by this amendment is to create an obligation which the Charter clearly and significantly avoids. The United States Delegation, therefore, opposes the third resolution in its amended, present form, and moves the adoption of an amendment (A/) which would restore the language according with the Charter provisions, as proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The fourth resolution on the role of specialized agencies with respect to information transmitted under Article 73(e) was unanimously adopted by the Fourth Committee as recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. My Government considers this to be a very useful resolution and hopes the Assembly will adopt it.

The fifth and last resolution on this subject is the most important of all. It proposes the creation of a special committee or organ to examine the information transmitted under Article 73(e). A resolution on this subject was initially drafted by the Representative of India in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and, after a few amendments, was adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee without a dissenting vote. This resolution, which I shall refer to as the first Indian resolution in order to distinguish it from the second which was adopted by the Fourth Committee, wisely defined the type of recommendations which it would be proper for the Committee to make, and provided that the Committee should be constituted as a special subcommittee of the Fourth Committee which would meet as the General Assembly might decide. What happened to the first Indian resolution as adopted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee without a dissenting voice? It was later abandoned in the Fourth Committee. Instead, the Indian Delegation brought in a new resolution, subsequently adopted by the Fourth Committee by the slight margin of 23 to 19. This resolution leaves undefined the type of recommendations which the special committee may make, thus apparently giving free rein to the proposed committee to trespass as it pleases in fields falling exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction

of the administering Members. Furthermore, the second Indian resolution gives the special committee an independent and apparently permanent status not unlike that of the Trusteeship Council, by making it, not a subcommittee of the Fourth Committee, but a committee or organ of the General Assembly, with its members elected for a period of two years by the General Assembly and with the power to meet when the General Assembly itself is not in session. This would seem quite out of line with the carefully drawn provisions of the Charter. The United States Delegation, for all these reasons, opposes the fifth resolution in its present form and moves an amendment (A/), which would restore the original text agreed to in the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The United States Delegation is genuinely and sincerely concerned over the political, economic, and social advancement and welfare of the millions of people who have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. It seeks ways that are practical and ways that are constitutional for achieving this end. It therefore favors the adoption of the five resolutions as proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. Because the United States Delegation desires that the well-being of these people be fostered in conformity with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter, it opposes Resolutions 2, 3, and 5 as reported in their amended form by the Fourth Committee.²

² The final result of a succession of votes by the General Assembly on November 3 was General Assembly approval of the motions, jointly submitted by the six delegations, to restore the texts of Resolutions 2, 3, and 5 to the original texts recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. For discussion by the General Assembly on November 1 and November 3, see GA (II), *Plenary*, vol. 1, pp. 667 ff. For texts of the five resolutions regarding transmission of information under Article 73(e) of the Charter, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions*, pp. 48 ff.

IO Files : US/A/C.4/78

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James F. Green of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] November 5, 1947.

Participants: Ambassador Liu Chieh, Representative, Delegation of China
 Raja Sir Maharaji Singh, Representative, Delegation of India
 Ambassador Padilla Nervo, Representative, Delegation of Mexico
 Judge Jose D. Ingles, Alternative Representative, Delegation of the Philippines
 Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, United States Delegation
 Mr. Earle R. Dickover, United States Delegation
 Mr. James Frederick Green, United States Delegation

The four representatives of non-administering Members were invited to lunch at the Colony Inn today to discuss the question of establishing the Special Committee on information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter. The principal points of the conversation, which lasted almost an hour and a half, are summarized below.

Ambassador Sayre said that because the United States was genuinely and sincerely interested in the welfare of the peoples of non-self-governing territories the United States Delegation was somewhat concerned over the split which had developed in the Fourth Committee between the administering Members and the non-administering Members. The development of such conflicts might prove injurious to non-self-governing peoples. The Delegation had sought, whenever possible, to secure cooperation between these two groups in the effort to make progress along a constructive program. It sought to avoid conflicts which might result in the more conservative colonial powers becoming resentful and apprehensive and hence less ready to cooperate in an international cooperative program. Ambassador Sayre said that he was not interested in going over all that had previously happened in the Fourth Committee, but he hoped that in the future all could work together in a more cooperative attitude. He pointed out that in the Trusteeship Council no such split had developed, and that on only one minor occasion had there been a division in the voting between the administering Members and the non-administering Members. Ambassador Sayre concluded by saying that he thought it might be profitable to exchange views on three questions: first, when should the Special Committee be elected; second, what Members should be chosen; third, when should the Committee meet?

Ambassador Liu said that there was also a fourth question—what should the Special Committee do when it met? In other words, should it be just a rubber stamp, as the colonial powers seem to desire? Ambassador Liu said that he was not aware of any such division in the Fourth Committee. None of the non-administering Members had consulted together or worked out a common policy. In response to a question from Ambassador Liu the other representatives present agreed that this was true. On the other hand, Ambassador Liu went on, the colonial powers seemed to have cooperated very closely and to have persuaded the United States to become their spokesmen. In his opinion everybody in the Fourth Committee had rejoiced over Ambassador Sayre's opening speech on the resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Committee because it represented a fine liberal spirit. In his closing speech, how-

ever, Ambassador Sayre seemed to have taken back everything he had said earlier. Nevertheless, he was sure no one had ever considered the United States as a colonial power.

Ambassador Sayre remarked that there was no inconsistency in the two speeches since they had been written at the same time. The United States always took a liberal view in the colonial field but it wanted to see things done within the framework of the Charter.

Raja Singh said that two developments had greatly upset the non-administering Members. In the first place they resented the insistence of the administering Members that the Indian Resolution and the Fifth Resolution of the *Ad Hoc* Committee required a two-thirds vote. They regretted that the United States had unnecessarily taken such a strict position on this question. In the second place, these Members felt that the plenary meetings had completely overturned the work of the Fourth Committee. In fact, the Fourth Committee might just as well never have met.

Ambassador Padilla Nervo said that he agreed with these views and that he felt strongly that the Indian Resolution, which merely expressed a hope that non-self-governing territories should be placed under trusteeship, required a two-thirds vote. The colonial powers, he added, may have set a precedent which they will regret some day.

Ambassador Liu commented that he had invented the phrase "non-self-governing territories" at the San Francisco Conference. Lord Cranborne had presented a paper on trusteeship which also dealt with what were then called "dependent territories". Ambassador Liu had suggested that the latter was not an accurate or desirable phrase and suggested "non-self-governing territories". Lord Cranborne had remarked that "non-self-governing territories" contained too many hyphens and was unpronounceable, but it had now become the standard phrase. Both the United Kingdom and Australia, Ambassador Liu went on, had tied trusteeship and non-self-governing territories closely together in all their discussions at San Francisco. Therefore, he could not agree with the view that the Charter did not intend that non-self-governing territories should be placed under trusteeship.

Raja Singh commented that the United States had no business dragging in the "category (b)" territories during the discussion of the Indian Resolution. The Charter said nothing about the order in which territories should be placed under trusteeship. The whole issue was completely irrelevant.

Ambassador Sayre asked when the Special Committee should be elected, as the Resolution was not clear on this point. Several of the

colonial powers, he went on, had told him that they favored holding the election next year rather than at this session. Raja Singh replied that he felt strongly that the Committee should be elected at this session. Ambassador Liu asked how a subcommittee of the Fourth Committee could be elected at this session if it were to meet next year, since the Fourth Committee would go out of existence some time this month. He said that he could recall no precedent for the establishment, by a Committee of the Assembly, of a subcommittee which would meet after the end of the session. This showed that the colonial powers really did not want such a committee.

Ambassador Sayre asked whether the other representatives had any views as to which States should be elected to the Special Committee. None of the representatives gave any indication as to their views.

Ambassador Sayre then asked when the Committee should meet. He said that he had a completely open mind on this point, but he did see that there were fairly strong arguments in favor of a meeting during the next session of the Assembly. This arrangement would save the time of busy officials; it would be less expensive; and it would give the Secretariat more time to prepare the documents. In any case, the Fourth Committee would have plenty of time to deal with this subject next year.

Raja Singh said that it was absolutely essential that the Special Committee should meet before the General Assembly. There would be much more detailed information to review than was available last year. None of the representatives would have time during the General Assembly to give attention to this very important matter.

Ambassador Padilla Nervo agreed with this view, and added that it was impossible for the smaller delegations to deal with these complicated technical problems during the regular session of the Assembly. The large delegations of the colonial powers thus had an unfair advantage. In response to questions from Ambassador Sayre, both Ambassador Liu and Judge Ingles agreed that the Special Committee should meet two weeks before the Assembly.

Summing up the conversation, Ambassador Sayre said that it appeared to be the view of the other four representatives present that the Fourth Committee should elect the non-administering Members tomorrow and that the Special Committee should meet two weeks before the General Assembly. He said that he would pass on these views to the colonial powers if they consulted him on this matter. He suggested that someone ought to submit to the Fourth Committee tomorrow a Resolution which would make recommendations on this matter to the General Assembly. Ambassador Sayre said that he would give

careful thought to the views expressed by the other representatives on these points.¹

J. F. GREEN

¹ On November 6 the Fourth Committee met and chose the eight elective members of the Special Committee, in accordance with the terms of Resolution 146 (II); these were China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Sweden, and the Soviet Union. States who were members of the Committee by virtue of transmitting information under Article 73(e) were Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the same meeting, it was decided that the Special Committee should meet at a date to be fixed by the Secretary General, not less than two weeks before the next regular session of the General Assembly. (GA (II), *Fourth Committee*, pp. 108 and 109.)

IO Files : US/A/912

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harley E. Notter of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 14, 1947.

My conversation at Lake Success with General Romulo today was designed to moderate his known support of the main provisions of the resolution proposed by India on the problem of the treatment of the Indians in South Africa, since we were trying to win changes in substance of that resolution.¹ It was broadened immediately by General Romulo to United States relations with his Delegation.

I said that in the temporary absence of our liaison officer at the plenary meeting at Flushing, I had come to him during the discussion in Committee 1 to tell him in advance of our attitude that the three substantive provisions in the resolution proposed by India should all be modified. We did not wish to have a condemnation of either of the two parties, South Africa or India. We felt that the present resolution by affirming last year's resolution and by basing the projected round-table conversations singly upon that resolution as the basis for those conversations was too narrow and, because it would further antagonize South Africa, it would not promote the real objective—a settlement of the difficulty between the two parties. In the interest of having the problem resolved as expeditiously as possible, we felt that modification of these paragraphs was essential. I said that since he was on the speakers' list, and would speak before the United States Delegate made his brief remarks, we thought he might

¹ For text of the Indian resolution as voted upon by the General Assembly, see GA (II), *Plenary*, pp. 1612 ff., annex 26; for statement by the United States Delegate to the General Assembly (Fahy) in opposition to the resolution, see *ibid.*, pp. 1129 ff. The United States was opposed to a reaffirmation of the General Assembly's resolution of December 8, 1946, as called for in the draft Indian resolution, believing that the resolution had been unsuccessful in getting India and South Africa together.

like to be apprised of our views in these specific matters even though we understood that he would oppose our position in general.

He expressed the greatest appreciation for this courtesy and remarked that he agreed with the view I had expressed that we were really dealing in this problem with the social attitudes held by great masses of the people directly concerned, and that, as all thoughtful persons knew, such attitudes were too unwieldy even for governments to move excepting slowly. It should be noted here that in his subsequent speech, which was brilliantly reasoned and was one of the best short speeches made in the present Assembly, he opposed having condemnation of any kind in the resolution and left the door open for widening the basis of the round-table talks to include related issues rather than last year's resolution solely. He therefore did try to assist us to win our main changes while supporting in general the Indian resolution.

General Romulo immediately broadened the scope of the conversations by remarking that this was the first time that any member of the American Delegation other than the liaison officer, Mr. Dickover, "who is friendly and helpful", had talked with him on the substance of our views. He said that he had been asked often what he was going to do and how he was going to vote, and that sometimes he had been urged to vote in favor of our position, which he was glad to do whenever his own convictions were not in issue or his announced position had precluded a shift on his part. He said that throughout the time that Mr. Marshall had been here, he had not had a word with the General, though he had done his best in the war to fight successfully to carry out the orders of General Marshall. I broke in there to say that Secretary Marshall preferred not to linger in lounges for conversations but rather to have talks in his office or rooms with whoever wished to do so, and that perhaps Mr. Romulo did not know that Mr. Marshall's door had been open to such initiative and many had had such talks. He seemed most particularly hurt that he had not had an opportunity "to shake hands" with General Marshall. (Apparently he ignored the opening U.S. reception and meant special personal recognition.) He fully shares the unqualified admiration for Mr. Marshall by all the Delegates here. He remarked that he also had not had conversations with Mr. Austin or other ranking members of the American Delegation, though "of course" they had exchanged greetings as they met each other in the various rooms at the United Nations. I remarked that U.S. Delegates were so busy that much of their conversational work was carried on through the assistance of the advisers. He said he completely recognized that Philippine security and all its other major interests were wrapped up with the interests of the United States, and that the destiny of the Philippines at all times and par-

ticularly its fate in the event of war was wholly identified with the United States. He hoped that we might see that if he could be informed of our views in substance, there would be many times when he could support us and help to rally support. As things had gone on heretofore, he had too little direct knowledge through contact with our delegates in person to know enough to proceed even on matters which were of concern directly to his own country "because they were of concern directly to the United States". "How do you think I feel when I am ignored?"

While stressing his loyalty to the United States, and making clear in various ways his admiration of our delegates and the chief officials in Washington, and in fact basing his next remarks on those feelings, he deplored the weakening of our moral leadership on the questions relating to dependent peoples and the colored independent peoples. He said that the world had changed drastically since the beginning of the war, that the State Department could not seem somehow to realize that the colonial peoples were not going to be content with the step-by-step progress which we seemed so much to emphasize in our policies in the Trusteeship Committee and in other ways, as in the Indonesian case before the Security Council.² At that point I said that he should be the first to realize that the rapid granting of independence to the Philippines had been made possible by reason of the solid fact that the Filipino people had not only asserted their rights and had been willing to go through a process of preparation for independence, but above all, that they had genuinely realized that independence meant responsibilities as well as rights. He said he completely agreed that sense of responsibility and readiness to discharge the duties of independence or self-government were requisite. He then said that he fully appreciated that the Indonesians were not ready for complete self-government and he would be the first to admit this. Nevertheless, he went on, the only way to instill in them the right attitude and to develop their sense of responsibility was to treat them as human beings who did have capacity for self-rule, moderation and discipline. The Netherlands was violating every day the principle that men have to be guided and helped to learn their duty, and they can't be expected to get that right idea by being shot down. Did the Netherlands give opportunity for their development? In contrast, as he put it, he used the illustration that while the Americans had shot down Filipinos in the early years of our occupation, we had changed as soon as Aguinaldo had been captured; and we had then immediately established schools and started training the people through experience in self-rule step by step to get them ready for independence. "Indonesia now will be inde-

² For documentation on the Indonesian matter, see vol. VI, pp. 890 ff.

pendent in a year, still not prepared." He said that he particularly deplored that the United States had so strongly sided against forcing the Netherlands to adopt conciliatory attitudes and to move on constructive lines of development in Indonesia. He said we were undermining our influence in the Far East among all colored races and ruining the "wonderful" capital we had accumulated by our treatment of the Filipinos.

He said that the United States was now carrying this same "reactionary" attitude over to the treatment of the Indians in South Africa by siding with the Government of South Africa rather than pressing that Government to confer the right to decent treatment on all the depressed groups in the jurisdiction of South Africa. I said that I hoped he would realize how long it had taken—a full generation and more—to prepare the Filipinos for independence, and that the United States was still busy, for another example, preparing Puerto Ricans for self-government. I said that any great social changes took a good deal of time. Even attitudes having nothing to do with the so-called color problems show that fact, as witness the 40-year struggle in the United States to get adoption of the income tax, which was a much fairer tax based on ability to pay than we had ever had in the United States until the end of World War I. He admitted the point but said that since World War II, the colonial peoples were determined to get self-rule at once, and we had better do our best in that direction in order to have the friendship and support of their millions of population—especially their manpower.

He said that he hoped it would be possible for him to have a conversation with General Marshall and if that were not possible, a conversation with some other high official of the Department of State. If that were not possible, he would welcome having me convey some of his views to the members of the Department of State, all of whom he thought deserved great praise for their ability and whose "only fault" so far as he could see was that "you officers of the Department of State held yourselves apart from every one else." He said that if we had wide enough contacts with other delegations, we would know that we are not popular "down underneath". The election of Aranha over Evatt had been a protest against the pressure of the United States to elect Dr. Evatt.³ On several other occasions in this Assembly, he said, delegations had to decide whether to support the United States on some broad issue of vital consequence to the world as well as to the United States, or to oppose by way of showing their disapproval of our attitude of making up our minds wholly by ourselves and then "exacting" that all other states rally to our views. He said he did not

³ This refers to the election of Dr. Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil as President of the General Assembly; for documentation, see pp. 100 ff.

think that many delegates liked the idea of being taken to the bar for a drink, asked for their views, being told what ours are, and then being asked to change their views and support ours. He said, "Many of them will do it, but still they don't like it", though they do not reveal that attitude to us. He said he would say this as coming from one whose friendship and liking for the United States and Americans was wholly unquestioned and unquestionable, and who did not want to see us hurt ourselves—"You people have the moral and practical leadership of the world."

I thanked him for being so frank, though I hoped and believed we were really a little more cooperative than had appeared in his comments, and I said my colleagues would equally appreciate his wanting to be helpful. He said in return that he hoped this would not be only the first time that he could have a real discussion with members of the United States Delegation and Department of State, and that he very greatly welcomes my coming to him not to ask his support but simply to explain our own views on the question of the Indians in South Africa in advance of his speech. He spoke about an hour later in Committee 1 in the sense indicated above.

HARLEY NOTTER

UNITED STATES ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS ESTABLISHING THE CARIBBEAN COMMISSION AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION

IO Files: US/A/C.4/24

United States Delegation Working Paper

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] November 13, 1946.

PHILIPPINE RESOLUTION ON THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE CHARTER REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES ¹

SUMMARY OF PHILIPPINE PROPOSAL

The Philippine Delegation proposes that in order to implement Chapter XI of the Charter, the General Assembly of the United Nations should:

(1) authorize the holding of a world conference of non-self-governing peoples.²

(2) request the Economic and Social Council to convoke such a conference in accordance with the following guiding principles:

(a) that it be purely informative.

(b) that its discussions should enable the Economic and Social Council to formulate proper recommendations.

(c) that the General Assembly be enabled to take appropriate action to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Chapter XI.

(d) that the Delegates to such a conference be selected by the representative organs of each territory or in a manner to ensure proper representation.

¹ For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Fourth Committee* (hereafter cited as GA (1/2), *Fourth Committee*), Part I, p. 289, annex 21 (part III).

² For a discussion and analysis by the Secretariat of the United Nations of territories falling within the scope of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations (Non-Self-Governing Territories), see *ibid.*, pp. 273 ff. annex 19. This includes extracts from answers sent by concerned governments in reply to a query from the Secretary General to them in June 1946 as to what constituted a non-self-governing territory, together with a comprehensive list of such territories compiled by the Secretariat from information submitted by the governments.

The statement submitted by the United States Government read:

"In determining which are the Non-Self-Governing Territories referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter, it is noted that this Chapter relates to 'Territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government'. Chapter XI would thus appear to apply to any Territories administered by a Member of the United Nations which do not enjoy the same measure of self-government as the metropolitan area of that Member" (*ibid.*, p. 275)

(3) urge the Economic and Social Council to initiate studies and formulate recommendations so that this world conference might become a permanent body.

ACTION ALREADY TAKEN

The General Assembly on November 9 adopted the recommendation of the general committee that this proposal be referred simultaneously to the Trusteeship Committee and the Legal Committee.

RECOMMENDATION

1. The Philippine proposal is, in a number of particulars, incompatible with the provisions of the Charter and recommend that our Delegate on the Legal Committee examine it particularly from this point of view.

2. The proposal on its merits is premature and that any attempt to salvage any of the ideas contained therein would be likely to create difficulties for us in future Assemblies.

3. It is proposed, therefore, that in opposing the Philippine resolution, the Delegation should base itself on the following position:

that, because of the wide diversity of conditions and problems in non-self-governing territories, priority should be given at this time to a continuation and extension of the very promising efforts now being made on a regional basis, such as the Caribbean Commission.³

³ Subcommittee 2 of the Fourth Committee submitted the Philippine resolution to the Sixth Committee for consideration, and in that Committee the Philippine delegate submitted a new draft resolution. The new draft called for the holding of regional representative conferences "such as in the Caribbean area" so as to extend to other areas "the provisions and the spirit of Chapter XI of the Charter . . ." (GA (I/2), *Fourth Committee*, Part I, p. 290).

For the legislative history of this resolution, see GA (I/2), *Fourth Committee*, Part I, pp. 289 ff., and United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 1561-1563, annex 77. For text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Resolutions*, p. 126.

844.00/5-2847

The Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
(*Martin*)¹

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: There is transmitted herewith a draft of a proposed joint resolution, authorizing the President to accept membership for the United States in the Caribbean Commission, established

¹ The same letter, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent to the President pro tempore of the Senate, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.

pursuant to an Agreement signed at Washington on October 30, 1946 by representatives of the Governments of the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.²

The purpose of this Commission is to encourage and strengthen international cooperation in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the non-self-governing territories in the Caribbean area. Such cooperation is of vital interest to the security of the United States and is in keeping with its desire to advance the interests of the peoples of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands of the United States, the administration of which islands rests with this Government. Such a goal can be best and most readily achieved only through participation by this Government together with the Governments enumerated above, all bearing responsibilities of administration in the Caribbean area, in practical programs designed to promote the advancement of the peoples of non-self-governing territories in the area.

There is enclosed herewith an "Explanatory Memorandum"³ covering in detail the background of the creation of the Caribbean Commission, the purposes which it is designed to fulfill and the reasons which impel participation by the United States therein. For your convenience, there is also enclosed a copy of the agreement establishing the Commission.

A similar letter is being dispatched to the President pro tempore of the United States Senate.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

² Draft not printed. For text as adopted by the Congress and approved on March 4, 1948, see 62 Stat. 65. For text of the Agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1799, or 62 Stat. (pt. 3) 2618. The agreement entered into force on August 6, 1948.

³ Not printed. For an article, "Regionalism in the Caribbean: Six Years of Progress," see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1948, pp. 691 ff.

890.0146/6-347

The Secretary of State to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
(*Martin*)¹

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: There is transmitted herewith a draft of a proposed joint resolution² providing for membership and partici-

¹ The same letter, *mutatis mutandis*, was sent to the President pro tempore of the Senate, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.

² Not printed. For text as adopted by the Congress and approved on January 28, 1948, see 62 Stat. 15.

pation by United States in the South Pacific Commission and authorizing an appropriation therefor. Adoption of such a resolution is necessary to permit the United States to accept fully the Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission. A copy of the Agreement is enclosed.³

This Agreement was signed by the United States Delegate to the South Seas Conference on February 6, 1947 at Canberra, Australia, subject to acceptance by this Government. Delegates at the Conference, representing the Governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, also signed the Agreement.⁴ The purpose of the Commission is to provide the means whereby Governments which administer non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific may cooperate with one another to promote the economic and social advancement of the peoples of these territories. There are some fifteen non-self-governing territories in the region, the total population of which approximates 2,000,000.

The United States has the obligation, under Article 73(d) of the Charter of the United Nations, to cooperate with other governments with a view to the practical achievement of the social and economic advancement of non-self-governing territories. The United States is responsible for the administration of American Samoa and a number of other islands in the South Pacific. Participation by the United States, therefore, in the Commission would not only be in accord with the Charter of the United Nations but would also contribute to effective administration of the United States island possessions in the South Pacific.

Other important interests of the United States in the South Pacific would also be protected and advanced by membership in the Commission. Although the Commission does not have the power to concern itself with political matters or with questions of defense or security, it will indirectly contribute to the political stability and, therefore, the security of the area. Since ten percent of the trade of the area is with the United States, this Government also has an interest in programs affecting the area's economy.

The Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission was largely based upon experience derived from the organization and activities of the Caribbean Commission. Both Commissions have been

³ The South Seas Conference met at Canberra, Australia, from January 28 to February 6, 1947, and the agreement was signed *ad referendum* for the United States by Robert Butler, United States Ambassador to Australia and Chairman of the U.S. Delegation. For text, see TIAS 2317, or United States Treaties and Other International Agreements No. 1787 (2 UST 1787). The agreement entered into force on July 29, 1948.

⁴ For a report on the South Seas Conference, with an analysis of the agreement establishing the South Pacific Commission, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 16, 1947, pp. 459 ff.

designated to facilitate regional cooperation in areas where the presence of non-self-governing territories makes such cooperation particularly important.

It is significant that the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have taken the initiative in setting up the South Pacific Commission, are assuming a large share of the cost thereof, and are determined that a regional organization for non-self-governing territories shall be established in the South Pacific. Since it is extremely important that the United States participate in any intergovernmental program which may affect its interests in the South Pacific and for other reasons cited above, it is strongly urged that favorable consideration be given by the Congress to the proposed joint resolution.

A similar letter is being dispatched to the President pro tempore of the United States Senate.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS
AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY; REGULATION OF
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS; EFFORTS TOWARD
AGREEMENTS PLACING ARMED FORCES AT THE DIS-
POSAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL¹

500.A/12-3146: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative
at the United Nations (Johnson)*

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1947—6 p. m.

1. Dept believes SC should move at earliest practical and convenient date to take up general subject of regulation of armaments and disarmament in response to GA Resolution on this subject² (Re your tel 1002, Dec 31³). Draft Resolutions have already been submitted by Soviet Union and ourselves to bring this subject before SC.⁴ Dept feels that part of general subject which relates to international control of atomic energy, as set out in findings and recommendations contained in report of AEC,⁵ should be considered first by SC. While we desire SC to consider this part of subject first, at the same time we believe fruitful, rather than hasty, discussion should be the aim. Accordingly,

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 712-1109. For documentation on aspects of United States policy with respect to atomic energy other than international control, see pp. 781 ff. For documentation on United States national security policy, see pp. 707 ff. For documentation on the attitude of the Soviet Union concerning regulation of armaments, see vol. IV, pp. 514 ff., *passim*. For information on U.S. policy regarding international control of atomic energy, see Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947-1952*, volume II of *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969). For an informal summary record of policy developments concerning international control of atomic energy, October 15, 1946, to May 17, 1948, see Department of State Publication 3161, *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Policy at the Crossroads* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948). Regarding efforts toward agreements placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 3, 1947, Supplement, "Arming the United Nations."

² December 14, 1946; *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1099.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1106.

⁴ For the text of the Soviet resolution, see telegram 998 from New York, December 28, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1104; for the text of the United States resolution, see telegram 327 to New York, December 30, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1105.

⁵ Published as United Nations, *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement* (hereafter cited as AEC, 1st yr., *Special Suppl.*).

we are ready to accommodate our views on timing to those of SC if others feel that such discussion is more likely to result from consideration some time in the near future rather than immediately as is called for by our Resolution submitted Dec 31. We would not consider the three weeks' delay suggested by De Rose ⁶ and Hasluck ⁷ as too long and a delay of this duration would meet Cadogan's point.⁸

Since CFM desires SC approval of Trieste documents by Jan 15, we can see some additional advantage in acceding to desires of other SC members regarding timing of SC discussion of atomic energy control, since to do so would give an early opportunity for SC to take up Trieste papers.

Further instructions referred to in para 3 of Dept's 327, Dec 30, will be dispatched promptly.

BYRNES

⁶ François De Rose of the French Delegation to the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission.

⁷ Paul Hasluck, Alternate Australian Representative on the Security Council; Acting Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.

⁸ Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission, had expressed reluctance to support immediate consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's report, fearing a veto; see telegram 1002 from New York, December 31, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1106.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files ¹

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Hiss) to the Secretary of State* ²

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1947.

Subject: Questions of Special Importance Raised By Submission of Interim Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council ³ and the Placing on the Agenda of the Security Council the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments ⁴

Introduction

The interim report made by the Atomic Energy Commission transmitted on December 30 to the Security Council faces the Department and the Government with a new situation. Atomic energy problems are now transferred to a new forum where the spokesmen for the governments concerned, including particularly our own representative, will

¹ Lot 57D688, the consolidated lot file on atomic energy, 1944-1962, located in the Department of State, including the records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy and the records of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

² The file copy is labeled "draft."

³ AEC, *1st yr., Special Suppl.*

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1099.

be different from those who have heretofore considered this matter. Senator Austin⁵ will now be our spokesman instead of Mr. Baruch.⁶ Three entirely new countries (Colombia, Syria and Belgium), whose representatives will not have had the benefit of the discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission, will participate in the Security Council consideration of this problem. (Mexico, Egypt and the Netherlands have ceased to be members of the Security Council.)

The Department will be faced with the necessity of issuing day to day operating instructions to Senator Austin. This represents an entirely new responsibility and arrangements should be made for the effective discharge of it. Other agencies of the government have a very direct and vital interest in the formulation of policy which will guide Senator Austin's actions in the Council. These include the War and Navy Departments, the Congress, our domestic Atomic Energy Commission, and Mr. Baruch. Senator Austin should, of course, also participate directly in the formulation of policy. It is suggested that the Under Secretary,⁷ the Counselor,⁸ and the Legal Adviser⁹ be asked to assume special responsibilities for supervision of the development of policies to govern instructions to be drafted by the Department. It is believed that informal arrangements already instituted by the Department for liaison with the War and Navy Departments should be adequate for that purpose, although it might be wise to get definite confirmation from the Secretaries of War and Navy if this arrangement is satisfactory from their points of view. It is suggested that Senators Vandenberg¹⁰ and Connally¹¹ should be consulted on basic questions of policy. This should adequately provide for the necessary Congressional liaison. Mr. Lillenthal¹² could be asked to designate a liaison officer for the domestic Atomic Energy Commission. It is suggested that the Secretary talk personally to Mr. Baruch about the basic policy questions relating to atomic energy referred to subsequently in this memorandum and also ask Mr. Baruch to designate a liaison officer for day to day liaison with the Department.

The consideration by the Security Council of the General Assembly's resolution of December 14 on general regulation and reduction of

⁵ Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations; Senator from Vermont, 1931-1946.

⁶ Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 1946; his letter of resignation is printed *infra*.

⁷ Dean Acheson.

⁸ Benjamin V. Cohen.

⁹ Charles Fahy.

¹⁰ Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senator from Michigan; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 80th Congress.

¹¹ Tom Connally, United States Senator from Texas; ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 80th Congress.

¹² David E. Lillenthal, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

armaments raises another major question which will affect the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the governmental agencies referred to above. The General Assembly resolution and our own policy emphasize as of priority second only to control of atomic energy the control of other modern scientific discoveries and technical developments elsewhere in the resolution referred to as "other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction". The terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission as approved by the General Assembly in London last January include the making of specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments . . . of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction".¹³ It is the agreed policy of the United States to urge that after the Security Council has completed its forthcoming consideration of the control of atomic energy, the Council should as its next step in carrying out the General Assembly's resolution of December 14 consider the question of control of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. This consideration should be in the nature merely of brief discussions of principles, with emphasis upon the importance of giving priority to the study of effective safeguards, as provided in the Atomic Energy Commission terms of reference, and by the Council thereupon requesting the Atomic Energy Commission simultaneously with its drafting of a treaty or convention for the control of atomic energy to prepare recommendations as to the control of the other major weapons. Very little thought has been given to the formulation of our own policy on this subject and it is urgent that prompt steps be taken to formulate that policy. It is suggested that discussions be held promptly with the agencies listed above and with Dr. Bush¹⁴ on this subject to the end that arrangements can be immediately instituted for the development of such a policy. It is suggested that the Secretary discuss this matter of arrangements with Mr. Baruch and ask Mr. Baruch to designate a principal member or members of his staff to participate in the establishment of these arrangements and the formulation of policy.

*Relationship Between the International Atomic Energy Authority
and National Agencies for Atomic Energy*

The recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission contain the following paragraph:

"Decisions of the authority pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by the treaty or convention should govern the operations of national agencies for atomic energy. In carrying out its prescribed functions, however, the authority should interfere as little as necessary with the operations of national agencies for atomic energy, or with the eco-

¹³ Omission indicated in the source text.

¹⁴ Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

conomic plans and the private, corporate, and State relationships in the several countries."

The problem raised is whether our representative in the Security Council should propose elimination of or modification of the second sentence, in view of the fact that that sentence is capable of being construed in such a way as to impair the powers of the international atomic energy authority, a basic element in the American program. It is important that the views of the interested agencies referred to above be obtained promptly on this point. As a first step in this process it is recommended that the Secretary talk to Mr. Baruch to see whether Mr. Baruch would have strong objections to elimination of or modification of the sentence under reference.

In the event that it should be decided not to attempt to eliminate or modify this sentence it will be important to formulate with care the statement of the United States position to be made in the Security Council on this point in order to make it clear that approval of this paragraph by the Security Council would not be a decision requiring that the treaty be drafted in such a way as would impair the powers of the international atomic energy authority.

The Veto Question

The recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission contain the following provisions which raise the question of procedure to be followed in the Security Council:

"3. . . .

(e) Specifying the means of methods of determining violations of its terms, setting forth such violations as shall constitute international crimes, and establishing the nature of the measures of enforcement and punishment to be imposed upon persons and upon nations guilty of violating the terms of the treaty or convention.

"The judicial or other processes for determination of violations of the treaty or convention, and of punishments therefor, should be swift and certain. Serious violations of the treaty shall be reported immediately by the authority to the nations parties to the treaty, to the General Assembly and to the Security Council. Once the violations constituting international crimes have been defined and the measures of enforcement and punishment therefor agreed to in the treaty or convention, there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a willful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms.

"The enforcement and punishment provisions of the treaty or convention would be ineffectual if, in any such situations, they could be rendered nugatory by the veto of a State which had voluntarily signed the treaty.

"4. In consideration of the problem of violation of the terms of the treaty or convention, it should also be borne in mind that a violation might be of so grave a character as to give rise to the inherent right of

self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”

This subject may well prove to be crucial in terms of whether or not the entire international consideration of control of atomic energy is to break down at this stage. Of equal importance is the question of estimating whether the Congress would approve any recommendations that might be agreed to. It may develop that the best tactics to be followed, in order to avoid either a break down of international consideration of atomic energy or adoption of principles which would not be acceptable to Congress, will prove to be to urge the Security Council not to attempt to reach a definitive decision on this subject at this time, but after an expression of views of the various members to approve other portions of the recommendations and refer the entire recommendations back to the Atomic Energy Commission with the request that the Commission proceed promptly to draft a treaty or convention carrying into effect the recommendations, with the understanding that alternate drafts would be prepared in those cases where the Commission finds itself unable to reach unanimous agreement as to particular provisions.

It is suggested that as the initial step in formulating policy on this subject the Secretary should talk to Mr. Baruch to ascertain Mr. Baruch's views on the subject.

501.BC Atomic/1-447

*The United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Baruch) to President Truman*¹

[NEW YORK,] January 4, 1947.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform you that the first phase of the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has been completed. The basic principles have been clearly stated in the Commission's report² which has been submitted to the Security Council and exposed to the study of the world.

Accepting the principles, substantially those first enunciated by the United States Delegation on June 14 last, the Commission,³ after more than a hundred conferences, voted on December 30 (last Monday) by 10 to 0 (Russia and Poland abstaining) to approve the formulae sub-

¹ Baruch transmitted a copy of this letter to the Secretary of State on January 4.

² AEC, *1st yr., Special Suppl.*

³ For the text of Baruch's statement at the 1st Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, which contained the initial United States proposal, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 4-14 (hereafter cited as AEC, *1st yr., Plenary*), or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 23, 1946, pp. 1057-1062.

mitted by the United States, as in keeping with the desires of the nations represented and with the creating Act of the General Assembly on January 24, 1946 in London.⁴

The task of general disarmament, with special accent not only on the war use of atomic energy but on its peaceful uses, too, previously had been set by you in consultation in Washington with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of Canada in November 1945;⁵ and outlined and fortified by the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945,⁶ the personnel being Mr. Secretary Byrnes of the United States; Mr. Molotov⁷ of the Soviet Republics; and Mr. Bevin⁸ of the United Kingdom.

The active undertaking of the problem of General Disarmament by the Security Council, expressed in the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1946,⁹ has created a new situation in which our hand would be strengthened by an identic representation on the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission. This country is one of the few whose Atomic Energy Commission representative is not the same as the representative on the Security Council.

Former Senator Warren Austin, our member in that body, is thoroughly equipped to handle this business as it develops from now on. In fact, he would be handicapped by divided authority. And were he to take over the atomic subject, he would have the important aid of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (dealing with domestic phases of this matter), to the head of which you recently appointed the Honorable David Lilienthal. He would also have the assistance of the staff we have built up; of the State Department, which has been kept informed of our proceedings; and of the United States members of the United Nations Military Staff Committee.

So, because of my belief that the work of my American associates and myself is over, and because I am convinced that the job now should be taken over by Senator Austin, I submit my resignation and those of the men who have worked with me—all of whom worked with—

⁴ Identical with the proposed resolution on atomic energy contained in the Communiqué of the Moscow Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, December, 1945; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, p. 815, or United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, First Part, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during the First Part of the First Session*, p. 9 (hereafter cited as GA(I/1), *Resolutions*).

⁵ For the text of the Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy, signed at Washington on November 15, 1945, by President Truman, Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee of the United Kingdom, and Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King of Canada, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.

⁶ For documentation on the Moscow Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, December 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, pp. 560 ff.

⁷ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁸ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1099.

out fee or expense allowance, and at considerable sacrifice to their personal affairs for nine months.¹⁰ Their efforts were of inestimable value to the country and, I hope, to the world. They include Messrs. John M. Hancock, Ferdinand Eberstadt, Herbert Bayard Swope, Fred Searls, Jr., Dr. Richard C. Tolman and Major-General Thomas F. Farrell.

We had the continuing help of Major-General Leslie R. Groves¹¹ and his staff—he was the head of the atomic project since its military beginnings; and the help of our Scientific Panel: Drs. J. R. Oppenheimer, Robert F. Bacher, Harold C. Urey, Charles A. Thomas, Arthur H. Compton and I. I. Rabi. To this credit list I add the members of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, particularly Lieutenant-General M. B. Ridgway, USA, General George C. Kenney, USA, and his successor Brigadier General C. P. Cabell, USA, and Admiral R. K. Turner, USN; they represented the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States.

We acknowledge the debt we owe to the preliminary work done in the Acheson-Lilienthal report¹² and, too, I am grateful for the ever present and efficient work of our staff, who gave their minds and hearts to the job, at far lesser compensation than they could have earned in private pursuits.

No acknowledgment would be complete without recording the unflinching, whole-hearted support given at all times by you and Secretary Byrnes.

Permit me to make certain points:

In working out the basic principles to govern the control of atomic energy, I make bold to suggest that I and my associates have carried out the primary orders given by you and the Secretary of State at the time of my appointment last April.

I accompany this letter by the full report of the work of the Commission. From its text you will understand why I see encouragement as to the eventual outcome, for with four of the Great Powers, permanent members of the Security Council and six other nations in agreement, the difficulty of gaining unanimity has lessened. While unanimous action is important, it must not be gained at the expense

¹⁰ For text of President Truman's reply to the present letter, accepting Baruch's resignation, see *The Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman: 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1, or Bernard M. Baruch, *The Public Years* (New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 379.

¹¹ Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project; Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District, the atomic bomb development program, 1942-1946; appointed to the Military Liaison Committee, United States Atomic Energy Commission, January 31, 1947.

¹² Department of State Publication 2498, *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, March 16, 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946).

of principle. To do that would be to lull the world into a false sense of security.

As you and the Secretary of State are aware, in all of our insistences that "there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise, whereby a wilful violator of the terms of the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences of violation of its terms" (the language of the report), we did not attack the general right of veto in the Security Council. We opposed the secondary veto upon enforcement or punishment, called for by a treaty, if the treaty were approved by the Security Council and ratified "by the several nations necessary to assure its success."

Let me say a word as to the final vote:

France, the United Kingdom and China together with the United States are the Four Great Powers approving the principles that were acted upon by the Commission. The six other nations were Australia, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, the Netherlands and Canada. Those countries, excepting Canada, plus the two abstainers (Russia and Poland) compose, as you know, the Security Council. (Since the first of the year, Mexico, the Netherlands and Egypt have been succeeded in the Council and the Commission by Belgium, Colombia and Syria.)

As to the primary principles we have sought to enact, they are familiar to you, since they are definitely part of your instructions to us.

I can find no better way of summarizing the work of the Commission than to invite your attention to the Findings and Recommendations found from pages 18 to 27 of the Commission's Report already referred to.

They include, among many others, these most important elements:

(a) the creating of a comprehensive international system of control and inspection, under the direction of an agency within the framework of the United Nations, by means of an enforceable treaty, subject, of course, to ratification by our Senate;

(b) that the control should start with the production of uranium and thorium when they are severed from the ground and extend through the production of fissionable material, using safeguards at each step, including accounting, inspection, supervision, management and licensing, as may be appropriate;

(c) that the powers of the agency should be commensurate with its responsibility, with no government possessing the right of veto over the day-to-day operations of the agency;

(d) that the agency should have unimpeded right of ingress, egress, and access for the performance of its inspections and other duties;

(e) prohibiting the manufacture, possession and use of atomic weapons by all nations and providing for the disposal of existing stocks of atomic weapons and fissionable materials;

(f) specifying acts constituting international crimes, and establishing adequate measures of enforcement and punishment, subject to the condition that there shall be no legal right, by veto or otherwise,

whereby a wilful violator shall be protected from the consequences of violating the treaty.

The international control agency will require broad powers commensurate with its great responsibilities, so that it may possess the requisite flexibility to adapt safeguards to a rapidly developing technology. The safeguards that have been discussed are meant only to be indicative of the types of safeguards that must be erected, which should be strengthened and never weakened.

There is one more theme that I must emphasize, namely that the Commission's recommendations constitute an integrated and indivisible whole, each part of which is related to, and dependent upon the others. This fact is stressed in the Commission's recommendations. It must never be lost sight of. No partial plan for the control of atomic energy can be effective, or should be accepted by this country.

In the extended debates of the Atomic Commission, the original principles of the United States Delegation have been tested and the outcome shows them to be sound.

We believe that this beginning, translated into action, may begin a broad program to govern weapons of mass destruction. In fact, it could even include other armaments. Were such a system employed effectively, it might lead us into a warless age.

I know how near to your heart that objective is. I know the peoples of the world are yearning for the chance to live and work with dignity and without fear, in Peace and Security.

To that end I shall hold myself ready to answer any call you may make.

Let me add these final thoughts:

I see no reason why this country should not continue the making of bombs, at least until the ratification of the treaty.

I have drawn your attention before to the necessity of preserving the atomic secrets. Particularly is this wise as to our designs, know-how, engineering and equipment. The McMahon law¹³ carries authority for this protection. If this authority should be found to be inadequate, it should be broadened to meet any needs, until a treaty is ratified by our Senate.

While science should be free, it should not be free to destroy mankind.

Our gratitude goes to you for the opportunity of service you have given us.

With warm regard.

Respectfully,

[File copy not signed]

¹³ Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act, August 1, 1946 (Public Law 585, 79 Cong.; 60 Stat. 755-775).

500.A/1-447: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, January 4, 1947—11:55 p. m.

URGENT

10. USDel, talking to junior officers of British and French delegations and to Hasluck (Australia) was informed that they personally would have no objection to SC discussing general aspects of GA disarmament resolution¹ without waiting for SC to take action on AEC report.² Hasluck and De Rose (France) both indicated that they could see no real disadvantage to the creation of a commission by SC to consider regulation and reduction of armament simultaneously with AEC deliberations.

All three delegations favored temporary postponement of consideration of AEC report (USDel's 1002, December 31³) and the GA disarmament resolution is now on SC agenda. Therefore, it may be difficult at SC meeting January 7 to avoid general discussion of this item if the Trieste item is passed without long debate.

JOHNSON

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1099.

² AEC, 1st yr., *Special Suppl.*

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1106.

Department of State Disarmament Files¹

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the
Secretary of War (Patterson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1947.

Subject: Regulation of Armaments.

1. The recent General Assembly Resolution on the Regulation of Armaments is expected to come before the Security Council this week. The State Department, in consultation with War and Navy staff officers, has developed the position indicated in the attached paper² as a basis for instructions to Senator Austin and Herschel Johnson for use in the Security Council. The attached paper:

- a. gives first priority to Security Council action on atomic energy;
- b. gives second priority to consideration of "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;"

¹ Lot 58D133, a consolidated lot file in the Department of State containing documentation on armaments, regulation of armaments, and disarmament, 1943-1960.

² The paper is printed as the enclosure to the letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, January 8, p. 341.

- c. gives last priority to conventional arms and armed forces;
- d. indicates that the Security Council might take action to speed up the allocation of forces under Article 43 of the Charter;
- e. recommends that no additional U.N. machinery be established at this time to deal with the regulation of armaments;
- f. points out the necessity for prompt agreement on the organization and procedure with which the U.S. position on "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" and conventional weapons and armed forces might be reached in preparation for future discussions in the Security Council;

2. The big question at the moment is how far we should insist that the Security Council get in its consideration of atomic weapons before it moves into the problem of "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." State, War and Navy are thus far agreed that the general principles and the main framework of atomic weapons control satisfactory to the United States must be adopted before we proceed to the next stages. It is reported, however, that the British, Australians and French will oppose us on this on the ground that completion of the work on atomic energy is not needed as a prerequisite to work on other major weapons. It is understood that the British are strongly opposed to the United States' surrendering atomic weapons before certain other weapons capable of neutralizing the U.K. from across the Channel are brought under firm international control. The State Department agrees that the United States cannot take an active part in discussing other major weapons at this time, principally because we have no agreed U.S. position; they are very much concerned about what might happen if the other members of the Security Council insist upon discussing the subject.

3. The State Department will shortly propose interdepartmental machinery to deal with the general subject of regulation of armaments. It is informally understood that they are thinking of a special SWNCC³ full-time committee to work intensively on the problem for the next sixty days, with full freedom to consult other agencies of the Government as well as private organizations and individuals. They are troubled about the handling of atomic weapons through such a committee, however, because of the relation which must be established with the United States Atomic Energy Commission, and because the State member (General Hilldring⁴) is probably not their candidate on the atomic weapons aspect. Pending recommendations to the three Secretaries on such machinery, an informal SWNCC committee is now meeting to deal with the situation as it arises in New York.

³ For information on the functions and organization of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, footnote 15, p. 1118.

⁴ John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas; Department of State Representative on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee; Chairman of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, Department of State.

Senator Austin arrives in Washington Tuesday morning⁵ and the attached position paper will be discussed with him. If he and the Secretary of State are agreed on the paper, it will be forwarded by the latter to you and Mr. Forrestal for your views, suggesting that you also get any expression of views which the Joint Chiefs of Staff might wish to make.

I believe the attached statement is all right as far as it goes but we may find the situation changing rapidly under the pressure of events in New York. If discussion in the Security Council goes faster than is expected and the United States Representative must take a position before approval by the State, War and Navy Departments of the attached position paper, the U.S. Representative will undoubtedly be instructed to adopt the position outlined therein on a tentative basis.

4. As soon as we know what sort of machinery the State Departments wants to handle the general subject of Regulation of Armaments, I will submit for your approval a comprehensive plan for dealing with the many aspects of the subject in the War Department.

HOWARD C. PETERSEN

⁵ January 7.

500.A/1-647 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1947—7 p. m.

US URGENT

2. Dept appreciates impossibility of foretelling now date and form of development of SC debate re GA Resolution on regulation and reduction of armaments, and manner in which US Resolution introduced Dec 31 will be discussed (Dept's 327, Dec 30,¹ and 1, Jan 2). Following points are for use as indicated in such formal discussion when it occurs and also for your background information in informal discussions with other members of SC.

1. In dealing with regulation of armaments and disarmament it is vital to success to take first things first. We think first thing is effective international control of atomic energy. We find it impossible to believe that regulation of armaments generally can be achieved without control of atomic energy. Indeed, so important to success in the general field do we consider international atomic energy control that substantial progress in this limited, though crucial, field is needed before consideration can be given to other parts of the problem such as

¹ Telegram 327 to New York, December 30, 1946, contains the text of the United States resolution; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1105.

elimination of other weapons adaptable to mass destruction and regulation of conventional weapons and equipment and of armed forces. Council has recently received from AEC its first report. Consideration of this report with its recommendations and findings should be first SC action in response to GA Resolution. This is purpose of our resolution introduced Dec 31. We feel strongly that conclusion of forthcoming discussion of GA Resolution in SC should be early decision to take up AEC report. The Commission has worked for months in producing this first report and it seems to us not only natural but proper for SC to decide to deal with these findings and recommendations for atomic energy control before dealing with other parts of the problem.

2. The GA Resolution of Dec 14 on principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments reflects this assignment of highest priority to atomic energy control. In this Resolution there is found accurate expression of our views. In this connection, reference could be made to my speech of Dec 13 to GA.² There it was made clear that in our opinion the matter having highest priority of all matters in field of general regulation and reduction of armaments is effective international control of atomic energy to extent necessary to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. This is our understanding of that part of para 2 of GA Resolution referring to "practical measures, according to their priority," as viewed in the light of paragraphs 3 and 4, with their urgent objectives of prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and of the GA recommendation of expeditious consideration of AEC reports by SC. Throughout my statement, there are numerous passages which reiterate this understanding that first priority is to be given to atomic energy part of the subject. Furthermore, para 8 of GA Resolution states specifically that nothing in said Resolution is to alter or limit Resolution establishing AEC. My statement was made to GA before Resolution was adopted in plenary and while there was still opportunity for representatives of other governments to take issue, if so inclined, with our understanding of priorities; as there was no such statement by representatives of other governments, our understanding of priorities should be regarded as expressing GA's understanding.

3. There is obviously no need for additional UN machinery to deal with atomic energy, or with other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, which are also within AEC's terms of reference. In view of priorities set forth in para 1 above any additional commission or other subsidiary organ to deal with other aspects of problem is at

² For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, Plenary Meetings*, pp. 1289-1296 (hereafter cited as GA (1/2), *Plenary*).

present time also obviously unnecessary, and would probably cause confusion and therefore be harmful to attainment of objectives of GA Resolution. (It is of course assumed that there would be no question of referring determination of priorities to such a body; SC should, in accordance with para 2 of GA Resolution decide priorities itself.)

4. Upon conclusion of SC's consideration of AEC report, it will then be time enough to consider what further steps Council should appropriately take in response to GA Resolution.

5. As regards UK, French and Australian views (your 10, Jan 4) Dept believes you should on basis of above point out that general discussion of GA resolution can serve little useful purpose at this time. If discussion is kept on general plane it could only be a repetition of GA discussion. If it becomes specific there is serious danger of introduction of substantive proposals which may affect adversely desired priorities outlined above. It therefore seems most desirable to us not to enter into discussion until SC is ready to discuss AEC report. Please stress importance which we attach to this question.

BYRNES

500.A/1-347

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose herewith copies of a paper prepared in the Department of State designed to form the basis for the position to be taken by the United States Representative in the Security Council of the United Nations during the forthcoming consideration in that body of the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946, concerning the "Principles governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments."

Officers of this Department have consulted informally with officials of the War and Navy Departments in the course of preparing this paper.

As consideration of this subject is expected to take place in the Security Council in the immediate future, this is a matter of great urgency. I should, therefore, appreciate it deeply if you and the Secretary of the Navy, to whom I am today sending a similar letter,¹ could, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, let me have your views on the enclosed paper as soon as possible.

It will not be necessary to have comments at the same time on the parenthetical paragraphs under points (3) and (5) of the enclosure, relating to the need for agreement upon necessary intra-governmental organizations and procedures. As these are, nevertheless, matters which

¹ Identical, *mutatis mutandis* (500.A/1-347).

require early action, I have asked the State Department member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to consult with his colleagues from the War and Navy Departments with a view to making appropriate recommendations as a matter of urgency.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES

[Enclosure]

THE BASIS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DURING THE FORTHCOMING CONSIDERATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF DECEMBER 14 ON THE "PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE GENERAL REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS"

JANUARY 6, 1947.

It is recommended that the following points form the basis for the position to be taken by the United States Representative on the Security Council in connection with the forthcoming consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14² on this subject.

1. In the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on general regulation and reduction of armaments, the Security Council should give consideration first, and as soon as practicable, to the problem of the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. The Council should make the Atomic Energy Commission's report the basis of its consideration.

2. When the Security Council has completed to the satisfaction of the United States its forthcoming consideration of atomic energy control, the Atomic Energy Commission should be instructed to proceed with the drafting of a convention to implement the plans.

In the event that the Security Council is unable to complete satisfactorily its forthcoming consideration of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States will have to reconsider its general position on the regulation of armaments.

3. Not until after its completion of the consideration referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above should the Security Council take up the second priority problem, that of the international control of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. In the consideration of this problem primary emphasis should be placed on the provision of adequate safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. This should also be dealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission in accordance with its terms of reference (Paragraph 5(c), General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946³).

² *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1099.

³ GA (I/1), *Resolutions*, p. 9.

Decision by the Security Council as to the exact time when the Atomic Energy Commission should take up this subject should be made after the forthcoming consideration of the control of atomic energy has been completed in the Security Council.

(Intragovernmental organization and procedures should be immediately agreed upon for formulation of the United States position on international control of these other weapons of mass destruction.)

4. No additional United Nations machinery is necessary at the present time to deal with the regulation of armaments.

5. As regards armaments other than those adaptable to mass destruction—the “minor weapons” of paragraph 4 of the General Assembly Resolution—the formulation of plans for the regulation of such armaments and of armed forces should not be taken up by the Security Council until a later date. The United States position is that the prospects for success by the United Nations in their great undertaking of a general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be enhanced if success is first attained in working out controls for the major weapons. Indeed no general international regulation of armaments and armed forces as a whole could be effective without such controls. Were the Security Council to itself discuss, or establish any agencies for the discussion of the details and complexities involved in attempting to regulate conventional weapons and armed forces, progress with respect to the major weapons might well be retarded. Consequently the United States will not itself advance proposals relating to the regulation of conventional weapons and armed forces at this time or in the immediate future, except possibly as its proposals relating to major weapons may as a necessary incident include other weapons. The United States should discourage other members of the Security Council from advancing proposals regarding conventional weapons and armed forces. In the event that other Security Council members should nonetheless advance proposals which are not confined to major weapons the United States will determine its position with respect to the advisability of Security Council consideration of any such proposals on the basis of its decision as to whether such consideration is likely to promote international security and particularly United States security and whether it will in fact facilitate or obstruct the working out of a satisfactory system for the overall regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. No commitment should be undertaken by representatives of the United States to agree to discussion by the Security Council of any proposal relating to the regulation of conventional weapons and armed forces unless a specific decision is made by the Government of the United States with respect thereto.

Intragovernmental organization and procedures should be immediately agreed upon for a detailed formulation of the United States

position on the regulation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. This information should include the preparation on a tentative basis of specific proposals which may be introduced in the Security Council when it is decided that presentation of them will be timely. These proposals should emphasize the provision of adequate safeguards. Among the factors to be considered in determining the timing of their introduction are: (1) the progress made in the international control of atomic energy and of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, in accordance with paragraphs 1-3 above; (2) progress achieved in the settlement of issues arising out of the Second World War; and (3) progress in the negotiation of the special agreements for the provision of armed forces in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.)

6. As regards the negotiation of special agreements pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter (referred to in paragraph 7 of the General Assembly Resolution), the Military Staff Committee is already working on Article 43 from the military point of view. The early conclusion of those agreements is desirable to carry out Charter commitments and is called for by the General Assembly Resolution. Early consideration should therefore be given to methods whereby the conclusion of these agreements may be accelerated.

7. Another recommendation made by the General Assembly in paragraph 7 of its Resolution concerns withdrawal of armed forces of members of the United Nations from ex-enemy territories. This is directed, not to the Security Council, but to individual Members of the United Nations. The United States has already proposed that this matter be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers and it should be followed up there, not in the Security Council.

8. If the question of the withdrawal of troops from territories of other Members is raised, the United States will determine its position in the light of the particular proposals made. So far as United States troops are concerned, we have made it plain that, as the Secretary pointed out on December 13 to the General Assembly, our troops, except in ex-enemy countries, are stationed abroad with the consent of the states concerned and in no sense constitute a threat to the internal or external peace of any country.

9. Information on the armed forces of Members of the United Nations is not necessary to give effect to the General Assembly's Resolution on general regulation and reduction of armaments. Accordingly, if this question is again raised in the Security Council, the United States should take the position that any request for such information should not be based on the General Assembly's Resolution on this subject. If the question should be raised independently, however, and not in connection with implementation of the Resolution on general

regulation and reduction of armaments, the United States should not oppose the Council's making such a request. The United States is prepared to support a request by the Council asking for troops at home as well as troops abroad. It will not oppose the adoption of such a request even if it excludes home forces.

10. Information on arms and armaments, as distinct from that on armed forces, should be neither requested nor supplied at the present time, but only in response to the requirements of the overall program for the regulation and reduction of armaments as developed in international arrangements according to the sequence set out in paragraphs 1-5 above.

811.002/1-247

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, January 8, 1947, 11 a. m.

TOP SECRET

[Here follows discussion of various subjects.]

DISARMAMENT IN UN

MR. FORRESTAL¹ asked whether in Mr. Byrnes' opinion Senator Austin would hold the position that an atomic agreement must come first in connection with the disarmament discussions. MR. BYRNES replied that he was confident Senator Austin would maintain this position. MR. FORRESTAL asked whether the British and French would support us. THE SECRETARY said that he thought the British would support us but he was less definite about the position of the French. MR. PATTERSON pointed out that the UN Assembly resolution of last month stipulated that agreement should first be won on atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction. He said that he felt that it was important that everybody understand that the reference to other weapons of mass destruction stemmed from the Tripartite Declaration of late 1945 issued by President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee and Prime Minister King² and that this reference clearly meant *new* means of mass destruction. He said that as a matter of fact the only means of mass destruction discussed at the meeting which lead to the statement dealt with biological warfare. In any event, he said that it should be clearly understood that it relates to new weapons or means of mass destruction. He said the Russians would undoubtedly try to

¹ James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; appointed first Secretary of Defense, July 26, 1947.

² Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.

stretch this to mean major weapons such as bombers and perhaps even 16'' guns.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

501.BC Atomic/1-847 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY

NEW YORK, January 8, 1947—11:30 a. m.

17. It is believed that the Department will wish to give urgent consideration to problem of work to be done by AEC in next few weeks. In this connection a member of USDel to AEC has suggested two lines of development which might be pursued simultaneously: (a) Legal Committee might be asked to begin work again to examine certain specific problems such as limitations of authority of Control Commission and its agents, crimes and punishments for individuals violating AE convention or Control Commission's orders, relations of Control Commission to non-participating states; (b) Committee Two¹ might begin work on organizational and operational problems of Control Commission.

In conversation yesterday with member of USDel, Herring,² Secretary of AEC, specifically asked for US views on the nature of the work which Commission might do in forthcoming weeks, and when it might begin active work again. He stated he had recently held conversation with AEC Chairman Lange³ (Poland) who appeared agreeable to renewing Commission activities shortly after January 15. When asked what form he thought such activities should take, Herring, while not giving precise suggestions, stated he thought there is much work which Committee Two might undertake without awaiting SC action on recent AEC report. In this connection Department will note that in letter of December 31 transmitting AEC report to SC (document S/239⁴) Sandoval-Vallarta⁵ stated that "continuing its further work along the lines indicated in the report, the Commission will proceed to the further study of the topics noted in the last paragraph of part one of the report and the other matters contained in its terms of

¹ Committee 2 was established on July 12, 1946, to deal with the basic issue of international control.

² Edward Pendleton Herring.

³ Oscar Lange, Polish Representative to the United Nations and on the Atomic Energy Commission; Polish Ambassador in the United States.

⁴ United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 5*, pp. 59-60 (hereafter cited as SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 5*).

⁵ Dr. Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, Alternate Mexican Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission and Chairman of its Working Committee in 1946.

reference with a view to making the specific proposals set forth in the Resolution of the GA of 24 January 1946 and reaffirmed in Resolution of the GA of 14 December 1946". The paragraph referred to (AEC/18/Rev.1 Page 13) cites a number of important questions, considered so far only in broad outline, which need further study. They include "detailed powers, characteristics, and functions" of International Control Agency; relations between the agency, organs of the UN, and participating states; powers of agency re research, development and planning; provisions for transition to full operation of international control; and other matters to be included in treaty or convention.

It would be helpful to have Department's views, even though preliminary and tentative, as basis for informal reply to Herring and to representatives of other delegations who may make similar inquiries.

JOHNSON

500.A/1-847: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, January 8, 1947—6:15 p. m.

21. I had a talk this morning with Cadogan along lines of Department's No. 2, January 6, 7 p.m. I outlined our views regarding the GA Resolution on regulation and reduction of armaments fully and did not disguise our dissatisfaction that the general question had been brought to an issue at this time, a view shared by Cadogan. He is awaiting instructions but agrees with our policy regarding prior consideration of the AEC report. He believes, however, that there will be considerable opposition in the Council to any attempt to bar all discussion of other phases of disarmament before the atomic energy problem has been solved. While recognizing that the problem of security involving the atomic energy question is one which must have a solution before any profitable general discussion of all phases of disarmament can take place, he thinks that we will find it difficult to find convincing arguments that the general problem should not be discussed. He said that he had very long experience with the old disarmament conference and that he cannot believe the present consideration of the problem will be any less complicated and discursive than it was before. I reiterated our strong conviction that a general discussion of the GA Resolution could serve no useful purpose at the present moment; that if we can reach agreement on the atomic energy problem and subsequently on the other weapons of mass destruction which are under the terms of reference of the AEC, a solution of the remaining phases of the disarmament problem should offer relatively little

difficulty. Cadogan expressed no disagreement with this view, but reiterated that others might find it difficult to accept this argument as a reason for not carrying on concurrent discussions of the general problem. Even if he has not received instructions, he will support our position for prior consideration of the atomic energy report.

JOHNSON

501.BC/1-1047 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, January 10, 1947—1:30 a. m.

US URGENT

30. I would like to summarize for you the results of today's meeting on the subject of the general regulation and reduction of armaments.¹ We have forwarded to you in separate telegrams the Australian statement,² the French Resolution,³ the regular summary of the meeting and my statement.⁴

My estimate of the situation as it exists at the present moment is that there is no chance that the US Resolution will receive the necessary support for its approval. I believe that if we press for a vote on our Resolution we will receive little if any support, and may stand alone. The US has received no backing from any delegation. The positions of Syria, Belgium, Brazil, China are uncertain. The statements made by the five representatives who have spoken up to the present, namely USSR, Australia, France, UK, Poland, make it quite clear that they will not oppose the proposal for a commission to discuss general regulation of armaments concurrently with the continued discussions in the AEC. Lopez,⁵ Colombian delegate thinks we are making a great mistake to bar concurrent discussions. The Russians, he believes do not want to exercise a veto and could probably be brought to accept our concept of priority for atomic agreement, if we concede concurrent discussion on the general problem. Lopez expressed opinion that if we make concession on this line it will create highly favorable impression and be of much political value. He made it clear that he did not agree with our present position. He did not indicate what Colombia's official position will be.

¹ Reference is to the 90th Meeting of the Security Council, January 9.

² Telegram 22, January 9, not printed; for the text of the Australian statement, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 2*, pp. 24-28 (hereafter cited as SC, *2nd yr., No. 2*).

³ Telegram 28, January 9, not printed; for the text of the French resolution, see SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 2*, pp. 33-34.

⁴ Telegram 31, January 10, not printed; for the text of Johnson's statement, see SC, *2nd yr., No. 2*, pp. 31-34.

⁵ Alphonso López, Colombian Representative on the Security Council.

All those representatives with whom I have spoken have expressed their inability to understand why it is not possible for us to agree to concurrent discussion of the problems of general disarmament and the problems of control of atomic energy. They feel that it is politically impossible to take such a position themselves. In spite of Cadogan's promise of limited support as reported in my 21, January 8, he provided no assistance in his speech today. Moreover, Bathhurst (UK) told USDel after hearing exposition of US position by Johnson at Council table that in his opinion that US argument was eloquent but "indefensible". He thought that decisions regarding international control of atomic energy should precede decisions to be made regarding other weapons mass destruction or conventional weapons, but added firmly that public opinion in UK could not understand refusal even to discuss regulation non-atomic armaments prior to decision on AEC report.

I assume the Department will wish to reappraise its position in view of the present situation as summarized above, and I am therefore setting forth the alternatives as I see them from here. I assume first that the Department does not desire us to go so far as to veto or attempt to veto a proposal along the lines of the French proposal, and therefore conclude that we must face the prospect that the Council will establish a disarmament commission in the near future. On this assumption, the following seem to me to be the alternatives.

Alternative I. We could decide to maintain our position and to press for a vote on the US motion. As I said, it is my estimate that we will receive little, if any, support. The advantage of such a tactic would be that we would maintain our position on principle. The disadvantages from a political point of view are obvious, particularly since we are assuming a decision that we will not attempt to veto a resolution along the lines of the French proposal, but will instead abstain. We could, of course, after losing our own motion attempt to rally sufficient votes to prevent the approval of a resolution along the lines of the French proposal. There is little likelihood, in my opinion, that such efforts would be successful.

Alternative II. We could attempt to work out a compromise, accepting the principle of concurrent discussion and at the same time maintaining our main objectives that the question of atomic energy control must receive first priority. If we adopt this course, we might withdraw our motion in its present form and attempt to get agreement from the Council on inserting a new paragraph in the French proposal or whatever proposal is used as the basis for consideration, indicating that the Council accepts the principle that the work of the AEC should receive first priority and should proceed with the utmost dispatch and that the decisions with regard to atomic energy should be taken before any attempt is made to reach decisions on any other aspects of the regulation

of armaments. I think the Council might be willing to accept some statement of principle along these lines if we were to accept the principle of concurrent discussions of the question of general disarmament and of atomic energy control.

JOHNSON

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Director of the Office (Hiss)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 10, 1947.

To keep you posted, following is report of meetings I participated in this morning on the question of our position on atomic energy and disarmament.

The first meeting I attended was in Mr. Acheson's office beginning at 11 o'clock and running until considerably past one o'clock. Senator Austin, Mr. Fahy, and Mr. Gross¹ were also present.

The basis for the discussion was the attached draft² on our procedure with respect to the AEC Report.

Following extended discussion, Senator Austin indicated his agreement with the approach set forth in this draft which the Senator thought provided a larger measure of flexibility than was set forth in the memorandum sent yesterday to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy.³ The Senator also thought that the approach set forth in this draft provided best opportunity for avoiding controversy and stalemate in the Security Council, for obtaining the highest possible measure of agreement, and for further consideration of such points as the Council might not find it possible to agree upon.

It was agreed that this paper should be discussed by the Secretary with Mr. Baruch who is coming to Washington this afternoon, and thereafter with Senators Connally and Vandenberg. Meanwhile, it will be discussed with representatives of the War and Navy Departments.

It was agreed that greater emphasis should be given to the phrase at the beginning of page 4 concerning the tentative nature of agreements reached at this stage and that this should be accomplished by transposing this phrase with some elaboration to the first page of the memorandum. (See subsequent revised draft.²)

¹ Ernest A. Gross, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring).

² Neither the original draft nor the revised draft, both attached to the source text, is printed. Neither is identical with the January 21 version of the paper which was transmitted by the Under Secretary to the Secretary of State on January 24; for text of the latter, see p. 370.

³ Reference is to the paper transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and Navy on January 8, p. 342.

Senator Austin then raised the question of the relationship of this draft paper on procedure to telegram #30 of January 10⁴ reporting on the situation as it developed in the Security Council yesterday afternoon with regard to disarmament. The Senator wondered whether the proposed procedure with regard to atomic energy might not provide a way out of the dilemma we find ourselves in as a result of discussion in the Council yesterday.

As an alternative to the second alternative mentioned in the telegram under reference, Mr. Acheson suggested that it might be possible to get the Council to agree to defer further consideration of the whole disarmament question until approximately three weeks from now, that we might propose setting a specific date for consideration and action by the Security Council on the AEC Report, and agree that immediately thereafter we would be prepared to proceed to discussion of other weapons of mass destruction and next, the conventional weapons.

I pointed out that the only difficulty I saw in this suggestion was that the other Members of the Council have every reason to believe because (a) of our strategy in the Atomic Energy Commission and (b) the resolution giving first priority to the atomic energy report in the Council that our objective would be to insist upon final definitive action by the Council on the AEC Report as a whole. It would be helpful, I suggested, if Mr. Johnson could be authorized, in following out Mr. Acheson's suggestion, to give some indication of the procedure we have in mind with regard to the AEC Report so as to allay the fears which most of the Members of the Council would probably have.

It was agreed that this approach would be a desirable one. Mr. Acheson thereupon telephoned Mr. Johnson and gave him over the telephone the gist of the proposals we were considering as to how we felt the AEC Report should be handled, making it clear that further discussions with Mr. Baruch, the Senators, and the War and Navy Departments remain to be had. Mr. Johnson thought it might be possible, without revealing to other Members of the Council exactly what we contemplate in our procedure, to give two or three of them enough of a hint so that it might be possible to persuade them to adopt the procedure suggested by Mr. Acheson, namely, to repeat, (a) postponement of consideration of the whole question until a fixed date approximately three weeks from now, (b) discussion of the AEC Report beginning on that date, and (c) discussion of the other aspects of disarmament to follow action by the Council on the AEC Report.

We then adjourned at this point and moved on to the Secretary's Office.

⁴ *Supra.*

The Secretary read a copy of the attached draft and indicated his general agreement with the procedure outlined.

Mr. Acheson pointed out to the Secretary that we do not feel this represented any deviation from Mr. Baruch's feeling that definitive action on the atomic energy recommendations should be an indivisible whole. It was merely a question of what procedure would best assure the most rapid possible progress towards unanimous acceptance of all of our proposals.

The Secretary felt that we could hardly insist that the AEC Report be considered and acted upon as a whole. He thought that the proposal to consider and vote paragraph by paragraph was a reasonable one comparable to the procedure in our own Senate.

Mr. Acheson then pointed out and emphasized the importance of the question of supervision of stages (paragraph *b* bottom of Page 2).

Mr. Acheson indicated that this was perhaps the most important aspect of the whole procedure. He was quite sure that very little thought had been given to the recommendation that the Commission should pass upon the satisfactory accomplishment of the various stages. He hoped, therefore, that Mr. Baruch would agree that this question might be left open without prejudice as to what body might be determined upon as the most suitable one.

After some discussion the Secretary indicated he could not support this proposal. He said that he had approved the report when Mr. Baruch showed it to him three weeks ago and that he had not raised any question on this point. The only point on which he had raised any question was the formulation of the statement on the veto with regard to punishment. Not having raised any question on the body which should determine the accomplishment of the stages, he felt he could not do so at this time with Mr. Baruch. Furthermore, the Secretary went on, he thought that this matter of crucial importance should not be left to some mere technical body. He thought that the only people qualified to pass on this question of stages for the United States were people who had been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. He said that this is one of the highest functions they will be called upon to perform.

In the course of the discussion I pointed out that paragraph *b* as drafted had perhaps misled the Secretary because it had referred to the possibility of leaving this determination "to a technical body". This appeared to ignore, which I was sure was not the intention, the necessity of retaining political control. Recognizing, however, this necessity, I wondered whether the purpose of retaining political control would be served if the Commission were the body charged with making the determinations as to stages. In the Commission we might be out-voted. In the Security Council, for example, on the other hand, we would

retain control of the situation because of our veto power. It was this type of consideration which had led to the conclusion that it would be wise to keep this matter open and not foreclose it.

The Secretary nevertheless felt that he could not support the proposal with Mr. Baruch. He thought this was the kind of important question on which he should not pass. This kind of question, he thought, should be left for the consideration of his successor, particularly since the point was not one that had to be decided for another three weeks when presumably the AEC Report will come up for discussion in the Security Council.

Senator Austin agreed with the Secretary's arguments that this matter of passing on the stages must be in the hands of representatives of the United States confirmed by the Senate, and that if there were to be any change it should be in the direction of tightening rather than relaxation. (In order to save this point, of course, the question would have to be left open by the Security Council for further detailed consideration by the Commission.)

Following the discussion with the Secretary, Senator Austin left and Mr. Acheson, Mr. Fahy and I agreed that it would probably be best to revise the draft memorandum by dropping out the paragraph on the supervision of stages, reserving this question for further consideration. Mr. Gross, who had not been present during the discussion in the Secretary's office, undertook responsibility for this revision. (Redraft attached.)

501.BC/1-1147 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET
URGENT

NEW YORK, January 11, 1947—12:20 p. m.

35. In view of the fact that the Trieste matter took up the entire time of the Council at yesterday's meeting, I decided not to discuss with any of my colleagues the program of action agreed upon with Under Secretary Acheson in my telephone conversation with him yesterday noon.¹ I have already been informed by Cadogan that he was planning to introduce his complaint regarding the Corfu matter very shortly and that he was planning to press for quick action by the Council next week. This will obviously give us a further opportunity to attempt to sidetrack temporarily discussion of the disarmament question. I fully agree with the Department that a suggestion on our

¹ For an account of this telephone conversation, see Ross's memorandum of January 10, *supra*.

part to the other members of the Security Council that we proceed to take up the Atomic Energy Commission report before returning to a discussion of the General Assembly's resolution on the regulation of arms would have a much greater appeal to them if I were also able to give them some indication as to our plans in that regard along the lines which the Under Secretary suggested.

We had further discussion with some of the other members of the Council which confirms my previous estimate of the situation reported in my telegram No. 30. The Australians are prepared to introduce a resolution of their own which I assume will establish a commission for the regulation of arms and also contain a statement on the principle that atomic energy control shall receive first priority.

The Chinese delegation has informed us that they also have a draft resolution which they intend to submit. As described to us, this would contain a statement that the Security Council would consider and act upon the report of the AEC immediately. Second, that the Council would establish immediately a commission on the regulation of arms. Third, a decision under paragraph 2 of the General Assembly Resolution to fix priorities. They propose to give atomic energy control first priority; then weapons of mass destruction; then, finally, conventional weapons.

Nisot (Belgium)² indicated that his government felt that concurrent discussion of general regulation of arms and of atomic energy control was the proper course. They did not feel that our principle of giving first priority to atomic energy control was inconsistent with the above. In this respect they agreed with the Australian position. He indicated that they were not prepared to take a position on the question at this meeting and appeared anxious to avoid taking sides publicly. He also was concerned as to whether this was a procedural or substantive decision and expressed the view that it should be considered procedural.

The French delegation indicated that they have been impressed with the arguments which Sir Alexander Cadogan had put forward as to the details of the work of the commission and that they would probably revise their resolution in a number of minor respects. It was not clear as to exactly what they had in mind. They reiterated the difficulty they had in understanding why it was impossible for us to agree to concurrent consideration of the general regulation of armaments and atomic energy control. They urged that they were as anxious as we were not to permit discussion of atomic energy control to drown in the larger field of general regulation of armaments. They felt, however, that we would have ample support in the Council to prevent the USSR from accomplishing this if they should attempt to do so.

² Joseph Nisot, Alternate Belgian Representative on the Security Council.

The Brazilian representative expressed his full support of the principle that the atomic energy discussion should receive first priority and was sympathetic with our position that it was important to have an early discussion of the AEC's report so as to find out where the Russians stood on some of the fundamental questions involved. He was elusive as to whether he would accept concurrent discussion of the question of general regulation of arms. He indicated that while he was sympathetic to our proposal he was not prepared to support it if it appeared likely that he would be our sole support. He also indicated that because of the fact that his representatives on the AEC had given us such all-out support he was most anxious to know whether there was any chance that we might be planning to modify our position.

A member of the Canadian delegation to AEC indicated general sympathy with our position but felt it would not prevail, as other delegations believed public pressures would not permit them to support delay in discussion of general regulation of armaments. When questioned as to what he thought the nature and content of such discussions should be, he acknowledged that he believed that little of a fruitful character could be accomplished by discussion at this time. When it was suggested that, if a commission or committee were to be established, its terms of reference particularly in relation to AEC, must be clearly defined, he wholeheartedly agreed. He likewise appeared to accept the proposition that it might be difficult to define these terms of reference satisfactorily before agreement had been reached as to the content of the phrase "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction", plans for the control of which are within the competence of the AEC. Subsequently (apparently after a conversation with the UK delegation) he said he thought Cadogan would continue to press Gromyko for an elaboration of his position on the commission's terms of reference.

With respect to Council consideration of the AEC report, the Canadian indicated he thought this should be directed toward determining the precise areas of agreement, with a view to referring the matter back to the AEC for drafting a convention. He thought the areas of disagreement might similarly be referred back for further consideration by the AEC. Linking this subject to the question of the work which the proposed commission on the general regulation of armaments might perform, he suggested that the Council might transmit the principles respecting safeguards and controls of atomic energy which it approved to the proposed commission as an indication of the approach which the latter should make. This would have the advantage of focusing that commission's work on safeguards, rather than allowing it to become lost in attempts to find equivalents between different categories of arms. He thought that if a procedure of this

nature, which would probably mean that discussion of the general regulation of armaments would not begin until after the council has considered the AEC report, could be worked out, it might resolve the difficulties which the UK, French and Australian delegations see in our position, and form a procedure acceptable to them.

JOHNSON

SWNCC Files ¹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the United States Representatives on the United Nations Military Staff Committee ²

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1947.

SWNCC 240/2

GUIDANCE AS TO INFORMATION WHICH STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD FURNISH IN REGARD TO THEIR ARMED FORCES

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that you take the following position should your advice be sought with respect to the scope and character of the information member nations of the United Nations should be called upon to furnish in order to give effect to the United Nations resolution of 14 December 1946 on the Principles Governing the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments.

2. You should inform the U.S. Representatives that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that no information concerning existing military establishments is essential for the implementation of the general resolution. However, in accordance with the policy which was in effect established for the United States by the speech of the Secretary of State before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 December 1946 ³ and by formal statements of members of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, United Nations, you should indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection to disclosing the numbers and locations of the total armed forces of the United States provided such a resolution is not based upon the specific resolution contained in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Document

¹ Lot 52M45, the files of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee which are located in the National Archives under the administration of the Department of State. For information regarding the organization and functions of SWNCC, see *Foreign Relations, 1946*, vol. I, footnote 3, p. 1112. Regarding the *Ad Hoc* Committee to Effect Collaboration on Security Functions of the United Nations, the principal SWNCC subcommittee charged with consideration of matters relating to the regulation of armaments and collective security at the UN, see *ibid.*, footnote 73, p. 754.

² Sent to the United States Representatives on the United Nations Military Staff Committee as SM-7382, January 10; circulated in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for information as SWNCC 240/2, January 13.

³ For text, see GA (1/2), *Plenary*, pp. 1289-1296.

A/269 [A/267].⁴ If you are requested to furnish this information to the United States Representatives on the Security Council you should forward such a request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. You should inform the U.S. Representative that no information concerning the types and numbers of arms or armaments possessed by the United States should be disclosed at this time since the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to perceive that supplying such information would facilitate the development of an effective system for regulation and reduction of armaments. For your information the Joint Chiefs of Staff are informed that if it should become apparent that the United States would be placed in an untenable position by resisting a resolution calling for such disclosures, the United States will insist that the following conditions be satisfied before such disclosures are actually made:

a. It must be demonstrated that such disclosures will be helpful in working out the practical measures for general regulation and reduction of armaments.

b. Adequate safeguards must be provided to insure that all nations conform to the same standards with respect to information disclosed.

c. Adequate safeguards must be provided to insure that no nation's security is endangered by such disclosures.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that implementation of paragraph 7 of the general resolution will require member states to make

⁴ Reference is to paragraph 7 of the General Assembly resolution on the regulation of armaments of December 14, 1946, A/267; for full text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1101. Paragraph 7 read as follows:

"THERE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED, within the framework of the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, an international system, as mentioned in paragraph 4, operating through special organs, which organs shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament,

RECOMMENDS the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter;

IT RECOMMENDS the Members to undertake the progressive and balanced withdrawal, taking account of the needs of occupation, of their armed forces stationed in ex-enemy territories, and the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements;

IT FURTHER RECOMMENDS a corresponding reduction of national armed forces, and a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces."

The resolution contained in Doc. A/269, also adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946, read as follows:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Desirous of implementing, as soon as possible, the resolution of 14 December 1946 on the principles governing the regulation and reduction of armaments,

CALLS upon the Security Council to determine, as soon as possible, the information which the States Members of the United Nations should be called upon to furnish, in order to give effect to this resolution."

known in due course the character and size of the armed forces they are willing to make available to the Security Council in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. Guidance in this respect was furnished you by memorandum dated 11 March 1946.⁵ It is conceivable, but not now probable, that the figures furnished you as to the size of the forces the United States is willing to make available to the Security Council will require revision due to the length of elapsed time between the original establishment of the figures and their formal presentation. Therefore, these figures should be considered as tentative only and should not be formally presented until they have been reaffirmed or changed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You should request such reaffirmation or change when you have learned that the time for formal disclosure of the figures is at hand.

5. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the general subject of disarmament and regulation of arms and armaments as stated in their memorandum dated 6 December 1946,⁶ and their memorandum dated 31 December 1946,⁷ remain unchanged.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. J. MCFARLAND
Colonel, Infantry
Secretary

⁵ The document under reference, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as SWNCC 219/8, is summarized in footnote 2 in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 769.

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1091.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1107.

501.BC/1-1447

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1947.

Subject: U.S. Position in the Security Council at the Meeting Scheduled for Wednesday, January 15, on the Subject of the Atomic Energy Commission Report and Regulation of Armaments

After checking the attached draft resolution with Mr. Acheson I called Mr. Johnson and said that Mr. Acheson thought that the draft which we had prepared might be helpful to Mr. Johnson and to Senator Austin. Mr. Acheson thought of it simply as a crystallization of his understanding with the Senator resulting from his conversations this morning with the Senator as to the action we would like to see the Security Council take tomorrow.

I pointed out that Mr. Acheson did not want Mr. Johnson and the Senator in any way to regard the language of our draft as binding

on them. They should feel free to change it in order to meet circumstances.

I added that we had thought that the Senator would probably not wish to propose a resolution at the very outset of the meeting but might want to have a prepared resolution available for introduction if no one else made a similar proposal and if the course of the discussion indicated that a proposal of this kind would help accomplish our objective. Mr. Johnson said that he was rather inclined to feel that because of the fact that we already have a resolution before the Council it might be desirable for us to state at the very outset of meeting that we wished to suggest a modification of our resolution and consequently it might be desirable for us to propose a new resolution promptly. I said that I thought this was a question of tactics which should be left to Mr. Johnson and Senator Austin to determine.

I pointed out that what we were suggesting was not very different except in form, and hence psychologically, from the resolution we have already put in. We still are opposing the immediate establishment of a commission to consider the question of regulation of armaments. Our position had been vigorously opposed by Gromyko¹ and unless he could be talked to along the lines of Senator Austin's discussion this morning with Señor López of Colombia,² he would probably continue vigorously to oppose our new proposal and we might find ourselves unable to obtain sufficient support in the face of his opposition to accomplish our objective. Mr. Johnson said that he was planning himself to see Gromyko this afternoon about this matter but he was not too sanguine as to the result. He pointed out that López had been anxious to facilitate our objective whereas Gromyko probably would have no such approach to the problem.

[Annex]

DRAFT

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1947.

The Security Council RESOLVES:

That it will take up on February 4 the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission dated December 31, 1946, and

¹ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Permanent Soviet Representative at the United Nations.

² The record of a telephone conversation between Austin and Acheson on January 14 indicates that following a conversation with Dr. Alphonso López, Colombian Representative to the Security Council, Austin and Herschel Johnson had decided to present to the Security Council the next day a motion along the following lines. Consideration of the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission would be postponed until February 4, and that thereafter those parts of the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1946, which dealt with general disarmament would be considered. The motion would provide that consideration of general disarmament could begin prior to full and final disposition of the atomic energy question. (Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations; hereafter referred to as USUN Files).

That immediately following its consideration of that Report it will give consideration to the further steps to be taken by it in fulfillment of its responsibilities under the General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, concerning "the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments".

501.BC/1-1547 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, January 15, 1947—11:45 p. m.

PRIORITY

49. The following telegram is intended to supplement the regular summaries and to give you additional background concerning the Security Council's consideration of general regulation of armaments.

By the middle of the afternoon meeting, when Senator Austin spoke,¹ it had become quite clear both from what was said at the Council table and from private discussions that the Council was unwilling to support a proposal along the lines discussed over the telephone with the Under Secretary.² We decided, therefore, in accordance with telephone conversations with Hiss³ and Ross, not to introduce our revised resolution as planned. Instead Senator Austin requested the Council to postpone further consideration on all three items on the Council's agenda until February 4, without prejudice as to the order in which they would then be considered, and without prejudice to the position of any member of the Council on the various issues presented. The exact wording of the resolution follows:

"The Security Council resolves that further consideration of items 2, 3, and 4 on the agenda of the 92nd meeting be deferred until February 4, 1947."⁴

After his statement Senator Austin left to catch his train for Chicago.

We had hoped that the United States motion would be agreed to by the Council at this meeting. By the time the statements of representatives wishing to speak on the substance of the matter were finished,

¹ Reference is to the 93rd Meeting of the Security Council, January 15, 2:30 p. m. For the text of Senator Austin's statement, see SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 4, pp. 80-83.

² See footnote 2, p. 359.

³ *Supra.*

⁴ In introducing this resolution, Senator Austin contended that there was a good chance for agreement through informal conversations by February 4 on how to deal with the Atomic Energy Commission Report and the implementation of the General Assembly resolution. At its 95th Meeting, January 20, the Security Council adopted the United States proposal for postponement 9-2 (the Soviet Union and Poland voted against the proposal).

however, there were indications that if we had pressed for a vote, we might not have received a majority of seven. Hasluck felt we might have 5 or 6 votes at this point. He indicated that he was doubtful whether Makin⁵ would vote for the United States proposal if we pressed it to a vote immediately. We had learned that the French delegation had requested the floor in order to propose an amendment to our motion, which would have set up a subcommittee of the council to draft a resolution during the interval before February 4. I made it clear in presenting our motion formally that we could not agree to discussion in a subcommittee any more than in the Council. We later received a copy of the French proposal, which is as follows:

“Add to the American draft resolution:

In the meantime a subcommittee of the Security Council will meet in order to submit to the Council for the 4 February:

1. A draft resolution merging in a single text the French and Australian draft resolutions;

2. A common proposal relating to the eventual composition of the Disarmament Commission and to the general rules for its work and procedure.”

Since the Syrian delegation had made a similar suggestion and was opposed in substance to our general position, we could not count on their vote. Under the circumstances, I felt it wiser to accede to the President's suggestion that we adjourn the meeting until Friday morning without voting on our resolution.

My estimate of the present situation is that we are likely to succeed in obtaining from the Council a postponement of further consideration of these items, probably until February 4. I plan to see Parodi⁶ tomorrow and I am hopeful that I will be able to persuade him not to introduce his amendment to our proposal. When he gave me a copy of his draft amendment after the meeting, he asked me whether we would accept it. I referred to the remarks which I had made in the Council and advised him I was quite certain we could not accept it, but that I would request instructions. He assured me again, as he had done the previous day, that he would support our request for postponement.

I also plan to see Makin and hope I can persuade him that he must support us in our request. We have reason to believe that he might prefer a postponement until January 27 so that the problem will be considered again during his presidency.

I believe we can count on the support of United Kingdom, China, Brazil, Colombia, Belgium and France. The position of the Syrian

⁵ Norman John Oswald Makin, Australian Representative on the Security Council; Ambassador in the United States.

⁶ Alexandre Parodi, French Representative on the Security Council and Atomic Energy Commission.

delegate is doubtful but I believe he would probably support us if Parodi's motion is not introduced. We can assume that the USSR and Poland will oppose our resolution.

It appears probable now that we will obtain postponement until February 4 from the Council at Friday's meeting, although there may well be considerably more discussion and efforts to amend or water down our proposal. With the exception of the United Kingdom, who are genuinely interested in a postponement, it is quite clear that those members of the Council who will support our motion will do so largely as a courtesy and out of goodwill to the United States and with considerable reluctance.

Our position on Friday may be slightly eased by the fact that the Albanian case will be on the Council's agenda.

AUSTIN

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (Rusk)
to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen)*

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] 16 January 1947.

I believe you will be interested in the following marginal note written by the Chief of Staff¹ on a recent staff memorandum in connection with a JCS paper on the regulation of armaments:

"Neither in public nor in our own thinking must we ever fail to support honest proposals for world disarmament. The tone of all our messages and replies must not be negative. We must embrace the objective and continuously point out constructive points toward its attainment."

D[EAN] R[USK]

¹ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

500.A/1-1747

*The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy
(Forrestal) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We have considered the paper enclosed with your letter of 8 January 1947 on the position to be taken by the United States Representative in the Security Council regarding the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946, on the subject of "Principles governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments."¹ We have also obtained the views of the

¹ *Ante*, p. 342.

Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same paper, as requested by you, and forward herewith the statement prepared by them. The War and Navy Departments are in general agreement with the position indicated in the paper prepared by the State Department, as well as with the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon. It will be apparent that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken into account the recent discussion in the Security Council which may affect the present position of the United States.

The War and Navy Departments are aware that it may not be possible to postpone all general discussion of the regulation of armaments until after broad agreement has been reached on the international control of atomic energy. We believe, however, that it is greatly in the interest of United States security that this be done.

We note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested that priority should be given, in any discussion of the regulation of armaments which might be forced upon the United States, to "discussion of practical and effective safeguards against the hazards of violations and evasions, to the exclusion of discussion of other elements of the general problem until this matter has been settled to the satisfaction of the United States." We agree that when the substance of a regulation of armaments program is under discussion, primary emphasis should be placed by the United States upon practical and effective safeguards. We believe, however, that two other matters must be dealt with prior to initiating any substantive discussion of the regulation of armaments:

a. The terms of reference for any commission or committee which may be set up by the Security Council to discuss the regulation of armaments and armed forces must, presumably, exclude those functions already allotted by the General Assembly to the Atomic Energy Commission. One of these functions is to make specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." There has thus far been no definition, except in the case of atomic weapons, of weapons adaptable to mass destruction, nor has there been any agreement as to which agency or agencies are responsible for reaching such a definition. It would seem clear that the Atomic Energy Commission itself should be asked for its views on what these other major weapons are, not only because of its terms of reference but also because its experience in dealing with atomic energy makes it peculiarly aware of the great technical problems involved in dealing with other such weapons. But the Atomic Energy Commission still faces an enormous task before the international control of atomic energy has been achieved, a task which takes priority over the consideration of other major weapons.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that a system for the regulation of armaments can hardly be established prior to, or independently of, the solution of other problems affecting the peace and security of the United States. Such problems are the conclusion of the

peace treaties, the termination of the occupation of ex-enemy countries, the determination of measures which will be required to prevent German or Japanese aggression in the future, and the allocation of forces to the Security Council under the United Nations Charter. We note, for example, the special responsibilities which the five principal powers now have under Article 106 of the Charter to act for the United Nations to maintain the peace, pending the establishment of the security system envisaged in Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter.

The War and Navy Departments believe that the proposed United States position presents a logical and practical approach and one which is most likely to bring about the most satisfactory establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments and armed forces with due regard for the continuing maintenance of international peace.

Sincerely yours,

FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)*²

WASHINGTON, 15 January 1947.

Subject: Basis for United States Policy on the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered from the military security point of view the paper prepared in the Department of State to form the basis for the position to be taken by the U.S. Representative in the Security Council of the United Nations during the consideration in that body of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 concerning the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments and are in general agreement with the contents thereof.

If the United States is forced to accept early establishment of a special commission to discuss general regulation and reduction of armaments concurrently with discussion of the problems of international control of atomic energy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned lest resultant discussions, considerations and pressure for early commitments result in premature agreements for disarmament to the detriment of United States security and world position. They feel from the military security point of view, that if the United States is forced to accept a resolution calling for the discussion of other phases

² The enclosure does not accompany the file copy of the covering letter; the source text for the enclosure is located in the Department of State Atomic Energy Files.

of the regulation and reduction of armaments concurrently with discussion of the problems concerning the international control of atomic energy, the United States, conforming to its stated position that first things must be considered first, should insist that priority be given to discussion of practical and effective safeguards against the hazards of violations and evasions, to the exclusion of discussion of other elements of the general problem until this matter has been settled to the satisfaction of the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that if a special commission is set up to discuss general regulation of armaments concurrently with continued discussion of the problem of international control of atomic energy, its terms of reference should ensure that it can not encroach on the field previously allotted to the Atomic Energy Commission. (Paragraph 5(c) General Assembly Resolution of 24 January 1946). They further consider that the Military Staff Committee should act as the military advisers to any special commission which may be set up for this purpose.

If a proposal is made to establish a separate military body to furnish military advice for a special disarmament commission, the proposal should be resisted on the following grounds:

a. The Military Staff Committee, by terms of the Charter of the United Nations, is given special responsibilities with reference to the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, and

b. The Military Staff Committee is empowered by Article 47(2) of the Charter to invite military representatives of other member nations to be associated with it when necessary.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasize their view that decisions acceptable to the United States regarding international control of atomic energy must precede decisions regarding those other weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction, and that decisions acceptable to the United States for control of such other weapons must precede decisions regarding control of conventional weapons and the general reduction of armaments and armed forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that armaments are a consequence and not a cause. The need for them, today as throughout history, arises from the existence of conflicting international aims and ideologies and will pass only with the passing of such fundamental reasons for conflict between nations. Consequently the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that commitments towards the regulation of armaments or disarmament should be made prior to, or independently of, the solution of other problems affecting world peace generally and, specifically, the security of the United States.

They believe that present U.S. armaments are a vital factor contributing to our own as well as to international peace and security

and that reduction of these armaments should not be considered independently of other problems affecting that peace and security. Prior to the settling of such problems the military requirements of the United States can not be determined. Foremost among these problems, from the military point of view, are the establishment of a system of effective international control of atomic energy which is acceptable to the United States; the conclusion of the peace treaties and enforcement of the terms therein having predominate military implications; and the conclusion of agreements for providing contingents of armed forces for the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it is premature and dangerous to the future security of the United States to go beyond the discussion stages concerning the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces—other than the problem of international control of atomic energy—until these other problems have been settled to the satisfaction of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

USUN Files¹

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1947.

Following a meeting in Mr. Acheson's office this noon in which Mr. Fahy, Mr. Marks² and Mr. Gross also participated, I telephoned Senator Austin and told him that Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Acheson had discussed with Senators Vandenberg and Connally this morning the Department's paper on the United States position with regard to the procedure to be followed in the Security Council concerning the Atomic Energy Commission's Report.³ Mr. Acheson felt it would be desirable for Senator Austin to know Senator Vandenberg's views as soon as possible, although these views might not have any immediate bearing on Senator Austin's efforts in the Security Council this afternoon to get the whole disarmament question postponed without prejudice to February 4. As I understood them, Senator Vandenberg's views were as follows:

¹ Files of the United States Mission at the United Nations.

² Herbert S. Marks, General Counsel of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, 1945-1946.

³ For the January 21 draft of the paper under reference, see p. 370.

1. The Senate and people of the United States would not approve a treaty on atomic energy which did not include provisions for prompt and effective sanctions imposed on violators.

2. If we followed the procedure outlined in the Department's paper under reference, the impression would be given to the public and the Senate that we were welching on the position which had been taken by Mr. Baruch in the Atomic Energy Commission and were, in fact, preparing a retreat from this position.

3. Senator Vandenberg agreed that we should get agreement in the Security Council on as many of the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission as possible.

4. He also felt, however, that it is essential to get agreement in the Security Council in principle that there will be sanctions to punish violators.

5. Senator Vandenberg was apparently not worried about any magic words such as "veto" or any specific language. The main thing was to find out where the Russians stand on the principle of sanctions or punishment.

6. If the Russians understand that we are not worried about specific language (e.g. the veto) but that we are insistent on getting agreement in the Security Council on the principle there will be three alternatives as follows:

(a) The Russians might agree to the principle. This would, of course, meet our objective and would be satisfactory.

(b) The Russians might say that they did not understand enough of what we meant to agree even in principle but would be willing to abstain on a vote. This would also meet our objective and would be satisfactory.

(c) The Russians might, however, veto our proposed agreement in principle. In this case we would have to reconsider our entire position.

I told the Senator that we were working on a revision of the Department's paper on this matter and I hoped it would be possible to send him a copy tonight which could be used as a basis for further discussion with him. I told him we also had felt it would be desirable for him to discuss this whole matter at an early date directly with Senator Vandenberg. Senator Austin said he would like to do this.

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes, Adviser to the Permanent United States Delegation to the United Nations

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] January 21, 1947.

The following statements were made to Representatives of the Security Council to the effect that the United States had no intention of

pressing for a vote by the Security Council on sections of the Atomic Energy Report as to which there remained disagreement with the Russians.

1. *Ambassador Gromyko*

Mr. Johnson made the following statements to Mr. Gromyko over the telephone:

"Mr. Gromyko, there is one aspect of this that I do want to emphasize to you most sincerely, and that is that the United States wants to reach agreement on this atomic energy problem and we have no intention of trying to push consideration of this report immediately to disagreement, to the point of disagreement [*sic*]."

"Now, we hope between tomorrow (Jan. 15) and February 4, which is nearly three weeks, it is nearly three weeks, to discuss with you and with the other members of the Council and of the Atomic Energy Commission the parts on which we can reach agreement—we want to develop the agreement as far as possible on the recommendations—and then to refer back to the Commission the agreed recommendations for the drafting of treaty provisions, and so forth, and then reference back to the Commission of those recommendations as to which agreement is not reached in the Security Council for further consideration and possible resolution of differences in the drafting process."

"Many people in the Council thought that by our first resolution we were trying to push consideration of this atomic energy report to the point even of disagreement, trying to push the thing through, and that is not true."

To the latter statement, Mr. Gromyko replied:

"I appreciate it very much and I am glad to hear this. I think this may be helpful . . ."

Later on, Mr. Gromyko added:

"Well, I appreciate your observation that you did not wish to push this matter to the point of disagreement. That is very sound . . ."

2. *Ambassador Parodi*

In a telephone conversation, Mr. Johnson made a statement along the following lines to Mr. Parodi:

We would try to have everyone in agreement and to gain a common mind before the consideration of the AEC Report. "We can exchange views because we haven't the desire to push this report to a negative vote. We do not want to take a rigid position that the report should be pushed to a negative vote."

3. *Sir Alexander Cadogan*

In a telephone conversation with Sir Alexander, Mr. Johnson stated that he "had tried to impress on both Gromyko and Parodi that the U.S. does not want to press the action on this report (AEC Report) to disagreement. We don't want to do that."

He also stated that by having the delay which the U.S. proposed we would have time to reflect on this Report (AEC Report), to have consultations with the other members and perhaps narrow down the areas of disagreement to the point where we can have prompt determination in the Council and send the Report back to the AEC.

CHARLES P. NOYES

501.BC/1-2447

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1947.

Subject: Forthcoming Security Council Consideration of Regulation of Armaments Matters

It is necessary to establish the position to be taken by Mr. Austin in the Security Council when that body resumes on February 4 its consideration of the whole problem of the regulation of armaments, which was postponed, on our request and over the objection of the U.S.S.R.

The agreed United States position has been that armaments regulation should be dealt with in the following order of priorities: (1) atomic energy, (2) other weapons of mass destruction, and (3) conventional weapons and armed forces.

The U.S.S.R. has proposed that the Council immediately establish a commission to submit to it in not less than three months recommendations covering the whole subject. The United States, on the other hand, has proposed that the Council first proceed to a consideration of the December 31, 1946, Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, and then determine the matter in which it will implement the rest of the Assembly Resolution.

The U.S.S.R. has never stated the exact purpose of its proposal, although one point is absolutely clear,—that the U.S.S.R. desires that the atomic bomb be immediately outlawed, and that a system of control and inspection of atomic energy be considered only subsequently.

The majority of Security Council members are in favor of concurrent action, that is, of considering the Atomic Energy Commission Report immediately and also establishing at once a commission to consider the rest of the armaments problem. Many of these members have told us they are unable to understand our opposition to such a commission, and some of them evidently think we have an ulterior motive in opposing it. Unless the situation changes markedly between now and February 4, it is therefore very likely that, while the Council will

¹ On January 21, George C. Marshall had succeeded James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State.

agree to immediate consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission Report, it will also approve the establishment of a commission of some kind to deal with the regulation of armaments.

The United States must, before February 4, decide:

(a) how best to ensure first priority for consideration by the Security Council of the Atomic Energy Commission Report,

(b) how far it is necessary or desirable to go in satisfying the desire of other Council members for discussion of the general regulation of armaments, and

(c) the manner in which we wish to have the Council deal with the Atomic Energy Commission Report. In this connection Senator Vandenberg recently stated that he wished us to press for a decision on sanctions, although the United States Delegation had, under authorization from the Department, informed other delegations that we would not now press for a vote on controversial issues.

There are attached:

1. A draft of a resolution which might be substituted for the one we have already proposed.²

2. An alternative draft of a resolution, setting forth a position to which we might recede, if necessary.²

3. A summary of suggested points to be covered in a speech by Mr. Austin in the Council on February 4, 1947.³

4. The January 21, 1947, draft proposal regarding consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission Report in the Security Council.

Also attached is a folder of relevant documents. You will probably wish to examine particularly Mr. Byrnes' letter of January 8, with its enclosed memorandum,⁴ the joint reply of Messrs. Forrestal and Patterson, dated January 17,⁵ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of January 15.⁶

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

[Annex 4] ⁷

STATEMENT OF POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE PROCEDURE
TO BE FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO THE REPORT OF THE ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION

[WASHINGTON,] January 21, 1947.

1. The Council should make plain its appreciation of the work of the Commission to date; that the first stage of this work has been com-

² The attached draft resolution is not printed. For the text of the draft resolution subsequently approved by the President, see p. 388.

³ Annex 3, not printed.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 341.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 362.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 364.

⁷ The annexes do not accompany the file copy of the covering memorandum; the source text for this annex is located in the Department of State Atomic Energy Files.

pleted; that the second stage now begins; and that any agreements proposed to be reached are tentative, depending upon the fate of each factor essential to a complete system because such a system is indivisible. It should also be made plain that in making the proposals for drafting it is recognized by the Council, as it has already been recognized in the Commission's Report, that there must be further studies and deliberations by the Commission in regard to many problems antecedent to drafting.

2. Our objectives in the Security Council are:

a. Discussion in the Security Council of the Recommendations of the Commission with a view to developing agreement on as many as possible of the Recommendations, having regard to the considerations developed in this memorandum.

b. Reference back to the Commission of agreed Recommendations for the drafting of treaty provisions and the necessary deliberations and studies connected therewith.

c. Reference back to the Commission of those Recommendations as to which agreement is not reached in the Security Council for further consideration in the Commission and possible resolution of differences in the drafting process. However, a special problem is presented by Recommendation 3*e* of the Report relating to the basic principles underlying punishment for violation. In the event that all Members of the Security Council approve this Recommendation, it will, of course, be referred back to the Commission as provided above. In the event that a majority of the Members of the Council agree to the Recommendation in question, with the Soviet Government or other Governments abstaining from the vote, the Recommendation will also be referred back to the Commission, as provided above. In the event, however, that the Soviet Government, or other permanent Members, vote against the principles embodied in the Recommendation in question, the U.S. will oppose reference back to the Commission of the Report or any of its Recommendations. The course to be followed thereafter by the U.S. will then be reconsidered in the light of the discussions in the Security Council and the situation existing at that time.

3. The Security Council should regard portions of the Report other than the Recommendations, e.g., the Findings and the Technical Discussion, for what they are, namely, the interim product of the Commission helpful in providing the Security Council with the background for its consideration of the principles recommended, but not calling for approval by the Council.

4. There is widespread belief that the only issue as to which unanimity was lacking in the submission of the Report to the Security Council was on the much publicised question of punishments for violation of the treaty. This, however, is supported neither by the

record nor by the votes in the Commission. Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind the desirability of seeking agreement on as many of the principles recommended as possible. With respect to matters as to which agreement is not now possible, (except as indicated in paragraph 2 above) it is desirable to adopt methods by which agreement might be reached, namely, further studies and consideration by the Commission and the use of the drafting process.

Another aspect of the recommendations requires special comment, namely the relationship between the international control authority and national agencies concerned with atomic energy. We should make plain that any approval by the Council of the recommendations dealing with this subject in no way prejudices the basic principle that the international authority must have all the powers necessary to insure adequate safeguards.

5. If the discussion in the Council proceeds along the above lines it should be our effort to keep it from being too detailed or prolonged. We would aim to have the consideration concluded by a general resolution reciting the nature of the Council's consideration, the agreement reached by it with respect to certain principles and directions for further study during the drafting process in the Commission of unagreed points, as well as drafting of agreed points.

USUN Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1947.

Participants: Senator Austin
 Mr. Fahy
 Mr. Gross
 Mr. Ross
 Mr. Joseph E. Johnson

Subject: Regulation of Armaments: Atomic Energy

In response to Mr. Ross's request that he give the rest of the group a summary of his views on the whole problem now facing us with respect to the regulation of armaments including the Atomic Energy Commission's Report, Senator Austin made the following points:

1. The discussion and the problem are now only procedural. There has been no consideration of the substance of arms regulation matters.
2. Other delegates have told U.S. Delegation they found it difficult to understand our insistence on priority for consideration of atomic energy. Several of them, notably Parodi, have asked two principal questions:

(a) Why do we insist on giving up our chief weapon before considering other armaments, when that weapon might be our principal bargaining point in obtaining agreement on reduction of other armaments?

(b) Why do we announce that we will not disarm the United States unilaterally and then propose to do just that by getting rid of the weapon which we alone hold?

3. Senator Austin said that Mr. Herschel Johnson had told Gromyko, Parodi, and Cadogan that the United States did not intend to press for a vote on issues respecting the Atomic Energy Commission Report on which there was disagreement and read what he, Austin, had said in open Council on this point.

4. Mr. Austin had had a very satisfactory talk this morning with Senator Vandenberg. He said that the position of Vandenberg and that of Mr. Austin and the Department are not inconsistent. Mr. Austin had pointed out to Senator Vandenberg that the Atomic Energy Act passed by Congress provides that no information shall be given without Congressional approval and that in addition, any treaty on this subject must be approved by the Senate. He had also called Senator Vandenberg's attention to the provision in the Atomic Energy Act to the effect that U.S. national atomic energy policy shall not be inconsistent with any such treaty. These facts, Austin had said, made it clear that it would be impossible to agree upon a treaty which was not satisfactory to Congress and particularly to the Senate. Mr. Austin had emphasized to Senator Vandenberg his determination that they should be, and his belief that they are, in agreement on substance. He felt, however, that he must have latitude with respect to negotiations. He had said, "You must trust me. I cannot be put in a straight jacket." Senator Vandenberg had replied that he realized Austin's need for negotiating freedom. He just wanted to be certain that there would be "no giving in to the Russians."

Austin, referring to the regard in which he knew Vandenberg held Baruch, had then told Vandenberg of his talks with Baruch in which he had asked Baruch if he thought the same urgency exists now as existed earlier. Specifically he had asked Baruch whether he thought the sanctions ("veto") issue should be forced to a showdown in the Security Council now. Baruch, Austin told Vandenberg, had made it clear that he did not think there was urgency and had pointed out the difference in circumstances between the present and when he, Baruch, had pushed for a vote in December. Baruch had made it clear that he felt Austin should allow the matter to simmer and should not press issues to a vote. Vandenberg, who had not known of Austin's conversations with Baruch, was "visibly affected by this information."

5. In response to a query, Senator Austin indicated that he was satisfied that, as a result of his conversation with Vandenberg, we are

no longer in the position of having to press for a vote on the sanctions issue. In other words, the January 21 draft of the position paper¹ is not now binding. Senator Austin also said that he feels the Department must leave him much freedom in negotiation. He proposed that an effort be made to reach agreement here in Washington on a draft of a resolution for introduction on February 4. He would take this draft back with him to New York on January 29 and use it as a basis for negotiations with other members of the Council over the week end, although he would not agree to any changes suggested by other delegations without prior consultation with the Department. In this connection the Senator referred to the similarity of thinking in the Department and that in the United States Delegation in New York, and read two drafts of resolutions that had been prepared by Mr. Noyes, one a short one and one very long and detailed.² It was the initial reaction of the Department officers that the longer draft was too detailed and that an effort to spell out the resolution too much merely created more difficulties.

6. Senator Austin, indicating that he had spoken in a similar vein to Senator Vandenburg, referred to his conviction that the whole problem of the control of atomic energy and of regulation of armaments generally is intimately linked to other factors of which he mentioned specifically the strategic trusteeships and the provisions of Security Council forces under Article 43. He went on to elaborate his present belief that the treaty for the control of atomic energy must provide for enforcement by means of a collective security pact, which would bind all non-violating signatories to go to war immediately against a nation committing a violation tantamount to an act of war, such as the seizure of an atomic energy plant. Senator Austin stressed the fact that this would be war and not the kind of enforcement action envisaged by Article 42 of the Charter. For this reason the forces to be provided under Article 43 agreements would be entirely inadequate and would be only part of whole.

7. Mr. Austin had discussed with Senator Vandenberg in a general way the question of his relationship with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Vandenberg had indicated that he thought it desirable to go slow in developing relationships with Lilienthal and his colleagues, at least until the hearings on their confirmation have ended. Senator Austin said that he intended to follow Vandenberg's suggestion and made it quite clear that he had reached no decision as to the relations between himself and his staff on the one hand and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its staff on the other.

8. Mr. Fahy, expressing the gratification which the Department

¹ *Ante*, p. 370.

² Neither printed.

officers felt at the results of Senator Austin's conversation with Senator Vandenberg, raised the question as to whether it might not be advisable for Mr. Austin also to see the Secretaries of War and Navy.³ No definite decision was reached on this point, but during the ensuing discussion, Senator Austin mentioned the short JCS paper of December 6 for guidance of the U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee (SWNCC 240/2[1])⁴ and stated his approval of paragraph (d) thereof which spoke of the necessity of not proceeding beyond the discussion stage with respect to general regulation of armaments until a substantial measure of agreement has been reached regarding the international control of atomic energy.

9. Referring to a previous telephone conversation with Senator Austin,⁵ Mr. Ross asked whether the Senator still felt it desirable to keep the Atomic Energy Commission Report in the Security Council until agreement is reached. The Senator indicated that he did not feel this so strongly now, stating that there might be some advantage in sending the Report back to the Atomic Energy Commission for drafting, provided that it is clear that, once agreement in principle has been reached in the Security Council, on a particular point, the Atomic Energy Commission is not free to revise or modify that decision. Mr. Austin believes it most important that it be clearly understood at all times that the Security Council must make the decisions and that the Atomic Energy Commission cannot reverse the Council's actions.

10. Senator Austin expressed great concern over the recommendation in the Atomic Energy Commission Report concerning supervision of the transitional process. He referred to earlier conversations with Mr. Byrnes on this point and to a talk with Mr. Baruch. What particularly concerns Mr. Austin is the fact that if the Atomic Energy Commission supervises the transition from one stage to another, as proposed in the Report's Recommendation 5, the United States will not have the control that its security requires and that the McMahon Act specifically makes mandatory. After Mr. Austin had pointed this out to Mr. Baruch, the latter had said that he fully understood the Senator's concern and remarked that here, in effect, was a case where the United States must have the veto. The discussion which followed Senator Austin's remarks on this point at today's meeting did not lead to any specific conclusion as to the manner in which this particular

³ Senator Austin did not see the Service Secretaries, but on January 30, after his return to New York, he spoke by telephone with Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson. The record of that conversation indicates that they exchanged general views on international control of atomic energy, regulation of armaments and collective security, and relations with Congress in regard to those subjects. (USUN Files)

⁴ Reference is to SWNCC 240/1, December 9, 1946; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1091. (SWNCC 240/2, January 13, 1947, is printed on p. 356.)

⁵ Reference is to a telephone conversation between Austin and Ross on January 22, the record of which is not printed (USUN Files).

recommendation should be handled in the Security Council. It was definitely understood, however, that the Recommendation should be dealt with in such a manner as not to foreclose the issue of who would control the transitional processes.

11. During the discussion Senator Austin said that Mr. Noyes had prepared a paper⁶ which took the view that the Security Council should consider not only the recommendations in the Atomic Energy Commission Report, but the findings as well. The Senator said he saw much force in this position, which is contrary to that previously held in the Department. There was no discussion of this point.

⁶ January 25, not printed.

500.A/1-2747

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1947.

Subject: Discussion of the Question of Disarmament by the Security Council

The British Ambassador¹ called on me at his request. He handed me the attached *aide-mémoire* and read me the attached confidential explanation of Mr. Bevin's attitude.

DEAN ACHESON

[Annex 1]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Since the Security Council's agreement on the 20th January to the request of the United States Delegation for postponement of consideration of the question of disarmament, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been considering future procedure on this matter.

They consider that in all the circumstances the United States Delegation's request for delay was reasonable and that the Security Council was right to comply with it. On the other hand they have some difficulty in understanding the United States Delegation's firm insistence upon priority for the discussion of the control of atomic energy. They understand it to be the general sense of members of the Security Council that it would not be desirable to attempt to pigeon-

¹ Lord Inverchapel.

hole the Soviet resolution on disarmament and that it should be possible to resume work on atomic energy and to begin work on general disarmament simultaneously.

His Majesty's Government feel considerable sympathy with this view. Provided it is clearly understood that what is now under discussion is the preparation of plans and that the implementation of these plans will not take place until agreement has been reached over the whole field of disarmament, atomic and general, they consider that it should be possible for the Security Council to agree to deal with the problems before them on the following general lines.

The Security Council might:

(a) Formally set up the Disarmament Commission as a parallel body to the Atomic Energy Commission.

(b) Instruct the Military Staff Committee to expedite its work on the agreements under Article 43.

(c) Receive the report of the Atomic Energy Commission, approve it in principle (leaving the veto issue open at this stage) and then set the Atomic Energy Commission working in parallel with the Disarmament Commission.

(d) Consider the veto issue as a whole at a later stage when the drafts to be produced by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Disarmament Commission come (as His Majesty's Government understand the situation) before the Security Council for final approval in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of the 14th December, before submission to a special session of the General Assembly.

His Majesty's Government consider that it should be possible in practice for (a), (b) and (c) to be dealt with by the Security Council almost simultaneously, particularly if the Council do not go over the Atomic Energy Commission's report in detail but merely instruct the Atomic Energy Commission to work out a detailed plan on the basis thereof. Such a procedure should eliminate the necessity for argument about priorities.

His Majesty's Government have not modified in any way their views on the international control of atomic energy or on the importance to be attached to devising means of ensuring that there must be no evasion of the system of control of atomic and other armaments through the right of veto. They do not, however, consider that their views on these points, which they believe, correspond closely with those of the United States Government, would in any way be prejudiced if the Security Council planned its programme on the lines indicated above. His Majesty's Government would be grateful to learn the views of the United States Government on this whole question and in particular to know whether they feel able to agree with the foregoing procedure. If they do, His Majesty's Government would propose to urge it also on the Soviet Government.

Meanwhile His Majesty's Government have decided to establish forthwith an official Committee on Disarmament under the chairmanship of Mr. Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office and containing also senior representatives of the Dominions Office, the three Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply, with the following terms of reference:

(I) To make an early examination of the resolution on the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments adopted by the General Assembly.

(II) On the basis of this resolution, to prepare and submit to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet draft proposals to be submitted to the Disarmament Commission of the Security Council by the United Kingdom representative.

(III) To keep under constant review the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission and of the Security Council when the latter body is itself considering disarmament.

(IV) In conjunction with the Official Committee on atomic energy, to coordinate policy regarding the regulation and reduction of armaments with policy regarding the control and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

No information is being published about the establishment of this Committee and it is requested that the foregoing particulars may be treated as strictly confidential. His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow has been instructed to inform the Soviet Government in strict confidence and in general terms of the establishment of the Committee.

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1947.

[Annex 2]

EXPLANATION OF MR. BEVIN'S ATTITUDE FOR USE IN INFORMAL
ORAL DISCUSSION

CONFIDENTIAL

We want to get the United States Government to agree that the establishment of the Disarmament Commission is not held up by detailed examination at this stage in the Security Council of the Atomic Energy Commission's Report. Similarly we want to get the Soviet Government to agree to accept in the Security Council the Atomic Energy Commission's Report in principle and to allow that Commission to pursue further studies on that basis in parallel with the studies to be undertaken by the Disarmament Commission.

Both sides have therefore something to gain as well as to give by adopting the procedure proposed by His Majesty's Government and it should not be too difficult to get it agreed. Otherwise it is difficult to see how work on the Assembly Resolution of December 14th can ever get started.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1947.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION
OF ARMAMENTS

An *aide-mémoire* left with me yesterday by the British Ambassador¹ states among other things that the United Kingdom Government has decided to establish forthwith an official Committee on Disarmament under the chairmanship of one of the Under Secretaries in the Foreign Office and with senior representatives of the Dominions Office, the three service Departments, and the Ministry of Supply. The terms of reference of this Committee are set forth in the *aide-mémoire*. It is requested that this information be considered as strictly confidential. The British Ambassador in Moscow has been instructed to inform the Soviet Government.

We have given considerable thought to the organization of this work within the United States Government and have reached the conclusion that we should establish a committee similar to that which has now been established in the United Kingdom Government. I should therefore like to suggest the following points for your consideration :

1. That we establish informally and without publicity a Committee on the Regulation of Armaments.

2. This Committee should be composed of the Secretary of State as Chairman with the following as members: The Secretaries of War and Navy, Senator Austin, General Eisenhower, Admiral Nimitz² and General Spaatz,³ and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. From time to time the Chairman of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Atomic Energy Committees might be asked to participate.

3. Each of the members of the Committee might be represented in his absence by a deputy. I would suggest that I be named as your deputy and serve as Chairman of the Committee in your absence.

4. The principal function of this Committee would be to determine the policy of the United States with regard to the matters dealt with in the Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and the General Assembly resolution of December 14. It would receive and act upon reports from the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee and it would issue appropriate directives to the staffs of the

¹ Annex 1 to Acheson's memorandum of conversation, January 27, *supra*.

² Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations.

³ Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

various member Departments and agencies concerning the program of work in this field.

5. More detailed terms of reference can be worked out at a later date should this be necessary. Meanwhile, I think this proposal might usefully be discussed with the two service Secretaries, the Chiefs of Staff and tentatively, pending his confirmation by the Senate, with Mr. Lilienthal. It has been discussed with Senator Austin who agrees.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 28, 1947.

RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS

I have the following recommendations with regard to this matter.

1. The United States should agree in principle to the setting up by the Security Council of a General Commission for the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments.

2. The United States should agree to the setting up by the Security Council of a Committee of the Whole, responsible for reporting back to the Security Council its recommendations regarding the composition and terms of reference of the proposed Commission. The most important consideration here is that the new Commission should not in any way infringe upon the responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission which has jurisdiction over atomic and other major weapons of mass destruction.

3. The United States, having agreed to the first two points, should press for immediate consideration by the Security Council itself of the Atomic Energy Commission's Report.

4. There is attached a draft resolution (Tab 1-a) ¹ which might be used by Senator Austin as a basis for his consultations with other Members of the Security Council before the Council meets to consider this matter next Tuesday. This draft has been cleared with him. It is my thought that it would be preferable for some other Member of the Council to introduce a resolution which would meet our points rather than for us to do this ourselves.

It should be added that the United Kingdom Government, the only

¹ Not printed; it was identical with the draft resolution subsequently approved by the Secretaries of the State, War and Navy Departments, and by the President, printed as the annex to the Secretary of State's memorandum to the Under Secretary, January 30, p. 388, with the following exception: the present draft did not contain the phrase "including the provision of effective safeguards" following the expression "practical measures" in the first numbered paragraph.

one which has given us even lukewarm support in the Council in our efforts to avoid setting up another Commission, is now taking the position that a separate Disarmament Commission, working in parallel with the Atomic Energy Commission, should be established promptly. This position is set forth in an *aide-mémoire* which the British Ambassador left with me yesterday.²

² Annex 1 to Acheson's memorandum of conversation, January 27, p. 376.

811.002/1-247

Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, January 29, 1947, 10:30 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Participants:

Secretary Marshall	General Eisenhower
Under Secretary Acheson	Major General O. P. Weyland ¹
Secretary Patterson	Admiral Nimitz
Assistant Secretary Petersen	Captain Dennison
Secretary Forrestal	Mr. Matthews
Assistant Secretary Sullivan	

DISARMAMENT

GENERAL MARSHALL said that Senator Austin two days ago had informed him of the unanimous opinion of the other members of the Security Council that we should proceed to a discussion of general disarmament simultaneously with the report of the Atomic Energy Commission. He said that Senator Austin quoted Mr. Baruch as feeling that it would be a serious mistake to conclude an agreement with respect to atomic energy before considering general disarmament. The other members of the Security Council, Senator Austin reported, could not understand our position in declining to discuss general disarmament until after consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission report. The British Ambassador also left with Secretary Marshall a communication advocating that we proceed with simultaneous discussion of general disarmament along with atomic energy.² Senator Austin felt that we have been put in a position of opposing general disarmament and he favored parallel simultaneous discussions and the setting up of a general disarmament commission for the purpose. The British note likewise said that they are setting up within their Gov-

¹ Assistant Chief of Air Staff-5, Army Air Forces.

² Reference is to the British *aide-mémoire* printed as Annex 1 to Acheson's memorandum of his conversation with the British Ambassador, January 27, p. 376.

ernment a commission specifically to follow the disarmament problems. We have a February 4 deadline for Senator Austin to meet and he must be given a chance to consult other members of the Security Council before that date. Therefore the matter is urgent. A State Department draft resolution suggests that a country other than the United States introduce the resolution.³

MR. FORRESTAL said that he fears the public may get the impression that disarmament is really on the way.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said he was not clear on one point. He thought our position at first and that of the others had been that we wanted to put disarmament problems all in one pot. GENERAL MARSHALL said that Senator Austin's plan keeps atomic energy separate from general disarmament. MR. PETERSEN referred to the question of what are "weapons of mass destruction". Would they include strategic air bombing, for example. GENERAL EISENHOWER said it was easy to say that the atomic bomb was a mass destruction weapon and one armed soldier was not. But a mass of soldiers with guns is likewise a weapon of mass destruction.

MR. PATTERSON thought that President Truman's declaration made it clear that biological warfare is the only other weapon of mass destruction then contemplated⁴ but the qualifying words had been left out in the January (1946) resolution of the General Assembly.⁵

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that from the Staff point of view and disregarding political aspects, if a general disarmament commission sets up methods of verification and compliance in the field of conventional weapons he thought this would help in reaching agreement on atomic energy. GENERAL MARSHALL agreed and said no plan was realistic unless it was enforceable: if we can get agreement on atomic energy in this respect we could probably get it on other matters.

MR. PATTERSON said it was obviously to Russian interest to outlaw all scientific weapons. This would mean that the country with the highest scientific development would in security matters be reduced to the level of a barbaric country. He thought that the Russians had injected the broader question of general disarmament just to confuse the public, as it was a curious reversal of what their interest seemed to be. MR. ACHESON said that the USSR had been much embarrassed by the pressure it was under with respect to inspection and control of atomic energy. To escape from this embarrassment Molotov had

³ Reference is to Acheson's memorandum of January 28, *supra*. For the text of the draft resolution proposed in that memorandum, as amended and approved at the present meeting, see the annex to the Secretary of State's memorandum to Acheson, January 30, *infra*.

⁴ For elaboration of Secretary Patterson's contention, see the Minutes of the Three Secretaries' Meeting of January 8, p. 345.

⁵ GA (I/1), *Resolutions*, p. 9.

resorted to his New York speech in favor of general disarmament.⁶ He thought that Molotov's purpose had been (1) to confuse the public on an issue embarrassing to it before the public, (2) to obtain a strong propaganda position and (3) to bring about the abolition of weapons they do not possess. They have already proposed the abolition of the atomic bomb. He thought they would soon propose the abolition of strategic bombers. Finally, he thought they would suggest the abolition of larger naval vessels, thus strengthening their own relative position.

GENERAL EISENHOWER thought that the principle of verification and how you are going to accomplish it is the place to start. We might start with regard to sea, land and air forces. The Russians presumably would have in the NKVD alone the equivalent of all our ground forces.

MR. PATTERSON thought it was sound procedure to stick first to the atomic bomb. That was the first business decided upon, but he supposed we couldn't avoid discussing other questions in view of the considerations set forth in the paper before them. MR. FORRESTAL thought that the difficulty lay with our own public opinion. GENERAL MARSHALL did not feel that our public opinion had yet been aroused against our position but it was the opinion of other countries which opposed our position. MR. FORRESTAL asked why we should not use our veto. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that world public opinion wants to discuss general disarmament. MR. FORRESTAL inquired whether we could not resist this. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that Senator Austin had said Mr. Baruch had thought it would be a tactical mistake to settle the atomic bomb question before other matters.

ADMIRAL NIMITZ asked whether we are not being forced from one position to another and suggested we consider first *how* to regulate armaments and then *when* to do it, which he assumed should be after the peace treaties. He believed we should make sure of our new position, specifically how to check on inspection. We should seek a firm commitment by the Commission that disarmament measures should not become effective until after the peace treaties. He thought that the "how" and "when" should precede "what" we are going to do. This also might have the effect of speeding work on the peace treaties.

MR. PATTERSON said he did not see how the Russians could insist on disarmament until after the peace treaties. For instance, there is always the question of a possible German resurgence.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought Senator Austin would agree that any measures should not become effective until later.

MR. FORRESTAL again expressed anxiety about our public opinion and thought our press had been full of what amounted to Russian

⁶ Reference is to Molotov's address before the General Assembly on October 29, 1946; for text, see GA (1/2), *Plenary*, pp. 832-847.

propaganda for disarmament. GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that Senator Austin in his recent statement carefully tied any disarmament on our part to universal military training and the fact that disarmament should not be unilateral on our part. MR. FORRESTAL was afraid that we will not be able to get universal military training.

MR. PATTERSON inquired whether it had been a mistake for us to take up the atomic bomb question first. MR. ACHESON thought that that had been a wise step and that our mistake came later in permitting the general disarmament resolution to be adopted by the General Assembly in New York. We should, he thought, have fought our propaganda battle there. Secretary Byrnes had, however, been won over in New York to the other view and Mr. Acheson thought we had made our slip when we agreed there to discuss general disarmament. MR. FORRESTAL was afraid that we would continue to make similar mistakes.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to Admiral Nimitz' statement which he thought was a sound one. He believed it would be a good plan for us to enunciate those principles at the start.

GENERAL EISENHOWER agreed. He felt there was a danger of our being put in a false position: We had segregated the atom bomb from the rest; Russia wished to make many things weapons of mass destruction and this might prove embarrassing to us. GENERAL MARSHALL said that according to Senator Austin's statement we must agree to simultaneous discussion but he did not see how we could be forced to go along with unsatisfactory proposals. How far are we committed in the General Assembly resolution to the establishment of a general commission. Assuming that the general commission is established he supposed he could take our own position on its report. MR. PATTERSON thought we could veto any objectionable report in the Security Council and GENERAL EISENHOWER pointed out that this would not break up the United Nations. The danger, he thought, lay in public opinion.

MR. PETERSEN suggested we might take other mass destruction weapons out of the atomic commission. GENERAL MARSHALL asked if our position on the Atomic Commission wasn't a strong one. GENERAL EISENHOWER thought "mass destruction" was an undefinable term. He agreed that it would be all right to let bacteriological warfare remain in the Atomic Commission but he would not want other weapons of mass destruction left there. He said that all this discussion has as its object the abolition of war. Why not have the Commission study means of abolishing war. MR. PATTERSON said we must discuss ways and means of accomplishing disarmament before discussing the limits. GENERAL EISENHOWER thought that this was the essence of our position. MR. PATTERSON asked whether we could hold it or whether we would be outvoted. MR. FORRESTAL again expressed his fears concerning American public opinion. GENERAL EISENHOWER said our position was so

logical that people must see that you have to discuss ways and means first. GENERAL MARSHALL thought we have a good propaganda base out of what happened after the last war. We disarmed unilaterally and the results are still fresh in American memory. It is important for us to prepare our proper propaganda.

MR. PATTERSON inquired as to just where we could dig in our heels and hold. Whether the position was in this one of declining further discussions until the matter of ways and means of inspection and compliance had been decided. MR. ACHESON did not think we could hold to any fixed position but that we must work continuously on this problem and keep public opinion informed.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as set forth in par 3 of our proposed resolution it is important to get consideration of Part III of the Atomic Energy Commission recommendations. If we start on this by announcing our position along the lines suggested by Admiral Nimitz, it might be better if we introduced the resolution ourselves with a statement explaining what we mean rather than to have it introduced by some other country. He also thought it was important that we should get together leading columnists and radio commentators and tell them what we have in mind. MR. PATTERSON said that he agreed that we should introduce the resolution ourselves and tell our position. MR. PETERSEN thought we should reiterate our position that we are not going to disarm unilaterally. MR. PATTERSON said we should make it clear that nothing was any good without strict provisions to insure inspection and compliance. GENERAL MARSHALL said we should enunciate first that our purpose is to find what gives security,—inspection and compliance safeguards; second, that no disarmament plan should be put into effect until treaties are signed.

GENERAL WEYLAND suggested it might be desirable to keep the handling of mass destruction weapons in the Atomic Energy Commission if they could be separated from the question of the carriers of such weapons. MR. PATTERSON said he did not agree. The Atomic Energy Commission should handle only the atomic bomb otherwise we would get into the old business of arguing what was an offensive or a defensive weapon. GENERAL MARSHALL thought we were in a stronger position on the basis of General Weyland's suggested and he favored letting the Atomic Energy Commission hold the powers it now has. MR. PATTERSON inquired what they are: Is the heavy bomber a weapon of mass destruction? If the question is handled by the broader committee we could tie bombers to the strength of standing armies. MR. FORRESTAL did not think that we could. MR. PATTERSON did not think it was in our interest to discuss the banning of specific weapons separately.

MR. PATTERSON said that in his view the problems should be settled

in the following order: (1) treaties with Germany and Japan; (2) agreement on the atomic bomb; (3) ways and means of inspection in the broader disarmament problems; and (4) abolition of weapons and demobilization of armed forces. GENERAL MARSHALL thought that control and inspection should precede any decision on the atom bomb.

MR. PETERSON said that the commission on general disarmament is a *control* commission whereas the commission on the atom bomb is an *abolition* commission. GENERAL EISENHOWER said he did not see that any harm would come if both commissions acted on the same weapons, for example, submitting separate recommendations on the strategic bomber. MR. PATTERSON asked whether we were bound by the General Assembly resolution in the Security Council. MR. ACHESON said he thought we were in view of the unanimity of the General Assembly resolution and the fact that Secretary Byrnes had made a speech in favor of it. He said he agreed with General Eisenhower that there is no need now to define the powers of the two commissions or what constitute weapons of mass destruction.

The proposed draft resolution was then read and after discussion it was decided to make the following changes:

1. In the first sentence the words "fulfillment of its responsibilities under" were changed to read "in consideration of".

2. In paragraph 1 after the words "practical measures" the following words were inserted: "including the provision of effective safeguards".

Paragraphs 2 and 3 were agreed as drafted. *The whole resolution was approved.*

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that it was important that Senator Austin be informed immediately: (1) that the text of the draft resolution as revised above had been approved; (2) that he should introduce the resolution himself; and (3) that he would be given an accompanying statement which would explain our position.

MR. FORRESTAL emphasized the importance of getting important editors and publishers together and explaining our position. GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that this should be done. It was also agreed that the Secretary of State should issue a statement emphasizing that the United States after its experience following unilateral disarmament after the last war had no intention of repeating that mistake. It was suggested that the President might make some similar statement at his next following press conference. ADMIRAL NIMITZ thought that in the explanations of our policy we should point out that the whole purpose of disarmament is to outlaw war, not just control arms. This would involve a study of conditions which produce wars, for example, the Soviet thesis that a Capitalist and Soviet system cannot exist peacefully side by side.

After some discussion of the paper on the establishment of a United States Committee on the Regulation of Armaments *it was decided that a permanent committee to deal with disarmament should be set up to operate full time and with a full time secretariat of its own. It was agreed that the relation of this committee to the JCS, SWNCC and the three Secretaries should be defined.*

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

501.BC/1-3047

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1947.

The President this morning orally approved the draft of the resolution agreed to yesterday by the State, War and Navy Committee for Senator Austin's presentation to the Security Council.² He also agreed to the Committee's view that a special statement should be drafted for Mr. Austin to voice when he submits the resolution and also that the Secretary of State in Washington should make a statement emphasizing the fact that the United States had had one tragic experience in unilateral disarmament and under no circumstances could commit itself to a repetition of that experience. Therefore, we would require ample practical security arrangements. Also, the President agreed with the Committee's recommendation that Senator Austin's statement should include the fact that we did not propose completing any disarmament procedure until the question of the treaties had been formally settled.

The President further stated that, when I made my statement as Secretary of State, he would at his press conference in answer to a possible question merely state that I had enunciated the policy of his government which would be strictly followed in the matter. He thoroughly agreed with the Committee's feeling that we must follow up carefully in months to come our stand in this matter so that the public would not be diverted from the stand that the United States must have definite concrete assurances as a basis for any agreement on disarmament.

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ This memorandum was transmitted to the United States Representative at the United Nations in telegram 31 to New York, January 31 (501.BC/1-3147).

² Reference is to the meeting of the Secretaries of the State, War, and Navy Departments, January 29, the minutes of which are printed *supra*. The Secretary of State informed the Secretaries of War and Navy by letter on January 31 of the President's approval of the draft resolution (500.A/1-3147).

[Annex]

DRAFT RESOLUTION ³

JANUARY 28, 1947.

The Security Council, in consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, on the "Principles governing the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments", RESOLVES:

1. To establish a Commission the function of which shall be to make recommendations to the Security Council regarding the practical measures, including the provision of effective safeguards, for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, except as regards those matters which fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission as determined by the General Assembly Resolutions of January 24, 1946 and December 14, 1946.

2. To create a committee of the Security Council consisting of a representative of each member of the Council which shall make recommendations to the Security Council regarding the composition of the proposed commission and its terms of reference, including its relations with the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

3. To begin at its next meeting consideration of the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission dated December 31, 1946, with particular reference to the Recommendations contained in Part III thereof.

³ This draft resolution was modified before being introduced as a result of correspondence between the United States Delegation at the United Nations and the Department of State. In telegram 97 from New York, February 3, Senator Austin suggested the following changes: "In paragraph 1 after 'to establish a commission' insert 'composed of the members of the Security Council.' In numbered paragraph 2 after expression 'make recommendations to the Security Council regarding' delete 'the composition of the proposed commission and', substitute word 'the' for 'its' immediately following." Senator Austin was informed of the Department's approval by telephone. (501.BC/2-347)

For the text of the draft resolution as actually introduced at the 98th Meeting of the Security Council, February 4, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 9, p. 151.

501.BC/1-3047

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments (Hilddring) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1947.

1. The present agreed position to be taken by the United States member of the UN on February 4, 1947 is understood to be:

- a) First priority will be given to the A.E.C. report.
- b) Second priority will be given to the international control of other weapons of "mass destruction". This will be handled by

A.E.C. and should bring forth definition of "weapons of mass destruction".

c) Action looking to the regulation of "conventional" weapons should be postponed.

2. It may occur that the Security Council will decide over the protest of the United States member that a commission to discuss the regulation and reduction of conventional weapons separate from the A.E.C. should be organized.

In any case the United States will be faced ultimately with the problem of conventional weapons, unless it retracts its agreement to the resolution of the General Assembly of December 14, 1946.

When that time arrives the United States member should have available an agreed course of action. This should include among other things, for example:

a) What feature of a reduction plan must be settled first.

b) What specific acts must be included in an inspection system presumed to guarantee compliance by all powers.

c) What are the maximum and minimum limits for armaments that he must insist upon for the United States and the reasons for the United States position. Also, many other decisions will be required.

3. The time is rapidly approaching when specific details must take the place of generalities. The United States representative of [*at*] the UN cannot discuss the regulation of conventional weapons unless he knows at least certain specific conditions that the United States wants or objects to.

4. The Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments of the Department of State has prepared the basis of a plan for the regulation of conventional weapons.¹ The technical details must be furnished by the War and Navy Departments, and the completed study should be an agreed document. It is urged, therefore, that the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments plan be introduced into the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee with request that it be completed and be held available for future use. Further delay in this matter can only result in a succession of important decisions hastily improvised.

¹ Presumably Doc. PCA D-5/5, not printed, the report of PCA's Subcommittee on the Regulation of Armaments, submitted December 6, 1946, which consisted of an outline entitled "Topics To Be Considered in Connection with the Formulation of Specific United States Proposals for the Regulation of Armaments." (Department of State Disarmament Files)

500.A/1-3147 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1947—4 p. m.

34. Other members of SC have demonstrated interest in mentioning Art 43 agreements in any resolution dealing with general regulation of armaments. Our approved draft resolution of Jan 28 as amended in Sec's office Jan 29 (see Ross memo to you Jan 29¹) does not specifically cover this question.

Not only does Dept believe some action designed to expedite completion of these agreements desirable, but it appears mandatory on SC under GA Resolution. We do not, however, consider that calling on MSC² at this time is either appropriate or likely to expedite agreements, nor do we believe SC should itself now give detailed consideration to the problem of these agreements.

We therefore favor action along line proposed in para 7 of first alternative draft resolution of Jan 24 brought by you to Washington,³ that is, that MSC be requested to inform SC without delay how soon SC can expect report and recommendations from MSC under Feb 1, [16] 1946 directive.⁴ The information should include an enumeration of matters to be covered by report and recommendations.

If SC takes this action it could, after receiving report, decide what further action should appropriately be taken to expedite agreements.

While we have no objection in principle to SC deciding on Feb 4 to make such a request of MSC, we feel that consideration of this question might unnecessarily complicate approval of basic resolution. It would therefore be better if it could be understood that question of expediting Art 43 agreements would also be considered by SC committee proposed in para 2 of resolution.

¹The memorandum under reference is not printed; for the text of the draft resolution, see the enclosure to the Secretary of State's memorandum to the Under Secretary, January 30, p. 388.

²The Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; documentation generated by that body exists in the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

³Paragraph 7 read as follows: [the Security Council] "Draws to the attention of the Military Staff Committee the recommendation of the General Assembly in Paragraph 7 of its Resolution of December 14 that the Security Council accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter, and to the fact that the Security Council has accepted this recommendation, and accordingly requests the Military Staff Committee to inform the Security Council without delay how soon the Security Council can expect the report and recommendations requested of the Military Staff Committee on February 1 [16], 1946." (500.A/1-3147)

⁴The directive requested the Military Staff Committee "as its first task to examine from the military point of view the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter and submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Council in due course."

We suggest that, after discussing this question with US Reps on MSC you take it up with your colleagues on SC particularly reps of permanent members of SC. You are authorized to agree to or propose any procedure which you consider most likely to accomplish our aims with a minimum of confusion.

MARSHALL

USUN Files

Mr. Franklin A. Lindsay¹ to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, January 31, 1947.

DEAR SENATOR AUSTIN: We have prepared for your information a memorandum covering the attitudes and policies of the various foreign delegations to the Atomic Energy Commission.² There are two additional items of Top Secret information which it seems desirable to cover in a separate letter.

United Kingdom

In the event a point is reached in the negotiations at which the Russians definitely refuse to accept the principles of international control, the United Kingdom Delegation has received instructions to put forward a strong suggestion of the possibility of the formation of an international control body excluding Russia. Such a commission would of course be essentially a military alliance.

Belgium

Our special interest in the Belgian situation arises from the fact that the Belgian Congo is a major source of supply of uranium at the present moment. The United States has worked out very satisfactory relations with the private management of these mines. Should nationalization of these mines be carried out by the Belgian Government, United States arrangements would become known and in all probability our monopoly position in respect to their production would cease. It is therefore to our interest that the Belgian mines remain under private management, particularly during the period preceding the establishment of effective international control.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY

¹ Executive Officer, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

² Not printed.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1947.

Senator Austin telephoned me yesterday afternoon and Herschel Johnson last night to report on their conversations Thursday and Friday with the other members of the Security Council on our draft disarmament resolution¹ (copy attached for convenient reference). The highlights of their report follow. I will send you somewhat more detailed memoranda of my conversations with them as soon as they are typed.²

1. They have talked with all of the other ten members of the Council.
2. Our draft resolution was very well received by all but Gromyko.
3. Gromyko did not see the necessity for our resolution but did not seem to have any very positive objection to it. It was clear in Senator Austin's conversation with him that Gromyko realized that the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission would have to be excluded from the terms of reference of the new Commission. It was also clear that Gromyko would not object to the Security Council proceeding to consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's Report as soon as action was taken looking toward establishment of the proposed new Commission on other phases of disarmament.
4. The Polish representative, who ordinarily might be expected to follow the Russian line, told Mr. Johnson he thought our resolution was a very conciliatory gesture; he said he would try to see Gromyko, apparently with the intention to try to win him over.
5. Gromyko particularly, and apparently a number of other members of the Council, felt that it was unnecessary to provide, as we do in paragraph 2 of our resolution, for the Committee to report "regarding the composition of the proposed Commission". The others seem to feel (Senator Austin agrees with this and so do I) that the proposed Commission would have to be composed of all of the members of the Security Council.

Recommendation—I expect to be talking on the telephone with Senator Austin some time this morning. I should like authorization from you to tell him (a) that the Department has no objection to his dropping out the reference to "composition", if he considers this necessary, so that the phrase would read "regarding the terms of reference of the proposed Commission"; and (b) that we feel it would be wisest for us to stick to the contemplated procedure, namely, that he should

¹ *Ante*, p. 388.

² Neither printed.

go ahead and introduce this resolution on Tuesday³ in substantially its present form.⁴

³ February 4.

⁴ In a marginal notation, Acheson indicated his agreement with the recommendation.

501.BC/2-447

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)¹

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Herschel Johnson called from Lake Success at the request of Senator Austin regarding Item 3 on the Security Council's Agenda, the General Assembly Resolution relating to information on armed forces.²

Gromyko had just asked Senator Austin privately whether we could agree that this Item should be referred to the proposed commission. Gromyko had apparently indicated that if we could so agree, it might be possible to reach agreement on the whole matter in a few minutes.

Mr. Herschel Johnson said that he had been told by Mr. Ross that this question had been discussed with Mr. Acheson and that the Department's position was that, if anybody raised this question, the Senator was authorized to say that we had no objection to the matter's being referred to the commission. The Senator wished, nevertheless, to check back with the Department.

After consultation with Mr. Ross (being unable to reach Mr. Acheson) I called Mr. Herschel Johnson back to tell him we had no objection to the matter's being referred to the proposed commission, although we think it would be a more orderly procedure to ask the committee which our resolution calls for to make recommendations to the Council on this matter. I said I thought Senator Austin might inform Gromyko privately that if Gromyko would raise the question in the Council he could reply along those lines.

¹ The source text is accompanied by an unsigned covering chit headed "Office of the Secretary," which reads as follows:

"Some difficulty has arisen over Gromyko's desire to tie into our resolution a specific reference to the General Assembly Resolution on Armed Forces. Gromyko wishes agreement that the Assembly resolution shall be referred to the Commission to be set up under our proposal.

The Department has suggested that Gromyko should be asked to agree to our resolution on the private understanding that we will then support reference of the Assembly Resolution to the Commission. Herschel Johnson does not believe that Gromyko will change his position publicly and feels that the whole matter must be worked out privately.

Urgent instructions are requested.

Mr. Ross is working on this."

² For text, see footnote 4, p. 357.

Mr. Herschel Johnson remarked that he thought Senator Austin and Gromyko had had in mind some private agreement; Mr. Johnson thought that the procedure I had outlined might be the most orderly one. He then asked whether, if Gromyko in talking to Senator Austin indicated a strong desire to agree now that this item should be referred to the commission when established, there would be any objection to Senator Austin's agreeing. I said I did not think so, but I still thought that Gromyko and the Senator should agree in private conversation that the former would raise the question in open Council and the latter would reply that the United States had no objection to the proposal. I said I thought this was a separate item which should not be confused with our proposed resolution. Mr. Herschel Johnson agreed that it was in effect a separate item.

A few minutes later Mr. Herschel Johnson called again to say that Senator Austin had thought it might be possible to accommodate Gromyko by including in numbered paragraph 2 of our resolution a specific reference to the Assembly Resolution on armed forces. I indicated some doubts about this, and Mr. Herschel Johnson asked what specific objection I had. I replied that one thing that bothered me about any suggestions for such a substantial change was the fact that the resolution had top clearance in Washington. Under the circumstances I did not feel justified in agreeing to a change. Mr. Johnson replied he thought that was a very important point and he would mention it to the Senator.

Subsequently, after further consideration of the matter, I called Mr. Johnson back suggesting that it might be possible to reach agreement with Gromyko on the following basis: (1) to point out to him that the instructions of the U.S. Delegation would not permit the Senator to accept such a substantial change in the resolution; (2) to point out that obviously the recommendation regarding information necessary to give effect to the Assembly Resolution on regulation of armaments was such a "practical measure" as was contemplated by numbered paragraph 1 of our resolution; (3) to suggest that if Gromyko could agree to our resolution and it passed, then Item 3 of the Agenda would come up automatically. At that point Gromyko might propose that consideration of it be deferred until the commission was established at which time the Council could refer the Assembly Resolution on information on armed forces to the commission with a request for recommendations. Senator Austin might agree privately that, if Gromyko were to make such a proposal, he would support it.

Without indicating definitely whether he thought such a suggestion would solve the difficulty, Mr. Herschel Johnson said that it was clear that Gromyko would not change his position publicly in the Council and that any agreement would have to be reached in private conversation.

He reported that the Council will not take a vote today. It has been suggested by one of the Members of the Council that the Council appoint a drafting group consisting of the representatives who have submitted resolutions on this matter. Mr. Johnson remarked, however, that one of the difficulties is that the other Members would want such a group to establish the terms of reference of any commission, whereas the United States believes the satisfactory determination of terms of reference is a task requiring more careful consideration than such a drafting group might give it.

Upon learning that the Council would take no decision today, I promised to see that the issue raised by Gromyko's talk with Senator Austin would be taken up in the Department with a view to getting high level recommendations to the U.S. Delegate as quickly as possible.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

500.A/2-547

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1947.

Senator Austin telephoned at 10:40. I left Mr. Acheson's staff meeting to take the call.

The Security Council yesterday had set up a Subcommittee consisting of the four or five Members of the Council who had submitted procedural resolutions (including Senator Austin) for the purpose of trying to draw up a resolution that might be generally acceptable.¹ The Senator was about to leave for a meeting of this Subcommittee scheduled for eleven o'clock this morning at the United Nations Manhattan headquarters. He said that we had virtually no support for the second paragraph of our resolution providing for a Committee to report on the terms of reference of the proposed new Commission. At the Subcommittee meeting this morning he would make the strongest possible case for the Committee.

On the other hand, he thought in his tactical situation that it might be easier for him to win acceptance of the Committee if he could agree, should it be necessary to do so, to language in paragraph 2 of our resolution which would cover Item 3 on the Security Council's agenda,

¹The United States Delegation had submitted the draft resolution on the regulation of armaments approved by the President to the Security Council at its 98th Meeting, February 4. For the text of Senator Austin's statement introducing the resolution, including the text of the resolution, see SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 9, pp. 150-154. The Security Council, unable to reach agreement on the basis of the new United States proposal, created a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Australia, and Colombia, for the purpose of drafting an acceptable resolution by means of informal discussions.

which is the brief General Assembly Resolution of December 14 concerning information on the armed forces of the United Nations. The Senator read to me the following phrase, "which shall include Item 3 of the agenda, the resolution of the General Assembly concerning information on the armed forces of the United Nations (Document S/230)"² which would be included after the phrase in paragraph 2 reading "terms of reference of the proposed Commission".

I told the Senator that unless he heard from us to the contrary he should feel free to accept an amendment along the lines indicated should he find this necessary in order to save paragraph 2. (I immediately thereafter checked with Mr. Acheson who approved what I had said and I telephoned this message to the Senator.)

The Senator went on to say that he was afraid it was going to be very difficult to resist an effort which he felt would reflect the majority view in the Council to eliminate the Committee idea entirely and provide the terms of reference for the proposed Commission in paragraph 1 of our draft resolution.

I asked the Senator if he thought any definitive conclusions were likely to be reached by the Subcommittee at its meeting this morning. I suggested to him that before the Subcommittee reached any definitive conclusion some of the Members might want to consult their delegations or their governments.

The Senator commented that so far as he was concerned he was not going to accept anything today unless he was fully satisfied with it.

JOHN ROSS

² For text, see telegram 962 from New York, December 13, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, p. 1099.

501.BC/2-547: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, February 5, 1947—11:30 p. m.

US URGENT

113. I am sending herewith a short summary of the position at the end of today's meeting of the Security Council's subcommittee to draft a resolution regarding the reduction of armaments with my comments. The subcommittee met all day and will meet again Thursday morning at eleven. There were four issues dealt with at the meeting.

First is whether the United States proposal for a committee should be adopted. It is clear that the members of the subcommittee other than ourselves are unsympathetic to our suggestion for a committee of the whole, and feel that it is unnecessary and will cause delay. We urged

the importance of preparing careful terms of reference to protect Atomic Energy Commission and the necessity of defining what are conventional weapons as opposed to weapons of mass destruction, but various members suggested that this task should be done either by the Council or perhaps by the new commission itself.

The Belgian chairman put forward the following suggestion in an effort at compromise :

"The commission shall submit its plan of work to the Council for approval and shall propose measures to be taken in order to prevent any encroachment on the competence of the AEC." The chairman indicated one measure would be to propose delimitation of conventional weapons. I indicated we would consider this and advise the Council tomorrow as to our views.

I do not feel that the subcommittee will support our suggestion for a committee of the whole and under the circumstances consider that it might be advisable to accept the Belgian's suggestion. In essence it merely postpones until later a Council decision as to the exact boundaries of the jurisdiction of the new commission. It has the advantage from our point of view of placing first on the agenda of the new commission a subject which will undoubtedly require some time to dispose of. Gromyko objected to this proposal on that ground and said he could not accept it. Furthermore, the representatives on the commission would probably be exactly the same as the representatives on our proposed committee of the whole and, therefore, the resulting recommendation should be the same. The recommendation is, of course, subject to the final approval of the Security Council itself and perhaps the General Assembly.

Second controversial point was whether we should include a specific statement in any resolution to the effect that the new commission had no jurisdiction over matters which fall within the competence of the AEC. We pressed hard on this point, and as the meeting dragged on and Gromyko continued to oppose any such provision on the sole ground that it was unnecessary and repetitive, other members of the subcommittee became suspicious and, I believe, came around to our point of view that it was absolutely essential. At the end, I made our position absolutely clear that we would not approve any resolution unless it contained a clear provision establishing this principle.

In my opinion the subcommittee will now support us on this point and I feel sure that most of the members of the Council will also do so.

Third question related to when we should deal with the AEC report. Gromyko suggested that if item three were included in the terms of reference of the new commission we would then proceed immediately from the present item on the agenda to a discussion of the AEC report. We agreed to his suggestion and the subcommittee seems to be in

accord. I submitted the following language: "The terms of reference of the commission shall also include appropriate provisions for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1946, relating to information on the armed forces of the United Nations insofar as that resolution relates to armaments within the new commission's jurisdiction." Gromyko never agreed to this language and appeared to back away from the whole proposal as soon as I submitted it.

Fourth question related to proposals to press for action by the Military Staff Committee on Article 43 agreements. It was agreed that the French would submit a new draft of their proposal for consideration tomorrow to the general effect that the Military Staff Committee will be called upon to submit a report on this question as soon as possible.

The committee ended up by attempting to reach agreement by using the French resolution¹ as a basic text. My following telegram will report more in detail on the textual amendments suggested. The general tactical situation at the present moment is roughly as follows:

Because of Gromyko's obstinate refusal to put into the record a statement that the new commission shall not infringe upon the competence of the AEC, the other members of the subcommittee have become increasingly suspicious of the Russians' intention on this entire proposal for a commission. I assume this will apply to the other members of the Council if he maintains his position. I doubt if we have any real chance of obtaining our proposed committee of the whole to write terms of reference. I feel that the Belgian suggestion has a good deal of merit under the circumstances since, if we accept it, it provides us with an excellent opportunity to come out of the subcommittee with a resolution which will have the support of the majority of its members and probably the large majority of the Council, with the Russians being in an untenable position if they do not come along. Furthermore, if this course were followed, I feel we would in essence be getting what we really want, namely, an opportunity to prepare careful terms of reference which would make certain that there was no infringement by the new commission on the field of competence of the AEC.

I suggest, therefore, that we should accept the French text as the basis for a compromise resolution; insist on inserting a provision protecting the AEC competence; accept the Belgium proposal referred to above; and attempt to add to this resolution any other provisions which we feel are essential.

AUSTIN

¹ SC, 2nd yr. Suppl. No. 2, pp. 33-34.

500.A/2-647 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET
URGENT

NEW YORK, February 6, 1947—10:45 p. m.

118. Following is a short summary of the meeting of the subcommittee of the SC on the regulation of armaments. I am sending in a separate telegram a working paper¹ which will be taken up at another meeting of the subcommittee Friday at 3 p. m.

The subcommittee reached no decision after six hours of discussion. It now appears unlikely that complete agreement will be reached. The last hour of the meeting was spent in attempting to frame alternative resolutions which could be submitted to the SC indicating the exact areas of agreement and disagreement, so as to frame the issues for the Council.

The only real issue remaining is whether the resolution should contain provisions which would make it amply clear that the new commission shall not in any way infringe on the jurisdiction of the AEC. Gromyko continued his obstinate refusal to include such provisions in any resolution. The stated grounds for his refusal continued to be that the GA resolution in paragraph 8 was an authoritative decision on this question which amply protected the AEC. Any further protection was unnecessary and, in fact, reflected on the GA. He also stated that the Council could not add to or subtract from the GA's decision. The members of the subcommittee, I feel sure, are now all satisfied that some such provisions are essential and the only question is as to the exact formulation of the provisions.

We continued to press for the provisions contained in the working paper submitted to the committee this morning. These provisions were somewhat modified and now appear in the Australian proposal paragraph 3 (see separate telegram). The Colombian alternative was put forward in the hope of a compromise. Gromyko stated it was much preferable to the Australian proposal but avoided committing himself to it during the meeting and finally made it quite clear that he could accept no statement in the resolution which excluded from the new

¹ Telegram 119 from New York, February 6, not printed, transmitted the text of the subcommittee working paper which was in the form of the four-paragraph draft resolution subsequently recommended by the subcommittee. For the text of the latter, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 2, Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly*, p. 71 (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Suppl. No. 2*). The working paper draft was substantially the same as the subcommittee's ultimate recommendation as to paragraphs 1, 2, and 4. Its paragraph 3 consisted of Colombian and Australian texts from which evolved final subcommittee alternative texts for that paragraph. (501.BC/2-647)

commission matters which fell within the terms of reference of the AEC. In spite of this there continued to be some pressure for further discussions in an effort to find a solution. We made it clear that our position was based on principle, that if there was agreement that there should be no encroachment by the new commission on the jurisdiction of the AEC, we would be glad to search for language to put this in effect. We made it quite clear we doubted that there was such an agreement.

AUSTIN

501.BC/2-647

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1947.

Following two telephone calls from Mr. Noyes reporting on the present situation regarding the procedural resolution on the disarmament matter, I telephoned Senator Austin. Referring to telegram No. 119 from New York,¹ I told the Senator I felt the language in the draft Australian working paper requiring the proposed new Commission to report on substantive matters "within the space of not more than three months" was likely to be misleading. The prevailing view in Washington was, first, it is unrealistic to think that the Commission could accomplish very much in this highly complex and technical field in so short a time. Second, progress in disarmament is closely related to progress in solving the many problems inherited from the war including the peace treaties with Germany and Japan. The Soviet tactical position called for substantive accomplishment by the new Commission in a short time. If we gave in to this now we might find it difficult to defend ourselves against charges made later (for propaganda purposes) that the United States was not sincerely interested in disarmament.

The Senator said he had kept these factors in mind but that it had been necessary for him to agree with the other members of the subcommittee yesterday on this point. He thought we were protected by the subsequent conditional phrase "which the Commission may be in a position to formulate" which applied to any substantive proposals. It was also provided (but not yet agreed upon) that the Commission should first prepare its plan of work.

The most important considerations, the Senator said, were (a) to insist on language in the resolution which would protect the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission from impairment by the

¹ See footnote 1, *supra*.

new Commission, and (b) to insist on language which would make it clear beyond any possible risk of future misunderstanding that information to be called for under the brief Assembly resolution of December 14, in implementation of the longer resolution of the same date, did *not* include information about atomic energy. He had talked with Gromyko on the telephone this morning and these were the points on which Gromyko was most inflexible. The Senator said he intended to fight for these two points; in order to win them, however and he expected to win, he had to be prepared to make some compromises and sacrifices on less important points.²

JOHN ROSS

² In telegram 124 from New York, February 7, Austin reported that the subcommittee had agreed that day to report to the Security Council a draft resolution containing two alternative texts for paragraph 3, one including only language acceptable to the Soviet Delegation, the other including additional language upon which the United States insisted (500.A/2-747). For the text of the subcommittee's recommendation, see GA (II), *Suppl. No. 2*, p. 71.

Department of State Disarmament Files

The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 7 February 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway has been the Chief of Staff's Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee since the latter's initial organization. He has had an excellent opportunity to observe closely the attitude of the U.S.S.R. on Atomic Energy Control, the allocation of forces to the United Nations Security Council and the general Regulation of Armaments.

General Ridgway has reached some interesting and significant conclusions on Russian objectives which are set forth in the attached memorandum. I believe you will find his memorandum of very considerable interest. I am furnishing a copy of this letter to the Secretary of the Navy.¹

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

¹ Secretary Patterson transmitted General Ridgway's memorandum to the Secretaries of the State and Navy Departments at the suggestion of his Special Assistant, Dean Rusk. In his acknowledgment of February 18, Secretary Marshall declared that he was "in agreement with General Ridgway's statement of the Soviet objectives" and likewise agreed "with his conclusions." The Secretary of State further remarked that he was "taking steps to have Senator Austin and his principal assistants, as well as the officers of the Department of State who deal with these matters, informed of General Ridgway's views and of my agreement with them." Copies of this memorandum and the correspondence between the Secretaries were enclosed in instruction 1740 to the Embassy in the Soviet Union on February 27.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Representative of the United States Army Chief of Staff on the United Nations Military Staff Committee (Ridgway) to the Army Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)*²

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, 3 February 1947.

1. Against the background of ten months continuous contact with Russian Representatives to the United Nations, I am impressed with what appears to me to be the emergence of a pattern of Russian objectives. The opinions stated herein are for your information. They derive from my evaluation of the facts of Russian action before the United Nations on the subjects of Atomic Energy Control, Disarmament and the establishment of United Nations armed forces under Article 43 of the Charter.

FACTS

2. *a. Atomic Energy:*

The USSR insists upon the conclusion of an international convention designed to prohibit the employment of atomic energy for military purposes and to accomplish the destruction of all existing atomic weapons within a period of three months after the ratification of such convention. Concurrently, the USSR has so far refused to accept the US proposals for effective safeguards and for the collective imposition of sanctions.

b. *Disarmament:*

The USSR introduced the disarmament resolution to the General Assembly and presses for United Nations action thereon.

c. *Establishment of United Nations Armed Forces under Article 43 of the Charter:*

The USSR Delegation in the Military Staff Committee has for ten months obstructed and so far has effectively prevented, any substantial progress towards the establishment of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council. Further, the Soviet Representatives have recently emphasized their insistence that the contributions from each of the Big Five shall be equal in overall strength and composition. In other words each of the Big Five shall furnish equal air, ground, and sea contingents.

EVALUATION

3. *USSR Objectives:*

At present, these facts indicate to me the existence of coordinated USSR objectives embracing:

² A copy of this memorandum also exists in the Central Files of the Department of State, file 500.A/2-747.

a. Public agreement by the US to :

(1) Prohibit the use of atomic weapons for military purposes and destroy all existing atomic weapons.

(2) Prohibit the use of all other weapons of mass destruction, in which classification, the USSR may seek to include such instruments of long range warfare as strategic air forces, guided missiles, and certain naval categories.

(3) Ultimately reduce each Member's armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available by that Member to the Security Council.

(4) Establish United Nations armed forces, in which the contribution of each of the Big Five shall be equal in over-all strength and composition in their air, ground and sea contingents.

b. Use of world public opinion and US national conscience to compel the US to comply with its agreements on the above subjects, while the USSR by equivocation and delay, evades the establishment and operation of effective safeguards on atomic energy and disarmament, and concurrently by intensive national effort, develops and produces atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

CONCLUSIONS

4. *a.* Well known USSR moral codes and conduct indicate the following as capabilities with a high degree of probability :

(1) An attempt to secure United Nations approval of an international convention outlawing the use of atomic energy for military purposes and requiring early destruction of all existing atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction; to keep this convention separate from any convention dealing with safeguards; to avoid pushing the question of safeguards; and ultimately, to refuse to accept, or if forced to accept, to fail to comply with them. If these attempts succeed, we shall have been deprived of atomic weapons at no cost to the USSR. In that event, we can not ignore the possibility that the USSR would continue its present great national effort to develop and produce such weapons clandestinely.

(2) An attempt to bring about a convention reducing world armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available to the United Nations under Article 43 of the Charter.

(3) An endeavor to secure United Nations approval of the principle of equality in strength and composition of the air, sea and ground contingents of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by each of the Big Five. This would compel us largely to renounce our modern complex armaments and would vastly increase the relative value of man-power as a determining factor in war.

(4) A concurrent effort to infiltrate Soviet agents into our industrial structure in such manner as to increase their capability, at a time of Russia's choosing, of paralyzing our national systems of transportation, fuel and telecommunications, for the purpose of preventing the timely restoration of our ability to exploit our superior industrial potential.

5. The foregoing actually amounts to an integrated plan to bring about unilateral disarmament by the US under the guise of a plan for general regulation and reduction of armaments by all nations; to strip us of our present technological, managerial, and scientific superiority; and to elevate the USSR to the position of the dominant military power in the world.

6. No effort is made to fix a period of time within which attainment of these objectives by Russia might be reasonably expected. However, regardless of when attained, their attainment at any time under currently existing world power relationships, would represent a grave menace to US security and to the peace of the world.

M. B. RIDGWAY
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

500.A/2-747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1947—7 p. m.

43. Urtel 124, Feb 7.¹ 1. We wholeheartedly support your firm insistence on language clearly removing from proposed commission's jurisdiction all matters within competence of AEC. Gromyko's attitude in subcommittee is added evidence of absolute necessity of such language if work of AEC is not to be endangered.

2. Dept fully recognizes difficulties of tactical position and desirability of not insisting on any matters not deemed essential. We feel, however, that subcommittee's draft is seriously defective in three respects in those portions not relating to jurisdiction of AEC. War and Navy Depts also gravely concerned on these three points.

a. Use in para 1 of expression "the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the establishment of international control". This paragraph as it stands embraces SC action regarding both atomic energy and other armaments. Unless "and" is replaced by "including", so that last part of phrase will read "including the establishment of international control", it could be argued that this para authorizes submission to SC and consideration by it of proposals concerning prohibition or limitation alone without provisions for practical and effective safeguards. USSR could for example maintain that this would justify it in insisting that SC consider its proposed convention for prohibition of atomic weapons.

¹ See footnote 2 to Ross's memorandum of conversation, February 7, p. 401.

b. Inclusion of phrase "within the space of not more than three months". Even though it be made clear, as texts we have seen do not now make clear, that this phrase modifies subparagraph A as well as B, it is still open to serious objection. US Govt is convinced that it will not be possible for Commission to formulate within three months proposals regarding either safeguards or other aspects of general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Should we agree to language of this kind, we might give world and especially American public false impression that something practicable can be done in this period. Moreover, if US fails within this period to come forward with or agree to proposals regarding A or B or both, we may be placed at serious disadvantage not only in eyes of world but in those of American people. Acceptance of this language would also appear inconsistent with our contention that peace settlements must precede actual reduction of armaments.

c. Placing concept of regulation and reduction before that of safeguards. This appears to suggest that commission should discuss "what" before dealing with "how".

3. Following comments and suggestions may be of use to you in working out best procedures for further handling of this question:

a. It is desirable not to press issue to a vote in Council at present. Even were it possible obtain support of seven members of SC for a resolution fully acceptable to us, and even though such a resolution were clearly procedural in technical sense, the matter is of such grave importance that adoption of a resolution over opposition of USSR, at least without further efforts to find basis for agreement, would be very unwise.

b. Although Gromyko's obstinacy regarding jurisdiction of AEC presents us with tactical advantage public relations-wise which it is desirable to make use of, it is important for future position vis-à-vis public that, in seizing the opportunity, we at same time, avoid being placed in position of appearing to support view that practical proposals regarding general regulation of armaments and effective safeguards can be worked out in few months.

c. In present circumstances it may be worthwhile considering anew our proposals for a committee of the Council to formulate terms of reference for commission. You could point out that this would enable Council to get on with its other business, such as Corfu, while still endeavoring to work out agreement on whole arms question.

MARSHALL

501.BC Armaments/2-1147

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division
of International Security Affairs (Johnson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1947—11 a. m.

Mr. Herschel Johnson called this morning with regard to the Department's telegram #43 of February 10 setting forth our views on the present draft disarmament resolution.

He said that Senator Austin had studied the telegram carefully and had stated that he thought the views expressed in it were, on the whole, sound.

Senator and Mr. Herschel Johnson both wanted the Department to understand, however, the difficult situation which they are in in New York—Mr. Johnson referred to it as one of the most difficult we have yet been confronted with. Because of this situation, it is extremely difficult for Senator Austin to propose changes in the resolution at today's meeting of the Council.

I emphasized to Mr. Johnson the fact that I fully understood the difficulties of their situation tactically. I said that was one of the principal reasons why we did not want it pushed to a decision today. It seemed to me particularly, and to others, desirable to let the matter simmer. If no decision is taken today, it may be possible to work toward a text more acceptable to us.

Mr. Johnson said that in the present tactical situation, U.S. Delegation could not afford to be concerned with "semantics." He and Senator Austin both felt that the proposed substitution of "include" for "and" in paragraph 1 was a mere exercise in semantics. Mr. Johnson said he simply could not see why this was important. To this I replied that we were concerned lest the door be left open for the introduction of proposals which did not encompass safeguards.

Mr. Johnson thought the resolution should be considered as a whole, and that if this were done, the potential dangers we saw in paragraph 1 and in the order of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of 3 would not appear so great.

At this point I indicated our concern over the possibility that we would be placed in a disadvantageous position propaganda-wise.

With regard to the clause relating to the three months time limit, Mr. Johnson again said that it would be very difficult in the present situation to get that eliminated, and I repeated my statement that awareness of this difficulty was the principal reason why we desire to postpone any action for the present. Mr. Johnson wondered whether our concern could not be taken care of by a statement by Senator Austin stating that his understanding of the three months clause was that it set an optimum goal and would spur the commission on, but

that people should not be disappointed if the commission did not come forth with significant proposals within that period. I replied that this would certainly help. I thought that any such statement also should reiterate the views expressed by Senator Austin on February 4¹ relating to timing, particularly the peace treaties. I thought it most important to record publicly that our attitude remained what it had been on February 4.

To this last point Mr. Johnson remarked that our position had in fact changed, to which I replied immediately that this was so only with respect to the proposed committee of the Council. He agreed that was so.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

¹ Reference is to Austin's address at the 98th Meeting of the Security Council, February 4; for text, see *SC, 2nd yr., No. 9*, pp. 150-154.

Matthews Files¹

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Matthews) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1947.

MR. ACHESON: We have gone over the attached memorandum² with care. I have also asked Colonel Eddy³ whether he had any information which would throw any light on the subject. He referred me to Mr. Hughes⁴ and Mr. Morrison⁵ of DRE. They agree with General Ridgway's views but have no data which would either confirm or refute them. They will keep on the lookout for anything on the subject.

Mr. Hickerson,⁶ our Russian Division and I all agree entirely with General Ridgway's views.

With regard to his paragraph 3a.(3) he presumably means that the USSR would in fact obtain reduction of other states' armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available by each member to the Security Council and would itself evade compliance both through the concealment of armaments and through utilization of large NKVD forces. If the USSR did not retain such NKVD or similar forces above the level of forces to be made available to the Se-

¹ Lot 65A987, certain files of H. Freeman Matthews.

² The paper under reference, General Ridgway's memorandum of February 3, p. 402, was referred to Matthews by Acheson for comment on February 10. In the memorandum of transmittal, Acheson stated that he agreed completely with General Ridgway. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

³ William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.

⁴ H. Stuart Hughes, Chief of the Central European Branch of the Division of Research for Europe.

⁵ John A. Morrison, Chief of the Division of Research for Europe.

⁶ John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

curity Council it would not, in our opinion, have adequate strength to maintain its own position internally and in Russian controlled areas.

As to your paragraph 4 we agree that it would be well to inform Senator Austin and his assistants as well as SPA that we fully share General Ridgway's views. I assume that since the memorandum came to us through the Secretary of War that both the Army and Navy already have copies of the attached paper. I believe we should inform them that we concur with General Ridgway. The question of informing the public generally is a more difficult one and I suggest that it might be studied urgently by the new interdepartmental working committee set up under Joe Johnson.⁷

I assume that the Secretary has himself given careful consideration to General Ridgway's views. If not, I believe he should do so.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

⁷ Presumably a reference to the Interdepartmental Committee on Regulation of Armaments on which Joseph E. Johnson was Department of State representative. This body, which held nine informal meetings from February 7 to February 24, was subsequently formalized as the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments; in regard to the latter, see Acheson's letter to Petersen, February 20, p. 418. The minutes of the informal committee are located in the Department of State Disarmament Files.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum by Mr. James M. Ludlow of the Division of
International Security Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 12, 1947.

MEMORANDUM ON CHANGES IN THE UNITED STATES POSITION RELATING
TO THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED
FORCES FROM JANUARY 6 TO FEBRUARY 12

The January 6 memorandum entitled "The Basis for United States Policy in the Security Council During the Forthcoming Consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments",¹ in brief made the following recommendations:

1. Priority consideration should be given to the Atomic Energy report. After the Security Council has finished consideration of the report to the satisfaction of the United States, the Atomic Energy Commission should then be directed by the Security Council to start a draft convention. Following this, the matter of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be taken up by the Atomic

¹ *Ante*, p. 342.

Energy Commission. In view of this order of business, no additional United Nations machinery on the regulation of armaments would be necessary for the present.

2. The postponement of consideration of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments to a later date. The arguments proposed in favor of this were to the effect that successful controls of the atomic energy program would be essential in all regulation of armaments; that consideration of the regulation of conventional armaments by the Security Council might be detrimental to the progress of regulation of other major weapons of mass destruction and that therefore, all efforts should be made to discourage proposals for consideration of the regulation and reduction of conventional arms and armaments now although an intra-governmental organization to consider such matters should be set up. (This should also be done in connection with other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.)

3. Negotiations on the Article 43 agreements should be expedited.

4. The withdrawal of troops should be handled by the Council of Foreign Ministers and not the Security Council, and if the problem were ever to be raised, this country's position should be determined at that time. Information on troops at home and abroad and arms and armaments might be divulged but such information should not be deemed necessary by us. Information on arms or armaments should not be asked for or given except in response to requirements of over-all plans on the regulation and reduction of armaments as set forth in the program under 1 and 2 above.

The U.S. position on February 12 may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Priority consideration should be given to the Atomic Energy Commission's report. This has been publicly reiterated by the Secretary in his press conference on February 7² and by Senator Austin in his speeches of January 25, February 4,³ 8 and 11.⁴ However, the draft resolution now before the Security Council to which the United States has agreed sets no specific date for the consideration of the report, merely calling for consideration "as soon as possible", and presumably this must be considered as placing less urgency on immediate consideration than we have hitherto insisted upon.

2. The United States is willing to begin consideration now of problems on the regulation of conventional arms and armaments by establishing a commission for that purpose. This is in direct opposition to the position of January 6. This is supported by the U.S. Resolution

² For the text of statements by the Secretary of State at his press conference, February 7, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 16, 1947, pp. 286-287.

³ SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 9, pp. 150-154, or Department of State *Bulletin*, February 16, 1947, pp. 275-276.

⁴ SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 11, pp. 194-203.

of February 4, 1947 (S/264),⁵ by the draft resolution now before the Security Council, and by Senator Austin's statement on February 4 and his speech of February 8 wherein he stated that our position does not bar consideration of problems relating to the regulation of armaments and armed forces concurrently with such other problems as the peace treaties and the Article 43 agreements.

3. Discussions and consideration on the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces either before the Council or in the proposed commission must emphasize that collective security and safeguards are prerequisite to disarmament. This is supported by the U.S. draft proposal of February 4, 1947, by the Secretary's press statement of February 7, 1947 and by Senator Austin's speeches of January 25 and February 4 and 8. The matters pertaining to collective security we deem to involve the negotiation of the peace treaties and of the Article 43 agreements. This is particularly emphasized by the Secretary's statement and by Senator Austin's speeches of February 4 and 8.

4. In any resolution adopted by the Council there must be a clear demarcation between the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission and the proposed disarmament commission and the latter should in no way encroach on the jurisdiction of the former. This is the present basis of controversy between this country and Russia. The opposing views are outlined in the draft resolution now before the Security Council and in Senator Austin's speeches of February 8 and 11.

5. There is no change in the position taken on January 6 relative to the withdrawal of troops and the divulging of information on troops at home and abroad and on arms and armament. The refusal to divulge information on armament was heavily underscored in Senator Austin's speech of February 11 when he pointed out that if the Russian position were accepted it might be possible for the new commission to require information concerning our supply of atomic bombs.

⁵ See the annex to the Secretary of State's memorandum to Acheson, January 30, and footnote 3 thereto, p. 388.

501.BC Armaments/2-1347

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1947.

Subject: Disarmament Resolution Now Before Security Council

At yesterday's meeting of the Council ¹ the preamble and paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the proposed resolution regarding armaments were

¹ Reference is to the 102nd Meeting of the Security Council, February 12.

approved, the latter in the long form desired by the United States, with the U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining. It is expected today to vote on paragraph 4 over which there is no controversy and then on the resolution as a whole.² The Chairman has indicated that the vote on the resolution as a whole will be substantive. While it is impossible to say for certain whether Gromyko will veto, the chances are he will not. If the resolution goes through, the new commission will be excluded from any encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission.

As you will recall, the Department sent over Mr. Acheson's signature on February 10, a telegram expressing the view of the Department and the War and Navy Departments that the resolution was "seriously defective in three respects in those portions not relating to jurisdiction of AEC."³ On February 11 Mr. Herschel Johnson telephoned me, after having talked to Senator Austin, indicating that these views, were on the whole sound, but that the tactical situation prevented Senator Austin's opening up the agreed points of the resolution.⁴ I emphasized how concerned we—and the War and Navy Departments—felt but it was obvious that the U.S. Delegation was not going to make any special effort to reopen the resolution.

In our telegram we included among "comments and suggestions" the statement that "it is desirable not press issue to a vote in Council at present." I reiterated this view in telephone conversations with Mr. Herschel Johnson on February 11 and with Mr. Blaisdell⁵ on February 12.

When talking to me Mr. Herschel Johnson proposed that Senator Austin might make a statement in the Council giving our interpretation of the clause requesting the commission to submit proposals within three months. I replied that I thought such a statement was an absolute minimum and I reiterated that view in my conversation on February 12 with Mr. Blaisdell. Senator Austin did not mention this point at the Council meeting on February 11, nor, according to the summaries available to us, did he do so on February 12.

I strongly recommend that in order to make the best of a bad situation, Mr. Acheson telephone Senator Austin at once to impress upon him the fundamental importance of making a public statement of our

² For the text of the resolution adopted as a whole by the Security Council at its 105th Meeting, February 13, by a vote of 10 in favor and the Soviet Union abstaining, see SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 5*, pp. 58-59.

Regarding the negotiations culminating in this resolution, see "The Establishment of the Commission on Conventional Armaments," by James M. Ludlow in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 27, 1947, pp. 731-740, 743.

³ Telegram 43 to New York, February 10, p. 404.

⁴ Memorandum of the telephone conversation under reference is printed on p. 406.

⁵ Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs.

interpretation of paragraph 3. Such a statement should contain two points:

(1) Our view that the request for a report within three months is merely an expression of hope and an injunction on the commission to proceed as quickly as possible. In connection with this point, the Senator should, I believe, reiterate and emphasize the principal points made in his own statement on February 4 and in Secretary Marshall's statement to the press on February 7 to the effect that disarmament cannot be speedy, that practical steps for reduction of armaments cannot take place until after the peace settlements have been made, and that the goal is the establishment of security and not disarmament for its own sake.

(2) That we do not regard the order of sub-paragraphs A and B of paragraph 3 as having any significance. Indeed, as we have constantly stated, we think the "how", that is, the provision of safeguards, must be dealt with first.

I realize that, after the leadership which Senator Austin has asserted with respect to paragraph 3, he may feel that to make these statements will place him in an embarrassing situation. That is unfortunate, but it will be much less embarrassing to the United States in the long run than would action which might mislead the American people and indeed undo the good results of Secretary Marshall's press statement. Moreover, it would also be less embarrassing than would our appearing to drag our feet at the end of the three months.

I cannot refrain from pointing out that the Delegation in New York has in effect ignored a telegram from the Department and has not only accepted, but has strongly advocated, language which we and the War and Navy Departments told them we regarded as "seriously defective." To my knowledge the only notice paid to this telegram was Herschel Johnson's telephone call to me complaining in effect at our quibbling over "semantics."

The War and Navy Departments are, if possible, more deeply concerned than I at developments in New York.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

500.A/2-1347

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1947.

Subject: Disarmament Matter

In the absence of both Senator Austin and Herschel Johnson I dictated the following message to the Senator's secretary and asked her to get it to him as soon as possible. I asked her to tell the Senator that I would, of course, be delighted to discuss any aspect of this with

him but that if he had any very serious question and felt his time was too short he might wish to telephone you.

At Mr. Acheson's staff meeting this morning he raised the question of the present status of the disarmament matter and we discussed this situation with particular reference to two points.

The first point was Langenhove's¹ ruling yesterday that the final vote on this resolution would be considered a substantive vote.

If this is considered a substantive vote, that is, a substantive vote on a matter which seems to us down here as essentially procedural, as a matter of precedent, we might get into future difficulties with the Russian veto on procedural matters which they would claim were substantive.

Furthermore, if this is considered a substantive vote, that is, a vote on the disarmament resolution, and if the Russians abstain, would their abstention be considered as a veto or as a waiver of their right to veto? Our general position is and has been, of course, that an abstention is not a veto.

We are not entirely clear here what the situation is in New York with regard to Langenhove's ruling. We talked in Mr. Acheson's meeting about the possibility of challenging this ruling, that the final vote would be a substantive one.

In any event, it was the sense of the meeting that our position should be made clear: first, that in agreeing to a substantive vote on this particular matter we were not agreeing to a precedent, and second, that an abstention on a substantive vote does not constitute a veto.

The second principal point which was discussed in Mr. Acheson's meeting was the three months clause, that is, the language which would call on the new Commission to make a report within three months. There is no disposition here to put the Senator in a straightjacket but the feeling continues to be strong that this particular clause is quite bad. Secretary Forrestal apparently seems to feel in particular quite strongly about this. Mr. Acheson asked me to take up again with the Senator whether there is any chance even at this late date of getting the three months clause out of the resolution.

On the other hand, if, in view of the tactical situation in New York, the Senator feels this is not possible, Mr. Acheson wanted me to ask whether it would not be possible for the Senator to make very clear in the proceedings, that is, in the discussion in the Council, that in agreeing to this three months clause we emphasize the reservation which is formulated in the words "which the Commission may be in a position

¹ Fernand van Langenhove, Permanent Belgian Representative to the United Nations; President of the Security Council in February.

to formulate". The sense of the discussion in Mr. Acheson's meeting was that we should make clear in the Council the realities of the situation with particular reference to two points: first, the realistic difficulties standing in the way of accomplishing any very substantive results in this very complex field in so short a time; second, the relationship of the whole disarmament matter to progress in other closely related areas involved in the whole development of collective security, particularly the conclusion of the peace treaties with Germany and Japan.

500.A/2-1347

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 13, 1947.

When the Senator telephoned me at 1:30 p. m. he had not yet received the message I had given his secretary for him and I therefore repeated the gist of this message.¹

On the question of the requirement in the resolution pending before the Security Council that the proposed new commission report "within three months," the Senator said that he had been alert at yesterday's meeting of the Security Council for any opportunity to straighten this language out. I gathered, however, that the British Government attached considerable importance to this language and the Senator said that he could not let his British colleague down. He said that Cadogan had given him in yesterday's meeting of the Council very fine and wholehearted support in winning our case against the Soviet Union on excluding the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission from the proposed new commission.

The Senator went on to say that if we said so he would, of course, move to strike out this language. He advised most strongly against this, however, and said that if he took this action the whole resolution would be laid wide open and we would run a very serious risk of losing the advantage we had gained with regard to the atomic energy aspects of the matter.

I told the Senator that the War and Navy Departments down here, including the two Secretaries, were particularly concerned lest this whole disarmament matter would sweep public opinion like a prairie fire in this country and, as a result, impair our national security through curtailed appropriations and the like. I asked him whether he thought it would be possible for him in today's Security Council meet-

¹ For the substance of the message Ross had dictated to Senator Austin's secretary, see Ross's memorandum to Acheson, *supra*.

ing to make it clear on the record what our position is on this three months clause.

The Senator said that he would be perfectly willing to do this.²

² For the text of Austin's remarks on the subject at the 105th Meeting of the Security Council, February 13, see SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 13, p. 270.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1947.

RAC D-17 Final

STATEMENT OF POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO THE REPORT OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

I. Present Situation and Possible Developments.

1. The resolution regarding regulation of armaments which the Security Council adopted on February 13² contains a paragraph providing that the Council shall "consider as soon as possible the Report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission (on December 31) and . . . take suitable decisions in order to facilitate its work."³ Immediately after adoption of the resolution the Council began consideration of the Report.

2. Gromyko announced in the Security Council on February 11 that the Soviet delegation "reserves the right to state (during the discussion of the Report) the position of the Soviet government on the question of control of atomic energy and will, in particular state its belief that the early conclusion of a convention is necessary to prohibit atomic weapons." (Underlining added.) It has already been announced that Gromyko will make his statement today, February 14. It is probable that the Soviet delegation will not be willing to proceed to an examination of the Atomic Energy Commission Report to the exclusion of the other questions relating to atomic energy, and that the U.S.S.R. will seek consideration of its proposed prohibition conven-

¹ This memorandum, drafted by Edmund A. Gullion of the Office of the Under Secretary of State, Ernest A. Gross of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser of the Department, and Joseph E. Johnson, the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, was approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-17 Final on February 13 and was sent to the United States Representative at the United Nations for his guidance.

² SC, *2nd yr.*; *Suppl. No. 5.*

³ Omission indicated in the source text.

tion prior to actual examination of the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

3. The attitudes of other delegations cannot be stated with any certainty, as there has been no discussion of this question with them since January. Three of the countries which voted for the Report are no longer members of the Council or of the Atomic Energy Commission. So far as is known there have been no discussions between the U.S. Delegation in New York and the representatives of the three new members of the Council, Colombia, Syria and Belgium, regarding any aspect of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Polish representative will presumably follow whatever line the U.S.S.R. takes. The old members of the Council (and of the Atomic Energy Commission) unquestionably desire the Security Council to take speedy action on the Report, with a view to sending it back to the Atomic Energy Commission for further work. They would probably wish to obtain as large a measure as possible of agreement in principle on the Recommendations contained in the Report, without attempting to be too specific on details or to go over the Recommendations line by line. Whether they will wish to go into the Findings as well as the Recommendations is not known.

II. *U.S. Strategy in the Security Council Regarding Consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission Report.*

1. The Council should consider, not the whole problem of the international control of atomic energy, but solely the Report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission on December 31, 1946; any attempts to have the Council take up other aspects of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission should be discouraged and countered. This applies specifically to a convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons, which Gromyko has announced he will bring before the Council.

2. The Council should make plain that it appreciates the work of the Commission to date; that it understands this to be only an interim report; that the first stage of this work has been completed; that the second stage now begins; and that any agreements proposed to be reached are tentative, depending upon the fate of each factor essential to a complete system because such a system is indivisible. It should also be made plain that the Council recognizes, as has already been recognized in the Commission's Report, that in connection with the drafting of treaty provisions there must be further studies and deliberations by the Commission in regard to any problems antecedent to drafting.

3. Our major objectives in the Council are:

(a) To avoid losing any ground thus far gained.

(b) To get the Atomic Energy Commission at work again and as quickly as possible on the problem of the international control of atomic energy.

(c) In order to accomplish both of the above, to endeavor to obtain agreement in principle on the Report as a whole, including the Recommendations relating to sanctions, and to have it referred back to the Atomic Energy Commission as soon as possible for further development in a draft treaty or convention of the principles embodied in the Recommendations.

(d) Failing, as is probable, to obtain objective (c), to obtain agreement in principle on as large a part of the Report as possible. The purpose would be to refer back to the Atomic Energy Commission for further development and the drafting of treaty provisions, those Recommendations upon which agreement has been reached in the Council. At the same time those Recommendations on which agreement has not been reached would also be referred back in the hope that after further deliberation and study the Atomic Energy Commission would find it possible to reconcile divergent points of view in the drafting process.

4. The emphasis in all Security Council discussion should be on the Recommendations contained on pages 22-24 of the Report (S/239). The portions of the Report other than the Recommendations, e.g., the Findings and the Technical Discussion should be taken for what they are, namely, the interim product of the Commission helpful in providing background for consideration of the principles recommended. The Council should not specifically approve these parts of the Report, although it will have to examine some of them in order to understand fully the Recommendations upon which they are based. It would be understood that reconsideration of these Findings would not be precluded, if further study in the Atomic Energy Commission indicated the desirability of such action.

5. There being no certainty as to how many of the Recommendations are acceptable to the U.S.S.R., or indeed whether any of them are acceptable, it is important to keep in mind the desirability of ascertaining exactly what the Soviet position is. There is widespread belief that the only issue as to which unanimity was lacking in the submission of the Report to the Security Council was on the much publicized question of punishments for violation of the treaty. This, however, is supported neither by the record nor by the votes of the Commission.

6. With specific respect to the Recommendations regarding relationship between the international control agency and national agencies concerned with atomic energy, it is important to make plain that any approval of these Recommendations by the Council in no way prejudices the basic principle that the international authority must have all the powers necessary to insure adequate safeguards.

7. The Recommendation that the Atomic Energy Commission supervise the transitional process involves very important questions for the United States, since it relates to the control by this Government over revelation of information and over the giving up of our special position with respect to atomic energy. Until further exploration has revealed the precise way in which we should deal with the transitional problem, we should not commit ourselves irrevocably to this Recommendation. On the other hand, it would appear unwise to call attention to this problem by raising it ourselves in the Security Council. The United States position on this matter should therefore be covered by a carefully phrased statement clearly referring to all the Recommendations and announcing that the United States considers that Security Council approval of Recommendations should be regarded as approval of the fundamental principles contained therein, but should not be considered as binding instructions to the Atomic Energy Commission as regards details.

8. However the discussion develops, it should be our endeavor to keep discussion in the Council from being too detailed or prolonged. Our aim should be to have consideration concluded by a general resolution reciting the nature of the Council's consideration and the nature and degree of agreement reached by it with respect to the principles contained in the Recommendations, and giving directions to the Atomic Energy Commission respecting further study and the drafting of appropriate treaty provisions. In the case of Recommendations on which no agreement is reached, the directions could include a request for further efforts at reconciliation of views and for a report regarding those points on which lack of agreement still exists.

501.BC Armaments/2-2447

The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1947.

DEAR MR. PETERSEN: I enclose a copy of a memorandum relating to the establishment of intra-governmental machinery for dealing with matters of policy relating to international control of atomic energy and the regulation of armaments.

I consider that this memorandum sets forth a satisfactory basis for the establishment of such machinery and am preparing to submit it to Secretary Marshall. In doing so, however, I should like to be able to inform him that I understand this proposal to be acceptable to the War and Navy Departments and to the Atomic Energy Commission. Could you therefore let me know at your early convenience whether

the arrangement proposed in this memorandum will be satisfactory? ¹

I am sending identical letters to Mr. John L. Sullivan, Under Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. David Lilienthal, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

[Enclosure] ²

MACHINERY TO DEAL WITH REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS MATTERS

FEBRUARY 17, 1947.

The following intra-governmental arrangement is suggested for dealing with the international control of atomic energy and the regulation of armaments.

1. Recommendations to the President on issues of major policy should be made by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Representative at the Seat of the United Nations. The three Secretaries should invite the other two officials to participate in Committee of Three meetings when these matters are to be discussed.

2. There should be an Executive Committee consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of War and an appropriate representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. Each member of the Committee should have a full-time alternate. It should be understood that the U.S. Representative at the Seat of the United Nations may be represented at any or

¹ In his letter of reply, February 24, the Assistant Secretary of War stated the following: "Although the War Department would have preferred that inter-departmental coordination in this field be accomplished through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, we agree to the arrangement proposed in the memorandum." (501.BC Armaments/2-2447). In a letter of February 21 David Lilienthal replied by expressing the agreement of the United States Atomic Energy Commission to the proposal (Department of State Disarmament Files). On March 3, Marshall proposed to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to the Chairman of the US AEC that the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments be considered as formally constituted as of that date (501.BC Armaments/3-347). In a letter to Acheson, March 14, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal stated that he was in agreement with the proposed arrangements with the exception that he did not agree to the participation of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in dealing with matters of policy concerning the regulation of armaments other than atomic weapons (501.BC Armaments/3-1447).

The Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments first met on February 26, 1947; documentation generated by the Committee is located in the Disarmament Lot file, Department of State. The present memorandum and other correspondence relating to the establishment of the Committee was circulated within the Committee as RAC D-1, March 12, 1947 (Department of State Disarmament Files).

² The enclosure does not accompany the file copy of the covering letter; the source text for the enclosure is contained in document RAC D-1, March 12, 1947 (Department of State Disarmament Files).

all meetings of the Executive Committee. The responsibilities of the Committee should include:

(a) The formulation of plans respecting (1) the further development of the U.S. position regarding international control of atomic energy; (2) the establishment and development of a U.S. position on "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;" (3) the establishment and development of a U.S. position on the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(b) The allocation of responsibilities for the preparation of studies necessary to the formulation and development of plans as set forth in (a). In fulfillment of this responsibility the Committee may (1) employ consultants and (2) assign work to personnel and staff already available within the three Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. It may also make recommendations for the establishment of special groups when this is deemed advisable.

(c) The formulation of policy recommendations regarding the above subjects for transmission to the three Secretaries, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

(d) Guidance to the State Department, within established policies, in furnishing instructions to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

3. The Executive Committee should obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when appropriate.

4. The responsibility for liaison with the Congress and appropriate Committees thereof should rest in the five persons named in 1 above.

5. The State Department representative on the Executive Committee should be responsible for the transmission to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations of necessary instructions, policy guidance and information. The War and Navy Department representatives should arrange for the transmission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of appropriate parallel instructions and information to the U.S. Representatives on the Military Staff Committee.

6. The Executive Committee should have its own Secretariat.

7. No publicity should be given to the arrangements described above, but no special effort should be made to insure secrecy.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board (Bush) ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 21, 1947.²

Subject: International Aspects of Bacteriological Warfare

The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission is required by a Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 24 January 1946 to make specific proposals, *inter alia*, for "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."

In a further Resolution of 14 December 1946 on "Principles Covering the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments," the General Assembly recommended "that the Security Council expedite consideration of the reports which the Atomic Energy Commission will make to the Security Council and that it facilitate the work of that Commission, and also that the Security Council expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes." (Underlining supplied)

On 13 February 1947 the Security Council established a United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments to deal with general questions concerning the regulation and reduction of armaments except those already assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission by the General Assembly.

The precise meaning of "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" has not yet been authoritatively determined. It is believed, however, that bacteriological warfare will be proposed as such a weapon for elimination. In any event, it is desirable to establish the U. S. position on this means of warfare at as early a date as practicable. With this in view it is requested that you undertake a study and furnish a report to the Secretaries of War and Navy on the technical aspects of bacteriological warfare which could serve as a basis for the formulation of a policy for submission to the President by the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.

¹ The Joint Research and Development Board was established by agreement between the War and Navy Departments on June 6, 1946, for the coordination of research and development activities of interest to the two Departments.

² This document was signed by Patterson on February 19, and by Forrestal on February 21.

In order to assist the organization of your work and the preparation of the report requested, the following are furnished as examples of the types of questions with which this Government is likely to be confronted in the course of forthcoming negotiations:

a. Do bacteriological weapons now exist which are adaptable to mass destruction? Is it to be anticipated that bacteriological weapons can be developed in the future which are adaptable to mass destruction?

b. If so, is it possible to devise a practicable system of international control, directed toward either elimination or regulation, with adequate safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions? Can this be done without hampering the fullest development and exploitation of the biological sciences for the benefit of mankind?

The Joint Research and Development Board is invited to consider the broad aspects of this problem in order that those responsible for national policy may have the full benefit of the views of those most conversant with the technical aspects of the subject.

Since this subject may be a matter of early consideration in the United Nations, it is requested that this study be made and report rendered as soon as possible.

JAMES V. FORRESTAL
ROBERT P. PATTERSON

501.BC Atomic/2-2447: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, February 24, 1947—2 p. m.

PRIORITY

173. Following is a draft US resolution to cover the Security Council's debates on the atomic energy report.¹

“The Security Council, having received and considered the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission dated 31 December 1946, together with its letter of transmittal of the same date, notes with satisfaction the wide areas already explored by the Commission, the progress made by it, and the far-reaching extent of agreement on its interim report; notes that many important questions have been considered only in broad outline and remain to be dealt with in more detail by the Commission; notes that the Security Council's consideration of this report has broadened and more clearly defined the areas

¹ Discussions on the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission had occurred at the 105th, 106th, 108th, and 110th Meetings of the Security Council (February 13, 14, 18, and 20th, respectively). This draft was submitted at the 112th Meeting, February 25. In telegram 62 to New York, February 27, the Department of State indicated that it believed that the draft formed an excellent basis for disposal of the matter by the Security Council (501.BC Atomic/2-2747).

of unanimous agreement among the members of the Council on the fundamental principles and basic organizational mechanisms which are indicated as being necessary to attain a strong and comprehensive system of international control of atomic energy; recognizes that any agreement expressed by the members of the Council to the separate portions of the report is preliminary since final acceptance of any part by any nation is conditioned upon its acceptance of all parts of the control plan in its final form; transmits the record of its consideration of the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Commission for the purpose of acquainting it as to the portions of the report on which the members of the Security Council are in agreement and those on which the members of the Security Council are not yet in agreement; urges the Atomic Energy Commission, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions of 24th January and 14th December 1946, to continue its inquiry into all phases of the problem of the international control of atomic energy and to develop as promptly as possible the specific proposals called for by Section 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 24th January 1946, and in due course to prepare and submit to the Security Council a draft treaty or convention incorporating its ultimate proposals."

I should appreciate any comments you may have.

AUSTIN

Department of State Disarmament Files ¹

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 25 February 1947.

Up to now the emphasis in any discussion in the United Nations about reduction of military power has always focussed on disarmament—which means weapons and technological equipment.

Is it worthwhile trying to shift the emphasis on this subject by introduction of an American proposal for the reduction of armies, with inspection to guarantee fulfillment?

FORRESTAL

¹ Secretary Marshall acknowledged receipt of this memorandum on February 25 and stated that he had referred it to Joseph Johnson for reference to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments. The exchange of notes was circulated in RAC as Doc. RAC D-11(WP-5), March 12. (Department of State Disarmament Files)

501.BC Atomic/2-2847

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division
of International Security Affairs (Johnson)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 28, 1947.

Mr. Noyes telephoned to me a brief résumé of the present situation.

He said that the United States draft resolution¹ had been prepared in the expectation of paragraph by paragraph discussion of the Report. However, in the midst of the Council meeting the other afternoon, it became apparent that no member of the Council had other things to say and Senator Austin therefore decided to introduce the resolution.

Under the circumstances there is not much of a record of the views of members of the Council. U.S. Delegation has therefore been quietly urging other members of the Council who have not yet spoken to state in general terms in the Council their approval of the Report as submitted. This would mean disagreement with the proposed Soviet amendments² whether that was explicitly stated or not. Talks have been held on this basis with all but the Syrian, whom they expect to see before the next Council meeting on Wednesday.

Mr. Noyes said his personal opinion is that Gromyko was surprised at our resolution which was much more "liberal" than he might have expected. Mr. Noyes believes that Gromyko has requested instructions in this new situation and that that is the basis for his request to Senator Austin late on February 27 for a postponement.

I informed Mr. Noyes that in my opinion the course they were pursuing and intend to pursue is a good one, adding that we here had all along had serious doubts about the desirability of paragraph by paragraph consideration. I thought it certainly desirable to have the old Council members who have not spoken reaffirm their approval of the Report, and the new ones indicate their acceptance of it. I added that I thought it would be helpful if Senator Austin could, without forcing the occasion, make a more specific declaration of U.S. approval of the Report and disapproval of the Soviet amendments than he had yet

¹ For text, see telegram 173 from New York, February 24, p. 422.

² At the 108th Meeting of the Security Council, February 18, the Soviet representative introduced 12 amendments to the findings and recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission report. The Soviet Union proposed that inspection, supervision, and management by an international agency should apply to all existing atomic plants immediately after the entry into force of an appropriate convention, that an effective system of control must be international in scope and established by an enforceable multilateral convention administered within the framework of the Security Council, that existing stocks of atomic weapons be destroyed, and that the report's recommendation that a violator of the terms of the treaty should have no legal right, by veto or otherwise, to protect itself from the consequences of violation, be eliminated. For the text of the Soviet amendments, see SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 7*, pp. 63-68.

done. Noyes said he was planning to make precisely such a recommendation to the Senator.

When Noyes asked whether there were any textual changes in the resolution which we would like to see made, I replied that we felt that was a matter which should be left to the people in New York, and that approval here had been on the basis of the general idea. He said that some members of the staff there (specifically Lindsay and Arneson) were in doubt about the paragraph recognizing that agreement is "preliminary" and had proposed its excision. Noyes' view, which he intended to indicate to Austin, was that if any other delegation questioned that paragraph, we might suggest the deletion of the word "preliminary" and the revision of the paragraph in such a manner that it would still contain the "one package" idea. I stated that I personally was in favor of such a course.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

501.BC Armaments/2-1447

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)

SECRET

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency's Note No. 83, dated February 14, 1947 (Ref: 12/44/47)¹ concerning proposals to be offered in the United Nations Commission For Conventional Armaments by the United Kingdom Representative.

This Government is pleased to observe that the views of the British Government regarding the principles which should underlie the work of the Commission coincide so closely with those of the United States Government. This Government believes that two of the most important factors involved in the "establishment of international confidence" are the satisfactory solution of the major issues involved in the peace settlements with Germany and Japan and the establishment of a system for the international control of atomic energy with effective safeguards.

The Government of the United States desires that the work of the new Commission should proceed in a manner consistent with these principles and will cooperate with other members of the Commission For Conventional Armaments to this end.

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1947.

¹ Not printed.

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Ross) to the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1947.

SENATOR AUSTIN'S REPLY TO MR. GROMYKO'S SPEECH, MARCH 5,¹
ON ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS

I had a talk with Mr. Acheson on the telephone after lunch today on the question of what Senator Austin might say in the Security Council on Monday in response to Gromyko's speech yesterday on the atomic energy matter.²

Mr. Acheson felt that Senator Austin's remarks on Monday must be considered against the background of the President's forthcoming statement on Greece.³ In the light of this statement there are two approaches which Senator Austin might follow, either one of which would be a mistake.

First, Senator Austin might make a "patience and good will" speech. This would be inconsistent with the President's statement on Greece since this will be a pretty strong and realistic statement of the present situation.

Second, the Senator might make a speech which would indicate that as a result of Gromyko's statement the jig is up and there is no longer any hope of accomplishing international control of atomic energy. This would be going to the other extreme and read in conjunction with the President's statement would give rise to speculation that our foreign policy had undergone a far-reaching and fundamental reversal. Mr. Acheson thought that it would perhaps be desirable, if possible, to keep the whole atomic energy matter in the Security Council for awhile and expose fully the Soviet position in the Council. It was unlikely, however, that this could be accomplished. It seemed to Mr. Acheson, therefore, that the essential thing to accomplish in the Security Council on Monday would be to give the headlines and lead paragraphs to the work of the Atomic Energy Commission for the next few weeks following reference back to the Commission of the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

In this connection the Senator might stress the importance of the

¹ Reference is to Gromyko's address at the 115th Meeting of the Security Council, March 5; for text, see SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 22, pp. 443-461.

² For text of Senator Austin's address at the 117th Meeting of the Security Council, Monday, March 10, see *ibid.*, No. 24, pp. 487-493.

³ For text of President Truman's message to Congress, March 12, containing recommendations on assistance for Greece and Turkey, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 23, 1947, p. 534; for documentation on United States economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, see vol. v, pp. 1 ff.

issues raised by Gromyko indicating clearly the great gulf between the Report of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Soviet views. This statement would bring out the fact that the Soviet disagreement concerns not only minor points but major points, and that the Soviet Government disagrees with practically all of the major points in the Atomic Energy Commission Report.

The Senator's statement might further make clear that when the Soviet Government abstained from voting on the Atomic Energy Commission Report last December it had been generally felt that this abstention might indicate that the Soviet Government would after all sooner or later go along with the major conclusions of the Report. This impression had been heightened by remarks and statements made on various occasions, if not by Gromyko then by other Soviet leaders. Gromyko's statement yesterday clearly indicates that the impression created by the Soviet abstention last December and statements made by Soviet leaders was a false one.

I told Mr. Acheson that I felt the best way of handling the preparation of a statement for Senator Austin along the lines indicated would be to get Mr. Osborn⁴ down here to spend all day Friday in the Department talking with Mr. Oppenheimer and others concerned so that he could then subsequently, upon returning to New York, work on Saturday and over the weekend with Senator Austin having the benefit of the firsthand views he would obtain down here tomorrow.

I suggested to this end that Mr. Acheson telephone the Senator which he agreed to do.

Mr. Acheson subsequently called me. He had talked with the Senator apparently somewhat along the lines of his conversation with me, and the Senator had agreed to send Mr. Osborn down here tomorrow.⁵ I agreed with Mr. Acheson that we would take Mr. Osborn and Mr. Oppenheimer⁶ in hand and accomplish as much intensive work tomorrow as we can.

⁴ Frederick H. Osborn, Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

⁵ The record of the March 6 Acheson-Austin telephone conversation here referred to indicates that the Under Secretary's suggestions with respect to Austin's projected reply included the following:

"It seems to me that what Gromyko has done now is to develop the tremendous gulf that there is between the Russian ideas and ours. That I don't think ought to be fluffed over at this time. I don't think on the other hand it is something that you possibly can develop in one speech. It has got to be developed in the commission over a long period of time, but what you can do is to sort of write the opening paragraph so that the American people will be oriented on this and will not think that this is just some technical jargon which they don't understand and then perhaps a little good will will smoothen it all out." (USUN Files)

⁶ Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Consultant, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; Member, General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

800.646/3-1247 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, March 12, 1947—4 p. m.

1581. Jebb, Foreign Office, said he was not surprised by Gromyko's statement on atomic energy¹ as he had always been sceptical of Soviet intentions, and didn't believe Molotov had ever meant to agree to international supervision and inspection within Russia as we contemplated it, but envisaged rather an international organization, only the Soviet section of which would inspect and supervise within Russia. Molotov's statement represented a diversionary tactic to meet a transitory situation, he thought, and no change in basic strategy. Returning the matter to the commission seemed the only course open.

Cadogan intends to take an early opportunity to take exception to Gromyko's breach of confidence in quoting Churchill² from the secret record at Yalta, and to his statement that the British had favored the veto at Dumbarton Oaks. Jebb remarked that the Dumbarton Oaks record would clearly indicate the British had been strongly opposed to veto at that time.

Thinking out loud, Jebb wondered whether it might not be possible to conclude some sort of international agreement for the use of atomic energy among those willing to play ball, excluding untrustworthy nations and the Soviet Union if it would not come in on our terms. He admitted immediately, however, that the broader the knowledge of atomic energy the more likely it would be to fall into Russian hands. It seemed, nevertheless, too bad that here as in other fields the Soviets were succeeding in preventing the rest of the world from obtaining the benefits which would result from international agreement.

Sent Dept 1581, repeated Moscow 98, repeated Paris 192.

GALLMAN

¹ Reference is to Gromyko's address at 115th Meeting of the Security Council, March 5; for text, see SC, *2nd yr.*, No. 22, pp. 443-461.

² Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister, 1940-1945.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Research and Development Board (Bush) to the Secretary of War (Patterson)*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 13 March 1947.

Subject: International Aspects of Bacteriological Warfare

Reference (a): Memorandum, Secretaries of War and Navy, dated 21 February 1947²

Enclosure (A): Interim Report

1. The questions proposed by the memorandum, Reference (a), were referred to the Committee on Biological Warfare of the Joint Research and Development Board for consideration and recommendation.

2. Enclosure (A) is an interim report setting forth several of the most important elements of this situation which can be commented upon by the Committee immediately. The Board has not had time to investigate the subject thoroughly, so it submits the enclosure without comment. The enclosure was prepared after discussion of the implications of this problem with Colonel P. M. Hamilton, Deputy to the War Department Member of the State-War-Navy Executive Committee for Regulation of Armaments.

3. A complete report considering the broad technical aspects of this problem which may be of further assistance in the negotiations is in preparation by the Committee. In the event that additional information is required, prior to completion of the final report, the Board is prepared to provide the assistance of the Committee on Biological Warfare or members thereof.

4. It is considered highly desirable that a national policy in the field of biological warfare for the future be formulated and adopted at an early date. The Board, through its Committee, will attempt to provide the factual basis for consideration of such a policy. This has not, however, yet been accomplished.

V. BUSH

¹ Circulated in the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-12/1, March 21.

² *Ante*, p. 421.

[Annex]

INTERIM REPORT

24 FEBRUARY 1947.

Subject: International Aspects of Bacteriological Warfare

Reference (a): Memorandum from Secretaries of War and the Navy dated 21 February 1947

1. Because of lack of time the Committee has been unable to make careful assessment of the problem presented to it by reference (a).

2. Preliminary report presented here is for information of appropriate United States personnel and is not to be made public.

3. The Committee believes that certain agents of biological warfare now in existence could be used against the United States by saboteurs with sufficient effect to reduce materially the agricultural production of this country.

4. The Committee believes that it may be possible to develop other agents of biological warfare into weapons of real effectiveness.

5. The Committee can envision no practicable scheme of inspection and control which would be effective in controlling research directed toward improving the effectiveness of biological agents as weapons of warfare, nor in controlling production of effective amounts of certain agents. Probably the class of biological warfare agents most to be feared are self-propagating, highly infectious and highly virulent agents of the epidemic-producing type. The necessary research, development and production of such agents might be carried out in almost any medical, veterinary or agricultural research laboratory. The task of inspecting and controlling all such laboratories seems totally impracticable.

6. Certainly any scheme of inspection and control of a type and size sufficient to attain the objective of controlling research in the production of biological warfare agents would severely hamper research in public health, medicine and agriculture and would result in throwing open the manufacturing and trade secrets of a large section of American industry.

7. The Committee believes that it is not possible to establish a system of control and inspection which would give mankind assurance that biological warfare research, development and production would not be prosecuted effectively. The Committee further believes that any system of inspection of the biological laboratories and related industries of the United States would work to the great disadvantage of the economy of the United States.

8. The Committee will prepare a more detailed and complete report as required. The Committee would appreciate receiving information as to the desired content and as to the proposed use of such a report.

501.BC Atomic/3-1347

*Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] March 13, 1947.

Subject: Draft Proposal of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission Covering Our Plan of Action for the next six months.²

I. Basic Purpose to be Achieved: It is our purpose, to which we should adhere consistently throughout the next six months, to get the Atomic Energy Commission to complete by September an actual draft (i.e. a specific proposal) of at least those portions of the Charter of the international control agency and of the treaty incorporating the charter which would define those things which are essential (a) to the security of all participating nations; and (b) to a cooperative international development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Without a specific proposal of this sort, the debates will be carried on in a vacuum.

II. As means to effect this central purpose, we propose the following:

A. The greatest possible cooperation with delegations of all other nations on the Atomic Energy Commission. While we recognize that the position of the United States with respect to atomic energy gives us special responsibilities which we cannot avoid, we should constantly have in mind the contributions which may be made by other nations provided they have a sense of complete participation.

¹ Austin was also United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

In a memorandum to the Staff of the United States Delegation to the UN AEC, March 13, Osborn indicated that Austin had approved the present memorandum in all its parts, and that Rusk and Herschel Johnson had also gone over it and approved it (501.BC Atomic/3-1347).

² At its 117th Meeting, March 10, the Security Council had unanimously adopted the United States resolution regarding the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, as amended by proposals by Brazil, France, and the United States itself. The original United States draft resolution is printed on p. 422; for the text of the resolution actually adopted, see SC, 2nd yr., Plenary, No. 24, pp. 487-488. The resolution, among other things, instructed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its study of all phases of international control of atomic energy and to submit a second report to the Security Council prior to the convening of the next session of the General Assembly (September).

The UN AEC held four plenary meetings and numerous subcommittee meetings between March 19 and September 11, 1947; with respect to this work, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Plenary Meetings* (hereafter cited as AEC, 2nd yr., Plenary); *United Nations, Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, September 11, 1947* (hereafter cited as AEC, 2nd yr., Special Suppl.); and Department of State Publication 3161, *The International Control of Atomic Energy: Policy at the Crossroads* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948).

Every effort should be made to draw from the Soviet Delegation their constructive proposals, but the work of the Commission cannot wait on a process which in the past has resulted in infinite delays. It is our feeling that we may have to be satisfied with specific proposals in which the majority concur, but with respect to which the Soviet Delegation's members give no indication of their position, either in detail or as a whole.

B. We will attempt to concentrate the first energies of the Commission on drafting only those portions of a charter and treaty essential to the development of an effective cooperative control agency, and to the prevention of national rivalries in armament, and drafting them first from the point of view of security, returning, after the first drafting, to a redrafting from the point of view of national interest and other considerations; if we should attempt at the start to cover all of the charter and treaty, we might by the dispersion of our energies lose our chance to complete a draft of any part by the first of September. A more detailed plan as to where we should start the drafting should be worked out at once by our staff in cooperation with the other delegations.

C. Exploration of the possibilities of strengthening the United Nations Secretariat of the Atomic Energy Commission in the hope that they may more effectively discharge their responsibility for the drafting of specific proposals based on the Commission's instructions.

III. There is a question in our minds as to whether it is necessary at this time to make any further reply to the Soviet proposal for a convention which would immediately outlaw atomic weapons. Most of us have rather the feeling that it is not necessary unless Gromyko, as the present Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, should force our hand on it. If he should attempt this, should we take the position that the matter has already been discussed and rejected in the Atomic Energy Commission (Para. 6 of General Findings, Part II of the First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council) ?

IV. If you approve of this general outline of our plans, we should propose to discuss it at once on a personal and informal basis with the other delegations and report to you thereafter in more detail.

SWNCC Files

*Statement Presented by the Department of State to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1947.

SWNCC 219/16

IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FORCES STATIONED ON TERRITORY OF OTHER MEMBERS

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what action the United States should take with reference to the recommendation made by the General Assembly regarding the presence of armed forces on the territory of other Members of the United Nations.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations on December 14, 1946 passed by acclamation a resolution on the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments (A/267)² which contained in paragraph 7 the following recommendation:

"It (the General Assembly) recommends the Members to undertake . . . the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements."

3. This recommendation grew out of an Egyptian proposal³ to add a somewhat similar provision to a resolution calling for certain information about the armed forces of Member States on foreign territory which the Soviet Government introduced first in the Security Council and later in the General Assembly in the hope that it would prove embarrassing to the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Soviet proposal was introduced in the Security Council on August 29, 1946 (S/144),⁴ but after debate a majority of the members of that body voted not to place the matter on the Council's agenda. The Soviet Government then introduced a similar resolution in the General Assembly,⁵ but that body adopted in place of it the part of the reduction of armaments resolution quoted above and a resolution (A/269) calling upon the Security Council to determine, as soon as

¹ Approved by informal action of the Committee on May 27.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1099.

³ For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Second Part, First Committee*, p. 160.

⁴ For text, see telegram 527 from New York, August 29, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 892.

⁵ For text, see telegram 831 from New York, November 21, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1030.

possible, the information which UN Members should be called upon to furnish in order to give effect to the regulation of armaments resolution.⁶

4. As frequently stated by the President and the Secretary of State and more recently by the President in his speech on October 23, 1946,⁷ it is the policy of the United States to support the United Nations with all the resources in its possession. While never formally expressed, this policy would appear to imply that the United States will endeavor to comply with all recommendations of the General Assembly. Furthermore, compliance with the Assembly's resolution would serve to disarm any criticism leveled at the U.S. by a state intent on exploiting this country's inaction in the matter. While there are a number of cases in which armed forces of the United States are stationed on the territory of other Members without published agreements, it is believed that the negotiating and publishing of such agreements will, for the most part, involve only routine negotiations. For these reasons, the United States should seek to comply with the recommendation of the General Assembly.

5. The term "armed forces" as used in this recommendation might be interpreted to cover all uniformed members of armed services or to cover only troops intended for or prepared for combat. The broad interpretation is preferable since it was the interpretation most generally used in the course of the debate and since a restricted interpretation might make possible adverse propaganda such as has been directed against the United States in the past. Members of the offices of Military and Naval Attachés, however, can be excluded from this definition since their presence is justified by international custom and is covered by the issuance of visas and by *agrément*s.

6. Fulfillment of the requirements of the General Assembly Resolution that consent shall be "freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements" may be achieved by the conclusion of formal treaties or agreements, by an exchange of notes, or by the release of a joint communiqué. It may be the policy of the United States in some instances to negotiate a formal treaty with another state covering the presence of U.S. armed personnel in that nation's territory; in such cases no further agreements would need to be obtained to implement the General Assembly Resolution. However, in other instances, the preferable method of satisfying the Resolution's requirements would be by the aforesaid exchange of notes, a procedure which has the ad-

⁶ For text, see telegram 962 from New York, December 13, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, p. 1099.

⁷ For the text of President Truman's address to the opening meeting of the Second Part of the First Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, October 23, 1946, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 3, 1946, pp. 808-812.

ditional advantage of providing documents appropriate for registration with the United Nations Secretariat. Where this is impracticable, a joint communiqué by the governments concerned might be sufficient. To serve its purpose, such an exchange of notes, or communiqués, should indicate that the U.S. armed force personnel stationed in the territory of the other member State have been and continue to be so stationed with the consent of the government concerned, should mention already published agreements covering the presence of any of them, and wherever such is the case, should mention that the number is small and that no combat troops are included. Wherever it would prove difficult to arrange for the negotiation of an exchange of notes or a joint communiqué, an effort should be made to find some other acceptable method by which the requirements of the recommendation could be satisfied.

7. It is recommended that each exchange of notes be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations which would automatically publish them in its regular series. This procedure would fulfill the requirements of the General Assembly Resolution passed on December 14, 1946 entitled "Registration and Publication of Treaties and International Agreements; Regulation to Give Effect To Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations."⁸

8. It is suggested that conversations with the British Government for an exchange of notes or for a joint communiqué precede negotiations with other governments in order that the former may be acquainted with the general procedure which the United States intends to follow.

9. It would appear to be desirable to arrange for the registration of the exchange of notes as they are negotiated. Since the recommendation of the General Assembly was passed on December 14, 1946, the negotiations of the agreements should be consummated with a minimum of delay. It would be reasonable to fix June 1 as the target date prior to which all notes and communiqués should be negotiated.

10. When comprehensive information on the subject was last assembled, it was found that the United States was maintaining armed force personnel in 57 territories of United Nations Member States, but that in only 20 out of such territories were all of the personnel covered by published agreements, and it was estimated that arrangements would have to be made with 19 separate governments to cover all the armed force personnel in the remainder of such territories. Since considerable changes in that situation may now have occurred, and since information is lacking concerning the withdrawals which are likely to take place during the next six months, it would be desirable to obtain from the War, Navy and Treasury Departments the latest

⁸ GA (II), *Resolutions*, pp. 189-194.

information which they can furnish describing the numbers, locations and types of armed force personnel stationed on the territories of other Member States, the types of activities in which such personnel are engaged, any covering agreements which have been made on the military level, and the withdrawals contemplated during the next six months.

CONCLUSIONS

11. It is concluded that :

a. In each case where all of the uniformed members of the armed forces (other than members of Military, Naval, or Air Attachés' offices) are not covered by published agreements, arrangements should be made for the negotiation of an exchange of notes between the United States and the other government concerned, or where this may be impracticable, the conclusion of a joint communiqué (see Appendices "A" and "B"⁹). If neither of these methods appears feasible, other methods of satisfying the requirements of the General Assembly Resolution on armaments should be canvassed by the Department of State in conjunction with the other departments concerned. Registration with United Nations Secretariat should be effected upon the conclusion of each exchange of notes.

b. Negotiations with the British Government for the negotiation of an exchange of notes or a joint communiqué should precede negotiations with other governments in order that the former may be acquainted with the general procedure which the United States intends to follow.

c. The War, Navy, and Treasury Departments at an early date should supply the State Department with the latest information which can be provided describing the numbers, locations, and types of U.S. armed force personnel stationed on foreign territory, the types of activities in which such personnel are engaged, any covering agreements which have been made on the military level, and the withdrawals contemplated during the next six months.

d. August 1¹⁰ should be fixed as the target date by which all agreements shall have been concluded and registered.

12. It is recommended that :

a. SWNCC approve the above conclusions.

b. After approval by SWNCC, copies of this paper be forwarded to the State, War, and Navy Departments for information and appropriate implementation and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for information. The responsibility for obtaining from the Treasury Department information concerning any Coast Guard personnel on the territory of other Member States should be assigned to the State Department.

⁹ Neither printed.

¹⁰ At the time it approved this paper, the Committee amended this paragraph to specify August 1 in lieu of June 1.

501.BC Armaments/3-2047

*Position Paper Prepared by the Executive Committee on the
Regulation of Armaments*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1947.

RAC D-13c (Final)

PROPOSED INITIAL U.S. POSITION ON THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION
FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

The February 13 Resolution establishing the Commission² provides that there should be submitted to the Security Council the plan of work of the Commission. The United States should prepare for an early meeting of the new Commission a full statement of this Government's position on the plan of work and be prepared to take a position on other issues which may be raised at the early sessions of the Commission.

The basic problem, at least for the foreseeable future, is not one of negotiation but of gaining and maintaining support for the United States position by the American people and by world public opinion generally, in a way which will not permit this position to be undermined by propaganda attacks.

A. UNITED STATES POSITION ON PLAN OF WORK

(1) *Basic United States Position and its Presentation.*

At the initial sessions the Commission will probably take steps to establish its organization, including the appointment of a committee to bring in draft rules of procedure. It can be expected that there will also be a general debate in open Commission in which the views of the various members will be stated.

The presentation of the United States position outlined herein should be so timed as to provide the greatest possible assurance that the position will prevail. For public relations purposes it would be highly advantageous for the United States Representative to speak before the Soviet delegate.

The United States should seize the earliest opportunity to affirm its conviction, based on history and an appraisal of the current steps toward international security, that no system for the regulation of armaments can be successfully established and maintained, except it be reinforced by effective measures for control and enforcement, and the stages in its accomplishment inseparably synchronized with the

¹ Approved informally by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and forwarded to the United States Mission at the United Nations (Department of State Disarmament Files).

² SC, 2nd yr., Suppl. No. 5, pp. 58-59.

progressive evolution of international security. The United States view on prior agreement on atomic energy, on peace settlements, and on Article 43 agreements should be restated in this connection. That being its considered opinion, the United States strongly urges that the Commission direct its attention first to the study of those safeguards which are essential ingredients of the establishment and successful maintenance of an effective system of regulation. In this connection, the United States Representative may wish to point out the gravely divergent positions of the U.S.S.R. and the majority report on safeguards with respect to the control of atomic energy.

Attention should be called to the fact that safeguards fall into three categories: political, technical, and organizational, each sufficiently complex to require most searching examination. Further, it should be stated that, not only is a solution of the problem of safeguards necessary before agreement can be reached on any system of armaments regulation, but a prior examination and solution of this problem will in the long run make less difficult the working out of an agreement.

(2) *Tactics and Organization.*

At an appropriate moment the United States should suggest that the best way to carry out the work of the Commission with proper emphasis on safeguards would be the establishment of two committees as outlined in the latter part of this section. This suggestion should probably not be made in the opening statement but should be so timed in respect to statements by other delegations as best to insure its adoption.

In this connection it is known that the British have the following views which they intend to set forth in a long, formal statement during general debate: (a) that the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces depends primarily on the establishment of international confidence; (b) that the Article 43 agreements should be completed before the adoption of measures for regulation and reduction of armaments; (c) that an effective system of international control and verification must precede the adoption of any system of regulation and reduction of armaments.

Should the British proposals be advanced before the United States suggests the organization of committees, it would be appropriate to suggest that the first item on the agenda of the Committee referred to in (a) below should be a consideration of the British proposals.

The committees referred to above should be as follows:

(a) A working committee or committee-of-the-whole. This committee would deal with such matters as (1) political safeguards, including necessary conditions of international security, and (2) the political and other nontechnical problems involved in the recommendations of the technical subcommittee, when submitted.

(b) A sub-committee of experts. This sub-committee would study the question of technical safeguards and report its findings to the working committee. The objective of the work of this committee would be to develop a program or programs upon the basis of what is technically rather than upon what is politically feasible.

(N.B. These suggestions are based on the experience of the Atomic Energy Commission.)

B. U.S. POSITION ON OTHER ISSUES WHICH MAY BE RAISED

It is anticipated that in the course of the general debate in the Commission certain issues may be presented on which it may be necessary for the United States to take a stand. These issues and the proposed United States positions are as follows:

(1) *Immediate Disarmament, or Limitation or Reduction of Armaments.*

(It is not unlikely that the U.S.S.R. may make a proposal of this kind.) This is the "what" of armaments regulation referred to by Senator Austin in his February 4 speech to the Security Council.³ The United States Representative should refer to this matter in his opening statement along the lines suggested in the third paragraph of A above; the emphasis given to this reference would depend on whether or not such a proposal has been made before the United States Representative speaks.

The United States Representative should constantly endeavor to discourage, both formally and informally, any premature consideration of such a proposal, emphasizing the over-riding and prior importance of security and safeguards. He should in any case strive to make sure that the question of safeguards receives a higher priority in the Commission's plan of work.

[If and when the "what" has to be dealt with, the United States might propose that as an initial step a study of the criteria making the possession of certain levels of armaments and armed forces justifiable might be undertaken. This would involve as objective an analysis as possible of the various bases for the existence of armaments and armed forces, such as the examination of the problem of maintaining internal order, individual and collective security, and international commitments in their relation to armaments.]⁴

(2) *Armaments To Be Considered Within the Competence of the Commission.*

This involves a number of problems which require careful study before a final United States position can be established. If, however,

³ SC, 2nd yr., No. 9, pp. 150-154.

⁴ Brackets appear in the source text.

the question should arise in the near future, the United States Representative should suggest that for the present the Commission has enough to occupy its full resources in studying the problems posed by the regulation of weapons which are clearly conventional.

If this position proves unacceptable and it is proposed that the Commission for Conventional Armaments should deal with weapons which might be considered adaptable to mass destruction, the United States should reiterate the above view. It should add that proposals concerning the control of biological warfare and toxic chemicals should be dealt with by the Atomic Energy Commission after it has completed its proposals on atomic energy.

If a decision as to what are "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" is insistently called for, the United States should maintain that such a decision should be made by the Security Council.

(3) *Offensive vs. Defensive Weapons.*

The Representative of the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council has intimated that this distinction, as a basis for regulating armaments, may be urged upon the Commission. The United States Representative should be prepared to make at an appropriate time a carefully phrased statement designed to refute any suggestion that in this age of modern warfare any such distinction is practicable. (Such a statement is under preparation.)

(4) *Information on Strength and Location of Armaments and Armed Forces.*

The United States position on this subject should remain for the present that set forth in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the January 6, 1947 memorandum entitled "The Basis for United States Policy in the Security Council During the Forthcoming Consideration of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14 on the 'Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments'."⁵

(5) *Withdrawal of Forces From Territories of Ex-Enemy and Member States.*

The position of the United States is that the recommendation of the General Assembly on this subject is directed to individual Members and that no action is called for by the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

C. DIPLOMATIC PREPARATION FOR SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION IN THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

A program of diplomatic preparation for the support of the United States position by other Governments in the Commission for Con-

⁵ *Ante*, p. 342.

tional Armaments should be undertaken immediately. In this connection, the following steps are suggested:

(1) The United States Delegation to the United Nations should exchange views with representatives of other Governments with a view to gaining support for the United States position and ascertaining their views.

(2) Similarly, appropriate United States missions abroad should undertake to acquaint the Governments to which they are accredited, endeavoring in the process to elicit their support and to ascertain their views.

D. SOLICITING VIEWS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS NOT REPRESENTED ON THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

Consideration should be given to methods of soliciting the views on the issues involved in armaments regulation of United Nations Members not represented on the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Since their security is directly affected by these issues, it is only fitting that some means should be developed for reflecting their thinking in the meetings of the Commission.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] March 21, 1947.

DEAR MR. JOHNSON: Van Bush talked to me yesterday about the embarrassment to our position which might result from the disclosure made by Mr. McCloy¹ in a recent speech on the possibilities of hydrogen and helium fission for explosives.

We may, at any time, be called on publicly, or in the Working Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission for a statement clarifying the significance of Mr. McCloy's remarks.

Mr. Bush told me that in his opinion the actual facts would not be as dangerous to our position as the partial disclosure made by Mr. McCloy.

We are asking your instructions as to what should be our reply if this matter is brought up. Should we make a more detailed disclosure of the facts of the situation as detailed by Dr. Bush? Should we refuse to comment further? Or what should we do? Refusal to comment would

¹ John J. McCloy, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Assistant Secretary of War, 1941-1945; Member, Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy, 1946.

put us in an impossible position and might result in the complete breakdown of further negotiations. You will remember that at the outset of these negotiations we pledged that we would make available the information necessary to a common understanding of the basic problems involved in setting up an international agency. The terms of the McMahon bill prohibit giving out classified information except with their consent. The problem we are putting up to you is therefore extremely difficult, yet we feel we must have instructions as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

USUN Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, March 26, 1947, 10:30 a. m.*¹

SECRET

Present: State Department—Mr. Acheson, Mr. Joseph Johnson
 War Department—Mr. Patterson, Assistant Secretary
 Petersen, Colonel Hamilton
 Navy Department—Mr. Forrestal, Under Secretary Sullivan, Admiral Wooldridge
 U.S. Delegation—Senator Austin, Mr. John Ross
 Atomic Energy Commission—Mr. Lilienthal, Mr. Bacher²

Senator Austin outlined what seemed to be the present positions of the various members of the Atomic Energy Commission. It seemed likely that the Russians would press for prohibition and outlawry of the atomic bomb. The British seemed inclined to take the easiest matters first. The Canadians seem to feel that any approach would be better than the Russian approach. The French seem to feel that it would be best to proceed by easy stages.

The Senator said that he was not asking for an immediate decision. He wanted to lay a suggestion on the table for an exchange of views and later decision, namely, would it be desirable for the United States to propose as the starting point the charter of the proposed international control agency, that is, the organization and functions of this agency. The Senator referred in this connection to Chapter 2 of a treaty outline which had been prepared by Mr. Ingraham of Mr. Fahy's staff.³

¹ These minutes were drafted by Mr. John C. Ross; minutes located in file 811.002/1-247 provide less complete treatment of the discussion of international control of atomic energy and indicate that the three Secretaries considered other matters later in the meeting.

² Dr. Robert F. Bacher, member, United States Atomic Energy Commission.

³ The document under reference, RAC-D/14, Tentative Outline Plan of a Treaty or Convention for the Control and Development of Atomic Energy, is not printed. Ingraham had been attached to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and had been working on matters relating to a draft treaty for international control since June 1946.

The Senator said that at the Assembly meeting last fall the Russians had changed their position from one of favoring strict national control to favoring strict international control. He said that the Russians had indicated that they were against unlimited international control. In this sense their position was basically no different from that of any other country. No country would accept unlimited control beyond the needs of the situation, that is, reaching into the whole economic life of a country beyond the control of atomic energy plants.

Mr. Acheson asked just how much agreement had been indicated by the Russians, that is, how much change there really had been in their position since they first proposed last June their convention for the outlawry of the atomic bomb. He was aware of statements which had been made by Stalin,⁴ Molotov and others but he wondered whether in the light of Gromyko's most recent statement in the Security Council we were not really right back where we started from last June.

The Senator said the statements which had been made by the Russians were subject to various interpretations. One interpretation was that given by the Acting Secretary. It was clear that there was general agreement on many of the principles contained in the Atomic Energy Commission's Report. There was clear disagreement only with regard to those items on which Gromyko had introduced amendments. We would never know exactly how much agreement we had from the Russians until we layed down a specific proposition and got yes or no answers.

Mr. Forrestal said that the American public misunderstood the gradations of agreement. Assuming that there had been agreement with regard to many matters the American public did not distinguish between the importance of these matters and the importance of other matters upon which agreement had not been reached.

Mr. Sullivan raised the question whether, even assuming that we got agreement on the points at issue, we would have any real guarantee that international control as envisaged would be effective.

The Senator said the only thing specific we had from the Russians was their proposal for a treaty outlawing the bomb which of course did not give us any guarantees.

Mr. Forrestal observed that the American people probably did not understand this point and that perhaps this should be the starting point.

Mr. Petersen asked whether it was agreed that by taking up one part of the whole problem first, our position with regard to any definitive action on the whole problem would be protected.

⁴ Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

The Senator made clear that it was definitely agreed that agreement to any part of the overall proposals did not imply a commitment to agree to the whole. Each government's position was fully reserved in this respect.

Mr. Acheson said that he leaned towards the Senator's suggestion that we propose taking up first the charter of the international authority. If we started with the Soviet approach of outlawing the bomb, discussion of this subject could go on for months and the United States might be in a negative position vis-à-vis public opinion. The Acting Secretary asked the representatives of the United States Atomic Energy Commission whether it would be feasible to determine in the United Nations Commission the degree of authority required by the international authority without getting into the writing of actual treaty provisions as he had understood the Senator to suggest.

Mr. Lilienthal replied that whichever of the two approaches were followed, it led logically and otherwise to the same point, that is, do we or do we not want to use our knowledge of atomic fission as a source of energy. It was not realized that outlawing the bomb did not stop there. If we were going in for this type of program we would have to outlaw everything, root and branch, that is to say, the plants which made it possible to manufacture the bombs. He said he would want to give some thought to the matter but that he leaned in the direction of attempting to write the charter provisions. In response to a further question by Mr. Acheson, Mr. Lilienthal said that one of the problems would be how to achieve the objective of writing the charter provisions without giving information which it would not be proper to give during this process.

Mr. Bacher commented that he was quite sure that the closer we got to the drafting of detailed provisions the greater would be the vigorous demand from other countries for information which they would consider essential to understand the provisions they were being asked to draft.

Mr. Patterson asked for a brief review of historical developments which Senator Austin gave him. Mr. Patterson then asked whether we had not gained a great deal by the December 31 Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Senator Austin said he thought we had.

Mr. Petersen asked whether the controls were positive or negative in character as envisaged in the Report.

Mr. Acheson observed that the Report seemed to narrow down

the control aspect to a negative police kind of control away from the positive developmental control.

Mr. Sullivan asked whether it is possible technically to accomplish what we are groping for.

Mr. Lilienthal replied that short of international planning, design and operation of plants control was *not* possible.

Mr. Sullivan asked whether assuming this there would be any point at which operations could be turned over to national control. He had in mind, for example, a remark made earlier by the Senator about a possible British concern over losing control of atomic energy which might be a vital factor in their economic recovery.

Mr. Lilienthal replied that the output of atomic plants, that is to say, for example, electricity, could readily be placed under national control. National governments would determine the use to be made of the electricity to be produced by atomic plants. On the other hand, the international authority would probably have to determine the location of atomic plants and it might have differences of opinion with national governments in this respect. The authority would presumably be thinking in terms of international security and economic factors while the national governments might be thinking in terms of national security.

The Senator then posed this problem. Assume an international control authority acting under majority rule. Assume further the most absurd situation, this Authority might suggest to us that we move all our atomic plants to very different locations. Would we submit to this? Mr. Patterson replied without any hesitation that we could not avoid that, we must submit to this kind of authority. Mr. Lilienthal seemed to agree and there was no objection stated.

Mr. Sullivan observed that he liked Senator Austin's suggestion that we propose in the Atomic Energy Commission as a starting point that consideration be given to the charter of the proposed international authority. Mr. Forrestal indicated that he was coming around to this point of view.

As the discussion had developed it seemed clear that the consensus of opinion in the group favored this approach. A definitive decision was not taken, however, it being tacitly understood that Mr. Joe Johnson's committee would probably prepare a paper on the subject for appropriate clearance. In discussion subsequently with Senator Austin and Mr. Dean Rusk the Senator indicated that he would like to have this done.

SPA Files : Lot 55D323¹

*The Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council
(Johnson) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk)*²

RESTRICTED PERSONAL

NEW YORK, March 29, 1947.

DEAR DEAN : I am enclosing a memorandum which we have prepared as a suggested procedure which might be followed by the Security Council when it receives the report of the Military Staff Committee on the Basic Principles Governing the Article 43 Agreements.³

I am not now recommending the proposal contained in this memorandum. It seems to us that it would be premature to attempt to decide what our course should be until we have a better picture of what the Military Staff Committee's Report will contain. I believe it may be useful for you to consider the proposals in this paper as one of the possible alternative procedures, assuming that there remains a substantial area of disagreement when the Military Staff Committee Report is completed. I am sending it to you in advance in order that you may have plenty of time to give the matter full consideration. We feel that if a proposal along these lines is to be put forward, there are advantages in making the decision sufficiently early so as to have time to put the idea forward to some of our colleagues, informally, in advance of the Military Staff Committee Report.

We have had informal discussions here with the United States Representatives on the Military Staff Committee in connection with this memorandum. They also feel that it is premature to reach any definite conclusions on this subject at the present time.

Sincerely yours,

HERSCHEL JOHNSON

¹ Two lot files containing records of the Office of Special Political Affairs and its successor organization, the Office of United Nations Affairs, include documentation on the regulation of armaments and collective security for 1947 : Lot 55D323 and Lot 428.

² Appointed March 5.

³ Prior to the adoption of the resolution on the regulation of armaments at its 105th Meeting, February 13 (see footnote 2, p. 411), the Security Council modified the final paragraph of that resolution in accordance with amendments submitted by the British and Australian delegations. The final paragraph requested the Military Staff Committee to submit to the Security Council as soon as possible and as a matter of urgency the recommendations for which it had been asked on February 16, 1946. The British addition, approved 9-0 (the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining), requested the MSC to submit not later than April 30, 1947, an interim report on basic principles governing the organization of United Nations armed forces.

[Annex]

Position Paper Prepared in the United States Mission to the United Nations

[NEW YORK,] March 28, 1947.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
SUGGESTED SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

PROBLEM

What action should the Security Council take on April 30 when it receives from the Military Staff Committee the progress report and recommendations as to basic principles which the Security Council requested in its resolution of February 13, 1947.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the Security Council establish a Committee to be composed of representatives of all the eleven members to review the recommendations expected to be received from the Military Staff Committee on April 30 on the basic principles governing the organization of the international security force and further to recommend to the Security Council a course of action on this subject. Following debate on the entire Military Staff Committee report and simultaneously with the establishment of the Committee, the Security Council should request the Military Staff Committee to complete its examination of Article 43 from the military point of view.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENTATION

The Military Staff Committee has now devoted more than a year to the task of carrying out the Security Council directive of February 15 [16], 1946, to examine Article 43 "from the military point of view". That part of the report containing recommendations on basic principles consists of an enumerated set of principles which frequently merely paraphrases the Charter. On many principles complete agreement has not been reached and this result will not be impressive, particularly in view of the length of time that has been consumed in their preparation. This is due largely to the Soviet Delegation's tactics of obstruction and delay. Whereas four delegations submitted drafts of principles in April, it was not until September that the Soviet draft was received. They have been free to follow these tactics in the privacy in which the Committee conducts its operations. The request of the Security Council for recommendations from the Military Staff Committee by April 30 presents an opportunity to lift the matter into the light of day.

The United States is interested in fulfilling promptly the Charter's mandate to conclude the special military agreements "as soon as possible". Moreover, the position which we have taken towards the regulation of armaments makes progress on the military agreements highly desirable. Now that the Commission for Conventional Armaments has been created and is operating, before regulation of armaments can be seriously considered the collective security system as projected in the Charter must be completed. An important part of this system will be the international security force.

The Security Council itself will probably not have the time to consider and decide on the merits of the recommended basic principles which should govern the organization of the international security force. It is not organized to do this nor would it probably wish to do so. It should be remembered that six of the Council members are unfamiliar with the year's proceedings of the Military Staff Committee on this subject. Moreover, two new factors will be introduced into the situation when the report containing the recommendations comes before the Security Council. These are the participation of the six non-permanent members and the impact of public opinion. A Committee established by the Council and representing all its members would provide a desirable means for considering on behalf of the Council the Military Staff Committee recommendations. Such a Committee might be asked to examine the report and to prepare recommendations for the approval of the Security Council. The resolution providing for the establishment of the Committee should charge it with recommending the basic principles and simultaneously urge the Military Staff Committee to complete without delay its recommendations needed to fulfill the examination of Article 43 from the military point of view.

The only practicable alternative would be to re-commit the report to the Military Staff Committee, without a decision by the Security Council, for further negotiation by the military representatives. If this were done, the entire subject of the Article 43 agreements would probably become bogged down again in interminable controversy in the Military Staff Committee once the pressure of publicity had been removed. If this were done, the usefulness of the April 30 report would be very considerably diminished.

If the device of a Committee were to be approved numerous questions regarding its procedure would need examination. Among them are the following: whether it should arrange to hold some of its meetings in public; whether the documentation of the Military Staff Committee, especially the summary records of its meetings, should be called for by the Committee as an essential part of the material upon which to base its recommendations. If the report does not make clear the reason for the long delay in the Military Staff Committee these records might

be published in order to demonstrate the nature of the difficulties under which the Military Staff Committee had been carrying on its work. Finally there would be the question of the relationship between the Security Council Committee and the Military Staff Committee.

501.BC Armaments/3-3147: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1947—6 p. m.

US URGENT

116. Following are our views re plan of work for CCA: ¹

1. This plan can best be developed in a working committee constituted of representatives of all eleven members of Commission. We favor establishment of such a committee on a standing basis which would consider as its first task the plan of work.

2. Political safeguards and other political problems should be studied initially in political committee meeting informally and corresponding to AEC's Committee 2.

3. There should be established a technical subcommittee to examine problem of safeguards, from standpoint of what is technically feasible (for your information a list of topics which might be considered by such a subcommittee is being prepared and will be forwarded as soon as available).

4. Political committee should as its first task study principles which should underlie work of CCA, making recommendations thereon to CCA through working committee. UK proposed principles ² and any others which may be introduced should be referred this committee, which would also in due course consider political safeguards and political issues relating to technical safeguards.

5. You will note that above differs from proposal in position paper dated Mar 20 (RAC D-13c final) ³ in suggesting political committee separate from working committee. This change is recommended in view of usefulness which similar AEC committee structure has demonstrated and because working committee will probably function fairly formally whereas political committee should be as informal as possi-

¹The Commission for Conventional Armaments, established by the Security Council on February 13, first met at Lake Success on March 24. Documentation generated by the CCA exists in the Reference and Documents section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (hereafter referred to as "IO Files").

²The principles under reference were enunciated at the 1st Meeting of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, March 24, by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British representative; these principles were substantially the same as those contained in the note from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, February 14, not printed, the reply to which, March 5, is printed on p. 425.

³ *Ante*, p. 437.

ble. Should other members of CCA manifest strong desire to have working committee consider political questions directly you may in your discretion concur in such an organizational arrangement.

6. We consider it preferable that initial discussion of plan of work take place in working committee and would therefore favor your supporting proposal we understand Belgian made that working committee be set up at once and that no other decisions re organization or plan of work be made by CCA itself pending report of this committee.⁴ You should endeavor obtain agreement your colleagues this position. If however it becomes necessary discuss full structure in CCA itself in open meetings you are, of course, at liberty to present views included in paras 2, 3 and 4 above whenever you deem it appropriate.

7. Structure proposed by Chinese⁵ would, in our opinion, lead to premature discussion of "what". Furthermore, it would, we believe, be impracticable to discuss regulation and reduction apart from safeguards. We hope Chinese can be persuaded not to press their proposal.

Substance of above was informally communicated Brit Emb Mar 29, it being made clear that views were then tentative. UK had apparently gained impression from penultimate para of Herschel Johnson's Mar 24 statement in CCA⁶ that US intended at early date submit specific proposals re safeguards. It was explained that this was erroneous and that phrase "manner in which Commission could most usefully examine" safeguards related only to proposals re procedure.

ACHESON

⁴ Reference is to a proposal made by the Belgian representative at the 2nd Meeting of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, March 23 (IO Files).

⁵ At the 2nd Meeting of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, March 28, the Chinese representative suggested the establishment of two subcommittees: an armaments subcommittee to consider proposals regarding reduction of armaments and a safeguards subcommittee to consider regulation mechanisms (IO Files).

⁶ The reference is to remarks by the United States representative at the 1st Meeting of the Commission on Conventional Armaments.

500.A/4-147

Memorandum by Mr. Wilder Foote¹ to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

[NEW YORK,] April 1, 1947.

Before you go to Washington I want to place before you in as succinct a way as possible my fear that Washington's failure to develop a constructive policy on conventional armaments is leading us up a blind alley and that immediate corrective action on the highest level is necessary.

¹ Adviser to the Permanent United States Delegation to the United Nations.

We start with these facts:

1. As I understand it, we oppose unilateral disarmament and fear being maneuvered into a position where congressional and public pressures will force what would, in effect, be unilateral disarmament. We also believe collective disarmament should be attempted only as part of a general system of collective security which will safeguard complying states against the hazards of violations.

2. Disarmament has a tremendous appeal to all peoples. Every government is under pressure from its own people to cut down on arms and therefore finds it very difficult to resist disarmament proposals of any kind, no matter how ill-conceived they may be.

The Russians may be expected to propose an immediate disarmament program that will be dramatic, sweeping and enthusiasm-provoking.

It is at this point that our present policy collapses. Once such a proposal has been made, we will not be able to win an argument either with our own people or with other countries based simply on the fear of being tricked into unilateral disarmament.

If we continue our present defensive, negative strategy, the very result that the War and Navy Departments most fear will have come about—and the blame for that will lie squarely on the bankruptcy of our own strategy.

You cannot arouse loyalty and mobilize support for a policy that is simply against something, especially when it is something as popular as disarmament.

You cannot replace something with nothing.

In order to achieve the results stated in (1) above, it is necessary to formulate and publicize a constructive, positive, specific proposal on conventional armaments that will enlist the same kind of enthusiastic support both in this country and abroad that our atomic energy proposals achieved.

A little application of creative imagination on our part now (it should have been done months ago) would enable us to propose in broad outlines a control plan for conventional armaments that could and would enlist such support.

We would then be in a position to defeat any attempt to disarm us unilaterally by having something better to offer to our own people and to the world.

We would also make it politically possible in their home countries for other governments to rally to our support and we would strengthen the faith of the rest of the world in our capacity for leadership at a time when that faith needs strengthening.

811.002/1-247

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
Washington, April 2, 1947, 3 p. m.*

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

STATE	WAR	NAVY
Acting Secretary Acheson	Asst. Secretary Petersen	Secretary Forrestal
Mr. Johnson	Col. Hamilton	Under Secretary Sullivan
Mr. Allen		Rear Admiral
Mr. Moseley (SWNCC), Recorder		Wooldridge
U.S. DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS	U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION	
Mr. Ross		Mr. Lilienthal Mr. Marks

I. U.S. POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL

DECISION

Agreement that consideration would be deferred until the Committee could meet with Senator Austin who is expected to be in Washington the next day.

IMPLEMENTING ACTION

None.

DISCUSSION

MR. ACHESON distributed a memorandum prepared by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments entitled "United States Policy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission".¹ He said that this memorandum proposes a different approach from that which was generally agreed upon at the last Meeting of the Committee of Three, when it was determined that the United States representatives should first introduce for the consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission a draft charter of an international control agency proposing in general outline its form, status, functions, etc. Mr. Acheson pointed out that the memorandum of the Executive Committee recommended that the United States should follow a course which will make explicitly clear in the record of United Nations discussions and to world opinion (1) what the essentials for control are, and (2) that it

¹ Not printed; for a revised version, RAC D-6/2a Final, April 15, see p. 459.

is the opposition of the U.S.S.R. which prevents progress in reaching agreement on an effective system. Mr. PETERSEN said that the War Department was in general agreement with the conclusions and recommendations of this memorandum. Mr. FORRESTAL said that the position set forth in the memorandum was also agreeable to the Navy.

Mr. SULLIVAN said that the second sentence of paragraph 3(d) on page 2 should have added to it a statement to the effect that the United States could not comply legally with demands of the other Members of the Commission for atomic energy information. Mr. JOHNSON invited Mr. Sullivan's attention to the parenthetical phrase in the first sentence of paragraph 3(d) which refers to the illegality of releasing information, but stated that he agreed that this phrase or a similar one might best be placed at the end of the second sentence of paragraph 3(d) as suggested by Mr. Sullivan.

Mr. LILIENTHAL said that if we attempted to draft a treaty, we might well be put in a difficult position as we would be unable to supply certain information necessary for the drafting of the key provisions of such a treaty.

Mr. FORRESTAL said that we must be careful that the public does not misinterpret discussion on this subject for actual progress.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

811.002/1-247

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
Washington, April 3, 1947, 3 p. m.*

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

STATE	WAR	NAVY
Acting Secretary Acheson	Secretary Patterson Asst. Secretary Petersen	Secretary Forrestal Under Secretary Sullivan
Mr. Johnson	Col. Hamilton	Rear Admiral Wooldridge
Mr. Allen		
Mr. Moseley (SWNCC), Recorder		

U.S. DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Mr. Osborn
Mr. Ross
Senator Austin

Mr. Lilienthal
Mr. Marks

I. U.S. POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL

DECISION

General approval of the memorandum of the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments entitled "United States Policy in

the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission" [RAC D-6/2],¹ as amended by Mr. Osborn's proposed alternates to paragraph 3(d) and paragraph 4(c). It was further agreed that the entire memorandum should be revised where necessary by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments to bring the memorandum in line with the tenor of Mr. Osborn's amendments.

IMPLEMENTING ACTION

The Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments to amend RAC D-6/2 to bring it in line with Mr. Osborn's amendments.

DISCUSSION

MR. ACHESON said the purpose of the Meeting was to consider the next course of procedure that the United States representatives on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission should follow in the work that is being undertaken by that Commission. He said that the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments had proposed in RAC D-6/2 a somewhat different approach from that which had been agreed upon at the last Meeting when Senator Austin was present. He then asked Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn for their views with respect to the program set forth in this memorandum.

SENATOR AUSTIN said that there was much in this memorandum that he disapproved. He stated that he did not like the defeatist tone of the memorandum, that we should not assume at the beginning that we cannot make any progress or gain toward international control of atomic energy, and that it is not proper to assume that Russia is not agreed to any of the fundamental principles of control. He added that we should not create a block against the Russians but that rather we should try to work with Russia and Poland as we did the other Members of the Commission. He said that we must have faith that we can reach an agreement with Russia and all countries on this all important matter.

MR. OSBORN said that he did not share Senator Austin's optimism in the same degree, but he did share his views on what should be done to correctly approach this problem. He said that we must give the Russians a forum where they can discuss their grievances and he pointed out that the Commission has already agreed to the French proposal that the Russian amendments will be considered. He added that we must go along with the British and other Members in defining the functions of a control agency; otherwise we will be placed in a position of obstructing progress.

MR. OSBORN said that the Working Committee of the Commission

¹ Brackets appear in the source text. The memorandum is not printed; for a revised version, RAC D-6/2a Final, April 15, see p. 459.

has asked Committee 2 of the Commission to study such questions as the detailed powers, characteristics and functions of an international control agency.

MR. OSBORN said that by starting with specific functional proposals we would not only make better progress towards the final goal but we would pin the Russians down to specific points and thus get their definite views. He said that we could present our arguments and proposed definitions for these functions, but that our proposals would be of a general nature and that it would not be necessary to provide any further technical information.

SENATOR AUSTIN said that he was in agreement with Mr. Osborn's views in this connection. He said that so far all we have is agreement on certain general principles, but that by introducing specific proposals as to functions and definitions as to inspection we should be able to bring out the concrete Russian viewpoint. Senator Austin reiterated his previous point that we must face this problem with courage and not with a defeatist viewpoint; that we must start with a sound constructive program and that in this way we will accomplish most.

MR. OSBORN said that we must seek a water-tight treaty which will prevent national rivalries, and that the only possible way of getting the Russians to agree to such a treaty is to develop a treaty with which we and all other Members of the Commission agreed. Once we do define such a treaty and obtain agreement of the other Members to it, our hope then would be that events will take place which will force the Russians to change their policy and agree to this treaty.

MR. PATTERSON said that he was in agreement with Mr. Osborn in this connection. He added that he agreed that our hope for a reversal of Russian policy depends upon the ruling clique being eliminated or other major changes taking place in the world situation. He added that he believed that the present Russian Delegation undoubtedly were acting under instructions to stall in all considerations on this subject.

MR. ACHESON said that he believed that we should try to concentrate on essential points of international control so that at the end of our work we would know where we did or did not agree, and at least we would have made progress up to this point.

MR. OSBORN introduced two proposed alternate paragraphs for paragraph 3(d) and 4(e) of the Executive Committee's memorandum which outlined an approach more in line to his previously stated views. MR. LILIENTHAL said that he understood that Mr. Osborn proposed to only draft the purposes of the functions of an international control agency, and not get into the technical terms which would be necessary for treaty drafting or for a legalistic approach to the problem. MR. OSBORN said that Mr. Lilienthal's understanding was correct, and that

proposals and discussions in the Commission would go no further than information already released would allow them.

MR. OSBORN also distributed for the information of the Members a "Summary of Principal Subjects to be incorporated in Specific Proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy".² He said that he anticipated that the first five months work in the Commission would be devoted to the items on the first page of this Summary which were the operational and developmental functions of the international agency and a definition of terms to be used in the treaty.

MR. FORRESTAL said that he was concerned that the public may misinterpret discussion of control provisions in the Atomic Energy Commission for progress. He added that great care must be exercised that the public is properly informed in this connection.

MR. ACHESON asked for the views of the other Members to Mr. Osborn's proposed amendments to paragraphs 3(d) and 4(c) of the memorandum of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, stating that he was in general agreement with them and that he felt the entire memorandum should be modified to bring it in line with the thoughts and principles set forth in Mr. Osborn's amendments. MR. FORRESTAL and MR. PATTERSON said that they were in agreement with Mr. Acheson in this connection.

Supplement

II. PROPOSAL REGARDING U.S. POSITION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

DECISION

None.

IMPLEMENTING ACTION

Paper on this subject introduced by Senator Austin to be referred to the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments for study.

DISCUSSION

SENATOR AUSTIN read a memorandum which he had received from Wilder Foote dated April 1,³ suggesting that we abandon our "present defensive negative strategy" and "formulate and publicize a constructive positive, specific proposal on conventional armaments". The Senator said that he would appreciate having this proposal very carefully studied, indicating that he agreed with the approach indicated.

² Not printed; prepared by the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-14/1, April 4 (Department of State Disarmament Files).

³ *Ante*, p. 450.

MR. FORRESTAL said that he agreed in principle to this proposal but reiterated his warning about misleading the public.

MR. PATTERSON said that this proposal sounded reasonable but that he would like to be assured that any such proposal we might develop would emphasize at the outset in bold type that conclusion of the peace treaties and the provision of implementing machinery were prerequisites of any reduction of conventional armaments.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1947.

RAC D-5a (Final)

Attached for appropriate information and guidance is a memorandum entitled "Basis for United States Position on a Possible Proposal to Distinguish between 'Offensive' and 'Defensive' Weapons". This memorandum was prepared in the Department and was approved by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments on March 31 for transmission to the United States Representative to the United Nations.

A proposal to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons as a basis for armament regulation could assume one of the following forms: (1) abolition of "offensive" weapons, (2) severe limitation of "offensive" weapons, or (3) "internationalization" of "offensive" weapons. The attached paper is based primarily on the assumption that the proposal will assume form (1). If the proposal assumed either of the other forms, a change in emphasis in the memorandum would be required.

It should also be noted that the position stated in the attached memorandum differs from the position which the United States took during the Disarmament Conference of 1932.¹ During that Conference the United States Delegation advocated the abolition of "offensive" weapons, particularly certain weapons of land warfare. In the event the question of "offensive" weapons arises in the course of the current discussions, it may be anticipated that references will be made to the earlier position of the United States on the matter.

JOHN C. ELLIOTT
Executive Secretary

¹ For documentation on United States participation in international negotiations for disarmament in 1932, see *Foreign Relations*, 1932, vol. I, pp. 1-574.

[Annex]

BASIS FOR UNITED STATES POSITION ON A POSSIBLE PROPOSAL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "OFFENSIVE" AND "DEFENSIVE" WEAPONS

It has been proposed that the problem of armament regulation and reduction be approached by drawing a distinction between "defensive" and "offensive" armaments with a view to abolishing or limiting the latter. At first glance there is an attractive simplicity in the idea that the identification of "offensive" weapons and their elimination from national armaments would automatically render attack impossible, prevent aggression and thus establish international peace and security. If it were true that certain weapons could be used only for aggression, while other weapons exist solely for defense, the United States would be the first to support the proposal to establish a distinction between them, since the United States obviously does not intend to engage in aggression. But reflection must lead inevitably to the conviction that it would be fruitless and impracticable in the highest degree to attempt to decide whether some weapons are "offensive" and others "defensive" as the basis for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

As a practical matter, it is impossible in a military sense to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons. Armaments are simply an effective means for the concentration of force, which is indispensable for both defense and offense. It is obvious that nearly all armaments have to some extent both an offensive and a defensive character, and that virtually every weapon can be employed offensively or defensively in turn. Offense and defense are subjective terms dependent on circumstances, applicable to the way in which weapons are used but not to the weapons themselves. The fact is that a weapon is defensive when used for the purpose of resisting aggression and offensive when used for the purpose of promoting aggression. A pistol in the hand of a man bent on murder is offensive but that same weapon in the hand of a man defending his life against murderous attack is defensive. As an international body of military experts reported in 1926: "The principal test whether a force is designed for purely defensive purposes or built up in a spirit of aggression remains in any case the intentions of the country concerned".*

The idea of basing armament regulation on a distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons is not new. The Disarmament Conference which began in 1932 adopted this approach and sought to implement it by subjecting the whole range of land, sea and air armaments to a searching technical examination. The result is well known: The Conference was unable to draw a distinction between "offensive"

*Report of Subcommittee A to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, Geneva, 1926. [Footnote in the source text.]

and "defensive" weapons. Those who insisted that such a distinction was feasible could do no better than stigmatize the most powerful modern weapons as "offensive", although it was pointed out that wars of aggression had taken place from the dawn of history, long before the development of these modern armaments. After months of intensive study, debate and negotiation the discussion of this subject ended in confusion and futility. Surely the present discussions will not be condemned to the same fate.

In this connection one more point must be emphasized. The Charter is based on the principle that Members of the United Nations will make available to the Security Council armed forces for the maintenance of international peace and security. If an attempt is now made to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons, if (following a certain trend in the Disarmament Conference of 1932) it is decided that the most powerful modern weapons are "offensive" and should be abolished, the result would be to deprive the United Nations security forces of the most effective weapons for the repression of aggression. The authority of the United Nations would be undermined and the way smoothed for an aggressor who might install himself in the territory of a weaker state through his quantitative superiority in older-type armaments. The United States has repeatedly indicated that arrangements for providing military force under Article 43 of the Charter constitute an important element of security on which successful armament regulation depends. The national contingents of these forces must not be deprived of weapons adequate to their task; they must not be hamstrung at the outset by a fictitious distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Mé morandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of
Armaments to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1947.

RAC D-6/2a Final

The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments submitted to the three Secretaries on April 2, 1947, a paper entitled, "United States Policy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission".¹ This document was returned to the Executive Committee for further consideration in the light of the discussion at this meeting.²

¹ RAC D-6/2 final, not printed.

² For an extract from the minutes of the April 2 meeting of the three secretaries, see p. 452.

The enclosure is a revision of this paper which has been approved by the Executive Committee and has the concurrence of Mr. Frederick Osborn. It is submitted for approval.³

JOHN C. ELLIOTT
Executive Secretary

[Enclosure]

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the policy which the United States should follow with respect to the present phase of the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, having in mind that the Commission is due to submit a second report to the Security Council prior to the meeting of the General Assembly in September, 1947.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. See appendix, page 4.*

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:

(a) The basic objective of the United States continues to be the establishment of an effective enforceable system for international control of atomic energy.

(b) The record of the United Nations discussions of this subject to date indicates that the U.S.S.R. is opposed to the elements deemed by the United States and the overwhelming majority of the other members of the Atomic Energy Commission to be essential to an effective system of control.

(c) Therefore, the United States should follow a course designed to lead to the widest possible measure of agreement on these essential elements, and which will, whatever the outcome, make explicitly clear in the record of the United Nations discussions and to world opinion (1) what these essential elements of control are, and (2) should the U.S.S.R. continue to reject them, that it is the opposition of the U.S.S.R. which prevents progress in reaching agreement on an effective system.

³ It was announced at the 27th Meeting of the Executive Committee, April 28, that the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission had indicated their approval (Department of State Disarmament Files).

*Secretary's note: Minor changes are being made in the last two parts of this document: Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion, in order that they may conform with the revised text of the Conclusions and Recommendations. They will be distributed shortly. [Footnote in the source text.]

(d) To undertake drafting of actual treaty provisions without basic agreement on essential elements of control would be likely to cause unwarranted public optimism throughout the world.

(e) It is possible that other members of the Commission would not agree to key provisions in treaty language without requesting, as ostensibly or actually essential to their understanding of them, additional information which the United States would not as a matter of policy and could not as a matter of law disclose.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that:

(a) The above conclusions be approved.

(b) The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments work out with the U.S. Delegation as a matter of urgency (1) those essential elements of an effective system of international control on which discussion should be focused, not only to make absolutely clear the necessity of such elements for true international control, but if the Soviet Union remains unwilling to agree to such a system, to reveal this unwillingness in the most effective manner, and (2) a tentative order of priority of discussion of these elements.

(c) The United States should endeavor to obtain, preferably in informal meetings of Committee 2, the widest possible agreement among the other members of the Atomic Energy Commission on the elements which we deem essential to an effective system of international control. It should, however, be understood that tentative agreements will be accepted by majority vote, it being further understood, however, that minority reports may be submitted. The work of the Committee should be initially directed toward describing the functions of the proposed international control agency. These functions should be stated in descriptive language, supplemented by such explanatory notes as may be desired.

(d) This paper be forwarded to the United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission for his guidance.

Appendix

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. On March 10, 1947, the Security Council asked the Atomic Energy Commission to continue studying all phases of the problem of the international control of atomic energy, to develop specific proposals as promptly as possible, and in due course to prepare for submission to the Council a draft treaty or treaties. It also requested a second report before the next session of the General Assembly. On March 19, 1947, the Commission itself decided that its committees should con-

sider the questions arising from the Security Council resolution and particularly questions on which Members of the Commission had not reached agreement. Pursuant to this latter resolution the Commission's Working Committee, which meets in private, resolved on March 31 to consider the points of disagreement outlined in the Soviet statements in the Security Council. The Working Committee further asked Committee 2, which also meets in private, to study the various questions arising from the Security Council and Atomic Energy Commission resolutions and, in particular, such questions as the detailed powers, characteristics and functions of an international control agency, provisions for the transition to the full operation of the international system, and new questions not studied before. These resolutions establish the framework within which United States policy must be carried out.

2. The Commission is renewing its labors against the background of the fact that its first Report of December 31, 1946, was approved by ten of its members, but not by the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Since the submission of that Report, three new members, all of whom apparently accept the basic principles contained in that Report, have joined the Commission. The Soviet Union, whose abstention from voting on the Report gave rise to uncertainty as to its exact attitude, has now indicated, through amendments submitted in February and through Mr. Gromyko's speech of March 5, that none of the fundamental elements of the Report, which was based upon the United States Proposals, are at present acceptable to it.

3. The past work of the Commission had the effect of focusing public attention primarily on essentially procedural aspects of the problem, such as the scope of inspection and the relationship of the veto to the machinery of sanctions.

4. Several nations which voted for the first Report of the Atomic Energy Commission are extremely anxious to promote the earliest possible development of atomic power for peaceful purposes. Their national economic requirements lead them to stress this aspect of the problem much more than does the United States which places its chief emphasis on national and international security.

DISCUSSION

5. It cannot be stated now with absolute certainty that the U.S.S.R. will not within the next six months be prepared to accept a system for the international control of atomic energy which embodies the elements which the United States regards as essential. The issue depends at least in part on developments in the whole complex of Soviet foreign relations, of which the problem of international control of atomic energy is only a part. Nevertheless, there is good ground for believing that the U.S.S.R. is not at present prepared to accept such a system.

6. There is reason to expect that the great majority of the Commission's twelve members will continue to agree to an effective system as its elements are further developed, although it must be recognized that there is a possibility that the United Kingdom, and perhaps France, will differ with the United States on the issue of international control of power-producing reactors. There may be other issues on which the present majority will split, e.g., the ownership and control of raw materials and mining operations.

7. It is of the utmost importance that the American people, and the Governments and peoples of other countries, be convinced:

(a) that the United States has been and remains absolutely sincere in its efforts for international control;

(b) that agreement on the basic elements of the United States proposals is essential to such control;

(c) that, if any delay in reaching, or any failure to reach, agreement occurs, the responsibility will not rest upon the United States.

8. The United States objectives in the present phase of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission work should accordingly be:

(a) to present clearly and concisely the elements which we deem essential to an effective system of international control, with particular reference to the functions and powers of an international authority;

(b) to attempt to obtain the widest possible agreement on these elements;

(c) to make it clear that, if, as appears likely, the Soviet Union will not accept these elements, the fault lies with the U.S.S.R.;

(d) to prepare a firm basis for whatever measures the United States may find it necessary to take in its own interest if and when it becomes clear that agreement on an effective system of international control is not possible.

9. Three possible courses of action which this Government might advocate have been considered. They are not all mutually exclusive:

(a) To debate the basic differences of principle which the Soviet amendments and Mr. Gromyko's speech of March 5 have shown to exist between the Soviet Union and the overwhelming majority of the Atomic Energy Commission's members. The Resolution adopted March 31 by the Commission's Working Committee contemplates discussion of these differences as one of two parts of the Commission's program.

(b) To examine the essential elements of an effective system of international control with the specific objective of developing actual provisions of a treaty. This alternative, which includes the submission of specific proposals of articles in charter language for inclusion in a treaty, has been informally discussed by the United States Delegation with other delegations.

(c) To focus upon the elements of an effective system of international control, which the United States regards as essential, particularly those relating to the functions and powers of the proposed Authority.

10. At first glance alternative (b) appears to have advantages. If this course were followed, it is argued, it would be possible to obtain agreement on a large number of charter articles, and because the discussion is taking place in terms of specific legal phraseology, to discover precisely where differences exist and the degree to which it might be possible to reconcile them. It is also argued that this course would permit the preparation of a treaty to which all could agree except the U.S.S.R. and Poland, and which could then be laid upon the table for signature at any time the U.S.S.R. is ready to sign.

11. These advantages are, however, offset by two major considerations:

(a) to attempt under present circumstances to focus discussion on provisions of an actual charter would almost certainly be to mislead the American public into believing that fundamental differences had been reconciled and that the United Nations Commission was now attacking the problems of organization and operation of the control authority.

(b) It would be impossible to enter a discussion of specific treaty language on key provisions without raising the question of the disclosure of classified information. Other delegations might legitimately contend that in the absence of the necessary information they could not agree to specific provisions even though all agreements would be subject to review on an overall basis. For example, treaty provisions for the control of reactors to be used as sources of power could probably not be agreed to by a nation which had no more knowledge of "denaturants" than is now public. The security provisions of the McMahon Act and the security requirements of the United States would not allow the release of such information. Disclosures of "restricted data" must be made only in accordance with the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

501.BC/4-2547: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1947—8 p. m.

185. Believe US should advocate (re Herschel Johnson letters March 29¹ and April 15² to Rusk) as initial SC action on receipt MSC report due April 30³ (a) prompt establishment subcommittee representing all members SC, action to be pursuant item 2 S/331⁴ (if necessary USDel should request inclusion this item SC agenda), and

¹ *Ante*, p. 446.

² Not found in Department of State files.

³ See footnote 3, p. 446.

⁴ Summary Statement by the Secretary General of Matters of Which the Security Council is Seized and of the Stage Reached in Their Consideration, April 18, 1947; item 2 was the matter of Special Agreements Under Article 43 (10 Files).

(b) direction MSC proceed urgently study Art. 43 as previously directed.

Subcommittee should review report, examine basic principles and consider further action SC should take accelerate implementation Art. 43 in accord GA Res Dec 14. It should report recommendations SC soonest.

Urge immediate informal discussion proposed action other SC members.

Further recommendations including detailed subcommittee terms of ref follow.⁵

Strongly urge USDel take necessary action earliest release MSC report.

ACHESON

⁵ Telegram 204 to New York, May 6, not printed.

SPA Files : Lot 55 D 323

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Special Political Affairs

[Extract]

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1947.

ACTION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 43 OF UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER AND RELATED MATTERS

Much emphasis has recently been placed on the importance of implementing Article 43 as one of the prerequisites to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. That must not lead us to forget that implementation is well worth pushing for other reasons and that it has consistently been the policy of the United States to do so. Despite the severe restrictions imposed by the veto power of the permanent members on the use which it would in practice be possible for the Security Council to make of armed forces placed at its disposal, the completion of arrangements making forces, facilities, and assistance available to it would nevertheless represent an important step toward the provision, within the framework of the United Nations, of effective international means of enforcement action for the maintenance of peace and security, and should have the effect of binding Member States more firmly to the organization. The completion of those arrangements should have the further effect of making it much more difficult than at present for a Member State to take military action outside the framework of the United Nations without openly refusing to permit that organization to act or openly refusing to cooperate with it. The total effect should therefore be to strengthen the Organization

materially. While Article 106 makes interim provisions for enforcement action on behalf of the United Nations, it does not give the Organization effective control over that action.

9. There is danger, however, that unless the publicity on the subject is skillfully handled, the conclusion of agreements making armed forces available to the Security Council in accordance with Article 43 would have the undesirable effect of causing the United States public to rely on the United Nations for the maintenance of our national security to a greater degree than is justified by the capabilities of the Organization, and to attach too little importance to the maintenance of an adequate degree of national military strength and readiness. That danger must be kept constantly in mind in connection with our efforts to achieve the implementation of Article 43 and in connection with all other matters relating to the enforcement capabilities of the United Nations.

10. The actions of the Soviet Representatives indicate clearly that the Soviet Government is opposed to the implementation of Article 43 in a manner consistent with the purposes of the Charter but wishes to prevent that fact from being generally understood, because of the unfavorable effect on public sentiment toward the U.S.S.R. which a wide public understanding of it could be expected to have in the United States and elsewhere outside the sphere of Soviet domination. All other governments represented on the Security Council except the Polish Government, have indicated that they favor early implementation, presumably in accordance with the Charter. The British Government has even gone so far as to state that it considers the provision of armed forces in accordance with Article 43 to be a prerequisite to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. A considerable number of other governments not represented in the Security Council also have indicated that they favor early implementation. The widespread agreement on the desirability of early implementation does not, however, mean that no serious difficulties will be encountered in achieving the areas of agreement among the nations concerned which will be essential for implementation.

11. It seems likely that the Soviet Government believes that if armed forces, assistance, and facilities were available for use by the Security Council as contemplated by the Charter, the U.S.S.R. would more frequently be forced to choose between the alternative of resorting to the outright use of its veto power in the Security Council, which it apparently desires to avoid doing, and the alternative of accepting a curtailment of its ability to exert pressure on some government which it desires to influence or to dominate, accepting the entry into the U.S.S.R. or its area of domination of armed forces of an outside state, or accepting some other breach of the wall which it has built between

its area of domination and the rest of the world. The Soviet Government may also fear that the implementation of Article 43 in the manner contemplated by the Charter, by imposing an obligation on the United States or establishing a floor for the strength and readiness of its armed forces, would prevent the degree of unilateral disarmament on the part of this country which might otherwise take place.

12. The apparent objectives of the Soviet Government in relation to the implementation of Article 43 are, therefore, to prevent implementation, except on terms satisfactory to it which differ very widely from those contemplated by the Charter, or failing that to delay implementation and to establish principles and precedents governing the provision by Member States of forces, facilities, and assistance, and the Security Council's employment of them, which will reduce as much as possible the extent to which implementation might produce the undesirable consequences previously described. Many of the Soviet proposals probably have the dual purpose of helping to prevent or of delaying implementation, if they prove to be unacceptable, or, if they are accepted, of helping to establish the restrictive principles and precedents just mentioned. It is likely that some of the Soviet proposals are related also, or entirely, to still other Soviet objectives, such as the reduction of the U.S. lead in the development of atomic energy for military use or other reductions of the relative military power of the United States.

13. The Soviet Government apparently desires to do what it feels that it can, without too seriously interfering with the accomplishment of its other purposes, to gain for some of its policies the support of public opinion in the United States and in other countries in which a reasonably free flow of information exists and the government and legislature are responsive to the views of pressure groups and of large segments of the public. In view of this and of the unfavorable effect on public sentiment toward the U.S.S.R. which could be expected to result from any reasonably correct and widespread public understanding of the Soviet objectives relating to the implementation of Article 43, it appears that the most promising means of causing the U.S.S.R. to relax its opposition to effective implementation is to have the greatest possible publicity given to the proceedings on the issue in the United Nations. For that purpose much of the substantive action on the issue should be transferred to an organ of the United Nations whose rules of procedure do not, as do those of the Military Staff Committee, severely limit the publicity which can be given to its proceedings.

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501.BC/5-147: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1947—8 p. m.

198. Believe further efforts reach agreement principles covered MSC report¹ should be handled political level accordance Deptel 185 April 25.² Strongly oppose return MSC proposed London telegram 2497 April 30.³ Believe return would delay progress implementation Article 43 without serving useful purpose. Agree report represents progress but oppose glossing over failure reach agreement important principles. Inform UKDel. Repeated London as [1898.]

MARSHALL

¹ For text of the report of the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council, April 30, 1947, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Special Supplement No. 1* (hereafter cited as SC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl. No. 1*), or Department of State *Bulletin*, August 3, 1947, Supplement, "Arming the United Nations," pp. 247-273. The report, submitted pursuant to the Security Council directive of February 13 (see footnote 3, p. 446), was entitled "General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations." It consisted of the report itself and two annexes: Annex A, "Positions of the Delegations of the Military Staff Committee on the Articles of the General Principles Governing the Organization of Armed Forces on Which the Military Staff Committee Has Not Reached Unanimity," and Annex B, "General Comments by the French Delegation."

² *Ante*, p. 464.

³ In telegram 2497, April 30, the Embassy in the United Kingdom had reported the following: "Foreign Office informs us British press being urged to take line that Military Staff Committee report represents progress and not to stress failure to reach full agreement. British hope press will agree that like with CFM meetings progress is reported even though complete agreement impossible and that good will result from public airing Staff Committee report and recommittal for further study." (841.20/4-3047)

SPA Files: Lot 55 D 323

Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1947.

U.S. LEADERSHIP IN NEGOTIATION OF SPECIAL AGREEMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE 43 OF THE CHARTER

In the light of the breakdown of the recent Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the receipt of the Military Staff Committee Report¹ by the Security Council raises the question of the

¹ See footnote 1, above.

adequacy of the schedule of making forces available to the Security Council, as envisaged by the United States.

In his Report to the Nation on April 29 [28],² Secretary Marshall stated that "agreement was made impossible at Moscow, because in our view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals" regarding Germany which "could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany and Europe and the inevitable emergence of dictatorship and strife." It is questionable whether the Soviets really desired agreement on Germany at this time. Their political strategy appears to be to keep the world upset so that economic depression and the passage of time will make communist infiltration easier in non-communist dominated areas. If so, the United States should examine its relations with the Soviet Union and adapt them so as to offset Soviet tactics. The Secretary recognized this in his speech where he hinted we could not afford to wait indefinitely to conclude peace with Germany. Can we afford to wait indefinitely to have the security articles of the United Nations Charter implemented?

If the Security Council accepts our suggestion to set up a Committee to review the Military Staff Committee's recommended basic principles and to recommend further steps for accelerating the conclusion of the Article 43 agreements, the United States could propose in that Committee that the Security Council offer forthwith to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement with any Member which expresses its readiness to do so. Simultaneously, the United States could offer to undertake such negotiations with the Security Council. Such a proposal should be made as soon as it becomes clear that the Soviets are insisting on a distorted reading of the Charter and as a consequence are continuing their delaying tactics.

Numerous reasons in support of this suggestion can be advanced. First and foremost, it would confront the Soviets with the possibility that their tactics of delay, in order to allow communist infiltration in Central and Western Europe, might be partly offset by the United Nations having armed forces made available to it. Regardless of the military value of this possibility, there can be little doubt that psychologically and politically it would assist the Governments of countries now open to communist infiltration.

Additional reasons are as follows:

It would improve the public acceptability of our position on the regulation of conventional armaments, progress on which we have made contingent on progress on making armed forces available to the Security Council.

It would provide the opportunity for necessary analysis of the situation which might be created by the Balkan Investigating Commission

² For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1947, pp. 919-924.

or the Palestine Commission of Inquiry making recommendations involving the use of United Nations Armed Forces.

It would provide concrete evidence that the United States supports the United Nations with all its resources, as stated by the President.

Pending a thorough analysis of this idea, it is difficult to conclude whether it has sufficient merit to warrant its adoption, and if so, whether the present or the near future is the proper time to propose it. In any event, I suggest the desirability of undertaking such an analysis and I will take the necessary steps to get it under way.

501.BC Armaments/4-2547 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1947—2 p. m.

PRIORITY

200. Urtel 389, Apr 25.¹ Secretariat's draft plan of work for CCA is as it stands unsatisfactory as basis for further Subcom discussions. Chief faults are:

(a) Omission any provision for examination (re US and UK positions) of conditions essential establishment of effective system for regulation and reduction armaments; (b) inclusion entirely extraneous matters as in 2(C); (c) distortion of emphasis and obviously incomplete and weighted enumeration of various alternatives, especially in paras 2 and 4; and (d) apparent prejudgment several issues, especially relative priorities.

There follows suggested redraft plan of work designed to correct above faults and to reflect what we consider logical order priorities CCA work. All ref to subject matter para 4 Secretariat draft omitted in view present US position this point (RAC-D-13c final²). We recognize, however, US cannot oppose if majority members favor it, inclusion in work plan of item re consideration of whether report on armaments and armed forces within its competence is necessary for CCA work, and if so at what stage.

This draft may in your discretion be submitted Subcom as substitute

¹ At its 5th Meeting, April 9, the Commission on Conventional Armaments created a subcommittee to prepare a draft plan of work; this subcommittee first met on April 21. The subcommittee decided that the Secretariat of the CCA should draft a plan of work and tabulate various proposals (IO Files). Telegram 389, not printed, contains the text of Doc. S/C.3/SC.2/1, the suggestions for a draft plan of work prepared by the Secretariat (501.BC Armaments/4-2547).

² *Ante*, p. 437.

for Secretariat draft and should we believe form basis appropriate informal discussions other members of Subcom. You should in any case insist on inclusion item 2, and, in so far as plan sets forth priorities, on precedence of items 2 and 3 over all others except item 1. There would be no objection appropriate elaboration of item 4 if other members strongly desire. Parenthetical portion of item 2 may be omitted provided it is made clear we shall insist these points be discussed under this item. Subheadings under item 3 may also be omitted in your discretion.

DRAFT PLAN OF WORK FOR CCA

1. Consider and make recommendations to SC concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within jurisdiction of CCA.

2. Consider conditions of peace and security essential to establishment any effective system for regulation and reduction armaments and armed forces, [including relationship of: (a) peace settlements, (b) international control of atomic energy, and (c) implementation of Art 43 of Charter, to such establishment.]³

3. Consider practical and effective safeguards by means international system of control operating through special organs, including:

- (A) A reporting system;
- (B) A system of inspection and other means of control;
- (C) Organization, functions and personnel of international control agency;
- (D) Relationship of international control agency to other UN organs;
- (E) Rights and privileges of international control agency in territories of participating nations;
- (F) Definitions of violations and evasions;
- (G) Remedial and enforcement action in case of violation or evasion.

4. Consider possible methods of regulation and reduction armaments and armed forces.

5. Consider possible methods for regulating production of, and international traffic in, certain armaments and war materials.

6. Consider nature and sequence of possible stages in effecting regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

7. Consider applicability of system for regulation of armaments and armed forces to states not members of UN.

8. Submit a report or reports to SC presenting specific proposals. Report or reports might include basic provisions for a convention embodying these proposals.

MARSHALL

³ Brackets appear in the source text.

501.BC Armaments/5-647 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, May 6, 1947—10:20 p. m.

427. For Joseph E. Johnson from Bard.¹ The following text of a plan of work for the CCA has been prepared in the light of Bard's draft of May 1,² Department's 200 of May 2, 2 p. m.,³ and comments by Blaisdell. It is proposed to use this text at the next meeting of the CCA subcommittee to prepare a draft plan of work, and it will be discussed informally with other representatives on CCA prior to that meeting, time for which has not yet been set.⁴

Text follows:

DRAFT PLAN OF WORK FOR THE COMMISSION

I. *Substantive problems to be considered*

(1) Consider and make recommendations to the Security Council concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the jurisdiction of the CCA.

(2) Consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(3) Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means to protect complying states against violations and evasions).

(4) Consider practical proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(5) Submission of a report or reports to the Security Council.

It is proposed that under the five headings listed above all of the references by the various delegations suggested for the plan of work will be considered.

It is also understood that this plan of work does not limit the freedom of individual delegations to make additional suggestions at a later time.

II. *Organization*

(1) Establishment of a working committee of the whole to deal with the political aspects of security and to supervise and coordinate the work of the subcommittees.

(2) Establishment of a subcommittee to study the technical aspects of safeguards and any other problems referred to them by the working committee. This committee would report to the working committee.

¹ Ralph A. Bard, Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments.

² Not printed.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ In telegram 209 to New York, May 8, the Department indicated that the draft contained in the present telegram conformed with United States policy and had the full approval of the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments (501.BC Armaments/4-2547).

These suggestions are not intended to preclude the formation of other subcommittees if and when they are needed. The committees mentioned are merely those which appear to be necessary during the initial stages of the Commission's work.

[Bard]
AUSTIN

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 9, 1947.

Subject: Information on Armed Forces for the Commission for Conventional Armaments (RAC D 15/1 attached)

Attached for your approval is a paper on this subject prepared by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments.¹ There is no need for you to read anything beyond the first three pages.

This paper has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and will subsequently be submitted to the Committee of Three in view of the fact that both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three Secretaries approved the earlier position set forth in a memorandum of January 6.

The evidence indicates that Mr. Bard will probably feel that the position set forth in this paper still does not give him the leeway that he requires. It was the strong feeling of all the members of the Executive Committee, however, that there is no real need for the Commission to obtain information at the present time and that the only reason for agreeing to a request for any information is a tactical one; i.e., the strong evidence that other delegations will desire to have an immediate request and the danger that if we stand too pat, we will be unable to curb a request for information on armaments as well as armed forces.

During consideration of this paper by the Executive Committee the question of whether or not the United States should not now come out flatly for an adjournment of the Commission for Conventional Armaments until the world situation has changed, was raised in an acute form.²

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

¹ In a marginal notation, Acheson indicated that he approved the paper going forward.

² Opposite the last paragraph, Acheson wrote "How can one present this idea as a practical matter?"

[Annex]

UNITED STATES POSITION CONCERNING A REQUEST BY THE COMMISSION
FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS FOR INFORMATION ON EXISTING
ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES

RAC D-15/1

MAY 6, 1947.

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to re-examine the United States position with respect to furnishing information on armaments and armed forces in connection with the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments, with a view to determining whether that position should be changed in the light of developments since it was established on January 6, 1947.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

See Appendix A.³

III. DISCUSSION

See Appendix B.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that:

a. Information on armed forces and armaments is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except as it may be related to a specific plan.

b. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that there will be a move in the Commission for Conventional Armaments to initiate a request for information on armed forces and armaments at an early stage in its work.

c. Disclosure of information on numbers of armed forces would not adversely affect the security interests of the United States provided that information on composition and disposition of units is not required.

d. Taking all considerations into account the advantages of acquiescing in a request for information on armed forces (as distinguished from armaments) seem to outweigh the disadvantages.

e. The United States should oppose any proposal requesting information on armaments in connection with the work of the CCA even if accompanied by verification. Such information should be required only as a part of an overall program for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

³ The appendices are not printed.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that :

- a. The above conclusions be approved.
- b. The United States Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments be instructed
 1. To emphasize the United States view on all appropriate occasions that information on armed forces and armaments is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except as it may be related to a specific plan.
 2. To oppose strongly any request for information on armaments to the CCA.
 3. For the present not to support a request for information on armed forces but not to vote against such a request if the majority of the CCA favor it.
 4. To lend his support to a request for information on armed forces provided that in so doing he is able to gain the assurance that the United States position set forth in b.2. above will be accepted.
- c. A copy of this paper be forwarded to the United States Mission to the United Nations.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Division of International Security Affairs

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] May 12, 1947.

Attention: Mr. Joseph Johnson, Chief

DEAR SIRs: I acknowledge receipt of the signed instructions of the Executive Committee on Atomic Energy, dated April 15, 1947.¹ A copy has been sent to Senator Austin. We will continue to be guided accordingly.

We may add that the anxieties expressed in these instructions appear after six weeks of negotiation to be unfounded. The public does not as yet seem to have gotten the impression that the Russians are rapidly agreeing; nor has any question been raised at any of the meetings with respect to our providing additional scientific information. No responsible delegate of another nation has as yet indicated that such information is needed.

In our minds the most sensitive aspect of the work going on in Committee No. 2 is that by making more specific the recommendations in the Committee Report, clauses would be written which would be

¹ The reference is to Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments memorandum RAC D-6/2a Final, p. 459.

unacceptable to one or another of the nations which voted for the Report on December 31st. If this should happen, it would be our hope to reach an acceptable compromise with such nation by broadening the scope of such proposal by amendment in Committee No. 2 or the working committee.

Yours very truly,

FREDERICK OSBORN

501.BC Armaments/5-2147 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, May 21, 1947—8 p. m.

494. Text of USSR proposal introduced on May 21 on plan of work of CCA follows:

(1) The establishment of general principles for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the determination of the minimum requirements of each state in all kinds of armaments and armed forces (land, sea and air), taking into account also the prohibition of atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

(2) The establishment of general principles which should govern the reduction of war production and the determination of the maximum capacity of war production for each state, having also in view the permission of the production and use of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes.

(3) The extension of the principles set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 to the states non-members of the UN.

(4) The establishment of limits on individual kinds of armaments and armed forces for each individual country, on the basis of principles stated in paragraph 1.

(5) The establishment of limits on various kinds of war production for each individual country on the basis of principles stated in paragraph 2.

(6) The determination of the method and time-limits for the adaptation of the level of armaments and armed forces as well as of war production to the limits stated in paragraphs 4 and 5 for each individual country.

(7) The problems of location of armed forces and the question of the reduction of the network of military, naval and air bases.

(8) Measures on the prohibition of the use of non-military industries and non-military means of transport for military purposes above the limits set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5.

(9) The organization and the method of establishment of a system of control of the fulfillment of measures on the general regulation

and reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as of war industry and war production, taking into account the coordination of the above-mentioned system of control with the system of control of use of atomic energy.

(10) The working out of a draft convention.

JOHNSON

SPA Files : Lot 55D323

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. George H. Haselton of the Division of International Security Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1947.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING ON MONDAY, MAY 26

Mr. Rusk opened the meeting by describing the difficulties which the Military Staff Committee Report¹ had encountered in that Committee, and no doubt would meet in the Security Council,² and pointed out that one of the methods, perhaps, of resolving this deadlock would be for the United States at this time to offer to make available to the Security Council certain forces, facilities, and assistance in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. He stated that, in his opinion, it would require six to eight weeks of processing a paper if it were decided to adopt this plan. The statement was made that there were some domestic arguments for this plan to offer forces to the Security Council, one of which was that an element of uncertainty would exist in the U.S. post-war military planning so long as the strength of the forces which the United States would make available to the Security Council was not established.

The opinion was expressed that an offer emanating from the United States at this time would look like a hollow gesture if no other nation joined in making a similar proposal. Mr. Bohlen³ agreed that there might be some merit in the plan if there were any chance of its achieving its objective, of bearing some fruit, but he was afraid that this would not be the case and that we might be manufacturing additional trouble for ourselves. He pointed out that the end result might be that U.S. troops would be the only forces available to the Security Council and that they might be the only ones employed in the event of an international emergency, a situation which certainly would not please the Congress.

Mr. Cohen believed that this plan to make an offer of forces, assistance, and facilities would not increase the chances of achieving unanim-

¹ See footnote 1, p. 468.

² Although the Military Staff Committee submitted its report on April 30, the Security Council did not begin consideration of it until June 4.

³ Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

ity on various matters with the Russians, whereas if unanimity did exist it was easier to take action under Article 106 of the Charter. He also suggested that the United States might conclude an informal, more preliminary, special agreement with the Security Council which could be couched in very general terms.

Mr. Raynor⁴ stated that an offer of such forces from the United States at this time would be interpreted by the Soviets as applying pressure upon them, and, in his opinion, there were more important matters which should be emphasized at the moment.

It was agreed that the proposal to make U.S. forces available to the Council would be placed before certain members of the War and Navy Departments in order to obtain their reaction.

⁴ G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Executive
Committee on Regulation of Armaments*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1947.

RAC D-15/2

Subject: United States Position Concerning a Request by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for Information on Existing Armaments and Armed Forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the paper entitled "United States Position Concerning a Request by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for Information on Existing Armaments and Armed Forces," which was enclosed with your letter of 8 May 1947² and on which their views were requested.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement with the major feature of the subject paper, that any request for information on armaments for the Commission for Conventional Armaments should be strongly opposed. They believe, however, that such a position on armament disclosure would be weakened by support for disclosure of information on armed forces. Manifestly, to oppose one while supporting the other would be inconsistent, and logical maintenance of such a position would be difficult.

Since the purpose is to prevent armament disclosure, the place to

¹ Sent to the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments as SM-8290, May 26; circulated within the Committee as RAC D-15/2, May 27.

This document consists of comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Doc. RAC D-15/1, May 6, p. 474.

² Not found in the files of the Department of State.

stop it is at the beginning, and the beginning, since armed forces and armaments are so closely related, is disclosure on either subject. As set forth below, there are compelling arguments against armed forces disclosure, against the thesis that the United States is actually already committed to such disclosure and against the usefulness or need of any such data that could be obtained at the present time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate that information regarding the over-all strength of U.S. armed forces is available in official government publications, appropriation bills, etc., to those who seek it, and therefore, that any such disclosure to the Commission for Conventional Armaments would not necessarily have serious, direct and adverse effect on our national security.

They would point out, however, that indirectly such action may nevertheless have considerable adverse effect on that security. Communist aggression tactics now threaten a number of countries located on the perimeter of the Soviet-controlled area in Eurasia, particularly Turkey, Greece and Iran, and it is "the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the effect of the United States taking a position agreeable to the disclosure of numbers of armed forces would be to place heavy pressure on these friendly nations to make like disclosures, obviously inimical to their security interests because of the intelligence value of such disclosures to an aggressor. The importance of this intelligence would be increased wherever United States assistance was provided, particularly in cases of military aid.

Furthermore, information as to members of United States armed forces would collate and confirm to the world accurate figures as to our own military status, a matter of increasing gratification to aggressor nations and of embarrassment to us as our military establishments are reduced.

The United States did not insist upon verification of information in connection with a census of armed forces when the matter was under discussion in the Security Council last year, presumably since the census was not directly related to the subject of regulation of armaments. Such is not now the case, however, since the information would be requested by the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has consistently been that, whenever the subject of information on armed forces is considered as an integral part of the question of armament regulation, it should be done only "with appropriate measures of international verification". Otherwise, the information so provided by the various nations will be of no appreciable value in that there will be no assurance of the accuracy necessary for any work which might be undertaken in connection with

it. In fact, distorted information before the Commission might well be a source of real danger in arriving at conclusions therefrom. And, finally, for the United States to support such a proposal at the outset of regulation of armament discussions would be at least to condone a departure from the fundamental United States principle of international verification in connection with *all* matters pertaining to the regulation of armaments.

The United States should therefore, in light of the foregoing, oppose a move in the Commission for Conventional Armaments to initiate a request for information on armed forces at an early stage in its work on the grounds that the information is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and that such information, without verification—which is obviously impossible at this time—cannot possibly serve any useful purpose at this stage of the discussions.

In addition to the foregoing comments on information regarding armed forces, two other suggestions regarding the Conclusions and Recommendations of the position paper are offered:

a. The phrases, "except as it may be related to a specific plan" and "only as a part of an over-all program," used in the subject paper to qualify opposition to requests for information on armaments do not seem to be sufficiently positive. To make them less general in nature, it is believed that use should be made of the stipulations in paragraphs 2*c* and 3*b* of Appendix "A" of the position paper.

b. It is stated in Conclusions that an any case information on *composition and disposition of units* of armed forces should not be required. The Recommendations in the position paper omit this proviso. For consistency and definiteness, the Recommendations should be appropriately amended.

Summarizing the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest a rewarding of the Conclusions and Recommendations of the position paper as follows:

"IV. *Conclusions*

It is concluded that:

a. Information on armed forces and armaments is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except in response to the requirements of an over-all program for the regulation and reduction of armaments developed in a sequence which gives priority to the control of atomic energy, the peace settlements and the implementation of Article 43, and with adequate safeguards, including verification, to insure that all nations conform to the same standards with respect to the information disclosed.

b. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that there will be a move in the Commission for Conventional Armaments to initiate a request for information on armed forces and armaments at an early stage in its work.

c. Disclosure of information on numbers of armed forces would not have direct adverse effect on the security interests of the United States provided that information on composition and disposition of unit is not required. However, such disclosure, being also required from certain nations friendly to the United States and currently under foreign pressure, might adversely affect their security. It would also serve to collate and confirm information on United States armed forces which is currently available only in diffuse form in unclassified government publications and press releases.

d. Taking all considerations into account, the disadvantages of acquiescing in a request for information on armed forces (as distinguished from armaments) outweigh the advantages.

e. The United States should oppose any proposal requesting information on either armed forces or armaments in connection with the Work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except under the conditions set forth in subparagraph *a* above.

V. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a. The above conclusions be approved.

b. The United States Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments be instructed:

(1) To emphasize the United States view on all appropriate occasions that information on armed forces and armaments is not necessary to the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments except in response to the requirements of an over-all program for the regulation and reduction of armaments developed in a sequence which gives priority to the control of atomic energy, the peace settlements and the implementation of Article 43, and with adequate safeguards, including verification, to insure that all nations conform to the same standards with respect to the information disclosed.

(2) For the present, to oppose strongly any request for information on either armed forces or armaments except under the conditions set forth in subparagraph *b*(1) above.

(3) Subject to further review and instructions when the situation arises, to be prepared to support a request for information on armed forces (excepting composition and disposition of units) provided that in so doing he is able to gain clear assurance that the United States position set forth in subparagraph *b*(1) above will be accepted as far as information on armaments is concerned.

c. A copy of this paper be forwarded to the United States Mission to the United Nations."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. G. LALOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Secretary

501.BC Armaments/5-2947

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell)

[WASHINGTON,] May 29, 1947.

Subject: May 28 Meeting of the Commission for Conventional Armaments Subcommittee on Plan of Work.

Mr. Lindsay called me by telephone from New York this morning to convey information on the results of yesterday's meeting of the Committee for Conventional Armaments Subcommittee on plan of work. He stated that the United States had introduced the draft plan¹ aimed at reconciling the divergent United States (New York's 427, May 6, 10:20 p. m.)² and Soviet (New York's 494, May 24 [21], 8 p. m.)³ draft plans. This action on the part of the United States brought no favorable response from the Soviet Union representative, Mr. Gromyko, who said that the introduction of the second draft indicated lack of sincerity in proposing the first. The United States representative thereupon withdrew the compromise plan and no further progress was made with respect to the contents of a plan of work. However, representatives of the U.K., France, and China reiterated their support of the United States draft plan in the course of the discussion.

Full agreement, however, was reached in the Subcommittee on a proposal for organization, namely, for the Commission to establish a working committee composed of representatives of all members of the CCA, the working committee to be authorized to establish such subcommittees as are necessary.

The Subcommittee will meet next on Wednesday, June 4.

¹ Not printed.

² *Ante*, p. 472.

³ *Ante*, p. 476.

501.BC/6-347 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1947—7 p. m.

247. 1. When Agenda item requested by US in S/338¹ is taken up by SC, Dept suggests US Rep direct attention to relevant portion of

¹ S/338, not printed here, was a letter dated April 30 from Herschel Johnson, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, requesting that the question of Article 43 agreements be placed on the provisional agenda of the next meeting of the Security Council (IO Files).

para 7 of GA Resolution of 14 Dec 1946 and to following topic, consideration of which has been deferred since second meeting of SC: "Discussion of best means of arriving at conclusion of special agreements referred to in Article 43 of Charter" (Item 2 S/340).² Dept believes emphasis should be placed on general problem of implementing Article 43 at earliest possible date. While this has been US objective from beginning of UN, lack of striking progress since Feb 1946 suggests desirability of examining alternative ways and means. There was no SC discussion of means of arriving at conclusion of Article 43 agreements before SC on Feb 16, 1946, directed MSC to examine Article 43 from military point of view. Decision was made by SC at almost last minute of London session. Apparently, it was assumed that such examination was best means of arriving at conclusion of special agreements. This assumption need not be questioned, since pending matter regarding Article 43 is how to proceed now in light of all circumstances. There has never been any systematic examination of Article 43 from other than the military point of view in any UN organ. With receipt of the MSC Report, time appears ripe for full SC discussion of this Article. Dept believes SC should be free to examine Article not only in light of MSC study, made from military point of view, but also from other points of view, political, legal, etc. Views of non-permanent members will be important. In other words, while regarding MSC Report as advice and assistance in sense of Article 47, para 1, SC should now proceed, after full discussion, to selection best means of arriving at conclusion of Article 43 agreements and furnish necessary political guidance to MSC for further work in this connection.

2. SC may not be able to obtain early agreement on all principles of MSC Report. Report itself shows how difficult and time-consuming it is to achieve agreement on general principles without reference to specific forces, facilities and assistance. SC might attempt agreement on those principles necessary to initiate negotiations with member states, if early agreement on all principles is unobtainable. This possibility is now being studied by Dept. For your information, remarks critical of MSC by various members in GA and in SC Committee 1 indicate SC and Dept may wish to consider negotiation of agreements without having first obtained unanimity on all principles, particularly if this appears as only alternative to indeterminate efforts to achieve unanimity on general principles.

3. General discussion in SC may get into particular principles of MSC Report in which case US position would be that taken by JCS representatives in the MSC as stated in the MSC Report.

² Summary Statement by the Secretary General of Matters of Which the Security Council Is Seized and of the Stage Reached in Their Consideration, May 2, 1947; item 2 was the matter of Special Agreements under Article 43 (10 Files).

4. Specific action believed desirable by Dept follows:

a. Establishment of Committee in SC consisting of representatives of all eleven members, with terms of reference specified Dept's tels 185, April 25³ and 204, May 6.⁴ In line with general approach indicated above, Committee should be directed to make recommendations to Council within specified period of time (not more than ninety days) on best means of expediting conclusion of special agreements referred to in Article 43 of Charter.

b. Adoption of resolution by SC requesting MSC to continue study of Article 43 from military point of view pending further instructions.

5. In anticipation of examination of Agenda Item 2, S/340, by SC Committee, in course of which MSC Report would be examined in detail, Dept is preparing complete analysis of MSC Report.

MARSHALL

³ *Ante*, p. 464.

⁴ Not printed.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy
(Forrestal) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1947.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that their views on the military aspects of the regulation of armaments be transmitted for your information, so that you may be advised of the military thinking upon this problem. Accordingly, enclosed herewith is a study, the work of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which may be considered as accurately reflecting their views.¹

Sincerely yours,

FORRESTAL

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

¹ In instruction 139, June 25, the enclosed study was transmitted to the United States Representative at the United Nations for information.

[Enclosure]

Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

SECRET

JCS 1731/22

GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF REGULATION
OF ARMAMENTS

[Here follows a statement of the problem and discussion.]

CONCLUSIONS

12. The following preamble and principles regarding the military aspects of the problem of regulation and reduction of armaments are basic to the security interests of the United States:

Preamble

Armaments do not cause war. They result, rather, from the causes of war. Disarmament in itself will neither remove the causes of war nor prevent war. War and armaments can only be eliminated when the ideological, political, economic and other causes of war are exorcised. Concurrently with all disarmament negotiations, supreme effort must be continued to eliminate these causes. A highly important feature of this effort is the codification and establishment of a complete body of international law as envisaged by Article 13 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Principles

a. There should be no unilateral disarmament by the United States by international agreement, nor should there be a unilateral reduction of armaments, by any means, which jeopardized the military security of the United States.

b. In any program, commitment or schedule for abolition or regulation and reduction of armaments, the establishment of effective safeguards, including international inspections and punishments, against violation and evasion of agreements is an essential prelude to the implementation of each step in the agreed program.

c. Once agreements on safeguards are reached, evasion will still be feasible unless the veto is eliminated in so far as these specific agreements are concerned. It follows that this possibility must be obviated to satisfy our military security interests.

d. Commitments or agreements regarding abolition or regulation and reduction of any armaments should neither become effective nor be rigidly cast until after the peace treaties have been consummated and the collective security forces contemplated by Article 43 of the United Nations Charter have been effectively established to preserve international security.

e. The first step to be accomplished in the control of armaments is the establishment of an effective system for the international control of atomic energy (U.S. [Baruch] ² Proposal).

² Brackets appear in the source text.

f. The next step is the establishment of an effective system for the international control of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

g. Until the above principles are established and implemented the United States cannot determine its military needs for self-preservation as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

h. Pending establishment and implementation of the principles enumerated above, discussions regarding regulation and reduction of conventional armaments should be directed toward solution of the questions of how and when rather than what elements of armaments should be regulated and reduced.

i. Undue reduction of the mechanical weapons in which we excel, such as long-range bombers, naval forces and mechanized ground forces, would jeopardize the power of self-preservation of the United States.

j. All moves toward regulation and reduction of armaments which accomplish merely the abolition or limitation of destructive and complicated weapons operate to the advantage of nations primarily superior in manpower and to the disadvantage of nations superior in technology and industrial capacity.

k. The armament requirements for self-preservation of the United States will increase greatly if we fail to retain and to acquire by negotiation the advanced bases needed for our own use and if we neglect to deny them to potential enemies.

l. Until an effective system of international security is established, our own requirements in armaments for security will be greater than those of an aggressor nation.

m. The extensive and general reduction that we have already made since V-J Day in our own armaments should be an important consideration in arriving at the terms of any future program for regulation or reduction of armaments.

n. Any attempt again to resolve the problem of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments on the basis of a differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons, or other comparative formulae, will be impractical, unrealistic and contrary to the interests of the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in Appendix "A"³ be forwarded to the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

b. The memorandum in Appendix "B"³ be forwarded to the Representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Staff Committee, United Nations.

³The appendices, draft memoranda transmitting the body of the document, are not printed.

501.BC Atomic/6-1147

Memorandum by Mr. William T. Golden¹ to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 9 JUNE 1947.

Subject: Meeting with Professor Einstein.²

1. On Friday afternoon, June 6, 1947, I spent 2½ hours with Professor Albert Einstein at his home in Princeton, New Jersey, pursuant to his indirect request to the Secretary, referred by Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, to have a representative come to his home for discussion of a matter to be communicated to the Secretary.

2. *Summary*: The topic that concerns him and his views regarding it may be summarized as follows:

(a) The world is heading for an atomic war. Our monopoly, if we have one, cannot be maintained for more than a few years. The premium on surprise attack is greater with the atomic bomb than ever before. When two sides have the bomb, one or the other will surely use it, from nerves or fear if not from policy. The devastation from atomic warfare will be fully up to the popular conception.

(b) The United Nations has been ineffectual and there is every indication that it cannot control the situation.

(c) The only way of averting an atomic war within a few years, say 2 to 10, is through an effective supra-national World Government to which military power will be transferred.

(d) The destruction of civilization can be averted only if the United States takes the lead in establishing a World Government. He hopes for bi-partisan political leadership for such a scheme.

3. *The Interview*: Professor Einstein spoke with deep feeling but with almost childlike hope for salvation and without appearing to have thought through the details of his solution. The field of international politics is clearly not his métier. He recognizes that World Government would be difficult of accomplishment but says that no matter how remote the chance, every effort should be made to achieve it since otherwise all will be lost.

4. Certain specific points which he made are listed below:

(a) Russia will surely develop an atomic bomb.

(b) If an effective World Government is not established, an atomic war is a certainty within a few years since the premium on the attack has become so great that one side or the other will shoot first, from fear or from nerves if not from policy. This is inevitable.

(c) For civilization to survive, it must have an effective supra-national World Government. The United States of America must be

¹ Of the office of Mr. Lewis L. Strauss, Member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

² Theoretical physicist; discoverer and exponent of the theory of relativity.

the leader if a World Government is to be established. Military power must be turned over to the World Government. All countries should be invited to join. If Russia does not join, proceed without her. If the World Government is strong, Russia will join eventually, but even if she does not join, she would not be so foolish as to attack so strong a group. And the group will not attack Russia, either, because it will be so strong it need have no fear. When I suggested that the measure of power today is the possession of the "A" bomb and that therefore the United States, even by itself, would meet his definition of a strong "group", he replied that this monopoly cannot last for any appreciable period of time and that intangible matters of public sentiment and moral regard were also important.

(d) Non-members of the World Government would be invited to send observers to its councils so that they could assure themselves that they were not being plotted against. He felt that security problems could be handled somehow or other and that anyway secrets are transitory.

(e) Delegates to the World Government should be elected directly by the citizens of the nations, not appointed by the Governments. He stressed this point and returned to it several times. Perhaps the number of votes of each country should be in proportion to the number of professional men (or college graduates or some other such standard of intellectual hegemony) rather than the total population. He merely cited this as a possibility, pointing out that the idea was not original with him, and he did not urge it.

(f) It pains him to see the development of a spirit of militarism in the United States which follows from our experiences in the last war. The American people are tending to become like the Germans—not, he hastened to add, the Nazis but those of the Kaiser. He says that Americans are beginning to feel that the only way to avoid war is through a Pax Americana, a benevolent world domination by the United States. He pointed out that history shows this to be impossible and the certain precursor of war and grief. There can be no lasting enforced peace. The benevolent despot becomes a tyrant or a weakling; either way his structure crumbles.

(g) The German people have been ruined by their military spirit which stems from Bismarck.

(h) He would like the United Nations to govern Palestine. This would be an excellent chance for it to assume authority and re-establish its tarnished prestige.

(i) He referred to the Catholic church in connection with political longevity and pointed out that it is the outstanding and only historically durable organization.

(j) In reply to my question, he expressed the opinion that the atomic

bomb would surely have been devised even if it had not been for the stimulus of World War II. The war accelerated it but it would have come within, say, 10 years anyway.

5. Professor Einstein's manner was warm and completely informal. He seemed to speak from emotion rather than from reasoned conclusions and it was surprising, though perhaps it should not have been, that, out of his *métier* of mathematics, he seemed naive in the field of international politics and mass human relations. The man who popularized the concept of a fourth dimension could think in only two of them in considerations of World Government.

WILLIAM T. GOLDEN

501.BC Atomic/6-1047

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1947—2:45 p. m.

Having been informed by Mr. Volpe ¹ of the U.S.AEC this morning that Sir George Thomson of the United Kingdom Delegation to the U.N.A.E.C. had indicated to Dr. Bacher last week that the British did not approve of the positive operational and developmental functions for the Atomic Development Authority which the United States favored, and that a new plan was under consideration in London, I called Mr. Osborn to inquire whether the Department could help by sending a cable to the London Embassy on this subject. At the same time Mr. Osborn put in a call to me on the same subject.

Mr. Osborn informed me that Sir George Thomson, who recently arrived to replace Sir Charles Darwin as the United Kingdom Delegation scientist, had immediately, and without reading the four Committee 2 papers relating to functions, begun to attack the whole United States concept of ownership, operation and management by international agency. Thomson also in a Committee 2 meeting at Lake Success openly attacked the United States position.

On Monday, June 9, Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn, much concerned about this development, called on Sir Alexander Cadogan. Cadogan rather lukewarmly indicated his personal approval of an agency with ownership and operational functions but remarked, to Mr. Osborn's great and understandable alarm, that it might be necessary in the long run to agree to a system involving solely inspection, in order to obtain Soviet concurrence. Mr. Osborn endeavored to explain in most vigorous terms to Cadogan, whom he described as not

¹ Joseph A. Volpe, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, United States Atomic Energy Commission.

really understanding the issues involved, the absolute unacceptability and great dangers of any plan relying solely on inspection.

Cadogan informed Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn that Sir George Thomson had, before coming to this country, prepared a plan embodying his own views (elimination of operational and developmental functions and reliance upon inspection) which is now before Mr. Bevin for approval. Cadogan said the plan could not be made available to the United States until approved.

Senator Austin and Mr. Osborn were so alarmed at this development that they discussed with Cadogan whether it might not be desirable to send Mr. Arneson,² USUN, to London to brief Ambassador Douglas³ in connection with a direct *démarche* by the latter at the foreign office.

I told Mr. Osborn I was calling him precisely to get his views on what the Department might do to help him to find out more about the Thomson plan and, if possible, forestall its approval. I said we had merely thought of a telegram to London but not of sending anyone there.

Mr. Osborn suggested that Mr. Acheson might as a first step call in the British Ambassador and through him request that approval of this plan by the Foreign Office be withheld pending a presentation of United States views. Mr. Osborn desired to telephone Mr. Acheson on this subject. I undertook to try to see Mr. Acheson beforehand to brief him regarding it with the understanding that Mr. Osborn would in any case call about 4:30 this afternoon.⁴

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

² R. Gordon Arneson, Staff Member, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

³ Lewis Douglas, appointed Ambassador in the United Kingdom March 6, 1947.

⁴ A letter from Osborn to Senator Austin dated June 10 read as follows:

"I talked to Mr. Acheson today about our interview with Sir Alexander yesterday. Acheson felt that this was a matter of the very highest importance and that if the British should disturb the work of the Commission at this point, it would have grave consequences in all our relations with the British. He said that he was going to call the British Ambassador at once and ask him to send a message to London, and if that was done, the State Department would keep Lewis Douglas fully informed and offer to send him Arneson.

It was most helpful of you to come down for the meeting with Sir Alexander. It went all right, but I must admit that I was shocked by Sir Alexander's saying that we might have to make very serious concessions in the plan 'so as to bring the Russians in.'" (USUN Files)

501.BC Atomic/6-1047: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1947—9 p. m.

US URGENT

2486. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Amb Austin NY recently told informally by UK Del UN Atomic Energy Commission

that a new Brit plan re international control of atomic energy has been submitted Bevin. Plan prepared by Sir George Thomson who has recently joined UK Del, reported contemplate much less strict control than regarded by US as essential.

Consistent US position, embodied Acheson-Lilienthal proposals and Baruch proposal in UNAEC June 14, and incorporated first report UNAEC Dec 31, 1946, has been that effective international control requires international control agency possessing positive functions re production of fissionable materials, research and development. US view has consistently been that reliance on inspection alone completely inadequate satisfy basic security requirements.

Nine other members UNAEC including UK supported US position in approving Dec 31 report that body. We had assumed that UK, as well as Canada which has taken lead in recent work in UNAEC designed present more detailed description necessary positive functions of control agency, continued support our views.

Since first meeting UNAEC June 1946 USSR has consistently opposed US position, and only USSR and Poland failed concur Dec 31 report. At Gromyko's request AEC is holding plenary meeting June 11 at which he will present new Soviet proposals of a character now unknown to US, but undoubtedly intended be diversionary and divisive.

Pls see Bevin immediately to convey message from me along following lines:

"1. This Government is greatly concerned over the possibility that the UK no longer believes that an international atomic authority having positive functions of ownership and management is indispensable to effective international control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only. From informal conversation with Cadogan and Sir George Thomson it appears (a) that Brit Gov may have come to conclusion that Soviet Union will never agree to a system of international ownership and that the other UNAEC countries will therefore be best advised to content themselves with some scheme of international inspection in another frame of reference; (b) that Brit Gov actually has under consideration such a plan; (c) that it may be prepared to propose or support such a plan in UN.

2. This is first indication that this Gov has received that UK does not support major elements of proposal put forward by AEC to SC on Dec 31, 1946. Indeed the mutual support and common front of UK and US have been of greatest importance in UN effort.

3. This cooperation is all more important as we approach the Sept report of AEC to SC; I regard it as critically important UK should not under present circumstances present or support any proposal which would weaken the position and solidarity of UNAEC countries other than Soviet group.

4. It would be most unfortunate if UK were to act on foregoing lines without further consultation with US. Such action would create great confusion, indicate apparent division among Western powers,

and confuse the pattern of foreign relations in a context wider than the atomic issue.

5. I, therefore, hope you will defer approval of any plan that may be before you pending further consultation with US."

For your info we are prepared send immediately upon receipt report your conversation with Bevin an expert having full background of negotiations NY to advise with you.¹

MARSHALL

¹ In telegram 3247, June 16, the Embassy in the United Kingdom transmitted to the Secretary of State Bevin's assurances that he desired "to work out as soon as possible a mutually agreeable solution of the problem of international control of atomic energy." (501.BC Atomic/6-1647)

SWNCC Files

*Report by the "Ad Hoc" Committee To Effect Collaboration on Security Functions of the United Nations to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1947.

SWNCC 219/17

DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS BY MEMBER NATIONS²

1. The *Ad Hoc* Committee to Effect Collaboration Between the State, War and Navy Departments on Security Functions of the United Nations has completed its examination of the final report made by the Military Staff Committee to the Security Council on the above subject. Special attention was given by the committee to those matters in the report on which unanimity was not reached in the Military Staff Committee and to the reasoning submitted by the United States Delegation in support of its position with respect to these matters.

2. As a result of its study, the Committee is of the opinion that the position taken by the United States Representatives in the Military Staff Committee in each instance was correct and was consistent with

¹ This document, a report by the *Ad Hoc* Committee dated June 6, 1947, was circulated in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on June 10 as SWNCC 219/17 and approved by SWNCC on June 27. For information regarding the organization and functions of SWNCC, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, footnote 3, p. 1112. Regarding the *Ad Hoc* Committee, the principal SWNCC subcommittee charged with consideration of matters relating to the regulation of armaments and collective security at the United Nations, see *ibid.*, footnote 73, p. 754.

² SC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl. No. 1.*

the attainment of the objective stated in Appendix "A" to this report. The Committee is further of the opinion that the positions taken by the United States Representatives in the Military Staff Committee with respect to the major matters on which agreement was not reached were consistent with the principles stated in Appendix "A" to this report.

3. Approval of Appendix "A" is recommended.

Appendix "A"

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH REFERENCE TO THOSE MAJOR MATTERS PERTAINING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 43 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ON WHICH UNANIMITY WAS NOT REACHED IN THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Attainment of the objective stated below and adherence to the principles stated below are reaffirmed as United States policy :

Objective :

The early conclusion of special agreements conforming to the provisions of Articles 43 and 45 of the United Nations Charter which will make available to the Security Council on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including bases, rights of passage, and the immediately available air force contingents referred to in Article 45, adequate with regard to strength, amount, composition, training, equipment, readiness, location, and in all other respects, to fulfill any need which might arise by reason of the Council's functions under the Charter with reference to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Principles :

a. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from agreeing to the principle of equality (identical contributions) which has been advocated by the Soviet Representatives with respect to the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by the five permanent members but shall insist that the contributions of the permanent members, as well as those of the other members of the United Nations, shall be made in accordance with each Nation's capabilities and the needs of the Security Council. (Article 11 of the Military Staff Committee Report.)

b. That the Representatives of the United States shall maintain the principle that no Member be asked to increase its armed forces or to create components for the specific purpose of making its contributions (Article 13 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

c. That the Representatives of the United States shall insist that the degree of readiness of national air force contingents should be

maintained at a level which will enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures in accordance with the provisions of Article 45 of the Charter (Article 25 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

d. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from assenting to the use of the term "national emergencies" as a case in which member nations will have the right to make use of armed forces which they have made available to the Security Council (Article 17 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

e. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from agreeing to the establishment of any predetermined time limit for the withdrawal of United Nations armed forces which have completed their tasks or to limitations to territorial waters or areas within which these forces must be located when not employed by the Security Council or to which they must be withdrawn after employment which would bar them from any area to which they have legal right of access (Articles 20, 21 and 32 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

f. That the Representatives of the United States shall insist that bases be included in the definition of assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, which member nations may obligate themselves to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with specific agreements (Article 26 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

g. That the Representatives of the United States shall refrain from assenting to any provision which states or implies that "commanders-in-chief" of land, sea or air forces acting under the supreme commander or commanders of armed forces made available to the Security Council may be appointed only by the Council (Article 41 of the Military Staff Committee Report).

Appendix "B"

1. The Military Staff Committee report was submitted in response to a request by the Security Council for submission not later than April 30, 1947, of recommendations as to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Force. This was to be done as a first step in complying with the request contained in the resolution adopted on February 13, 1947, to the effect that the Military Staff Committee submit to the Council, "as soon as possible and as a matter of urgency," its recommendations based on an examination from the military point of view of the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter, which the Council had previously requested the Committee to undertake. The purpose of the requests was to provide the Council with advice and assistance which it would need in the discharge of its obligation under Article 43 of the Charter to take the

initiative in negotiating "as soon as possible" the special agreements mentioned in that Article by which Members of the United Nations would undertake to make available to the Council on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. The tabulation which follows shows the nations whose representatives dissented from the majority version of each "article" of the Military Staff Committee report on which unanimity was not achieved (the article numbers in the tabulation refer to articles in the Military Staff Committee report, not to articles of the United Nations Charter). As shown by the tabulation, the Committee was unable to achieve unanimity in the wording of 16 of the 41 articles of the report. A majority of the nations represented was, however, able to reach agreement on the wording of every article. The United States was in every instance included in that majority. The U.S.S.R. was on the minority side in 14 of the 16 instances in which unanimity was not achieved. In 13 of those 14 instances the U.S.S.R. did not reach agreement with any other nation, and in 11 of them it was the sole dissenter. France was on the minority side in five instances, and in two of them did not reach agreement with any other nation, but was not in any instance the sole dissenter. China and the United Kingdom were each on the minority side once but not as the sole dissenter.

Dissenters From Majority Version of Each Article of Military Staff Committee Report on General Principles Not Unanimously Agreed To

- Article 7 and 8. USSR accepts conditionally provided Soviet version of Article 11 is accepted by other Delegates—condition unacceptable to others. These articles are not discussed further in this report.
- Article 11. USSR would not accept version agreed to by others.
- Article 16. USSR " " " " " " " " " " " "
- Article 17. CHINA and FRANCE *agreed*; others insisted upon omission of article.
- Article 20. USSR would not accept version agreed to by others.
- Article 21. USSR " " " " any version acceptable to others.
- Article 25. USSR would not accept version agreed to by others.
- Article 26. USSR and FRANCE *disagreed* with each other and would not accept version agreed to by others.
- Article 27 and 28. USSR would not accept the version agreed to by others. No further discussion of these articles appears in this report.
- Article 31. USSR would not accept the version agreed to by others. No further discussion of this article appears in this report.
- Article 32. USSR and FRANCE *disagreed* with each other and would not accept version agreed to by others.

Article 33 and 34. USSR would not accept the version agreed to by others. No further discussion of these articles appears in this report.

Article 41. UK and FRANCE *agreed* but would not accept version agreed to by others.

3. In view of the principles advocated by the Soviet Representative for inclusion in this report of the Military Staff Committee, the position which they took in the extended discussions which occurred during the preparation of that report, and other circumstances, the U.S. Representatives in the Military Staff Committee have reached the conclusion, in which the *Ad Hoc* Committee concurs, that the Soviet objectives in relation to the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter are:

a. To delay to the greatest possible extent the date at which it would be possible for the Security Council actually to organize a United Nations Armed Force.

b. To word as many articles as possible of the principles governing the organization of armed forces made available to the Security Council in such a way as to limit the effectiveness of such a United Nations Armed Force. The "principle of equality" advocated by the Soviet Representatives (see paragraphs 5 and 6 below), the restrictions which they advocate with reference to the immediately available air force contingents referred to in Article 45 of the Charter (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 below) and with reference to the location of the forces made available to the Council (see paragraphs 12 and 16 below), and their attitude concerning the availability of bases and rights of passage (see paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 below), appear to be of particular significance in this connection. Acceptance of the Soviet proposals concerning those matters could be expected to have the effects of reducing drastically the range and striking power of the armed forces which the United States could make available to the Council and of increasing greatly the shortest period within which they could be brought to bear at a point distant from the Continental United States. It is probable that the Soviet attitude concerning bases and rights of passage is in addition connected directly with the Soviet unwillingness to permit the penetration into the USSR or the Soviet sphere of domination of the nationals of nations outside that sphere.

c. To gain armament advantages and to reduce present disadvantages of that nature. One way in which the USSR might hope to accomplish this would be first to get the Security Council to agree on a basis for implementing Article 43 of the Charter which would eliminate from the forces which Members might make available to it the kinds of forces in which the United States has an advantage over the USSR, or which might prove particularly useful to the United States in a war with the USSR; then to try to engineer the adoption of a reduction of armaments plan based on the forces made available by each nation to the Security Council.

[The remainder of this document consists of discussion, by groups of related articles, of the instances tabulated above in which the Military Staff Committee failed to reach unanimity.]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] June 11, 1947.

URGENT

DEAR JOE: I enclose a copy of a summary and explanation of the report from Sir John Anderson's Committee,¹ brought to the U.K. Delegation in this country by Sir George P. Thomson, whose position here now corresponds to that of U.K. Deputy to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sir George has told us he had the major share in preparing this plan and that this is the plan now being put up to Bevin for approval. It is to be presumed that if Bevin approves, the British Delegation would then be instructed to submit it to the Atomic Energy Commission, but they have not made a direct statement on this.

We have just received this paper and are sending you a copy, as we believe Mr. Acheson should see it at once. Even without our comments you will note the rather shocking resemblance to the Russian proposals, and the complete inadequacy and many gaps in control, which we feel certain would make this plan wholly unacceptable to any thoughtful person who considered it carefully. We feel certain that that is the position that will be taken by the Canadian Delegation and the Brazilian Delegation, and we believe that the Belgians, the French and the Chinese will feel as we do about it. We are not so sure about the Australians, who are now considerably under the influence of a scientist named Briggs, recently returned as their atomic representative, and whose views are academic to an extent only matched by their persistence.

We have received copies of your cable and will be in constant touch with you.

For your information, our preliminary assessment of Gromyko's speech of today is that it offers practically nothing new, and is simply a restatement of the same position the Russians have held from the start.

Yours sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

¹The United Kingdom Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, of which Sir John Anderson was chairman.

[Enclosure]

The Deputy United Kingdom Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Thomson) to the Deputy United States Representative on That Commission (Osborn)

NEW YORK, 11 June, 1947.

DEAR MR. OSBORN: Sir Alexander has asked me to send you the enclosed summary and explanation of the Report from Sir John Anderson's Committee, which has been sent out to us. In making the summary we have tried to deal in greater detail with those features of the Report which differ from the papers now before Committee 2.

Yours sincerely,

G. P. THOMSON

[Subenclosure]

THE CONSTITUTION, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Powers of International Authority.

(1) These are for two purposes—control and development. For control the Authority is to be given powers of two general kinds:—

- (a) power to control the distribution of source materials and their derivatives so as to prevent the accumulation in any country of excessive stocks either of source materials or fissile materials;
- (b) powers of inspection and management to guard against clandestine operation and diversion.

(2) Taking (b) first, powers for inspection include:

- (i) the right to send its employees freely anywhere in the territories of the governments in question;
- (ii) the right to call for a return of all uranium and thorium mines and such other metalliferous mines as the Authority may specify;
- (iii) the right of aerial survey;
- (iv) the right to have resident inspectors of mines, refineries and chemical plants with suitable powers;
- (v) power to inspect all new establishments while they are being built; and the right to be shown, and consulted on, plans for such establishments;
- (vi) management of plants for the separation of fissile isotopes, and plants for the chemical treatment of material from piles;
- (vii) management of piles themselves and all other plants using uranium, thorium or plutonium, except where those piles or other plants have been constructed in accordance with a design approved by the Authority. In this case the Authority will inspect them only.
- (viii) powers of inspection of any building suspected of containing a clandestine plant subject to some not yet specified right of appeal.

(3) The control of distribution starts from the mines which are worked by their owners subject to inspection. No sale, transfer or export of source material, or its derivatives, can take place except under license granted with the approval of the Authority. Governments in whose territory sources are being worked must dispose of all material obtained from those sources as the Authority may direct, except for any part which the Authority may allow it to retain for its own use subject to the control of the Authority. The Authority will allocate the material to countries applying for it in accordance with a plan agreed upon when the Authority is constituted, and subject to revision from time to time. The present report makes no attempt to suggest numerical quotas, though such would be necessary. It does however make it clear that, even if abundant supplies are available, no country will be allowed to receive more than is required to meet its needs for peaceful purposes without excessive stockpiling. If too much material is being produced the Authority can shut down on production. It can also do so on any particular mine where the amount of ore or concentrates, or both, held in stock exceeds a figure to be agreed and published in advance. There is no power given to force production.

The Authority is given power to keep an accurate and up-to-date record of all uranium and thorium products sent from one establishment to another in the territory of each government or exported to some other territory, and as stated above any such transfer will require the Authority's license.

The powers of management of the principal plants and inspection of the rest will enable the Authority to keep track of the extent to which source material has been turned into fissile material, and they have power to keep this in check, even in establishments which they do not manage, by controlling the supply of material to the different establishments and its transfer from one to another.

There is no power to give or withhold permission to a government for the construction of an atomic energy plant.

The Authority is to report to the Security Council on any difficulties or obstacles which it may encounter. Pending decision by the Security Council, the Authority should have discretion to withhold consent to any request by the government concerned that might otherwise be granted, e.g. it might refuse to allow the transfer of source or fissile material.

(4) Powers of development. The Authority is given power

(a) to set up research establishments which would carry out research on fundamental physics and the practical application of atomic energy;

(b) to advise any government on the construction of plants for the use of atomic energy;

(c) to undertake under contract with the government of any country the construction and operation of atomic energy plants in the territory of that country.

Provision (c) is permissive only, except in so far as management is required under 2(vi) and (vii).

(5) No mention has been made among the powers and functions of the Authority of research on atomic weapons. In the report of the Atomic Energy Commission it was suggested that the international Authority should be given an exclusive right to carry on research of this kind. In our view, however, it would be impracticable to prevent such research being carried out on a national basis, nor do we consider that public opinion would react favourably to an Authority ostensibly concerned primarily with the prevention of the manufacture of atomic weapons, being empowered to conduct research on the development of improved types of weapon. We have, therefore, concluded that the best course is to omit all reference to such research in defining the powers and functions of the Authority.

Composition and Voting Procedure.

(6) It is suggested that the central organisation of the Authority should resemble that of a government department with a body very similar to the Atomic Energy Commission performing the functions of Minister. The composition proposed is one representative for each nation on the Security Council, plus Canada if not otherwise a member. While this will lead to some nations taking part which have no great interest in the development of atomic energy, it has the advantage of being automatic and giving a commission of manageable size. This commission would take all policy decisions of the Authority such as those connected with allocation of materials or the construction of plants. It need not necessarily meet at very frequent intervals.

(7) Below the Commission level the emphasis should be on the administrative and technical aspects of control and development. A Director-General of the highest quality would have to be appointed and would attend all meetings of the Commission and be the head of the Permanent Staff of the Authority. There would be an administrative staff and a complete establishment of research workers, inspectors, engineers and technicians.

Voting Procedure.

(8) The voting procedure will of course have to be laid down in the convention which constitutes the Authority. For most decisions a majority of two-thirds of those present and voting would be required.

A question may be raised as to the powers of the Authority in a case in which it is claimed that unanimity of the Five Great Powers is necessary so that a veto could be interposed. The convention should enable the Authority to exercise the powers conferred on it without interference and without the impediment of the veto. Therefore the above voting procedure should apply over the whole range of the activities of the Authority and should enable it to take all decisions relating to the execution of its powers by a two-thirds majority. Any matters which the Security Council are unwilling should be decided on this basis should be referred to that body for decision.

Enforcement.

(9) The resolution of the General Assembly of the 14th December, 1946 contemplates the creation of an international system of controls and assures a relationship between the special organs, such as the Authority we are considering, which are to operate the "system", and the Security Council. But apart from the fact that this resolution cannot override Article 27 of the Charter it is unfortunately open to different interpretations. It can be read in the sense that these conventions should provide for enforcement measures against a violator in respect of which the right of veto could not be exercised. But while it is probable that this was the intention of the Assembly, the resolution does not make this clear. It may be questioned whether the veto in major matters is as important as appears on the surface. Even if there is no veto, a major Power may refuse to accept punishment when the time comes. Only war can enforce it, and this course is available if a violation is proved, even if a veto is in force.

(10) The United States Government have taken the view that while it is not practicable to amend Article 27 of the Charter, it should be agreed that the veto will not be invoked against a proposal to take enforcement action against a violator of an Atomic Energy Convention. This view has been supported by His Majesty's Government, and extended to apply to the proposed convention to deal with "conventional" armaments. But in practice the question of the powers considered necessary for an international authority controlling atomic energy and the manner in which they should be exercised can be examined by the Atomic Energy Commission without deciding the question of enforcement. In any case, since the problem does not exclusively affect the Atomic Energy Commission and the Convention which is to be drawn up, it would be preferable to handle it outside the Commission as one of general application.

501.BC Atomic/6-1147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 11, 1947—4 p. m.

3183. Department's telegram 2486, June 10, 9 p. m. Your message was promptly conveyed to Bevin. He indicated that he had heard that a US proposal governing the control of the development and use of atomic energy for purely commercial purposes might have the effect of denying to this Government development of such energy for industrial purposes. This, he said, was cause of concern to his Government. Moreover, he stated candidly that there was a feeling here that our Government had not observed the arrangements that had been made at Quebec¹ and Hyde Park.² I explained to him that our Government was bound by the express terms of the legislation providing for the establishment of the American Atomic Energy Commission. These provisions, I pointed out, prohibit by law full exchange of information and therefore necessarily covered our action.

I pressed the point that no approval should be given by his Government and no proposal be advanced by his delegates until further consultations had been had between us. He agreed to your request and stated that no such approval would be given and no proposal would be presented until there had been further consultations which he suggested could best be held here because his technical experts are located in London. He added that he was meeting with the Prime Minister this afternoon and that he would telephone Cadogan in New York notifying him of his action and suggesting that the plenary session called at Gromyko's request be adjourned.

In view of the fact that Bevin has agreed to further consultations before taking any action, suggest there be sent here as soon as possible expert who has a full background of the negotiations in New York.

I leave for Berlin today for visit with General Clay³ but can return on moment's notice.⁴ This is satisfactory to Bevin.

DOUGLAS

¹ In regard to the Quebec agreement, see footnote 4, p. 787.

² For the text of the *aide-mémoire* of conversation between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492-493.

³ Gen. Lucius duB. Clay, Commanding General, United States Forces in Europe; Military Governor for Germany.

⁴ In a marginal notation of June 11, Joseph E. Johnson indicated that he had been informed by Herbert Fales, Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, that the Ambassador had departed for one week.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] June 12, 1947.

DEAR LEW: This letter will be brought to you by Mr. Gordon ARNESON, a member of the staff of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

During the war Mr. Arneson was brought back from overseas with the rank of Captain to serve as one of the assistants in Mr. Stimson's¹ office, and continued there after Bob Patterson became Secretary. He was brought to this job by Mr. Baruch at the time of Mr. Baruch's appointment.

When I came in to take Mr. Baruch's place, I was advised by Mr. Baruch, by Senator Austin, and also by members of the staff, that Mr. Arneson was the most competent of the group. Bob Patterson gave me a similarly unqualified endorsement based on a close personal experience with his work. Mr. Arneson knows the whole course of the atomic energy negotiations in the United Nations, from his intimate daily experience there from the beginning to date. In addition, he is quite thoroughly informed on many aspects of the international relationships of the United States in this field. My own experience in the past four months confirms everything said about Mr. Arneson by Mr. Baruch and Bob Patterson. You may place the most complete confidence not only in his knowledge of what is going on and his ability to give this knowledge lucid expression, but also in his judgment.

The United Nations Commission has suffered considerably in its work because in too many instances the qualifications of the personnel of the various Delegations are not fully appropriate to the development and understanding of plans which have now gone quite beyond the scientific stage and require a combination of political and business judgment. The Commission has also been handicapped by constant changes in the personnel of the Delegations. These criticisms apply to several of the Delegations, including the British. Sir Alexander² has been too much engaged in other heavy duties to be fully apprised of what was going on in atomic energy. Much of the responsibility for their work has fallen on Sir George Thomson when he was here last fall, and then during his long absence on Sir Charles Darwin who took his place, and now again by Sir George, who has returned and has not yet readjusted his thinking to a new, quite different situation

¹ Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, 1940-1945.

² Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations and Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.

from that in which he found himself last fall. Moreover, I think it is fair to say that both Sir Charles and Sir George would view any matter of this sort from what you or I, as practical men, would call a very academic standpoint. They keep thinking of this proposal in terms of what would be a nice set-up for the scientists, rather than what would be an effective control, or what would be the alternatives if we failed in providing for effective control.

As a result of these difficulties, I know from my conversations with the British Delegation that they have not sent home a really clear picture of what was going on here. In the first place, they have felt that the present work on a treaty which would only go into effect if all nations accepted it, is in some way related to the interim arrangements which may be made with the British if the Russians delay their acceptance too long. Arneson will explain to you that this is not the case. My instructions have been to help work out a report to the Security Council covering a treaty which would only become effective if all nations accepted it. I have been told expressly that such a treaty would have no relation to any interim arrangements, and that interim arrangements would be handled by quite another group.

In the second place, the working papers covering the more specific development of the Commission's report of December 31, 1946, are not "U.S. proposals," but tentative papers prepared by cooperative effort of all Delegations except the Russians, for the purpose of providing a useful base for discussion and, if necessary, amendment, in preparation for the submission of a new and more detailed report.

Finally, the British have consistently misunderstood certain aspects of these working papers, notwithstanding that Sir Charles Darwin was present and, to some extent, took part in their formulation. We felt certain that this misunderstanding persisted, because of what Darwin himself said while he was here. The misunderstanding is now confirmed by your cable, where it says that Mr. Bevin had "heard that a 'U.S. proposal' covering the control and use of atomic energy for purely commercial purposes might have the effect of denying to this (British) government development of such energy for industrial purposes."³ When I found that Sir Charles Darwin could not understand the purpose of the papers in this respect, I made a careful and detailed explanation to Sir Alexander Cadogan, showing him the first draft of clauses specifically designed to protect the British and other governments in this respect, but apparently in the press of other business he did not fully understand or sufficiently transmit this information.

These are misunderstandings which it should be possible to clarify, and with respect of which Mr. Arneson is not only informed, but highly qualified to help with.

³ Telegram 2486 to London, June 10, p. 490.

We believe that there is also another difference between our points of view which is much harder to handle. Apparently the British, perhaps because the wish is father to the thought, are much more hopeful of the near possibilities of atomic power than either the United States scientists or the members of the U.S. Commission. This may make a difference in their point of view.

My own feeling, which I believe is shared by both the State Department and by Congress, is that unless a treaty can be arrived at which gives promise of effectively preventing national rivalries in atomic weapons, and clandestine developments, it would be better to have no treaty at all. Any loose or weak treaty would inevitably react to the benefit of the totalitarian state and to the danger of all countries with a free press and a public opinion.

No one better than you knows the need for a united front. At this stage, it seems to me that these matters should be in the hands of statesmen rather than in the hands of academicians.

I can't tell you, Lew, what it means to all of us back here that so difficult and vital a job is in your hands.

Good luck and God bless you.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK OSBORN

501.BC Atomic/6-1247

*Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1947.

Subject: Conversation with Senator Austin re Ambassador Gromyko's Atomic Control Address.

According to the attached memorandum of conversation, Senator Austin believes that the Soviets may have modified their insistence on outlawry of atomic bombs before conclusion of the international control agreement. I fail to see where in Gromyko's remarks there is any justification for this belief, even in the paragraph cited by Senator Austin.²

It seems to me that the best way of piercing through the camouflage would be for Osborn to ask Gromyko directly whether there is any modification of the Soviet stand on this point.³

¹ This memorandum was directed to Acheson and Joseph E. Johnson.

² Acheson wrote "I agree" in the margin next to this sentence.

³ Following the last sentence of the memorandum, Gullion wrote "Do you agree?" Acheson responded "I agree."

[Annex]

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion,
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 12, 1947.

Senator Austin telephoned and asked to speak to Mr. Acheson, who was then at the White House, and the call was referred to Mr. Gullion.

Senator Austin said that he had just seen the draft of a proposed statement (Annex A)⁴ to be made by the Secretary with reference to Ambassador Gromyko's June 12 proposals for international control of atomic energy.⁵ He thought it would be a mistake to issue any such statement since in his view it was not true that Gromyko had merely reaffirmed the Soviet insistence on outlawry of atomic weapons prior to conclusion of an international agreement for control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes. Senator Austin read over the telephone a portion of Ambassador Gromyko's remarks (Annex B) which he believed showed that the Soviets might actually have in mind "simultaneous" arrangements for the outlawry of weapons and the installation of an international control authority. He pointed out that the Soviets apparently contemplated two separate treaties but nevertheless the net result seemed to be a recession from the Soviet position, as previously understood by us, for outlawry of atomic weapons as a condition precedent to an international control treaty. The Senator thought that the word "simultaneously" in numbered paragraph 1 of Ambassador Gromyko's proposals was the key to what might be a new Soviet attitude.

Senator Austin said that he realized that not everyone would agree with his own interpretation. In fact, General Osborn did not, but he felt that the possibility of a Soviet change of heart was such that we ought in all conscience to give Gromyko's remarks serious consideration before issuing the negative commentary proposed as a press statement for the Secretary.

Senator Austin said, further, that the whole of Gromyko's speech should have the close attention of the Secretary, since, again in his own opinion, it was quite different from anything issued by the Soviets thus far and contained much that was concrete and constructive.

I told the Senator that I believed no statement had yet been made by the Secretary, that I believe none would be made without reference to his views, and I assured him that his opinion would be communicated to the Secretary and Mr. Acheson promptly.

EDMUND GULLION

⁴ Annexes not printed.

⁵ Reference is to Gromyko's address at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11; for the text of this speech, which includes the text of the Soviet proposals, see AEC, *2nd yr., Plenary*, pp. 20-24.

501.BC Atomic/6-1347

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division
of International Security Affairs (Johnson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 13, 1947—9:30 a. m.

Mr. Osborn called to pose two questions which are now in the minds of himself and his colleagues regarding the report which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission is to submit in the Fall, and which he would like to have interested persons in Washington thinking about.

1. What form should the second report of the AEC take?

This question arises as a result of the present efforts of the Soviet Union to have the proposals recently put forward by Mr. Gromyko in the Commission¹ referred to Committee 2. Mr. Osborn says that the Soviet Union is endeavoring to have this referral made for the purpose of mixing these proposals with the papers now being developed by Committee 2. (This appears to be consistent with Gromyko's statement reported in today's *New York Times* to the effect that there is a possibility of agreement on the basis of the divergent Soviet and United States proposals.) The United States view, shared by a number of others including particularly the French and Canadians, is that if the Soviet proposals are submitted to Committee 2, there will be real danger of confusion and of possible compromising attitudes on the part of certain delegations.

Mr. Osborn indicated that he personally sees certain advantage in the Atomic Energy Commission submitting two proposals in its next report,—that being developed in Committee 2 along the lines of the First Report of the Commission, and one based upon the Soviet proposals. While he did not say so specifically, I gathered that his expectation was that the submission of two plans might result from keeping consideration of the recent Soviet proposal and of the development of the First Report separate. Specifically, therefore, Mr. Osborn's question is whether it would be wise to consider making a report which would include the submission of two plans.

2. Would it be advisable for the United States to consider permitting a report to go forward containing some proposals on which we have reservations?

Mr. Osborn explained that it might be possible by "politicking," negotiation and heavy pressure to get the same kind of agreement on a plan acceptable to us as was obtained last December. On the other hand, it is conceivable that we might accede to the watering down of the plan on certain points, with the United States entering a reservation on all points that we considered important.

¹ For the text of the proposals, see Gromyko's speech at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11, AEC, 2nd yr., Plenary, pp. 20-24.

Mr. Osborn pointed out that certain countries will definitely make reservations on specific points. Brazil, for example, will undoubtedly continue to make a reservation with respect to international control of her monozite sand deposits. Australia also will probably insist that ownership and management of refineries and concentration plants by the international control agency should be permissive rather than mandatory. (On this last point Mr. Osborn commented that he finds it difficult to fight too hard on this point, provided it is definitely clear that the agency may in its discretion own such plants.)

Mr. Osborn commented that Mr. Baruch would undoubtedly disapprove any open willingness on the part of the United States to permit a plan to go forward on which we have reservations. Mr. Osborn's own preliminary thought, however, is that since all our reservations would be in favor of stronger security provisions than the actual draft, it might not be too dangerous to consider this tactic.

When Mr. Osborn indicated that he was merely telephoning in advance of a letter, I suggested that, rather than send a letter to me, he prepare a formal dispatch to the Secretary of State (either telegraphic or by courier) raising the questions. He gave me the impression that he would do so, but made it clear that his formal message would only raise the questions and would not indicate his preliminary attitude on them as outlined above.

In further discussion Mr. Osborn indicated that he thinks it will be possible to defeat the Soviet effort to have their recent proposals referred to Committee 2.

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

501.BC Atomic/6-1347 : Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, June 13, 1947—7 p. m.

566. Would appreciate your advice on how we should try to shape the form of the next report of the Atomic Energy Commission. We are forced to consider possibility that Commission will be unable in next three months to reconcile conflicting views of Russians and of majority who approved the year-end report and may desire to submit to Security Council in September two alternative proposals: the amplification of the Commission's first report as developed in working papers now before Committee Two; and the other, the Russian proposal submitted this week. Open discussion and comparison of the two plans together should provide favorable opportunity for sound public understanding. This fact and the possibility of presenting the two plans to the Assembly as well as Security Council might force Rus-

sians considerably to modify their position and bring them closer to agreement at later date. The choice is between a loose plan encouraging national rivalries and a strong plan evidently aimed at real control. In this suggestion we are endeavoring to find some way by which these differences can be made generally clear and ultimately the Russian point of view changed.

[OSBORN]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson

TOP SECRET

[LONDON,] 16 June 1947—3 p. m.

At 11 a. m. I saw Mr. Gallman,¹ who is acting in the Ambassador's absence. Mr. Landreth Harrison, Embassy First Secretary, joined us about 11:30.

Mr. Gallman reported briefly on the talk that the Ambassador and he had had with Mr. Bevin last week. Mr. Bevin complained that the British were not being given the assistance due them under existing executive agreements. It was pointed out that domestic U.S. legislation precluded the continuation of war-time arrangements.

I suggested to Mr. Gallman that I would endeavor in talking with the British to point out at the earliest opportunity that my mission is concerned only with a special sector of the entire problem, namely, current negotiations in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. He agreed that it should be made perfectly clear to the British that we are not concerned at this time with any other arrangements that might have to be made in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations. I went on to say that should it prove necessary some time after September to make less-than-universal arrangements, negotiations would have to be taken up by a quite different group, not drawn from the present U.S. delegation to the U.N.A.E.C. Mr. Gallman agreed.

When Mr. Harrison joined us, he gave me a general briefing on the current situation here. He stated that two general theories have had currency in official circles. The first is that the U.K. should attempt to put in an alternate plan which would serve to mediate between the Soviet and American positions. The second contemplates the establishment of an international system of control ex-U.S.S.R. This latter plan would presumably have the U.S., the U.K., France, the Dominions, and probably Belgium as a nucleus. The way would be left open for the U.S.S.R. to join later, if she were so persuaded.

Of these two proposals, the second seems to be gaining ground. My own personal opinion is that British thinking on specific proposals

¹ Waldemar J. Gallman, Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

such as those indicated in the summary we have of their current effort, is conditioned by this less-than-universal concept. It is difficult to see how they could seriously propose the kind of plan they are thinking about if it is intended to include the Soviet Union.

Mr. Harrison pointed out that there is a considerable difference of opinion among various groups of scientists, government officials, and industrialists on the question of what sort of international control should be arrived at. Decisions on policy are evidently made at the highest levels, with pressure being brought to bear from all quarters: Parliament, business, scientific groups, and the various Ministries.

As to the prospects of atomic power, it was Mr. Harrison's opinion that the scientists, in general, are not very optimistic as to the immediate prospects. Many persons in the government, however, and particularly those concerned with the economic affairs of the country seem to be persuaded on the basis of wishful thinking that atomic power is just around the corner and may be looked to as a means of economic salvation.

The general public does not appear to be very well informed on the issues involved, but there is much discussion in official quarters.

While I was with him, Mr. Gallman called Roger Makins² of the Foreign Office, to arrange an appointment. I am to see him at 5 p. m., accompanied by either Mr. Gallman or Mr. Harrison. I know Roger Makins quite well, having had some dealings with him when I was in Secretary Stimson's office. He should be quite reasonable to deal with.

R. GORDON ARNESON

² Roger M. Makins, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British Foreign Office.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Record of a Meeting Between United States and United Kingdom
Representatives at the Foreign Office, London, June 16, 1947, 5 p. m.*

TOP SECRET

After the usual pleasantries, Mr. Gallman and I sat down with Roger Makins and Dennis Rickett¹ to discuss the matter at hand. Mr. Gallman explained that I had come over at the Ambassador's request, and to be available to the British for any assistance they might want in getting a full understanding of U.S. views on current negotiations. At the outset I made it clear that we would be concerned only with current negotiations and not with the larger issues of the U.S.-U.K. relations in the field of atomic energy.

¹ Adviser, British Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

At Mr. Makins' suggestion, I gave a rather full exposition of the course of negotiations to date, and of the views of the U.S. on effective control. He was particularly anxious to know what status the papers of the working groups had. I explained that, in a formal sense, no government is committed to any one of them. The U.S. had been anxious to have these papers prepared as quickly as possible in order to give time to the various delegations to send them home to their governments for consideration. Nevertheless, as far as the U.S. was concerned, these papers reflected quite accurately our views and any major change of principle or substance could not be accepted. I said that any government which wished to could, of course, lean heavily on the fiction that their representatives were speaking only for themselves, but that this should be recognized to be, in reality, a fiction. As far as we were concerned, we considered that our representatives in the working groups were reflecting not only their personal opinion, but the views of the delegation and our government as well.

I outlined the procedure whereby these four papers,² as well as the preamble, and probably the next paper on rights and limitations would be considered in Committee Two. First, a general discussion of basic principles. Second, a review of the papers in terms of their precise meaning and intent. Third, consideration of formal written amendments thereto. As to time scale, I said that governments should probably be able to express their official positions within the next few weeks. It seemed to us, therefore, it was extremely important that the Foreign Office should understand quite clearly the convictions and views of the U.S. before that time arrived.

All this seemed of great interest to Mr. Makins, who apparently was under the impression that the working groups were general debating societies in which no one was expressing any serious view. If Makins really meant what he said, which I doubt, to the U.K. should go the prize for sheer irresponsibility on the part of government representatives. I did not express this view to Makins, but made it clear that as far as the U.S. was concerned, we took these working groups very seriously and saw to it that our representatives sitting in on them took them seriously and were reflecting the views of the U.S.

I took up a general analysis of the four papers, beginning with research and development. As a prelude to this, I said that we had received very fine cooperation from most of the other delegations, particularly the Canadians, the French, the Chinese, and the Belgians. As far as the U.K. was concerned, it was only recently that we received any inkling that there was any serious difference between us. This was heralded by the return of Sir George Thomson, who immediately leaped into the discussion with both feet to upset the general

² AEC/C.2/36, 37, 38, 39, not printed.

agreement that had been worked out cooperatively among the several delegations in his absence.

I indicated that the principle point of substance in the research and development paper was the question as to whether nations should be permitted to carry on research and development activities involving dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel, source materials, or facilities using, or capable of producing, such quantities. I stressed that the U.S. position on this point had been arrived at after the most careful consideration, and that the position reflected in this paper had the fullest concurrence of such American scientists as Dr. Oppenheimer, Dr. Bacher and Dr. Conant. I observed that the opposing view to the effect that nations should be permitted such research under "appropriate safeguards" was reflected in the alternate paragraph written by the Pole, Professor Zlotowski.³ I pointed out that specific proposal number four, dealing with the manner in which the agency would take over research and development activities in case they grew to the point of requiring dangerous quantities had been drafted after close consultation with Sir Charles and with the view to taking into account legitimate British interests, as well as those of other nations in the field of research and development.

In discussing the location and mining of ores paper, I stressed that the chairman of that group had been General McNaughton.⁴ He came to the discussion with grave doubts about the need of ownership of source material, but as the discussion proceeded he became completely convinced that ownership was the only feasible way in which to insure effective control. In applying his principle criterion of security, he found that ownership was inescapable.

We passed over the paper on processing and purification rather rapidly. I explained that there could be little question in anybody's mind of the need for management, operation and ownership by the agency of isotope separation plants, primary reactors, and chemical extraction plants. This being so, we saw no reason to leave a gap in the chain of processes.

Coming to the fourth paper, I stressed the decision that had been reached by the working group to the effect that the primary consideration should be security and that peaceful exploitation of atomic energy would have to be considered in terms of that over-riding consideration. I stated that one of the strongest proponents of this view was Mr. de Rose of the French Delegation, and that this view secured the unanimous support of the working group. On the basis of this paper, I expounded the thesis that it seemed to us that by giving to the agency

³ Prof. Ignacy Zlotowski of the Polish Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

⁴ Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton, Canadian Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission; Chairman of the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board.

positive powers of development the progress of atomic energy utilization for power purposes would be moved along more rapidly than under national auspices. Furthermore, under agency control, this could be done with far greater safety to the world; if this matter were left in national hands there would be the keenest competition and the greatest national rivalries for source materials, and a race to see which nation could secure power-plants first, each plant, of course, being an extreme military hazard to other nations.

We discussed briefly the question of the rights and limitations on the agency and its personnel. I stressed that a clear distinction should be made between the *grant of powers* to the agency in matters of inspection and rights of access and the *actual exercise* by the agency of those powers. In our view the powers should be very broad, but the actual exercise of them should be carried on under carefully prescribed procedures for judicial review and full cognizance of domestic law. To the extent that the agency has under its own control all dangerous quantities of source materials and nuclear fuel and owns, manages, and operates all dangerous facilities, the problem of diversion is greatly reduced, and the problem of detecting clandestine operations as well. This situation would impel a malevolent nation to seize agency facilities if it were trying to wage atomic war. Seizure would obviously be an overt act and would be evident to all. Attempts at diversion and clandestine operation, on the other hand, might very well go undetected and would impose the gravest problems for world security. By having under its own control these dangerous operations, the agency would be able to reduce to measurable proportions the job of inspection. In the circumstances it could afford to take more time in following through on established judicial procedures.

Touching upon the problems of organization and staffing, I suggested that, while we had not jelled our views on this subject, certainly one of the things which would have to be considered would be the establishment of a special court, an "Atomic Energy Court", which would have power of review over many of the decisions and actions of the agency, and also have power to grant warrants on the application of the agency in the event that domestic courts prove unwilling to grant them. I suggested that we had thought about several different ways in which the governing body might be established, and its voting procedure set up. We had been thinking about a body of eleven members, representing in all cases the Big Five and non-permanent members of the Security Council on a rotating basis. As to voting procedure, two fairly clear alternatives might be suggested. One would be that the agency itself would make final policy decisions within the framework of treaty provisions on a majority basis on day-to-day matters, with provision for an extraordinary majority of two-thirds

or three-fourths in the case of important policy decisions, such as the location of power plants, allocation of source materials, and the distribution of nuclear fuel. The other possibility would be to provide for a simple majority vote on all matters with provision for Security Council review of decisions taken on important questions. Here the idea would be that the Security Council would override a decision of the agency only by a vote of seven with all the permanent members concurring. Failure to over-ride would mean that the original agency decision would stand.

I indicated that we did not expect that the other items on the list of topics would be elaborated in as much detail as the first four papers had been. This was largely the result of lack of time. Makins wanted to know what the second report to the Security Council would look like. I said that it would contain as its nucleus the four papers, plus the fifth one on rights and limitations, all introduced by the preamble, a copy of the first draft of which, prepared by Mr. de Rose, I gave him. In addition, the report would contain a section on organization and staffing in some detail and the rest of the topics would probably not be spelled out very elaborately.

On the question of geographical distribution and stockpiling, Mr. Rickett raised the question as to what we proposed to do with existing stocks of nuclear fuel. I stated that no decision had been reached on this question, that it was obviously a most difficult one and would certainly have to be answered. I pointed out that the possibilities ranged from on the one hand, distributing nuclear fuel strategically around the world as a counter-balance to the location of mines and present dangerous facilities, to on the other, dumping it all in the ocean. I said that within those two extremes there would appear to be infinite possibilities. We did not discuss this point further.

The one significant statement made by Mr. Makins, in addition to his general impression that these working papers were not very definitive, was that the British had been hoping that some middle ground could be found between the obviously inadequate solution proposed by the Soviets, and the "perfectionist" approach taken by the U.S. The British hoped that by a gradual process the two positions could be brought together. They seemed to feel that the only hope for solution lay in agreeing to a less radical approach. On hearing this, I stated that on the basis of the summary Thomson prepared which we had seen of the alleged British alternate plan, our delegation considered the alternate hopelessly inadequate. I said I could not speak for the Soviet Union, perhaps they would be willing to accept it, but that I was completely certain that the U.S. would not under any circumstances agree to it. I stated very clearly that as far as we were concerned, we would much rather have no treaty at all than one which

purported to be effective but which in reality was not. I said that the temper of our delegation—and I felt that it was fully supported by the State Department and by our Congress—was that only a fully effective system could be taken seriously, and that if no other delegation wished to vote with us, we would be obliged to, and would be prepared to, and would undertake to, stand alone. I remarked that these negotiations were not quite like customary negotiations in which country A comes in maintaining that two and two make four, and country B comes in maintaining that two and two make five and that somehow everyone is perfectly pleased when the conclusion reached is that two and two make four and one-half. Unless it was agreed that two and two made four, we would not be interested. This problem was not a problem of negotiating where the boundary line of Trieste should be drawn, or some such similar problem of little consequence. I said that perhaps the difficulty here was that the American proposals, which have now gained considerable support, reflect too much idealism for a cynical world to accept and yet that it seemed to us that this problem could be solved in realistic terms, only through the application of unaccustomed ways of thinking. Unless the world were to continue endlessly breeding on national rivalries, culminating in war after war, we would do well to seize upon this problem as the one hope of breaching the wall and moving into a new phase of international relations that would hold some promise for world security.

To all this lecturing, Mr. Makins had very little to say. He suggested that he and Mr. Rickett would like to think over the points I had made, and hoped to talk further with us today. We are now awaiting a call from him.

R. GORDON ARNESON

501.BC Atomic/6-1747

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Johnson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1947.

Subject: Clarification of Gromyko's June 11 Proposals: Analysis of Soviet and U.K. Views

1. I called Mr. Osborn with respect to the question of whether or not the U.S.S.R. had modified its position regarding the time relationship between a convention outlawing atomic weapons and a convention establishing a system of international control of atomic energy. I reminded him in this connection of Senator Austin's conversation with Mr. Gullion of Mr. Acheson's office on June 12¹ in which the Senator

¹ For Gullion's memorandum of the conversation under reference, see p. 506.

said he thought Gromyko had retreated to the extent of contemplating simultaneous conventions. I told Mr. Osborn that it was our opinion here, in which Mr. Acheson concurred, that it was desirable to have this point cleared up by Mr. Osborn's asking Gromyko directly whether or not he now envisaged two simultaneous conventions.

Alluding to the newspaper stories in which it was stated that Gromyko in a press conference held after his speech had said that he still favored outlawing the bomb *before* establishing controls, Osborn said he recalled quite clearly hearing Gromyko making a statement to this effect. He agreed, however, that it would be desirable to clarify the point and for that purpose he would ask Gromyko the question directly either in a meeting or privately, and inform the Department. He agreed to my view that it would be undesirable to put the question in such a manner as to give the impression that this was the only or even the most important of the differences between the U.S. views and those of the U.S.S.R.

2. I inquired of Mr. Osborn whether he and his staff were making analyses of the Soviet and U.K. proposals.² He said that they were examining the Soviet proposal carefully and promised at my request to send down a half-dozen copies of any analysis prepared by USUN.

As regards the U.K. proposal, Mr. Osborn felt that it would be difficult to analyze it without having the full text instead of the outline which has been furnished us. He commented also that the U.K. proposal might not, if the present discussions in London are satisfactory, ever see the light of day. I replied that it was the feeling here that a careful analysis of the U.K. proposal is desirable and said we would try to undertake one in Washington, letting him have copies of what is prepared.

3. In the course of our conversation Mr. Osborn indicated that Sir George Thomson of the U.K. delegation is becoming much less opposed to the U.S. position than when he first came over. This changed attitude of Thomson was evidently one of the reasons why Mr. Osborn had thought that the U.K. draft proposal might die aborning.

4. Mr. Osborn said that in the meeting this afternoon of Committee 1 Gromyko had striven desperately to have his proposals referred to Committee 2 and given priority. If successful, this would of course have had the effect of stopping in its tracks the present work on the development of the functions of an international agency. Mr. Osborn had kept silent during the meeting but the French, Belgian, Canadian and other representatives vigorously opposed Gromyko's proposal.

² For the text of the proposals, see Gromyko's speech at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11, AEC, *2nd yr., Plenary*, pp. 20-24. For a summary of the British proposals, see p. 498.

While no vote was taken Mr. Osborn was confident that Gromyko's attempt would be unsuccessful, despite his intemperate insistence.

J[OSEPH] E. J[OHNSON]

501.BC Atomic/6-1147 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1947—9 p. m.

2603. For Chargé d'Affaires eyes only from the Secretary. Reurtel 3183, June 11.¹

1. Bevin's reference to Hyde Park and Quebec agreements² and to technical assistance available to him in London seemed to indicate intention to link question of British request for supply of information for use in developing atomic energy plants with question of independent British line in UNAEC as discussed in my 2486.³ However, British Embassy now volunteers information that Foreign Office officials discussed with Bevin his conversation with you and that, as a result, the British do not plan to try to tie the two questions together.

2. Dept strongly of opinion that they are separate and distinct problems and hopes that discussion of British request for information can be avoided. Your conversations should bear on international control proposals but we do not wish to conduct definitive negotiations in London on either the proposed new British UN plan or British request for information. Our thought is that your talks would be exploratory and chiefly directed, until further instructions are received, toward gathering information about British plan and explaining to British why they should not put it forward in light of considerations in my telegram in reference and New York background which Arneson can supply.

3. For your own strictly confidential information, and with reference British request for industrial atomic energy information, Dept is at present engaged with US Atomic Energy Commission in studying whether provisions of McMahan Act will allow us, in view of primary objective which is to assure common defense and security, to use information as a counter in dealings necessary to assure adequate supply raw materials for development atomic energy in this country. We are trying establish whether this proposition, which applies not only to our relations with UK, is correct and, if so, what our course should be. In any case we shall try to hasten decision.

4. Also for your own strictly confidential information, it is possible,

¹ *Ante*, p. 502.

² See footnote 5, p. 781, and footnote 4, p. 787.

³ Dated June 10, p. 490.

but not likely, that we may come to some conclusion before UNAE Commission presents its report to Security Council in late summer or early autumn. We still hold strongly to view that original Dec 31 proposals present best scheme for international control and that abandonment of concept of full international control in favor of less complete control means endangering world security, rather than merely settling for something less than hypothetical "total" security of the earlier proposals.

5. If therefore Bevin in his further talks with you tries to condition UK support of our UN position upon our supplying information to them, or if he should press you for action on their request, you should tell him that we do not see how one relates to the other; that you are not in position to go into latter question extensively. We are trying as best we can to find solution to problem posed by McMahon Act and will investigate every possibility of extending basis of cooperation with Brit within provisions of law. Some time may yet elapse before we can come to conclusion since we are still in stage of basic studies within some of the Executive Departments. Some progress toward solution has been made by getting over one of the collateral obstacles in the way. Action on Brit request seemed to us necessarily to involve disclosure to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy of wartime agreements, such as Quebec and Hyde Park arrangements. As Brit are aware, on May 12, 1947, I told Congressional Committee about these arrangements in strictest secrecy. There appear to have been no leaks and no complications. I believe our future handling of this problem has been facilitated by this session.

6. If Bevin renews his comment about a US proposal which might have effect of denying to his government use of atomic energy for industrial purposes, you may say that we do not understand this reference since we know of no such proposal. It is true that we believe that all important atomic facilities should be closely controlled by an international authority but this we conceived to be in interest of world security and not solely in US interest and most certainly not US policy aimed at Brit. When such an authority is set up, US and UK would be in same position in respect to whatever abatement of sovereignty an international authority would involve. We had thought UK in agreement with this position, when it supported Dec 31 report of UNAEC to Security Council.

7. Perhaps Bevin believes McMahon Act would prevent our turning over to an International Atomic Authority information it needs to develop plants in areas where they do not now exist. You may assure him that we do not see any obstacle there; in fact setting up of authority would presumably constitute kind of safeguard which the Act contemplates as existing before exchange of information on use of

atomic energy for industrial purposes is permitted. In sum, we do not see how Brit position with respect development atomic energy for industrial purposes would be affected one way or another by proposed modification Dec 31 UNAEC proposals.

Re last paragraph your 3183, Dept presently sees no necessity Amb to forego planned short visit with General Clay but if at any time you and Arneson believe his immediate return necessary, Dept would concur in your decision.

MARSHALL

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Record of a Meeting Between United States and United Kingdom Representatives at the Foreign Office, London, June 18, 1947, 2:30 p. m.*¹

TOP SECRET

Gallman, Harrison and I spent two hours with Makins, Rickett and Miles,² who had just arrived from New York. Miles looked very unhappy, possibly as the result of a rough plane trip, but more likely as the result of the way things are going on the negotiations. He seemed quite friendly but subdued. He made very little contribution to the discussion.

Makins stated at the outset that as a result of our previous meeting, they now understood fully the firmness of the United States' position. They felt, however, that inasmuch as no formal governmental commitment has yet been made on the papers dealing with the functions and powers of the Agency they were still free to put forward alternative proposals, suggestions or changes. He welcomed this opportunity to discuss the matter in detail in order that they might more fully understand the reasoning behind our conclusions and also in order that they might make up their minds as to their own position and what to do about it. He emphasized that they considered these talks purely exploratory and that no government commitments were involved in anything they might say. He said they were as concerned about security as we were but that they felt that a system less tight than ours would provide security, would be more practicable, and, in addition, might prove acceptable to the U.S.S.R. I said we, too, were interested in getting Russian acceptance if this were at all possible, but that we did not propose to sacrifice effective control in trying to do so. Agreement for agreement's sake would be of no value and would not be considered for a moment by the United States.

¹ This meeting was reported to Washington in telegram 3359, June 19, not printed.

² R. T. G. Miles, Adviser, British Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Rickett said he could not see what additional advantage the right of ownership would give to the Agency in terms of maintaining security. He felt that security could be achieved through a system of management, inspection, and the allocation of source materials. He thought that ownership would place needless burdens on the agency and require it to make exceedingly difficult political decisions which might cause it to fall of its own weight. Members of the Board of Governors would certainly be representing their respective governments and the net result would be a jockeying for position in arriving at Board decisions.

I stressed very strongly that we found no particular magic in the word "ownership" in itself. What we were concerned about was that the Agency should be given powers normally associated with ownership to the extent necessary to carry out its functions without equivocation. We were particularly concerned that the Agency should manage and operate all dangerous facilities, decide (under the terms of the Treaty) on the location of such facilities and have final right of disposition and distribution of all source materials and nuclear fuel. To our minds, this meant in essence that the Agency would have all the important powers normally residing in ownership. If it was the word itself which was causing the difficulty, we would be glad to use another or invent one, provided that the Agency's powers were of the character I had indicated.

As to the value of giving the Agency ownership rights, I said that this would make it clear where the right of final decision lay, always subject, of course, to the general principles contained in the Treaty itself and to whatever review procedure might be established. Ownership would greatly facilitate the expeditious carrying out of Agency decisions. There would be no question as to residual national rights over materials or facilities. Endless negotiation and argument would be avoided. In other words, the advantages of ownership (or the bundle of rights included in that term) would be both substantive and psychological.

There is no way in which difficult decisions can be put off. Someone will have to make them and it seems to us that the Agency itself under the terms of the Treaty, should be the body to make these decisions. One such important policy decision had already been reached in these working papers, namely, that security considerations should be the overriding factor in making decisions concerning the stock-piling of nuclear fuel and the location of plants. Any proposal which contemplated leaving such decisions in the hands of individual nations and to the pulling and hauling of negotiations between nations and the Agency would, in our view, be completely hopeless.

Rickett asked how we thought considerations of security could be reconciled with economic need. I repeated that working papers had concluded that security should be paramount, and, in furtherance of this conclusion, had decided that stocks of nuclear fuel should be kept to an absolute minimum consistent with realistic peacetime requirements. The fourth paper concluded that this basic principle should govern the operations of the Agency until changed by participating nations through amendment of the Treaty itself. I went on to say that as far as the item on the list of topics dealing with strategic balance was concerned, the U.S. Delegation itself had not yet jelled its ideas. We recognized that it was perhaps the most difficult of many difficult problems. Indeed, we had put it rather far down on the list of topics with the idea that a more complete spelling out of the functions and powers of the Agency would help in considering this question. I said that whatever level of operation might be decided upon in the treaty, i.e., whether all-out effort should be made to achieve atomic power in the shortest possible time or whether it should be allowed to come more slowly, it was evident that the nub of the matter was to arrive at some kind of equitable distribution. This meant that the present predominating position of the U.S. would have to be redressed. It also seemed to us that this fundamental problem would have to be taken care of in the terms of the treaty itself and that the Agency could not be allowed any broad powers of discretion on this point. Whatever solution might be worked out, it seemed to us perfectly clear that in no event could such decisions be left in the hands of individual nations.

The British said that they thought the paramouncy of security over economic considerations might have the net effect of retarding the development of atomic power. I went on at some length on the thesis that the Agency, rather than retarding the development of power, would advance it and that it would do so under sound and secure arrangements. Conceivably some single nation, i.e., the U.S., could outstrip the world in developing atomic power, but it could do so by itself only in the most dangerous circumstances and the constant fear that other nations were producing, or were about to produce, atomic bombs. We envisaged the Agency as having the fullest knowledge of all phases of atomic energy, the facilities to make use of such knowledge, and instructions to move ahead as quickly as security considerations permitted. The Agency would also be enjoined to help individual nations carry on research and development in all peaceful phases of atomic energy provided dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel were not involved. This, to our minds, was an arrangement which provided safety plus real encouragement to whatever advance might be possible on technical and security grounds. When it became feasible to

erect power reactors, the Agency would do so at the request of any nation which could prove economic justification and provided:

1. paramount security considerations were met, and
2. materials and facilities were available.

I stated that I could not see how anyone could propose that individual nations should be free to go ahead at their own pace to build power plants with the provision that the Agency would manage such plants wherever and whenever built. It seemed to us that such a scheme would completely wipe out any advantage international control would have in the direction of eliminating national rivalries, interminable suspicions, and unbearable tensions.

We discussed at some length the nature of the Governing Board of the Agency. The British apparently look upon the Board of Governors as a typical kind of international organization in which the members would in each case represent their respective governments. I agree that members would not be unaware of their country of origin but that every effort should be made to secure men who could take a world view of the matter. In general, these men should not receive or request instructions from their governments. Admittedly, this was an ideal which might be difficult to achieve and yet to the extent that it was achieved, the success of the Agency could more nearly be assured. However difficult this question might be, it was clearly no solution to leave important matter involving world security in the hands of individual governments. We explored tentatively possible voting procedures. I suggested certain methods that had occurred to us:

1. simple majority on all questions with review by the Security Council on certain specified major decisions and
2. simple majority on day to day matters with extraordinary majority in the Agency on important policy decisions.

In the course of the day's discussions, the following ideas were presented by the British. (These ideas were not put forward very clearly and, in large part, developed as a result of my asking at various points what the alternatives were. The British were most anxious to point out that these ideas by no means represented any official view but merely the trend of their recent thinking.)

A. One way to obviate placing in the Agency impossibly difficult decisions would be to allow nations to go ahead to build whatever power plants they see fit to build. Once such plants were built, presumably with the design and construction supervised by the Agency, the Agency would take over management. The Agency would have no right to retard, or duty to foster, such development. The Agency would merely take over management but not ownership of plants, whenever and wherever built. Pressed as to what they meant by management, the British were not at all concise. In general, however, it

seems that they have in mind that the Plant Manager would be responsible to the Agency for all questions regarding security and the safe operation of the plant but would also be responsible to the government concerned on many questions of operating policy. I stated that this would be a completely hopeless situation. One could foresee nothing but endless bickerings, suspicions, and inaction under this kind of scheme. The British seem to feel that this idea would have the advantage of leaving present plants and stocks of material in the U.S. but under Agency management. I said this obviously was no answer at all to the question of a strategic balance. If the Russians accepted this idea, we would all be very much surprised.

B. The Agency would presumably have certain limited powers of research and development, not for the purpose of fostering developments, but merely to enable itself to keep informed of the increase of knowledge. Their research facilities would serve as a training ground for personnel. Arrangements would be made for clearing and coordination of information generated in individual nations.

C. The principle control measure given to the Agency would be the power to allocate source materials quotas and to control the flow of such source materials. Source materials could be purchased by a nation and transported only under Agency license. Title to the material would go to the nation-purchaser. Plants using source material would presumably be owned by producing nations. I pointed out that this proposed source materials allocation scheme would in no way solve the basic problem of strategic balance. It would prove fully as difficult to decide on source material quotas as it would to decide on location of plants. Furthermore, without solving this problem, this scheme would deny to the Agency critical control powers which to our minds were essential. Rickett ruefully agreed that their scheme did not solve the strategic balance problem but it appealed to them nevertheless because it placed on the Agency fewer difficult duties. I asked whether these quotas would be worked out in advance in the Treaty or whether they should be decided on the basis of negotiation between the Agency and each individual nation. He said that they had not really worked that out and they were not certain which might be the more practicable.

The British seem to think that the above scheme would have the following merits:

1. It would avoid placing impossible burdens on the Agency.
2. Decisions as to location of plants would be avoided. (They would apparently grow up over the world like Topsy.)
3. Nations would be free to develop atomic power to the maximum extent of their ability and interest.

I asked whether the British were seriously proposing this as something which they hoped the Soviet Union might accept. For our part we would be frightened to death if the Soviets did accept it. Makins quickly replied that this was not in any sense a formal proposal but merely some ideas they had been considering.

From today's discussion it rather seems to me that the British think that this *laissez-faire* scheme they have been considering would pro-

vide them with atomic power more rapidly than any other nation except the United States and more rapidly than under our plan. Basic to this point of view seems to be the confusion on their part that the time scale of atomic power development is much shorter than we do [consider it].

Miles said very clearly that they were most anxious that the U.K. and the U.S. not show any major differences between them in the presence of the Soviet and Polish representatives. It was because of this that they were pleased to have these private conversations with us. It seems to me that the British are again engaged in a whittling-down procedure trying to see how far we will yield. I am completely convinced that if we remain firm and make our firmness quite evident they will eventually join with us. They know that the U.N.A.E.C. working papers are a cooperative effort but they think that if we weaken, other friendly nations will follow. I would put more strongly than I did in my cable No. 3359 of June 19 the conviction that I doubt very much that the British will attempt to put in any alternative proposal or major amendments.

We hope in the next discussion with the British to get a further elaboration of their ideas and to take as long as necessary to make clear the details of our own position. They seem anxious at this stage not to get into the questions of:

1. Tactics in the U.N.A.E.C. negotiations, and
2. Broader questions of U.K.-U.S. relations in the whole field of atomic energy.

They seek (and we are quite willing) to confine present discussions to the question of the major functions and powers of the Agency.

R. GORDON ARNESON

501.BC Atomic/6-1947: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, June 19, 1947—11 a. m.

3353. For the Secretary. Regret Embtel 3183¹ carried the implication that Bevin contemplated relating Hyde Park and Quebec documents with the question of international control of the development of atomic energy plants. This he did not contemplate doing. He merely referred to our present attitude toward those two documents as a matter which influenced the British approach to the question of international control.

¹ Dated June 11, p. 502.

I had inferred that you do not desire that definitive negotiations be conducted in London on either a British UN proposal or British request for information and that the purpose of the consultations here, unless other instructions are received, should be confined to persuading the British that they should not advance any UN proposal. (Deptel 2603, June 17²).

We shall, of course, keep any UK request for information from US wholly separate from the larger question and will not discuss it with Bevin.

The remainder of your cable is very helpful.

DOUGLAS

² *Ante*, p. 517.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Plan of Work Approved by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, June 18, 1947*¹

RAC D-13/5

[WASHINGTON,] June 19, 1947.

(1) Consider and make recommendations to the Security Council concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

(2) Consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(3) Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means) to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

(4) Formulate² practical proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(5) Extension of the principles and proposals set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above to states which are not members of the United Nations.

(6) Submission of a report or reports to the Security Council including, if possible, a draft convention.

¹ On June 6, the Committee on Conventional Armaments' subcommittee on a plan of work decided to submit both the United States plan (telegram 427 from New York, May 6, p. 472) and the Soviet Plan (telegram 494 from New York, May 21, p. 476) to the Commission. At its 6th Meeting, June 11, the CCA considered the report of the subcommittee (S/C.3/12). At its 8th Meeting, June 18, the CCA adopted the United States plan as amended during the course of discussion, the text of which is printed here. At its 9th Meeting, June 25, the CCA approved its report to the Security Council including this plan of work. For the text of the entire report, see SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 14*, pp. 141-143.

² The underlining, which appears in the source text, indicates addition to or alteration of the United States draft proposal.

It is proposed that under the six headings listed above all of the references by the various delegations suggested for the plan of work will be considered.

It is also understood that this plan of work does not limit the freedom of individual delegations to make additional suggestions at a later time.

501.BC Atomic/6-2047 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, June 20, 1947.

Unnumbered. Relay AmEmbassy London for Arneson from Osborn. 1. Reurtel 3359, June 19.¹ Results talk Conant,² Tolman³ and others and better understanding of working papers, George Thomson now cooperating better with McNaughton, De Rose and ourselves. We therefore discussed your cable with Thomson.

2. While United States principle that security is overriding consideration indicates necessity that nations could not decide on the location of their own facilities, we may suggest possible clarification of that point in paper 39.⁴ Instead of giving agency full responsibility for determining strategic balance of facilities, this responsibility might possibly be carried out by agency within limitations of an over-all quota plan approved in the treaty or by the Security Council. Moreover responsibility of agency for location strategic facilities within each nation might be modified by stating various limitations under which the agency would exercise this responsibility. Such important questions as whether plants could be located underground or in strategically secure positions, such as mountain ranges have had no careful examination and must be fully considered by all governments. In other words, we recognize that the agency must not be given unlimited powers in these respects which would overload their administrative and political difficulties and afford Russians arguments for effective propaganda against proposal.

3. Thomson still feels ownership by agency of facilities not desirable but willing to concede ownership of materials to agency.

¹ Telegram 3359 is not printed, but see the record of the June 18 meeting it describes, p. 519.

² Dr. James B. Conant, Consultant, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; Member, General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

³ Dr. Richard C. Tolman, Consultant, United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; physicist, California Institute of Technology.

⁴ AEC/C.2/39.

4. Important you should know that Thomson has disclosed to Conant, Tolman and Osborn that he had personally developed the idea for a plan under which all production nuclear fuel and all plants capable of dangerous activities would be prohibited for a considerable period to [of] time, say, 20 years or until power development had reached stage of known economic value. Under such plan considerable experimentation and development with denatured nuclear fuel in relatively small quantities and continuation laboratory research of non-dangerous sort would of course be continued. Thomson's plan might conceivably be somewhat modified to provide for perhaps two small power developments under the agency of limited danger because of their small size. In any event, power development would proceed but at a slower pace and under whole plan envisaged in present working papers. If adopted, the major questions of strategic balance and the existence of large quantities of undenatured nuclear fuels and more dangerous plants would be deferred to be taken up by the nations at a later time. We felt that you should have this information and particularly that you should recognize that it was conceived solely by Thomson and discussed informally with us. We have as yet not formed an opinion and have no expression on it from our government, and Thomson does not know views of United Kingdom. We understand he has sent personal cable to Jebb asking certain persons in government consider this possibility and has also written a number of personal letters being sent by air mail today to certain members Anderson Committee.⁵ We understand Thomson feels this idea of his would be very difficult to accept but that it offers the only hope he has yet had for putting Russians in such a position before world opinion that there might be some slight possibility of their entering into the treaty.

5. We are still looking at this work solely from point of view of what would be an acceptable treaty if it actually became effective, but Thomson seems inclined to think about papers in terms of their not being accepted. [Osborn.]

JOHNSON

⁵The United Kingdom Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, of which Sir John Anderson was chairman.

501.BC Atomic/6-2147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 21, 1947—6 p. m.

3412. 1. In private talk with Makins, whom I consider completely forthright and dependable, I asked frankly whether chief concern of

British was that under U.S. plan U.K. might be denied power plants. He replied with equal frankness that this was not the case. U.K. realizes that Soviets will in all probability not accept either our plan or U.K. approach. They feel, however, public opinion would support us more strongly if the plan turned down by the Soviets were made less rigid along lines of U.K. suggestions. I pointed out that U.S. public opinion would not support any watering down of U.S. position.

2. U.K. considers that ownership concept involves too great impairment of sovereignty. I replied that sovereignty would be affected under any system which included inspection.

3. Under U.K. concept of managerial control, plant manager would evidently take orders from both nation and agency. I stated that such an arrangement would be intolerable leading to endless confusion and irritations.

4. Makins admitted that their scheme of source materials allocation in no way solved problem of strategic balance. He agreed that basic principles would have to be written into treaty itself.

5. Makins stressed that U.K. has no approved alternate plan.

6. Next phase of discussion probably will be with Bevin, Portal and other Ministers directly concerned and will deal with questions of tactics and political considerations. I shall take Arneson with me. He has been invaluable and has gained confidence of all through his knowledge and conduct.

Dept please repeat to New York.

DOUGLAS

501.BC Atomic/6-1947: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1947—1 p. m.

2677. For Arneson. Reurtel 3359, June 19¹ and Dept's 2603, June 17, your full and helpful report of preliminary British views will receive weekend consideration here and in New York and you will receive further instructions promptly. Until reaction here can be ascertained, we believe it advisable to refrain from further discussions with British.

MARSHALL

¹ Telegram 3359 is not printed, but see the record of the June 18 meeting it describes, p. 519.

501.BC Atomic/6-2247 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 22, 1947—noon.

3414. 1. Ambassador, Gallman and I¹ met Friday² with Makins, Rickett, Miles and representatives from Prime Minister's office, Ministries of Supply and of Defense. At outset Ambassador stressed broader implications of relations among Big Five. Failure of US, UK along with majority of other countries represented in UNAEC to present a united front against Soviet intransigence would have most far-reaching repercussions. US was anxious to secure agreement but not at price of jeopardized effective control.

2. Makins agreed on need for united front and said this was objective of present conversations. They, too, wanted an intrinsically good plan. There were three main aspects of problem before us: (1) Broad political factors; (2) tactics and timing in UNAEC; (3) functions and powers of agency. Suggested discussion be confined for moment to (3). Previous talks had shown wide measure of agreement in general but following points of disagreement:

(a) Status of UN working papers. UK considered no commitment involved. US considered papers expression of firm US views.

(b) Security objective. UK wanted security but stressed minimum to increase possibility of agreement. Admittedly wide latitude in year-end report³ to strengthen controls or relax them. US moving in direction of stronger controls. UK wanted about the same as provided in year-end report.

(c) Powers of control. US required ownership or at least all powers normally subsumed under that term. UK not yet convinced of necessity for ownership which raised serious problems of workability because (1) heavy burdens of decision on agency concerning allocation of materials, location of plants, distribution of nuclear fuel; (2) harder for countries to accept; (3) no solution to problem of undeclared plants. Makins stressed that UK views were being crystallized but not yet formalized.

3. Discussion covered much the same ground of previous meetings. Some new points raised:

a. Question of proportionate depletion of mines. British thought this quite complicated especially in view of by-product mining. Seemed impressed with point we made on need to give agency power to require production to prevent a country securing advantage over long term by depletion of other sources.

¹ Arneson.

² June 20.

³ Reference is to the First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, December 31, 1946 (AEC, *1st yr., Special Suppl.*).

b. Additional advantage to security under ownership. British hold system should (1) make it possible to know all that was going on (2) provide unmistakable evidence when rules are broken and (3) give no nation a predominating position in event of breakdown of the treaty. A thorough-going system of inspection plus management would, in their view, make it possible to achieve objectives (1) and (2) above. Ownership would give no additional guarantees. We stressed that powers stemming from ownership would reduce dangers of diversion and clandestine operations. Under inspection violations might easily occur without clear assurance that agency could prove them as for example various seemingly innocent interferences with agency functions. Under ownership scheme nation would be forced to seize agency materials or facilities, in order to gain advantage. Such action would be clear and unambiguous danger signal, which would surely arouse other nations to action. British, especially representative of Prime Minister's office, seemed impressed with this point. Ambassador stressed that ownership would greatly reduce frictions and make more certain and continuous the application of strict control. Makins thought that the actual difference between a system of ownership and a system of inspection and management would not in practice be very great.

c. Managerial control. British thought that managerial control by agency of dangerous plants would give adequate powers of decision on security grounds. Pressed to define what they meant by managerial control, their answer was ambiguous.

d. Power plants. We stated that it was in no way our intention that any highly industrialized country with bona fide needs for atomic power should be denied reactors provided (1) security requirements were met, [(2)] clear economic justification existed and (3) nation concerned bore equitable share of cost.

e. Time scale. UK feels that basic principles on stockpiling and distribution of nuclear fuel contained in working papers based on assumption of long period before atomic power feasible. We stated that criteria (indicated above) on which nation's request for power reactors would be judged should be applied whatever the time scale might prove to be. They finally seemed to agree on this point.

4. Further discussion concerned with nature of controls required at each stage from mine to final product. General result was clarification in British minds as to provisions of working papers.

5. British expressed fear that agents under ownership would be empowered to dictate precise location of plants within a country. We stated that while no final position had been reached on whole subject of strategic balance it was not our intention that the agency should be concerned with specific location of plants within a given country except in cases of obvious misplacement in relation to proper use. In any event, it seemed to us that solution lay not in reducing powers of agency on question of strategic balance but in spelling out general principles on this matter in the treaty itself.

6. At close of discussion Makins stated that he thought they were now quite clear as to the US position and they wanted time for con-

sultation among themselves and reference of matter to their respective Ministers. Next phase of discussions might move on to broader policy questions and question of tactics in UNAEC.

Dept please repeat to New York for Osborn from Arneson.

DOUGLAS

501.BC Atomic/6-2347

The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 23 June 1947.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that their views on the interpretation to be given the phrase "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" be transmitted for your information, so that you may be advised of the military thinking on this problem. Accordingly, enclosed herewith is a study, the work of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which may be considered as accurately reflecting their views.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

FORRESTAL

Enclosure

Study Prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

DISCUSSION

1. The phrase "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" first appeared in the text of the Declaration on Atomic Energy issued in Washington, D. C., on 15 November 1945 by President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee of Great Britain and W. L. Mackenzie King of Canada. It again appeared on 27 December 1945 in Section VII of the communiqué issued in Moscow by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom recommending, "for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the establishment of a commission to consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters."

2. Subsequently, the phrase was used in Section V of a resolution passed by the General Assembly on 24 January 1946 in which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was directed to make specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction." The phrase is now included in the language of the reso-

lution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1946 on the subject of the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. This resolution recommends to the Security Council, among other things, that it give prompt consideration to the working out of proposals to insure the adoption of measures for the early "elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now or in the future to mass destruction."

3. The matter of cognizance of weapons of mass destruction has already been raised in the Security Council of the United Nations in order, among other reasons, to delimit the functions and responsibilities of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and it is to be expected that argument on the question in the United Nations will continue. The position of the United States to date has been that the Atomic Energy Commission has and must retain cognizance of all weapons of mass destruction and that another agency, intended to deal with conventional armaments, should not be brought into the same picture if anything effective is to be accomplished. The identification of "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction," by definition or otherwise, is obviously, therefore, of importance not only as a basis for determining what weapons should be eliminated, but also in connection with the question of jurisdiction of the two commissions.

4. A definition is "a brief explanation of the exact meaning of a term." In this case we are not dealing with a term, but with a phrase which includes the terms "major," "adaptable" and "mass destruction." To explain the exact meaning of a term would be comparatively easy, but in general only the makers of a phrase can explain exactly what is meant by it.

5. The Declaration on Atomic Energy of 15 November 1945 makes it quite clear that the makers of this phrase were concerned primarily with the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes. However, they wrote as follows:

"We recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown, against which there can be no adequate military defense . . .¹ No system of safeguards that can be devised will of itself provide an effective guarantee against production of atomic weapons by a nation bent on aggression. Nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other weapons, or of new methods of warfare, which may constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic weapons." (Underlining supplied)

¹ Omission indicated in the source text.

6. It is implied in the above quote that "other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" should include only those weapons which constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic energy and those weapons against which there can be no adequate military defense. From the words "nor can we ignore the possibility of the development of other (than atomic) weapons" it could be deduced that the authors felt there were at present no known major weapons adaptable to mass destruction other than atomic weapons. However, available information indicates this is not entirely true and that the authors, while certain that atomic weapons were adaptable to mass destruction, also felt it quite likely that other weapons, such as biological warfare weapons, should be classified as weapons adaptable to mass destruction on the basis that there could be no adequate military defense against them.

7. The statement of Messrs. Truman, Attlee and King speaks of "new methods of warfare" and there are indications that some nations will attempt to seize on these words and use them as reasons for eliminating means and/or methods of mass destruction from the practices of war. However, a full reading of the text of the quoted Declaration on Atomic Energy indicates clearly that the authors of the Declaration did not intend literally to outlaw any known method of warfare, but were using "method" in the broad sense as applying to possible future developments that might provide a means, i.e., a weapon, comparable to the atomic bomb in destructiveness. It is also quite clear that when the authors of the Declaration spoke of means of destruction they had in mind weapons such as atomic weapons and not the method by which the weapons can be, or are, applied against an enemy.

8. There could be endless discussion concerning what are major weapons. However, in this case, the weapon is to be eliminated only if it is adaptable to mass destruction. But, it is clearly the intention of the authors that all weapons adaptable to mass destruction shall be eliminated. Hence, we do not have to determine what weapons are major weapons and must determine only those weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

9. A weapon is any "instrument for inflicting, or defending from, bodily harm." There must be an inclination on the part of some nations to classify instruments which are not in fact weapons as weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The obvious example is the long-range bomber aircraft. However, this aircraft is not a weapon in itself although the bombs, cannon and machine guns it carries are weapons. It is a carrier or a vehicle. But can this vehicle be easily fitted or made suitable for mass destruction? Individually, it cannot if only conventional weapons are carried by it. Collectively, long-range bomber aircraft employing conventional weapons can achieve mass destruc-

tion if they are used en masse. However, such employment is a technique and does not make the carriers of the weapons involved either weapons themselves or weapons of mass destruction. The long-range bomber aircraft is therefore adaptable to mass destruction only in the same sense that artillery employed en masse for the purpose of achieving widespread destruction is also adaptable to mass destruction. The same is true for guided missiles employing conventional explosives in their warheads. It is true that the guided missile in its present state of development cannot achieve the accuracy of the individual long-range bomber aircraft and produces only comparatively indiscriminate destruction; and it cannot as yet be used with discrimination against purely military installations or military personnel. There is therefore more reason from this viewpoint to classify the long-range guided missile as a weapon of mass destruction than there is so to classify the long-range bomber aircraft. But, keeping in mind the intention of the authors of this phrase to eliminate only those weapons which constitute as great a threat to civilization as the military use of atomic weapons or those weapons against which there can be no adequate military defense, it appears that the long-range guided missile is not adaptable to mass destruction.

10. It is believed that the intention of the General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1946 is to eliminate all weapons adaptable primarily to the *indiscriminate* destruction of human life, particularly large masses or communities of the civilian population. From the viewpoint of the security of the United States the emphasis in our discussions should certainly be on the word *indiscriminate*. Modern war cannot be fought for long unless large masses of the civilian population are producing the weapons of warfare. *Discriminate* destruction of these production facilities is essential to the successful prosecution of modern war and is thus a proper and important objective. That civilians may be killed in the process of such destruction is not an acceptable reason for eliminating air attacks against industrial facilities.

11. It is clear from the Declaration on Atomic Energy that all atomic weapons (the effectiveness of which is attained by explosive force, by heat, by radioactivity, or by combination of these effects) are generally considered as "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."

12. Accordingly, it may be reasonably assumed as a point of departure that the phrase "other major weapons" was intended to include only those weapons of comparable effectiveness, when employed indiscriminately against population masses, that might now or in the future become available. Thus, in determining what other "mass destruction" weapons should appropriately be associated with the atomic warfare problem, we should consider only those having characteristics

comparable to those of atomic weapons, leaving all others for consideration in connection with the general subject of the regulation of conventional armaments.

13. At the present time, the foremost atomic weapon is the atomic bomb. Its characteristics, to a very great extent unique with respect to conventional weapons, are:

a. The relative futility of other than totally successful, and hence the extremely difficult nature of, defense against it,

b. The almost inevitable, and certainly the readily possible, widespread and indiscriminate lethal and disabling results of its use,

c. The practical impossibility of providing beforehand, in the attack area, measures for minimizing to any reasonable degree its lethal and disabling effects,

d. The lingering aftereffects of the attack, for which there is no practicable alleviative and, finally,

e. The overwhelming catastrophic results if used in a general attack on numerous heavily populated centers and the still greater effects that are possible if such a general attack be made suddenly and without warning.

14. It is believed that radioactive, lethal chemical and biological weapons possess the capability of being developed and employed in such a manner as to approximate the above characteristics of the atomic bomb, particularly the vast peril to human life, coupled with minimum opportunity for defense and escape, that we now associate with that weapon. Their potential characteristics are probably not ultimately so terrific as those of the atomic bomb and they can produce no appreciable explosive or heat effects. On the other hand, they cannot possibly be employed for other than lethal and disabling purposes and their other characteristics are comparable to those of the atomic bomb, while certainly this can be said of no other known weapons. Therefore, it is believed that the atomic bomb, atomic explosives delivered by other means, and radioactive, lethal chemical and biological weapons should be classed as "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" and that no other known weapons should be so classified. It is possible that new weapons may be developed that in the future may meet or even exceed the general definition of comparable characteristics outlined above. If and when any such weapons are developed, consideration should be given to classifying them also as "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction."

15. In view of the foregoing discussion the Joint Strategic Survey Committee believes that the interests of national security can best be protected by agreement that:

a. The characteristics of the atomic bomb that have caused it to be classified as a major weapon adaptable to mass destruction are:

(1) The relative futility of other than totally successful, and hence the extremely difficult nature of, defense against it;

(2) The almost inevitable, and certainly the readily possible, widespread and indiscriminate lethal and disabling results of its use;

(3) The practical impossibility of providing beforehand, in the attack area, measures for minimizing to any reasonable degree its lethal and disabling effects;

(4) The lingering aftereffects of the attack, for which there is no practicable alleviative and, finally,

(5) The overwhelmingly catastrophic results if used in a general attack on numerous heavily populated centers and the still greater effects that are possible if such a general attack be made suddenly and without warning.

b. These characteristics define in general terms all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. The only known other weapons that are capable of being developed so as to approach these characteristics are atomic explosives delivered by other means and radioactive, lethal chemical, and biological weapons.

c. All atomic, radioactive, lethal chemical, and biological weapons should therefore be classified as major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

d. No other known weapons should be so classified.

e. Any weapons developed in future with characteristics comparable to those of the atomic bomb should be classified as major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

16. In view of the foregoing the following appears to be a suitable definition for major weapons adaptable to mass destruction:

“Major weapons adaptable to mass destruction are all atomic explosive, radioactive material, lethal chemical and biological weapons; and, in the future, and weapons developed which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.”

501.BC Atomic/6-2247: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1947—7 p. m.

2693. For Ambassador and Arneson from Acheson and Austin. Further regard to Dept infotel 2677,¹ the instructions of which are now replaced by those of this cable, Dept. requests you continue along lines original instructions as your cables indicate satisfactory progress education British in needs present situation in AEC. Reurtel 3412 June 21 and 3414 June 22 pleased your talks have clarified UK understanding of working papers. Believe this has already and will continue

¹ June 21, p. 528.

to assist work here. You will recall that working papers do not represent final commitment of any single government. US position is in general agreement with their content and US would not go along with any amendments which weakened them. Further, while we would be interested in British views on broader policy questions and questions of tactics in UNAEC, these are not matters for negotiations in England as they must be handled here. Concur in your defense of strong control system with understanding that no negotiations or even discussions of possible amendment are to be undertaken in UK at this time. For information State Department finds no objection to substance of paper 44 as basis discussion in Committee 2. Senator Austin hopes that Arneson can complete and return soon as he is missed in New York. [Acheson and Austin.]

MARSHALL

Policy Planning Staff Files ¹

The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas).

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1947.

DEAR LEW: Your cable 3353 of June 19 states precisely what we expect from your conversations with the British in regard to their intention to introduce a new plan for international control of atomic energy into the United Nations discussions. I hope that you personally make clear to Bevin, informally, that our strong reluctance to see any such diversionary proposals presented is tied up with our apprehensions about Russian foreign policy and tactics in UNAEC.

It is difficult, if not impossible, at this stage to synthesize all the impressions of the Russians held by various persons who deal with them or work on the Soviet Union problem in the Department, UN, the War and Navy Departments, and in our Missions abroad, and to peg that composite as an official government estimate of Russian policy. I should think that the British would understand this difficulty.

What I am about to describe is merely the climate of opinion here, more or less reflected in official thinking, as in the so-called "Ridgway" memorandum (SC 210—"Objectives of USSR atomic energy & disarmament policies", April 7, 1947 ²) which Mr. Joseph Johnson discussed with you in Washington, and of which you have a copy. Although we have not lost hope of achieving an international control regime and intend to continue the effort in the AEC as long as we can, I, personally, and most other observers are much discouraged about

¹ Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1947-1953.

² A revision of General Ridgway's memorandum of February 3, p. 402.

present prospects and fear that the Russians' present line is to filibuster in the United Nations, while at the same time they try:

- a) To attract support from anxious minority opinion in other United Nations atomic energy commission countries;
- b) To break down existing US-UK arrangements for procurement of raw materials by tactics such as they are pursuing in Belgium;³
- c) To infiltrate research and control programs in any or all other countries;
- d) To hasten their own development of atomic weapons; and
- e) To extend their area of effective political domination, as in Hungary.

The longer the filibuster can be prolonged, the more they can hope to play upon the fears and idealism of that part of the population of interested countries which is desperately anxious to preserve peace and which is receptive to Soviet professions and propaganda.

In the early fall the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission is to make its second report to the Security Council; we had planned and hoped that by that time the essential points of difference between the Soviet Union and the countries supporting the original December 31 proposals would have been isolated, and that it would be clear just what, if any, possibility existed of agreement on these points, so that if negotiations were to fail or to drift into nothingness, it would be clear to the world where the responsibility lay.

Since we have been pursuing that policy it has been difficult to bring the Russians down to brass tacks or to prevent them from taking refuge in discussions of comparatively minor phases of an international convention. It is my own strong feeling that they are not really ready to adopt any international control scheme, either the Baruch proposals, the new British plan, or any other. They have recently given some details as to how they would expect inspection systems to function, but it is clear that they do not intend to abandon their insistence on the destruction of atomic bomb stocks before adoption of an international control convention. I am confident that the United States would never agree to this. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is just as adamant as ever about not accepting international ownership or genuine control of important facilities. Compared to these two major points of disagreement, the questions of the veto and of the mechanics of inspection seem less important.

In view of all the above, I think it would be a grave error for the British to introduce new proposals at this time. It would merely give the Soviet Union a new set of points to discuss, new papers to prepare, and new ammunition for the filibuster.

³ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 781 ff. *passim*.

I should like you, if possible, to convey to Bevin some sense of this climate of opinion here, without giving him the impression that you are presenting a crystallized hard-and-fast policy on Russia. Also, both we and the British must avoid giving the Russians the opportunity of accusing us of bad faith or of selling the UN negotiations short.

It would be very useful to have from the British at the close of your talks a clear indication as to whether they intend to put forward their proposal or to support one on similar lines. They might not be willing to tie their hands now but I think you should ask them anyway for any forecast they are prepared to give of their future course, at least through September.

The conversations have been most helpful and we are very grateful to you and Arneson.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

501.BC Atomic/6-2947 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 29, 1947—1 p. m.

3566. Before leaving for Paris, Bevin informed me he had had brief conversation with Prime Minister regarding international control atomic energy. They had been so preoccupied with other matters that it had been impossible to give consideration to matter at Cabinet level but that he and Prime Minister felt that we should not press for definite action which would force Soviet to accept or reject at September meeting. He also said Makins would give me more detailed report.

This Makins subsequently did. He confirmed what Bevin had told me and said that probably Ministers would consider matter within two weeks and would talk with me.

In the meantime, Mr. Bevin hoped we on our part would not press our plan and said that the British on their part would come to no conclusions of their own. They thought that Arneson's visit had been extremely helpful and had clarified our position. I again emphasized that anything short of ownership would be unpalatable in the United States for the reasons which had already been explained to him. He said that they understood our view and were impressed with the arguments which we had advanced but implied that it might be difficult for them to accept agency ownership of plants. He, however, was not able to express a view until the Cabinet had reviewed the matter. He recalled that in a personal conversation I had asked him whether the British

doubts about our plan arose from fear that it would be used to prevent the use of nuclear energy as a source of power for commercial purposes in the UK.

Since that conversation, he had talked with representatives of the interested ministries and was able to confirm his original opinion that they had no apprehension on this score with the following qualification, that while it was believed that we had devised our plan with the thought in mind that it might be used to prevent the establishment of plants in countries other than the UK, it could be applied similarly to the UK.

Repeat to Osborn New York.

DOUGLAS

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

NEW YORK, June 30, 1947.

Actual voting on the specific proposals to be embodied in the second report of the Commission will probably begin around the end of July.

This memorandum is to inform you in some detail of the present status of our work and the line of action planned by this Delegation, subject to any change made in our previous instructions, in order that you may keep the State Department, and through them also the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Atomic Energy Commission fully informed.

Up to this time the Commission has been engaged in preparing working papers for discussion in Committee 2. No nation, as such, is finally committed to the contents of any of these papers, but we have taken an active part along with the other Delegations in drafting them, and we believe the contents to be in full accord with the American position. The various group leaders who directed the original drafting are making notes of the discussions on these papers now commencing in Committee 2, and will coordinate and clarify the papers to put them in form for their final consideration in Committee 2 by the end of July. It is at this time that there will be the best opportunity for proposing amendments.

It is hoped to complete this process and to move the papers into the Working Committee about August 1st. In the Working Committee, amendments will still be possible, but more difficult, to make. Material will then be added to put the papers in the form of a report and the final report will probably be voted on by the end of August or the first week in September. The report will presumably cover only the present content of the working papers, namely, all of the functions of the

international agency, including the limitations of personnel with respect to inspection, etc., and possibly some statement on the staffing and organization of the international agency. It is not expected that there will be any new material on financing, sanctions, or stages. The subject of strategic distribution is touched on in a tentative way in the working papers on nuclear fuels and reactors, and we shall discourage any attempt to elaborate this or other subjects this summer. Copies of all these papers in their present form, with the exception of the paper on staffing and organization, are now in your hands, and have also been sent to the State Department, the U.S. Commission, and the Military Staff Committee. Additions will be forwarded you currently. The present papers provide that the amount of nuclear fuel to be produced will be held at all times to the minimum necessary to meet the needs of research and development projects and of power plants actually approved for construction. There are no such prospective plants now; the working papers provide that when further technical advances prove the feasibility of such plants, the matter of increasing the available quantities of nuclear fuel and, therefore, of deciding its strategic distribution, will be referred for decision to all nations signatory to the treaty before the agency is permitted to embark upon a major program of producing nuclear fuels.

The vote in Committee 2 and the final vote in August or September in the Working Committee, and then in the Commission itself, would represent approval of this work as the basis for the second report. It would not bind the United States to the final form of a treaty, since this would be contingent on future agreement on questions as yet undecided; but it would represent a further step in the series of commitments which have already been made.

It is our understanding that we will vote affirmatively on these papers, provided their contents continue to represent, as we believe they now do, an elaboration of the proposals in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, of the proposals put forward by Mr. Baruch, and of the Commission's report of December 31, 1946—all within the explicit instructions of the President of the United States, bearing his signature and initials in a memorandum to Mr. Baruch of June 7, 1946.¹ These papers represent a strengthening of the safeguards proposed in Chapter V of the year-end report, and we consider them to be fully in conformity with the principles contained in the General Findings and Recommendations.

If any of these matters need clarification, we will make ourselves available at any time to you or to the State Department.

FREDERICK OSBORN

¹ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, p. 846.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] July 1, 1947.

DEAR LEW: Arneson is back and has given me your good letter of June 26th.¹ I am glad you agreed with us as to his competence and fine qualities. I might add that he is altogether appreciative of and enthusiastic about the extremely able way in which you handled the whole negotiation, and feels confident that nothing can go wrong in this matter now it is in your hands.

It might be useful for me to comment briefly on your cable 3566,² received this morning.

The schedule of work now contemplated in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission will not necessitate taking formal positions on the AEC working papers until the end of July. At that time, it is expected that the first voting will take place on these papers in Committee 2. At that time it will be possible to introduce alternative provisions, but only as formal amendments. It is expected that the papers will be voted out of Committee 2 to the Working Committee around August 1st. After they are in the Working Committee, formal amendment will be possible but more difficult. The United States will stand firmly on the substance of the papers in their present form, although some verbal changes are possible and probably desirable in terms of consistency. It is certain, however, that any serious weakening of the proposals would not only be unacceptable to the United States Government, but also to American public opinion.

It is expected that the Working Committee will complete consideration of these proposals by the end of August and they will be made the basis of the second report to the Security Council. It has not yet been decided just what will be done with the formal Soviet proposals of June 11th. None of the Delegates seems to take these very seriously, their feeling being that they were introduced for their public effect, contained nothing new, and got a bad reception. It seems clear that any attempt to "mediate" between the United States and the Soviet now would be quite unrealistic in terms of the present close cooperation of the majority of Delegates on the Commission, and would be resented by the American public as an attempt at appeasement.

¹ Presumably Douglas' letter to Osborn of June 23, not printed.

² Dated June 29, p. 539.

In your further conversations with the U.K. we would urge you to stress that these papers represent the views of the Delegates of the nations that worked on them, especially Canada, France, China, Brazil, Belgium, Colombia and the United States. They represent group effort and group conviction. While consonant with the original Baruch offer, they should now be termed the group or Commission plan. They include changes in the year-end report proposed by others and accepted by the United States. The position on ownership of source material was arrived at in a working group of which General McNaughton of Canada was Chairman. The principle of paramountcy of security in regard to minimum stockpiling of nuclear fuel was first put forward by the French. The Soviet is exceedingly anxious to attack these papers on the ground that they are United States proposals. It is very evident that the Soviet does not like being put in the position of opposing proposals put forward by the whole group of nations on the Commission. My own personal guess is that they will again abstain from voting.

The question of tactics in September is still under consideration. It requires, of course, highest level decisions in our government and others will write you about this matter.

With most warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK OSBORN

501.BC/7-147: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1947—8 p. m.

2842. For your info Dept giving consideration to fulfilling requirements para 7 GA resolution Dec 14, 1946, on presence armed forces on territories other members UN by securing, preferably through exchange of notes, which could be registered and published under Art 102 of Charter, or possibly through joint communiqué, freely and publicly expressed consent of states in which US armed personnel stationed to presence such personnel. In deciding policy Dept wishes know what plans if any UK has for fulfilling requirements para 7 GA resolution. Please cable available info urgently.

Please inquire whether exchange of notes with UK would be satisfactory method from their point view for covering presence US armed personnel in all UK territories.

MARSHALL

USUN Files

The Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments (Bard)

WASHINGTON, 1 July 1947.

DEAR RALPH: Admiral Sherman¹ has told me of your discussion with him, Admiral Wooldridge² and Captain Smith concerning the regulation of conventional armaments.

As I see it, we should adhere to our position of 21 March, 1947,³ of deferring any implementation of regulation of conventional armaments (including actual exchange of information and actual inspection of any sort) until the following essential preliminaries have been accomplished:

- (a) Satisfactory treaties of peace.
- (b) Effective arrangements for the control of atomic weapons.
- (c) Effective arrangements for the control of other weapons of mass destruction.
- (d) Arrangements for effective use of a United Nations military force.

The Navy Department holds strongly to the view that regulation of conventional armaments must follow the achievement of security. Even though it may be a long time before we achieve the degree of security which will warrant reduction of our armaments we should adhere to our planned program. Any plan which involves inspection of our forces and resources before we have achieved a control which will prevent the use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction is unacceptable for the simple reason that it jeopardizes the future security of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

¹ Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

² Rear Adm. Edmund T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Political-Military Affairs.

³ Reference is presumably to the position defined in Doc. RAC D-13c (Final), March 20, p. 437.

501.BC/7-347: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1947—7 p. m.

294. Re CCA Plan of Work in SC¹ Dept in consultation with reps War and Navy contemplates following position. Pending final clearance July 7 would appreciate your comments.

¹ RAC D-13/5, June 19, p. 525.

1. Support and vote for Plan of Work in SC.
2. If SC approves Plan of Work (with USSR approval or abstention) SC should direct CCA to proceed on basis of approved Plan of Work.
3. If USSR vetoes Plan of Work USUN is authorized to express in its discretion, if situation appears appropriate, regret unwillingness USSR to accept Plan of Work and to permit CCA to proceed along this line. USUN authorized to propose that SC direct CCA to proceed in accordance item 1 Plan of Work.
4. If USSR vetoes such proposal USUN then authorized to propose to SC CCA item 2 Plan of Work, while SC itself considers item 1.
5. If USSR vetoes item 2, consult Dept for further instructions.

MARSHALL

501.BC Armament/7-847

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

[NEW YORK,] July 8, 1947.

DEAR MR. RUSK: In view of the approval of our Plan of Work by the Security Council today,¹ it is important that we make plans ahead at once covering our position on the various items of the Plan.

I have already asked you for advice and definition covering Item No. 1 on the Plan of Work, and I understand that you are sending me tonight the JCS definition covering this item, approved by the War and Navy Departments.² As soon as I receive this, I will get in touch with you about it, as I understand that it has not been officially released.

It is possible that item one will not consume too much time and it will very shortly be necessary for us to give the Commission our ideas on item No. 2, which as you know has to do with the consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. When this comes up for discussion, we will of course have our own ideas as to how it should

¹Nine nations voted in favor of the plan; the Soviet Union and Poland abstained.

²Item 1 concerned the weapons falling under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Conventional Armaments. The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1731/28) which sought to define "weapons adaptable to mass destruction," those which would fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission rather than within that of the CCA, is printed on p. 531. See also RAC D-4/2b, July 8, *infra*.

be handled, and in the absence of any advice or instructions from the State Department we will have to proceed along those lines.

What I am trying to say is that these procedures will not necessarily wait for the State Department. Quite a few of the delegates are very impatient and want to make progress, and when these subjects come up they will have to be discussed by us as well as by others. I therefore suggest that you give us as promptly as possible whatever suggestions you may have on items 1, 2, and 3 of the Plan of Work.

We may also be up against the introduction of a plan by the French or the Soviets in connection with item two, and it is therefore wise to do everything we can to set up our Plan so that it may be available when needed. Otherwise we may be placed in the position of having to oppose a French plan, instead of talking for our plan. It is very difficult for us to tell when such a plan might be needed.

Some time ago in talking to Secretary Marshall, he made the definite statement that our Delegation could not afford to take a negative position in connection with the disarmament program. The other delegates are looking to us for leadership, and I can assure you that our position is going to be practically untenable unless we are prepared to talk some definite plan.

Perhaps the best position to take at present is that the non-cooperative atmosphere in which we are negotiating and the lack of confidence, good will and security make the discussion of real disarmament futile at this time. For that reason, it might be well to adjourn further meetings in the Disarmament Commission at least until the General Assembly has met and some of the present problems resolved.

Several of the delegates have suggested to me in conversations recently that they can see no possibility of going forward with the disarmament program under the conditions which now exist. It is questionable whether or not it is wise to kid the public into feeling that something constructive is being done. They are smart enough to realize that until the general atmosphere changes, nothing can really be accomplished. We know that is a fact and so do others involved. Is it now the time to say so?

We shall be glad to have your advice on the various problems confronting us.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH A. BARD

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1947.

RAC D-4/2b

Subject: U.S. Position on Armaments and Armed Forces Within the Competence of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

There is forwarded herewith for approval a document on the above subject which has been approved by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments.

Item No. 1 on the Plan of Work drawn up by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments requires that recommendations be submitted to the Security Council concerning the armaments and armed forces within the Commission's jurisdiction. The attached paper recommends a United States position on this question. At the same time it recommends a definition of "other weapons adaptable to mass destruction" which phrase is used in the terms of reference of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to describe its competence with respect to weapons other than atomic.

Briefly, the attached paper recommends that the United States position in respect to Item No. 1 of the Plan of Work should be

(a) that the Commission for Conventional Armaments deal with

- (1) all armed forces, and
- (2) all armaments not specifically exempted by being classified as major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

(b) that the only weapons presently adaptable to mass destruction are:

- (1) atomic explosive weapons
- (2) radioactive material weapons
- (3) lethal chemical weapons
- (4) biological weapons

(c) That in the future, any weapons developed which have characteristics comparable to those of the atomic bomb should be classified as in (b) above.

The position outlined above is in harmony with the views of Joint Chiefs of Staff as given in JCS 1731/28.¹ A copy of this document is also attached together with a copy of a letter to the Secretary of State dated June 23, 1947 from the Secretaries of War and the Navy (RAC D 4/3).²

JOHN C. ELLIOTT
Executive Secretary

¹ *Ante*, p. 531.

² *Ibid.*

[Enclosure]

U.S. POSITION ON ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE COMMISSION FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS³

[WASHINGTON,] July 7, 1947.

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the U.S. position in respect to item No. 1 of the proposed Plan of Work in the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments, which is:

“To consider and make recommendations to the Security Council concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the jurisdiction of the CCA.”

FACTS AND DISCUSSION

2. The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946 commits the member nations to establish an international system of control and inspection for the regulation of armaments, including atomic energy. Before this Resolution was adopted, the Atomic Energy Commission was already in existence, having been established in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, and having terms of reference which clearly indicated that it had primary responsibilities in the field of atomic weapons and other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. When, on February 13, 1947, a Resolution was passed by the Security Council establishing a Commission for Conventional Armaments, the problem was raised as to where its jurisdiction should be delimited vis-à-vis the Atomic Energy Commission. Despite objection on the part of the Soviet Union, it was generally understood that in establishing the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the Commission would deal with all weapons and armed forces not within the jurisdiction of the AEC.

3. It follows, therefore, that the final determination of the competence of the CCA must logically be made by the Security Council by means of:

(a) definition of what constitute “major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”, or

(b) specification of particular weapons presently deemed to fall within the category of such weapons of mass destruction.

4. It should be noted that a decision by the Security Council as to a definition of “weapons of mass destruction” would not obviate the

³At their meeting on July 10, the Secretaries of the State, War, and Navy Departments endorsed the recommendations contained in this memorandum (811.002/1-247). The memorandum was transmitted to the United States Representative at the United Nations with instruction 173, July 17.

necessity for a subsequent decision by the Security Council to determine whether any given weapon, other than atomic weapons, should be so classified, now or in the future. Therefore, there would appear to be no impelling reason for the U.S. to press for immediate definition except as necessary to prevent the adoption of one which could be interpreted to our serious disadvantage.

5. The following definition of "major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" has been developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1731/28) and concurred in by the Secretaries of War and the Navy: "Major weapons adaptable to mass destruction are all atomic explosive, radioactive material, lethal chemical and biological weapons; and, in the future, are weapons which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bombs and other weapons mentioned above." This JCS paper also calls attention to the possible danger to the U.S. interest deriving from any confusion of "weapons" with "means" or "method" of delivery, and provides valuable background material in support of the position taken.

6. From a political and social point of view it is desirable to eliminate from national armaments any weapon which—

(a) in its initial impact or inevitable after-effects, is capable of producing widespread destruction of life comparable to that attending such natural catastrophes as plague, pestilence, famine, earthquake and flood;

(b) affords an aggressor state the means of overwhelming or paralyzing its victim before national or international counter-measures could become effective;

(c) in the constant threat of its possible use, imposes on organized society, as the only means of achieving "freedom from fear", defensive measures wholly incompatible with its normal peacetime social and economic structure.

7. In line with the U.S. estimate of Soviet intentions, as set forth in the "Ridgway Report"⁴ and interchanges of correspondence thereon among the three Secretaries, it can be anticipated that the Soviets will attempt to have long range aircraft, rockets and guided missiles designated as weapons capable of mass destruction, hoping thereby to eliminate them from national armaments to the particular disadvantage of the U.S. Similarly, it can be expected that the Soviets will attempt, during consideration of Item 1, to include within the competence of the CCA marginal items such as: base systems, industrial potential, utilization of manpower, transportation networks, and communication systems.

8. It is of utmost importance that the U.S. prevent the *exclusion* from the competence of the CCA of any weapon which it is unwill-

⁴ General Ridgway's memorandum of February 3, p. 402.

ing to see eliminated from national armaments. Conversely, it is of importance for the U.S. to prevent the discussion in earlier items of the Plan of Work of matters, particularly marginal weapons and methods of warfare, which should be dealt with in connection with Item 4.

CONCLUSION

9. It is concluded that the U.S. position in respect to Item No. 1 on the Plan of Work of CCA should be—

(a) to recommend to the Security Council:

(1) That all armed forces fall within the jurisdiction of CCA rather than the AEC.

(2) That all armaments not specifically exempted by being classified as major weapons adaptable to mass destruction fall within the competence of CCA.

(3) That major weapons adaptable to mass destruction may be specifically defined as atomic explosives, radioactive material, lethal chemical and biological weapons; and, in the future, any weapons developed which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.

(b) to insist, failing to secure agreement on the above definition in either the CCA or the SC, that the only weapons now subject to classification as weapons of mass destruction and thus exempted from CCA jurisdiction are:

- (1) Atomic explosive weapons.
- (2) Radioactive material weapons.
- (3) Lethal chemical weapons.
- (4) Biological weapons.

(c) to oppose vigorously any attempt to interpret the above definition or to expand the alternative list to include a "means" or "method" of delivering massed attack as distinct from weapons.

(d) Since the competence of the CCA covers all armed forces and all armaments not specifically exempted by classification as weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. opposes any attempt to make in connection with Item 1, a detailed listing of specific categories or types of armaments and armed forces falling within the CCA jurisdiction, since the elaboration of such detail would be expected to fall under Item 4.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that the above conclusions be approved and that this paper be forwarded to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations for its guidance, accompanied by copies of the JCS document 1731/28 for its information.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 8 July 1947.

Subject: Adjournment of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments.

1. The delegate of the USSR to the United Nations has stated that rejection of the view of his government, which regards consideration of atomic weapons and conventional weapons as inseparable, will impose obstacles which may result in the collapse of disarmament efforts.

2. In the event that when it is considered in the Security Council the Soviet delegate either vetoes or abstains from voting on the plan of work adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments, the United States should be prepared, if the situation so indicates, to move promptly and take action to defer further discussion of the regulation of armaments until other necessarily precedent steps are effectively accomplished.

3. It is therefore requested that the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments undertake the formulation of policy recommendations regarding the above subject for submission to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy.

JAMES FORRESTAL

501.BC/7-847: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 8, 1947—4 p. m.

US URGENT

3714. We discussed with Gladwyn Jebb¹ today Deptel 2842 July 1, re presence armed forces on territories other members UN. British take the strong position that in each case where British troops are stationed on foreign soil they are there with the consent of the nation concerned publicly given. If anyone feels otherwise Jebb says, let that nation complain and Britain will reply. He feels that to exchange notes would be "asking for trouble" and he can "see no point in it". British are satisfied that presence of our troops in UK territories is in each case with British consent publicly given and they see no need for an exchange of notes.

DOUGLAS

¹ Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, British Foreign Office; Chairman of the British interdepartmental Committee on Disarmament.

501.BC Atomic/7-847

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1947.

Today's press carries stories about the fact that Mr. Gromyko obtained majority support in Working Committee No. 1 of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on behalf of a proposal to "destroy" atomic weapons—i.e., "the destruction of stocks of manufactured atomic weapons and of unfinished atomic weapons".²

Committee 1 is now considering Soviet amendments and additions proposed on February 18³ to the first report of the AEC to the Security Council. These discussions are preliminary to the working out of specific proposals for eventual inclusion in a draft treaty to be submitted in due course to the Security Council by the AEC. Before the results of current discussions could become effective, the following action must be taken:

(a) Approval of a report by Working Committee 1 to the AEC (majority)

(b) Approval by the AEC and inclusion in its report to the Security Council (majority in AEC)

(c) Approval by the Security Council by vote of not less than seven, including concurring votes of 5 permanent members

(d) Reference to a special session of the General Assembly for its consideration and recommendation to signatory governments for acceptance (by $\frac{2}{3}$ vote of General Assembly)

(e) Approval by member governments, by their several constitutional processes.

It has been agreed that discussions in Working Committee 1 of the AEC *do not commit* their governments at this stage.

The subject now under discussion is for eventual inclusion in a treaty or set of treaties, none of which would become operative unless an entire system for the control of atomic energy simultaneously comes into existence.

The discussion on July 7 turned upon the difference between "the disposal of" and "the destruction of". It was apparent from the record of the discussion that some of the members saw no difference between the two expressions.

The U.S. is already committed to the eventual elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments. The remaining issue is limited to the question as to whether such weapons might be available to the

¹ Robert A. Lovett, appointed Under Secretary of State July 1.

² For the record of the 24th meeting of the Working Committee (Committee 1), July 7, see AEC, *2nd yr.*, *Special Suppl.*, pp. 185-196.

³ See footnote 2, p. 424.

Security Council. Decision on this latter question is still open and has not been precluded by the discussion of July 7.

Mr. Osborn's view is that the press representatives sought to build a story out of inadequate material, explainable perhaps by the fact that this was the first meeting of Committee 1 to which they had been admitted.

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

NEW YORK, July 8, 1947.

This memorandum supplements my recent memorandum of June 30th¹ which refers to the current status of preparation for the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition to the contents of that report, there will arise questions as to the form of its presentation to the Security Council. This memorandum will present the various alternative forms which have been discussed by the leaders of the different Delegations, and on which you will undoubtedly desire to ask the views of the State Department.

We are assuming that the second report will have as its main body the specific proposals and explanatory statements covering the operating functions and responsibilities of the international agency. It has been suggested that the introduction to this report should be a discussion of the Russian proposals recently submitted to the Commission² with strong, but simply presented, arguments to the effect that the Russian proposal is unacceptable to the majority of the Commission because it does not provide for sufficient or effective control and might, indeed, encourage rather than prevent national rivalries. There has been some discussion as to whether putting this condemnation of the Russian proposal in the introduction of the report might force the Russians to an adverse vote. As an alternative, it has been suggested that there might be an appendix to cover the Soviet proposals of June 11th, and a statement to be signed by the ten nations giving their reasons why the Soviet proposals are unacceptable. The report itself would then simply contain the specific proposals for the functions of the agency, and while the Russians would not vote for it, they would be more likely to abstain than vote against it.

Which of these two proposals is the best will probably depend on the decision as to what we would want the Security Council to do with

¹ *Ante*, p. 540.

² Reference is to the proposals contained in Gromyko's speech at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, June 11; for text, see AEC, *2nd yr.*, *Plenary*, pp. 20-24.

the report when they get it. Here again, two alternatives have been proposed. The first, that the report might put it up to the Security Council to accept the proposals in the report as the basis for the further work of the Atomic Energy Commission, ruling out the Russian proposals as unacceptable. The other alternative would be a report such that the Security Council could accept it as an interim report only and again refer it back to the Atomic Energy Commission with instructions (a) to complete the report by the elaboration of specific proposals on strategic balance, sanctions, and, ultimately, stages, and (b) secondarily to examine any further Soviet counter-proposals.

So far as the work of the Delegation is concerned, the second alternative, namely, that the report should be an interim report, drafted in the expectation that the Security Council would return it to the Commission, both for further elaboration and to consider any Soviet counter-proposals, would, in our opinion, be the most likely to further our work. We see no advantage in a showdown with the Russians on atomic energy in September. We are conscious that the matter is very difficult to understand and that even the detailed statement of functions of the agency which will be in the report will take months to be absorbed and understood in the Russian hierarchy. But until the Soviet bureaucracy has some idea of the proposed functions of the agency, it will be very difficult indeed to deal with them on such matters as strategic balance and sanctions.

We recognize, of course, that the tactics of this situation will depend on the over-all decisions made at the highest level. The control of atomic energy is only a part of the totality of our relations with the Soviet. It is important that this Delegation should receive clear instructions based on the relation of their work to the whole of the American position.

In this connection, it may be worthwhile to quote a conversation which illustrates the point of view of the majority group of the Delegates to the Commission.

At dinner the other night Gonzales Fernandez³ of Colombia said he saw no sense in doing all this work when the Russians had specifically said they would have none of it. The Canadian, Ignatieff,⁴ immediately replied that the reason seemed to him and to the other Delegates very clear. The democratic nations are engaged in a great debate with the totalitarians. Atomic energy is one facet of that debate. If the democratic nations keep on proposing a solution which they can defend as the only realistic solution, then the Soviets are in the position in the eyes of the world of refusing to accept atomic dis-

³ Alberto González Fernández, Colombian Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission.

⁴ George Ignatieff of the Canadian Delegation to the Atomic Energy Commission.

armament. If we do nothing, the Soviets take over the offensive and are in a position to claim that they have made proposals for atomic disarmament which the democratic nations are unwilling to accept, and that their refusal indicates some evil motive. It is for these general reasons that we feel so strongly that the initiative must be kept in our hands by continuing to develop a sound plan which would really control dangerous uses of atomic energy.

FREDERICK OSBORN

Policy Planning Staff Files

Memorandum by Mr. Edward A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), to Mr. Joseph E. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1947.

Subject: Future Course with Respect to Atomic Energy

I have had a couple of talks with Dean Acheson¹ about our future course with respect to atomic energy.

He seems to believe that it is high time for some intensive high level consideration as to what we should do as the September "deadline" approaches. For that reason he thinks the Kennan² group should be brought especially to bear.

Although Mr. Acheson appeared to have been impressed by some of the arguments for a large-scale alliance, grouped around the atom, without Russia, he now appears to believe that a grouping confined to the US, UK, Canada and certain raw material supplying countries would be sufficient. This understanding could be established with practically no negotiation and with little chance of any new overt provocation to the Soviet Union. In any wider alignment of powers the small countries would be liabilities and among the middle powers few could be forced to choose sides in such a fashion without great disturbance.

As to tactics in the UN, Mr. Acheson inclines to the opinion that negotiations should be brought to an unmistakable and definite close if results in September are negative. He endorses this course for two reasons:

(a) So long as negotiations are allowed to trail along with no real prospect of constructive achievement, public opinion in this country, and in countries sympathetic to our views, will be lulled into a false sense of security unaware of the gravity of the situation.

¹ Under Secretary of State August 16, 1945-June 30, 1947; practicing law in Washington, D.C.

² George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

(b) The longer the talks go on, the less prospect there seems to be of maintaining our united front with the countries in AEC other than the Soviet Union and Poland.

However, before negotiations are broken off, Mr. Acheson feels that we should be absolutely certain that there is no modification of the U.S. proposals based on the Baruch plan, now before the Commission, or under discussion in the committees, which would offer reasonable world security if adopted. He believes this question requires early and earnest consideration within the government.

I suggested a new Board of Consultants³ constituted to consider the specific question of possible changes in the U.S. proposals but he believed most of the competent people were already in the AEC and that we should start by ascertaining their views. He said that he had been surprised to hear reports that Dr. Oppenheimer had now developed some second thoughts about our proposals.

EDWARD A. GULLION

³ Reference is to the Board of Consultants which assisted the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy in 1946.

501.BC Atomic/7-947: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

LONDON, July 9, 1947—5 p. m.

3760. Re Acheson's letter June 27,¹ received July 7. I explained to Bevin the various considerations which it enumerates and in the light of those considerations the importance we attached to maintaining a united front in the matter of international control of atomic energy. Bevin bluntly said that our unsynthesized views and what I called no more than suspicions, were reasonable and fair. He concurred in the opinion that a separate British proposal would offer the Soviet another opportunity to prolong the filibuster.

A special Cabinet Committee will meet on Friday morning² and discuss a paper on the subject prepared by those with whom Arneson had met on his visit here. He assured me that he would give me on Friday, before he leaves for Paris, the results of the meeting of this Committee. It was probable that this Committee would conclude to send the paper with an able person to "inform and reinforce Cadogan". It would not, he thought, be the British Government's purpose in doing this to present a separate proposal but rather to try to attempt to go as

¹ *Ante*, p. 537.

² July 11.

far as possible along the lines of our proposal and to effect complete agreement with us on the few matters about which they were doubtful.

He did, however, intimate the apprehension that if our proposal were accepted *in toto* it might have the effect of retarding the use of nuclear energy for commercial purposes in the United Kingdom and he implied that developments here, of which we had no knowledge, might make the use of nuclear energy for this purpose more immediate than we thought possible. This source of power he thought essential, if it were practicable, to a highly industrialized nation like the United Kingdom if it were to be one of the Great Powers in the world.

DOUGLAS

USUN Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)

[NEW YORK,] July 10, 1947.

DEAR JIM: I found your letter of July 1¹ upon my return to New York on July 7, and will undertake to answer it as briefly as possible, although I want to talk again with you and Admiral Sherman before a final decision is made.

Your conclusions of course are sound from the standpoint of the armed forces considering their responsibilities and also perfectly proper, if it were not for the fact that sticking arbitrarily to these principles will bring us into conflict with other nations on the basis which will make it very difficult for us to maintain leadership in the disarmament program. We could hold out and in the end veto any program which was set up which did not agree with these ideas. However, we would be constantly in a negative position, and one thing that Secretary Marshall has impressed upon me is that we must not occupy a negative position and must supply leadership for the other smaller countries involved.

If we do not have a constructive program of our own, we will be in a negative position of opposing disarmament programs, which will undoubtedly be in the case of Russia entirely antagonistic to our ideas and probably to some degree in the case of the French program. We will then be in a position of blocking a program of disarmament. That is just where Russia wants to place us, and they will make the most of it. For many years, they have put out the propaganda that the world does not expect any disarmament program from the capitalistic nations, and that they will never get one.

¹ *Ante*, p. 544.

The program which I have in mind, which has been accepted in principle by most of the members of the Military Staff here, is one based upon progressive disarmament as the United Nations becomes a strong functioning organization—as the United Nations armed force comes into being and is effective as the peace treaties are signed—the atomic weapons program concluded, etc. etc.

We feel here that we must have a program where we can show leadership. We feel that the net result of having such a program will be very much more favorable, even though it is not exactly what we want, than the results will be if we have to take a program proposed by some other country which in the end will be probably very unsatisfactory and which we might have to veto. Various delegations and millions of people through the world and in this country are greatly interested in the disarmament program, and our Commission is going to work on some program, and it would be much better if the majority of the delegates approved our program than it would be if we have to fight against someone else's program.

I don't think the military in Washington quite understand that as the steps in our program are developed, they will be consulted, and these steps will be carried out in accordance with their wishes, so far as is possible. In other words, we would not take steps unless they are satisfactory to us. For instance, when we ask the nations of the world to fill out a questionnaire showing their armed forces and armaments in the initial stages, this could be so limited that it would really not be embarrassing at all to us—somewhat the same information as President Truman has already given on our armed forces and perhaps approximately the same information that *Life* magazine has given as to our Navy. Such matters are in our hands for decision and will only be decided after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As to verification procedures and inspection, these too could be limited very drastically in the initial stages. Don't forget that it will be many months before we will reach the position of asking for such information and setting up the verification and inspection units, if ever. The point is, however, that it is agreed by all of the military here that we must have a program to work on, one that holds hope for eventual substantial disarmament, but one which progresses very slowly, only as all the conditions you enumerate have taken place.

In talking to General Osborn yesterday, he agreed that from his experience in the Atomic Energy Commission, it was absolutely necessary that we have a program. He also said that he thought this progressive plan that I have been talking about is just what we need, indicating also that it would never progress too far too soon to our

embarrassment, because the Russians in his opinion would under no condition accept the verification and inspection program.

We are trying through the State Department and with the help of the Army and Navy to set up this embryo program in some final form that may be acceptable, and when we get it in better shape, I will want to talk to you and Admiral Sherman again.²

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

RALPH A. BARD

² For partial text of Forrestal's letter of reply of July 11, see Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, Viking Press, 1951), p. 290.

501.BC Atomic/7-1147: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1947—8 p. m.

US URGENT

3810. Supplementing Embtel 3760, July 9. Mr. Bevin informed me this afternoon that the special Cabinet Committee to which reference is made in Embtel 3760 in its meeting this morning came to no final conclusion. A person "steeped in all phases of atomic energy" would be sent to reinforce Cadogan early next week. He was not able today to give me the name of the individual.

The special Cabinet Committee will meet again next Wednesday further to consider our proposals and to decide on instructions for Cadogan.

I again emphasized our view that the British do not put forward a separate proposal on their own and repeated our reasons. Bevin was very sympathetic with them and said that it would be the purpose of Cadogan and his special advisor to attempt to come to an agreement with us on the international control of atomic energy in order that a separate British proposal might be avoided. He further said, however, that there was a prevailing apprehension among the members of the Cabinet Committee and Chiefs of Staff that our plan might have the effect of denying to the UK atomic energy as an adequate source of industrial power. The British would, he said, go as far as possible to meet us but he hoped we would make at least a few concessions to meet them.

I will be advised of the outcome of the special Cabinet Committee meeting to be held next Wednesday.¹

Repeat to New York for Osborn.

DOUGLAS

¹ July 16.

501.BC Armaments/7-1147

*Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

[NEW YORK,] July 11, 1947.

I have not discussed with you for a good while the problems we are facing as a member of the Conventional Armaments Commission.

The Plan of Work of the Commission has been adopted and approved by the Security Council, although the Soviet Delegate, after the vote in the Security Council, declared that in the Commission, his Government's representative would be guided by the general line indicated in the Soviet Plan of Work.²

We are now faced with the discussion of General Principles, safeguards, and following these, the formulation of a practical program of disarmament. As matters stand now we are in a most unsatisfactory position to engage in debate upon the program ahead. My instructions from the Secretary of State are that we must not take a negative position in the disarmament program, and yet because of the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy, our hands are tied, and no position but a negative one is available.

I and my advisers agree that we must have a practical program for disarmament, behind which we can rally our friends on the Commission. Otherwise we will have to oppose piecemeal any program brought forward by the Soviets or the French and be put in the position of opposing the only programs for disarmament which are before the Commission.

We have developed, as you know, an interim proposal for eventual disarmament on a progressive basis,³ which has been in principle approved by a number of well informed people who know what we are up against in dealing with the Soviets in our Commission. But the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff so far make it impossible to go forward with our plan.

The Army and Navy take the position that until the peace treaties have been signed, the United Nations armed forces set up, and the atomic bomb question settled satisfactorily, including also settlement

¹ Bard transmitted copies of this memorandum to Lovett and Rusk (501.BC Armaments/7-1147).

² At its 152nd Meeting, July 8, the Security Council debated and adopted the Plan of Work approved by the Commission on Conventional Armaments on June 18 (for text, see Doc. RAC D-13/5, June 19, p. 525). For the relevant portion of the record of the 152nd Meeting of the Security Council, including statements by the United States and Soviet representatives, and the text of the Soviet Plan of Work, see SC, 2nd yr., No. 55, pp. 1218-1229.

³ See Doc. RAC D-9/1a, July 16, p. 562.

of methods of handling other mass destruction weapons, there shall be no discussion of a definite program of disarmament and that they will not give out any information as to their armament or armed forces or submit to any verification or inspection procedures, no matter how restricted.

Under such conditions, it is of course obvious that no plan can be proposed by the United States Delegation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff seem to forget that all of these matters will be discussed under someone else's plan and that we cannot prevent such discussions. The various delegates and millions of people throughout the world want a plan, and if we have none to offer and possibly end up with nothing but a most disastrous Soviet plan, we are going to be entirely on the defensive, and a trimmed down Soviet plan will be much worse in all respects than any plan that we would propose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff advisers don't seem to realize that every part of our plan as it progresses will be submitted to them for approval of such details as the terms of the questionnaire, the question of safeguards, verification and inspection, etc. In General Osborn's opinion, they have nothing to worry about anyway because the Russians will never accept our plan with its safeguard features.

It is of course apparent to everyone in the United Nations and on the street that the present international atmosphere is not such that lends itself to a discussion of a program of disarmament. Several delegates have mentioned this, and in talking to Cadogan yesterday, he said that from a common sense standpoint, it would be better to adjourn further meetings of our Commission until after the General Assembly meetings in the fall, in the hope that developments will occur which would permit us to resume on a basis that makes sense.

Unless we are to be permitted to set up a program of our own, it would be far better to arrange in some manner for an adjournment than to be placed in a negative position of being opposed to the only disarmament programs before the Commission. This is just the position Russia desires us to be in, and they will make the most of it. Why not be forthright and truthful and say out loud what everybody is saying and everyone knows is a fact, that talk of disarmament under present international conditions is a farce. Such a statement properly arranged for might clear the atmosphere in a very desirable manner.

In this connection, I am talking only about adjournment until controversial matters are settled to the point the disarmament discussion can be resumed in an atmosphere of cooperation, good will and greater security than now exists. Unless we can work out shortly some solution to our difficulties, I am afraid we are in for a bad time in our Commission in trying to carry out the ideas of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are attempting to revise our plan and as soon as we can get this done, I expect to again discuss it with the Secretaries in Washing-

ton of the Army and Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have not given up hope of getting their approval.

RALPH A. BARD

501.BC/7-847 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1947—5 p. m.

2982. Re urtel 3714 July 8 please inform FonOff following: Dept appreciates position expressed by Jebb re UK armed forces on territories other members UN. Our situation apparently different as US armed forces stationed on a few territories members UN without consent "freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements" as required by para 7b GA resolution Dec 14, 1946. In view desirability fulfilling requirements para 7b and in order be in good position meet any criticism from Soviet Union or others at Sept GA, we plan proceed secure consent to presence US armed personnel on certain such territories, preferably through exchange of notes, which could be registered and published under Art 102 of Charter, or possibly through joint communiqué. Please cable FonOff reaction urgently.¹

For your info question has arisen our minds whether Jebb was expressing considered views of interested Govt depts when indicating reaction contents Deptel 2842.²

MARSHALL

¹ In telegram 3908 from London, July 17, Douglas reported that the British had no objection if the United States decided to go ahead with plans to exchange notes or otherwise justify the presence of US armed forces on territories of other United Nations members. They preferred, however, that if the United States did so proceed that it would avoid giving publicity to the number of armed forces involved as such publicity might prove embarrassing to the United Kingdom. (501.BC/7-1747)

² Dated July 1, p. 543.

500.A/7-1647

*Draft Proposal Prepared in the Office of the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard)*¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] July 16, 1947.

[RAC D-9/1a]

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR ARMAMENTS REGULATION PROGRAM

It is recognized that until general conditions for international security have been established, no actual program for the regulation

¹ This document is a revision of RAC D-9/1, May 21, not printed. The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments transmitted the present document to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation from a military point of view on August 5.

and reduction of armaments can be implemented. These pre-requisites include the completion of the peace treaties, the establishment of an effective international security force, in conformity with Article 43 of the Charter, and an international agreement providing effective control of atomic energy. Further, implementation of any program of regulation and reduction must be accompanied by an effective system of international safeguards, which will make it impossible for any nation to violate with impunity the terms of an international agreement for arms regulation and reduction.

During the interim period prior to the establishment of these general conditions of security, it will be possible to institute a preliminary program which will in itself assist in establishing conditions of international control and confidence. Such an interim program would recognize that until conditions of international security and confidence are established, each nation must reserve to itself the right to determine the size of its military establishment. The program would call for submission of annual reports to an international agency, which would give information of a general character on the strength of its military establishment. These reports will then be subject to verification by an international inspection agency operating within the national territories of the members of the United Nations. The objective of this interim program will be two-fold:

(a) It will recognize that since the end of hostilities all nations have voluntarily reduced their military strength to a point where they are no longer capable of undertaking a general aggressive war. The interim program will, therefore, be directed primarily toward the possibility of any nation undertaking a re-armament program of a general character.

(b) The interim program is designed to make use of the only effective international force in existence today, that of world public opinion. The publication of the annual reports and the publication of the verification reports will immediately bring to light any military program which may in the future threaten the peace of the world.

I. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY STRENGTH

Within — months after the entering into effect of an international agreement, each member of the United Nations shall submit to the United Nations a report on the strength of its military establishment. Subsequent reports shall be submitted annually. The form of this report is given in Annex 1.²

In general, this report will provide data on the overall strength both in manpower and matériel, and will further show the turn-over in manpower and matériel during the previous year. This will provide a valuable indication of the rate in which reserves are trained

² Not printed.

and then returned to inactive status, and the rate at which new matériel is produced. Both active and reserve manpower and matériel will be broken down into the following three categories:

1. Required for occupation duties and for United Nations commitments.
2. Required for internal security.
3. Required for national defense.

II. CONVENTIONAL ARMS REGULATORY COMMISSION

There shall be established immediately upon the entering into effect of the international agreement a Conventional Arms Regulatory Commission. This Commission shall be within the framework of the Security Council, but shall derive its powers and status from the convention under which it is established. The duties of this Commission will include both the collection and publication of reports submitted by member states and the verification of these reports by means of international inspection bodies. The organization, rights, and duties of this Commission shall be as follows:

1. The Commission shall represent all members of the United Nations.

2. Its membership shall include the five permanent members of the Security Council and six temporary members who shall be drawn from those other members of the U.N. who are not simultaneously serving as temporary members of the Security Council. The term of the non-permanent members shall be two years.

3. There shall be routine inspections which shall be automatic, and such other inspections as the agency may decide upon. The inspectorate will include nationals of member states other than the nation being inspected.

4. Subject to limitations specifically provided in the convention, the Commission shall itself determine the extent of inspection necessary for the verification of the national reports.

5. The size and composition of the inspectorate for any nation shall be determined by the international supervisory agency.

6. Individual members of the inspectorate shall be rotated periodically by nationality and geographic location.

7. There shall be no requirement of unanimity within the agency with respect to its decisions within its defined functions.

8. Each participating state shall afford duly accredited representatives of the agency unimpeded rights of ingress to and egress from, and movement within its territories; shall aid and assist them in the performance of their duties, and shall provide access to the activities subject to inspection, unhindered by national or local authorities or private individuals.

9. The Commission shall not be required to verify the absolute accuracy of each item of each report submitted. It shall rather provide a general verification which in its opinion is reasonably accurate. It shall at all times keep in mind that the general purpose of such verification is immediately to bring to light the initiation of any military program which may at some future time threaten international peace.

10. The Commission shall render both periodic reports and such special reports as it sees fit to the Security Council. Unless the Commission decides to the contrary, these reports shall be made public. The reports shall include the reports submitted by member nations, together with reports on the verification performed by the Commission. The Commission shall also include in such reports a full statement covering any situation in which verification has been hindered or rendered impossible by the action of any government, group or individual, or by any other circumstance.

11. *Initiation of negotiations of regulation and reduction of armaments.* The Commission shall be empowered to determine when conditions of international security have been established to a sufficient degree to make possible the initiation of a program of progressive reduction of armaments and armed forces. Upon the satisfactory conclusion of such negotiations, the Commission shall report to the Security Council its recommendations, and the program shall be implemented in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946.

In this connection, the interim reports and the verification system shall be modified as may be necessary to provide clear and unambiguous signals in the event of violation of the agreement by any nation.

USUN Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)

[NEW YORK,] July 17, 1947.

DEAR JIM: I am in receipt of your letter of July 11th,¹ and certainly agree with you that there is "practically no basis for any realistic talk about disarmament" until conditions change materially. In fact I have suggested to the State Department the possibility of someone making a public statement to this effect, recommending adjournment of further meetings of the Commission for Conventional Armaments until some of the controversial matters before the United Nations have been resolved, until as you say, "the Russians have made it manifest and

¹ For partial text, see Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 290.

clear that they want the substance and not merely the sham of peace in the world."

I would say that the delegates from the United Kingdom, France and many of the others agree that this is a common sense suggestion, but they take the position that it is politically impossible for them to make such a statement and assume that it is impossible for us.

I am sure our diplomats will never agree to such a statement. Personally, I am inclined to believe that a straightforward statement of this kind very carefully drawn would be appreciated by almost everybody concerned and might turn out to be a very healthy antidote which might help to either kill or cure the patient. I think a statement could be drawn up which would throw all the onus of the adjournment on the Soviets. I will try and work up such a statement and if I have any success, will send it on to you. I am quite sure that nothing will be done along these lines by the State Department without pressure from other directions.

Assuming that we have to proceed, I think you will agree that we must have a plan. Otherwise we will be in a negative position of opposing a Soviet plan, as it does not appear at the moment that even the French or the British or anybody else has a plan.

Our instructions from the General Assembly and the Security Council are to the effect that we must proceed with the discussion of a program of disarmament, even though in the discussion of general principles it is decided that such a program cannot be implemented until after the peace treaties have been signed, the United Nations armed force set up, and the atomic problem disposed of.

Therefore, whether we like it or not, we will have to continue to discuss disarmament, and we cannot afford to be in a position of trying to whittle away on a Russian plan, which will no doubt be so drastic that even if you do whittle industriously, you are apt to arrive at a very unsatisfactory program. We must also realize that these delegates are on this Commission to produce a disarmament program, and they will develop one with the Russian plan as a basis, unless we have one to which they can adhere.

We have drafted a new proposal² which I am sending you under separate cover. You will find that we have set up a questionnaire which is so broad in the information required that we can't see how the JCS can object. Of course this questionnaire is subject to change, in fact just about anything that the JCS wishes. I would say that all of this information, as far as the United States is concerned, is immediately available to anyone who might wish to obtain it.

I hope you will keep in mind that this program, because of the verification and inspection procedure, will probably not be at all accepta-

² *Supra.*

ble to the Soviets, and also that as we proceed, our Military Staff Committee will be constantly consulted on all points. If the plan is adopted, it will be months before this happens and then there will be a period of time after its adoption before the information will be called for.

The Navy Department seems to be much more averse to such a program than the Army. I hope you will see that this proposition is considered with an open mind, because we have been committed by our President, a former Secretary of State, our Senators, Senator Austin and everybody concerned to diligent consideration and development of a plan of disarmament. This procedure can only be directed as we would wish it, by means of a plan of our own.

I hope to be down in Washington the early part of next week.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH A. BARD

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1947.

MEANS FOR UNITED NATIONS ACTION AGAINST AGGRESSION: POSSIBLE
UNITED STATES PROPOSALS AT NEXT ASSEMBLY

With the imminence of the second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which will convene on September 16, thought has been given by various officers of the Department to placing on the Agenda of the Assembly United States proposals having as their aim the enlistment of maximum United Nations assistance against direct and indirect aggression inimical to the interests of the United States.

There are three tentative proposals on which the preliminary views of the officers attending your morning meeting would be most helpful:

1. *Action Looking Toward the Maintenance of the Independence of States.*

The first is a possibility that this Government might advocate at the next Assembly Session that a Permanent Commission be established to investigate and study threats against the integrity of States through indirect aggression.² Such attack might take the form of infiltration and Fifth Column activity, the subversive actions of minority groups, illegal traffic in arms, the abuse of economic concessions, the machina-

¹ Folder "Committee 1, Interim General Assembly Committee on Peace and Security".

² For documentation on United States interest in increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations, including material on the United States proposal for the creation of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, see pp. 166 ff.

tions of international Communism, or other measures falling short of outright armed aggression across frontiers.

It is thought that such a Commission might be composed of the twenty-one States which make up the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Such an "automatic" choice of membership would have several advantages. The principal of these would be that, although smaller powers would hesitate to accept service on a Commission whose duties would be surcharged with heavy political responsibility and therefore political risk, if the membership of the Commission were already predetermined, on the very good logic that maintenance of the integrity of States involves both questions of security and problems of an economic and social character, much of the onus of service on such a Commission would disappear. The new body would, it is thought, be appointed by the next Session of the Assembly and directed to report back to a Special Session meeting in the Spring of 1948.

The establishment of the Permanent Commission would afford a means of bringing together the consensus of many governments that covert assault upon the integrity of States must effectively be resisted. It must be admitted however, that even though the Assembly by a two-thirds vote might grant such a Commission wide powers of investigation and recommendation, the Russians and their satellites would most certainly resist, and could effectively prevent, the Commission from visiting areas in which their sovereignty is supreme.

Despite this difficulty the appointment of such a Commission would present advantages from the aspect of United States policy both domestic and foreign. It would provide a six months spotlight on the problems of indirect aggression. So far as the domestic picture in the United States is concerned this would materially assist the Department in educating popular opinion to the dangers and responsibilities of the situation confronting us today. From the international point of view this spotlight might, however, unless properly handled, serve more to highlight the cleavage between the Western and Eastern worlds than to focus on possible bridges to bring those worlds together. In consequence it would seem imperative that the terms of reference of the Commission and U.S. participation thereon be designed so as to leave the door open to the U.S.S.R. to join in the work of the Commission and to cease the type of activity complained of.

2. *Mutual Assistance Treaty under Article 51.*

The second possible step which the United States might take would be to broach a global plan for mutual assistance supplementary to that now provided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. This would, in effect, be a world wide treaty of mutual assistance along

the lines of the Act of Chapultepec³ and the contemplated mutual defense treaty to be negotiated in Rio next month,⁴ but keyed to the requirements of Article 51 of the Charter which provides:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The mutual defense arrangements would automatically go into effect under Article 51 in the event of an armed attack, pending effective action by the Security Council. If the Council did not undertake effective action the network of mutual assistance engagements would fill the void occasioned by misuse of the veto in the Security Council.

The multilateral convention for measures of self-defense would be complementary to the proposed twenty-one State Commission on indirect aggression. It would be the purpose of the multilateral pact to deal with armed attacks, leaving to the Security Council, the 21 State Commission and the States concerned the problem of covert aggression. It is thought that, if smaller States such as Greece and Turkey had concrete assurance that in cases of armed conflict they would have the automatic support of other and more powerful States, they would be free to dispose more of their resources and energy in combating instances of infiltration and subversion within their own borders.

The advantage to the United States of a mutual defense pact would be two-fold. In the first place such a pact would impose a legal obligation on the signatories to take action to meet overt aggression. Such an obligation is today perhaps implicit in the Charter of the United Nations but it is not explicit. The second advantage would be that in the event of aggression threatening the security of the U.S., even though such aggression took place against a third party, the U.S.

³ Resolution VIII, "Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity," known as the "Act of Chapultepec," approved at the plenary session, March 6, 1945, of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City; for text, see Department of State, *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21-March 8, 1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 72, or Department of State TIAS 1543 (60 Stat. 1831); for additional documentation on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.

⁴ For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro, September 2, 1947, see Department of State TIAS 1838. For documentation on the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, August 15-September 2, 1947, see vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.

would have clear legal sanction for such measures of self-defense as it might find necessary to take immediately, pending assistance from other signatories of the multilateral treaty or pending action by the Security Council according to the terms of Article 51.

3. *A Treaty for Control of Atomic Energy.*

The third possible proposal which the United States might advocate at the next session of the Assembly relates to the control of atomic energy. There is no question but that a complete impasse has been reached in the Atomic Energy Commission so far as really effective control of the atomic bomb is concerned. It might serve our purpose if the Assembly should pass a resolution calling upon the Atomic Energy Commission promptly to draft a treaty for the international control of atomic energy and to submit this draft to a Special Session which would convene in January, 1948. Such a Special Session would focus world scrutiny on the stumbling blocks in the way of effective international control of atomic energy, where these stumbling blocks lie and who is responsible for them.

It is apparent at this point in the thus far fruitless debates in the Atomic Energy Commission that time is running out and running against the interests of the United States. The more months spent in circumlocution the more time the Soviet Union has in which to perfect its atomic armament. However, it would be very difficult for the U.S. abruptly to break off negotiations in the AEC and take remedial measures for the improvement of its security without having clearly shown to the world and to the American people that it has exhausted every ounce of patience and endeavor to find a meeting of the minds within the framework of the AEC and the UN in general. Once the proposed draft treaty were elaborated and brought to a special session of the UN General Assembly, if then there could be no compromise and no agreement, the political preparation would be complete for the U.S. to regain its liberty of action.

501.BC Atomic/7-2247

The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn)

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1947.

DEAR MR. OSBORN: I wish to reply at once to your letter of July 22nd¹ regarding the form of the Commission's report to the Security Council, and the question of having the report considered by the General Assembly in September.

¹ Not printed.

A telegram of instruction should reach you shortly on the form of the report. Because of the fundamental issues involved the text of the telegram will require considerable clearance. In substance it will state that the AEC report should be based on the assumption that the AEC will in due course complete the task assigned to it by the directives of the General Assembly and the Security Council. At the same time, however, the report should not conceal but should clearly delineate the basic disagreements which are now blocking the rapid establishment of an effective international system for the control of atomic energy.

Your question on consideration of the Atomic Energy Commission's report by the General Assembly is one which has been bothering us a great deal. It will be impossible to keep the subject out of the General Assembly if any members wish to have it discussed. It will be comparatively easy for the Assembly to debate the matter in connection with the report of the Security Council. Further, there is a belief in many responsible quarters that we are faced with two dangers (1) that of not obtaining an agreement before other nations get atomic weapons, and (2) that of creating the illusion through continued discussion that more progress toward agreement is being made than is the case.

On Monday, the 28th, some of the senior officers of the Department will consider briefly whether the General Assembly should not at its September session call upon the Atomic Energy Commission for a final report by a given date, such final report to be commented upon by the Security Council and considered by a special session of the General Assembly early next year. The purpose would be to make a strong effort to obtain maximum agreement or, lacking such agreement, to clear the way politically for any new approach which might be necessary in the interest of our own security.

I mention this prior to responsible department consideration because you raise the matter in your letter and because your views will be solicited at once if it is concluded that any such idea has enough merit to be worth developing further. My own impression is that some such "disengaging action" is necessary if we are to achieve no agreement along present lines because of the political difficulty we should incur if we simply try to pull out of the present discussion and undertake other measures.

Any comments which you care to furnish at any time on this sort of question will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

SPA Files: Lot 55D323

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1947.

POLICY REGARDING THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS.

DISCUSSION

1. The Department of State must instruct the United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as to how he should vote on the question of eventual destruction of atomic weapons. Specifically the question is whether, when the proposed system of international control of atomic energy comes into effect and when the stage is reached which calls for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, atomic weapons then existent should be destroyed or otherwise disposed of.

2. The position on this issue proposed to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission by the Department of State (Tab A)¹ is that:

“Our atomic weapons will not be destroyed or disposed of unless or until a fully effective system of international control of atomic energy, including international inspection, operation and ownership of dangerous atomic activities, has been established and has progressed to that stage at which it shall have been agreed atomic weapons are to be eliminated from national armaments. The United States considers that at that point all atomic weapons should be destroyed, and that nuclear fuel contained therein should be diverted to peaceful purposes.”

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have commented on this position as follows: (Tab B):

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff see no objection, after successful establishment by treaty or convention of a control agreement embodying the principles of the United States (Baruch Plan) proposal for the control of atomic energy, and after adequate demonstration of the plan's effectiveness, to the disposal of existing atomic weapons by any means, including destruction, which may be agreed upon at that time.

“From the point of view of the National Security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that an agreement by the United States as to the ultimate disposition of atomic weapons should not be made at this time.”

4. It is understood informally that the Secretary of War concurs with the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of the Navy,

¹ The three attachments to this memorandum, tabs A, B, and C, are not printed.

however, has withheld his concurrence pending discussion with the three Secretaries. The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission has stated that he favors the principle of ultimate destruction.

5. Attached is a series of quotations from important documents and published statements which set forth the attitude previously taken by the United States Government on this question. (See Tab C)

6. On the basis of these quotations it seems clear beyond reasonable doubt that our primary purpose has been to bring about the elimination of atomic energy as a *weapon* and to insure its use for *peaceful purposes only*.

7. Staff discussions have indicated that the reluctance of the military to reach a decision on this issue now is affected strongly by their view that we may some day wish to place atomic weapons in the hands of a force controlled by an international agency.

8. The moral and political commitments to eliminate atomic weapons from national armaments apply with equal or greater force to the use of such weapons for international police action. The United States cannot afford to defend the continued existence of the bomb on the basis of any such theory.

9. The USSR has seized upon our apparent reluctance to agree to ultimate destruction of the bomb as a propaganda point which they can be expected to use to fullest advantage. It is believed that the State Department proposal would deprive them of this particular propaganda fuel.

10. On the other hand, there is evidence of some concern in Congress over the possibility of an agreement to "destroy the bomb". The Department believes that the safeguards contained in the proposed policy would go far to meet this concern.

11. On the clear issue of the ultimate destruction of the bomb the United States would find at least ten of the twelve members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission favoring destruction.

RECOMMENDATION

That the Secretary should seek to obtain at the next meeting of the Committee of Three the agreement of the Secretaries of War and Navy and of the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission with the proposed policy statement indicated in paragraph two (2) above as a basis for a recommendation to the President.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum by the Executive Committee on Regulation
of Armaments*¹

CONFIDENTIAL
RAC D-18/2a

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1947.

BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN AN INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY SYSTEM FOR THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

PREAMBLE

The principle has been established by the General Assembly of December 13 [14], 1946, "that essential to the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions".

1. An international agency should be established within the framework of the Security Council, deriving its powers and status from the treaty or treaties under which it is established, to supervise and administer a system of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments.

2. The international agency should be broadly representative of the states participating in the system, but limited in size in the interest of efficient operations. It should be composed of a representative from each of the states which are members of the Security Council, the non-permanent membership changing in conformity with elections to and retirement from the Security Council.

3. The inspectorate should be recruited on the basis of character and competence from all participating states and should have international status similar to that provided for the International Secretariat.

4. There should be routine inspections which should be automatic, and such other inspections as the agency may decide upon. The inspectorate will include nationals of member states other than the nation being inspected.

5. The international agency and its representatives should have no authority to issue directions to contracting states, except as may be provided in the treaty or treaties under which it is established.

6. The size and composition of the inspectorate for any nation should be determined by the international supervisory agency.

¹ This document was approved by the Executive Committee on July 23 and was transmitted to the United States Mission at the United Nations with instruction No. 181, July 29 (Department of State Disarmament Files).

7. Individual members of the inspectorate should be rotated periodically by nationality and geographic location.

8. There should be no requirement of unanimity within the agency with respect to its decisions within its defined functions.

9. The system of safeguards, basically, should be composed of three parts:

a. An accurate reporting by each nation of all essential elements of its military potential, and

b. Accurate verification of reports by an international supervisory agency.

c. Effective inspection by an international supervisory agency.

10. The system of international safeguards should be so devised that its operations will be effective, technically feasible, and practicable, and will:

a. Detect promptly the occurrence of violations;

b. Minimize interference with and impose minimum burdens on the economic and industrial life of the inspected nation.

11. Each participating state should afford duly accredited representatives of the agency unimpeded rights of ingress to and egress from, and movement within its territories; should aid and assist them in the performance of their duties, should provide access to the activities subject to inspection, and should arrange for the full cooperation of national or local authorities or private individuals.

12. The agency will be responsible for immediate certification to the Security Council and to all participating states, for appropriate action, of serious or willful violations of a treaty or treaties providing for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

[Here follows Appendix "A," "Discussion."]

USUN Files

Memorandum by the British Delegation to the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments to the United States Delegation

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, July 28, 1947.

The United Kingdom Government are anxious that their Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments should take the initiative as soon as the appropriate moment offers to put forward a simple scheme for the exchange of information on armed forces and for the verification of this information.

2. A proposal in this sense was communicated to the United Kingdom Delegation in New York even before the Commission was fully established, but, as the United States Representative will be aware,

the preoccupation of the Commission with procedural questions has hitherto left no opportunity for such proposals to be put forward.

3. The proposal of the United Kingdom Government may be summarised as follows. The difficulties which must confront us when we attempt to draft a comprehensive convention must be faced. We must not delude ourselves or the public with the idea that it is a work that can be easily or rapidly accomplished, and much time must elapse before any such convention can be brought into force. It is for consideration, therefore, whether it would not be better to proceed by stages, and the United Kingdom Government have considered, for instance, whether it would not be practical to arrange now for an early exchange of information on armed forces and armaments, coupled with a simple system of verification such as is only possible at this preliminary stage. Whatever preliminary system of verification could be agreed on would, of course, have to be one that gave reasonable assurances as to the reliability of the information supplied.

4. As the confirmation of numbers of certain types of armaments might be extremely difficult, and might lead to delays in the setting up of the first simple foundations for a system of exchange of information and its verification, it is proposed that initially the scheme should be limited to the exchange of information on the strength of armed forces. It is considered that it should be relatively easy to confirm the truth of statements on the strength of armed forces, and a system of verification designed to cover armed forces alone might gradually be developed into the basis of any future convention on general armaments regulation. The usefulness of such a scheme for the exchange of information on armed forces depends on its being recognised as a first step. It is felt that the readiness of the nations to cooperate would be an earnest of their readiness to proceed into more complicated fields of armaments regulation and reduction; it also felt that readiness to cooperate in the first and admittedly simple step would be a valuable contribution towards the re-establishment of international confidence, upon which any system of armaments reduction must depend.

4. The United Kingdom Government are still anxious that their representatives in New York should take the initiative in putting forward such a scheme. They have been apprised in the meantime of the rather more extensive scheme (which would embrace armaments) which Mr. Bard has been considering,¹ and an outline of these proposals is being examined in London.

5. The initial reaction to Mr. Bard's proposals was that the difficulties inherent in extending the scheme to embrace categories of armaments were being anticipated unduly, and that it would be preferable, if the question of the exchange of information is to be dis-

¹ For text of the Bard proposal of July 16, see p. 562.

cussed at all in the Commission or its committees, that such a simple scheme as the United Kingdom Government favour should be tabled as the first step, and that an attempt should be made to limit the scheme for the exchange of information and its verification to armed forces.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum Submitted by the War Department Member to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments*¹

TOP SECRET
RAC D-19/a

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1947.

[DRAFT] MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR
AND THE NAVY

Subject: United States Position If Effective International Control of Atomic Energy Cannot Be Accomplished.

1. On 12 March 1947, the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments undertook on its own initiative to study the alternate courses the United States might pursue if, as appeared likely, Soviet opposition were to prevent agreement on an effective system of international control of atomic energy. On 17 March 1947, the Assistant Secretary of War conveyed to the Committee the War Department's view "that it should proceed, as a matter of priority, to study this matter and submit as soon as possible its recommendations covering United States policy and procedure in the eventuality envisaged."

2. The Committee is convinced that the Soviet opposition to the "Baruch" plan derives not merely from specific disagreement with the plan itself but rather is one single facet of the overall Soviet policy of opposition to the principles and aims of the Western democracies. It does not appear either logical or possible to isolate the case of atomic energy from the other facets, such as Soviet resistance to European economic unity, to a Four-Power Pact against resurgence of German militarism, or a single cooperative effort toward European rehabilitation.

3. It becomes apparent that Soviet obduracy is destroying the hoped for degree of agreement among the great powers essential to a unified undertaking of their direct responsibilities and to the effectiveness of the United Nations. The effect is to postpone the probability of a truly

¹ At its 65th Meeting, August 22, the Executive Committee decided to table this memorandum after Dean Rusk, representing the Department of State, had expressed the opinion that its scope exceeded the purview of RAC. Rusk indicated that the Policy Planning Staff was preparing a paper on the same general subject as the present memorandum; see PPS 7, August 21, p. 602. (Department of State Disarmament Files)

comprehensive system of international cooperation and collective security toward which objective the United Nations constitutes, admittedly, only a first step.

4. Therefore, the Committee concludes that the question requiring immediate solution is not: What position the United States should take if and when international agreement on control of atomic energy appears hopeless, but rather: What is to be the United States policy in the face of the "two-world" situation which Soviet *intransigence* is clearly creating?

5. The greatly extended scope which the problem thus assumes appears to the Committee tantamount to the formulation of basic United States foreign policy, and thus far beyond its competency. On the other hand, the Committee is not unaware of recent developments and current planning which indicate an orientation of overall United States policy sufficiently discernible for the Committee to organize its thinking along parallel lines. It is in this light that the attached study has been developed.

6. The Executive Committee recommends the attached study to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy as suggesting an essential application of present United States foreign policy. The Committee requests expressions of opinion on the whole or parts of the attached in order to provide general guidance for its further work toward concrete recommendations.

[Annex]

APPLYING THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The fundamental aim of the United States is the attainment of lasting world-wide peace and security. We believe that the following principles are essential to that attainment:

a. Government subordinate to the freely expressed wish of the governed based on respect for the equal rights of all.

b. International relationship in conformity with principles of justice and law, recognizing the collective responsibility for the enforcement of peace and security.

2. Only universal acceptance of an authority superior to the State can guarantee the ultimate accomplishment of this aim. Such acceptance being unobtainable at this time, the United Nations was designed to offer a means for the voluntary cooperation of States toward that same end. Its establishment presupposes, and its effectiveness depends on, the sincerity of all its members in their cooperative endeavor.

3. The principles and aims of the United Nations are substantially identical to the principles and aims of the United States. Therefore,

a. the United States is best pursuing its own aims by wholeheartedly supporting the United Nations, and

b. policies or actions inconsistent with the aims and principles of the United Nations are inimical to the fundamental aims and principles of the United States.

4. The record of international activities, within and without the United Nations, indicates that pursuit of these aims has been seriously impeded by constant opposition from the Soviets. Their opposition is so widespread and so consistent as to justify the conclusion that the Soviets are fundamentally insincere in their professed adherence to the aims and principles of the United Nations which their membership implies.

5. In view of this Soviet insincerity, it does not appear likely that unanimity can be reached at this time on any of those factors on which only complete agreement among the great powers can presage effective cooperation toward worldwide peace and security. This essential unanimity is unattainable so long as one of the major powers continues to seek subordinate aims which conflict with the basic principles of the United Nations and with the majority of its members' concept of international democracy.

6. Ultimately a "single world" must eventuate—either their way or our way must prevail or a satisfactory compromise be achieved—for it is inconceivable that the narrowing world can interminably endure two such widely opposed concepts. Admitting the possibility that force may become the sole final arbiter of which "credo" is to survive, this calamitous method of decision is not today the only course, nor the one which either side could advantageously adopt. The less drastic alternative is to temporize without appeasement: to prolong the time during which a "divided world" can endure in peace giving fullest opportunity for the areas of present and future common self-interest to emerge while the areas of present and past conflict and distrust are fading into unimportance.

7. This alternative will probably never be adopted through formalized understanding between the opposing factions; rather can it be said to be already in effect as a consequence of the fact that neither side would today, or in the immediate future, resort to war unless inescapably forced into it. This period of peaceful endurance can end in only one of two ways: (1) by war between the Soviets and ourselves or, (2) by the gradual transition of the "divided world" into the eventual "one world" through reconciliation of conflicting principles into a single cooperative aim.

8. Assuming our intent to keep the door always open for ultimate international cooperation, it remains to determine how best we can pursue the accomplishment of our basic aims during the endurance of this divided world. Since we surely do not wish to destroy the hard

won beginnings of unity which the United Nations represents, we must contrive a means of operating a "two world" system within the broad limits of a "one world" framework. This entails strengthening the United Nations to the maximum extent possible and, in those matters dealt with of necessity outside the organization, acting in conformity with its aims and principles, but it further entails active resistance, wherever applicable, to the development or extension of policies which are basically hostile to those aims.

9. It will be argued that active resistance to Soviet aims might weaken rather than strengthen the United Nations by inviting the possibility of Soviet withdrawal or, at best, aggravating the dead-lock. On the other hand, it is a well recognized method of communist expansion to insinuate into an organization in apparent sympathy with its purposes only, under this so-called United Front, to divert it to Soviet ends, either by eventual domination or by undermining it from within. Therefore, against this first risk is posed a second, and conceivably greater one: that by non-resistance we may be aiding the transformation of the United Nations into a "United Front."

10. The Truman Doctrine evidences the application of this "resistance" concept to our direct relationships outside of the United Nations but has not as yet been extended to our participation within the United Nations where we continue patiently to watch the Soviets thwart the will of the majority by distortion, specious argument, the introduction of impracticable counterproposals, and capricious abuse of the veto, thereby frustrating all effective action.

11. It is unnecessary to set forth here the long record of unremitting Soviet opposition. Only detailed study of every verbatim report of every organ and sub-agency gives the full picture of their undeviating singleness of purpose. The fact of frustration becomes undeniable and the pattern of cause and effect permits of no reasonable explanation except that the Soviets are deliberately prostituting the United Nations. Under the circumstances, for the United States not to make a firm stand against its further subversion, would be to acquiesce in the wilful enfeeblement of our prestige and that of the organization on which we base our fondest hope of lasting world peace and security; veritably, would we be "fiddling while Rome burned."

12. It is submitted that the United States *must* directly and forthrightly impugn the Soviets' present attitude toward the United Nations as violating the purposes and principles of the Charter, and, concurrent therewith, make a thorough and explicit pronouncement of the policies in respect of every phase of United Nations activities which we, under the circumstances, intend to pursue. No lesser action on our part would accomplish what must be done to preserve the organization.

13. As mentioned above, the immediate argument against such a

suggestion would probably be that it might invite—or even force—the Soviets to withdraw in “injured innocence” from membership. It is, therefore essential to examine the actual likelihood of their doing so as well as the foreseeable results, if they did. Let it first be admitted that the likelihood will largely depend on the terms in which our indictment and intentions are expressed. It is here assumed that they would be painstakingly phrased to avoid belligerency, castigation and any semblance of recrimination, but would rather constitute the regretful citation of a record which impelled up to certain conclusions leading, in turn, to a calm reaffirmation of our adherence to the principles and aims of the Charter and our firm intention that they be extended to all peoples.

a. On this assumption, it is believed unlikely that the Soviets would withdraw. In the first place it would presumably catch them off-balance and in the spotlight of public attention, a situation in which the vagaries of the oriental type of reasoning processes are peculiarly handicapped because they do not permit impetuous reaction—the Russian does not “think well on his feet.” In the second place, for them to withdraw, in the face of such a measured indictment, from an organization wherein they have always shown exaggerated ideas of their especial importance would be an admission of defeat—if not of guilt—unacceptable to the Slavic mind. Thirdly, the Soviets would, it is believed, find ways to absorb any amount of mere oral criticism rather than deny themselves the forum and the prestige the United Nations provides. Fourthly, it is doubted that the Soviets are in any condition to cut themselves loose from the material benefits the Western world can furnish to their grave problems of rehabilitation. Lastly, the United States did not contemplate withdrawal at any of the many occasions when our motives or sincerity were pilloried in Soviet statements; to the Soviets strong invective against one’s opponent is an accepted technique of debate—so, they are not likely to retreat before even strong criticism.

b. Next, assuming they did withdraw, what would the results be? Even admitting that such a step would apparently lessen the United Nations’ immediate potential for complete international cooperation, it would do so to no greater extent than the Soviets’ present obstructionism. Moreover, it is an open question whether a United Nations minus Soviet and Satellites but effective in the limited collective security and mutual cooperation of its remaining members, would not be a more constructive vehicle for the pursuit of peace than is the present organization under circumstances as they are. Whether the Soviets are inside or outside the United Nations would not appear to have serious bearing on which way the “divided world” period will end. The all-important factor is that the door to ultimate cooperation be kept always wide open for the eventual dissolution of the “two worlds” into the hoped-for “one.”

c. Should they not withdraw, the results to the United Nations could not be other than a marked improvement over present conditions and might represent a spectacular turning point in history. For it is completely compatible with previous experience that the Russians will pro-

ceed along a chosen course only as far as can be done without encountering clear opposition and it is, thus, not impossible that a firm stand on our part might be the dominant factor in a reversal of Soviet attitude. Should this happen, an immeasurable advance would have been accomplished toward the ultimate goal of real international cooperation.

14. It is, therefore, contended that it is better for the United States to take the calculated risk of possible Soviet withdrawal than to permit the unchallenged continuance of Soviet subversion of the United Nations. At the same time it is recognized that the manner in which this risk is taken is no less important than the decision on the risk itself. The situation is extremely delicate and *how* anything is done may well be as important as *what* is done. The decision once made, it will become imperative to plan the actual exposition of the United States position and the projection of that position into every phase of our activities in the United Nations with the utmost care. Also, what we do or plan to do within the United Nations should be supported by an equally carefully conducted campaign of education so that the American people and the informed public opinion of the world may have full and accurate knowledge of our course of action and the why's and wherefore's of its adoption.

15. While far beyond the scope or capabilities of this paper to encompass the whole field of recommended action, it is appropriate to indicate how that action might be applied in certain of the principal problems now being dealt with by the United Nations.

a. The Provision of Security Forces Under Article 43 of the Charter.

(1) The United States should take the position in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee that the all important consideration is that the Security Council be afforded the forces contemplated for its efficient functioning. There is no useful purpose to be served by prolonged disputation on questions of principle. How available forces may be utilized can be better determined as occasion arises and when their availability is known. Therefore, the United States offers to make available certain given air, ground and sea forces and is disposed to listen with interest to any similar offer which any other member may wish to make. Thought might be given to the possible advantage of adding to the above United States declaration a statement to the effect that the United States considers it immaterial, if the Security Council, by exercise of the veto, is prevented from "accepting" the forces we offer, since they will be held available by us with or without formal agreement until it becomes abundantly evident that sufficient other forces are likewise available to permit of a reduction in our contribution.

b. The International Control of Atomic Energy.

(1) No system of international control which does not include the USSR can conceivably obviate an atomic armaments race or truly dispel the dread prospect of atomic warfare. However, it is conceivable

that this situation could be partially mitigated by avoiding competition among known friends and, instead, enlisting their cooperation toward the maximum collective security in return for the maximum of peaceful nuclear-fission benefits possible under the circumstances.

(2) Since circumstances permit no safe alternative to absolute retention by the United States of its present monopoly and technical headstart, the United States has no recourse except to constitute itself as trustee-custodian of its atomic energy secrets and "know-how" until such time as practical international control becomes possible.

(3) In this role, we might conceivably make available certain peaceful uses and developments to any nation which would agree to essential measures of control. We might further undertake not to use atomic weapons except in self-defense or against an act of aggression as mutually agreed by a majority of other member states in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter.

(4) The virtual "atomic alliance" which would thus come into being, would be not so much a deliberate association as it would be the natural sequence of events growing from the existing circumstances. It presents as proximate an approach to the elimination of atomic warfare as can be contrived on any less-than-universal basis of international control. It would leave the door to full international control wide open for Soviet acceptance at any time. Pending such control, it would confine the inevitable atomic armaments race to the USSR and Satellites versus the United States and cooperating nations, as against the general free-for-all which might easily result if no arrangement were to exist whereby we could safely share with anyone else the power and the possible benefits our present monopoly affords.

c. Regulation and Reduction of Armaments and Armed Forces.

(1) Since effective regulation of armaments cannot be achieved in the aura of international distrust created by Soviet *intransigence*, the United States should point out the futility of further meetings of the Commission for Conventional Armaments pending the attainment of a degree of international confidence which would warrant resumption of its activities. The United States might further suggest that it would be happy to discuss with any and all nations similarly disposed means whereby their individual burden of armaments might be lightened by possible cooperation in the problems of security, again emphasizing our desire to carry out the aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter as far as actual circumstances will permit.

d. Economic and Social Problems.

(1) Since the absence of the veto greatly reduces the Soviet's power to thwart action in respect of matters outside the competency of the Security Council, the United States should seek to compensate for the security deficiencies of the United Nations by redoubling our efforts to strengthen its economic and social endeavors. In this connection, the United States might well assume an even more active leadership in solving such problems as the relocation of Displaced Persons, the elimination of hindrances to equitable economic development, and the codification of a system of international law.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1947.

Subject: Today's meeting with Mr. Ralph A. Bard.

At the meeting which you have arranged for this afternoon Mr. Bard will present his interim plan for regulation of armaments on which he desires Government approval. I am attaching a paper giving the most important facts bearing on this problem.

As you may recall, Mr. Bard saw the Secretary in June and presented an early version of this plan.¹ The Bard proposal has not received any official clearance in the State, War, or Navy Departments although it has been discussed in the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments. I understand that Mr. Bard talked yesterday with Admiral Leahy who expressed his belief that the plan had considerable merit and promised that he would endeavor to obtain JCS clearance.

Also attached for your information is a copy of Mr. Bard's proposal, RAC D-9/1a.²

[Annex]

I. THE PROBLEM

To establish a U.S. position in the CCA in connection with Item 4 of the Plan of Work.³

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Present U.S. policy is not to agree to any plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments until satisfactory conditions of international security have been established, for example, the peace treaties have been signed, Article 43 agreements have been implemented, and international control of atomic energy has been agreed to.

2. The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, and the Security Council Resolution, Feb. 13, however, have committed us to a *discussion* of regulation and reduction of armaments without qualification.

3. The first four items of the CCA plan of work, accepted by the SC on July 8, 1947, are as follows:

(a) A consideration of what weapons properly fall within the jurisdiction of the CCA.

¹ Document RAC D-9/1, May 21, not printed.

² *Ante*, p. 562.

³ For the text of the Plan of Work, see RAC D-13/5, June 19, p. 525.

(b) A consideration of basic principles applicable to a program of regulation.

(c) Development of an effective system of safeguards against violations of the treaty.

(d) Development of a plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

4. If the U.S. view should prevail that the above items should be considered in the order listed there is a good chance that an impasse would be reached with the Soviet Union before Item 4 comes up for consideration.

5. Inasmuch as there is no guarantee that this order will be followed or that some one will not introduce a plan at any time (the British and French have already intimated they might introduce one in the not too distant future), the U.S. Representative faces the following alternatives:

(a) Presenting no plan and therefore forfeiting a possible U.S. position of leadership.

(b) Presenting a plan and possibly gaining a position of leadership for the U.S.

6. At the present time, the U.S. has no approved plan.

7. The Deputy U.S. Representative on the CCA, Mr. Bard, has suggested a plan which he believes would enable the U.S. to assume leadership in the CCA. Its main elements are:

(a) To permit participating states to establish their own levels on armaments.

(b) To require a periodic reporting of information on such armaments.

(c) To provide for a system of verification of the reports.

The plan would contemplate a reduction and more comprehensive regulation of armaments at a later date.

III. DISCUSSION

8. The Bard plan has been criticized because:

(a) It is contrary to the U.S. position outlined in (1) above, since it would be implemented before "suitable" conditions of international peace and security had come into effect.

(b) It would call for information on armaments which present U.S. policy says must not be given except in connection with carrying out an "over-all" plan.

(c) The act of providing the general information contemplated by this plan would morally obligate the U.S. to go further and supply detailed information on weapons which we possess, including atomic weapons.

(d) It would place the U.S. in an unfavorable propaganda position because the Soviets could use the plan to prove that the U.S., a typical capitalist state, was not prepared to take any genuine steps toward disarmament.

(e) It would represent no real gain since it would not lead to the regulation and reduction of armaments and would impair the strength of the U.S. demand that conditions of peace and security are a prerequisite to disarmament.

9. In favor of the Bard plan, it has been said that:

(a) It would give the U.S. a position of leadership in the CCA.

(b) It might prevent this Government's having to fight a rear-guard action against a less acceptable plan put forth by another Government and acted upon by the CCA in default of a U.S. plan.

(c) It would not sacrifice any important element of the present U.S. position or of U.S. security.

(d) It would gain for the U.S. a propaganda advantage.

(e) It might gain for the U.S. valuable information which it does not currently possess.

(f) It would help to establish the confidence necessary for more advanced steps in regulating armaments by testing the willingness of governments to accept a system of inspection and verification.

10. In proposing his plan, the U.S. Deputy Representative is not requesting that he be given the authority to introduce his plan regardless of circumstances. The plan would not be advanced at a time when Soviet obstructive tactics would make any further constructive action of the CCA impossible. Nor would it be put forward after long debates on other plans had taken place. It would be presented only at a time which would gain the maximum advantages for this Government.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

In the light of the foregoing facts, the present U.S. position should be re-examined to discover whether it should be modified to permit the U.S. Deputy Representative's plan to be introduced into the CCA at an appropriate time in connection with Item 4 of the Plan of Work.

501.BC Atomic/8-147

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] August 1, 1947.

DEAR SENATOR AUSTIN: The six papers attached¹ were deposited formally with Committee 2 at Lake Success yesterday. They include a foreword and five chapters of general considerations and specific proposals covering the functions of the international agency and the limitations on its personnel and rights and duties of inspection.

¹The papers are not printed here; they do appear, with varying degrees of modification, in the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, September 11, 1947, AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl.*, pp. 12-74.

It is expected that these papers will form the major basis of the second report of the Commission to the Security Council on September 15th. Since these papers were drafted with infinite effort by all of the Delegations excepting the Soviet, and since the group leaders in charge were, respectively, deRose of France, McNaughton of Canada, Darwin and Thomson of England, Wei of China² and Nichols of the United States,³ they represent a truly cooperative effort. There seems at this time little doubt that they will be strongly defended by those who wrote them and will be favorably voted on by ten to two.

Yesterday, my committee of consultants met here all day to go over the papers. Including Conant, Oppenheimer, Barnard,⁴ Tolman, Generals Groves and Farrell,⁵ all were present except Dr. Bacher. These men have followed the development of the papers from the beginning. They went over them in final form in great detail. They have one change to make in the mining paper which can probably be covered by a brief amendment. In all other respects they approve the papers thoroughly. They feel that they are a logical development of the first report and, in general, considerably strengthen that report. They recommend them unqualifiedly.

It is proposed that the time from now to August 15th be taken up at Lake Success by discussion in the Working Committee of the material to go into the second report, covering the debate on the Russian amendments, and in Committee 2 by a discussion of the Russian proposals of June 11th. I presume it will be made clear with respect to the Russian amendments that no agreement whatever has been reached and that the proposals of June 11th are wholly inadequate because they do not provide any effective controls. It is then proposed to adjourn from August 15th to August 25th or September 1st. Commencing September 2nd, the Atomic Energy Commission should be in almost continuous session discussing these working papers and possible amendments, preparing the second report in its final form and voting on it. It is believed that two weeks will suffice for this work, and since the Commission will then be under the Chairmanship of General McNaughton we can be assured of firm direction in the completion of our task.

The tentative instructions of the State Department, as expressed for the present, indicate that the second report should be an interim report presented to the Security Council in the expectation that we will be instructed to write similar specific proposals on (a) staffing and organization, (b) finance, (c) strategic distribution, (d) sanctions, (e) stages. This is the course I have myself recommended to the State Department through your office, subject, of course, to their over-all

² Dr. Hsieh-ren Wei.

³ Col. Kenneth D. Nichols.

⁴ Chester I. Barnard.

⁵ Maj. Gen. Thomas F. Farrell.

decisions as necessitated by the determination of our foreign policy from time to time.

Our advisory group is fully in accord with this view, except that, in varying degrees, they have doubts about any group development of stages proposals. They feel too that the matter of stages is affected by many factors which are not yet determined, and our position should therefore be left open.

I will be available any time for a conference with you during the coming week. I shall probably go to Washington for a one-day conference the week following.

Yours sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

[NEW YORK,] August 4, 1947.

I should like to report to you the developments in the Conventional Armaments Commission since my last memorandum of July 11th.¹ As you will recall a plan of work based on a U.S. draft was finally accepted both by the Commission and by the Security Council. Following the acceptance of the plan by the Security Council, the Soviet representative indicated that he would be guided in the future by the general line expressed in his own plan of work which had been rejected.

In recent discussions in Washington, I have endeavored to place before the representatives of the Armed Forces and the State Department the necessity for the development of a positive plan of action in respect to our activities in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. As I see it, we have three alternatives:

- a. To present a positive program which can be supported by our own public and by our friends in the Commission.
- b. To continue to take part in negotiations without putting forward any specific proposals of our own.
- c. To recognize that continued negotiations in the existing atmosphere cannot be successful and to propose an indefinite recess.

The interim proposal for an international system of reporting and verification which I discussed with you a few weeks ago has been further developed and has been submitted to the military services and to the State Department. On my last visit to Washington I discussed the plan with Admiral Leahy and found his reaction quite favorable.

I have been advised informally that the Foreign Office is pressing the

¹ *Ante*, p. 560.

U.K. Delegation here to put forward at an early date a proposal for a similar system of reporting and verification, but which would be applied to armed forces alone. I pointed out to the U.K. Delegation that such a proposal would invite amendments to include not only armaments but other provisions which we might find unacceptable. If negotiations were to continue, such an interim proposal would almost certainly be introduced by at least one other delegation. Regardless of whether or not we were prepared to submit our own proposal, we would be forced to take a definite position either for or against.

The entire matter was presented last week to Under Secretary Lovett at a meeting of military and State Department representatives. Both our interim proposal and the alternate course of recessing were discussed thoroughly. At the close of the meeting, Mr. Lovett directed that our interim plan be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an opinion in respect to its military implications. He also directed that Dean Rusk's office thoroughly study the two alternate courses suggested. I have hopes that a decision will be reached shortly.

If we are to call for a recess in negotiations on the ground that present discussions are futile and that the atmosphere of cooperation necessary for success is entirely lacking, it may be desirable to first discuss the first two points in the Commission's plan of work. As you will recall, the first point involves the definition of the armaments and armed forces falling within the jurisdiction of the CCA and the second provides for the development of the general principles of disarmament. Under this point, we propose to put forward for decision a set of general principles which will include, as prerequisites for the implementation of any disarmament program, the establishment of the international security force, the completion of the German and Japanese Treaties, and agreement on atomic energy.

I am enclosing a draft of a statement to be given in the Commission should the decision be made to propose an indefinite recess.²

² Not printed.

USUN Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, August 5, 1947.

DEAR SENATOR AUSTIN: As a result of a visit yesterday from Dr. Oppenheimer, I must advise that the views of my advisory group were not properly stated in my letter to you of August 1st.¹ Dr. Op-

¹ *Ante*, p. 586.

penheimer feels quite strongly that the United States should not continue to take part in the development of specific proposals covering the other items on the subject list, which would in the normal course come up after September 15th, namely, staffing and organization, finance, strategic distribution, sanctions and stages.

General Groves also has doubts about our going further. Dr. Oppenheimer feels that Dr. Bacher would have agreed with him if he had been here. Dr. Oppenheimer pointed out that Mr. Conant said that he felt that somebody, presumably the United States, should make it clear that no treaty on atomic energy would be acceptable until world conditions of peace are assured.

It seemed to me that Messrs. Barnard, Tolman and Conant and General Farrell all felt we should proceed with further specific proposals unless other factors or other nations put a stop to it.

My own view is:

(1) If there is to be a break with Russia it should not be made through the Atomic Energy Commission.

(2) So long as any considerable number of other nations on the Commission desire to go forward in writing specific proposals any holding back on the part of the United States would have the following bad results:

a. Feeling on the part of friendly nations that we had gone back on our offer and on them.

b. Strong propaganda by Russia that we had never intended the offer seriously.

c. Loss by the American people of their present feeling that they are committed to the "American plan." If this feeling were lost it might be difficult to recover later.

(3) I do not share the fears of Dr. Oppenheimer and others that we will get into trouble if we go on to discuss questions of strategic balance and sanctions. I think the other nations will support our views as they have our position on the functions of the agency. As to stages, I have always felt that a spelling out of stages could only be done at the time the treaty was ready to go into effect.

I am advised that the State Department has prepared instructions to me on this matter, which I have not yet received. Owing to the strongly expressed views of some of our advisory group, it seemed desirable to inform you, and through you the State Department, that the matter is still being discussed here by them.

Yours sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

Department of State Disarmament Files

Extract From the Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Washington, August 7, 1947

SECRET

I. POLICY REGARDING THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

DECISION

It was agreed to defer consideration of this matter pending consultation with Mr. Osborn, the U.S. [Deputy] Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, on the question of approaching certain member governments of the Atomic Energy Commission with a view to having further discussion of the subject matter postponed indefinitely.

IMPLEMENTING ACTION

Mr. Rusk of the State Department to give Mr. Osborn the benefit of the views expressed at this meeting and report on his reaction.

DISCUSSION

SECRETARY MARSHALL raised as the first item the need for instruction to the U.S. Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as to how he should vote on the question of the eventual destruction of atomic weapons. SECRETARY MARSHALL read the the position proposed by the State Department:

“Our atomic weapons will not be destroyed or disposed of unless or until a fully effective system of international control of atomic energy, including international inspection, operation and ownership of dangerous atomic activities, has been established and has progressed to that stage at which it shall have been agreed atomic weapons are to be eliminated from national armaments. The United States considers that at that point all atomic weapons should be destroyed, and that nuclear fuel contained therein should be diverted to peaceful purposes.”

SECRETARY MARSHALL also read excerpts from the President's letter of instructions to Mr. Baruch of June 7, 1946¹ and from a series of public statements by U.S. officials indicating the attitude of this Government toward the eventual destruction of atomic weapons.

MR. PIKE² indicated that the United States Atomic Energy Commission considered the question primarily one for the State Department as a basic policy matter, and stated that the Commission accepted the proposed views of the Department of State.

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 846.

² Sumner T. Pike, member, United States Atomic Energy Commission.

SECRETARY ROYALL stated that the War Department considered that the U.S. should not extend its position on this matter since discussions thus far in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission have indicated no agreement on basic principles with the Russians, and that the U.S. should not make any amendments of the type proposed at this time. He indicated that the War Department accepted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and read the following summary of their views:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff see no objection, after successful establishment by treaty or convention of a control agreement embodying the principles of the United States (Baruch Plan) proposal for the control of atomic energy, and after adequate demonstration of the plan's effectiveness, to the disposal of existing atomic weapons by any means, including destruction, which may be agreed upon at that time.

"From the point of view of the National Security, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that an agreement by the United States as to the ultimate disposition of atomic weapons should not be made at this time."

SECRETARY MARSHALL asked Mr. Rusk to indicate the situation in the United Nations on this question. MR. RUSK stated that although the question is not now immediately before the Atomic Energy Commission, it would undoubtedly be raised during the Commission's debate on its second report to the Security Council and it would probably come up for discussion in the Security Council itself and in the General Assembly. He stated further that Mr. Osborn had asked for and obtained the assistance of his colleagues on the Atomic Energy Commission in dealing with this question when it was raised by the Russians and that Mr. Osborn had assured his colleagues that the U.S. position would be clarified in the near future.

MR. SULLIVAN indicated his concern lest the "disposal" of atomic weapons would in fact be more harmful to U.S. interests than "destruction" since we are already committed to the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, when an international control system has been effectively established.

MR. PIKE stated that one of the reasons for his Commission's agreement with the view proposed by the State Department was that they had considered very carefully the various ways and means of disposing of the weapons and had concluded that destruction was by all doubts the method of disposal most acceptable to the U.S.

MR. VOLPE stated that the U.S. position on this question would be determined to a considerable extent by whether discussions in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission should continue beyond

September, in the light of complete lack of progress in these discussions today.

MR. RUSK indicated that Mr. Osborn was desirous of not having to meet this question and would in any event do what he could to keep it from arising, but that it might be dangerous to leave him without instructions on a point on which it would be possible in a parliamentary sense for the Russians to insist upon an expression of a U.S. position.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked whether it might not be useful to make a further approach to the member governments of the Atomic Energy Commission to get their assistance in postponing discussion on this matter.

After considerable discussion Mr. RUSK suggested that he be permitted to give Mr. Osborn the benefit of the views expressed at the meeting to determine whether an approach might not be made to certain member governments of the Atomic Energy Commission to get further discussion of this point indefinitely postponed. The Committee members agreed to this procedure.

Policy Planning Staff Files

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1947.

Subject: United States Program at the Forthcoming General Assembly

At your morning meeting on July 28, Mr. Rusk brought up the question of the planning which should be put in hand in SPA for the coming meeting of the General Assembly, with particular reference to evolving some move by this Government which would gain for us the initiative in that gathering. His suggestions were spelled out in detail in the attached memorandum of July 23.¹

It was agreed at that meeting that the question should be referred to the Planning Staff.²

The views of the Planning Staff are set forth in the attached paper designated as PPS/5.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

¹ *Ante*, p. 567.

² Regarding the establishment, organization, and functions of the Policy Planning Staff, see the editorial note, p. 733.

[Annex]

*Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff*SECRET
PPS/5

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1947.

PLANNING WITH RELATION TO A UNITED STATES PROGRAM AT THE
FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Policy Planning Staff has studied the question of the United States posture at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, with particular reference to the suggestions in Mr. Rusk's memorandum to Mr. Lovett of July 23rd. The conclusions of the Staff are as follows:

1. The major consideration in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy for the next few months must be the achievement of economic recovery in Europe. There is no initiative we could take in the Assembly which could relieve us of this problem.

2. The U.S. should not propose or support a multilateral mutual assistance pact at this Assembly. While rejecting this specific proposal, the Staff recognizes the necessity for early and thorough examination of all possible means for attaining the objective at which the proposal was aimed.

3. The Staff sees merit in the idea of this Government proposing the establishment of some sort of standing committee of the General Assembly to which problems of international peace and security could be referred or which could at least occupy itself with the question of concealed forms of aggression. It recommends that planning along these lines be undertaken at once in SPA.³

4. In general, SPA should study possible technique for keeping from the Security Council's agenda international situations and disputes that are evidently not susceptible of effective solution by that body in present circumstances.

5. There should be prepared for possible use by the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly, without prejudice to subsequent decision as to the manner in which they may be used: (1) A record, couched in measured tones, of U.S. efforts to strengthen the U.N. and to carry out effectively its purposes and principles; and (2) a thorough indictment, also dispassionate but vigorous, of Soviet efforts to block, delay, or emasculate the proposals of the U.S. and other Members.

The Staff is dealing separately with the problem of the impasse in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission and will shortly submit recommendations thereon.

³ See footnote 1, p. 166.

501.BC Atomic/6-1347

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1947.

No. 190

SIR: The Department refers to the United States Mission telegram No. 566, dated June 13, 1947 (from Osborn) in which advice was solicited on the position of the United States Mission with respect to the form of the next report of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Department has consulted with the War and Navy Departments and with the Atomic Energy Commission concerning this problem. On the basis of these discussions, it is the view of this Government: (a) that the next report of the Atomic Energy Commission should be presented in a form that will evidence the agreement of the majority on the proposals developed under Items A.1 through A.2 of AEC/C.2/16¹ which will enable the Security Council to direct the Commission to complete the task of developing specific proposals on the remaining items, and (b) that at the same time it is important that the next report of the Commission should reveal with unmistakable clarity the grave and fundamental differences between the position taken by the Soviet Union on atomic energy control and that of the United States and nine other members of the Commission.

As a method of achieving the foregoing objectives the Department looks with favor upon the suggestion made by Mr. Osborn at the meeting of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments on July 10. This would provide that the next report would consist of two principal parts, the first being a presentation of the plans so far developed in Committee 2 in pursuance of the request contained in the fourth paragraph of the Security Council Resolution of March 10, 1947 (S/296)² and the second, a statement of the Soviet proposals of June 11, 1947 (AEC/24),³ together with a summary of the proceedings of the Commission at which these proposals were discussed and an indication of the areas of disagreement.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

R. A. LOVETT

¹ "Summary of Principal Subjects to be Incorporated in Specific Proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy," the working schedule under which Committee 2 had been operating; for text, see the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl.*, pp. 5-8 *passim*, or Department of State Publication 2932, pp. 7-9.

² SC, 2nd yr., No. 24, pp. 487-488.

³ AEC, 2nd yr., *Plenary*, pp. 21-24.

Lot 71-D 440, Box 19232¹

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1947.

Subject: United States Program at the Forthcoming General Assembly

I have had an opportunity to discuss the attached memorandum from the Policy Planning Staff² with senior officers from EUR, NEA, FE, ARA, Le and SPA who are working on General Assembly preparations. The consensus on each of the numbered paragraphs follows:

1. While the statement appears sound as far as it goes, it does not take sufficiently into account (a) the influence of political and security matters on the prospects of European economic recovery, (b) the indirect and supplementary assistance to European economic recovery which can be obtained from activities of the United Nations and many specialized agencies in specialized and technical fields, and (c) the possibility that initiative by someone else might seriously embarrass or hamper concerted action to obtain European economic recovery.

Recommendation: That the Under Secretary take note of the view expressed by the Policy Planning Staff and also the necessity for careful consideration of the relation between matters likely to arise in the General Assembly and our present effort to achieve European economic recovery.³

2. The conclusion in this paragraph is entirely acceptable insofar as present action is concerned. It is recognized that the proposal of a multilateral mutual assistance pact has many and serious implications which need careful study here as well as careful diplomatic preparation. Time alone now probably prevents the initiative on our part in the General Assembly. We consider it necessary, however, to continue to develop our position on this subject in the event that the question arises in some other connection in the General Assembly.

Recommendation: That this paragraph be approved.⁴

3. This conclusion is acceptable and the necessary preparatory work is under way as a matter of urgency.

Recommendation: That this paragraph be approved.⁴

4. The import of this conclusion is not entirely clear and raises a question which needs considerable further study. On the one hand, we have made persistent effort to obtain settlement of political disputes prior to United Nations action and have generally taken the position

¹ Folder "Committee, Interim General Assembly Committee on Peace and Security".

² PPS/5, August 7, p. 594.

³ Lovett wrote "noted" next to this recommendation.

⁴ Lovett wrote "OK" next to this recommendation.

that the parties themselves should exhaust their own efforts to reach a settlement before taking a situation or dispute before the Security Council. On the other hand, the United States should not take the position that the Security Council is closed to complainants whose complaints are unlikely to be dealt with effectively by the Security Council. Further, formal action by the Council is not the only and may not be the most important result from Security Council consideration of a case. It is fully recognized that our position as a permanent member of the Security Council forces us to adopt attitudes toward political controversies of diverse types arising in all parts of the world and that this lays upon us an onerous, and sometimes embarrassing, responsibility. SPA agrees that the problems involved are of the greatest importance and should be given further serious study.

Recommendation: That the Under Secretary take note of paragraph 4 and of SPA's agreement to pursue the matter further with the other interested offices of the Department.⁵

5. *Recommendation:* That the Under Secretary approve paragraph 5.⁶

⁵ Lovett wrote "noted" next to this recommendation.

⁶ Lovett wrote "OK" next to this recommendation.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1947.

Subject: British view in regard to breakdown in the present negotiations of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Participants: U—Mr. Lovett,
Mr. Balfour,¹ Chargé d'Affaires, British Embassy,
Mr. Maclean, First Secretary, British Embassy,
U—Mr. Gullion

Mr. Balfour presented the attached paraphrase of the Foreign Office's telegram which gives the British view that it would be undesirable to adopt any line which would lead to a breakdown in the present negotiations of the Atomic Energy Commission, especially in view of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November.² The British would like to see the Report of the Commission take the form of an interim or progress report to the Assembly not requiring any recorded vote. In conversation the British representatives ampli-

¹ John Balfour.

² For documentation on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, November 25–December 15, see vol. II, p. 676.

fied the memorandum to state that not only did they not wish to see the issue joined with the Soviet Union at this time, but that, inasmuch as there were still points on which the United States and the British did not agree, e.g. extent of "ownership" and research functions of the international agency, they would not like to vote on the proposals of the Committee thus far. This would be an additional reason for not bringing things to a head at this time.

Mr. Lovett explained that it was not our thought to "upset the applecart" or to take any action which would bring to a close the negotiations in the Commission. Nevertheless, we felt that some stock-taking or "balance sheet" was necessary at this time in order that the people of this country and of the world would not continue to feel a false sense of security. We must find some way to make it clear that the negotiations had not so far been productive and that the prospects were not favorable.

Mr. Lovett assured the British representatives that before we came to the point at which we thought that the negotiation effort should be definitely brought to a close, or took some action which might bring it to a close, we would consult the British beforehand. Although we do not wish to join issues now, still it was clear enough that the Russians were not going to agree, so that a showdown would not be altogether disadvantageous even if it occurred earlier rather than late.

Mr. Lovett could not say that there would not be any showdown before the Foreign Ministers' meeting in November, which was looking very far ahead, but didn't necessarily anticipate one.

The British views as to the form which the next report of the Commission should take and the way it should be then dealt with would be taken into account. Although we could not say just what might occur, he did not know of any resolution or method of submission of the report which would [not] require a vote. Our delegation in New York would be informed of the additional reasons why the British did not wish to see a general vote at this time, i.e., the existence of the unresolved points of difference between the US and the UK. (Mr. Balfour had previously stated that these were minor compared to the differences between the Soviet Union and the other delegations.)

Mr. Maclean pointed out that the British concern had to do with the action at the next important stage, the meeting of the Commission to consider its report, which he believed to be set for August 29.

E. A. GULLION

[Annex]

PARAPHRASE OF A FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM OF AUGUST 12 TO HIS
MAJESTY'S EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON

In the present state of international relations there seems to be no prospect of securing an agreed solution on the matters before the Atomic Energy Commission and therefore of sending an unanimous report to the Security Council and the Assembly. In any case, the Commission in the present phase of its work has not yet tackled some of the most important and difficult questions e.g. of quotas and strategic balance; the stages by which control is to be introduced; and enforcement. In the circumstances we feel that it is undesirable and indeed unnecessary to force atomic energy questions to an issue with the Soviet Government before the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November.

2. We have the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the United States authorities are anxious to take issue with the Soviet Delegation on the questions at present before it, which, in present conditions, can only lead to a breakdown. Rather than adopt this line we should prefer to see the Commission make an interim or progress report to the Assembly giving an account of the position which has been reached in the Commission but if possible without recording votes. This would certainly facilitate an agreement if international relations improve as a result of the Foreign Ministers Meeting. It would also appear more realistic in so far as it is not clear what would follow after a vote on the present report of the Commission.

3. We should be grateful for the United States Government's considered views on the broad issue of policy involved and hope that they will give favourable consideration to the conception of a progress report.

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1947.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1947.

This is my attempt to get order out of our talk with Balfour and Maclean.¹ I think the difficulty was caused by the fact that:

a) The British memorandum does not make clear all the points they wanted to make, e.g., that they do not want to be forced, for the sake of solidarity, into voting with the U.S. right down the line, when in

¹ See memorandum of conversation and annexed memorandum, *supra*.

fact there are still relatively minor but nevertheless important points of difference between us and them;

b) They had the impression that the "showdown" or "stock-taking" about which you spoke would necessarily take place in the Commission or in the Security Council itself. If it takes place in the Commission it would of course bring negotiations to a halt. It was not our intention that the "stock-taking" should take place in the Commission, but that the President should do it.

I simply do not know, nor am I sure that anyone knows, whether there will be any kind of record vote on the report itself at the stage of its consideration in the Commission. Mr. Kennan, Mr. Osborn and I will discuss this tomorrow.

The air should be considerably clearer when we have decided whether or not the recommendations of the Policy Planning Committee, which are now in the works, are to be followed, and we can then consult the British accordingly.

E. A. GULLION

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, August 13, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We refer to your top secret letter No. 190 of August 11, 1947, second paragraph sub-title (b) which reads:

"... that at the same time it is important that the next report of the Commission should reveal with unmistakable clarity the grave and fundamental differences between the position taken by the Soviet Union on atomic energy control and that of the United States and nine other members of the Commission."

At the present time it is contemplated that the interim report of the Commission to the Security Council on September 15th will include the following:

(a) A report by the Secretariat on the discussion which took place with respect to the Russian amendments and differences in principle. This report will make clear "the grave and fundamental differences, etc."

(b) A report on the discussion of the Russian proposals of June 11, which it is expected will include the proposed Canadian resolution, copy of which is attached.¹ Herein you will note that this resolution states "that these proposals as they now stand and that the explana-

¹The attachment is substantially the same as Doc. AEC/C.2/73, adopted by Committee 2 on August 15; for text, see AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl.*, pp. 95-96.

tions given thereon, do not provide an adequate basis for the development of specific proposals for an effective system of international control of atomic energy.”

(c) The Foreword of the report is expected to contain the statement that the A.E.C. is continuing the development of specific proposals based on the principles of the first report of the Commission. The Soviet have clearly stated that these principles are not acceptable to them.

We believe that a report containing the statements listed in items (a), (b) and (c) above would satisfy the instructions given by you on August 11th and quoted in the first paragraph of this letter. If this is not your opinion, we would appreciate your prompt advice.

Sincerely yours, For the U.S. Representative to the United Nations:

FREDERICK OSBORN

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] August 14, 1947.

Subject: Policy regarding the eventual destruction of atomic weapons.

I have read carefully the extract of the minutes of the meeting of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, on August 7, on the above subject.¹ I note the suggestion in the last paragraph that after I have had the benefit of the views expressed at this meeting I should approach member governments of the AEC to get further discussion of this point indefinitely postponed.

All friendly governments would be glad to postpone the subject. Most of them think it is not a proper subject to discuss until the actual time arrives for implementation of the treaty. The “matter of destruction” came up because it was embodied in one of the Russian amendments to the first report. The Russians may bring it up again at any time and there is no way we can prevent their doing so.

In the original debate on this subject the US took the position that the destruction of “atomic weapons” without destroying the nuclear fuel contained therein had little meaning since the nuclear fuel itself was the “dynamite” and the rest of the weapon was simply the mechanism by which the “dynamite” was set off. The real question therefore is what to do with the nuclear fuel.

If there should be a treaty signed within the next few years there

¹ *Ante*, p. 591.

will be large quantities of U235 and of plutonium in the US and probably none in the rest of the world. The other nations, especially Russia, would be unwilling to have all this nuclear fuel stored in the US until there would be peaceful uses for it in other parts of the world. The US would certainly be unwilling to distribute it. Canada and some of the others have said that the destruction of nuclear fuel would be vandalism.

Nonetheless, I believe that at the right time the US should propose its destruction. Then, if the others want to come back and propose that it be stored in the US until there is actual use for it for power purposes, we might consider that alternative.

Policy Planning Staff Files

Report by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET
PPS/7

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1947.

MR. LOVETT: At the request of Mr. Dean Acheson, the Policy Planning Staff undertook to draw up recommendations on the broad pattern of future U.S. policy with respect to the atomic energy negotiations. It was understood that these recommendations would, if approved, serve as guidance for the State Department representative, Mr. Rusk, in the Executive Committee of the Regulations of Armaments Committee (RAC).

A draft paper along these lines is attached in Annex B. A summary of the main recommendations contained in this paper is attached in Annex A.

In drawing up these papers, the Policy Planning Staff has consulted with the following persons:

Colonel Pierpont Hamilton, USA;
Captain Page Smith, USN;
Mr. John Hancock, Lehmann Brothers, New York;
Mr. Frederick Osborn, U.S. Representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission;
Mr. Joseph Volpe, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission;
Mr. Edmund A. Gullion;¹
Mr. Dean Rusk; and
Mr. Francis Russell.²

These gentlemen participated on a personal basis at various stages in the discussions, without engaging the responsibility of their respective organizations. While careful and sympathetic consideration was

¹ Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

² Director of the Office of Public Affairs.

given to what they had to say, the attached paper may not coincide with their views in every particular. The interested Departments and agencies will, of course, have opportunity to present their views to the Regulation of Armaments Committee, and in the wider consultations proposed in this paper, before a final Government policy is evolved.

With your approval, this paper should be transmitted to Mr. Rusk for his guidance.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

Approved: ROBERT A. LOVETT³
Acting Secretary of State

Annex A

GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

(through and after the Submission of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council)

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the United States take no initiative at this juncture in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in the Security Council, or in the General Assembly, to terminate negotiations looking toward international control of atomic energy.

2. That, notwithstanding the continuance of negotiations, it be announced by the President at the time of the submission of the next (second) report to the Security Council that this Government is obliged to take full account in its defense plans of the fact that no agreement has yet been reached with respect to the international control of atomic energy; and

that, accordingly, appropriate directives then be issued to all Government departments and agencies handling matters which would affect either the defense of this country against attack by atomic weapons or its power to retaliate in the face of such an attack.

3. That it also be announced by the President, at the time of the presentation of the second report, and by prior agreement with the two governments concerned, that this Government proposes to discuss with the British and Canadian Governments the situation resulting from the failure up to this point to achieve general international agreement on this subject, and

that, accordingly, invitations then be issued to the British and Canadian Governments along these lines.

³ In a memorandum for the record, September 9, Rusk stated that Lovett had indicated that he approved the paper as a planning guide within the Department of State, not as a final position for immediate action (Policy Planning Staff Files).

4. That the U.S. Government Delegate to the UNAEC be instructed to recommend the inclusion in the forthcoming AEC report to the Security Council of an indication that in view of the failure of the Commission to agree on preceding items there will be limitations on the extent to which certain of the remaining items on the Commission's agenda can be explored. (This refers particularly to the question of staging and of strategic locations.)

5. That a Board of Consultants, comprising as many as possible of the original membership of the group which drew up the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, be secretly convened as soon as possible to report whether in their opinion anything has been brought out in the United Nations debate, or in the progress of atomic science since their original report, which would call for any substantial modification in the original plan.

6. That measures be taken at once to acquaint the public with the significance of the lack of progress in the UNAEC and to prepare the public for the announcements which are to be made at the time of the presentation of the second report.

7. That it be accepted as a tentative plan of procedure, subject always to reconsideration in the light of later circumstances, that before the work of the UNAEC be allowed to break down entirely, this Government should send to Moscow a qualified public figure whose task would be to see to it that Stalin and the members of the Politburo are given a true and complete picture of this Government's objectives with respect to the international control of atomic energy, thus enabling us to be sure that the failure to agree in the UNAEC does not rest on the failure of subordinate Soviet organs to report our position correctly to those responsible for Soviet policy.

Annex B

GENERAL UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

(through and after the Submission of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council)

I. THE SITUATION TO DATE

After fourteen months of negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) the impasse continues. The United States must consider how to make the reasons for this impasse clear to world opinion, and how best to safeguard its own security in the circumstance.

The Report which the Commission will submit to the Security Council prior to the next meeting of the General Assembly in Septem-

ber will reveal that the Commission has not succeeded in resolving the fundamental differences between the US and the majority of members of the Commission on the one hand, and the USSR and Poland on the other. The report will unquestionably clarify still further the scope and nature of the fundamental differences between the Soviet position and the position held by ourselves and nine other countries represented on the 12-man commission.

The US position, although perhaps susceptible of modification in regard to details, cannot, it is believed, be altered in any important respect without endangering our national security. On the other hand no modifications in detail can, under present circumstances, conceivably make the proposals of the majority acceptable to the USSR.

Since the submission of its First Report on December 31, 1946, the Atomic Energy Commission has been laboring to iron out the differences with the Soviet Union and at the same time to draft specific proposals. Committee 2 of the Commission has worked out in detail a series of papers describing the functions and attributes of an international control authority. In these negotiations the US Representative has made a special and successful effort to let other countries assume the initiative. Representatives of the Soviet Union have not really contributed to these negotiations. They have attended only as observers. According to the United States Representative on the Commission, their presence has served only to delay the negotiations as long as possible through the raising of questions of a merely procedural nature.

Another committee (the Working Committee) has been considering the twelve so-called Soviet "amendments" to the year-end report. Substantive consideration of these proposals on their merits has proved difficult. The other members of the committee have found it impossible to induce the Soviet representatives to define with any precision the exact meaning of their "amendments" or proposals, particularly those which relate to the scope of the inspection function under an international control authority.

Several basic differences divide the Soviet Union and Poland from the other ten members of the AEC. While these differences include, of course, the mechanics of inspection and the relation of the veto to the use of sanctions, there are two points of disagreement which are basic and which have become even more significant:

First, the majority believes that outlawry of atomic weapons should be accomplished only as part of an international agreement providing for the development, by stages, of an adequate system of control, with safeguards necessary to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, evidently does not intend to abandon its insistence on the destruction of atomic bomb stocks before adoption of an international

control convention, or at least before it can become reasonably effective.

Second, the United States and most other UNAEC countries believe that an international control plan would afford no security unless it envisaged an atomic development authority endowed with broad powers over practically all operations connected with the production of atomic energy. Its powers would be those which, in Western nomenclature at least, are usually subsumed in the term ownership. The Soviet Union has repeatedly rejected the idea of such an authority, claiming to see in it an instrument for interference with the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Without a settlement on these two points it appears impossible for the United States, even though it continues to seek a solution, to agree with the USSR on a plan for the international control of atomic energy.

The United States could not agree to destroy its bomb stocks except in terms of the security provided by an agreed international convention. The Russians have heretofore been willing to agree only to immediate destruction, provision for security being left to later negotiation.

An international authority endowed by international agreement with some of the controls usually exercised by sovereign states is indispensable to security in an atomic world. Unless the international control authority has plenary powers in its field, secular nationalistic rivalries would still operate and conduce to conflict behind the screen of lesser forms of control. Meanwhile world opinion would be lulled into a false sense of security. Moreover, the problem of inspection without a strong authority would be of unmanageable proportions. Since the processes for the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and for explosives are similar and inseparable throughout most of their courses, the inspectors would have to investigate not only atomic energy operations but also the motives of the operators.

The United States believes that international ownership or its equivalent is the only answer to these problems.

Unfortunately ownership or beneficial control of important industrial facilities within the territory of the Soviet Union by any other authority than the Soviet state is incompatible with all known Soviet ideology and practice.

II. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF FUTURE U.S. POLICY

In the face of these fundamental differences the United States must begin to develop a policy which does not appear to place all our eggs in the UN Atomic Energy Commission basket.

The best estimates indicate that the Soviet Union will have effective use of the atomic bomb within — * years.

*To be supplied. [Footnote in the source text.]

A due regard for United States security does not permit us to stand idly by while the Soviet Union continues its filibuster in the UNAEC. The Russians are using delaying tactics in the Commission while they pursue specific objectives outside the meeting hall. These include:

- a) Hastening their own development of atomic bombs;
- b) Dividing opinion in other United Nations, particularly those having atomic energy resources or skills;
- c) Infiltration of research and control programs in any or all other countries;
- d) Breaking down existing secret US arrangements for procurement of raw materials outside the United States;
- e) Extension of their area of effective political domination by infiltration or direct pressure.

This enumeration demonstrates that we cannot consider the debate in the AEC as taking place in a vacuum. The extent to which Soviet strategic and diplomatic objectives are furthered by delay in the Commission is obvious, and too pat for mere coincidence. We must consider Soviet tactics in the AEC as part of the Kremlin's general strategy; and we must be able to recognize the end of the line when we come to it.

We are now faced with the basic fact that under present circumstances the effort to achieve international control affords less hope for protecting our national security than other means. We must begin, therefore, to take alternative measures which, while they would not provide as high a degree of security as effective international control, would at least materially improve the United States position in a world in which others possess atomic weapons.

This means that we turn a corner in our thinking and this turning-point must soon be made unmistakable to the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

This does not mean, however, that there is any necessity for terminating the work of the Commission at this point. On the contrary it is desirable that the door be left open to further negotiation with the Russians *subsequent* to the taking of these alternative measures. For although the measures would be taken primarily in the interests of our own security, they might just possibly have some effect in inclining the Russians toward the plan of the other UNAEC nations. This is so for the following reasons:

The Russians are trained to reason dialectically. Their diplomatic history shows that they seldom approach an objective along one course without at the same time having in reserve an alternative and sometimes entirely dissimilar course. In pressing their own demands, they are quick to take into account the extent to which their opponent has alternatives to the acceptance of their demands. If they think he has no acceptable alternative, they are insistent and intractable.

Thus far, we have not demonstrated to the Russians that we have any alternative to the present course of basing our future atomic security on general international agreement. On the contrary, we have tended to labor the point that there is no effective means of defense against atomic weapons. The Russians have probably concluded from this that we see no alternative to international agreement. This has put them in a position where they feel at liberty to stall the negotiations indefinitely, believing that as long as they refuse to reach agreement with us their basic security position will not deteriorate, because little will be done here to reduce our vulnerability and to increase our retaliatory power in the face of atomic attack.

The Russians are probably negotiating under the impression that this country has not taken, nor even seriously contemplated, any serious measures of civilian defense. This being the case, the possibility of being able, in the event of a military conflict, to cause great damage and panic by a surprise attack must be an appealing one to them. It must put a premium, in their minds, on the possibility that they may some day be able to use the weapon against us.

There is no intention here to make light of the damage which can be done by the atomic weapon or the difficulties of defense against it. Nor is there any disposition to minimize the importance of the planning for atomic warfare and defense which has already been done in the military establishments. But there must be degrees in vulnerability to atomic attack; and there are certainly degrees in determination and effectiveness of retaliatory force.

If it were clearly established in the Russian mind that there was no possibility of this country's being a push-over in the face of surprise atomic attack—that there existed in this country mechanisms which would enable us to recuperate with relative promptness and to impose swift retribution, even in the face of the heaviest blow; and that we were ready to depart from traditional American policy in the direction of effective international understandings which increase our retaliatory power—then there could be no doubt that the prospect of the atomic age would take on a somewhat different color to Russian eyes.

It cannot be said with any assurance that the effect thus achieved would be strong enough to overcome the inhibitions on the Russian side which stand in the way of Soviet acceptance of our atomic energy proposals. Indeed, the odds are probably rather on the other side. But the possibility that their attitude might be affected to some extent by such a state of affairs is a strong one; and unless that possibility had been explored before the work of the Atomic Energy Commission was permitted to come to a final end, it would not be possible for us to say that we had exhausted every possibility of bringing the Russians near to our point of view.

For this reason we should not allow the AEC to be torpedoed *before* we have taken measures to convince the Russians that we are going to maintain as firm a posture as possible in the face of atomic attack.

While expressing our belief that negotiations should continue, we should make it clear that they can do so only on an altered basis; that hopes of constructive agreement on the remaining items of the agenda have been compromised by the failure to reach agreement on the preceding items. The order of the items in the present work schedules of the AEC is progressive. It was conceived, for example, that a phasing plan for the transition from national to international control should grow out of, and depend upon, agreement as to the functions and powers of the international control agency.

Had agreement been reached on the basic features of a control authority, it would have been relatively easy for the United States to agree to a phasing plan, or even to a plan on strategic location. The task has now become much more difficult as the disagreement crystallized and as Soviet-US relations have deteriorated across the board. The safeguards which the US public would now have to require in the way of international control, of inspection, of undertakings by the Soviet Union go far beyond anything that would have been asked in the early days of the Atomic Energy Commission. Yet Russians have become increasingly outspoken in refusing to accept that minimum abatement of national sovereignty which a successful control plan would require.

If possible the report to the Council should include some clear acknowledgement that the Commission will have difficulty in discussing questions of staging or strategic location (and possibly some of the other remaining items) in face of the failure to agree on the subjects already considered.

Such a statement would serve as a caveat or advance disclaimer of responsibility for the difficulties which are bound to develop when such things as stages come up for discussion. Otherwise, if we failed later to discuss stages at all, the Russians could claim that we had never had any intention of handing over our present quasi-monopoly, gradually or otherwise. If, as appears probable under the circumstances, only a truncated or rudimentary staging plan could be offered, we might also be effectively accused of bad faith by Soviet propaganda, unless we gave some preliminary warning of the poor results to be expected in the present atmosphere and allotted the blame correctly.

Our object should not be to drive the Russians out of the AEC at this time. And we should avoid giving them an opportunity to put the onus for an open break upon this country. In particular, if we announce now that we envisage any international consultations outside the AEC, we must try to insure that these consultations have little as possible the

aspect of a mutual assistance pact against the Soviet Union at a time when UNAEC negotiations are still in progress.

It is probable that the Russians have too much respect for the bomb and too much appreciation of the peculiar uses to them of the AEC forum to isolate themselves by walking out on the negotiations.

Nevertheless we cannot dismiss the possibility that they may do this at the time the reorientation of our policy is made known. And this should be accepted as a considered risk.

If they do walk out, we need not take it too tragically. Their action would most probably not be approved by most states. It would in no way alter the premises underlying our policy. It might even be to our advantage in a number of ways: it would dramatize for world opinion as nothing else could the issues between the Soviet bloc and the rest of the AEC; it would occur at a time when the solidarity of the other AEC countries was still intact; it would put an end to the filibuster and give us a freer hand in making our defense preparations; and it would forestall the next stage of the AEC discussion which promises to be very difficult for us.

III. PRESENTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORIENTATION OF POLICY

Before the United States can proceed to seek security along the alternative courses represented by alliances or by military preparation, it must first effectively mobilize public opinion in this country and in other countries in support of its position. To the public the discussions in the UNAEC have tended to appear esoteric and philosophical. The continuing problem is to make the differences between the Soviet Union and the other members of the UNAEC stand forth clearly as something more than mere debating propositions. The issue with respect to international ownership of atomic facilities must be made at least as vivid and concrete as, for example, the issue with respect to the Greek northern frontier.

To do this will require a program of appeal to public opinion, geared to the UN deliberations but more imaginative and active than anything which has gone before. The process of public enlightenment by a planned campaign should begin as soon as possible, if the ground is to be prepared for a policy statement of real importance.

Such a statement should be made by the President and would be most effective if made at the psychological moment afforded by the presentation of the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council in September. (A tentative outline of a proposed address has been prepared by Mr. Gullion and can be made available if this paper is approved.)

In essence this declaration would (a) reaffirm the bases of US for-

eign policy; (b) review the disappointing course of the UNAEC so far; (c) isolate the major points of disagreement; (d) make it clear that this country would henceforth have to take carefully into account in questions of national defense the fact that no agreement had yet been reached over a year and a half after the Moscow declaration; and (e) announce that this Government proposed to discuss with the United Kingdom and Canada, the two countries which joined with us in pioneering atomic energy and in first seeking a scheme of control to ensure its use for beneficent purposes only, the situation resulting from the failure to reach agreement up to this time in the AEC. (The President's announcement of these discussions should be worded in such a way as to avoid the appearance of conflict with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 relating to exchange of information with other nations.)

Reasons already exist for initiating consultation with the UK and Canada other than those arising from the course of the UNAEC debate as developed in this paper. Certain secret war-time agreements between the three powers appeared to envisage that cooperation in the development of atomic energy for industrial uses would continue after the war. Canada and the UK, particularly the latter, have been pressing us to honor what they conceive to be commitments on our part. (No public reference would of course be made to these agreements at this time.) Britain is desperately eager to bolster its peaceful production with new sources of industrial energy.

The stagnation of discussions with the British and Canadians not only is damaging to US-UK-Canadian relations; it inhibits exploration of the possibilities of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It may increasingly affect our ability to secure as much raw materials as we require for our own domestic program of atomic energy development.

These consultations might possibly be followed up eventually by others with other nations which have indicated general agreement with the principles of international control of atomic energy accepted by the majority of the UN Atomic Energy Commission Countries. The basis and extent of their participation might vary as their needs and their economic, political and strategic situations indicated. We and the British are under commitment to furnish Belgium, which supplies the bulk of the raw material for our atomic energy program, with information about industrial uses when this becomes practical. Presumably we shall have to admit Belgium eventually into consultation with the US, UK and Canada; but in view of her relatively exposed position on the continent she may not want her affiliation publicly announced. Our policy vis-à-vis Belgium would thus require special consideration.

A public invitation at this time to a broader circle of other nations to join in consultations outside the UNAEC would be undesirable for the following reasons:

(a) Such multilateral arrangements would presumably involve, as a *sine qua non*, the disclosure by this country of some of its knowledge of atomic energy processes. So long as the Soviet Union is not a member of the club, the war potential of atomic energy will take precedence over peaceful uses. The revelation of classified technological information to a relatively large number of small states, militarily weak, geographically vulnerable, and politically unstable, is plainly undesirable;

(b) Such proposals would be gravely embarrassing to certain countries, e.g., Sweden or Belgium, who exist on the margin of Russian power;

(c) Most of these other countries would have little strength to contribute and would be liabilities rather than assets;

(d) Their cooperation could be assured by other means which would not give the Russians a chance to say that they were hitched to our chariot;

(e) In a middle power such as France, such an invitation might split the country politically, resulting in upheavals which might not be in our interest;

(f) Such a move might complicate an eventual amelioration of Soviet-American relations; and

(g) The cohesive force binding together principal partners with common interests and of comparable strength would be dissipated in a hopeless quest for universalism.

The mode and timing of a policy statement on the foregoing lines require careful planning. When the AEC Report is introduced into the Security Council, the United States representative at the Seat of the United Nations might review the report to make clear the areas of disagreement, refer to the difficulties of the next step of the negotiations and to the grave implications of continued disagreement, and announce that the President of the United States would speak to the people on this subject on that evening.

Obviously the policy outlined above will require wide clearance within the Executive Branch of the Government, and it is essential that the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy be fully informed.

In view of the content of the President's message, it would obviously be necessary to consult beforehand with other members of the UNAEC, particularly the UK and Canada. If the British Government has received answers to the questions which it recently put to the Russians on their atomic energy policies, the President's announcement might be synchronized with some similar British Government pronouncement underlining the negative results of UNAEC thus far.

IV. FINAL PRECAUTIONS

(a) *Review of basis of our policy.*

It is obvious that the course of action outlined above is predicated on the assumption that the plan for international control to be pre-

sented in the forthcoming report to the SC (which is substantially the original US proposal) is not susceptible of any important modification. Certainly before discussions in the UNAEC are adjourned, or before we decide to place no more reliance on them, we should be absolutely certain that this, to the best of our knowledge, is so. We should be sure that full study has been given to all possible new proposals and to every possible accommodation of conflicting views and that nothing has occurred in the past year and a half to invalidate any of the premises of the original Acheson-Lilienthal report, on which our policy has been based.

Consequently a group should be constituted, similar to the Board of Consultants which drew up the original Acheson-Lilienthal proposals, to reexamine the US position with a view to determining what, if any, changes are possible and to report to the Secretary of State as soon as possible. It would be unrealistic to suppose that such a study could be launched entirely *de novo*, especially since time is of the essence. Fortunately the main elements in any plan for international control are sufficiently well known not to require it. A feasible and satisfactory plan would be to convene quietly as many as possible of the original consultants and to ask them merely to judge whether, since their report was originally prepared, anything has been brought out in the UN debate or in the progress of atomic science which would dictate or permit any real modifications in the original plan.

It is desirable that this be done without publicity, at the time. The results of their reexamination could be made known at a later date, if need arose.

(b) *Final High Level Approach to Soviet Government.*

All possibility of misunderstanding as to terms or definitions or of the bases on which the delegates are negotiating should be eliminated before the ultimate breakdown be allowed to occur. The proposed review by the Special Consultants group should help to accomplish this check in so far as this country is concerned. However, we have no grounds for certainty that Stalin himself has any detailed understanding of the negotiations so far, or that he grasps the implications of continued failure to reach agreement. The record shows that, purposely or accidentally, Stalin's few utterances on the subject have not been consistent with Gromyko's or Molotov's stand of the moment.

If the recommendations contained in this paper are adopted it will presumably be some time before there will be any complete break of the negotiations in the Commission. It would therefore be premature to make final plans now as to what we should do just before the final break. This would have to be judged in the light of circumstances.

It should be tentatively recognized as desirable, however, that before negotiations die out entirely a qualified public figure representing

this Government should proceed to Moscow and talk with Stalin on this subject, in order to make sure that the latter fully understands our position and to ascertain whether there is any last possibility of a change in the Soviet attitude. It is absolutely essential that whoever is chosen to confront Stalin have an intimate knowledge of the subject, as well as of the wider issues of US-USSR relations. He must be able to speak with assurance on these matters, and to state his case strongly and bluntly enough to prevent Stalin from taking the usual refuge in dialectical generalities.

SPA Files : Lot 55D323

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division
of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 24, 1947.

Subject: Withdrawal of Forces from UN Members' Territories.

Participants: Mr. N. J. Henderson, Second Secretary of the British
Embassy
Mr. D. C. Blaisdell, IS
Mr. J. E. Johnson, IS

At his request, Mr. Henderson called on me today and inquired about our intentions regarding the publication of agreements giving the consent of the governments concerned in UN Member territories where U.S. forces were stationed. I asked Mr. J. E. Johnson to join the conference.

Mr. Henderson stated that Mr. Lewis Clark of the American Embassy had discussed this matter with Mr. Jebb of the Foreign Office. It was his understanding that the U.S. proposed to proceed along the lines outlined by Mr. Clark in his discussion with Mr. Jebb. I replied that that was correct; that while we understood the British might feel that a precedent was being set by the course which the U.S. was following, a precedent which the U.K. might be forced to follow, nevertheless, we felt that it was desirable for the U.S. to comply strictly with the UN GA resolution of December 14, 1946 on this subject. Mr. Johnson referred to a message received from the American Embassy in London stating that the British would not object.

Mr. Henderson said that Mr. Johnson's statement was not strictly in accord with their information.

Mr. Johnson and I undertook to answer certain questions put to us by Mr. Henderson:

What form would these agreements take? (An exchange of notes or a joint communiqué);

Would information on numbers of forces be included? (No);

How many instances were involved? (We did not give the exact number but indicated there may be as many as ten or a dozen);

Would they be "published"? (Yes, and in the case of an exchange of notes they would be registered with the UN pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter);

Was it proposed to publish them simultaneously? (No);

When was it likely that the agreements in question would be completed and published? (Difficult to say, but possibly some of them within the next month or six weeks, that is, before the convening of the General Assembly on September 16).

I gathered from the nature of Mr. Henderson's questions that the British had not received a completely accurate understanding of our policy. He did not request any change in it and I gather that the purpose of his visit was to obtain fuller information about our course of action and report it to London.

501.BC Atomic/8-2647: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

NEW YORK, August 26, 1947—1 p. m.

777. For Acting Secretary and Rusk from Osborn and Gullion. Will Department please relay urgently to London if approved. Reurtel

1. British Embassy reports that Cadogan has been instructed to indicate that British Government gives general support to views of the majority in the UNAEC. (In the main these are fully satisfactory to us and will form main body of the Commission's second report to the Security Council). He will take position that these proposals afford the basis of a scheme of control which will be effective, whereas the alternative proposals put forward by the Soviet will not.

2. However, Cadogan will also apparently be instructed to reserve the British position with respect to three points, (a) they are not convinced that the residual powers conferred on the international agency in respect to ownership are, in fact, necessary. (b) they may also indicate reservations with respect to extent to which research by individual nations can or ought to be restricted. This reservation may turn on definition of "dangerous quantities" which cannot now be made. (c) they have some doubts about necessity of vesting exclusive right of research on atomic weapons in the agency.

3. In view of the above would you please inform Foreign Office promptly of the following:

4. In US view the forthcoming report should be an interim report by the majority which would include the working papers approved in

their present form presenting general considerations and specific proposals covering items through A (2) in the approved subject list.¹ Report will include a summary of the discussion on the Soviet amendments showing no agreement has been reached on them, and a summary of the discussion on the Soviet proposals of June 11, recently concluded, plus a resolution voted by the Commission on August 15² which states that the Soviet proposals as thus far elaborated are inadequate and do not constitute a basis for the future work of the Commission. The foreword of this interim report will state that the AEC is continuing its work under recommendations previously received from the Council to develop specific proposals on the items remaining on the subject list—these proposals being based on the general findings and recommendations of the first report which are to be reaffirmed. It is proposed that foreword should also state that work on remaining items rendered difficult by lack of Soviet agreement on specific proposals contained in the report.

5. US Government deems it necessary that the report should be presented in a form that will evidence the agreement of the majority on the proposals developed under items through A (2) of AEC/C.2/16 and should also reveal with unmistakable clarity the grave and fundamental differences between the position taken by the Soviets on the atomic energy control and that of the US and nine other members of the Commission. US sees no way to do this without a clear-cut expression of support by the delegations of the majority.

6. In view of these differences, Department is of opinion that time has arrived when US-UK-Canada ought to resume consultations as to next steps in development of humanitarian and peaceful uses of atomic energy. Desirability of such consultations is now being considered urgently on high level with other Departments and we hope soon to be able to give more concrete indications to British. Although it is unfortunate that decision can apparently not be reached before Commission acts on its report, we think British should bear this in mind in considering their course in the UNAEC.

7. The idea of such consultations had received impetus from increasing recognition of the fact that UNAEC negotiations have provided little positive result thus far. We are thus in a position to say that the project is more concrete and imminent than at any time in the past. The British will recall that we have always pointed out that real decision on the future on US-UK-Canadian cooperation in this field was bound up with the assessment of the position to be made in September.

8. We believe it would be most unfortunate if at this stage the

¹ AEC/C.2/16, AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Supplement*, pp. 5-8, *passim*.

² AEC/C.2/73, *ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

British should introduce any separate reservation or amendment. We had thought that clarification of the meaning of ownership contained in AEC/C.2/44,³ particularly the recognition that its scope and powers would be specifically limited in the treaty, had substantially eliminated main divergencies between US and UK. Indeed the AEC document in reference contains certain restrictive language concerning meaning of ownership submitted by UK Delegation.

9. We feel that independent reservations by the British would open the door to further reservations by other powers of which we and the British have some foreknowledge. An accumulation of such reservations would seriously jeopardize basic concepts of effective international control. We believe that any reservation specifically labelled as British would give Russians opportunity to say that the majority confronting them was not in fact united.

10. We assume, moreover, that the British have not overlooked the fact that dilution of the powers of the ADA is one of the prime Soviet objectives. For example, there is nothing the Russians would like more than to be permitted to do research on "dangerous" activities and nothing more calculated to rob an international control plan of real effectiveness, or for that matter, of any chance of acceptance by the majority. [Osborn and Gullion.]

JOHNSON

³ The document under reference concerned itself with operational and development functions of the international agency and its relation to the planning, coordination, and direction of atomic activities.

501.BC Atomic/8-2747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

[Extracts]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1947—6 p. m.

3728. For the Ambassador.

[Here follow paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of telegram 777 from New York, August 26, *supra*.]

4. The United States does not intend at this time to take any action looking to the termination of the negotiations in the UNAEC. It will continue to seek agreement on international plan for the control of atomic energy.

[Here follow paragraphs 4 and 5 of telegram 777.]

7. In view of these differences with the Soviet Union, the Department has been considering what further steps are necessary to progress toward the elimination of atomic weapons and the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Following the submission of the second report, the United States, the United Kingdom and

Canada may wish to consider together the situation arising out of the failure thus far to reach any agreement in the UNAEC.

[Here follow paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of telegram 777.]

11. We believe that instructions to representatives of the Western powers in the UNAEC should be framed not only with reference to the exigencies of the debate and the problem of atomic energy control in the abstract, but must also be consistent with the position in which they find themselves vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and with respect to one another. Therefore, the views expressed by Secretary Marshall in his telegram number 2486 of June 10, especially numbered para 4, seem to apply to present situation with even greater force.

[LOVETT]

501.BC Atomic/8-2947: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 29, 1947—3 p. m.

4694. In Ambassador's absence we discussed atomic matter (Deptel 3728, August 27) with Makins temporarily in charge Foreign Office who supervises atomic questions there and headed UK group in recent US-UK informal talks on atomic matters in London. Makins made following comments:

1. Dept views (par 4-7) clarified situation since reports received by Foreign Office had not clearly set forth planned US course of action. UK did not plan to submit any amendments but did plan to submit some reservations including one on ownership (reflecting UK attitude in London conversations) and one on research (reversing UK attitude in London conversations).

2. Cadogan has extensive discretion to proceed under general directives based on decisions at Cabinet level here and Attlee's personal feeling that while US-UK attitude much the same and cooperation essential "there could be no objections to UK making reservations on minor points about which there were strong feeling in Britain". Foreign Office has just thoroughly briefed UK technical expert Thomson who left yesterday by air for US and would give Cadogan latest London views.

3. Makins intimated that frank talks with Cadogan and Thomson in US might be helpful. He stated Foreign Office was informing both Embassy at Washington and Cadogan of US attitude. He thought there was possibility much of difference in US-UK views could be ironed out with Cadogan and Embassy possibly on basis that reports from them might be influential in backing up our action here.

It was apparent from Makins' statements that matter has been considered on Cabinet level in UK and that Cabinet does not like idea of

agency ownership of any plants in UK and also objects to development of atomic weapons by any international agency. We left matter with Makins, informing him that Ambassador Douglas upon his return might desire to discuss question further.

CLARK

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/79

*Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1947.

GENERAL DISARMAMENT INCLUDING ATOMIC WEAPONS

THE PROBLEM

The questions of the international control of atomic energy, and the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces are not on the agenda of the General Assembly. However, in view of the past actions and proposals of the Soviet Union the possibility should not be precluded that the USSR might again attempt to associate atomic weapons with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. In that event, this Government should be prepared to state its position on this problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Delegation should not initiate a discussion of the relationship of the international control of atomic energy and the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. If a debate on this subject develops, however, this Government should reaffirm its basic position which is that the two problems must be kept separate.

(a) The United Nations has already separated the two problems by the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, the General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, and the Security Council Resolution of February 13, 1947.

(b) The following reasons for the above action further illustrates the necessity for continued separation.

1. The urgency of the problem of atomic energy.
2. The uniqueness of the problem of atomic energy.
3. The greater importance of the problem of atomic energy as distinguished from conventional armaments.
4. The objective of "elimination" from national armaments of atomic weapons as distinguished from "regulation" and "reduction" of conventional armaments.
5. The greater complexity of the problem of atomic energy.

¹ Circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-27/1 on September 5 (Department of State Disarmament Files).

6. The necessity to keep the issues of atomic energy clear cut and not involved and entangled in discussing less important issues of conventional armaments.

DISCUSSION

1. The United States Delegation should not initiate a discussion of the relationship of atomic weapons to the regulation of conventional armaments in the General Assembly. If the issue is brought forth by another delegation, this Government should reaffirm the position it has taken many times in the past year that the work of the two Commissions namely, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Commission for Conventional Armaments must be separate and continue to be separate.

2. This Government's Representative should argue that the two problems should be kept separate on the following grounds:

(a) The General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, which established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and set forth its terms of reference, clearly assigned the problem of atomic weapons to that body. The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, concerning the general principles in reference to the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces again emphasized the separation of the two problems. While the Resolution calls for expediting consideration, both of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, and of a general system of control to include both the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, it also contains the provision that nothing in the Resolution "shall alter or limit" the General Assembly Resolution of January 24, 1946, creating the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Security Council Resolution of February 13, 1947, establishing the Commission for Conventional Armaments and setting forth its terms of reference states that "those matters which fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission as determined by the General Assembly Resolutions of January 24, 1946, and December 14, 1946, shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission hereby established."

(b) Aside from previous decisions taken by organs of the United Nations providing for the separation of atomic energy and conventional armaments, the more important reasons for keeping the work of the two Commissions separate are found in the nature of the two problems:

1. This Government has argued and continues to emphasize that the most urgent problem facing the United Nations is that of the international control of atomic energy. The urgency of the problem and, therefore, the special attention which must be given to the problem was stressed by this Government in collaboration with the United Kingdom and Canada in the Three Nation Agreed Declaration on

Atomic Energy November 15, 1946. In proposing a United Nations Commission to engage this problem, the Declaration stated that "the Commission should be instructed to proceed with the utmost dispatch . . ." The General Assembly Resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission also emphasized the same necessity for a speedy solution of the problem and urged that "the Commission shall proceed with the utmost dispatch".

The urgency of this problem has not only been reflected in official pronouncements and Resolutions but is a part of the nature of the problem of atomic energy. If there is no international control of atomic energy, this Government considers that the near future will bring forth the possibility of world wide competition for atomic weapons. Such a competitive struggle with the possibility of utilization in warfare would deny to all peoples of the world the security that they desire, and fear and suspicion would dominate the United Nations. In the opinion of this Government, therefore, the terrifying possibilities in uncontrolled atomic energy competition among states requires that the problem of international control of atomic energy must have top and first priority over all other weapons.

2. The uniqueness of atomic energy is related to the very nature of nuclear fission and requires a special awareness of the scientific and technological implications of the problem. Thus, the international control of atomic energy as envisaged by the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission and as particularly emphasized by this Government requires a limitation on the present actions and rights of participating states. For example, this Government considers that there can be no international control of atomic energy, unless there is an international authority which will be entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw material and including managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security. While there might be wide inspection powers, both in atomic energy and the regulation of conventional armaments, atomic energy control has a separate and unique status in terms of managerial and ownership responsibilities of a highly specialized nature. Thus, both the understanding of the problem of atomic energy and the proposed solution of the problem rests on unique grounds which are unrelated to the regulation of conventional armaments.

3. The importance of the problem of the international control of atomic energy is underlined by the urgent necessity to find a solution. Despite the urgency of the problem, however, one cannot deny that the proportions of the problem, particularly if the problem is not solved, transcends the problem of conventional armaments. The destructive power of atomic weapons and the possibility that further research in the military aspects of atomic energy will produce even more terrifying results both in scope and destructive force makes conventional weapons small in importance. Thus this Government considers that another reason for keeping the two problems separate is that the importance of the problem of atomic energy justifies one organ of the United Nations devoting its full time to examining proposals and providing recommendations for the international control of atomic energy.

4. Another reason for keeping the two problems separate is related

to the different objectives in reference to atomic energy and conventional armaments. The objective of the international control of atomic energy is to "eliminate from national armaments atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction". The objective in reference to conventional armaments relates to "the regulation and reduction" of conventional armaments. These two different objectives require distinct and separate approaches to their solution both on technical grounds and political grounds. The technical problem of "elimination" is quite different from the technical problem of "regulation" and "reduction". The political implications of an international authority having title or managing an operation are quite different from an international commission which might be authorized to "inspect" certain national armaments. Thus, the solution to the objective of "elimination" is related to the unique nature of the problem of atomic energy which is completely different from the nature of the problem of conventional armaments. This Government considers, therefore, that the different objectives provide further justification for keeping the work and solution of the problem of atomic energy distinct and separate from that of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

5. The complexity of the problem of atomic energy is well known. The world is aware of the fact that the problem is comparatively new and men competent to understand the complexities of the problem are few. The deliberations and the discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission have set forth the complexities related to the international control of atomic energy. Thus, the understanding of the problem and the knowledge to set forth an adequate solution requires not only political understanding but technical understanding of a highly specialized type not required in the problem of conventional armaments. This Government does not deny that an adequate and effective solution of the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments will be characterized by complexities of great magnitude. However, the complexities of conventional armaments as they relate indirectly and directly to possible regulation and reduction are fairly well known to many states and literally thousands of technicians in all states. Thus, the complexities of the problem of atomic energy are quite different and greater in scope than the complexities of the problem of conventional armaments which again provides a justification for keeping the two problems separate.

6. This Government considers that one of the most important reasons for keeping the problem of atomic energy separate from that of conventional armaments in attempting a solution is to make sure that the issues in both Commissions are at all times clear to the world. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has attempted to associate atomic weapons with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. This Government has vigorously opposed this move not only upon the grounds stated above but on the grounds that a joining of the two proposals would slow the ultimate solution of atomic energy which should have the highest priority and would cloud the issues. Such a move would also provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to propose the elimination of atomic weapons on a basis related to conventional armaments resulting in no security for participating states against the hazards of violation.

It might be argued that this Government could derive a tactical

advantage in the General Assembly by accepting the Soviet challenge to join the two problems, if such a challenge is made. Such an argument would have to be based on the idea that this Government really does not care if there is one Commission or if there are two Commissions as long as the result provided an adequate and effective system of international atomic energy control and an adequate system for the general regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. However, as long as it is clear that the USSR in proposing the association of atomic weapons with conventional armaments has as an objective the embarrassment of this Government and a system of international control which would be meaningless and a fraud, this Government should insist upon the separation of the two problems. Stating the issue in another way it would be entirely appropriate for this Government to accept the Soviet challenge if it were clear that the result of joining the two problems, as might be evidenced by Soviet actions and attitudes, would produce an effective and adequate international system for both atomic energy and conventional armaments. The preponderance of evidence, however, indicates no willingness on the part of the Soviet Union either to understand or accept the basic principles underlining an effective system for the international control of atomic energy. Bearing this in mind it would be extremely dangerous for this Government to risk what is now a clear record of Soviet negativism by placing any faith in an alternative approach which the past year would overwhelmingly indicate would result in failure. It is considered that any tactical "victory" such as the acceptance of a Soviet challenge would be ephemeral. Thus, it is of enormous importance particularly from the standpoint of the record and world opinion that the issues particularly on atomic energy be preserved as they now stand with a majority favoring an effective international control and the Soviet Union in a minority and with a clear record of non-participation, blocking and criticism.

501.RC/S-2947 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1947—noon.

3762. 1. Present stalemate in SC re General Principles governing the organization of the armed forces to be made available to SC by UN member nations as recommended by MSC is causing us concern.²

¹ Repeated, *mutatis mutandis*, to the Embassies in France and China and to the United States Representative at the United Nations.

² The Security Council had examined the report of the Military Staff Committee at its 138th to 143rd and 145th, 146th, 149th, and 157th Meetings, from June 4 to July 15. For the record of these discussions, see SC, *2nd yr.*, Nos. 43-58, pp. 952-1312, *passim*. In presenting an initial statement on the subject for the United States at the 138th Meeting, June 4, Herschel Johnson had called for full and open discussion of the report. He had not specifically requested the creation of a committee for that purpose. Such a suggestion was subsequently presented by the Belgian and British representatives. However, at the 141st Meeting, June 16, after the Syrian and Australian representatives had vigorously opposed establishment of a committee, the Council decided to proceed with discussion itself. Other business prevented the Council from devoting attention to the subject after July 15; it did not complete its review of the report in 1947.

SC agreement to such principles prior to initiating negotiations in accord with Charter Article 43 is a condition the satisfaction of which any permanent member SC not wishing to strengthen UN can obstruct indefinitely. Moreover Dept convinced one such member is exploiting this opportunity to full. In so doing this member is aided by inability SC, due to heavy agenda during recent weeks, to give attention to principles. This in turn has prevented SC from dividing on each unagreed principle, thus making a record which Dept desired should be made before GA session in order that Soviet isolation on most principles would be clear. Little prospect now that GA will have such a record before it and GA will reconvene with no agreements negotiated despite its recommendation last regular session that SC accelerate placing at its disposal of armed forces mentioned in Art 43 of Charter.

2. In pursuit our objective getting forces allocated to SC soonest consideration now being given to proposing that GA consider accelerating carrying of Art 43 into effect and, specifically, recommend (1) to members that they tender offers of forces, facilities and assistance to SC before March 31, 1948, (2) to SC that it accept such offers as agreements, thus effectuating a provisional implementation of Art 43, pending completion of SC consideration of general principles when SC could initiate renegotiation in order to bring terms of offers completely into line with accepted principles.

3. Before decision is made re such proposal Dept would like to know whether, if proposal were made, UK would respond affirmatively to such a recommendation from GA. Please approach British ascertain whether they have given thought to ways of getting Art 43 brought into effect other than present method of prior SC agreement on principles. If they have, Dept would appreciate being informed. In any event please outline to FonOff substance of proposal under consideration and inquire for Dept's information what their reaction to such a GA recommendation would be.

LOVETT

501.BC Atomic/9-447: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1947—6 p. m.

US URGENT PRIORITY

1015. You are requested to make urgent representations to FonOff concerning following situation which has arisen in UN AEC.

Deputy US Rep on UN AEC has been informed by Brazilian Rep that he intends proposing amendment to document entitled "Functions of the International Agency in Relation to Stockpiling, Production,

and Distribution of Nuclear Fuels and the Design, Construction, and Operation of Isotope Separation Plants and of Nuclear Reactors" (AEC/C.2/39/Rev. 2.). This document is one of six on functions proposed international atomic agency which has been developed by majority members of UN AEC in working groups of Commission and is to be considered next week by AEC for incorporation Second AEC Report to SC.

Brazilian amendment would state that "no restrictions shall be imposed on the nations that hold raw materials relative to the use of material for pacific ends."

If amendment fails of acceptance Brazilian Rep is instructed to have recorded his Govt's reservation on this point. This Govt considers that such an amendment would be denial of Baruch proposals and of First Report of AEC to SC which was approved by Brazil. It would be strongly opposed by other delegations who had joined in development of important working papers which represent many compromises including those made at request of Brazil.

We believe that if the plan for international control of atomic energy put forward by the majority of the UNAEC delegations were made subject to such a limitation it would become meaningless. Although the language of the Brazilian amendment is sweeping and imprecise, it does appear to contemplate an exemption entirely inconsistent with the central requirement of a workable control plan which is the development of a strong international control agency with full responsibility for all the "dangerous" activities involved in the production of atomic energy. Of these, mining, distribution and stockpiling of raw materials are at least as important as any.

As the Brazilian delegation must be aware the processes for the production of atomic energy for weapon use and for peaceful use are throughout most of their courses identical and inseparable. The Brazilian reservation would appear to leave a large loophole in control schemes which would invite evasions and diversions. The country "holding" raw materials would apparently have only to profess peaceful intentions in order to safeguard itself from strict international control and inspection. The Brazilians have only to ask themselves if they would be prepared to credit such professions if made by any power. Moreover, no security would exist if it were left to each nation to make its own decision as to the amount of raw material to be declared or placed under the control of the international agency.

The Brazilian amendment would fail of passage and would make for bad feeling among delegations which could be exploited by Soviets.

This Govt strongly desirous Second Report of AEC reflect clearcut issue that majority accepts effective and adequate international system

control of atomic energy and USSR does not. Such a reservation would cloud the record and permit the Soviets at a crucial stage in these deliberations to point to such departures as lack of confidence in the proposals developed by majority.

On above grounds urge FonOff to reconsider present instructions. Inform Dept results immediately.¹ Sent to Rio repeated to New York.

LOVETT

¹ In telegram 1235 from Rio, September 6, Ambassador Pawley reported that on the previous day, while in an automobile with President Truman (who had delivered an address on the occasion of the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2), he had asked President Dutra of Brazil to read a translated summary of the present telegram. Dutra had stated that he was familiar with the question and would take the necessary action to see that Brazil conformed with the Baruch proposals to which it had previously agreed. On September 6, Pawley was informed that telegraphic instructions were going forward to the Brazilian Delegation at the United Nations to the effect that the Brazilian amendment be withdrawn and that no reservations be registered. (501.BC Atomic/9-647)

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/84

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, September 6, 1947.]

WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM TERRITORIES OF OTHER MEMBER NATIONS

THE PROBLEM

The General Assembly on December 14, 1946 adopted a resolution on "Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments" (A/267), paragraph 7 of which provided in part: "IT (the General Assembly) RECOMMENDS the Members to undertake . . . the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements; . . .". In the forthcoming session of the General Assembly there may arise the question of the extent to which this recommendation has been carried out by the Members.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. If any complaint should be made to the General Assembly that the United States has failed to comply with the resolution quoted above, the United States delegation should make an appropriate reply on the basis of the latest information furnished to it. (See comment below.) In its discretion, the delegation may include in its reply a statement to the effect that United States forces have been stationed in territories of Member Nations only with the freely given consent of

¹ The General Assembly did not consider this matter during its deliberations.

such Members, that following the adoption of the resolution of December 14, 1946 the United States took prompt steps to comply with the provisions of paragraph 7 quoted above, and that in no case do United States forces stationed abroad constitute a threat to peace and security. In the unlikely event that a complaint against the United States appears to be developing into a major issue which cannot be quieted by such assurances of United States' good faith and good intentions, the delegation should consult the Department for instructions.

2. The United States delegation should not oppose any reasonable proposal that the General Assembly attempt either to ascertain the extent to which Members generally have complied with the resolution or to determine the need for further action by the General Assembly on the same subject. However, it should not take the initiative in proposing such action. (If such proposal calls for the submission of data on numbers and location of forces abroad, the delegation should be guided by the position set forth in .²)

3. If any complaint should be made to the General Assembly alleging failure by any Member other than the United States to comply with the resolution, the United States delegation should ascertain the validity of such complaint and be guided accordingly, consulting the Department if necessary.

4. If any proposal should be made that the General Assembly condemn generally the presence of troops on foreign soil in time of peace the United States delegation should oppose it on the ground that the portion of the resolution of December 14, 1946 quoted above clearly implied that the United Nations had no objection to the stationing of a Member's forces in the territory of another Member when authorized by "treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements." The United States delegation should also oppose any attempt to place additional restrictions upon such stationing of forces.

COMMENT

In order to comply with the portion of paragraph 7 of the General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1946 quoted above, the United States has undertaken negotiations with a number of Members for an exchange of notes or joint communiqué to cover United States' armed forces stationed in their territories. It is hoped that these negotiations will have been satisfactorily completed by the time the General Assembly convenes. No attempt is being made at this time, however, to obtain agreements covering very small contingents of United States military personnel on missions of an obviously temporary

² Omission indicated in the source text.

nature such as, for example, grave registration units, groups which are arranging for the disposal of certain items of military equipment, etc. The Department is of the opinion that the resolution was not directed at situations of this sort.

Prior to the convening of the General Assembly, the United States delegation will be furnished with a summary of the latest available information regarding United States forces located in the territories of Members of the United Nations, the extent of United States' compliance with the resolution, and the status of negotiations which may still be incomplete. (In view of the possibility that attempts to embarrass the United States in the Assembly on the issue of location of troops abroad may go beyond the precise scope of the quoted portion of the resolution, the delegation will also be given a brief summary of the current situation in each case where United States forces are stationed in the territories of non-member states.) This statement will also include a full account of action taken by the United States, since adoption of the resolution, in completing the withdrawal of troops from certain areas, such as Iceland, where their former presence might be the subject of adverse comment.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
Washington, September 8, 1947, 10:30 a. m.*

SECRET

PRESENT

STATE	WAR	NAVY
Secretary Marshall Mr. Rusk Mr. Gullion Mr. McWilliams Mr. Moseley, Secretary (SWNCC)	Secretary Royall Colonel Hamilton Colonel Munson	Under Secretary Sullivan Assistant Secretary Kenney Rear Admiral Wooldridge

AEC

Dr. Bacher
Mr. Volpe

**I. PROPOSED U.S. POSITION ON DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ¹**

DECISION

Approval of the Atomic Energy Commission documents. (AEC/C.2/36, Rev. 2, AEC/C.2/37, Rev. 2, AEC/C.2/38, Rev. 2, AEC/C.2/

¹ With respect to subsequent consideration of this subject by the three Secretaries, see the minutes of their meeting of September 11, p. 838.

39, Rev. 2, AEC/C.2/44, Rev. 2, AEC/C.2/61, Rev. 1.² The Committee was informed at the meeting that AEC/C.2/37, Rev. 2 had been revised to satisfy the exception to certain provisions of this paper originally taken by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments.)

IMPLEMENTING ACTION

State Department (Mr. Gullion) to advise Mr. Osborn, U.S. Representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, of the Committee's action.

DISCUSSION

SECRETARY MARSHALL referred to the working papers of the UN Atomic Energy Commission dealing with various aspects of international control of atomic energy which have been referred to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission for approval by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments. He said that the State Department had already approved these papers and he understood that they were acceptable to the Navy and the US Atomic Energy Commission but that Secretary Royall had certain reservations concerning the documents which he would like to discuss. He indicated that Mr. Osborn had to have immediate instructions regarding the U.S. position on these papers.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that he had two general misgivings with respect to these papers, one of which had already been clarified. He said that at first he had been uncertain whether the substance of these documents extended our position beyond the Baruch plan, but that he is now convinced that they do not. However, his other misgiving was whether it was proper that we should take any action at all in connection with these papers. He said that he understood that the Russians had indicated that they would not take any action on these documents, and therefore this might be a good opportunity to adopt the position that we would stop any further consideration of the problem in the UN Commission. He said that he believed that we must now determine whether we have to withdraw the original proposal of the Baruch plan or agree to do nothing further about it from now on.

MR. SULLIVAN said that he shared Secretary Royall's misgivings. He added that he was fearful that if the report was approved by us at this stage and generally accepted by the UN, he wondered what would happen if the Senate refused to ratify the agreement in treaty form.

² These documents, slightly revised, constituted Part II of the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, September 11, the Report's specific proposals; for text, see AEC, *2nd yr., Special Suppl.*, pp. 12-74.

DR. BACHER said that it was his understanding that the documents were consistent with the original Baruch proposals, containing some amplification of detail, and that he saw no objection to approving them.

MR. RUSK said that the problem before the Committee could be divided into two parts: the first is the more immediate problem of approving the documents of the working groups of the UN Atomic Energy Commission and secondly, there was the question of what position toward international control the U.S. should take from now on as a result of the situation arising from the failure to reach agreement in the UNAEC. He indicated that the documents in question would constitute the main part of the Commission's forthcoming report, which would be an interim report showing a clear division in the Commission. Ten nations, including the US, supported the proposals contained in the documents under discussion, with only the Soviet Union and Poland dissenting. It was the hope of the US delegation to make the submission of this report an occasion for demonstrating the solidarity of the majority. Under its working schedule the Commission still had to consider a number of important subjects, such as the staging of the transition from national to international control if it was to fulfill its mandate to work out specific proposals. It was nevertheless planned to point out in the report that there would be difficulties in developing specific proposals on subjects yet to be discussed because of failure to agree on the earlier topics on the work schedule, i.e., the functions and attributes of the international control agency. He indicated that Secretary Royall's fundamental points regarding our future position toward agreement on international atomic energy control are now being given active consideration by Mr. Kennan's planning group and others. He pointed out that it was planned to ask for a resurvey of our original position in light of developments. He said that he favored our going ahead and approving these documents pending a resurvey of our entire position.

SECRETARY ROYALL asked just what reasons there would be for our [not] stopping negotiations right at this point.

MR. GULLION replied that there was general agreement among those who had been discussing the problem at working level that the onus for a break ought never to be placed on this country. Moreover, there was no doubt that these majority proposals before this Commission were of American inspiration—and we had exerted great effort to preserve a solid front among the UNAEC nations opposed to the

Soviet Union and Poland. In the last week there had been particular difficulty in keeping Britain and Brazil in line. We were committed by the whole course of negotiation thus far to follow through in putting these working papers to a vote and in completing the effort to draw up specific proposals for atomic energy control. A reversal now would be inconceivable. If we were to break off now, we would not be supported by the other nations now behind us in the majority group of ten.

MR. VOLPE said that in view of the fact that the Russians have refused to participate in the working groups, approval of these documents by 10 nations would show up the Russians in their true light.

MR. SULLIVAN said that he agreed that we should take advantage at this time of indicating the underlying differences between our position and that of the Russians.

MR. RUSK pointed out that our present policy as indicated in the Baruch plan, as well as in statements of the President, is that we favor the international control of atomic energy. He said that approval of the documents in question would in no way depart from our commitments under our present policy.

SECRETARY MARSHALL called attention to the exception to one Atomic Energy Commission document (AEC/C.2/37, Rev. 2) taken by the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments.

MR. GULLION said that word had been received from Mr. Osborn by telephone that agreement had been reached to amend this particular document in such a way that it met the U.S. objections.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that in view of this development it was understood that the Committee need not consider this particular provision of that document, and it was assumed that it was now in satisfactory form. Secretary Marshall cited the importance of our retaining the support of other friendly member nations of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, particularly as several of these countries contained the raw materials from which atomic energy is derived.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that he appreciated the importance of retaining the support and cooperation of such countries as England, Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands and that he was agreeable to approving the documents. He added that he believed we should start immediately to reconsider our entire position towards international control. MR. GULLION said that this was now being done and that the Kennan group would soon make a report available.

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/88

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1947.

THE CONCLUSION OF SPECIAL AGREEMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 43 AND ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ARMED FORCES

Note: The final form of this proposal and actions under it depend upon the outcome of conversations now in progress with China, France, and the United Kingdom.

THE PROBLEM

To determine what action the United States should take in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly regarding implementation of Article 43 of the Charter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Subject to the necessary approval by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

1. The United States delegation should propose to the General Assembly that it consider means of accelerating as much as possible the placing at the Security Council's disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter.

2. The United States delegation, in the course of debate on this subject, should urge the desirability of the earliest possible implementation of Article 43 and should impress upon the General Assembly the improbability of achieving this end in the near future if agreement on the general principles of the Military Staff Committee Report must first be reached.

3. The United States delegation should introduce a resolution (draft of which is appended hereto) recommending:

a. That the Members of the United Nations each inform the Security Council not later than March 31, 1948 of the armed forces, assistance, and facilities which they will offer to make available to the Council on its call in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter.

b. That the Security Council accept such offers promptly and conclude agreements with the Members accordingly, reserving the right to renegotiate such agreements from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to such general principles as may thereafter be agreed upon.

DISCUSSION

1. *U.S. Position*

The United States has always favored action to bring about the early conclusion of the "special agreements" governing the numbers, types, degrees of readiness, and general locations of the armed forces, and the natures of the facilities and assistance, which the Members of

the United Nations have undertaken by Article 43 of the Charter to make available to the Security Council on its call. The President in his address before the General Assembly on October 23, 1946, said in this connection :

“At the same time [that the United States seeks agreements which will establish the international controls of atomic energy and will remove the deadly fear of other weapons of mass destruction] ¹ we shall also press for preparation of agreements in order that the Security Council may have at its disposal peace forces adequate to prevent acts of aggression.”

In approving SWNCC 219/17 ² (classified Confidential) the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on June 27, 1947, reaffirmed as United States policy the attainment of the following objective :

“The early conclusion of special agreements conforming to the provisions of Articles 43 and 45 of the United Nations Charter which will make available to the Security Council on its call armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including bases, rights of passage, and the immediately available air force contingents referred to in Article 45, adequate with regard to strength, amount, composition, training, equipment, readiness, location, and in all other respects, to fulfill any need which might arise by reason of the Council's functions under the Charter with reference to the maintenance of international peace and Security.”

The United States has consistently maintained that the conclusion of arrangements making armed forces available to the Security Council on its call is, among other things, one of the essential steps in building up the collective security which is a prerequisite to the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. That alone would call for vigorous U.S. advocacy of effective action to implement Article 43.

2. *Action to Date*

The first action toward carrying out the mandate in Article 43 that the “[Special] agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council” was taken by the Council on February 16, 1946. On that date it adopted without discussion a directive proposed by the U.K. representative calling on the Military Staff Committee, as the latter's first task after meeting in New York, “to examine from the military point of view the provisions in Article 43 of the Charter and submit the results of the study and any recommendations to the Council in due course.” The question of action to implement Article 43 was not again taken up in the Security Council until January 1947.

Action by the Military Staff Committee to comply with the Council's

¹ Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.

² *Ante*, p. 492.

directive of February 16, 1946, was initiated on March 27, 1946. By directing a subcommittee (subject to final confirmation by the Soviet Delegation) to "formulate recommendations to the Military Staff Committee as to the basic principles which will govern the organization of the United Nations Forces", the Committee on that date established the course of action to implement Article 43 which has ever since been followed both in the Security Council and in the Military Staff Committee. The wording of the directive adopted by the Committee was proposed by the U.S. Delegation, but the action for which it called was much the same as that envisaged in proposals submitted by the U.K. and French Delegations.

Within a week the U.S., U.K., French, and Chinese delegations each submitted drafts of the basic principles proposed, but despite attempts by those delegations to get the Soviet Delegation to do likewise, that delegation did not submit anything of the sort until September 18, 1946—nearly six months later. On that date it submitted, not a draft of the basic principles proposed, but a draft statement of the purposes for which the Security Council could use the armed forces made available to it. This was cast in the form of a distorted restatement of certain provisions of the Charter which, if accepted and adhered to, would have seriously restricted the use which the Council would be able to make of any forces placed at its disposal. In addition the Soviet Delegation insisted that the Military Staff Committee, after completing its action on this statement of purposes, should await the completion of action on it by the Security Council before proceeding to the consideration of other basic principles. The submission of this statement marked the abandonment by the Soviet representatives of the purely dilatory pattern of obstruction which they followed during the first six months of action to implement Article 43. Since September 1946 the pattern of Soviet action on this question, both in the Military Staff Committee and in the Security Council, has to an increasing extent conformed to the pattern of the two actions just described—namely, the submission of a proposal which, if accepted and adhered to, would seriously restrict the Council's freedom of action under the Charter, and insistence that until all action on that proposal had been completed in the Council as well as in the Committee, the Committee should refrain from considering any other aspect of the question before it.

When the General Assembly met in October 1946 information about the action taken in the Military Staff Committee, beyond that given in the Committee's brief report to the Security Council, was presumably known only to the governments represented in that committee; but it was generally understood that not much progress had been made toward the implementation of Article 43. While the question never

received separate consideration by the Assembly, the importance of concluding arrangements which would make forces available to the Security Council on its call, or of accelerating action to that end, was brought up on a number of occasions by the representatives of various nations. The result was the inclusion of the following in the resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments unanimously adopted by the Assembly on December 14, 1946: "THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament, RECOMMENDS the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter."

The question of what should be done to accelerate the placing of forces at the disposal of the Council received the attention of the Security Council during the debate in January and February 1947 on the action to be taken to implement the General Assembly's resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments. After rather heated debate the Council voted to include in the resolution which it adopted on February 13, 1947, a request that the Military Staff Committee accelerate its action to carry out the Council's directive of February 16, 1946. The inclusion of that request in the form finally adopted received the affirmative votes of nine members with the USSR and Poland abstaining. The important part of the request was that the Committee "submit to the Security Council not later than 30 April 1947 its recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Force."

In compliance with this request the Military Staff Committee on April 30, 1947, submitted a report containing its recommendations on the "General Principles Governing the Organization of the Armed Forces Made Available to the Security Council by Member Nations of the United Nations." This report revealed wide divergences of views between the USSR and the other four permanent members on the following important points: the USSR insists on what it calls the "principle of equality", which would place restrictions unacceptable to the other members on the strength and composition of the forces which each permanent member is to make available to the Council. The USSR insists that the forces pledged to the Council must remain within their home territories or territorial waters when not employed by the Council; this restriction also is unacceptable to the other permanent members. The USSR insists that a predetermined limit be fixed on the time after conclusion of an operation during which the forces employed by the Council may remain away from their home territories or territorial waters without special authorization of the Council; this restriction also is unacceptable to the other permanent members. The USSR denies that bases are included in the assistance or facilities which all

Members have undertaken by Article 43 of the Charter to make available to the Council; the other permanent members consider that bases and rights of passage are the most important items to be furnished in the way of "assistance and facilities."

While the views of the non-permanent members have not been so clearly established as those of the permanent members, Poland appears generally to hold views similar to those held by the USSR, and the other non-permanent members appear generally to hold views similar to those held by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China.

Discussion of the Military Staff Committee Report took place at eleven meetings of the Council (the 138th, 139th, 140th, 141st, 142nd, 143rd, 145th, 146th, 149th, 154th, and 157th). It was then interrupted by the pressure of other business, and resumption of the discussion has not since been feasible. During the discussion efforts were made both by discussing the general principles recommended and by attempting to discuss specific figures, to resolve the divergencies of views between the USSR (and Poland) and the other members; but neither method of approach resulted in any apparent progress toward that objective. Throughout the debate the USSR was unyielding in its attitude; and its representatives in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee have repeatedly made statements indicating that until agreement has been reached on the general principles they will oppose any other action to implement Article 43.

3. *Soviet Position*

It appears reasonably certain that the Kremlin does not look upon the United Nations as a means for maintaining international peace and security based on a due regard for the interests of nations and a reasonable give and take among them. It looks upon the United Nations rather as an arena in which to pursue its aims inimical to governments which it does not control, so long as that appears profitable to it. The Kremlin may hope eventually to gain control of the United Nations and make it a useful instrument for Soviet expansion, but until that time is clearly in sight the Kremlin probably hopes to keep the United Nations weak in order to minimize its value as a possible anti-Soviet alliance.

The apparent objectives of the Soviet Government in relation to the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available for use by the Security Council are consistent with that attitude. The actions of the Soviet representatives in the Council, the Military Staff Committee, and the General Assembly since March 1946 indicate that those objectives are:

a. To prevent, or failing that to delay greatly, the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council on its call.

b. To establish "principles", or to secure commitments or understandings of some other nature relating to the provision, organization, use, or support of any forces or facilities eventually made available to the Council, which will help to accomplish one or more of the following purposes:

(1) To keep such forces weak and ineffective, at least as regards the use in the Eastern Hemisphere of components furnished by nations other than the U.S.S.R. or its satellites.

(2) To guard against the possibility that components of such forces furnished by nations other than the U.S.S.R. or its satellites might enter the U.S.S.R. or Soviet-dominated areas.

(3) To prevent or to hinder the use against the U.S.S.R., or against operations favored by the Kremlin, of any forces eventually made available to the Council.

(4) To further the efforts of the Kremlin, made through negotiations concerning the control of atomic energy or the reduction of armaments and through subversive and propaganda activities as well as in this manner, to better the war-making position of the U.S.S.R. in relation to other nations, particularly the United States.

c. So far as is feasible without unduly sacrificing or jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives described under *a* and *b* to avoid antagonizing opinion in foreign countries. The balance between the Soviet efforts to attain those conflicting objectives cannot be predicted with any certainty and is likely to be subject to sudden changes made for tactical reasons.

It is possible that the Soviet Government would stop trying to prevent or to delay the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council, if it were to conclude that the other permanent members of the Security Council would accept all the "principles" or the like advocated by the U.S.S.R. to govern the provision, organization, use, and support of any forces made available to that organ. But in view of the Soviet attitude toward the United Nations it is improbable that the U.S.S.R. would willingly assent to any arrangements of that character which it considered likely to strengthen the United Nations to a material extent.

The Soviet advocacy of restrictive "principles" may in some instances stem wholly or in part from an intention to cause delay by proposing restrictions estimated to be unacceptable to other members of the Council, rather than from any hope of getting the "principles" accepted.

The U.S.S.R. has never openly opposed the conclusion of arrangements making forces available to the Security Council or openly denied the desirability of concluding such arrangements. But representatives of that government have denied that the conclusion of such arrangements is in any sense a prerequisite to the regulation or reduction of armaments.

4. *Positions of Other Governments*

The other permanent members of the Security Council, the non-permanent members other than Poland, and many other United Nations Members have expressed strong dissatisfaction with the slowness of the Council in carrying out the intention of the Charter that the special agreements mentioned in Article 43 be negotiated with a minimum of delay, or have urged that action to that end be accelerated. There do not appear to be any differences of opinion among members of the Council which would be likely to constitute serious obstacles to the implementation of Article 43 if Soviet opposition and obstruction were to cease.

5. *Reasons for Attempting to Accelerate Action*

It is undeniable that the enforcement machinery provided by the Security Council is inherently unsuitable for any use which is strongly opposed by a permanent member of that organ. Aside from the veto power conferred on such a member by Article 27, the fact that the agency charged with military planning for enforcement action undertaken by the Council and responsible under the Council for the strategic direction of the forces placed at the latter's disposal is composed of the chiefs of staff of each permanent member of the Council, or their representatives, would make it difficult, if not impracticable, for the Council to use force effectively for any purpose strongly opposed by a permanent member. But in spite of this there is good reason to believe that the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council on its call would help materially to promote international peace and security.

Despite these weaknesses, the conclusion of such arrangements would constitute a relatively long step toward the provision of effective means for international enforcement action for the maintenance of peace and security and would represent an advance beyond anything of the kind which has been accomplished before. The representatives of many Members of the United Nations have made it clear that their governments on that account attach great importance to the early conclusion of such arrangements. Continued inability to complete them seems likely to have a worse effect on the prestige of the United Nations and its support by the Member nations than would the demonstration of inability to agree on the use of force, when force is needed, which would be likely to occur after the arrangements had been completed. There appears to be little if any danger that any arrangements of this nature which could be concluded within the foreseeable future would cause the U.S. public to rely too heavily on international enforcement action and for that reason fail to support the maintenance of an adequate national military establishment.

The conclusion of arrangements making forces available to the Secu-

rity Council would provide means for the establishment of precedents for the international enforcement of law. Even a small beginning of that kind might ultimately prove to be of great importance.

The conclusion of arrangements making U.S. armed forces available to the Council would go far toward committing the United States irrevocably and openly to participation in world affairs.

After arrangements had been completed making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council it should become more difficult than at present for a permanent member of that organ which desired to prevent enforcement action by the Council, or which desired to take improper military action itself outside the framework of the United Nations, to do either of those things without making its true purpose apparent to all observers.

While the Security Council enforcement machinery could probably not be used in the early stages of military action against a permanent member which had embarked on a course of aggression, it might well prove to be of material value, particularly with regard to the provision of bases, after the Council had been reconstituted following the expulsion or withdrawal of the permanent member which had embarked on a course of aggression. It might very well take less time to reconstitute the Council on that basis, and to obtain any necessary reaffirmation of the pledges of forces, assistance, and facilities previously made to it, than to bring into existence by other means an equally widespread and effective military alliance.

The evident desire of the Soviet Government to prevent, or at least to delay as long as possible, the conclusion of arrangements which would enable the Security Council to carry out its enforcement functions under Article 43, and to emasculate any arrangements of that nature which may finally be concluded, indicates that in the opinion of that government the conclusion of such arrangements in accordance with the intention of the Charter would strengthen the United Nations or impede the international activities of the U.S.S.R.

The pledge to the Security Council of certain kinds of weapons, aircraft, or vessels might impede the efforts of the Soviet Government by means of propaganda, disarmament negotiations, and other maneuvers, to force the United States by the pressure of public opinion or by other means to abandon them.

It appears that generally speaking the interests of the United States would be better served by the early conclusion of arrangements making some forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council on its call than by the delayed conclusion of arrangements which would make more adequate provisions of those natures. Once the forces of a nation have been committed to a military operation it becomes very difficult for the nation to limit its involvement or to withdraw.

6. *Possible Courses of Action*

The course of action to implement Article 43 which has been followed in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee since March 1946 would be well adapted to its purpose if all the permanent members of the Council desired to strengthen the United Nations and with that in view to implement Article 43 in accordance with the intentions of the Charter, but that is clearly not the desire of the Soviet Government. The course of action followed has, however, served a valuable purpose in bringing about wide areas of agreement and understanding among the members of the Council other than the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

The Soviet representatives have taken the position that until agreement has been reached on all the "principles" in the Military Staff Committee Report the U.S.S.R. will not assent to any other action toward making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council. Further discussion could apparently continue indefinitely without resulting in such an agreement; and in the unlikely event that such an agreement should appear imminent the Soviet representatives could, and almost certainly would, advance apparently plausible reasons for bringing up additional matters requiring discussion and agreement as prerequisites to the implementation of Article 43. The present course of action therefore presents the U.S.S.R. with just the opportunities it desires to delay the conclusion of arrangements making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Council, and to emasculate any arrangements of that character which may eventually be concluded. And it appears reasonably certain that the U.S.S.R. would use its powers as a permanent member to block any proposals initiated within the Council to adopt any alternative course of action which might, within a reasonable period of time, result in the implementation of Article 43 in accordance with the intention of the Charter.

For the reasons just given it is unlikely that any action taken by the Assembly which did not bring about some radical departure from the course of action now being followed would actually accelerate to any material extent the conclusion of arrangements making forces available to the Council.

While it is true that a recommendation of the General Assembly is not binding upon the Security Council, and that the U.S.S.R., despite adoption by the Assembly of a resolution along the lines recommended, could nevertheless prevent, by its adverse vote in the Council, the conclusion of "special agreements" in the case of each individual member, it seems unlikely that it would find it expedient to follow such a course of action. The prospect of frustrating, by a succession of vetoes, the manifest desire of Members to assume obligations plainly contemplated by the Charter is apt to be a distinctly distasteful one. Thus the recom-

mended course of action should do much, by removing the problem from the realm of abstract principles and bringing it down to the hard facts of specific offers, to make the continuation of present Soviet tactics more difficult and more embarrassing to the U.S.S.R.

The making by important Members of the United Nations of the offers contemplated by the recommended resolution would in itself constitute an important step toward making forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council.

The Soviet representatives may take the position during debate in the General Assembly on any proposal such as that now recommended that any decisive action on this matter by the Assembly would be premature until the exact measure of agreement on the general principles in the Military Staff Committee Report has been determined in the Council. In order that the respective positions of the U.S.S.R. and the other members of the Council concerning the principles and related questions should be defined as clearly as possible before any action relating to the provision of forces came up for consideration by the General Assembly, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was instructed to press for a vote in the Security Council on each of the principles on which agreement had not been reached. But effective action of that nature was prevented by the pressure of other business before the Council and could not now be taken in time to be useful in connection with the Assembly's consideration of any proposals made during the forthcoming session. However, while votes on the principles in disagreement have not been taken in the Council, the permanent members have already made their positions on all of them pretty clear, and during the debate in the Council most of the non-permanent members have given many indications of their positions.

Appendix

DRAFT RESOLUTION

In pursuance of Article 11 of the Charter and with a view to enabling the Security Council, at the earliest possible time, to exercise its responsibilities under Article 42 of the Charter,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Recognizes:

1. That the implementation of Article 43 of the Charter is essential to enable the Security Council to discharge its "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" under the Charter;

2. That, notwithstanding the recommendation of the General Assembly contained in paragraph 7 of the resolution of December 14,

1946 (A/267) that the Security Council "accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter," no such forces have yet been made available to the Security Council and Article 43 remains unimplemented;

3. That the present lack of agreement in the Security Council on general principles governing the organization of forces under Article 43 of the Charter should not prevent the Members of the United Nations from carrying out at the earliest possible date their undertakings, as set forth in Article 43, to conclude agreements making available to the Security Council, on its call, armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security; and

4. That in view of such lack of agreement in the Security Council it is desirable, in order to effect the early implementation of Article 43, that the Members of the United Nations be enabled to make available to the Security Council on its call such armed forces, assistance and facilities as they may individually offer.

Accordingly,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Recommends:

1. That each Member of the United Nations inform the Security Council not later than March 31, 1948 of the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, which the Member offers to make available to the Security Council on its call; and

2. That the Security Council, as expeditiously as possible, accept such offers and conclude agreements with the several Members accordingly, such agreements to be subject in each case to the right of the Security Council to negotiate at any time for their revision in order to give effect to such general principles governing the organization of forces under Article 43 of the Charter as may be agreed upon by the Security Council from time to time.

501.BC Armaments/9-1047

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, September 10, 1947.

DEAR BOB: During the past ten days, our Commission has been making definite progress, contrary to our expectation that we would not

do much of anything during September or through the General Assembly. We have completed point #1 of our Plan of Work¹ and have started on point #2. We are covered satisfactorily on our instructions on point #2 and point #3. We are completely at sea on point #4, which has to do with the program for the regulation and reduction of armaments.

Several months ago, following our instructions from General Marshall to the effect that we must develop a program of leadership and not be placed in a negative position, I developed a plan for our delegation to submit under item 4,² and asked the State Department to either approve this plan or develop something more satisfactory to take its place. Nothing has happened as yet that I know of, and we are apt before long to be put in the negative position of approving or opposing a plan submitted by some other nation, although it is obvious that the smaller nations are looking to us for leadership on this main item of our Plan of Work.

As I understand it, our plan has been for a long time in the hands of the Strategic Committee³ of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I believe they have just recently made their recommendation to the Joint Chiefs.⁴ I am informally advised that this recommendation opposes our plan. I was convinced all the way along that the Strategic Committee would oppose our plan, because they opposed the original conventional armaments program when it was agreed to by the United States.

I believe their main objection is that they do not wish to give any information whatever about armaments or armed forces until the

¹ For the text of the Plan of Work, see RAC D-13/5, June 19, p. 525.

At its 10th Meeting, July 16, the CCA had established a Working Committee of the whole with the Plan of Work as its terms of reference. The Working Committee first met on August 20 at which time the United States Delegation offered a proposal defining weapons of mass destruction to determine the jurisdiction of the Commission. This proposal, as amended in the course of discussion, was adopted by the Working Committee at its 4th Meeting, September 9, despite opposition by the Soviet Union by a vote of 7 to 2 with two abstentions. The resolution read as follows: "The Working Committee resolves to advise the Security Council

"(1) that it considers that all armaments and armed forces, except atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction, fall within its jurisdiction and that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above; "(2) that it proposes to proceed with its work on the basis of the above definition." (IO Files)

The CCA began consideration of item 2 of the Plan of Work, "general principles," on September 9.

² For the text of the July 16 draft proposal for an armaments regulation program, prepared in the Office of the United States Representative to the Commission for Conventional Armaments, see p. 562.

³ The Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

⁴ For the evaluation of the Bard Plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Forrestal's letter to Marshall, October 10, p. 679.

treaties have been signed, the atomic energy program completed, and the armed force set up of the United Nations arranged for.

A month ago at the time I met with you in Washington I talked to Admiral Leahy, explained our plan in detail, and obtained his approval and assurance that he would back it up at the time of the JCS meeting. I also talked to Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz together. Mr. Forrestal said that he had no objections whatever to the innocuous information that was asked for as part of our plan, as it was available and could be obtained in a few hours by any high school boy.

Admiral Nimitz had not heard of the plan or had the opportunity to study it up to that time. I am convinced that if this plan could be properly explained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it was to Admiral Leahy, they would not oppose it, as it is by long odds, in my opinion, the lesser of the two evils confronting us.

The British have a very loose open-end plan providing for reporting on armed forces personnel only. They have been instructed to introduce it in connection with item 2, and may do so on Friday.⁵ Their program will permit and encourage every delegation to ask for all types of information, with the result that it may be very much more embarrassing to our armed forces than the innocuous information requested in our plan. On top of this, we will probably have a Russian plan, and you can imagine the program which will be outlined by them.

It has been my purpose to try and get a majority of our Commission to approve of our plan before submitting it, with the understanding that there should be no changes and that this would be as far as we would be willing to go under present existing conditions. If this could be accomplished, we should have created a vehicle for conventional disarmament which would go forward by stages and be implemented as the United Nations develops, as treaties are signed, the armed force set up and atomic energy program matured.

In the meantime, nothing in the program of an embarrassing nature to our armed forces would develop, as far as conventional armaments is concerned.

I feel that I must call this matter to your attention for if we are to take the lead and not be placed in a negative position, we must have a program. I have done everything in my power to develop such a program, and I must say it has been approved by practically everybody who has seen it, with the exception of some of the military, although in the initial stages when I took it up with the heads of our Military Staff Committee here in New York, it was generally approved by them in principle, and a strong letter of recommendation was writ-

⁵ September 12.

ten by General Joseph T. McNarney to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.⁶

I had hoped that we could delay the decision by the JCS until Admiral Leahy returned to Washington about September 20th, but I have been informed that the Admiral may be retired and be replaced by someone else as soon as he returns, and if we delay until September 20th, it may be too late.⁷

The only further suggestion is that I shall be glad to come to Washington to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their request to consider this subject, or if it is preferable, to meet with the Secretaries when they have received the recommendations of the JCS.

Awaiting your further suggestions,⁸ I remain with kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

RALPH A. BARD

⁶ The letter under reference was presumably that of June 12, 1947, from Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, United States Air Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, to Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, not printed (USUN Files).

⁷ In a letter of September 18, not printed, Bard reviewed the problem for Admiral Leahy and expressed the hope that the Admiral would be present when the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it (USUN Files). Admiral Leahy remained as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy until March, 1949.

⁸ Replying by letter on September 12, not printed, Lovett stated that he saw real merit in Bard's plan. He suggested that Bard contact Secretary of Defense Forrestal to arrange a personal hearing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (501.BC Armaments/9-1047) Bard informed Lovett on September 15 that Forrestal wished to defer such a meeting until after September 20 (501.BC Armaments/9-1547).

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 10, 1947.

At the Secretary's request Mr. Gullion today consulted Mr. Bernard Baruch at his hotel concerning PPS/7 (General United States Policy with Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy.)¹

Taking up the recommendations of the Planning Staff paper in order:

1. Mr. Baruch agrees that the United States should take no steps at this time to terminate UNAEC negotiations; he does not believe that we should ever close the door on such negotiations.

2. His first reaction to the idea of a Presidential statement on UNAEC's failure to produce results was that too much had been said already. In the margin of the page on which this recommendation occurs he immediately wrote "Why say anything?". However, when

¹ August 21, p. 602.

he had finished reading the paper he agreed that a statement should be made about the impasse and its implications. A great deal would depend upon the actual content of the statement and he would have to see it before expressing a firm opinion; something would also have to be said in the General Assembly.

3. Mr. Baruch's opinion about consultations between Britain and the US would depend upon the content of the proposed conversations between the United States and Britain. He had many reservations about handing over any information to the British. He thinks that once the information is given it will then be public property, because he thinks the British would turn it over to other countries. He mentioned that the British were committed to France in this respect. His principal reservation has to do with financial assistance to Britain. He believes that it is entirely inconsistent that we should be aiding the British while they are stockpiling uranium and withholding it from our use.

4. Mr. Baruch agrees that the point should be made that the US plan is a whole and that implementation of any part of it depended upon acceptance of the main principles of the whole. He was not clear as to what advantage might be gained by stressing the future difficulty in discussing staging. He pointed out that the question of the veto was also fundamental in the whole discussion. My general impression, however, is that he agrees with recommendation No. 4.

5. He agrees with the convening of the Board of Consultants but believes strongly that it should not address itself to the basic Acheson-Lilienthal Report but to the original American proposals to the Commission which he presented on June 14, 1946, which were more complete than the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.

6. He agrees that something could and should be done to inform the public more effectively of the UNAEC issues and the lack of progress.

7. He agrees strongly with the recommendation of an interview with Stalin and believes that the President might make some reference to it. He confirmed that it was probable that Gromyko was not giving the Politburo the true picture of our proposals.

[Here follows an annex, "Personal Views Expressed by Mr. Baruch in conversation with Mr. Gullion on September 10, 1947."]

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/97

*Position Paper Prepared in the Division of International Security
Affairs*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1947.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

(Comment Paper)

THE PROBLEM

What should be the United States position if and when the problem of atomic energy is raised in the General Assembly in connection with:

1. The Assembly's consideration of the Security Council Report embodying, among other matters, a summary of the Security Council's consideration of the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission;
2. The Assembly's consideration of the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, if this report should be referred to it by the Security Council; or
3. The possible introduction into the General Assembly of substantial proposals dealing with the control of atomic energy.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation should recall the initiative taken by the United States in proposing a system of effective controls, review the efforts made in the Atomic Energy Commission to obtain agreement on the essential features of such a system, and point out the increasing insecurity resulting from the failure of atomic energy negotiations to discover common ground. In this connection it should be stated that, in the absence of Soviet acceptance of the majority views on the functions and powers of the proposed international control agency, there will be more difficulty than had been anticipated

¹This paper was approved by the alternate War and Navy Members of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments on September 12 and was circulated in that body as RAC D-28/1 on September 16 (Department of State Disarmament Files).

²The matter of international control of atomic energy was not considered during the deliberations of the General Assembly's Second Session. The General Assembly simply took note of the Report of the Security Council covering the period July 16, 1946-July 15, 1947 (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 2*). Certain items of the report were considered in connection with matters on the General Assembly agenda, but atomic energy was not among them. The Security Council did not refer the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission, which it received on September 11, 1947 (AEC, *2nd yr., Special Suppl.*), to the Second Session of the General Assembly since it itself did not consider that report in 1947. Nor did consideration of the question of international control of atomic energy originate from initiative taken within the General Assembly, that body being preoccupied with other issues.

developing proposals on matters still pending before the Atomic Energy Commission. The United States Delegation should cite the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept any of the elements considered by the great majority of the Commission to be essential to such control, to make adequate counter-proposals, or to participate in many of the working groups of the Commission.

2. The United States should take the position that no action by the General Assembly is necessary at this time with respect to the status and terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission.

3. If any substantive proposals on atomic energy are submitted, the United States should insist that they be referred to the Atomic Energy Commission for consideration and that the reference should in no way alter the competence of the AEC as stated in Paragraph V of the Resolution of January 24, 1946. (If a substantive proposal is made which attempts to link atomic weapons with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments, see position paper entitled "General Disarmament Including Atomic Weapons," Document .³)

4. The United States should support any resolution requesting that the work of the Atomic Energy Commission be completed as soon as possible.

DISCUSSION

The Present Situation

The Atomic Energy Commission was established on January 24, 1946, by a resolution of the General Assembly (See Appendix A ⁴). The Commission submitted its first report (Appendix B) to the Security Council on December 31, 1946, after the adjournment of the last session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946 (see pages 8-10 of Appendix B) urged that the Security Council "expedite consideration of the Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission."

The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission was adopted by the Commission by a vote of 10-0 with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. In the discussions of the Report in the Security Council, the Soviet Union introduced on February 18, 1947, certain "Amendments and Additions" (see Appendix C). The Security Council recommitted the report of the Atomic Energy Commission (S.C. Resolution of March 10, 1947, S/296, see Appendix D) for further study of all phases of the problem, the development of specific proposals as soon as possible, and, in due course, the preparation for submission to the Council of a draft treaty or treaties. It also requested a second report from the Commission before the next session of the

³ SD/A/C.1/79, August 29, 1947 (RAC D-27-1, September 5), p. 619.

⁴ The appendices are not printed here.

General Assembly. Since receiving the Security Council's directive, the work of the Commission has gone forward in two of its committees, a Working Committee (Committee 1) and Committee 2.

The Working Committee has examined the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union as "Amendments and Additions" to the First Report and has recently discussed proposals for atomic energy control presented by the Soviet Union on June 11, 1947 (see Appendix D). With minor exceptions the Working Committee has rejected the "Amendments and Additions" in that they would render ineffective the major proposals of the First Report. The majority of the Commission rejected the Soviet proposals of June 11 as not fulfilling the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission. The majority also objected to the proposals in that they do not include as functions of the international control agency the management, ownership or operation of dangerous atomic activities. The Soviet proposals have also been criticized for being too vague with respect to the inspection functions of the agency.

In Committee 2 the program of work (see Appendix E) has involved the development of specific proposals, in harmony with the First Report, to be incorporated in a treaty or treaties for the control of atomic energy. Working papers on the functions of the proposed international agency (see Item 2 of Appendix E) were prepared and are included in the Commission's Second Report. This work has proceeded with only minor Soviet participation. The greater part of the program of work of Committee 2 is unfinished. This includes the development of proposals on the organization and structure of the international agency, strategic balance, application of sanctions against violators, and the stages of transition from conditions of national control to those of predominantly international control.

The view of this Government as conveyed to the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission⁵ is that: "(a) that the next report of the Atomic Energy Commission should be presented in a form that will evidence the agreement of the majority of the proposals developed under Items A.1 through A.2 of AEC/C.2/16 which will enable the Security Council to direct the Commission to complete the task of developing specific proposals on the remaining items, and (b) that at the same time it is important that the next report of the Commission should reveal with unmistakable clarity the grave and fundamental differences between the position taken by the Soviet Union on atomic energy control and that of the United States and nine other members of the Commission".

The Atomic Energy Commission has presented its Second Report to the Security Council. Full agreement has only been possible on rela-

⁵ Instruction No. 190, August 11, p. 595.

tively minor issues. The continuing Soviet disagreement with the majority on fundamentals has given rise to the question whether the work of the Commission should continue or whether the Second Report should present the major issues in final form. The introduction to the Second Report (AEC/26 of 8 September 1947)⁶ states:

"It is evident that, until unanimous agreement is reached on the functions and powers of the international agency, there will be limitations on the extent to which proposals on other topics in the Summary of Principal Subjects can be worked out in detail. Clearly, much remains to be done before the final terms of a treaty or convention can be drafted. The Commission intends to proceed with the remaining topics in the summary and, at the same time, will continue its endeavors to clarify and resolve, where possible, the existing points of disagreement."

In order that there may be no illusions regarding the kind of progress made by the Atomic Energy Commission it is important that the United States emphasize the limitations on the future work of Committee 2 in the absence of unanimous agreement on the subjects thus far developed.

Past United States Position

In United Nations discussions of atomic energy the United States has consistently adhered to the principles laid down in its original (Baruch) proposals. These principles have been accepted by the great majority of the Atomic Energy Commission in the First Report of the Commission. The United States has urged that effective international control of atomic energy is one of the prime requisites to the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security. An objective of United States foreign policy has been and continues to be the establishment of an effective, enforceable system for the international control of atomic energy. Important statements of the position the United States has taken on this subject are listed in Appendix F, with appropriate references.

Attitude of Other States

Inasmuch as the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council was approved by ten Representatives on September 11, 1947, it can be assumed that these ten States, namely, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, United Kingdom, and the United States, will support any proposal in the General Assembly which is in line with the Second Report, and therefore the United States position. It may also be assumed that the Soviet Union and Poland will criticize the United States position or

⁶ AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl.*

make recommendations contrary to the United States position in as much as they did not approve the Second Report.

Egypt, Mexico, and The Netherlands supported the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council prior to leaving the Atomic Energy Commission on the 31 December 1946. There has been no indication in the past nine months that these three States no longer support an effective and adequate system for the international control of atomic energy.

No definite indication of the Soviet position in the General Assembly has been obtained. It is believed, however, that the Soviets may attempt to divert attention from their unfavorable position in the Atomic Energy Commission by introducing proposals designed to confuse atomic energy control with the problems of general disarmament and to undermine the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission. Such efforts should be vigorously resisted for the reasons more fully outlined in a separate paper on this subject.

Position of the United States in the General Assembly

United States policy as referred to in the Department's instructions of August 11, 1947 (above, page 3), requires that the United States take no initiative to terminate negotiations for international control of atomic energy. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the United States Delegation to the General Assembly should remain silent when atomic energy is discussed. Bearing in mind the urgent need of impressing the American people with the implications of the present situation, the United States Delegation should seize every appropriate occasion for emphasizing (a) that the United States considers that the outlook for international control of atomic energy is dim; (b) that the great majority of the Atomic Energy Commission is in agreement on the essential requirements for effective international control; and (c) that fundamental differences exist between the great majority of the Commission and the Soviet Union. These differences should be cited together with the basis for the rejection of the Soviet's counter-proposals. (Refer to Mr. Osborn's statement of June 11 proposals, Appendix 1, AEC/C.2/78 of August 26, 1947).

Assuming that the action of the Security Council on the Second Report directs the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work in developing specific proposals, there would seem to be no necessity from the United States standpoint, for the General Assembly to take any action at this session with respect to the work of the Commission. However, the United States should support any resolution calling on the Atomic Energy Commission to complete its work as soon as possible.

If a proposal of a substantive nature is made by any member, the United States should insist that the General Assembly is not at the

present time the appropriate body to consider it and should move to have any such proposal referred to the Atomic Energy Commission. It is possible that the Soviet Union may attempt to use the forum provided by the General Assembly to press once more for consideration of proposals for the abolition of atomic weapons. The conception of the abolition of atomic weapons as a separate and preliminary step to be taken prior to the conclusion of agreements embodying a system of international control is diametrically opposed to the position of this Government and the majority of the Representatives on the Atomic Energy Commission who have embodied their views on this subject in the First and Second Reports to the Security Council. The position of this Government is that the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments is an inseparable part of a comprehensive system for the international control of atomic energy which will include effective and adequate safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of evasion and violation. The efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve any acceptance of their proposals that atomic weapons should be destroyed at once apart from the conclusion of some type of system of controls might come to naught. The Atomic Energy Commission in its First Report to the Security Council specifically states under "C. General Findings," paragraph 3: (See Appendix B). Thus the United States should vigorously oppose any resolution which would attempt to eliminate atomic weapons without providing for the comprehensive system as set forth in the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council.

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/99

*Position Paper Prepared in the Division of International Security
Affairs*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1947.

REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS
AND ARMED FORCES

Comment Paper

THE PROBLEM

The question of regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces is not on the agenda of the second session of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, certain delegations may initiate a general discussion of the subject, or may even introduce new proposals, either during the opening general debate in the Assembly or during consideration of the annual Report of the Security Council, which is expected to include a section summarizing action taken in

the field of armament regulation since the 1946 Assembly. In either case it would be incumbent upon this Government to state its position.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States Delegation should not initiate a discussion of conventional armaments and armed forces in the General Assembly.

2. If a general debate on the subject develops, it should reaffirm the basic position which this Government has previously maintained, that the establishment of a system for the regulation and reduction of armaments depends upon the achievement of conditions of international security and confidence as manifested, for example, (a) by the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, (b) by the establishment of international control of atomic energy, and (c) by the attainment of agreement on making forces available to the Security Council as provided in Article 43.

3. The United States Delegation should also take the position that no substantive recommendations by this Assembly are necessary or desirable since the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments are currently engaged in implementing the recommendations of the last Assembly.

4. If substantive proposals are introduced, the United States Delegation should seek supplementary advice from the Department of State before indicating in detail its attitude toward such proposals.

(NOTE: The position of the United States with respect to a possible Soviet proposal linking atomic energy control with regulation of conventional armament is being dealt with in separate paper.)¹

DISCUSSION

The Present Situation

The General Assembly resolution of December 14, 1946, recommended that the Security Council promptly consider the practical measures necessary to effect the regulation and reduction of armaments and to establish safeguards guaranteeing observance. Pursuant to these recommendations, the Security Council resolution of February 13, 1947, established the Commission for Conventional Armaments and directed it to submit to the Security Council within three months such proposals as it was in a position to make (a) for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and (b) for practicable and effective safeguards in connection with armament regulation and reduction.

The Commission initially undertook to formulate a plan of work for submission to the Security Council. Deliberations were focused on two draft plans, a United States proposal which was very general

¹ Position paper SD/A/C.1/79, August 29, p. 619.

in nature but which was designed to permit consideration under its general headings of all relevant topics, and a Soviet proposal which was objectionably specific and detailed in that it linked consideration of atomic energy control with measures for the regulation of conventional armaments and included other provisions which might be used to divest the United States of its superiority in "offensive weapons" and industrial potential. The Commission for Conventional Armaments approved the United States proposal by a vote of 8 to 1, the USSR voting in the negative and Poland and Colombia abstaining. On July 8 this Plan of Work was approved by the Security Council with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. The Commission for Conventional Armaments is currently engaged in carrying out the approved Plan of Work.

The question of conventional armaments, though not on the agenda of the second session of the General Assembly, may arise during the opening general debate or during consideration of the annual Report of the Security Council. This document will probably summarize action taken by the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments in implementing the 1946 resolution of the Assembly with respect to conventional armaments. If the Assembly follows last year's precedent it will simply note this Report and pass on to the next item on the agenda. However, the Soviet Union may, in the hope of a propaganda victory, seize upon the opening general debate or upon consideration of the Report as the occasion for initiating a general debate on conventional armaments or may even introduce new and far-reaching proposals designed to embarrass the United States.

Past United States Position

Throughout discussion of the subject in the United Nations, the United States has consistently maintained that conditions of general international security are necessary for the conclusion of international agreements for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Listed as paramount among these conditions have been the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the conclusion of agreements implementing Article 43 of the Charter, and an international agreement for the control of atomic energy.

By subscribing to the General Assembly resolution of December 14 and to the Security Council resolution of February 13, this Government has committed itself to a discussion of regulation and reduction of armaments before these conditions of international security have been completely realized, but has not in any sense receded from its original position that security must precede the actual execution of plans for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Important statements of the position which the United States has previously taken are attached as Annexes.²

Attitude of Other States

The position of the United States on conventional armaments has been upheld by a majority of Security Council members, and particularly by the United Kingdom. France and China have stressed the view that the progressive realization of conditions of international security should make possible parallel and corresponding steps in the regulation of armaments. The Soviet Union has insisted that disarmament is an essential prerequisite to international security. It is anticipated that these differences of opinion will continue to appear in any General Assembly debates on the regulation of armaments.

Position of the United States in the General Assembly

Since an Assembly debate on armament regulation would be seized upon by the Soviet Union as an opportunity for a propaganda attack against this Government, the United States Delegation should not initiate a discussion of conventional armaments. However, if such a discussion should develop on the initiative of another delegation, it would be incumbent upon the United States, by virtue of its role in the United Nations, to participate in the discussion and state its position.

There would appear to be no reason for altering the basic position which this Government has taken in previous discussions of conventional armaments, inasmuch as there has been no change in the fundamental security considerations upon which this position has been based. A general debate in the Assembly or a far-reaching Soviet proposal would not alter the essential nature of the problem, and any minor modifications of the United States position for General Assembly purposes would be of a tactical rather than a substantive nature. It is therefore recommended that if a general debate on conventional armaments develops, the United States Delegation should reaffirm the previous general position of this Government, emphasizing the priority of international control of atomic energy, settlement of the peace terms, and implementation of Article 43 of the Charter.

Since the Security Council and the Commission for Conventional Armaments are currently engaged in attempting to implement the resolution on regulation and reduction of armaments adopted by the 1946 Assembly, it is believed that it would be unnecessary and undesirable for the 1947 Assembly to adopt resolutions or recommendations of a substantive nature. However, the United States would have no objection to a resolution urging the Commission for Conventional Armaments to expedite its work or expressing hope for an early solu-

² Not reproduced.

tion of the problem of conventional armaments. If substantive proposals are introduced, the United States Delegation should in general take the position that they are unnecessary and undesirable, but should await further guidance from the Department of State before stating a detailed position, which will depend upon the exact nature of the proposals as well as upon the tactical situation in the Assembly, in the Security Council and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/49 add. 1

*Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 13, 1947, 3:00 p. m.*¹

TOP SECRET

THE CONCLUSION OF SPECIAL AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 43

At the Secretary's request, Mr. Blaisdell referred to SD/A/C.1/80/Rev. 1,² setting forth the tentative United States proposal as to what action should be taken regarding implementation of Article 43 of the Charter. Mr. Blaisdell emphasized that the paper was in preliminary form and the final position would depend on the outcome of conversations now in progress with China, France and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, before taking the action proposed in the paper, the United States believed that the Security Council should make another effort to agree on basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations armed forces. Thus far all attempts to obtain an agreement on this topic had been unsuccessful. Only if this effort failed would the following recommendations come before the Delegation for final decision. In its present form the paper was favorably considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³

Mr. Blaisdell then read the following recommendations:

[Here follow the identical recommendations contained in position papers SD/A/C.1/80/Rev. 1 and SD/A/C.1/88.]

Admiral Hewitt stated that he personally felt that the proposal had considerable merit. However, it has not been favorably received by the

¹ This document consists of the top secret portion of the minutes of the 5th Meeting; the remainder of the minutes, which dealt with other issues, was issued as US/A/M(Chr)/58, not printed.

² SD/A/C.1/80/Rev. 1, September 8, is not printed in its entirety. However, its recommendations, those read by Blaisdell below, are identical with the recommendations contained in position paper SD/A/C.1/88, also dated September 8, p. 632.

³ The Department of Defense has been unable to locate any record of such consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations. He read part of a letter (USMS/S/3719 August 25, 1947) of the Chief of Naval Operations as follows:

It should be recognized, however, that the deadlock in the Military Staff Committee is but a single example of Soviet tactics in the broad overall strategy of the Politburo to dominate the world. Breaking of the deadlock will not, of itself, bring any appreciable easing of the tension existing in the whole realm of Soviet relations with the Western World. We here are forced to the conclusion that, even should the United Nations Armed Forces be established, no effective use could be made of them by the Security Council in the resolution of the issues now threatening international peace

General McNarney outlined the position of the members of the Military Staff Committee on the estimates of the overall strength of the United Nations Armed Forces. He pointed out that the United States is actually in a minority of one in this matter in that the United States estimate is by far the highest of all, the other four estimates being relatively similar to one another. Political considerations of varied character have influenced the position of the members. The United Kingdom insists on an absolute equality of its contribution with the contribution of the United States. France similarly insists on an absolute equality with the United Kingdom but is willing to accord the United States twice as large a contribution, while China would be willing to follow the majority. The Soviet Union would prefer no force at all and insists on an absolute equality of all contributions. The United States is the only member which desires that the United Nations should have at its disposal a truly effective force able to deal with any situation anywhere in the world. The General further pointed out that even if an effective United Nations Force is established, it will nevertheless be necessary for the United States to maintain considerable forces in addition to the complements placed at the disposal of the Security Council, until true international security is attained and international confidence fully restored.

A lengthy discussion followed on the subject of the relationship between the size of the United States armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council and the United States forces required for national security. General McNarney emphasized that under the Charter the armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council could not in effect be used against a permanent member, but should, in the United States view, be able to cope with any coalition of non-permanent members. Mrs. Roosevelt⁴ raised the question as to the use of forces stationed within a certain region for enforcement action in such region. This, she thought, might make the enforcement

⁴ Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, member of the United States Delegation; widow of the President.

action more effective. General McNarney saw a number of objections to this idea.

In answer to the Secretary's inquiry, Admiral Hewitt explained that the United States insisted on including in its estimate three battleships with three carrier task forces and three supporting forces, chiefly because of the anticipated need to project land forces and aircraft into hostile territory.

General Ridgway stated that the United States must insist that the forces at the disposal of the Security Council be homogeneous, balanced and equipped with all modern weapons including battleships and carriers. The Soviet Union opposes in effect such forces obviously in the belief that if the Soviet estimate were accepted a move might be initiated towards disarmament with the exception of the forces held available for the Security Council. That would result in stripping the United States of its modern arms.

General Ridgway enumerated four elements as guiding factors in the United States estimate of its overall forces: (1) the size of the United States contribution to the United Nations; (2) the requirements for the occupation of ex-enemy countries; (3) the requirements of a mobile, modern striking force and (4) the overhead cadre required for building up an army in case of a mobilization. General Ridgway, in reply to Ambassador Austin's question, assured the latter that the action proposed by the United States in the recommended position paper, in the view of the United States Representative[s] on the Military Staff Committee, would not constitute a major departure from the Charter. Since no alternative appeared feasible, this would be the only course of action.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States proposal was motivated by the thought that the Soviets might be more inclined to agree to a tangible agreement obtained through the procedure outlined in the United States proposal than to the basic principles, since a discussion on these principles had ended in an impasse.

Mr. Dulles⁵ expressed his reservations on the proposal. In his view, the Charter contemplates an international consensus obtained through the Security Council on the subject of armed forces placed at the Council's disposal. It would be argued, Mr. Dulles continued, that the United States was searching for a good excuse to maintain a larger force than other members of the Security Council thought appropriate. Since the United States was unable to obtain agreement by other members, it now proposed to make an offer of availability of such larger forces and then say that it could not disarm since it had made this offer.

Speaking for the United States Army, General Ridgway reiterated

⁵ John Foster Dulles, Member of the United States Delegation.

that the two divisions proposed as a United States contribution to the United Nations forces certainly could not be termed too large. General McNarney, speaking for the United States Air Forces, declared that in the interim period of the next twenty-five to fifty years, pending the settlement of the most important problems, such as the international control of atomic energy, and the peace treaties, the United States must maintain a relatively large air force. Mr. Dulles emphasized that the question of the United States contribution to the United Nations, and of the total United States Armed Forces, should not be confused. The Secretary suggested that the entire problem should be help in abeyance for the time being.

ERIC STEIN^o

^o Adviser, United States Delegation.

501.BC/9-1647 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Hawkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 16, 1947—5 p. m.

4999. (1) Received today Foreign Office letter dated September 15 signed by Paul Mason, Counselor, UN political department, re organization of armed forces for SC (Deptel 3762, August 29). After opening phrases re British regret that speedier progress had not been possible to fulfill recommendation of GA, letter reads:

(2) "We hope, indeed, that the Assembly will take note of this disappointing situation and, while probing, as it thinks fit, into the causes of the delay, will once again urge that rapid progress should be made.

(3) At the same time, however, our authorities feel some doubts about the specific proposal for a recommendation by the Assembly on the lines indicated in your letter. It is fully understood that the desire underlying this proposal is to attempt to speed matters up and to produce some concrete offers of forces, facilities, etc., in the near future. Our authorities fear, however, that the result might be that we could only expect to get by March 31st, 1948, a heterogeneous force of very doubtful value and that such offers as might be made by individual nations would have to be welded into a satisfactory whole, which, in itself, would involve working over a good deal of ground which has already been covered in the Military Staff Committee.

(4) Moreover, by the same date of March 31, it is felt that there is a fair prospect that at least four members of the Military Staff Committee will have agreed on an estimate of the overall strength of the security forces and the proportion to be supplied by each of the Big Powers. Our authorities feel that it would be a pity to throw all this good work away, and that it would be more satisfactory to continue on the present basis of trying to wear the Russians down by a process of

attrition. They consider that the Military Staff Committee, which will remain responsible for the strategic direction of the security forces once they are created, ought to retain their present responsibility for designing them and drawing up a carefully balanced scheme, into which individual contributions, which may be in the form of either forces or other facilities, can be fitted. If the Military Staff Committee is to perform its proper function in this respect, our authorities would not wish to see it by-passed by the General Assembly.

(5) I am also asked to point out that so far in the Military Staff Committee the Russians have stood firmly on the opinion that the first step in creating these security forces must be agreement on the basic principles governing their organization. If they maintained this position in the Assembly, the problem will arise as to whether there will be any advantage in pressing an establishment of these forces in the face of Russian opposition. In fact, if the proposal were adapted to the offers made, the Russians would still be able to veto acceptance of any or all of the offers in the Security Council.

(6) In the light of the foregoing considerations, I am asked to say that our authorities much hope that the United States authorities will think it wise to refrain from putting forward the proposal outlined in your letter, now under reply, in the General Assembly, though there is full agreement here that the Assembly should be asked to express its disappointment that progress has not permitted of negotiations of agreements under Article 43 of the Charter, and to urge again that the matter should be expedited by the Security Council."

HAWKINS

USUN Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments (Bard) to the Chairman of the Working Committee

[NEW YORK,] September 17, 1947.

SIR: In accordance with your suggestion made at the last meeting of the Working Committee of the Commission for Conventional Armaments on September 12th, I am transmitting herewith some of the views of my Government in connection with the Items 2 and 3 of the Plan of Work.¹

The United States feels that the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces is only one part of the problem of preventing

¹ The Working Committee of the CCA had decided at its 5th Meeting, September 12, that each delegation should submit its views regarding items 2 and 3 of the Plan of Work. This statement represents the response of the United States. It was based largely upon position paper US/A/C.1/136, September 15, "United States Position on General Principles in Connection with the Regulation and Reduction of Armaments and Armed Forces (CCA Plan of Work, Item II)," not printed. That paper had been informally approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy on September 4 and by the Acting Secretary of State on September 10; it had been circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-13/10e, August 14. (Department of State Disarmament Files)

wars. In any consideration of the general principles governing the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, the first and most important consideration is the establishment of world confidence and security. Indicative of the fact that this condition is at hand would be such concrete achievements as the conclusion of the peace treaties with Germany and Japan, the organization and implementation of a United Nations armed force under Article 43 of the Charter, the conclusion of an international agreement for the control of atomic energy, etc.

Because of the past experience of my Government in the field of disarmament, we are determined never again to be a party to any scheme of unilateral disarmament. It is an important principle, therefore that any effective system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must be participated in and agreed to by *all* nations having substantial military resources.

Since it is anticipated that some time may elapse before conditions of world security are such that a full-fledged system of regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces can be implemented, it is important to consider the general principles which should govern our actions in the interim period. It is the view of my Government that any system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should therefore be instituted progressively, in phase with the achievement of improved conditions of international security and good will.

My Government also subscribes to Article 26 of the Charter, which provides that any system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces should permit the diversion of human and economic resources to armaments only to the extent that such armaments contribute to and are consistent with the maintenance of international peace and security. It is felt that examples of ultimate requirements within this principle would be armaments essential to the internal security of nations, the provision of United Nations forces under Article 43 of the Charter, occupational responsibilities as contemplated by Article 107 of the Charter and expressed in peace treaties with Germany and Japan, etc.

It is contemplated also that any system for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces must make provision for effective enforcement, in the event of violation, of the terms of the treaty.

Lastly, my Government considers it important that a system of international controls and inspections be established by the treaty for the regulation and reduction of armaments. This is important, in order to provide effective safeguards to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

In connection with point 3 of the Plan of Work, which provides for a discussion of safeguards, the above general principle would of course come into play. It is important that the system of international safeguards be so devised that its operation be effective, technically feasible and practicable. Any system of international control and inspection should be so devised that it will detect promptly the occurrence of violations. It is also of importance that the system minimize interference with and impose the minimum burdens on the economic and industrial life of the inspected nations.

It is hoped that the above stated general principles and the comment on the system of safeguards will prove of value in the discussion of general principles and will result in a concrete expression of the feelings of a majority of the Working Committee. This concrete expression might take the form of a resolution setting forth the agreed general principles.

I have [etc.]

RALPH A. BARD

501.BB/9-1347: Telegram

The Secretary of State at New York to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, September 18, 1947—5:28 p. m.

Personal eyes only for Lovett from Marshall. I would like the U.S. stand on over-all strength of UN security force immediately reconsidered. Present position cannot be successfully or consistently supported in negotiations, and, in my opinion and that of our delegates, would weaken the integrity of our position in general and would be legitimately and seriously criticized by American public opinion.

Our published proposal involves approximately three times the strength of next largest proposal for air and naval assault shipping, and seven times for submarines.

I am not questioning reasons for including various types or categories of forces, that is, heavy bombers, battleships, et cetera, though I do not fully understand logic of their necessity under realistic conception confining use of force exclusively against small or non-UN members. My concern is with the published strengths we presently propose.

I think it very necessary for our delegates to have a clear-cut statement, confidential or secret, giving exact reasons for our proposal.

MARSHALL

501/9-1947

*Memorandum by the United States Army Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee (Ridgway) to the United States Army Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)*¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] 19 September 1947.

PROPOSED U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY FORCES

1. Secretary Marshall has asked the U.S. Military Representatives:
a. For reasons supporting the proposed U.S. contribution to the United Nations' armed forces to be made available to the Security Council on its call.

b. For the relation which the strength of our proposed contribution bears to total U.S. armed forces.

2. Reasons given should so support proposed strengths in Army, Navy and Air categories as to convince U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly that these proposals are reasonable, in accord with spirit of the Charter, and will justify its giving them its full U.S. support before General Assembly.

3. Confining myself to the proposed U.S. Army contribution as approved by the J.C.S., I have spoken to Secretary Marshall substantially as given in paragraph 4 herein.

4. *a. Reasons supporting proposed U.S. Army Contributions*

(1) The force should be the smallest Army unit of sufficient size to accord with U.S. power and prestige, to be capable of effective sustained combat for considerable periods, and to include such supporting services as the American people demands for its troops.

(2) The Corps of two Divisions is the smallest Army unit which can meet these requirements; can provide and administer proper evacuation and hospitalization services for sick and wounded, adequate postal and information services, and recreational and other facilities which American standards recognize as essential. A single division can not do this.

(3) Further, the question of command is of very great importance. A Corps will have a senior commander of great experience, chosen for his mature and sound judgment in the difficult post he will occupy, as well as for strength of character and proven combat capacity. It is expected that all U.S. Army forces of our contribution would be under his command, and that he would be responsible di-

¹ Carbon copies were addressed to the Secretary of State; Chief of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Austin); the U.S. Air Force Representative, MSC (McNarney); and the U.S. Naval Representative, MSC (Hewitt). The following notation appears at the top of the source text: "19 Sept 47 Read by Secstate this afternoon."

rectly to our Government, subject only to operational control of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Any smaller U.S. Army contingent, such as a single Division, would almost certainly have at least one other commander of a different nationality intermediate between him and the Commander-in-Chief. If such a commander were a Russian, the U.S. force could expect to be employed in accordance with Russian standards, with a brutal disregard for the value of American lives and of the persons and property of civilians in the combat area. In such a case, U.S. public opinion might well compel withdrawal of the U.S. contingent, and in turn bring about collapse of the operation and UN failure.

b. Relation of the strength of this contingent to anticipated U.S. Army strength:

(1) U.S. Army missions assigned by law will require principal categories as follows:

- (a) Occupation forces.
- (b) General Reserve (including our mobile striking force).
- (c) UN Security Forces.
- (d) Zone of Interior services to support the above.
- (e) Cadres for training civilian components and with which to handle mobilization.

(2) It is to our advantage to keep category (c)—UN Security Forces—as small, compared to our total forces, as the foregoing reasons dictate. Moreover, once Congress approves this contingent, and the Security Council calls it into service, it could be committed anywhere in the world, and would then be beyond our power to employ elsewhere, even though National interests might so require. We would have to write it off from the total of our then available armed forces.

5. *a.* The relation of the strength of this contingent to the U.S. Naval and Air contingents, and to the total anticipated U.S. armed force strength can be stated when and only when this Nation's Army, Navy and Air requirements have been determined by joint Army-Navy-Air Force study.

b. This determination, a command decision on the highest governmental level and based upon a dispassionate objective analysis, should bring our armed force requirements into proper balance in the light of the best judgment available to the American people. Such an analysis and decision are, in my opinion, urgently required as an element essential to our security.

6. For these reasons, the U.S. Army contingent is recommended to be a Corps of two Divisions, with an approximate overall strength of from fifty to sixty thousand.

M. B. RIDGWAY

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

SPA Files : Lot 428

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1947.

Subject: Explanation for the Secretary of the Provisional Estimate of the Over-all Armed Forces Needed by the United Nations Security Council

Discussion

On June 30, in response to a request from the Security Council, the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United Nations Military Staff Committee submitted a provisional estimate of the over-all forces needed by the Security Council to carry out its Charter responsibilities. The strength and composition of the force thus estimated is as follows: Air force, 3,800; Ground forces, 20 divisions, Naval forces, three carrier task groups, each of two carriers, one battleship, two cruisers and 16 destroyers; and three surface support groups, each of three cruisers and 12 destroyers; assault shipping and craft of three groups capable of lifting a total of six troops divisions; and 90 submarines.

In the course of briefing the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, questions were raised as to the necessity for an over-all force of this strength and composition. Although negotiations currently progressing in a Subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee indicate the possibility of agreement on those elements so far discussed (ground forces and surface naval forces other than assault forces), questions apparently still remain unanswered in the United States General Assembly Delegation as to the need for an over-all force of the size and composition estimated by the JCS representatives to be desirable from a military point of view.

In response to a request of the Secretary (Telegram 856 of September 19¹) the attached paper has been prepared giving the justification for the provisional United States estimate of over-all forces.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the attached paper be approved and transmitted to the Secretary in New York.²

Concurrences

IS—Coordinating of substance with the Army, Navy, Air Force

¹ Telegram 856 from New York, September 19, the daily classified summary of events at the United Nations, discussed proceedings in the Subcommittee on Overall Strength of the Military Staff Committee but did not contain the Secretary of State's request (501.BC/9-1947). The telegram actually containing the request, dated September 18, is printed on p. 662.

² A copy of the attached paper was taken to New York by Rusk on September 23.

Representatives of the *Ad Hoc* SWNCC Committee to coordinate security functions of the United Nations.

Attachments

Paper entitled "Proposed United States Estimate of the Over-all Strength and Composition of the Armed Forces to be made Available to the Security Council."

[Annex]

IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 43 OF THE CHARTER

Subject: Published U.S. estimate of the overall strength and composition of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council.

Summary:

1. The published figures proposed by the United States representatives in the Military Staff Committee represent an estimate made from the military point of view of the aggregate forces which should be made available to the Security Council by all Members of the United Nations. Since forces called for by the Security Council from this aggregate may be employed for enforcement action in any part of the world, the aggregate forces estimated to be needed are larger in numbers and different in composition than they would be if their employment were to be limited geographically. The availability of such an aggregate would make it possible for the Council to set up, and to bring promptly to bear at any desired points, effective and well-balanced task forces possessing such striking power, range, mobility, and capacity for sustained action that they might be able to overawe an enemy without having to fight and would almost certainly be able to accomplish their missions with minimum losses.

2. The published proposals provisionally made by the other delegations to the Military Staff Committee were probably based much more on political considerations than on military estimates of the forces which should be available to the Council to enable it to perform its enforcement functions under the Charter.

3. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider that forces materially smaller than those shown in the published U.S. proposal would be acceptable, though much less desirable, from the military point of view. The U.S. representatives in the Military Staff Committee were accordingly authorized, if they consider it advisable to do so, to agree provisionally to figures materially lower than those shown in the published U.S. proposal.

4. Unpublished discussions taking place in a subcommittee of the Military Staff Committee indicate that agreement with most, if not

all, of the other delegations, except the U.S.S.R., could probably be reached, within the range of figures approved by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, on ground forces and on surface naval forces other than amphibious forces. The latter, aircraft, and submarines have not yet been discussed to an extent sufficient to justify a statement concerning the possibilities of agreement on figures for those categories.

Discussion:

5. The published estimate tentatively proposed by the United States (not constituting a commitment and not prejudicing United States policy of opposition to the "principle of equality") is as follows:

Air Forces:		
Bombers	1250	(Includes only strategic and tactical bombers.)
Fighters	2250	(includes fighter bombers.)
Miscellaneous	300	
	<hr/>	
	3800	(does not include air transport requirements.)

Ground Forces:

Divisions 20

Naval Forces:

Battleships	3	} (3 carrier task groups, each of 2 carriers, 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, and 16 destroyers; and 3 surface support groups, each of 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers.)
Carriers	6	
Cruisers	15	
Destroyers	84	

Submarines 90

Assault shipping and craft 3 groups capable of lifting a total of 6 troop divisions.

6. The size and composition of the aggregate forces proposed by the United States are justified by the following:

a. In the aggregate it would be strong enough:

(1) To be a deterrent to aggression.

(2) To deal with comparatively large states which do not have the veto, or even with several states banded together or with more than one situation simultaneously.

b. The aggregate forces proposed by the published U.S. estimate would provide a broad base from which to constitute, *ad hoc*, a balanced military force or forces of the characteristics required to enable the Security Council to deal successfully with a wide variety of situations.

(1) It includes all necessary components of arms in suitable numbers to form a well-rounded, combined military establishment of such

strength and disposition that in many cases it could suppress active aggression without prolonged fighting or excessive losses.

(2) It permits balanced national contingents within the aggregate forces, thus enabling the Security Council to take prompt action by employing contingents of States Members adjacent to the offending nation without the long delay which would ensue if the entire security force had to be first assembled whenever the use of armed forces became necessary.

(3) The large long-range striking elements (naval and air) and amphibious lift which would be included, with the necessary escort and support, would enable such task forces to be used effectively in any part of the world.

(4) The air arm is of sufficient strength and its composition is such that those national air force contingents which must be held immediately available (Article 45 of the Charter) would be adequate for urgent military measures anywhere in the world, and with other air units in a lower category of readiness, would be available to support a striking force of other arms whenever required.

c. The United States estimates would permit satisfying the desire of the small Member nations to make contingents available to the overall armed forces of the United Nations, since it would allow all of the fifty nations not permanent members of the Security Council to provide contributions of armed forces without unduly reducing the strength of the more homogeneous forces to be furnished by the Five Permanent Members or preventing those Members from making comparable contributions.

7. The aggregate forces proposed by the United States are related to the tentative U.S. contingent, which is:³

Air forces:	A balanced task force of 5 wings (2 bombers, 2 fighters, 1 troop carrier—approximately 210 bombers, 450 fighters, 225 transport)
Ground Forces:	1 corps comprising 2 divisions
Sea Forces:	1 carrier task group with amphibious and sea transport lift for the above troops to the extent available, plus adequate surface support

8. In connection with the size and composition of the U.S. contingent relative to the overall strength and composition, the matter of command is of great importance. The tentative U.S. contingent would make available an air task force, a corps of ground troops, and a carrier task force. Each of these would be directly under a U.S. com-

³ The following handwritten footnote appears at this point in the source text: "SWNCC 219/8 (Feb. 27. 46) p. 82, para 5, App. C. 'The Size & Composition of the Entire Force which shd be made available to SC.' Reaffirmed." The appendix under reference is not printed, but for the conclusions of Doc. SWNCC 219/8, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, footnote 2, p. 769.

mander responsible directly to the U.S. Government and subject only to operational control of a United Nations supreme commander. A U.S. contingent composed of smaller elements would almost certainly have commanders of other nationalities intermediate between the U.S. commanders and the supreme commander. From the military point of view this is undesirable and should be avoided.

9. Lower figures, less desirable from the military point of view but still acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were given to the U.S. representatives in the Military Staff Committee for its use in negotiation, provided there existed a possibility of agreement in that committee on an acceptable overall strength and composition. The minimum overall strength and composition acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were set at:

Air Forces:	2800 combat aircraft; air transports to be additional and furnished as required
Ground Forces:	15 divisions
Sea Forces:	2 carrier task groups
	2 surface support groups
	30 submarines
	2 amphibious groups each capable of lifting 2 divisions.

In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have authorized the U.S. representatives in the Military Staff Committee to use their discretion in breaking down the composition of the groups, thus making possible a reduction in the numbers of surface vessels shown in the published U.S. proposal.

10. The French, Chinese, and U.K. proposals (Appendix), especially the latter, are probably based more on considerations of prestige and limited ability to provide forces than on a military estimate of the Council's requirements for the performance of the task prescribed by the United Nations Charter. Such considerations would help explain the small figures proposed, as compared with those proposed by the United States. The U.S.S.R. estimate is apparently designed to further that government's objective of preventing or delaying the provision of forces and of reducing the possibilities of effective action by any forces which may eventually be provided, and evidently is designed to further that government's objective of increasing its military power relative to that of the United States.

11. In making the tentative U.S. estimate of overall strength no consideration was given to the possible effects on overall strength requirements of agreements which may be reached for regulation and reduction of armaments. It is assumed that appropriate adjustments of the undertakings of Member states to make forces available to the Security Council would accompany any agreement to regulate or reduce armaments.

Appendix

PROVISIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE OVERALL STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES WHICH SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ITS CALL

NOTE: The Chinese estimate has not been published; the others have been. The Chinese originally accepted the published British estimate; that fact was published.

	U.S. (Published)	U.S.S.R. (Published)	U.K. (Published)	FRANCE (Published)	CHINA (Not Published— See note above)
AIR FORCES					
Bombers	1, 250*	600	600	775	700
Strategic				(225)	(400)
Medium				(150)	(100)
Light				(400)	(200)
Fighters	2, 250†	300	400	300	300
Reconnaissance	None)	300	(None	200	150
Miscellaneous	300)		(200	None	None
Total	3, 800‡	1, 200	1, 200	1, 275	1, 150
GROUND FORCES					
Divisions	20	12	8-12	16	12-15
Armored				(3)	
Airborne				(3)	
Motorized or Mountain				(10)	
NAVAL FORCES§					
Battleships	3	None	2	3	2
Carriers	6	None	4	6	4
Cruisers	15	5-6	6	9	6
Destroyers	84	24	24	18-24	24
Escort Vessels	None	24	48	30	48
Minesweepers	None	24	24	30	24
Submarines	90	12	12	12	12
Assault shipping and craft for number of divi- sions shown opposite	6	None	Two- thirds	1	2

*Includes only strategic and tactical bombers. [Footnote in the source text.]

†Includes fighter bombers. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡Does not include air transport requirements; the U.S. proposal is based on 60 combat groups. [Footnote in the source text.]

§The U.S. proposal concerning surface naval forces is based on 3 carrier task groups, each consisting of 2 carriers, 1 battleship, and 16 destroyers; 3 surface support groups, each consisting of 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers; and 3 amphibious groups each capable of lifting 2 troop divisions. U.S., U.K., and French proposals are intended to provide for appropriate naval auxiliaries without specifying exact numbers. [Footnote in the source text.]

||Two regimental combat teams or brigade groups. [Footnote in the source text.]

Policy Planning Staff Files

*Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the
Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 27, 1947.

SUMMARY—MR. OSBORN'S VIEWS ON ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY
(PPS/7, August 21, 1947)²

For your information I submit herewith a general summary of Mr. Osborn's views on atomic energy policy, as gathered from several conversations I have had with him in the past two weeks.

Mr. Osborn in general is strongly in favor of the policies outlined in the S/P paper on atomic energy policy. He is, however, especially anxious that other countries represented on the Atomic Energy Commission be consulted in advance of any public announcement of a re-orientation of our policy, particularly, the U.K., Canada, Belgium and France. The latter has been a staunch supporter in the delegation. (Parenthetically I should point out that if consultation involves discussion of exchange of information, there would be special difficulties with respect to France, where the domestic atomic energy policy is directed by Joliot Curie, member of the Communist Party.) The S/P paper, in reference, points out the advantages and disadvantages of making public any consultations with countries other than the United Kingdom and Canada.

According to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Osborn also recommends that the timing of any discussion in the General Assembly, or of any public announcement, be considered with reference to other items on the Agenda. We probably would not want to concentrate all discussions of major issues into one part of the Assembly calendar.

Mr. Osborn is generally informed on the problem in respect to the content of the proposed consultations with the British and Canadians. In this connection he is most strongly opposed to any project to link the question of our source material shortages with the question of aid to Britain or other European countries.

I have informed Mr. Osborn that policy outlined in the S/P paper is by no means definitely decided and indicated to him some of the problems involved in obtaining concurrence from other departments. In response to his inquiry about the possible time schedule, I informed Mr. Osborn on September 24 that I could not see that we could possibly hope to have an announcement ready and have consulted other governments in under two weeks' time; on the other hand that we wished to

¹ This memorandum was directed to Lovett, Kennan, and Rusk.

² *Ante*, p. 602.

do anything which could be done within the term of the current General Assembly or about six weeks.

It would, of course, be desirable to synchronize any announcement, or the initiation of any talks looking to tripartite consultations, with the submission of the Atomic Energy Commission's Second Report to the Council.³ Mr. Osborn pointed out that Mr. Gromyko is not particularly anxious to have the report submitted now, and I indicated that neither were we, in view of our hope of synchronizing our overall policy with its submission.

It was agreed that the time limits for possible implementation of the Kennan paper policy, which Mr. Osborn might have in mind in his conferences with the other delegations (but not for disclosure to them), would be not less than two weeks from now and not later than the close of the General Assembly. We would continue to reckon with the possibility that any public announcement might coincide with the submission of the report to the Assembly which might be within three or four weeks time. If the Assembly should terminate before the Kennan recommendations could be put into effect, that would not necessarily mean that the policy would not be carried through later on.

Mr. Osborn also made some comments in writing about the details of the S/P paper, which are attached. He doesn't believe it takes sufficiently into account that the Russians don't really understand our proposals. He asks "If the British Labor Government is so confused on this issue, isn't it likely that the people in the Kremlin are even more confused?" He believes that the Russians are continually weighing the comparative disadvantages of our having the bomb and of their submitting to inspection. He thinks they "will consider accepting international control on the day that the disadvantages of inspection seem to them less than the disadvantages of our having the bomb, and not before."

[Annex]

COMMENTS BY MR. OSBORN

The explanation commencing on page 8 leaves out entirely the following:

a. The Commission report is a new idea in international relations, not easy to absorb. Only the Canadian, French, Belgian and United

³ The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl.*, or Department of State Publication 2932 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), had actually been formally transmitted to the Security Council on September 11. However, the Council, preoccupied with other issues, did not consider it in 1947.

States Delegations understand the plan and what necessitates it. The British Government certainly does not.

The entire United States Delegation is convinced that the present British reservations do not, in reality, protect any British interests, but rather seriously endanger them, and that they are put forward because of a complete lack of understanding, not only of how the international organization would operate, but particularly because of a lack of understanding of why it still seems the only alternative to national rivalries in which dictator states would have immense advantage.

If the British Labor Government is so confused on this issue, isn't it likely that the people in the Kremlin are even more confused. Certainly, Gromyko and Skobeltzyn,⁴ who are the only Soviet representatives with whom we deal here, show no understanding of how the agency would operate. Except for their interest in quotas, it would appear that they do not consider the majority proposals as any true safeguard against atomic war. Their intense interest in quotas may indicate that when we come to writing down in details such things as staffing, financing, strategic balance and sanctions, they may get quite a different picture of the advantages of the treaty.

b. I know of no evidence that "we have tended to labor the point that there is no effective means of defense against atomic weapons," as giving the Russians the idea that they are in an advantageous position. It is more likely they think we have labored this point either so as to frighten them or so as to frighten our own public into a larger air force. On the other hand, it is quite possible, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Russians actually do not think we could or would use the bomb against them very effectively. Though in this connection, it is interesting to note that both the French and Syrian Delegates believe that if it were not for our possession of the bomb, the Russians would by now have taken over France and the Arab States, respectively.

My own belief is that the Russians mind very much our having the bomb. They also mind very much the idea of opening up Russia to inspection. They must be constantly weighing these disadvantages against each other. I think they will consider accepting international control on the day that the disadvantages of inspection seem to them less than the disadvantages of our having the bomb, but not before.

⁴ Dmitriy Vladimirovich Skobel'tsyn, Soviet nuclear physicist serving as a technical adviser to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations Commission for the Control of Atomic Energy.

USUN Files

Record of an Informal Meeting Among Certain Representatives on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] October 3, 1947.

An informal meeting took place at General McNaughton's Office on October 3rd, at which the following were present:—

Mr. Harry	Australia
Mr. Errera Commandant Ducq	} Belgium
Capt. Alvaro Alberto da Motta e Silva	} Brazil
General McNaughton Mr. Ignatieff	} Canada
Mr. Wei	China
Mr. de Rose	France
Mr. Miles	United Kingdom
Mr. Osborn Mr. Arneson	} United States

The following general conclusions were reached:—

1. It is not desirable that atomic energy or disarmament issues should be allowed to obscure the central theme of the Assembly, which appears to be how to get round Russian obstruction in the United Nations.

2. Insofar as the initiative lay with us, atomic energy and disarmament issues should be raised only to assist this main theme.

3. This makes it desirable to avoid detailed technical issues when atomic energy or disarmament are raised, and direct appeal to the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission should be avoided. In this connexion it was generally agreed that the Report could not get the attention it deserved from this Session of the Assembly, and any attempt to get the Assembly to approve the Report would probably result in a large number of abstentions on the ground that the Delegations had not had time to study it.

4. It is, however, most desirable that the Assembly should become acquainted with the atomic energy problem as quickly as possible, and the First and Second Reports of the Atomic Energy Commission ought to be transmitted formally to all member nations of the United Nations at an early stage.

(In this connexion the General Assembly resolution of 24th January 1946 called upon the Security Council "in the appropriate cases" to transmit reports to the General Assembly and to members of the United Nations as well as to the Economic and Social Council and other organs within the framework of the United Nations).

5. At this Assembly every opportunity should be taken to educate nations not members of the Atomic Energy Commission in the problems so far met with and the principles adopted by the majority. An excellent opportunity for doing this should be provided in the course of consideration by Committee 1 of the Soviet resolution on warmongering, Section 4 (A/BUR/86),¹ and, if the matter is not then exhausted, when the report of the Security Council is considered.

6. Even if Section 4 of the Soviet resolution is not voted on separately or as an integral part of the main resolution, it is most desirable that, in the course of the debate, its sense should be corrected to show what the December 14th, 1946 resolution had actually required and what are the true causes of its non-implementation. If the opportunity offered, it might be desirable to consider a distinct resolution on this subject, which, after all, is somewhat artificially injected into the resolution on warmongering.

¹ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation, introduced the resolution under reference in an address during the general debate phase of the Second Session of the General Assembly (84th Plenary Meeting, September 18); for text of the address, see GA (II), *Plenary*, pp. 81-106. For text of the resolution, see telegram Delga 3, September 19, p. 76. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the resolution, see pp. 76 ff.

TO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/59

Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly, New York, October 3, 1947, 9:15 a. m.

:SECRET

PRESENT

Ambassador Austin
Ambassador Johnson
Mrs. Roosevelt
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Fahy
Mr. Thorp
Ambassador Sayre
Mr. Stevenson
General Hilldring

Ambassador Alling
Mr. Bard
Mr. Bohlen
Dr. Corrigan
Ambassador Dawson
Mr. Dickover
Admiral Hewitt
General McNarney
Mr. McKeever
Mr. Mills
Mr. Osborn
Mr. Popper

Mr. Power
Mr. Notter
Mr. Raynor
Lieutenant General Ridgway
Mr. Noyes
Mr. Ross
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Stinebower
Mr. Thompson
Lieutenant Colonel Truman
Mr. Wainhouse
Mr. Winslow

· OVERALL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Rusk recalled that the question of the United States position on overall strength of armed forces to be made available to the Security Council had been taken up by the Delegation three weeks before (September [13])¹ when it was holding its initial briefing sessions, because the question was raised in the Security Council report. It was mentioned more specifically because of the impasse on the question in the Security Council and because consideration was being given to having certain Delegations offer to provide forces. The interest of the Delegation at that time showed the need to have a concise statement on the question, together with the latest information available.

Mr. Rusk pointed out it would be easy to reach the conclusion that the forces provided for under Article 43 of the Charter would never be used, especially if it were assumed that the forces were not to be used against one of the Big Five. When there was no unanimity the armed forces could not be used. However, the Charter required that forces be set up under Article 43, and public opinion wanted such forces. Moreover, the political situation of the world might change.

SWNCC and the Chiefs of Staff have assumed, in setting up armed forces under the Charter, that it was impossible to suppose that Permanent Members would be acted against by such a force. Thus the question of the size of the force needed against a Permanent Member could be disregarded. However, the middle and small powers were generally tied to the great powers, and thus the veto worked on their behalf. Moreover, there were also regional arrangements, such as the USSR and its satellites and the Inter-American defense system. So it could almost be concluded that there were not many states against whom the Security Council could act, and these states could not stand against the Security Council. However, it was important that the forces should be on their face the kind of forces that the Security Council would require. There should not be established a cynical farce. Moreover, the prestige of the Great Powers was involved. At the same time, it was desirable to reduce the forces to the smallest size feasible because of the political and economic factors involved. On the other hand, some of the Big Five did not have balanced forces, for instance, lacking long-range air forces or navies. Any force established should be set up on a basis so that all of the Big Five could contribute to it.

One of the difficulties was in foreseeing what the small nations would want to do in the way of contributing to the forces of the Security Council. A good number of them could offer bases, or the right for passage of forces, but others apparently wanted to contribute small

¹ Reference is to the 5th Meeting of the Delegation, September 13; for the pertinent portion of the minutes of that meeting, see p. 656.

amounts of armed forces. Among such states were Poland and Australia. Therefore, it would be wise not to be rigid regarding the overall total until it was clear what other states wanted to do.

Mr. Rusk warned that it should not be assumed that action should be against a middle-sized power, such as Poland, Pakistan or Australia, but cited, as an example, the fact that the Dutch had played with the idea of resuming hostile activities in Indonesia a few weeks ago, and it had been necessary to warn them regarding the consequences of the Charter and point out that sanctions could be employed. It was also quite possible that several states would find themselves in defiance of the Security Council at the same time. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the draft peace treaties with Germany and Japan referred to forces which could be quite substantial. It was possible that the Security Council might be given enforcement responsibility in other places where troops would be useful and convenient as, for example, Palestine, Trieste, or the Italian colonies. When these possibilities were added together, a substantial potential problem was found. It was also clear that it was hard to say how large the forces should be to give effect to the Charter, avoid cynicism, be useful (but at the same time small enough so that the force might be shared), the Congressional war-making power not be cut and resources not be over-taxed.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

[Here follow statements by the United States Representatives on the United Nations Military Staff Committee, General McNarney, Admiral Hewitt, and General Ridgway. Each statement consisted mainly of a portion of Doc. USMS/S/23/18, September 29, 1947, "U.S. Position on the Overall Strength of Armed Forces to be Made Available to the Security Council," not printed, which had been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the United States Representatives.]

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr. Dulles stated that it was his understanding that the United States was not putting in any resolution on the subject of military forces. The purpose of consideration of the question of the present meetings was in anticipation of a general discussion of the Security Council report.

Ambassador Austin said he was not certain about this because the paper under discussion stated that the General Assembly might call upon Members to tender offers of armed force.² Mr. Dulles inquired whether that was still a live proposal.

Ambassador Austin inquired of the Military Staff Committee how

² Reference is presumably to position paper SD/A/C.1/88, September 8, p. 632.

the matter stood at the moment. It had been his understanding that the Navy had not approved this project. He inquired whether any further progress had been made.

General Ridgway said that he understood that the question had been dropped. Mr. Ross said that this was his understanding, and Mr. Popper confirmed that that was the consensus of opinion.

Mr. Dulles said that he felt very strongly that the project for making offers of force should be dropped. He said that it was a constitutional question, for the Charter provides that the Security Council should negotiate on this question. There already was a feeling that the United States was by-passing the Security Council and dumping questions into the General Assembly. He thought that adding this question to the Assembly's agenda might break the back of the good will which the United States enjoyed in the Assembly.

General Ridgway said that he wanted to make an individual comment that if such an offer of troops were made by the United States and accepted by the Assembly, then the Security Council might use such forces in Palestine. He did not believe that the Joint Chiefs had thought out this possibility. He thought it should be understood that if an offer were made it would lay the United States open to having troops sent to Palestine.

REQUEST TO DEPARTMENT

Ambassador Austin said that in the circumstances he thought the Department should be asked to draft a new paper on the question of overall strength of armed forces and be asked for a definitive decision on whether the United States should introduce in the Assembly a resolution recommending that the Members of the United Nations make specific offers of armed forces to the Security Council, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. Moreover, a statement should be prepared for the use of the United States Representative to be used in Committee I, if, during the discussion of the Security Council report, the activities of the Military staff are considered.

The meeting adjourned at 10:15 a. m.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 10 October 1947.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In compliance with the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I am forwarding herewith their comments on the Draft Proposal for the Armaments Regulation Program:

"By memorandum dated 6 [5] August 1947 the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ten copies of a 'Draft Proposal for Armaments Regulation Program' and requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine this proposal from the military point of view and give the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments the benefit of their views.² Except for the element of timing of presentation as proposed by Mr. Bard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection to the 'Draft Proposal' from the military point of view.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it to be of overriding importance to the future security of the United States that an international system, acceptable to the United States, be devised and accepted by all nations which will prevent any nation's secretly building up weapons of mass destruction to the extent which will permit it to undertake general aggressive warfare. The United States (Baruch) plan for the international control of atomic energy is the only proposal publicly advanced to date which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe would, if mutually agreed to by all nations, adequately safeguard the future security of the United States. This plan contains provisions for detection of violators and evaders and for enforcement of sanctions against such violators or evaders. Acceptance of both of these proposals by all nations is believed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be mandatory for our future security.

"The 'Draft Proposal for Armaments Regulation Program' does not provide for enforcement of sanctions against violators or evaders of the program. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that presentation of the Draft Proposal to the Commission before the Commission has reached unanimous agreement on the substantive matters contained in the first three items of its Plan of Work or before the provisions contained in the United States (Baruch) plan for the international control of atomic energy for enforcement of sanctions against violators or evaders have been unanimously accepted by the Atomic Energy Commission and by the Security Council, would establish a United States position prejudicial to the acceptance of the sanctions provisions of the United States (Baruch) plan and would therefore be prejudicial to the future security of the United States.

"In consequence, the Joint Chiefs of Staffs recommend against the

¹This letter was circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-9/7, October 17. At a meeting of Forrestal, Lovett, and Bard, October 17, the letter was withdrawn, but it served as the basis for subsequent discussions. (Department of State Disarmament Files) Regarding the October 17 meeting, see Blaisdell's memorandum of that date, p. 685.

²The memorandum of transmittal, RAC D-9/6, August 5, is not printed; the draft proposal itself, RAC D-9/1a, July 16, is printed p. 562.

presentation of the 'Draft Proposal for Armaments Regulation Program' until *after* complete international agreement has been reached on the following items:

"a. The United States (Baruch) plan for international control of atomic energy and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other major weapons of mass destruction, and

"b. Practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions of an international agreement to eliminate, regulate or reduce armaments and armed forces.

"The presentation of the Draft Proposal except in terms of the timing indicated above would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be dangerously inadvisable for the reason that the future security of the United States would thereby be jeopardized.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff take this opportunity to reaffirm their support of progressive regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces consistent with the security of the United States. They therefore offer their assistance to the Department of State in drafting a broad outline of a workable plan for the progressive regulation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to be presented to the Commission for Conventional Armaments when it enters discussion of Item 4 of its Plan of Work."

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

501.BB/10-447 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1947—1 p. m.

467. 1. Developments since position paper on Conclusion of Special Agreements under Art 43 and Organization of UN Armed Forces (SD/A/C.1/88, Sept 8, 1947)¹ do not warrant US taking initiative in proposing in GA that it recommend to members that they make specific offers of forces to SC (urtel 938, Oct 4²). Inquiries US has made as to acceptability of such proposal have not produced encouraging response.

2. Feasibility of such proposal to GA turned on several factors, among them: further consideration by SC of general principles governing organization armed forces (Apr 30 report MSC) thus clarify-

¹ *Ante*, p. 632.

² Telegram 938 requested a definite decision on the question whether the United States should introduce in the General Assembly a resolution recommending that the members of the United Nations make specific offers of armed forces to the Security Council (501.BB/10-447).

ing position SC members on main principles at least; reaction of France, UK, China to inquiry; interest of UN members in obtaining implementation Art 43 as manifested in general debate.

3. No further action has been taken by SC on the principles recommended by MSC. Other and more pressing matters, some connected with GA have absorbed time SC. While GA is in session hardly to be expected that SC could complete its study of these principles. Since additional study leading to decisions seems a necessary prerequisite to GA action it follows that to propose at this time that Assembly take steps in this matter would be premature.

4. Reaction of French and UK Govts has not been favorable. Our Embassies in Paris, London and Nanking were requested on Aug 29 to inquire informally if these Govts contemplated any new course of action to implement Art 43 and if not what the reaction would be if US were to propose to GA it recommend to members that they make offers of forces. French, while approving our aim (presumably for early implementation Art 43), nevertheless have given no further evidence their reaction. UK reacted negatively and hoped that we would not make proposal in GA. No report received from Nanking. In this situation obvious US could not be assured in advance of readiness these three Govts to support proposal in GA and to respond affirmatively to GA recommendation. In absence such advance assurance reps. Army, Navy, Air Depts advise from military point of view against making proposal.

5. General GA debate developed no evidence particular interest or desire of members for early implementation Art 43.

6. Final consideration is full GA agenda and particularly the program of US proposals. Addition another item such as one under consideration appears unwise.

7. Despite our desire for early implementation Art 43 weight of above considerations is against making proposal as originally contemplated.

LOVETT

IO Files : SD/A/C.1/105

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 13, 1947.

INFORMATION ON ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES

THE PROBLEM

What should be the United States position in the General Assembly if a request is made for information :

(a) On armaments and armed forces generally ;

(b) On armed forces in foreign countries other than ex-enemy states; or

(c) On armed forces in ex-enemy states.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) If proposals are made for requesting information on conventional armaments and armed forces wherever located, the United States should insist that such proposals be referred to the Commission for Conventional Armaments as the agency established for the purpose of considering such matters. The United States should oppose any request calling upon the General Assembly to obtain such information emphasizing the position that such information is necessary only in response to the requirements of an overall program for the regulation and reduction of armaments as developed under Item IV of the Plan of Work of the CCA.

(b) If the question of a census of foreign troops in the territories of member states arises in the General Assembly, the United States should express the view that the provision of such information is not necessary to determine compliance with the provision of the third paragraph of Section 7 of the General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946, relating to withdrawal of troops from such territories. (The U.S. position on the withdrawal of such troops is dealt with in a separate paper, Document SD/A/C.1/84).²

(c) If proposals for obtaining information on numbers of troops in the territories of ex-enemy states are made the United States should state its view that this is a matter to be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

(d) If, despite the expression of the views in (b) and (c) above, there is general interest in obtaining information on the numbers of foreign troops in member states or ex-enemy states, the U.S. Delegate, if he deems the circumstances warrant, should vote in favor of a proposal to obtain such information.

COMMENT

The position recommended is in accord with present United States policy. It leaves to the Delegation certain decisions which should be made in the light of the circumstances under which this question arises.

¹ The General Assembly did not consider this matter during its deliberations.

² September 6, p. 626.

SPA Files: Lot 428

Memorandum by Lt. General Lauris Norstad¹ to the Army Chief of Staff (Eisenhower)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] 16 October 1947.

Subject: Mr. Bard's "Draft Proposal for Regulation of Armaments".

1. The following criticism of "The Bard Plan" is submitted as of possible value in your forthcoming meeting with Messrs. Forrestal, Lovett and Bard to discuss the plan and the JCS comments on it contained in JCS 1731/35:²

a. The only argument evinced by Mr. Bard for presenting his plan is to preserve U.S. leadership in the U.N. Commission for Conventional Armaments by introducing an innocuous program which would accord with the ideas of the majority of that Commission.

b. This argument evidences a basic misunderstanding of the problem and of the present position of the U.S. Government in respect thereof, which is substantially:

(1) That the regulation of armaments is primarily a corollary to international confidence and security and cannot "per se" contribute to their enhancement,

(2) That it would be absurd—and certainly, not conducive to improved international confidence—to regulate conventional arms unless effective control of atomic and other weapons of massed destruction were first or simultaneously achieved,

(3) That unless and until the major powers are agreed on the principal safeguards and enforcement measures essential to the effectiveness of any disarmament plan, no plan could be more than an empty gesture.

c. The problem, therefore, is not to devise a formula which would appeal to the already sympathetic majority but, rather, to keep trying to gain agreement of the antipathetic Soviet minority on the basic principles essential to any effective regulation.

d. Under existing conditions, it appears impossible to achieve the latter because the U.S.S.R. simply refuses to contemplate the derogation of sovereignty and privacy which effective measures of control would entail.

e. Therefore, the U.S. has two alternate courses: to stand on our basic policy and reject any compromise with reality, or to modify that policy and accept some admittedly less effective plan. It is submitted that the only valid justification or compulsion for the latter course would be for the possible purpose of obtaining Soviet agreement.

¹Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Air Force; formerly Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff.

²For the comments by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Forrestal's letter to Marshall, October 10, p. 679.

This the Bard Plan cannot hope to do, inasmuch as the Soviet position on disarmament is fixed upon the immediate elimination of atomic weapons and a wholly unacceptable conception [of] international enforcement.

2. It is also suggested that nothing could subject the U.S. to more scathing Soviet propaganda than for us to propose a plan which, while neither regulating nor reducing armaments would still provide for the hated intrusion on national privacy.

3. The present and future security interest of the U.S. strongly urges that U.S. leadership in the UN CCA be exercised in holding and emphasizing our anything-but-negative position: i.e. that agreement among the great powers on the fundamental principles of regulation and enforcement must precede *any* substantive plan for control of armaments.

Lauris Norstad

SPA Files : Lot 428

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1947.

Subject: Proposed US Procedure in the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments

A procedure for the United States to advocate in the Commission for Conventional Armaments, including submission of the Bard Plan, at an appropriate time, is proposed as follows:

1. Proceed with consideration of items 2 and 3 of approved CCA Plan of work.

a. Plan of work (Tab A)²

b. US views on items 2 and 3 (Tab B)³

c. Secretariat synopsis of Delegations' views on items 2 and 3⁴ (Tab C)

¹ This document was used by Rusk in briefing Lovett for his meeting with Forrestal, Bard, and Eisenhower on October 17. It was circulated in the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as RAC D-13/11, November 7. (Department of State Disarmament Files)

² RAC D-13/5, June 19, p. 525.

³ The tabs do not accompany the source text. The document under reference is presumably RAC D-13/10e (US/A/C.1/136), not printed, upon which Bard's statement to the Working Committee of the Commission on Conventional Armaments, September 17, was based; the latter document is printed on p. 660.

⁴ The Working Committee of the CCA decided at its 5th Meeting, September 12, that the delegations should submit their views with respect to items 2 and 3 of the Plan of Work. Bard's statement of September 17, p. 660, represents the United States response. The working papers submitted were tabulated as a synopsis by the CCA Secretariat and presented to the Working Committee on October 10. A copy of this document is in the IO Files.

2. After completion of consideration of items 2 and 3, or in the absence of unanimous agreement, the US should decide whether the amount of agreement on items 2 and 3 makes it possible or desirable to proceed to discussion of item 4.

3. If it is decided to proceed to item 4, the Bard Plan (or a similar plan) should be offered by the US as the first stage of a practical proposal for the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. The decision as to when the Bard Plan would be put into operation should be made in the light of the political situation existing at the time.

- a. Secretary Marshall's General Assembly speech: excerpt on conventional armaments regulation (Tab D)⁵
- b. The Bard Plan (Tab E)⁶

4. If it is decided *not* to proceed to a discussion of item 4, the CCA should either return to further consideration of the points of disagreement in items 1, 2 and 3, or should recess for, say, a year to await a more favorable political atmosphere.

5. If at any time members of the CCA consider that information on conventional armaments and armed forces is necessary or desirable for the furtherance of the work of CCA, the US should support the reporting of categories of information not classified by the US and should not connect such reporting with inspection, verification or other safeguards.

⁵ For text of Secretary Marshall's speech at the 82nd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, September 17, during the general debate phase of the 2nd Regular Session, see United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings*, vol. I, pp. 19-27 (hereafter cited as GA (II), *Plenary*).

⁶ Document RAC D-9/1a, July 16, p. 562.

SPA Files: Lot 428

Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1947.

At 3:50 this afternoon, Mr. Lovett called Mr. Rusk and me to his office to inform us of the results of the meeting he had with Messrs. Forrestal and Bard and Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther,¹ regarding the US position in the Commission for Conventional Armaments.²

¹ Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Director, Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

² No record of this meeting has been found in the files of the Department of State. A brief description exists in Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, Viking Press, 1951), pp. 326-327.

Mr. Lovett said that he came back with the documentation provided by SPA, but not with the letter to the Secretary from Mr. Forrestal,³ containing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Bard Plan.⁴ The letter is to be re-written after consultation between General Gruenther and Mr. Rusk.

Mr. Lovett said he had stated that there are three things we do not want to have to do.

1. Veto or obstruct a plan proposed by another member
2. Be responsible for breaking up the negotiations in the CCA
3. Accept any proposition with regard to information and verification which would react to the detriment of our position on inspection as regards atomic weapons

Noting that the Commission for Conventional Armaments is not a Commission for Disarmament, Mr. Lovett stated that he had proposed that the United States develop a plan for the exchange of information on conventional armaments and armed forces, with appropriate verification, for possible use by the CCA in formulating practical proposals for the regulation of conventional armaments. He said that we wished to stay away from "disarmament". Mr. Blaisdell said that a plan developed along such lines would approximate the one which the British have suggested.⁵ Mr. Lovett said that that might be true, except for the verification aspect.

Mr. Rusk inquired if the procedure proposed in his memorandum of today to Mr. Lovett⁶ was acceptable, to which Mr. Lovett replied in the affirmative.

³ October 10, p. 679.

⁴ RAC D-9/1a, July 16, p. 562.

⁵ Regarding the proposal contemplated by the British Delegation, see Bard's memorandum to Austin, August 4, p. 588.

⁶ *Supra*.

501.BC Armaments/10-1747: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1947—8 p. m.

US URGENT

491. Secretariat's synopsis working papers submitted by various dels on Items 2 and 3 of CCA Plan of Work recently received.¹ Views of Dept being forwarded USUN. First reading synopsis indicates at least three objectionable features. These are: general slant of paper,

¹ Regarding the synopsis, see footnote 4, p. 684; the Plan of Work itself is printed as RAC D-13/5, June 19, p. 525.

inclusion Soviet Plan of Work² under new guise; and inaccurate classification of material.

General Slant of Synopsis

Paper generally slanted to emphasize elements of practical proposals rather than "principles in connection with" the regulation of armaments. This may lead into an immediate discussion of Item 4 Plan of Work before completion of Items 2 and 3.

Inclusion of Soviet Plan in Synopsis

Inclusion of Soviet Plan of Work already rejected by majority is transparent device to have it considered on equal basis with new proposals other dels. While it has been US position that CCA Plan of Work does not exclude introduction of pertinent topics nature of Soviet tactic should be clearly indicated and resisted and Soviet plan shown to relate primarily to Item 4. As already noted by dep U.S. rep in October 10 session CCA Soviet plan has little relation to subject matter under Items 2 and 3.

Inaccuracies in Synopsis

Understand inaccuracies of synopsis already called to attention UN Secretariat.

Essential to emphasize that recent developments in CCA such as: (a) Remarks Brit and Aus reps in October 10 CCA session re desirability of proceeding with "planning" as soon as statement of agreed proposals developed; (b) Soviet tactics in reaffirming adherence to unacceptable position and rejected Plan of Work; (c) emphasis in synopsis on elements of practical proposals rather than on principles in connection with regulation of armaments; all make it likely Item 4 may be discussed before prior agreement reached among permanent members on Items 2 and 3 of CCA Plan of Work.

It is our view that without agreement among permanent members on basic principles embraced by Items 2 and 3, questionable whether any further fruitful work can be accomplished by CCA at this time. In event of disagreement among permanent members over principles under Items 2 and 3 seems likely discussions under Item 4 would merely give Soviets opportunity to introduce irresponsible proposals for propaganda purposes and to have them considered on basis equality with those introduced by other dels which would be bound by agreement on principles. Every aspect of Items 2 and 3 should therefore be thoroughly and completely discussed so as to encourage maximum possible agreement. At same time, most important that discussion be so directed as to prevent premature (i.e. before agreement on Items 2 and 3) consideration of Item 4.

² For text, see telegram 494 from New York, May 21, p. 476.

Ref agreement of permanent members on Item 3: means accord on basic principles which should govern a system of safeguards and not necessarily agreement at this time on details such as organization, composition and functions of international supervisory agency. (RAC D-18/2a) July 25,³ 1947, already sent Mission.

If it should develop that such broad and fundamental differences exist among the permanent members as to prevent agreement on Items 2 and 3, it may be necessary refer matter SC before further discussions in CCA, since questionable in such circumstances whether CCA could fulfill its terms of reference.⁴

LOVETT

³ *Ante*, p. 574.

⁴ The Department transmitted additional objections to the synopsis in telegram 515, October 27 (501.BC Armaments/10-2747).

501.BC Atomic/10-1847: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1947—11 a. m.

492. Second Report AEC will be received by SC as interim report requiring no additional SC instructions to enable AEC to continue work.¹ USGovt feels that divergencies between AEC majority and Soviet are more significant than could have been adequately presented in such an interim report. Therefore, it is important, when Report before SC, for USrep to: (a) review efforts US and majority to fulfill assigned tasks of AEC, (b) summarize and sharply define the basic disagreements between the majority and minority views calling particular attention to inadequacy Soviet proposals of June 11, (c) refer to record Soviet nonparticipation and evasiveness, (d) call attention grave difficulties and limitations imposed on future work of developing proposals because of Soviet and Polish non-acceptance basic principles and possibility of eventual breakdown in negotiations if the minority persists in refusing to join the majority (refer Secretary Marshall's speech Sept 17 before GA²) and (e) refer to Soviet's exaggerated and reactionary interpretation of national sovereignty rights which, if carried to its logical conclusion might make impossible any agreement on a give and take basis.

US at same time should reaffirm intention to continue effort to clarify and resolve, where possible, existing points of disagreement.

LOVETT

¹ The Report (AEC, 2nd yr., *Special Suppl.*) had been submitted on September 11; the Security Council did not consider it in 1947.

² For text, see GA (III), *Plenary*, pp. 19-27.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] October 20, 1947.

DEAR MR. RUSK: 1. After some weeks of quiescence some of the delegations on the Atomic Energy Commission have been raising the question whether we should again take up our work.¹ Thus far, the United States delegation has sought, and has been successful in maintaining, a non-committal position.

2. As you know, we have Mr. Heneman² with us working on the problem of staffing and organization, which is the next topic on the list of principal subjects of the Commission's work program. His work is not yet very far advanced but even in the preliminary consideration that we have been able to give to this phase of the work, it is evident that this subject will necessarily involve consideration of very difficult problems, such as: the relations between the Agency and the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and the General Assembly; the question of which actions of the Agency should be subject to review and which should not; whether amendments to the Charter are necessary, particularly in relation to voting procedure in the Security Council, the substance of Article 51, and the possible strengthening of the General Assembly as against the Security Council.

3. Apropos of this problem of relationships we must recognize that our success or failure to obtain the establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly and the precise characteristics of that Committee³ will have an important bearing on staffing and organization problems of the Agency.

4. The Soviet Union refused to participate in the drafting of the Specific Proposals of the Second Report. While it abstained from voting on the First Report and later submitted amendments to it, the Soviet Union rejected unequivocally the Specific Proposals of the Second Report and voted against their adoption. In the discussions leading to the final vote, the Soviet Union made it clear that they were not willing to try to amend the Specific Proposals because they were fundamentally wrong. Thus, it would seem that the possibilities of reconciling points of disagreement are virtually nil.

¹ The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had adjourned in September to await consideration by the Security Council and the General Assembly of its Second Report. The latter bodies took no action on that document in 1947. The AEC did not reconvene until January 16, 1948, although its Working Committee did meet once in December.

² Harlow J. Heneman of the Division of Organization and Budget.

³ For documentation on this subject, see pp. 166 ff.

5. The majority of the Commission is firmly convinced that the Specific Proposals of the Second Report, taken together with the General Findings and Recommendations of the First Report, are the essential basis for an effective system of control. Any work that may be decided upon with regard to further Specific Proposals must, in our view, be based squarely on the Second Report and the General Findings and Recommendations of the First Report.

6. The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission contains in its Introduction the following statement of the present state of affairs:

“It is evident that until unanimous agreement is reached on the functions and powers of the international agency, there will be limitations on the extent to which proposals on other topics in the ‘Summary of Principal Subjects’ can be worked out in detail. Clearly, much remains to be done before the final terms of a treaty or convention can be drafted. The Commission intends to proceed with the remaining topics in the Summary and, at the same time, will continue its endeavors to clarify and resolve, where possible, the existing points of disagreement.”

This statement on limitation applies not only to such questions as stages, strategic distribution and sanctions but to staffing and organization as well. In other words, the majority of the Commission is on record that there will be limitations on any further work beyond that already done and contained in the First and Second Reports.

7. There would seem to be the following alternative courses of action:—

a. Attempt no further work on the remaining topics. If this course were decided upon we could remind other delegations of the above-quoted statement of limitation and could point out further that we think it would be difficult for some delegations to staff meetings of the AEC during the current General Assembly session. We could also stress that the results of the General Assembly session might have an important bearing on the decision to carry forward our constructive work in the Atomic Energy Commission. This approach would leave open with the other delegations the question as to whether negotiations should be either suspended or terminated.

A decision to do no further work on the topics still remaining might be handled tactically in the following ways:

1. *Recommend that no meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission or its committees be held at least until the General Assembly session is over.*

If the Russians or the Poles should call a meeting to draw the red herring of biological warfare across our path, we could discuss that problem in general terms as long as they wanted to.

2. *Meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission might be convened*

for sole purpose of debating at length the points of difference between the majority and the minority.

It is, of course, evident that this move would not advance the negotiations but could be used as a means of making even clearer the rift between the majority and the Soviet Union. These discussions could go on interminably.

It should be pointed out, however, that such discussions could backfire. The Soviets might very well gain considerable propaganda advantage. They would not be constrained in such discussions by any sense of verity or responsibility. Furthermore, there is danger that some members of the majority would attempt to weaken and modify the majority position in the illusory hope of attaining agreement.

b. Continue work on the remaining topics.

A decision to continue constructive work would, of course, be based entirely on the majority proposals to date and would, in all probability, be carried on without the cooperation but rather with the active opposition of the Soviet Union.

There are two principal tactics available under this alternative:

1. Continue work only on the question of staffing and organization.

A working group is already established on this subject. It has done some preliminary work and could be reconvened with a minimum of fanfare. Discussion could proceed very slowly, informally, and tentatively. This problem could take several months to work out. As indicated above, however, it is evident that this problem contains many difficult aspects and may be susceptible of several different solutions. There may, in fact, develop serious differences of opinion, even among the majority, as to the best solution of some aspects of this problem, particularly as regards relations with other organs of the United Nations.

2. Continue work on the entire remaining portion of the Summary of Principal Subjects.

Most of the remaining topics are extremely difficult. No useful purpose would be served if we were to lay before the world our ideas on stages and strategic balance in the absence of even a token payment on the part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the solutions to these problems will change not only for technical reasons, such as atomic energy developments in other countries, but more particularly with changes in our relations with the Soviet Union. If work were done on the remaining topics only the most general considerations should be advanced. It would seem most unwise to attempt to make specific proposals on them.

8. It seems to us that no intelligent decision can be made concerning the several alternatives outlined above except in the context of U.S. policy as regards the United Nations and general U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Moreover, no intelligent decision can be made without taking fully into account the status and the timing of side conversations with the British, the Canadians and others. The arguments given above pro and con for the enumerated alternatives have no real significance, except in the context of these considerations. Atomic en-

ergy negotiations cannot lead but must follow and be a part of our over-all foreign policy.

9. In view of the foregoing and subject, of course, to broader policy considerations, we recommend that negotiations be terminated or suspended either on the basis of work done up to the present, or after a paper on staffing and organization has been completed. Because of the many difficulties involved in dealing with staffing and organization, as indicated above, our preference is for the former.

10. We consider that the questions posed in this letter are of the gravest concern. We feel that the answer to how we should now proceed must come from the highest levels.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK OSBORN

SPA Files : Lot 428

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs (Blaisdell)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 20, 1947.

Participants: Major General Gruenther
Major General Cabell ¹
Mr. Donald C. Blaisdell

This morning I spent an hour with Generals Gruenther and Cabell and after the former left another half hour with General Cabell.

General Gruenther reviewed the principal points made in the meeting last Friday between Secretary Forrestal, Acting Secretary Lovett and Mr. Bard. (General Gruenther said that General Eisenhower was present as an observer). There was some discussion about the consensus reached regarding the Bard plan and how that could be reflected in Secretary Forrestal's letter.² Emphasis was placed upon the adverse effect upon the United States position on the Atomic Energy Commission if the Bard plan, with its verification feature, were to be proposed by the United States, in the CCA, either now or in the near future. General Gruenther said that Mr. Bard had agreed that this was a point the importance of which had not been drawn forcibly to his attention and he agreed that it should be given due weight.

Upon leaving the meeting at 10 o'clock, General Gruenther said that he had asked General Cabell to do the drafting on this matter. Thereupon, General Cabell and I discussed the matter further. He agreed that the best procedure to follow to identify the acceptable features of the Bard plan would be for him to undertake a close

¹ Maj. Gen. C. P. Cabell, Headquarters, United States Air Force.

² October 10, p. 679.

scrutiny of the plan RAC D-9/1a³) and to bring in the features of the idea advanced by Mr. Lovett for an exchange of information with appropriate verification, endeavoring thereby to ascertain what the Bard plan would look like if the legitimate concerns of the military as expressed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff comment and tempered by Secretary Forrestal and Mr. Lovett were taken into account. General Cabell said that while he was originally sympathetic to the Bard plan and even now did not subscribe to the Joint Chiefs of Staff views, nevertheless he proposed to examine the plan as objectively as possible and that he would not hesitate to arrive at an adverse conclusion if his analysis led to no other alternative.⁴ He promised to keep in touch with me and solicited any suggestions I might have for carrying forward this analysis.

With respect to the urgency of the matter, General Cabell said that he did not believe it need or could be acted on within a matter of days, whereas Mr. Bard appeared to feel that action was required by, say Wednesday of this week.⁵ I said that I did not feel that Mr. Bard's estimate of the situation was correct.

DONALD C. BLAISDELL

³ July 16, p. 562.

⁴ No revised draft of the Forrestal letter has been found in the files of the Department of State. For a subsequent statement of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Bard Plan, see Doc. RAC D-15/6, November 12, *infra*.

⁵ October 22.

Department of State Disarmament Files

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 12 November 1947.

RAC D-15/6

Subject: Draft Proposal for the Armaments Regulation Program

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the "Draft Proposal for Armaments Regulation"¹ program transmitted under cover of memorandum from the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments dated 5 August 1947.²

In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the "Draft Proposal" represents a divergence from present United States policy which would be contrary to the security interests of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to concur with the representations made on either the impulsion for, or the benefits to be derived from this proposal. From the military point of view they feel that on neither count would the contemplated relaxation of present policy be justified.

¹ RAC D-9/1a, July 16, p. 562.

² Covering memorandum not printed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the cause of armaments regulation and international peace will not be served by the adoption of any program which does not incorporate the principles which have already been enunciated. On the other hand they recognize the requirements to give all possible assistance to the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in the difficult negotiations with which he is confronted. They have, accordingly, reviewed the whole situation of armaments regulation and are of the opinion that the position of the United States in respect of a possible census of armed forces, either with or without a simple system of verification, might be modified without adverse effect on United States security and with consequent advantage to the negotiating position of the United States Representative on the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now modify their position as expressed in SM-8290³ and concur in the recommendations of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments as set forth in the paper RAC D-15/1⁴ submitted under cover of letter from the Executive Committee dated 8 May 1947.⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that if it becomes necessary to support the troop census proposal either with or without verification, it be made clear that it is an interim measure only, and that such support in no way constitutes a departure from the fundamental United States position previously announced.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. G. LALOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Secretary

³ RAC D-15/2, May 27, p. 478.

⁴ May 6, p. 474.

⁵ Not printed.

501.BC Atomic/11-1447

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, November 14, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Confirming conversation of this date with Mr. Rusk, I am enclosing report of recent conversation with delegates to the Atomic Energy Commission.

It was agreed that if conversations on Staffing and Organization were carried on in the informal sub-committee of Committee 2, we would limit ourselves pretty strictly to the subject matter of 3(a) in the subject list on Page 7 of the Second Report; namely, Organization

and Structure. Subject 3(b), Relations to Other Organs of the United Nations, would be omitted so as to avoid at this point discussion on such subjects as the veto, and these matters would be referred to in later sections.

On this basis the United States Delegation is in agreement with the action proposed by the other delegations consulted, and as indicated in the attached memorandum, and recommends it to the State Department for their approval.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK OSBORN

[Enclosure]

REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS WITH MAJOR DELEGATES TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

1. *Decision as to introduction of atomic energy in debates of present session of the General Assembly.*

It is the feeling of the American Delegation, concurred in by other major delegations, that there would be no value in debating atomic energy in the present session of the General Assembly. There is neither time for a full discussion, nor is the emotional atmosphere right for an unbiased and technical discussion. Such a debate should therefore be avoided if possible.

If the Soviet precipitates a debate in the form of a speech by Vishinsky, which may include a reintroduction as a Soviet resolution of paragraph 4 in their previous war-mongering resolution,¹ a reply of course will be necessary. It would be desirable that the first replies should be made by other than the United States, particularly by Canada, France and the United Kingdom, leaving the American reply to follow. All replies should be brief and as unemotional as possible and deal lucidly with the facts at issue. If the Soviet reintroduce their resolution it is considered desirable that an amendment be introduced immediately, such that the resolution as amended would include the entire terms of reference of the General Assembly of January 24, 1946.

2. *Basic considerations in formulating future plans.*

It is the general opinion that at the present time there is no likelihood of the Soviet entering in good faith into an acceptable agreement for the control of atomic energy. It is believed that the Soviet will not be ready to consider such a step unless and until (a) Europe is restored to sufficient strength to put up serious resistance to a Soviet invasion,

¹ For documentation on United States concern regarding the resolution on war-mongering proposed by the Soviet Union in the General Assembly, see pp. 76 ff.

(b) the Soviet become convinced that the United States will not suffer an economic breakdown in the next depression.

We are therefore all agreed that it would be unwise to go forward with specific proposals on the balance of the subjects which would need to be included in a treaty (other than staffing and organization), namely, financing, strategic balance, sanctions and stages. These subjects are more political than those previously covered and should be considered under the conditions existing at such time as the Soviet Union desires to enter into a treaty. The subjects on which specific proposals have been developed to date, as embodied in the Second Report, are, in general, technical subjects having to do with the functions and control powers of the international agency, and therefore are essentially nonpolitical. Having reached unanimity on these technical subjects, it is highly desirable that this unanimity should not be destroyed, and that the First and Second Reports be kept intact for use if and when the Soviet are ready to come in. From this general background, it is felt that these are the objectives which it is desired to achieve:

a. To develop the widest public appreciation of the Second Report of the Commission.

b. To maintain the initiative in the Atomic Energy Commission at least to the extent of protecting the First and Second Reports of the Commission, and to keep a united front.

c. To prevent the Soviet from taking over the initiative by focusing attention on new proposals incompatible with the previous work of the Commission, or by such a maladroit cessation of activity on our part as would give the appearance of lack of sincerity as to our adherence to the Commission's Reports.

d. To continue the Atomic Energy Commission in being against the possibility of Soviet agreement at some future time.

e. To make it absolutely certain that the United States is not withdrawing its "offer" and is not suspected of proposing to withdraw its "offer."

3. *The alternative procedures which may be followed to achieve the desired objectives.*

The group has considered that the next few months might be taken up by any one of the following:

a. The development of consideration of specific proposals on staffing and organization.

b. The discussion of biological warfare and other weapons of mass destruction.

c. The discussion with the Soviet Union on their reasons for refusing to accept the Second Report of the Commission, particularly the paper on inspection. This would give the best opportunity for developing public appreciation of the Second Report.

If proposals (a) and (b) were selected they would probably be followed by proposal (c) in order that a final conclusion could be reached and a third report made to the Security Council submitting the dead-

lock to them. Against the advantage in courses (a) and (b) taken above, there are some serious objections, which are as follows:

On the proposal to discuss staffing and organization, there is the danger that this paper would become quite controversial and that we might not be able to get the same full agreement as was obtained on other papers. If it should involve the discussion of the relations of the control agency with other agencies of the United Nations, of the veto, of sanctions, and by-passing the Security Council, the Soviet would be given new ammunition for their propaganda. However, these matters might be deferred to later papers. The solution which has been suggested by Canada has been that we should go along on staffing and organization in informal conversations of Committee 2 and if we find there is going to be serious disagreement, withdraw at that point, and not include the subject in any further report.

The difficulty with respect to the consideration of biological warfare and other means of mass destruction is that the Poles, who suggested such a program,—probably at the instigation of the Soviets,—have in mind that there is no means of controlling these things and that the only solution would be a convention prohibiting their use, and that having developed this course it would then be easy to propose that atomic warfare be similarly prohibited, pending agreement on controls. There is also the disadvantage that no governments working on biological warfare would be anxious to give up their real or assumed secrets. The Soviets would probably look on this as a fishing expedition and then complain bitterly if any other governments refused to send their best expert witnesses to the Commission.

4. *Final steps and reference to the Security Council.*

It is obvious to all the delegations we have talked to that at some point the Commission will have to recognize that it can go no further with its work in the face of Soviet intransigence, and so report to the Security Council and General Assembly. We are therefore concerned with the following questions:

- a. When will the appropriate time arrive?
- b. Should such a report be designed to precipitate a considerable public debate in the Security Council or in the General Assembly?
- c. Should such a report ask for a definite mandate from the General Assembly to proceed along the lines of the Second Report and the general principles laid down in the First Report, or some other proposed action?

The decision as to when to report this impasse to the Security Council and what recommendations should accompany such a report may perhaps be left to sometime in the future. The general feeling is that it is too early to take such action now.

At a further meeting on November 14th of delegates (Canada, U.K., France, U.S.), at which this paper was discussed and approved, the

United Kingdom delegate brought up the matter of further discussing the Soviet proposals, and the following actions were recommended:

1. A meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission should be called about December 15th while the French have the chair.
2. Committee 1 should be assigned the work of further consideration of the Russian proposals of June 11th in the light of the replies to the U.K. questions.
3. Committee 2 should undertake work on Staffing and Organization in informal sessions.

It was the feeling that this work would take some months and would result, probably, in a Report to the Security Council which would state that the Commission was unable to reconcile its differences with the Soviets and could go no further for the present.

501.BC Atomic/12-247

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

NEW YORK, December 2, 1947.

DEAR MR. RUSK: This will confirm our telephone conversation of this morning covering tentative plans with respect to atomic energy matters in the Security Council.

Mr. Harry of Australia this week expressed a desire to know how we thought the Security Council should handle the Second Report of the A.E.C. which is now in their hands. He felt that some action might be taken during December while Australia had the Chairmanship of the Security Council, and expressed the opinion that the Australian Delegation would like to see the Security Council simply note the receipt of the Report without further action and without discussion.¹

We talked to General McNaughton of Canada and to Mr. deRose of France, and they both expressed the same view.

Our staff conference this morning held the same opinion, and I judge from our telephone conversation of this morning that we may understand this method of procedure to be acceptable to the State Department.

We believe it unlikely that the Soviet Delegation, or any others, will attempt a discussion of the Second Report in the Security Council under these circumstances. If, however, such a discussion is entered into we will be prepared to reply along the lines of the instructions

¹ The Security Council did not consider the Report in 1947.

contained in Mr. Lovett's telegram to the U.S. Mission under date of October 18, 1947.²

Yours sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

² Telegram 492, p. 688.

501.BC Atomic/12-247

The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, December 2, 1947.

DEAR MR. RUSK: The present and tentative plan for the Atomic Energy Commission is as follows:

A meeting of the Commission will be called during December, sometime after the 15th of the month, while the French have the Chairmanship.

It will be proposed to reopen in the working committee the discussion of the Soviet proposals of June 11th in the light of the Soviet replies to the United Kingdom's questions.¹ These replies were received after the completion of the Second Report.

It may also be proposed to continue work on Section 3(a) of the subject list, which has the title "Organizational Structure." This proposal is still under discussion. It is the view of the major delegations that we should work on specific proposals covering organizational structure, provided we find no serious points of disagreement.

All the major delegations are agreed not to go beyond 3(a) for the present, because we would then become involved in controversial political questions not yet ready for solution.

The big problem we are now facing is the content and timing of the Third Report. In order to get as much light as possible on these questions we are calling a meeting of our board of consultants in New York on Friday, December 12th, including Messrs. Conant, Oppenheimer, Bacher, Farrell, Groves, Barnard and Tolman.²

Yours sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

¹ For the texts of the questions and the replies, see AEC, *2nd yr., Special Suppl.*, pp. 92-95.

² Blaisdell made the following marginal comment opposite the final paragraph: "To me this is premature except in the most tentative fashion. Why the rush?"

501.BC Atomic/12-447 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1947—5 p. m.

587. For Osborn. Re Osborn letters November 14 to SecState¹ and December 2 to Rusk.² Pending further decisions on atomic energy questions Department approves as next steps to be pursued in AEC (a) reconvening the Commission about December 15³ and (b) assigning Committee I further consideration of Soviet proposals June 11, in light of UK questions.

Decision on resumption of work in Committee 2 deferred pending Osborn visit Washington next Tuesday.⁴

LOVETT

¹ *Ante*, p. 694.

² *Ante*, pp. 698 and 699.

³ The Commission next convened on January 16, 1948.

⁴ December 9.

Department of State Disarmament Files

*Summary of Action of a Meeting of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, Washington, December 9, 1947, 3 p. m.*¹

TOP SECRET

RAC S-80 Final Revision

1. *Convening of a Committee of Consultants on International Control of Atomic Energy*

1. *Action:* The Committee agreed that confidential oral inquiries should be made of selected individuals concerning the advisability of convening a Committee of Consultants to advise the Department of State on international control of atomic energy. Final decision on this matter should be made by the Secretary of State in the light of the above advice.

2. *U.S. Role in Committee 1 of the UNAEC*

1. *Action:* The Committee agreed that when the AEC resumes its meetings the U.S. by its activities in Committee 1 should focus public attention on the inadequacy of the Soviet proposals and on the wide divergencies separating the majority and the minority on the elements of an international control system.

¹ This record, drafted December 29, 1947, was transmitted to Austin in despatch 15, January 15, 1948, for the guidance of the United States Mission at the United Nations (USUN Files).

3. *Work of Committee 2 of UNAEC*

1. *Action:* The Committee agreed that the organization and staffing paper (RAC D-20/17)² prepared in USUN should be studied by the Executive Committee prior to a decision by this Government as to the scope of the discussions in Committee 2. In the meantime the present informal method of developing proposals on "Organizational Structure" (item A-3 (a)) should be continued, it being understood

(a) that this would not lead to discussion by the Atomic Energy Commission of the other matters on the subject list and

(b) that nothing would be reported to Committee 2 which would occasion a reservation on the part of any of the majority group.

It was further understood that Mr. Osborn might at a later date reopen with the Executive Committee the question of the discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission of the balance of the topics on the subject list.

4. *Security Council Consideration of the Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission*

1. *Action:* The Committee agreed:

(a) The United States should avoid being drawn into a full-scale discussion when the Second Report is reached on the agenda.

(b) If the United States can find an opportunity to make a tempered, factual statement of its views without provoking protracted discussion and without leading to the introduction of a resolution, it should take advantage of such an opportunity.

(c) The United States, however, should be prepared for a full-scale debate in the Security Council.

(d) If the Soviets should seek an understanding under which the Security Council would merely note the Report, the United States should acquiesce.

Present

Members:

Department of State

Messrs. George F. Kennan (for Mr. Lovett), Chairman
 Dean Rusk, Deputy Chairman
 John C. Elliott, Executive Secretary
 Earl D. Sohm, Secretary

Department of the Army

Colonel Pierpont Hamilton (for Mr. Draper)

Department of the Navy

Mr. W. John Kenney

² Not printed.

Department of the Air Force

Mr. C. V. Whitney

Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Robert F. Bacher

USUN

Ambassador Warren R. Austin

*Consultants**Department of State*

Messrs. Edmund Gullion

Donald Blaisdell

Howard Johnson

Department of the Navy

Admiral E. T. Wooldridge

Captain H. P. Smith

USAEC

Mr. Joseph Volpe, Jr.

USUN

Messrs. Frederick Osborn

John Ross

Gordon Arneson

501.BC Armaments/12-947

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
(Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 9, 1947.

Subject: Safeguards Essential to the Regulation and Reduction of
Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces—Proposed U.S.
Position

Discussion

In the near future, the Working Committee of the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments will probably be ready to act on Item 3 of its Plan of Work which calls for "consideration of practical and effective safeguards . . . to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions."¹ At that time the United States representative, Mr. Ralph A. Bard, should be prepared to state our views. The Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments has prepared the outline of a proposed United States position on this subject (Tab A).²

As envisaged by the Executive Committee, the system would be

¹ The Commission completed its consideration of neither item II nor item III of its Plan of Work in 1947.

² See annex.

established by international convention and would depend for its success upon three safeguards: reporting on conventional armaments and armed forces, verification of these reports by international inspection, and remedial action in the case of violation of the convention. Administration of the convention would be in the hands of an international agency composed of a governing board, an inspection corps, and a secretariat. States signing the convention would be obliged to submit periodic reports which would be subject to verification by inspection teams drawn from the inspection corps by the governing body of the agency. Signatory states would also be under the obligation of allowing authorized representatives of the agency to enter, move freely within, and depart from territory under their jurisdiction. Reports would be published by the agency and would be furnished to the Security Council and the signatory states. Instances of non-compliance and violation would not be defined in the convention but would be within authority of the agency to determine. Action in such instances would be primarily the responsibility of the Security Council. Failure of the Council to act would relieve states of their obligations under the treaty and would permit them such freedom of action as is consistent with the Charter.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the proposed U.S. position be approved (Tab B).³

Concurrences

(Approval by the Secretary of Defense of the proposed position is being recommended by the service Members of RAC)

[Annex]

UNITED STATES POSITION ON PRACTICAL AND EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS ESSENTIAL TO THE GENERAL REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES ⁴

RAC D-18/2d

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1947.

Item III of the Plan of Work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments provides for: "Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means) to protect complying

³ Not printed.

⁴ Approved by the Secretary of Defense on December 12 and by the Acting Secretary of State on December 15 and transmitted to the United States Representative at the United Nations in instruction No. 282, December 27 (Department of State Disarmament Files; 501.BC Armaments/12-2747).

states against the hazards of violations and evasions." The following outline should provide the basis for the United States position when Item III is discussed by the Commission:

I. *The Objective of Safeguards.*

A. To protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

II. *The Nature of Safeguards.*

A. The system of safeguards should be so devised that its operations will be effective, technically feasible and practicable, and will:

- (a) Detect promptly the occurrence of violations;
- (b) Minimize interference with and impose minimum burdens on the economic and industrial life of the participating states.

III. *The Basic Elements Constituting Safeguards.*

A. Accurate and regular reports by all participating states of such information related to conventional armaments and armed forces as may be required by the treaty.

B. Verification of the above mentioned reports by thorough international inspection procedures.

C. Remedial action in the case of violation of the treaty.

IV. *The International Agency Responsible for Safeguards.*

A. An international agency should be established within the framework of the United Nations, deriving its powers and status from the treaty under which it is established, to supervise and administer the agreed system of safeguards in connection with the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments.

B. The international agency should consist of a governing board, an inspection corps and secretariat.

C. The governing board should be composed of representatives from each of the states which are members of the Security Council, the non-permanent membership changing in conformity with elections to and retirement from the Security Council.

D. The inspection corps should be composed of members drawn from panels nominated by each participating state. The size and composition of the inspecting teams drawn from this corps and utilized in particular instances should be determined by the governing board.

E. Such secretariat as may be needed should be selected by the governing board.

F. The decisions made by the international agency should not require unanimity.

V. Rights and Duties of the Agency.

A. Receiving from each participating state the reports specified in the treaty.

B. Verification of this information through direct inspections.

C. Review and interpretation of data derived from reports and inspections.

D. Preparation and publication of periodic and special reports to organs of the United Nations and to the participating states.

E. The inspection and verification process as applied to each state should be made by nationals of states other than the states being inspected. However, the state being inspected should be obliged to appoint a liaison officer to assist and accompany the inspection group representing the international agency.

F. Individual members and national composition of the inspection teams should be varied periodically.

G. The international agency and its representatives should have no authority to issue directions to participating states except as may be provided in the treaty under which it is established.

H. Inspection and verification should be conducted on a regular basis with reasonable advance notice which should be set forth in the treaty. However, special inspections may take place under such circumstances as may be specified in the treaty.

I. Certification to the Security Council and to participating states of violations or evasions.

VI. Rights and Duties of Participating States.

A. Each participating state should afford duly accredited representatives of the agency unimpeded rights of ingress to and egress from, and movement within its territories; should aid and assist them in the performance of their duties, should provide access to the activities subject to inspection, and should arrange for the full cooperation of national or local authorities or private individuals.

B. The treaty should set forth the nature and scope of the inspection and verification processes to be followed by the international agency in order that all participating states may be aware of their rights and obligations.

VII. Action To Be Taken Upon the Determination of a Violation.

A. The international agency should be responsible for the certification to the Security Council and to all participating states of such acts of omission and commission as the agency shall determine to be violations of the treaty.

B. Such certification may be accompanied by such recommendations in respect of any violations cited as the international agency may deem appropriate.

C. Action in respect of any violation should be primarily the responsibility of the Security Council. The treaty should provide that, since the purpose of the system of safeguards is to protect complying states against the hazards of violations, failure by the Security Council to correct violations or otherwise enforce the treaty should relieve participating states from their obligations thereunder and permit them such freedom of unilateral or collective action as is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY: THE EXTENSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN NATIONS; ESTIMATES OF THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY; COORDINATION OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY POLICY; POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE ACQUISITION OF MILITARY BASES AND AIR TRANSIT RIGHTS;¹ FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF THE STOCK-PILING OF STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

Editorial Note

A substantial portion of the documentation printed in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1947 concerns subjects of relevance to the national security. Documentation in the present compilation is related to the formulation of high-level general policy. It is necessary to consider this material in connection with papers on specific issues and areas found elsewhere in the *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1947 for examination of policy implementation and for appreciation of the role of specific circumstances in the development of general policy. The compilations noted below are most directly related to the more general documentation printed here.

For documentation on United States policy at the United Nations with respect to the regulation of armaments and collective security, see pages 327 ff. Regarding foreign policy aspects of United States development of atomic energy, see pages 777 ff. For documentation on the Soviet Union and national security, see volume IV, pages 514 ff. *passim*. Regarding the political and economic crisis in Europe and the United States response (the Marshall Plan), see volume III, pp. 197-484. For documentation on United States economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey (the Truman Doctrine), see volume V, pp. 1-484. To locate documentation on United States policy with respect to military assistance to individual nations or areas, see the indexes of volumes III, V, VI, VII, and VIII.

For documentation on the negotiation of the Trusteeship Agreement for the former Japanese-mandated islands in the Pacific, concluded between the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations, April 2, 1947, see pages 258 ff. To locate documentation on United States policy with respect to the acquisition of bases and mili-

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1110.

tary air transit rights in various areas of the world, see the indexes of volumes III, V, VI, and VIII.

840.20/1-1747

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Mathews) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 17, 1947.

UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC

ICELAND, GREENLAND, SPITSBERGEN ¹

Iceland

Iceland's geographic position dominates the Northeastern approaches to the United States from Europe. In recognition of this fact the United States, by the Defense of Iceland Agreement of July 1941,² assumed the protection of Iceland for the duration of the war. By a US-Icelandic Agreement of October 7, 1946,³ the 1941 Defense Agreement was terminated, and the United States secured the right of transit through Iceland and the use of the Keflavik airport for US military planes for a minimum period of six and a half years. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have on several occasions designated Iceland as a primary base area in which long-term military base rights by the United States and the denial of similar use to a hostile power are essential to the security of the United States. Formal proposals were made to Iceland on October 1, 1945, to secure these long-term rights by agreement, but we were prevented from securing them by a vigorous local opposition led by the Communists. Negotiations for long-term base rights have therefore had to be postponed, but the October 7, 1946, Agreement may serve as a point of departure from which a later solution to the long-term problem may be found.

State Department Action: Cooperation with War and Navy Departments in implementing October 7 Agreement.

¹ For documentation on the attitude of the United States regarding reported demands by the Soviet Union on Norway with respect to Spitsbergen and Bear Island, see vol. III, pp. 1003 ff.

² Reference is to the Agreement for Defense of Iceland effected by exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Iceland and the President of the United States, July 1, 1941; for texts of letters, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 232. For documentation regarding this agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 776 ff.

³ For text of agreement between the United States and Iceland regarding the termination of the Defense Agreement of July 1, 1941, effected by exchange of notes on October 7, 1946, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1566, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2426.

Greenland

Similarly essential to the defense of this continent is an arrangement permitting the United States to maintain military forces and facilities in Greenland. This fact was recognized by the conclusion, on April 9, 1941, of the Defense of Greenland Agreement.⁴ The Agreement is still in effect. The termination clause of the Agreement was purposely phrased in a vague manner, but the Danish Government has been showing increasing interest in terminating the Agreement. In the meantime, the outcome of the negotiations with Iceland makes it even more essential to US security that we have long-term military rights in Greenland. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that our first objective should be to acquire Greenland by outright purchase from Denmark; alternatively to acquire long-term military base rights.

In an exploratory conversation with Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen on December 14, 1946, Mr. Byrnes⁵ emphasized the vital importance of Greenland to US security and suggested to him that our needs in regard to Greenland might be met by a new agreement giving the US long-term rights to construct and maintain military facilities in specified areas of Greenland or by a US-Danish treaty in which the US would undertake to defend Greenland from aggression and would secure the right to maintain such military installations there as would be necessary. Mr. Byrnes stated, however, that possibly the best solution, in the long run, both from the Danish and US points of view, would be outright US purchase of Greenland under an agreement concluded in accord with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. These several points were contained in more detail in a memorandum which Mr. Byrnes handed to Mr. Rasmussen at the close of the conversation. A copy of the memorandum is attached.⁶ The Minister's first reaction was that he had not thought of anything so drastic but had in mind something along the lines of the US October 7 Agreement with Iceland. He agreed, however, to give Mr. Byrnes' suggestions careful study. Mr. Byrnes indicated that we were willing to continue the *status quo* while a solution is being sought. Mr. Rasmussen has since agreed not to take the matter up with the Danish Parliamentary Committee until Soviet-Norwegian negotiations regarding Spitsbergen should materialize or be made public.

State Department Action: Await Danish reaction to December 14 conversation. If such reaction is delayed, consider course to be followed.

⁴ For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 204, or 55 Stat. (pt. 2) 1245; for pertinent documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 35 ff.

⁵ James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, July 1945-January 1947.

⁶ Not printed.

Spitsbergen

More or less counterbalancing the US' interest in Iceland and Greenland is the Soviet's interest in the Norwegian Archipelago of Spitsbergen (Svalbard). The proximity of the islands to Soviet territory makes this a reasonable Soviet interest. However, the islands are also within five hundred miles of the Northeast corner of Greenland, and the US (together with thirty-three other countries, including the Soviet Union) is a party to the 1920 Treaty by which Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen was recognized, with the proviso that Norway would not construct any fortifications in the territories, "which may never be used for war-like purposes". Nevertheless, as the US Government has known secretly since July 1945, Mr. Molotov⁷ in November 1944 approached the Norwegian Government with a proposal that the Soviet Union be granted outright possession of Bear Island and be permitted to maintain military facilities on the remaining islands of the Archipelago which would be under Soviet-Norwegian condominium. The Norwegians endeavored to counter these extreme proposals by advancing milder ones, and on April 9, 1945, they presented in Moscow a draft declaration of joint Soviet-Norwegian intention to abrogate the 1920 Treaty and work out defense arrangements for the area as a regional link within the framework of the international security organization. There has been no Soviet reply to this Norwegian proposal, although the Soviets have repeatedly indicated that they have not dropped their demands. In November 1946 Molotov indicated to the Norwegian Foreign Minister⁸ that he believed bilateral negotiations should begin soon. Probably they will take place in January or February.

The Norwegians have taken the line that since the status of Spitsbergen is regulated by multilateral treaty, no change in this status can be made without consultation with and approval of the signatory states. The US has informally made it clear to the Norwegians that it claims a right to be consulted before any change in the status of the islands, as regulated by the 1920 Treaty may be made. The Norwegians are now actively considering what action is incumbent upon them in view of the recent publicity and the Soviet pressure for early negotiations.

State Department Action: In a paper prepared in July 1945, before the termination of the war with Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated our opposing the Soviet proposals.⁹ In case such opposition should prove unavailing, the JCS proposed that the US insist that the

⁷ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁸ Halvard M. Lange.

⁹ See memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 23, 1945, in *Foreign Relations, 1945*, vol. v, p. 98.

Soviets in return agree not to object to our obtaining exclusive base rights in Iceland and Greenland, that they withdraw entirely from Northern Norway, that they make no bid for Jan Mayen Island, and that Norwegian coal and economic rights in Spitsbergen be preserved. In view of the changed circumstances the JCS are preparing a revision of the 1945 paper.

The opinion of the British Joint Chiefs as expressed to us in July 1945 was that they saw no strategic objections to the Soviets' establishing bases on these islands since the naval and air base facilities which could be constructed would be very limited and their use severely restricted by weather conditions.

When the revised JCS paper is received the Department will consider action to be taken in the light of the developing situation in Norway and Moscow.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

ADDENDUM—SPITSBERGEN¹⁰

In a paper dated January 15, 1947,¹¹ the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that Spitsbergen in Soviet hands would have a military potential against the US but not sufficient to warrant US military action to prevent a measure of Soviet control. The JCS favor preservation of Spitsbergen's present treaty status; otherwise change should be allowed only by due and public process. They point out, however, that Soviet military facilities on the islands would render US long-range military rights in Greenland and Iceland more important than ever.

In parallel letters dated February 18 to the Secretaries of War and of the Navy the Secretary of State observed that if we now press ahead with negotiations for military rights in Greenland and Iceland we might stimulate positive Soviet action in Spitsbergen which might otherwise be avoided or at least postponed.¹² The Secretary's letter also brought out these points:

1. Now that Soviet objectives in Spitsbergen have become public, Denmark and Iceland are not likely to grant us long-term military rights if we at the same time oppose change in the status of Spitsbergen.

2. Maintenance of the *status quo* (which the JCS recommend as the preferable solution) would not preclude clandestine Soviet military activity on Spitsbergen under guise of development of now-existing Soviet coal mines.

¹⁰ This addendum is attached to the file copy of the preceding memorandum by Matthews, dated January 17.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² For text, see vol. III, p. 1013.

Foreign Minister Lange informed Molotov (ca. February 17) that, since circumstances have changed, Norway does not wish to open discussions of a military character with a single foreign power concerning a region under Norwegian sovereignty. However, because of Russia's economic position in the Archipelago, Norway expressed willingness to discuss with the USSR economic aspects of the Spitsbergen Treaty with a view to proposing certain non-military changes.

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1947.

811.20/2-747¹

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 7, 1947.

Subject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill To Promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947)²

The provisions of the draft bill which are of primary concern to the Secretary of State are contained in Title III - "Coordination for National Security—National Security Council" (Sec. 301), "Central Intelligence Agency" (Sec. 302), and "National Security Resources Board" (Sec. 303).

Sec. 301 - *National Security Council*. The draft bill would establish a National Security Council. The powers and functions which the bill would vest in this Council appear to be extraneous to the purpose of the bill—unification of the military departments, and would evidently by statute dissipate the constitutional responsibility of the President for the conduct of foreign affairs.

The Council would be composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Forces, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and such other members as

¹The source text—an unindexed photocopy from the papers of Clark M. Clifford at the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri—became available after this volume had been set in pages. No copy was found in the files of the Department of State.

²For a summary of the final version, adopted as the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, see the editorial note, p. 760.

the President might designate from time to time. The draft provides that "the function of the Council shall be to integrate our foreign and military policy and to enable the military services and other agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving our national security." It is made the duty of the Council, subject to the direction of the President, "to consider and establish policies on matters of common interest to the Department of State, the Armed Forces Establishment, the three Military Departments, and the National Resources Board; and to reconcile and coordinate action to be taken in connection therewith." Further, subject to the authority of the President, it is provided that decisions of the Council "shall establish the approved policy of the departments and agencies represented in the Council". The head of each department shall then take action to implement Council decisions in the name of the head of the department.

Under the foregoing provisions, apart from those which have to do with unification of the armed forces, there would be inaugurated a critical departure from the traditional method of formulating and conducting foreign policy. The procedure under Sec. 301 would give predominance in the field of foreign relations to a body composed of not less than six, of which at least four would be the civilian heads of military establishments. I think it would be unwise to vest such a Council by statute with broad and detailed powers and responsibilities in this field. Under the proposed statute it would be the duty of the Council in carrying out the specific obligations imposed upon it and in exercising the authority granted to limit, in effect, this vital responsibility of the President in the first instance and at the same time markedly to diminish the responsibility of the Secretary of State. Coordination is highly desirable, and the lack of it has been a weakness in the past, but Sec. 301 introduces fundamental changes in the entire question of foreign relations.

The constitutional and traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs, principally throughout our history with the aid of the Secretary of State, is deeply rooted, I believe, in the sentiments of the people. There is also the strong feeling that the direction of policy, foreign or domestic, should be dominated by the non-military branches of the Government. The President should not

be made subject to the statutory persuasions for which the bill provides.

The foregoing comment might be enlarged upon, for example, by emphasizing the implications of the provision that action taken in any department to implement decisions of the Council shall nevertheless be taken in the name of the head of the department. Under this provision the Secretary of State would become the automaton of the Council.

On the basis of the general analysis and considerations stated, it seems to me that the provisions for the Council should be eliminated from the bill, confining its purpose to the unification of the armed services and such reorganization as that might require, without introducing critical matters concerned with the conduct of foreign relations. This original purpose was evidently the reason that the Department of State was not asked to participate in previous studies or in drafting. I am aware that in the discussion of these developments reference has been made publicly to a Council having to do with the integration of foreign and military policies; but this has been in very general terms.

Sec. 302. — *Central Intelligence Agency*. Sec. 303. — *National Security Resources Board*. The elimination of provisions for the Council would require reconsideration of the provisions for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Resources Board, both of which are related to the Council. Creation of these two bodies now is not essential to the main purpose of the bill. I believe there should be, as now, a central intelligence agency and a resources planning board. But legislative provisions for them need further and more detailed study.

The Secretary of State is at present Chairman of the National Intelligence Agency composed of four members. The new agency would be responsible to the National Security Council which itself is subject to the objections already set forth and on which the Secretary of State is numerically subordinated to the heads of the military establishments. The Foreign Service of the Department of State is the only collection agency of the government which covers the whole world, and we should be very slow to subject the collection and evaluation of this foreign intelligence to other establishments, especially during times of peace. The powers of the proposed agency seem almost unlimited and need clarification.

As to the National Security Resources Board, I feel that there should be a board functioning in this field during times of peace; but its powers should be considered in relation to the peacetime execution of programs and policies involving foreign trade. If it is intended that the policies laid down by the Board would require action in peacetime, conflict might arise with foreign trade policies which are quite important to the maintenance of peace and economic security. These matters should not be left under the control of the military. The subject, important as it is, also needs further clarification from the standpoint of the State Department.

I suggest that these two problems of centralization of intelligence and a resources planning board be deferred and that in the meantime the several departments concerned be requested to give joint consideration to them and report to you.

G. C. MARSHALL

761.00/2-1747

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1947.

Actions of the Soviet Government in the field of Foreign Affairs leave us no alternative other than to assume that the USSR has aggressive intentions.

The Soviet Government nearly always has alternative courses of action for its objectives. It can openly use force, or threaten to use force, to influence foreign countries or it can try the inside job method, using the local communist party and boring from within as they are now doing in France.¹ They can shift from one method to the other readily, depending upon the needs and circumstances of the moment.

If the right of free men to live out their lives under institutions of their free choice is to be preserved, there must be a vigilant determination on the part of peoples and governments of the U.S.A. and the U.K. to resist Soviet aggression, by force of arms if necessary. It seems clear that there can be no question of "deals or arrangements" with the

¹ For documentation on United States interest in the preservation of democratic government in France, see vol. III, pp. 688 ff.

USSR. That method was tried with Hitler and the lessons of that effort are fresh in our minds. One cannot appease a powerful country intent on aggression. If the lessons we learned from efforts to deal with Hitler mean anything, concessions to the Soviet Union would simply whet their appetite for more.

The United States' policy is based squarely on the principles of the United Nations and the fullest support of that organization. I am convinced that we must continue this policy. The United Kingdom similarly has been built around the fullest support of the United Nations. I am convinced that any departure from that policy on the part of the UK would not only be a serious mistake in itself but would have far-reaching and disastrous consequences on public opinion in the United States.²

I am convinced that the people of the United States are prepared to back up support of the United Nations, by force of arms if necessary, so long as the United Kingdom and the other peace-loving democracies are similarly minded.

If our two countries continue their policy of building up support for the United Nations, I believe that in course of time the organization will become a defensive alliance of peace-loving states. Article 51 of the Charter says that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". This might well afford an appropriate framework for collective action by peace-loving states in the event of armed aggression by the Soviet Union, whose veto power would of course block action in the name of the whole organization against her.

While the people of the United States are wholeheartedly supporting the United Nations, it would be foolish to assert that isolation is dead in the United States. So long as our Foreign Policy is based squarely on the principles of the United Nations and the fullest support of that organization, I believe that the strong pull toward political isolation can be successfully resisted. I am, however, certain that any arrangements between the UK and the USSR which could be

² For documentation on United States interest in Anglo-Soviet relations, see vol. iv, pp. 514 ff. *passim*.

interpreted as appeasement or which did not fall fully and completely within the purposes and principles of the United Nations would touch off an upsurge of isolation sentiment in the United States which would be irresistible. In other words, the American people would say "To hell with all of them".

JOHN HICKERSON

840.20/2-2647

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 26 February 1947.

Subject: Minimum Strength of U.S. Forces in Europe

1. The War Department has restudied the problem of minimum strengths which should be provided by the United States for the accomplishment of occupational objectives in Europe. Consideration has been given to the present and probable future strengths of Allied troops on foreign soil in Europe. The War Department considers that conditions have not changed to allow a reduction in the troop strengths which should be provided for Europe since the U.S. view was transmitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1946. (See Tab "C")¹

2. A staff study, which outlines pertinent details of the problem, is inclosed herewith. Appended to Staff Study as Tab "B"² is a War Department study which was furnished Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Cohen³ by the War Department during their discussion of the question of reduction of Allied forces in Europe in the Council of Foreign Ministers in November 1946.

For the Secretary of War:
J. E. BASTION, JR.
Colonel, GSC

¹ For text, see CFM (46) (NY) 59, December 6, 1946, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. II, p. 1466.

² Not printed.

³ Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor, Department of State.

[Enclosure]

Staff Study Prepared in the War Department

THE PROBLEM

1. To outline War Department views on minimum U.S. forces which should be authorized for the accomplishment of occupation missions in Europe as of 1 July 1947 and 1 July 1948.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. *a.* As of 1 February 1947 the following armed forces were on foreign soil in Europe: (See Tab "A"⁴ for detailed tabulation)

United States	202,000
British	247,000
French	80,000
U.S.S.R.	1,110,000

b. The following factors in connection with U.S. troop strengths are pertinent:

(1) U.S. forces in Italy will be withdrawn when the Italian Peace Treaty comes into force. A total of 5000 troops will remain in Trieste for an indeterminate period.

(2) U.S. forces in Austria totalling 11,500 should not be reduced until after the conclusion of an Austrian peace treaty.

(3) Of the present 150,000 U.S. troops in Germany, approximately 38,000 are in AAF units. General McNarney,⁵ AAF and the War Department concur that this air strength could be reduced to between 8,000 and 12,000 without jeopardizing the occupation mission. The State Department, considering the overall situation in Europe, has been reluctant to see such a major removal of U.S. forces from Germany for fear it might be interpreted as partial abandonment of the U.S. occupational commitment and thus adversely affect the U.S. negotiating position in the conferences on Germany. Action is in progress to request the State Department to reconsider its position on this matter.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Commanding General, United States Forces in Europe.

c. In connection with U.S.S.R. troops on foreign soil in Europe, the War Department Intelligence Division estimates that some sizeable reduction will be effected by 1 July 1947. These reductions should be viewed with reserve because of the Soviet practice of retaining demobilized soldiers in civilian and quasi-military capacities in countries where Soviet troops are stationed.

d. Consultation between the War Department and the State Department in November 1946 during discussion of the question of reduction of Allied forces in Europe in the Council of Foreign Ministers resulted in the following U.S. proposal for troop *ceilings*: (See Tab "B" for War Department study furnished Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Cohen)

Germany (Allied Occupation)

U.S. — 140,000

U.K. — 140,000

France — 70,000 (approximate existing forces not subject to reduction in 1948)

U.S.S.R. — 200,000

Poland (Protection of Communication Lines)

U.S.S.R. — 20,000

Austria (Aid for re-establishment of Independence)

U.S., U.K., France, and U.S.S.R. — 10,000 each

Hungary (Protection of Communication Lines pending Austrian Treaty)

U.S.S.R. — 5,000

Rumania (Protection of Communication Lines pending Austrian Treaty)

U.S.S.R. — 5,000

DISCUSSION

3. During the past several months, War Department concern over budget and manpower restrictions has caused a concentrated effort to reduce U.S. forces in occupation areas to a "bed-rock" minimum which is consistent with the accomplishment of occupational objectives. In November 1946, General McNarney advised the War Department as follows: "The occupation forces must be such as to provide the small amount of leeway to permit our governmental authority to operate

in the event of a refusal or failure of the German people or quadripartite agencies to function, rather than be completely at their mercy. The ground strength (117,000 other than air for Germany and Austria) presently authorized for 1 July 1947 is the minimum which can accomplish the missions in the areas assigned." It is the view of the War Department that this force might be unable to maintain order in the event budgetary restrictions force a drastic reduction in the food which is supplied the German people. Assuming that conditions continue to be most favorable, however, some reductions in troop strength might be possible by abandoning or reducing such activities as:

- a. Commitment to displaced persons.
- b. Occupation of Austria.

Reduction of air strength in Europe will also reflect a minor saving in service type personnel.

General McNarney reaffirmed his position in a message to the War Department on 20 February 1947 that reductions in resources available to him below those presently planned could not be absorbed without jeopardizing his occupational mission.

4. Troops in Italy must be withdrawn within 90 days after the Italian peace treaty comes into force. It is assumed that the treaty will be ratified by the signatories and no discussion is believed necessary except to note a maximum of 5,000 troops from each U.S., Britain, and Yugoslavia will automatically be available to the Governor in Trieste for a period of 90 days after he assumes office. These forces must then be withdrawn unless the governor requests their retention through the Security Council of the United Nations.

5. War Department Intelligence reports an increase in the Soviet practice of retaining demobilized soldiers in foreign countries in civilian or quasi-military capacities. These former soldiers are recruited into the Russian Secret Police, put in charge of cooperative farms, placed in responsible positions in industrial concerns, etc. All of these activities are largely controlled by the Kremlin and give the Soviets a degree of control disproportionate to the troop strength in such countries as Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Austria, and Poland.

6. It is considered that Russia will correctly appreciate U.S., French, and British difficulties in maintaining sizeable occupation forces during peacetime. This appreciation will probably cause Russia to view troop ceilings as a stratagem on the part of the Western Powers to force a material reduction in Russian military strength in Europe, while at the same time resulting in no real reduction in planned strengths on the part of the Western Powers. Another important factor is the Russian capability for rapid mobilization, which puts her in a position to upset any agreed balance of force in Europe practically overnight.

7. This analysis is premised on continued occupation of Germany for a considerable period or until a treaty is concluded along the lines of the text of the U.S. Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Germany announced on 30 April 1946⁶ and Mr. Byrnes' Stuttgart speech of 6 September 1946.⁷ It is considered that if such a treaty were concluded the troop strengths shown herein will still apply during the interim period until the treaty takes effect.

CONCLUSIONS

8. *a.* Conditions have not changed to allow a reduction in the troop ceilings for 1 July 1947 which should be provided for the Allies in the various European countries since the U.S. view was transmitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1946.

b. In the absence of unforeseeable difficulties these forces might be reduced by one quarter to one third by 1 July 1948. This reduction is subject to such earlier withdrawal from Austria, Rumania and Hungary as may be required by an Austrian treaty, and in the case of the U.S. would consist mainly of Air Force troops.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. It is recommended that:

A copy of this study be furnished to the Department of State for guidance in the forthcoming Moscow Conference.⁸

⁶ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 12, 1946, pp. 815-816.

⁷ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1946, pp. 496-501.

⁸ For documentation on the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 10-April 24, see vol. II, pp. 139 ff.

Department of State Disarmament Files¹

*Minutes of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, Washington, March 7, 1947, 10:30 a. m.*²

SECRET

PCA M-37

PRESENT

General Crain,³ A-H, Deputy Chairman
 Messrs. Cummins,⁴ A-P, Executive Secretary
 Sohm,⁵ ESC, Secretary
 Dreier,⁶ ARA
 Elliott,⁷ (for Blaisdell,⁸ SPA)
 Labouisse,⁹ EUR
 McAfee¹⁰ (for Ringwalt,¹¹ FE)
 McGhee,¹² UE
 Satterthwaite¹³ (for Timberlake,¹⁴ NEA)
Consultants: Messrs. Abbott,¹⁵ IS
 Cardozo,¹⁶ FLC
 Margrave,¹⁷ MD
 Miss Chadwell, ESC

Approval of Minutes

1. *Action:* The minutes of February 28, 1947 (M-36)¹⁸ were approved.

¹ Lot 58D133, a consolidated lot file in the Department of State containing documentation on armaments, regulation of armaments, and disarmament, 1943-1960.

² Regarding the establishment and functions of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments of the Department of State, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, footnote 72, p. 840.

³ James K. Crain, Deputy Chairman of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, Department of State.

⁴ Elmer T. Cummins, Executive Secretary of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments; Chief, Munitions Division, Department of State.

⁵ Earl D. Sohm, Secretary, Executive Secretariat, Department of State.

⁶ John C. Dreier, Chief of the Division of Special Inter-American Affairs.

⁷ John C. Elliott, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of International Security Affairs.

⁸ Donald C. Blaisdell, Associate Chief, Division of International Security Affairs.

⁹ Henry R. Labouisse, Jr., Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews).

¹⁰ William McAfee of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

¹¹ Arthur R. Ringwalt, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

¹² George C. McGhee, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton).

¹³ Joseph C. Satterthwaite of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

¹⁴ Clare H. Timberlake, Chief of the Division of African Affairs.

¹⁵ Henry L. Abbott of the Division of International Security Affairs.

¹⁶ Michael Hart Cardozo, Director of the Legal Division, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.

¹⁷ Robert N. Margrave of the Munitions Division, Department of State.

¹⁸ Not printed.

*Relative Priorities for Receipt of U.S. Military Supplies (D-13/4)*¹⁹

2. *Action:* The Committee recommended priorities for the receipt of United States military supplies by the following countries, in the order listed: (a) Greece, (b) Italy, (c) Turkey, (d) Iran, (e) Canada, (f) Republic of the Philippines and (g) the other American Republics. The Committee further recommended that this action be subject to the following conditions:

a. This arrangement of priorities is a temporary one and it must be revised at frequent intervals.

b. Priorities alone will not furnish final action in reserving or delivering equipment to a foreign government. Decisions concerning such action will take into consideration the following:

(1) The quantity of important items available for transfer in relation to the overall demand for such items.

(2) The importance to each nation of particular types.

(3) The percentage of requirements to be assigned after consideration of (1) and (2) above.

The Deputy Chairman was directed to communicate this recommendation to the Acting Secretary of State. Further, the Deputy Chairman was directed to obtain information from the CCS concerning lend-lease military supplies in the hands of the British and available for retransfer to Greece.

3. *Discussion:* GENERAL CRAIN reviewed D-13/4 and pointed out that it is necessary to designate the relative priorities of certain countries for the receipt of U.S. military supplies since a limited quantity of such supplies are available from the armed services. He added that the priority designation would be presented to the SWNCC Subcommittee on Rearmament for coordination with Army and Navy representatives after the approval of the Acting Secretary had been obtained.²⁰

¹⁹ Document PCA D-13/4, March 4, read as follows:

"The members of the Committee are requested to be prepared at the meeting of Friday, March 7, 1947, to determine and recommend to the Acting Secretary of State the relative priorities of the following countries for receipt of United States military supplies:

Greece	Republic of the Philippines
Italy	American Republics
Iran	Canada
Turkey	

"The decision is required because of inability of the armed services to meet all approved and prospective programs."

²⁰ In a memorandum of March 12, Crain informed John H. Hildring, Chairman of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments (also Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas and Department of State Member and Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee), of the action taken at the present meeting. A typewritten marginal notation on that memorandum reads as follows: "General Hildring took this up with Mr. Acheson [Dean Acheson, the Under Secretary of State] at the 9:30 a. m. conference, March 13, 1947, and it was approved by Mr. Acheson." (811.24/6-2647)

4. The following recommended priorities for the receipt of United States military equipment were registered:

- EUR**
1. Greece
 2. Italy (up to treaty limits)
 3. Turkey
 4. Canada
 5. none
 6. none
 7. none

- ARA**
1. Canada
 2. none
 3. none
 4. none
 5. none
 6. none
 7. Am. Republics

- NEA**
1. Greece
 2. Italy
 3. Iran
 4. Turkey
 5. Philippines
 6. none
 7. none

- FE**
1. Greece
 2. Philippines
 3. Italy
 4. Iran
 5. Turkey
 6. Canada
 7. Am. Republics

- UE**
1. Greece
 2. Iran
 3. Italy
 4. Turkey
 5. Canada
 6. Philippines
 7. Am. Republics

- SPA**
1. Greece
 2. Turkey
 3. Canada
 4. Philippines
 5. Italy
 6. Iran
 7. Am. Republics

5. **MR. CARDOZO** stated that surplus supplies are supposed to be sold for fair value²¹ and he questioned whether the priorities established by the Committee would override the obligation to obtain fair value or would obviate the acceptance of the highest bid for supplies. It was pointed out that the established priorities would apply to equipment properly available, and would not affect property under the custody of FLC when such equipment had been declared surplus for disposal, unless FLC receives specific instructions to the contrary.

6. **MR. LABOUISSÉ** pointed out that the determined priorities could not be conclusive, but should be used only as a tentative guide subject to modification. He added that the Committee could not be expected to determine the details of supply of military equipment to the countries involved until it is known what supplies are desired and what items are available for transfer. It was believed that the priorities might be revised or weighed if it is determined that the available supplies can fulfill only the requests of the one or two countries receiving the highest priorities.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

²¹ Reference is to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, P.L. 457, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (H.R. 5125), the legislative basis for the disposal program; see 58 Stat. (pt. 1) 765.

SWNCC Files ¹*Report by the Special Ad Hoc Committee to the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee* ²

[Extract]

TOP SECRET
SWNCC 360

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1947.

POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND COSTS OF ASSISTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES
TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES ³

Annex "B" to Appendix "A"

GENERAL MILITARY AID PROGRAM

Reference: Special *Ad Hoc* Committee Memorandum of request
dated March 20 [17], 1947 ⁴

1. The close of World War II has left the world with only three, and perhaps only two, nations which are capable of producing modern complicated military arms and munitions in large quantities. These are the United States, the Soviet Union (with its satellites), and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. Other nations such as Sweden, France, Belgium and Canada have more limited capabilities. As a result, the smaller nations of the world, which could formerly procure their arms from a large number of munitions-producing countries, must now, for practical purposes, seek them in great part from the Soviet Union and its satellites, or the U.S. supplemented by Britain. The source of acquisition by such countries of military equipment will have profound military and political implications. If, through inability to obtain the equipment and supplies from the United States, they turn to the Soviet Union or its satellites they will provide the Soviet Union with a political leverage potentially dangerous to U.S. security interests. The same leverage, possessed by the United States, could be

¹ Lot 52M45, the files of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee which are located in the National Archives under the administration of the Department of State.

² This document was the interim report of an *ad hoc* committee instructed by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on March 20 to investigate the question of foreign assistance. SWNCC took this action in response to letters from Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, to the Secretaries of War and Navy, March 5, stating that it was in the interest of the United States to try to anticipate the further need to extend foreign assistance along the lines of the Greek-Turkish aid program. The conclusions of this report were tentatively approved by the three departments. For the text of the letter of March 5, see vol. III, p. 197. For other portions of the text of SWNCC 360 and for information on subsequent action taken in its regard, see *ibid.*, pp. 204-220.

³ For documentation on United States policy with respect to the economic crisis in Europe, see vol. III, pp. 197 ff.

⁴ For partial text, see vol. III, p. 198.

made to serve the interests of international peace and security. Procurement of military equipment and supplies by other nations will also give to the supplying nation long-term military advantages in the form of an increased capability for mobilization which derives from the existence and readiness of a larger domestic munitions industry.

2. For the purpose of maintaining internal security and a reasonable degree of security against attack, nations have legitimate needs for moderate, suitably trained and equipped military forces. Through well-considered military collaboration, standardization, and the provision, by sale or otherwise, of military equipment, the U.S. can promote its own security and other national interests by improving the military posture of various foreign nations listed in paragraph 5, by orienting their military forces toward those of the U.S., and by causing them to look to the U.S. for replacement, maintenance, service, and training in the use of U.S. types of equipment.

3. A comprehensive program must be developed, on the basis of a careful judgment and consideration of the many and complex U.S. interests, both military and political, involved. The actual execution of the program should receive the same careful judgment and consideration. The program should be in specific terms as to places, times, types and amounts of aid contemplated, and should be subject to continuing reexamination.

4. Military supplies and equipment provided to foreign nations by the U.S. must come from existing stocks or from new manufacture, both of which are subject to serious limitations. Before any substantial provision of equipment can be made, authorizing legislation is required. In nearly all cases this is now lacking. Appropriate financial arrangements will be required. Much of the equipment provided from existing surplus stocks will be transferred at nominal cost, and rehabilitation and transportation charges. In some cases, a part of the financing will require appropriations for loans or grants. Existing stocks will merely serve to initiate the programs, not to sustain them, nor even to provide in their entirety all the initial sets for which need is foreseen. For the program to remain vital and to serve effectively the national interest of the U.S. and the interests of the countries concerned, provision must be made for a moderate, though steady, resupply from new manufacture. Careful planning is required in order that orders placed in private industry should not be subject to wide fluctuations.

5. As of this date, world-wide survey indicates that it is desirable in the U.S. interest to initiate, or to be prepared to initiate, programs involving provision of U.S. military equipment and assistance in the following countries:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>a. <i>Europe</i>
 Italy
 France
 Austria
 Norway
 Spain (contingent)</p> <p>b. <i>The Western Hemisphere</i>
 Canada
 Latin-American Republics</p> | <p>c. <i>The Far East</i>
 Korea
 China
 The Philippines</p> <p>d. <i>The Near and Middle East</i>
 Greece
 Turkey
 Iran
 Remainder of Near & Middle East</p> |
|---|---|

Details as to the pertinent U.S. national interests involved in the case of certain European, Near and Middle East, and Far East countries are contained in Annexes "C" to "E", pages 36 to 88.⁵

6. Requirements for U.S. military aid under national programs which have been developed to date are summarized as follows:

Italy

General. Provision of military equipment and supplies on an *ad hoc* basis.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Army—Surplus equipment to supplement, as necessary and feasible, equipment provided by British; Air Force—50 a/c (P-51) with maintenance equipment and spare parts for 3 years (probable); Navy—16 minesweepers and spare parts therefor (probable).

Arrangements for Financing. Equipment to be transferred at scrap prices; for air equipment, Italians will pay packing, crating, and transporting costs.

Canada

General. Joint Canadian-U.S. adoption of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization and training methods; assistance to Canada in the procurement of standardized equipment.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Any equipment required by Canada (as yet undetermined).

Arrangements for Financing. All costs for equipment, supplies, and services provided to Canada to be borne by Canada.

Latin-American Republics (for breakdown by countries, see pages 23 to 32, SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 78.⁵)

General. Maintenance of military missions; training of Latin-American personnel in U.S. service schools; and provision of military equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Under W. Hemisphere Defense

⁵ Not printed.

Program, equipment for 28 divisions; 1530 a/c (and 31 base units and 34 communication groups); 4 light cruisers, 25 destroyer escorts, 34 patrol and other types; (this is an interim plan and subject to review). *Under Interim Allocation Program*, equipment for 3 divisions; 576 a/c (and 25 base units and 25 communication groups); 84 patrol and other naval craft.

Arrangements for Financing. U.S. to pay costs of maintaining missions and training personnel in U.S. service schools; financing of provision of initial equipment is as yet undetermined; costs of non-excess equipment and supplies and costs of maintenance to be borne by Latin-American countries.

China

General. Maintenance of a U.S. military advisory group; provision of equipment and supplies; and training of key Chinese personnel.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Initial equipment and supplies for 8½ air groups (4 fighter, 2 troop carrier, 1 medium bomber, 1 heavy bomber group; 1 photo recon squadron) (transfer of military type items for this program has been suspended); equipment shortages (expected to be food, petroleum products, and medical supplies) and supplies for Chinese occupation forces for Japan (about 15,000); initial total of 130 vessels and craft, including 4 destroyer escorts, and mine, patrol, auxiliary and amphibious types.

Arrangements for Financing. Cost of 8½ air group program to be borne by China; occupation force cost to be borne by China; training in U.S. carried out at Chinese expense; naval vessels and craft to be given to China without cost, subject to reimbursement for rehabilitation and transportation.

The Philippines

General. Maintenance of a U.S. military advisory group; provision of equipment and supplies; and training of key Philippine personnel.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Initial equipment for a Philippine Army ground and service force of approximately 33,000; initial equipment and 3 to 5 years maintenance for Philippine Naval Patrol of approximately 1800, equipped with minor patrol and amphibious craft; initial equipment and 3 to 5 years maintenance for 1 composite group (2 fighter, 1 troop carrier, 1 liaison and training squadron) of approximately 2000.

Arrangements for Financing. Initial military equipment and supplies to be furnished without cost; arrangements for costs of services and additional munitions have not been worked out; arrangements for financing assistance in the maintenance and supply of the Philippine Army, and training of Philippine Army personnel at U.S. military schools are undetermined.

Greece (Tentative and Preliminary)

General. Maintaining U.S. military personnel in an advisory capacity, provision of military supplies and equipment, and training of key personnel.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Partial equipment for and partial maintenance of Army of 115,000; Gendarmerie of 50,000; and Pioneer force of 5,000; maintenance of Navy of small craft, strength 13,000; partial equipment for and maintenance of one composite group (1 transport, 2 fighter, and 1 recon squadron) numbering 5,000.

Arrangements for Financing. For fiscal year 1948, entire amount (estimated at \$150,000,000) to be borne from U.S. funds (expected to be a grant); arrangements thereafter undetermined.

Turkey

General. Nature and extent are as yet undetermined.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Details are as yet undetermined.

Arrangements for Financing. For fiscal year 1948, entire amount (some part of \$400,000,000—possibly \$150,000,000) from U.S. funds (expected to be a grant). Arrangements thereafter undetermined.

Iran

General. Maintenance of a military and a constabulary mission; training of Iranian military personnel; and provision of military supplies and equipment.

Military Equipment & Supplies. Non-combat material in reasonable quantities; non-aggression combat material (excludes such items as bombers and medium tanks) with limits of a \$10,000,000 credit.

Arrangements for Financing. Financing of the cost of the missions and the cost of training undetermined; cost of non-aggression combat equipment to be met from credit (\$10,000,000), not yet arranged; arrangements for other equipment undetermined.

7. Potential requirements for U.S. military aid, under national programs which it may prove desirable or necessary to initiate, are in broad and preliminary estimate, as follows:

France

General. Provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Maintenance and replacement equipment and supplies for seven U.S. equipped divisions; possible spare parts replacement (short term only) for 269 U.S. type aircraft; transfer of lend-lease amphibious and patrol craft (243).

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

Austria

General. Provision of equipment and supplies; maintenance of small training mission.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Initial equipment and maintenance for ground force of 50,000 including six mountain regimental combat teams; initial equipment and maintenance for air force of 5,000 (90 a/c).

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

Norway

General. Provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Minor specific ground items; possible maintenance and replacement supplies and equipment for 104 U.S. type aircraft; transfer of ten U.S. vessels now on loan.

Arrangements for Financing. Ground items to be paid for by Norway. Other arrangements undetermined.

Spain (military assistance to the present Spanish Government would be contrary to current U.S. policy).

General. Provision of military supplies, equipment, and technical advice.

Military Supplies and Equipment. Nucleus of a tactical air force, details undetermined; possibly, limited specific items of naval equipment.

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

Korea

General. Maintenance of a constabulary advisory mission; provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Small arms and ammunition and a limited number of radios, vehicles, and spare parts for a police-type force of about 25,000.

Arrangements for Financing. Provided without costs as available from local theater stocks declared surplus.

Near and Middle East (less Greece, Turkey and Iran)

General. Provision of equipment and supplies.

Military Equipment and Supplies. Amounts undetermined (probably not substantial).

Arrangements for Financing. Undetermined.

8. The general situation as to availability is:

a. Availability is limited generally by lack of legislative authority, lack of funds, reluctance of private manufacturers to accept orders, shortage of materials and tools, lack of balanced sets of equipment,

deterioration of stocks in storage, disposal of munitions, inaccessible location and lack of transportation.

b. Although a large portion of any reasonable foreign program, particularly if of emergency nature and given a sufficiently high priority, can within the immediate future be filled from existing stocks, shortages will exist in certain critical fields, including trucks, batteries, radios, and equipment spare parts.

c. Full assurance cannot be given for manufacture, procurement, and availability of replacement and maintenance matériel.

d. Commitments under the programs indicated in paragraph 6 above can be met from existing stocks approximately as follows:

- (1) Philippines—85%
- (2) China: Air—undetermined; Army—100%; Navy—95%
- (3) Western Hemisphere—85% of military type munitions
- (4) Italy—100%
- (5) Greece, Turkey, Iran—To a limited extent only, without interfering with other programs (other nations, U.S. establishments and civilian components).
- (6) Possible other programs—very little available from existing stocks and no balanced availabilities.

9. A system of priorities as among these nation-programs is needed. This system should be developed in necessary detail and adjusted as appropriate by the SWNCC Committee on Rearmament within the framework of the priority guidance in paragraph 10. This priority guidance is based on the following general considerations:

a. One call on U.S. resources comes from the equipment shortages and other military deficiencies of foreign military forces which result in present inability on the part of these countries to resist foreign penetration and coercion, and hence endanger the existence of the nation and its institutions.

b. A second call comes from the requirements of constructive programs aiming at development of sound military forces as a foundation for national, regional, and international security in the future.

c. The first necessity is the more pressing. However, the second type of program is generally more efficient. It helps a nation avert wars of subversion, such as that in Greece, by developing a respectable military posture, and thus avoid the consumption of resources in continuing civil strife and disorder.

d. Since the object of the emergency type of aid is to stop political aggression, any threatened nation which, with U.S. help, can reasonably be expected to survive has a valid claim on U.S. resources. Because of the immediacy of the threat, these nations will probably be found along the "iron curtain". For the second purpose, the order of priority derives from the importance in terms of military strategy and the

positive contribution that the nation, if so aided, will make to U.S. security.

e. The pressure of urgent requirements should not preclude the initiation and orderly development of foreign military forces under the constructive long-term programs referred to above.

10. *Priority Guidance*

a. Where requirements are to be filled from existing stocks and such stocks are inadequate in some items, first priority should be given to minimum lists of equipment required to stabilize a situation against active attempts at penetration and coercion. This may be done by transfer or by ear-marking or setting aside supplies which are not required prior to the latter phases of the program. From stocks remaining after the setting aside of emergency requirements, the requirements of long-term constructive programs should be filled in a secondary priority, and the provision of such of these materials as are available should be initiated without delay.

b. Where uncertainty exists as to the duration of emergency programs or as to their total requirements, it will be necessary (in order to proceed with long-term constructive programs) to make a somewhat arbitrary assumption as to the total provision for such emergency programs, which should be made from existing stocks. If it becomes evident that this provision will in fact probably prove inadequate it will be necessary either to revise the long-term programs downward or to fill additional requirements from new manufacture.

c. If new manufacture is available to augment existing stocks, first priority must be given on a month by month basis to meeting the requirements of emergency programs, and any remaining equipment will be utilized for the long-term programs.

d. Within the emergency category priority should be given on the basis of immediacy and gravity of the threat to the country concerned, together with the ability of the country in question to withstand the threat with and without the contemplated aid. On this basis the present priority as between countries where such a threat exists or might quickly arise is as follows:

- (1) Greece
- (2) Turkey
- (3) Italy—Iran
- (4) Korea (police, constabulary, and coast guard)
- (5) France
- (6) Austria

(These priorities are [subject] to continuing revision in the light of changing circumstances)

e. With respect to the long-term constructive programs of military development, priorities are as follows:

- (1) Western Hemisphere (1—Canada; 2—Latin-American Republics) and the Philippines.
- (2) Near and Middle East—Europe.
- (3) Far East (less the Philippines)

f. These priorities must remain subject to modification as to detail. Such modifications include the following:

- (1) Materials not practicable to move should be disposed of locally.
- (2) Long-term programs should be initiated, with at least moderate quantities of equipment, without regard to priority.
- (3) Opportunities which may arise from time to time for provision of assistance or support in the U.S. interest, at little or no expense, and not directly related to the programs indicated herein, should be considered on an *ad hoc* basis and not automatically ruled out on the basis of the priorities indicated herein.

11. Additional governmental implementing actions of a procedural nature are required for most of these nation-programs. Among these are:

a. *Legislative Authority*: For the transfer of U.S. owned munitions, legislative authority initially necessary is contained in the following:

- (1) *Naval Ordnance material*. A bill to authorize the sale, loan, exchange, or gift of U.S. naval ordnance material to foreign governments (HR 1357) (80th Congress).
- (2) *China*. A bill to provide military advice and assistance to the Republic of China (HR 6795) (79th Congress).
- (3) *Western Hemisphere*. The Inter-American Military Cooperation Bill (HR 6326) (79th Congress)
- (4) *Greece and Turkey*. HR 2616, now pending (80th Congress).

Additional legislation is required to authorize the War and Navy Departments to accept reimbursement for procurement, manufacture, rehabilitation, storage, or maintenance of munitions intended for a foreign nation.

b. *Operational policy*. The actual implementation of the programs will require continuing policy guidance and adjustment within the framework of broad national policy. The SWNCC subcommittee for Rearmament is considered to be the proper agency to examine and recommend as to these matters.

Editorial Note

The Department of State announced on May 7, 1947, the establishment, effective May 5, of the Policy Planning Staff "for the purpose of assuring the development of long-range policy." The purpose, major functions, and organization of this group are described in the press release containing the announcement; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1947, page 1007.

The Policy Planning Staff acted as a mechanism for drawing together the views of the geographic and functional offices of the Department of State and non-Departmental sources, enabling the PPS to engage in the broad consideration of policy problems. The PPS initially devoted its attention to the European Recovery Program; however, by November 13, 1947, when it submitted its first report on its activities (PPS/15, not printed), it had prepared thirteen substantive papers on a variety of issues. These studies were submitted to the Under Secretary and/or the Secretary; certain of them are printed in *Foreign Relations* in compilations relating to the subjects to which they were directed. Eleven of the papers recommended Departmental or Governmental action. According to PPS/15, all of these recommendations exercised some effect on subsequent operations.

The Policy Planning Staff also served as a means by which the views of qualified individuals outside the Department were made available to policy makers. The PPS consulted more than a score of officials of other Governmental agencies and members of the academic community in 1947. In addition, the PPS developed liaison with the armed forces and the National Security Council. (Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1947-1953; hereafter cited as Policy Planning Staff Files).

SWNCC Files

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1947.

SWNCC 360/1, Enclosure "B"

Subject: Policies, Procedures and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries

Enclosure: J.C.S. 1769/1 (Copy No. 39).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered an interim report by a Special *Ad Hoc* Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on the subject of "Policies, Procedures, and Costs of Assistance by the United States to Foreign Countries" (SWNCC 360). They note that the subject matter of this report parallels in many respects a study undertaken by them for the purpose of determining, from the

¹ SWNCC 360/1 consisted of two enclosures, memoranda commenting on SWNCC 360, (April 21, p. 725). Enclosure "A", by the War Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, indicated fundamental agreement with SWNCC 360, but expressed the need for further studies on both economic and military aid questions and suggested the revision of certain sections of the subject paper. Enclosure "B",

standpoint of national security, the countries of the world, in order of their urgency and their importance to which the United States should, if possible, give current assistance (J.C.S. 1769/1) (Appendix).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the conclusions in their study provide a sound broad basis for study from the viewpoint of national security and should be considered in connection with the political basis set forth in the foreign policy assumptions in Section II of Appendix "A" of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee report.² In this connection, they would point out that strategic implications, together with the facts that our national security is paramount and our powers of assistance are not without limitation, make it necessary to apply more specific consideration to individual cases than that set forth in the foreign policy assumptions referred to above.

The study of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter, based upon the strategic implications and national security, is presented in J.C.S. 1769/1 (Appendix).

Referring to the listing of countries as set forth in J.C.S. 1769/1 as *needing assistance*, this differs from the listing in the subject paper (SWNCC 360) in that China has been inserted after Austria and Turkey has been moved to the position next below China. Also, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been removed from the list. It will also be noted that application of the criterion of *importance to the national security to [of] the United States* results in a priority listing of countries that differs considerably from the priority listing of those that should be assisted based on need alone.

printed here, was transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SWNCC on May 10; it was circulated in the Committee as SWNCC 360/1 on May 12.

SWNCC 360/2, not printed, a memorandum by the Department of State Member of SWNCC, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas John H. Hildring, was circulated on June 30 in connection with the Committee's consideration of SWNCC 360 and 360/1. In addition to several suggested amendments to SWNCC 360, SWNCC 360/2 contained three appendices. Appendix "A" dealt with the possible use of the United Nations in administering foreign assistance. Appendix "B" consisted of a draft directive to the Rearmament Subcommittee of SWNCC with respect to studies it should undertake. Appendix "C" was a copy of SWN 5383 of May 12, a memorandum to SWNCC from its Secretary referring to the Committee SWNCC 360 and 360/1.

At its 59th Meeting, July 23, SWNCC noted SWNCC 360 as amended by SWNCC 360/1 and 360/2 and referred the subject papers to the Special *Ad Hoc* Committee for consideration in connection with its final report. That report, SWNCC 360/3, October 3, a document of approximately 200 pages, is not printed. The Special *Ad Hoc* Committee prefaced the report with the statement that much of the data on which it was based had been made obsolete by events. The Special *Ad Hoc* Committee also stated that the report was intended as "a survey of the present world situation and to indicate countries to which the United States for its own security and national interests may find it desirable to extend aid *during the next three to five years* The attached report recommends that US capabilities be reviewed once the Marshall Plan becomes firm insofar as the application of US support to other areas of the world is concerned." (SWNCC Files)

² Vol. III, p. 208.

The three major points of variance between the subject paper and J.C.S. 1769/1 are:

a. The subject report proposes certain measures of aid to countries which very probably cannot in the foreseeable future be removed from predominant Soviet influence—Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—while the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that exclusion from current assistance of every region under Soviet control is desirable from the point of view of national security.

b. The subject report gives no particular consideration to the relationship between the future security of the United States and the positions of Germany and Japan in the postwar world.

c. Specific application of national security considerations changes the priority listing made in the subject paper as to the countries that should be assisted.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest that in the interest of national security, consideration be given to their views as set forth above in the revision of the subject paper and in the more comprehensive report which it is understood the Special *Ad Hoc* Committee is to undertake. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are enclosing J.C.S. 1769/1 on which their opinions, set out above, were based. This study (J.C.S. 1769/1) does not represent the final views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since certain changes and additions are now being considered. However, it may be of value in its present form to the Special *Ad Hoc* Committee as background material for its further study. The further views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be furnished when available.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

W. G. LALOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Secretary

Appendix

UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE

[WASHINGTON, April 29, 1947.]

THE PROBLEM

1. On the assumption that the next war will be ideological, to prepare a study, from the standpoint of national security, to determine the countries of the world, in the order of their urgency and their importance, to which the United States should, if possible, give current assistance.

DISCUSSION

2. See Enclosure.

CONCLUSIONS

3. *a.* A sound program of United States assistance to other countries along the line indicated in the remainder of these conclusions will greatly assist in the realization of the major objectives currently supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the interest of strengthening the national security of the United States.

b. The area of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare is Western Europe, including Great Britain.

c. Other areas of major strategic importance to the United States (North America including Greenland and Alaska) in the event of ideological warfare, arranged in order of importance are:

The Middle East
Northwest Africa
Latin America
The Far East

d. No current assistance should be granted the USSR.

e. Every region under Soviet control should be excluded from current assistance, except in those rare instances which present an opportunity for the United States to gain worldwide approbation by an act strikingly humanitarian; for example, the recent provision of food for the famine areas of Roumania.

f. If assistance is given it should, in each instance, be sufficient to positively assist the nation aided to achieve, or retain, a sound economy, to maintain the armed forces necessary for its continued independence and to be of real assistance to the United States in case of ideological warfare.

g. Conclusion *f* may prevent the United States giving assistance to all nations which it is desirable to aid, but adherence to conclusion *f* is necessary if the national security of the United States is to receive maximum strengthening from a United States program of current assistance to other nations.

h. The nations it is desirable to aid *because of their need*, listed in order of the urgency of current need, are as follows:

Greece	Austria	Netherlands—N.E.I.
Italy	China	The Philippines
Iran	Turkey	Portugal
Korea	Great Britain	The Latin American
France	Belgium and	Republics
	Luxembourg	Canada

i. The nations it is desirable to aid *because of their importance to the national security of the United States*, arranged in order of importance are:

Great Britain	Italy	Spain
France	Canada	Japan
Germany	Turkey	China
Belgium	Greece	Korea
Netherlands	Latin America	The Philippines
Austria		

j. The nations it is desirable to aid listed in an order of importance arrived at by consideration of their *importance to the national security of the United States and the urgency of their need, in combination*, are as follows:

Great Britain	Japan
France	Belgium
Germany	Netherlands
Italy	Latin America
Greece	Spain
Turkey	Korea
Austria (assuming conclusion of peace treaty)	China
	The Philippines
	Canada

RECOMMENDATION

4. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the foregoing conclusions.

[Enclosure]

DISCUSSION

1. At the outset, it should be firmly fixed in mind that the mere giving of assistance to other countries will not necessarily enhance the national security of the United States. The results obtained by such assistance will determine whether our national security is strengthened thereby. What, then, are the desired results? These are firm friends located in areas which will be of strategic importance to the United States in the event of war with our ideological enemies, and with economies strong enough to support the military establishments necessary for the maintenance of their own independence and national security.

2. The problem envisages aid for two reasons; namely, urgency of need and importance to the national security of the United States. The past months have proved that United States assistance to some countries whose inhabitants urgently needed aid did not increase the military security of the United States, but that, on the contrary, it was

used by governments ideologically opposed to the United States and representing a minority of the people, to strengthen their control of suppressed majorities. For this reason, it is believed that the question of which countries to exclude from receipt of United States aid is as important as the question of which countries should receive assistance. Keeping in mind that the United States cannot give substantial aid to all countries of the world, it is evident that, if we spread our available resources for aid over too large an area, no country is likely to receive assistance sufficient to be of major importance in the resurgence of its economy and military potential. The primary rule governing assistance by the United States should be that the USSR and every country now under her control should be specifically excluded from assistance. No country under Soviet control should receive assistance from the United States until every vestige of Soviet control has been removed therefrom.

3. The first step in determining the countries which should receive assistance because of their importance to our national security is to establish the areas of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare.

4. The area of United States defense commitments includes, roughly, the lands and waters from Alaska to the Philippines and Australia in the Pacific and from Greenland to Brazil and Patagonia in the Atlantic. This area contains 40% of the land surface of the earth but only 25% of the population. The Old World (Europe, Asia and Africa) contains only 60% of the land surface of the earth but 75% of the population. The potential military strength of the Old World in terms of manpower and in terms of war-making capacity is enormously greater than that of our area of defense commitments, in which the United States is the only arsenal nation. It is obvious, therefore, that in case of an ideological war we must have the support of some of the countries of the Old World unless our military strength is to be overshadowed by that of our enemies.

5. In the case of an ideological war the most vulnerable side of our defense area will be in the Atlantic. Also, unless we can retain allies on the eastern side of the Atlantic strong enough, in the event of an ideological war, to hold the Soviets away from the eastern shores of the Atlantic, the shortest and most direct avenue of attack against our enemies will almost certainly be denied to us. Further, almost all potentially strong nations who can reasonably be expected to ally themselves with the United States in such a war are situated in western Europe. Moreover, two world wars in the past thirty years have demonstrated the interdependence of France, Great Britain and the United States in case of war with central or eastern European powers. In war these nations not only need one another but are in mortal peril if

they do not combine their forces. In the past war it was demonstrated that France could not stand without Great Britain and that when France fell the British Isles were in mortal peril. If Britain had fallen, the Western Hemisphere would have been completely exposed, and the United States would have had to defend itself in the Atlantic before it could have thought of resisting the Japanese conquest of China, the East Indies, the Philippines and the Far Pacific. That the defense of the United States and Canada in North America and of Great Britain and France in western Europe is inseparable from the combined defense of them all is not a question of what men think now, but is something that has been demonstrated by what we have had to do, though tardily, and therefore at greater risk and cost, in actual warfare in the past. In the light of this past experience the burden of proof is upon anyone who opposes the thesis of the interdependence of these four countries. The opponent would have to show that an assault by our ideological opponents on any one of these nations would not be of vital consequence to the other three nations. No one can show this, nor how Britain could live in security if France were not independent and her friend, nor how Canada and the United States could live safely if France and/or Great Britain were under Soviet domination either by reason of military conquest or for the reason that communists had taken over control of their governments. While the conquest or communization of other countries would adversely affect the security of the United States, the conquest or communization of no other country or area would be so detrimental as that of France and/or Great Britain. The maintenance of these two countries in a state of independence, friendly to the United States and with economies able to support the armed forces necessary for the continued maintenance of their independence, is still of first importance to the national security of the United States as well as to the security of the entire Western Hemisphere. This means that the entire area of western Europe is in first place as an area of strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare.

6. Potentially, the strongest military power in this area is Germany. Without German aid the remaining countries of western Europe could scarcely be expected to withstand the armies of our ideological opponents until the United States could mobilize and place in the field sufficient armed forces to achieve their defeat. With a revived Germany fighting on the side of the Western Allies this would be a possibility. Further, the complete resurgence of German industry, particularly coal mining, is essential for the economic recovery of France—whose security is inseparable from the combined security of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. The economic revival of Germany is therefore of primary importance from the viewpoint of United States security.

7. France is, however, still the leader of those countries of Europe west of Germany and all indications are that France will vigorously oppose any substantial revival of German heavy industry. The fear of a revived Germany is still strong in France and this fear is compounded by the activities of French communists who, in accordance with Soviet desires, seek to make post-war Germany weak industrially and militarily. Yet the German people are the natural enemies of the USSR and of communism. If treated without undue harshness by the Western Allies they would in all probability align themselves with the Western Allies in the event of ideological warfare unless the countries of Europe to the west of Germany had previously fallen under communist domination. In this latter case Germany would be between two hostile factions and her alignment in such a war would be problematical.

8. From the viewpoint of the security of the United States it appears that our efforts should be directed toward demonstrating both to the leaders of France and to the leaders of Germany that the emergence of a principal world power to the east of them, ideologically opposed to all of their traditional way of life, whose ultimate aim is world conquest, and which they can successfully oppose only if both are strong and united against the new eastern menace, makes them interdependent just as France, England, Canada, and the United States are interdependent. Further, France, as one of the victors of the past war, must be made to see that diplomatic ideological warfare is now going on and that if the diplomatic war can be won the shooting war will be delayed and perhaps even avoided. Most important of all, France and the United States and Great Britain must acknowledge that the decisive diplomatic contest between totalitarian Russia and the democracies of the West is taking place in Germany today. The western democracies can win this contest only if there is drastic change in their economic policies for Germany. Further, Germany can aid in European recovery and become an ally of the West against their ideological opponents only if her economy is restored. In fact, such a course should appeal to France and Great Britain as well as to the United States in view of the high cost that devolves upon these countries for the mere feeding of the German population so long as German industry and foreign trade are paralyzed. This cost to Great Britain and the United States has been estimated by Mr. Herbert Hoover to be \$950,000,000 before July of 1948.

9. Other countries in the Western European area which are of more than ordinary importance to our national security for military or political reasons are Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark. To assign priority of assistance to these countries on the basis of importance to our national security is most difficult, but on the basis of urgency of need they appear to line up as follows: Italy, Belgium,

the Netherlands, Spain, and Denmark. The reasons for the importance of these countries to our national security, aside from geographic positions, deserve brief mention. Italy and Spain are of primary importance in connection with control of the Mediterranean sea lanes, shortest route to the oil and processing facilities of the Middle East. Further, Italy, like Greece, is a border nation in the current diplomatic ideological war between the western democracies and the Soviets. Denmark has sovereignty over Greenland which, by reason of geographic position, is a major outpost for defense of North America. Belgium controls, in the Belgian Congo, the area containing the largest and richest known deposits of uranium ore in the world.

10. The area of secondary strategic importance to the United States in case of ideological warfare is the Middle East, not only because of the existence of great oil reserves and processing facilities in this area but also because it offers possibilities for direct contact with our ideological enemies. However, a program of aid to Greece and Turkey in this area has already been approved by the Senate of the United States. Other countries in this area—Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia—are of importance, but their need for aid is not urgent and they could not repel Soviet attack until United States military assistance could reach them. In fact, since they could offer practically no military assistance to the United States in case of ideological warfare, direct assistance to these countries can be considered as of minor importance from the viewpoint of United States security. However, in order to retain their good will they should be granted favorable terms for the purchase from the United States of supplies needed for the modernization and improvement of their industries, living conditions and armed forces. Further, technical assistance, both military and civilian, should be granted if they request it.

11. Central and South America and northwest Africa comprise the remainder of the United States Atlantic area of defense commitments. If Western Europe, particularly France and the Low Countries, falls under Soviet domination for any reason, the United States would immediately have to take the action with armed forces necessary to exclude the Soviets from northwest Africa. However, if Western Europe can be kept out of the sphere of Soviet domination and friendly to the United States, no immediate threat to the security of the United States can be expected to develop in western Africa. In any event, there are no countries in this area to which direct current assistance should be given.

12. The defense of South America is of vital importance to the national security of the United States. But, since South America contains no principal military power which can help greatly to insure that defense, the United States must regard the defense of South

America as a heavy commitment and should seek to alleviate it by actions which will gradually increase the level of military self-sufficiency of South America as a whole.

13. However, the commitment of the United States for the defense of South America can be challenged by only one of the great powers of the Northern Hemisphere, and the fulfillment of our commitment depends upon whether, in our relations with the great powers, we and our friends outweigh our foes. In spite of technological developments it is still true that only a great power can successfully challenge or resist another great power and that, total resources being equal, the strength of a number of small nations will not combine to balance that of one of the great powers. For this reason the bulk of United States assistance should be given to nations who are potentially powerful and also potential allies of the United States.

14. Thus, current *direct* assistance to the individual countries of South America is not of critical importance to our national security at this particular time. However, policies designed to lessen the potential burden of our commitment for the defense of South America are of great importance. There can no longer be doubt that the communist party is gaining strength in that area. In consequence, anything less than complete *rapprochement* between the United States and every one of her neighbors to the south is entirely unacceptable from the viewpoint of United States security. To stand by and watch a fifth column grow stronger and stronger to the south of us is to invite disaster. The United States is, by reason of its strength and political enlightenment, the natural leader of this hemisphere. But, there is always jealousy of the leader and in this case the injurious effects of that jealousy are compounded by the activities of our ideological opponents in that area. Further, the opposition has plainly undertaken to overthrow by one means or another the ideology which we champion. How better to combat us than by taking over the leadership of the southern half of the Western Hemisphere? They are attempting it now and it must be realized that in this hemisphere we cannot combat them by dollar credits alone. Individual and national want is not sufficient in this hemisphere to make this an effective method here. The most important specific act required is the completion and implementation of a treaty embodying the agreements concerning the defense of the Western Hemisphere which were reached at Chapultepec.

15. Of almost equal importance is the passage of a bill embodying the provisions of H.R. 6326 (79th Congress) which would permit the standardization of the armaments of the American republics by the transfer of United States equipment, and the maintenance of United States military missions in those countries. Apparently the support

for such a bill, other than by the War and Navy Departments, has been withdrawn. The public press has suggested that the reason for the withdrawal of support is that implementation of the provisions of the bill might weaken the economies and the political stability of the governments of South America. Whether or not this be so is of little consequence from the viewpoint of national security, since our present policy is reacting unfavorably upon the security of the United States and of the Western Hemisphere. An important fact is that most of the Latin American Governments are dependent upon the military for stability. In consequence, contact with Latin American military men would in reality mean contact with very strong domestic political leaders. It is suggested that it is now advisable to attempt to bring about the economic and the domestic conditions which we desire to see in South America through these men and through passage of a bill similar to H.R. 6326 instead of attempting to attain these ends through direct diplomatic pressure. We need offer these countries no current financial assistance in the interests of our own security. However, in the interest of this same security we should take our hemispheric neighbors into full partnership in the affairs of our hemisphere; should conclude one formal blanket mutual defense treaty with all of them; and should definitely, positively, and tactfully lead them toward true democracy while publicizing the misery and the slavery to the state which would result should they come under the control of our ideological opponents whether by the communization of their governments or by conquest.

16. In the Pacific area of United States defense commitments, from the standpoint of urgent want, Korea, China, and Japan deserve consideration for current United States assistance. From the security viewpoint the primary reasons for current assistance to Korea would be that, as a result of the 38° parallel agreement, this is the one country within which we alone have for almost two years carried on ideological warfare in direct contact with our opponents, so that to lose this battle would be gravely detrimental to United States prestige, and therefore security, throughout the world. To abandon this struggle would tend to confirm the suspicion that the United States is not really determined to accept the responsibilities and obligations of world leadership, with consequent detriment to our efforts to bolster those countries of western Europe which are of primary and vital importance to our national security. However, this suspicion could quite possibly be dissipated and our prestige in these same western European countries enhanced if a survey of our resources indicated we could not afford to resist our ideological opponents on all fronts and we publicly announced abandonment of further aid to Korea in order to concentrate our aid in areas of greater strategic importance to us.

17. If the present diplomatic ideological warfare should become armed warfare, Korea could offer little or no assistance in the maintenance of our national security. Therefore, from this viewpoint, current assistance should be given Korea only if the means exist after sufficient assistance has been given the countries of primary importance to insure their continued independence and friendship for the United States and the resurgence of their economies.

18. China's greatest military asset is manpower. However, China does not have the industry to equip this manpower for warfare nor does she produce sufficient food to maintain this manpower in fighting condition. Therefore, in the case of warfare with our ideological opponents, China could be a valuable ally only if we diverted to her great quantities of food and equipment manufactured in this country. It is extremely doubtful that the end result would be any great assistance to our war effort. On the other hand, there is in existence in China an army which embraces the ideology of our opponents and which, given assistance by our opponents concurrent with the withdrawal by the United States of assistance to opposing forces in China, could possibly conquer all of China with very grave long-range jeopardy to our national security interests. If, however, we abandoned aid to China in order to concentrate our forces for a crushing offensive from the West against our primary ideological opponents and the success of this offensive resulted in the isolation of communism among the undeveloped countries of the Far East, it might be possible to keep it isolated there by the imposition of an economic quarantine. The assumption that the next war will be ideological and the thesis that current aid shall be given only in the interest of our national security places China very low on the list of countries which should be given such assistance.

19. Japan is the most important arena of ideological struggle within our Pacific area of defense commitments. Like Germany, Japan is a defeated nation and the idea of assistance to her is probably offensive to the majority of our people. However, Japan left to herself grew strong enough to challenge American power in the Pacific. Japan is still a potentially powerful nation and one which we cannot forever keep militarily impotent. Japan is the one nation which could contain large armed forces of our ideological opponents in the Far East while the United States and her allies in the West launched a major offensive in that area. For this very simple reason, on the assumption that the next war will be ideological, of all the countries in the Pacific area Japan deserves primary consideration for current United States assistance designed to restore her economy and her military potential.

20. The question of assistance for the Philippine Republic is unique since the islands have long been closely associated with the United

States and since the republic was formed, and remains, under United States guidance. There is need in the Philippines for financial assistance, but the importance of the republic to our national security in case of ideological warfare is not great. Financial assistance should be continued, however, in order to assist in the stabilization of the republic's budget and economy and for the maintenance of United States prestige throughout the Far East. We cannot afford to renounce our primary moral obligation in this area.

21. In view of this general consideration of the areas of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare, it appears that current assistance should be given if possible to the following countries arranged in order of their *importance to our national security*:

- | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Great Britain | 7. Italy | 13. Japan |
| 2. France | 8. Canada | 14. China |
| 3. Germany | 9. Turkey | 15. Korea |
| 4. Belgium | 10. Greece | 16. The Philippines |
| 5. Netherlands | 11. Latin America | |
| 6. Austria | 12. Spain | |

22. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are currently supporting certain specific objectives, the attainment of which they believe will enhance the national security. These objectives are:

a. A system of military base rights as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4 June 1946 in J.C.S. 570/62.³

b. The accomplishment of a treaty formalizing the agreements concerning the security of the Western Hemisphere which were reached at Chapultepec.

c. The continued availability of the oil of the Middle East.

d. The elimination from national armaments of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction preceded by the conclusion of agreements which provide effective safeguards against their production and use.

e. The realization of a United Nations organization capable of playing an effective role in the maintenance of international security, thereby making it possible to scale down the military establishments presently required for maintenance of the security of the individual nations of the world.

f. The prevention of communist control over those areas from which offensive air, ground and naval action could be most effectively and economically launched against our enemies in the event of ideological warfare.

³ For expression of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to military base rights, see the following: SWNCC 38/25, November 8, 1945, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1112; SWNCC 38/30, February 11, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1142; and SWNCC 38/35, June 5, 1946, *ibid.*, p. 1174.

23. It is axiomatic that any program of aid to other countries of the world should aim at making it easier to attain these security objectives and that no assistance adversely affecting our ability to attain these objectives should be undertaken. The relationship of a program of United States assistance to these security objectives will therefore be treated briefly.

24. The United States desires base rights, considered essential to her security, from Portugal, Ecuador, France and Spain. Of these, base rights from Portugal and Spain are the more essential. There are other base rights listed in Joint Chiefs of Staff papers as required if reasonably obtainable but not absolutely essential to the base system. The majority of these are in the Pacific and have been obtained by the United States by reason of the mandate⁴ granted under the United Nations. Those desired in the Atlantic belong to Great Britain, France, Portugal, Cuba, Liberia and Newfoundland. This study envisages United States assistance to Great Britain, France and the Latin American countries. The program should therefore enhance our possibilities of receiving the base rights desired from these countries.

25. A program of aid to other countries should not adversely affect our objective of accomplishing a treaty formalizing the agreements concerning the security of the Western Hemisphere which were reached at Chapultepec. On the contrary, since assistance to the Latin American countries of the Western Hemisphere is envisaged, this objective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be made easier of attainment by such assistance.

26. Whether a program of assistance will make it easier for the United States to insure the continued availability of the oil of the Middle East or whether such a program will cause Russia to take equally forehanded action to deny us this oil in event of ideological warfare is problematical. It is true, however, that the availability of this oil in case of war *cannot* be adversely affected by the program of United States assistance and that assistance given to countries in the Middle Eastern area may prevent these countries from falling within the Russian orbit, thereby making the task of protecting this area less difficult if war occurs.

27. The objective of eliminating from national armaments atomic and other weapons of mass destruction will certainly not be adversely affected by United States assistance to other countries. However, this is only one part of the United States objective in this respect and the other part, the conclusion of agreements which provide effective safeguards against the production and use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, may be so adversely affected that its realization will be impossible. The elimination of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction would be to Russia's advantage at present so that,

⁴Trust Territory of the Pacific.

instead of resisting this, she will continue her present maneuvers to accomplish it without safeguards if possible. The United States cannot accept elimination without safeguards and therefore, since the Soviets will correctly interpret a program of United States assistance as aimed at containing them, they may become increasingly adamant on the question of safeguards with resultant failure of the United States to attain this objective.

28. The realization of a United Nations capable of playing an effective role in the maintenance of international security, thereby making it possible to scale down the military establishments presently required for maintenance of the security of the individual nations of the world, will be made more difficult by a program of United States assistance to countries strategically important to the United States in the event of ideological warfare. This follows from the fact that the realization of a United Nations capable of playing an important and useful role in the maintenance of world security is entirely dependent upon the achievement of a general over-all understanding and peace settlement by the great nations of the world. A program of United States assistance to countries outside the Soviet orbit will certainly prevent achievement of the general over-all understanding and peace settlement required for the accomplishment of this objective. However, this result would not necessarily adversely affect our national security since the United Nations as presently constituted can in no way enhance that security. On the contrary, faith in the ability of the United Nations as presently constituted to protect, now or hereafter, the security of the United States would mean only that the faithful have lost sight of the vital security interest of the United States and could quite possibly lead to results fatal to that security. Yet, it is partially an earnest desire to make the United Nations a capable and useful instrument for the maintenance of world security which has led the United States to try to attain a settlement with our ex-enemies before we have stabilized our relations with our allies in the past war, and before we have a clear idea of the role we wish our ex-enemies to play in the post-war world. The drawing up of a comprehensive program of assistance to other countries may clarify United States policy in this regard with possibly very beneficial effect on the national security of the United States.

29. Finally, there can be little doubt that a program of United States assistance will aid in the realization of the objective of preventing communist control over those areas from which offensive air, ground, and naval action could be most effectively and economically launched against our enemies in the event of ideological warfare.

30. It appears, on balance, that a program of United States assistance would be desirable if the major objectives of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff are considered as a whole, and that, since the attainment of these objectives would increase our national security, the program is, from the military point of view, highly desirable.

31. An initial step in this study was to list the countries of the world to which assistance should be given in order of urgency of need. For this purpose documents of the Department of State prepared in connection with a preliminary similar study for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee have been consulted (J.C.S. 1769—SWNCC 360). These documents support the following listing of countries in order of the *urgency of their need*:

- | | | |
|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Greece | 8. Hungary | 14. Portugal |
| 2. Turkey | 9. Great Britain | 15. Czechoslovakia |
| 3. Italy | 10. Belgium | 16. Poland |
| 4. Iran | 11. Luxembourg | 17. Latin American
Republics |
| 5. Korea | 12. Netherlands—
N.E.I. | 18. Canada |
| 6. France | 13. The Philippines | |
| 7. Austria | | |

China does not appear on this list although the documents referred to indicate that China will need an undetermined amount of post-UNRRA aid in the near future. The Department of State wishes further time to determine China's real needs before determining a priority for aid to that country. On the basis of actual current needs, however, it is believed that China should be placed after Austria and be followed by Turkey.

32. Notwithstanding the listing given above, no aid of any sort to Hungary or to Czechoslovakia and Poland is advocated. The reason for this is that the United States cannot give aid to all countries requiring aid on the basis of their need in sufficient amounts to have any real effect on the ability of all of these countries to retain, or regain, freedom from predominant Soviet influence. From the military point of view, it is firmly believed that assistance should be concentrated on those countries of primary strategic importance to the United States in case of ideological warfare, excepting in those rare instances which present an opportunity for the United States to gain worldwide approbation by an act strikingly humanitarian; for example, the recent provision of food for the famine areas of Roumania. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the national security of the United States, assistance should be extended to the following countries listed in order arrived at by considering *their importance to United States security and the urgency of their need in combination*:

- | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Great Britain | 7. Austria | 13. Korea |
| 2. France | 8. Japan | 14. China |
| 3. Germany | 9. Belgium | 15. The Philippines |
| 4. Italy | 10. Netherlands | 16. Canada |
| 5. Greece | 11. Latin America | |
| 6. Turkey | 12. Spain | |

33. It is emphasized that assistance in each instance should be sufficient to positively assist the nation aided to achieve, or retain, a sound economy, to maintain the armed forces necessary for its continued independence, and to be of real assistance to the United States in case of ideological warfare. This requirement, since the ability of the United States to give assistance is not unlimited, may mean that not all nations listed above will receive assistance. However, it is felt that the requirement is necessary if the national security of the United States is to receive maximum benefit from a United States program of assistance to other nations.

841.00/5-1747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1947—1 p. m.

2155. For the Ambassador from Acheson.¹ In our appraisal of probable future international developments it is of cardinal importance to us to have a full knowledge of all aspects of the British situation including their capabilities, intentions and thinking on world problems. I know, of course, of your plans to study principal British industries, starting with coal. I fully realize that in the brief time you have been in London you have not had an opportunity to complete thorough studies on which you could make an authoritative appraisal. It would, however, be helpful to us here to have your preliminary views on a number of important questions such as the following:

1. In view of British withdrawal from Burma, India, Egypt, and possibly Palestine, how do the British themselves forecast the future course of Empire defense and of their defense commitments; for instance, does the present Government share Mr. Churchill's² views on Hong Kong and Singapore? And in view of their present position in Greece and Palestine, what is the future of defense of the Eastern Mediterranean?

2. In the domestic political field, do you anticipate in the next few months any important changes in the British Cabinet? Are we safe in assuming that Bevin³ is likely to remain in the Foreign Office for the remainder of the year? Is Bevin making any progress in lining up the

¹ This telegram was based on a memorandum of May 12 by Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, to H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, outlining a series of questions to be asked of Lewis W. Douglas, the new Ambassador in the United Kingdom. Referring to the newly formed Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, Acheson stated: "I do not know how [Director George F.] Kennan expects to start his work, but I should think it hard to begin thinking about American policy without considering what the British position is and where they think they are going." (Lot 52D224)

² Winston S. Churchill, British wartime Prime Minister; leader of the Conservative Party.

³ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Labor back-benchers in support of British foreign policy? Is his thinking still influenced by their critical attitude?

3. We have been troubled over the attitude of the British press toward international affairs. In its comments on the proposed U.S. program for Greece, for instance, British press to a considerable extent seems to have assumed that UK can occupy a spectator role in a contest between the US and the USSR. Some sections of the British press seem to believe that UK can be an intermediary between the two and perhaps enjoy the traditional honest broker role in this relationship. Similar attitude has been reflected in speeches of some members of Parliament. If, as we assume, responsible British Government officials do not share these views, why has not British Government, especially the Foreign Office, supplied background press guidance as effectively as they customarily do when important British interests are at stake?

4. In the economic field, for how long do British authorities look forward to continuation present austerity in living standards and what effect do they think this is having on the vigor of the British people?

5. British thoughts on no. 4 above would be closely related to their views on further productivity and discipline of labor and on further production of coal. British exports, imports and, indeed, standard of living depend in final analysis on answers to these questions. So does Britain's position as a world power.

6. We have noted, of course, recent British White Paper.⁴ Are British plans such that they can see a date by which they will have achieved a balance of payments? If not, are they contemplating a further and more vigorous government control of foreign trade, or may they come to us for further financial help to maintain a more liberal trade policy? ⁵

Your estimate of these and other related questions will be of great value to us in gauging the urgent period ahead. [Acheson.]

MARSHALL

⁴ British Cmd. 7046 (1947) : *Economic Survey for 1947*.

⁵ For documentation on concern of the United States over the foreign exchange position of the United Kingdom, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

841.20/6-1147 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
U.S. URGENT

LONDON, June 11, 1947—10 a. m.

3173. For Acheson from Douglas. In your top secret 2155 of May 17 ¹ you asked for my preliminary views on Empire defense, Bevin's posi-

¹ *Supra*.

tion and that of the Cabinet as a whole, apparent failure of British Government to supply British press with background information on questions of importance to US and on various phases of the economic situation. My preliminary views on these and related questions follow. With reference to questions of Empire Defense, I have, of course, been in touch with our service representatives here.

Empire Defense, general.

Current official British views and policy on Empire Defense is based on the assumption that except for unpredictable developments another World War is improbable for 10 to 15 years. Accordingly British objective is to bridge successfully this period. Thereafter it is hoped UN will be effective international agency for World Peace, or alternatively, that Britain will have so recovered a position of authority that she, with the US, will be able to preserve the peace.

General considerations covering British defense policy appear now to be:

(1) (a) USSR is the only important potential enemy, Soviet action in Germany and Middle East must therefore be carefully observed and assessed; and Soviet war potential must not be fostered. (b) The US will be either, at worst a benevolent neutral, or at best an active ally in any war involving the Empire. Accordingly the Empire Defense Program involves close cooperation between the U.S. and the Dominions on the one hand and UK on the other. (c) The re-establishment of economic and military potential of Western Europe modeled on UK and US democratic principles.

(2) The reduced UK economic and manpower resources indicate voluntary curtailment, if not abandonment, of certain former overseas commitments on the presumption that they can best be met by transferring certain of them to the members of the Commonwealth, certain of them to US, accepting certain of them in cooperation with the Dominions and US, and by reposing certain of them in the UN.

(3) Compact modern forces will enable UK to meet reasonable curtailed overseas peace-time commitments. Such forces can, it is believed, fight holding and delaying action until reinforcement from Allies (US and the Dominions) provides adequate military support. Delayed demobilization, plus peace-time conscription and heavy service appropriations will serve to implement these commitments. The willingness of the government and the people to accept peace-time conscription and large service expenditures are the best indication of the present attitude toward commitments. This attitude is, however, subject to change and cannot be taken as permanent reflection of British views.

(4) The defense of the British Isles, vulnerable as they may be to modern warfare, is the key to the Empire Defense system which rests upon the control of the sea approaches and which is related to possible

dispersion of the economic and industrial potential throughout the Empire and the reliance upon the economic and industrial might of the US.

Observations on defense covering specific geographic areas follow next.

Mediterranean.

The new independence of Burma and India has in British eyes in no way diminished the strategic importance to Britain of the Mediterranean Area. Satisfactory defense arrangements for the Mediterranean are imperative to Britain. Momentarily Britain's one basic tenet is that no outside power other than the US shall be allowed to acquire a strategic position in the area. Britain welcomes US taking over any degree of responsibility for the three most crucial problems of Mediterranean—Greece—Turkey—Middle East and North Africa. Britain welcomes the influence that the American Ambassador in Teheran wields in Iranian affairs.

A great concern to Britain at the moment is Italy because it is felt here that, if Italy goes Communist, France would have small hope of escaping the same fate, and the position of Greece and Turkey would be made even more precarious.

Britain's actual military and naval position in the Mediterranean is weak and during the next decade is likely to be weaker before it grows stronger. Here again Britain is operating on the calculated risk of no war for at least ten years. Aside from retaining Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, Britain does not now know where its bases in the Mediterranean area will be in 1957.

The future of Palestine is most uncertain. Although the Treaty of 1936 with the Egyptian Government permits the use of Egypt as a strategic base for British forces it is not thought that she will for long be available for this purpose. Accordingly, the UK seeks Cyrenaica as a suitable substitute for Egypt as a base for military, naval and air defense of the Eastern and Middle Mediterranean. Until, however, the disposition of the Italian Colonies is finally made Britain cannot assume that Cyrenaica will or will not serve her purpose. Even in Iraq the British are not certain to what extent concessions to Iraqi Nationalism must be made re RAF bases. Britain would like to set up a strong base in Cyrenaica which could be the major Anglo-Saxon bastion in the area. Britain would like to retain its present relationship to the Sudan. Britain hopes at the very least for continuing privileges in Iraq. Britain wants to retain troops in Palestine, although the Palestine situation is so onerous and uncertain that Britain is reconciled to giving up Palestine as a base provided this does not leave a vacuum which any power other than the US might fill.

In the long view, Britain is convinced that there can be no "Maginot

Line" of bases which will assure security of the Mediterranean against Soviet Russia. The British believe that the best defense of the Mediterranean area will, in the final analysis, be achieved by neutralizing if not eradicating the virus of Communism in the area by improving the well-being of its people and thus establishing their allegiance to Anglo-Saxon democracy.

If treated as equals and if given reason for establishing a strong attachment to the Anglo-Saxon way of life and therefore a willingness to accept guidance and direction in the development of their own defense machinery, Britain feels confident that in the event of a conflict the governments of the area will, if not definitely under obligation to do so, welcome Anglo-Saxon forces in their defense. Indeed, if these countries are well disposed towards the US and UK they can be persuaded to maintain at their own expense large scale air-fields and other facilities. What has been lost to them in Egypt and may be lost to them in Palestine the British hope will be freely handed to them in time of crisis as a result of good will and respect.

Central Africa.

Taking an ultra long range view there is possibility that the largest British base east of Gibraltar will be located in Kenya. This location takes into account the vast potentialities of Africa from the point of view of climate, population, waterpower, agriculture, and industry; under such a plan Kenya would be developed into a British "heartland" where strategic industries would be dispersed and soldiers trained. However, this costly development of Kenya will take many years and, so far as the Mediterranean is concerned, Kenya in the foreseeable future will not offer much more than it did in the last war.

India-Burma.

Until the smoke clears away from the Indian situation and the fate of the Indian army is known, it is extremely difficult for the British even to assist the Indians in drawing up their defense plans. However, India has sufficient population, industry, and wealth for the Indians themselves to assume responsibility for their defense like any other dominion. On a much smaller scale the same is true of Burma although the Burmese may seek at the outset more direct aid and advice from Britain.

North Atlantic.

Traditional heavy naval commitments in the Greenland, Iceland and Spitsbergen areas are being relinquished on the primary interest doctrine to Canada and the United States. Efforts are also under way to develop closer military and political cooperation among Scandinavian countries to prevent Soviet infiltration and to enlist future Scandinavian participation in defense [of the] North Atlantic. In this way UK hopes to contain USSR in Arctic area without heavy demands on home fleet.

Antarctica.

British economic, strategic and scientific interests in Antarctica are important but remoteness of area from UK makes its defense a burden on navy. Determined to maintain UK claims there against Argentina, Chile and other claimants, London has decided to act first through Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and possibly as last resource through the UN.

Far East, general.

In considering the overall British position toward the Far East, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that Britain no longer has the power or the resources required to pursue a strong and independent policy in that part of the world. This state of affairs has obtained since 1939 and is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Plainly, British Far Eastern policy is now compounded of the major elements of retrenchment and withdrawal. In general, it is British policy to follow the lead of the US in the Far East, and in the settlement of most Far Eastern issues Britain may be expected to cooperate closely with the US. At the same time, however, Britain will work intimately with Australia and New Zealand and further their participation in Far Eastern questions.

Japan.

Britain, by and large, is satisfied with the US administration of Japan and will support US on most occupation issues, and particularly against divisive tactics employed by the USSR. While apparently not so sanguine as General MacArthur² about the "reformation and democratization" of the Japanese people, the British have gone on record as favoring a reasonably early treaty of peace with Japan. Just now British policy vis-à-vis Japan is focused largely on the re-opening of Japan to private foreign trade. In connection with the occupation of Japan, it should be remembered that the UK has already withdrawn a brigade of its occupation forces. This, taken in conjunction with the present shortage of British manpower, suggests that progressive withdrawal of Commonwealth forces from Japan is only a matter of time with the Indian contingent the first to go.

Korea.

Britain deplores the current American-Soviet impasse over Korea, and would like to see a settlement effected which would leave Korea free and independent. But the essence of present British policy toward Korea—wholly negative in character—is an abiding desire to avoid embroilment in the American-Soviet controversy. Clearly, Britain hopes the US and the Soviet Union will be able to resolve the Korean deadlock between themselves, but if the issue were taken to the UN

² Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Pacific; Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Japan.

or some other international forum, Britain would undoubtedly support the US.

China.

Britain desires the cessation of Kuomintang-Communist strife and has all along supported US efforts to bring about peace and unity. Britain may be expected in future to keep in step with US policy toward China. But Britain is neither able nor willing to bring more than moral pressure to bear in the settlement of Chinese internal differences.

Hong Kong.

The British purpose to retain Hong Kong, not so much as a military and naval base (for which purpose it proved valueless in the Pacific war) but as a gateway for trade to the Chinese mainland. With a view to diminishing Chinese Irredentist agitation, the British are at present revamping the municipal administration of Hong Kong so as to allow a measure of administrative participation on the part of the Chinese populace.

Malaya.

This is the one important area in the Far East which the British evidently have no intention of abandoning. This is so because Malaya is a vital link on Britain's lines of communications to Australia and New Zealand, because Malaya is rich in rubber and tin and therefore a source of substantial dollar exchange, and because the Malayan people are politically immature and not ripe for self-government. Britain aims to establish efficient and liberal administration in Malaya to facilitate its retention under British control, and to present it as an example of forward-looking government which the British hope the French and Dutch will see fit to emulate in French Indochina and in Indonesia, respectively. Indeed, Britain seeks the achievement of the maximum possible political and economic harmony among Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina, Burma and Siam. To assure Malaya's security, Britain will do all in her power to prevent Communist infiltration of that strategic and rich area.

Indonesia.

Britain has all along sought to effect a harmonious and just settlement of conflicting Dutch-Indonesian differences and aspirations. Now that the Linggadjati agreement, which provides the hard basis for Dutch-Indonesian understanding, has been signed, the British will do all in their power to see that its terms are carried out on a reasonable basis. The British ardently desire peace and understanding between the Dutch and Indonesians because they regard these as conditions precedent to the maximum rehabilitation of Indonesian trade and industry in which they have a substantial stake. For not only are British investments in Indonesia valued at pounds 50 million, but Britain

relies on the Indies as a major source of certain commodities which are in short supply all over the world. Moreover, the economic welfare of Malaya is intimately related to that of Indonesia, and the British are anxious for that reason to see that peace and prosperity prevail in Indonesia. It is to be stressed that British interests in Indonesia are overwhelmingly economic in character and not influenced by imperial considerations.

French Indochina.

Like ourselves, the British desire to see the French and Vietnamese work out a peaceful solution of their present impasse. To this end, the British would welcome an amicable French-Vietnamese solution of the matters at issue between them. The British are not prepared to underwrite a French military re-conquest of Indochina and will not intervene in Indochina other than through the use of moral persuasion.

For earlier Embassy reports on British Far Eastern policy please see despatch 204, March 28 and airgram A-700, March 31.³

United Nations.

Britain sees in the United Nations the best hope for the establishment of conditions most conducive to future world peace and we can continue to rely upon her to support and use United Nations machinery to the fullest.

Commonwealth and Colonies.

Britain, it seems, is seeking desperately to cut her cloth to fit her present stature—to reduce her world commitments to balance more nearly her capabilities. Where the pressure in Colonial fields has become irresistible or the burden in her defense structure has become more than she can carry, she will continue to withdraw or to seek, at most, a maintenance of the *status quo*. Not being able any longer to pay the entire costs of Commonwealth and Empire defense, she has sought with considerable success to spread that burden more evenly over the Commonwealth and Empire. (Canada and Australia now each have their own armed services of increasing size supported wholly by their own taxpayers. Britain aids, of course, with guidance and manpower). Part and parcel of this same program, it seems, is the basic belief in British Commonwealth policy today that, as the UK succeeds in diffusing responsibility for defense throughout the Commonwealth, it will increase the likelihood of Commonwealth unity of purpose, policy and action, thus materially strengthening the British voice in international politics. Some Dominions, such as Australia and New Zealand, agree with this thesis. In others, Canada and South Africa, it meets with opposition. As Britain succeeds or fails in this policy of diffusion of responsibility, so will her international capabilities increase or wane.

³ Neither printed.

Also, it seems Britain will be able to derive considerable defense strength from her Colonies if, as now seems likely, her enlightened Colonial policy succeeds. Ever since we won our independence, British Colonial policy has tended toward granting to each colony the great amount of self-government deemed feasible under the circumstances. It was under this enlightened policy that the present Dominions grew to full political stature and attained what is in effect complete sovereignty. The Colonial Office today takes great pride in the continuance of that policy although the tendency now is the direct development more toward the interest of the native population than toward garnering profit from the exploitation of the natural resources. By a very flexible system of reserving to the Crown those powers deemed essential to the proper administration of a particular colony and by reducing the number of those powers so reserved, as the political tutelage of the native population progresses, Britain has been able to raise the status of some of her colonies to a position where they are now, or will in the near future, be in a position to take their place among the sovereign nations of the world. [Given?] the upsurge of national consciousness throughout the colonial world which has been particularly evident since the cessation of hostilities, this machinery stands Britain in good stead and, seeing no chance of checking the trend, British colonial policy seeks to guide this national consciousness into channels of ordered progress. By encouraging the improvement of health and education and the development of natural resources in the interest of the native, and by granting the greatest measure of political autonomy thought feasible, the British hope to instill into the natives a loyalty to the Crown which will make it likely that a colony, or group of colonies, upon attaining complete autonomy, will choose to remain in the Commonwealth, thus further strengthening the voice of Britain in international politics. The whole situation is still in a period of transition, yet each additional colony reaching full autonomy and choosing Dominion status, may be counted upon to increase British influence and capabilities as its resources, both natural and political, would likely be used to further policies agreeable to Britain.

[Here follows discussion of the British cabinet situation, the Foreign Office and the press, and economic and financial questions.]

DOUGLAS

811.24/6-2647

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas
(Hilddring) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1947.

Subject: Relative Priorities for the Receipt of U.S. Military Supplies

Discussion:

1. On March 13, 1947 you approved an action of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments which established a relative priority for receipt of U.S. military supplies. A copy of this action is attached and is marked Tab "A".¹

2. By reason of changed conditions in World affairs since March 13th the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments on June 20th revised its previous recommendations, and directed the Deputy Chairman to submit new recommendations to you for action. The action of the Policy Committee of June 20th is attached hereto and is marked Tab "B".

3. The War Department requires a revised policy on these priorities in order to apportion the available surplus military equipment among the various programs requiring implementation. The Navy Department likewise requires this guidance.

4. It is necessary for the State Department to establish its position at this time on these relative priorities. Thereafter SWNCC will be asked to coordinate this policy.

Recommendation:

5. It is recommended you approve the relative priorities established by the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments with the conditions imposed in Tab "B".²

[Annex—Tab "B"]

*Summary of Action Taken at a Meeting of the Policy Committee on
Arms and Armaments, Washington, June 20, 1947*

PCA S-49

1. *Relative Priorities for Receipt of U.S. Military Supplies (D-13/9)*³

The Committee revised its previous recommendations (see S-37, p. 1, #1⁴) as follows: The Committee recommended priorities for the

¹ See the Minutes of the 37th Meeting of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments, March 7, p. 722.

² A marginal notation indicates that this memorandum was approved.

³ PCA Document D-13/9a, June 20, a revision of D-13/9, June 13, also describes the decision indicated in the present Summary of Action. (Department of State Disarmament Files)

⁴ S-37, the Summary of Action of the 37th Meeting, is not printed, but see the Minutes of that meeting, p. 722.

receipt of United States military supplies by the following countries, in the order of the groups listed below :

I—Greece, Turkey

II—Italy, Iran, *China (8 1/3 Air Group Program only)

III—Canada, Republic of the Philippines, American Republics

The Committee further recommended that this action be subject to the following conditions :

a. This arrangement of priorities is a temporary one and it must be revised at frequent intervals.

b. Priorities alone will not furnish final action in reserving or delivering equipment to a foreign government. Decisions concerning such action will take into consideration the following :

(1) The quantity of important items available for transfer in relation to the overall demand for such items.

(2) The importance to each nation of particular types.

(3) The percentage of requirements to be assigned after consideration of (1) and (2) above.

The Committee agreed that by reason of Congressional enactments the conditions outlined above do not apply to the requirements of Greece and Turkey for military supplies since these countries should be furnished such equipment to the fullest extent possible. The Deputy Chairman was directed to communicate this revised recommendation to the Under Secretary and, if approved, to representatives of the War and Navy Departments.

*This priority includes civilian end-use items, transport planes, and spare parts *only* for all equipment transferred to China under this Program. [Footnote in the source text.]

Editorial Note

The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of July 26, 1947 (P.L. 253, 80th Congress; 61 Stat. (pt. 1) 495). Its membership included the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.

The duties of the NSC as specified by the National Security Act were :

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

For additional information on the operations of the Council, see Henry M. Jackson, ed., *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), and James S. Lay, Jr. (Assistant Executive Secretary of the NSC), "The National Security Council", in *The American Foreign Service Journal*, March 1948, page 7.

711.40/8-3047

*Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)
to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1947.

I have made a very brief account of our meeting at the War Department on Saturday,¹ and I suggest that it be held in your safe. If you agree I might orally convey the substance of the meeting to Mr. Hickerson,² Mr. Rusk,³ and Mr. Wood⁴ and of course to Mr. Armour,⁵ Mr. Kennan and Mr. Henderson⁶ when they return. I suggest no distribution of the memorandum in the Department in order to insure against any possibility of a leak.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

¹ August 30.

² John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

³ Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

⁴ Presumably C. Tyler Wood, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

⁵ Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

⁶ Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

[Annex]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1947.

Present:

Acting Secretary of State
 Mr. Saltzman ⁷
 Mr. Bohlen

Secretary of War ⁸
 Under Secretary of War ⁹
 General Eisenhower ¹⁰
 General Norstad ¹¹
 Admiral Wooldridge ¹²

The Acting Secretary of State said that he had suggested the meeting in order that the top officials of the War Department might be kept up to the minute on the thinking in the Department of State in regard to the foreign situation as a whole.

At the Acting Secretary's request Mr. Bohlen then outlined certain basic aspects of the present critical world situation along the lines of the attached paper. The Acting Secretary then related the basic considerations of the specific case of Western Europe and the implementation of the Marshall Plan. He pointed out that, in view of the fact that the world is definitely split in two, we must consider Europe west of the iron curtain as a whole and that we should apply our economic assistance to those sections of Western European economy which offered the best prospect of immediate and effective revival in an attempt to break the economic bottlenecks which were retarding the recovery of Western Europe as a whole. We should endeavor to keep in mind the concept of Western Europe rather than the individual countries and likewise short-term revival as against long-term complete reconstruction. American assistance carried out with these two main considerations in view offered the best chance of keeping Western Europe from economic collapse and starting it on the road to healthy recovery. In the light of these concepts, the three Western zones of Germany should be regarded not as part of Germany but as

⁷ Charles E. Saltzman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas from September 2, 1947.

⁸ Kenneth C. Royall.

⁹ Howard C. Petersen.

¹⁰ General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

¹¹ Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff.

¹² Rear Adm. Edmund T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Political-Military Affairs.

part of Western Europe.¹³ It should be given proper weight as a factor in the economic recovery of Western Europe as a whole.

Mr. Lovett asked the Secretary of War and General Eisenhower to think over the views which had been expressed by the State Department representatives and to let him have any comments which they might have on the basic views advanced with a view to another meeting at which their specific application could be more fully discussed.

Both the Secretary of War and General Eisenhower expressed complete agreement with the general exposition of the situation confronting the U.S. and the necessity of orienting the thinking of this Government in conformity with that situation.

On leaving General Norstad expressed to Mr. Bohlen full satisfaction with the nature of the meeting and said he thought it had been most helpful. He suggested that another meeting of a similar nature to deal with more concrete matters should be set up not later than Thursday or Friday of the coming week.¹⁴

[Subannex]

*Memorandum by the Consular of the Department
of State (Bohlen)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 30, 1947.]

The United States is confronted with a condition in the world which is at direct variance with the assumptions upon which, during and directly after the war, major United States policies were predicated. Instead of unity among the great powers on the major issues of world reconstruction—both political and economic—after the war, there is complete disunity between the Soviet Union and the satellites on one side and the rest of the world on the other. There are, in short, two worlds instead of one. Faced with this disagreeable fact, however much we may deplore it, the United States in the interest of its own well-being and security and those of the free non-Soviet world must re-examine its major policy objectives in the light of this fact. Failure to do so would mean that we would be pursuing policies based on the assumptions which no longer exist and would expose us to the serious danger of falling between two stools. In furtherance of the policy based on the non-existent thesis of one world, the United States might neglect to take such measures as would make the non-Soviet world possible of existence. The full consequences of the existing split in

¹³ For documentation on United States policy with respect to the occupation and control of Germany, see vol. II, pp. 831 ff.

¹⁴ No record of such a meeting has been found in the files of the Department of State.

the post-war world have obviously not been fully assimilated by all parts of this Government involved in foreign affairs nor by all persons even in the State Department or abroad directly involved in formulation of foreign policy. In the Soviet world, which means those areas under direct Soviet control or domination in Europe and the Far East, the Soviet Government is proceeding on the exact opposite of the one world principle and is rapidly and, for the present at least, effectively engaged in consolidating and strengthening those areas under its control. The logic of the situation is that the non-Soviet world through such measures as are open to it would draw closer together politically, economically, financially, and, in the last analysis, militarily in order to be in a position to deal effectively with the consolidated Soviet area. Only in this way can a free and non-Soviet world hope to survive in the face of the centralized and ruthless direction of the Soviet world.

In these circumstances, all American policies should be related to this central fact. It does not mean that as an eventual objective that the United States should discard forever a one world objective but rather bring its policies more into relation with reality as long as the condition described above continues to exist. Nor does it mean that the United States should endeavor to hermetically seal one world from the other. On the contrary, mutually profitable exchange of goods, in an endeavor to do good, can be carried on between the two worlds. But this could be done on a basis of equality and profit only if the non-Soviet world is able to face as a whole the areas dominated by the Soviet Union rather than as individual weak and disjointed units. The drawing together and consolidation of the non-Soviet world is obviously a process that cannot be achieved overnight and should not be attempted by precipitous action but should be regarded rather as a trend logically flowing out of the present state of the world. The chief aspects of United States policy which require re-examination in the light of these considerations are those relating to economic policy (leaving aside for the moment the entire question of the United Nations which is a separately related problem). Such objectives as those embodied in the ITO, the lowering of customs barriers on a world-wide scale and general freeing of world commerce from restriction must either be indefinitely postponed until the assumption upon which they rested comes into being or consciously and definitely be restricted to apply to those areas of the world not under Soviet domination. While the thinking of this Government should be guided by the above considerations, in application of course the United States must carefully avoid assuming any responsibility for the division of the world and should therefore always keep the door open for participation by the Soviet Union or its satellites in any such measure.

In the present state of economic emergency in Europe which has been highlighted by the continuing British crisis, it is inadvisable for this Government to continue to press for long-range objectives, however desirable in themselves, which do not immediately and directly bear upon the solution of Western European problems. This is especially true when objectives such as a European Customs Union raise political complications which retard rather than facilitate the tiding over of the present crisis and tend to divert the attention and energies of the European countries concerned from the absolutely essential measures which must be taken to this end. Internal political factors and certainly the national sensibilities of the Western European countries must be taken more fully into consideration except where they have an immediate and deleterious effect upon measures to be taken in the present emergency in Western Europe.

On a short-term basis, all indications point towards a major political showdown crisis between the Soviet and non-Soviet world, which as a present correlation of forces means between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is virtually no chance of any of the problems existing between those worlds being settled until that crisis comes to a head and is met. Long-range plans of economic rehabilitation of even the non-Soviet world should not be allowed to obscure that almost inevitable fact. From present indications, this crisis will mature considerably earlier than has been expected. It is not a matter of several years in the future. It is more likely a question of months. No one can in confidence predict that this crisis, when it arises, will remain confined to the political field. It obviously will contain in it the very real danger of outbreak of hostilities. If it is to be solved short of war, it must result in a radical and basic change in Soviet policies. There is no sign as yet that any such change is to be anticipated or even if it is possible in view of the structure and character of the Soviet state. In anticipation of this global political crisis coming to a head in the not too distant future, the United States must do everything in its power to ensure the maximum degree of political support from the non-Soviet countries of the world. The array of potential strength which would be lined up against the Soviet Union and its satellites in any such showdown crisis will in the last analysis determine whether war will result or whether the Soviet or non-Soviet world will be able to find a *modus vivendi* which will permit some stabilization of the world situation for at least some period of years.

In relation to the present economic emergency in Europe, the logical consequence of the present state of the world is that measures of assistance envisaged by this Government should be consciously limited to Western Europe, based on the concept of the economic unity of Europe west of the Stettin-Trieste line.

SWNCC Files

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1947.

SWNCC 38/46

Subject: Over-all Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military
Bases and Base Rights.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be informed as follows:

"In view of national and international trends, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to supplement and revise the contents of their memorandum of 4 June 1946 (SWNCC 38/35)² relative to military rights desired on the territory of foreign nations.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the difficulties attendant upon negotiations and the reluctance of foreign nations to grant 'rights' to any outside power, and accordingly have established the requirements for a minimum of such rights. However, there are certain areas, vital to the security of the United States, in which rights should be obtained as soon as possible so that our utilization of such rights can be effected with the least delay and within the legal framework of such rights. In such cases it may be expedient to conclude temporary arrangements for rights based upon occupation requirements, pending the obtaining of the required rights.

"In their previous memorandum (SWNCC 38/35) the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the term 'base' was not intended to imply necessarily the permanent garrisoning of troops or stationing of aircraft or naval vessels during peacetime. Except for transit air bases and subject to the limitations of budgetary and personnel authorizations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate the peacetime garrisoning of all bases listed in the Appendix.

"The present strategic situation indicates the need of stationing U.S. armed forces in Iceland, Greenland, Labrador, the Azores, the Ryukyus, the Bonins and Volcanos, and Port Lyautey at the earliest practicable date and, accordingly, any interim arrangement that will make this possible will be acceptable, pending the ultimate obtaining of desired long-term rights.

¹ The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 38/46 by informal action on October 21. In approving this paper the State Member indicated that the Department of State agreed to transmit these views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, but that the Department was not to be understood as approving these views in their entirety at that time. (SWNCC Files)

² *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. i. p. 1174.

"It should be noted that the Ryukyus and the Bonins-Volcano Islands are included in those locations for which suitable arrangements are desired. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the acceptance by the Security Council of the United Nations and ratification by the U.S. Senate of the U.S. trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandated Islands, and consider that U.S. rights in these islands are adequately met. The status of certain former Japanese islands, namely the Ryukyus, the Bonins-Volcano Island and Marcus, however, has not yet been settled. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under further study the status of these islands, and will communicate their views to you separately regarding the desired status of these islands.

"The locations mentioned above and other locations at which rights are desired have been summarized in the Appendix which the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to be considered as their appraisal of military rights desired on the territory of foreign nations. In addition to locations at which rights are desired, there are certain areas of the world in which the United States, by reason of budgetary limitations on personnel and funds available to the armed forces, is not able to maintain bases, but which areas should be kept under surveillance with a view to denying or restricting military development by other powers. Such areas are also indicated in the Appendix.

"As will be seen in the Appendix, the locations at which rights are desired have been considerably reduced from previous estimates which in turn places additional emphasis on our previous statements that failure to obtain the stated requirements for any particular area will necessitate a re-evaluation of the importance of adjacent areas.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff request, therefore, that they be kept advised of the progress of negotiations for all base rights in order that they may promptly revise the rights desired at alternate sites should the need arise.

"In conclusion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stress the importance to the security of the United States of obtaining the military rights set forth in the Appendix. These military rights are required in peacetime, under currently estimated world conditions if the United States is to have that adequate military posture which is essential to United States security."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. LALOR
Captain, U.S. Navy
Secretary

Appendix

<u>Base</u>	<u>Sovereignty</u>	<u>Rights Desired</u>	<u>Use</u>	<u>Ref. SWNCC Paper³</u>
1. <i>Required</i> Iceland	—	Joint (par. 3)	Naval, Air, & Ground	38/41
Greenland	Denmark	Participating (par. 3) (with Canada)	Naval, Air, & Ground	38/41
Goose Bay, Labrador	Newfound- land (British)	Participating (with British Empire only)	Air & Ground	
Bonin—Volcano Islands	Japan	Will be communi- cated by separate memorandum	Air & Ground	
Azores	Portugal	Participating (with U.K. only)	Naval, Air & Ground	38/40
Ryukyus Islands	Japan	Will be communi- cated by sepa- rate memo- randum	Naval, Air, & Ground	
Panama Republic	—	Joint	Air & Ground	38/42
2. <i>Desired</i> Port Lyautey (or Canary Islands if rights at Port Lyautey are unobtainable)	French (Spanish)	Joint (Joint)	Naval & Air (Naval & Air)	38/36 38/43
Galápagos Islands	Ecuador	Participating (with other American na- tions only)	Naval & Air	38/41
Marcus	Japan	Will be communi- cated by sepa- rate memo- randum	Air	
Ascension Island	British	Participating (with British Empire only)	Air	38/39
Talara	Peru	Participating (with other American na- tions only)	Air	38/41
Batista Field and St. Julian—LaFe	Cuba	Transit (par. 3)	Air	38/41
Surinam	Dutch	Transit	Air	38/37
Curacao—Aruba	Dutch	Transit	Naval & Air	38/37
Casablanca	French	Transit	Air	38/43
Dakar	French	Transit	Naval & Air	38/36
Monrovia	Liberia	Transit	Air	38/34
Cayenne, French Guiana	French	Transit	Air	38/36
Noumea, New Caledonia	French	Transit	Naval & Air	38/36
Viti Levu, Fiji Islands	British	Transit	Naval & Air	38/39
Algiers	French	Transit	Air	⁴ 38/30
Tripoli	Italy	Transit	Air	38/30
Cairo, Egypt	Egypt	Transit	Air	38/30

³ SWNCC reference papers not printed unless otherwise indicated.⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1142.

Dhahran	Saudi Arabia	Transit	Air	38/30
Karachi	Pakistan	Transit	Air	38/30
Agra	India	Transit	Air	38/30
Kharagpur	India	Transit	Air	38/30
Rangoon, Burma	British	Transit	Air	38/30
Bangkok	Siam	Transit	Air	38/30
Saigon, French Indo-China	French	Transit	Air	38/36

3. *a.* Joint right is the right to use for military purposes, in common with the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, an area, installation or facility, and to debar any other nation from such use unless it is mutually agreed between the United States and the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, that another nation or nations may share use.

b. Participating right is the right to share, on the most favored nation principle, with the nation exercising sovereignty, mandate or trusteeship, and with any other nation which that nation may accord the right to participate, in the use for military purposes of an area, installation or facility.

c. Transit right is the right of military air transit and technical stop as defined in SWNCC 38/30.

4. *Strategic Areas.* Specific areas in addition to such obvious ones as Northwestern Europe, United Kingdom and South America, for which surveillance is particularly necessary with the objective of denying or restricting therein the development of military potential either directly or indirectly by possible enemy powers. These areas include:

a. Japan.

b. Islands of the Pacific Ocean generally south of the equator, north of Australia and New Zealand and east of the Malay Peninsula; including all of the Malay Archipelago.

c. Clipperton Island.

d. Northwest and North Africa, the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, and including the following countries: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Crete, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Rio de Oro, French West Africa, Sierra Leone and Liberia.

5. The above list is predicated on the following assumptions:

a. The U.S. strategic trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandated Islands continues effective.

b. Military base rights and air transit privileges in South and Central America and Mexico will be available as required from the implementation of the Act of Chapultepec (J.C.S. 570/51).⁵

c. Bases and locations at which the U.S. already has long-term

⁵ Not printed.

rights such as the Panama Canal Zone, Guantanamo, and the destroyer-lease bases remain unaffected.

d. The recently negotiated base rights in the Philippines remain unaffected.

e. Presently effective understandings between Canada and the United States recognize the mutual acceptance by the two nations of their responsibilities for collective security for the northern part of the Western Hemisphere. It is expected that all provisions for military security evolved by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense Canada-United States will provide for joint use of facilities in Canadian territory rather than exclusive U.S. bases.

f. An extension of the present Brazil-U.S. Base Agreement, or a satisfactory similar agreement, will be negotiated.

Policy Planning Staff Files

*Report by the Policy Planning Staff*¹

SECRET
PPS/13

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1947.

RÉSUMÉ OF WORLD SITUATION

SUMMARY

1. The danger of war is vastly exaggerated in many quarters. The Soviet Government neither wants nor expects war with us in the fore-

¹ On November 4, Secretary Marshall asked Kennan to prepare a brief résumé of the world situation for presentation by Marshall at the Cabinet meeting of November 7. Kennan complied on November 5 by submitting Policy Planning Staff Report PPS/13. At the Cabinet meeting, the Secretary read this résumé making certain omissions and alterations of his own. The version of the introductory summary which he presented read as follows:

"1. The political advance of the communists in Western Europe has been temporarily halted. This is the result of several factors, among which the prospect of U.S. aid is an important one.

The halt in the communist advance is forcing Moscow to consolidate its hold on Eastern Europe. It will probably have to clamp down completely on Czechoslovakia, for a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become a threatening salient in Moscow's political position.

This also means that the Kremlin may very likely order the communist parties in France and Italy to resort to virtual civil war as soon as our right to have troops in Italy expires. If this happens, an intensified push against Greece may be expected at the same time.

In these operations, the Russians will try to keep their hand well concealed and leave us no grounds for formal protest against themselves.

2. Our best answer to this procedure is to strengthen in every way local forces of resistance (i.e., governments, armies as in Greece, political groups), and persuade others to bear a greater part of the burden of opposing communism. The present situation will, in the long run, impose burdens beyond our resources. Its continuation will also overstrain the UN. It is possible that the Russians may withdraw from that body if its present successful employment as an instrument for mobilizing world opinion and pressure against them is pressed too heavily.

3: Our policy, I think, should be directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia. This means that in the C.F.M. meeting we must insist on

seeable future. The warmongering campaign in the UN² is designed to weaken our world leadership and to prevent the UN from being effectively used as a means of pressure against communistic expansion.

2. The political advance of the communists in Western Europe has been at least temporarily halted. This is the result of several factors, among which the prospect of U.S. aid is an important one.

3. The halt in the communist advance is forcing Moscow to consolidate its hold on Eastern Europe. It will probably have to clamp down completely on Czechoslovakia. For if the political trend in Europe turns against communism, a relatively free Czechoslovakia could become a threatening salient in Moscow's political position in Eastern Europe.

This also means that the Kremlin may very likely order the communist parties in France and Italy to resort to virtual civil war in those countries as soon as our right to have troops in Italy expires. If this happens, an intensified push against Greece may be expected at the same time.

4. In these operations, the Russians will try to keep their hand well concealed and leave us no grounds for formal protest against themselves.

5. Our best answer to this is to strengthen in every way local forces of resistance, and persuade others to bear a greater part of the burden of opposing communism. The present "bi-polarity" will, in the long run, be beyond our resources. It will also over-strain the UN. It is entirely possible that the Russians may soon withdraw from that body if we continue to use it as an instrument for mobilizing world opinion and pressure against them.

6. All in all, our policy must be directed toward restoring a balance of power in Europe and Asia. This means that in the C.F.M. meeting³ we must insist on keeping Western Germany free of communistic control. We must then see that it is better integrated into Western Europe and that a part of our responsibility for conditions there is shifted to the western European allies and the German people themselves.

keeping Western Germany free of communistic control. We must then see that it is better integrated into Western Europe and that a part of our responsibility for conditions there is shifted to the western European allies and the German people themselves.

4. The danger of war, I think, has been exaggerated in many quarters. The Soviet Government neither wants nor expects war with us in the foreseeable future. The war-mongering campaign in the UN is designed to weaken our world leadership and to prevent the UN from being effectively used as a means of pressure against communistic expansion. It is intended to arouse fears and develop indecision or hesitation on our part."

In response to a request made by the President after the meeting, Marshall provided him with a copy of the full statement. (Policy Planning Staff Files)

² For documentation on this matter, see pp. 76 ff.

³ For documentation on the 5th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25-December 15, see vol. II, pp. 676 ff.

I

The world situation is still dominated by the effort undertaken by the Russians in the post-hostilities period to extend their virtual domination over all, or as much as possible, of the Eurasian land mass.

In making this effort the Russians were taking advantage of the power vacuums left by the collapse of Germany and Japan and by the natural wave of radicalism following on the heels of any great military-political upheaval.

It was an integral part of that project to neutralize our own ability to oppose it by weakening in every way our national potential and by undermining confidence everywhere in our motives and our fitness for leadership.

II

That effort has now been brought substantially to a standstill by four factors:

1. Our insistence on a satisfactory peace settlement as a prerequisite to our military evacuation of ex-enemy territories. This has meant that we have offset to some extent the power vacuum on which the Russians had counted in their plans.

2. The recent use, in some instances—or proposed use in some others—of our economic aid to strengthen forces of resistance to communist pressure.

3. The Soviet failure to dominate the United Nations and the partial effectiveness of the United Nations in mobilizing world opinion against communist expansion.

4. The natural recession of the wave of post-war radicalism.

In consequence of these factors the Russians have been momentarily blocked in their political advance in the west. If U.S. aid to Europe becomes a reality, they will probably not be able to resume it. But the battle is far from won, and any relaxation of our efforts could still result in a political debacle for the non-communist forces.

III

Of the four factors cited above which have brought communist expansion to a halt, three are the result of our efforts. We have borne almost single-handed the burden of the international effort to stop the Kremlin's political advance. But this has stretched our resources dangerously far in several respects.

The continued occupation of Japan and of portions of Germany and Austria becomes increasingly more difficult for us, and disadvantageous in other respects, as the war recedes.

The program of aid to Europe which we are now proposing to under-

take will probably be the last major effort of this nature which our people could, or should, make.

Our use of the United Nations as an instrument for opposing Soviet expansion, prior to the conclusion of peace, has strained that institution severely. It has an increasing tendency to alarm smaller nations and to paralyze, rather than stimulate, their will to play an active part in the organization. Furthermore, if we continue vigorously along this line—and particularly if we try to make effective use of the “little Assembly,”⁴ there is a real likelihood that the Russians will leave the Organization.

In these circumstances it is clearly unwise for us to continue the attempt to carry alone, or largely singlehanded, the opposition to Soviet expansion. It is urgently necessary for us to restore something of the balance of power in Europe and Asia by strengthening local forces of independence and by getting them to assume part of our burden. The Harvard speech⁵ approach was highly effective from this standpoint. But we have done almost nothing to exploit psychologically the initial advantage we have gained. If our effort in Europe is to be successful we must improve radically our machinery and practice in matters of informational policy in Europe and elsewhere.

IV

The halt in the communist advance in Western Europe has necessitated a consolidation of communist power throughout Eastern Europe. It will be necessary for them, in particular, to clamp down completely on Czechoslovakia. As long as communist political power was advancing in Europe, it was advantageous to the Russians to allow to the Czechs the outer appearances of freedom. In this way, Czechoslovakia was able to serve as a bait for nations farther west. Now that there is a danger of the political movement proceeding in the other direction, the Russians can no longer afford this luxury. Czechoslovakia could too easily become a means of entry of really democratic forces into Eastern Europe in general.

The sweeping away of democratic institutions and the consolidation of communist power in Czechoslovakia will add a formidable new element to the underground anti-communist political forces in the Soviet satellite area. For this reason, the Russians proceed to this step reluctantly. It is a purely defensive move.

Once having dug in politically on the Luebeck-Trieste line, the

⁴ Reference is to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly; for documentation on United States policy with respect to the establishment of that body, see pp. 166 ff.

⁵ For text of Secretary Marshall's address at commencement exercises at Harvard University, June 5, see vol. III, p. 237, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

Russians can probably maintain their position there for some time by sheer police methods. But the problem will become an increasingly difficult one for them. It is unlikely that approximately one hundred million Russians will succeed in holding down permanently, in addition to their own minorities, some ninety millions of Europeans with a higher cultural level and with long experience in resistance to foreign rule.

One of the most dangerous moments to world stability will come when some day Russian rule begins to crumble in the eastern European area. The Kremlin may then feel itself seriously threatened internally and may resort to desperate measures. I do not see that situation developing in the immediate future.

V

If native forces in western Europe are to take over part of our burden of opposing communism, it is essential that Germany be fitted into this picture.

It is now more unlikely than ever that the Russians would be willing to take their chances on a genuinely democratic, united Germany. Such a Germany, if it were to withstand communist penetration and domination, would, like present day Czechoslovakia, exercise a highly disruptive influence on communist power in eastern Europe. Rather than risk that, the Russians would probably prefer a continuance of the present status, under which they are at least sure of being able to neutralize the political potential of eastern Germany.

They may well attempt various ruses at the coming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting to try to get us out of western Germany under arrangements which would leave that country defenseless against communist penetration. For us to yield to such tactics would plainly undermine the ability of western Europe as a whole to withstand communist pressure and would of course be inconsistent with the aims of our program of aid to Europe.

If pressed along these lines we will therefore have no choice but to disagree again at London and to proceed to make the best of a divided Germany. It will then be essential that we bring the western part of Germany into some acceptable relationship to the other western European countries. Geographically, it is much more their problem than ours; and it is improper and unnatural that we should continue to bear the lion's share of the responsibility for handling it.

This means that we shall have to make a determined effort to bring the French, Belgians, Dutch, Danes, et cetera to an enlightened understanding of the necessities of the German situation; to the acknowledgement of their primary responsibility for integrating western Germany into western Europe, and to a detailed agreement with us as

to how this shall be done. In this effort we must expect to give, as well as to receive, concessions.

VI

The Middle East is undoubtedly in for a rocky time. In Palestine, we have a situation which is badly fouled up by the past mistakes of many people, including ourselves.⁶ These probably cannot be settled without great unpleasantness, including violence. The further development of this situation is inevitably going to present favorable opportunities for the Russians to fish in muddy waters. These they will exploit to the limit. But if we and the British remain united in the resolve to hold this area free of Soviet control, and agreed as to the methods for doing so, we ought to be able to weather the storm.

VII

The Far Eastern area is in a state of almost total instability. The problem of correcting that instability and bringing some order out of the chaos and uncertainty is an enormous one, which we have scarcely touched. In part, it probably exceeds our capacity. But we will have to make a careful and realistic study of what we can conceivably do, and then proceed to implement that program.

Our most immediate problem is Japan, where our responsibility is directly engaged. It is unlikely that we will reach any early agreement with our Allies on any Japanese peace settlement. We must therefore reckon with the possibility of a continuation of our direct responsibility for Japan for some time into the future.

The basic ideas with which we entered on the occupation of Japan apparently did not take into account the possibility of a hostile Russia and the techniques of communist political penetration. Our occupation policies have consequently been effective in disarming Japan and destroying the old pattern of militarism; but they have not produced, nor are they designed to produce, the political and economic stability which Japanese society will require if it is to withstand communist pressures after we have gone.

Our task now is to correct that deficiency. Until we do that, we cannot safely release Japan from the occupational regime.

All this calls for a thorough re-examination of our occupation policies.

In China there is not much we can do, in present circumstances but to sweat it out and to try to prevent the military situation from changing too drastically to the advantage of the communist forces. We must bear in mind that a frustration of communist aims in the west

⁶ For documentation on United States policy with respect to Palestine, see vol. v, pp. 999 ff.

will probably lead to increased Soviet pressure in the Far East. But there are definite limitations on both the military and economic capabilities of the Russians in that area. We should not ignore these limitations or over-rate the Soviet threat.

As to Korea, there is no longer any real hope of a genuinely peaceful and free democratic development in that country. Its political life in the coming period is bound to be dominated by political immaturity, intolerance and violence. Where such conditions prevail, the communists are in their element. Therefore, we cannot count on native Korean forces to help us hold the line against Soviet expansion. Since the territory is not of decisive strategic importance to us, our main task is to extricate ourselves without too great a loss of prestige. In doing so, however, we should remember that it makes no sense to yield in Korea and then to try to insist on the elimination of Soviet influence behind Korea, in northern Manchuria.

VIII

As to the over-all international situation, the extreme anxiety felt in many quarters about the danger of war rests on an incorrect appraisal of Soviet intentions. The Kremlin does not wish to have another major war and does not expect to have one. Their warmongering campaign in the United Nations is a smoke-screen, designed to scare off our friends and to discredit us.

If aid to Europe gets favorable reaction in the coming Special Session of Congress, Moscow will probably order the French and Italian communists, as a last resort, to proceed to civil war, in the hopes that this will bring chaos in Europe and dissuade us from proceeding with the aid program. Such tactics will probably not be implemented until after mid-December, when our right to have forces in Italy will have expired. That is also the time when we may expect the culmination of communist-satellite pressure in Greece.

The Russians do not expect these actions to lead to war with us. They will try to keep their own hand carefully disguised and to leave us in the frustrated position of having no one to oppose but local communists, or possibly the satellites.

They are aware that civil war in France and Italy may lead to serious reverses for the communist parties of those countries. This does not bother them very much. If United States aid is successful, these parties will not be much immediate use to them, anyway. And the hard cores of the parties are prepared to go underground again, if need be.

In playing this sort of a game they are admittedly operating very close to the line: closer than they themselves probably realize. They normally work with a disciplined movement; and they are accustomed

to feeling that they can always withdraw if they see that they have reached the limits of the other fellow's patience. The greatest danger in this case is that they may overestimate the discipline of their satellites in the Balkans, and that the latter may get out of hand, once violence begins, and go so far as to engage our interests directly.

Our best answer to all of this will be to stiffen local forces of resistance, wherever we can, and to see first whether they cannot do the work. There is a good chance that they can, particularly in France and Italy. Only if they show signs of failing, do we have to consider more direct action.

But even then, we should be free to call the play and to determine whether that action is to be directed against Russia or only against Russian stooge forces. The latter would be strongly preferable, in principle—and would *not* necessarily lead to war with Russia.

All in all, there is no reason to expect that we will be forced suddenly and violently into a major military clash with Soviet forces.

840.50 Recovery/12-1247

The National Security Resources Board to President Truman

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 4, 1947.

A RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY
RESOURCES BOARD ON THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM

1. The objectives of the European Recovery Program are of such importance that they must be achieved by every means possible short of seriously depleting our own natural resources.¹ Strategic and critical materials as such on the Munitions Board's list should not be supplied in quantities that would dangerously deplete our reserves. Other materials which are approaching the critical stage of supply should be similarly treated.

2. National security requires adequate reserves of strategic and critical materials. The maximum possible fulfillment of the stockpiling program of the Munitions Board should be made an objective in fulfilling the European Recovery Program. Every effort should be made to maintain the importation of such materials at least at current rates. Appropriate and expeditious expansion of existing production and exploration and development of new sources of supply within the control of the countries under the Program should be promoted. Similar considerations should apply to materials approaching the critical stage of supply. There should be no restrictions on increased production for United States requirements of these materials due to cartel arrangements and similar devices. Expansion and development

¹ See circular airgram 1620, December 22, p. *infra*.

of foreign sources of supply would serve the interests of both world recovery and national security.

3. To assist the development of foreign sources of supply of strategic and critical materials, American private capital and initiative should be encouraged in such productive enterprises abroad as part of the European Recovery Program. Some of the countries under the European Recovery Program may be unable to provide the means required for increased production and new development. In such cases prompt development of these urgently needed sources of supply by the application and utilization of American private investment, management, technical skills, and equipment should be encouraged.

840.50 Recovery/12-2247 : Circular airmgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1947—8:15 a. m.

1620. According to proposed legislation the Congress will be asked to provide in the enabling legislation of the European Recovery Act provisions for promoting in the territories, colonies and dependencies of the participating countries, an increase in the production of materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its natural resources.² While other resources may be included, it is contemplated that this will mean in practice strategic and critical materials as determined by the Munitions Board, particularly those listed in Group A of the "Current List of Strategic and Critical Materials" as amended August 28, 1947 and in accordance with Section 2 of the "Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act."³ Materials listed in Group A are:

Agar	Cadmium
Antimony	Castor Oil
Asbestos	Celestite
Chrysolite	Chromite
Amosite	Metallurgical Grade
Bauxite	Refractory Grade
Beryl	Rhodesian Origin
Bismuth	Other Origin

¹ Sent to 29 posts for action and to five for information.

² With respect to United States policy regarding the economic crisis in Europe, see vol. III, pp. 197 ff. The Economic Cooperation Act (Title I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948), approved April 3, 1948, was the enabling legislation for the European recovery program; see 62 Stat. (pt. 1) 137.

³ For additional information on United States policy pursuant to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act, July 23, 1946, see memorandum of November 6, 1946, by the Acting Executive Secretary of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, p. 1183.

Cobalt	Monazite
Coconut Oil	Nickel
Columbite	Opium
Copper	Palm Oil
Cordage Fibers	Pepper
Manila (Abaca)	Platinum Group Metals
Sisal (Henequen)	Iridium
Corundum	Platinum
Diamonds, Industrial	Pyrethrum
Emetine	Quartz Crystals
Graphite	Quebracho
Amorphous Lump	Quinidine
Flake	Quinine (cinchona bark)
Hyoscine	Rapeseed Oil
Iodine	Rubber
Jewel Bearings	Crude Natural Rubber
Instrument Jewels, except	Natural Rubber Latex
Vee Sapphire and Ruby	Rutile
Vee Jewels Watch and	Sapphire and Ruby
Time-keeping Devices	Shellac
Kyanite	Sperm Oil
Lead	Talc, Steatite, Block or
Manganese Ore	Lava
Battery Grade	Tantalite
Metallurgical Grade	Tin
Mercury	Tung Oil
Mica	Tungsten
Muscovite Block and	Vanadium
Film (Good stained and	Zinc
better) Muscovite	Zirconium Ores
Splittings	Baddeleyite
Phlogopite Splittings	Zircon

The proposed legislation will provide for the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and each participating country containing appropriate provisions for (a) Making efficient use, within the framework of a joint program for European recovery, of the resources of such participating country (its territory, colonies and dependencies), including any commodities, facilities, or services furnished under this act, and (b) Facilitating the sale to the U.S. for stockpiling purposes, for such period of time as may be agreed to and upon reasonable terms and in reasonable quantities, of materials required by the U.S. as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own natural resources, and which may be available in the territory, colonies and dependencies of such participating country after due regard for reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of such country. Funds authorized under the program will presumably be used to promote production in the territories, colonies and dependencies of the participating countries in the form of producing machinery and equipment and possibly incentive goods, the primary emphasis

in such utilization of the ERP funds remaining, of course, the economic recovery of the participating countries.

In order to facilitate such negotiations as regards stockpiling commitments by the participating countries, it will be necessary for the Department to obtain current and detailed information regarding certain economic aspects of the materials involved. The most important of these aspects are current production, factors mitigating against increased production, normal domestic and export requirements, and the excess production which would be available for United States procurement under various assumed conditions of production. The Department is scrutinizing such material as is available regarding the strategic materials and the additional data which may be requested of the offices concerned will be in terms of specific problems involving a particular material. It is not proposed that such information will be requested of the offices to which this circular airgram is addressed pending enactment of the proposed stockpiling provisions in the enabling legislation of the ERP. In the meantime, however, the officers concerned may find it desirable to assemble and analyze such data as is readily available regarding the strategic materials herein listed. Since a large proportion of the critical materials listed above is available from the colonies and dependencies of the European participating countries, the Department believes that this résumé of the proposed stockpiling provisions will provide useful background information for the various offices concerned. The Department wishes to emphasize that the program herein outlined is of tentative nature and, pending further instructions, should be held in the strictest confidence.

LOVETT

FOREIGN POLICY ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES
DEVELOPMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY ¹

Department of State Atomic Energy Files ²

*Memorandum of Conversation, Between the Secretary of State and
the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1947.

The BRITISH AMBASSADOR, calling at his request to see the Secretary, thanked him for the interim reply on the atomic energy inquiry.³ He stated he believed it would be wise if the British and US experts have some discussion on this matter before this Government sends its considered reply. He said he had mentioned this to Mr. Acheson.⁴

The SECRETARY said Mr. Acheson had talked with him about it. He said this matter is very disturbing to him and he expected to give some thought to it over the weekend. He said as he now sees it, any course we take will give us trouble, and the problem will be to decide which course will give the least trouble. He said he was conscious of the trouble the British will have and will certainly consider the matter from that angle. The Secretary mentioned the agreement between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt,⁵ of which the people of neither country

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. i, pp. 1197, 1259. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the international control of atomic energy, see pp. 327 ff., *passim*. For documentation on national security policy, see pp. 707 ff. For documentation on the attitude of the Soviet Union with respect to atomic energy, see vol. iv, pp. 514 ff., *passim*. For additional information, see Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, *Atomic Shield, 1947-1952*, vol. II of *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969).

² Lot 57D688, the consolidated lot file on atomic energy, 1942-1962, located in the Department of State, including the records of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy and the records of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

³ In a telegram to President Truman, June 7, 1946, British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee had urged that steps be taken to establish full and effective cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. i, p. 1249. President Truman sent an interim reply in a telegram of December 28, 1946; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 1259.

⁴ Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State.

⁵ Reference is to the *aide-mémoire* of conversation between the President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492-493. The agreement stated, *inter alia*, that cooperation between the two nations in developing atomic energy for military and commercial purposes would continue after the conclusion of the war. The American copy of the *aide-mémoire* could not be located for some years after the death of President Roosevelt. It was ultimately found misfiled in the papers of Adm. Wilson Brown, Roosevelt's naval aide. The British had provided the United States with a copy in 1945, prior to the Potsdam Conference.

have been informed, and stated he believes the people should know of this. He told the Ambassador we do not have a copy of the agreement, a photostatic copy of which was furnished by the British. He said he had spoken to the President about having Mr. Roosevelt's papers searched for this agreement. He said further there will be quite a story if it develops we do not have the paper.

The AMBASSADOR said he was not well enough acquainted with the problem as yet.⁶

The SECRETARY told him he did not believe Bevin⁷ was either, that in New York Bevin had suggested discussing the matter but did not have the files and was not familiar with what has taken place. The Secretary had then suggested they take it up when Bevin had received the file, but no mention had been made of the matter thereafter, so he assumed Bevin could not obtain the file.

The AMBASSADOR said he thought Bevin had decided that Mr. Attlee should ask the President for a reply to his communication.

The SECRETARY said that in view of the changed situation that has resulted from the enactment of legislation establishing the Commission,⁸ the President should be familiar with this subject, but he is afraid he is not. The Secretary said he saw at least a dozen questions that should be considered before the public is advised. He said he considered it important to advise them as early as possible because some member of the new Commission may at any time make a statement, not knowing the full facts. He said he would greatly regret having any statement made that would cause misunderstanding between the peoples of the two countries.

The SECRETARY inquired what the situation is in Britain concerning their Prime Minister making an agreement such as the one on atomic energy.

The AMBASSADOR said there was no objection to the Prime Minister signing an agreement and thereafter advising Parliament. He did not need Parliament's assent.

The SECRETARY said Mr. Acheson had told him of having discussed with the Ambassador this whole question and he believes we should reach some agreement that would supersede these indefinite things and make the relationship more firm. The Secretary brought out the fact that UN has not been advised of this agreement, and as the outstanding proponents of UN with its requirement that any agreement between the Governments should be filed, it leaves us in a bad position. Certainly we cannot be left in the position of failing to notify UN of an agreement and expect to hold anyone responsible in the future.

⁶ Lord Inverchapel had presented his credentials on June 5, 1946.

⁷ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸ Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which established the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

The SECRETARY said he assumed we would turn over the information to an international organization as soon as an agreement has been reached.

The AMBASSADOR said that any understanding reached between the two governments would be superseded by an international agreement. The SECRETARY agreed.

855.646/1-1047 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, January 10, 1947—2 p. m.

31. For Under Secretary Acheson from Kirk. Spaak¹ tells me that Professor Joliot-Curie² has been active among Belgian scientists in promoting idea his own researches nuclear physics antedate ours and that western European scientific talent quite capable paralleling our successes in field atomic energy in all its aspects. He proposes pooling talent and resources with Belgian conferees and then ingenuously suggests Belgian contribution should be uranium from their large supplies in Congo. (You will be familiar with background Professor Joliot-Curie who trades on *réclame* family name and is avowed Communist.)

Spaak says scientific circles here have been working on other cabinet members who in turn are asking if Belgium's interests do not require real research in atomic energy field including active experimentation with uranium from Congo sources. He feels that pressure of this character is growing and that his colleagues cannot be indefinitely put off with evasive replies nor with negative answer to proposals that must only seem reasonable to Belgian scientific world.

He has suggested therefore that perhaps we would consider inviting selected Belgian scientists to come to America for participation in research and development work. He said his ideas were not yet precisely formulated as to scope of terms of reference for such visitors and naturally would defer to our point of view. If we find such suggestion acceptable Spaak feels an arrangement to this effect to be made known publicly at a date to be mutually decided but not long delayed, would go long way to silence criticism on this point. He said he would give me memorandum soon but as three days have now elapsed I consider you should be apprised of tenor his proposal and be prepared to answer specifically when we have his communication.³

¹ Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

² Prof. Frédéric Joliot-Curie, director of the French atomic energy program; member of the French delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

³ For a translation of the memorandum submitted by Spaak to Kirk on February 4, see telegram 168 from Brussels, February 5, p. 792.

In this connection, from other sources, I learn universities Liège and Brussels are consulting on Belgium's needs for pursuit research this field. I also learn War Department has circularized several Military Attachés western Europe regarding possible sending scientific attachés or creating some exchange professorships, etc. My Attaché has recommended certain lectures only under auspices selected universities or Belgian-American association or *fondation universitaire*. (My comment on this will follow in separate message.) You will thus perceive topic very active in scientific circles which appears to me perfectly natural and normal.

Have not had opportunity to discuss foregoing with Hugessen.⁴

KIRK

⁴ Sir Hughe M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador in Belgium.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Chairman-Designate of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Lilienthal) to the Commissioners

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1947.

This is to record the substance of our conversation with Roger Makins, British Minister here, and until recently Deputy Chairman of the "Insecticide" Committee. (C.D.T.)¹

There was much general conversation of a social character—about the British Parliamentary system compared with ours, etc.

He said he was leaving this week to become a permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office; that his successor, Mr. Gordon Munro, and he would appreciate it if the Commission would be willing to see Mr. Munro from time to time.

We made it plain—each of the Commissioners expressing himself on this in one form or another—that the law creating the Atomic Energy Commission made it obligatory upon us to disclose to the Joint Committee of Congress our "activities" in respect to raw materials under the Insecticide arrangement, and that that disclosure might of necessity be forthcoming quite promptly, either during the hearings on our confirmation now going on, or as soon as the Joint Committee held its first meeting with us. Admiral Strauss read the applicable

¹ Reference is to the Combined Development Trust, established by the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on June 13, 1944; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. II, p. 1026. The Trust operated under the direction of the Combined Policy Committee; regarding the latter, see footnote 4, p. 787. The main function of the CDT was to secure control and insure development of uranium and thorium supplies located outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, India, and Burma.

provisions of the law to Mr. Makins, and also made it plain that disclosure was a matter of our *affirmative* duty. We all made the point, not once but several times, that the proper and ordinary way for the report of the wartime arrangements was on the initiative of the State Department, and that this we had recommended to the State Department on several occasions. We also made clear that whatever might be the British feeling about cooperation agreed to during the war, that cooperation to the extent that it involved exchange of vital information was almost certainly now forbidden by law, and that this law bound us. We pointed out that there was no alternative but to face these as the realities we suggested, that perhaps the best way would be to regard the wartime agreements as terminated, and a new agreement as to raw materials and their joint purchase contained, and reported to Congress. We made it clear that these suggestions were just "conversation" since these were matters outside our province and would have, of course, to be worked out between the two governments through their departments of foreign affairs.

D[AVID] E. L[ILIENTHAL]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 1, 1947.

Mr. Makins called on me at my house at his request. He outlined for me what he termed as his personal suggestion as to the solution of the problem raised by the Attlee-Truman correspondence on atomic energy. He said that he had discussed this matter with the Ambassador and with Field Marshal Wilson;² that he was making this suggestion with their approval, but that it had not been cleared in any way with London. Therefore, he asked me to regard it as a personal suggestion. If something along these lines could be worked out, he would be in London at the time it matured and would do his best to further it there.

¹ In a memorandum of February 3 transmitting this document to George C. Marshall, who had succeeded James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State on January 21, Acheson stated the following:

"It is important in the near future for me to review with you the negotiations which have led up to the conversation reported in the attached document. Some action is urgently required.

"When our own views are clear, we should consult with the War and Navy Departments, Dr. Bush [Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; United States Member, Combined Policy Committee], and the Atomic Energy Commission."

Marshall's initials and "OK" appear as a marginal notation on the source text.

² Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British member, Combined Policy Committee.

Mr. Makins stated that the difficulty in London was in some part practical, but in large part psychological. The practical difficulties arose over irritating obstacles which had arisen in the course of the British program, which could be quickly solved by comparatively minor help from the United States. The psychological difficulties came from the fact that London had the belief that we were ready and willing to cooperate in the field of raw materials, where there were substantial benefits accruing to us, but that we were not ready to cooperate in other fields in which the benefit might flow from us to the British. While Mr. Makins did not take this view, he thought the tone of the reply and some of his suggestions would go a long way toward eliminating the latter difficulty.

Mr. Makins has had several talks with Mr. Lilienthal and the full membership of the Atomic Energy Commission, with Mr. Carroll Wilson,³ and with Dr. Bush. These suggestions evolve out of those talks.

His view as to our reply would have it contain the following:

1. An expression of our desire to cooperate fully and effectively with the British, subject to the limitations of existing legislation.

When I asked him to be as specific as possible as to exactly what "full and effective cooperation, subject to existing legislation" meant to him, he said that, first, the British would like us to agree to an exchange of personnel; that is, that they might send representatives who could examine all that we were doing and be fully informed about it and that we could send representatives who could examine all that they were doing and be fully informed about that. This, he frankly stated, he did not believe to be possible under our existing legislation and, therefore, he did not believe that we could agree to this. Therefore, dropping back to what he thought was possible, he believed that for the present the British could furnish us with a list of some twelve or fourteen points, all of which related to specific obstacles which they or the Canadians had encountered. These obstacles would not in the long run interfere with the main course of British or Canadian work, but might delay specific operations six months or more. They would like to know how these specific obstacles had been overcome by us. He thought most of these difficulties were present in the Chalk River operation and that we might by specific answers at that plant give them the cooperation which they asked. He admitted that most of these points related to know-how rather than to basic scientific information and also admitted that these questions would have to be examined by the Atomic Energy Commission in the light of the existing restrictions of their law.

³ Carroll L. Wilson, General Manager of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; United States member, Combined Policy Committee.

2. He asked that the reply should also affirm that we wish to maintain the existing arrangements for consultation. By that he meant the Combined Policy Committee⁴ and the Combined Development Trust.

3. He asked that the reply continue that we would look to closer cooperation as soon as conditions permitted. By this he referred to his conversation with Mr. Lilienthal and Mr. Wilson, who, he stated, had told him that from time to time the Commission might find it necessary to request amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. These amendments, while requested for the purpose of domestic operation, might make possible closer cooperation.

4. Mr. Makins suggested that we might agree in the reply to provide the information on developments which had taken place prior to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act. When I asked him to explain this further, he said that we might take the view that under existing commitments we would be under an obligation to exchange information with the British until Congress had placed limitations upon our doing so by the passage of the Act. We had not exchanged information during the period when we were enabled to do so, and, therefore, we might regard the Act as applying only to information on developments occurring since the passage of the Act. I told Mr. Makins that quite frankly I could see no possible legal basis for such a position on our part and did not believe that this suggestion provided a fruitful field for exploration.

5. He would like some statement in the reply to the effect that we raised no objection to the development by the United Kingdom of its atomic energy program, which had been communicated to us, and, if possible, we should give it our blessing. He said that in accordance with existing commitments (he did not explain what commitments) the British had communicated to the Combined Policy Committee, and Mr. Makins had also communicated to General Groves,⁵ British plans for development of atomic energy under Lord Portal's organization in England.⁶ The impression was abroad that we were cool, if not hostile,

⁴The Combined Policy Committee was established under the terms of the Roosevelt-Churchill "Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys [atomic energy research and development]" signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943 (Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2993; *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (UST), vol. 5 (pt. 1), p. 1114). The text of the Quebec Agreement and related documentation are presented in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943.

⁵Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, Commanding General, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project; member of the Military Liaison Committee, United States Atomic Energy Commission; Commanding General, Manhattan Engineer District, the atomic bomb development program, 1942-1946.

⁶Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Lord Portal of Hungerford, head of the department in the British Ministry of Supply charged with the organization for production of materials for atomic energy research; Air Chief of Staff, 1940-1945.

to these plans, and he thought it most important that this belief should be dissipated.

6. He would like us to confirm the fact that arrangements for exchange of information in the defense field applied to military applications of atomic energy. He said that there were arrangements in existence by which information on various military developments were freely exchanged between our armies. To some extent this applied to atomic energy, as, for instance, the results of the Bikini tests. He gave me the impression that in his conversations with Mr. Lilienthal and Dr. Bush he found them favorable to the extension and development of exchange in this defense field.

Here again, I asked him to be specific as to what he meant, inquiring whether it covered the entire field of the construction, dropping, and detonation of the atomic bombs. He said that this was the case, and he said he thought that in this field the British already knew as much as we did, and that, therefore, the exchange of information would be of mutual benefit.

I then asked him whether in his judgment this particular item might be construed to be even broader than this and cover the whole field of preparing the ingredients which went into the bomb. He said that this was quite definitely a possibility. I pointed out that by following this road we might get by another path into another field of uncertainty and difficulty such as that in which we now found ourselves. He did not deny this, but urged that there was no reason and logic why, if we were exchanging full information on all other types of weapons, we did not do so on this one. I asked him whether he had considered the possible international, as well as United States domestic, complications if such a program became a matter of public knowledge. He said that he recognized that it would have complications.

7. He hoped further that our reply would suggest a visit from Lord Portal to Mr. Lilienthal to discuss common problems of administration, etc. Such a visit, he thought, while not a medium for the exchange of information, would give further reassurance of our sympathy with the United Kingdom program and of our desire to cooperate.

8. Finally, he suggested that our reply propose the interchange of information and personnel on declassified material (basic scientific information) on nuclear physics. Explaining this suggestion, he said that certain work was being done, for instance, at the University of California on the development of cyclotrons. This in itself was not classified material, but British participation in it has been precluded because at the same institution work of a classified nature was in progress, and it was felt that security required exclusion from both fields of work. He thought that ways could be worked out to permit a less harsh result.

When Mr. Makins finished his exposition, I asked him what his attitude was toward the existing arrangements, pointing out that we should have accomplished little if we did not find some way of terminating those agreements and putting our relations solely on some basis which could be made public without embarrassment.

He asked whether by terminating existing arrangements I meant terminating the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust. I replied that I did not include these two institutions, the provisions as to which could be kept in existence or repeated in some suitable way.

He said that from his point of view he saw no reason why, if the other ideas were worked out satisfactorily, the pre-existing arrangements should not be terminated.

Mr. Makins is leaving on Tuesday.⁷ I told him that we would not have any reply for him before he left, but after consulting within the Government, we would take the matter up with the Ambassador.

DEAN ACHESON

⁷ February 4.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee at the
Department of State, February 3, 1947*

TOP SECRET

Present:

Members

The Secretary of State (in the Chair)
The Secretary of War ¹
Dr. Vannevar Bush
The British Ambassador
Field Marshal Lord Wilson

By Invitation

The Canadian Ambassador ²
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Stone ³
Mr. George Bateman ⁴
Mr. Munro ⁵

¹ Robert P. Patterson.

² Mr. Hume Wrong.

³ Thomas A. Stone, Canadian Joint Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee (appointment approved at the present meeting); Canadian Minister in the United States.

⁴ Former Canadian Joint Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee (resignation approved at the present meeting).

⁵ R. Gordon Munro, British Joint Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee (appointment approved at the present meeting).

Col. Jannarone

Dr. King

Mr. Maclean ⁶

Secretariat

Mr. Gullion ⁷

Mr. Roger Makins

I. *Minutes of the Meeting of July 31, 1946.*⁸

The Minutes were approved.

II. *Resignations and New Appointments.*

The Committee had before it a paper by the Joint Secretaries on this subject, the text of which is annexed to these minutes.⁹ The Committee accepted and approved the resignations and new appointments described therein.

III. *Disposition of Minutes and Records of the Combined Policy Committee.*

By a decision at its meeting of December 4, 1945 (Item 10 of the Minutes)¹⁰ the C.P.C. agreed that its Minutes and records should be kept in the War Department. Inasmuch as the American Secretariat is now in the Department of State, and meetings will be held there, the Committee agreed that a master copy of the Minutes and records should now be kept in the Department of State.

IV. *The Establishment of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and Developments Thereafter.*

MR. ACHESON informed the Committee officially that the Atomic Energy Commission had been established in accordance with Public Law 585 and that it had taken over from the Manhattan District the property, functions and personnel as provided in Executive Order 9816 of December 31, 1946.

It did not appear that the passage of the Act and the establishment of the Commission would, at least for the present, affect the operations of the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust. The Atomic Energy Commission would take over the American side of the C.D.T.

For the present the Commission would continue to function with respect to procurement under the provisions of the Agreement and Declaration of Trust, but would not participate in the Combined Policy Committee deliberations.

⁶ Donald D. Maclean, First Secretary in the British Embassy.

⁷ Edmund A. Gullion, United States Joint Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee (appointment approved at the present meeting); Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1256, 1257.

⁹ The annexes to the minutes are not printed.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, p. 89.

As the Committee was aware, Public Law 585 (the Atomic Energy Act of 1946) prescribes that there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes have been established.

MR. ACHESON also informed the Committee that if it became necessary to acquaint the appropriate committees of Congress with the war-time arrangements regarding atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, the United States Government would, so far as possible, inform the other C.P.C. governments so that they could if they wished synchronize any exposition which they wished to make to their respective Parliaments.

V. Monazite Sand Supplies for American Rare Earths and Thorium Producers.

The Committee heard statements on this subject by the Chairman and by the British Ambassador, the texts of which are annexed. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR stated that insofar as Canadian requirements are concerned the object would be to obtain an assurance that Canada will receive annually from Thorium, Ltd. as cerium chloride the cerium content of 75 tons of monazite sands and in addition that Canada would be able to obtain as thorium oxide rods approximately three to four tons.

Attention was drawn to the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for the regulation of the use of atomic energy materials by American industry and that the matter would have to be discussed with them. Prima facie the procedure proposed by the U.K. members appeared to be reasonable. The desirability was recognized of expediting the delivery of monazite to United States industry and it was agreed that they could now be assured that some supplies from Travancore would be made available as soon as possible.

The Committee took note of the Chairman's, of Lord Inverchapel's, and of the Canadian Ambassador's statements and directed the Secretariat

(a) to take up with the Atomic Energy Commission the question of the control and re-export of thorium,

(b) to pursue the question of the quantity and timing of deliveries from Travancore to United States companies.

VI. Filing of Patent Applications by C.P.C. Countries in Non-C.P.C. Countries.

The Committee had before it the annexed paper by the Secretariat on this subject.

DR. BUSH expressed the opinion that security considerations would not allow the filing of such applications at the present time. He sug-

gested that the matter should be further examined in Washington by the patent advisers of the Committee. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR stated that a Canadian representative would be available for this examination. LORD INVERCHAPEL said he would do his best to arrange a visit by the U.K. adviser, Mr. Blok.

DR. BUSH also said that he thought that we must look forward to the question of the interchange of patents being raised at some time, and hence it would be well, since the patent advisers were to gather on another matter, for them to give thought to this subject as well in order that it may be in order for consideration at the appropriate time. Personally he felt that as simple an arrangement as possible for interchange would be advisable when the time comes.

On the other hand, he thought that everyone recognised that there could not now be a complete interchange of patents without some formal arrangement for the purpose, and that it will take time to go into this subject.

The Committee took note of and approved the foregoing proposals and instructed the Secretariat to make arrangements accordingly.

VII. *Declassification Procedure.*

The Committee approved the proposal contained in the attached statement by the U.K. members on this subject.

EDMUND A. GULLION
D. D. MACLEAN
for
Roger Makins

855.6359/2-547 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, February 5, 1947—2 p. m.

168. For Under Secretary Acheson from Kirk. *Verbatim text (translation)*¹:

“Uranium question is being more and more actively discussed in Belgian press and political circles. Govt will certainly be confronted shortly either by Parliamentary interpellation or draft laws. Certain members of Chamber will more than probably demand that uranium deposits be nationalized or placed under strict control.

It is furthermore evident that public opinion is now aware of fact that our entire uranium production is sold to US. As far as immense majority of public opinion is concerned there has until now been no difficulty but few days ago in mixed commission considering future

¹This text is a translation of a memorandum presented to Kirk by Spaak on the evening of February 4.

organization of Army, its President, a PSC Senator, asked me point blank if secret treaty between US and Belgium concerning uranium existed.² I was able to avoid replying but question might be put to me publicly in such fashion that it would be difficult for me to reply.

All these considerations force me to insist that US Govt in agreement with British Govt let me know what in their opinion can be said on this question and also that they consider possibility of associating certain Belgians in research on utilization of atomic energy for industrial purposes.

I believe it really urgent that this question be examined and settled."

KIRK

² For text of the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium regarding the control of uranium, September 26, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 1029-1030.

855.6359/2-547 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1947—1 p. m.

165. For the Ambassador. Reurtel 168 February 5, Department believes that any statement Spaak may have to make should follow as closely as possible text suggested by your 67 January 17.¹

As to Spaak's request regarding visit of Belgian scientists to engage in research on utilization of atomic energy for industrial purposes: Public Law 585 (Atomic Energy Act of 1946) makes it unlawful to exchange information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes until a joint resolution by Congress states that there have been established adequate international safeguards against destructive uses of atomic energy. If Spaak presses this request, we see no alternative except for you to inform him that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 makes it impossible for us to comply at this time.

¹The text under reference, prepared by Kirk in concert with British Ambassador Knatchbull-Hugessen, read as follows:

"1. During war it was essential to take steps to secure for Allied cause all possible supplies of vital materials required as a source of atomic energy. To this end arrangements were made with knowledge of Belgian Government whereby supplies of uranium ore in Belgian Congo were made available to the two governments. These arrangements fully protected natural and legitimate interest of Belgium as regards supplies which she might require for her own purposes.

"2. These arrangements continue to apply. Belgian Government hopes however that in due course as a result of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations an international agreement for control of atomic energy will be achieved and universally adopted under auspices of United Nations. At that time it will be appropriate to review existing arrangements so that they might be fitted into the agreed international scheme." (855.6359/1-1747)

In telegram 228, February 15, Kirk reported that Hugessen had presented a copy of this text to Spaak (855.6359/2-1547).

You may also indicate that we concur in the interpretation offered by the British of Section 9a of the agreement ² but for your own information our objection is primarily based on the restrictions contained in the statute.

If you should have any advance notice on the date on which Spaak makes a statement please advise Department.

MARSHALL

² Section 9a of the Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium regarding the control of uranium, September 26, 1944, read as follows:

"In the event of the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom deciding to utilize as a source of energy for commercial purpose ores obtained under this agreement the said Governments will admit the Belgian Government to participation in such utilization on equitable terms."

For full text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 1029-1030.

On January 31, Donald D. Maclean, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States, had transmitted to Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, an extract of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the Embassy which reflected the British attitude with respect to section 9a. The extract read in part as follows:

"This paragraph as you know stated that in the event of the two Governments deciding to utilize as a source of energy for commercial purposes, ores obtained under the Agreement they would admit the Belgian Government to participation in such utilisation on equitable terms. These words make it clear that it is the utilisation in which the Belgians are to share and not in research work. So far as we know, nothing has happened since the Agreement was signed which could be regarded as a decision by the Americans or ourselves to utilise uranium as a source of energy for commercial purposes. Such a decision could only come after the necessary research and development work has been completed, and this alone would make it clear that the participation referred to could not be participation in such research and development work.

"We propose therefore that M. Spaak should be informed that while we naturally fully adhere to the terms of para. 9(A) of the Agreement, the circumstances have not yet arisen in which its provisions become operative. We should be glad if you would let us know whether the Americans agree." (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson)*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, has informed the President that the United Kingdom desires to obtain from this country certain information relating to manufacturing and industrial aspects of atomic energy. This information would aid the British in the construction of a large scale atomic energy plant in the British Isles and the British contend that this country is under a commitment to supply it.

Without reference to the extent of any commitment this country may have in this field, or to our proposals for international control

¹ Transmitted at the meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, February 12 (811.002/1-247).

of atomic energy, I believe that a considered military opinion is required as to the effect on the security of the United States the location of such a plant in Britain may have.

I would appreciate a joint War and Navy Department opinion as to whether the location of a large scale atomic energy plant in the United Kingdom would be advantageous, disadvantageous, or of limited effect on the security of the United States. It would be helpful if I could receive this opinion prior to my departure for Moscow, the first week in March.²

I am sending a similar letter to the Secretary of the Navy.

Faithfully yours,

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

² For documentation on the 4th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 10–April 24, see vol. II, pp. 139 ff.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 18, 1947.

Mr. Maclean called at his request. He referred to the Department's telegram of February 10, 1947, to our Ambassador in Brussels¹ (the substance of which had been conveyed to him orally) indicating the answer which the Ambassador should make with regard to request from Prime Minister Spaak for guidance on a statement which he might be forced to make to the Belgian Parliament on arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom concerning sale of uranium ores. Spaak had also asked that Belgian scientists might be allowed to come to this country to engage in research on atomic energy uses for industrial purposes. The Department's telegram in reference informed Kirk of the restrictions which the McMahon Act imposed on exchange of information with other nations; if Spaak persisted in his request Kirk would have to inform him that the Atomic Energy Act made it impossible for us to comply.

Mr. Maclean said that London considered it unfortunate that the Americans had to cite the Act in replying to Spaak; the British felt that this might cause the Belgians to question our good faith in making the Belgian accord. The British did not, however, ask us to modify our instruction. I told Mr. Maclean that while I understood London's concern there was no alternative to citing the Act if necessary. I pointed out that the language of our instructions to Kirk gave him some leeway in making reply to Spaak and that he might soften his negative in any

¹ Telegram 165, p. 793.

way which seemed appropriate. I also told Mr. Maclean that the question of the applicability of the Act in this matter had been taken up with the Atomic Energy Commission which was quite definite in ruling that it applied.

I took the occasion to point out that this same restriction which prevented us from complying with the Belgian request was also one which appeared to prevent our transmitting to the British certain information requested by them. I did not tell Mr. Maclean that this might be the reason why the British were unhappy about our reply to the Belgians.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, February 25, 1947.

DEAR DEAN: Many thanks for your most interesting letter of February 5.¹ I appreciate the detail you went into about organizational changes and the persons involved. For God's sake keep things tight.

It is rather difficult to answer your question as to why there has not been heavier pressure here. It has puzzled me considerably. Trying to put myself in the Russians' place, I would think that their objectives on uranium would be two-fold. One would be termination of the present contract. This would require that its terms be made public and made to appear objectionable to Belgian public opinion. The other would be to have uranium made available to scientists whose work would be made known to the Russians. While they presumably have uranium from internal or Czech deposits for their own research, they would naturally be interested in obtaining the results of nuclear research anywhere and the work of "friendly scientists" such as Joliot-Curie could be important to them. So far they have followed both lines with the emphasis increasingly, for the moment, on the second.

What is more difficult to understand is why neither line has been pushed more actively. On this point the Communists here are, of course, in the Government. They probably realize that a country as small as this, prosperous as it is, could not readily be persuaded to undertake the enormous expense of serious research in this field. Furthermore, the Belgian Communists seem to operate on a fairly loose rein from Moscow and to be permitted for the time being to be more Belgian than Communist. For example, Lalmand, the Communist Minister of Food Supply, who according to our best information is the real as well as the titular leader of the Belgian Communists, advocates retention of the monarchy to tie Belgium's two linguistic

¹ Not printed.

groups together and expresses his opinion that Communism can grow faster in Belgium under a high level of prosperity than under adverse economic conditions. In addition, the *Drapeau Rouge* has been urging that the way for Belgian workers to get higher real wages is to increase productivity and that strikes at the present time are against their own interest.

All this seems to indicate that Moscow does not currently attach sufficient importance to either objective indicated above to whip up the Belgian Communists over them. Why it is not more interested I frankly cannot answer.

Spaak has more than once expressed amazement to me that the Russians did not try to buy some from Union Minière. He mentioned this in connection with possible nationalization of the deposits, as nationalization would make such requests more difficult to refuse.

I am delighted that you have decided to stay on in the Department and wish you all the best. Lydia joins in warm regards to you and Alice.

Sincerely,

ALAN

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Foster)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1947.

Subject: Exchange of Information Between Canada and the United States Relating to Atomic Energy

During the trip of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense¹ to Churchill, Manitoba, last week, General A. G. L. McNaughton, Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Board, told me informally of his responsibilities as Chairman of the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board. He said that he was deeply disturbed over the present legal situation in the United States which prevented American officials and scientists concerned in atomic energy matters in this country revealing information to him and his Canadian Board. He said that before the McMahon Act there had been free interchange in both directions and each side had obviously benefited enormously. Now, however, it was a "one-way traffic" of information from Canada to the United States and he personally was very fed up. He added that this situation was not going to do Canadian-American relations any good and that he personally was indignant about it. He said that some of his fellow Board members in Canada, and other Canadian officers and scientists concerned, were advocating retaliation, but he had given them orders

¹ For documentation on military cooperation between the United States and Canada, see vol. III, pp. 104 ff., *passim*.

that they were to continue to give information without restriction to the Americans. He said that a number of Americans who had come to Canada to gain information had expressed themselves as "ashamed" to be in a position of asking without being able to give anything in return.

General McNaughton said that he hoped the Senate would make up its mind about Mr. Lilienthal or somebody to head the American Board² and he added that within 24 hours of the new Chairman's confirmation he, the General, would be on his doorstep to urge a change in the unfortunate situation relating to the exchange of information.

General McNaughton is of course a man of deep conviction but he spoke with extra feeling about this problem and he ended up by saying "I wish you would tell your State Department how strongly I feel about this". It is worth recalling that General McNaughton is very close to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and may be assumed to have made his views known to the Prime Minister.

ANDREW B. FOSTER

² Reference is to Senate consideration of the nomination of David E. Lilienthal as Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission; the Senate confirmed the appointment on April 9.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In reply to your letter of 11 February 1947 requesting a considered military opinion as to the effect on the security of the U.S. of the location of a large-scale atomic energy plant in the U.K., the Joint Chiefs of Staff have furnished the following views with which we concur:¹

"1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff answer the question on the assumption that, in any future war, Britain will be an ally of the United States.

"2. Fundamentally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the location of a large-scale atomic energy plant in Great Britain to be disadvantageous to the security interests of the United States because:

a. It locates such a plant, and presumably large stocks of useable material, closer to a potential enemy than would be the case if it were located, for example, in Canada.

b. Presumably, its construction would divert from U.S. manufacturing capacity an appreciable portion of available raw materials, all of

¹The JCS views were forwarded to the Secretaries of War and Navy by a memorandum dated 1 March 1947.

which can and should at this time be used in producing in U.S. plants material suitable for atomic weapons.

"3. The point of overriding importance, however, is that all available ore be turned into useable fissionable material available to the United States or to potential allies in case of an emergency. Consequently the disadvantages of having a plant constructed in Great Britain can be minimized by the earliest possible conversion into a form useable for atomic weapons of those raw materials which are now accumulating in England."

Sincerely yours,

R. P. PATTERSON
FORRESTAL

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1947.

Subject: Brazilian Offer of Monazite Sand to Canada

The attached memorandum is self-explanatory. I have confirmed that our approval is necessary before the one ton of monazite in question can be assigned to the Canadians.

The Brazilian motives in making this offer are, I think, to establish a basis for scientific cooperation and exchange of information with Canada. The Brazilians are taking a more ambitious and energetic line with respect to exploitation of their monazite than hitherto. You have seen the inspired editorial in *El [O] Globo* which calls for nationalization of the deposits and the trade with pressure for higher prices and concessions from the United States. Our despatches from Brazil report the interests of many firms, Dutch, Portuguese, French, et cetera, in making offers on Brazilian monazite. There is no indication as yet that the Brazilians have violated the agreement of July 10, 1945,² by releasing any quantity for shipment to nonapproved consignees (except for the one ton for Canada about which they may yet ask us) but there is a suggestion of pressure on us in the numerous rumors of a lively demand for Brazilian monazite by non-CPC countries. As you also know, the Brazilians are trying to get Lindsay³ and others to build monazite refining plants in Brazil. Our attitude toward Brazilian nationalization of the industry is contingent on whether it affects the Agreement, our access to the material, and the price we have

¹ At the top of the source text, Acheson wrote "I agree with all three points."

² For the text of the agreement between the United States and Brazil providing for the purchase of monazite sands from Brazil, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, p. 14.

³ Reference is to the Lindsay Light and Chemical Company, an American processor of monazite sands.

to pay. We would also be opposed to any arrangement which caused any appreciable thorium residues to remain in Brazil.

It may be possible that the Brazilians are going to try to modify the Agreement, possibly sometime before we notify them of our desire to continue our option which must be done before January 10, 1948.

If you agree I propose:

(a) To tell the British and Canadian CPC secretaries that we have no objection to Canada as a consignee of the one ton; we assume, however, that there would not be any exchange of scientists and we understand that that is also the attitude of the Canadian Government.

(b) To review for them our latest information on Brazilian measures and actions with regard to monazite.

(c) To get from our Embassy any further information about Brazilian intentions.

[Annex]

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1947.

Mr. Stone informed me that the Brazilian Government through Cmdr. [Captain] Alberto ⁴ had offered to the Canadian Government one ton of monazite sand for experimental purposes. The Brazilians had also indicated an interest in having scientists participate in research in Canada and having Canadian scientists visit Brazil. Mr. Stone said that the Canadians had said they would accept the one ton but they were not going to arrange for any exchange of scientists. I told Mr. Stone I believed, subject to further study and consultation, that the US-Brazilian Agreement of July 10, 1945 to which the UK had later been made a party, required that all consignees have prior approval from the US and UK authorities.

(A despatch from Rio, number 1668, dated February 12, 1947,⁵ transmits a top secret memorandum from the Legal Attaché stating that Mr. Jean Desy, Canadian Ambassador to Brazil, had requested the ton of monazite from Brazilian suppliers. According to this source General McNaughton, Canadian Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, had made arrangements to facilitate the shipment with Commander Alberto. It is established, however, that the Brazilians through Alberto took the initiative in making the offer.)

⁴ Capt. Alvaro Alberto da Motta e Silva, Brazilian Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

⁵ Not printed.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 7, 1947.

The French have suggested to the British that a patents' pool should be established either (1) between the French and U.K. Governments or (2) between the French, U.K., and U.S. Governments. They have also suggested that the U.K. Government might be prepared to enter into closer cooperation with the French Government in the general fields of atomic energy.

The British have already explained that they cannot establish a French-U.K. pool and propose to state that the time is not ripe for a French-U.K.-U.S. pool. They want to say, however, that they are anxious to see closer relations in the general sphere (not only in patents) established between the French, themselves and the U.S. Munro of the British Embassy here has written me a letter (attached)¹ enclosing a memorandum requesting the comments of "the American side".

Mr. Marks² suggests, and I agree, that it would be better to give our answer informally to someone from the British Embassy rather than in a written reply.

(a) Do you concur?

(b) Do you approve my telling Munro the following:³

"I refer to the the memorandum transmitted by your letter of February 10, 1947, concerning United States and United Kingdom relations with France in respect of atomic energy.

"With regard to the suggestion put forward by Professor Joliot, we concur in the answers your government has made or proposes to make to the proposals indicated as A (i) and A (ii) in your memorandum.

"We can have no objection to your government's informing the French that it is anxious 'to see closer relations established in this field between the French, the Americans' and itself. For our own part, however, we cannot see our way clear to extending the basis of cooperation with the French at this time. As you are aware, Public Law 585 (The Atomic Energy Act of 1946) contains a number of restrictions with respect to the international aspects of atomic energy and specifically prescribes that there shall be no exchange of information with other countries on industrial uses until Congress has declared by joint resolution that effective and enforceable safeguards exist against its use for destructive purposes. Our domestic Atomic Energy Commission is only now beginning its task and the Act has been in force only a short time.

¹ Not printed.

² Herbert S. Marks, General Counsel of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

³ In marginal notations, Acheson expressed agreement with items (a) and (b).

"Furthermore, as you point out, the matter should be considered later in the light of the results of the discussions in the United Nations commission."⁴

⁴In a marginal notation dated March 10, Gullion indicated that Maclean of the British Embassy had been informed.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Guillion to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1947.

MR. ACHESON: Developments in Belgium in the last two weeks have an indirect but very important bearing on the United States atomic energy program. A new Government has been formed, without Communist participation; this Government plans to nationalize uranium and to begin research in Belgium; and M. Godding, the Minister of Colonies, is no longer in the Cabinet. The following is the story:

The Belgian Government fell on March 11, and on March 19 Monsieur Paul Henri Spaak succeeded in forming a government of 19 ministries comprising 9 Catholic Socialist members,¹ 8 Belgian Socialist members and 2 "technicians". Significantly, no Communists were included in the Government. Little information has so far been received concerning the reasons for the Government's fall, but the immediate issue appears to have been disagreement between the Socialists and Liberals on the one hand and Communists on the other over the price of coal. The Communists, who were for a lower price, appeared to have grasped the issue as one on which they could pose as public champions.

Our Embassy reports that this issue was generally considered to be a pretext for the Communists' exit. Hitherto they have preferred to stay in the Government and have even indicated that their ends would best be served by Belgian economic recovery. The Embassy thinks the move was due to instructions from abroad rather than to any factors in Belgian politics. Now that the Communists are out of the Government, they are free to attack Government handling of uranium which is what we have feared for some time.

So far the Embassy has not indicated that there is any direct connection between the Communists' withdrawal and the atomic energy question. However, there are other developments, which coupled with the new Communist tactics, give cause for concern.

The two parties now represented in the Cabinet have agreed on a "political platform plank" calling for the nationalization of uranium

¹ i.e., members of the Belgian Social Christian Party.

deposits. The Communist defection was partly responsible because, in order to keep the Left Wing Socialists from following the Communists out of the Government, Spaak had to swing his platform far to the Left. The program specified a number of targets for nationalization, among them the National Bank and the Association Nationale de Crédit, and included a plan for participation of workers in the management of industry.

As you are aware, nationalization of Union Minière is contrary to our interests inasmuch as it would presumably be more difficult for a national company to refuse Russian requests for uranium than for a private company. However, the Regent and Spaak have told our Ambassador that existing contracts should preclude granting the Russian requests.

Spaak has defended nationalization on the grounds that the US, UK and Canada had established rigid controls over raw materials and that Belgium had to do something similar.

Another disturbing development has been the decision to allocate ten million francs (\$250,000.00) for uranium research, which will involve diversion of some mineral to Belgium. Our Belgian friends do not think that the amount will be sufficient for any significant development. Nevertheless, from our point of view it is dangerous that the principle of diversion should be established and that research should be brought into Europe at a point where its materials and results might become easily available to the Russians. Spaak pointed out that our new legislation (the McMahon Act) made it very difficult to object to the research project since it apparently prevented the Belgians from getting needed information from this country.

Finally, the Cabinet crisis has meant the disappearance from the Cabinet of the Liberal member, M. Godding, the Minister of Colonies, who had been a key man in our relations with the Congo. Pierre Wigny, who replaces him as Colonial Minister, is a Catholic Socialist and is not known to our Embassy, although Spaak has indicated he would not be particularly "in the picture".

There seems little that we could have done or can do about these developments which, although limited in their immediate effects, are rather disturbing for the long range. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions to be drawn. Do you concur in the following? : (a) The thesis developed in Mr. Snapp's² and my paper³ about the dangers to our procurement program which would result from a deterioration in US-UK-Belgian cooperation is reinforced by these developments; (b) the necessity of finding some solution to the problems presented by the

² Roy B. Snapp, Special Assistant to the General Manager of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

³ Not printed.

restrictive clauses on exchange of information in the McMahon Act has become more urgent; and (c) assuming a solution of (a), Ambassador Kirk's suggestion that we should bring Belgian scientists to this country should be adopted. The Atomic Energy Commission was not originally receptive to this last idea, but they might wish to reconsider it at the present time. It is true that we are to some degree locking the barn door after the horse is stolen, but we might be able at least to keep some control of the Belgian research program by bringing scientists here.⁴

EDMUND A. GULLION

⁴In a notation at the bottom of the final page of the source text, Acheson stated that he agreed that developments in Belgium were adverse to United States interests and should be taken very seriously.

United States Atomic Energy Commission Files

Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Lilienthal) to the Commissioners

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1947.

[Here follows mention of those present at a meeting at the White House on April 16, 11:15 a. m.: the President; Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy; Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War; James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; and Lilienthal. The memorandum next describes the first part of the meeting, which was devoted to discussion of production and allocation of fissionable materials.]

The President asked if there had been any improvement in the raw materials picture and what we thought could be done about it. I replied that our import situation from Belgium and elsewhere is not in good shape; that the Belgium miners had reported that another shaft had to be driven and imports might be at quite a low level; that we were not completely sure that this was correct and we hope to try to check the matter.

Secretary Patterson asked if the division of 50-50 with UK and Canada continued and I said it did. I said that the most important development recently had been our determination to press forward with recovery processes which regrettably had not been prepared earlier and that this in a couple of years, with good luck, might fortify but would by no means cure our situation.

Reference was made to the feeling by the British and Canadians that our position on exchange of information was wrong. Secretary Patterson said the British were bitter about it. Admiral Leahy said he could not see why that should be; that there was no agreement to

that effect. He was reminded that there was an agreement but that it had been explained to the British that the McMahon Act made that agreement one that the Commission could not carry out in respect to exchange of information. I stated that the Commission had from the outset been considerably and deeply concerned that the existence of this agreement with UK and Canada had not been laid before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; that we appreciated the difficulties of such disclosure but that nevertheless it made things much more difficult than if the disclosure had been made; and that further it would be most inappropriate if the reporting concerning the agreement came from the Commission rather than from the State Department.

The President made some reference to Churchill understanding that there was no agreement beyond the end of the war and the President said that he had made no such agreement. Admiral Leahy again said that he knew of no agreement. I stated as tactfully as I could that our information was that there was an agreement known as the Quebec Agreement; that it covered not only raw materials and exchange of information but also matters relating to the use of atomic bombs in warfare. The other participants in the conference dropped the matter of the agreement at this point and I left it only with renewed expression that I hoped that disclosure by the State Department would be made. I said it was important that in our relations with the UK we bear in mind that some of the most substantial uranium possibilities were those in South Africa in the Rand Gold area. The President asked if this were uranium or a by-product and I explained that it was a by-product in the mining of gold and that while the concentration was not high it was fair and the quantities were large.

Secretary Forrestal said, with some impatience, that he thought that the British claims on us were wiped out by the 7½ billion dollar loan [*sic*]¹—or so I understood him.

I stated that another question I wished they would keep in mind was the matter of a test of atomic weapons; that a substantial number of the assemblies were weapons that had never been tested and that this was not a good situation. I said that the Commission was thinking about the matter and hoped that the broad public policy issues involved could be worked out. I said that Dr. Bacher² was of the opinion that a test probably should not be held within the continental limits of the United States. The President said that the New Mexico test had been successful. I pointed out, however, that virtually everybody in the state knew of the test but that voluntary censorship in war-time had kept

¹ For documentation on United States–United Kingdom financial relations, see vol. III, p. 1 ff; especially, p. 48.

² Robert F. Bacher, member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

it rather secret but that we could not rely upon that in peace-time. Admiral Leahy suggested some isolated island in the Pacific. I said that the test should not be an elaborate one with great fanfare such as Bikini, that monitoring devices would catch the fact that a test had been made almost anywhere in the world. Secretary Patterson asked about Australia. The President seemed of the opinion that a test held for technical reasons was probably entirely suitable. I said the matter would be brought back to them again when we are farther along.

I repeated the fact that the program had a number of weak spots and that it would take great energy and much money to strengthen it. I said, referring to the Secretaries and the President's Chief of Staff, that the Commission would hope that these three gentlemen would assist in stating the security reasons for monies needed; whereupon the President said that he will be glad to take a hand and to ask John Taber³ to come "right in here and talk it over".

This was the extent of the conference.

DAVID LILIENTHAL

³ Representative John Taber of New York, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Statement by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to an Executive Session of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, May 12, 1947

TOP SECRET

At the outset if you will bear with me I should like to say a word about security considerations, of which I am sure we are all aware, but which cannot be overemphasized. Of course, there is the obvious danger of leaks about figures, sources and production quotas which are, of course, prime military secrets. But what I propose to discuss chiefly with you are certain secret bilateral international arrangements which were made during the war with regard to atomic energy.

Some of the collaboration with other nations provided for in these arrangements still continues. At the same time we are trying to secure the adoption by the United Nations of our proposals for a multilateral system of international control of atomic energy. We have made no new bilateral arrangements and are not undertaking anything in the way of cooperation which is inconsistent with our effort in the United Nations. We are, however, actively going ahead with our own program which we would presumably be prepared to mesh into any international regime adopted by the United Nations.

If efforts to achieve the latter should fail, we would, of course, re-

examine the question of further unilateral and bilateral arrangements, with your advice and counsel.

In the meantime, any leaks about the war-time arrangements would give the Soviet Union the opportunity to distort the records and our motives. It might suit the Russians' book to represent our United Nations effort as insincere. Consequently whenever we widen the circle of knowledge or speculation about these arrangements we do so at some risk to the effort to get international control of the atom.

Moreover, it is a fact that in the countries where we obtain raw materials there are strong elements, either actually within the government or in opposition, who are trying to break up the arrangements under which we obtain our supplies.

In Belgium, for example, the Communists have been vigorously pushing for abrogation of the contracts under which we get all the production of the most important uranium source in the world, which is in the Congo. Just now they have withdrawn from the Government, at least partly so that they can bring greater pressure to bear on this very issue. Already there is some deterioration in the position because the government has been forced to announce that it will nationalize uranium and has begun a small research program in Belgium which means bringing materials and research into Europe where they might become available to the Soviet Union. Any publicity on our contracts with Belgium would strengthen the hand of the Communists and might easily make it very difficult for us to get the imports we vitally need to keep the program running.

I should now like to outline for you the principal existing arrangements.

The development of atomic weapons and the discoveries made in the field of atomic energy are to a large degree the product of international cooperation. The United States, by reason of its position, resources and technical facilities, not the least of which is the skill of its scientists, has probably made the major contribution to this development. Nevertheless, our advances in the field owe a great deal to the contributions made by Great Britain and Canada, and certain other countries which control the sources of some of the indispensable raw materials.

In late 1941, when the fate of Europe hung in the balance and war menaced the United States, Mr. Roosevelt proposed to Mr. Churchill that there should be cooperation in research in the field of atomic energy which was proceeding actively in the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States.¹ As a result of discussions on the initiative of the two Chiefs of State, a very important decision was made to con-

¹ For the text of Roosevelt's letter to Churchill, October 11, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, footnote 3, p. 3.

concentrate further development in this country where research could be carried on in comparative safety and where our greater resources ensured quicker results. This was part of the pooling of effort and wise division of resources which made possible the winning of the war. British scientists, and some scientists who had fled from the continent and were assisting the British, came to this country and assisted materially in our researches.

The British had and still have much to contribute. Their scientific and theoretical knowledge of the processes has practically paralleled our own, although, partly as a result of the decision to concentrate development in this country, their industrial "know-how" has lagged far behind. From the beginning there was much to gain by cooperation with the British and the Canadians; the latter, for example, are in a position to supply current operating data on one of the few heavy water piles in existence.

In order to bring the project to fruition as soon as possible, it was decided in August 1943 to establish a Combined Policy Committee on which there was high level representation of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Policy Committee* was established by an agreement signed at Quebec by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt on August 19, 1943.

This agreement was primarily designed to govern collaboration in the atomic energy field during the war period. Under it, interchange of information was provided for within certain limits. In the field of scientific research and development, full interchange was maintained between those working in the same section of the field; in matters of design, construction and operation of large scale plants information was exchanged only when it was considered that such exchange would hasten the completion of weapons for use in the war. The Combined Policy Committee kept under review the broad direction of the project.

The signatories agreed not to use the weapon against each other; not to use the weapon against third parties except by mutual consent; and not to communicate information on this matter to third parties except by mutual consent.

It was early recognized that for security reasons there would have to be some control of patents. Consequently, under the agreement, it was arranged that in each country all personnel engaged in the work, both scientific and industrial, would be required to assign their entire rights to any inventions in this field to their respective governments.

*As of March 1, 1947, the members of the Combined Policy Committee were:
 United States —Secretary of State, Hon. George C. Marshall, Chairman
 Secretary of War, Hon. Robert P. Patterson
 Dr. Vannevar Bush

United Kingdom—The British Ambassador to the U.S., the Rt. Hon., The
 Lord Inverchapel Field Marshal, the Lord Wilson
 Canada —The Hon. C. D. Howe [Footnote in the source text.]

Arrangements were made for appropriate patent exchange in instances where inventions were made by nationals of one country working in the territory of another. Such patents, interests and titles as are exchanged, however, are held in a fiduciary sense subject to settlement at a later date on mutually satisfactory terms.

As an example of the kind of continuing cooperation for which the guidance of some combined policy committee is required, there may be cited the question of declassification of scientific information. Obviously, unless there were some synchronization of releases by the various countries possessing scientific knowledge there would be great risks to security.

The atomic energy project relies in its present state of development almost exclusively on imported raw materials. In 1944, it was realized that it would be necessary to control as far as possible all the ore indispensable to the process and also to insure a continued supply from abroad.

Practically none of the raw materials lie in territories under the direct control of the United States. The Belgian Congo and certain areas of the British Commonwealth are the principal suppliers. We realized then that British cooperation in procurement would be of the utmost importance in assuring continued operation of the process, at least at the stage of development existing then and now. Accordingly, an instrument known as the Combined Development Trust Agreement was signed on June 13, 1944, by President Roosevelt and former Prime Minister Churchill, governing joint acquisition of uranium and thorium supplies. The following were its principal provisions:

A Combined Development Trust† was established. The functions of the Trust are to:

1. Explore and survey sources of uranium and thorium outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., U.K., and the Governments of the Dominions and of India and Burma.
2. Acquire supplies outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., U.K., and the Governments of the Dominions and of India and Burma;
3. Provide storage and safekeeping of such supplies.

Under this Trust Agreement the two governments undertook to secure fullest possible control over uranium and thorium ores within their respective jurisdictions.

†As of March 1, 1947, the members of the Combined Development Trust were:

United States —Mr. Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman
 Dr. C. K. Leith
 Mr. Joseph Volpe, Jr.

United Kingdom—Mr. R. Gordon Munro, Deputy Chairman
 Mr. Arthur D. Storke

Canada —Mr. G. C. Bateman [Footnote in the source text.]

The United Kingdom undertook to approach the Dominions, India, and Burma with the view to having these governments secure control over uranium and thorium ore deposits within their respective jurisdictions.

The Combined Development Trust was made the agent of the Combined Policy Committee and subject to its direction and guidance.

All the ores, supplies, and properties acquired by the Trust were to be held in trust for the two governments jointly, subject to allocation or other disposition by the Combined Policy Committee.

The expenses of the Trust were to be provided one-half by the United States and one-half by the United Kingdom.

The Agreement and Declaration of Trust were to remain in full force and effect until extended or revised by the signatories after cessation of hostilities. The signatories agreed to recommend to their respective governments, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of hostilities, the extension and revision of this agreement to cover post-war conditions and its formalization by treaty or other proper method.

On September 19, 1944, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill discussed the program further at Hyde Park. An *aide-mémoire* of their conversation indicates that the two Chiefs of State agreed that the time had not arrived to tell the world about atomic energy with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use.²

They also envisaged that full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing atomic energy for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

On November 16, 1945, President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King initialed a memorandum stating (1) that there should be full and effective cooperation in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada; (2) that the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Trust should be continued in a suitable form, and (3) that the Combined Policy Committee should consider and recommend appropriate arrangements for this purpose.³

It will be obvious to the Committee that these principal agreements contain much which bore solely on the conduct of the war; it is also clear that although hostilities have ceased we still are not in a state of peace. We are actively studying how much of these agreements should be continued in effect in order to assure the development of atomic energy and our own national security. In any case, so far as the

² For text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conference at Quebec, 1944, pp. 492-493.

³ For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. II, p. 75.

Department of State is aware, the departments of this government charged with responsibility for atomic energy development have not taken any action under these agreements, especially as regards international arrangements, inconsistent with either the general constitutional obligation of the Executive Departments to the Congress or with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

After V-J Day we began to consider with the British and Canadians the question of the form which future cooperation should take. Any proposals for new agreements will be scrutinized in the light of Executive responsibility to the Congress, the Atomic Energy Act and our obligations as members of the United Nations.

Pending any further standing arrangements it is obviously most important that a supply of raw materials be assured in at least the current volume. Within the framework of the Combined Development Trust, a series of agreements have been made with either the governments or the principal suppliers in areas where the key deposits of uranium or thorium exist.

One arrangement has been made with the Union Minière of Belgium for the purchase of all the ore which can be produced economically in the Belgian Congo through October 27, 1955.

There is an agreement between the United States and Brazil for the purchase from Brazil if available of 3,000 metric tons of monazite thorium-bearing sands a year for three years, with ten successive options to extend the agreement for three years each. In accordance with the Combined Trust Agreement we have made it possible for Britain to obtain some supplies from this source.

An agreement with the Netherlands covers all sources of thorium under Netherlands jurisdiction, particularly the Netherlands East Indies. Provision is made for the purchase of 200 metric tons of monazite thorium sands a year for three years with six successive options to extend the agreement for three years each.

An approach was made to Sweden but it was impossible to reach the usual agreement with that country. The Swedish Government has, however, undertaken to prohibit the export of uranium-bearing materials and to consult with the United States and the United Kingdom before taking any action involving the export of uranium to other countries.

The greatest known source of thorium-bearing monazite sands is in Travancore, a princely state in India. An agreement was recently concluded between Travancore and the British which provides that within a period of three years, from January 1, 1947, Travancore will sell 9,000 tons of monazite to the United Kingdom. We, in turn, will be able to get Travancore monazite from the British Ministry of Supply or a consignee designated by it.

855a.6359/5-1447 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BRUSSELS, May 14, 1947—6 p. m.

777. For Under Secretary Acheson from Kirk. (*Translation of verbatim text.*)¹

Memorandum. I. I am still concerned with question of eventual publicity to be given agreement of September 1944. Parliamentary questions about Congo uranium are relatively frequent and now that Communists are in opposition they may well become more specific. I wonder if interested Governments do not exaggerate secret aspect of agreement. Everybody knows that Congo uranium is sold to US and UK and everybody knows our entire production is sold to them. Sole important thing which remains in doubt is duration of agreement. That part of public opinion which is interested in matter guesses there is secret accord and its imagination has free reign. It probably believes that secrets are much more complicated than they are and in my opinion present mystery is likely in long run to do much more harm than good. I wonder if there are serious objections to full revelation of text of agreement? (Embassy's telegram 776, May 14, 5 p. m.).

II. I believe time has come to give specific interpretation to paragraph 9-A of agreement and to seek formula for concrete realization of undertakings contained therein. I recall that agreement envisages: "In case Governments of US and UK decide to use ore obtained in accordance with agreement as source of energy for commercial purposes these Governments will permit Belgian Government to participate in such utilization under equitable conditions." According to reports reaching Belgium it certainly seems that industrial utilization of atomic energy is being very seriously considered in US and UK and that efforts toward its realization are already under way. I should like to know as soon as possible the form in which those two Governments contemplate giving effect to their promises. Matter is obviously delicate and complicated. That is why I believe it should be studied without delay. Finally, I recall that this provision of agreement is of paramount importance for Belgium.

KIRK

¹ In telegram 776, May 14, 5 p. m., Ambassador Kirk stated that Spaak had presented him with the memorandum on atomic energy matters which he had promised; the text would be transmitted in the immediately following telegram (855a.6359/5-1447).

855.6359/5-1447 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1947—9 p. m.

US URGENT

683. For the Ambassador from Acheson. 1. The Department is in complete agreement with your analyses over recent weeks of the atomic energy situation in Belgium, and the dangers to our procurement

program and to security presented by recent political changes there. For your own strictly confidential information, the Department is at present engaged with the Atomic Energy Commission in studying whether the provisions of the Act will allow us in view of its primary objective which is to "assure the common defense and security" to use information as a counter in the dealings necessary to assuring continuing supplies of raw materials in the required amounts. We are trying to establish whether this proposition, which applies not only to our relations with Belgium, is correct, and, if so, what our course should be. In any case, we shall try to hasten a decision. The outcome of discussions in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission will also obviously have a bearing on our future course.

2. If you are able to see Spaak before your departure¹ you may inform him in the sense of the following paragraphs; if not, your Chargé may act for you.

3. I testified on May 12 before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the arrangements by which we have been securing raw materials for the program. I informed the Committee of the existence of the Belgian agreements, and of their duration. I did not discuss quantities, consignments, prospects, price or other details. I did refer generally to recent developments in Belgium as reported in your telegrams. The Committee appeared to understand fully the need for secrecy in respect to the arrangements, although there was much speculation on the extent to which the main outlines of the agreement might already be known to unauthorized persons. I believe that the session was successful and that it will facilitate our further handling of the program.

4. We are somewhat concerned about recent developments in Belgium, although we understand the difficulties of Spaak's position and the pressures on his government. We trust that no arrangements made in pursuant of the decisions to nationalize uranium and to extend research in Belgium will interfere with the execution of present agreements and contracts. We, here, are investigating every possibility of extending the base of cooperation with the Belgians within the provisions of law. Some little time may lapse, however, before we can arrive at a decision, since we have not yet progressed beyond the stage of basic studies within some of the Executive departments. We cannot, therefore, give any assurances and Spaak should make only the most restricted use of this information. As to publicity on existing contracts, we shall consult with the British about any statement Spaak should make if he is forced to do so. We do not presently see that my statement to the Committee is any occasion for such a statement.

¹ Ambassador Kirk left for Washington on May 16, returning to Brussels on June 27.

5. You may also indicate to Spaak, with reference to his desire to send Belgian scientists here to study the development of atomic energy for industrial purposes, that these uses do not seem as imminent as he appears to believe, judging from his conversations with you. No plants or other installations have yet been designed or operated for such uses nor can there be until a number of important engineering and technical problems are solved. I am sending you, under separate cover, copies of a recent statement by Oppenheimer before a committee to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission which deals with these prospects.

6. We are aware of our obligations to Belgium, under Sec. 9a of the agreement, and will do all in our power to carry them through when the time comes, but our research and development have not yet entered the stage where the cooperation envisaged by this section would become operative.

7. We note that Belgium has begun a small research program and the British and ourselves would be glad to see that some Congo ore is provided for that purpose as stipulated in the agreement. We should be glad to know how much will be required and when.

8. For your own information, and, in accordance with your suggestion, we are exploring the possibility of bringing a Belgian scientist here to see as much as the law permits, or of sending a scientist to Belgium.²

9. We are concerned about the presence of Communists in the directorate of the Belgian research program. Certainly it would be difficult for this country to enter into arrangements for exchange of research findings if the Belgian research center were penetrated by Communists.

10. I realize that it has been difficult for the Belgians to prevent this, especially in view of the undesirability of aggravating the debate on disposition of Congo ores but could there not be more vigilance by the government on this score now that the Communists are out of the government?

11. I am anxious that Spaak be strengthened in his appreciation of the necessity of continuing cooperation with us, if such strengthening is needed, and that his conviction be shared as widely as possible in Belgium, together with an awareness of the alternatives.

12. In this connection, am I correct in assuming that while the Belgian Communists have raised a hue and cry about Anglo-American domination of Belgium's unique resource, there has been no corresponding clamor from the Right and Center about Communist infiltration into the Belgian research program in the interests of a third

² Ambassador Kirk offered this suggestion in telegram 604, April 15, not printed (855a.646/4-1547).

power. Is the history of the atomic spy ring in Canada popularly known in Belgium? Is the Belgian public aware of the obstructionist role of the Soviet Union in the United Nations, which more than any other factor has prevented an agreement on international control of atomic energy? We assume that Spaak himself is well aware of the discouraging rate of progress in the United Nations at this time, as well as of the relation of the United Nations picture to what the Communists are trying to do in Belgium.

13. It would be reassuring if there were more concern in the press and parliament about Communist influence in the research program and Communist motives in agitating the question of the disposition of Congo ore. (For your information, I realize that manifestations of such concern may understandably not have been reported as fully as the Communists' attacks on the *status quo*, so anything you may say to Spaak on this point may be modified accordingly.)

14. With regard to your suggestions about Joliot-Curie, we do not feel that it would be practicable to "debunk" his scientific reputation, although his Communist affiliations can be stressed.³

15. I realize that some of these points may already be covered in the memorandum Spaak promised you,⁴ but it would be interesting to have his reaction to the foregoing nevertheless.

16. Paragraphs 3 through 14 of foregoing have been discussed with British here who appear to be in general agreement. You may keep your British colleague informed.

MARSHALL

³ In telegram 604, April 15, Ambassador Kirk had stated "Communists have had considerable success in building up Joliot-Curie as man who knows most atomic 'secrets' and who will gladly work with Belgians (and Belgian uranium) in developing nuclear industrial power in Belgium. I suggest that one line of attack would be to debunk Joliot-Curie's reputation. This would be a delicate operation and American scientists would be in a better position than we to pass on both its practicability and best methods." (855a.646/4-1547)

⁴ In telegram 640, April 20, Ambassador Kirk had reported that Spaak had indicated that he intended to soon give him a memorandum on atomic energy questions (855A.6359/4-2047). For text of this memorandum, see telegram 777 from Brussels, May 14, *supra*.

855a.6359/5-1947:Telegram

The Chargé in Belgium (Achilles) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, May 19, 1947—7 p. m.

806. For Under Secretary Acheson from Achilles. Due abnormal transmission delay your 683 May 14, 8 p. m. received here only evening May 16 after Ambassador had sailed. This morning I gave Spaak memorandum¹ giving full substance paragraphs 3 through 7

¹ Not printed.

and indicating briefly concern indicated paragraphs 9 through 13, advising him that it had crossed his memorandum of May 14 in transmission (our 777 May 14).

After reading it he remarked it covered much ground and that he wished study it carefully before replying. He could however observe immediately that principal point of his memorandum of May 14 was being met in that you were already studying means of giving effect to paragraph 9-A. On secrecy aspect he noted you had advised Congressional Committee of duration and observed that any leakage on that would make last real secret point public knowledge. He said he would like at some point to reveal substance of 9-A to show that Belgian interests were protected by wartime agreements. Am confident this is point he is most interested in having made known.

I then developed orally concern reflected in paragraphs 9 through 13 your telegram. He said steps could be taken to safeguard research if necessary including appointment of new scientific commission (Ambassador and I continue skeptical on this point) and that any Belgian scientist sent to US would of course be most carefully picked. I inquired specifically as to practicability of enacting Belgian law along lines of McMahon Act. He said law could undoubtedly be adopted but that he believed it would be impossible to separate security of information aspect from nationalization of deposits and disposition of ore. He said Belgian public so far interested only in development of research in Belgium so that Belgium would profit from industrial utilization of atomic energy and as yet unconcerned over Communist participation in research or conscious of motives behind their campaign for Belgian research and attacks on policy of furnishing uranium to US and UK.

Ending conversation Spaak stated and reiterated that what he wanted from us was not secrets but results, in other words that he was not interested in having us reveal anything to Belgian scientists here or in US but was most interested in eventual use of atomic power from [for ?] Belgian industry.

Your assumption correct that there has been no complaint whatever from Right or Center concerning Communist infiltration into research. Belgian public well aware of Soviet obstructionism in UNO due to good press coverage but activities of atomic spy ring in Canada practically unknown here as there has been no publicity since original arrests. Neither Spaak nor I clearly understood your reference to relationship between UNO picture and Communist efforts here.

On whole question of lack of concern here at Communist infiltration and pressure I would comment that probably few people here are aware of it. In our desire to keep you fully informed we have reported every scrap of information on their activities which has come to our attention, primarily from *Drapeau Rouge* and Parliamentary debates,

Very few Belgians other than Communists ever see *Drapeau Rouge* and Parliamentary questions on uranium by Communists have gotten minimal attention from press. Despite open nature their campaign they have thus succeeded in creating general interest in developing atomic energy in Belgium without, at least until now, attracting public attention to their role or motives. In discussing this with Spaak it is also necessary to bear in mind that, while he personally is sound, he is politician of party nearly half of whose council voted against party joining govt. without Communists. Will discuss with Sengier² possibility encouraging backfire against Communists.

Am giving Hugessen copy of memorandum and advising him of conversation.

ACHILLES

² Edgar E. B. Sengier, Managing Director, Union Minière du Haut Katanga.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1947.

As he does at frequent intervals, Mr. Maclean asked me if any progress could be reported on the British desire to secure from this country information relating to the construction of a large-scale atomic energy plant in Britain. He asked whether the departure of Mr. Acheson¹ from the Department would have a bearing on this question and whether any answers could be expected before his departure.

I replied that I did not think that Mr. Acheson's resignation would, per se affect the question but that Mr. Lovett's taking over from Mr. Acheson would be an occasion for us to review once more the various pertinent considerations. I referred to the fact that the next report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission would be made to the Security Council in September and that, as he was aware, the result would certainly have a bearing on the question if it had not been resolved by that time.

I said nothing to give Mr. Maclean any impression as to whether we would or would not have resolved the problem by September.

¹ Robert A. Lovett succeeded Dean Acheson as Under Secretary of State on July 1, 1947.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1947.

Subject: Memorandum of a meeting between the Atomic Energy Commission and Ambassador Kirk, June 4, 1947

Participants: Ambassador Kirk

The Members of the Commission :

Messrs. Lilienthal, Pike, Strauss, Waymack and Bacher

Mr. Wilson—General Manager

Mr. Marks —General Counsel

Mr. Volpe —Deputy Counsel

Mr. Belsley—Secretary

Mr. Gullion—Department of State

Mr. Lilienthal expressed to Ambassador Kirk the Commission's appreciation of the Ambassador's handling of atomic energy matters and said that his reports from Belgium had been most useful.

Ambassador Kirk discussed briefly the political situation in Belgium as it affected atomic energy matters. He named the few Belgian officials at the highest level who were informed concerning the existing United States-Anglo-Belgian accords with respect to raw materials. Although the actual agreements were known to so few, nevertheless the fact that most of the Congo ore was going to the United States and the United Kingdom was rather widely known and approved by all except the Communists.

Key executives in business and industrial fields had a good grasp of the situation through inference based on their knowledge of Belgian economy and realized that the arrangements were probably the best to be made in terms of security for Belgium. They did not at any time attempt to discuss them or elicit details from the Ambassador.

The Union Minière and the Belgian Government could be counted upon to stand by the contract; they would not sabotage it by any indirect means, through price changes or interference with deliveries. Although the Belgians were always very careful to consider the agreements as commercial understandings, nevertheless in their view the faith and responsibility of the United States Government was directly engaged in them. In this sense they thought of the agreements, and sometimes referred to them in conversation as "treaties" (*traités*). Those who were aware of the existence of the Trust approved of its commercial character, although the word "Trust" was considered by Sengier to be an unfortunate choice.

In spite of Spaak's good will and the Belgian Government's good faith, it was always to be realized that Spaak was subject to considerable pressure by the Communists for publicity on the arrangements. Furthermore, his tenure at the head of the government was, of course, subject to political fortunes; many of the other key men in the picture were also in politics. Some of them were old men and consequently we had to take into account the human factor in envisaging the future of our cooperation.

The Belgians, as practical people, wanted a *quid pro quo* from the agreements and that to which they would attach the greatest value would be an assurance, based on Section 9-A of the Agreement, that Belgium would eventually share in any commercial uses to which it might be discovered that atomic energy could be put. Here the Ambassador referred to his conversations with Spaak and Spaak's desire for reassurance on this point. The Ambassador had assured him, of course, of American good faith and our desire to do anything which could be done under the McMahon Act, but Spaak's reaction to the difficulty presented by the Act should be clearly understood: He said, in effect, that "after all, it was unfortunate that the Act was drafted in such a way that it came into conflict with the 'treaty.'" The desire of Spaak, and Belgians generally, to share in the benefit of atomic industrial energy was heightened by reports reaching the country of the imminence of development of industrial power plants using atomic fuel. Such possibilities were, of course, easily over-estimated in the press and elsewhere. Nevertheless interest in such development ran high in Belgium and Spaak had suggested sending a mission to the United States to check on the development. What was needed was a clear statement to the Belgians: (a) that they would share in the benefits of atomic industrial energy; and (b) that industrial use of atomic energy was not going to be possible as soon as the Belgians believed. In this connection the Ambassador pointed out that some of the Belgian authorities felt some misgivings about Errera,¹ who seemed curious about the provisions of the contract and, apparently, wanted to push up the prices. It would not, therefore, be a good idea for Errera to be taken on a tour of installations in this country, which had been thought of as a gesture to the Belgians.

The Belgians would keep quiet on the agreement both in Belgium and in the United Nations but we must realize that their hands could be forced at any time.

In general discussion following the Ambassador's introduction the following points were made:

1. The Belgian Government does not appear to be aware that our

¹ Prof. Jacques Errera, member of the Belgian Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; a leading Belgian specialist on atomic energy.

reluctance to reveal anything about contracts arises from the fact that we do not want the Russians to make use of the information in a propaganda drive in the UN. Mr. Lilienthal and others referred to the fact that at least until the AEC should make its report to the Security Council in September, we should refrain from making any statements which might give ammunition to the Russians for a charge that we were acting unilaterally, or in bad faith. The Ambassador said that this connection had not been altogether clear to the Embassy. He did not believe the Belgians were aware of it either, but, in his future conversations with Spaak, he could make sure that the latter saw the point. The Russian's present line appeared to be to filibuster in the UN, while they tried to divide opinion in other countries on the subject of international control, and tried to break down existing arrangements in raw materials supplier countries by tactics such as they were pursuing in Belgium. At the same time they were trying to infiltrate into research and other programs in other countries.

Mr. Lilienthal pointed out that in this country knowledge of the Belgian agreements and of our great use of Belgian ore was not as general as it probably was in Belgium and that there was nothing to be gained by uncalled for publicity in this country.

2. The Ambassador did not believe that atomic energy objectives had necessarily much to do with the Communists recent withdrawal from the Cabinet, precipitating the government crisis. He pointed out that this might have seemed to be the case if subsequent events had not proved that the Communist action was in line with a pattern dictated from Moscow, according to which Communists were withdrawing from coalition governments in several European countries.

3. The Ambassador did not think that the nationalization and research programs were a serious threat to our procurement program. He referred to Sengier's thesis that in fact the Congo was already nationalized since the government owned the land. Commissioner Pike pointed out that this was the usual subsoil mineral law of Latin countries in which title inhered in the government. The Ambassador agreed, and mentioned Sengier's willingness to deal with uranium ores just as diamonds were handled.

4. The Ambassador explained the entrée which Joliot-Curie enjoyed in atomic energy matters in Belgium and the prestige he had because of his supposed prime contribution to the research program. The Ambassador did not think that the research program in Belgium was particularly important, nor that Communist infiltration was directly menacing to our interests. He agreed that the Belgian Government did not seem as worried about Communist infiltration as it might be.

5. Chairman Lilienthal and Commissioner Bacher pointed out that the industrial use of atomic energy was still distant, in spite of the

tendency of "Sunday Supplement" journalism to play up an aspect which coincided with the aspirations of the people. As far as the Commission knew there was no industrial plant in actual operation, nor could not be [*sic*] except on a "stunt basis" for a long time to come. It was, however, misleading to speak in terms of years since at any time discoveries might upset the evaluation of prospects. At this point there was some discussion of sending a scientist to Belgium who might in his discussions set the Belgians right. Dr. Bacher suggested that one of the scientists attending a projected conference in Europe might be asked to take on this task. Commissioner Strauss felt that a difficulty connected with any such visit was in handling any proposal for a reciprocal visit in this country. Ambassador Kirk believed that this, however, need not be considered too great a difficulty. It seemed to be the sense of the meeting that a scientific visit to Belgium might be useful.

6. Chairman Lilienthal referred to the studies being made of our raw materials situation in general and said that we were considering whether we might make more effective use of the exchange of information, and interpret the McMahon Act to make it possible. The answer would of course depend on consultation with the Army, Navy and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The decision, together with the result of deliberations in the UN, would have a lot to do with the degree to which we could implement Section 9-A. He pointed out, however, that on the basis of present development, processes and installations for the development of industrial uses of atomic energy were in many respects identical with those needed for the development of atomic bombs. Therefore, any policy on facilitating plant construction in Belgium would have to be considered in the light of over-all policy with respect to placing such installations in Europe. He did not believe that this aspect of the matter ought to be developed for Mr. Spaak but felt that the Ambassador should keep it in mind. Mr. Marks pointed out that it would be unwise to dwell on this consideration, especially since time might reveal some way of keeping the two uses distinct. For example, at one time it appeared that the use of denatements might be very effective in this regard.

7. Commissioner Pike asked whether the Belgians were making an effort to explore and exploit any possible further deposits of uranium in the Congo. The Ambassador said he assumed they were but that he might talk further to Sengier about it.

8. It was suggested that the early despatch of radio-active isotopes to Belgium might be a beneficial public relations move.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1947.

DEAR ALAN: I should like to confirm, informally, some of the things we discussed with respect to atomic energy matters during your recent visit.

You mentioned, as you had previously done in your telegrams, that the Belgians could not readily understand our strong desire to maintain secrecy on the US-UK-Belgian procurement agreement, since so many of the facts seemed to be already well known in Belgium. Our principal reason for maintaining secrecy is to avoid giving any opportunity to the Soviet Union to distort our motives and use this information in a propaganda campaign, or in United Nations deliberations, to bolster a charge against us of bad faith and unilateral self-serving, at the same time that we are ostensibly trying to promote multilateral control of atomic energy.

I hope that you can personally make clear to Spaak, quite informally, that our attitude with respect to publicity on agreements at this time is affected by our apprehensions about Soviet Union foreign policy and tactics in UNAEC. This relation is the situation to which I referred, too indirectly, in paragraph 12 of my telegram No. 683¹ and which was not understood by you or Spaak.

It is difficult, if not impossible, at this stage to synthesize all the impressions of the Russians held by various persons who deal with them or work on the Soviet Union problem in the Department, UN, the War and Navy Departments and then our Missions abroad and to peg that composite as an official government estimate of Russian policy.

What I am about to describe is merely a climate of opinion here more or less reflected in official thinking, as in the so-called Ridgway memorandum (SC 210—"Objectives of USSR atomic energy and disarmament policies", April 7, 1947)² which is being sent to you under separate cover. It should also answer some of the questions raised in Achilles' useful telegrams.

Although we have not lost hope of achieving an international control regime and intend to continue the effort in the AEC as long as we can, I, personally, and most other observers are much discouraged about present prospects and fear that the Russians' present line is to filibuster in the United Nations, while at the same time they try:

¹ May 14, 9 p.m., p. 812.

² SC 210, not printed, was a revision, prepared in the Department of State, of a memorandum of February 3, by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, United States Army Representative on the United Nations Military Staff Committee; for text of the Ridgway memorandum, see p. 402.

- a) To attract support from anxious minority opinion in other United Nations atomic energy commission countries;
- b) To break down existing US-UK arrangements for procurement of raw materials by tactics such as they are pursuing in Belgium;
- c) To infiltrate research and control programs in any or all other countries;
- d) To hasten their own development of atomic weapons; and
- e) To extend their area of effective political domination, as in Hungary.

The longer the filibuster can be prolonged, the more they can hope to play upon the fears and idealism of that part of the population of interested countries which is desperately anxious to preserve peace and which is receptive to Soviet professions and propaganda.

In the early fall the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission is to make its second report to the Security Council; we had planned and hoped that by that time the essential points of difference between the Soviet Union and the countries supporting the original December 31 proposals³ would have been isolated, and that it would be clear just what, if any, possibility existed of agreement on these points, so that if negotiations were to fail or to drift into nothingness, it would be clear to the world where the responsibility lay.

Since we have been pursuing that policy it has been difficult to bring the Russians down to brass tacks or to prevent them from taking refuge in discussions of comparatively minor phases of an international convention. They have recently given some details as to how they would expect inspection systems to function, but it is clear that they do not intend to abandon their insistence on the destruction of atomic bomb stocks before adoption of an international control convention. I am confident, that the United States would never agree to this. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is just as adamant as ever about not accepting international ownership or genuine control of important facilities.

In view of all the above, I think it would be a grave error for Spaak at this time to volunteer any information about Section 9-A or the rest of the Agreement. If his hand is forced, we recommend that he make a statement along the lines of that proposed in your telegram No. 67 of January 17,⁴ which can possibly be amplified by the material in the statement prepared some time ago by M. Sengier for the stockholders of Union Minière. I can appreciate that you would feel more secure if the text of some approved statement were actually in hand and I am having one worked up for you.

³ Reference is to the First Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, adopted by the UNAEC on December 31, 1946; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement, Report to the Security Council (1946)*.

⁴ See footnote 1, p. 793.

I assume that you will be seeing Spaak shortly after your return and I think it would be wise if you were to review the whole situation with him informally in view of the foregoing considerations and your conversations with the President, the Secretary and the members of the Atomic Energy Commission.⁵ Of course you should avoid giving Spaak any impression that you are presenting a crystallized hard-and-fast policy on Russia. Also, we, the British and the Belgians must avoid giving the Russians the opportunity of accusing us of bad faith or of selling the UN negotiations short.

I agree with your suggestion that we should deflate the Belgians optimistic conception of the imminence of commercial and industrial use of atomic energy. I shall try to have you sent material from time to time to help you in this respect. I am now waiting to have the Atomic Energy Commission's views on the question of sending a qualified scientist to Belgium to make as clear as he can, within the limitations of the McMahon Act, just what the prospects are. We do not, of course, wish to encourage a reciprocal visit, inasmuch as the Act would probably make it difficult for us to make the mission worth while from the Belgians' point of view.

I think that your suggestion about dissemination of the Canadian Royal Commission's Report on Espionage is a good one, if the hand of the US is not too obvious in the promotion.

With kindest personal regards,

[File copy not signed]

⁵ For the record of Ambassador Kirk's meeting with members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, see *supra*. No record of conversations with President Truman or Secretary Marshall during the period of Kirk's visit to the United States have been found in the files of the Department of State.

855A.6359/7-347 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, July 3, 1947—8 p. m.

1067. For Under Secretary Lovett from Kirk. Have assured Spaak regarding our intention faithfully to implement provisions of paragraph 9A when we are in position to do so. Outlining generally difficulties and possibilities utilization atomic energy for industrial purposes, I found him quite responsive and willing to wait developments. He likewise fully appreciative our problem regarding UN and while somewhat surprised extent Russian *intransigence* yet wholly sympathetic and prepared prevent premature disclosures. He now understands our concern and will play ball.

KIRK

855A.6359/7-447 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, July 4, 1947—1 p. m.

1071. For Under Secretary Lovett from Kirk. In Senate debate July 3 on foreign affairs the export of uranium to US was discussed by Communists. Glineur (Communist) asked: "When will the agreement end permitting US obtain and stock for its sole benefit Congolese uranium?" Spaak replied: "It was necessary during the war to assure to the Allies as large a quantity as possible of those materials indispensable to the development of atomic energy. Therefore with the complete approval of the Belgian Government these arrangements were concluded so that uranium minerals of Congo were placed at disposition of US and UK. In these arrangements the legitimate interests of Belgium were safeguarded. They are still in force and the Belgian Government hopes that an international agreement for the control of atomic energy will soon be concluded, as result of work of Commission established by ONU [UN]. As soon as this is achieved the Belgian Government will hasten to draw up appropriate legislation concerning uranium."

Communist Senator Fonteyne: "In the meantime our uranium is being hoarded." Glineur: "And the US is accumulating its reserves." Spaak: "I have made my statement and you can draw conclusions you wish."

Informal minutes debate follow airmail.

KIRK

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Combined Development Trust (Wilson) to the Chairman of the Combined Policy Committee (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1947.

The Combined Development Trust since 1945 has had an active interest in certain uranium mines in Portugal. The original properties were acquired from the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, who had purchased them mainly for pre-emptive reasons during the war. The principal working is at Urgeirica, the largest uranium mine in Portugal. During the intervening period, as the result of a limited program of field prospecting, other mines, concessions, and claims have been acquired.

These activities, which have been directed on behalf of the Trust by the U.K. Government, have been operated in the names of commercial companies registered in Portugal and elsewhere.

Up to the present, the Trust has considered that it would be inadvisable for them to attempt to develop these properties, or to undertake operations on a commercial scale. Accordingly, the work carried out so far has more or less been confined to the limits of the requirements of Portuguese law that mining properties shall be maintained in a satisfactory and workable state.

Recently the constituent members of the Trust have had under consideration the question whether, and if so to what extent, the previous "go-slow" policy which has been followed in Portugal should be modified, particularly in view of the technical information recently received as to the likely uranium reserves of these properties.

I now attach a paper which was considered by the Trust at its meeting on June 12, 1947.¹ The U.K. Trustees inform us, however, that there has been a development since this paper was written, in regard to the approach which is being made to the Portuguese for assurances as to the issue of export licenses.

The British Embassy in Lisbon has advised, and the authorities in London have agreed, that such assurances to be worth much must come from Dr. Salazar himself.² It has therefore been decided to approach him, rather than the official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with whom we were previously in touch. Secondly, on the advice of the British Embassy in Lisbon, it has been agreed that it would be unrealistic to expect the Portuguese to permit the removal from Portugal of material of considerable potential value, without some advantage to themselves. The British Chargé d'Affaires in Lisbon has therefore been authorized to tell Dr. Salazar that it is recognized that the Portuguese Government might wish to reserve for their own purpose a reasonable proportion of the material which is produced; also that it is recognized that the Portuguese Government cannot be asked to give an indeterminate assurance, and therefore an assurance covering an initial period of ten years is being suggested. If, as seems likely, Dr. Salazar asks for further advantage to his own country, the British Chargé d'Affaires, besides pointing out that the eventual advantage to Portugal of the work being done almost exclusively by the United States and United Kingdom, and the advantage to Portugal of the increased employment which the present program will bring, is authorized to listen sympathetically to any suggestion that an export tax or payment on output might be introduced, provided that this was kept within reasonable limits. If Dr. Salazar makes any proposal for Portuguese participation in the enterprise the British Chargé d'Affaires is to say that this does not come within the scope of his instructions and that he would have to refer the matter to London.

¹ Not printed.

² Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal.

This action is being taken in Lisbon at once, and the initial reaction of Dr. Salazar will no doubt be known very shortly.

In the light of the information now available to them, including certain additional technical data, the Trust is prepared to adopt the program proposed, subject to the outcome of the approach to Dr. Salazar, on which the U.K. Trustees will keep their U.S. colleagues informed.

In the meantime, the Trust has asked me to inform the Combined Policy Committee of these developments.

Respectfully submitted,

CARROLL L. WILSON

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 22, 1947.

Subject: Brazilian Government's Intention To Negotiate New Agreement with U.S. respecting procurement of Monazite.¹

Ambassador Pawley² asked me to call on him yesterday, just before his departure to Brazil. He informed me that prior to his leaving Brazil he had had a conference with President Dutra and some six members of the Cabinet, in which the disposition of Brazilian Monazite was discussed. The Brazilians indicated that they intended to ask for a new U.S.-Brazilian agreement, to replace the existing accord of July 16 [10], 1945, which has until July 16 [10], 1948 to run. It appeared that they wished especially to come to a new agreement on prices and on technical assistance to be made available to Brazil. The figure of \$75 a ton was mentioned. Ambassador Pawley could not recall that any more specific indications were given with respect to this figure; i.e., as to what grade of ore or at what stage of processing it would apply. He said he would check this data.

¹ A memorandum by Gullion to Lovett, July 31, transmitting the present paper, reads in part as follows:

"Brazil and India are the principal suppliers of Monazite sands from which thorium is extracted. Under the auspices of the Combined Trust we have a procurement agreement with Brazil, in which the British have beneficial rights, and the British have an agreement with India and have undertaken to supply us from time to time with material from that source. As you know, Monazite contains other materials, besides thorium, of paramount interest to a number of domestic industries.

"In this conversation Ambassador Pawley confirms for the first time our suspicion that Brazil wishes to discontinue the current agreement. For well over a year Brazil has shown little disposition to implement the agreement of July 16 [10], 1945 and the rare earth industries of this country have gotten practically no Monazite from any source, nor, of course, have we obtained thorium from Brazil. I am engaged with the Atomic Energy Commission in preparing the basis for some negotiations with Brazil." (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

² William D. Pawley, United States Ambassador in Brazil.

I gathered that the meeting with the Brazilians was preliminary and that no definite request was made for opening of new negotiations.

The Ambassador stated that it was his firm opinion that our further interests in Brazil would be best served by a straight government to government negotiation. He had formed this conviction while looking the ground over since his conference with members of the Commission and the Department on the occasion of his last visit to Washington. He thought that small scale commercial dealings, such as had taken place over the past year, got nowhere.

I referred to the Ambassador's statement in one of his telegrams, to the effect that any agreement concluded with the Brazilians would have to be ratified by the Brazilian Senate, and asked if this was the sense of the meeting which he held with members of the Brazilian Cabinet. The Ambassador said that this was the case. He didn't know what the possibilities were for concluding a secret executive agreement, which I informed him would almost surely be a requirement on our part. The Ambassador said that he could answer this question more definitely when he knew just what kind of an agreement we wanted. He asked for further instructions as soon as possible.

Finally, the Ambassador indicated that some sort of *quid pro quo* in the way of processing facilities would be required by Brazil. I said that the Department and the Commission had this under consideration. I pointed out that there could surely be a lot of counters on both sides in any negotiation—we might consider withholding aid, credits and assistance of various kinds as a means of pressure or of increasing them as inducement. The Brazilians in the UNAEC had indicated that they wished to reserve their rights, under any international scheme for the control of atomic energy, to say what amount of radioactive material they would make available to an international authority. This might be an indication of their attitude in any negotiations.

E. A. GULLION

840.50 Recovery/7-2447: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton), in Geneva*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1947—6 p. m.

880. For Clayton. Kirk reports² that when he told Spaak of Alphand's³ reported desire to list colonial resources among assets of

¹ Under Secretary of State William L. Clayton was in Geneva for the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment; for documentation on United States participation in that conference, see pp. 909 ff.

² Reference is to telegram 1134 from Brussels, July 18, not printed.

³ Hervé Alphand, Director of Economic Services, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

nations participating Paris Conference,⁴ Spaak assumed that Congo uranium should not be so listed. Kirk informed him, and Dept concurs, that it should not be so included and should if possible not even be mentioned.

If in any future conversations with any representatives of participating nations you should be asked for suggestions on Conference treatment of radioactive minerals, or if you should hear of any plans for consideration of the subject by participating nations, I hope you can discreetly head off any further development along this line. Dept strongly unwilling link uranium supply or atomic energy development with question of European rehabilitation. Subject is not appropriately within scope of present plans and discussions since industrial application of atomic energy is considered to be still remote.

MARSHALL

⁴For documentation on United States interest in the Paris Conference of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, see vol. III, pp. 249 ff.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1947.

The attached memorandum, dated July 24, 1947, requires no action on our part, unless Mr. Lilienthal has personally indicated to you that he desires the support of the Department of State.

If the Department should be consulted, I believe we should back the Commission for the following reasons:

1. The State Department shares with the War and Navy Departments responsibility for the national security. In the Department's opinion it is essential that we know as soon as possible when the Russians have succeeded in developing atomic explosives.

2. We are at present gambling in continuing UN negotiations. The Soviet Union is very probably merely filibustering while it develops its own bomb. It is imperative, therefore, that we have the knowledge of the Soviet Union's intentions and progress in atomic science afforded by a system of long range detection of atomic explosions.

3. In the likely event of failure of United Nations atomic energy discussions, the country must reconsider its diplomacy. For example we shall have to consider the possibilities of combining with other nations in a United Nations without Russia; or a limited alliance with other countries which cooperated closely with us during the war; or a series of movements in the UN serving to isolate the Soviet Union and show up its intransigence and its aggressive intentions on several

points; e.g., subversion of civil liberties in satellite states and indirect aggression against member countries. The Soviet's role in the atomic energy negotiations would be shown to be a part of its over-all strategy. In order to set the time table for such a campaign and to plan ahead, we must have the kind of intelligence about the Soviet indicated in the attachment.*

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (Lilienthal) to the Director of the Central Intelligence Group (Vandenberg)

WASHINGTON, 24 July 1947.

Subject: Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions.

1. Your memorandum of June 30th¹ on this subject has been studied with great interest.

2. Paragraph 7 states that, "A rough estimate indicates that approximately two years will be required to locate, install and operate the complete network of stations and facilities, capable of feeding data into the Control Central". In the light of the prevailing situation, the A.E.C. regards it as essential to the national defense and security that a working arrangement, even though less than "complete", for the detection of atomic explosions in other parts of the world be established without such delay. We cannot regard a two-year period as realistic and believe it necessary that means be found, as should be done in time of national emergency, to devise a practical solution as a matter of utmost urgency. It is understood that the technical issues have already been essentially solved and that the problem is now one of organization and coordination.

3. Consequently, the A.E.C. is and has been fully in accord with your basic judgments that a long range detection system be established and that responsibility for organization and direction be assigned to a single agency. We would like to discuss this and other subjects of mutual responsibility with you and hope that an early appointment can be arranged.

DAVID E. LILIENTHAL

¹ Not found in Department of State files.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1947.

Subject: Negotiations with Brazil for Procurement of Monazite Sands Containing Thorium

After India, Brazil is the second most important supplier of monazite sands from which thorium is produced. Thorium, in conjunction with uranium, will support a chain reaction and recent advances in atomic science indicate increasing importance for thorium.

The United States has a secret agreement with the Brazilian Government, dated July 16 [10], 1945, which unless renewed will expire on the same day in 1948, which provides for the purchase of 3,000 tons per year, if available, of monazite sands (a copy is in the files of our Embassy at Rio). Hitherto, purchases in Brazil have been accomplished by US private industrial firms interested in components of sands other than monazite. The thorium content is then turned over to the AEC in this country. The execution of the agreement has been very unsatisfactory in that deliveries, about 1,000 tons annually, have been made only after numerous delays. The Department and the Atomic Energy Commission are now of the opinion that best results can only be secured by a government-to-government negotiation, although operations in Brazil might be carried on by commercial agents as heretofore. The Brazilians have notified our Ambassador, informally, that they wish to negotiate a new agreement.

If during your stay in Rio de Janeiro¹ the Brazilians should make any inquiries to you, it is recommended that you:

a) Indicate that although Brazil is not the only source of monazite, the United States considers agreement between United States and Brazil as to its procurement as one of the most important points in United States-Brazil relations;

b) Although you are not in a position to discuss details, you believe this government would shortly be prepared to negotiate for procurement of monazite. You understand that the existing agreement is unsatisfactory in a number of respects and that not much monazite has been forthcoming.

c) The United States is, of course, prepared to consider some adjustments in price and in other concessions but hopes that the subject can be looked upon as one bound up with the common security of Brazil

¹ Secretary Marshall served as Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, August 15-September 2; for documentation on United States participation in that conference, see vol. VIII, pp. 1 ff.

and the United States and that petty commercial considerations will have relatively little place in it.

d) It is your belief that the interests of both Brazil and the United States would be best served by increased deliveries to this country. So far as thorium goes, you understand that it could only be used, for atomic energy purposes, in conjunction with considerable quantities of uranium and by countries disposing of a vast industrial plant and financial facilities.

If the Brazilians wish to make formal proposal for negotiations, it is suggested that you refer them to the United States Ambassador, who is informed.

ROBERT LOVETT

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1947.

The following is some background for that item of the Committee of Three agenda, for Thursday morning, August 21,¹ which refers to the need for an estimate of the date by which other countries may have developed atomic weapons.

1. The needs for such an estimate are many and obvious; e.g., our conduct of negotiations in United Nations, and our diplomatic negotiations across the board, would be affected by Russian production schedules of the bomb. Certain private groups in this country are pressing for abandonment of the negotiations and formation of a group of powers into an atomic alliance without Russia, on the theory that Russian production will begin next year. The Service Departments will, of course, have their own obvious interests in the Russian time schedule.

2. There does not appear to be any authoritative or precise estimate. The recent report of the Commission on Universal Training assumes "not less than 4 and not more than 10 years" as the period during which the US may be immune from attack. At the time of the Potsdam Conference this question was put to leading scientists and industrialists by Secretary Stimson's Advisory Committee: "How long would it take Russia to produce an atomic bomb with or without complete blueprints of our production plans, with some consideration of German technical assistance?" The general consensus of opinion was a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 20 years. Many scientists now claim that

¹ No record of the meeting under reference has been found in the files of the Department of State.

the minimum figure should be given more serious consideration. They reason that it took the United States, with its almost unrestricted resources, three years to build the first atomic bomb. As an absolute minimum, assume that it would take the Russians the same time, which would be about Potsdam plus three, or, say, the summer of 1948.

Of course the question is very intricate, depending for example on whether the Russians are concentrating on plutonium or U-235 and on their uranium availabilities, as well as on their industrial facilities.

[Here follow suggestions with respect to organization of atomic energy intelligence functions.]

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

The Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (Hickenlooper) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A short time ago I learned, and my Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was informed, of the secret agreement entered into at the Quebec Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill for the sharing of uranium from the Belgian Congo and other parts of the world with the British and touching the use of atomic weapons. I assure you that I was shocked and astounded by the information, and I am sure that other members of the Committee were similarly impressed. I am aware of the arguments expressed in support of this action, but I cannot agree that they were sound. In fact, I believe that the agreement was ill-advised, and its form, more in the nature of a treaty than of a simple memorandum, is disturbing. I asked Senator Vandenberg¹ to take this matter up with you or the President or both in his discretion, and he has done this some time ago.

I understand that up to V-J Day the entire available uranium supply came to this country, but beginning sometime thereafter, Great Britain has stock-piled her share in the British Isles, and it now constitutes a considerable amount. In addition, other sources within the British Empire have not been made available to us. I am convinced that Britain's arguments for the use of this material for the production of power are now, and will continue to be for many years to come, only wishful thinking; efficient power development from this source is remote and its progress will probably be measured by decades rather than in terms of a few years. In other words, the present stock pile in Britain and future accumulations will not be needed there for a long

¹ Arthur H. Vandenberg, United States Senator from Michigan; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

period of time and will continue to be very attractive "bait" for some other nation or nations. It could easily become a target. The amount presently stored in Britain is sufficient to cause great concern.

Britain is now asking for a review and a rearrangement of her financial affairs with us.² No doubt, this matter will be seriously considered by us in the immediate future. I am firmly of the opinion that the uranium now in Britain and her future acquisitions must be brought to this continent for storage, perhaps in the nature of collateral for any additional credits, but primarily as a matter of security. In addition, the Quebec Agreement must be mutually rescinded. A new and more equitable agreement may, possibly, thereafter be in order, but the present agreement, in view of all circumstances, is intolerable.

If our country is expected to use its strength, resources, etc., in a tremendous effort to stabilize the world, and incidentally pull British chestnuts out of the fire, then I think we should have all of the implements of strength readily and securely available to us. Uranium is one potent means by which this matter of assistance can begin to travel a two way street.

I shall oppose, as vigorously as I can, and publicly if necessary, any further aid or assistance to Britain unless these two matters are satisfactorily solved, because they strike at the heart of our present national security. My attitude toward future aid to Britain, no doubt, will be influenced by additional factors, but I assure you that these two matters, in my opinion, are vital and their solution is a prerequisite so far as I am concerned.

I am writing you at this time, because I expect to go to Europe within a few days for a period of six weeks or more and I want to make my attitude clear before any formal negotiations have been concluded. I also want to make clear that this letter expresses my personal views and that this matter has not been the subject of formal action by my Committee. I am confident, however, that the overwhelming sentiment of the members of the Committee is in accord with the views I have expressed here.

With kind personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,

B. B. HICKENLOOPER

² For documentation on United States concern regarding the foreign exchange position of the United Kingdom, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

BRUSSELS, September 2, 1947.

DEAR BOB: Before the arrival of Spaak and Sengier in the United States,¹ I should like to send you an informal summary of atomic energy matters, to supplement my official cables and despatches. Also, I should like to say that the informal letter from Dean of 27 June, 1947,² was most helpful to me and has of course guided my action here.

Spaak's hand was forced in the Senate on July 3rd, to the extent that he was obliged to make the statement we all concerted and accepted. He was not obliged to extend his remarks, and no reference has ever been made publicly to supplemental clauses of the Agreement, such as 9-A. I say "publicly", for you will recall that André De Staercke (Private Secretary to the Prince Regent) emphasized that the Prince Regent relied upon our good faith in performing our obligations under that clause (my 1290 of August 22³). And I would remind you that Sengier also was at some pains to say, very positively, that while the price we paid for ore concentrate was "dirt cheap", the real recompense to Belgium was the knowledge we were bound to give, under 9-A. My reassurances on this point have been reported, and are in accord with Dean's letter (page 3). Our position was carefully explained to Spaak in my conversation with him immediately after my return (see my tel. 1067, July 3, 8 p. m.).

This preparation of the minds of the Prince Regent, Spaak and Sengier has, I think, stood us in good stead, for it has enabled them to hold fast against the Communist maneuvers. The line taken in their important French-language paper *Le Drapeau Rouge* and supplemented by articles elsewhere, has been to attack the price, which has been called *dérisoire*; to pretend that a proper price would pay for all war damages to Belgium; to claim that coal shortages would be overcome were Belgium able to use her own resources of uranium to develop atomic energy for commercial use; and to hint at other advantages, in science, medicine, etc., which would accrue to Belgium were she really master of her own fate.

¹ Prime Minister Spaak planned to serve as Chairman of the Belgian Delegation to the 2nd Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly which convened in New York on September 16. Sengier was to visit the United States on behalf of the Union Minière for the purpose of discussing a new uranium purchase agreement.

² For Acheson's letter to Kirk, June 27, see p. 822.

³ Not printed.

Spaak has maintained his stony silence to all such attempts to draw him out. But his Parliament is in recess until late October or early November, and he has not had to face any hostile questioning from members of either House. I think he will be under fire when the recess is over, and will need some help and guidance.

Perlman's leak (see my tel. 1206 of August 6⁴) was bad, for it resulted in reasonably accurate figures on weights and prices becoming publicly available. I suspect the Communists had these data some time ago, and it is just possible the *New York Herald Tribune* article may do us good by blowing the top at a time inconvenient to the Communists. Nevertheless it is regrettable that the orders of Godding were not checked as to performance, and that subordinates continued to compile and make available routine reports. I gather the Russians can now deduce pretty closely how much active stuff we got from the Congo deliveries.

You will have noted the Communists now never mention English deliveries, and that all their wrath is directed against the United States. You have noted the effect of Errera's talk about the British "pile" upon the Prince Regent. It is likely the British themselves are hopeful such a source of energy may augment their own power shortages. While I have always kept Hugessen fully in the picture, he is leaving this month. His successor is Sir George Rendel—a man I do not know and upon whom I should like advice as to how much he is in the picture. I realize some slight divergence in interests may be in the making, and would like to be assured just how far it is desired I take the new man into my confidence.

It seems to me it would be wise for you to see Spaak when he is in New York, and to go over with him our problems with the Russians in the UNAEC; to have him brought up-to-date on commercial uses of atomic energy, including medical and scientific phases; and to feel him out upon Congo deliveries to the United States in case we find ourselves, unhappily, in a state of war with the Russians—initially perhaps in a distant area, such as Korea, or even Greece. In connection with this last suggestion, you will appreciate Spaak has no knowledge of Sengier's plan to deposit in New York all necessary authority to act with us.

I think I should add that Spaak has never indicated in any way whatever that he now felt the contract terms of our agreement to be

⁴Telegram 1206 reported the appearance in the Paris edition of the *New York Herald Tribune* on August 6 of an article by David Perlman which purported to reveal the amount of uranium from the Belgian Congo purchased by the United States Government in the first quarter of 1947 (855A.6359/8-647).

unfavorable to Belgium. In my view he will abide by such agreement; but, as head of his political party, of the coalition government, and as a Belgian, it is not inconceivable he might find himself obliged to yield to heavy internal pressure in order to remain in power. What would be the position were Spaak to be elected to high place in the United Nations, forcing him to give up his political life in Belgium, is a possibility I am not able to forecast.

I do not think it advisable to see Spaak and Sengier together, since they are not politically close; and since Sengier always maintains he is the commercial agent and that Spaak is the political leader.

Sengier will of course see Lilienthal and others of his Commission; he would be flattered to see you, even briefly. From Sengier the AEC will get full particulars of the tax burdens now imposed upon his company. There is an uneasy suspicion in my mind that Wigny (Minister of Colonies) is antagonistic to Sengier, as to all big business-men; and that Wigny contemplates something more in the Congo; perhaps along nationalization lines. While not hostile to the United States, I sense he reflects the concern often felt by Belgians with Congo interests, lest Yankee dollars disturb their position. In this connection, it might be wise policy to be sure Export-Import and International Bank (if we can quietly do so) would clear any prospective loans to Belgium, or Belgian Congo, with you, in order that we might assess the situation as it would affect our interests. We might thus be able to brake M. Wigny a little, if he gets too active.

Sengier is far-sighted enough to foresee the possibility we may be in a mess with the Russians. That is why he is activating his New York set-up; and why he asked me to insure his exit was arranged. He is a little jittery, and you, or Lilienthal, might well reassure him we will take care of him. He is a very fine man, and devoted to American ideals, hating Russia like poison.

May I suggest how helpful it would be to me if you could insure I receive copies of any notes of conversation with Spaak, or with Sengier? Without such, I could be a little off-base.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

ALAN KIRK

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy,
Washington, September 11, 1947, 10:30 a.m.*

TOP SECRET

PRESENT

STATE	WAR	NAVY
Secretary Marshall	Secretary Royall ⁴	Secretary Forrestal
Under Secretary Lovett	Brig. General Schuyler	Under Secretary Sullivan
Assistant Secretary Armour	Colonel Hamilton	Rear Admiral Wooldridge
Mr. Bohlen ¹		
Mr. Kennan ²		
Mr. Rusk ³		
Mr. Gullion		
Mr. McWilliams		
Mr. Moseley (SWNCC) Secretary		

I. U.S. POSITION TOWARD ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL

DECISION

a. It was the sense of the discussion that the question of financial aid to European countries should not be linked to procurement of raw materials for the U.S. atomic energy programs.

b. It was also the sense of the discussion that the United States take no initiative at this juncture in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in the Security Council, or in the General Assembly to terminate negotiation looking toward international control of atomic energy. We should, however, review our whole position in view of the situation arising out of failure to reach agreement in the UNAEC thus far, particularly with respect to our defense plans and our atomic energy relationship with Great Britain and Canada.

IMPLEMENTING ACTION

None.

DISCUSSION

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that he wished to raise the question whether we considered ourselves bound by the terms of the alleged Churchill-Roosevelt agreement on the atomic bomb.

¹ Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State.

² George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

³ Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

⁴ Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of War from July, 1947.

MR. GULLION said that we have never taken a categorical position whether we are still bound by these agreements, although we do admit their validity. He said that the question of the extent to which the agreement is still valid in the postwar period is something to be decided in connection with the projected discussions with the British and the Canadians. He added that it must be recognized that the operation of our atomic energy program relies largely on cooperation with Great Britain and Canada. The pattern for some aspects of this cooperation particularly in procurement was set in war-time agreements, and we are continuing that cooperation without prejudice to the question of the continuity of the agreements. On the other hand the exchange of information apparently envisaged in the agreements was largely held up on our decision. Certain provisions of the McMahon Act might be held to preclude furnishing such information.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that one factor we must face is that we are deficient in our supply of essential raw material for atomic energy production. He said that the question has been raised of tying in our aid to various countries with our needs for this essential raw material. MR. KENNAN said that the project of aid to Europe must fall or stand on its own merits and this program should not be connected with the problem of our atomic material shortages. He added that we would be subject to the severest criticism if it should become known that we were bargaining relief aid for rights to atomic materials. SECRETARY ROYALL said that he agreed that we should not mix these two matters together.

SECRETARY MARSHALL referred to the discussion at the last meeting of the Committee regarding our future position toward international atomic energy control.⁵ He said that it appeared certain that we should not break off negotiations in the UN Atomic Energy Commission until we have considered and decided upon our position following a break-off. He said that before we decide upon any future course of action we undoubtedly should have some quiet and informal talks with the Canadians and the British on the present situation. He then read the various recommendations set forth in the State Department Policy Planning Committee paper.⁶ MR. KENNAN pointed out that the line of action proposed by this paper was based on the present Government policy which is based upon the principles of the Baruch plan.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that he could not accept the fact that our policy should be based upon the Baruch plan and he believed that we should reconsider our entire position including the abandonment of the Baruch plan.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked what we would do if the Soviets agreed

⁵ For the minutes of the meeting of the Committee of Three on September 8, see p. 628.

⁶ PPS 7, August 21, p. 602. In regard to the establishment and operations of the Policy Planning Staff, see the editorial note on p. 733.

to the plan thus far developed. SECRETARY MARSHALL replied that we would have to accept this adherence, that we were committed to it—but he pointed out that our measure of confidence in the Soviets' good faith would be reflected in the discussions which would take place on staging the transition from national (US) control to international control. We would, of course, reexamine our position very carefully with reference to the entire international picture before agreeing on any time table for the transition.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Paraphrase of Telegram From the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the United States*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1947.

Errera approached the British Embassy in Brussels with a tentative suggestion that the Belgians should build an atomic energy pile alongside our own in the U.K. and that the power from this pile should be transmitted by cable to Belgium. He said that this approach was only a preliminary feeler to find out whether we would regard the proposition with favour and how highly we rated the possibility of a pile in the U.K. being seized in the event of war. His idea was that, if we were encouraging, he would suggest that Spaak should raise the matter formally.

We considered the proposal to be very premature and suspected that the Belgians had read into the news that we were building an atomic energy plant the idea that it is now a practical proposition to produce useful power from atomic energy. Apart from this there are certain technical difficulties in transmitting a large supply of power over the long distance involved.

Our Ambassador to Belgium saw the papers while in London recently and agreed to speak to Spaak saying that we had heard of Errera's proposal and assumed that it was unofficial. We agreed with the principle behind it of close Anglo-Belgian co-operation in the peaceful development of atomic energy which was in fact written into the Anglo-Belgian-American agreement. This particular proposal was however very premature but we would be glad to consider it at a later stage if the Belgians wished to put it forward. Our military authorities had no fears on the score of vulnerability.

It seems that Errera approached the United States Embassy at the same time. The U.K. Ambassador agreed to tell the United States Embassy about the general statement which he was making to Spaak.

¹ This document was transmitted to Gullion by Donald D. Maclean, First Secretary in the British Embassy, on September 30.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the
Division of Western European Affairs*

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK], October 3, 1947.

Subject: Belgian Participation in Industrial Application of Atomic
Energy

Participants: The Belgian Prime Minister

The Secretary

(Ambassadors Silvercruys¹ and van Langenhove² and
Mr. Achilles were present.)

M. Spaak stated that the continuing secrecy of the Belgian-United States agreement on uranium was causing him increasing difficulties. Communist insistence for disclosure of its terms had led many prominent non-Communists to request information, but he had not yet felt at liberty to take even his cabinet into his confidence. He said that the only real secret in the agreement was its duration, and that he, for his part, saw no objection to making the whole agreement public.

M. Spaak said that the pressure to which he was subjected had been intensified by press reports that the atomic pile now being built in England would be providing industrial power in a year or two. He thought that the time had come to begin giving effect to the clause in the agreement providing for Belgian participation on equitable terms in the benefits of industrial utilization of atomic energy derived from Congo uranium.

The Secretary stated that he was not in the position to give a definite reply at the moment, but that he would take up both points with his associates in order that a definite answer might be given the Prime Minister without delay.

M. Spaak stated that he would not press unduly his point on making the agreement public. He would like, however, if pressed hard, to be able to say that Belgian interests were fully safeguarded by provision in the agreement for Belgium to share equitably in the benefits of industrial utilization. That was the basic point. If a pile could be built in England to supply electricity for the use of England, could not a second pile be built, and, possibly at Belgium's expense, to supply electricity to Belgium? The scientists assured him transmission of the power from England to Belgium would be practicable. He had not discussed this matter in any way with the British.

The Secretary said that both psychological and technical problems were involved. He understood the difficulties caused M. Spaak by Com-

¹ Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador in the United States.

² Fernand van Langenhove, Permanent Belgian Representative at the United Nations.

munist propaganda. The United States was facing similar problems in its efforts to secure international control of atomic energy. Any public statement on the agreement would have to be very carefully framed to minimize the propaganda advantages which might be taken of any loopholes. As to the construction of atomic piles, he had had heavy personal responsibilities in this field during the war. The width of the Atlantic Ocean provided invaluable protection, and he had not been happy over the decision to build a pile in England. However, M. Spaak's suggestion of a second pile in England to provide power for Belgium offered an interesting possibility. He reiterated that a definite reply would be given on the points M. Spaak had raised.

While leaving the building, van Langenhove asked Achilles if his understanding was correct that our major worry was the construction of a pile in Europe. He was advised that this was certainly one of our principal worries.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1947.

1. In accordance with the decision taken at your meeting with Secretary Forrestal and others on October 8, 1947,¹ I have consulted with General Groves with a view to obtaining from him any information not already in our files concerning the history of our special relationships with Britain and Canada in atomic energy matters. He has kindly offered to make any such material available to the Department of State.

2. The General is preparing a chronological account of these matters but there appear to be some points of difference between himself and Dr. Vannevar Bush, more with regard to emphasis than to fact, which will delay submission of his report.

3. In the meanwhile I am confident, following my talks with General Groves, that our own records are complete enough to permit us to advance well founded opinions for interdepartmental consideration. General Groves is finding difficulty with the period from 1940 to 1944. Our own records are reasonably good for that time, and are clear and largely controlling for the period from 1945 to date, which is more pertinent to the decisions we are called on to make. They have been checked against the Groves material in its preliminary form. In any case our decisions should be based primarily on considerations of

¹ No record of this meeting has been found in the Department of State files.

national security in the present circumstances rather than on an interpretation of the letter of war-time arrangements.

4. A decision on our future course is urgently required. Not only is the present state of our dealings with the British and Canadians in these matters quite unsatisfactory and detrimental to the general fabric of our international relations, but we have a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, dated October 1, recommending that the Secretary consider urgently the means of improving this country's unsatisfactory uranium position.²

5. Accordingly, Mr. Gullion has prepared, with my guidance and assistance, a study of the problem involved, consisting of a statement of the problem, discussion, and conclusions, which is attached as Annex I.³ He has prepared a dossier of source materials bearing on the subject which is attached as Annex II, together with other pertinent material.⁴

6. On the basis of the source material at hand and of the study Mr. Gullion has conducted, Mr. Gullion and I have drawn up a set of recommendations as to the future course which this Government should pursue in these matters. These recommendations, which should be considered as recommendations of the Policy Planning Staff, are set forth in the enclosure to this memorandum. You will see that they envisage early discussions with the British and Canadians directed not to the conclusion of another formal agreement at this time but to the achievement of a community of views which can be made the basis for further domestic executive action on the part of the respective governments.

7. I recommend that the memorandum of recommendations and the papers listed below be circulated to the American members of the Combined Policy Committee and that a meeting of these members be convened on November 3, 1947.⁵

GEORGE F. KENNAN

² The letter read in pertinent part as follows:

"The United States at present faces a shortage of natural uranium to sustain the current atomic energy program. This program, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Atomic Energy Commission, cannot now be reduced without an adverse impact on the national security.

"Indeed, national security requires expansion rather than curtailment of the United States atomic energy program and preemption of as much as possible of world production of uranium.

"According to the best available estimates regarding technological improvements which may be achieved, the United States cannot expect any reduction in the requirements for raw materials for the present program before about the end of 1951. So far as can now be said with any certainty, the quantities of raw materials necessary to see us through this critical period can be obtained only from the Belgian Congo, material shipped to the United Kingdom but unallocated by the Combined Policy Committee, and possibly, beginning about 1950, from South Africa." (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

³ Not printed.

⁴ Source material not printed here.

⁵ Lovett wrote "OK" beside the final paragraph.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by Messrs. George F. Kennan and Edmund A. Gullion

PPS/11

[WASHINGTON,] October 24, 1947.

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING A PROGRAM OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH
THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME
PRESENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF
URANIUM ORE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES

A. *Procedure:*

1. It should be made clear publicly in the immediate future that this Government is obliged to take full account, in its plan for national defense and in the conduct of its foreign policy, of the fact that no agreement has yet been reached with respect to the international control of atomic energy.

2. The program outlined below, after approval by the United States members of the Combined Policy Committee, should be discussed with members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and the two Foreign Relations Committees.

3. Once we are assured of an understanding attitude among interested Congressional leaders, we should invite the British and Canadians to join us in informal and secret discussions, on the diplomatic level, concerning the situation arising from failure to reach agreement to date in the UNAEC and concerning our future dealings with one another in the procurement of materials and in the exchange of information.

4. Our position in these discussions should be as described below in B.

5. If agreement is reached in the discussions, we should ask the British and Canadian Governments to join us in a public announcement along the following lines:

(a) Discussions have taken place among the three governments reviewing the course of events since the issuance of the Three-Nation Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy of November 15, 1945,⁶ and examining the situation created by the failure thus far to achieve general agreement in the UNAEC, and that

(b) The three governments have found themselves in complete agreement in their analysis of the situation and in their view of its implications for their respective national policies.

⁶ Reference is to the Joint Declaration by the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, November 15, 1945; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1504, or 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479.

Requests from the press for further details about the results of the discussions should be declined on the grounds that release of such information would not be in the interests of national security.

B. Position in which we would seek UK-Canadian concurrence:

1. The Combined Policy Committee and the organization now known as the Combined Development Trust, will continue in existence along the general lines provided in the war-time agreements but all other provisions of these agreements shall be mutually considered as suspended *in toto*. The Combined Policy Committee shall undertake a revision of the charter of the Combined Development Trust, with a view to changing its title and to introducing any alterations that may be called for by the spirit of present relationships or by new developments with respect to supplies of source materials.

2. No new formal obligations will be entered into by the three governments at this time. Each will confirm to the others in an exchange of notes, or by conclusions to be recorded in the minutes of the CPC, or other such informal means as may be appropriate and agreeable to the parties, its intentions with respect to the policies it proposes to follow, as developed in these discussions.

3. The three governments will recognize that their atomic energy programs shall be conducted in such manner as to contribute in maximum degree to the common military security.

4. The three governments will take measures so far as practicable to secure control and possession, by purchase or otherwise, of all deposits of uranium and thorium, and such other materials as the Combined Policy Committee may direct, situated in areas comprising the United States, its territories or possessions, the United Kingdom and Canada. They will also use every endeavor with respect to the remaining territories of the British Commonwealth, and other countries, to acquire all possible supplies of uranium and thorium and such other materials as the Combined Policy Committee may direct. All supplies acquired under such arrangements will be placed at the disposition of the Combined Development Trust, under that title or as renamed as provided in 1 above.

5. The materials thus acquired shall be allocated to the three governments in such quantities as may be needed in the common interest for scientific research, military and humanitarian purposes. In making such allocations the three governments will recognize the principle that, in the interests of the common security, all source and fissionable material not required for operating needs of current industrial projects in the United Kingdom and Canada and elsewhere, as defined by the CPC, will be allotted to the United States.

6. The government of the United Kingdom will ship to Canada and

the United States all of its present stocks of source material and fissionable material beyond the operating needs of its present project as defined by the Combined Policy Committee and will no longer stockpile source materials or fissionable material in the United Kingdom beyond these needs.

7. The United States Government will recognize the desirability in principle of assisting the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments in the execution of programs of development of atomic energy for peaceful uses. Without endorsing the general desirability or prospects for early success of projects for large scale atomic energy development for industrial uses in the United Kingdom, the United States will recognize that existing projects of this nature represent a legitimate claim on raw materials.

8. There shall be full and effective cooperation in the field of basic scientific research among the three countries. In the field of development, design, construction, and operation of plants such cooperation, recognized as desirable in principle, shall be regulated by such *ad hoc* arrangements as may be approved from time to time by the Combined Policy Committee as mutually advantageous.

9. The United States Government will seek at the next regular session of Congress, wider authority to exchange information with other countries when, in the opinion of the President to do so would contribute to the national security. Meanwhile, it will, subject to the restrictions of existing legislation and in order to promote the national defense and security, do its best to answer specific queries arising from practical difficulties encountered by the two other governments in the execution of these programs.

10. The Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada will keep the United States Government currently informed of their atomic energy projects and will follow practices with regard to the exchange of information no less liberal than those followed by the United States Government in respect to them.

11. The Combined Policy Committee, already established and constituted so as to provide equal representation to the United States on the one hand and to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on the other, shall carry out the policies provided for, subject to the control of the respective governments. To this end, the Committee shall:

(a) Review from time to time the general program of work being carried out in the three countries.

(b) Allocate materials in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above.

(c) Settle any questions which may arise concerning the interpretation and application of arrangements regulating cooperation between the three governments.

12. The three governments will not disclose any information or enter into negotiations concerning atomic energy with other governments or authorities or persons in other countries except in accordance with agreed common policy or after due prior consultation with one another.

13. The three governments reaffirm that their policy with respect to international control of atomic energy remains that set forth in the Three-Nation Agreed Declaration of November 15, 1945, and regret that the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has been unable to resolve the differences between the Soviet Union and Poland on one hand and thirteen other countries, now and sometime members of the Commission, on the other. They recognize that should full and effective international agreement be achieved, the present tripartite arrangements would be subject to basic review.

711.329/9-1347 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1947—5 p. m.

1226. Reurtels 1279, Sept. 13, and 1468, Oct. 24,¹ please notify Brazilians by formal secret note that this govt is pleased to learn that Brazilian Govt is ready to discuss further procurement of Brazilian monazite by this country and takes the opportunity to give formal notice that it intends to exercise the option reserved to it in para. 5 of the Agreement of July 10, 1945. The US Govt is prepared to review with the Brazilians prices, quantities and other matters pertinent to an extension of the agreement on mutually satisfactory terms.

During the period covered by US options, this govt considers that all parts of the Agreement of July 10, 1945, continue in force unless modified by mutual consent, including para. 2 which provides that there shall be no shipments of monazite to any consignee not approved by the US Govt.

At same time you present note in above sense you may refer orally to reports that French or other interests are trying to make arrangements for delivery of monazite in the future and indicate in appropriate fashion that any commitments in this sense would, of course, be contrary to the agreement, while negotiations with such interests would seem to be inconsistent with its spirit.

For your info, Dept. considers that form of present agreement gives us sufficient flexibility for either direct governmental or private purchases; and that the negotiation of an entirely new agreement might give an opportunity to influential members of National Security Coun-

¹ Neither printed.

cil² to confuse issue or press for arrangement less advantageous to us. Suggestions on proposed renegotiation will follow shortly; in meantime any comments by you will be welcome.

LOVETT

² Reference is to the National Security Council of Brazil.

Policy Planning Staff Files¹

*The Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (Osborn) to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)*²

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, October 29, 1947.

DEAR MR. RUSK: Following is a memorandum of a conversation with General McNaughton on various atomic energy matters on October 27, 1947:

1. *Canadian-American Relations:*

General McNaughton has been cheerfully carrying out the close liaison between the Canadian Commission and particularly their scientists at the Chalk River plant, and scientists of the United States government under Mr. Lilienthal, giving Mr. Lilienthal's people any and all information on what they are doing in Canada, including new developments. There are two U.S. representatives at the Chalk River plant and they are kept fully informed. General McNaughton points out that this is entirely a one-way liaison. Under the McMahon Act no classified information is permitted to go from the United States to Canada. He considers the McMahon Act very badly drawn in this respect, and while he has been able to sit on the lid effectively, the situation is now causing him deep anxiety. He feels he cannot go on quite in this way very much longer.

2. *Canadian-British-U.S. arrangements:*

General McNaughton feels very strongly that in these matters Canada must negotiate directly with Washington. The defense of North America is a mutual concern of the two countries. Together they constitute the citadel which protects all Western European civilization. England is not in this citadel, though dependent on it. The views of her people cannot help but be disturbed by their immediate proximity to Europe, by their staggering problems and by their still fresh recollection of their previous position. It is therefore essential that Canada and the United States negotiate these matters together directly, and

¹ Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1947-1953.

² Transmitted by Gullion to Lovett and Kennan on November 24.

General McNaughton is disturbed that apparently some conversations have been going on in London on this matter. I have told him that my only knowledge is that both the British and Canadian Embassies in Washington were advised of the possibility of a statement by the President, and that this statement was put off, but that I am not in on these negotiations and may be quite uninformed.

General McNaughton points out that England is like a man groggy from blows to the solar plexus and the jaw, and we should understand and sympathize with her inability to plan coherently for the future when she is in this position and in her present difficulties. He thinks those British who believe atomic power to be of importance in the next decade or so are wholly unrealistic.

3. *The situation with respect to the Soviet Union:*

General McNaughton feels that if it were not for the U.S. possession of the atomic bomb the Soviet Union would by now have overrun Europe. (As I have already reported, this view is shared by deRose of France,³ and with respect to the Arab States, by el-Khouri of Syria⁴).

General McNaughton feels that the Soviet Union is making very slow progress with the atomic bomb. Reports indicate they have large numbers of miners hand-picking the dumps in the uranium mines of Czechoslovakia, and that the amount of material they can get in this way must be wholly insufficient. He cannot imagine their using manpower for this purpose if they had discovered any real source of supply within the Soviet Union, and he tends to the view that no adequate source of supply has been found in the Soviet Union as yet. He thinks that the Kremlin recognize their inability to prepare for atomic warfare in any near future. He thinks they might make enough material for a single bomb in the next five or ten years, but not enough to support an atomic war. He thinks the government of the Soviet, highly centralized in Moscow and Leningrad, is very conscious of the chaos which would result if those two cities were destroyed. Hence that any steps taken by the Soviets will be short of war.

In this situation he stands, as always, for the most absolute firmness, a steady marching forward along the constructive lines laid down by all of us, without being diverted by propaganda and the red herrings of the Soviets.

4. *Activity proposed for United Nations Atomic Energy Commission:*

General McNaughton feels that it would be wholly unwise to go forward with plans for stages, financing or strategic balance until

³ François de Rose of the French Delegation to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

⁴ Faris el-Khouri, Syrian Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.

the Soviet Union is ready to accept an international agency as defined in the Second Report.⁵ However, he feels that we should go through with the working paper on staffing and organization. He sees difficulties in doing so, and some dangers, but thinks that the difficulties and dangers are subordinate to the importance of having a plan which is complete except for those matters which must be determined at the time the treaty is drawn, namely, financing, strategic balance and **stages**. His reason for desiring to complete the plan to that point is that so long as there is any chance of a turn in Soviet affairs which would make it possible for them to join in a treaty, we should be ready to take advantage of that opportunity, which probably would not last long. He thinks there is an outside possibility of such an opportunity in the next four or five years, because there might be a possibility of some sort of a breakdown in the Soviet government giving us a real chance for negotiations. There is little possibility that the Soviet would break off relations with the West because if they did so they would be left in ignorance of the technological developments which are proceeding far faster than in the Soviet. However remote these possibilities, we should be ready for them.

We should stand absolutely firm on the Second Report and there is no use whatever discussing the Soviet differences in points of view. It would get us nowhere and would only be taken by them as a sign of weakness. General McNaughton believes that weakness is the one thing likely to lead to war. He thinks that the Kremlin is entirely realistic in its recognition that the great technological development of North America would inevitably result in defeat for them at this time.

Finally, he thinks it vital that there should never be any suspicion of U.S. withdrawal of their offer. The time for splitting the world into two camps has not come yet. If it comes, we will face it then. Meanwhile, we must try our utmost not to let a break occur.

Yours sincerely,

FREDERICK OSBORN

⁵ Reference is to the second report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, The Second Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, September 11, 1947*; also printed as Department of State Publication 2932 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947).

Brussels Embassy Files¹: Telegram

Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), to the Embassy in Belgium

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, November 1, 1947—4 p. m.

Unnumbered. For the Ambassador from Gullion in New York. Reurtel 1688.² Essence Spaak conversations here is, as reported first paragraph your 1617, October 17.³ In conversation with secretary he reiterated opinions known to you, referring to increasing difficulties being caused by communists, and stating that as duration of agreement was only real secret, he saw no objection to making whole agreement public. However, in conversation with both Secretary and Under Secretary he said that he would not press point. He seemed confident he could handle communists and unworried by their pressure.

Reports in Belgian press of early realization of industrial uses in United Kingdom had intensified public pressure on him and he thought time had come to begin giving effect to section 9 (a) and for him to be able to say that Belgian interests were being safeguarded. In this connection, he referred to possibility of building pile in Britain for Belgian account which scientists had assured him was practicable. He had not discussed this with British.

Secretary assured Spaak of his understanding of Spaak's position and of communist pressure. Any public statement would have to be very carefully worded to minimize possible propaganda advantages to USSR. As to construction of piles he had during war heavy personal responsibilities in this field. He had not been happy over projects for pile in UK. He referred to invaluable protection afforded by Atlantic.

In conversation with the Under Secretary at Belgian Embassy dinner, Spaak took somewhat similar line. The Under Secretary assured him our great appreciation of his steadfastness and referred to difficulties our own position, including McMahon act. Nevertheless we would carry out our obligations in agreement.

The Under Secretary had earlier given Spaak a pre-release text of address on industrial uses by David Lilienthal which made clear that these were extremely remote even in this country and referred to unjustified hopes which existed abroad and were exploited by certain interested parties. This seemed to bring situation home to Spaak more completely than our previous explanations have done. Spaak also was

¹ Lot 56F191, files of the United States Embassy in Belgium.

² In telegram 1688 from Brussels, October 30, Kirk requested urgent telegraphic summaries of Spaak's conversations with the Secretary and Under Secretary (855.6359/10-3047).

³ In telegram 1617, Kirk reported the account Spaak had given him of his conversations in the United States (855A.6359/10-1747).

told that our scientists thought that the idea of piping power to Belgium from pile in Britain was fantastic.

After high level consideration, plans mentioned in Millard's letter to Gullion of October 16 were not discussed.⁴ These plans are going forward and you will be informed.

No decision yet taken on any text of new declaration by Spaak,⁵ but course suggested second paragraph your 1617 seems satisfactory. Your report of luncheon conversation will be helpful in this regard but do not believe you should raise question of new statement. For your own information, if Spaak is compelled to make further declaration, we believe it might go as far as that set up for Sengier in your 1766, October 31 [*December 31, 1946*],⁶ disregarding change suggested by Department in its 46, January 15.⁶ This cannot be confirmed immediately, and also for your own information, forthcoming meeting on plans mentioned by Millard's letter in reference may have bearing on decision. Will try to send further views first part of next week.

Sengier's conversations here on similar lines. He and commission have made mutually satisfactory new arrangements for further quantities of raw material at higher price. Details follow. Sengier did not mention question of new statement to Department although he did speak of it to Commission. Belief here is that original statement in your 1766 December 31 is satisfactory to him and to us.

[GULLION]

⁴ Hugh Millard, Counselor of the Embassy in Belgium, had requested information on the status of the recommendations contained in "your [Gullion's] memorandum." Reference was presumably to PPS/11, October 24, p. 844. (Brussels Embassy Files)

⁵ Kirk had reported Spaak as stating that he expected the Communists in the lower house to emphasize in imminent interpellation the vast quantities of uranium being sold to the United States. Spaak intended to discount extravagant production figures and if pressed to state merely that all have read what the newspapers have published. (855A.6359/10-1747)

⁶ Not printed.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, November 5, 1947

TOP SECRET

Present: Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall
 Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Mr. Kennan
 Mr. Gullion, American Executive Secretary
 Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal
 Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Research and Development Board

Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Mr.
Lilienthal
Mr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission
Mr. Herbert S. Marks, General Counsel, U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission

Subject: A program of negotiations with the British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States.

Decision:

That negotiations with the British and Canadians ought to be undertaken.

Implementing Action:

The Committee considered recommendations proposed by the Department of State.* As a result of the discussion it was agreed that State Department (Mr. Kennan and Mr. Gullion) would revise the State Department recommendations, in consultation with AEC and the Department of National Defense, and that a further meeting would then be held.

Discussion:

SECRETARY MARSHALL opened the meeting referring to the fact that there had been a number of issues outstanding between ourselves and the British and Canadians with respect to atomic energy policy for well over a year; that the United States Government had not yet been able to give answers to the British to specific representations made by them, and that we were aware of some antagonism which had developed as a consequence. There was a feeling that the United States record in the matters at issue displayed some lack of frankness. We had based our argument on our unwillingness to do anything which might prejudice the chances of success of the negotiations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, whereas our principal reasons for not exchanging information with the British arose from different considerations. Our policy with respect to exchange of information also had to be considered in relation to the Belgian supply situation. He had had a talk recently with the Belgian Prime Minister which clearly indicated that we should come to some decision on this policy.¹ Moreover, it would be highly undesirable if relations among the United States, United Kingdom and Canada in atomic energy matters

*Annexed to these Minutes as Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. The document under reference, PPS/11, October 24, is printed p. 844.]

¹For the memorandum of the Marshall-Spaak conversation of October 3, see p. 841.

become so strained that the Belgians might come under pressure from other powers for concessions in the way of raw materials.

The uranium situation in this country was reported to be highly unsatisfactory and the meeting had been convened to consider it. This was the first time that the American Members of the Committee had met as a body, and he would begin by asking those present to express their general views before considering the specific recommendations prepared by the State Department.

DR. BUSH stated that we had not during the war, and for some time after, offered the British opportunities to develop post-war uses, or the large-scale operations which might contribute to post-war uses, of atomic energy. In retrospect, this was wise in reference to the strategic situation; it had been considered unwise to have a plant developed in Britain close to the reach of any potential aggressor. Moreover, the development of the project for war-like purposes clearly indicated concentration in this country and the British had understood this. Also, we had told the British that any substantial modification of the war-time agreements, or any new agreement, would raise questions with respect to the applicability of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter, requiring that agreements between states be notified to the Secretariat. Dr. Bush then emphasized that today we were in many ways confronted with a new situation. The British were actively going ahead on their own and the Canadians also, particularly at Chalk River. In the scientific field particularly, both had done distinguished work. We in this country needed to know what the British and Canadians were doing and to get the benefits of their discoveries. He hoped, therefore, that it would be possible to renew some form of cooperation to this end. If an interchange of information could be brought about, this would contribute to an improvement in our raw materials situation.

MR. KENNAN believed that it was not feasible to expect to continue a form of cooperation which brought us raw materials while we were unprepared to offer anything in return. It was possible that the British did not actually want much technical information at this time, especially since they had not pressed their requests in recent months. In the present situation it was possible that what they really wanted was to engage in discussions with us, and to have some reaffirmation of the special relationships which had previously existed among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the field of atomic energy. An effective understanding with the British and Canadians would bring up the question of what was possible under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, or of what should be done to modify it. As to this, he was offering no firm opinion. He did believe that it was probably desirable that Congress should be asked to relax the law to make interchange of information possible. In any case, he did not like the fact

that at the same time that we had in hand a letter from the Prime Minister to the President, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was in preparation, in a form which contained restrictions cutting across the very subject which was the heart of the correspondence between the heads of State. Moreover, we had not given any real answer to the British and had made no effort to acquaint the British or the Canadians with the exact status of any opportunities for cooperation that might exist under the Act.

MR. GULLION referred to two facts which were obvious, but which had not thus far been emphasized. These facts had not been predominant at the time we had initially considered the questions at issue with the British, in November of 1945. They were: First, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world had seriously deteriorated and we had, therefore, to reconsider atomic energy policy in that light. Secondly, the effort to obtain multilateral control of atomic energy in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had all but officially and overtly been adjudged a failure. As late as December 1946, the President was telling the Prime Minister that public opinion in this country would not permit this Government to build additional atomic energy plants, much less assist the British in building one, before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission could report. Now it had become increasingly apparent that there was no hope of any constructive result from the deliberation of the UNAEC.

MR. FORRESTAL said that two things seemed clear to him as a result of his consideration of the State Department's papers and the entire problem: (1) The U.S. wanted to get raw materials; (2) we did not want to see a large-scale atomic energy plant located in the British Isles. If in negotiations with the British we could secure these two objectives, and if, as indicated by Dr. Bush earlier, there was substantial useful information which we could obtain from the British, then we should be prepared to give the British information.

SECRETARY MARSHALL said that he recalled that during the war, there was considerably less objection to having a plant in Canada than in the U.K. He assumed that this was still the case, and would be a possibility worth investigating in connection with the projected conversations. He also referred to the fact that both the British and the Canadians were actually going ahead with their studies and the building of plants.

DR. BUSH referred to the British view that they could not, for political reasons and reasons of national prestige surrender to another state the right to say where a British plant might be located and what kind of a plant it might be. This feeling was a factor to be taken into account in relations with the British.

THE SECRETARY agreed there were reasons for having some kind of a plant in the United Kingdom. MR. GULLION referred to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff opinion of last March which stated that although the existence of an atomic energy plant in the British Isles was disadvantageous to the military security of the United States, the disadvantage of such a plant might be minimized by the earliest possible conversion to a form useable for atomic weapons of those raw materials now accumulating in England.² In other words, our principal objection on strategic grounds would now appear to be not so much to the presence of the physical installations themselves, as to the accumulation of stocks. We should take as a "base" line in our negotiations with the British, that they would have some kind of a plant, and concentrate our efforts on reducing the size of any plant the British might have and holding down its consumption of available raw materials. This would be good policy on our part since (a) the British were probably going to have a plant any way, although we had no precise information as to size or present rate of progress, (b) the British could not very easily forego atomic energy development altogether, especially since their people were looking desperately toward realization of the industrial potential, and (c) the military situation was more static than when the Manhattan Project was being brought to fruition, that is, the Red Army was not right on the Channel as was the Wehrmacht. DR. BUSH agreed with this. However, he observed that the British, commencing as long ago as last spring and increasingly since that time, were taking a more realistic view of the prospects for industrial development, and he thought they now realized that such developments would be in the remote rather than the near future.

MR. LILIENTHAL pointed out that his position at the current meeting was somewhat different than that of the other conferees, who were Secretaries and the heads of their departments. He was one of five Commissioners, and there was no provision, in the Act under which they operated, allocating to him as Chairman sole responsibility in such meetings. Therefore, while he appreciated the difficulties which might arise from enlarging the meeting considerably, he regretted that his fellow Commissioners were not asked to attend. In the circumstances, he would report the line of the Commission as he understood it, and report back to his fellow Commissioners the sense of the meeting.

In his view there were two kinds of issues involved in this discussion, and in the deliberations of the Combined Policy Committee. One set had to do with the very broad questions of United States foreign policy, of which our atomic energy policy was only part. Although the Atomic Energy Commission was a member of this Committee, it approached these issues primarily from the standpoint of its responsi-

² See undated letter from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Secretary of State, p. 798.

bility for the operation of the United States atomic energy program.

Then there was the other set of problems coming directly within the purview of the Combined Policy Committee which related more particularly to the work of the Commission and its program. In connection with the latter, it was extremely urgent that something be done to remedy our present raw material position. Even if we were to secure all of the production of the Belgian Congo in sight, our situation would still be bad; if we failed to obtain some amelioration within the relatively near future it would become apparent through the necessary curtailment of some of the operations of the Commission.

With respect to the issues under discussion, the Commission saw them somewhat differently from the way they appeared to be envisaged in the State Department recommendations. First, he did not believe, at least at the outset, that we should consider asking for new legislation or an amendment to the existing legislation. Second, we should not link the supplying of information to the British by us with the supplying of raw materials to us by the British.

The prospects of getting action by Congress on new legislation was attended with so much uncertainty and risk to security that it would be undesirable, and also might delay matters more than our present position permitted. Moreover a request for legislation, no matter how limited, might appear broader than was necessary since any request would expand the executive's authority to disclose information and this would cause anxiety and controversy in Congress. It was the opinion of counsel for the Commission that even under the present law a good case could be made out justifying some exchange of information with the British and Canadians.

MR. MARKS explained that he thought the authority to take such action could be based on the Commission's power to control dissemination of information in such a way as to assure the common defense and security. He thought this authority was also reinforced, in this connection, by other provisions of the law. He referred to Dr. Bush's statement that the British and Canadian work in this field was developing information that it would be of advantage to the United States to get. He also observed that there were existing relations with the British and Canadians in this field which were being carried on in the common interest of the three nations. He said that if it was established that their continuance was in the interest of our own national defense and required for their effectiveness arrangements with Canada and Great Britain involving exchange of information, he thought a sound argument could be made that such arrangements were permitted by present law. He pointed out that the question of whether or not the facts would support such an argument depended upon a careful investigation of the facts.

MR. LILIENTHAL mentioned specific existing relations with the British which needed to be examined in determining such facts, such as those at Chalk River and Trail, and the problems growing out of the effort that the three countries were making together to maintain effective security while at the same time declassifying appropriate information. We needed to make an effort to find out what the British and Canadians wanted to know and what advantages to U.S. security could be secured by discussions in the areas that would elicit information from them of interest to us.

When we go before the Congressional committees, it should be with a positive approach in which the advantages to us of continuing an established pattern of cooperation would be clear as well as any advantages to be gained and things to be learned by us if consideration was given to an arrangement with the British for exchange of information. But to link raw materials with information would not be a sound approach. It should not be assumed that a raw materials solution desirable to us could only be secured by particular concessions. The disposition of raw materials which we proposed could be approached on its own merits as being in the interests of the common security of all three nations.

He envisaged that the negotiations might take somewhat the following line: (a) we would tell the British and Canadians that we wanted to discuss an allocation of raw materials more in keeping with the security of all three countries. (b) The British would then probably bring up the question of information. We would say we were prepared to discuss information but not as a counter for raw materials. We would ask the British to tell us precisely what they wanted and what information we would get from them.

If a satisfactory agreement on information could be reached advantageous to our security as well as British and Canadian, that should facilitate agreement on raw materials, but the two items should not be otherwise linked.

Dr. BUSH suggested that the formula which might apply to exchange of information was the one which had been used during the war. Information was discussed freely only on those specific lines of investigation which the British and the Canadians were engaged, not in the whole atomic energy project. In this way, Dr. Bush said the British had made substantial contributions to the success of the project. He thought on the purely scientific side, as distinguished from the industrial, the British had contributed equally with ourselves.

MR. KENNAN stated that the State Department would modify the recommendation about seeking new legislation if what was necessary could be accomplished under the existing legislation.

MR. GULLION suggested that it was also possible that the logic of

events since November 1945 might have caused the British to be less anxious to link raw materials with information. The situation had deteriorated to point where they might believe that the considerations applying in 1942 were once more applicable. However, (a) in the last analysis there was a link between the two and although we should avoid making it explicit or starting off our talks in that relation, it had to underlie our negotiations with the British. The British had certainly not recognized the "logic of events" by dispersing the stockpile they now maintained. (b) It would not be practicable to avoid discussing the broad picture of our position vis-à-vis the British, both as to raw materials and information with the Congressional committees. We should, however, try to initiate negotiations as proposed by Mr. Lilienthal but we should be prepared to recognize that we might have to use information as a lever to get raw materials.

MR. LILIENTHAL and MR. MARKS pointed out that if a satisfactory agreement on information could be reached, one that was advantageous to our own security, that should also have the effect of creating an atmosphere favorable to agreement on raw materials. But they emphasized that the two items should not be otherwise linked. Mr. Lilienthal also pointed out as bearing on the change in conditions since November 1945 that the passage of time had created a somewhat different situation as to security in that the British and Canadians were going ahead on their own with atomic energy work and were developing information which it was important for us to keep out of unfriendly hands, just as it was important to keep our own information secure. There had been some intimations that the British were being pressed by the French to exchange information with them, a possibility which it was in our interest to guard against.

MR. LILIENTHAL suggested that in undertaking negotiations, it would, of course, have to be recognized that in the background of any discussions about raw materials, the British would be thinking about information. Similarly, whether or not brought out into the open, the atmosphere of the negotiations would necessarily be affected by any current relations between the British and ourselves in regard to general assistance from this country in the economic field; he thought that if such factors began to enter directly into the negotiations, then the agencies of the Government primarily concerned would have to play a part.

MR. KENNAN pointed out that the Congressional committees were already acquainted with the broad situation through the testimony of Mr. Dean Acheson on March [May] 12, 1947.³ However, in this testimony Mr. Acheson had said that we were still studying how much of the wartime arrangements should be continued in effect in order to

³ *Ante*, p. 806.

assure the development of atomic energy in such a way as to contribute to our own national security. We could now put the matter up to the Congressional committee saying that the proposed talks with the British were a move to continue the study somewhat further. Mr. Gullion pointed out that the individual committee members were pretty well informed of all the issues at stake and would certainly want to go into all angles more widely. This was clear from the questions which had followed Mr. Acheson's testimony.

SECRETARY MARSHALL referred to Senator Vandenberg's objection to continuing that clause of the Quebec Agreement with reference to mutual consultation as to any further use of atomic weapons. He indicated that Senator Vandenberg was probably unaware that the reason for including this provision was as a protection against an extension of atomic warfare. He pointed out the parallel to the discussions, during the war, of gas warfare, explaining that gas used in any remote corner of the world in an isolated field emergency might, in the British view, have provoked large-scale gas warfare with the British Isles as the battle ground.

MR. FORRESTAL inquired what response would be made to an inquiry from the Congressional Committee as to the present status of these wartime agreements.

MR. KENNAN said that the British would be asked to regard them as expired, that we would wish to make a completely new start and that we would advise the Congressional Committee that this was our view.

THE SECRETARY also referred to the question of timing of any announcement of our negotiations with the British. While it would be obviously advantageous to make our disclosure at the time the report of the Atomic Energy Commission was presented to the Security Council, it might also be undesirable to make such a declaration now in view of the tenseness of the world situation. MR. KENNAN suggested that any declaration or disclosure which was made need not be particularly drastic or alarming; it would merely be in the pattern of similar pronouncements which were made with some frequency at the time that the Anglo-British-American cooperation was in course.

THE SECRETARY directed that the State Department representatives should revise their recommendations in consultation with the AEC and the Department of National Defense and that a further meeting would then be held.

EDMUND A. GULLION

Policy Planning Staff Files

*Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 13, 1947.

Subject: Molotov's² remarks of November 6, 1947 on atomic bomb "secret"³

On November 6, 1947, Mr. Molotov, speaking in Moscow, declared that the secret of the atomic bomb had "ceased to exist." This statement received wide publicity in this country and abroad, and many appeared to draw from it the inference that the Soviet Union was now producing the bomb. It has been followed by "bomb scare" stories about experiments in the Soviet Union.

Molotov's statement is very similar to previous remarks by him and other Soviet spokesmen (see attached summary) and, by itself, gives no grounds for such a conclusion. For that matter it is absolutely the same thing that American leaders, scientists and publicists, have been saying for a long time, and the latter may be grateful to Molotov for securing a wider public for their message than they have been able to do.

Molotov says the bomb is no longer a secret; he does *not* say the *Russians* have the bomb, although they can be presumed to have the basic, scientific knowledge concerning it. He does not say either that they have mastered the industrial "know-how" or bomb assembly technique.

The most important Soviet statements in the field seem to be (1) "Russia does not have the bomb" (Stalin⁴ to Hugh Baillie, October 28, 1946); (2) "Russia will have the bomb and much else," November 7, 1945, Molotov. Besides this they have consistently repeated that any monopoly of the weapon can be only temporary, a statement with which we agree, and of which the latest statement seems to be only a variant.

The wide notice given to the statement is probably due to the absence of atomic news in the press lately, and the general situation in the UN.

EDMUND A. GULLION

¹ This memorandum was directed to Messrs. Lovett and Kennan.

² Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

³ The remarks under reference were contained in Molotov's speech before the Moscow Soviet on November 6; for text of the address, see V. M. Molotov, *Problems of Foreign Policy* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), p. 471.

⁴ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

[Annex]

SOVIET STATEMENTS ON THE ATOMIC BOMB

1. "Russia will have the atomic bomb and much else besides"—Molotov, November 7, 1945.

2. *Stalin to Werth*,⁵ September 5, 1946

QUESTION: Do you believe that the actual monopoly possession of the atomic bomb is one of the principal threats to Peace?

ANSWER: I do not believe the atomic bomb would be as serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs are intended for intimidating weak nerves, but they cannot decide the outcome of war, since atomic bombs are by no means sufficient for this purpose. Certainly monopolist possession of the secret of the atomic bomb does create a threat, but at least two remedies exist against it. (a) Monopolist possession of the atomic bomb cannot last long, and (b) use of the atomic bomb will be prohibited.

3. *Stalin to Hugh Baillie, President of the UP, October 29, 1946.*

QUESTION #26: Has Russia yet developed its own atomic bomb or any similar weapon.

ANSWER: No.

QUESTION #27: What is your opinion of the atomic bomb or similar weapon as an instrument of warfare.

ANSWER: (Stalin refers to his earlier reply to Werth on that.)

4. *Interview between Stalin and Stassen*,⁶ May 3, 1947. (This interview did not touch upon the question of secrets or monopolies.)

QUESTION: Do you feel there is a reasonable prospect for working out control for this?

ANSWER: There are big differences of views among us but in the long run I hope that we shall come to an understanding. International control and inspection will be established in my view and it will be of great importance . . . As for the use of atomic energy for war purposes, this in all probability will be prohibited. The desire and conscience of peoples will require it.

5. *Molotov speaking in General Assembly, October 29, 1946.* (not completely official translation)

"In this connection it is necessary to dwell on the question of the atomic bomb which now plays such an important part in political calculations of certain circles."

(Later on—talking about the Baruch plan)—

"This plan moreover is afflicted by certain illusions. Even in the field of atomic energy one cannot possibly count on the monopolistic posi-

⁵ Alexander Werth, correspondent for the Manchester *Guardian*.

⁶ Harold E. Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota; member, United States Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, 1945.

tion of any single country. Science and scientists cannot be put in a box and kept under lock and key. It is high time that illusions on this score were dispelled."

. . . "It is beyond any doubt that the position of monopoly for one country in this field is of a temporary character. I think everyone is in agreement on this point. It is impossible to stop the advance of science not only in the United States but in other countries as well."

6. The President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Vavilov, stated on November 2, 1946 that Soviet scientists were devoting great attention to problems of nuclear energy.

7. Vavilov was also reported in *Pravda* for November 25 to have stated that the Soviet scientist Lukirsky had recently discovered a new way to disintegrate the atom.

8. On December 2, 1946 Caffery⁷ reported from Paris a conversation alleged to have been held by Molotov with Odinetz, editor of the Communist Russian language newspaper *The Soviet Patriot*, at the Soviet Embassy. Molotov reportedly stated that Russia did not have the atomic bomb but that by April or May 1947 it would have its new cosmic weapon for use, and from that time forward it would not need to make further concessions to the United States.

9. "*New Times*" article in issue dated September 3, 1947. Article called "*Once More on the Atomic Energy Commission*" by M. Rubenstein.

"American diplomats, however, fail to take two important factors into account. In the first place they are inclined to forget that the United States atomic monopoly cannot last for any great length of time."

10. The Embassy at Moscow reported the following statement by Zhdanov⁸ made at the Cominform meeting in Poland and published in *Pravda*, which the Embassy believed to be the closest approximation to an official confirmation of the generally held belief that the Soviet Union did not yet possess the atomic bomb.

"On the heels of Churchill, the most venomous imperialist politicians who had lost their sense of balance, began to propose plans for the quest realization of a preventative war against the USSR, and openly called for the utilization of the temporary American monopoly of the atomic bomb against Soviet people."

⁷ Jefferson Caffery, Ambassador in France.

⁸ Andrey Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, member, Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

EYES ONLY

[WASHINGTON,] 16 November, 1947.

Meeting this afternoon with Under Secretary of State Lovett, Senator Vandenberg and Senator Hickenlooper.

Subject: Atomic Energy—Agreements with Britain in their relation to long-term aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan.¹

Senators Vandenberg and Hickenlooper said that for some time they had been in possession of the knowledge as to the Quebec Agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill which bound the United States not to use the atomic bomb without the consent of Britain and Canada. [Under] Secretary Lovett explained that this was partly because of the British fear that in the event of the use of the atomic bomb by the United States in the European theater of war Great Britain would be exposed to reprisals.

He said that the objectives of the State Department would be three: (1) scrapping of the Quebec Agreement on the foregoing point and expunging from the record any other arrangements which we found embarrassing; (2) British agreement on shipment to Canada of the bulk of their present supply of 3250 tons of uranium, either for stockpiling or for use in this country if possible; (3) aggressive exploration and development by all three countries of additional sources of ore, with the British agreeing that all uranium produced shall be shipped to this continent except such amount as they themselves need for the development of industrial uses of atomic energy. The input to England should equal use and not be for stockpiling.

(Footnote: Mr. Lovett explained that so far as the agreement, non-conformance with which by the United States had so much irked the British, that there should be cooperative exchange of information between the two countries, was concerned, Dr. Bush had made the statement at the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee that so far as this being unfair to American interests, it was actually important that we should have such an exchange. The British have undoubtedly made developments in the field of abstract science of which we should be informed.)

Mr. Lovett said that the British were prepared to discuss the transfer of the existing stockpile in Great Britain. In response to a question by Senator Hickenlooper he said that the Canadians were quite willing to cooperate with us in urging the British to this action.

¹ For documentation on United States policy with respect to the economic crisis in Europe, see vol. III, pp. 197 ff.

Mr. Lovett said he proposed to have a full discussion of these negotiations under discussion both with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House if they approved, and that he also proposed to discuss it fully with the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Congressional Committee in any event.

In State's conversations with the British these considerations would be paramount in the American interest: (a) continuation of the Combined Development Trust, which is the name for the agency of the three governments of the UK, Canada and the United States for the development of atomic energy supplies (steps will probably be taken to change the name of the agency to eliminate the word "trust"); (b) to secure the suspension or renunciation of all previous agreements; (c) the three governments to agree on the use of stockpiles of uranium with primary consideration given to common military security; (d) the three governments to agree to pursue as vigorously as possible the development of additional supplies both in their own countries and on the outside—specifically this means that the British give their undertaking to further development of any sources in all possible parts of the British Empire; (e) allocations of the mineral to be made in terms of the common security; so far as the UK is concerned they to undertake that all future deliveries not required for the industrial possibilities of atomic energy in the United Kingdom itself, will be allotted to the United States; (f) the United Kingdom to ship all of the existing stockpile not needed for their *present* industrial plans to Canada.

Senator Vandenberg raised the question of the relation of long-term credits under the Marshall Plan to payment for uranium. He asked whether he would be able to say that among the *quid pro quos* for our aid there would be delivery of certain strategic materials. Mr. Lovett replied that in the first year and a half credits under the Marshall Plan would probably take the form of grants in aid to the extent of 65%, and 35% would be in the loan form. Senator Vandenberg said his point was: could not some arrangement be worked out whereby we would only pay for the deliveries of strategic materials if repayments of our long-term loan were being kept up. Mr. Lovett said this was a most interesting suggestion, that it would have many aspects in terms of exchange transfers which might have to be considered, but that nevertheless he thought it had sufficient merit to warrant study.

Mr. Lovett said he proposed to suggest to the Secretary of State that an early meeting of the American Combined Policy Committee be called to bring together all of the Government thinking on the subject (and particularly to secure from the Atomic Energy Commission a precise statement of their requirements). Following that he proposed to make a presentation to the appropriate committees of the House and Senate as indicated above, and then get down to negotiations with

the British through a meeting of the members of the Tripartite (Britain, Canada and the United States) Commission.²

J[AMES] F[ORRESTAL]

² The source text bears the following typewritten addition dated November 17: "Senator Vandenberg, at the close of the conversation stated that he was well satisfied with the report which Mr. Lovett had made and thought the basis for negotiation with the British and Canadians was sound, but he did say he would be constrained to propose conditions in the long-term aid to England if the objectives outlined by Mr. Lovett were not accomplished."

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee, Washington, November 24, 1947

TOP SECRET

Present: Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lovett
 Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Mr. Kennan
 Mr. Gullion, American Executive Secretary
 Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal
 Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman, Research and Development Board
 Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Lilienthal
 Mr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
 Mr. Herbert Marks, General Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Subject: A second meeting to consider: "A program of negotiations with the British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States." The Committee had before it two drafts of "Recommendations", the original State Department text of October 24, 1947 (annexed to Minutes of November 5, 1947 as Tab A);¹ and an Atomic Energy Commission revision of November 22, 1947 (annexed to these Minutes as Tab A).²

Decision:

To approve the paper presented by AEC, modifying the original State Department draft, except that it was agreed that recommendations should take account of fact that some exchange of information with British and Canadians, the extent to be explored in projected conversations, would be in interest of U.S. national security.

¹ PPS/11, October 24, p. 844.

² Not printed; a revised version is contained in telegram 5103 to London, December 4, p. 882.

Implementing Action:

Department of National Defense, AEC, and Research and Development Board to consult on revision of recommendation to be presented to American members of CPC, and, if approved, to Congressional leaders.

Discussion:

MR. LOVETT said the group should know as background that there was strong Congressional sentiment for including special clauses on uranium procurement in the European Economic Recovery legislation. If our negotiations were unsuccessful we would be faced with this probability. He described actual and anticipated European reactions to any proposal to make procurement of uranium by us a condition precedent, under the Economic Recovery legislation, for aid to European countries. Such reactions might be expected to have an adverse effect on U.S. policies. Moreover, insofar as its effect on countries producing or owning uranium, such a course would be meaningless or ineffective. No British Government could be expected to sell uranium, or put it up as collateral, for an amount in dollars which would make little impression on its financial crisis but which would place the government in the position of surrendering an asset far more important in terms of political and national security value. South Africa was not a participating country in ERP and moreover already had both gold and dollars. Belgium also had dollars, and there were existing arrangements covering our procurement of Belgium uranium.

The record on the matters at issue with Britain and Canada was confused, and was the cause of some bad feeling among the three countries. This condition had been allowed to exist for some 15 months, and the impact on our foreign relations generally had to be considered. As the political situation grew tenser, there was increased need to retain the good will of reliable allies. We had reason to believe that it might not be too difficult to reach an agreement with the other countries. With the advice of the Commission and of the Defense establishment, the State Department would be willing to undertake negotiations.

It was the attitude of the Department that in these negotiations uranium should not be made a *quid pro quo* for European aid. These negotiations should be largely based upon considerations of the national security. They should also take account of possibilities for mutually beneficial exchange of information on atomic energy development, although the State Department agreed that we should not offer to link raw materials and information. It would be desirable to secure the suspension of all the war-time agreements, except those portions which applied to the Combined Policy Committee and to the Combined

Development Trust. It should be possible to secure the transfer of most of the British stockpile to this hemisphere, part in Canada and part in the United States, and to reduce the input of materials in the U.K. in the future so as to balance consumption.

However, in negotiating for these objectives, the State Department would have to be given a clear indication of the upper and lower limits of offer which it might make. The Department believed that the AEC revision of the recommendations currently before the Committee did not afford sufficient latitude for negotiation because it appeared to exclude even the possibility of discussing exchange of information with the British, during the course of the projected talks. Mr. Lovett also explained that unless our problem with the British and Canadians could be worked out in the very near future, there was a real danger that they might become the subject of Congressional debate and that procurement of uranium might become mixed up in the Marshall Plan discussions to the detriment of our foreign relations generally.

MR. LILIENTHAL and MR. MARKS explained that only when the discussions were actually in progress could we determine accurately how much exchange of information might be considered feasible in the national interest and in conformity with the Atomic Energy Act. Only then would we know what the British wanted, and what information they might have that we wanted. The Commission felt that the proposals in the State Department draft had the effect of offering more than might later be found feasible to grant, in view of the provisions of the Act and our national interest. Mr. Lilienthal referred to Section 10 of the Act, and the very strong restrictions which it imposed.

There was some discussion of the effect of the language in Section 10 and elsewhere in the Act setting forth its primary objective as "promoting the national security." MR. LOVETT pointed out that the State Department had been willing to seek a change in the Act to facilitate such exchanges but was quite willing to go along on a present law if there was common agreement on its interpretation.

MR. FORRESTAL felt that if exchange of information would benefit the U.S. he would not hesitate within the limits of his authority to defend such exchange on the grounds that it would promote the "national security." MR. LILIENTHAL said that instead of a "blank check" to the negotiators to offer anything required in the way of information, it would be both more fruitful and more prudent to go before the Joint Congressional Committee, after we had established what the British and Canadians wanted, with instances of the fields of information in which exchanges might be profitable to us, having determined whether the information was on the one hand within our power to grant and, on the other likely to contribute to our national security.

DR. BUSH believed that the process should be started by asking the

British and Canadians what their requirements were. We already had gained an idea of what they wanted, and it might be held to come under the heading of "basic scientific information" exchange of which was permitted under Section 10(a) (2) of the Act.

MR. GULLION believed that all were agreed on the strategy and sequence to be followed in the negotiations but that the draft offered by the Commission did not afford sufficient latitude to the negotiators, nor any real indication to Congress as to what we really intended, nor any particular incentive to the British to warrant their going on with the talks, much less dispersing their long-held stockpile. On the other hand, the Department's original draft offered a basis for exchange which permitted exchange of scientific information, but made all other exchanges subject to *ad hoc* determination. This was, in fact, the same offer which this Government had been prepared to make in November 1945, at a time when the pressure on us to do something of the kind was less than it is now. MR. LOVETT pointed out that the McMahon Act had been passed since that time and other things had happened which required modification of the language proposed in 1945. MR. MARKS believed that Section 10(a) (2) of the Act which had been referred to should not be regarded too optimistically as providing a basis for exchange of scientific information with the British. It had been included in the Act primarily to govern the process of declassification, and not with a view to furnishing a warrant for secret exchanges among the British, Canadians, and Americans to strengthen their basic atomic energy programs.

MR. LILIENTHAL and MR. WILSON reported on the recent "declassification" discussions among the three countries, and it was the sense of the meeting that these offered encouraging prospects for the success of the discussions which had been envisaged.³

The AEC representatives had taken advantage of the occasion presented by these meetings to ask the British and Canadian scientific representatives informally what they required in the way of information from us. Mr. Wilson gave the substance of their replies which indicated that the requirements of the other countries appear to be moderate, and of such nature that a good case could be made out for supplying them in our own interest.

MR. KENNAN pointed out that frankness was required in our dealings with the U.K. and Canada. The negotiations should be designed to produce a continuing working arrangement and attitude of mutual confidence which would govern any future cooperation in the field. The State Department was not proposing merely a "one time deal" or a contract to cover a specific situation.

³ The conference under reference occurred in Washington, November 14-16, with a view toward establishing a common declassification policy.

MR. LOVETT said that this Government should not be placed in a position where it might be accused of "stalling" on the issues involved, especially since there was some feeling that we had already done so more than once. There should be no reference in the negotiations to any exchange of information if, in fact, this Government did not seriously contemplate implementing such an exchange. It was clear that some such question would be raised by the British and the Canadians, and we should not be in a position of refusing even to talk about this, while pressing the question of raw materials exclusively. The Commission, the Defense Establishment, and Dr. Bush were in the best position to say whether such an interchange would be beneficial to us and how much we could offer. All the State Department wanted was a clear indication of how far it could go in the negotiations.

MR. LILIENTHAL agreed that AEC and Defense should give State some indication of whether exchange would be beneficial and as to what line it should take on this point in the negotiations. He went on to say that if the State Department believed uranium should not be tied into ERP he believed that could be taken as the sense of the meeting. He believed the Commission would be guided by State's opinion in this matter.

EDMUND A. GULLION

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of the Meeting of the American Members of the Combined Policy Committee With the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, November 26, 1947

TOP SECRET

Present:

The Congress

Senator Hickenlooper, Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Senator Vandenberg, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

State Department

Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary

Mr. Kennan, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Mr. Gullion, American Executive Secretary, CPC

Department of National Defense

Mr. Forrestal, Secretary

Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Lilienthal, Chairman

Mr. Strauss, Commissioner

Dr. Bacher, Commissioner
 Mr. Wilson, General Manager
 Mr. Marks, General Counsel
 Mr. Volpe, Deputy General Counsel
Research and Development Board
 Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman

Subject: A program of negotiations with the British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase the amount of uranium ore available to the United States.

Decision:

Subject to the opinion of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, to open negotiations with the British and Canadians as proposed by the Executive departments and agencies represented at the meeting.

Implementing Action:

1. State Department to make preliminary informal contacts with British and Canadian Embassies in preparation for projected conversations.
2. Chairman of Congressional Committee, Senator Hickenlooper, to convene, at an appropriate time, a meeting of the Joint Congressional Committee to review the proposal of the Executive departments and to have a report on the progress of negotiations.

Discussion:

The group had before it a paper, "Recommendations Concerning a Program of Negotiations with the British and Canadian Governments Designed to Overcome Present Misunderstandings and to Increase the Amount of Uranium Ore Available to the United States," dated November 25, 1947 (annexed to these Minutes as Tab A),¹ which was the joint work of the Department of State, the Department of National Defense, the Chairman of the Research and Development Board, and the Atomic Energy Commission. SENATOR HICKENLOOPER opened the meeting stating that he was confident that this session would be useful in making clear the nature of the problem, but that it was desirable to convene a full meeting of the Joint Congressional Committee as early as possible. The Acting Secretary, MR. LOVETT, introduced the proposals cited above, stating that they represented the joint view of the interested Executive departments on which it was hoped to obtain the concurrence of the Congressional leaders and the appropriate committees.

MR. LILIENTHAL referred to the testimony of the then Under Secretary, Mr. Dean Acheson, to the Joint Congressional Committee on

¹ For text, see telegram 5103 to London, December 4, p. 882.

March [May] 12, 1947, in which Mr. Acheson had traced the history of the so-called war-time agreements among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and indicated the principal action taken under them. Since then the Committee had from time to time received further information with regard to particulars of the atomic energy program of this country and to the effect on it of the international situation. The Atomic Energy Commission's chief concern was with the raw materials situation which was distinctly unfavorable. The prospects for more efficient and economical extraction processes which would reduce our dependence on imports were real but still remote. All concerned with the problem now agreed that in order to meet our requirements, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be necessary for us to obtain considerably better than a fifty-fifty division of future production. The situation had become so tight that, on the date of October 1, the Atomic Energy Commission had addressed a letter to the Secretary of State² directing his attention urgently to the need for improving the raw materials situation. Since then, there had been continuous consultations among the Secretary of State, Atomic Energy Commission, Joint Defense Board, and the Research and Development Board. A project for negotiations with the British and Canadians had emerged from these conferences. The Commission stood ready to supply technical information and assistance in these negotiations which would be directed by the Department of State. Since the national security would primarily govern our conduct of the negotiations, Secretary Forrestal and Dr. Bush would naturally have a leading responsibility.

MR. WILSON described the present raw materials situation, the extent of stockpiles in this country and in the United Kingdom, and the manner in which raw materials have hitherto been allocated. He reinforced with detail the conclusion that our raw material situation would be very poor for a critical period of some three or four years unless we could obtain a dispersion of a portion of the stocks in the British Isles and a satisfactory allocation from South African and Congo production. (Discussion of stocks, quantities and locations off the record.)

MR. LOVETT said that our raw materials situation appeared to be critical. Moreover, it was complicated by two factors. First, our arrangements with the Belgian Congo were with a private company, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga. Second, the only other important source of materials now known was in South Africa. There was very little leverage that we could apply to South Africa through credits or the Marshall Plan or other means. South Africa was not a participant

² For the pertinent portion of the letter, see footnote 2, p. 843.

in the Plan. Moreover, she was a great exporter of wealth through gold. She provided considerable credits to Great Britain. With respect to Belgium, our arrangements with the Congo were satisfactory at present, and any attempt to gain further concessions from the Belgians through European Economic Recovery legislation would appear as an attempt to obtain concessions already secured to us by commitments entered into in mutual good faith. Although the need for discussions with the British and Canadians arose out of an unfavorable raw materials situation, such talks would give us the opportunity to settle an unclear situation with respect to the war-time agreements which had a bad effect on relations with Britain and Canada. Both of these countries had the impression that the United States had not made good on its commitments in those agreements. We were in receipt of three notes from the British Prime Minister asking us to implement what the U.K. considered to be our obligations in regard to cooperation. We had not been able to make a concrete reply to these communications, either affirmative or negative, because of uncertainties about the McMahon Act and the effect of the war-time agreements. It was high time such a situation was cleared up. Moreover, it had been apparent for some time that our efforts to secure multilateral control through the United Nations had reached a stalemate.

We had been considering our course with respect to the British and Canadians, and our future policy in the UN, in relation one to the other. We had reached the time when we must solve once and for all the ultimate disposition of the raw materials in question. The existence of a stock-pile in Britain was disadvantageous to the security of the United States. We wanted to get the use of it and have it brought to this country or Canada for storage. We also wanted the British to limit the input of raw materials in the U.K. to the use which could be made of them. This we hoped to hold to a minimum. We had to consider two factors in this connection: First, excessive British optimism about the imminence of industrial applications. We would try to overcome this optimism, but hitherto the extent to which we could do so had been apparently limited by the restrictions of the Atomic Energy Act. The question of British national pride and the prestige of any current British government was involved. In Britain's precarious productive situation, the government had to give assurances to the people that it was doing its utmost to develop atomic power as a source of industrial energy. Uranium had acquired a symbolic value bound up with nationalism and defense. The monetary value of the uranium stockpile in Britain was relatively little. We had reason to believe that the British would never sell or hypothecate it just to acquire a small amount of dollars which would have relatively little effect on their financial position.

The Atomic Energy Commission spokesmen had underlined the value of South Africa. We had to reckon on strong British influence on South Africa, an area which was of key importance in the British strategic plans for the post-war commonwealth, and one in which they were not prepared to abdicate. We had also to consider the character and influence of Prime Minister Smuts.³ If he should acquire the British view that the United States had not been faithful to its commitments, it might well influence him against making an agreement satisfactory to us. This was a current concern since Smuts was recently in London, attending the Royal wedding, and it was known that the British were going to tackle him on the subject of uranium.

In summary, our negotiations with the British and Canadians should be aimed at (1) "tidying up" the war-time agreements, (2) dispersal of the stockpile in Britain, (3) getting a satisfactory share of Belgian production, (4) restricting storage in Britain to the amount which could be used in current projects, (5) obtaining British and Canadian support in negotiations with South Africa. In all negotiations we had to realize that it was a very difficult thing for the government of one country to propose and justify the surrender of its stock of uranium to another country. We had no assurance of complete success in our negotiations. Therefore, we had to consider all possible levers and incentives which might be used. We had received many intimations a year ago and more recently on working levels that the British were interested in exchanging information with us. We knew also that the Canadians felt very strongly about this, and General McNaughton had often complained that the cooperation of Canada with the United States was a one-way street with the advantage flowing exclusively to the United States.

Of course, any question of exchange of information with other countries had to be considered with reference to the national security of this country, and could not be justified unless we stood to gain information or other concessions thereby which would improve our security position. Dr. Bush and Mr. Forrestal could talk to that point. He had received the impression that what the British and Canadians might ask would be relatively small and that we might profit thereby. In any case, the Department of State does not feel that it could start negotiations with the other countries unless it had a clear mandate as to how far it might go, or what it might say with respect to these matters.

DR. BUSH believed that agreement on the question of exchange of information might contribute to an atmosphere in which the allocation of raw materials could be arranged in a mutually satisfactory manner. There were definitely certain areas in which interchange of information would contribute to the security of the United States. For example,

³ Jan Christiaan Smuts, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

(1) we needed all information we could get on Russian production and procurement. To get this a world wide information net was required and our collection net would be widened to the extent that we could cooperate with the British. (2) It was most important to know when the Russians might set off a bomb. To know this we ought to have a world-wide meteorological testing system for radioactivity. Here again our facilities could be pieced out by joining up with the British. (3) There were considerable areas of scientific research and development in which the British and Canadians had information which we should acquire. American scientists had great respect for the work of British scientists in this field. For our maximum progress and security, Dr. Bush would advocate a reasonable exchange of information. Exchange was important in another way. We had developed methods for protection of personnel working with radioactive materials. We would be in a bad moral and political situation, if what we had developed was not available to other countries who shared with us the arrangements whereby the materials were procured in the first place.

MR. LILIENTHAL emphasized that in the view of the Commission, no interchange of information was justified unless it could be found to be in our own interest. The Commission had examined the fields in which interchange would be beneficial to us. Some light on this matter was cast by our experience in joint procurement of raw materials. Cooperation in procurement was to our advantage and we had continued it. In a collateral way we had seen the utility of interchange of information in this field, for example, with respect to procurement and treatment of low grade ores. The Commission had recently conducted on behalf of the U.S. talks with the British and Canadians with respect to declassification of secret information. MR. WILSON explained that during the war classified information had been jointly developed among the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. The U.S. had developed a Guide (the Tolman Guide) setting standards for that gradual declassification of information which was necessary for security reasons, and also to advance the development of atomic energy. The British and Canadians used the American Guide, but there had grown up some tendency to interpret it differently, and some danger that information still classified in country A might be released by country B. It was to insure synchronization that the talks had been held. The conferees had arrived at agreement on a basis of synchronization in an atmosphere of complete understanding.

The Commission had taken advantage of this meeting to ask in an informal scientist-to-scientist way what it was that the British and Canadians required in the way of interchange of information. The U.K. and Canadian scientists present were those who presumably knew most about the requirements of their countries' programs. The Cana-

dians wanted (a) information as to health and safety procedures, including (1) safety of workers in radioactive materials, (2) disposal of radioactive wastes. (b) The most advantageous use to which Chalk River (in which we had a heavy investment) could be put when it entered into operation. The British wanted information similar to that required by the Canadians on health and safety. This was particularly important since the Labor Party and Government had been critical of us for withholding health information, and because the British facilities were located in the Thames watershed containing the largest agglomeration of persons in the British Isles. The British also wanted information about the preparation and use of isotopes which, of course, had humanitarian justification. They wanted information about extraction chemistry and the installation of a "closed cycle" in a diffusion plant which they wish to construct. It appeared from their specifications that British research was following a line parallel to our own and that they were confronted with similar problems. The clear inference was that we could certainly profit by solutions which they might have worked out.

MR. LOVETT thought that the time was peculiarly ripe for us to settle many of the issues outstanding between ourselves and the British and the Canadians. MR. GULLION pointed out that there had been working level intimations that the British might be interested in the kind of settlement we proposed. They had not for some months pressed their demands for information with the same intensity as they did in the notes from Prime Minister Attlee around the first of the year. It was probable that the general tautening of the international situation and the increasing division between East and West had brought the British around to accepting a regime in atomic energy matters which took realistic account of these trends. MR. KENNAN said that the mere fact that we would open talks with them would weigh heavily with the British. What they probably wanted was a reaffirmation that special atomic energy relationships existed among the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. Such a relationship had often been cited publicly, prior to the Atomic Energy Act, but not subsequently. MR. LOVETT agreed and emphasized moreover that the apparent collapse of any real hope of getting agreement on multilateral control in the UNAEC should also influence our approach toward the British and the Canadians. We had to consider the worth to us of reliable allies.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that circumstances seemed to impel, and to favor, negotiations along the proposed lines. This was the first time that the various loose threads relating to these matters—i.e. wartime agreements, the question of exchange of information, the raw materials situation—had all been brought together, and it was now apparent that we had once and for all to settle these problems. His concern was,

of course, in the national defense and the line we proposed to take appeared to be in the interest of the national defense. If it worked out that what suited our security needs also favored those of countries friendly to us, so much the better. But we must approach the matter primarily from the interests of our national security.

MR. LOVETT referred to the fact that the Syrian representative at the United Nations, Dr. Khoury, had informed our representative that the Arab world as a whole relied on U.S. possession of the bomb to protect it from being overrun; moreover our delegate had received similar intimations from the French; thus the question was wider than one of our Anglo-British [*Canadian?*] U.S. security system.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER said that what we proposed in all its implications amounted practically to a military alliance. He did not undertake to oppose it on this ground, or to say that it should not be so, but he thought the implications should be clear. He concurred in our objectives as Mr. Lovett had outlined them and believed that the measures we proposed to secure them would gain support from his Committee. However, rightly or wrongly, the Atomic Energy Act contained some strong prescriptions with respect to exchange of information which had not so far been emphasized. Consequently it was obvious that anything that might be done had to be something that could be done within the law. DR. BUSH referred to the provisions of Section 10 of the Act containing the restrictions on dissemination of information. Section 10(c) provided for the encouragement of dissemination of scientific information. He believed that what the British wanted might be held to come within the definition of scientific information. Moreover, in the paragraph introducing these restrictions, as well as in the preamble of the Act, it is stated that the Act and the information policy were to be administered with reference to the overriding consideration of "promoting the national security."

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER emphasized the desire of the Committee to be of help. The Committee had proved to be a completely dependable repository of classified information. There had been no leaks. His work with the Committee had convinced him that no subject was closer to the interest of the average American, and none on which lack of popular confidence could create more unrest than our atomic energy policy. Nothing could alarm this sentiment more than some indication, however mistaken, that the Government was giving something away, or dissipating national security in atomic matters, to gain some other less important objective. We had, therefore, to keep constantly before us the fact that all our proposals had to be firmly anchored in our security interest. Our negotiations had to be successful, and we must emerge with an arrangement which brought the stockpiles to this country. If this could be made agreeable to the other country con-

cerned, well and good. But that country should realize that the United States was the source of the common security of those who claimed to have the same ideas as we do. Cooperation was desirable, but strength to preserve the common weal lay in this country and here alone.

MR. LOVETT agreed with the Senator. He pointed out that we should not, however, underestimate the strength of the British position in these talks, nor overestimate our chances of success although they seemed to be quite good. The British were in a very strong position. They did have stocks in their possession. They had as much influence in the Belgian arrangements as we did, and they had their Empire affiliation with South Africa. It was, of course, too much to say that the U.K. would venture to put herself in opposition to us on so important a matter, but it was possible that she might think that we needed less material than we thought we should have. Here was where the bargaining process would come into play. Moreover, the British were now at a point of extraordinary national self-consciousness. Their government was willing to apply extremely stringent controls to their people to gain its ends. Feeling as they did, the Government could not be expected to toss away the uranium stockpile lightly. Moreover, there was the feeling of resentment toward us because of our action with respect to the war-time agreements. We could no longer, in the present world situation tolerate the degree of disaffection which these agreements produced. Circumstances were now very opportune for us to settle with them and abrogate them except insofar as they were useful to us.

SENATOR VANDENBERG expressed himself strongly to the effect that no arrangement would be acceptable which continued to place this country under obligation to consult another country before it could use the atom bomb. The provision in the war-time agreements to this effect absolutely had to go. There could be no question of coming to an agreement with Britain on these points, or, for that matter, of favorable consideration of aid to Britain if this provision remained. It was, of course, desirable to reach an amicable understanding with the British, but it was inconceivable that we should go to pains to aid Britain financially, and in other ways, if she refused to see that the disposal of material proposed by us was in our joint interest. It was inadmissible that she should hoard uranium, making no use of it at all, when it might be made into weapons for protection of the democratic world. He would not insist that our negotiators start by using the lever of financial aid on the British but the British should be left in no doubt as to the effect their failure to come to a meeting of minds with us would have on projects for assistance to the United Kingdom. There might even be a real advantage in his explaining the facts very frankly to the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel.

It should be clearly understood that by the time the long-term Economic Recovery Program legislation came before the Congress our differences with the British should have been settled. If not, the Senator would certainly try to see to it that any future legislation or further loan assistance to the British took account of their failure to meet us at least half-way. With this proviso, he believed that exchange of information, to the extent it could be accomplished within the law, was acceptable. So far as he personally was concerned, the outline of negotiation which the group had before it was satisfactory. Mr. LOVETT replied that the Senator's reservations with respect to further financial assistance were fair enough. He did not think it was necessary for us at this time to lay the cards on the table for Ambassador Inverchapel, and he thought that we should and would be able to gain what we wanted through normal diplomatic negotiation. There was no harm, however, in keeping the "big stick" in plain sight in the corner, even if we gave no indication of an immediate disposition to use it.

It was agreed with the two Senators that while an early full meeting of the Joint Committee was highly desirable, the Department of State should begin meeting with the British and the Canadians with a view toward the saving of time, which was vital, both because of the raw materials situation and in relation to the legislative program.

EDMUND A. GULLION

841.6359/12-447 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1947—7 p. m.

NIACT

5102. Eyes only for Ambassador—Personal from Lovett. The Dept with the concurrence of Atomic Energy Commission, Dept of National Defense, Research and Development Planning Board, has prepared plans for negotiations with British and Canadians designed to remove present misunderstandings and to increase amount of uranium available to United States. The negotiations will involve questions familiar to you which have been outstanding since end of war and settlement of which has been complicated by passage of Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Our recommendations for talks are contained in my immediately following wire which is for your discreet use in conjunction with what follows. It should not be shown to British until I confirm. I anticipate that Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy will endorse our projected line at meeting tomorrow.

However, Senator Vandenberg and some others strongly feel that

further aid to Britain, or provision for the UK in ERP, should be conditioned on Britain's meeting our terms with respect to allocation of atomic raw materials and other aspects of future cooperation. Particularly they would insist on dispersal of most of stockpile now lying in UK to this hemisphere. Dept has reason to believe that this objective can be attained by normal diplomatic negotiations without injecting matter into the Marshall Plan which would have series of most unfortunate consequences: (a) Corroboration of Communist propaganda that Marshall Plan was means of fastening US atom monopoly. (b) Throwing into open debate the war-time arrangements among US, UK, and Canada with (c) possible effect of endangering passage of ERP itself. Senator Vandenberg, however, has agreed to hold off any action in this regard, insofar as he can, while negotiations with the British and Canadians are under way. We have in effect until Dec 17 to secure an arrangement with British satisfactory to us and one which Senator Vandenberg and his supporters would endorse. We may actually hold preliminary meeting with British and Canadians this week-end. In the interest of saving time, I have advised the British and Canadians of project of consultations in advance of action of Joint Congressional Committee but have not felt authorized to reveal in detail our maximum and minimum limits of offer nor objectives to be sought except that I have made clear that we think British stockpile should be reduced in our favor. I explained to Inverchapel that we had for a long period been working on a plan to adjust our differences and that, as my predecessor had explained to his Embassy, the time would be ripe for tackling the matter when the second report of the UN Atomic Energy Commission had been rendered. This time had now arrived but we had to accelerate our time table because of desire to keep atomic energy problems out of the gears of ERP. It is my thought that you may be able to explain our position vis-à-vis Congress to the British in a manner which could not possibly be conveyed second hand through Inverchapel's cables. I have therefore indicated that you would be available to discuss scope and timing of negotiations. The British say that they are in some doubt as to what range projected talks would cover and consequently uncertain about which advisers should be dispatched to this country. The recommendations in my following cable will give you an idea of the scope of the negotiations. We envisage that this meeting is called for not only because it is time we agreed on allocations of materials but because of failure of United Nations Atomic Energy Commission after 15 months of negotiations to reconcile important differences with the Soviets. As you will see from following wire, inducements we offer British are (a) reaffirmation of our special relationship in atomic energy matters, whatever attraction this may hold for them, and (b) the

possibility of discussing interchange of information they have desired for over a year. On last point, the outline is not very positive primarily because it was drafted with great care to elicit support of Congress which might not look with favor on project to buy raw materials with information. The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, especially Section 10, still constitute our main difficulty. We hope that information desired by British can be held to come within the category of basic and scientific, exchange of which is permitted. Moreover, to the extent that interchange of information can be shown to be mutually beneficial, we could demonstrate that such an exchange would "promote the national security" (see Section 10 of the Act) and thus probably be permitted within the terms of the Act. We cannot, however, give any assurances to British now about what information we can offer until we have learned in course of negotiations just what they want. However, in the course of recent official talks among American, British and Canadian scientists, with respect to declassification of secret data, Dr. Cockroft,¹ representing the British, was asked for, and supplied specifications of data required by them. It is my understanding that there is considerable hope of our being able to meet these requests.

We believe that British delegation should be prepared to discuss allocations, the program of development contemplated by Great Britain, the amount of stocks to be required in the UK, and an interchange of information policy. We wish to approach problem with reference to the existing world situation and not on the basis of controverted war-time agreements. For this reason, and because any agreement with respect to limited international cooperation in atomic energy has a strong military connotation, the British delegation should be able to speak with knowledge of British security requirements. All these talks would be conducted within framework of the Combined Policy Committee of which the chief British representatives are the British Ambassador, Adm. Sir Henry Moore, and Sir Gordon Munro. There could however be parallel consultations with advisers on a wide and informal basis. Finally it is possible that some communiqué may be issued on results of negotiations, and the impact on United Nations Atomic Energy Commission deliberations would have to be considered. Of course consideration of the action of the three countries with respect to future policy in the UN would not be discussed solely in the CPC but through diplomatic channels and among the respective delegations to the UN Atomic Energy Commission.

LOVETT

¹ Dr. John D. Cockroft, Director of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell.

841.6359/12-447 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1947—7 p. m.

5103. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Re immediately preceding Deptel 5102.

“RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING A PROGRAM OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME PRESENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF URANIUM ORE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES

A. PROCEDURE

1. It should be made clear publicly at some suitable stage that this Government is obliged to take full account, in its plan for national defense and in the conduct of its foreign policy, of the fact that no agreement has yet been reached with respect to the international control of atomic energy.

2. The program outlined below, after approval by the United States members of the Combined Policy Committee, should be discussed with members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

3. Once we are assured of an understanding attitude among interested Congressional leaders, we should invite the British and Canadians to join us in informal and secret discussions, within the framework of the Combined Policy Committee, concerning the situation arising from failure to reach agreement to date in the UNAEC and certain aspects of atomic energy development of common interest to the three nations.

4. In these discussions the United States will be prepared to discuss separately the question of information and the question of allocation of materials. We should maintain that the disposal of materials proposed by us should commend itself to the three participating nations in the light of military security and of the most expeditious development of the potentialities of atomic energy. When the British and Canadians raise the question of cooperation in the field of information we should be prepared to consider that, too, on its merits, with reference to the possibilities of mutual benefit and to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. We recognize, however, that the satisfactory solution of one problem will contribute to a satisfactory solution of the other.

5. Our position on each of the issues mentioned above should be generally as described in B. below.

6. If agreement is reached in the discussions, we should consider with the British and Canadian Governments the desirability and the mode of any public reference to these conversations.

B. POSITION IN WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK U.K.-CANADIAN CONCURRENCE

(Here set forth in sequence for convenient reference. Actually concurrence would be sought separately on the separate headings and not on any consolidated document in which the sections were interdependent.)

General

1. The Combined Policy Committee and the organization now known as the Combined Development Trust will continue in existence as established by the wartime agreements. Except in this respect all other features of the several wartime agreements on atomic energy shall be mutually considered as suspended *in toto*. The Combined Policy Committee shall undertake a revision of the charter of the Combined Development Trust, with a view to changing its title and to introducing any alterations that may be called for by the spirit of present relations or by new developments with respect to supplies of source materials.

2. Each government will confirm to the others in an exchange of notes, or by conclusions to be recorded in the minutes of the CPC, or other such informal means as may be appropriate and agreeable to the parties, its intentions with respect to the policies it proposes to follow, as developed in these discussions.

3. The Combined Policy Committee, already established and constituted so as to provide equal representation to the United States on the one hand and to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on the other, shall carry out the policies provided for, subject to the control of the respective governments. To this end, the Committee shall:

(a) Allocate materials in accordance with the principles set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7.

(b) Consider general questions arising with respect to cooperation between the three governments.

4. The three governments reaffirm that their policy with respect to international control of atomic energy remains that set forth in the Three-Nations Agreed Declaration of November 15, 1945, and regret that the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has been unable to resolve the differences between the Soviet Union and Poland on one hand and thirteen other countries, now and sometime members of the Commission, on the other. They recognize that should full and effective international agreement be achieved, the present tripartite arrangements would be subject to basic review.

Disposition of Materials

5. Each of the three governments will take measures, so far as practicable, to secure control and possession, by purchase or otherwise, of all deposits of uranium and thorium, and such other materials as the Combined Policy Committee may direct, situated within its own Territory, that is within the United States, its territories or possessions, within the United Kingdom and within Canada. They will also use every endeavor with respect to the remaining territories of the British Commonwealth, and other countries, to acquire all possible supplies of uranium and thorium and such other materials as the Combined Policy Committee may direct. All supplies acquired under such arrangements will be generally placed at the disposition of the Combined Development Trust, under that title or as renamed as provided in 1 above.

6. The government of the United Kingdom will ship to Canada and the United States all of its present stocks of source material and fissionable material beyond the operating needs of its present project, as defined by the Combined Policy Committee, and will no longer stockpile source materials or fissionable material in the United Kingdom beyond these needs.

7. The materials thus acquired pursuant to paragraph 5 or stockpiled pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be allocated to the three governments in such quantities as may be needed for scientific research, military and humanitarian purposes. In making such allocations the three governments will recognize the principle that, in the interest of security, all source and fissionable material not required for operating needs of current projects in the United Kingdom and Canada and elsewhere, as defined by the CPC, will be allocated to the United States.

Information

8. Exploration of possibilities of cooperation in respect to information and experience will be designed to identify with particularity the areas in which it would be in the interest of our national security to consider arrangements for cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada. Such exploration will seek to determine the extent to which it would be of advantage to us to know of the progress and the results of developments that are now going forward in the United Kingdom and Canada. Reciprocally, in the course of the discussion it will be necessary to ascertain the areas of information and experience as to which the United Kingdom or Canada desire us to cooperate with them; and it will be necessary for us to appraise the effect that any arrangements for cooperation in these areas would have on our national security.

9. It is the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission, and of the

Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board that there are areas of substantial importance in which cooperation with the British and Canadians in respect to information and experience would be in the interest of our own national security. After the proposed exploratory discussions with the British and Canadians (described in paragraph 8 above) as to the possibilities for cooperation in respect to information and experience, the question of the adoption by this Government of any proposed arrangements growing out of these discussions, will be considered in consultation with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

Security

10. Any arrangements for cooperation in respect to materials, information and experience would be subject to agreement by each of the three governments that they will not, without the consent of the others, disclose information in the field of atomic energy to other governments or their nationals."

LOVETT

841.6359/12-647 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, in London*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1947—4 p. m.

URGENT

Telmar 46. Eyes only for the Secretary and the Ambassador. Personal from Lovett. Please see my telegrams 5102 and 5103, December 4 to Douglas. Course of action we propose to pursue in atomic energy conversations with British and Canadians has been reviewed with Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy including Senators Vandenberg and Hickenlooper and met with entirely sympathetic response.² The recommendations contained in Deptel 5103 will guide our discussions but probably will not be shown to British at this time or in that form.

I believe it would facilitate our task and demonstrate importance we attach to success of talks if Secretary could find time to see Bevin and confirm to him that we wish: (a) to remove misunderstandings on atomic energy matters which have grown up among the three countries since passage of Atomic Energy Act of 1946, (b) to come to some

¹ Secretary Marshall was in London for the 5th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25–December 15; for documentation on United States participation in that conference, see vol. II, pp. 676 ff.

² Reference is to a meeting on the morning of December 5, recorded in a memorandum by Secretary of Defense Forrestal not printed. Present in addition to Lovett, Forrestal, and the members of the Joint Congressional Committee were the members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Bush, Carroll L. Wilson, Kennan, and Gullion. (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

understanding about disposition of wartime agreements, (c) to secure a disposition of stockpiles and future production more in keeping with the common security, and (d) to explore possibilities of mutually advantageous interchange of information.

We conceive that in present world situation and especially in view of failure of United Nations Atomic Energy Commission thus far to reconcile differences of majority and Soviets, it is appropriate that partners who originally launched effort for international control should meet together to take account of situation arising out of this stalemate. If our talks are successful we might make public a joint communiqué to that effect.

As explained in my telegram to Douglas, talks must be conducted urgently to avoid injection of the issues into Congressional debate on European Recovery legislation. I would appreciate your explaining this to Bevin, adding that Department has for some time been discussing with other agencies a plan for discussion of problems outstanding between us and the British and Canadians, but because of concern of some members of Congress over uranium in connection with ERP we have had to advance our time table.

LOVETT

501.BC Atomic/12-847: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1947—7 p. m.

URGENT

590. 1. Reference penultimate paragraph urtel 1281, December 4,¹ Dept considers it undesirable to postpone discussion of US communication on Eniwetok² until SC receives report of Committee of Experts.³ Notification of closure of an area is unilateral act not dependent on SC action. Moreover, procedures proposed by Hood⁴ might complicate discussion of both subjects.⁵

¹ Not printed.

² Document S/613, December 2; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 20*, p. 169 (hereafter cited as SC, 2nd yr., Suppl. No. 20.); or Department of State *Bulletin*, December 14, 1947, p. 1174.

³ At its 220th Meeting, November 20, the Security Council had referred the question of respective functions of the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council with regard to the Trusteeship system as applied to strategic areas to the Committee of Experts for a report within four weeks. For documentation on United States policy with respect to the trusteeship question, see pp. 279 ff.

⁴ John D. L. Hood, of Australia, President of the Security Council in December.

⁵ At the 222nd Meeting of the Security Council, December 9, Hood proposed that the Council simply take note of the United States communication, deferring discussion on it until such time as the Committee of Experts submitted its report on the Trusteeship system. No objection was raised to this suggestion.

2. Following is text of a statement all or part of which might be used in SC debates if it seems necessary to defend US position. Suggest you might query Hood as Australian Delegate on his intentions in placing item on agenda and in suggesting postponement and discuss with him and with other delegates their estimate whether full-dress debate will be precipitated. In your discretion suggest to other delegates debate on this item may be unnecessary.⁶

"The US Govt has notified the SC that, effective Dec 1, 1947, Eniwetok Atoll in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is closed for security reasons. The action to close this area was taken pursuant to the provisions of the trusteeship agreement concluded between the SC and the US.⁷ The SC was notified of this action in accordance with the statement made by the US Representative in the SC on Apr 2, 1947, that 'my Govt contemplates that notification shall be made to the SC whenever the proviso contained in Article 13 comes into use.'⁸

The US Govt has made known to the SC in some detail the reasons for closing Eniwetok Atoll. It has announced that work has commenced there on the construction of installations required in conducting experiments relating to atomic fission. These installations will be used for the continuing conduct of a wide range of experimental projects, including the testing of results indicated by laboratory studies carried out in this country. All test operations will be under laboratory conditions and the security restrictions provided under the laws of the US will be applied.

It is expected that these scientific and technical operations on Eniwetok will provide new fundamental data and a broader understanding of the phenomena of nuclear fission which will facilitate advances in peaceful as well as in military applications of atomic energy. With respect to military applications, my Govt has made it clear many times that, pending the establishment of a fully effective system for the control of atomic energy, the US intends to expand its knowledge of atomic weapons and to continue its experiments in this field.

Scientific research in atomic energy need not and should not, in the view of my Govt, wait upon agreement among the nations of the world on a system of international control. The US has already made available to other Governments radioactive isotopes for use in medical research and for other humanitarian purposes. My Govt, moreover, has urged and will continue to urge the adoption of effective international control of atomic energy.

In this connection, it is recalled that the US Representative, in presenting the draft trusteeship agreement⁹ for these islands to the

⁶ On December 12, the Committee of Experts informed the Security Council that unexpected complications prevented it from submitting its report within the prescribed four weeks; the report was not submitted in 1947. The United States found it unnecessary to discuss its communication since no debate on it occurred in the Security Council. In a circular diplomatic note of December 26, not printed, the Department of State officially notified the Chiefs of Mission in Washington of the closing of the Eniwetok area as of January 31, 1948.

⁷ For text, see SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 8*, pp. 69-74.

⁸ For the full text of the statement by the United States Representative, Warren R. Austin, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year No. 31*, p. 668. Hereafter cited as SC, *2nd yr., No. 31*.

⁹ For text, see SC, *2nd yr., Suppl. No. 8*, pp. 69-74.

SC on Feb 26, 1947, stated that with respect to the provision in Article 13 for closing areas: 'This provision will not, of course, prejudice the full application to the entire trust territory of all international control and inspection measures that become part of a system of international control of atomic energy, other weapons of mass destruction, and conventional armaments.' Furthermore, my Govt stands ready, as it has stated on numerous occasions, to turn over its plants and facilities to an international agency, to dispose of its atomic bombs, and to reveal its scientific information at an appropriate stage as the elements of effective international control are progressively established. In the meantime, scientific research must go forward if mankind is to derive at an early date the full benefits of atomic energy.

The decision to establish installations for research in nuclear fission on Eniwetok Atoll was made after the most thorough investigation had been made of possible sites in the US and in areas under the jurisdiction of the US. Because of the nature of the experiments, a relatively uninhabited and isolated, though accessible, area was needed to avoid endangering human life. A study revealed that Bikini is not suitable because of its lack of suitable land surface for instrumentation necessary in scientific observations, and for housing, utilities, communications, and other facilities. Of other possible sites, Eniwetok Atoll has the fewest inhabitants to be cared for, approximately 145, and, at the same time, the necessary land surface. Of particular importance from a radiological standpoint, Eniwetok is isolated; it is far from the routes of commercial shipping and aviation; and there are large areas of open sea, particularly in the direction in which winds might carry radioactive particles, and which will be kept clear by suitable measures to avoid danger to life and property.

The action by my Govt in establishing installations on Eniwetok and the closing of the atoll for security reasons falls clearly within its powers under the terms of trusteeship. Under Article 3 of the trusteeship agreement the US Govt, as administering authority, has full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory, subject to the other terms of the agreement. Under Article 13 of the agreement, the US Govt has the authority to close Eniwetok Atoll and the territorial waters surrounding it for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter shall be applicable to the closed area.

In the exercise of these powers, the US will protect the safety and welfare of the 145 people now located in Eniwetok Atoll. These people were relocated in their present villages by US forces during the war. They had previously been dispersed throughout the atoll to avoid being pressed into labor service by the Japanese and to obtain protection during the military operations. The chiefs and elders of Eniwetok have consented to the removal of the inhabitants from the atoll and have selected the sites for their new homes in Ujelang. They have expressed complete satisfaction with the plans for the relocation. The inhabitants concerned will be reimbursed fully for lands and other property utilized. The people to be relocated will be given every assistance and care in their move to, and reestablishment at, their new location. Measures will be taken to insure that none of the inhabitants of the Pacific area are subject to danger, and also that those few inhabitants who will move will undergo the minimum of inconvenience.

The UN has the pledge of the US Govt that the local inhabitants of the Trust Territory affected by the proposed experiments not only will be accorded every right which would be accorded under the Constitution to citizens of the US, but also will be treated as persons to whom the US owes special obligations. I am instructed by my Govt to state that special attention will continue to be given to those few inhabitants who have traditionally occupied both Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls. They will be abundantly provided with housing, food, and clothing. Special regard will be given to their permanent economic rehabilitation in their new location. Special attention will be given to their health and their educational advancement.

Periodic visits provided for in Article 87(c) of the Charter are suspended in the closed area until further notice as permitted in Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement. With this exception the provisions of Article 87 of the Charter, i.e. those relating to annual reports and petitions, will continue to apply. With respect to Article 88 of the Charter, the US Govt will, of course, report to the UN on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory on the basis of a questionnaire prepared by the appropriate organ of the UN. In these reports special information will be given as to the steps taken to promote the welfare of the people of Eniwetok and the former inhabitants of Bikini."

3. More detailed material for use in rebuttal will be forwarded shortly.

LOVETT

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee at the Department of State, December 10, 1947, 4 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Present:

Members

The Acting Secretary of State (in the Chair) as alternate for the Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel

Sir Gordon Munro

The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Hume Wrong, as alternate for Mr. C. D. Howe

By Invitation

Dr. Bush

Mr. Kennan

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Volpe

Admiral Sir Henry Moore

Mr. Rickett

Dr. Woodward ¹
 Mr. Mackenzie ²
 Mr. Bateman ³
 Mr. Ignatieff ⁴

Secretariat

Mr. Maclean
 Mr. Stone
 Mr. Gullion

I. *Minutes of Meeting of February 3, 1947* ⁵

The Minutes were approved.

II. *Resignations and New Appointments.*

The Committee had before it a paper by the Joint Secretaries on this subject, the text of which is annexed to these Minutes (see Tab A).⁶ The Committee accepted and approved the resignations and new appointments described therein.

III. *Cooperation Among the Three Governments.*

MR. LOVETT explained that the Committee had been convened at the request of the American Members to consider outstanding questions which had accumulated since the close of the war. The American Members regretted as much as anyone the long interruption in the discussions of the Committee. The former Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, had, he believed, indicated to the British and Canadians that an appropriate time to tackle the points of difference among our three countries would be at the time of the submission of the Second Report of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.⁷ This time had now arrived. The Report had been written and it was to be submitted very shortly. The U.S. Government had for several months past been preparing to initiate a review of their problems with the U.K. and Canada, but the time table had recently been accelerated because of a desire to keep the matter from being injected in the Congressional discussions of European Recovery legislation.

Since our last meeting there had been a tautening of the world political situation which made these conversations among the group which originally pioneered the development of atomic energy, and who had first launched the appeal for international control, all the more

¹ Dr. F. Neville Woodward, Director of the British Scientific Mission in the United States; Scientific Attaché, British Embassy.

² Dean C. J. Mackenzie, President of the National Research Council of Canada.

³ George Bateman, mining expert; former Joint Canadian Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee.

⁴ George Ignatieff of the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 789.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ United Nations, *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, Second Report to the Security Council, 11 September 1947.*

appropriate. In present circumstances the three governments should approach their problems in the atomic energy field afresh, each in the interests of its own national security and in the interest of the common security. This was especially true since there seemed to be little, if any, hope that United Nations Atomic Energy Commission would make any progress in resolving the differences between the majority members on one hand, and the Soviet Union and Poland, on the other.

The United States members hoped that these talks would not be a "one-time affair" devoted only to clearing away an accumulation of problems. The conversations should mark the resumption of regular friendly and informal contact among the three governments on all matters of interest to the Committee. From now on the meetings of the Committee should be frequent and informal; members should feel free to bring matters before the Committee if and when they arose, and questions should be handled on a day-to-day basis. The American side aimed at a resumption and reaffirmation of the close association we had in the past in matters of concern to the Committee.

In the talks projected for the immediate future, and in the parallel conferences of the ancillary working groups, it was especially important that each man present should be able to discuss the matters in hand informally without the sense that he was in any way obligating his government.

Mr. Lovett reiterated that there was a certain hump of accumulated problems to be got over at the beginning in order to lead the discussions of the Committee out onto a regular and normal basis. Mr. Lovett then proceeded to outline the three principal topics with which the American side believed the current talks ought to be concerned:

A. *Information.* The first of these was the question of cooperation in matters of scientific and technical information. An approach to these problems had hitherto been inhibited by certain difficulties. For example, as the British and Canadian Members were aware, the United States Atomic Energy Act (Public Law 585) contained certain provisions regarding international cooperation. At the last meeting of the CPC Mr. Acheson had acquainted the Committee with the provisions of that law with respect to interchange of information. Mr. Lilienthal was under a special obligation under the Act and had very carefully considered what the U.S. might be able to do under its provisions. All the U.S. Departments represented on the CPC, with the help of advisers, such as Dr. Bush, could now say that they were beginning the talks on the assumption that there were considerable areas in which there could be cooperation to the mutual benefit. This was, of course, outstandingly a technical matter, and for this reason the U.S. would suggest the establishment of a special small working group in order that these questions could first be discussed on an exploratory basis among persons who were technically qualified. The

U.S. group would consist of Dr. James Fisk, Director of Research of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Vannevar Bush, of the National Research and Development Board.

LORD INVERCHAPEL agreed to the establishment of this group. He was gratified to learn that the forthcoming talks were to be informal, that individuals could speak without obligating their governments, and that the cooperation proposed by the U.S. was not to be a "one-shot affair."

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR also agreed to the setting up of the group.

DR. BUSH wished more particulars concerning the frame of reference of the group, and examples of the fields it was to discuss.

MR. LILIENTHAL said that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was prepared to aid in discussions of areas of experience, as well as of information in which an interchange would help each of the three governments. As an example of questions which might be discussed, he cited procedures for radiological safety and chemical extraction processes.

It was the sense of the meeting that the information sub-group would not be expected to report back to the CPC a definitive statement of all areas in which cooperation should prevail, but should report back likely possibilities, with the probability that, as their studies developed, or as the art progressed, more such areas would be revealed.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR said that the British technical advisers, who were expected to arrive on December 11, 1947, would include Mr. Peirson of the Ministry of Supply,⁸ Dr. Cockroft, and Mr. Roger Makins, and that British representation on the information group would probably be drawn from this team.

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR named Dr. Mackenzie and Mr. Ignatieff.

B. Raw Materials. MR. LOVETT explained that the raw material situation was, as the British and Canadians were aware, of extremely great interest to the United States. It was of real and urgent importance to the U.S. to arrive at agreement on the means of acceleration of a program of research and development, and on some sort of arrangement in which materials not required for the immediate needs of existing projects should be disposed of in a manner as favorable as possible from the standpoint of our common security. It was hoped that detailed arrangements could be worked out satisfactory to all. For this matter, also, a sub-group should be appointed. The U.S. spokesman would be Dr. Carroll Wilson, General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. It was important that too much restric-

⁸ David E. H. Peirson, Assistant Secretary in the Headquarters Division of the British Ministry of Supply.

tion not be placed upon the working group as to what it could, or could not do. It would explore the situation without commitment on anyone's part. If they found they were in agreement as individuals on possible solutions, and wished to suggest solutions to the CPC, so much the better. If not, they might at least be able to come together on a stipulation as to fact which would be helpful to the central group. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR indicated that the British spokesman would be named in the next day. He believed that the U.S. would find the British prepared to discuss raw materials. He then described the security "cover stories" planned by the British to account for the presence in the U.S. of so many British persons intimately and responsibly connected with atomic energy developments.

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR named Mr. Bateman and Mr. Stone.

C. *Public Announcement.* MR. LOVETT explained that if the current conversations were successful the U.S. members had in mind that some public joint communiqué would be issued. Here the impact on the deliberations of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission would have to be considered. This was, of course, a matter for the respective governments and the U.N. delegations to consider, rather than for the CPC. Tentatively the State Department had in mind that the resumption of U.S.-U.K.-Canadian talks ought to be related publicly to the stalemate in the UNAEC in a significant but not too alarming way. It was hoped that this would have a desirable effect, both at home and abroad, by demonstrating that our countries could not fail to take account in their defense plans, and in the conduct of foreign policy, that the UNAEC deliberations were deadlocked after 15 months. It was not, of course, the U.S. intention that these current talks should herald any breaking off of negotiations in the UNAEC. Any communiqué would stress the fact that negotiations would continue.

D. *Procedure in case of premature publicity.* The Committee had to reckon with the possibility of a news "leak." The U.S. side had no firm suggestion to offer, but thought that, if publicity should occur, the official reaction should be that the current meetings were merely the continuation of long-standing cooperative arrangements in the Combined Policy Committee which had been made public long ago in official press releases and had many times been referred to in public statements by the President and other important public figures.

SIR GORDON MUNRO asked whether it was contemplated to amend or terminate the war-time agreements, or just what disposition would be made of them. MR. LOVETT answered that here again the whole answer could not lie in the CPC but that he was tentatively of the opinion that, as governments, we should try to get these out of the way, except insofar as they provided something useful for the future, as, for example, with respect to procurement, or continuing a joint organ in

which matters of common concern could be discussed. The U.S. believed that something like the Trust Agreement should be retained and modified. SIR GORDON asked how any meeting of minds in the current talks would be evidenced, and whether there would be some instrument, or paper, setting forth the heads of agreement. MR. LOVETT said that it was important that all know what had been agreed upon. It was best, for reasons which the Committee was aware, that this be done in an informal manner, and he had in mind perhaps an agreed minute of the CPC meetings. Most of the U.S. side in these talks were relatively new to the subject, and had experienced great difficulties arising from the absence of agreement on just what was the basis of the atomic energy relations among our three countries. The U.S. side would want the matter cleared up, and thought that the anomalous war-time arrangements had been productive of needless disagreements and irritations among our three countries. It was best, in the present situation to start afresh and not to get bogged down in the interpretation of out-of-date and controversial texts.

EDMUND A. GULLION
DONALD D. MACLEAN
THOMAS A. STONE

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Memorandum From the Subgroup on Technical Cooperation to the
Combined Policy Committee*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1947.

The Sub-group has considered a wide range of subjects of common interest within the field of Atomic Energy and from among these has selected certain topics which were agreed upon for presentation to the Combined Policy Committee as suitable subjects in which cooperation and the exchange of information, at the present time, would be mutually advantageous:

1. Those subjects covered in Sections I and II of the "Proposed Declassification Guide", (PDG-6), which are listed as "Topics for Immediate Declassification". (See Appendix A)¹

2. *The entire field of health and safety*, including (a) experimental work from which radiation tolerances may be established (b) genetics (c) general medical and biological studies; therapy of overexposure to radiation (d) health hazards associated with reactors, such as: effluent gases and their ecological effects, disposal of wastes, toxic effects of reactor materials including Be and Pu; tolerances for the various toxic substances and the various radiations (e) instruments, laboratory design and techniques of this field.

¹ Not printed.

3. *Research uses of radio-isotopes and stable isotopes*, including preparation, techniques for handling, instruments; mutual availability for general research purposes.

4. *Fundamental nuclear and extra-nuclear properties of all the elements* including experimental methods and instruments (e.g. particle accelerators, detection devices).

5. *Detection of a distant nuclear explosion*, including: meteorological and geophysical data; instruments (e.g. seismographs, microbarographs); air sampling techniques and analysis; new methods of possible detection.

6. *Fundamental properties of reactor materials* (i.e. *solid state physics, basic metallurgy*) including moderators, fuel elements, structural materials, also liquid metal and other coolants; the reactions of materials to radiations; the preparation of moderator materials, e.g. graphite, heavy water.

7. *Extraction Chemistry* including basic chemistry of processes, problems of 'scale up' of laboratory methods, techniques of remote control, concentration and storage of fission products.

8. *The Design of Natural Uranium Reactors* in which the power generated is not wasted. The economy of operation of such reactors, e.g. preferred schemes for enrichment of depleted fuel for re-use.

9. *General research experience with the following (low power) reactors*: Clinton (graphite), Argonne (graphite, heavy water), Chalk River (heavy water), Harwell (graphite).

In furthering these objectives it is considered desirable to encourage the exchange of technical experience and information in these fields. Administrative arrangements should be followed which apply the general principle that classified information shall be currently useable by the recipient.

Sub-group Membership:

<i>U.K.</i>	J. D. COCKROFT	F. N. WOODWARD
<i>Canada</i>	C. J. MACKENZIE	GEORGE IGNATIEFF
<i>U.S.</i>	V. BUSH	J. B. FISK

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Notes on Conversation Between the British Prime Minister (Attlee) and the South African Prime Minister (Smuts)*¹

TOP SECRET

A pilot leaching plant will be in operation by the end of this year at one of the few gold mines on the Far Eastern Rand (Blyvooruit-

¹ This document was transmitted by Donald D. Maclean of the British Embassy to Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman of the Combined Development Trust, on December 12 with the information that the conversation recorded occurred "two weeks ago." (Department of State Atomic Energy Files)

zicht). Field Marshal Smuts thought that it would be possible, during the course of next year, to determine the best method of extraction on a commercial scale and the likely order of capital and operating costs involved.

2. Field Marshal Smuts fully appreciated the importance of getting ahead with production as quickly as possible and expressed the view that once the problems of extraction had been solved, there would be substantial quantities of material available both for the U.K. and the U.S. He made clear that the South African Government would retain control of the disposal of uranium and that he was thinking in terms of supply only to the U.S. and the U.K.

3. The mining companies were said by Field Marshal Smuts to be co-operating fully, as it was in their interest to do, in view of the economies to be obtained from the simultaneous extraction of gold and uranium. They were anxious that the process finally chosen for uranium extraction should not interfere with the extraction of gold.

4. Arrangements for the provision of capital could not be settled yet, but the mining companies had been told that, if necessary, the South African Government would be prepared to put up capital.

5. Field Marshal Smuts said that he would continue to welcome suggestions and advice from the U.K. and the U.S. on extraction and other technical problems.

6. There was no doubt that Field Marshal Smuts was ready to co-operate with the U.K. and with the U.S. and was fully aware of the importance of the whole subject. He had expressed the view that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement with the U.K. and the U.S. on price and supply arrangements next year when estimates about quantities and cost of production would be available.

841.6359/12-1347 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 13, 1947—7 p. m.

6463. For Lovett's eyes only from the Ambassador. 1. In view of Bevin's physical condition which compelled him to remain quietly at home for several days, excepting for attendance at the CFM meetings from which he had to absent himself on one occasion, and his extreme preoccupation with the business of the CFM and his other duties, it was impossible for me to have any satisfactory conversation in regard to Deptels 5102 and 5103 December 4, and Telmar 46, December 6.

2. I did, however, see Roger Makins before his departure for Washington. I explained to him the extreme importance of keeping the

matter out of the area of congressional debate and generally, the purposes of the discussion, including the basic approach to the problem as outlined by you, though I, of course, did not show him your communication to me.

3. Makins general comment was, in regard to the movement to Canada and the US of source and fissionable material not required for operating needs in the UK, that his Government would find it very difficult to agree to any proposal which implied that the UK was not, for security reasons, an appropriate place for stocks.

4. I saw Bevin this morning, and briefly discussed the matter explaining our concern that the subject be not involved in ERP debates, and the general purpose of the discussion in Washington, including the movement in our favor of fissionable or source material. The conversation, because of its shortness, was not satisfactory, but Bevin indicated that Makins and his group had gone to Washington prepared to discuss the matter fully, and that he doubtless would hear from Makins during the course of the next day or so.

5. Regret that the matter was not covered as adequately as you would have wanted before Makins departure. If you have any advice as to what I should say, if anything, to Bevin as a result of such talks as may have already taken place in Washington with Makins and the Canadians, I would appreciate it.

DOUGLAS

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Combined Policy Committee at the
Department of State, December 15, 1947, 3 p. m.*

TOP SECRET

Present:

Members

The Acting Secretary of State (in the Chair) as alternate
for the Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission

The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel

Sir Gordon Munro

The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Hume Wrong, as alternate
for Mr. C. D. Howe

By Invitation

Dr. Bush

Mr. Kennan

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Volpe

Admiral Sir Henry Moore

Mr. Bateman

Mr. Ignatieff

Mr. Wells

Dr. Cockroft

Mr. Peirson

Mr. Makins

Secretariat

Mr. Gullion

Mr. Maclean

Mr. Stone

I. *Minutes*

It was agreed that the minutes of the previous meeting,¹ together with the minutes of the present meeting, should be submitted for approval at the next meeting.

II. *Procedure*

MR. LOVETT suggested that the procedure of the present meeting should be to consider the reports of the sub-groups appointed at the meeting on Wednesday, December 10th.

III. *Information*

MR. LOVETT said that the committee had before it the report (appended to these minutes as Tab A) ² of the sub-group on the exchange of scientific and technical information. He asked Dr. Bush to comment on this report.

DR. BUSH said that the report indicated nine areas in which the cooperation in scientific and technical fields might appropriately be started at the present time. The sub-group were unanimously agreed that the areas defined represented a good start but that the list was not exclusive. He said that further definition would be necessary.

It was generally agreed that clear definitions of these areas of cooperation would be developed as discussions went on between the experts concerned and that other areas will be found where interchange of information is desirable. It was emphasized in the discussion that the areas defined by the technical sub-group were the immediately desirable areas of exchange of information and technical cooperation.

MR. LOVETT observed that the report of the sub-group represented a notable advance in the field of technical cooperation and wished to be sure that all members of the committee agreed that this was not an exclusive list. He suggested that there should be some continuing group of technicians qualified to keep possible fields of exchange under

¹ December 10, p. 889.

² December 12, p. 894.

review. This is the type of thing which does not lend itself to definition or absolute limits. It would be necessary to redefine and establish boundaries as we go along.

MR. LILIENTHAL emphasized that the exchange of information was a continuing process of interpretation and establishment of new areas from time to time.

It was generally agreed that this meeting of minds on the desirability of exchanging information should be clearly recorded in these minutes, with a reference to III (A) in the minutes of the C.P.C. meeting of December 10th.

MR. LOVETT desired it to be recorded that the report of the sub-group on information was accepted with thanks and that discussions would continue on a technical level.

IV. *Materials*

MR. LOVETT said that the sub-group on materials had submitted factual reports (appended to these minutes as Tab B and Tab C)³ on the supply and requirements situation.

LORD INVERCHAPEL noted that in the United Kingdom view the report of the sub-group reflected a conservative estimate of supplies and that the situation was perhaps not as bad as it appeared.

MR. WILSON drew attention to the fact that the report of the sub-group was in two parts—one on supply, the figures of which were based on the judgment of specialists, and one on requirements, which showed two levels of United States operations and one level of United Kingdom operations and also a note on Canadian needs.

There was some discussion of the figures as presented by the sub-group from which it developed as follows:

1. The fall-off in Congo production in 1949 is explained by the fact that the figures given are based upon all of the high grade ore in sight—subsequent to 1948 lower grade ores will have to be processed.

2. While the table of requirements shows a maximum and minimum level of operation for the United States, it shows only one level of operation for the United Kingdom. Mr. Makins explained this by saying that the United States figures represented the requirements of a continuing operation while the United Kingdom figures represented the requirements of a starting operation. In answer to a question by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Makins said that the United Kingdom figures represented the supplies required for presently authorized plans and did not include additional supplies which would be required for a diffusion plant, the installation of which was presently under consideration.

MR. LOVETT observed that it seemed to him that a sub-committee should now be authorized to examine the problem of how to reconcile supply and demand.

³ Neither printed.

LORD INVERCHAPEL again emphasized that the picture as presented was conservative and that in addition to the points which he had previously mentioned (hopes for more ore from the Congo and possibly other sources) there was the possibility of economy in the use of material, especially through the re-working of sludges, a field in which British scientists were conducting promising research.

It was agreed that a sub-committee should commence its work with all possible speed.

MR. WILSON said that in his view the sub-committee in its approach to the problem of supply and demand should bear in mind:

1. That while the Congo is the principal source and that while there is always the possibility of developing new strata of high grade ore there, there is always the possibility that the mines may be played out, plus the possibility of technical or political problems arising which might retard or cut off deliveries.

2. That while the estimates of South African production represented the best judgement of the experts, uranium will be extracted there by new processes which might be expedited but which might also be delayed by unforeseeable technical difficulties.

3. As regards requirements, while one must recognize the efforts being made towards economy in the use of materials and in improved processes, these were not yet sure enough to be guaranteed by anyone.

MR. WILSON affirmed that the statistical picture as presented by the sub-group was the "coldest" estimate of the supply situation over the period under review. He suggested that the sub-group be now given directions as to how to proceed.

MR. PEIRSON recalled that 12 months ago an almost equally discouraging picture on the Congo situation, as regards high grade ores, had been presented, but at the close of the year it was found that high grade ore was, in fact, available for a further year's mining.

MR. LOVETT observed that this was encouraging but nevertheless the committee must balance supply and consumption. He suggested that the sub-group be reconstituted to include non-technical members. He thought that this reconstituted group might receive further guidance from the C.P.C. and he asked the Secretary of Defense if he had any observations to make on this point.

MR. FORRESTAL said that he was encouraged to hear that there were prospects of continuing Congo production. He, however, preferred to proceed on the basis of more pessimistic assumptions. He pointed out that as a result of the military planning of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have put demands on the Atomic Energy Commission for increased production—demands the importance of which, in his view, has been emphasized by events of the past week. He thought that nations in the East must be impressed with the true facts—policy must never outstrip power, and power must be based on fact. These were the governing considerations in United States planning. He personally

regarded Canada and the United Kingdom as partners in the field. He thought that the joint approach of the three countries to these problems should be in this spirit. He recognized that each of the three countries has domestic problems in this regard but he expressed the hope that the partnership would have a meaning backed up by fact.

MR. LOVETT thanked the Secretary for his frank statement and suggested the naming of a further sub-group to consider the problem of materials and requirements.

It was agreed that this group would consist of:

For the United States:	Messrs. Kennan and Wilson
For the United Kingdom:	Messrs. Munro and Makins
For Canada:	Messrs. Wrong and Stone

V. *Other Questions*

(a) *Standards of Security*

MR. LILIENTHAL drew attention to the need of having common standards of security, especially in relation to the exchange of information. He thought that this was a matter in which there was complete agreement as to intention, that no policy questions were involved and that the problem was, therefore, one of drafting.

(b) *Nomenclature*

MR. LILIENTHAL drew attention to the desirability of changing the name of the Combined Development Trust. It was emphasized that the reasons for this were purely political and related to the Congo contracts. Several suggestions were made, e.g., the C.D. Trading Organization, the C.D. Traders Ltd. It was agreed that an examination of the legal position should be made, assuming that the name became the C.D. Trading Organization. If no legal problems arose the change could be made forthwith.

(c) *Basis of Future Cooperation*

LORD INVERCHAPEL suggested that the drafts of 1946 provided starting point for discussion. He said that on the United Kingdom side thinking was in the direction of a minute of the C.P.C., which would be confirmed by the three governments.

It was generally agreed that having a minute of the C.P.C. was a desirable approach to the problem and that a drafting sub-committee should be set up at once.

MR. LOVETT drew attention to the constitutional difficulty in the United States of determining the form of an international understanding in these matters from the point of view of executive-legislative relationships. He pointed out that it would be unfortunate if the present arrangements in respect to the old agreements had to be discussed in detail by Congress. He felt that the present situation was an unhappy one and that we should try to provide clear statements of intentions which would obviate the possibility of old misunderstandings arising again. He thought, therefore, that one paper should be

drafted which would set out intent and purpose and that this paper should be put up to each government as a recommendation and, after approval, be incorporated in the minutes of the C.P.C.

MR. FORRESTAL expressed agreement and said that the language of this paper should express intent.

MR. WRONG raised the question of registration under Article 102.⁴

MR. LOVETT agreed that registration would present difficulties from the security point of view. He thought that the solution under discussion was best calculated to meet this problem.

After further discussion a drafting group was set up to consist of the following:

United States:	Messrs. Gullion and Volpe
United Kingdom:	Messrs. Peirson and Maclean
Canada:	Messrs. Ignatieff and Stone

(d) *Requests for Assistance from certain Commonwealth Countries in the field of Technical Information*

LORD INVERCHAPEL drew the attention of the committee to requests received by the United Kingdom, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, for information and assistance in the scientific and technical field.

In reply the United States members pointed out that frank exchanges of views in the C.P.C. were only possible on the assumption that reports of the discussions were not made available to any non-C.P.C. country. They emphasized that insofar as the United States was concerned the law by which they were governed precluded such exchanges except where it was clear that they could be regarded as in the interest of the National Security of the United States. MR. LOVETT particularly pointed out that under the Atomic Energy Act consideration of common defense and National Security offered latitude for cooperation with other countries. Insofar as Canada and the United States were concerned the case seemed to be clear considering the importance of each to common defense and National Security. In this connection he referred specifically to joint continental defense planning as between the United States and Canada.

MR. COCKROFT suggested that there would be found certain areas of exchange of information with non-C.P.C. countries which might be justified within the terms indicated. MR. LILIENTHAL cited as an example long range detection.

It was agreed that such cases should be discussed on their merits by appropriate technical advisers.

(e) *Publicity*

LORD INVERCHAPEL suggested that the view of the United Kingdom was that there should be no publicity on the current discussions.

⁴ Reference is to the United Nations Charter.

MR. LOVETT agreed insofar as any reference to the C.P.C. was concerned. He thought that some reference might be made to the existing deadlock in the U.N. A.E.C., and possibly to its effect on U.S. foreign policy in the President's message in January to Congress on the State of the Union. He thought that the present false sense of security on the part of the public required correction. This reference, however, would not include any mention of present discussions in the C.P.C.

In answer to a question from Mr. Ignatieff, Mr. Lovett said that this reference would not raise any question as to the validity of the majority plan—on the contrary, the majority plan would probably be the springboard from which it would take off, placing emphasis on the discouraging attitude of the two minority members of the Commission.

MR. LILIENTHAL pointed out that present discussions of the C.P.C. would be reported fully to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

As regards any statement to the public, if one should become necessary, he suggested that present discussions of the C.P.C. should be explained as a continuation of long standing cooperation which is already public knowledge.

It was agreed that the next meeting of the C.P.C. would be held on Wednesday, December 17th, at 4:00 p. m.⁵

EDMUND A. GULLION
DONALD D. MACLEAN
THOMAS A. STONE

⁵ The Combined Policy Committee did not meet again in 1947.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 15 December 1947.

Memorandum to: Senator B. B. Hickenlooper
Mr. Robert A. Lovett
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis¹
Major General S. J. Chamberlin²
Major General George C. McDonald³
Major General L. R. Groves
Dr. Vannevar Bush
Admiral John Gingrich⁴

¹ Chief of Naval Intelligence.

² Director of Intelligence, United States Army.

³ Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence.

⁴ Director of Security, United States Atomic Energy Commission.

Subject: Status of Russian Atomic Energy Project.

1. There is attached hereto the latest study on the Russian atomic energy project prepared and coordinated with Scientific Branch—ONI, Scientific Branch—MID, and Director of Intelligence—AEC.

2. The study contains many items of sensitive intelligence information and it is strongly urged that its circulation be under appropriate safeguards.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER

[Annex]

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY

PROBLEM

To estimate the state of development of atomic weapons in the USSR and probable future progress.

FACTS AND DISCUSSION

See Appendix "A"⁵

CONCLUSIONS

1. The USSR does not have atomic weapons now.
2. Present activities relative to uranium development include:

- (a) Prospecting for uranium.
- (b) Exploitation of all known deposits in Russia and controlled territories.
- (c) Stockpiling of uranium.
- (d) Developing methods of producing pure uranium metal.

3. These and presumably other aspects of the development of atomic weapons are being pressed with vigor by the Russians.

4. Shortages of equipment and apparatus are retarding the development program.

5. Reserves in the form of salts and unprocessed ore are estimated to be sufficient for the production of 300 to 450 tons of uranium metal. The current ore production will yield 80 to 100 tons of metal per year. This schedule can be maintained for three to five years after which it will drop to 55 to 65 equivalent tons of metal.

6. The above stockpiles of uranium salts and ore combined with the ore to be mined within the next three to five years should be sufficient for the production of 8 to 15 atomic bombs. The estimated ore production rate, thereafter, would be sufficient for the production of 1 to 2 bombs per year.

This estimate presupposes that no hitherto unknown ore deposits of appreciable magnitude will be developed and that no revolutionary

⁵ Not printed.

process for the extraction of uranium from low grade ores will be developed. These developments, however, would not alter the minimum estimated date given below, although the quantity of bombs produced could be materially increased.

7. Many reports, often conflicting and vague, have been received relative to the location of Soviet atomic activities. Analysis of these reports with the basic intelligence available indicates that important centers of atomic development are:

- (a) Fergana Valley, near Tashkent, chemistry and mining.
- (b) Elektrostal, near Moscow, metal refining and research.
- (c) South Central Urals—possibly isotope separation and engineering development.
- (d) Bohemia—mining.
- (e) Bulgaria—mining.
- (f) Estonia—mining.

8. Evidence indicates that the major effort is directed toward a plutonium project.

9. There is no evidence that the USSR has a means for large scale separation of uranium isotopes. Evidence that the plutonium project would absorb all known uranium resources implies that isotope separation is not in progress, although pilot plants are probably contemplated.

10. Only limited quantities of uranium metal, if any, are believed to have been produced.

11. In the light of intelligence information as to the date at which it is likely that the Russian project could have started and the direction in which it appears to be going, and assuming that the USSR could not proceed faster than the U.S. and possibly not so fast, it is doubtful that the Russians can produce a bomb before 1953 and almost certain they cannot produce one before 1951. A probable date cannot be estimated.

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Record of Teletype Conference Between the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen) in London and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1947—7 p. m.

MR. KENNAN: I want to let you and the Secretary have a brief picture of the state of the talks we are having with the British and Canadians on a subject [with which] you are familiar. In general, the talks have gone very well, and in a completely frank and pleasant atmosphere. We have reached satisfactory agreement on all points except the question of raw materials. The British are willing to agree that we should have the entire Congo production for the next year or

two, but they do not wish to let us have any of the stocks which have accumulated in England. At least a portion of these stocks will have to be moved [to] this country if adequate reserves are to be maintained for our project. It is plain to us that difficulties stem not from British delegation here but from Cabinet in London, where decision appears to be made, largely on emotional grounds, that none of supplies on hand in England are to be given up. Makins, who has clearly been impressed with our good will and with logic of our position, will probably be returning to London soon to ask for re-consideration of British position at Cabinet level. I thought Secretary might wish to mention this matter to Bevin before his departure. We have been warned that Bevin is very sensitive about suggestion that materials should not be left in England because this would be "insecure". For this reason, we have not introduced this argument here but have stuck strictly to consideration of needs. I believe this has been wise and is one of reasons why British are prepared to ask Cabinet to reconsider. Do you suppose Secretary will have another opportunity to speak to Bevin on this matter?

MR. BOHLEN: I will put it up to him but as he paid farewell call on Bevin this afternoon and we are leaving tomorrow about 3 p. m. he may not wish to seek special interview. Douglas in any case might see Bevin before our departure.

MR. KENNAN: That is just what we were afraid of.

MR. BOHLEN: I will see what can be done tomorrow morning if you think it important enough for special call by Secretary.

MR. KENNAN: I do not think we would recommend special visit on Secretary's part but it would be fine if Douglas could handle.

MR. BOHLEN: no reply

MR. KENNAN: Present British position is not one we could well defend to Congress. I am sure British delegation here is keenly aware of its weakness though we must not let them down on this point. They may be able to accomplish the results alone. But British Government must in any case understand that our demands are reasonable and entirely justified in needs of our operation and that unless there is some give on their part we can be faced with a situation in Congress which could have appalling consequences. *End of Conference.*

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edmund A. Gullion, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 20, 1947.

Participants: Senator Hickenlooper
Edmund A. Gullion—U
Carroll L. Wilson—AEC

At Mr. Lovett's request I arranged to see Senator Hickenlooper, on December 20, 1947, to bring him up-to-date on our talks with the British and Canadians. I saw Mr. Carroll Wilson at lunch preceding the visit to Senator Hickenlooper and, inasmuch as Mr. Wilson had been a member of the working group on raw materials which had worked out the proposed allocation formula, I asked him to accompany me.

We exposed to Senator Hickenlooper in some detail the progress so far achieved by CPC and its *ad hoc* sub-groups on information, raw materials, and "drafting." Senator Hickenlooper expressed himself as satisfied that considerable progress had been made and that the proposed allocation formula might be as good as we could hope for. He did not appear to be too happy about it. Although he had not expected us to be able to secure the whole of the stocks in Britain, he believed that any arrangement which left any quantity in the U.K. had one defect: namely, that in the event of a swing to the left by the British there might be some danger of a diversion, or surrender, or barter of these stockpiles. He agreed that this risk was minimal, that it was becoming less and that it represented, at worst, a calculated risk to be run in making any arrangement. He appeared somewhat disappointed that the British had not been induced to store more materials in Canada.

With reference to the instrument which would evidence any final understanding, the Senator thought that an agreed minute might be satisfactory. He referred to the position of Senator Vandenberg and the misgivings he had about what might amount to a secret agreement not shown to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He suggested that the Atomic Energy Commission had authority, under the Atomic Energy Act, to make arrangements with respect to information policy and procurement of raw materials. The best arrangement might be for the Commission to make a statement in the Committee as to how it would proceed, or even for it to make its own arrangements with its opposite numbers in the British and Canadian atomic energy set-ups. Mr. Wilson and I assured the Senator that this possibility was being investigated.

On the whole, I should say that the Senator will support the arrangements we have so far reached. I think it is important that Secretary Forrestal's approval be obtained and communicated to Senator Hickenlooper. I do not believe, however, that the Committee as a whole will want to take jurisdiction, or be put into the position of either approving or disapproving solutions finally achieved by the Executive agencies concerned.

UNITED STATES INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION FOR THE EXPANSION OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: ¹ NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA LEADING TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) AND TO THE CONVENING OF THE HAVANA CONFERENCE

Editorial Note

The First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment met in London from October 15 to November 26, 1946. At that meeting the United States draft Charter for an International Trade Organization was revised and an attempt was made to reach agreement on a set of principles which all could accept. Where there was an identity of view, the articles of the Charter were assembled in a revised draft; where differences, however, could not be reconciled, the conference report simply described the different views that had been advanced.² The First Session laid the groundwork for an interim drafting committee, which met in New York City in January 1947, and improved the language of those articles where substantial agreement had been reached. The First Session delegates selected April 8, 1947, as the date for convening the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee.

During the early part of 1947, considerable discussion took place among representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and France as to how the projected multilateral negotiations on tariffs could best be accomplished. All agreed that because the United States was prepared to provide a number of negotiating groups, the talks could be speeded up. Planning also involved deciding how delegations would be staffed to handle various problems, some of which were matters of policy formulation, while others involved special technical competence. The United States urged that the tariff and Charter negotiations take place simultaneously, but the British preferred that the former be started at least a month before the latter. Both countries agreed that the principal policy officers ought to remain at Geneva throughout the entire conference, to speed decisions.

¹ For previous documentation concerning this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 1263 ff.

² *Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment* (United Nations Doc. E/PC/T/33) (London, 1946).

To insure that the tariff negotiation sessions got off to a quick start, the United States on November 9, 1946, issued a list of items on which it would be willing to make concessions (Department of State Publication 2672, Commercial Policy Series 96). No other nation followed this exact procedure, but each submitted special lists, requesting other countries to lower their tariffs a given percentage on specified items. Once received, the requests were to be studied and acted upon so as to form the basis for negotiations. The United States anticipated that it might receive requests for concessions on items not included on its November 9 list, and decided that such matters were to be considered by the Interdepartmental Trade Agreements Committee, which would make recommendations to President Truman.

Another question which arose in this preparatory period was that of briefing "non-nuclear" countries (those not having representatives on the preparatory committee) about the Charter. The United States and the United Kingdom agreed that the United Nations Secretariat should first send out appropriate materials prepared during the London meeting, following which the United States or the United Kingdom diplomatic mission would offer its services to these governments in order to answer questions or explain obscurities. Latin American Governments were to be briefed by the United States missions, and the European Governments by the British missions. The remaining countries were either to be assigned to one or the other, or both the United States and the United Kingdom were cooperatively to provide the briefing.

In this pre-conference stage, one of the issues which regularly emerged was whether official delegations might be accompanied by representatives of private interests. The United States at first opposed such representatives, but because other nations had made certain commitments to their private interests, subsequently accepted the view that private representatives might be given such status as would prevent their admittance to closed sessions. Australia, for example, arranged that representatives of private interests were to be appointed as non-official advisors and were not included in the delegation.

Besides the preparations and discussions held with other nations, the Department of State had to inform the American public and take cognizance of diverse views prior to the conference. On January 2, 1947, the Department therefore announced that a series of informal hearings on the proposed International Trade Organization would take place so that all interested persons and groups might have an opportunity to present their views. (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 12, 1947, page 686) Conducted under the auspices of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy (made up of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor

and the United States Tariff Commission, all under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State Thorp), the hearings took place between February 24 and March 16, and the report on the hearings is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 26, 1947, pages 721 ff.

During this period of preparation, the Administration ordered some changes in the way new tariff schedules would be handled. The Tariff Commission was now given the responsibility for applying escape clauses, if such protection seemed necessary. The text of the statement by Senators Vandenberg and Millikin, which prompted this re-examination of domestic procedures, may be found in the Department's "Wireless Bulletin," February 7, 1947. President Truman's executive order and press statement announcing these changes is printed in the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman: 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), pages 151-152.

560.AL/4-247

*The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements*¹ (Brown)² to President Truman³

SECRET

WASHINGTON April 2, 1947.

There are presented herewith for your approval the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Trade Agreements Committee as to the tariff concessions we should request of and offer to the seventeen nations meeting with us in Geneva on April 10 to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. These recommendations are the result of careful study and analysis by the Trade Agreements Committee and its country subcommittees after full public hearings and consultation with technical experts of the Government and other interested organizations.

The Trade Agreements Committee recommend:

a) that we request foreign countries for concessions in their tariffs on products which in 1939 accounted for \$1,433,000,000 of their imports from us (reductions \$738,938,000 and bindings \$693,556,000). These requests cover major export items such as apples, tobacco, wheat and flour, dried fruits, fruit juices, automobiles, refrigerators, office machinery, and electrical equipment, and also myriad other items of interest to both large and small businesses in the United States. A

¹ This interdepartmental committee was known as TAC. See Department of State *Bulletin*, March 9, 1947, p. 436.

² Winthrop G. Brown, Chief, Division of Commercial Policy.

³ This memorandum was transmitted under Acting Secretary Acheson's covering memorandum for the President, not printed, concurring in the conclusions reached by TAC (560.AL/4-247).

table showing the distribution of these requests between countries is attached. Reduction or elimination of preferences discriminating against United States exports is also requested in a very large number of cases;

b) that we offer concessions on products which accounted in 1939 for \$1,407,000,000 of our imports from those countries (reductions \$416,000,000, and bindings \$991,000,000, of which bindings \$843,000,000 are on the free list).

The volume of United States trade covered by the concessions which it is recommended that we offer, and the general nature of these concessions are as follows:

VOLUME OF TRADE COVERED BY PROPOSED U.S. OFFERS OF TARIFF CONCESSIONS TO THE 17 NUCLEAR COUNTRIES*

	U.S. Imports, 1939 from:		
	All countries total	Nuclear countries	Non-nuclear countries
	<i>Millions of dollars</i>		
Imports into U.S., total all products	2, 208	1, 449	759
A. Products upon which it is proposed to offer concessions:	1, 827	1, 407	420
1. Reductions in duty:	480	416	64
36-50% reduction	287	247	40
25-35% reduction	78	65	13
less than 25% reduction	115	104	11
2. Bindings:†	1, 347	991	356
Present duties	174	148	26
Free list	1, 173	843	330
B. Products upon which it is not proposed to offer concessions	381	42	339

Of the approximately 3,500 recommendations for tariff concessions to be offered by the United States on specific products, the overwhelming majority are unanimous. In fourteen one member of the

*Nuclear countries were those represented on the Preparatory Committee. [Footnote in the source text.]

†Binding a product means that a nation agrees not to change the current rate. Essentially this means that the present duty will not be revised upward, and represents a concession to exporting nations. [Footnote in the source text.]

Committee dissented, and in three there were two dissents. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 9832, the reasons for these dissents have been formulated by the agencies involved and are attached hereto, together with a brief summary of the basis for the majority decision.⁴

A number of the recommendations as to tariff concessions to be offered by the United States are of crucial importance to the success of the negotiations and are also likely to give rise to vociferous objections from organized special domestic interests. The attached memorandum also refers briefly to the principal items of this character.

The success or failure of the Geneva negotiations will depend on the adequacy of the tariff concessions offered by the United States. The Trade Agreements Committee believe that the tariff concessions which it recommends can be made without likelihood of substantial injury to domestic interests, and that they represent about the minimum which we could offer and hope for a successful negotiation. Your approval of these recommendations as a basis for bargaining is therefore requested.

WINTHROP G. BROWN

⁴ These attachments are filed with Acting Secretary Acheson's covering memorandum, not printed (611.0031).

611.0031/4-347

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Brown)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 3, 1947.

Participants: The President
Mr. Acheson
Mr. Clayton
Mr. Brown

We called upon the President to ask his approval of the recommendations of the Trade Agreements Committee for concessions to be requested of and offered to the other nations at Geneva.

Mr. Acheson stated that the work of conducting the public hearings and preparing the recommendations had been difficult and well done, and that the business community seemed to be well satisfied with the way in which the public hearings had been handled. The President stated that he felt that the job had been done "better than ever before", and that he had not heard a single complaint about the way in which the public hearings were conducted. He stated that he was both surprised and pleased at this fact.

Mr. Brown then explained to the President the coverage of the recommendations as to concessions that we were suggesting that we offer,

and called his attention specifically to each of the items set forth in the memorandum sent to the President on April 2, 1947, which were believed to be politically significant, explaining the concession offered and indicating the objections that might be raised. In each case in which a dissent was involved, the President's attention was specifically called to that dissent and the main grounds for it and the majority recommendation were summarized. In each case, the President said that he felt the majority position was reasonable. He had specific comments to make on the following items.

Zinc: The President said he felt it most important that we open up new sources of zinc outside the United States. He said we could not possibly fight another war on the resources we had in the country. He said he knew all about the political outcry that would ensue from a reduction in the duty, but that he felt the national interest demanded increased imports. He said he had refused to see a delegation from Missouri which had wished to protest to him against a reduction in the duty.

Woolen textiles: The President said he felt the recommendation was reasonable, and that it was important that we import more woolen textiles in order to provide additional dollar exchange for the British. He said he felt that the concession recommended was a very sensible one.

Cotton textiles: The President said he did not feel the concession recommended would hurt anyone, and referred to the unprecedented profits currently being made by textile concerns in the United States.

Rubber and tin: It was explained to the President that the proposed binding would preclude the use of the tariff as a means of protecting the domestic synthetic rubber industry or of protecting the Texas City tin smelter. The President said that the tariff was no way to afford such protection; it should be done by means of a subsidy.

It was explained to the President that the Department of Agriculture had dissented from the recommendations to offer concessions on agricultural products of which we had an export surplus and for which we were asking concessions from other countries. The President said that it would be unreasonable for us not to offer concessions in such cases.

It was pointed out that adoption of the recommendations would undoubtedly give rise to vociferous political protests from many well organized and powerful special interests throughout the country. The President said, "I am ready for it".

It was further explained to the President that it might be necessary to come back to him as a result of the Geneva negotiations and ask his approval for some further tariff concessions. The President stated that he was fully back of the conference, and would be glad to consider further action, if necessary.

Mr. Clayton explained that we were offering only a binding on wool, because of the present state of the domestic wool industry and

the recognition of its position contained in the President's letter of March 12, 1946, to Senator O'Mahoney,¹ but that this item would be of crucial importance at the Geneva conference and that we might have to make further recommendations to him on this commodity. The President indicated his willingness to consider such recommendations.

In conclusion, the President gave his approval to the recommendations made by the Trade Agreements Committee, stating that he felt the job of preparing for the tariff negotiations had been well done, and he wished the negotiators all success and assured them of his full support.

¹ For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman: 1946* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 150-153. The letter was dated March 11 and released March 12.

Editorial Note

The Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment convened in Geneva on April 10, 1947. A list of the United States Delegation is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1947, page 660.

An official report on the conference was published in August 1947 at Geneva as United Nations Publication E/PC/T/186. A substantial amount of material dealing with the preparations for the conference, the conference itself, and its aftermath may be found in the Department of State *Bulletin*, 1947, *passim*. A large corpus of unpublished documentation relating to the conference is found in the Department's indexed file 560.AL. Records of the United States Delegation may be found among the unindexed files in Lot 65A987.

560.AL/4-1047: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1947—6 p. m.

114. Toito 4. Subject attendance of observers from non-UN countries Dept understands Committee will determine promptly its recommendations to ECOSOC as to which countries should be invited to full conference, and on basis such invitation these countries will be given opportunity send observers Geneva for Charter discussions. US should support invitations to Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria because of peace treaty provisions requiring sponsorship of UN membership for these countries, also to Austria, Burma, Eire, Portugal, Switzerland, Transjordan and Yemen. Dept position on Albania and Outer Mongolia is that US should take no initiative and

should maintain neutral position in case their inclusion proposed by others. Spain and diminutive states should not be invited. With respect to Germany and Japan, Dept opinion is that attendance by observers from occupation authorities would be useful at Geneva, and would recommend that invitations go to ACC Berlin and SCAP Tokyo. It is Dept opinion that it is impossible at present to settle question of status of these two countries relative to world conference. Delegation at its discretion may wish to initiate action in early session of Committee along foregoing lines. Memo giving background each non-UN state being air mailed.

ACHESON

560.AL/4-1547 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, April 15, 1947—6 p. m.

119. Frito 9. For Nitze¹ from Wilcox. Wool price support bill containing import fee provision reurtel 137,² would be:

1. Inconsistent with administration wool program contained in President's letter to O'Mahoney.³
2. Seriously embarrassing to Geneva trade conference.
3. Violation spirit of paragraph "avoidance of new tariff measures," annexure 10 London ITO report and numerous exchanges of notes with other govts.
4. Prejudicial to continuance wool study group negotiations looking toward surplus disposal agreement.⁴

Recommend preparation veto message and informing conferees veto pending. Will confirm above following discussion Clayton on his arrival Wednesday, the 16th.

Repeated London for Clayton and Wheeler. [Wilcox.]

TROUTMAN

¹ Paul Nitze, Deputy Director, Office of International Trade Policy.

² Department telegram 137, April 14, not printed, described the wool bill which had passed the Senate, and asked for the views of Clayton and Wilcox. (611.003/4-1447)

³ Reference here is to President Truman's letter of March 11, 1946, with an attached memorandum describing the Administration's proposed wool program; see footnote 1, p. 915.

⁴ The Wool Study Group held its first meeting in London, March 31-April 3; its principal objective was that of finding means to liquidate a world surplus stock of wool. See Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1947, pp. 659-660; and *ibid.*, May 18, 1947, pp. 987-989.

560.AL/4-1547: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1947—6 p. m.

157. For Clayton and Wilcox from Nitze.

1. Reur 119 House Committee has reported out Wool Bill with import fee amendment.
2. Acheson has memo for President urging him take steps prevent passage this amendment or veto if it passes. Acheson expected see President Thursday noon.
3. Monday night Acheson called Congressman Hope¹ who told him House Committee had approved amendment unanimously. Expect approach Vandenberg and Eaton² at appropriate time.
4. With release of amendment extensive press comment likely. SA/M preparing for Acheson press conference Friday.
5. Preparing veto message.
6. Appreciate current information status negotiations wool concession and apparent importance to Empire countries.³ [Nitze.]

ACHESON

¹ Congressman Clifford R. Hope of Kansas, Chairman, House Agriculture Committee.

² Congressman Charles A. Eaton, of New Jersey, Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee.

³ In telegram 133 from Geneva, not printed, Under Secretary Clayton responded: "If this proposed increase in duty should finally become effective, it would make our task here almost impossible." (560./AL/4-1747)

560.AL/4-2847: Telegram

The Consul in Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, April 28, 1947—5 p. m.

US URGENT

176. For Acheson and Anderson¹ from Clayton. After exchange offers Australia on 23rd, Coombs,² McCarthy³ and Morton⁴ called on Clayton to ascertain what possibility improving offer to bind wool before cabling it home since Govt may call them home upon receiving it or face defeat. Their situation described as follows:

1. Home support depends on wool, meat, butter producers and on employment, industrialization and commodity ITO chapters. Wheat agreement difficulties and International Bank's position tend reduce

¹ Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture.

² Dr. H. C. Coombs, Director General, Australian Department of Post-War Reconstruction.

³ E. McCarthy, Secretary, Australian Department of Commerce and Agriculture.

⁴ C. E. Morton, Assistant Comptroller-General (Tariffs) Australian Department of Trade and Customs.

value those chapters.⁵ US being only large protected wool market offers only chance expand wool trade by tariff negotiation. No objection to subsidization. Benefits still would result from lower prices stimulating consumption and discouraging synthetic substitution.

2. Fifty percent reduction wool duty tentatively offered in 1941 (September 3 when opposition party in power).⁶ Therefore, they anticipated some offer and urged present Govt to participate ITO on basis such prospect. Binding only may cause McCarthy, as Minister, Country Party man, to quit present Govt.

3. Beef and butter offers inadequate too. Only in US can markets be expanded by tariff negotiation.

Clayton thought with subsidization duty reduction offered little benefit, but that large part of Australia's recent gain in US market far exceeding possible gain from duty reduction would be retained by binding, and described legislative wool situation at home and possibility of increased duty.

Coombs suggested US consider not only political factors regarding wool, but also political consequences of failure here. Clayton pointed out great trade expansion offered by US total offers, indirectly benefiting Australian wool growers, and stated withdrawal of Australians would be calamity and serious responsibility would rest on them.

Clayton recounted administration efforts to obtain passage O'Mahoney bill⁷ making possible duty reduction pointing out in response to query, that passage not yet out of question that he would recommend administration's efforts be continued and that, if passed, duty reduction might be offered, but he feared that owing to high priority of other pending legislation such passage would be extremely difficult now and pointed to need of bending every effort prevent duty increase.⁸

Comment: Situation here serious as result failure to offer duty cut. May result complete suspension tariff negotiations with southern dominions and perhaps UK, and might endanger whole ITO project. Foregoing emphasizes necessity of preventing passage of import fee provision of present House bill. May be necessary to go even farther to prevent failure of conference. Could save situation if passage O'Mahoney bill or Senate bill minus import fee made it possible to offer substantial duty reduction. Invite your reactions and suggestions. [Clayton.]

TROUTMAN

⁵ For chapter texts of the London Draft of the ITO Charter, see *Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment* (United Nations Doc. E/PC/T/33) (London, 1946).

⁶ For documentation regarding trade discussions with Australia, although wool is not specifically mentioned, see *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 121-127.

⁷ Senate Bill S. 2033, 1946. Documentation relating to the Department's position on this question may be found in file 811.62222.

⁸ A memorandum of conversation covering this talk on April 24, is filed among the records of the U.S. Delegation in Lot 65A987 (Box 99).

560.AL/4-2847 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

[Extract]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1947—1 p. m.

251. Reur 176 and 177. 1. Recognize "withdrawal of Australians would be calamity" and all feasible measures should be taken to keep issue open.

2. Appears fee provisions S 814, still in House Rules Committee, will be retained by House. Some possibility defeat in Senate. Prospective veto unlikely to be overridden. But in any case some action by Congress likely to clarify Commodity Credit's¹ power to purchase and to empower it to sell below support price.

3. If time permits may be advisable to delay TAC consideration reduction wool duty pending clarification situation on S 814.

4. We are asking British to call wool study group Subcom. meeting London before end May.

5. Ambassador Butler² here and his and BC's views on political situation will follow.

[Here follow technical details of 1941 wool offer and extract from Department's note to Australia, September 3, 1941.]

MARSHALL

¹ Commodity Credit Corporation, a Federal agency under the administrative supervision of the Production and Marketing Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

² Robert Butler, U.S. Ambassador to Australia.

560.AL/4-2847 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

SECRET

WASHINGTON May 2, 1947—8 p. m.

US URGENT

271. For Clayton and Wilcox from Nitze. Re wool situation your judgement needed on following:

1. Ambassador Butler here from Canberra believes Labor party in power is under pressure from press and opposition parties. Present government could be overturned and opposition less friendly to US and Charter. Current high wool prices and strong demand give Australians strong bargaining position on duty cut but loss of dollar exchange if US imports of wool decline from higher US duties or rapid liquidation CCC stocks would be serious blow to Government. Australia more friendly to US in recent months because British withdrawal from India tends to isolate them, but opposition to Charter and reduction in Empire preference very strong. Butler believes

Evatt¹ is power behind the negotiations. Coombs position at home shaky.

2. Wool commodity agreement. What is your judgement minimum Australia would take? US could probably offer to limit rate of liquidation CCC stockpile and perhaps tie liquidation rate to price range above and below the support price. US might undertake auction selling and standard grading system which we understand Australians want. US could not offer to guarantee imports, in view sentiment in Dept. of Agriculture and probable requirement state trading.² Pressure by wool interests would make guaranteed minimum import a maximum quota.

Would such agreement without import guarantee and without duty cut along with threat of rapid disposal CCC wool, induce Australia to cooperate? If proposal outlined does not go far enough, suggest we should no longer count on results of subcommittee meeting (re urtel 177, April 28) Butler ready to communicate to Evatt any suggestion Clayton thinks wise.

3. It may be desirable consider Clayton returning here to lead fight against unsatisfactory wool legislation. [Nitze.]

MARSHALL

¹ Herbert V. Evatt, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister for External Affairs.

² Presumably the reference here is to the article covering state trading in the ITO Charter.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

*Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation,
Geneva, Switzerland, May 5, 1947*

[Extract]

SECRET

[Here follows a discussion of other subjects.]

6. *Summary of Status of Conference.* At the end of four weeks, Mr. Wilcox said that negotiations with the Commonwealth countries were either dragging or stalemated. It is evident that we can expect to get ahead with only a limited number of negotiations. Furthermore, we cannot sit around Geneva indefinitely, for a failure to move ahead with reasonable despatch will have a cumulatively bad effect.

Mr. Wilcox suggested, therefore, that Mr. Clayton should call in the Heads of the Empire Delegations . . . He should note the unsatisfactory lists of offers and the failure to pay any attention to the automatic rule on preferences. He conjectured that they would note the requirement that the negotiations should be mutually advantageous and point out the US failure to act on wool. Such failure would free them from any obligation and therefore excuse the weak-

ness of their offers. Mr. Wilcox proposed that then Mr. Clayton could call their bluff with an offer on wool which should put the US in an excellent position to move the conference along to a successful conclusion.

In addition to the tariff aspects of the conference, Mr. Wilcox reminded the delegates that the Chapters on Employment, Economic Development and Commodities had all been vigorously attacked in the US by business groups. On the other hand the Australians state that these Chapters are the only sections of the Charter which hold attraction at home. Therefore, where the US might hope to make changes or insert new provisions, it may be expected that Australia will be in opposition and included in that opposition will be a sizable group of underdeveloped countries. As a consequence, the changes which the Australians and the US groups desire will throw these two much wider apart. Mr. Wilcox concluded that without action on wool, he did not see how the US had the slightest chance of getting the necessary changes in the Charter which would make the document acceptable to Congress, and indeed we might have difficulty in holding the ground gained at London.

Mr. Schwenger¹ said that he agreed in general with Mr. Wilcox's analysis, but that he wished to suggest another course of action. He observed that we would not have a clear answer from Washington for a couple of months on the wool question and suggested that we put this item to one side for that period and proceed as rapidly as possible with the other elements of the tariff negotiations and the Charter. He suggested further that we make use of the Wool Study Group and use that medium for resolving, if possible, the wool problem. He referred in this connection to his memorandum on this subject of May 2.²

Mr. Wilcox replied that he could not see how it was possible to get anywhere on the conference without breaking the Empire bloc and that this could only be done by taking action on wool. Mr. Schwenger stated that he felt all the countries hoped for success at this meeting and would make a serious effort to see that it did not fail. It was Mr. Hawkins' observation that this was a dangerous assumption, that indeed, from a review of circumstantial evidence, the contrary conclusion could be drawn, that the British were making considerable effort to see that the meeting would not succeed. Mr. Wilcox said that if we should go ahead on the Charter negotiations without a decision on wool, we may inevitably expect a weakening of various important provisions of the Charter and a failure to achieve the changes we desire, which, in turn, would mean that if action should be taken on wool at a later time, we could not then reopen those sections of the Charter for improvement.

¹ Robert Schwenger, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture.

² Not found in Department files.

Mr. Ryder,³ Mr. Evans⁴ and Mr. Brown agreed in general with Mr. Wilcox. It was their view that if the conference should fail due primarily to wool, it would be difficult for the US to defend itself from foreign accusations that it had ruined the Conference. It was suggested that by publishing after the Conference the entire US list of offers we could defend ourselves from this attack. It was the consensus, however, that the excellent overall US offer list could be easily obscured by our failure to take any positive action on wool. Mr. Hawkins observed that pressure groups in all countries had continuously pointed out that it is the US which stands to gain the most from this meeting and the wool question would play right into the hands of these critics.

The Delegation was in complete agreement that a change in the wool duty was of no particular trade importance, but had great political significance to the Australians and to us. Mr. Evans inquired as to whether it was possible to make an offer on wool. It was agreed there was no constitutional restriction. Mr. Wilcox recalled that Mr. Clayton had never pressed the matter with Mr. Anderson nor with the President. The procedure required would be for TAC approval of a reduction; Mr. Clayton would take such a proposal to Mr. Anderson and the President; and it would, of course, be necessary for the President to veto contrary legislation.

Mr. Evans then asked that if the British failed to live up to the letter and the spirit of the Anglo-American financial agreement, could we deny them the balance of the British loan. Mr. Hawkins said that unless action is taken on wool, and in the face of a fair Australian position that they must have a reduction in the wool duty, there is no possibility of accusing the British of bad faith. Furthermore, he said, it would be absolutely impossible to cancel the British loan in any event. Mr. Ryder observed that it would be extremely difficult to prove that the British were not living up to their commitments.

Returning to the possibilities of getting congressional approval of the Charter, Mr. Evans said that he felt the Charter as drafted could be sold to Congress. Mr. Wilcox commented that on the basis of his experience he had considerable reservations about the possibility of doing so without including some of the changes which had been suggested. Mr. Schwenger said that he was inclined to agree with Mr. Evans.

Mr. Wilcox went on to say that if the US took action on wool then we would be in a perfect position to demand that the Empire improve their offers and negotiate in good faith. Mr. Hawkins said that then the Conference could be pushed ahead, that an elimination of all

³ Oscar Ryder, Chairman, United States Tariff Commission.

⁴ John W. Evans, Trade Barriers Policy Officer, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce.

preferences of importance to the US could be demanded, and that if the Empire countries were unwilling to do this, the US could then modify its offers accordingly. Mr. Ryder said that he would only approve a reduction of the wool duty if it were conditioned on decisive action by the Commonwealth countries on their preferences. Mr. Hawkins reminded the Delegation that we had used a rifle and not a shotgun on the preferences and had not demanded action on preferences of no importance to US trade.

It was Mr. Ryder's opinion that a reduction in the wool duty might well lose 10 or 15 senators on a Charter vote and that furthermore we would increase the difficulties of a renewal of the trade agreements legislation. Mr. Wilcox agreed with the latter point, but Mr. Hawkins questioned whether we would actually lose more than 2 or 3 senators on the wool question.

Mr. Schwenger reiterated the advantages of turning the wool question over to the Wool Study Group, and it was tentatively agreed that if a reduction should be offered on wool, it would be of considerable value to have the Study Group carrying on simultaneously. He argued that a wool agreement would counteract to a large extent the US reaction to a cut in the duty by reducing the wool growers fear of a flood of imports. The Delegation agreed with Mr. Schwenger's conclusions. Mr. Wilcox wondered, on the basis of recent experience, whether we can expect a wool agreement to result in the near future, if at all. It was agreed that a wool agreement should be easier to negotiate.

Mr. Schwenger suggested that it would be better, if we should decide to follow Mr. Wilcox's proposed line of action, to call the countries in one by one, thereby ignoring as far as possible the existence of a bloc. Mr. Hawkins said, in this connection, Canada was anxious to move away from the Australian position. The Delegation accepted Mr. Schwenger's suggestion.

In conclusion Mr. Wilcox said that the matter had been thoroughly discussed by the Delegation and the next step was to take the problem up with Mr. Clayton.

560.AL/5-647 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 6, 1947—10 a. m.

US URGENT

251. For Acheson and Anderson from Clayton. Following present situation negotiations British Commonwealth:

1. Original Commonwealth offers generally inadequate particularly

with respect preferences. Reductions of significant margins small; eliminations few.

2. Australian offers showed more serious effort comply trade program than those of other Commonwealth countries.

3. Following our failure offer reduction wool: (a) Australia has withdrawn her offers; (b) South Africa offered thin list apparently amended and later submitted stiff letter indicating no basis agreement; (c) Australia has withdrawn her waivers of preferential treatment under agreements other Commonwealth countries; (d) South Africans indicate they will take similar action. Other Commonwealth countries therefore cannot reduce such preferences our favor unless they denounce agreements, which probably politically impossible.

4. Negotiations this basis offer slight prospect real attack on preferences to southern Dominions mainly on agricultural products. Would therefore be necessary curtail our offers. The sort of trade barrier reduction contemplated in our original program could not then occur. Tariff negotiations would at best produce disappointing results.

5. In view key position Australia leading bloc of undeveloped countries opposing US views on charter her dissatisfaction would probably make impossible get modifications required satisfy American business and Congressional opinion and might result in loss of ground gained in London.

6. I am meeting heads Commonwealth delegation urging improvement their offers. Anticipate they will use our failure offer reduction wool as justification their obdurance. This issue jeopardizes all aspects negotiations. Indefinite continuation stalemate would imperil conference.

7. If we could offer maximum concession wool would turn situation our advantage placing US in strategic position to demand maximum tariff cuts by Commonwealth and elimination preferences of material importance to US. Change in atmosphere would also revive prospect of successful charter negotiations.

8. Believe commodity agreement along lines suggested paragraph two, urtel 271, May 2 would not be acceptable Australia as substitute duty cut but might make cut more acceptable in US.¹ [Clayton.]

TROUTMAN

¹Marginal notation: "5/9/47 Action taken by Mr. Acheson. C[larence] W. N[ichols]". Nichols was Assistant Chief, International Resources Division.

560.AL/5-347 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1947—4 p. m.

304. For Clayton from Anderson. Reurtels 176-177, Apr 28 and May 3.¹ Do not believe it possible go further than the binding of wool tariff in connection with proposed agreement with Australia. At same time, we would be prepared, once legislative situation is clarified, enter into discussions with Australia and such other countries as may be interested, looking toward arrangement for an orderly disposition of surplus wool. It might be possible in such an arrangement to give some assurances to Australia with respect to amount of wool it might expect dispose of in U.S. over a period of years. Such disposal might well be larger than in the years immediately preceding the war, but could not be expected reach volume obtained in recent years when our wool purchase program and accompanying prohibition of sales below parity has permitted Australian wool almost to monopolize our domestic market.

I do not think it desirable hold a meeting of International Wool Committee proposed at recent London meeting of Wool Study Group² until this Dept has authorization from Congress under which to act. [Anderson.]

MARSHALL

¹ Neither printed.

² A generalized summary of the work of the London meeting of the Wool Study Group is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 13, 1947, pp. 659-660; this contains no reference to an International Wool Committee. The proposed formation of such a committee, which was to serve as a consultative group regarding the liquidation of surplus stocks is discussed by James Gilbert Evans, "American Wool Import Policy", Department of State *Bulletin*, November 3, 1946, p. 787.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation, Geneva, Switzerland, May 6, 1947

[Extract]

SECRET

[Here follows a discussion of other subjects.]

3. *Preferences.* Mr. Wilcox referred to the studies prepared by the UN, Southern Dominions and Canada negotiating teams outlining the impact on the US request lists of a failure to get substantial action on Commonwealth preferential contracts. It was noted that the canned fruit and dried fruit industries would be seriously affected; in other words, one agricultural group would have to pay the price of protect-

ing another agricultural group—wool. Mr. Hawkins observed that the fruit industries are rapidly expanding.

Mr. Clayton said that he could not see why our deadlock with the Southern Dominions on wool should prevent us from holding the UK to the obligations they undertook in connection with the British loan. Mr. Wilcox referred to the "mutually advantageous" qualification existing in the loan agreement. Mr. Clayton emphasized the basic bilateral nature of the financial agreement, while Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Hawkins attempted to show that the negotiators had accepted at the time the loan was discussed the necessity of achieving a multilateral and mutually satisfactory agreement. Mr. Clayton said that if he had interpreted the commercial policy commitment of the British as did Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Hawkins, he would never have accepted the agreement; that he had never understood the agreement to mean anything more than what it said, namely, that the British agreed to negotiate in good faith a reduction of tariffs and an elimination of preferences in return for adequate concessions on our part. He stated again that he could not see why we had to conclude successful agreement with the Australians before we could hold the British to their obligation implied in the financial agreement. Mr. Hawkins pointed out that if Mr. Clayton's analysis was right, it would mean that the UK would be bargaining away Australian preferences in the UK market, at no loss to the UK, for a reduction in US duties. He said that this just was not equitable. Mr. Clayton repeated that he could not see this or that in any event it did not convince him.

Mr. Clayton went on to say that if this interpretation was correct the US had only a paper agreement and asked how, on this basis, would it be possible to bring pressure to bear on the British so that they, in turn, would force the Dominions to give the necessary waiver of preference contracts. Mr. Hawkins said that on the contrary the financial agreement means a great deal to us. For the first time in a generation the British have indicated their willingness to negotiate on preferences. This they had never agreed to before. Mr. Evans said that in addition we can now force the British to give waivers of their preference rights to other countries, for instance Canada, so that these countries can negotiate a reduction of preferential margins in their discussions with us.

Mr. Brown referred to the fact that the British have agreed to bargain, and are in fact doing so, for the reduction of duties on an extremely large number of items and have actually refused to negotiate due to existing preferential contracts on only 35 items. He admitted that a number of these 35 items were of critical importance to us. To all this Mr. Clayton replied that he did not see how we had gotten anything out of the British loan as far as commitments were concerned to negotiate preferences, if this was a correct interpretation

of the agreement. Mr. Hawkins and Mr. Wilcox emphasized that the British Government has absolutely no support at home for taking action to eliminate preferences. They reminded him that it was the preference question which almost broke up the British loan discussions. Mr. Hawkins went on to say that if the British government should act to abrogate preference contracts, or to bargain unilaterally preferences enjoyed by the Commonwealth in the UK market, it would be suicidal for them at home and would certainly alienate completely members of the Commonwealth.

Mr. Wilcox asked what would happen if we were in a position to carry out the line of argument suggested by Mr. Clayton, specifically, that we should force the British to negotiate on preferences in the face of their failure to obtain the necessary waivers from the Commonwealth. He thought that Australia would either withdraw from the conference or in any event would refuse to go along with the Charter. He reminded the Delegation of Australia's key position on the Charter negotiations. Mr. Evans supported this conclusion and observed that a deflection [*defection?*] of the Southern Dominions would be disastrous not only to the Charter, but also to the tariff negotiations. It was Mr. Schwenger's opinion that should the US bow to the Australians and offer a wool duty reduction, he had no confidence that we would not run into another commodity problem and another reason for procrastinating immediately thereafter. Mr. Schwenger said that he agreed with Mr. Ryder's statement that there were reasonable doubts about getting the Australians to go along even if a cut in the wool duty should be offered.

4. *Future Course of Action.* Mr. Wilcox suggested that perhaps the most effective way of attacking the problem would be to call Heads of the Commonwealth Delegations in . . . He said Mr. Clayton could mention the fact that the Commonwealth countries had come to Geneva with the conviction the US would cut the wool duty. But in the face of this expectation where were the reasonable offers we had a right to receive in the light of such a concession? It was Mr. Schwenger's opinion, however, that we had not yet put enough pressure to bear on the Commonwealth based on our good offers. Mr. Schwenger then referred to Mr. Wilcox's draft cable to Washington, and stated that in his opinion Mr. Wilcox overemphasized the solidarity of the Commonwealth and also put the original Australian offers in too good a light.

Mr. Clayton suggested that the cable be redrafted for further consideration. He asked that Mr. Wilcox call in the Heads of the Negotiating Teams and get a factual picture. Mr. Clayton also suggested that a question be added inquiring about the current status of the wool bill.

Referring to Mr. Nitze's inquiry, Mr. Clayton said that he could either return to Washington in the near future and join in the fight for satisfactory wool legislation and then return to Geneva later, or he could stay here and attempt to work out a compromise. He asked for the judgment of the Delegation on which would be the best course of action.

It was agreed that Mr. Clayton would call in the Heads of the Commonwealth Delegations individually, following up on the letters sent out transmitting Mr. Ballif's chart-analysis of our overall offers. These interviews would begin with Helmore, then Wilgress, then Coombs, Holloway and Nash. It was agreed that the Heads of the respective negotiating teams would brief Mr. Clayton with memoranda summarizing the important elements of our offers and what we find most unsatisfactory about the offers given us. No indication would be given of any action the US might take on wool. However, it was agreed that Mr. Clayton should refer to the Commonwealth's expectation that the US was going to offer a 50% cut in the wool duty and that even on the basis of this expectation their offers were totally unsatisfactory.

560.AL/5-747: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1947—1 p. m.

312. Toito 42. Soviet delegation headed by Arutiunian¹ and including three representatives from Ministry of Foreign Trade, is now here for Lend-Lease settlement negotiations which by definition are limited to terms of Soviet Lend-Lease Master Agreement.² It is planned to discuss commercial policy with them in accordance with Article VII and the views of the delegation are solicited with respect to the scope of such discussions and the nature of the commitments the US might seek to obtain from the USSR. It is planned to outline the trade program, express regret at Soviet non-attendance at Geneva, and offer to discuss Charter in detail. Commitments sought might include expression of Soviet views on Charter and agreement to attend World Conference. Please advise promptly concerning delegation opinion.³

MARSHALL

¹ Amazasp Avakimovich Arutyunyan, Deputy to Soviet Ambassador Novikov.

² For documentation regarding these negotiations with the Soviet Union, see vol. iv, pp. 653 ff. The text of the Master Agreement with the Soviet Union, June 11, 1942, is printed in Department of State Executive Agreement Series, No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2), 1500.

³ In telegram 282, May 9 (Frito 43), the delegation suggested that "Greatest help Geneva negotiations would be Soviet statement sympathy purposes ITO, indication . . . probability eventual membership ITO. In unlikely event you can get more than this, ask endorsement in principle of Article 31." (560.AL/5-947)

Lot 65A987, Box 99

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of Commercial Policy (Beale)*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 8, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Delegation
Mr. Helmore, Chairman, U.K. Delegation
Mr. Beale, U.S. Delegation

Mr. Clayton informed Mr. Helmore that we were disappointed in the British offers as compared with the U.S. offers. Mr. Clayton pointed out that we were offering concessions which affected 95 per cent of U.K. imports into the U.S. in 1939, that the U.S. concessions on dutiable items affected 70 per cent of U.K. imports into the U.S. and the U.S. concessions in the form of free list bindings covered 75 per cent of U.K. imports into the U.S. Furthermore Mr. Clayton noted that 57 per cent of the trade was covered by reductions in dutiable rates, and 50 per cent of the trade was covered by direct concessions to the U.K. He also pointed out that of the reductions in dutiable items covered by the U.S. concessions on 92 per cent reductions of 36-50 per cent were offered, on 17 per cent reductions of 25-35 per cent were offered and on 11 per cent reductions of less than 25 per cent were offered.

Mr. Clayton pointed out, on the other hand, that with respect to duty concessions offered by the U.K., about 48 per cent of total dutiable imports on which concessions were offered were affected by reductions of less than 25 per cent, about 41 per cent by reductions of 25-35 per cent and only one per cent reductions of 50 per cent. Mr. Beale stated that the U.K. offers covered only 34 per cent of total U.S. imports into the U.K., although the U.K. statistics indicated that this figure should be about 42 per cent. Mr. Helmore agreed that a figure between 34 and 42 per cent might be taken as representing the probable figure for the purposes of the discussion.

Mr. Clayton then said that the U.K. offers were particularly disappointing with respect to offers of elimination of preference, pointing out that in only one instance had the U.K. offered to eliminate the preference. In this connection Mr. Clayton noted that "on 15 items the U.K. offered to bind the rates, etc."

In reply Mr. Helmore pointed out that the U.K. duties were already low and it could not be expected that the reductions offered would be equivalent within the percentage brackets. He also emphasized that the Procedural memorandum provided that bindings of low tariffs should be taken as representing concessions in the same way as reductions of high tariffs. With regard to the elimination of preferences accorded by the U.K., Mr. Helmore stated that the U.K. offers should

be taken as the combination of reductions in U.K. tariffs as such plus the reductions in preferences accorded to the U.K. in Commonwealth markets. So far as the items of interest to the Commonwealth countries in the U.K. market on which preferences are accorded by the U.K., Mr. Helmore pointed out that such preferences were not the concern of the U.K. but of the countries benefiting by such preferences. Mr. Helmore said that the U.K. was to be regarded as making her offers partially in the form of reduced preferences in Empire and Commonwealth markets and that such reductions in preferences represented costs to the U.K. He instanced as an example the case of linseed oil, which is dutiable at 10% and on which the margin of preference is bound to India. Mr. Helmore said that from the U.K. standpoint the U.K. would be advantaged by having freedom of action, since conceivably they might use their freedom in bargaining with Argentina, if an agreement were ever negotiated with that country. But, he stated, it would be extremely difficult to persuade India to give up their preference and if it were to be done the U.K. would have to pay India. Mr. Helmore concluded by saying that whereas on the one hand, as Mr. Clayton had pointed out, the U.S. offers represented a totality so the U.K. offers could only be assessed by taking a look at all the offers made by the U.K. in the form of reduced preferences accorded the U.K. by the Commonwealth countries.

Mr. Clayton stated that this was not his understanding of the case. He pointed out that the U.S. and U.K. had agreed, as part of the Financial Agreement, that they would undertake the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of preference and the question was therefore one of the fulfillment of a commitment by both sides. He pointed out that the U.S. offers represented their contribution, and he felt that no one could dispute the degree of that contribution. On the other hand the U.K. offers did not represent any substantial contribution to the objective of eliminating of preference. Mr. Clayton then explained that the procedure, as he understood it, was for the U.K. to undertake the reduction or elimination of preferences accorded by the U.K. and on the other hand for the Commonwealth countries to reduce the preferences which they respectively accorded. Only in this manner, could we expect to affect the preferential system. He pointed out that it lay within the power of the U.K. to take their own action with respect to the preferences accorded by the U.K.

Mr. Helmore replied that the extent to which the preferential system would be affected by the offers made by all countries within that system could only be judged by examining the offers with respect to preferences proffered by the various countries concerned. In this connection he reminded Mr. Clayton of Sir Stafford Cripps' statement for the press regarding the elimination of preference. Mr. Clayton replied that our requests would not in fact result in the dissolution of

the preferential system, and Mr. Beale pointed out that our requests to the U.K. were in fact selective so far as preferences were concerned and the U.S. requests for bindings would not in fact result in any reduction in the margin of preference. Mr. Helmore then pointed out that under the provisions of the Charter margins of preferences would be bound and in the view of the U.K. and commonwealth countries this represented an important contribution. Mr. Helmore stated that, whereas circumstances might arise under which a country such as the U.S. would withdraw from the organization and take steps to increase their tariffs, it would be infinitely more difficult to expand the preferential system once the margins of preference had been bound since such a move would require agreement among six countries rather than unilateral action by one.

During the conversation the part played by wool in the offers made by the Commonwealth countries was discussed. Mr. Clayton stated that in his view a reduction in the duty on wool by the U.S. would not result in any substantial increase in the U.S. market for wool and that the importance attached to the concession by Australia was greatly exaggerated. Mr. Clayton and Mr. Helmore discussed the probable effect of a reduction in the duty on wool upon the cost of woollen textiles and Mr. Clayton emphasized that in his view the result would be slight.

In this connection Mr. Clayton again stressed the point that the U.K. was responsible for offers on preferences accorded by the U.K., and he pointed out that this was made clear when one considered the possibility that no agreements might be reached with the Southern Dominions. Mr. Helmore stated that he had considered this possibility and had in fact discussed the matter during the talks which the Commonwealth countries had been having recently. He said that, in the event of the withdrawal of the Southern Dominions it would be necessary to review the whole problem, but that he felt that an opportunity would remain for agreement between the U.S., U.K. and Canada, as well as other countries, though on a reduced scale. Mr. Helmore said further that during the discussions referred to, Mr. Nash¹ had pointed out that no government could be expected to resign at the request of another government, and that a failure to secure a concession on wool would almost assuredly result in the fall of the Australian Government. Mr. Clayton replied that he recognized the political implications of the wool problem for Australia as well as for the U.S., but that he could not agree with the Australian view as regards the economic aspects of the problem.

Mr. Clayton then referred again to the U.K. offers in contrast to the U.S. offers. He pointed out that, as a result of the proposed reductions, the U.S. tariff would be lower than at any other time within his

¹ Walter Nash, New Zealand Minister of Finance.

memory, lower even than under the Underwood Tariff,² which was a low tariff. He emphasized the level of the tariff as a result of previous reductions and pointed out that this level would be substantially lower as a result of the present U.S. offers.

Mr. Helmore then raised the question of the actual advantages to trade which might be expected to result from the U.S. offers. Mr. Clayton pointed out that the over-all U.S. offers would undoubtedly result in an expansion of trade to the benefit of all the countries concerned. Mr. Beale stated that so far as advantages were concerned it was important, in evaluating the U.K. offers, to realize that bindings of relatively low duties, although given due importance, could not be expected to result in any substantial improvement in the U.S. position in the U.K. market. On the other hand, for example, it was anticipated that the U.S. offer on woolen and worsted goods would be of great advantage to the U.K. He noted that whereas average annual imports during the period 1930-38 were valued at 5.3 million dollars, the quota, if filled, could represent a value to the importing countries of 66 million dollars. He also pointed out that in absolute amount the quota was several times greater than imports into the U.S. in the year in which their volume was greatest, and was several times greater than U.K. exports to the U.S. in their best year. Mr. Helmore said that they viewed the quota as most undesirable since it would open the door to pressure for other similar quotas on manufactured goods. Mr. Clayton agreed that tariff quotas are undesirable but emphasized that the U.S. offer was the only means by which the U.S. could make a reduction in the duties. Mr. Helmore recognized that the offer on woolen textiles presented an opportunity for the expansion of U.K. trade. He pointed out however, that the quota applied to all countries. In reply, Mr. Beale informed him that the U.K. accounted for the greater part of imports of woolen and worsteds.

In conclusion, Mr. Clayton again pointed out that the U.K. offers were disappointing and did not represent a fulfillment of their commitments with respect to the elimination of preference. Mr. Helmore replied that before the U.S. reached any final conclusions he would ask that they look at the total offers with respect to preferences. Mr. Beale pointed out that the U.K. offers as such, if taken as representing part of that total picture, did not reflect any substantial contribution on the part of the Commonwealth countries concerned, and that the main concern was with the situation as represented by the U.K. offers. He pointed out that, for example, the U.K. offers reflected negligible contributions on the part of South Africa and New Zealand.

W[ILSON] T. BEALE

²The Underwood Tariff, enacted during the first administration of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1917), was considered the lowest tariff since the 1860's.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Homer S. Fox, Member of the United States Delegation Staff*¹

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 9, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Clayton, Chairman of U.S. Delegation
Mr. Wilgress, Chairman of Canadian Delegation
Mr. McKinnon, Canadian Delegation
Mr. Fox, U.S. Delegation

Mr. Clayton inquired whether Mr. Wilgress had had an opportunity to review the statistical summary and charts which had been sent to him regarding the United States offers.

Mr. Wilgress replied that he had studied them carefully, found them of great interest and that they made a very impressive showing. He was fully cognizant of the lengths to which the United States had gone in preparing its offers. He thought, however, that for several reasons too much importance should not be attached to any such statistical appraisal.

In the first place, the United States had started from a higher tariff level than had Canada. In the second place, while Canada was of course interested in direct reciprocal reductions between our two countries, and in fact had only comparatively few items on which they considered the United States offers perhaps somewhat inadequate, Canada was very much interested in the opening of the United States market to other countries. He thought the only way that Canada could meet its commitments to the United States was by means of a considerable increase in imports from other countries which would make more exchange available to them, increase their purchasing power and thus equip them to purchase larger quantities of Canadian goods. He thought that while the United States tariff on Canadian goods had been appreciably lowered already, and would be further lowered under the present proposals, this was not true to the same extent of the United States tariff against the goods of other countries.

Mr. Wilgress also stated that Canada was interested in reductions of duty which would result in actual increases in trade as distinct from reductions which provided a good statistical presentation. On this point he thought the United States showing was somewhat weak in that there seemed to have been a tendency in making the United States offers to make the major reductions on items in which there was already a substantial import trade, but to be more hesitant regarding items in which there was little or no trade because of prohibitive duties or where further reductions would result in increased imports of a strongly competitive nature.

¹ Mr. Fox was the Commercial Attaché at Ottawa.

For example, among the few items in which Canada was directly concerned in a major way, he cited groundfish fillets. It seemed to him that this was a case where the United States was being unnecessarily restrictive in its offer. It was true that the offer included a substantially larger tariff quota but that perhaps if the competitive angle had not been given undue consideration no quota at all might have been necessary. In addition the over-quota duty had been raised, which would be a point of great difficulty in Canada. The Canadian offers contained no increases and even this one increase on the United States side would cause a great deal of dissatisfaction in Canada with the whole agreement as being contrary to the general principles of the program.

Mr. Wilgress then reviewed the history of United States tariff negotiations, pointing out that in 1935 the United States had been given the Canadian intermediate tariff rates plus some reductions from those rates. In 1938 further reductions had been made to the United States on a wide range of items. Both of these negotiations had resulted in effect in horizontal cuts in the Canadian tariff. Now they were proposing a third cut pretty much across the board and while, admittedly, most of their reductions were small, they were widespread, and he thought went very far to offset a smaller number of larger reductions on the part of the United States. He also referred to the fact that the United States had limited the amount of its reductions to 50 percent of the existing rates whereas Canada was able in a number of cases to make 100 percent reductions by adding important items to the free list. He repeated that he thought the two offer lists were not statistically comparable and that the Canadian offers represented, in their way, a contribution comparable to those of the United States. He also stressed the fact that Canada had been the strongest supporter of the United States in this whole program, that its objectives were similar, and he felt that this was an important consideration.

Mr. Clayton replied that as regards the height of the tariff, we did not accept the contention that the United States now had a high tariff, referring to the very substantial reductions which had been made since 1930, and that taking into account the reductions already made and now proposed, together with the changes in the price level, the average duty (on dutiable items only) would probably be less than 20 percent. He noted the Canadian interest in improving multilaterally the trading situation, and stated that that is just what we are attempting to do and believe we are doing it in the only practicable way.

With regard to specific items such as fish fillets, Mr. Clayton said that the United States did not like quotas, even tariff quotas, and in fact has only a very few. In this case it seemed to be the only way that the United States could give a substantial concession and the quota proposed had been substantially enlarged to approximate the

maximum of even the abnormal imports of recent months. He thought it quite probable that actual imports in the future would not reach the proposed quota level and while he regretted the necessity of increasing the over-quota tariff rate, this was an essential corollary of the larger quota, and in fact, at present price levels or anything approximating them, would probably be not greatly restrictive of trade even if future imports should tend to run above the quota.

Mr. Clayton then said he would like to explain the United States position on wool. Even though Canada was not directly interested to any extent, she was indirectly affected in various ways. He explained the situation at some length, including reference to the pending legislation and informed Mr. Wilgress that he (Mr. Clayton) expected to return home shortly for two or three weeks to do what he could to prevent this legislation being passed and in fact to try to prevent any further increase in the impost on wool.

Mr. Clayton then referred to the subject of preferences, explained the great and longstanding interest of the United States in the elimination or substantial reductions of British preferentials, indicating that no appreciable improvement in this situation was apparent in the offers thus far made to the United States, and that unless we could show substantial progress in this direction we could not go back home. He also referred to the commitments made by the United Kingdom in connection with the loan agreement.

Mr. Wilgress replied that as far as Canada was concerned some reductions in preferences had already been proposed and that if and when the wool situation were cleared up so that Canada could be given a free hand by the other dominions, very much more indeed could be done in the way of reduction of preference margins. He said that, of course, they were very greatly handicapped at the moment and that the only way they could make any definitive and substantial improvement would be, under present conditions, to denounce their agreements with Australia and possibly South Africa, and that this would be very difficult for them to do. The impression gained from his remarks was that, in spite of their reluctance, they would, if the necessity should arise, as for example if Australia and possibly South Africa were to withdraw from the present negotiations, Canada would denounce its agreements with those dominions, although of course he did not specifically commit himself on this point. The tenor of his remarks in this connection also was that there was little likelihood of Australia at any rate being able to continue present negotiations unless there were some reduction in the duty on wool.

Mr. Clayton, as part of his explanation of the wool situation, had indicated that while he could understand the political difficulty he could not understand the economic arguments put forward by Austra-

lia. On this point Mr. Wilgress stressed the political importance of the subject in Australia and indicated that in all the southern dominions, somewhat isolated as they are from the rest of the world, a subject like this tended to assume an even greater political importance than it might perhaps do in Canada or some other country nearer to the center of things.

Mr. Wilgress then asked Mr. McKinnon if he had any additional remarks to make. Mr. McKinnon said that as regards the statistical summary he had already explained, in the negotiating meetings, his complete lack of confidence in statistical presentations, that he would not even look at them, and that in his opinion the appraisal of the relative contributions of the various countries must be made on other grounds. He thought, as had been expressed by Mr. Wilgress that the Canadian offer list, consisting as it did of a large number of small reductions, constituting in effect a further horizontal cut in the Canadian tariff, was in its way as much of a contribution as the United States offer list, although of an entirely different nature. As regards preferences he said Canada had given complete freedom to the other dominions to make whatever reductions in preferential margins they might consider appropriate without obtaining prior agreement from Canada in individual cases. Mr. Wilgress interjected at this point that Canada had informed the other dominions that all that was necessary was to inform Canada of the action taken.

Regarding the maintenance of preferential margins by lowering both the MFN and preferential rates by the same amount, Mr. McKinnon was understood to justify this largely on behalf of the West Indies. He said that so far as he had been able to examine our offer list, it did not provide for any increased market in the United States for West Indian products, and Canada could not entirely cut off its own market for those products unless and until the United States could take at least a share of the load.

Mr. McKinnon then referred to the negotiations thus far and expressed the view that if we continued to negotiate on an item-by-item basis it not only would take months but that the result would be unsatisfactory both to Canada and to the United States—to Canada in that more reductions might be forced upon them than could be accepted by Parliament and that while many of them might add up to a good statistical presentation from the United States point of view, they would not in fact be greatly effective in increasing trade. On the other hand the United States might wind up by being resentful of what seemed to it the rather niggardly Canadian approach and that the effect all around would be unsatisfactory.

Mr. Fox inquired at this point whether Mr. McKinnon had any alternative procedure to suggest. He said that the negotiations thus far had proceeded according to the usual procedure and by mutual agree-

ment. Mr. McKinnon replied that he thought it would be a great saving of time and that the same result would be accomplished if each side were to select the few items on which they thought a really effective reduction could be made and more or less to take the balance of the schedules as read. Mr. Fox pointed out that this would hardly be practicable for the reason that while Canada might have only three or four major items on which it might wish to press for further reductions, the United States was interested in a wider range of commodities, most of them much less important individually, and that if any such procedure as that suggested by Mr. McKinnon were to be followed, it would necessarily have to be on the United States side by groups of commodities, rather than by individual items, although he was not even sure that this would be feasible. We would, however, consider what might be done to meet Mr. McKinnon's point.

Mr. McKinnon also suggested that the system of negotiating teams set up by the United States might be conducive to the development of competition between those teams to see which could make the best showing regardless of the merits of the reductions which they might be seeking. Mr. Fox assured him that this was not the case, that both the United States offer and request lists had been prepared on a unit basis, that the negotiating teams were only a convenience for the saving of time and the expediting of the negotiations, and that they were not in any sense concerned either with competitive showing among themselves or with the establishment of a favorable statistical position as such.

Further general discussion followed at the end of which Mr. Wilgress expressed to Mr. Clayton the hope that similar discussions might be held with him at frequent intervals. He thought they were extremely helpful and useful, and expressed his appreciation for the opportunity of holding the present conversation.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William Adams Brown*¹

SECRET

[GENEVA,] May 9, 1947.

J² opened the conversation by saying that the Conference needs all the good wishes for its success possible and struck a pessimistic note.

The basic reason for the lack of progress of the Conference is that the United States Delegation seems not really to know what it wants.

¹ Mr. Brown, formerly an officer in the Department of State, was then a member of the staff of the Brookings Institution and an informal observer at Geneva. The document bears the following marginal notation: "Memo of Conversation between Mr. Wm. Adams Brown and Mr. James Helmore handed confidentially to Mr. Wilcox."

² James R. C. Helmore, of the British Delegation.

It is pursuing two contradictory objectives: (1) To obtain a world in which there will be a minimum of trade restrictions and impediments to private enterprise; and (2) to obtain for every concession it makes on tariffs an *equivalent* concession in tariff and preference from other countries.

The reason these two are contradictory is that *equal* concessions in the tariff bargaining will not help to turn over the U.S. favorable export balance. The U.S. is working on the theory that the U.S. balance of payments position can be put right in an environment of generally expanding trade, but this is a fallacy as long as the U.S. does not make any tariff cuts which really hurt anyone in the U.S. The U.S. Delegation, which by the way has by no means offered a 50% reduction on all items, is trying to squeeze the water out of the protective system and leave the gold core of protection untouched. If the Americans really want to advance towards a regime of more liberal trade by the path of tariff bargaining, they must make *unequal* trades in this field and offer concessions which will really lead to greater international specialization through the shifting of some productive resources and capacity in the U.S. in favor of imports. A commodity which might illustrate this point would be raw wool.

I suggested that the bargain being struck at Geneva might not really be an equal exchange of tariff and preference concessions, but an acceptance of the principle of equal tariff and preference bargains on the one side against the acceptance of various exceptions permitting quantitative restrictions to be continued under Articles 25 and 26 under stated conditions on the other side. I asked whether this, coupled with the two provisions in the Charter providing for a review of all quantitative restrictions after a period and at a time when all countries would know a lot more about the economic situation following reconstruction, did or did not constitute the basis for an acceptance bargain. J replied that this *was* a basis for a bargain but that it was not the *preferred* basis in the eyes of the U.K. because an equal bargain on tariffs and preferences would *prolong* the period during which the U.K. would have to take advantage of balance of payment quantitative restrictions under Article 26. (This would be due to the fact that equal tariff bargains would *not* reduce or increase U.S. imports relative to exports.) The U.K. does not like this solution, because as long as the U.K. takes advantage of Article 26, many other countries will feel that they must do so also, and the U.K. objects to the system of balance of payment quantitative restrictions applied generally as contrary to her own export interests.

The U.K.'s preferred solution would be an unequal tariff and preference bargain (the U.S. making greater concessions, leading to more U.S. imports relative to exports) and a consequent shortening of the

period during which Article 26 will have to be availed of. This, J said, is in the *true* U.S. long-run economic interest. The U.S. really ought to go in for free trade (or as near as makes no difference) in order to avoid a prolongation of the regime of quantitative restrictions, the necessity of continuous financing of a large export surplus, and an inevitable fresh period of debt repudiation and unpleasantness. Failing this, the U.S. ought at least to accept the idea of unequal tariff and preference bargains, which is the preferred solution from the U.K. point of view. (I gathered, but J did not say so, that the U.K. offers were made on the basis of this preferred solution.)

I asked if any other delegation had come to Geneva with the intention of making tariff deals which would cause serious injury to their own producers. J said, of course, not, but that it was not necessary for other countries though it was necessary for the U.S. It is high time, he said, that the U.S. should realize that there are some inconveniences as well as advantages connected with being a creditor country.

With respect to preferences, I asked whether it was not true that there were a few "key" preferences which were economically important and that the rest could be left without major economic effect. He said this might be true of preferences granted *by* the U.K. to the Dominions, but that it was not true of preference granted *by* the Dominions to the U.K. These latter covered a large and diversified number of products (reflecting the characteristics of U.K. export trade). The expert advice received by the U.K. Delegation (and the Delegation could only follow the expert advice which it receives) was that these preferences were actually important in diverting specific orders to U.K. producers and that their removal would definitely injure U.K. export trade.

J then suggested that even if we do not get at this Conference a Charter as rigid or tariff cuts as deep as the U.S. wants, we should still make a substantial advance, and could then take a further step at a later time. I suggested that it might very well be that the present opportunity of making an overall substantial agreement with the U.S. might not recur again, and that given the political situation in the U.S. (especially the possibility that the Charter *might* have to come up for ratification when the U.S. was experiencing a period of economic recession), it might be risky to pursue a policy of taking two bites to the cherry. Would it not be wiser to reach a general agreement now on the basis of equal tariff and preference concessions and with the danger of prolonging the period of use of Article 26 subject to the safeguards of a general review later of outstanding quantitative restrictions? J replied that if the U.S. persisted in misunderstanding its own long-run interests, that *might* be the best course. (On this point I felt that J's tone justifies my underlining the word "might".) He

still felt that the U.S. spirit of competition was manifesting itself in Geneva in a very unfortunate way. Each of the twelve negotiating teams was exerting itself to bring back the best bargain; i.e., the least cuts with the greatest possible counter concessions, in order to win a gold medal from Mr. Clayton. The gold medals should be distributed to the teams making the worst bargains, as this would most quickly bring to an end the overriding dollar exchange shortage problem which is plaguing the world.

With respect to this general problem, J did not say how the ordinary economic forces expressing themselves in the price and market mechanism could bring about a condition of balance of payments equilibrium in the U.K. or in the U.S. except after a long period of time. The change in the position of the U.K. from creditor to debtor had been too rapid for this. Specific governmental measures to bring exports and imports into reasonable balance (i.e., where the financing problem would be manageable) would be necessary.

With respect to Australia, J said that Coombs would say in private conversation that Australia's industrialization has already passed through the infant stage and is approaching maturity. Quite shortly Australia will find itself in the position of a very high tariff country, vitally interested in industrial exports. Australia will in fact be in the same economic dilemma as the U.S.

[Incidentally, J said that the political attacks to which Coombs has been subjected at home came about in this way: On his return from the London conference, the government asked him to report privately to the Labor Party. He did so and then the opposition demanded the same privilege. He reported to them, and after that meeting one of the opposition people quoted him incorrectly to the press as having said that Imperial preferences had been ended in London.]³

With respect to India, J agreed that none of the political, administrative or other prerequisites necessary to carry through a 15-year large scale industrialization plan existed in India. I asked whether in that case it would be sensible to make any further "underdeveloped country concessions" on the basis of claims and plans that are really not substantial. J replied that the present Chapter IV was the absolute limit to which the U.K. would go.

With respect to China, J said simply that China does not count.

With respect to employment, he said that both he and Coombs sincerely believed in Chapter III and that it is very little to ask that countries should pledge themselves to do what they would do anyway in their own interest. I asked whether Chapter III, when read in conjunction with Article 35 (nullification and impairment) was not really a good deal more than this—i.e., failure to implement the employment

³ Brackets appear in the source text.

pledges might be grounds for claiming nullification or impairment. J said (I thought with some satisfaction) the change of the word "charter" to "charter" in Article 35 had been a very "cagey" alteration (some British equivalent of "cagey" was used which I do not recall precisely).

I asked if J had heard of the "nosebag" theory of the Charter as expounded by Senator Millikin and he indicated that there *might* be something in it. The U.S. stands, he thought, virtually alone in the world in its belief that free enterprise can be a wise or even a major rule for the conduct of economic affairs, and that in fact in time of emergency, the U.S. does not live up to this article of faith. On the other hand, the USSR and satellites and India stand alone almost in denying the vital contribution of free enterprise to economic expansion. J thinks that we must all move towards some intermediate system and he feels that the U.K. has already learned a lot as to how to construct a viable "half-way house".

The rest of this conversation was in the realm of long-run economic speculation and about people. He did, however, suggest that the exhaustion (relative) of some of our American natural resources, such as petroleum, might be a *deus ex machina* leading to new U.S. imports and its relief for the dollar shortage, but J said that by that time, the Americans would probably have upset the whole foreign exchange picture by being first to apply atomic power to industrial uses.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. Carr of the United States Delegation Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

[GENEVA,] May 12, 1947.

Present: Dr. Holloway, South Africa;
Mr. Clayton and Mr. Carr, United States

Mr. Clayton referred to the chart,¹ a copy of which had been given to Dr. Holloway, showing in terms of imports into the United States in 1939 the wide coverage of the United States offers of tariff concessions and the extent of the duty reductions involved. He pointed out that as the result of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act² the United States had in the early '30s perhaps the highest tariff in the world. Since about 60% of the duties were specific duties, its height varied in terms of ad valorem equivalents with changes in price levels. In 1932 or 1933, dutiable imports were subject to a tariff which on a weighted basis averaged about 52%. After 1934, many of the duties were reduced

¹ Not printed.

² 46 Stat. 590.

under the Trade Agreements program³ and also there was a moderate rise in prices, so that before the war the level of our tariff had fallen to about 34%. The level now, he thought, must be down at least to 25%. If duties were reduced to the extent shown in the chart, the level would, he was sure, fall well below 20% ad valorem at the present level of prices, and our tariff would probably rank among the lowest, instead of highest, in the world. It would be even lower than the Underwood tariff of 1913, the lowest United States tariff in Mr. Clayton's lifetime, which averaged about 27% ad valorem.

Mr. Clayton further observed that United States exports last year had reached a figure of about 16 billion dollars, whereas imports had been valued at hardly half that figure, that imports would have to be increased if exports were to be maintained and that the U.S. offers of tariff concessions represented a drastic downward revision of tariffs designed to bring about a better adjustment in the trade balance. The imports which would result would create, he argued, a greatly increased supply of dollar exchange which the rest of the world could draw on to buy more commodities, including wool. Even though wool would not benefit directly from a duty reduction, it would benefit substantially from the increase in world purchasing power which would result from the tariff concessions which we offered in respect of other commodities.

Tariff agreements of the scope represented by the American offers would greatly improve the economic condition of the world and promote economic peace. However, the concessions offered by the United States could not be defended at home politically without the elimination of preferences. The United Kingdom had in connection with the Anglo-American Financial Agreement agreed to elimination of preferences. One of the principle reasons for the preferences, the high tariffs of the Hawley-Smoot Act, would be removed. If the Southern Dominions should stand in the way of the successful conclusion of these negotiations, they would be doing the world a great disservice and would surely incur the disapproval of world opinion.

Mr. Clayton appreciated the political problems at home which the Southern Dominions would encounter as the result of obtaining only a binding of the United States wool duty, but he pointed out to Dr. Holloway that a reduction of the duty on raw wool would not greatly affect the price of finished wool products and would not result in greatly increased consumption in the United States of wool and, since the wool growers would be financially assisted by the Government, it would not serve to discourage wool production in the United States and thereby stimulate imports.

If the Conference failed, Mr. Clayton stated, the world would again

³ 48 Stat. 943.

revert to the laws of the economic jungle and no one in the United States would care much if the duty on wool were increased.

Dr. Holloway did not agree that a duty reduction on wool would be as of little value as indicated by Mr. Clayton. He believed that even a few dollars decrease in the price of a wool suit would be important to the lower income groups and would in such a vast market as the United States increase substantially consumption of wool. He observed that not only was the per capita consumption of wool in the United States extremely low but also that the quality of wool goods consumed in the United States was notably poor, due in large part, he argued, to the wool tariff. A reduction in duty would also be important in improving the position of wool in competition with synthetic fibres and fabrics.

Dr. Holloway found himself, however, in full agreement with Mr. Clayton regarding the importance of the Geneva negotiations in improving world economic conditions and promoting economic peace. It was on the basis of these broad objectives that he had urged his Government to join the Bank and the Fund, for it had little to gain directly from doing so. It would be difficult, however, to defend the ITO on the basis of those broad objectives, especially since wool is a logical candidate for a duty reduction and also since South African efforts in the past to develop an export trade with the United States, first in liquors and then in fresh fruits, had met with frustration. America's sanitary regulations had operated so as to ruin the fruit and discourage further shipment and had given rise in South Africa to strong pressure for retaliation against United States trade, which did not subside until after the beginning of the war. While preaching the benefits of lower tariffs and of specializing in the production of goods which can be produced most efficiently, the United States now proposes to keep out of its market the most efficiently produced product of South Africa, wool, in order to preserve its own wool industry, the most inefficient of all its industries, but at the same time it expects South Africa to make more room in its markets for American exports.

South Africa can not afford to give up its preferences in the United Kingdom, Dr. Holloway stated, or to give up the opportunity of obtaining further preferences in the Commonwealth unless it can find markets elsewhere. The only opportunity for expanding its market for wool lies in the United States, the only large country with a wool tariff.

Dr. Holloway thought it unlikely that the United Kingdom would press the Southern Dominions to give up their preferences in the United Kingdom for nothing or go so far as to estrange them by terminating preferences unilaterally.

He argued that it was not the Southern Dominions, but the wool interests in the United States, which were standing in the way of the success of the Geneva Conference. It was inconceivable to him that the United States would sacrifice the global principles and objectives of its economic foreign policy to preserve an inefficient wool industry. He was sure that if the question could be decided by a Gallup poll, the wool industry would have no chance of winning.

Dr. Holloway was satisfied that the problem regarding wool had reached the level of high policy. The Minister for Economic Development,⁴ who is in charge of the South African Delegation, is expected to arrive in Geneva late this month or early in June. There will undoubtedly be a meeting of the Cabinet before he leaves to determine the South African position. Mr. Clayton told Dr. Holloway that he was leaving next Saturday for Washington to fight the inclusion of the import-fee provision in pending wool legislation but that he expected to be back by June 1. He agreed to inform the Minister for Economic Development through the South African Legation in Washington regarding the exact time of his return.

R. M. CARR

⁴ Sidney F. Waterson.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. Carr of the United States Delegation Staff

CONFIDENTIAL.

[GENEVA,] May 12, 1947.

Present: Mr. Nash, New Zealand; Mr. Clayton and Mr. Carr, US.

Mr. Clayton referred to the chart,¹ a copy of which had been given to Mr. Nash earlier, showing the scope of United States offers of tariff concessions and the depth of the duty reductions involved. He observed that these concessions would bring the U.S. tariff down to about the lowest level of any tariff in the world, that they would result in a great increase in dollar exchange for the world-wide purchase of commodities, including wool, and thus would contribute substantially to improvement of world economic conditions and the promotion of economic peace. He hoped that the Southern Dominions would not stand in the way of this prospect because of the failure of the United States to offer a reduction of the duty on wool, which, he argued, would be of only limited benefit in view of the financial assistance given by the United States Government to domestic wool growers.

Mr. Nash recognized that the United States offers were very sub-

¹ Not printed.

stantial. Much credit was due the United States for its persistence in pressing forward with its trade program over a period of many years in the face of great political obstacles at home and abroad. Had it not been for this persistence the Geneva Conference would not have been possible. He appreciated, too, the generosity of the United States in extending to New Zealand reductions in duty, especially on wool of the coarser grades, which had been given to Argentina, especially since New Zealand had not reciprocated in extending to the United States its intermediate rates.

Mr. Nash disagreed however that a reduction of the duty on the finer wools would not be of great value and elaborated in this connection on the threat of competition from synthetic fibres and fabrics and the need of keeping wool prices as low as possible. New Zealand is the world's third largest exporter of wool; its wool production last year exceeded that of the United States. Except for a reduction of the U.S. duty on wool, it has little to gain from the Geneva negotiations, although its position in this respect is not as bad as that of Australia and South Africa.

If the surplus wool stocks of the CCC were a factor accounting for the failure of the United States to offer a duty reduction and if in view of the surplus stocks of the British Joint Organization it was feared that a duty reduction would make it difficult to dispose of the CCC stocks in competition with the British stocks, he was sure that a satisfactory arrangement could be worked out to allay such fears and he was prepared, as a member of the Joint Organization, to see that such an arrangement was made.

Mr. Clayton informed Mr. Nash that he was leaving Saturday for Washington to fight the inclusion of the import-fee provision in pending legislation for extension of the wool price-support program. He would return before June 1. Mr. Nash said that he was leaving Europe for New Zealand, via New York, about May 29. They agreed that arrangements should be made for another meeting in Geneva if Mr. Clayton returned before the 29th, or else possibly in Washington.

Lot 65A987, Box 101

*The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Clayton) to
Mr. James R. C. Helmore of the United Kingdom Delegation*

GENEVA, May 16, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. HELMORE: In your letter of May 14,¹ I find the following:

"In our view no satisfactory result will be achieved if the negotiations are conducted in the spirit of the early days of the trade-agree-

¹ Not found in Department files.

ments program when all concessions had to be matched by equivalent concessions in return. Ought not rather the guiding considerations to be (1) how far can the United States go in offering effective tariff reductions and (2) how little (not how much) must be given in return?"

The suggestion of such an approach to the present negotiations is, to say the least, surprising. Quite aside from its fundamental inequity, it clearly represents a radical departure from the understandings arrived at between our two Governments during conversations extending over the past several years, and, as you will immediately recognize, implies that our negotiators should proceed in violation of the Trade Agreements Act. It is therefore unacceptable to the United States.

I should appreciate your assurance that this suggestion does not represent the considered position of your Government.

Sincerely yours,

W. L. CLAYTON

Lot 65A987, Box 101

Mr. Harold Wilson¹ to Mr. Clair Wilcox

GENEVA, May 21, 1947.

DEAR MR. WILCOX: Mr. Clayton's letter of the 16th May to Mr. Helmore has in his absence been brought to my notice. As Mr. Clayton is now not in Geneva I am addressing to you this reply to Mr. Clayton's letter.

The suggestion made by Mr. Clayton is that the passage in Mr. Helmore's letter of the 16[14?]th May which he quotes represents a fundamental inequity and a radical departure from understandings previously reached between the United States and United Kingdom Governments, and implies that your negotiators should proceed in violation of the United States Trade Agreements Act.

If I may take up the first part of this suggestion, I should like to point out that the basic understanding between the two Governments has always been that we should engage in negotiations for the purpose of achieving a mutually advantageous agreement directed towards the substantial reduction of high tariffs and the elimination of preference. I do not think that there is any doubt on this point, and it is well that there should not be since it is essential to the considerations advanced in Mr. Helmore's letter. What is much more important, however, is that it is essential to the success of the discussions on which representatives of our two countries are concerned and thus of the whole work now in hand here in Geneva.

¹ Secretary for Overseas Trade, British Board of Trade; and member of the United Kingdom Delegation, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment.

With this end in view we have started upon tariff negotiations in which you have made an offer in reply to our requests and we have made an offer in reply to your requests. But I must point out that before the negotiations started, or even requests were made by either you or us, we had made a very signal contribution the effect of which must not be discounted in any attempt such as Mr. Clayton has been anxious to have made, to reach some sort of relative assessment of the two offers. This contribution is the undertaking that no new preference shall be established and no preferential margin, whether as it exists today or as it may exist in a reduced form after the present negotiations, will be increased. There is no corresponding undertaking in respect of tariff rates except such as may be included as part of the multilateral agreement to which we are looking. This undertaking alone, though it does not in itself provide for the reduction or elimination of preferences, goes a very remarkable way along that road.

But it is of course the end result that matters, the achievement of a mutually advantageous agreement. If the result of the negotiations were that your exports were still to exceed your imports by the same proportion as they now do, I suggest that it would not be to your advantage any more than to ours or that of the world at large. A result which would merely leave a large part of the rest of the world, (including the United Kingdom) permanently short of dollars, and unable to provide that market for your goods which as a great trading nation you must have, would be a disappointing outcome of all our labours of the last few years and of the present discussions of the Preparatory Committee.

As regards Mr. Clayton's reference to the United States Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the only suggestion was that the United States should consider the two points numbered (1) and (2) in the fourth paragraph of Mr. Helmore's letter. There was no implication that the United States Government should go beyond its legislative authority. It is not of course for us to attempt to interpret your legislation but we have always understood that that Act too was designed to facilitate mutually advantageous results. Since that is what we of the United Kingdom are hoping to cooperate with you in securing, our negotiations should be well within the spirit of that Act. What we must avoid, or rather what, in prospect would jeopardize the present tariff negotiations and, I believe, the whole Charter, are mutually *disadvantageous results*.

I greatly hope that, on further study of Mr. Helmore's letter on this point and as a whole, you will see the position in the same light as we see it.

Yours sincerely,

HAROLD WILSON

560.AL/5-2247 : Telegram

*The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton) to
Representative Harold Cooley*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1947.

MY DEAR MR. COOLEY: I take pleasure in this opportunity to answer your inquiry of May 19 concerning the views of the Department of State with respect to proposed wool legislation. I refer to S.814, a bill to provide support for wool and for other purposes, as passed by the Senate and reported favorably with amendments by the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives.

The bill in the form in which it was reported was not under consideration by the Committee on Agriculture when representatives of the Department testified before that body. We have not had a formal opportunity to present our views on the legislation, as it has been reported.

S.814, as reported with amendments, is intended to achieve three main objectives. First, it directs the Commodity Credit Corporation to support a price to wool producers at the 1946 level until December 31, 1948. This provision is consistent with the proposed long-run program for wool submitted by the President in his memorandum to Senator O'Mahoney March 11, 1946.¹ The Department of State believes this section of the bill accomplishes the essentials of the Administration's plan which recognizes that wool should receive support comparable to that granted to other agricultural commodities.

Secondly, S.814 authorizes the Commodity Credit Corporation to sell its stocks of wool without regard to restrictions imposed upon it by law. This is necessary because Commodity Credit Corporation must be able to sell wool at the market if it is to dispose of its stocks. This is also consistent with the President's program in the opinion of the Department of State.

Thirdly, an amendment to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act has been added to provide for the imposition of fees on any imported article by the Secretary of Agriculture if he finds that imports of said article interfere materially with the wool support program. The accompanying report shows that the purpose of the fee is to increase the price of imported wool to equal the support level for domestic wool. The Department of State advises against the adoption of this amendment. I understand from the Congressional Record that it is proposed to modify this import fee amendment by directing the President, rather than the Secretary of Agriculture, to impose the fees after investigation by the Tariff Commission. This does not remove the fundamental objections to the provision.

¹ See footnote 3, p. 916.

If import fees, which are actually increases in the tariff, are levied, they would be harmful to the interests of the United States in the following ways.

First, the cost to the public in increased prices for woolen manufactures would far exceed the increased returns to the wool growers. The President's memorandum, previously referred to, pointed out that "it will be more desirable from a national point of view and more dependable for growers to have the Government absorb losses on sales of domestic wool rather than to raise additional trade barriers against imports." The cost of supporting returns to wool growers must be borne by the public of the United States regardless of the form that support takes. The tariff itself is a subsidy which is collected, like a sales tax, from consumers through raised prices and conveyed to producers by the same means. To talk about avoiding cost to the Treasury is to evade the issue, for the public, and not the Treasury, pays the bill.

A fee will raise the cost of the raw material. This in turn cumulatively increases the cost of doing business at every stage of the production process. Therefore, the final cost to the public as a consumer is far greater under the fee than it would be if raw material prices were not increased by fees and the public, as a taxpayer, paid the subsidy.

In the second place, new import fees on wool would injure the interests of the United States through their effect on our foreign relations. We all recognize the responsibility of this country for leadership, both political and economic, in the postwar world. The United States has taken the initiative in promoting the adoption of principles of economic conduct among nations which would require each country to consider the impact of the economic measures it undertakes on world economic progress. If the proposed amendment providing new import barriers is adopted, the moral leadership of the United States in world affairs will suffer a serious blow.

If at this time, when we are actually negotiating with other countries at Geneva for the lowering of trade barriers, we raise new barriers as this bill proposes, we stand convicted of insincerity.

Wool is a critical item in our current negotiations for an International Trade Organization for the expansion of world trade and employment. Although wool raising accounts for less than one-half of one percent of our agricultural income, it is very important in world trade. It is the most important import into the United States from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. It is by far their most important source of the dollars they need so badly to buy our exports. If we impose new barriers to this trade, we cannot expect them to cooperate wholeheartedly in creating the type of postwar world we want to have. Without such cooperation, the other British Commonwealth nations would have difficulty joining with us in a mutually ad-

vantageous program. Other nations would question the sincerity of our protestations that we do not intend to retreat to economic isolationism.

Let me summarize by saying the Department approves support to wool growers and authority for Commodity Credit Corporation to sell its wool below parity. The Department therefore hopes that the Congress will adopt the proposed bill as passed by the Senate without amendment.²

Sincerely yours,

W. L. CLAYTON

² In telegram 448 to Geneva, May 23, describing the voting in the House of Representatives on the wool bill, the ITO delegation was told that "Dept. position made clear informally and in Clayton letter to Cooley, which was read in House. Both sides recognized issue as conflict between international trade and agricultural policies." (560.AL/5-2347)

560.AL/5-1647 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1947—6 p. m.

140. Department realizes fully the importance to Australian Govt. of wool duty cut (re Embtel 164, May 16).¹ Clayton here to review situation and advise best US offer. Strong pressure in Congress to impose flexible import fee on wool by making Section 22 of AAA Act applicable to proposed Wool Act of 1947 which continues 1946 price support to Dec. 31, 1948, and authorizes CCC to sell govt. stocks below parity. Opposition may succeed in eliminating fee provision since it faces possible veto.

Australian withdrawal from conference would multiply difficulties of opponents of pending legislation. Australia has more to gain from accepting present offer to bind than from holding out for duty cut and running risk of raised duties and consequent reduction in exports to US. If duty is bound CCC will liquidate stocks gradually but if tariff can be raised by import fees CCC stocks will be sold rapidly which would sharply curtail dollars available to Australia in next two years.

MARSHALL

¹ Chargé Douglas Jenkins, Jr., had reported in telegram 164, not printed, that "from discussions with government officials I have gotten distinct impression that there exists a real possibility that Australia may withdraw entirely from Geneva meeting unless offered a reduction in present 34 cent US tariff on wool." (560.AL/5-1647)

560.AL/5-2847 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, May 28, 1947—5 p. m.

US URGENT

416. For Clayton from Wilcox. Dr. Coombs returned Geneva today. Carried message from Prime Minister of Australia ¹ to head of United States delegation as follows:

Neither this government nor any other government in Australia can agree to surrender of preferences or to approval of ITO Charter unless Australia receives cut in wool duty. Issue is regarded in Australia as test of sincerity of American proposals on whole program. Australia will cooperate fully in negotiating satisfactory agreement with respect to liquidation wool stocks and protection against price decline.

Australia vigorously supporting our proposal to include provisions for protection of investment in charter. Coombs indicated that Australia might find it necessary to inform Preparatory Committee that Australian agreement to charter provisions depends on satisfactory tariff concessions. On my advice he agreed to postpone any such statement pending outcome of present developments in United States. Australian cooperation all aspects charter negotiations to date has been excellent.

Kennedy ² due in Washington Thursday May 29. Can report fully on discussions in delegation relating to present situation.³ [Wilcox.]

TROUTMAN

¹ J. B. Chifley.

² Donald Kennedy, Chief, International Resources Division.

³ In Department telegram 481, May 29, not printed, Under Secretary Clayton answered: "Urtel 416, May 28, having careful attention." (560.AL/5-2847)

Lot 65A987, Box 99

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation Staff,¹ Geneva, Switzerland, May 28, 1947

SECRET

[Here follows a discussion of other subjects.]

5. *Round-up of Tariff Negotiations.*

UK. Mr. Beale said that the two teams had been going through the US offers, a task which should be completed by next week.

¹ Weekly General Staff Meetings were attended by the Chairman, and Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, by the Delegates, by the members of the Trade Agreements Committee, by the Charter Working Group, and by the chairmen of the negotiating teams. In addition the Adviser on Dependent Territories, the Adviser from Puerto Rico, the Press Officer, the Public Liaison Officer, the Executive Secretary and the Technical Secretary attended. A substantially complete record of the meetings of the General Staff Meetings is found in Lot 65A987, Box 99.

Canada. Mr. Fox reported that study of the Canadian offer list was almost completed, but that the Canadians would do nothing about preferences until the wool question has been resolved.

Southern Dominions. Mr. Carr merely stated that nothing at all was happening with respect to the Southern Dominions.

India. Mr. Moline² stated that on the basis of an informal discussion with certain of the Indians he was sure that the Indian offers would be improved and that he had been further informed by these same Indians that should these offers be inadequate the US should continue to say "no". He was informed that a strong position by the US would result in further improvement of the Indian offers. Mr. Wilcox mentioned the seriously divided Indian Delegation, the line of cleavage cutting between the Hindus and the Moslems. He asked that Mr. Moline check as far as he could to find out reasons for the Indian attack on the investment provisions.

France. Mr. Reagan³ reported that the French had been asked to reconsider their offers and that the leaders of their Delegation had returned to Paris for this purpose over the week-end. According to a report from the Embassy, the French government had worked on their list and a reply was expected today from the French team. It was Mr. Reagan's opinion that there will probably be some broadening of the offers but that the list will still be unsatisfactory.

Benelux. Mr. Fowler⁴ said that a revised set of US requests would be ready by the end of the week for submission to TAC.

Norway. Mr. Burns⁵ reported that the Norwegians were still attacking the US offers primarily on the grounds of their balance of trade picture, and secondly on the issue of sardines. He said that they still maintained that the US offers were inadequate but that when he had called their bluff by stating that many of these offers were embarrassing to us and we would be happy to withdraw them, they had hastened to say that they would still negotiate on the basis of our original offers. He added that the negotiations were momentarily stalled.

Czechoslovakia. According to Mr. Phelps⁶ a battle of the statisticians has been going on with each team attempting to prove that its offers were good and those which it had received were bad. He said the greatest difficulty was in scheduling meetings due to the small size of the Czech Delegation.

Cuba. Mr. Smith⁷ reported that at the first working meeting with

² Edwin G. Moline, British Commonwealth and Empire Branch, Division of Commercial Policy, Member of the U.S. Delegation Staff.

³ Daniel J. Reagan, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs at Paris, Member of the U.S. Delegation Staff.

⁴ William A. Fowler, Division of Commercial Policy.

⁵ Norman Burns, Adviser, Division of Commercial Policy.

⁶ Vernon L. Phelps, Adviser, European Branch, Division of Commercial Policy.

⁷ Probably H. Gerald Smith, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.

the Cubans held May 27 the US team had informed the Cubans how bad their offers were and they receded a bit as a consequence of this attack. As yet there is little to report.

Brazil and Chile. Mr. Clark⁸ felt that early next week he would be able to bring to the TAC firm recommendations on the Brazilian negotiations. He was quite optimistic about the prospects.

He further reported that Chile appears to be entirely content with the US offer list, but that we have continuously informed them that their offers were unsatisfactory. We have been informed that the Chilean Delegation has airmailed to Santiago new offers and asked for a cable reply. It is Mr. Clark's opinion that if approval is received from Santiago, the negotiations can be wound up quickly.

China and Lebanon. Mr. Gay⁹ said that so far it had been impossible to pin the Chinese down to a real meeting.

Conversations have been proceeding with the Syrian-Lebanese group and they have asked for instructions which would do away with discriminatory rates on automobiles. It was Mr. Gay's opinion that this would break the bottleneck on these negotiations.

[Here follows a discussion of other subjects.]

⁸ DuWayne G. Clark, Commercial Attaché at Rio de Janeiro.

⁹ Merrill C. Gay, Assistant Chief, Far and Middle Eastern Branch, Division of Commercial Policy.

560.AL/6-647 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 6, 1947—8 p. m.

452. For Clayton from Wilcox and Hawkins. When you stop in London on return you should have following situation in mind.

In our opinion Helmore is not approaching negotiations here in spirit shown by Liesching and Robbins in Washington.¹ We are convinced he desires face-saving charter draft and trade agreement but has no intention making serious modification in system of Empire preference. We believe he wishes to place responsibility on us for failure of conference to achieve purposes contemplated. Our position on wool gives him only opportunity he had to do this. It is our impression Helmore is delighted with action of House on import fee and that he expects and hopes that we will not be able to make a new offer to Australia. In this case he will have excuse he seeks. If President approves TAC recommendation, however, his strategy will fail completely. We should then break stalemate with southern Dominions and

¹ Reference here is to the informal exploratory talks on post-war commercial collaboration held in Washington in September 1943. Among the participants were Sir Percival Liesching of the British Board of Trade, and Lionel C. Robbins, Head of the Economic Section of the War Cabinet Secretariat.

push those agreements to rapid conclusion thus remove all support for UK position and then bring full pressure to bear on preferences in UK. Situation would also enable us simultaneously to strike hard on all other fronts where negotiations are now lagging.

In this event suggest you may wish to consider giving indication our intentions to Douglas² and Cripps.³ Are not sure Helmore's attitude is shared by Cripps.⁴ [Wilcox and Hawkins.]

TROUTMAN

² Lewis A. Douglas, U.S. Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

³ Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade.

⁴ Cripps' views were somewhat clarified in a speech made at the opening of a branch plant of the National Cash Register Company in Dundee, Scotland, on June 11, a summary of which is contained in telegram 3241 from London, June 12, not printed. In telegram 3242, June 12, not printed, Chargé Gallman reported that Cripps' speech "represents first official utterance to our knowledge wherein Government discounts ITO as solution current international economic problems." (560.AL/6-1247)

560.AL/6-1647 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 16, 1947—2 p. m.

US URGENT

509. Personal for Clayton from Wilcox. 1. Am being asked what is status of new program for aid to Europe, whether it will be presented to ECE meeting and how it is related to tariff and ITO negotiations.¹

2. Contrast Bevin's speech June 13 praising US offer of further aid with Cripps' speech June 6² bitterly criticizing US and disparaging importance tariff negotiations and ITO. Inference that aid program makes results Geneva negotiations unimportant tends to impair our bargaining position here. Question for consideration is how we can use program to improve bargaining position.

3. Assumption here has been that you will not return until wool issue settled. On basis reports in press, am now being asked when you will return Geneva, whether you will stop in London and Paris en route and what is schedule for subsequent trips. [Wilcox.]

TROUTMAN

¹ For documentation regarding the United States interest in the rehabilitation of Europe and the "Marshall Plan," see vol. III, pp. 197 ff.

² The speech was given on June 11; see footnote 4, above.

560.AL/6-1647 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1947—8 p. m.

602. Personal for Wilcox from Clayton. 1. There is no new program of aid to Europe. (urtel 509, June 16, 1947). If any such program develops, it will come only after showing by principal European nations why aid already extended has had such meager results and what they can do to help themselves, what steps will most quickly produce results, and how soon they can get back on their own feet with a minimum of help from us. Accordingly, nothing for us to present to ECE. Initiative must be taken by European nations. If they wish work through ECE, that is all right with us, but this should not be exclusive.¹

Any new program which may result from above would be a temporary and emergency program to assist Europe to help itself get back on its own feet, whereas tariff and ITO negotiations at Geneva are intended to produce results of a permanent character in putting the world back on the road to economic peace.

2. Have not seen full text Cripps' speech, but have read summary his speech June eleven (not June six as you state), cabled from London,² and must say see no inconsistency between it and Bevin's speech. Cripps is certainly right in saying that neither tariff negotiations nor ITO could result in additional half billion dollars monthly imports into United States in time to take care present European dollar shortage. Inference that aid program makes results Geneva negotiations unimportant entirely unjustified. It makes such negotiations more important than ever because without sound permanent program of reciprocal multilateral trade, no temporary emergency program could possibly have any permanent worthwhile results.

3. I am hoping to leave here Thursday or Friday, stopping in London. Please keep entirely confidential. However, do not mind your saying I expect arrive Geneva latter part of next week. In spite of failures up until now, hope to have some favorable news for you before leaving. [Clayton.]

MARSHALL

¹ For documentation regarding the genesis of a European recovery program, see vol. III, pp. 249 ff.

² Telegram 3241 from London, June 12, not printed.

560.AL/6-2047: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 20, 1947—7 p. m.

NIACT

545. For Clayton and Nitze from Wilcox. Just received following letter from John J. Dedman, Minister of Reconstruction, Government of Australia and now head of Australian delegation ITO Conference:

"I understand that the wool bill has now been passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States Congress and awaits consideration by the President.¹

While the Australian Government has no desire to intervene in a matter which is essentially a domestic one, I feel that it is essential that the U.S. Government should be aware that if this bill becomes law, every country concerned with the future of international trade will find it necessary to review its position.

It would appear to the Australian Government that the provisions of the bill are inconsistent at least with the spirit of the mutual aid agreement between the Australian and U.S. Governments,² the understanding upon which the current negotiations have been entered into and possibly with the terms of the draft charter. It must therefore cause us to doubt the capacity of the U.S. Government to make effective the policy relating to international trade which its delegation has outlined at this conference.

Consequently, I feel it is important that you should be aware that if the bill does become law, I shall find it necessary to move that the present conference at Geneva be adjourned for a sufficient time to enable the United States and other governments represented here to review their policies in the light of what appear to us to be substantially changed circumstances."³ [Wilcox.]

TROUTMAN

¹ On June 16, the House of Representatives accepted the wool bill by rejecting a motion to recommit the bill to conference 191-166, 72 not voting. The Senate on June 19, by a vote of 48-38, 9 not voting, also passed the conference committee bill.

² For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 271, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1608.

³ When the message arrived, Joseph Coppock, Economic Adviser of the Office of International Trade Policy, was unable to reach Nitze, Wood, Thorp, Acheson, or Marshall, and learned that Clayton was on his way to London. Coppock then called Harold Stein, White House, and sent him a copy of the telegram. Stein called back to say that John Steelman, Assistant to the President, would bring telegram to President's attention at appropriate time. (Telegram 2676 to London, June 21, 560.AL/6-2047)

560.AL/6-2147 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, June 21, 1947—10 a. m.

US URGENT NIACT

546. For Acheson and Nitze from Wilcox. Have just received following letter from J. R. C. Helmore acting head UKDel ITO Conference:

"On behalf of the UKDel I wish to invite attention to the provisions of a bill (S 814) which has been approved by Congress and at present waits Presidential sanction. According to the text of the introduction of the Senate House conference report which was made in the House of Representatives on 16 June the bill stipulates *inter alia* that an amendment shall be made to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 in such a way as to provide in certain circumstances for the imposition of import fees or quantitative limitations on wool entering the US.

As the USDel is well aware wool is a key commodity in the negotiations now in progress for the reduction of tariffs under mutually advantageous agreements as part of the plan for an international trade organization. The bill would apparently make it impossible for the USDel to reduce the barriers affecting one of the principal items of trade between the USA and the countries of the British Commonwealth. Its enactment would, therefore, shake confidence in the ability of the US Govt to give effect to the policy of trade barriers reduction through a series of mutually advantageous agreements.

Consequently, His Majesty's Govt in the UK as joint sponsors of the proposals relating to the establishment of an international trade organization, feel it their duty to point out to the US Govt that the wool bill, if it were allowed to become law as it stands at present, would constitute a most serious setback to all the efforts made during the past several years towards the removal of trade barriers from the Atlantic Charter to the present Conference at Geneva and would endanger not only the tariff negotiations but also the negotiations in regard to the Charter for an International Trade Organization.

For these reasons I must inform you that His Majesty's Govt express the earnest hope that this bill will not become law".

[Wilcox]

TROUTMAN

Editorial Note

On June 26, President Truman vetoed the wool bill and stated: "The enactment of a law providing for additional barriers to the importation of wool at the very moment when this Government is taking the leading part in a United Nations Conference at Geneva called for the purpose of reducing trade barriers and of drafting a Charter for an International Trade Organization, in an effort to restore the world to economic peace, would be a tragic mistake. It would be a blow to our leadership in world affairs. It would be interpreted around the

world as a first step on that same road to economic isolationism down which we and other countries traveled after the first World War with such disastrous consequences." For the complete text of this message, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman: 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), pages 309-310.

560.AL/6-2747 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
US URGENT

GENEVA, June 27, 1947—9 p. m.

578. From Wilcox. Re Finance Committee report urtel 675, June 26.¹

(1) Substantive content in general agreement not yet scheduled discussion full committee and will depend results charter discussions. Therefore, US amendments not yet prepared.

(2) Small working party (US, UK, Canada, France, Belgium, Netherlands) inclined favor US proposal reduce scope general agreement confining it to matters clearly related tariff concessions. This may be difficult carry through in view interests Australia and others in employment and development chapters. US delegation will in no event commit US to provisions going beyond executive authority.

(3) Absolutely essential US interests that adequate mechanism exist police balance of payments exception (Articles 10, 12) economic development exception (Article 17) and possibly other provisions. Consistent with this consideration, US delegation will explore methods of modifying provisions which Millikin thinks imply establishment of provisional ITO with broad functions in advance congressional action. One method might be replace reference committee in substantive articles by phrase "the contracting parties" and replace Article 22 by article providing for periodic meetings of contracting parties to determine application agreement.

(4) Suggest you point out Millikin that criticism by Finance Committee of Interim Trade Committee will embarrass US delegation and strengthen hand of several countries who would like general provisions substantially eliminated from general agreement and not made effective until after charter enters into force. If this were done US would be placed in impossible bargaining position at World Conference since tariff concessions would be already agreed to and we would have failed

¹ In telegram 675, not printed, the Department expressed concern that the impending Senate Finance Committee report might be extremely critical of the Interim Trade Committee. (560.AL/6-2647) The first session of the Preparatory Committee, which met in London in 1946, prepared a draft general agreement on tariffs and trade. This provided for the creation of an interim trade committee to implement the agreement, and to deal with disputes regarding its interpretation. The committee was to be dissolved when the ITO could assume its functions.

obtain in general agreement precise and firm commitments on provisions re nontariff trade barriers which are essential to adequate *quid pro quo* for US tariff reduction. [Wilcox.]

TROUTMAN

Lot 65A987, Box 99

*Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation, Geneva, Switzerland, July 2, 1947*¹

SECRET

1. *Return of Mr. Clayton to Geneva.* Mr. Wilcox opened the meeting by asking Mr. Clayton to give the Delegation a summary of his activities in Washington. Mr. Clayton said he returned to the United States to make a determined effort to try to forestall passage of the legislation with respect to wool as it was finally amended by the Committee handling the legislation of the House of Representatives. The terms of the legislation as passed by the Senate would not have affected adversely the negotiations on trade and the ITO Charter now in progress at the Geneva Conference on trade and employment. The Senate version of the Bill continued in effect the price support measures of the war period which amounted to a subsidy paid to domestic producers. However, the House Committee handling the legislation amended the Bill to provide authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to place an import fee of 50 percent ad valorem on imports of wool. However, there was such an outburst of opposition against delegating so much power to a cabinet officer that it was decided to drop the amendment in favor of another placing wool under Section 22(a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. During this period Mr. Clayton said he had many conferences with the Senate and House leaders, describing to them the irreparable damage this bill, if passed in that form, would have on the Geneva Conference. However, despite all of his pleadings the Bill passed both houses of Congress with very large majorities. Because of the wide difference between the Senate and House variations of the Bill it was sent to a House and Senate Conference's Conference. While before the Conference, Mr. Clayton, contrary to all previous proceedings, was permitted to appear before that body to state once again the tragic consequences that passage of the Bill in that form would have on the Geneva Conference, particularly at a time when the United States was taking the leadership in freeing the channels of international trade from restrictive barriers. Notwithstanding his pleading the bill was passed by both the Senate and House with small majorities.

¹ The entire Advisory Staff was also present.

Mr. Clayton indicated that he was confident at all times that the President would veto the bill, because, Mr. Clayton said, the President is firmly convinced of the importance of creating the conditions for full restoration of foreign trade upon sound basis as a means of increasing employment and standards of living. Terrific pressure was brought to bear upon the President to sign the bill. Proponents of the measure pointed out that the western farming states, due to political mistakes made by the Republicans vis à vis farm interests were once again back in the Democratic columns. However, the President was told, if he failed to sign the bill those states would revert to the Republicans. Mr. Clayton remarked the passage of the Wool Bill does not reflect a reversion by the American people to the splendid isolationism which followed the last World War, nor did it reflect a reversion to isolationism by Congress. The Bill was sponsored primarily by four groups: (1) Those who are economy minded and wish to safeguard the Treasury against large outlays of money by way of subsidies involved in the price support program in effect during the war. These people wished to transfer the costs of price support to the consumer; (2) Some supported the bill because of their firm conviction in protectionism; (3) Those that saw in the Wool Bill an excellent opportunity to undermine the Geneva Conference; and (4) Those groups of farmers who have become convinced that the subsidy system of aid is not satisfactory because they are never sure when an economy minded Congress might withdraw price support. Moreover, they felt that the payment of subsidies is at its best only a temporary postponement of the problem, and the time has come to seek permanent aids for the wool industry.

2. *Marshall Plan.* Mr. Clayton remarked that he was sure that many of the members of the United States Delegation had been trying to determine what the relationship might be between the Marshall Plan and the ITO. The two programs complement each other. Under the Marshall Plan the ITO becomes all the more important. Behind the Marshall Plan is a recognition that Europe has a number of extremely difficult reconstruction problems that must be solved in order to open up channels of trade. One of the most pressing of those problems is that of balance of payments. To create the conditions for normal commerce a temporary aid program for Europe had to be developed. Unbelievable damage was done to the economic structure of Europe by the war. Mr. Clayton remarked that the damage is greater than can be imagined. The Marshall Plan, Mr. Clayton said, is based upon two fundamental conceptions. The first one is that European nations must show what they can do individually to help themselves in rebuilding their economic structure; and second what they can do to help each other. In other words, they must draw up a blue print of their needs

and indicate to what extent those needs can be met by self help. The United States will aid in the balance.

3. *Tariff Negotiations.* Mr. Brown gave a brief resume of the progress of the tariff negotiations. He indicated that there are only two items holding up the progress of negotiations with Norway. As soon as those two items namely, apples and sardines were resolved, an agreement with Norway would be concluded. The same thing is likewise true in the case of Brazil and Lebanon. Mr. Brown reported that yesterday China had finally offered the United States concessions on two important items which up to this time they had been unwilling to do. The United States was very much interested in those two items since they constituted a very large part of our total trade with China. Those two items are leaf tobacco and raw cotton. Mr. Brown further reported that negotiations with the Southern Dominions was at an absolute standstill because of wool. As soon as the wool question has been finally settled, he said, negotiations will recommence and will be brought to a successful conclusion. India, he said, is very well pleased with our offers and the major obstacle in the way of concluding an agreement within a short time is due to two facts: (1) that the United States is not satisfied with the offers made by India; and (2) the political situation arising in connection with Indian independence has been a handicap to the Indian Delegation in improving their offers. Mr. Moline, however, is pressing the Indians hard both with respect to improve the offers made to the United States and to speed negotiations. Negotiations with France have been more or less in deadlock because of the new French tariff increasing all rates of duty compared to the prewar tariff. The French wish to negotiate on the basis of the new tariff, whereas the United States insists that negotiations should be conducted on the basis of the old tariff. It is hoped that real progress will be made this week. In the case of Cuba the preliminary work has been done and the team is evaluating the results. Cuba wishes to raise tariff rates on some important items in the United States trade relations with that country. The United States is resisting this endeavor. Conclusion of an agreement with the United Kingdom has been held up because of the wool question, but as soon as that question has been resolved negotiations will proceed rapidly. Negotiations with Belgo-Luxembourg are somewhat slow in getting started because of the new tariff structure which required United States to recast its requests. That was a difficult arduous undertaking. Recasting of the United States request list has been completed and negotiations are now proceeding rapidly with much satisfaction on both sides. The Czechoslovaks are not very forthcoming in their offers to the United States or to others.

4. *Charter Negotiations.* Mr. Wilcox remarked that we have undertaken the most complicated set of international negotiations in the

history of mankind. There are no less than 100 sets of negotiations among the 18 countries participating in the Geneva Conference proceeding at the same time. One should not be disturbed, therefore, Mr. Wilcox remarked, that three months have passed without the signing of a single agreement. It should not be forgotten that the trade agreement concluded in 1938 with the United Kingdom required 11 to 12 months to negotiate. Here we are negotiating with 17 other countries all at the same time; and those same 17 countries are negotiating among themselves also at the same time.

Mr. Wilcox said that the work on the employment, commercial policy, investment and cartel sections of the Charter are virtually complete. The work on all other Chapters is well under way. Mr. Wilcox informed the Delegation that the United States negotiators have succeeded in having amendments to the Charter adopted to meet practically all of the suggestions made by the Senate Finance Committee, by the Foreign Trade Council, by the National Association of Manufacturers, by the International Commerce Commission and by the various interested parties who appeared at the public hearings on the Charter held in various cities throughout the United States. No changes, Mr. Wilcox said, have been made in the substance or patterns of the Charter. The changes that have been made relate to matters of detail. Mr. Wilcox further informed the Delegation that there are a number of serious problems still ahead of us; the most serious of which is the one dealing with the continuous assaults that are being made from all sides upon the controls developed at the London Meeting dealing with the use and imposition of quantitative restrictions. Mr. Wilcox remarked that the United States reluctantly accepted at the London meeting two compromises with respect to the use of quantitative restrictions because it was necessary to recognize certain realities. But the instances under which quantitative restrictions may be imposed must be kept at an absolute minimum. It was agreed at London to permit countries to introduce quantitative restrictions on imports in cases of balance of payments difficulties. But the amendments which have been offered at the Geneva Conference are designed to whittle away all controls relating to the use of quantitative restrictions which are now provided for in the Charter. One of the most difficult compromises developed by the drafting committee at the London Meeting was the concession in favor of backward and underdeveloped countries. Under the terms of the compromise worked out in London a country could petition the ITO for permission to increase tariffs to institute tariffs, or to impose quantitative restrictions for a period of time for good cause shown. There is now developing a mounting drive, Mr. Wilcox said, against the requirement in the Charter that before a country may impose quantitative restrictions prior permission must be obtained

from the ITO upon a showing of a bona fide need for such action within the provisions of the Charter. What these countries want is an absolute free hand to impose quantitative restrictions without prior consultation with the ITO. Mr. Wilcox said that the obligation imposed by the Charter that prior international approval must be obtained to impose quantitative restrictions is something new in international affairs. This issue is a fundamental issue on which the United States can give no further ground. It was pressed vigorously in London. The same countries that pressed the matter at the London Meeting are pressing it in Geneva using the same arguments. The attack is made on all provisions of the Charter susceptible of amendment weakening existing controls. Among such provisions are: state trading, economic development, and balance of payments. The countries that are leading the fight are New Zealand, Cuba, China, Chile, India and Czechoslovakia.

The Geneva Conference, however, has an important feature distinguishing it from the London Meeting. In London the United States presented a draft Charter developed and worked out by experts of the various United States Government departments having responsibility of one kind or another in matters dealing with foreign trade. Consequently, the United States was constantly on the defensive in London. Here, however, the Conference is dealing with a draft that is the result of two international meetings, namely, the London meeting and the meeting in New York of the Drafting Committee created by a resolution adopted at the London meeting. Consequently, the United States can take the aggressive in the Geneva Conference. The United States is receiving excellent support from many countries, but notably from Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. Mr. Wilcox indicated that if he might be permitted to venture his own opinion the United States will ultimately win its fight against any impairment of the controls presently provided for in the Charter to cover imposition of quantitative restrictions. In fact, if the issue is forced to a vote showdown the vote will be 11 to 6 in favor of the position taken by the United States.

There are a few other difficult problems facing the conference. One is the voting procedures of the ITO. That issue was postponed primarily at the request of the United States until the substantive provisions of the Charter are clearly defined. Mr. Wilcox indicated that if no agreement can be reached on that issue the World Trade Conference will have to decide the problem. Another difficult problem deals with the admission of non-members. Some of the delegates asked that the problem be deferred and be presented for solution at the World Trade Conference. Others have suggested that the ITO be instructed to draw up rules and regulations for the admission of the new members because at this stage it is not known who may become members. Some of the

delegates fear the situation that may develop if Russia does not join the ITO; others fear what may happen if Argentina does not join. However, at a subcommittee it was decided to tackle that problem in Geneva on its merits and to present to the World Trade Conference three alternative drafts.

5. *Termination of the Conference.* Mr. Wilcox informed the delegation that according to the present schedule the work on the Charter should be completed by the 31st of July, and all of the editorial work by August 15. He remarked that the work on the Charter could be completed by those dates. Termination of tariff negotiations are scheduled for August 15, and all editorial work scheduled to be completed by September 1. However, Mr. Wilcox remarked this might be a bit optimistic. Some of the Delegation may have to remain in Geneva until September 15 to finish the work of the Conference.

6. *Place and Date of World Trade Conference.* Mr. Wilcox announced that at a meeting of the Executive Committee held yesterday afternoon the date of the World Trade Conference was definitely scheduled for November 21. The place of the Conference is to be somewhere in the western hemisphere, probably Havana. A suggestion was made by the Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation to hold the Conference in Havana. That suggestion was quickly seconded by Chile, and more than half a dozen delegations from the other countries. Finally the Chairman of the Cuban Delegation read a prepared statement to the effect that he had been instructed by his Government to extend an invitation to hold the World Trade Conference in Havana.

Lot 65A987, Box 99

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation Staff, Geneva, Switzerland, July 18, 1947

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

3. *Sir Stafford Cripps.*¹ Mr. Wilcox informed the Delegation that two long conferences had been held by Mr. Clayton with Sir Stafford Cripps: one on Saturday morning, July 12; another on Monday morning, July 14. During the discussions with Sir Stafford, Mr. Clayton had at his side for technical advice, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Brown, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Beale, and certain other members of the United States Delegation when questions arose involving special subjects.

During the two sessions, a number of thorny problems were discussed that had arisen in connection with the general work of drafting the ITO Charter for submission to the World Trade Conference,

¹ President of the British Board of Trade.

and in connection with the negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom on tariffs and trade. Sir Stafford Cripps' attitude at Saturday morning's session was marked by complete indifference bordering on open hostility toward the objectives of the Geneva Conference. His attitude manifested a complete reversal of the policy agreed to by the United Kingdom negotiators during the course of discussion which terminated in the conclusion of the Anglo-American loan agreement in 1945. Apparently, over the weekend the British reviewed the course the discussions had taken at Saturday morning's session, and had reached the conclusion that their attitude toward cooperative effort to reduce and eliminate trade barriers was alienating the friendship of the United States from United Kingdom. Consequently, steps would have to be taken to repair the damage. As a result the session on Monday morning was marked by an atmosphere of cordiality, friendship, and cooperation. Immediately following the Monday morning session, Sir Stafford Cripps held a press conference, followed later by a radio broadcast in which he threw the full support of the United Kingdom behind the ITO Conference.

At the Monday morning session the United States obtained commitments from the U.K. to support the United States' position on nearly all important points of differences which have arisen during the discussions on the Charter. One notable exception marred total victory. Sir Stafford Cripps continues to lean strongly in favor of amending the provisions of the ITO Charter to eliminate prior Organization approval to use quantitative restrictions in balance of payments difficulties.

When the question of Empire preferences was raised at the Saturday morning session Sir Stafford Cripps argued at great length, Mr. Wilcox said, that the United Kingdom is not in a position at this time to consider reduction or elimination of those preferences without the prior approval of the dominions and overseas possessions. In support of his arguments, Sir Stafford relied heavily upon the speech given in Parliament a short time ago by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in which the dominions were promised that no modification would be made in Empire preferences without the prior approval of the dominion or overseas possession affected. Furthermore, Sir Stafford pointed out, reduction or elimination of Empire preferences is not a matter that can be achieved over a short period of time. The use of Empire preferences has given British foreign traders market advantages in the dominions and overseas possessions which cannot be divested upon short notice. British foreign traders cannot compete in the absence of the market advantages obtained from Empire preferences until they have had sufficient time to change their approach to questions of production and production costs.

At the Monday morning session Sir Stafford Cripps was informed by Mr. Clayton that the United States, in view of economic conditions generally prevailing in the U.K., would not insist upon complete elimination at this time of all Empire preferences. However, there are certain preferences which must be reduced or eliminated. In the case of the others we would be willing to accept a commitment to reduce them gradually; a percentage each year so that by the end of a specified period of time the preferences would be completely eliminated.

Mr. Wilcox informed the United States Delegation that Mr. Clayton reminded Sir Stafford Cripps at the meeting on Saturday that the offers made by the U.K. to the United States in tariff negotiations were inconsequential; in fact they amounted to nothing more than token offers. Sir Stafford was told bluntly that the United States expected the U.K. to improve substantially their offers to the United States in order to bring them more nearly in a *quid pro quo* relationship to the offers made by the United States to the United Kingdom. The offers made by the United Kingdom to the United States do not offer a basis for negotiation. Mr. Clayton pointed out that the United States had offered 50 percent reductions in our tariff duties on nearly all products of importance in the export trade of the United Kingdom to the United States. In return, the U.K. had made practically no offers worth considering on products of importance in the export trade of the United States to the United Kingdom. In reply Sir Stafford said that the U.K. had gone as far as possible in its offers to the United States. He remarked that while it might be true that on a statistical basis the offers made by the U.K. to the United States were inconsequential, nevertheless, if the U.K. offers were reasonably considered from the point of view of the greater economic strength of the United States, and the tremendous increase in the volume of the foreign trade of the United States due to the war, the offers made by the U.K. to the United States compare favorably to those made by the United States to the United Kingdom. Sir Stafford noted that if the United States is dissatisfied with the offers received from the United Kingdom, and if the United States feels that the offers made by the United States to the United Kingdom are superior to those made by the United Kingdom to the United States the only way that he sees open to bring them into line with each other is for the United States to withdraw some of the offers made to the United Kingdom, and to withdraw the extent of concessions offered to the U.K. In fact, Sir Stafford invited the United States to do so.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

560.AL/7-2947

The British Chargé (Balfour) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1947.

IMMEDIATE

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Yesterday I left with you an *Aide-Mémoire*¹ regarding the foreign exchange situation of the United Kingdom. I have since then received urgent instructions to refer to this communication and to state that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been considering the effect of the dollar situation described therein on the negotiations now proceeding at Geneva for the establishment of an International Trade Organisation.

As was stated in my *Aide-Mémoire* of yesterday, His Majesty's Government will, within the next few months, be faced with the necessity of having to take drastic action to enable them to secure the barest minimum of supplies from overseas by means of measures which would be quite inconsistent with the spirit of the Draft Charter unless they can be sure that the peculiar dollar situation of the United Kingdom is being met. Moreover, they could not be sure that the measures which they might be forced to adopt would be in conformity even with the most reasonable provisions in the Draft Charter relating to exceptions to the rule of non-discrimination.

The Geneva timetable, which looks to agreement on a Draft Charter for submission to a World Conference towards the end of this year, would clearly permit His Majesty's Government, even in these circumstances, to agree to reasonable provisions on non-discrimination on the basis that by the time the World Conference met, the situation would be clear. But the Geneva timetable also contemplates that in September definitive agreement should be reached both on tariffs and preferences and on the necessary general clauses to accompany such concessions. It is contemplated that the appropriate articles from the Draft Charter would be used in this agreement about tariffs, so that in effect by the middle of August the form of the non-discrimination provisions of the tariff agreement would have to be settled.

There has just been circulated to the members of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva a first draft of the general agreement on tariffs and trade, in the drawing up of which the United States and United Kingdom Delegations have co-operated with a few others. This Draft agreement contains the following provisions as regards its coming into force:

(i) It should come into force provisionally on 1st November between certain named countries (including the United States and the United Kingdom);

¹ Vol. III, p. 45.

(ii) It should come into force definitely between all the signatory countries when ratified by countries covering 85% of the total trade of the signatories;

(iii) It should remain in force for three years unless replaced by the Charter of the International Trade Organisation.

His Majesty's Government are therefore faced with the following dilemma. They can either

(a) agree in September to bring into force in November an agreement containing provisions about non-discrimination which they might find themselves unable to carry out because they had no dollars,

or

(b) refuse to agree to any provisions about non-discrimination either in the Draft Charter or in the general agreement on tariffs and trade, in which case a mortal blow might have been struck at the whole project of bringing the world back to multilateralism. This is a project which His Majesty's Government firmly believe to be in their long-term interest as much as that of any other country; but in the short-term situation the lack of dollars might be overriding.

In the light of this dilemma His Majesty's Government have considered most anxiously how they might safeguard their most essential interests in the short term without losing the benefit of the years of constructive work which has been put in by so many countries but principally by the United States and the United Kingdom. As they see it, the only possible course of action is to postpone a definite commitment until it is known whether the immediate dollar shortage will be overcome, without at the same time causing negotiations at Geneva to be regarded by the world as having broken down.

His Majesty's Government believe that this result could be achieved if, instead of an arrangement by which the general agreement on tariffs and trade came into force provisionally on the 1st of November, it should (assuming a successful result to the negotiations on tariffs and a satisfactory draft of the Charter including reasonable provisions about non-discrimination) be initialled *ad referendum* at Geneva without any definite commitment as regards coming into force. We must make it quite clear that for our part at least (and no doubt, as the situation develops, other countries will be forced to make some reservation) the agreement could not be brought into force by His Majesty's Government until there is a substantial stability of international exchanges.

In proposing, as they do, that the Geneva negotiations should be finalized and a general agreement initialled in the manner suggested above, His Majesty's Government have in mind not only the desire not to lose the value of the work done but also the feeling that if things go wrong and an acute crisis develops, we shall still have preserved for the future, when conditions become more normal, a vast measure

of agreement from which we might in the longer term begin again to rebuild a multilateral world.

A communication similar to this letter is being made today to Mr. Clayton by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN BALFOUR

Lot 65A987, Box 101

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Brown)

TOP SECRET

PARIS, July 31, 1947.

Participants:

Sir Stafford Cripps

Mr. Helmore, Board of Trade

Mr. Clayton

Mr. Lintott, Board of Trade

Mr. Brown

Mr. Gunter, Treasury ¹

Sir Stafford made the following points:

1. The British would be out of dollars in October, probably early in the month. They were announcing most drastic measures of retrenchment next week.²

2. This meant that they would have to be free to adopt any measures necessary to get the bare essentials they needed, including any form of discrimination.

3. In such straits, it was impossible for them to sign, or hope for Parliamentary acceptance of, any agreement which limited their freedom of action under (2) *in any way*.

4. It was true that they would still be bound by the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, but that only prevented discrimination against the United States, whereas the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would apply to sixteen countries, including Canada. They would approach us separately on the Financial Agreement.

5. They are fully prepared to go ahead with the Charter and the World Conference on the ground that the situation would be clearer by the end of the year and much clearer by the time the Charter came into effect, probably about next August. At that time, they could probably accept reasonable rules against discrimination.

6. It was brought out that it was impossible for the United States and for others to put tariff concessions into force without general provisions, and that the concessions agreed here could not be put on ice. Sir Stafford recognized, therefore, that their inability to put the General Agreement provisionally into force before the end of the year would mean that Geneva would produce no substantial tariff reduc-

¹ John W. Gunter, U.S. Treasury Representative in the United Kingdom.

² For documentation involving United States concern over the British financial crisis, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

tions. If the United Kingdom did not participate, many others would also stay out.

7. They were entirely willing to act on tariffs and preferences. Nondiscrimination was all that concerned them.

8. They wanted the Charter and the General Agreement.

It was suggested that some modification of the rule against discrimination might be possible.

Sir Stafford replied flatly that this would not help—either the rule would mean something or it wouldn't. If it did, his Parliament would not, and should not be asked to, accept it. If it did not, it would be a hoax.

It finally developed that the United Kingdom could go ahead with the General Agreement, if the effectiveness of the rule of nondiscrimination were postponed until the Charter came into effect, and not otherwise.

We pointed out that if any Agreement, so weakened, were possible for us, it would have to be *very* satisfactory in other respects.³

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

³ Much of the information contained in this memorandum was sent to the Department in telegram 802, August 1, not printed. In addition, Clayton added: "Since my return to Geneva I have discussed with Wilcox and others possible ways of meeting this dilemma. We believe that only way to solve British problem without losing most of our objectives is to provide in general agreement on tariffs and trade that nondiscriminatory rule will not become effective until August 1948 or earlier in event of coming into force of ITO charter." (560.AL/8-147)

560.AL/7-3147

Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Willoughby) to the Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (Nitze)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1947.

Following are our preliminary reactions to the Balfour letter setting forth the British Government's position with regard to the Charter and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.

Evaluation of the British Position

1. It appears from the general tone of the British letter, that the British may be taking a bargaining position. They are fully aware of the great importance we attach to the Geneva negotiations, and know we must use all the means at our disposal not only to conclude the negotiations successfully, but also to bring the General Agreement into force at an early date.

2. The British may be sincere in stating that they are not sure the measures they may have to adopt would be in conformity with the

exceptions to nondiscrimination specified in the Charter. It appears to us, however, that Article 28 of the draft Charter (and the corresponding Article XII of the General Agreement) are sufficiently broad and flexible to permit almost any emergency measures which the British might have to take.

3. It appears probable that the British are also concerned about the necessity for making substantial reductions in imperial preferences if the General Agreement is to be concluded. From the standpoint of their internal politics this is important. Reports from Geneva indicate that they have made no substantial offers on preferences and there is no indication that they are prepared to make any. In London there is strong support in Parliamentary and even certain Governmental circles for maintaining the preferential system as intact as possible.

4. In extenuation of the British proposal, it must be admitted that it will not be easy for them to explain their signing of an agreement committing them to lower trade barriers and to nondiscrimination when at the same time it is necessary for them to take advantage of all the exceptions in the agreement to control imports and to discriminate against the United States.

Significance of the British Proposal

The British propose that the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs should not be put into effect on November 1, but should be initialled *ad referendum* without any commitment as to its coming into force. They state that on their part the agreement could not be brought into force "unless there is a substantial stability of international exchanges". Under this proviso the agreement might not come into force for years.

It appears obvious that we must oppose the British proposal very strongly. The difficulties we will encounter in connection with Congressional opposition and the domestic political situation will become more and more serious as the present schedule is delayed. In my opinion any delay in concluding the Charter which would envisage Congressional action later than the first part of next year probably would preclude it ever being approved. It is likewise essential that the General Agreement be concluded and made public before the end of this year.

We must also make every effort to prevent the British from backing out of making reductions in preference. For many years we have been pressing for elimination of British preference. We obtained pertinent commitments from the British in the Atlantic Charter and Article VII of the lend-lease agreement about the fulfillment of which they have never been very enthusiastic. If the present opportunity is lost, it will not recur for a long time to come, if ever.

Recommendations

The views of Mr. Clayton and the Delegation at Geneva must be obtained before a reply is made to the British letter. On the basis of the considerations outlined above, our tentative position ought to be as follows:

1. We ought to resist as strongly as possible the attempt to delay the coming into force of the General Agreement or the Charter.

2. Instead of permitting the British to use the Geneva negotiations as a bargaining point in support of their requests for assistance, we ought to reverse the position and press for the successful conclusion of the Geneva negotiations, including our desiderata with respect to preferences, and the early entry into force of the General Agreement, as a prerequisite to our assistance program, or at least as a prerequisite to our concurrence in any relaxation of the nondiscrimination commitments in the Financial Agreement. Such insistence will not be unreasonable in view of the many concessions we are making to the British point of view, and in view of our belief that neither the Charter nor the General Agreement will prevent any necessary British import or exchange control measures.

3. We should be as liberal as possible under the Loan Agreement and Monetary Fund Agreement in allowing the United Kingdom to discriminate wherever it will assist in resolving their dollar shortage. If they can demonstrate, which I doubt, that the Charter or General Trade Agreement prevent them from taking action which would materially assist them in meeting their balance-of-payments difficulties, I would advocate broader exceptions in preference to postponement of the effective date.

560.AL/8-147: Telegram

The Consul in Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, August 1, 1947—6 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

800. For Lovett and Nitze from Clayton. Absolutely essential I have authority act wool tariff tomorrow morning as fear cannot hold Dominion Cabinet members here longer. Have been trying telephone you all day to urge Secretary himself go to President this afternoon, but line out of order. Am still trying to phone. [Clayton.]

TROUTMAN

560.AL/8-147 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva*CONFIDENTIAL
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1947—4 p. m.

944. For Clayton from Wood.¹ Discussed with Nitze problems raised urtel 802 Aug 1.² Following our tentative thoughts:

1. Apparent Br econ and domestic political situation such that we must accede their demands for permission to discriminate.

2. Believe you and US Del best position determine technique (a) which would do least damage to ITO and (b) also which would not destroy chances TA renewal and acceptance ITO by Congress.

3. However suggest consideration alternative: That discrimination would be permitted on showing of need and fact, and with arrangements for consultation, although clearly understood that country proposing discrimination would have unilateral authority to (a) determine facts and need and (b) put into force discrimination. Belief that this approach might (a) be more palatable to US interests and Congress and (b) prevent oblique use discriminatory authority for purely protective purposes. [Wood.]

MARSHALL

¹ C. Tyler Wood, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

² Not printed, but see memorandum of conversation of July 31, p. 969.

560.AL/8-247 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva*SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1947—4 p. m.

943. For Clayton from Wood. Steelman said at 2:00 p. m. EST: "Send secret word to Clayton that President gives him authority if he needs to use it and will approve TAC letter ¹ Monday." Understands approval will not be made public. Also said: "The Boss and I know what Will is up against and hope he has luck". [Wood.]

MARSHALL

¹ Telegram 951 to Geneva, August 5, informed Clayton that the words TAC letter should have read "TAC recommendation as amended by Secretary's letter." (560.AL/8-247) This meant that he had the authority to cut the tariff on wool.

Lot 65A987, Box 101

*Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation, Geneva,
Switzerland, August 4, 1947*

SECRET

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

4. *Wool.* Mr. Wilcox reported to the Delegation that by using the most tactful means available, he succeeded in postponing until Saturday morning a meeting for the purpose of discussing wool between Mr. Clayton and Cabinet Ministers of the Southern Dominions. He was forced to take such action, Mr. Wilcox stated, because no word had been received yet from Washington on the burning question whether the President had acted upon the TAC recommendations regarding wool. By Saturday morning word still had not been received. A meeting with Mr. Clayton could be postponed no longer. In the meeting, Mr. Clayton persuaded the Southern Dominions' Cabinet Ministers to forebear with him a few more days until word from Washington might be received. Mr. Clayton explained that the delay in receiving word since the passage of the Wool Bill was caused solely by the fact that the President had been called to Missouri on account of the death of his mother. Australia agreed immediately. The Union of South Africa first expressed sharp disappointment over the fact that the US still was unable to discuss wool—then agreed to wait a few days longer. It was decided to meet again Wednesday or Thursday of this week, Mr. Wilcox said.

Mr. Wilcox reported that during all the discussions on the subject of postponing action on wool with the representatives of the Southern Dominions while awaiting the outcome of legislation in the US Congress regarding wool, the attitude of these people was above expectation.

About 8 o'clock Saturday evening word was received from Washington to the effect that the President had given Mr. Clayton authority to reduce the duty on wool if he needed it. Attempts to reach Dr. Coombs of the Australian Delegation proved unsuccessful. He had gone to London until Wednesday.

[Here follows a discussion of other subjects.]

Lot 65A987, Box 101

Memorandum by the Vice Chairman of the United States Delegation (Wilcox) to the Chairman of the United States Delegation (Clayton)

SECRET

[GENEVA,] August 6, 1947.

(1) It now appears probable that we shall come out of the Geneva negotiations with a Charter that will be more acceptable in the United

States than the earlier drafts. The prospective results of the tariff negotiations, however, are extremely discouraging. If the negotiations, as a whole, were to fail, we could probably salvage satisfactory agreements with Norway, Benelux and Lebanon-Syria, and a fair agreement with Canada and China. The present prospect for adequate agreements with Brazil, Cuba, Chile and Czechoslovakia are not promising. We shall have to wait for some time for an answer on the agreement with India. The real test of success or failure depends upon the outcome of our negotiations with France and with the British Commonwealth, and it is here that we have encountered our greatest difficulties. Unless we can obtain satisfactory agreements in these cases, the tariff negotiations will be a failure, and we shall be accused, in the United States, of accepting slim tariff concessions simply to get agreement to the provisions of the Charter. This would imperil the ratification of the Charter and the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act.

(2) It has been apparent, throughout the negotiations, that the United Kingdom has had no intention of making concessions that involve any real progress toward the elimination of preferences. The offers originally made by the United Kingdom were pitifully inadequate. Helmore and Cripps have nevertheless insisted that they represent a fair balance. Cripps, moreover, has made the amazing suggestion that a better balance might be achieved by the withdrawal or reduction of our offers. Helmore has sought an early termination of tariff negotiations and has indicated that we should be satisfied with modest results. In respect to preferences, the Commonwealth has placed us at a disadvantage in negotiations by taking the position that we must purchase every reduction or elimination of a preference twice—once from the country that receives it, and once from the country that grants it. On the basis of performance to date, it would appear that the United Kingdom will attempt to extract every concession that we will make toward easing their short-run situation without making any appreciable concessions with respect to long-run trade policy. The vested interests that have been built up under the preferential system are strong, and the United Kingdom has shown no willingness to take the political risks involved in reducing or removing the protection afforded them by the preferences which they enjoy. It appears that no concessions are made without the permission of the industry concerned. The real obstacle to effective action on preference exists, not in the Dominions, but in the United Kingdom.

(3) The approach to the immediate situation which was suggested to Helmore on Sunday evening, August 3, involved a thorough-going relaxation of restraints upon discrimination in the short run and, in addition, an easing of our requests with respect to preferences by (*a*)

reducing the number of items covered within the scope of these requests, (b) accepting gradual, rather than immediate, elimination of preferences in a majority of the remaining cases, and (c) insisting upon the immediate and complete elimination of preferences only in a minority of crucial cases. The implication was clear that it would not be politically possible for us to grant the sort of relaxation on discrimination which they desire to have in the short run, unless we could honestly demonstrate that the negotiations as a whole had resulted in really substantial progress toward the elimination of preferences in the long run. The United Kingdom has responded in no way to this approach.

(4) American opinion regards the Hawley-Smoot tariff and the Ottawa system as related parts of inter-war trade restrictions. We are undertaking the liquidation of the Hawley-Smoot rates. We cannot support this action at home unless we obtain, in the process, the liquidation of the Ottawa system. We now have in our hands bargaining weapons that we may never possess again: (a) Our excellent offers on tariff reduction; (b) a cut on wool; (c) the possibility of easing the British financial crisis through relaxation on discrimination in the short run; and (d) the prospect of aid under the Marshall Plan. If we cannot now obtain the liquidation of the Ottawa system, we shall never do so. What we must have is a front-page headline that says "Empire Preference System Broken at Geneva." With this, the success of this whole series of negotiations is assured. Without it, there is grave danger that the whole trade program will end in defeat.

(5) In this situation, most serious consideration should be given to these critical questions: If the United Kingdom should persist in its refusal to live up to its commitment with respect to the elimination of preferences, should we enter into any trade agreement with them? Would the chances of getting the Charter accepted in the United States be promising enough to justify us in submitting it to Congress at all? If the case is indeed hopeless, would it not be better for the Administration to abandon the program here and now than to run the risk of repudiation at home next year?

(6) If this analysis of the situation is correct, it is suggested that Sir Stafford should be told (a) that genuine and far-reaching performance on preferences is imperative here and now; (b) that the United States cannot enter into a trade agreement with the United Kingdom that does not involve such performance; (c) that the United States may be unable to attend the Havana Conference or present the Charter to Congress if it does not get such performance; (d) that the United Kingdom will have to take the responsibility for the failure of the program; (e) that, in this context, it will be virtually impossible for us generously to approach the problem of permitting short-term

discrimination; and (f) that the prospects of Congressional approval for additional aid, under the Marshall Plan or otherwise, will be seriously impaired.

(7) One serious aspect of this situation should be stressed. There has been growing irritation between our two peoples over the past year. This is attributable, in the main, [to] the British resentment against the requirements accepted by their Government in the Anglo-American Financial Agreement. If the United States were to take generous action to relieve the British financial situation in the present crisis, a large part of this resentment might be removed and our relations accordingly improved. Failure by the United Kingdom to fulfill its commitments as to long-term commercial policy, unrelated to its short-term difficulties on the other hand, would give rise to resentment in the United States. If, as a consequence, our country failed to come to Britain's aid in the present emergency, the bitterness against us would be continued and increased. In the circumstances, action by both Governments is required to reestablish the mutual respect and confidence that are essential to our cooperation in the reconstruction of the western world.

(8) What needs to be done, in this situation, can be done without real cost to either side. In the short run, the demand for American exports will be so great that greater latitude for discrimination can be permitted without serious harm to our interests. In the long run, the United Kingdom will be better off in a world of multilateralism and non-discrimination than in a world permanently condemned to bilateralism and preferential trade. The real obstacle to mutually advantageous agreement lies in the political resistance to multilateralism within the United Kingdom. Unless that obstacle can be removed, our program will have failed.

560.AL/8-2247: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, August 22, 1947—2 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

895. From Clayton for personal attention Lovett. Tariff negotiations with British Commonwealth have been lagging on question preferences. In order bring matter to head TAC has prepared revised list requests on Commonwealth showing (a) items on which we must insist on immediate elimination preferences; (b) items on which we could accept progressive elimination preferences over period five years; (c) items on which we require reduction margin preference beyond that now offered; (d) items on which we could accept margin prefer-

ence offered. The portion of this list affecting preferences enjoyed by the UK in the Commonwealth represents judgment TAC as to extent action on preferences necessary constitute implementation UK promise re preferences made in connection loan and adequate *quid pro quo* our tariff offers. It nevertheless represents substantial modification our original requests.

Wednesday I asked Cripps directly if UK was prepared negotiate real action on elimination preferences enjoyed by UK. He replied flatly politically impossible UK take any substantial action elimination preferences. He would look at "a short" list requests eliminations and give answer Monday. (See my telegram from London August 20.)¹

Probabilities are answer will be negative. In this case, alternatives open are as follows:

1. Conclude agreement without substantial preference elimination on basis substantially our present offers.

2. Conclude agreement without substantial preference eliminations but curtail our offers materially both in number and extent of concessions. Cripps has twice suggested such curtailment.

3. (a) Advise UK we cannot conclude trade agreement with them unless they take substantial action elimination preferences and therefore on basis their rejection our list we must not continue negotiations and (b) advise other delegates here we are discontinuing negotiations UK and reasons therefor and seek best agreements possible with them preferably still on multilateral basis.

4. Adjourn tariff negotiations either (a) until after Havana or (b) indefinitely.

Believe course 3 should be followed. Convinced we could not sustain domestically any material concessions UK unless they give substantial action elimination preferences. To do so might prevent renewal TA Act. We would be in sound position if we return having given no concessions to UK because we could not get adequate concessions from them in return. This agreement (course 2) would cheapen price admission to ITO and earn us criticism from friends and foes of program alike. Adjournment negotiations until after Havana would not only endanger progress made here with other countries but would put negotiations in setting TA renewal fight Congress. Indefinite adjournment complete confession failure.

Discontinuance US-UK tariff negotiations could not necessarily prevent UK signing multilateral agreement without US-UK items in schedules. This would have advantage of having UK as well as other members Preparatory Committee bound by main commercial policy provisions of charter including obligation not to increase margins preference. TAC unanimously concurs.

Have not overlooked fact course (3) involves serious risk, jeopardiz-

¹ Not printed.

ing success Havana Conference and support Marshall proposals in US with consequent broad political implications. Nevertheless believe making clear issue of UK non-action preference elimination and facing it squarely is on balance best course. Should convince British we are prepared forego any agreement rather than accept poor one.

Therefore propose if British reject our list without making any acceptable counter-proposal, to hand Cripps letter making following points:

1. In connection loan they promised negotiate substantial action elimination preferences in return substantial tariff concessions. We have offered latter. They have refused former.

2. We are offering substantial help their admittedly serious short-term problem:

- a. By agreeing non-convertibility sterling;
- b. By relaxation short-term non-discrimination provisions charter and trade agreement;
- c. By considering similar action loan agreement;
- d. By Marshall proposals.

3. Preference eliminations requested would not in any way handicap British in dealing with their short-term problem. Given non-convertibility sterling and freedom to discriminate in short-term they would have full ability direct their trade to meet their needs. Eliminations requested would affect only long-term. They would be fulfillment British promise (1) above, necessary basis any trade agreement with US, and step toward non-discriminatory multilateral trading world in longer term necessary to gain support in US for charter and Marshall proposals and make them worthwhile.

4. British failure perform on preference eliminations casts doubt validity their charter promises and will make more difficult our implementation Marshall proposal.

Please advise if you approve. You may wish to advise Secretary and possibly President as approach this subject might be made by British highest level.

Frankly, I was disappointed in Cripps' attitude, which bordered on a callous disregard of their commitment on preferences. At any rate, he used political arguments and present British circumstances admittedly extremely serious as excuse for disavowing any intention of substantially living up to their obligations, although I clearly pointed out that action requested by us on preferences would not add to the British burdens in the short term.

Suggest you consult Hawkins. [Clayton.]

TROUTMAN

560.AL/8-2247: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1947—1 a. m.

US URGENT NIACT

1065. For personal attention Clayton.

1. Department studying your 895 Aug 22 and will reply soonest. Are concerned probable repercussions failure to reach some agreement with UK. Lovett expects discuss with President Monday.

2. Lintott Board of Trade returning London with Eady¹ by air this week end is fully aware relationship between Geneva and loan negotiations and effect failure reach agreement Geneva would have upon overall US-UK relations.

LOVETT

¹ At about the same time that Under Secretary Clayton was holding discussions with Sir Stafford Cripps in London, a British mission headed by Sir Wilfrid Eady, Second Secretary of the British Treasury, was in Washington discussing the financial crisis. For documentation concerning this mission, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

560.AL/8-2647: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1947—1 p. m.

US URGENT

1079. For Clayton from Lovett.

1. Have discussed with President your 895, explaining the four courses action available if, as expected, British reject our list without making acceptable counterproposals. He agrees alternatives (1) and (4) impractical and should be rejected. He favors alternative (2) over alternative (3).¹ He is reluctant to send a message to Attlee at this time in view British political situation although he indicated he would reconsider if essential. We would be reluctant to urge sending message. Your proposed letter to Cripps was not discussed and we leave sending of this to your judgment, though if you decide to do so I would appreciate it if you would clear letter with Dept in order that we may check consistency with recent financial agreement discussions.

2. Hickerson, Hawkins, Nitze, Willoughby and I have independently considered matter and are also of opinion alternative (2) is lesser of two evils. Without attempting full evaluation here, following comments offered for your consideration.

¹ In a memorandum prepared for President Truman, August 25, not printed, covering both Geneva's 895, and the Department's thinking, Lovett said: "I feel that the final choice in this connection should be left to Mr. Clayton although I believe we should point out to him that opinion here is that alternative (2) is the lesser of the two evils." (560.AL/8-2547)

(a) Consensus here is British will not modify to great extent position taken by Cripps regarding preferences. Financial talks indicate British feel desperate and political situation such that they are likely follow course they feel necessary in view current crisis even if clearly contrary their own long-run interests. During loan conversations British made it clear they are prepared to violate any international obligations which would prevent them from taking action they consider essential, witness unilateral violation 16 financial and trade agreements regarding convertibility. Must assume therefore alternative (3) would result no agreement.

(b) In other matters we are attempting to give UK every assistance in getting over this difficult period and in avoiding irretrievable damage to their long-run position.

(c) Believe course of action leading to rupture trade negotiations inconsistent with policy we are following regarding financial agreement. (President referred to inconsistency our position if we should take alternative (3).) Important from point of view of successful relaxation convertibility and nondiscrimination provisions that some progress, even though slight, be made in commitment to reduce trade barriers.

(d) Believe alternative (3) likely to lead to strong resentment British public and considerable confusion and criticism in US. Would make more difficult consideration by Congress further assistance UK and Europe generally. As you know, UK Govt now under intense pressure from left wing members Labor party to curtail sharply UK foreign commitments, reduce arm forces and to withdraw British forces from Greece and Italy. We are concerned over likelihood that USSR will exploit fully any such differences between US and UK just as they are now trying to capitalize on British weakness by increasing pressure throughout Eastern Europe and Near East.

(e) Consequently best course seems to be to get best agreement possible in present highly unfavorable circumstances and reserve part of our negotiating position for use at more propitious time by trimming our offers correspondingly.

(f) From standpoint of public and congressional opinion here thin agreement of this kind we believe better than none, especially if made clear that present agreement only an initial stage in dealing with this problem. Such a position would probably be understood in view of fact Britain is a key country in these negotiations and present crisis creates very unfavorable conditions for finding complete solutions.

(g) In line with above could concentrate now on eliminating preferences in UK of little or no concern to latter but of importance to dominions, using such of our offers as may be necessary for this purpose but withholding a substantial part of our offers on products of

interest to UK for later use in getting releases for elimination of preferences enjoyed by UK in the dominions.

(h) Might seek commitment from UK to resume negotiations in hope of finding more satisfactory solution when Britain has gotten through the immediate crisis; also commitment from dominions that effect would be given by them to any agreement later reached with UK for elimination of preferential margins in dominion tariffs.

LOVETT

560.AL/8-3047: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

GENEVA, August 30, 1947—1 p. m.

934. For Lovett from Wilcox. Have indications (urtel 1122, August 29)¹ Commonwealth countries working on requests we presented to each of them re all preferences. Unlikely receive answer from UK before September 5. Therefore expect counter proposal rather than rejection. If reply still unsatisfactory Clayton and Douglas believe we should talk with Cripps again presumably week of September 8. Suggest discussion proposal re section nine await outcome.

Sent Dept; repeated Paris for Clayton 92; London for Ambassador 95. [Wilcox.]

TROUTMAN

¹ Telegram 1122, not printed, described the Department's thinking that an exchange of notes might be prepared to permit a relaxation of section 9 of the financial agreement; this would not, however, be discussed with the British until either a preference agreement had been reached or Clayton advised that such a move would have no adverse effect at Geneva. (560.AL/8-2947) Section 9 prohibited discriminatory import arrangements; for text, see 60 Stat. (pt. 2) 1843 and 1844.

560.AL/9-1547: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, September 15, 1947—11 a. m.

1005. Commonwealth answers our new proposal regarding preferences received September 9 are unsatisfactory. Wilcox, Brown, Beale discussed steps with Clayton [and] Douglas in Paris September 10. Agreed inform Commonwealth offers unsatisfactory and make new approach Cripps proposing action elimination preferences enjoyed by UK be postponed three years and taken gradually over following 10 years. Wilcox informing heads Commonwealth delegations Geneva September 15. Hopes discuss again with Clayton, Douglas London September 17. Has asked Clayton date Cripps September 17 or 18. Hawkins, Brown will participate. Will report result.

TROUTMAN

Lot 65D987, Box 101

Statement Made by Mr. Clair Wilcox to Representatives of the British Commonwealth, Geneva, Switzerland, September 15, 1947

SECRET

Gentlemen, when we met here last week I said that we would look at the revised offers that you handed us with respect to preferences and let you have our reaction. We were prepared to do that Friday or Saturday, but postponed the meeting until today so that Dr. Coombs could be here.

We have examined with care the suggestions that you made to us and have analyzed them in every way we can, and this is where we come out:

In the first place, it appears that as a result of the suggestions you have made there would be retained within the Commonwealth and Empire, unaffected by any action with respect to preferences, the following percentages of trade, measures in terms of percentages of imports subject to imperial preferences from the United States into these areas.

In the case of preferences received in the United Kingdom, 80 percent; in the case of preferences received in Canada, 61 percent; in Australia, 69 percent; in New Zealand, 35 percent; in South Africa, 76 percent; in Burma, 62 percent; in Ceylon, 82 percent; in Southern Rhodesia, 100 percent; in India, 93 percent; in Newfoundland, 98 percent; in the British Colonies, 100 percent. If we were to take as our basis not our shipments into those areas but shipments from British sources into these areas, the percentages would be higher.

Secondly, in the cases where preferences would be reduced, they would typically be reduced by less than one-third or one-fourth, that is about a third or a quarter of the margin would be shaved off and two-thirds to three-fourths of the margin would be retained. For instance, two-thirds of the existing margin would be retained on two-fifths of our trade in the products affected by the reductions in Canada, on three-fourths in the United Kingdom, on four-fifths in Australia, and on nine-tenths in New Zealand.

But the matter with which we are most concerned here is the question of eliminations of preferences. Here again the measurement is in terms of percentage of pre-war imports from the United States that were subject to imperial preferences. The eliminations of preferences in the tariff of the United Kingdom, that is preferences enjoyed by the rest of the Commonwealth, as a percentage of United States sales subject to preferences, in the United Kingdom, is 5 percent. In Canada, the figure is 9 percent; in Australia, 4 percent; in New Zealand, 19 percent; in South Africa, 13 percent; in Burma, 35 percent; in India,

one percent; in Ceylon, 1/10 of 1%; in New Foundland, 1/10 of 1%; in Southern Rhodesia, nothing and in the Colonies, nothing. If this were to be measured in terms of British trade rather than United States trade the figures would be very much lower.

The effect of the suggested action on the preference system as a whole, as nearly as we can compute it, appears to be this. Again these figures are in terms of a percentage of United States pre-war imports subject to preferences. In the United Kingdom and Dominions, no action on 71% of preference trade, reductions or eliminations on 29% of preference trade, eliminations on 7% of preference trade and non-eliminations on 93% of preference trade. Elsewhere in the Empire, no action on 97%, reductions or eliminations on 3%, eliminations on less than 1% and no eliminations on more than 99%. That is the statistical picture as best we can get it.

You suggested that certain conditions might be attached to such additional offers as you might be prepared to make. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, the things that Australia has offered us in the new list are largely restorations of offers previously made and subsequently withdrawn. I don't think that it would be possible for us to add a plus on our side of the agreement on this basis. If there is to be a plus on our side, there must be a plus on the other side. I should very much like to come to agreement with Australia, and I would prefer a strong agreement to a weak one. In the case of New Zealand, the points involved I think are the same as they are in the case of Australia. In the case of South Africa, the question of preferences is less significant than elsewhere. We still have before us some straight tariff bargaining with which we are prepared to continue. In the case of Canada, as I understand it, it is the Canadian view that any agreement arrived at should be based upon mutual advantage and that negotiations should preferably be left in the hands of the negotiating teams. We are entirely prepared to proceed on this basis.

In the case of the United Kingdom, it was argued that there must be a plus on our side of the balance because there already exists a satisfactory balance. I should like to examine the nature of that balance. We already have a trade agreement with the United Kingdom which presumably would be permitted to stand if we did not conclude a new agreement, unless, of course, it were denounced by one party or the other. So, I think that what we must look at are the changes that our present negotiations would make in the situation that already exists. That eliminates from the calculations all bindings on both sides on things already bound. What is there in our proposed agreement in the way of new reductions and new bindings on both sides? On that basis, it appears that United States offers apply to 81,500,000 dollars of prewar United Kingdom sales to the United States, and U.K. offers apply to 55,500,000 dollars of prewar US sales to the UK.

The condition that was suggested to us was the negotiation of the regulations in the US with respect to the mixing of synthetic rubber with crude rubber. Crude rubber is produced in the British Colonies and sold to us from the British Colonies. We have not included any figures with respect to the Colonies in our discussion of the balance between the US and the UK. I should like to examine the question of balance between the US and British Colonies.

There is one thing that we have been offered with respect to the Colonies that would be of some value to us. That is a change in the situation under which the export taxes on tin ore and tin are so arranged as to provide protection for domestic tin smelting and to make tin more expensive to smelters located outside the British Empire. On our side we were to bind free entry and this we are prepared to do. But a condition has been attached to that, namely that we will not subsidize the Texas City Tin Smelter and that at any time when we pay a subsidy to the Texas City Tin Smelter, the arrangement making tin more expensive to people outside the Empire than to people inside the Empire will be restored. This is a condition that we are not prepared to accept. We do not know whether it is going to be necessary to subsidize the Texas City Tin Smelter. But if we maintain the Smelter, it will be purely for reasons of our military security, and that is a thing which we cannot bargain away.

Now aside from the tin issue, on our other offers with respect to exports from the Colonies, we have offered a binding on rubber sales which before the war were worth 100,250,000 dollars and, in addition [to] that, we have offered concessions on another 18 million dollars worth of colonial exports. This adds up to a total of 118,250,000 dollars. The figure on the other side of the balance is zero. We are asked to rectify this balance of 118 million dollars to zero by adding something to the 118 million dollar side of the balance, namely negotiated percentages of synthetic in the rubber products manufactured in the US. We will not do this.

In the first place, it is our policy in the US, as I explained to you the other day, to cut synthetic rubber production to the minimum essential to our security needs. We have unilaterally determined, not on the basis of representations by any other country but by our own decision, to cut synthetic rubber production down from one million tons a year to one-fourth of a million or less. I have complete confidence that the market for crude rubber in the US will be greater after the war than it was before the war. The sale of synthetic rubber will be less than the increased consumption. I don't think any commitments are required with respect to this matter.

In the second place, mixing of synthetic with crude rubber will be on a product-by-product basis, according to product specifications. That means that, in some products, there will be no synthetic required

whatsoever; in other products there may be a high percentage required and in others a low percentage. The determination is to be made entirely in terms of the military significance of the products involved. If we were to attempt to negotiate this with another country, it would be a terrific nuisance and it would involve interminable delay, because it would require finding answers to questions that are as yet unanswered with respect to specific qualities and sizes and character of tires for particular military vehicles and these determinations have to be made by the Army and the Navy and we certainly are not in any position to make them here. Let me say, however, that even if it were physically possible for us to handle such negotiations I have serious misgivings as to whether we should do it. As a matter of national policy, I do not believe that our military security requirements should be fixed through tariff negotiations.

If we do seek a balance here in this unbalance of 118 million dollars to zero, there are two ways in which it could be achieved. One is by some action on the side of the Colonies, particularly with respect to preferences enjoyed by the rest of the Empire in the Colonies. The other is by withdrawing our binding on crude rubber and withdrawing our other offers on colonial exports. We would prefer to achieve a balance in the first way, but we are prepared to achieve it in either way.

So much for the factual picture. I would like to talk to you now in more general terms. What does the US seek in these negotiations? The phrase has been used at various times that we are seeking scalps for our belts. I think it should be perfectly clear that reductions in our tariffs will remove barriers to your exports to us immediately the day they take effect. But the concessions in the tariff of the UK and the concessions we get with respect to the preferences that the Dominions enjoy in the market of the UK will not. The UK is in a position, because of its balance-of-payments situation, to employ quotas on imports and to discriminate against imports from the US. Such concessions will therefore have no value for the US and no costs for the UK or the Dominions for an indeterminable period of time.

On the basis of this fact, I think it should be recognized that we are not now seeking an overall increase in exports from the US. We recognize perfectly well that we are exporting too much, not because we are pushing exports but because the rest of the world is begging us for the goods. And we are importing too little, not because our tariff is high, but because other people simply are not producing the goods that we would buy if they were offering them for sale. We recognize that this unbalance must be corrected. But the immediate step that must be taken toward its correction is by getting Europe back into production, so that the countries of Europe will buy less from us, will

stop depending on us, for instance, for their fuel and their food, and so that they will sell more to us. In semantics, the term "dollar shortage" is an interesting one because it is a way of putting on the US the blame for the failure of Europe to solve its political and economic problems and get back into production. If there was not a serious production problem in Europe, you would not have the present shortage of dollars. Less important now, but more important in the long run, is the reduction of the American tariff, so that in the long run we shall buy more from abroad.

What we are trying to do now is to reverse the international economic policy that the US has pursued for the past century and a half. Our record since the war in this respect is one of which I believe we can justly be proud. After the last war we attempted to collect the war debts. After this war we cancelled lend-lease. After the last war we simultaneously made loans and raised our tariffs. After this war we have been giving and lending and we are attempting to reduce our tariffs. Since this war, we have put out in the form of gifts and loans 20 billion dollars to assist the rest of the world. We are now being asked to put out another 20 billion dollars for this purpose. We are seeking to commit the US to a low tariff policy and to international cooperation in trade policy.

Some of you have said to us sometimes that you would like to help us with our political problem. I would suggest that it is also your political problem. We have been told repeatedly in the course of these meetings that the most important factor in the rehabilitation, stabilization and expansion of the world's economy is the future economic policy of the US. I dare say that determinations on this issue may have more significance for the well-being of many other countries than any decisions that they can make for themselves. I suggest that we are talking about a common problem and we should approach it as such.

The problem is whether American people and American Congress will acquiesce in what may amount temporarily to a unilateral reduction of the US tariff, to the numerous escape clauses in the ITO Charter, to the provision of another 15 or 20 billion dollars of aid for Europe, when they can see no immediate gains for the US. The only thing that they can take hold of is the hope that our trade relations, in the future, are going to be improved.

Our whole policy has been to exchange concessions of tangible and immediate value for commitments as to policy in the future. We have agreed to the revision of the Charter Article on non-discrimination in order to permit the UK to discriminate among other countries and specifically against us. We have agreed to postponement of the effective date of this Article of the General Agreement so that such discrimina-

tion will be subject to no criteria and to no right of complaint. We have under consideration relaxation of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement with respect to non-discrimination. We are considering the provision of further financial aid. The one argument that we need to be able to use is that trade policies, after the transition, will be better. But in the light of the extremely limited action which you have so far been prepared to take on elimination of preferences, this is an argument that we cannot use.

We should not forget the basis upon which these negotiations have proceeded. We begin with Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreements, concluded in 1942, which said that the settlement of the Lend-Lease account should include provision for agreed action by our governments directed "to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers".

The conclusion of the Lend-Lease settlement and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement in December 1945 followed upon negotiations between the United Kingdom and United States which resulted in the publication of the American Proposals. In these Proposals, it was provided that members of the projected International Trade Organization "should enter into arrangements for the substantial reduction of tariffs and for the elimination of tariff preferences, action for the elimination of tariff preferences being taken in conjunction with adequate measures for the substantial reduction of barriers to world trade, as part of the mutually advantageous arrangements contemplated in this document". At the same time the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom published jointly an "Understanding Reached on Commercial Policy". In this statement the United Kingdom expressed its "full agreement on all important points in these Proposals" and the two governments undertook to enter into negotiations "for the purpose of developing concrete arrangements to carry out these proposals including definitive measures for the relaxation of trade barriers of all kinds". And it was agreed that these negotiations would proceed in accordance with the principles laid down in the Proposals.

When he presented this understanding to the British Parliament the Prime Minister said:

"The statement makes it clear that in pursuit of the objectives of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, we for our part are ready to agree that the existing system of preferences within the British Commonwealth and the Empire will be contracted, provided there is adequate compensation in the form of improvement in trading conditions between Commonwealth and Empire countries and the rest of the world."

And he went on to make the following points: "There is no commitment on any countries in advance of negotiations to reduce or eliminate any particular margin of preference". We have always understood that to be the case. Second, "the reduction or elimination of preference can only be considered in relation to and in return for reductions of tariffs and other barriers to world trade in general which would make for mutually advantageous arrangements for the expansion of trade". We have always understood that to be the case. Third, "the elimination of all preferences would be such a step as would require a most substantial and widespread reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers by a large number of countries". We have never asked for the elimination of all preferences.

Again, at the conclusion of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee at London, representatives of our governments joined with other members of the Committee in recommending an article for inclusion in the Charter of an International Trade Organization which provided that each member of the Organization "shall, upon the request of any other Member or Members, enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous negotiations with such other Member or Members directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports and to the elimination of import tariff preferences".

And, finally, in the draft of the Charter which the Preparatory Committee has adopted at its second session at Geneva, the representatives of our governments have again joined in recommending to the International Conference an Article which provides that "each Member shall, upon the request of the Organization, enter into and carry out with such other Member or Members as the Organization may specify, negotiations directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other charges on imports and exports and to the elimination of the preferences referred to . . .¹ on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis".

These statements represent a thorough discussion and a clear understanding existing over a period of five years. They have been repeatedly presented to the American people and to the American Congress as a program to which the United States and the United Kingdom were both committed and in which they both believe. They have been put forward to the world as a joint enterprise in which we were in full partnership. Compared with this promise the prospective outcome at Geneva will be one of failure.

On the side of the tariff offers made by the United States, there are wide and deep cuts which, on top of the reductions made since 1934,

¹ Omission indicated in the source text.

will carry our average level of protection to a point below where it stood before the first World War. I want to acknowledge the validity of the point made by Dr. Coombs that this action does not effect all products equally and that the protection remaining on particular agricultural products which Australia exports does not carry the situation back to that which existed before the first World War. But I repeat that our proposed action would establish the lowest average level of protection the United States has had in 40 years. We call that action substantial. On the other side, it is only in the geological sense of the word that the action so far proposed can be said to be directed toward the elimination of preferences.

Now, under the circumstances, what alternatives are opened to us? We have considered them very carefully and they seem to be as follows:

First, we could ask that the tariff negotiations be adjourned indefinitely. This we are very reluctant to do. If this were done, I fear that the projected tariff cuts would never be made. The authority delegated to the Executive in the United States expires in June. We do not know whether or in what form the Act will be renewed. The policy of the present Administration we know. We do not know whether this Administration will be continued. And if there is a new Administration, we do not know what its policy will be.

The second possibility is that we ask that the tariff negotiations be adjourned to New York or to Havana until sometime in the near future. We cannot see that there is any greater likelihood of results being achieved there or then. For one thing, this action would be a confession of failure and would seriously imperil the Havana meeting. For another, it runs the risk of throwing our tariff negotiations into the Presidential campaign.

The third thing we can attempt to do is to get a balance between the United Kingdom and United States by withdrawing some of our offers and reducing others. This has twice been suggested to us by Sir Stafford Cripps. This would immediately prove injurious to the export prospects of the United Kingdom. It is the one suggestion that has been made in these negotiations that would hurt the United Kingdom. The other thing that bothers us is that if we start withdrawing proffered concessions, other people to whom those concessions have been offered directly or who had expected to profit from them indirectly will also start withdrawing concessions. And if we once start unwinding this thing, I can't see where it would stop. It seems to me that it would run down in a declining spiral, and destroy the prospect of agreement anywhere. It would certainly imperil the Havana meeting. It would make the price of admission into the ITO a very cheap price. My own view is that it is better for us to make the full cut or almost the full cut that we have projected or not cut at all.

We have decided that we are not yet ready to acknowledge failure. We shall make at least one more effort, with a new approach. Mr. Clayton will seek to talk to Sir Stafford Cripps again, I believe, on Wednesday, and he will make a proposal which relates only to those preferences which the United Kingdom enjoys throughout the Commonwealth and the Empire. This proposal will be that we accept the offers of reductions and eliminations made prior to September 9 and that we take from our past requests a wider list than the list that we last gave you on eliminations and agree that after three years these preferences will be eliminated over a period of ten years. This elimination, therefore, would not be complete until the 14th year. We will suggest that this list be made up by working through our requests in triangular or multilateral meetings. We suggest that these preferences be eliminated, after the 3-year postponement, within a decade, in one of three ways: first, preferably, by reducing the most-favored-nation rate. But if the country according the preference is unfortunately unwilling to do this, we suggest that action be taken, second, by raising the preferential rate, or third, by bringing the two together, raising the one and reducing the other.

I cannot agree that the latter course would be inconsistent with the spirit of these negotiations. In all of the basic documents which are relevant to these negotiations, the elimination of preferences has the same status as the substantial reduction of tariffs. The phrase "elimination of preferences" is not in a dependent clause, but is joined to the phrase "substantial reduction of tariffs" by the conjunction "and".

This approach of gradual action was first suggested to us by Sir Stafford Cripps and was then rejected by him for reasons that we do not know. Its advantages are, I think first, that it would cost the United Kingdom nothing whatsoever for the first three years of the agreement and very little for the first 5 years or 6 years. It would completely dispose of the argument that the financial difficulties of the United Kingdom prevent it from taking action at the present time. It would also dispose of the argument that American concessions are made for three years and the United Kingdom concessions forever. This argument was never valid. But under this plan, it would be crystal clear that if the United States denounced the agreement at the end of its third year, the United Kingdom would not have to eliminate these preferences at all. If we cannot approach the elimination of preferences even on this basis, it is seriously to be questioned whether it is intended that we should ever approach it.

If we are thus faced with failure in this matter, the alternatives open to us appear to be two. First, we could acquiesce in a thin agreement that makes no real progress towards the elimination of preferences. Second, we could terminate negotiations with the United Kingdom,

announce this fact to the Geneva Conference, and make a public statement outlining the reasons for our action. We would then push our other negotiations to agreement. We are not clear whether these agreements would take the projected multilateral form or be bilateral. In the first case, the contemplated multilateral agreement would contain no concessions on the part of the United Kingdom or United States to each other. But the schedule of each country would appear in the agreement and the general terms of the agreement would stand. The other possibility is the complete abandonment of the idea of getting a multilateral agreement and the conclusion of bilateral agreements in the familiar form. We have not concluded negotiations or have the conclusion of negotiations in sight which will give us satisfactory bilateral agreements with almost every other member of the Preparatory Committee.

I should now like to explore with you the implications and probable consequences of each of these courses of action. First, suppose we accept a thin agreement. We should have to confess to the American people that our negotiations with the UK were a failure. We could not attempt to hide the truth. The consequences of this would be, I believe, that it would jeopardize the Havana meeting, imperil the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, and probably prevent the ratification of the Charter. It would make it difficult if not impossible to get the money to finance the Marshall Plan. If we say, in connection with the Marshall Plan, that the aid we seek is only temporary, designed to get Europe on its feet and hold out hope for the future based on a promise of internal rehabilitation, economic unification and the restoration of economic health, our critics are bound to claim that promises made in the past have been ignored and that there can be no assurance that promises made in the future would be observed.

The second course would be to suspend negotiations. For this we have a precedent. When Australia and South Africa were dissatisfied with our offers, they suspended negotiations. Suppose we were to follow the example that they have set for us. What would the consequences be? First, I think it might make it impossible to conclude a multilateral agreement. Second, it might kill the Havana meeting. This is certainly a risk that we should have to take. Third, it might very well kill the ITO and the Charter. And fourth, it might put an end to the prospects of the Marshall Plan. But these risks are risks that we run if we take either course.

There is one thing, however, that we could retain. If we return home with a number of good trade agreements elsewhere in the world and if we break off where we can not get satisfactory agreements; that action, I believe, would insure the retention of the tariff making power in the hands of the Executive through the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act. And this is a matter by which we set great store.

Aside from this we would face failure in taking either course. Our choice would necessarily lie between breaking off negotiations at Geneva and courting repudiation at home. We should follow the former of these courses with the greatest reluctance and deepest regret. We see no advantage to be gained in following the latter. The American people will know in any case that our hopes for the future have been condemned to failure and they will know why.

The one remaining obstacle to the success of the Geneva meeting is the British position on preferences. This is true not only for the US but for other countries as well. The issue upon which all our hopes for eventual return to multilateralism and non-discrimination may stand or fall is the issue of preferences. This is why we have decided to make another appeal to the government of the United Kingdom. This is why we are prepared to do everything in our power to make it easier for you to carry out your part of the program to which we both have pledged ourselves repeatedly during and since the war. But the final decision on the success or failure of this program rests with you.

560.AL/9-2347 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 23, 1947—5 p. m.

5126. From Douglas and Clayton for Lovett and Nitze. Accompanied by Hawkins, Brown and Beal, we conferred on Friday for an hour and a half with Sir Stafford Cripps, Harold Wilson and several of their advisers regarding negotiations at Geneva between the US on one side and the UK and Dominions on the other.¹

We said that the question of reciprocal tariff reductions apparently presented no serious problem but that we were encountering serious difficulty in reaching agreement on the elimination of preferences which the UK enjoys in the Dominions. We pointed out that the latest offer of the UK covered elimination of preferences on a total volume of prewar trade with the Dominions of only 32 million dollars—one-third of which is anthracite coal to Canada, and that the UK trade in the same commodities totals only 12 million dollars, and that we considered this offer totally inadequate to meet the commitment which the UK took in connection with the Anglo-US financial agreement to negotiate for the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of preferences.

Sir Stafford had already been furnished with a copy of Wilcox's statement² at a meeting in Geneva about 10 days ago with the nego-

¹ A memorandum of conversation covering this meeting, not printed, is found in file 611.4131.

² *Ante*, p. 983.

tiating teams of the UK and the Dominions and was thus familiar with our arguments on the subject.

We then presented Sir Stafford with a memorandum³ proposing that the UK grant elimination of preferences on one-third of the US prewar trade with the Dominions, such elimination to start three years from the signing of an agreement and to take place at the rate of 10% annual reduction in the margin of preference so that at the end of 13 years from the signing of the agreement the preferences of such trade would be completely eliminated.

Sir Stafford stated that he had carefully read Wilcox's arguments but that he had also carefully studied the entire matter and that he had reached the conclusion that the offers of reciprocal tariff reductions had struck a balance as such and that any reduction or elimination of preferences by the UK would have to be compensated for by further tariff reductions by the US. However, they had agreed to make certain reductions and eliminations which he considered a generous offer on their side.

In this connection, Sir Stafford made quite a point of the fact that prewar UK exports to the US totalled only about 150 million dollars whereas prewar US exports to the UK totalled nearly 400 million dollars. Hence, equal tariff reductions were much more valuable to the US than the UK.

We strongly protested against this concept, referring specifically to the language of the agreement between the US and the UK regarding the proposals for expansion of world trade and employment and to the statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament⁴ at about the time of the publication of that agreement. Both documents in our opinion make it clear that reduction of trade barriers in general, such as are being brought about at Geneva, was to be considered as being adequate compensation for elimination of preferences. We pointed out that the benefits which will flow to the UK from such general reduction must be regarded globally and multilaterally and are thus far greater than any benefits accruing merely from reductions in tariffs on prewar trade between the UK and US; that we in US recognize that the existing unbalance in our international trade cannot continue and that its correction in our interest involves a heavy increase in US imports which will obviously greatly increase the global supply of dollars and that the UK will have the same opportunity to compete for these dollars as other countries.

We particularly denied the validity of the concept that elimination of preferences had to be specifically compensated for by reductions in our tariffs in addition to reciprocal tariff reductions; that a literal

³ Not printed.

⁴ December 6, 1945.

interpretation of the concept held by Sir Stafford would necessitate the adoption by the US of free trade on the commodities which the UK exports to us before we would obtain limitation of Empire preferences as contemplated in the Anglo-US financial agreement.

Cripps said that he would present our proposal to the Cabinet with a recommendation that it be not accepted.

We said to Cripps that failure to reach agreement or even the signing of an agreement on the basis of the UK proposal would be interpreted in the US as virtually a repudiation of the UK commitment regarding preferences.

Following the meeting, Douglas and Clayton felt that the whole matter was so serious and fraught with such grave [danger?] that we should have a talk with Bevin. Douglas so advised Cripps and an arrangement was made for Cripps, Douglas and Clayton to meet with Bevin on Sunday morning.

This meeting was held and the matter was discussed for an hour and twenty minutes. The arguments on both sides were presented to Bevin. Cripps said that he considered their offer more generous than the considerations accruing to them would warrant, but that he thought an agreement should now be made on that basis and a further look could be taken at the end of three years to see if further preference eliminations could be made. We asked if he would expect at that time further reductions in our tariff as compensation for such additional eliminations and he answered "certainly."

We made it clear that in our opinion this position was tantamount to repudiation of the UK commitment on the elimination of preferences in connection with the Anglo-US financial agreement.

Clayton said that there were three conditions in connection with that agreement which won support of the agreement for [from?] the American business interests and thus was largely responsible for the adoption of the agreement by Congress. These conditions were convertibility of sterling, non-discrimination in UK purchases abroad and elimination of Empire preferences. Clayton said that the British had suspended compliance with the first two of these conditions for reasons apparently beyond their control and that under the circumstances he personally felt that he could defend this action before any tribunal but if the third one relating to the elimination of preferences should now be repudiated in view of the proposal which we had made, he would not be able to defend the British action in that matter. He added that he would be compelled to say to the Secretary of State that in his judgment the British proposal did not constitute a proper basis for agreement and that he would further be compelled to carefully and seriously consider whether he should not recommend to the Secretary of State that no agreement be entered into on that basis. He added

in that case whether an agreement was entered into on the basis of the British proposal or not, the whole matter would certainly come out in Congressional hearings on the Marshall Plan and would undoubtedly seriously prejudice public opinion and Congressional action with reference to British participation in that plan.

Douglas sketched the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill and the influence of that act on the creation of the Empire preference scheme in Ottawa in 1932. He pointed out that trade agreements heretofore entered into and now in course of execution at Geneva had not only wiped out the tariff increases brought about by Smoot-Hawley, but would give us the lowest tariff in 50 years so that the conditions which gave rise to the preference system no longer existed. He also pointed out that the matter under discussion had serious political as well as economic aspects which was the reason we had troubled Mr. Bevin with it.

Bevin said that there were a great many people in the UK who thought that the best course for the UK to pursue in the present world situation was a policy of autarchy but that he had always believed that it was in their interest to return to multilateral trade as quickly as possible and, in any case, they wanted to keep whatever commitment they had with us if it were at all possible to do so.

A decision was promised for Thursday. [Douglas and Clayton.]

DOUGLAS

Lot 65A987, Box 101

*Memorandum by the Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs at London (Hawkins), and by Mr. Winthrop G. Brown*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 24, 1947.

If, as we anticipate, the British refuse any further substantial action on preferences we have two alternatives:

- (1) To break off negotiations.
- (2) To take the best agreement we can get.

If we make an agreement with the U.K.—

- 1) We will have the first multilateral tariff reduction in history, covering 75% of world trade.
- 2) We will get indirect concessions greater than we could ever get by a series of bilateral agreements.
- 3) We would get substantial tariff concessions from the U.K. and statistically the U.K.-U.S. pattern, taken alone, would look very satisfactory, aside from the issue of preferences.

¹ Mr. Brown, third-ranking member of the U.S. Delegation at Geneva, was temporarily in London. The memorandum was addressed to Under Secretary Clayton and Ambassador Douglas.

4) In the overall picture of success, the comparative failure on preference negotiations will not loom too large.

5) The Geneva Conference will end in an atmosphere of success and good will, with the U.S. recognized as having been constructive, generous and understanding.

6) The ITO project will get off to a good start, giving an objective towards which the Marshall Plan can work.

7) Under our present offers we still have substantial bargaining power left for the future.

If we break off with the U.K.—

1) Even though we are right, we appear to the world as Uncle Shylock.

2) We would be portrayed to British public opinion as exacting our pound of flesh. The British would be advertised to our public opinion as breakers of their contracts. British and U.S. opinion would be inflamed against each other.

3) A breach with the U.K. means a breach with all the Dominions.

4) The first effort at multilateral tariff reduction will fail. This type of effort will be set back for years.

5) Havana and the ITO will be jeopardized.

6) We will lose substantial tariff benefits and Commonwealth discrimination against us will be intensified.

7) An open breach with the U.K. will hurt the Marshall plan more than their failure, under present circumstances, to give substantial elimination of preferences.

8) We will provide the Russians with just the propaganda material they need.

9) We will end a joint effort with our best friends in bitterness and disillusionment.

We therefore recommend that we do not break off, but seek the best agreement, in substance and in form, that we can get.

Our objective in this case would be:

a) To retain the satisfactory offers on tariff rates made by the U.K.

b) To get the most we can on preference eliminations throughout the Commonwealth compensating for lack of coverage by importance of items.

To achieve these objectives we should tell the Commonwealth representatives that:

a) If we cannot get the broad action on preference eliminations requested of the U.K. we must have:

1) Elimination at least of certain key preferences beyond present offers, viz., dried and canned fruits in the U.K. and Canada, and automobiles in India.

2) A few further reductions in preference margin in cases where we are still dissatisfied with offers in the most-favored-nation rate, for example, automobiles in Australia and tin-plate in Canada.

b) Australia will immediately insist that she cannot waive her preference on fruits without an improvement in our offers on beef and

butter. We should say that if she will waive these preferences we will recommend the full 50% concessions on beef and an improvement in our offer on butter, for example, double the quota and make it apply to the Australian season only.

Agriculture might possibly agree with the improved offer on beef but would certainly dissent on butter. This would mean that the matter would have to be decided by the President.

c) In cases where the Dominions have agreed to elimination or reduction of the margin of preference they enjoy in the U.K., we would request the U.K. to reduce their rates accordingly.

d) If we are to maintain our offers to the Colonies, we would need some action on preferences in the Colonies. We are prepared to consider any formula which they wish to suggest.

e) To avoid an appearance of unbalance in depth of concessions, we propose to reduce the extent of our offer on whisky and perhaps a few other offers of 50% concessions (whisky alone would reduce the trade coverage of our 50% offers from 29% to 7%).

f) If our agreements with the Commonwealth countries are otherwise satisfactory we would probably accept agreement on this basis. If we do reach agreement with the Commonwealth, Geneva will be considered a success. If not, it will probably be considered a failure.

Success at Geneva is within our grasp. The General Provisions of the Trade Agreement have been unanimously agreed. A procedure for putting it into effect has been developed. On tariff rates, we are certain of good concessions from Benelux, Cuba and Norway and satisfactory concessions from China, Brazil, Chile and Lebanon. We are reasonably sure of good concessions from India and satisfactory concessions from France and Czechoslovakia. Over 70 other bilateral negotiations of varying importance have been concluded and are ready to be fitted into the unilateral frame. We will benefit extensively from these other negotiations. An agreement with the Commonwealth countries on the basis above suggested would therefore in our opinion make the over-all multilateral agreement generally satisfactory. Such an agreement would be a landmark in economic history and to have negotiated it under present conditions would be a very considerable achievement.

611.4131/9-2747 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Hawkins) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 27, 1947—3 p. m.

5218. For Clayton, Douglas and Wilcox.

(Part 1) Following is text of letter dated Sept. 25 handed to Clayton by Cripps:¹

¹ The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, also gave copies of this reply to Under Secretary Lovett in Washington on September 26, and to Secretary Marshall who was in New York on September 27.

“Dear Mr. Clayton: I have reported fully to the Cabinet what you told me and the Foreign Secretary with regard to our offers in respect of preferences which the United Kingdom enjoys in Dominion markets.

We have discussed in the light of the Prime Minister's statement of December 1945, your contention that we were under an obligation to relinquish preferences in exchange, not for specific concessions in the United States tariff, but for the general benefits which would accrue, especially to the United Kingdom, from a multilateral trade agreement in which the United States and many other countries participated.

We recognize fully that we are committed to action by way of the elimination or reduction of preferences, as well as by the reduction of tariffs, in return for tariff concessions to us, and that the account cannot be balanced solely on a bilateral basis since both sides must take stock of the advantages that may be expected from a multilateral agreement.

We consider, however, that we have already offered concessions on the United Kingdom tariff, and by way of eliminations and reductions of preferences that we enjoy, which cover twice as much trade as the concessions offered by you to us. I enclose a note (see following headed ‘*aide-mémoire*’) of statistical analyses which shows clearly how far we have gone beyond the sort of arithmetical balance which would have been appropriate to a purely bilateral agreement. In our view what we offer is fully adequate compensation for both the bilateral and the multilateral advantages which we can expect to obtain. Insofar, moreover, as the concessions offered in the United States tariff are more generous on manufactured goods than on primary products, I must remind you that the latter are the key to any great increase in United States imports from the Commonwealth countries, which in turn are our principal export markets.

An agreement in the terms we have offered would make it sufficiently difficult for us to satisfy Parliament and public opinion that we have not bargained away more than we stand to gain. We hope that you will be able to present to your Congress and public an account of the positive action you will have secured in respect of preferences which will give them cause for satisfaction with the results of your negotiations. In the Cabinet's view the offers we have made to you amply carry out what is required of us under the terms of the Prime Minister's statement of 6th December, 1945, which you saw before it was made.

If we were to go still further in the sense requested in your *aide-mémoire* of 19 September² we should be promising now to take action in 3 years' time in circumstances which cannot be foreseen and without adequate concessions in return. In the present uncertain state of the world and in the light of experience it would be wrong for us to accept an obligation, to come into force at a date in the future, which we might find when the time came we could only carry out at a cost we could not bear. What we can undertake, and indeed have already shown ourselves ready to undertake in the draft charter (Article 17), is to negotiate again for further reductions of preferences

² Not printed, but its substance is covered in telegram 5126 from London, September 23, p. 993.

against concessions in return on a mutually advantageous basis at any time. And in the meantime there would be no increase of any preferences—an obligation which we accepted in the proposals and are ready to reaffirm in the charter without any corresponding concession in return. As far as we are concerned we can say, here and now, that we should be ready for further discussions on tariffs and preferences after as short an interval as 3 years and in the light of all the circumstances at the time.

Both our delegations in Geneva have collaborated successfully in carrying forward the proposals which we jointly agreed in 1945, and we are now at least [*last*] in sight of the charter for which we have all worked so patiently and so long. We feel for our part that it would be a great misfortune if this point of difference that has come up between us were to place in jeopardy all our efforts over the much wider field, and I venture to express the hope, which is shared by all my colleagues in the Cabinet, that you and your colleagues in Washington will agree, in the light of all the circumstances, that the offers we [have] made to you provide a sufficient basis for a mutually advantageous agreement. Yours very sincerely," (Signed by Sir Stafford Cripps.)

"AIDE-MÉMOIRE"

“1. In negotiating with the USA the United Kingdom can look for increased trade only as a result of concessions on the US tariff. The total value in 1939 of United Kingdom export trade to USA (and a small part is already exempt from duty) was only pounds 35.5 million (or \$152 million).

2. On the other side of the picture, the USA can look for increased export trade both

(I) As a result of United Kingdom tariff concessions, and

(II) As a result of eliminations or reductions of preferences in other Commonwealth markets where USA and United Kingdom exports compete. Under (I) the total value in 1939 of US export trade to the United Kingdom which was subject to duty was pounds 87 million (\$392 million) and under (II) the total value of United Kingdom exports to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in respect of products where United Kingdom exports enjoyed preferential treatment was pounds 84 million (\$378 million).

3. Thus the total field of established US trade where the USA might seek concessions in respect of tariffs or preferences is pounds 171 million (\$770 million), while the corresponding field of established United Kingdom trade where the United Kingdom might seek concessions in respect of tariffs is less than pounds 33.5 million (\$152 million) or, say, one fifth of the size of the field open to US attack.

4. It follows that any agreement between the two countries which showed equality of sacrifice in terms of percentages would give advantages in respect of five times as much established trade to the USA as to the United Kingdom; conversely, an agreement which balanced in terms of absolute amounts of established trade would necessarily cover five times as big a percentage of the field in which the United Kingdom could seek benefit as of the field open in which the USA could seek benefit.

5. For these reasons we could not contemplate working to a balance in terms of percentages, though we have never intended, as the annexed figures show, to stipulate a strict equality in absolute terms.

6. In annex A, we analyze the balance in absolute terms of coverage of US export trade. In annex B, as an alternative approach, we analyze the balance in absolute terms of coverage of US exports to the United Kingdom and exposure to risk of United Kingdom exports to other Commonwealth countries. It will be seen that on either analysis the United Kingdom stands to lose over a considerably wider field of established trade than she stands to gain.

A. (All figures are of imports from the USA into the United Kingdom in 1938 c.i.f. and converted dollars at \$4.50 equals one pound.)

(EMBASSY NOTE: only million sterling figures quoted below. Dollar figures should be extended at arbitrary c.i.f. conversion factor of \$4.50 equals one pound.)

(I) *UK tariff offers.*

UK tariff offers representing new action beyond the 1938 trade agreement: bindings 5.5; reductions 5.9; total 11.4.

(II) *Preference concessions.*

Other Commonwealth countries have, with our consent, made offers to eliminate or reduce preferences to the detriment of our trade with them. These offers, in terms of USA trade with the other Commonwealth countries concerned, amount to: elimination 7.2; reductions 17.0; total 24.2.

(III) *Total UK concessions.*

To get the total of what is offered at the expense of UK industry we combine the totals in (I) and (II) above: 35.6.

(IV) *US tariff offers.*

USA offers representing new action beyond the 1938 trade agreement. Here we use figures received from the US delegation. These relate to 1939 trade returns as against ours above for 1938; bindings 1.3; reduction 16.8; total 18.1.

(V) *Balance.*

It will be seen that the total offer at UK expense is about double that of the USA.

[B.]

(I) The USA have offered new concessions (over and above the 1938 trade agreement) on UK trade valued in 1939 as follows: bindings 1.3; reductions 16.8; and the total of 18.1 represents the field where UK exports may be increased.

(II) The UK has consented to the following concessions on preferences at the hazard of UK exports to other Commonwealth markets, in terms of UK exports to the Dominions in 1938: eliminations 2.7; and reductions 15.8; total 18.5.

(III) It follows therefore that as a result of the present state of the Geneva negotiations the UK's exports stand to lose on as much trade in the Commonwealth markets as they stand to gain on in the USA markets.

(IV) However, consideration must also be given to the 'quality' of the concessions involved as well as to their range. In this connection it may be pointed out that the new bindings in the USA offers serve only to guarantee existing trade but not to afford an opportunity for increase and are akin to the binding of preference margins which the UK is offering over the whole preference field, under the terms of the charter. In fact the substantial USA reductions, namely those of reductions by from 36 percent to 50 percent account for only pounds 12.0 million (extend to column) (or \$53.9 million) in terms of UK exports to the USA. (This figure includes pounds 7.5 million (or \$33.8 million) in respect of a single item—whisky.)

(V) Compared with this the quality of the preference concessions to the hazard of UK export trade to which the UK has consented is as follows: elimination (i.e., reductions by 100 percent) 2.7; reductions by over 35 percent 7.2; total 9.9.

(VI) To offset the net balance between (IV) and (V) there are the UK offers on the UK tariff to the USA, over and above the 1938 trade agreement. These offers in terms of imports from the USA in 1938 are: bindings 5.5; reductions 5.9; total 11.4

It should be noted also that pounds 1.8 million (or \$8.1 million) represents bindings of low duties (not over 10 percent), which the procedural memorandum and the draft charter say are the equivalent of the reduction of high duties.

NOTE: Figures in paragraphs (I) and (IV) are taken from USA sources."

(Part 2) Above letter which Douglas returned to Bevin with request for revision at least to extent of giving flexibility to further negotiations has been handed back to us by Hall-Patch³ and Helmore without change but with oral explanation which they reduced to writing as follows:

"It was explained that the purport of Sir Stafford Cripps letter to Mr. Clayton, dated the 25th September, was in the first place to set out the view of the Cabinet that the offers already made were at least in balance with the concessions received by the UK. In the light of this the Cabinet's answer to Mr. Clayton's *aide-mémoire* of the 19 September must be in the negative. Finally, the letter said that in the Cabinet's view the offers already made by the UK provided a sufficient basis for mutually advantageous agreement. The implication of the word 'basis' was that the offers already made were not immutable but were subject to adjustment and discussion within the Cabinet's concept of a proper balance between the offers on both sides. It was therefore entirely open for the negotiators in Geneva to go through the lists and make suggestions but it could not be expected that the UK side would be able to depart from the overall balance as presented to the Cabinet.

It is, moreover, always open to the US delegation to put forward new suggestions. Any such proposal the UK were ready to consider on its merits, though the US side would naturally be able to appreciate what sort of proposal would be worth putting forward in the light of the views already taken by the UK side on the present state of the negotiations."

³ Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

(Part 3) I made it clear to Hall-Patch and Helmore that while greater fluidity in negotiations is desirable this would meet Clayton's viewpoint only if the preference issue is dealt with effectively; that he would regard only this as fulfilling British obligations.

Above text airmailed Geneva for Brown.

HAWKINS

560.AL/9-2747

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, September 27, 1947.

Lord Inverchapel called at his request. He said that instructions from his Government required that he point out to me that there had been a recent exchange of memoranda between Mr. Clayton and the British Government as to the Geneva trade negotiations. Lord Inverchapel left copies of the two memoranda with me. (He also said he had furnished Lovett with copies.) Clayton had informed the British that he would recommend to me that negotiations be discontinued if the British could not accept our position. Inverchapel said that Bevin was not closing the door in his memorandum, and that he, Bevin, hoped that before I made any decision as to closing out negotiations, I would allow Inverchapel to present the views of Bevin and his colleagues.

I stated very confidentially that I was going to Washington on Monday and that I would read over these papers on the way down and discuss them with Lovett. I told Inverchapel to assure Mr. Bevin that before I made final decision, Inverchapel would have an opportunity to discuss the matter with me again.

560.AL/9-2347: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1947—2 p. m.

4187. Following is gist of a statement (reurtel 5126, Sept. 23, 5 p. m.) which Brit Amb informs he is making to SEC today. He is also furnishing him copy of Clayton's *aide-mémoire*¹ and Brit reply:

"I have been kept fully informed of the crisis which has arisen over the Geneva Tariff negotiations. I know from the telegrams which I have received that the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues are disturbed at the possibility of a breakdown, both because it may spell the end of Anglo-American cooperation in the I.T.O. project just at the moment when it is coming to fruition and because of the wider political repercussions on Anglo-American relations and on their respective foreign policies.

¹ Not printed.

Nevertheless, for reasons which have been communicated fully to Mr. Clayton, we cannot accept the latest American demands for the gradual elimination of preferences any more than we can countenance Mr. Clayton's quite unjustifiable accusation that we are dishonouring our obligations. Our offers communicated to the United States negotiators in Geneva on 9th September² in response to their demands of 27th August² are in our view extremely forthcoming and amply fulfil our obligations. In any case no useful purpose would be served by offering to sacrifice our economic interests in this matter in order to meet the Americans, since political opinions here would unite to reject such an arrangement when it was presented to the House of Commons.

Mr. Bevin hopes that Mr. Marshall, after studying our offers and in the light of the wider considerations mentioned above, will see his way to avoid a breakdown. If however, there is a danger that the United States Administration may nevertheless decide to break off negotiations, Mr. Bevin would be grateful if Mr. Marshall would give me the opportunity before any final decision is taken to present his own and his colleagues' views on the situation which has arisen and the wider repercussions which might ensue."

LOVETT

² Not printed.

560.AL/9-2947 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, September 29, 1947—8 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

1059. For Wilcox and Willoughby from Brown. UK answer our proposal preferences was flat refusal on ground British offers already generous in light US offers. At Douglas' urgent request to Bevin British have, however, agreed they would consider any proposals made by US provided general balance present offers not disturbed. This leaves negotiators Geneva free at least to consider slight improvements preference offers.

Conferred Wilgress, Coombs separately Friday evening suggesting on my personal responsibility would be tragic have breakdown multi-lateral agreement and might be possible reach settlement if we could secure elimination key agricultural preferences in UK and Canada. If Australia would agree might be possible secure improvement our offers beef and butter. Wilgress indicated Canada willing make contribution but Coombs said elimination canned and dried fruit preferences fantastically difficult for Australia because these industries built up under preference peopled by last war veterans and elimination these preferences would leave Australia without bargaining power for future negotiations for reduction our remaining high agricultural tariffs. Nevertheless promised consider proposal.

Have now received revised Australian offers prepared prior my meeting Coombs described by Australians as final which are unsatisfactory basis agreement even without any improvement beef or butter. I am telling Coombs informally that I do not believe I can even present them TAC.

Saw Wilgress again today. He advises Ottawa greatly concerned possibility breakdown negotiations UK and failure multilateral approach and that King¹ telegraphed Attlee² urging every effort avoid this outcome. Canadian Ambassador Washington instructed make similar approach US Government and Foreign Office Ottawa will confer Atherton.³ Wilgress reports Coombs also most anxious avoid breakdown.

Coombs and Wilgress have been endeavoring bring Helmore Geneva at once in effort find solution. Helmore replied could not leave London before Tuesday evening since he is in consultation heads UK Government departments this subject. Wilgress interprets this as faint ray hope.

Wilgress reaffirmed Canadian Government attitude described by Robertson⁴ as reported my letter Wilcox September 24.⁵ Told me in strictest confidence strong group Ottawa wishes impose discriminatory import controls because of balance payments problem. Group advocating cure this situation by nondiscriminatory methods relies heavily ITO charter and proposed provisioning general agreement. Should general agreement not be signed and ITO fail hand of those advocating discriminatory path for Canada would be greatly strengthened. Our friends there much concerned this possibility.

Pillai⁶ advises India prepared give response our offers but awaiting UK clearance their offer elimination preference automobiles. I gave him broad outline US-UK situation. He expressed strong hope there would be no breakdown and strong advocacy multilateral approach but stated he would recommend separate agreement with US if break should come. He promised ask his government apply pressure UK obtain their waiver automobile preference India.

Probable no further substantial developments here before Wednesday. Please show this Clayton and Douglas and ask Clayton defer recommendation Secretary and President until I can report further.

Sent Department 1059; repeated London 122 personal for Hawkins. [Brown.]

TROUTMAN

¹ W. L. Mackenzie King, Canadian Prime Minister.

² Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

³ Ray Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to Canada.

⁴ Norman Robertson, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom.

⁵ Not found in Department files.

⁶ Sir Raghaven Pillai, Indian Delegate to the Conference at Geneva.

560.AL/10-247 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Geneva

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1947—6 p. m.

1270. Toito 243. For Brown from Wilcox. Suggest following possible approaches Commonwealth negotiations:

1. Abandon suggestions gradual elimination preferences.
2. Reclaim new eliminations offered September 9.
3. Obtain as many additional eliminations as can be made without cost to UK.
4. Relinquish cuts in UK tariff in return for further eliminations preferences UK enjoys.
5. Confine reductions our concessions to items such as whisky that do not risk unwinding other agreements.
6. Expand list of eliminations by getting maximum possible number on preferences enjoyed by Dominions.

Will take no final action here any front until we hear results further negotiations Geneva. [Wilcox.]

LOVETT

560.AL/10-247 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, October 2, 1947—9 p. m.

1070. Personal for Wilcox from Brown. Made further progress Helmore today obtaining tentative agreement elimination preference several important items and tentative offer blanket 20 percent reduction all UK preferences in colonies reserving right in UK to restore these preferences if US imports natural rubber fall below specified figure as result mixing regulation. Will report further tomorrow.

Send Dept 1070; repeated London personal for Hawkins 126. [Brown.]

TROUTMAN

560.AL/10-447 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, October 4, 1947— 11 a. m.

US URGENT

1078. Frito 233. For Wilcox from Brown. Have reached tentative agreement Helmore recommendations to be considered by Cripps and TAC over weekend. Will report in detail.¹ These recommendations

¹ This detailed information was sent in telegram 1077 from Geneva, October 4, not printed.

incorporate all suggestions Toito 243 except (4). Canadian negotiating teams at work and hope have recommendations TAC by middle next week. Will see Coombs today on important issues still unresolved with Australia.

Sent Dept; repeated London as 128 for Hawkins. [Brown.]

TROUTMAN

560.AL/10-647: Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, October 6, 1947— 11 a. m.

US URGENT

1084. Personal for Wilcox from Brown. Have reached satisfactory agreement Coombs. TAC acts today: ¹ Australian Cabinet acts tomorrow. TAC yesterday tentatively agreed recommend agreement UK general basis outlined mytel 1077, October 4.² Final decision today. Am well satisfied.

Having serious difficulty Canada apple preference. Seeing Wilgress again today. [Brown.]

TROUTMAN

¹ In telegram 1088 from Geneva, October 6, not printed. Brown reported that the Trade Agreements Committee "unanimously approved agreement I reached with Coombs." (560.AL/10-647)

² Not printed.

560.AL/10-847

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (Wilcox) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1947.

Subject: Report on Geneva Conference

I. Character of negotiations.

1. Length of negotiations.

- a. Charter has been under continuous international negotiation by Preparatory Committee for nearly a year.
- b. Previous bilateral trade agreement negotiations with U.K., Canada, France required 10 to 11 months. Geneva multi-lateral negotiations with 17 countries have been under way only 6 months.

2. Complexity of negotiations.

- a. Substantive agreements on
 - i. Commercial policy.
 - ii. Cartel policy.

- iii. Commodity policy.
 - iv. Employment policy.
 - v. Economic development policy.
 - b. Constitution setting forth structure and operation of ITO.
 - c. 108 bilateral tariff negotiations conducted simultaneously; U.S. participating in 15 negotiations; deriving indirect advantage from concessions made in other 93 negotiations.
3. Significance.
- a. Wide agreement on long-run trade policy despite present economic difficulties.
 - b. Largest undertaking to reduce trade barriers in history.
4. Relation of Charter and general agreements on tariffs and trade.
- a. Charter not effective until completed at Havana and ratified by 20 countries. Will be presented to Congress in 1948. ITO cannot be established and operating before 1949.
 - b. General agreement on tariffs and trade becomes provisionally effective for those among 19 countries (including Syria and Luxembourg) who can make it so on January 1, 1948; becomes fully effective when formally accepted by all signatories. Acceptance in US by Presidential proclamation under provisions of Trade Agreement Act.
 - c. General agreement contains common provisions on most-favored-nation treatment, customs matters, quantitative restrictions and state trading parallel to those in commercial policy chapter of Charter. These are similar to provisions in previous trade agreements; are necessary to protect tariff concessions. General agreement contains nothing on cartels, commodities, employment, economic development or establishment of an ITO. But it will commit signatories on essential commercial policy provisions of Charter.
- II. Tariff negotiations
- 1. Involve most comprehensive action in history for reduction of trade barriers.
 - 2. Achieved in face of adverse economic conditions.
 - 3. Great majority of 108 bilateral negotiations now completed.
 - 4. All U.S. negotiations virtually completed except with British Commonwealth.
 - 5. All negotiations should be completed and Conference closed this month.
 - 6. General agreement will have appended list of tariff concessions each country will make to all other countries.
 - 7. Plan is for simultaneous publication all capitals, when legal formalities are completed, translations made, and lists checked and rechecked, presumably late in November.

III. Charter negotiations.

1. Achievements of U.S. Delegation at Geneva.

- a. Amendments to meet almost all detailed criticisms made in Senate hearings and by business and other groups in the U.S.
- b. Addition of article for protection of American motion picture sales in foreign markets.
- c. Additional provisions on protection of private foreign investment—an entering wedge for inclusion of this material in Charter and later development of international investment code under ITO.

2. Major issues at Geneva.

- a. Prior approval on industrialization exception to rule against import quotas.
- b. Finality of Monetary Fund determination as to balance of payments position of countries seeking to use import quotas to correct balance of payments.
- c. U.S. successful in both cases in safeguarding two major exceptions to rule against import quotas.

3. Issues undecided at Geneva which will arise in Havana.

- a. Voting power in ITO—choice between
 - i. One country—one vote.
 - ii. Light weighted voting.
 - iii. Heavy weighted voting.
 - iv. Combination of two voting systems on certain issues.
- b. Relations with non-members—choice between
 - i. Tight provision ultimately confining tariff concessions to ITO Members.
 - ii. Loose provisions involving no incentive to join ITO and no penalty for non-members.

IV. Relation of ITO program to Marshall Plan

1. Reasons for present magnitude and increase of bilateralism.
2. Importance to ITO program of solving immediate economic problem.
3. Importance to Marshall Plan of long-run objectives in ITO Charter.
4. Recognition of relationship in CEEC report.
5. Importance of relationship in U.S. foreign policy.

Lot 65A987, Box 101

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of International Trade Policy (Wilcox) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1947.

Win Brown just called from Geneva to tell me Mr. Bevin has instructed Lord Inverchapel to call upon the Secretary and inform him

that the United Kingdom is prepared to conclude a tariff agreement with us on the terms worked out during the last two weeks in Geneva with one exception.¹

The British negotiators had tentatively agreed to reduce the preferences that the U.K. enjoys in the Colonies by 25 percent. This reduction was to be contingent upon our holding synthetic rubber production in the United States to a figure below 250,000 tons or 25 percent of our consumption. Mr. Clayton today reluctantly agreed to this arrangement.

The British Cabinet has now refused to agree to the reduction in Colonial preferences. The U.K. desires, however, to retain the restraint on our production of synthetic rubber. They therefore propose to tie it to the reduction they had promised us in their tariff on canned fruits. Under present circumstances this would amount to the withdrawal of the canned fruit concession.

The synthetic rubber provision would be embarrassing to us in any case. In the context previously proposed (as a string on the reduction of Colonial preferences) it might have been accepted and defended. In the new context (as a string on the canned fruit concession in the U.K.) it is utterly indefensible.

The Ambassador should be told that we cannot accept this particular arrangement in the tariff agreement. The door to the completion of the agreement, on other terms, should not be closed. The British should be invited to conclude the negotiation in Geneva where all the facts are in hand.

Since this is the only issue still outstanding, the completion of the agreement should clearly be possible, even if we reject the British proposal on this point.

¹Lord Inverchapel met Secretary Marshall in New York on October 10, and handed him an *aide-mémoire* that covered the British objections to the plan of concessions that had been worked out in Geneva by Brown and Helmore. "Lord Inverchapel stated the British belief that continuation of negotiations was of first importance. I [Secretary Marshall] reminded him of my previous promise to make no decision until the British were afforded opportunity to make further proposals.

"There followed a brief discussion of the British area of disagreement as covered in the *aide-mémoire*, with neither Lord Inverchapel nor myself making any commitments or decisions, except to agree that the British 'Board of Trade' language was difficult to comprehend." (Secretary Marshall's memorandum of conversation and the British *aide-mémoire* are in the 560.AL/10-1047 file.)

560.AL/10-1147 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

GENEVA, October 11, 1947—noon.

US URGENT

1118. Personal for Clayton and Wilcox only from Brown. Helmore told me privately last night that decision refuse colonial concession

was personal decision Bevin based on fear political reaction in UK and colonies. He strongly hinted we should tell Inverchapel we are not convinced by British reasons for refusing colonial concession and should insist on getting it. Other alternatives Helmore hinted open to us were insist substantial other concession equivalent value colonial concession or refuse bind rubber if no colonial concession offered.

Wilgress saw Helmore last night and advises us insist obtain colonial concession on grounds reasons given by UK for refusal unconvincing. British and Canadians most anxious we should indicate in some way in this agreement willingness negotiate our mixing regulations. Wilgress feels our insistence colonial concession will forestall British efforts link some other concession our mixing regulations.

Reporting TAC reaction Frito series. My personal opinion is that in light overall picture latest British action is comparatively of minor economic significance but makes our political problem somewhat more difficult. Development reported mytel 1100, October 8,¹ infinitely more important. Wilgress says this now "75 percent sure." Difficulties reported your 1284, October 7,¹ indicate we might be as well off with no colonial offer and nothing linked our mixing regulations. I would settle this basis.

Now expect all negotiations be concluded October 15 with signature agreement just before end month. Prompt decision obviously of utmost importance. Will stand by for messages all weekend. [Brown.]

[File copy unsigned]

¹ Not printed.

560.AL/9-2647

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE ¹

SECRET

Reference is made to the communication from the British Embassy on the subject of the reduction or elimination of Empire preferences on the trade which the United Kingdom enjoys with members of the Commonwealth and with the Colonies, which was delivered by the British Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State on the 27th of September.² It deals with three questions.

First: The adverse effects which might follow the breakdown of negotiations between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

¹ The *aide-mémoire* was handed to Ambassador Inverchapel by Under Secretary Lovett on October 15.

² The text of the letter is incorporated in telegram 5218 from London, September 27, p. 998.

This Government would, of course, deplore such an eventuality for it might produce far-reaching and incalculably grave complications for both countries. This Government, therefore, hopes that the British Government will join in continued attempts to find a way out of the present situation. It is glad to note that negotiations are continuing at Geneva and it is gratified that apparently progress is being made toward more satisfactory arrangements.

Second: Whether there has been a substantial observance of the principles to which the two Governments heretofore have agreed.

A careful review of the history of the negotiations culminating in the financial agreement, an examination of the terms of the financial agreement itself and of the collateral documents, combined with a precise interpretation of the language of the Prime Minister's statement made before the House of Commons on December 6, 1946 [1945], confirm our view that the agreement between our two Governments contemplated that elimination or reduction of imperial preferences was to depend on general tariff reductions and not on those offered solely by the United States.

The Prime Minister, in the statement referred to, used the following language:

"The statement makes it clear that, in pursuit of the objectives of Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, we for our part are ready to agree that the existing system of preferences within the British Commonwealth and the Empire will be contracted, provided there is adequate compensation in the *form of improvement in trading conditions between Commonwealth and Empire countries and the rest of the world.*"

Again on the same occasion he said:

"The statement makes it clear there is no commitment on any country in advance of negotiations to reduce or eliminate any particular margin of preference. The position is that each country remains free to judge in the light of the offers made by all the others, the extent of the contribution it can make towards the realisation of the agreed objectives."

He also used the following language:

"It is recognised that reduction or elimination of preferences can only be considered in relation to and in return for reductions of tariffs and other barriers to World Trade *in general* which would make for mutually advantageous arrangements for the expansion of trade."

Finally, he said:

"The elimination of all preferences would be such a step as would require a most substantial and widespread reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers by *a large number of countries.*"

The Prime Minister thus lucidly and categorically construed, we believe correctly, the understanding between our two Governments to mean that elimination or reduction of Empire preferences was to be undertaken in consideration for reductions of tariffs in general by many countries and that the measure of the elimination or reduction of such preferences was not to be calculated and effected on the basis of reductions of the tariff structure of the United States alone. Although this interpretation has been accepted by the British Government, the statistical comparison of reductions or eliminations of Empire preferences in relation to the tariff reductions of the United States alone is a contradiction of the basic principle to which both Governments in 1945 agreed. We therefore believe that the implicit departure from this principle recently taken by the British Government is contrary to the understanding between our two Governments.

At Geneva important progress has been made toward general relaxations of interferences with World Trade. To this progress the United States and many other countries have made substantial contributions. One hundred and eight agreements either have been or are in progress of being completed. Thus the conditions to which the Prime Minister referred as consideration for the elimination or reduction of Empire preferences have been satisfied.

Third: The British Government asks that before any termination or breakdown of negotiations takes place Mr. Bevin and his colleagues be given an opportunity to express their views on the subject to Mr. Marshall.

This Government will be glad to accord Mr. Bevin this opportunity should it be necessary. At the moment, however, it appears possible that results of the negotiations presently proceeding in Geneva may permit us to avoid a breakdown. On this question we therefore withhold further comment until we have had an opportunity to assess the results of the Geneva discussions.

The American Ambassador at London, Mr. Douglas, will arrive in England in about 10 days. He has had an opportunity to go into this matter thoroughly, and will be glad to discuss it in London on his arrival.³

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1947.

³ Ambassador Douglas discussed the *aide-mémoire* with Foreign Secretary Bevin on November 1, and reported: "I told Mr. Bevin that in view of the outcome of the negotiations at Geneva, there was nothing further to be said at the moment about Empire preferences, and that the matter of principle had been set forth for guidance whenever preferences might come up again for negotiation." (FW 560.AL/11-347)

560.AL/10-1547

The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1947.

DEAR UNDER SECRETARY: Since I called on you this morning and you took the opportunity to hand to me an *Aide-Mémoire* in reply to the Memorandum about the Geneva trade negotiations which I had left with the Secretary of State in New York on September 27, I have received a message from Mr. Bevin to the following effect:

His Majesty's Government have reconsidered the position, and have decided to accept the United States proposal on the basis of making the proposed concession regarding Colonial Preferences in return for a United States concession regarding the rubber mixing regulations. This would be on the lines already proposed at Geneva, and negotiations should accordingly be resumed there with a view to settling outstanding details by an early date.

I am happy to make this communication to you. In doing so, I am instructed to ask you to take steps to ensure that this communication be kept secret until our delegations have made arrangements for announcing a settlement. His Majesty's Government are still at the stage of informing the Colonial Governments concerned, and any leakage within the next few days would compromise the position.¹

Yours sincerely,

INVERCHAPEL

¹ In response to Lord Inverchapel's letter, Under Secretary Lovett on October 21, wrote: "I wish to express my satisfaction that this matter has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion." (560.AL/10-1547).

Lot 65A987, Box 98

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Committee on Trade Agreements (Brown) to President Truman

SECRET

[GENEVA,] October 17, 1947.

Subject: Action at Geneva with Respect to British Preferential System

One of the major problems at Geneva has been to obtain from the United Kingdom substantial action for the reduction or elimination of preferences in fulfillment of their commitments on commercial policy made at the time of the Anglo-American financial agreement in December 1945. The details of the action taken at Geneva for elimination or reduction of such preferences on particular products is contained in the schedule of United Kingdom offers attached to my memorandum of today's date requesting your approval of the recom-

recommendations of the Committee on Trade Agreements as a result of the Geneva negotiations. Eliminations and reductions of preferences enjoyed by the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth and Empire have been secured on products accounting for an appreciable dollar volume of United States exports to the Commonwealth and Empire, although this dollar amount is small in relation to the total United States exports on which the United Kingdom enjoys preferences.

In addition, however, the United Kingdom and Canada will exchange notes at the time of the signature of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade whereby each agrees to bind the preferential rates which it gives the other on products included in the schedules to the General Agreement, and to release each other from the contractual obligation assumed at Ottawa to maintain existing margins of preference. The notes will state that their agreement was reached in the light of the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and will become effective when that Agreement becomes effective.

This will mean that in all future tariff negotiations between the United States and Canada or between the United States and the United Kingdom, either of those two countries can negotiate with us with respect to their most-favored-nation tariff rates free of any contractual obligation to the other to maintain preferential margins. It amounts to the abrogation of the most important part of the Ottawa Agreements, and can fairly be considered to be substantial action with respect to preferences.

WINTHROP G. BROWN

Lot 65A987, Box 98

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1947.

I take pleasure in submitting the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements with respect to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which has now been completed at Geneva by negotiators representing the United States and twenty-two other countries belonging to fifteen other customs areas.

The proposed agreement is the result of fifteen negotiations between the United States and other countries and more than ninety negotiations between other pairs of countries carried on simultaneously over the past six months. It covers countries that handled three-quarters of the world's trade before the war and represents the most extensive action ever undertaken for the reduction of barriers to trade.

This agreement has been concluded in the face of great difficulties. Our representatives are to be congratulated on what they have achieved.

I join in the request of the Committee on Trade Agreements that you approve its recommendations.¹

ROBERT A. LOVETT

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Chairman of the Committee on Trade Agreements
(Brown) to President Truman*

SECRET

[GENEVA,] October 17, 1947.

Subject: Request for Approval of Results of Geneva Trade-Agreement Negotiations

(a) *Tariff Concessions*

On April 5, 1947, you approved a schedule of offers of tariff concessions to be made to, and requests for concessions to be made of, the seventeen (now twenty-two) * countries with which we have been conducting trade-agreement negotiations at Geneva.

The negotiations have now been concluded. Schedules setting forth the concessions offered by other countries and certain changes in the concessions originally offered by the United States which are necessary to obtain these concessions are attached. The Committee on Trade Agreements recommends that both be approved.

A summary table showing the volume of United States trade covered by the modified concessions now recommended, and their general nature, as compared with the original United States offers, is attached as Annex A.

A summary table showing the trade coverage of offers by other countries is attached as Annex B.

The improvements recommended in the United States offers are for the most part of minor significance. Exceptions are the recommended new offers on wool, which you have already approved, and on beef, butter, rayon filament yarns, rayon staple fiber, seed potatoes, coarse grains, apples and lace. A brief memorandum with respect to each of these offers is attached as Annex C.²

The concessions of other countries which it is recommended that we accept cover less of our trade than our original requests, and in many cases cover different products. This was expected, as our strategy was to ask for more than we expected to obtain and to bargain in the area of our requests rather than in the area of our offers. The con-

¹ President Truman approved the recommendations of the Committee on Trade Agreements on October 28.

*Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Southern Rhodesia and Syria are now counted as separate countries. [Footnote in source text.]

² Not printed.

cessions in question, however, in the opinion of the Committee on Trade Agreements, represent substantial advantage for the United States and a satisfactory *quid pro quo* for the concessions which it is recommended that we make.

With only four exceptions, recommendations of the Committee on Trade Agreements for improvements in our offers are unanimous.

In five cases there was dissent from our acceptance of offers made by other countries. In one case, that of the United Kingdom, a member of the Committee abstained on the issue of whether the bilateral balance between the direct offers made to and received from the other country was satisfactory.

Annex C attached includes the reasons for dissents and abstentions, and a summary of the majority view in each case.

The Brazilian concessions present a special problem, as Brazil, during the course of negotiations, proposed an upward adjustment of almost all of its specific tariff rates to take account of a depreciation in the value of its currency. Since most of the concessions offered by Brazil are bindings of low specific rates, this would involve increases in the absolute amount of the majority of the rates appearing in our 1935 agreement with Brazil. The ad valorem incidence of the adjusted rates in question, however, is in all cases substantially below that prevailing when the 1935 agreement was signed. The Committee recommends that the Brazilian concessions be accepted:

(a) Because the adjustment upwards is 40 percent, whereas the currency depreciation involved was 47 percent and there has been serious price inflation in Brazil;

(b) Because the ad valorem incidence of the adjusted rates is still very low—65 percent of United States trade covered enters at rates of 10 percent ad valorem or less, and 80 percent at rates of 20 percent or less;

(c) Because the rates would almost certainly be increased more than 40 percent if Brazil made no agreements at Geneva; and

(d) Because the coverage of the concessions now offered by Brazil is substantially greater than that in the 1935 agreement, whereas the additional coverage offered by the United States is not substantial.

The representative of the Department of Agriculture, though feeling that the adjusted rates offered by Brazil were generally satisfactory, abstained from voting on the ground that the adjustment would involve an increase in the specific rates on some agricultural products.

(b) *General Provisions*

The tariff concessions to be granted by each of the countries negotiating at Geneva will be embodied in a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the text of which, together with the texts of related documents, is herewith submitted for your approval. The General Agreement is,

for the most part, an elaboration of familiar provisions of our trade agreements, adapted to the economic conditions of today and to the fact that it will be a multilateral agreement among twenty-three countries. Its provisions have been approved by the Committee on Trade Agreements and by the legal staff of the Department of State. A memorandum briefly describing the Agreement and related documents is attached as Annex D.

(c) *Procedure for Making the General Agreement Effective*

It is proposed that the United States make the General Agreement provisionally effective on January 1, 1948, provided that Australia, Canada, Belgium-Netherlands-Luxembourg Customs Union (known as Benelux), Brazil, France and the United Kingdom, who account for 85 percent of the trade of the parties to the Agreement and over 50 percent of world trade, also make it provisionally effective on that date. The rest of the Geneva countries will make the Agreement provisionally effective as soon as they can constitutionally do so. The Agreement would be made definitively effective after the Charter of the International Trade Organization has been approved by the Havana Conference and by the Congress. Details of the proposed procedure are set forth in Annex D.

It is proposed to publish the text of the General Agreement and tariff schedules on November 18, 1947.³

(d) *General Comment*

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade represents the most extensive action ever taken with respect to trade barriers. It embodies the results of 106 separate bilateral tariff negotiations and establishes trading rules for countries which accounted in 1938 for 70 percent of total world trade. It is the culmination of more than two years of intensive work by the United States Government. I cannot praise too highly the devoted and effective work of the men and women of the United States Government agencies who have made this Agreement possible.

The Agreement is the first major step to be taken by important nations to reverse the trend toward trade restriction and economic isolation which has persisted throughout the world since the first world war. It establishes liberal commercial policies for all of the leading trading nations. Announcement of this Agreement should create an auspicious atmosphere for the opening of the United Nations

³ The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was made public on November 18 by Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Agreement was printed in four volumes by the United Nations. When adopted by the United States it was printed as 61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6), or TIAS No. 1700, vol. I. An analysis of its provisions may be found in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 30, 1947, pp. 1042-1052.

Conference on Trade and Employment scheduled for Havana on November 21, and, within the long-term framework which it establishes, it should be possible for the reconstruction of Europe under the Marshall plan to proceed with more confidence that efforts to restore world economy will not again be defeated by commercial warfare between the great trading powers.

WINTHROP G. BROWN

Annex A

SCHEDULE II. RECOMMENDED OFFERS BY UNITED STATES

Value of trade covered by U.S. offers of tariff concessions to Geneva countries: Original offers as compared with present offers

	U.S. imports, 1939, from all countries:	
	Offers approved April 5, 1947	Recommended offers Oct. 25, 1947
	<i>Millions of dollars</i>	
Imports into U.S., total all products	2, 208	2, 208
A. Products upon which it is proposed to offer concessions	1, 827	†1, 776
1. Reductions in duty	480	‡511
36-50% reductions	287	289
25-35% reductions	78	168
Less than 25% reductions	115	54
2. Bindings	1, 347	1, 265
Present duties	174	144
Free list	1, 173	1, 121
B. Products upon which it is not proposed to offer concessions	381	\$432

†77% from Geneva countries. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡87% from Geneva countries. [Footnote in the source text.]

\$74% from Geneva countries. [Footnote in the source text.]

Annex B

SCHEDULE I. PROPOSED CONCESSIONS OFFERED TO THE UNITED STATES

Value of trade covered by tariff concessions offered to the United States
by the Geneva countries

Country	Total	Imports from the U.S. into countries listed, 1939, of products upon which the United States obtained concessions directly from the country listed	
		Reductions in duty or preference	Bindings of existing tariff treatment
<i>Thousands of U.S. dollars</i>			
Total, all countries listed	1, 054, 396	390, 211	664, 185
Australia (1938/39)	34, 635	22, 595	12, 040
Benelux			
Brazil (1938)	30, 298	2, 431	27, 867
Burma	1, 020	431	589
Canada	331, 976	135, 288	196, 688
Chile	15, 853	6, 277	9, 576
China	48, 379	3, 077	45, 302
Cuba	61, 719	25, 195	36, 524
Czecho (1937)	30, 250	4, 690	25, 560
France & Colonies	101, 954	33, 182	68, 772
India & Pakistan			
Lebanon-Syria	1, 784	796	988
New Zealand	10, 768	9, 000	1, 768
Norway	13, 649	6, 076	7, 573
South Africa	34, 193	6, 710	27, 483
United Kingdom	314, 453	113, 628	200, 825
Southern Rhodesia	1, 209	—	1, 209
Dependent U.K. Colonies:			
Newfoundland	2, 256	835	1, 421
Other (1936)	20, 000	20, 000	—
	(est.)	(est.)	

INDIRECT BENEFITS

In addition to the above, the concessions offered by these countries directly to each other will result in substantial benefits to United States trade. In the time available it has not been possible to make a full analysis of these offers, but it is estimated that the U.S. trade benefited would exceed \$150,000,000.

||Includes \$3,035,000 representing value of imports from U.S. in 1939 of tobacco and cigarettes on which France bound the existing tariff treatment and established a minimum global quota. [Footnote in the source text.]

Annex D

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND RELATED DOCUMENTS

SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

1. *The Final Act.* The "Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment" authenticates the text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Protocol of Provisional Application. Signature carries no commitment beyond such authentication. It will be signed by all countries negotiating at Geneva.

2. *The General Agreement.* The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is divided into three parts.

Part I contains the schedules of tariff concessions. It also binds all margins of tariff preference against increase. This binding represents a far-reaching commitment on the part of the British and other preference-granting areas which the United States has not been able to obtain in any previous trade-agreement negotiation.

Part II reproduces many of the commercial-policy provisions of the draft Charter for an International Trade Organization, which in turn have been largely drawn from, or developed on the basis of, provisions customarily included in past United States trade agreements.

Among the more significant provisions in Part II, insisted upon by the United States as necessary either to safeguard the tariff concessions or to provide an adequate *quid pro quo* for tariff concessions, are the following:

a) Provision for equal treatment as between foreign and domestic products in the matter of internal taxation and regulation (Article III). These provisions are so drawn as to permit the continuation of United States mixing regulations on rubber at the level in effect on April 10, 1947.⁴ [Here follows a statement by the Navy Department representative.]

b) A special Article (Article IV) which will afford protection to United States exports of motion-picture films. The inclusion of this Article, which operates almost entirely to the benefit of an American industry, is a source of great satisfaction to the United States delegation.

c) Provisions confining the use of antidumping and countervailing duties to their proper scope (Article VI) and looking toward the use of true commercial values in assessing ad valorem duties (Article VII).

⁴Mixing regulations required manufacturers of rubber products to mix a specified percentage of synthetic rubber into their final product. These rules were designed to insure that the synthetic production capacity built up in the United States during the Second World War did not atrophy.

d) Provisions designed to bring about the elimination of protective quotas on imports and exports⁵ and to assure their nondiscriminatory application (Articles XI through XIV). Since quotas rigidly limit the amount of trade that can be carried on, these provisions are of critical significance to the United States in the years ahead. It has been necessary to make substantial exceptions to the rule against quotas and against discrimination, in view of the special economic problems created by the war, particularly those involving important trading countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, in acute balance-of-payments difficulties. As these problems are met, however, the operation of the provisions against quotas will come into play to the benefit of the long-run export trade of the United States.

e) Provisions which extend the principles of nondiscrimination to state-trading and assure private traders an adequate opportunity to participate in purchases or sales by state-trading enterprises.

f) Provisions which would permit the United States, or any other party to the Agreement, to withdraw or modify the tariff or other concessions it has made to the extent and for the time necessary to prevent serious injury to domestic producers (Article XIX). These provisions conform to Executive Order No. 9832 which requires the inclusion of such provisions in trade agreements and sets forth the procedure for administering them.

g) Provisions designed to cover the eventuality that some situation may arise, or that some party to the Agreement may violate the Agreement, directly or indirectly, which would have the effect of nullifying or impairing the Agreement. In serious cases of this kind, the other parties to the Agreement could agree that they, or any of them, would be free to suspend the concessions they have made under the Agreement. Any party affected by such suspension could then withdraw from the Agreement on short notice—60 days.

In addition to the foregoing, Part II contains provisions relating to such trade matters as freedom of transit, marks of origin, publication of trade regulations, and customs formalities. A special Article on economic development (Article XVIII) provides a carefully safeguarded method of adjusting tariff concessions and other obligations where additional protection is necessary for economic development.

Certain of the provisions of Part II of the Agreement cannot be made fully effective without changes in existing United States laws. These changes, mostly of a minor nature, include the elimination of certain existing discriminations in internal taxes, the amendment of our countervailing-duty legislation so as to make countervailing duties discretionary rather than mandatory, and the adaptation of United

⁵ At this point in the source text there is a footnote indicating another statement by the Navy Department representative.

States tariff valuation methods. Since these changes cannot be effected by the Executive under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act or other executive powers, it is provided, under the Protocol of Provisional Application (see below), that Part II of the General Agreement need be applied, during the period of provisional application, only "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation". Part II will be given full force and effect only after the United States and other large trading countries formally deposit an instrument of acceptance of the Agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Article XXVI). It is contemplated that such an instrument will not be deposited by the United States until after Congress has acted on the Charter for an International Trade Organization or has otherwise passed the necessary legislation to bring United States laws into conformity with all of the provisions of the Agreement.

Since the provisions of Part II of the Agreement (as well as Article I relating to most-favored-nation treatment) are identical with corresponding provisions in the Draft Charter, provision is made whereby these provisions of the Agreement may be superseded by the provisions of the Charter if the parties agree. If this is done, as it presumably will be, no separate legislative action relating to the General Agreement will be necessary in order for the United States formally to accept the agreement and thus bring it into full force and effect.

Part III of the Agreement deals with matters common to the whole of the Agreement, such as general exceptions (sanitary regulations, security exceptions and other matters customarily excepted from commercial agreements); amendments; territorial application; modification of concessions after the Agreement has run for three years (the statutory limit for the initial period of trade agreements concluded by the United States); and the like. Part III also includes the provisions relating to formal acceptance of the Agreement and its entry into full force, referred to above, and for the supersession of Part II by the corresponding provisions of the Charter, also referred to above.

In view of the importance attached by many countries to provisions of the Charter for an International Trade Organization which are not incorporated in the Agreement, a paragraph has been included (paragraph 1 of Article XXIX) under which the contracting parties undertake, "pending their acceptance of a Charter in accordance with their constitutional procedures, to observe to the fullest extent of their executive authority the general principles" of the Charter recommended to the Havana conference by the Preparatory Committee. This undertaking does not in any way tie the hands of Congress or prejudice the freedom of action of the United States or of other countries at the Havana conference.

An important Article of Part III relates to joint action by the contracting parties (Article XXV). An earlier draft of the General

Agreement, which was discussed during the hearings held by the Senate Finance Committee in March and April of this year, provided for the establishment of an Interim Trade Committee among the parties to the General Agreement. This provision was criticized by Senator Millikin as an attempt to set up a provisional International Trade Organization without Congressional approval. It has been omitted from the text for which approval is now sought. Instead, arrangements are made for meetings of representatives of the contracting parties in order to give effect to those substantive provisions of the Agreement where decisions must be taken by the contracting parties acting jointly. Such an arrangement is clearly necessary because of the multilateral character of the Agreement, and the functions of the contracting parties are confined to those necessary to carry out the Agreement.

3. *Protocol of Provisional Application.* The Protocol of Provisional Application, which will bind each country upon its signature by that country, provides that if Australia, Brazil, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States have signed the Protocol by November 15, 1947, the signatory countries will give provisional effect, on January 1, 1948 to *a*) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to tariff concessions, the most-favored-nation clause and matters common to the whole agreement) and *b*) Part II of the General Agreement (other trade barriers) "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation". Any signatory would be free to withdraw this undertaking on short notice—60 days. It is anticipated that all "key" countries except Australia will sign the Protocol of Provisional Application at Geneva on or about October 30, and that Australia will sign at New York by November 15.

4. *Supplementary Agreements.* The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will replace our existing trade agreements with Brazil, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Cuba, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It is accordingly proposed to sign with each of these countries, at Geneva and in conjunction with the signature of the Protocol, a supplementary agreement making it clear that the existing trade agreement concerned will be inoperative for such time as the United States and the other country concerned are both parties to the General Agreement (whether pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application or otherwise). If either country should withdraw from the General Agreement, the existing trade agreement would then come back into operation.

In the special case of Cuba, with which the United States has preferential relations, provisions have been included dealing with certain preferential matters not dealt with in the General Agreement.

Editorial Note

The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed by Winthrop Brown for the United States at Geneva on October 30, 1947; the agreement was to take effect on January 1, 1948. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is printed as 61 Stat. (parts 5 and 6). For documentation regarding the continuing effort to create an international trade organization and the Havana Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, volume I.

THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1947¹

Editorial Note

The summary table which follows is adapted from the *Report of Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems* [80th Cong., 2d sess., House Document No. 737] (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948). The report also contains numerous supporting tables which provide more detailed breakdowns of the summary figures.

Included are loans and property credits, relief, and other grants made to foreign countries between July 1, 1945, and December 31, 1947. The disparate components may be defined as follows:

Loans—These represent cash loans anticipating repayment in cash of principal plus interest. Commitments reported by the Export-Import Bank represent authorizations approved by the Board of Directors, which included, as of December 31, certain loans that had not been formalized by credit agreements. Included in this loan category, then, are these commitments, direct loans by the Export-Import Bank and other government agencies, and loans of agent banks fully guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank.

Property credits—These represent credits extended in connection with (a) disposal of surplus property including merchant ships, (b) settlement for lend-lease articles and services, and (c) commodity credits used to finance raw material shipments to the occupied areas for manufacture and export. In general the objectives of the loans and property credits were to assist in rehabilitation and to further the development of national economies above the level of self-sufficiency for minimum needs.

Relief—These include supplies, services, and funds furnished by the United States Government to international or national agencies for relief abroad, or directly by the United States Government to a recipient area. Relief includes funds and goods given through UNRRA, Post-UNRRA Relief, Interim Aid, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, the International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, and the governmental appropriation component of American Red Cross aid.

Grants—These reflect the estimated value of such aid including "Lend-Lease" furnished on a grant basis, and civilian supplies furnished by the U.S. Army for Italian relief and the occupied areas of Germany and Japan for purposes of alleviating disease and unrest, and by the U.S. Navy on the Pacific Islands. Other grants included aid furnished the American Republics in cultural and economic programs, aid furnished China, the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey.

¹ For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1437 ff.

Many of the grants had been made to rehabilitate national economies to the level of self-sufficiency for minimum needs, whereas the relief funds had been expended to sustain life and to prevent economic and physical retrogression. Marshall Plan figures are not included. This grant and loan program was inaugurated in 1948.

TABLE 1.—U.S. Government loans, property credits, and grants to foreign countries utilized, July 1, 1945, through Dec. 31, 1947, and unutilized as of Dec. 31, 1947, by type and country

[In millions of dollars]

Area and country	Total utilized and unutilized			Amount utilized July 1, 1945, to Dec. 31, 1947			Unutilized balance, Dec. 31, 1947		
	Total	Loans and property credits*	Relief and other grants†	Total	Loans and property credits*	Relief and other grants†	Total	Loans and property credits*	Relief and other grants†
TOTAL, ALL AREAS.....	18,180	9,899	8,281	14,595	8,134	6,461	3,585	1,765	1,820
Total, Europe.....	13,400	8,217	5,183	11,157	7,270	3,887	2,244	947	1,297
Total, European recovery program participating countries and western Germany.....	11,520	7,693	3,827	9,477	6,868	2,610	2,043	825	1,217
Austria.....	341	34	307	244	6	238	97	29	69
Belgium and Luxembourg.....	262	199	63	212	149	63	50	50	-----
Denmark.....	30	30	-----	16	16	-----	14	14	-----
France.....	2,336	1,990	346	1,966	1,892	74	370	98	272
Greece.....	742	121	621	488	97	391	254	24	230
Italy.....	1,320	369	950	1,011	249	761	309	120	189
Netherlands.....	342	316	26	300	273	26	42	42	-----
Norway.....	92	91	1	32	31	1	60	60	-----
Sweden.....	1	-----	1	1	-----	1	-----	-----	-----
Switzerland.....	2	-----	2	2	-----	2	-----	-----	-----
Trieste.....	22	-----	22	12	-----	12	10	-----	10
Turkey.....	152	52	100	14	13	1	138	39	99
United Kingdom.....	4,732	4,435	297	4,397	4,100	297	335	335	-----
Western Germany.....	1,146	56	1,090	783	41	742	362	14	348
Total, Europe, non-European recovery program.....	1,582	499	1,083	1,485	402	1,083	97	97	-----
Albania.....	20	-----	20	20	-----	20	-----	-----	-----
Czechoslovakia.....	211	30	182	211	30	182	(‡)	(‡)	-----
Finland.....	123	121	2	85	83	2	39	39	-----
Hungary.....	19	16	2	19	16	2	-----	-----	-----
Poland.....	453	90	363	420	57	363	33	33	-----
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	464	242	222	438	216	222	25	25	-----
Yugoslavia.....	292	-----	292	292	-----	292	-----	-----	-----
Unallocable Europe.....	298	24	274	195	-----	195	104	24	79
Netherlands Indies.....	204	200	4	68	64	4	136	136	-----
Other dependences of European recovery program participating countries.....	(‡)	(‡)	(‡)	(‡)	(‡)	(‡)	-----	-----	-----
Canada.....	300	300	-----	-----	-----	-----	300	300	-----
American Republics.....	501	471	30	248	226	22	253	246	8
China.....	1,491	250	1,241	1,407	206	1,201	84	44	40
Iran.....	38	38	-----	13	13	-----	25	25	-----
Japan.....	1,100	202	898	834	196	638	266	6	260
Korea (southern).....	180	25	155	108	15	93	72	10	62
Philippines.....	391	86	305	234	76	158	157	10	147
Saudi Arabia.....	29	27	2	14	12	2	15	15	-----
All other countries.....	113	81	32	88	56	32	25	25	-----
Unallocable.....	433	2	430	423	-----	423	9	2	7

*See table 2 for supporting detail. [Footnote in the source text; table not printed herein.]
 †See table 3 for supporting detail. [Footnote in the source text; table not printed herein.]
 ‡Less than \$500,000. [Footnote in the source text.]

THE MARSHALL PLAN

[See volume III, pages 197 ff., under the title "The Political and Economic Crisis in Europe and the United States Response".]

1028.

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR PROVIDING RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO WAR-DEVASTATED COUNTRIES, UPON THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION (UNRRA) ¹

840.50 UNRRA/10-2946

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Ness) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton)

[WASHINGTON,] October 29, 1946.

Subject: Post-UNRRA Relief Needs ²

1. *Total Need.* The total need for relief financing in 1947 is estimated to be \$672 million, distributed as follows (see the appended Tables I and II):

	(\$ millions)
Austria	142
Hungary	84
Italy	234
Poland	142
Yugoslavia	70
<i>Total</i>	<u>672</u>

By "need for relief financing" is meant the balance of minimum import requirements (including food, consumers' goods and essential rehabilitation items but excluding reconstruction or development) beyond what can be paid from current earnings, present exchange holdings or credits other than those specified below. On this basis it appears that Greece, Czechoslovakia and China will in 1947 have sufficient resources to finance their minimum import requirements over the year as a whole, although Greece may experience deficiencies in the first months of the year. No attempt is here made to consider the needs of the Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian Republics, which cannot be treated apart from the Soviet Union as a whole. Albania is excluded by reason of lack of information.

¹ For related information on this subject, see the editorial note in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1446-1447.

² Participating governments were scheduled to end their financial support of UNRRA on December 31, 1946, though deliveries were projected for Europe until March 31, 1947, and for the Far East until June 30, 1947.

In deriving the above figures it has been assumed that the following Eximbank and International Bank credits³ will be available to finance purchases in 1947 within the category of "minimum import requirements," chiefly rehabilitation items:

	(\$ millions)	
	<i>Eximbank</i>	<i>World Bank</i>
Austria	25	—
Italy	100	100
Poland	—	50
Yugoslavia	—	25
	—	—
<i>Total</i>	125	175

These figures may, so far at least as the World Bank is concerned, err on the side of over-estimate. If even these limited loans cannot be made, the need for relief financing will be correspondingly increased.

2. *Participation in Financing.* It appears likely that the British and Canadians will be willing to make some contribution to financing these relief needs. The British have indicated willingness to advance \$40 million for Austria. The Canadians have thus far mentioned no figures. If the U.S., U.K., and Canada were to share financing in the proportions to which they have contributed to UNRRA, the above total of \$672 million would be distributed as follows: U.S., \$490 million; U.K., \$140 million; Canada, \$42 million. It is also possible that the USSR may be willing to make relief supplies or funds available to some of the countries. As indicated in Mr. Wood's memorandum,⁴ the Department will consult with these countries and others on this question.

3. *Recommendations.*

a. I would recommend that any 1947 relief funds made available by the United States be advanced in the form of a grant rather than of a loan or credit. Since the commodities to be financed by 1947 relief grants for the most part are not of a "self-liquidating" nature, the loan form appears in general to be inappropriate. In the derivation of the country-by-country figures, moreover, loan-financing of the rehabilitation elements in minimum import requirements has been included to the maximum amount thought possible. Furthermore, the magnitude of the service burden which these countries will have to bear as a result of reconstruction credits already made or to be received over the next few years makes additional service charges undesirable and would affect adversely ability to repay Eximbank and World Bank credits.

³ For documentation regarding Export-Import Bank and International Bank credits, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1391 ff.

⁴ C. Tyler Wood, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp). Memorandum not found in Department files.

b. I would also recommend that a United States relief grant should not be limited to purchases in the United States, primarily because of limited availability of some supplies, particularly food, here.⁵

⁵ Export-Import Bank credits were extended in the form of "tied loans", which is to say that purchases made by the borrower under the credit had to be made in the United States.

Lot 60-D 137, Box 8

Memorandum by the Staff Committee of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems to the National Advisory Council

NAC Doc. 361

[WASHINGTON,] February 14, 1947.

Subject: U.S. Post-UNRRA Relief Program for Calendar Year 1947.

1. *Problem.*

A proposal for appropriation by Congress of \$400 million for post-UNRRA relief assistance in 1947 to certain European countries and China has been presented by the State Department to the National Advisory Council for its approval. (See draft bill attached)¹ The State Department's request is based on a series of studies, which the State Department has conducted continuously over the past twelve months, on the total relief deficits of the countries concerned. The Staff Committee has been requested by the NAC to evaluate the State Department's proposal and to recommend action.

2. *Background.*

At the fall session of the UN General Assembly, the U.S. committed itself, subject to favorable action by Congress, to the extension of post-UNRRA foreign relief assistance in 1947. The U.S. subscribed to the General Assembly's unanimous resolution of December 11, 1946, which defined 1947 foreign relief needs as the value of a country's minimum imports needed to prevent suffering and economic retrogression. The U.S. also participated in the work of the UN Special Technical Committee on Relief Needs after Termination of UNRRA.

At the same time, the U.S. insisted upon its right to administer its 1947 relief program on a national rather than on a UN basis. This decision was largely prompted by the need for flexibility in the administration of the program.²

¹ Not attached to file copy.

² The Under Secretary of State (Acheson) had said in a nation-wide radio broadcast on December 8, 1946, that "The people of the United States and the Congress of the United States have made up their minds that the relief problems of the near future are not of a character which would warrant grants of enormous

3. *Relief Needs.*

The State Department's request for an appropriation of approximately \$400 million* is derived primarily from two studies on the total minimum relief deficits of the countries requiring relief assistance in 1947: (1) an economic analysis of the relief deficits of Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, the Free Territory of Trieste and China, prepared by the State Department; (2) the report of the UN Special Technical Committee on Relief Needs after Termination of UNRRA, which covers relief needs of Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

The State Department estimate of the total relief deficit of the five European countries and Trieste yielded a total of \$576 million, made up as follows:

	<i>1947 Relief Deficit</i> (millions of \$)
Austria	†148
Greece	†56
Hungary	57
Italy	158
Poland	†137
Trieste	20
	<hr/>
Total	576

The State Department did not estimate China's total 1947 relief requirements, but indicated that China should receive some relief assistance in 1947. The UN Special Technical Committee established a total relief need for the six European countries (including Yugoslavia but not including Trieste) of \$583 million. Such discrepancies as exist

Footnote continued from previous page.

sums of money from the United States Treasury under conditions which would leave little or no effective control by the grantor of these funds.

"The people of the United States are determined that they will not send free shipments of great quantities of food, trucks, tractors, and other supplies of all kinds, many of which they desperately need themselves, to countries which are diverting their manpower and facilities away from the production of the necessities of life which they are asking others to supply. . . ." Earlier in the broadcast the Under Secretary had stated that with relief being administered by means of a national program the "nations receiving free relief must prove their need for it, and they can be held to a much closer and fairer accountability of the use of food and other free supplies. Those in power will be compelled to distribute relief food on the basis of need. They will not be allowed to feed their political supporters and starve their political opponents." (Excerpts from Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1946, p. 1108.)

*In the budget message sent to the Congress by the President on January 10, 1947, it was estimated that \$350 million would be required for post-UNRRA relief expenditures by the U.S., \$100 million in fiscal 1947 and \$250 million in fiscal 1948. [Footnote in the source text.]

†The estimated deficits for Austria, Greece, and Poland allow for the most recent changes in UNRRA programs in favor of these countries. Of the 1947 Austrian deficit of \$148 million, \$22.5 million will be met by U.S. Army funds. This \$22.5 million is in addition to the State Department's request for an appropriation of \$400 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

between the results of these two studies are explained by differences in the countries covered, adjustments for certain miscalculations in the UN report, changes in the carry-over of UNRRA programs in 1947 which have occurred since the completion of the UN report, and minor differences in the standards used in computing minimum import requirements.

The State Department's criteria for minimum import requirements were based on the resolution of the General Assembly referred to above. They may be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Sufficient food imports to provide, together with domestic supplies, a minimum daily caloric intake between 2,000 and 2,200 calories per capita for the non-farm population, except where supply conditions clearly preclude the maintenance of this level. The determination between 2,000 and 2,200 calories was made taking into consideration customary differences between the countries considered;

(b) Imports of materials for production of textiles and footwear at minimum per capita levels sufficient to provide between 70 and 100 percent of prewar consumption, depending on traditional differences in the per capita consumption and in the severity of the cumulative wartime shortage of these commodities among the various countries;

(c) Raw material imports needed (1) to permit production of minimum quantities of essential consumers goods other than textiles and footwear, (2) to permit exports of manufactured goods, (to earn foreign exchange for payment of necessary imports) and (3) to permit minimum maintenance and repair of industry, and transport and other essential services;

(d) Minimum imports of machinery and equipment necessary for repair and replacement of plant and equipment, excluding rehabilitation, reconstruction or development projects. A minimum of imports of agricultural supplies is also provided, as required by the General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1946, to make possible some recovery of domestic food production in 1947.

Although the Staff Committee based its conclusions on studies of the United Nations and the State Department rather than on any independent study of its own, the Staff Committee believes that the figure for the deficit derived on the basis of the criteria used appears to be a reasonable estimate of the total amount of the relief assistance which it is desirable for this group of countries to receive in post-UNRRA assistance in 1947.

Because of war damage and administrative and economic disorganization inherited from the war and enemy occupation, complicated by postwar adjustment difficulties, these countries have not had enough of a breathing space to get on their feet. Failure to receive such estimated relief assistance will have varying adverse effects on the individual countries. In certain cases, such failure would have very serious economic repercussions and cause retrogression while in other countries this would be true to a lesser degree. In some instances, it might

force adjustments which, owing to the extent and rapidity with which they would have to be made, might have very disturbing social and political consequences.

The State Department's request for \$400 million to cover the U.S. share of the 1947 relief needs of the five European countries, Trieste, and China leaves a residual of \$150 million plus whatever may be provided to China, to be met by other potential relief contributing countries. In view of the relative resources of the U.S. and its stake in the success of this program, the State Department's figure for the U.S. share, therefore, appears to be a minimum contribution.³

[Here follows discussion relating to administration of the program.]

³ The following was recorded in the minutes of the National Advisory Council for February 18, as action having been taken by the Council in its meeting of that date: "The National Advisory Council, on the basis of studies of post-UNRRA relief needs made by the United Nations and by the State Department, is of the opinion that the State Department's request for an appropriation of \$400 million as the United States contribution to post-UNRRA relief in the calendar year 1947 is appropriate and is consistent with the foreign financial policy of the United States Government." The Council was also recorded as requesting the State Department to report to it "periodically" on the allocation of funds appropriated for the program and on the agreements reached with the receiving countries. (State Dept. Lot 60-D137, Box 1)

840.50 UNRRA/2-2447

Text of Presidential Message to the Congress, Contained in Press Release Issued by the White House, February 21, 1947

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: I recommend that the Congress authorize the appropriation of not to exceed \$350 million to assist in completing the great task of bringing relief from the ravages of the war to the people of the liberated countries.

The period of full scale supply operations by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is rapidly drawing to a close. In some of the liberated countries UNRRA will have achieved its objective fully, for these countries will once again be self-supporting so far as the basic essentials of life are concerned. In other liberated countries, however, this is not yet the case. Compared with what has already been done, what remains to be done is relatively small and limited in time and scope, but none-the-less vitally important.

On humanitarian grounds, and in the light of our own self-interest as well, we must not leave the task unfinished. We cannot abandon the peoples still in need. To do so would be to replace hope with despair in the hearts of these peoples and thus to undermine the spiritual and economic stability upon which our own hopes for a better world must rest. Others will help but such is the preponderance of our economic resources that success cannot be achieved without us. If we fail to do our part, millions of human beings will be denied the elemental necessities

of life. Their strength and recuperative powers, which have been slowly growing, will be undermined. The time, now in sight, when they can once more exist without help and make their contributions to the peace, prosperity and progress of the world, will be indefinitely postponed.

I recommend that this relief assistance be given directly rather than through an international organization, and that our contribution be administered under United States control. International cooperation in the program and the necessary coordination of our relief activities with those of other contributors can be achieved by informal consultations with all nations concerned through the mechanism of the United Nations and otherwise. I believe that our relief contribution should be used only for providing the basic essentials of life, such as medical supplies, food and items which will aid in the production of foodstuffs.

The authorization recommended is designed for the urgent relief needs for the balance of the year. The most critical period will be in the spring and summer months, when UNRRA shipments will cease and the harvests are not yet available. Swift legislative action is necessary if our help is not to come too late.

The United States, in keeping with our traditions of immediate and whole-hearted response to human need, has stood in the forefront of those who have checked the forces of starvation, disease, suffering and chaos which threatened to engulf the world in the wake of the war. The task is nearly finished. I urge the Congress to act promptly to insure that we do not stop short of the goal; that we do not endanger the permanence of the gains we have helped to achieve.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

February 21, 1947

Editorial Note

The legislative history of the post-UNRRA foreign relief bill may be traced in the following documents of the 80th Congress, first Session: House Report 239; Senate Report 153; and Conference Report 395. The bill was introduced originally in the House of Representatives as H.J. Res. 134, hearings beginning in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 25 and the first witness being the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Clayton). Action was completed in the House on April 30 with the bill redesignated as H.J. Res 153. While the bill was still pending in the House, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate began hearings in executive session on April 15, the first witness being the Under Secretary of State (Acheson).

Hearings were held in Committee on April 15-18, 22, 25, and 29. The Senate completed action by mid-May, and on May 16 conferees of the two Houses met and reached agreement providing authorization of \$350 million for relief assistance to countries devastated by war. Both Houses on May 21 adopted the conference report; and the bill was signed into law by the President on May 31 as Public Law 84 (61 Stat. 125).

The document that follows is printed as exemplifying the type of information requested by the Congress and provided by the Department during the passage of this legislation through the Congress.

840.50 UNRRA/4-2347

The Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorpe) to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (Eaton)

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1947.

MY DEAR DR. EATON: In response to your request I am indicating below our answers to certain questions regarding the proposed post-UNRRA relief program.

QUESTION: What will be the agency set up in any Government Department or independently for the purpose of administering this relief, and who will be appointed to be the administrator?

ANSWER: It would be our intention to appoint a relief director in Europe who will supervise the relief program. We believe that the most important and critical function in connection with the proposed program is the supervision of the distribution of our relief supplies and the enforcement of the undertakings which would be required of the countries receiving relief. This can most effectively be done in Europe rather than from Washington. It is planned to recommend that Mr. Richard F. Allen be appointed to this position. He was in charge of Red Cross relief activities in Europe after the first World War and during the second World War was Vice Chairman of the American Red Cross in charge of all its activities in Europe. Mr. Allen would receive his instructions from the Secretary of State. A relief mission consisting of well-qualified American citizens would be established in each country receiving our help. These missions would work closely with our Embassy and would function under the general supervision of the relief director.¹

In Washington the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Bureau of Supply and other agencies would perform the procurement,

¹ Such a field organization was set up and functioning in the capitals of the receiving countries by the early summer of 1947. It may be noted parenthetically that these same field missions were later utilized to launch aid operations related to the beginning of the European Recovery Program.

supply and shipping functions which they are properly equipped to handle. The programming of supplies and the coordination of the activities of these agencies would be done by a staff under the direction of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. William L. Clayton.

QUESTION: What will be our policy regarding relief grants to countries, the governments of which are not in our opinion representative and democratic, or have not been elected in elections held pursuant to applicable international agreements?

ANSWER: It would be our policy to offer to help in preventing suffering and serious malnutrition in such a country to the extent that our assistance is clearly needed for this purpose. We have subscribed to the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which states the principle that at no time should relief supplies be used as a political weapon and calls upon all members of the United Nations to assist in the furnishing of relief when needed and where needed. Our help would be made available only on the condition that the government of the country agrees to the stringent but fair conditions specified in the Bill and lives up to these conditions faithfully. These are calculated to provide adequate assurance that relief aid would reach the people needing it and would not be used to promote the political aims of the Government. Furthermore, the requirements for full publicity in the country would ensure that the people would know the American source of the help and would understand its purposes. Our estimates indicate that Poland is the only such country which may need relief from us.²

QUESTION: Is it intended that the amounts authorized in the Bill will be adequate to take care of the relief need of the countries assisted through to the end of the crop year 1948?

ANSWER: The amount requested is to assist in meeting the estimated relief needs for the calendar year 1947. In the actual operation of the program, some shipments may slip over into the first few months of 1948. With the possible exception of Austria we do not anticipate that further relief will be necessary unless disastrous crop failures or other unforeseen events occur.

QUESTION: What measures will be taken to see that each country receiving relief assistance does everything possible to help itself and reduce its needs for relief as soon as possible through utilization of its own resources and the work of its own population?

ANSWER: The Bill requires that any country receiving relief must exert all possible efforts to speed its own recovery. It further provides

² It was subsequently found by U.S. survey teams that Poland and Hungary were not in need of relief assistance in order to prevent suffering and malnutrition.

that our relief shall be terminated if we are not satisfied that this is being done. We should keep a close check on the activities of the countries in this regard.

QUESTION: What assurances or expectations do we have of assistance to the countries to be benefited from other countries than our own as contemplated by the program?

ANSWER: The British have announced a program of \$40,000,000 in aid to Austria. The Norwegian Parliament has voted the equivalent of \$3,000,000. Denmark is making available the equivalent of \$4,000,000. New Zealand has stated its intention to make available some meat and other commodities. On the basis of consultations which have been conducted with other countries, we believe that additional contributions will be forthcoming if favorable action is taken by the United States, since some countries are waiting to see what action we take.

Sincerely yours,

[WILLARD L. THORP]

Editorial Note

The following agreements relating to relief assistance were entered into by the United States: with Austria, signed at Vienna, June 25, 1947, 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2970, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Act Series (TIAS, No. 1631); with Italy, signed at Rome, July 4, 1947, 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3135, or TIAS No. 1653; with Greece, signed at Athens, July 8, 1947, 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3017, or TIAS No. 1637; with China, signed at Nanking, October 27, 1947, 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3374, or TIAS No. 1674.

In the preamble of each agreement it was stated that the United States desired to provide relief assistance to the people of the designated country "to prevent suffering and to permit them to continue effectively their efforts toward recovery"; and that the Government of such country had requested the United States for relief assistance and had presented information which convinced the United States Government that the people of the named-country "urgently needs assistance in obtaining the basic essentials of life. . . ."

In April 1948, responsibility for administration of the Foreign Relief Assistance Program was transferred from the Department of State to the Economic Cooperation Administration.

UNITED STATES POLICIES REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF CRITICAL WORLD SHORTAGES IN FOOD, FUEL, AND INDUSTRIAL ITEMS: MESSAGES AND STATEMENTS RELATING THERETO

Editorial Note

Throughout 1947, the Executive Branch of the United States Government was constantly and urgently pre-occupied with the economic crisis in Europe and Asia arising out of shortages in food, fuel, and critical industrial items occasioned by wartime destruction and dislocations. These critical shortages, the fact that the United States was "the great undamaged center" of world food and industrial production, and the acute shortages in land transportation facilities in the United States and in shipping on the oceans, together made up the components out of which emerged a United States policy for controlled domestic and international distribution of basic items in critical short supply elsewhere in the world.

In the first six months of the year the Executive Branch communicated a series of messages and statements to the Congress, seeking needful legislation to implement such a policy. The following communications were basic and are found in the Department of State *Bulletin*:

(1) "Extension of the Second War Powers Act" (excerpts from message from the President to the Congress, January 31, 1947, Department of State *Bulletin*, February 23, 1947, page 362);

(2) "Necessity for Extension of Export Control Act" (message from the President to Congress, March 19, 1947, *ibid.*, April 13, 1947, page 676);

(3) "Extension of Second War Powers Act Requested" (statement by Under Secretary Acheson before Sub-committee 4 of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, June 6, 1947, *ibid.*, June 15, 1947, page 1173);

(4) "Extension of Government Operation of Shipping Facilities" (statement by the Secretary of State made before the House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, June 11, 1947, *ibid.*, June 22, 1947, page 1225);

(5) Statement made by Under Secretary of State William L. Clayton before the House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, June 11, 1947, in support of statement made by the Secretary of State, *ibid.*, June 22, 1947, page 1226.

In the summer of 1947 the United States Government became increasingly preoccupied specifically with the problem of the production and consumption of food in the United States and its distribution abroad. This concern was communicated to the United States public in a series of statements and reports as follows:

(1) "Report of the Cabinet Commission on World Food Problems: Statement by the President" (issued in White House press release, July 5, 1947, Department of State *Bulletin*, July 13, 1947, page 85);

(2) "The Cabinet Commission on World Food Problems: Statement by the President" (issued in White House press release, September 15, 1947, *ibid.*, October 5, 1947, page 690);

(3) "The 1947-1948 Grain-Export Program: Letter to the President from the Secretary of Commerce [Harriman]", dated September 24, 1947 (this included a special interim report on grain export policy prepared by the President's Committee on Foreign Aid; (released to the press by the White House on September 27, 1947, *ibid.*, October 5, 1947, page 691);

(4) "Congressional Committees Examine World Food Crisis: Statement by the President" (White House press release, September 29, 1947, *ibid.*, October 12, 1947, page 735);

(5) "Citizens Food Committee Inaugurates Conservation Program: Statement by the President" (delivered before the Citizens Food Committee at the White House, October 1, 1947; released to the press by the White House, on the same date, *ibid.*, October 12, 1947, page 736);

(6) "Food-Saving Program as a Contribution to Peace: Address by the President" (radio address broadcast over all national networks on October 5, 1947; White House press release, October 5, 1947, *ibid.*, October 12, 1947, page 738).

The United States had in 1947 formulated its food export program within the framework of the pattern recommended by the International Emergency Food Council, and the export of grain as a matter of national policy had necessarily been closely associated with the foreign relief program of the United States (for documentation on this subject, see editorial note, page 1026). With the coming of the autumn and the approach of winter, however, the United States Government became so gravely concerned with the critical food shortages in Western Europe, together with a financial and fuel crisis, and the certain knowledge that newly conceived European recovery program would not become a reality until sometime in 1948 (for documentation on the Marshall Plan, see volume III, pages 197 ff.), that President Truman was impelled on October 23, to announce the calling of Congress into special session on November 17 in order "for this Government to take adequate steps to meet the crisis in Western Europe, where certain countries have exhausted their financial resources and are unable to purchase the food and fuel which are essential if their people are to survive the coming winter." For documentation on the interim aid program, see *ibid.*, pages 439 ff.

THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION, CONFERENCES, AT ATLANTIC CITY, MAY 16—OCTOBER 2, 1947

Editorial Note

Three separate but related world telecommunication conferences were held in Atlantic City, New Jersey, from May 16 to October 2, 1947. Of the three conferences, only one was a plenipotentiary conference, the International Telecommunication Conference which met July 2—October 2 and which revised the international telecommunication convention signed at Madrid in 1932. The International Radio Conference, May 16—October 2, and the International High Frequency Broadcasting Conference, August 16—September 27, were administrative conferences, concerned with regulatory or engineering matters; in the event the latter, because of the pressure of time, was limited to the role of a preparatory conference to make ready for a later conference on high frequency broadcasting which would meet at Mexico City in 1948.

The three Atlantic City conferences met under the auspices of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an international organization based on the 1932 Madrid Convention but having a prior existence in other organizational forms dating back to 1865. For the United States, the *raison d'être* for the conference was "to bring order out of the chaos" that existed in the frequency spectrum in 1947 due to the unprecedented increase in the number of high frequency broadcast transmitters during the years of World War II; to provide a continuing body for the organization of administrative conferences and the formulation and administration of regulations, plans, and boards necessary to coordinate all the services (telegraph, telephone, radio) of international telecommunication; and to make world-wide frequency assignments based on modern engineering practices. In the general context of policies promoting freedom of information, the United States objective was to reduce disorder in the frequency spectrum through new regulations and thereby to remove barriers to the free flow of high frequency broadcasting.

Generally, these United States objectives were achieved at the Atlantic City conferences, except for the development of a new international frequency list which was postponed to the 1948 conference. The results, providing for a comprehensive reorganization of the structure and functions of the International Telecommunication

Union (including an association with the United Nations as a specialized agency) and a far-reaching revision of radio regulations and allocation of frequency bands, were embodied in two basic documents signed on October 2: (a) the International Telecommunication Convention, and (b) Radio Regulations annexed to the International Telecommunication Convention; for the texts, see 63 Stat. (pt. 2) 1399 (the Convention proper with additional protocols) and *ibid.*, 1581 (the Radio Regulations with frequency allocation tables and appendices), or Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1901. These were to take effect on January 1, 1949, regardless of the number of ratifications.

Papers concerning the Atlantic City conferences are found in Department of State central decimal file 574-WTC. The files of the United States delegations to the conferences are divided between Department of State Lot File 59-D594 (Boxes 461 and 462) and Department of State Lot File 59-D544 (Boxes 8484-8488); documentation on related telecommunication matters before and after 1947 is also found in Lot 59-D544, Boxes 8489-8494.

For a full account of the Atlantic City conferences, see *International Telecommunication Conferences, Atlantic City, N.J., May-October 1947*, Department of State publication 3177 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948). For a short account by Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf, Chief, Telecommunications Division, Department of State, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 30, 1947, pp. 1033-1034, 1040-1041. For the composition of the United States delegations to the three conferences, see Department of State, *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1946-June 30, 1947* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pages 184-185 (the International Radio Conference) and *ibid.*, *July 1, 1947-June 30, 1948* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pages 148-149 and 153-154 (the International Telecommunication Conference and the International High Frequency Broadcasting Conference, respectively). A useful survey of the history of the international law of telecommunications is found in Marjorie M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1968), volume 9, pages 690 ff.

UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE POLAR REGIONS¹

800.014/1-2747

*Department of State Policy and Information Statement*²

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1947.

POLAR REGIONS

I. ARCTIC REGION

A. *Current US Policy*

1. *General Political and Territorial.* The United States has had for a long time an interest in the territorial and political situation in the Arctic. The purchase of Alaska in 1867³ and the interest of the then Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, in the acquisition of Greenland and Iceland marked the high point of US territorial interest in that region during the nineteenth century. The activities of US citizens who carried on extensive explorations and made new discoveries in the Arctic region, particularly to the north of Canada and of European Russia and Siberia, were not followed up by formal US claim to any of the territories explored or discovered. Although it is known that an American was the first to land on Wrangel Island off the northeast coast of Siberia, and that Americans also were among the first to visit Herald Island in the same vicinity, the US Government has never advanced a claim to those islands. On the other hand, the US Government has not recognized the Czarist, and later Soviet, claim to the

¹ For previous documentation on United States policy with regard to Antarctica, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. I, pp. 1492 ff.

² The Department of State's Policy and Information Statements were concise documents summarizing the current United States policy toward a country or region, the relations of that country or region with the principal powers, and the issues and trends in that country or region. These Statements, which were begun in the spring of 1946, were generally prepared by *ad hoc* working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic posts abroad for comment and criticism. The Statements were periodically revised.

³ For the text of the treaty between the United States and Russia regarding the cession of Alaska to the United States, signed in Washington on March 30, 1867, see *Foreign Relations*, 1867, Part I, p. 388; and William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. II, p. 1521. For documentation regarding the negotiation and ratification of the treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1867, Part I, pp. 388-407.

islands, nor has it admitted the validity of the so-called Russian "sector" as set forth in the Soviet decree of April 15, 1926.⁴ In a telegram sent from Moscow direct to Secretary Hughes on November 12, 1924 the Soviet Foreign Minister complained of US and other violations of the territorial rights of the Soviet Union in the region of the northern coast of Siberia, and alleged in effect that by Article I of the Treaty of March 18/30, 1867 by which Russia ceded Alaska to the United States the United States was estopped from making territorial claims west of the boundary set forth in that Treaty as the dividing line between Russia on the west and Alaska on the east.⁵ Since the United States had no diplomatic relations with the USSR at that time, no reply was made to this communication, but the Department has taken the position that Article I of the Treaty of 1867 marked the extent of territory ceded to the United States "then possessed" by Russia, and in no way restricted the United States from participation in any future discoveries which might be made by it beyond the boundary indicated in the Treaty.

Although the United States has not formally recognized Canadian claims within any alleged "sector,"⁶ or recognized Canadian title to specific islands within the Canadian Arctic zone, there has been no evident inclination to challenge Canadian claims to jurisdiction over those areas in which the Canadian Government is exercising control. It is significant, in this connection, that both the Canadian and Soviet Governments in recent years have shown increased interest and activity within their respective Arctic zones and that if rival claims should be asserted by the United States or other governments the Soviet and Canadian Governments would be in a position to support their claims to superior title by concrete evidence of acts of possession and control exercised without challenge for a considerable period. It may be, therefore, that an international court would, in the face of such evidence, consider that those governments have a valid title, even without refer-

⁴ In a portion of the Policy and Information Statement not here printed, the Soviet decree under reference here was quoted as follows:

"Proclaimed as territory of the Soviet Union are all, discovered or yet to be discovered, lands and islands, not forming at the moment of publication of the present decree, territory recognized by the Government of the Soviet Union as belonging to any other States, and situated in the Northern Arctic Ocean to the north of the littoral of the Soviet Union up to the North Pole within the limits between the meridian of 32°4'35" longitude east of Greenwich, and the meridian of 168°49'30" of longitude west of Greenwich. . . ." [Ellipses in source text.]

⁵ The text of the message sent by telegram to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes on November 24, 1924, is printed in *Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. VII (Moscow, 1963), p. 531.

⁶ According to a portion of the Policy and Information Statement not here printed, the Canadian Government had made clear its claim to all islands lying to the north of continental Canada within the sector bounded on the east by the 60th meridian and on the west by the 141st meridian, with the exception of that portion of Greenland which lay within that sector.

ence to so-called "sector principles." The question of title to lands within the claimed sectors which might be discovered in the future is an entirely different matter. It is assumed that the United States would not acquiesce in a claim to such lands by any State merely on the basis of the application of a "sector principle." The US Government also assumes that the Arctic seas and the air spaces above them, being outside of normal territorial limits, are not subject to exclusive territorial control of any State and are, therefore, open to commerce and navigation in the same degree as other open seas.

The claims of Norway to Spitsbergen and Bear Island,⁷ as well as to Jan Mayen, and the Danish claim to Greenland have, as noted below, been recognized by the United States. Since neither Norway nor Denmark have propounded any "sector" claim in the Arctic it is assumed that the acquisition of new territories which may be discovered to the north of the Spitsbergen-Greenland zone will be treated in accordance with general principles governing acquisition of *terra nullius*.

The security interest of the United States in the Arctic region, particularly in the zone Alaska-Canada-Greenland-Iceland, has been indicated in a concrete manner by military measures taken by the United States during the war on its own territory in Alaska and in conjunction with the local governments in Canada, Greenland and Iceland.⁸ This interest has been stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a long-range interest, and efforts are, therefore, being made to secure the necessary cooperation and rights from the governments controlling those areas (Canada, Denmark, Iceland).⁹

2. *Economic*. In connection with future Arctic development, particularly in the field of aviation, the interest of the US Government

⁷ For documentation on the attitude of the United States regarding the reported demands by the Soviet Union on Norway with respect to Spitsbergen and Bear Island, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. v, pp. 91 ff. and *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. vi, pp. 673 ff., *passim*.

⁸ The topics under reference here are dealt with authoritatively in the following volumes in the series *United States Army in World War II*: Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959); Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960); Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964). See also the documentation regarding the agreement for the defense of Greenland, April 9, 1941, in *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. ii, pp. 35 ff. and the documentation on the participation of the United States in the defense of Iceland in *ibid.*, pp. 776 ff. and *ibid.*, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.

⁹ For documentation on the United States-Canadian discussions in 1946 relating to joint defense measures, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. v, pp. 53 ff. For documentation regarding the operation of weather stations in Greenland and discussions with Denmark concerning the role of Greenland in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, see *ibid.*, 1945, vol. iv, pp. 574 ff., and *ibid.*, 1946, vol. v, pp. 398 ff. Regarding the efforts of the United States to obtain postwar leases for military bases in Iceland, see *ibid.*, 1945, vol. iv, p. 953, and *ibid.*, 1946, vol. v, pp. 824 ff.

was indicated by the creation in 1945 of a standing sub-committee on the Arctic by the Air Coordinating Committee. The ACC is composed of representatives of the State, War, Navy, Commerce, and Post Office Departments, CAB, and Bureau of the Budget. On the recommendation of the sub-committee the ACC approved a program of Arctic development, with particular emphasis on the establishment of a network of Arctic aviation facilities, including weather, magnetic, and ionospheric stations, air navigational aids, communications, and airfields. Initial emphasis is being placed on the establishment and maintenance of primary weather stations in northern Canada and Greenland. As part of the program a primary weather station, operated jointly with Denmark, was established at Thule, Greenland by the US in the summer of 1946. The cooperation of the Canadian Government is being sought in order to carry out the desired program. Consideration is also being given to the feasibility of establishing weather stations under the Arctic pack ice by the employment of submersible vessels.

US economic interest in the Arctic is also manifest in connection with mineral resources, particularly rare minerals, which are known to exist or which may be discovered in that area.

[Here follows a more detailed examination of the aviation, meteorological, strategic, and territorial problems and issues relating to the Arctic region.]

II. ANTARCTIC REGION ¹⁰

A. *Current US Policy.* For more than a century US explorers have been making visits to the Antarctic region, as a result of which important discoveries have been made regarding the geography, resources, and other characteristics of the area and of the Antarctic continent in particular.

In 1819-1820 Captain Nathaniel D. Palmer proceeded south of the Shetland Islands practically to 65° south latitude and discovered new islands, named "Palmer Land" by the United States Geographic Board on November 6, 1912.

In an expedition authorized by Act of Congress of May 18, 1836, and proceeding under orders of the Navy Department dated August 11, 1838, the US exploring expedition under the command of Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, United States Navy, proceeded south from Sydney, Australia on December 26, 1839 and in January and February 1840 discovered and charted the coastline of the Antarctic continent between 160° and 100° east. The exact geographic extent of the exploration has not been defined. It is frequently asserted that Lt. Wilkes was the

¹⁰ The extract on the Antarctic Region printed here, which comprised pages 7-9 of the source text, was subsequently included as an attachment to a memorandum sent by the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Interior on December 11; and to the Secretaries of the Air Force and Commerce on December 16; see p. 1055.

real discoverer of the Antarctic continent. The portion of the coastline explored by him was in 1933 included by the British in the Australian Antarctic territory.

During the present century extensive explorations in the Antarctic have been carried on by private and official expeditions. Of greatest scope have been the explorations of Admiral Byrd and Lincoln Ellsworth during the seasons 1928-1929, 1933-1934, 1935, and 1939-41. The United States Antarctic Service Expedition, 1939-1941 was officially sponsored by the State, Navy, and Interior Departments and financed by Congressional appropriation. The Byrd and Ellsworth Expeditions have explored vast areas of the coastline and interior of the Antarctic continent, particularly between meridians 150° west and 68° west. Although Admiral Byrd's West Base was stationed near "Little America" at approximately 164° west, the Department of State, in response to inquiries concerning sovereignty over "Little America," pointed out that Admiral Byrd had claimed for the United States all the territory explored by him east of longitude 150° west but that "Little America" is situated to the west of longitude 150° west and, therefore, would not be included in the territory which he had claimed for the United States. However, the United States has not recognized that any claim to continental Antarctic territory thus far advanced by or on behalf of foreign governments serve to bar claims on behalf of the United States to any part of that continent. This Government is not obliged to assert US sovereignty over areas thus claimed for it but has reserved its right to do so. Thus in January 1939 Mr. Ellsworth flew over and claimed for the United States "the area south of latitude 70° and a distance of 150 miles east and 150 miles west of my line of flight and to a distance of 150 miles south of latitude 72° longitude 79° east" ¹¹ It will be observed that this area is within the so-called Australian sector claimed by the British in 1933.

The United States Antarctic Service Expedition, 1939-1941, was of outstanding importance in connection with possible US territorial claims on the Antarctic continent. The Expedition was organized for the specific purpose of establishing and strengthening US claims within the sector previously explored by Admiral Byrd and by Lincoln Ellsworth to the east of "Little America." Other governments, including the British, Norwegian, Australian, Japanese, and German, were showing intensified interest in Antarctica and it was felt that the time had come when the United States should either assert its claims or at least develop the basis for claims. The Expedition was noteworthy in that bases were established on the continent and maintained for a period of approximately two years. Large areas were actually explored and important information about them gathered by the Ex-

¹¹ Omission indicated in the source text.

pedition. The Expedition returned home when Congress refused to appropriate additional funds for its continued stay.

A US Naval Task Force on an expedition, known as "US Naval Antarctic Developments Project, 1947," arrived in Antarctic waters in December, 1946, and is currently engaged in discovery, exploration, and survey of large areas of the Antarctic. A small private scientific expedition sponsored by the American Antarctic Association, Inc., is also planning to establish a base at Marguerite Bay, Palmer Land, during the Antarctic summer of 1947.

Although Americans, acting privately or under official auspices, have laid claim to large portions of the Antarctic Continent, particularly in the sectors 100° east to 160° east and 50° west to 150° west, the US Government has never officially asserted a claim to territory in Antarctica. On the other hand, it has not recognized the validity of any claims on the continent asserted by other governments. In several instances the United States has responded to official notifications of such foreign claims by a statement that it reserves all rights which the US or its citizens might have in the particular case. In response to some of these notifications by foreign governments the United States has stated that it could not admit that sovereignty accrues from mere discovery (i.e. in its note of May 16, 1939 to the French Government regarding Adélie Land.¹² In a note to the British Ambassador on November 14, 1934 the Department of State asserted that "it could not admit that sovereignty accrues from mere discovery unaccompanied by occupancy and use."¹³

In view of the above, the US policy up to 1939 was primarily one of refusal to recognize the claims asserted by other governments; to emphasize the absence of acts of occupation or use of the territory to the extent considered necessary for the perfecting of a valid claim; and to reserve all rights which the US or its citizens might have in Antarctic areas. Without abandoning the previous policy, the US Antarctic Service Expedition of 1939-41 was planned as the beginning of a positive policy to establish a formal basis for eventual US territorial claims in the Antarctic. This policy, the execution of which was interrupted during the war, is being revived as a definite policy of exploration and use of those Antarctic areas considered desirable for acquisition by the US, including those Antarctic areas to which we already have a reasonable basis for claim to inchoate title by virtue of prior discovery and use, in order that we may be in a position to advance territorial claims to those areas at such time or times as it appears we have sufficient basis of sustained interest and use to sub-

¹² For the text of the note under reference, see Instruction 1487, May 16, 1939, to Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. II, p. 5.

¹³ For the text of the note quoted here, see *Foreign Relations*, 1934, vol. I, p. 1012.

stantiate claims under international law. A definite US policy has not yet been formulated respecting the manner in which an eventual settlement of conflicting territorial claims in the Antarctic shall be reached. An official statement was made on January 7, 1947 that this Government did not consider it essential to call immediately an international conference on Antarctic questions which are not of major world importance.¹⁴ It may be recalled that President Roosevelt in 1939 attempted without success to secure the adoption of a common inter-American policy with reference to the Antarctic. It may also be recalled that President Monroe in enunciating his famous Doctrine stated that the United States should "Consider any attempt on their part (Europe) to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." The question may be considered whether a portion of the Antarctic Continent and adjacent islands lie within "this hemisphere" thus providing a basis for considering that the Monroe Doctrine applies to them. Thus far the United States has taken no official action on such a premise. It has been noted above that Argentina and Chile also have territorial interests within the Western Hemisphere sector of Antarctica.

The United States has not, thus far, recognized the validity of the "sector" method of delineating Antarctic claims. It may be observed that the "sector principle" in the form announced by the Soviet Union in the Arctic has no parallel application in the Antarctic, since there are no "contiguous" territories extending into this area which could supply a base line from which to project southward to the Pole meridians bounding large sectors of the Antarctic mainland. It must be assumed, therefore, that the "sector" method of definition has been used in the Antarctic merely as a convenient method of defining boundaries on a continent which has largely remained unexplored. Although it may be admitted that normal rules of international law regarding acquisition of territory by discovery and effective occupation cannot reasonably be applied to the Antarctic Continent, there is objection to recognizing national claims based merely on "discovery" or on superficial exploration of parts of the coastline or ice barrier. In view of the numerous conflicting claims, none of which can be supported by recourse to established principles of international law governing acquisition of *terra nullius* in temperate regions, and in view of the possibility that troublesome rivalry may, therefore, ensue, it is probably desirable that the territorial problem in the Antarctic should eventually be settled by international action and agreement. Pending such international action, however, the United States is interested in reserving all its rights and in taking the steps necessary to support claims which it may wish to advance on its own behalf.

¹⁴ Regarding the statement referred to here, see telegram 490 to London, January 30, *infra*.

[Here follows a more detailed examination of some problems and issues of the Antarctic region including territorial rights, resources and possible economic development, and other possible values of Antarctica.]

800.014 Antarctic/1-2747 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1947—5 p. m.

490. For your info: In response press conference question on Jan 7, 1947, whether US favors international conference be called to settle various nations' territorial claims in Antarctic, Mr. Byrnes¹ replied that with all of the conferences that are being held about things of great importance in this world it would not be essential immediately to call a conference on Antarctic questions which are not very important (urtel 541 Jan 27).²

Although above statement doubtless reported Brit FonOff, Dept desires you seek appropriate opportunities discreetly to underline foregoing view.

MARSHALL

¹ James F. Byrnes served as Secretary of State until January 21, 1947, when he was succeeded by George C. Marshall.

² Not printed; it reported that the British Foreign Office official charged with Antarctic affairs had stated that no decision had yet been taken by the British Government or the Foreign Office regarding policy in Antarctica. It was further reported that some Labor Members of Parliament were proposing that the United Nations be given jurisdiction over the area (800.014 Antarctic/1-2747).

800.014 Antarctic/8-1447 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1947.

A-865. Suggest informal opportunity be taken re Embtel 4372, August 13¹ and Emb A-1787, August 14² to remind Foreign Office official US does not recognize Brit or other Antarctic claims and reserves all rights.

In view Argentine, Chilean sentiment, to challenge their freedom of movement in Antarctica until UK is ready to suggest practicable means of settlement would seem more productive of problems than of advantage. Our impression is that Argentina (and probably Chile), regarding matter as essentially question of national prestige, is pre-

¹ Not printed; it reported that the British Foreign Office had begun to study measures to obtain Chilean and Argentine recognition of United Kingdom territorial rights in the Antarctic (800.014 Antarctic/8-1347).

² Not printed.

pared to go to great lengths to defend her claim and probably would not accept reference of the problem to an international court for settlement.

Dept's impression is that Argentine-Chilean accord³ is more apparent than real, as noted by Foreign Office official. However, it seems probable that the accord could be firm against Britain should latter take uncompromising unilateral action. US as potential claimant and as having especial desire to cooperate with Britain as well as with Chile and Argentina will avoid position which could be interpreted as favorable to either faction.

MARSHALL

³ In July, the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Argentina issued a joint declaration asserting the sovereign rights of their states in Antarctica and promising to effect a harmonious plan of action by both governments in that region. A copy of the declaration was delivered to the Department of State by the Chilean Ambassador on July 29.

800.014 Antarctic/8-1447: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1947—2 p. m.

4090. Dept hopes contents its A-865 Sept 8¹ have been brought to attention Brit FonOff. Embtel 5015 Sept 16.² Submission of Argentine Brit Chilean claims to court, if agreed to by those countries, could settle priority of rights as between those three countries but would not affect rights of other possible claimants.

Dept believes that pressing for settlement of partial issues is not urgent, will not be useful at present and that action should be delayed until agreement can be reached on manner of arriving at total settlement.

Although not committed, Dept is currently studying desirability of some arrangement, possibly a special UN trusteeship which would remove Antarctic problem as a whole from area of international dispute, promote international scientific development and at same time safe-guard special interests of certain countries by giving them permanent control of trusteeship administration.

Please bring foregoing to attention of FonOff.

LOVETT

¹ *Supra.*

² Not printed; it reported that the British Cabinet had before it a Foreign Office recommendation that Chile and Argentina be invited to submit their claims to British territory in Antarctica to adjudication before an international court (800.014 Antarctic/9-1647).

800.014 Antarctic/10-1347

The Chilean Embassy to the Department of State

In view of the interest of the Government of Chile in matters pertaining to the Antarctic Region, and with the desire to continue her policy of close understanding with the United States on this subject initiated in 1939, there exists a desire to learn the thought of the United States with reference to:

- 1) the possible convocation of an Antarctic Conference;
- 2) the possible territorial claims of the United States in the Antarctic; and
- 3) whether such claims might include Marguerite Bay, situated within the boundaries of the Chilean Antarctic.

Information would be appreciated, also, with reference to the expedition to the Antarctic announced by the United States Navy to take place at the end of 1947, particularly if it is intended for it to extend to Marguerite Bay, and other places within the Chilean Antarctic Territory.

13 OCTOBER 1947.

800.014 Antarctic/10-1347

The Department of State to the Chilean Embassy

MEMORANDUM

With reference to the possible convocation of an Antarctic Conference mentioned in the Chilean Embassy's memorandum of October 13, 1947, the United States Government does not consider the present an opportune time for such a conference. Reference is made to the statement by the Secretary of State on January 7, 1947, in a press conference, to the effect that the relative importance of Antarctic questions, in view of the many other more important current topics which exist, was not such as to justify a conference. The United States attitude remains essentially the same as it was at that time.

The United States, while reserving all its rights in Antarctica, has neither made claims nor recognized the claim of any other state to territory in the Antarctic.

Concerning plans of the United States Navy to make an expedition to Antarctica at the end of 1947, it is understood that such an expedition is contemplated. Details concerning this expedition may be obtained from Rear Admiral Edmund T. Wooldridge in the Office of Naval Operations, Republic 7400, Extension 3062.

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1947.

800.014 Antarctic/9-1847

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1947.

No. 485

The Acting Secretary of State refers to the Embassy's airgram A-1949 of September 18, 1947 concerning UK interest in Antarctica.² The Department's position on the immediate problem was set forth in its recent airgram A-865, September 8, 1947³ and cable 4090 of September 22, 1947.⁴ The following information and comments are given for your information and for your use in further discussion of the problem with the Foreign Office official in charge of Antarctic matters.

Enclosures No. 1 and 2 hereto are of interest in connection with the statement of the Foreign Office official (numbered paragraph 2 of the Embassy's airgram) that "it is not impossible that during the coming Antarctic season, Argentine and Chilean expeditions might establish temporary bases in UK territory and if called upon to depart or recognize UK sovereignty their governments might claim this was British intervention in the Western Hemisphere".

The position of the United States is clearly that the sovereignty or the national or international status of any territory is not affected by its inclusion in the hemisphere defense area, and thus that the status of the British, Argentine and Chilean claims in Antarctica are not affected by the inclusion of portions of Antarctica in that area. The American Government would be pleased, in the event that Argentine and Chilean expeditions visit territory claimed by Britain in Antarctica in the coming season, if any British were limited to reiterating to them that in the British view they are in British territory. It is the

¹ This instruction was also sent to the Embassy in Argentina as No. 125, December 18; and to the Embassy in Chile as No. 1186, December 31.

² Not printed. It reported the current thinking of the British Foreign Office with reference to Antarctica. The Foreign Office anticipated that Argentine and Chilean expeditions might establish temporary bases on United Kingdom territory in Antarctica during the coming Antarctic season. If called upon to depart or recognize British sovereignty in this territory, Argentina and Chile might claim that the British were intervening in the Western Hemisphere. For this and other reasons, the British Foreign Office was anxious to get international recognition of United Kingdom sovereignty in Antarctica. The airgram also made the following observations:

"Attitude of US most interesting to UK. Has US made up its mind yet as to policy re Antarctica. Would US consider UK withdrawal from Falklands and some Antarctic regions as desirable withdrawal European power from American hemisphere. Would US (Navy) look upon non-British (Argentine) possession of Falklands and other islands on Drake Channel as not endangering US security in vital sea passage from Atlantic to Pacific. (800.014 Antarctic/9-1847)"

³ *Ante*, p. 1050.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 1051.

Department's view that, until such time as a course calculated to bring about a full settlement of the Antarctic problem is determined, more decisive action might serve only to inflame the issue without affording any compensating advantage.

The Department has no information that would indicate directly the possible Chilean reaction to a British proposal to submit their conflicting Antarctic claims to an international court. However, in view of the general situation it is not illogical to suppose that Chile would be very reluctant to do so. As previously indicated (Department's A-865, September 8, 1947), the Department believes that Argentina would go to great lengths to avoid such a proposal.

The American Government has not altered its position with regard to Antarctica, but in view of increasing British, Argentine and Chilean interest and tension, has come to the conclusion that a change in policy may be necessary and has initiated a study of the situation which may lead to an altered position within the course of the next few months, possibly along the lines suggested in the Department's cable No. 4090 of September 22, 1947 to the Embassy.

For your confidential background information, the best estimates now available in the Department do not rate the strategic or other value of Antarctic territory very high.

The Falkland Islands may be made the subject of a separate instruction, should any useful information become available. However, at this time the Department sees no advantage to be gained by including the Falkland Islands in the Antarctic problem. On the contrary, such inclusion would appear calculated to complicate greatly and unnecessarily both problems.

Enclosures:

1. Excerpt from Final Act of Rio Conference.⁵
2. Copy of note sent to non-American countries which have possessions within the defense area.⁶

⁵ Enclosure No. 1, not here printed, consisted of the final section, entitled "Statements", of the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro (Petropolis), Brazil, August 15-September 2. For the text of the Final Act and the text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance concluded at the Conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 21, 1947, pp. 565-572. For documentation regarding the Conference, see vol. VIII, pp. 1 ff.

⁶ Enclosure No. 2, not printed, was a copy of a note dated September 1, which observed that the United States Delegation at the Inter-American Conference then meeting in Petropolis, Brazil, had inserted in the record of the Conference a statement that the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance had no effect upon the sovereignty or national or international status of any territories in the hemisphere defense area defined in the Treaty. Included as enclosures to the note were a copy of a statement to the press issued by the United States Delegation to the Petropolis Conference, August 30 (text printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 21, 1947, p. 573) and the texts of articles III, IV, and VI of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

800.014 Antarctic/12-1147

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy
(Sullivan)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1947.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the Secretary of the Navy five copies of a memorandum on American Antarctic policy.

This memorandum consists of a brief synopsis and a fuller statement ending with a conclusion and recommendation.² There are two attachments to the Memorandum. 1. A brief statement on the value of Antarctica,³ and 2. An excerpt from a Department of State Policy and Information Statement summarizing very briefly the history of American Antarctic policy.⁴ In addition, the memorandum is accompanied by a study of the History and Current Status of Claims in Antarctica recently prepared in the Department of State.⁵ A related study entitled Basis for Possible U.S. Claims in Antarctica (OIR Report No. 4436, Sept 12, 1947) ⁶ has previously been circulated by the Department of State to the interested Divisions of the Department of Navy.

It will be noted that in this material care has been taken to avoid any position which might lead to the re-enforcement of the "sector principle" in the Antarctic.

The comment of the Navy Department will be appreciated upon the recommendation embodied in this memorandum as well as upon problems related thereto. A similar letter is being addressed to the Departments of Army and Interior.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

ANTARCTICA

Synopsis

A settlement of territorial claims in the Antarctic is complicated by the absence of general agreement on the legal principles which should

¹ Identical communications, *mutatis mutandis*, were sent to the Departments of Army and Interior on December 11, and to the Departments of Commerce, and Air Force on December 16.

² Of the memorandum attached to the source text, only the brief synopsis is printed here. The fuller statement comprised 11 typewritten pages and ended with a conclusion and recommendation substantially the same as those set forth in the synopsis.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Dated January 27, p. 1043.

⁵ OIR Report No. 4296, November 24, prepared by the Map Intelligence Division, Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination, Department of State (93 pp.); not printed.

⁶ Prepared by the Special Adviser on Geography of the Department of State; not printed.

govern acquisition of territory of this kind. Even the facts of discovery, exploration and investigation do not fall into any clear pattern and possible interpretations of the significance and implications of the facts are uncertain and complex.

However, a settlement is made desirable by the tendency towards increasing conflict rather than towards agreement. It is doubtful whether continued activity on the part of individual countries will ever bring the situation to maturity for settlement on clear legal principles. In view of existing and potential conflict of national claims it is also difficult to find a practical basis for partition of the area by political agreement. The United States could probably without serious objection on the part of other claimants lay claim to the "American Sector" between 80 degrees and 150 degrees west longitude.

Present incomplete knowledge indicates that the economic and strategic values of the Antarctic continent are probably small.*

There is general agreement that full exploration and investigation are desirable on scientific and technical grounds and that meteorological and magnetic stations established in Antarctica would perform an important service, of value to all countries but possibly of more immediate interest to countries in the southern hemisphere.

In view of the probable slight value of the area for the purposes of economic exploitation or strategic use, the difficulty of arriving at a valid basis for settlement by partition, and the general benefits which will derive from scientific investigation and establishment of meteorological stations, the development of the Antarctic may be considered an appropriate field for international cooperation.

An international trusteeship under the United Nations would raise the problem of recognizing and safeguarding the more direct interest in the area of certain countries. This problem may be met by giving these countries a predominating voice in the international trusteeship arrangement.

In the light of the present situation and the factors involved in the various possible courses of action, it appears that one of two courses looking towards a stable situation in the Antarctic is practicable for the United States Government: (1) Present claims together with a proposal for judicial settlement of conflicting claims. (2) Propose establishment of an international administration.

Given the assumption that the United States has little to gain from exclusive national control over large areas of Antarctica but that, on the other hand, many or all peoples will benefit by the results of a program of scientific studies and meteorological observations in the area, the second alternative is preferable.

*See numbered paragraphs 2 and 4 of the annexed memorandum by the Geographic Adviser. [Footnote in the source text; memorandum not printed.]

800.014 Antarctic/12-1647

Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley)

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1947.

I propose, in oral reply to Mr. Hadow's *aide-mémoire* of December 10 and letter of December 9, 1947,¹ to limit myself substantially to stating again our position as expressed in recent instructions to American Embassy, London (A-865, September 8, 1947; cable No. 4090, September 22, 1947, and instruction No. 485, December 8, 1947).²

If the policy recommended in our memorandum recently sent to the Army and Navy (and now being sent to the Air Forces and Weather Bureau)³ becomes in fact the policy of the United States, the British would lose nothing by limiting their communication to a reiteration of their position and not proposing that the dispute be taken to court at present. In any case the British position would not be seriously prejudiced by a reasonable delay. Adjudication of the Chilean-British and Argentine-British conflicts, even if accomplished, would be only a partial settlement.

Practically, there appears little doubt that Chile and Argentina would not submit their claims to judicial settlement, so that probably we are safe in not emphasizing too strongly to the British our preference that the proposal for court settlement be omitted. On the other hand, there may be some real risk that one of those countries, prodded by too sharp British action, might submit the whole matter to the United Nations in a way that would make the issue hard to handle gracefully. I think this point might be usefully made to Mr. Hadow, in addition to the points more specifically covered in the communications to London.

I shall therefore comment to Mr. Hadow along the following lines:

We have advanced no claims to territory in Antarctica, and we recognize no claims of other nations to any part of that area. We reserve all our rights in the event that other nations do advance claims.

Department has recently asked Embassy, London to convey informally to Foreign Office the following comments.

Department's impression is that Argentina and Chile, regarding Antarctic problem as matter of prestige, are prepared to go to great lengths to defend their claims and probably would not accept

¹ In a letter to Hulley, dated December 9, and an *aide-mémoire*, dated December 10 (neither printed), Robert H. Hadow, Counselor of the British Embassy, outlined the protests which the British Government contemplated making to Argentina and Chile with regard to their recent "encroachments" upon Antarctic territory under British sovereignty—namely, the Falkland Islands Dependencies, including Greenwich Island and the South Shetlands (800.014 Antarctic/12-1047).

² *Ante*, pp. 1050, 1051, and 1053, respectively.

³ *Supra*.

reference of their claims to an international court for settlement. Department's impression coincides with British view that the Argentine-Chilean accord on the subject is more apparent than real. However, it seems probable that the accord would be firm against Britain.

The United States as a potential claimant in Antarctica and being especially desirous of cooperating with Britain as well as with Chile and Argentina will avoid a position which could be interpreted as favoring any claimant.

Department believes that partial settlement is not urgent at this time and that action might well be delayed until agreement can be reached on manner of arriving at overall settlement.

Although not committed, Department is currently studying desirability of some arrangement, possibly a special United Nations Trusteeship which would (1) remove Antarctic problem as a whole from area of international dispute, (2) promote international scientific development, and (3) at the same time safeguard special interests of certain countries by giving them permanent control of trusteeship administration.

The sharpening of the issue between Britain, Argentina and Chile might make such an arrangement less likely to find acceptance and might also run the risk of causing Argentina or Chile to jump the fence and throw the matter into the United Nations in a way that would be difficult for the United States and Britain to handle gracefully.

The Department, while recognizing fully the British feeling that it cannot permit its position to be weakened by allowing conflicting Chilean and Argentine claims to go unchallenged, would—in the light of the foregoing—prefer for the present to see British protest limited to a reiteration of its view of the position in the disputed territory.

BENJAMIN M. HULLEY

800.014 Antarctic/12-1747

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1947.

Mr. Hadow, Counselor of the British Embassy, called on me December 17 to discuss the proposed British notes to the Argentine and Chilean Governments relative to claims in Antarctica outlined in his informal letter of December 9, 1947.¹

I talked to Mr. Hadow along the lines of the memorandum of De-

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1 to the Hulley memorandum of December 16, *supra*.

ember 16 which set forth our position.² Mr. Hadow expressed disappointment at the suggestion that the notes omit a reference to submitting the questions at issue to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. He said that this was the most important point in the note and he advanced the view that we might well be accused later of having sabotaged the Court, one of the three main pillars of the United Nations Organization, if we discouraged countries from appealing to it in any question. I pointed out that the question of timing was involved and that it might later seem a good idea to appeal to the Court, but that I could not see any sabotaging of the Court in the suggestion that this method be avoided at the present time in order not to jeopardize a larger plan for the solution of all Antarctic claims.

In touching on such a larger plan I mentioned that one idea we were studying is the possibility of establishing a special United Nations trusteeship. He took strong exception to this thought, asking how it would be possible to keep the Soviet Union from being one of the trustees since the Soviets have a claim based on the voyage of a Russian ship to the area over a hundred years ago. He expressed his personal opinion as being absolutely opposed to a trusteeship. Among other objections, he mentioned the strategic value to us of control of passage around Cape Horn in the event that the Panama Canal proved vulnerable.

He asked what the United States attitude would be if Chile or Argentina consulted us about submitting the dispute to the International Court for adjudication. He assumed that Chile would consult us, but that probably Argentina would not. It was important to the British to know whether we would advise the nation, if consulted, on the attitude to take. I told him I was not prepared to express a definite view on this point as it had not been raised so far with the other interested Divisions. Offhand I supposed that the principles I had already outlined to him would apply; specifically, we were likely to be governed by the thought that a general solution of the whole Antarctic problem should not be jeopardized by any premature action.

He was not sure whether the notes had actually been delivered to the Chilean and Argentine Governments. He would find out and let me know. He would be gratified if we would notify our Embassies in Chile and Argentina that in case those Governments asked advice on action to be taken on the British note, our Embassies would consult the Department before expressing any opinion. I suggest that this be done as soon as we know whether the British notes have been delivered and whether they retain the paragraph about the International Court.

[BENJAMIN M. HULLEY]

² *Supra.*

800.014/12-1147

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1947.

Participants: Mr. Hadow, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Acting Chief, NOE
Mr. Caspar D. Green, NOE

Mr. Hadow, Counselor of the British Embassy, called on Mr. Hulley this morning to discuss the annexed letter and *aide-mémoire*.¹

He confirmed that the notes mentioned in his letter of December 10 [9]² were delivered to the Argentine and Chilean Governments, probably on December 16 or 17.

The reasons for the additional protest to Argentina are fully set forth in his letter and *aide-mémoire* dated December 22, 1947. Briefly this protest is evoked by new evidence of relatively large-scale Argentine activity, apparently part of a long-term project, in an area where Britain feels its claims are most firmly grounded. Instructions are telegraphed to the British mission in Buenos Aires to present the protest, and it has already been presented, unless the Ambassador there took the initiative in postponing action because of the status of the current British-Argentine trade negotiations.

In response to an inquiry as to what he expected would be the Argentine and Chilean reaction to these protests, Mr. Hadow emphasized strongly the view that this depends on the American attitude: If the Latin Americans were allowed to feel that they could look for United States backing for their position, they could be expected to ignore the protest and the suggested manner of settlement. Otherwise it would be difficult for them to overlook their UN obligation to accept the proposed submission of the dispute to the International Court.

Mr. Hulley remarked that the proposed court settlement would only be a partial settlement of the Antarctic territorial problem and that we regretted to see the issue sharpened before an overall settlement can be proposed.

Turning to more general aspects of the problem, Mr. Hadow spoke very earnestly of the need for Anglo-American cooperation. He said in his view the importance of Antarctica is strategic—which means that it is valuable to two nations alone: Britain and the United States.

¹ Neither the letter of December 22 from Hadow to Hulley nor the British Embassy *aide-mémoire* of the same date has been printed. Both documents had to do with the instructions of the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Argentina to protest against visits by at least eight Argentine naval vessels to Deception Island in the South Shetland Group, where, despite protests by the Resident British Magistrate, landings had been made and parties established (800.014 Antarctic/12-2247).

² See footnote 1 to the Hulley memorandum of December 16, p. 1057.

He referred to the importance to the United States of the Drake Straits if the Panama Canal were out of service. He said he hoped that we could let the British in very early on our thinking and plans for an Antarctic settlement, which could then be worked out in cooperation. He felt that it would be a serious error on our part to present the British with a completed plan which they would then have to take or leave. With regard to a UN trusteeship arrangement, he again stressed the difficulty of excluding the Soviet Union from a share in the control and operation of a multilateral trusteeship.

There is considerable merit in Mr. Hadow's suggestion that we should let the British in early on our ideas and plans for an Antarctic settlement so that we can work out the actual program in cooperation, rather than presenting them with a completed project which they must then accept or reject substantially. We should seriously consider giving them informally either our policy memorandum on the subject, with slight modifications, or a summary outline of it as soon as preliminary reactions are received from the other Departments of the US Government. This might suitably be done before any approach is made to Argentina, Chile or the other claimant countries, as British acceptance of any final proposal made by us will be the key factor in its workability. The position which the British have now taken vis-à-vis Argentina and Chile is in line with our secondary position, i.e., the presentation of claims and the submission of the matter to the International Court, in case the more desirable alternative of joint trusteeship control fails to receive the support of the other interested countries.

BENJAMIN M. HULLEY

800.014 Antarctic/12-2447: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 24, 1947—2 p. m.

6619. We have discussed Instruction No. 485 of December 8¹ with Foreign Office officials charged Antarctic and South American affairs and found them greatly concerned with present situation at Deception Island, of which statedly British Embassy Washington has informed Department. Foreign Office now considering recommendations for presentation to Cabinet in late January as to action to take with Argentina if no satisfactory reply received to protest made at Buenos Aires. Department's views on general Antarctic question will be made known to Cabinet at that time.

¹ *Ante*, p. 1053.

From informal conversations, it appears Foreign Office thinking now runs along this line: Argentine intrusion at Deception Island, to which UK has unquestioned legal title, apparently is testing operation which may be followed by similar intrusion at inhabited South Georgia and in long run at Falklands if firm measures are not taken to stop such actions now. UK must also keep in mind effect of such actions on general Latin American attitude towards other British possessions in western hemisphere. Therefore, Foreign Office and Colonial Office will recommend firm attitude to Cabinet. Such recommendations may not be accepted but they will be made.

In view presence eight to ten Argentine naval vessels at Deception, action recommended may include (1) sending British naval vessels which will suggest withdrawal Argentine vessels, (2) sending British naval vessels but saying nothing, allowing their presence speak for themselves, and (3) asking UN to request Argentina to submit question to court. Officials stated it had already been planned to send RN sloop *Snipe* with Governor of Falklands on inspection trip to Deception (US Navy was about to be notified of intention) but this was hurriedly canceled as *Snipe* is not representative enough boat. Feeling is if Governor goes, he should have naval vessel or vessels adequate maintain his prestige in presence Argentine vessels.

Official was interested in statement US position would be formulated shortly but felt that continued delay of action by UK would simply operate to strengthen [Argentine?] and weaken British position.

He therefore hoped some definitive US views might be available in London before recommendations were submitted to UK Cabinet. Speaking personally, he thought UN action would appeal to British Cabinet and Parliament but it was not so highly regarded in Foreign Office and Colonial Office. Nevertheless, Foreign Office was coming around to view it was feasible.

We gained impression Foreign Office feels UK cannot delay making its position known to Argentina much longer and that it would like to have some guidance as to US attitude before Cabinet decision is taken. There is, of course, fair possibility Cabinet will desire avoid opening controversy with Argentina at this time in view trade and other relations.

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