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[s.l.]: [s.n.], 1945

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

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It is the only existing international agreement providing machinery for establishing and guaranteeing Korean sovereign independence & for United Korean nation.

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PRESS RELEASE #3

(To be issued approximately 5 days after the issuance of Press Release #2.)

In a previous release (#2--date, etc.), the phases and steps by which Korea will obtain its independence were described for the people of Korea. The purpose of this release is to describe in detail the steps of the first phase.

The object of the first phase is the establishment of a provisional government, and in step one of that phase, the object is for the Joint Corrission to obtain by consultation with Korean leaders the views of the people of Korea on the structure and organization of the provisional government as well as its rights and powers.

The Joint Corrission will determine the parties and groups with which it will consult. These parties and groups will send their representatives who will make clear to the Joint Corrission the views of the people that they represent. Of course, not all the many parties and groups in Korea can be consulted. It is expected therefore that the Joint Corrission will consult parties of significant and broad membership including a substantial number of people. In addition to having the proper degree of strength and importance, a party or group to be consulted must sign the declaration contained in Corrunique No. 5 and after signing that declaration must restrain itself from instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. Naturally, those Koreans who appear before the Corrission will confine their discussion to those matters which are up for discussion. Matters which are to be discussed, and the sequence of discussion, will be determined by the Corrission at the proper time; matters which are outside the scope of the work of the Commission will not be discussed at all. Any individual who persists in raising a subject outside the scope of the discussion may be interfered with by the Chairman; in that case, his party or group will be required

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to furnish a representative who will cooperate with the work of the Commission.

Herewith are listed the type of general subjects which will probably be included for discussion in the first step:

1. Rights of the people under government.

2. General type or character of the provisional government to be established.

3. The organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions.

4. Local organs of authority.

5. Judicial organs.

6. Political policies.

7. Economic policies.

8. Educational and cultural policies.

~~The final phase is covered in the following paragraph~~

With full consideration to the views of Korean parties and groups, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of the Korean Provisional Government. After the Joint Commission has completed its proposals for the provisional government (step two), they will be presented to the four powers (United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China) for their consideration, ~~will be~~ the final decision (step three) made by the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R. After decision by the governments, the Provisional Government of Korea will be inaugurated (step four). It ~~will be~~ expected that allied guidance will ~~be exercised over~~ this government ~~in its inauguration~~ will be a long step toward Korean independence. The allies who made great sacrifices in breaking the power of Japan over Korea must be assured that the government of Korea will stand and develop in an orderly, democratic manner without undue influence from any outside power.

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

31 January 1947.

Memorandum to: Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT: Press Releases by Joint Commission.

Reference: (a) Draft press release recently transmitted by you. (Attached)

1. Attached is a program of two press releases to be issued by the Joint Commission. A third release in tentative form and a listing of two additional releases (total - five) is included.

2. This program is in line with your suggestion in Reference (a).

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U.S.A.

Incls.
(1) Same as Ref. (a)
(2) Schedule of Press Releases with 5 Incls.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

PRESS RELEASE TRANSMITTED BY LT. GENERAL J. R. HODGE

In talking to Korean leaders, it becomes more and more apparent that the good people of South Korea do not understand the function of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission. Many of them seem to think that when the Commission brings in Korean representatives for consultation, it will become a debating society or a forum to discuss the pros and cons of the Moscow Decision and that possibly modification in that Decision will be made. Such a concept is entirely erroneous.

The purpose of the Joint Commission when it meets is to implement the Moscow Decision, and discussion with consultees will be confined to ways and means for this implementation. The first step prescribed by the Moscow Decision is the formation of a Korean Provisional Government of all Korea (joined into one nation). During this phase Koreans called in for consultation will be asked to present plans and ideas on the type of government, manner of forming it, representation, etc.

The second step, as prescribed by the Moscow Decision, comes after the Provisional Government is formed, when the members of the Joint Commission, working with and consulting the Korean Provisional Government and Korean leaders, will work out measures for helping and assisting the Korean people for a period of up to five years in political, economic and social progress in order to insure that they develop democratic self-government and complete national independence.

It should be kept in mind by all Koreans that the working out of these measures are done "with the participation of the Korean Provisional Government and Korean Democratic organizations", and that the proposals therefore "shall be submitted following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and China." These facts establish ample safeguards for the protection of the Korean nation and its independence.

(NOTE: This proposed release was drafted by Gen. Hodge and transmitted to the Joint Commission. It has been used as a theme in the series of releases attached.)

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SCHEDULE OF PRESS RELEASES

1. Progress in Implementation of Moscow Decision. (Inclosure 1)

   a. Adjournment of Joint Commission and exchange of letters with North Korea.

   b. Effects of Korean agitation against trusteeship.

   c. Purpose and importance of forthcoming press releases.

2. Outline of all phases and steps by which Korean independence will be obtained. (Enclosure 2)

3. The first phase -- creation of a Provisional Government. (Inclosure 3) (In tentative form only)

4. The second phase -- formulation of measures for effecting Korean independence. (Inclosure 4) (Not yet prepared)

5. Resume. (Inclosure 5) (Not yet prepared)

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[illegible] #1

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible], 1946, the CC U.S.F.I.K announced the adjournment of the Joint Commission. The announcement which was included in a special press release of that date explained the reasons for the adjournment. It also explained the problem problem in the disagreement which caused the adjournment. Since that time, there have been several [illegible] letters between General Chistiakov, as Chief Representative for each zone, in an effort to resolve the differences and reconvene the Commission. The proposals which have been exchanged were given full publicity by the CC U.S.F.I.K in Korea. In the January 11 release extracts were given from the most recent letters between the two commanders. The problem centers around the constant [illegible] of correspondence. The United States maintains that the right of freedom of expression cannot be [illegible] in the matter of implementation of the Moscow agreement. The object of the exchange of letters has been to attempt to arrive at a formula whereby both sides would agree that the exercise of the freedom of expression would not unjustly penalize any group which might voice opposition to some features of the Moscow agreement. At the same time, an agreed formula must assure that no group will be permitted to interfere with the [illegible] purposes of the work of the Joint Commission or disrupt its proceedings by fomenting and instituting active opposition. The attitude of some Koreans toward the Moscow agreement has made necessary an agreement on such a formula before further discussions can be held by the Joint Commission.

Since the Moscow agreement was first announced over a year ago, there have been a number of outbursts of antagonism against the "trusteeship" feature. "Trusteeship", in respect to Korea, however, has never been defined and no one can possibly know what it means until the Joint Commission determines its concrete form in

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consultation with representatives of the Korean people. This antagonism toward trusteeship contributed materially to the cause of the adjournment of the Commission last May, and since that date has occupied much time, energy, and attention of Korean leaders. These leaders would be much more patriotic to spend their time and energy on constructive matters, and an effort to cooperate in advancing Korean independence, rather than taking actions which hinder the union of North and South Korea and thus jeopardize the cause of Korean independence.

In order to insure that there will be no further misunderstanding of the Moscow Agreement or the functions of the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission, the Commission will issue during the next few weeks a series of releases. A careful study of these forthcoming releases will show Koreans the importance of avoiding entirely ill-advised actions which can serve only to delay and consequently delay the achievement of Korean independence. The progress of the Commission's work. A careful study of these releases will also show how free Korean patriots can exercise the maximum amount of influence in the formation of the Provisional Government.

It is pertinent to point out that there is no instrument other than the Moscow Agreement which now provides the measures for the achievement of Korean independence.

ALBERT F. BROWN
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief Commissioner

ENCLOSURE "1"

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PRESS RELEASE #2

STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER

(To be issued approximately 5 days after the issue of Press Release #1.

As indicated in my statement #1, in my talks with Koreans of all ~~classes~~ leadership, it has become more and more apparent to me that the people of Southern Korea do not understand clearly either the Moscow Agreement or the functions of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

The Moscow Agreement was not conceived in the spirit of binding Korea under foreign domination, although this misunderstanding is widespread among Koreans and appears to be furthered by some of the leaders for their own purposes.

On the contrary, the Four Allied Powers - Great Britain, China, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., after ~~agreed~~ having passed on the question of Korea by the end of the war agreed to the complete independence of Korea by a series of orderly steps, particular care being taken to prevent Korea from coming under the domination of any foreign power, including any of the Allied Powers.

The conditions of the post-war world could not be foreseen at the time the Agreement was made, and even at this date the political and economic pattern of the world is somewhat clouded.

As for the Joint Commission which was created by the Moscow Agreement, many Koreans mistakenly think that when the Commission brings in Korean representatives for consultation, the Joint Commission will become a debating society or a forum to discuss modifications in the Moscow Agreement. Such a concept is entirely erroneous.

Recent events have convinced me of the importance of issuing a series of statements explaining the procedure under the Moscow Agreement by which Korea will become independent. ~~Some~~ Many Koreans who have discussed the Moscow Agreement and its actual meaning with members of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission appeared to be satisfied that the Moscow Agreement as explained in the discussions was in no way detrimental to Korea. The following procedure is envisaged in the Moscow Agreement. It is here divided into ~~six~~ Probable

INCLOSURE 2

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phases and steps for purposes of clarity.

I. Phase One. The Establishment of the Provisional Government.

Step One

The Joint Commission will meet with Korean leaders of political parties and social groups to obtain their views as to the formation and organization of the Provisional Government of Korea. Views on the economic development of the country will also be obtained.

Step Two

With full consideration of the views of the Korean leaders, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of the provisional government.

Step Three

The plan for the provisional government will then be presented to the four powers: United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China for their consideration. The final decision will then be made by the United States and U.S.S.R.

Step Four

The Provisional Government of Korea will then be inaugurated and will assume the responsibility for governing a united Korea ~~under~~ with temporary guidance of the Allies to insure that the government is stable and democratic and that Korean independence is guaranteed.

II. Phase Two. The Formulation of Measures for Effecting Korean Independence.

Step One

The Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the Korean democratic organizations will work out the details of measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

Step Two

The proposed measures arrived at by the Joint Commission will be submitted to the governments of the United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom of

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China, and Great Britain for working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

It is this second phase of the program to which certain Koreans take exception, apparently solely because the word "trusteeship" was used in the text of the Agreement, and without thought as to the nature of the help and protection it would bring.

III. Phase Three. Korean Independence.

The consumation of the four power agreement reached in Phase Two will result in the complete sovereign independence of Korea.

This is a general outline only. I will follow this statement with others and will take up in detail ~~each phase~~ of the steps which I have indicated above. I am certain that only in this way will there come an understanding by the Korean people of the procedures set up by the Moscow Agreement for Korean independence. I strongly advise all Koreans to carefully and critically question any individual who would try to lead you to believe that the Moscow Agreement is an instrument for the enslaving of Korea. I would urge that you ask these persons whether or not they have read an official copy of the Moscow Agreement or whether their version of the Agreement is made up from rumors and statements of others.

The Moscow ~~Agreement~~ Decision is an existing treaty solemnly agreed upon by four great powers for the evolvement of an independent Korea. Know that document thoroughly. It is the only existing international agreement providing a way for establishing and guaranteeing Korean sovereign independence for united Korea.

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PRESS RELEASE #3

(To be issued approximately 5 days after the issuance of Press Release #2.)

In a previous release (#2--date, etc.), the phases and steps by which Korea will obtain its independence were described for the people of Korea. The purpose of this release is to describe in detail step one of the first phase.

The object of the first phase is the establishment of a provisional government, and in step one of that phase, the object is for the Joint Commission to obtain by consultation with Korean leaders the views of the people of Korea on the structure and organization of the provisional government as well as its rights and powers.

The Joint Commission will determine the parties and groups with which it will consult. These parties and groups will send their representatives who will make clear to the Joint Commission the views of the people that they represent. Of course, not all the many parties and groups in Korea can be consulted. The Commission is therefore expected to consult parties of importance and whose membership includes a substantial number of people. In addition to having the prerequisite degree of strength and importance, a party or group to be consulted must sign the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 and after signing that declaration must restrain itself from instituting active opposition to the Moscow Decision. Naturally, those Koreans who appear before the Commission will be confined to discussion of those questions which are up for discussion. Matters which are to be taken up in the various phases of the proceedings will be discussed at the proper time; matters which are outside the scope of the work of the Commission will not be discussed at all. Any individual who persists in raising a subject outside the scope of the discussion may so interfere with proceedings as to make himself ineligible for further consultation. In that case this party or group will be required

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to furnish a representative who will cooperate with the work of the Commission.

Herewith are listed the type of general subjects which will probably be included for discussion in the first step:

1. Rights of the people under government.

2. General type or character of the provisional government to be established.

3. The organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions.

4. Local organs of authority.

5. Judicial organs.

6. Political policies.

7. Economic policies.

8. Educational and cultural policies.

The final phase is covered in the following paragraph:

With full consideration to the views of Korean parties and groups, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of the Korean Provisional Government. After the Joint Commission has completed its proposals for the provisional government (step two), they will be presented to the four powers (United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China) for their consideration. The final decision will be made by the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R. After decision by the governments, the Provisional Government of Korea will be inaugurated (step four). It must be expected that allied guidance will be exercised over this government. Its inauguration will be a long step toward Korean independence. The allies who made great sacrifices in breaking the power of Japan over Korea must be assured that the government of Korea will stand and develop in an orderly, democratic manner without undue influence from any outside power.

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PRESS RELEASE #4

THE SECOND PHASE--FORMATION OF MEASURES FOR EFFECTING KOREAN INDEPENDENCE

(To be drafted)

INCLOSURE 4

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

PRESS RELEASE #5

RESUME

(To be drafted)

INCLOSURE 5

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
APO 235-2

5 February 1947

STATEMENT BY LIEUT. GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

My recent discussions with Korean leaders indicate that some people of South Korea do not understand completely the function of the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission. Such people erroneously believe that one purpose of the Commission's consulting with Korean representatives is to modify the Moscow Decision.

The actual purpose of the Joint Commission is to put into practical operation the provisions of the Moscow Decision. Discussion with consultees will be confined to ways and means for this implementation. The first step prescribed by the Moscow Decision is the formation of a Korean Provisional Government of all Korea (joined into one nation.) During this phase, Koreans called in for consultation will be asked to present plans and ideas on the type of government, manner of forming it, representation, etc.

The second step, also prescribed by the Moscow Decision, comes after the Provisional Government is formed, when members of the Joint Commission, working with and consulting the Korean Provisional Government and Korean leaders, will work out measures for aiding and assisting the Korean nation for a period of up to five years in political, economic and social progress in order to insure that the Korean people develop a stable, democratic self-government and to insure complete Korean national independence.

Koreans must remember that these subsequent measures are to be worked out "with the participation of the Korean Provisional Government and Korean Democratic organizations," and the proposals then for "shall be submitted following consultation with the Provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and China." These facts establish ample safeguards and insurance for the protection of the re-born Korean nation and guarantee its future sovereign independence.

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公報部特別発表

국련 임시 한국 위원단의 성명

一九四七年三月五日

국련 임시 한국 위원단은 조선 인민의 대표와 협의하여 조선 독립 정부를 수립하기 위하여 조선 남부에서 실시될 국련 감시 하의 선거 준비 사업을 협의하기 위하여 서울에 모였다. 우리

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8 Feb 47

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

(First in a series of five reports by Maj. Gen. Albert L. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission.)

PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE MOSCOW DECISION

On May 8, 1946, the CG USAFIK announced the adjournment of the Joint Commission. The announcement which was included in a special press release of that date explained the reason for the adjournment. It also explained the American position in the disagreement which caused the adjournment.

Since that time, there has been several interchanges of letters between General Hodge and General Chistiakov, the Soviet Commander in North Korea, in an effort to resolve the disagreement and reconvene the Commission. The present status of this correspondence was given in a press release by the CG USAFIK on January 11. In the January 11 release extracts were given from the most recent letters between the two commanders. The American position has remained constant throughout the entire exchange of correspondence. The United States insists that the right of freedom of expression cannot be denied to Koreans in the matter of implementation of the Moscow Agreement.

The object of the exchange of letters has been to attempt to arrive at a formula whereby both nations would agree that the exercise of this freedom of expression would not unjustly penalize any group which might voice opposition to some features of the Moscow Agreement. At the same time, an agreed formula must assure that no group will be permitted to interfere with the orderly progress of the work of the Joint Commission or disrupt its proceedings by fomenting and instigating active opposition. The adamant attitude of some Koreans toward the Moscow Agreement has made necessary an agreement on such a formula before further discussions can be held by the Joint Commission.

Since the Moscow Agreement was first announced over a year ago, there have been a number of outbursts of antagonism against the "trusteeship" feature. "Trusteeship", in respect to Korea, however, has never been defined and no one can possibly know what it means until the Joint Commission determines its concrete form in consultation with representatives of the Korean people. This antagonism toward trusteeship contributed materially to the cause of the adjournment of the Commission last May, and since that date has occupied much time, energy, and attention of Korean leaders. These leaders would be much more patriotic to spend their times and energy on constructive matters and an effort to cooperate in establishing a Korean Provisional Government and through it, Korean independence, rather than taking actions which hinder the union of North and South Korea and thus jeopardize the cause of Korean independence.

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SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE Cont'd:

In order to insure that there will be no further misunderstanding of the Moscow Agreement or the functions of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission, the American Delegation of this Commission will issue during the next few weeks a series of releases. A careful study of these forthcoming releases will show Koreans the importance of avoiding untimely and ill-advised actions which can serve only to delay the progress of the Commission's work and consequently delay your national independence. A careful study of these releases will also show how true Korean patriots can exercise the maximum amount of influence in the formation of the Provisional Government.

It is pointed out that there is now no instrument other than the Moscow Agreement which provides the measures for the achievement of Korean independence.

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

11 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER, XXIV CORPS:

SUBJECT: Press Release.

1. Attached hereto is the second press release to be released in the name of General Brown. Request that you release this one on Friday, 14 February, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel CE

1 Incl.
Press Rel.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

PRESS RELEASE #2

(Second in a series of reports by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation of the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission.)

PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE MOSCOW DECISION

As indicated in my statement #1, in my talks with Koreans of all ideologies, it has become more and more apparent to me that the people of Southern Korea do not understand clearly either the Moscow Agreement or the functions of the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

The Moscow Agreement was not conceived in the spirit of binding Korea under foreign domination, although this misunderstanding is widespread among Koreans and appears to be furthered by some of the leaders for their own purposes.

On the contrary, the Four Allied Powers--Great Britain, China, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.--after making possible the liberation of Korea by their all-out efforts in war, agreed to the complete independence of Korea by a series of orderly steps, particular care being taken to prevent Korea from coming under the domination of any foreign power, including any single Allied Powers.

The conditions of the post-war world could not be foreseen at the time the Agreement was made, and even at this date the political and economic pattern of the world is somewhat clouded.

As for the Joint Commission which was created by the Moscow Agreement, many Koreans mistakenly think that when the Commission brings in Korean representatives for consultation, the Joint Commission will become a debating society or a forum to discuss modifications in the Moscow Agreement. Such a concept is entirely erroneous.

Recent events have convinced me of the importance of issuing a series of statements explaining the procedure under the Moscow Agreement by which Korea will become independent. Many Koreans who have discussed the Moscow Agreement and its actual meaning with members of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission appeared to be satisfied that the Moscow Agreement as explained in the dis-

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cussions was in no way detrimental to Korea. The following procedure is envisaged in the Moscow Agreement. It is here divided into its probable phases and steps for purposes of clarity.

I. Phase One. The Establishment of the Provisional Government.

Step One

The Joint Commission will meet with Korean leaders of political parties and social groups to obtain their views as to the formation and organization of the Provisional Government of Korea. Views on the economic development of the country will also be obtained.

Step Two

With full consideration of the views of the Korean leaders, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of the provisional government.

Step Three

The plan for the provisional government will then be presented to the four powers: United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China for their consideration prior to the final decision by the United States and U.S.S.R.

Step Four

The Provisional Government of Korea will then be inaugurated and will assume the responsibility for governing a united Korea with temporary guidance of the Allies to insure that the Korean Government fully develops and that Korean independence is guaranteed.

II. Phase Two. The Formulation of Measures for Effecting Korean Independence.

Step One

The Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the Korean democratic organizations will work out the details of measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

Step Two

The proposed measures arrived at by the Joint Commission will

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be submitted to the governments of the United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom of China, and Great Britain for working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

It is the second phase of the program to which certain Koreans take exception, apparently solely because the word "trusteeship" was used in the text of the Agreement, and without thought as to the nature of the help and protection intended.

III. Phase Three. Korean Independence.

The consummation of the four power agreement reached in Phase Two will result in the complete sovereign independence of Korea.

This is a general outline only. I will follow this statement with others and will take up in detail the steps which I have indicated above. I am certain that in this way will there come an understanding by the Korean people of the procedures set up by the Moscow Agreement for Korean independence. I strongly advise all Koreans to carefully and critically question any individual who would try to lead you to believe that the Moscow Agreement is an agreement for the enslaving of Korea. I would urge that you ask these persons whether or not they have studied an official copy of the Moscow Agreement or whether their version of the Agreement is made up from rumors and statements of others.

The Moscow Decision is an existing treaty solemnly agreed upon by four great powers for the evolvement of an independent Korea. It is the only existing international agreement providing any machinery for establishing and guaranteeing Korean sovereign independence for a united Korean nation.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

PRESS RELEASE: 14 February 1947

Item 1.

(Second in a series of reports by Major General Albert L. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.)

PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE MOSCOW DECISION

As indicated in my statement #1, in my talks with Koreans of all ideologies, it has become more and more apparent to me that the people of Southern Korea do not understand clearly either the Moscow Agreement or the functions of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

The Moscow Agreement was not conceived in the spirit of binding Korea under foreign domination, although this misunderstanding is widespread among Koreans and appears to be furthered by some of the leaders for their own purposes.

On the contrary, the Four Allied Powers -- Great Britain, China, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. -- after making possible the liberation of Korea by their all-out efforts in war, agreed to the complete independence of Korea by a series of orderly steps, particular care being taken to prevent Korea from coming under the domination of any foreign power, including any single Allied Power.

The conditions of the post-war world could not be foreseen at the time the Agreement was made, and even at this date the political and economic pattern of the world is somewhat clouded.

As for the Joint Commission which was created by the Moscow Agreement, many Koreans mistakenly think that when the Commission brings in Korean representatives for consultation, the Joint Commission will become a debating society or a forum to discuss modifications in the Moscow Agreement. Such a concept is entirely erroneous.

Recent events have convinced me of the importance of issuing a series of statements explaining the procedure under the Moscow Agreement by which Korea will become independent. Many Koreans who have discussed the Moscow Agreement and its actual meaning with members of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission appeared to be satisfied that the Moscow Agreement as explained in the discussions was in no way detrimental to Korea. The following procedure is envisaged in the Moscow Agreement. It is here divided into its probable phases and steps for purposes of clarity.

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PRESS RELEASES:
14 Febraury 1947

Item 1. (Cont'd)

I. Phase One. The Establishment of the Provisional Government.

Step One

The Joint Commission will meet with Korean Leaders of political parties and social groups to obtain their views as to the formation and organization of the Provisional Government of Korea. Views on the economic development of the country will also be obtained.

Step Two

With full consideration of the views of the Korean leaders, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of th provisional government.

Step Three

The plan for the provisional government will then be presented to the four powers: United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and China for their consideration prior to the final decision by the United States and U.S.S.R.

Step Four

The Provisional Government of Korea will then be inaugurated and will assume the responsibility for governing a united Korea with temporary guidance of the Allies to insur that the Korean Government fully develops and that Korean independence is guaranteed.

II. Phase Two. The Formulation of Measures for Effecting Korean Independence.

Step One

The Joint Commission with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the Korean Democratic organizations will work out the details of measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

Step Two

The proposed measures arrived at by the Joint Commission will be submitted to the governments of the United States, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom of China, and Great Britain for working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea, period of up to five years.

It is the second phase of the program to which certain Koreans take exception, apparently solely because the word "trusteeship" was used in the text of the Agreement, and without thought as to the nature of the help and protection intended.

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Item 1. (Cont'd)

III. Phase Three. Korean Independence.

The consummation of the four power agreement reached in Phase Two will result in the complete sovereign independance of Korea.

This is a general outline only. I will follow this statement with others and will take up in detail the steps which I have indicated above. I am certain that in this way will there come an understanding by the Korean people of the procedures set up by the Moscow Agreement for Korean independence. I strongly advise all Koreans to carefully and critically question any individual who would try to lead you to believe that the Moscow Agreement is an agreement for the enslaving of Korea. I would urge that you ask these persons whether or not they studied an official copy of the Moscow Agreement or whether their version of the Agreement is made up from rumors and statement of others.

The Moscow Decision is an existing treaty solemnly agreed upon by four powers for the evolvement of an independent Korea. It is the only existing international agreement providing any machinery for establishing and guaranteeing Korean sovereign independence for a united Korean nation.

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Item 2.

Chong No Provost Court handed down the following three convictions during the week ending February 8, CHANG Taik Sang, Chief of Area A and Division M, National Police, announced today:

SUK Ho Su	Convicted of possessiong a weapon illegally; sentenced to three years confinement at hard labor.
OH Jai Hyong	Convicted of illegal possession of a Japanese saber; sentenced to one year confinement at hard labor.
KIM Kyong Yul	Convicted of theft of electrical wire; sentenced to six months confinement at hard labor.

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Item 3.

The following statement was issued today by Major General Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor:

"Due to student absences in connection with recent strikes, which rendered impossible the completion of acceptable academic progress, all American teachers, of Seoul University classes whose personnel have been involved in strikes have been removed. Those instructors, whose services have been

(More)

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PRESS RELEASES:
14 February 1947

Item 3. (Cont'd)

supplied to the University without charge, receive total annual pay of $39,785. Their transfer will be a distinct loss to the University."

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Item 4.

In every country there are people who are concerned with joining together to help those who cannot help themselves. Paying no attention to differences of political belief, religious creed and race, they have one main objective - to ease suffering in time of need during peace-time.

In Korea, as in all other lands throughout the world, there are many prominent and public-spirited citizens who have expressed their desire to organize a Korean [illegible] to the needs of the people of Korea. Korean leaders are being encouraged by Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor, to take part in the establishment of the worthy organization.

"The Korean Red Cross," said Major General Lerch, "should be a charitable organization composed of people who come together with the sincere purpose of helping others to help themselves. In such an organization, the differences of political belief, religious creed and race are forgotten in the endeavor to alleviate suffering."

When the Korean Red Cross is fully organized, it should follow the general philosophies and principles of all Red Cross societies. At some time in the future it may wish to become a member of the League of Red Cross Societies, whose function is to coordinate peacetime activities of national Red Cross societies throughout the world, particularly as they affect disaster relief, education, health and similar matters.

The American Red Cross has been requested by General Lerch to assist in an advisory capacity in the organization of the Korean Red Cross and the General Lerch will grant a charter to the new organization after the organizational work has been completed.

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Item 5.

The American Language Institute is offering a special course "Teaching Methods for Teaching English" beginning Monday, February 17 at the Seoul Library Annex, YU Uck Ayun, Director of the Department of Education, announced today.

This course, which will be given by instructors from the United States, is open to Middle School and College English teachers. It will meet Monday, Wednesday and Friday evenings of each week from 6:00 to 9:00 p.m. The last day of registration will be Friday, February 14, at the Seoul Library Annex building from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m.

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

15 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER, XXIV CORPS:

SUBJECT: Press Release.

1. Attached hereto is the third press release to be released in the name of General Brown. Request that you release this one on Tuesday, 18 February, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel CE

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Press Rel

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PRESS RELEASE #3

(Third in a series of reports by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation of the U. S. - Soviet Joint Commission.)

FIRST PHASE IN PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING MOSCOW DECISION
Creation of the Provisional Government

In a previous release, #2 dated February 14th, the phases and steps by which Korea will obtain its independence were described for the people of Korea. The purpose of this release is to describe in detail the steps of the first phase.

The object of the first phase is the establishment of a Provisional Government, and in step one of that phase, the object is for the Joint Commission to obtain by consultation with Korean leaders the views of the people of Korea on the structure and organization of the Provisional Government as well as its rights and powers.

The Joint Commission will determine the parties and groups with whom it will consult. These parties and groups will send their representatives who will make clear to the Joint Commission the views of the people that they represent. Of course, not all of the many parties and groups in Korea can be consulted. There are too many. It is to be expected therefore that the Joint Commission will consult parties of importance and whose membership includes a substantial number of people. In addition to having the proper degree of strength and importance, a party or group to be consulted must sign the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 and after signing that declaration must restrain itself from instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. Naturally, those Koreans who appear before the Commission will confine their discussion to those questions which are up for discussion. Matters which are to be taken up in the various phases of the proceedings will be discussed in sequence and at the proper time; matters which are outside the scope of the work of the Commission will not be discussed at all. Any individual who persists in raising a subject outside the scope of the discussion may so interfere with proceedings as to make himself ineligible for further consultation. In that case, his party or group will be required to furnish a representative who

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will cooperate with the work of the Commission.

Herewith are listed the type of general subjects which will probably be included for discussion in the first step:

1. Rights of the people under government.

2. General type or character of the provisional government to be established.

3. The organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions.

4. Local organs of authority.

5. Judicial organs.

6. Political policies.

7. Economic policies.

8. Educational and cultural policies.

With full consideration to the views of Korean parties and groups, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of the Korean Provisional Government. After the Joint Commission has completed its proposals for the provisional government (step two), they will be presented to the four powers (United States, U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China) for their consideration before the final decision is made by the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R. (step three). After decision by the governments, the Provisional Government of Korea will be inaugurated (step four). It is expected that allied guidance will be given this government to get it underway. Its inauguration will be a long step toward Korean independence. The allies who made great sacrifices in breaking the power of Japan over Korea must be assured that the government of Korea will stand and develop in an orderly, democratic manner without undue influence from any outside power.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

15 February 1947

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

The following statement was issued today by Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK:

"Since our arrival in Korea the Americans have worked with the Korean people in the preliminary steps essential to an independent Korea. In carrying on this work many thousands of Americans have foregone the privilege of living comfortably at home with their own families in order to aid the Korean cause. They have worked diligently for long hours in a strange land in their efforts to accomplish the American mission of reestablishing a stable, free and democratic Korea to take its place in the family of nations.

"In spite of our mutual aspirations for Korean independence, progress has been slow because of factors which are beyond your control and my power. My personal disappointment in the delays can be measured by your own. But I assure you that I have not given up. I am confident that Korean independence will come and that full cooperation between the Koreans and the Allied Powers will speed the day.

"Korean independence has been pledged by the Allies on more than one occasion. The ways and means of fulfilling these promises were stipulated in the Moscow Decision, agreed to by the Great Powers to carry out concretely their promises. The terms of this decision are far more definite than the phrase 'in due course' as stated in the Cairo Declaration. The Moscow Decision has two objectives: - first, the establishment of a Korean Democratic Provisional Government and second, stabilizing the Korean Government and nation by the Four Powers through helping and assisting a reborn Korea. As an agent to carry out their will, the signatory Powers set up the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission to accomplish these two objectives. In making plans to realize these objectives, the Joint Commission is required to consult with Korean leaders of democratic parties and organizations.

"In April 1946 the Joint U.S. - Soviet Commission during its sessions issued a Joint Communique No. 5 which prescribed a declaration to qualify those who signed it to be consultees with the Joint Commission. Unfortunately, the Joint Commission later adjourned indefinitely over the issue of full freedom of expression advocated by the U.S. delegates.

"In efforts to reconvene the Joint Commission, the U.S. and Soviet Commands in Korea have exchanged several letters. The Americans have always felt that signing the Joint Communique No. 5 is sufficient evidence of willingness to join in carrying out the work of the Joint Commission, and that it should open the door of consultation to those Korean patriots who have a sincere wish to work with and cooperate with the Joint Commission in its highly important task of working out the details for an independent Korea. The Americans have not and will not change their stand on freedom of expression by Koreans in consultation with the Joint Commission.

"The word 'Trusteeship' appears to carry a sinister meaning to many patriotic Koreans and is a stumbling block to clear understanding.

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It means that the Allies will give some form of help and assistance to the new Korean nation, the exact nature of which will have to be worked out by the Joint Commission. It means the maintaining of the stability of the Korean Provisional Government and the development of Korean independence with the assistance of the Allied Nations. As stated, the second task of the Joint Commission is to work out the details of this arrangement with the participation of the Provisional Government and democratic groups.

"I am fully aware of the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the word 'trusteeship' which in the minds of some Koreans has even a connotation of national strangulation and complete subservience to foreign nations. This is absurd, but it illustrates the attitude of many who blindly hate an as yet undefined arrangement. I wish I knew how to cause all Koreans to understand and to place their full confidence in the Allies, who sacrificed so much to liberate Koreans and who have pledged Korean independence. I recognize that the idea of sovereignty is sacred to Koreans. I also know that the intent of the Moscow Decision is to reestablish that Korean sovereignty so firmly that it will not again be threatened.

"I am also sure that these Korean patriots, who insist upon complete sovereignty for their country, would not want to do anything that may hurt their cause. Unfortunately, because of the riots last fall in Southern Korea, the Allies' confidence in the capability of Koreans in maintaining law and order may already have been somewhat shaken. Any movement, no matter how noble and patriotic the intentions may be, if it brings about disturbances or disorders, can only put a stigma on Korea. Korean leaders must understand that there are persons both inside and outside of Korea who would welcome disorders so that they might aggrandize their personal ends.

"Throughout history all successful patriotic movements were conducted in proper timing. Likewise, Korean patriotic movements should be well timed. During the past year a majority of Koreans made it clear to the world that they dislike the term 'Trusteeship'. Disorders arising from well-intentioned 'peaceful demonstrations' can only militate against the interests of Korea and delay the advent of full sovereign independence. My superiors and the U.S. Government officials are fully aware of the interpretation placed on the word 'Trusteeship' by a large number of the Korean people. The attitude of the opponents to the term is well known throughout the world. However, I feel that Koreans should welcome the re-opening of the Joint Commission and be anxious to help it establish a democratic Provisional Government with the consultation of Korean leaders. When the detailed measures for "helping and assisting" core under consideration, it is expected that Korean consultees will express clearly their opinions as to the character of these measures. By doing so, the Korean Provisional Government and Korean leaders will make a constructive contribution in determining the nature and terms of help and assistance for a re-born Korea and in guiding the future of their country.

"We must bear in mind that the Korean problem has an international aspect. Neither you nor I can change a word of the Moscow Decision. Some Koreans seem to believe that a nation-wide movement against 'Trusteeship' may impress the signatory Powers so as to change the agreement. There is no guarantee but that the effect may be quite different. It is far more important to utilize an already existing international agreement to unite your nation to get your Provisional Government and to establish your independence than to continue social turmoil over the use by the great Allied Powers of an instrument that is still to be worked out with the participation

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of your own patriots.

"I earnestly urge that you not bring about unpatriotic consequences through an ill-advised patriotic movement and that you discontinue agitation that can only delay the establishment of a Provisional Government for a united Korea.

"I give you this message, not only in the official capacity of Commanding General of the American Forces in Southern Korea, but also as a warm and personal friend of Korea and her people, as one who is working constantly and without stint for the independence of your nation. I firmly believe that when Koreans unite together and cooperate with the efforts of the Allied Powers, the aspirations of the 30,000,000 people will soon be fulfilled.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

18 February 1947

PRESS RELEASES

Item 1:

Following is the status of the rice collection program as of February 15, CHEE Yong Eun, National Food Administrator, announced today:

Province	Quota	Collection	% of Quota
Chungchong Pukto	180,000	161,021	89
Chungchong Namdo	470,000	416,569	88
Cholla Pukto	798,000	430,920	54
Cholla Namdo	750,000	606,560	81
Kyongsang Pukto	720,000	460,694	64
Kyongsang Namdo	600,000	555,928	93
Kyonggi Do	775,000	675,030	87
Kangwon Do	60,000	105,305	175
Cheju Do	5,000	1,100	22
Total	4,358,000	3,415,207	78

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Item 2:

(Third in a series of reports by Maj.Gen. Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission)

FIRST PHASE IN PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING MOSCOW DECISION

Creation of the Provisional Government

The phases and steps by which Korea will obtain its independence already have been described for the people of Korea. The purpose of this report is to describe in detail the steps of the first phase.

The object of the first phase is the establishment of a Provisional Government, and in Step #1 of that phase the object is for the Joint Commission to obtain, by consultation with Korean leaders, the views of the people of Korea on the structure and organization of the Provisional Government, as well as its rights and powers.

The Joint Commission will determine the parties and groups with whom it will consult. These parties and groups will send their representatives who will make clear to the Joint Commission the views of the people whom they represent. Of course, not all of the many parties and groups in Korea can be consulted. There are too many. It is to be expected therefore that the Joint Commission will consult parties of importance and whose membership includes a substantial number of people.

In addition to having the proper degree of strength and importance, a party or group to be consulted must sign the declaration contained in Communique No.5

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PRESS RELEASES (CONT'D)
18 February 1947

Item 2 (cont'd)

and after signing that declaration must restrain itself from instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision.

Naturally, those Koreans who appear before the Commission will confine their discussion to those questions which are up for discussion. Matters which are to be taken up in the various phases of the proceedings will be discussed in sequence and at the proper time; matters which are outside the scope of the work of the Commission will not be discussed at all. Any individual who persists in raising a subject outside the scope of the discussion may so interfere with proceedings as to make himself ineligible for further consultation. In that case, his party or group will be required to furnish a representative who will cooperate with the work of the Commission.

Herewith are listed the type of general subjects which will probably be included for discussion in the first step:

1. Rights of the people under government.
2. General type or character of the provisional government to be established.
3. The origin or organs of authority of the central government to perform executive and legislative functions.
4. Local organs of authority.
5. Judicial organs.
6. Political policies.
7. Economic policies.
8. Educational and cultural policies.

With full consideration to the views of Korean parties and groups, the Joint Commission will draw up its proposals for the formation and organization of the Korean Provisional Government.

After the Joint Commission has completed its proposals for the provisional government (Step #2), they will be presented to the four powers (United States, USSR, Great Britain and China) for their consideration before the final decision is made by the governments of the United States and USSR (Step #3). After decision by the governments, the Provisional Government of Korea will be inaugurated (Step #4

It is expected that allied guidance will be a long step toward Korean independence. The allies who made great sacrifices in breaking the power of Japan over Korea must be assured that the government of Korea will stand and develop in an orderly, democratic manner without undue influence from any outside power.

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Item 3:

Those Koreans repatriated from Japan who are now making application to the Provincial Bureaus of Commerce for shipment of their property from that country to Korea are reminded that they will be responsible for all freight and shipping charges from the point of origin of shipment in Japan to the ultimate destination in Korea, OH Chung Soo, Director of the Department of Commerce, said today.

Applicant will make payment for those charges in Bank of Chosen yen at the time the property is delivered. However, in order that the individual owner may receive his property without undue difficulties, he need not be concerned with

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PRESS RELEASES(CONT'D)
18 February 1947

Item 3 (cont'd)
exchange between Chosen Yen and Japanese Yen.

The Provincial Bureaus of Commerce have received a substantial number of applications from repatriated Koreans. All persons who have planned to make application for the return of property from Japan, but who have neglected to do thi are urged to obtain the necessary forms from their Provincial Bureaus of Commerce a soon as possible. This is desirable since the Department of Commerce will set up a system of priorities favoring the earlier shipment of that property which will make the greater contribution to the economy of Korea.

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Item 4:

A conference of women teachers in Middle Schools in Seoul City will be held in Room 127, Capitol Building, at 1 p.m., Tuesday, February 18, to discuss the report of members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and the part women can play in establishing a democratic Korea, it was announced today by Dr. KOH Whang Kyung, Chief of the Women's Bureau, Department of Public Health and Welfare.

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Item 5:

Dr. MOON Chang Wook, Director of the Office of Foreign Affairs, announced today that on February 7 a total of 1,626 Koreans were repatriated to their native country via Sasebo, Japan, from China, Manchuria and Japan. This makes a total of 1,900,251, Koreans who have been repatriated to Korea from abroad.

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Item 6:

Farmers of Chungchong-Pukto will be better able to combat plant diseases and pests during the 1947 crop year than in the past. Recently a shipment of 11,012, kilograms of farm insecticides, purchased from the Inchon Farm Chemical Company by National KMA, was sent to KMA headquarters in that province, it was announced today by YI Chung Sou, Vice-President of KMA.

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Item 7:

Koreans desiring to travel outside the American-occupied zone should direct their inquiries to the Office of Foreign Affairs, Room 329, Capitol Building, and not to the American advisors of that office, MOON Chang Wook, director, has announced. Mr. Moon pointed out that all such inquiries are handled by the Korean staff of the office.

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Item 8:

The appointment of KIM Chul Su as Provincial Governor of Kyungsang Namdo

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PRESS RELEASES (CONT'D)
18 February 1947

Item 8 (cont'd)

was confirmed by the Interim Legislative Assembly on February 7, KIMM Kiu Sic, chairman of the Assembly, has announced in a letter to Brigadier General Charles G. Helmick, Deputy Military Governor.

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Item 9:

The appointment by Major General Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor, of KIM Chai Hong as Civil Administrator of Southern Korea was confirmed by the Interim Legislative Assembly on February 7, KIMM Kiu Sic, chairman of the Assembly, has announced.

"I may voice the sentiment of the Assembly that the choice was a wise one," Dr. KIMM declared in a letter to General Lerch.

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Item 10:

Plans proposed by the Weights and Measures Station for an educational program to acquaint the public with the Metric System were approved February 11 at the third general meeting of the Korean Standards Committee in the Conference Room of the Central Research Laboratories, OH Chung Soo, Director of the Department of Commerce, announced today.

AHN Tong Hyuk, Director of the Central Research Laboratories, suggested at the meeting that proposals for the organization of a Korean Bureau of Standards be submitted to a special committee for consideration and final decision.

After a tour of the laboratories of the Department of Commerce, LEE Ho Sik, Chief of the Weights and Measures Station, gave a brief report on his trip to Japan in the interests of the Weights and Measures Station.

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FOREIGN NEWS BRIEFS:

The International Broadcasting Division of the United States State Department initiated February 17 the first of a series of one-hour Russian language broadcasts it will beam to the U.S.S.R. This series of programs will originate in New York studios and be relayed through transmitters in Munich, Germany.

The first program of February 17 included a summary of worldwide news, an explanation of the differences between the laws and political structure of the various states of the Union, examples of United States folk and popular music, and a talk on scientific developments in the United States.

The purpose of these broadcasts will be to give listeners in the U.S.S.R. a picture of life in America, and to explain domestic problems and the attempts that are being made to solve them.

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COPY

Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT:

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	20 Feb.	C/S USAFIK	Gen. Weckerling J.C.	The Commanding General, USAFIK, has cancelled his approval, previously given, to the Memorandum U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, 17 February 1947. Papers are being returned direct. Press release will be rewritten and re-submitted and will include Paragraph 6 and the last senctence of Paragraph 7. Original release recommended for deletion. TWH c/s
2	20 Feb	Gen. Weckerling, J.C.	C.G. USAFIK	The proposed press release of the Joint Commission (Press Release No. 4) has been rewritten in accordance with Memo No. 1 above. Recommend release as written on or about 22 February. J.W.

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43

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20 Feb. 1947

PRESS RELEASE NO. 4

STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT L. BROWN
CHIEF OF AMERICAN DELEGATION, JOINT COMMISSION

A careful analysis of the Moscow Agreement shows that only misunderstanding can be the cause of the strong objection of some of the people of South Korea to the aid and assistance (trusteeship) provision of the Moscow Agreement. General Hodge has explained this matter as recently as his February 11th statement. The misunderstanding seems to be found in different definitions applied by each individual who objects to the word "trusteeship".

The principle of "self determination", as included in the 14 points proposed by President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, visualized a willingness of a nation which determined its own form of government, to become a peaceful, law abiding and cooperative member of the League of Nations. The League of Nations would guarantee the status quo of its member nations as regards interference by other nations.

The allied leaders who signed the Moscow Agreement visualized a troubled post-war world, a world in which small nations not protected by a League of Nations or other international agency might become the prey of more powerful nations seeking strategic frontiers or economic advantage.

In order to assure protection of such nations, who without armies and navies for their own protection must be secured by others, the United Nations Organization was proposed. Until the United Nations could become a powerful operating agency, it was necessary to guarantee security to those smaller nations unable to secure themselves. Under the Moscow Agreement, Great Britain, China, Russia and the United States guaranteed for a limited period of time the security and complete independence of Korea in the post-war world. This is the first meaning of "trusteeship".

In order that the world may live at peace, it is essential that all nations of the world remain stable. Should a small nation become shaken by internal dissension and disorder, it becomes a

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threat to the peace of the world. Korea, having been controlled by Japanese for over 40 years, requires considerable development along economic, industrial and technical lines as do other nations of the world. We are all aware that the technical knowledge and management experience required to guide such development is in some degree lacking to Korea because of the long Japanese domination and oppression. In order to insure a healthy, normal development of Korea which would enable it to participate on an equal basis of competition with other nations of the world and to assure internal peace and tranquility during this period of growth and progress, the Four Powers, in guaranteeing independence under the Moscow Agreement, undertook to aid and assist Korea for a period not to exceed five years during this development. This is the second meaning of the word "trusteeship" as it appears in the Moscow Agreement.

The Korean people have been dominated by the Japanese and prior to that by an absolute monarchy for such a long time, that they are, in general, unfamiliar with democratic procedures and ideals. It is perfectly natural, therefore, that a few political leaders thinking primarily of the present rather than the future of their party and country should endeavor to appeal to the hatred which the average Korean holds for the word "trusteeship" in order to gain political advantage. Such cheap political maneuvering, while aiding the immediate objective of the political leader, cannot but injure his ultimate prestige because he is misleading the people and, in fact, delaying the achievement of that independence which they all so justly and naturally desire.

The details of "trusteeship" and the exact manner in which it shall be exercised was not stated in the Moscow Agreement nor is it yet known to anyone. This is a matter which must be worked out under Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement between the Joint Commission and the Provisional Government of Korea. Even after these agencies in cooperation determine the degree of helping and assisting (trusteeship), and define the method of its application, their

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decision must go to the four great powers - namely, Great Britain, China, Russia and the United States, for confirmation.

There is no satisfactory translation of the word "trusteeship" from English or other European languages into the Korean language. The nearest translation into Korean - "shintak" - is both inadequate and inaccurate. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be under a foreign protectorate such as that imposed on Korea in 1905 by the Japanese prior to annexation. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be a part of the general trusteeship system of the United Nations. "Trusteeship" does not mean that it will become a mandate under the protection of any foreign power. As a matter of cold fact, the activity of certain Koreans in appealing to the United Nations for voiding the Moscow Agreement, if successful, could conceivably bring Korea under the United Nations trusteeship system indefinitely with consequent loss of its sovereignty.

It will remain the fixed objective of the United States to assure that the provisional government to be created under the Moscow Agreement will be one which will adequately and honestly reflect the desires of the Korean people and will work for their advancement toward independence. It is important to bear in mind that this provisional government will participate in any negotiations or discussions concerning trusteeship. If any necessity should ever arise for the Korean people to take exception to the extent of trusteeship worked out by their provisional government and the Joint Commission, the time when such exception should be taken is after the agreement has been worked out and the exact nature of "trusteeship" made known. It is only at this time that there can exist any real basis for complaint. At the present time the exact methods for helping and assisting (trusteeship) are unknown and will continue so until worked out by the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Government. The furore raised by certain politicians, therefore, resolves itself into objection to a mere word without practical meaning. The only result is to raise a question in the

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minds of those responsible for assisting Korea to her independence as to the stability and judgment of their political leaders and their ability to take over and control the destiny of their nation.

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[illegible] Commission

[illegible] 7 PRESS RELEASE NO. 4

[illegible] 46

[illegible] shows that any misunderstanding of the Moscow agreement [illegible] in the case of [illegible] direction of [illegible] (emphasis) [illegible] maximum working accommodation [illegible]

[illegible] Commission.

[illegible] Commission, [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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[illegible] to the peace of the world. Korea, having been [illegible] Japanese for over 40 years, requires considerable [illegible] economic, industrial and territorial lines as do [illegible] of the world. We are all aware that the technical knowledge and management experience is in some degree lacking to the Korean people, but such deficiencies are not such formidable barriers as to [illegible] of growth and progress, in the long run, [illegible] the Korean people, unfettered by foreign domination and control, will quickly develop internal political stability.

The people [illegible] of the Korean people and, in fact, delaying the attainment of that [illegible] which they all so justly and naturally desire.

61. The definition of "trusteeship" and the manner in which it shall be exercised are not stated in the Moscow Agreement nor are they yet known to anyone. This is a matter which must be worked out under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement between the Joint Commission and the Provisional Government of Korea. Even after consultation with the Korean people and political parties in cooperation determine the degree of and duration of trusteeship, (trusteeship), and define the method of its application, their decision must go to the four great powers, namely, Great

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Britain, China, Russia and the United States, for confirmation.

Q. 8. There is no satisfactory translation of the word "trusteeship" from English or other European languages into the Korean language. The nearest translation into Korean - "shintak" - is both inadequate and inaccurate. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be under a foreign protectorate such as that imposed on Korea in 1905 by the Japanese prior to annexation. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be a part of the general trusteeship system of the United Nations. "Trusteeship" does not mean that it will become a mandate under the protection of any foreign power. As a matter of cold fact, the activity of certain Koreans in appealing to the United Nations for voiding the Moscow Agreement, if successful, could conceivably bring Korea under the United Nations trusteeship system with consequent loss of its sovereignty.

A. 8. It will remain the fixed objective of the United States to ~~ascertain~~ assure that the provisional government to be created under the Moscow Agreement will be one which will adequately and honestly reflect the desires of the Korean people and will work for their advancement toward independence. It is important to bear in mind that this provisional government will participate in any negotiations or discussions concerning trusteeship. If any necessity should ever arise for the Korean people to take exception to the ~~degree~~ extent of trusteeship worked out by their provisional government and the Joint Commission, the time when such exception should be taken is after the agreement has been worked out and the ~~degree~~ exact nature of "Trusteeship" made known. It is only at this time that there will exist any real basis for complaint. At the present time the ~~measures~~ exact methods for and assisting ~~aims~~ (trusteeship) are unknown and will continue so until worked out by the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Government. The furore raised by certain politicians, therefore, resolves itself into objection to a mere word without practical meaning. The only result is to raise a question in the minds of those responsible for assisting Korea to gain independence as to the stability of their political leaders and their ability to take over and control the destiny of their nation.

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PRESS RELEASE NO. 4

STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN
CHIEF OF AMERICAN DELEGATION, JOINT COMMISSION

1. A careful analysis of the Moscow Agreement shows that only misunderstanding can be the cause of the strong objection of some of the people of South Korea to the aid and assistance (trusteeship) provision of the Moscow Agreement. General Hodge has explained this matter as recently as his February 11th statement. The misunderstanding seems to be found in different definitions applied by each individual who objects to the word "trusteeship".

2. The principle of "self determination", as included in the 14 points proposed by President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, visualized a willingness of a nation which determined its own form of government, to become a peaceful, law abiding and cooperative member of the League of Nations. The League of Nations would guarantee the status quo of its member nations as regards interference by other nations.

3. The Allied leaders who signed the Moscow Agreement visualized a troubled post-war world, a world in which small nations not protected by a League of Nations or other international agency might become the prey of more powerful nations seeking strategic frontiers or economic advantage.

4. In order to assure protection of such nations, who without armies and navies for their own protection must be secured by others, the United Nations Organization was proposed. Until the United Nations could become a powerful operating agency, it was necessary to guarantee security to those smaller nations unable to secure themselves. Under the Moscow Agreement, Great Britain, China, Russia and the United States guaranteed for a limited period of time the security and complete independence of Korea in the post-war world. This is the first meaning of "trusteeship".

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5. In order that the world may live at peace, it is essential that all nations of the world remain stable. Should a small nation become shaken by internal dissension and disorder, it becomes a threat to the peace of the world. Korea, having been controlled by Japanese for over 40 years, requires considerable development along economic, industrial and technical lines as do other nations of the world. We are all aware that the technical knowledge and management experience required to guide such development is in some degree lacking to Korea because of the long Japanese domination and oppression. In order to insure a healthy, normal development of Korea which would enable it to participate on an equal basis of competition with other nations of the world and to assure internal peace and tranquility during this period of growth and progress, the Four Powers, in guaranteeing independence under the Moscow Agreement, undertook to aid and assist Korea for a period not to exceed five years during this development. This is the second meaning of the word "trusteeship" as it appears in the Moscow Agreement.

6. The details of "trusteeship" and the exact manner in which it shall be exercised was not stated in the Moscow Agreement nor is it yet known to anyone. This is a matter which must be worked out under Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement between the Joint Commission and the Provisional Government of Korea. Even after these agencies in cooperation determine the degree of helping and assisting (trusteeship), and define the method of its application, their decision must go to the four great powers - namely, Great Britain, China, Russia and the United States, for confirmation.

7. There is no satisfactory translation of the word "trusteeship" from English or other European languages into the Korean language. The nearest translation into Korean - "shintak" - is both inadequate and inaccurate. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be under a foreign protectorate such as that imposed on Korea in 1905 by the Japanese prior to annexation. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea

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will be a part of the general trusteeship system of the United Nations. "Trusteeship" does not mean that it will become a mandate under the protection of any foreign power.

8. It will remain the fixed objective of the United States to assure that the provisional government to be created under the Moscow Agreement will be one which will adequately and honestly reflect the desires of the Korean people and will work for their advancement toward independence. It is important to bear in mind that this provisional government will participate in any negotiations or discussions concerning trusteeship. If any necessity should ever arise for the Korean people to take exception to the extent of trusteeship worked out by their provisional government and the Joint Commission, the time when such exception should be taken is after the agreement has been worked out and the exact nature of "trusteeship" made known. It is only at this time when there can exist any real basis for complaint. At the present time the exact methods for helping and assisting (trusteeship) are unknown and will continue so until worked out by the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Government. The furore raised by certain politicians, therefore, resolves itself into objection to a mere word without practical meaning. The only result is to raise a question in the minds of those responsible for assisting Korea to her independence as to the stability and development of their political leaders and their ability to take over and control the destiny of their nation.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
APO 235-2

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE 25 February 1947

Fourth in a series of Statements by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief of American Delegation, Joint Commission:

A careful analysis of the Moscow Agreement shows that only misunderstanding can be the cause of the strong objection of some of the people of South Korea to the aid and assistance (trusteeship) provision of the Moscow Agreement. General Hodge has explained this matter as recently as his February 11th statement. The misunderstanding seems to be found in different definitions applied by each individual who objects to the word "trusteeship."

The principle of "self determination," as included in the 14 points proposed by President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, visualized a willingness of a nat on which determined its own form of government, to become a peaceful, law abiding and cooperative member of the League of Nations. The League of Nations would guarantee the status quo of its member nations as regards interference by other nations.

The allied leaders who signed the Moscow Agreement visualized a troubled post-war world, a world in which small nations not protected by a League of Nations or other international agency might becom the prey of more powerful nations seeking strategic frontiers or economic advantage.

In order to assure protection of such nations, who without armies and navies for their own protection must be secured by others, the United Nations Organization was proposed. Until the United Nations could become a powerful operating agency, it was necessary to guarantee security to those smaller nations unable to secure themselves. Under the Moscow Agreement, Great Britain, China, Russia and the United States guaranteed for a limited period of time the security and complete independence of Korea in the post-war world. This is the first meaning of "trusteeship."

In order that the world may live at peace, it is essential that all nations of the world remain stable. Should a small nation become shaken by internal dissension and disorder, it becomes a threat to the peace of the world. Korea, having been controlled by Japanese for over 40 years, requires considerable development along economic, industrial and technical lines as do other nations of the world. We are all aware that the technical knowledge and management experience required to guide such development is in some degree lacking to Korea because of the long Japanese domination and oppression. In order to insure a healthy, normal development of Korea which would enable it to participate on an equal basis of competition with other nations of the world and to assure internal peace and tranquility during this period of growth and progress, the Four Powers, in guaranteeing independence under the Moscow Agreement, undertook to aid and assist Korea for a period not to exceed five years during this development. This is the second meaning of the word "trusteeship" as it appears in the Moscow Agreement.

The Korean people have been dominated by the Japanese and prior to that by an absolute monarchy for such a long time, that they are, in general, unfamiliar with democratic procedures and ideals. It is perfectly natural, therefore, that a few political leaders thinking primarily of the present rather than the future of their party and country should endeavor to appeal to the hatred which the average Korean holds for the word "trusteeship" in order to gain political advantage. Such cheap political maneuvering, while aiding the immediate objective of the political leader, cannot but injure his ultimate prestige because he is misleading the people and, in fact, delaying the achievement of that independence which they all so justly and naturally desire.

The details of "trusteeship" and the exact manner in which it shall be exercised was not stated in the Moscow Agreement nor is it yet known to anyone. This is a matter which must be worked out under Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement between the Joint Commission and the Provisional Government

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There is no satisfactory translation of the word "trusteeship" from English or other European languages into the Korean language. The nearest translation into Korean - "shintak" - is both inadequate and inaccurate. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be under a foreign protectorate such as that imposed on Korea in 1905 by the Japanese prior to annexation. "Trusteeship" does not mean that Korea will be a part of the general trusteeship system of the United Nations. "Trusteeship" does not mean that it will become a mandate under the protection of any foreign power. As a matter of cold fact, the activity of certain Koreans in appealing to the United Nations for voiding the Moscow Agreement, if successful, could conceivably bring Korea under the United Nations trusteeship system indefinitely with consequent loss of its sovereignty.

It will remain the fixed objective of the United States to assure that the provisional government to be created under the Moscow Agreement will be one which will adequately and honestly reflect the desires of the Korean people and will work for their advancement toward independence. It is important to bear in mind that this provisional government will participate in any negotiations or discussions concerning trusteeship. If any necessity should ever arise for the Korean people to take exception to the extent of trusteeship worked out by their provisional government and the Joint Commission, the time when such exception should be taken is after the agreement has been worked out and the exact nature of "trusteeship" made known. It is only at this time that there can exist any real basis for complaint. At the present time the exact methods for helping and assisting (trusteeship) are unknown and will continue so until worked out by the Joint Commission and the Korean Provisional Government. The furore raised by certain politicians, therefore, resolves itself into objection to a mere word without practical meaning. The only result is to raise a question in the minds of those responsible for assisting Korea to her independence as to the stability and judgment of their political leaders and their ability to take over and control the destiny of their nation.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

26 February 1947

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

Washington -- Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, American Commander in Korea, has arrived in Washington and has conferred at the White House with President Truman. He reviewed the entire Korean situation with the President.

Following that conference, General Hodge answered questions put to him by newspaper reporters. He said that negotiations with Soviet officials to create a Provisional Government in Korea have failed, and that he has referred the matter to higher levels. He stated that the Russians had not answered his last letter recommending the reconvening of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission. Disagreement with the Soviet authorities, Hodge said, centered about the question of freedom of speech for all groups in Korea, in dealing with the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

He said the communications barrier at the 38th parallel still exists. Regarding the northern zone, General Hodge said the Russian authorities there have been conscripting Koreans in the age group of 17 to 55. But he added that he saw no reason for the Soviet plan to give military training to the Koreans.

About economic matters, General Hodge said that additional funds are necessary to provide food, fertilizer and industrial machinery in southern Korea and to pay for mill repairs and raw materials.

Incidentally, this is the General's first visit to the United States in five years.

公報部特別發表

在朝鮮美軍司令官 哈·奇·하-지中將은 워싱톤에 到着하야 日昨 [illegible]
會見 會談하였는데 同席上 大統領과 朝鮮事情을 詳細檢討한 바 있었다 하-지中將은 本國政府
하-지中將은 本國政府의 諒解를 얻은 後 [illegible]
[illegible] 協議하였다 蘇聯當局과 協議한 바 있는바 이는失敗로 돌아갔다고
[illegible] 問題를 各 商位의 當局에 委託하였다고 말하였다
하-지中將은 보고하기를 蘇聯側에서는 美蘇共同委員會의 [illegible]
에 對한 回答이 없다고 하였다 蘇聯當局과의 意見 相違는 [illegible]
相議한 朝鮮內의 모-든 團体에 対한 言論自由의 問題에 [illegible]
하-지中將은 말하였다 하-지中將은 38線의 障壁을 [illegible]
하였으며 38以北에 関하여는 同地 蘇聯當局에서는 17歲부터 [illegible]
의 朝鮮人을 徵兵하고 있다고 말하였다 그러나 朝鮮人에게 [illegible]
訓練을 實施한다는 點은 發見하지 못하였다고 하-지中將은 말하였다
[illegible] 하-지中將은 朝鮮에 食糧 肥料 및 工業機械의 [illegible]
[illegible] 代價를 支拂하는 [illegible]
[illegible] 하-지中將이 渡美한 5年만에 처음이다

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

26 February 1947

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

The following statement was issued today by Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea:

A story appeared in the Korean press this morning to the effect that General Hodge in Washington had stated that one of the primary aims of Military Government is the establishment of a separate government for South Korea by March first.

It is my firm belief that this is a misquotation of General Hodge's remarks, and I have sent today a radiogram to General Hodge, asking that he clarify his remarks so that the Korean people may understand clearly his position on this matter.

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軍政廳 特別發表

一九四七年二月二十六日

[illegible] 하지中將 [illegible] 今日下記의 声明을 發表하였다.

[illegible] 하지中將이 와싱톤에서 三月一日까지 別個南朝鮮[illegible] 朝鮮自領任務를 遂行하는데 資金을 要請하였다[illegible]

[illegible] 하지中將의 談話를 誤報한것으로 確信하고 하지中將에게 朝鮮民衆이 그의 態度를 明白히 理解하도록 事實을 알리워 달라고 今日 無電으로 要請하였다.

—끝—

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

28 February 1947

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

Major General A.L. Brown, Acting Commanding General U. S. Army Forces in Korea, today received a reply from Washington clarifying an erroneous report concerning a recent statement of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge in regard to Korea.

The reply to General Brown came in the form of an official telegram from Washington signed by General Hodge. The exact text of the telegram reads.

"It has been reported here (Washington) that the United Press in Seoul carried a news item which said we have hoped to establish a separate government in South Korea by 1 March.

"This is entirely untrue.

"I said we have a goal of about 1 March to get Koreans in administrative operation of the government in South Korea with advisors and certain controls well known to all of us. The United Press here (Washington) says that it will correct the false impression."

In connection with General Hodge's Radiogram, General Lerch stated that the plans as laid out by General Hodge essentially, have been completed, with the establishment of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Korean Government operated by Koreans for the Korean people.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

28 February 1947

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

RADIOGRAM

From: War Department, Washington D.C.

To : Acting Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea

The following is a message to the Korean people upon the occasion of celebrating the anniversary of their declaration of independence March 1:

"In all my work and conferences here in my nation's capital, I keep uppermost in my mind the needs and welfare of the Korean people and the Korean nation, and continue my utmost efforts in doing all I can to insure that Korea will again stand as a member of the great family of Nations, free, democratic and independent."

(signed) HODGE (Lt.Gen. John R. Hodge,
Commanding General of
U.S. Army Forces in Korea,
now in Washington.)

公報部特別発表

一九四七年二月二十八日

三月一日 独立宣言記念日를 祝賀하야 華府에滞在中인 하-지中将은 朝鮮国民에게 다음과같은 祝辞를보내왔다-

나는華府滞在中 모-든事務나 会議에있어서 늘 朝鮮国民과 朝鮮国家의権利를 為하야 至大한関心을 갖이고 또朝鮮이 世界列強의 一員으로自由로운 民主主義的独立国家가 다시되도록 나의最善의努力을 継続하다-

하 - 지(署名)

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Files

Press release No. 5,

2	1 Mar. 1947	C.G.	Gen. Weckerling	Please review revised draft. Comment on further amendment and return for release. Special messenger, please, and prompt return.

A.E.B.

3	1 Mar. 1947	Joint Commission	C.G. XXIV Corps	Draft of proposed press release No. 5 is returned. It is recommended that the release be made with the minor amendments made on the original.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, USA.

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PRESS RELEASE NO. 5

(This is the fifth and last of a series of releases issued by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner, US-Soviet Joint Commission, analyzing the Moscow Agreement.)

It is gratifying that the Korean press has devoted such generous space to the publication of the series of articles recently issued by the Joint Commission explaining the steps under the Moscow Agreement which will lead to Korean independence. It is regretted, however, that critical comment was in general confined to arbitrary broad statements of disapproval (overall opposition) rather than to constructive criticism of specific points stated.

Unfortunately the (discussion of) ~~objection to~~ the Moscow Agreement has, (in general), been (confined to objection to) one word. The great benefits assured to Korea under the provisions of the Agreement have been ignored and buried under volumes of written and spoken objection to this one word. Those who have studied the entire agreement with sufficient seriousness to understand its great advantages are fearful of expressing their approval of the agreement lest those who argue against the word "Trusteeship" (may denounce them as traitors). Blind adherence to a mistaken idea will never lead to (desired progress).

The Joint Commission again urges all Koreans who consider the future independence and welfare of their country of greater importance than immediate personal or political advantage to carefully review the four articles previously published. To assist in such review, the following brief summary of the principal points stated in those articles, is offered:

1. The section of the Moscow Agreement pertaining to Korea was written in the spirit of friendliness and helpfulness. It was not conceived as an instrument to hold Korea under foreign domination. Quite the contrary, it prescribes a series of orderly steps under which Korea will become a truly independent and stable nation. It is the intent of the Moscow Agreement to reestablish Korean sovereignty so firmly that it will not be threatened in the future.

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2. The Moscow Agreement pledges the complete independence of Korea.

3. It envisions an interim period of internationally controlled aid and assistance which will prepare Korea for admission into the United Nations.

4. The procedures of the Moscow Agreement visualize the creation of a Korea that will not be dominated by any country, including Allied nations.

5. It envisions a Korea capable of standing on its own feet, economically and politically, and a nation that will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Orient.

6. The American position during the interchange of correspondence with the Soviet Commander in North Korea has been constant. The United States insists t at the right of freedom of expression cannot be denied to Koreans in the matter of implementation of the Moscow Agreement. At the same time, however, no group will be permitted to intaffere with the orderly progress of the work of the Joint Commission or disrupt its proceedings by fomenting and instigating active opposition.

7. As for the word "trusteeship" to which many Koreans unreasoningly attach sinister meanings, it means that the Allies will give some form of jointly supervised help and assistance to the New Korean nation, the exact nature of which will have to be worked out by the Joint Commission in consultation with the Korean Provisional Government. It means maintaining the stability and authority of the Korean Provisional Government during the interim period.

In conclusion, it may be well to quote from General Hodge's special press release made just before his recent departure for the benefit of thoughtful Koreans and their leaders:

"We must bear in mind that the Korean problem has an international aspect. Neither you nor I can change a word of the Moscow Decision. Some Koreans seem to believe that a nation-wide movement against "trusteeship"

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may impress the signatory powers so as to change the agreement. There is no guarantee but that the effect may be quite different. It is far more important to utilize an already existing international agreement to unite your nation to get your Provisional Government and to establish your independence than to continue social turmoil over the use by the great Allied Powers of an instrument that is still to be worked out with the participation of your own patriots.

"I earnestly urge that you not bring about unpatriotic consequences through an ill-advised patriotic movement and that you discontinue agitation that can only delay the establishment of a Provisional Government for a united Korea."

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PRESS RELEASE #5 of JOINT COMMISSION SERIES ON MOSCOW AGREEMENT.

1	28 Feb. 1947	Joint Commission	C.G., XXIV Corps

1. Attached is draft of Press Release No. 5 of the Joint Commission's series analyzing the Moscow Agreement. (Incl. "A")

2. Attached also for information are "24-hour opinion sampling" (124 persons) of the previous four releases (Incl. "B") and summary of press reaction (Incl. "C") up to and including 27 February 1947.

3. Recommendations: That Press Release No. 5 substantially as drafted be released for publication on or about 4 March 1947.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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DRAFT
27 Feb. 1947

PRESS RELEASE NO. 5

(This is the fifth and last of a series of releases issued by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner, U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, analyzing the Moscow Agreement.)

It is very gratifying that the Korean press has devoted such generous space to the publication of the series of articles recently issued by the Joint Commission explaining the steps under the Moscow Agreement which will lead to Korean independence. It is regretted, however, that discussion and editorial comment were generally lacking. The views of some parties and politicians were published but these were general statements rather than specific comment on any one point.

Ordinarily, general lack of critical comment might be interpreted as approval of the Joint Commission's articles, for a free press is the recognized forum in democratic countries for discussion of matters of vital interest to the entire nation. However, the reason for this reserve lies elsewhere.

Regrettably there has been built up in the minds of many Koreans so blind and unreasoning a hatred of the international charter for complete independence for Korea that the press and leaders alike appear to fear fair-minded, logical discussion of the issues involved. And yet it is certain that a considerable number of thoughtful Koreans in their hearts accept the Moscow Agreement as it was written and intended - a sacred, international agreement

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assuring a completely independent Korea without foreign domination of any kind, including Allied domination. Unfortunately, these Koreans feel that they cannot even discuss "trusteeship" objectively for fear of being denounced as traitors. Thus free speech and free expression of views that prevail in South Korea are thwarted by the same persons incidentally who insist most loudly upon their free speech to denounce the Moscow Agreement.

It would be highly desirable to review briefly the principal points brought out by the Joint Commission's articles:

1. The section of the Moscow Agreement pertaining to Korea was written in the spirit of friendliness and helpfulness. It was not conceived as an instrument to hold Korea under foreign domination. Quite the contrary, it prescribes a series of orderly steps under which Korea will become a truly independent and stable nation. It is the intent of the Moscow Agreement to reestablish Korean sovereignty so firmly that it will not be threatened in the future.

2. The Moscow Agreement pledges the complete independence of Korea.

3. It envisions an interim period of internationally controlled aid and assistance which will prepare Korea for admission into the United Nations.

4. The procedures of the Moscow Agreement visualize the creation of a Korea that will not be dominated by any country

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including Allied nations.

5. It envisions a Korea capable of standing on its own feet, economically and politically, and a nation that will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Orient.

6. The American position during the interchange of correspondence with the Soviet Commander in North Korea has been constant. The United States insists that the right of freedom of expression cannot be denied to Koreans in the matter of implementation of the Moscow Agreement. At the same time, however, no group will be permitted to interfere with the orderly progress of the work of the Joint Commission or disrupt its proceedings by fomenting and instigating active opposition.

7. As for the word "trusteeship" to which many Koreans unreasoningly attach sinister meanings, it means that the Allies will give some form of jointly supervised help and assistance to the new Korean nation, the exact nature of which will have to be worked out by the Joint Commission in consultation with the Korean Provisional Government. It means maintaining the stability and authority of the Korean Provisional Government during the interim period.

In conclusion, it may be well to quote from General Hodge's special press release made just before his recent departure for the benefit of thoughtful Koreans and their leaders:

"We must bear in mind that the Korean problem has an international

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

aspect. Neither you nor I can change a word of the Moscow Decision.

Some Koreans seem to believe that a nation-wide movement against 'trusteeship' may impress the signatory powers so as to change the agreement. There is no guarantee but that the effect may be quite different. It is far more important to utilize an already existing international agreement to unite your nation to get your Provisional Government and to establish your independence than to continue social turmoil over the use by the great Allied Powers of an instrument that is still to be worked out with the participation of your own patriots.

"I earnestly urge that you not bring about unpatriotic consequences through an ill-advised patriotic movement and that you discontinue agitation that can only delay the establishment of a Provisional Government for a united Korea."

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24-Ho... Opinion Sampling on Gen. Brown's 4 Releases

27 February 1947

1. Have you read the four releases by Major General Brown regarding the Moscow Decision?

Yes - 100 (81%)
No - 24 (19%)
124 (100%)

2. (Asked of those who answered "Yes" to #1) Do you believe General Brown's stand to be the correct one?

Yes - 32 (32%)
No - 59 (59%)
Don't know - 9 (9%)
100 (100%)

3. Have you gained any clearer understanding of the Moscow Decision from reading these releases?

Yes - 41 (41%)
No - 59 (59%)
100 (100%)

4. Have these articles affected your attitude regarding "Trusteeship"?

Yes - 46
No - 43
Don't know - 11
100 - (100%)

5. If "Yes", in what way?

a. Remain as anti-trusteeship - 17

b. Changed mind to agree with trusteeship as defined by General Brown - 15

c. Strengthened our attitude of anti-trusteeship - 14

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GAIL CLELAND
Adviser, Bureau of Public Opinion

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNI) STATES ARMY MILITARY 3OVERNMF IN KOREA
Department of Public Informat)
Bureau of Public Opinion
Seoul, Korea

27 February 1947

SUBJECT: Reaction to General Brown's series of 4 articles on implementing the Moscow Decision

Comments were scarce and the political affiliations decided the reaction to General Brown's articles by newspapers, political leaders, and political parties.

1. Reports in newspapers:

11 Feb: All Seoul newspapers published first article, no editorial comments, no political comments

12 Feb: Seoul Shinmun, Kyeng Hyang Shinmun, Deklip Sinbo all carried statement of the People's Front: "General Brown's statements on the Moscow Decision and Joint Commission show marked progress in the U.S. conception of the Moscow Decision".

Seoul Shinmun, Kyeng Hyang Shinmun, Han Sung Ilbo, Dai Dong Shinmun reported the Anti-trusteeship Fighting for Independence Committee's statement as follows:"(1)General Brown has implied in his article that the Anti-trusteeship movement delays independence. However, we cannot call a puppet gov't. set up under trusteeship independence! (2.) The Provisional Government to be set up under trusteeship is not real independence. Therefore, we offer desparate opposition to trusteeship.

15 Feb: Deklip Sinbo printed an editorial in favor of Gen.Brown's articles entitled: "Rebirth of the Anti-trusteeship movement"..Gen.Hodge has often stated that the Moscow Decision is the only way to Korean independence, and Gen.Brown has also stated that anti-trusteeship is harmful to the Korean future. So reactionary politicans should pause and reflect upon their past actions and should work to reopen the Joint Commission by supporting the Moscow Decision."

16 Feb: All papers published 2nd article, no editorial or political comments

18 Feb: Ju Yu Shinmun and Dai Dong Shinmun carried the Nat'l. Hdqtrs for Unification's statement as follows:"When the Joint Commission adjourned last Spring, Russian delegates accused the Americans of festering anti-trusteeship sentiment among the Koreans. Recently Generals Hodge and Brown have issued many statements avoiding an international situation. It is not right to transfer the responsibility for failure of the Joint Commission upon Korean patriots because of their anti-trusteeship attitude. It is natural for patriotic Koreans to oppose trusteeship over their country.

19 Feb: All papers published 3rd article, no editorial or political comment

20 Feb: Deklip Sinbo editorialized as follows:"Meaning of General Brown's Statements" The Korean people should follow the leaders of the Peoples Front since they favor the Moscow Decision. It is because of the poor leadership of the reactionary political leaders that Gen.Brown was forced to issue his articles. These speeches should hereby put a full stop to the anti-trusteeship movement.

20 Feb: Dong-A Ilbo and HYUN Dai Ilbo reported the NARKI statement critizing Gen. Brown's statement:"The 4th of Gen.Brown's articles is phrased in violent language which prejudices the Korean people and causes much misunderstanding. He also assails Korean political leaders. It is very regrettable for the good relations between U.S. and Korea that Gen.Brown's statement ignored the good-will felt by Koreans for Americans.

27 Feb: Seoul Shinmun printed the Statemetn of Mr. CHO, Se Ang speaking as Chairman of the Emergency Nat'l. Assembly:"We oppose the trusteeship absolutely. Because of our anti-trusteeship attitude and movement, we have rejected and oppposed trusteeship for the past year. Gen.Brown's articles advocate the sort of trusteeship which corresponds to Mandate Rule. I wish to ask him a question: "Why is not a system of trusteeship administration established over other small and weak nations who need and receive assitance from big powers?"

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

4 March 1947

PRESS RELEASES:

Item 1:

(Fifth in a series of reports by Maj.Gen. Albert L. Brown Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission.)

It is gratifying that the Korean press has devoted such generous space to the publication of the series of articles recently issued by the Joint Commission explaining the steps under the Moscow Agreement which will lead to Korean independence. It is regretted, however, that critical comment was in general confined to arbitrary statements of disagreement rather than to constructive criticism of specific points stated.

Unfortunately the objections to the Moscow Agreement have been directed against one word. The great benefits assured to Korea under the provisions of the Agreement have been ignored and buried under volumes of written and spoken objection to this one word. Those who have studied the entire agreement with sufficient seriousness to understand its great advantages are fearful of expressing their approval of the agreement lest they be denounced as traitors by those who argue against the word "Trusteeship". Blind adherence to a mistaken idea on the part of some and fear of voicing an honest conviction on the part of others will never lead to democracy.

The Joint Commission again urges all Koreans who consider the future independence and welfare of their country of greater importance than immediate personal or political advantage to carefully review the four articles previously published. To assist in such review, the following brief summary of the principal points stated in those articles, is offered:

1. The section of the Moscow Agreement pertaining to Korea was written in the spirit of friendliness and helpfulness. It was not conceived as an instrument to hold Korea under foreign domination. Quite the contrary, it prescribes a series of orderly steps under which Korea will become a truly independent and stable nation. It is the intent of the Moscow Agreement to reestablish Korean sovereignty so firmly that it will not be threatened in the future.

2. The Moscow Agreement pledges the complete independence of Korea.

3. It envisions an interim period of internationally controlled aid and assistance which will prepare Korea for admission into the United Nations.

4. The procedures of the Moscow Agreement visualize the creation of a Korea that will not be dominated by any country, including Allied nations.

5. It envisions a Korea capable of standing on its own feet, economically and politically, and a nation that will contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Orient.

6. The American position during the interchange of correspondence with the Soviet Commander in North Korea has been constant. The United States insists that right of freedom of expression cannot be denied to Koreans in the matter of implementation of the Moscow Agreement. At the same time, however, no group will be permitted to interfere with the orderly progress of the work of the Joint Commission or disrupt its proceeding by fomenting and instigating active opposition

7. As for the word "Trusteeship" to which Koreans unreasonably attach sinister meanings, it means that the Allies will give some form of jointly supervised help and assistance to the New Korean nation, the exact nature of which will have to be worked out by the Joint Commission in consultation with the Korean Provisional Government. It means maintaining the stability and authority of the Korean Provisional Government during the interim period.

In conclusion, it may be well to quote from General Hodge's special press release made just before his recent departure for the benefit of thoughtful Koreans and their leaders:

"We must bear in mind that the Korean problem has an international aspect. Neither you nor I can change a word of the Moscow Decision. Some Koreans seem to believe that a nation-wide movement against "Trusteeship" may impress the signatory powers so as to change the agreement. There is no guarantee but that the effect may be quite different. It is far more important to utilize an already existing international agreement to unite your nation to get your Provisional Government and to establish your independence than to continue social turmoil over the use by the great Allied Powers of an instrument that is still to be worked out with the

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Participants
PRESS RELEASES (CONT'D)
4 March 1947

Item 1 (cont'd)
articipation of your own patriots.

"I earnestly urge that you not bring about unpatriotic consequences through an ill-advised patriotic movement and that you discontinue agitation that can only delay the establishment of a Provisional Government for a united Korea."

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Item 2:

Fire Prevention Day will be observed March 4 in South Korea to enlist the cooperation of the public in preventing fires and to acquaint the people with the mounting toll of damage and loss of lives caused by carelessness, AHN Chai Hong, Civil Administrator, announced today.

Beginning today the first Tuesday of each month will be observed as Fire Prevention Day so that the people can unite in their efforts to overcome this menace to the general welfare, Mr. AHN said.

The daily rate of fires has increased alarmingly in the past year. This has been caused chiefly by the careless handling of unsol atisfactory heating systems, the careless tending of open fires, and flying sparks which ignite adjacent roofs.

The people of South Korea can cooperate in correcting this condition by thei increased watchfulness of heating systems and open fires. They can cooperate with the Fire Department by promptly notifying that Department when a fire occurs, and t accepting the authority of the firemen when they arrive on the scene. An over-zealous citizen who undertakes to put out a fire independently of firemen is endangering his life, risking the lives of his neighbors and helping to undermine the economy of his country.

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Item 3:

A seven-man advisory committee selected from among its membership was appointed by the Interim Legislative Assembly 22 Feb. 47 to assist in the reorganization of the Korean National Red Cross and to be responsible for nominating the twelve incorporators to be named by the Assembly, KIMM Kiu Sic, Assembly chair has informed Major General Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor. The committee consists of the following:

LEENG Ho Ick, Chairman; SHIN Ki Eun, Rev. PAK Yong Hee, CHANG Myung, KIM Pub Kil, CHANG Kwang Jo and PYUN Sung Ok.

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Item 4:

Preservation of peace and order is the primary condition to the reconstructi of the Korean nation, Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor of South Korea, told 5,000 uniformed members of the Metropolitan Division of the Korean National Police at a review held on the steps of the Capitol in observance of Independence Day on March 1. The Police Review was the third to be held since the Liberation, according to Dr. P.C. Chough, Director.

General Lerch said:

"I am proud to review this splendid force standing before me. You are the loyal guardians of the citadel of law in Korea. The task that you perform is one of the greatest importance to your nation. The preservation of peac and order is the primary condition to your national reconstruction -- the completio of a unified democratic and independent Korea.

"I fully realize that the members of National Police are discharging their duties under many handicaps such as the high cost of living, political conflicts an international complexities. Let me assure you that you have done well. Just as patriotic citizens expect to suffer all the sacrifices of war to win the victory, you must dedicate what you are and what you have to the cause of your people. Your effort and deeds will be gratefully recorded by your nation.

"Do not stop where you now are. March on! March on to the final goal of making the Korean National Police efficient and democratic, comparable with the best police system of the civilized nations."

The Police Review marked the occasion of the first public appearance of the 60-piece Metropolitan Division Band, under the leadership of LEE Yu Sung. A member of the Police for the past year, he is an experienced musician, having played with the Korean National Symphony for 15 years. According to present plans, this band

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PRESS RELEASES (CONT'D)
4 March 1947

Item 4 (cont'd)
will give a series of free public concerts of popular music for the Korean people during the summer months.

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Item 5:

During the month of March the residents of Seoul and Inchon will receive a daily ration of 1.5 hop of rice and 1 hop of other grains, CHEL Yong Bun, National Food Administrator, announced today. The rice ration for this period is the same as that which was allowed for the month of February.

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Item 6:

The Tiger, the first in a new series of radio programs sponsored by the National Police, was broadcast at 8:00 p.m. February 28 by Station JODK of the Korean Broadcasting Company.

The Tiger, a man who has studied abroad and who now has returned to his native Korea to help his country, was featured in the Missing Rice Mystery on the first program. He is an astute, brave Korean who assists the police in combating crime and maintaining law and order.

This mythical character will be featured in the Black Market Killing, the second in this series of programs, March 7 at 8:00 p.m. over Station JODK. This series of programs will be broadcast every Friday evening at 8:00 p.m. over the same station.

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Item 7.

To enlist public cooperation in preventing crime and establishing a worthy social order, the week beginning March 4 is now being observed as National Crime Prevention Week, KIM Byung No, Director of the Department of Justice, announced today.

During this week the Departmetn of Justic e is making its annual appeal to the people through public lectures, drama, radio and posters on the need for preventing crime and respecting the rights of their fellow man.

No man can have freedom in a democratic society unless everyone observes the law and is made to pay the consequences if he breaks the law. An examination of conscience before committing a crime will help prevent wrong doing.

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FOREIGN NEWS BRIEF:

Washington - First of informal hearings throughout United States, to obtain full expression of American opinion on proposed International Trade Organization's chartar to be formulated at meeting of preparatory Committee on Trade and Employment at Geneva in April, opened here.

Appearing at initial hearing were spokesmen for labor and trade union, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, various industry associations, women's organizations and religious and cultural organizations.

During the next two week hearings will be held at New York, Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, Denver and San Francisco, giving interested persons and organizations opportunity to express their views on the International Trade Organizations charter prepared by the 18 nation preparatory Committee at its first meeting in London last fall.

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GENERAL SHTIKOV'S STATEMENT

Gen. A.
1st March 1946

General Hodge, Gentlemen-

Our joint commission of representatives of the American and Soviet Commands has been called on to act upon the historical decision, concerning Korea, of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom.

These decisions are an expression of great will and the aim of the great allied powers to cooperate in every way possible in the restoration of an independent Korean State and the establishment of conditions for the development of the country on democratic principles. The great armies of the [illegible] and the [illegible], having crushed the Japanese domination in Korea, and have freed the Korean people.

Now Korea has entered into a new era of her development--an era of national rebirth and restoration of national independence.

Gentlemen, the Korean people with their centuries of culture, have vividly expressed with national consciousness, long years of hardship and the misery of colonial slavery--these people are worthy of the brightest future. The Korean people have earned the right, with blood and innumerable sufferings, to a free and independent way of life.

The Soviet people heartily support this right of the Korean people. The Soviet Union has always championed and will always champion the self-determination and free existence of any nation without exception.

As we all are convinced, the Korean people are filled with ambition and have already shown their inclination to establish with the help of the allied powers a free democratic Korean government, friendly to all peace-loving nations.

The high goals for the creation of democratic, independent Korean state have brought to life much political activity on the part of all the Korean people. The Korean people have created its democratic parties, social organizations and national committees as an organ of democratic self government, nevertheless great difficulties stand in the way of gradual democratisation of the entire internal life of the Korean people; these are evoked by the fierce opposition of the reactionary anti-democratic groups, and individual elements, which have for their aim the frustration of the creation and establishment of a democratic regime in Korea.

The problem of the Joint American-Soviet Commission consists in helping the Korean people in creating a provisional Korean democratic government, capable of accomplishing the problems of democratization and rebirth of the country, which had been set before it.

The future Korean democratic government must be set up upon the basis of a broad unification of all democratic parties and organizations which support the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers.

SHTIKOV SPEECH

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Only such a government would be capable of abolishing completely the vestiges of former Japanese domination of the political and economic life of Korea, of waging a decisive struggle against the reactionary anti-democratic elements within the country, of putting into life radical measures for the reconstruction of national economy, of assuring the Korean people the political freedoms, and of struggling for the establishment of peace in the Far East.

The Soviet Union is vitally interested in seeing Korea a truly democratic independent state, friendly to the Soviet Union, in such a way that it should not become a military base and starting point for an attack against the Soviet Union.

The problem of the joint American-Soviet Commission which derives from the decision, concerning Korea, of the conference of three ministers, consists also in effecting, with the help of the provisional Korean democratic government and with the assistance of the Korean democratic organizations to elaborate the measures of assistance and collaboration (with regard to the trusteeship) to the political economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self government, and the establishment of the sovereign independence of Korea. The temporary trusteeship corresponds with the fundamental interests of the Korean people, in as much as it assures survival of an independent Korean state on a democratic basis.

General Hodge, concluding my speech, I wish in behalf of the Soviet delegation, to extend my sincere greetings to you and your distinguished delegates and express my deep gratification that we shall work together with the representatives of the American Command in the interest and for the good of Korean people.

I am fully assured that our joint work will proceed in a spirit of mutual understanding and friendship and that we shall successfully and honorably fulfill the will of our governments, expressed in the decisions of the Moscow Conference and the Foreign Ministers concerning Korea.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

21 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press Via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Item 1: FERTILIZER DISTRIBUTION PROGRESSES IN KOREA

More than 80,000 of the 111,664 tons of fertilizer received in Korea this year through the Civilian Supply Program have been shipped to provinces for sale to farmers, YI Chung Sun, vice-president of the Korea Agriculture Association, announced today.

The figures represent tabulation up to May 3 when actual sales to farmers totaled 63,394 tons. This is 78.6% of the high-powered ammonium nitrate and potassium sulphate fertilizer availabe for sale at provincial KAA offices.

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Item 2: KOREAN WOMAN TO SPEAK AT GEORGIA WESLEYAN COLLEGE

Mrs. PAHK Induk, Korean representative at the Women's International Conference called by the United Nations Organization in New York October 1946, will speak at the Georgia Wesleyan college commencement next month, Dr. Clarence Ryee, Department of Public Information director, announced today.

A graduate of the college, Mrs. PAHK flew from Korea last October to attend the conference in New York City. Since then she has visited 27 states and Ontario, Canada. She was widely received in her addresses to all religious groups, high school and college students, women's international groups and businessmen's clubs.

In Seoul Mrs. PAHK supervised "Democracy and Women," a program on station JODK here. A graduate of EWHA university, she has lectured for student Christian movements in Great Britain, Canada, Ireland, China and India. She will return to Korea in September.

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Item 3: ONE-YEAR OVERSEAS SERVICE NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR OCS APPLICANTS

Enlisted men who wish to attend Officer Candidate Schools no longer need to have served overseas a year to be eligible, according to War Department circular 101, just received here. However, the age eligibility has been changed, requiring applicants on the date of enrolment, to be at least 20 years and 6 months old and less than 28 years. No waivers for age will be granted.

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Item 4: KOREAN POLICE TO TAKE PROMOTION TEST

An examination to establish a list of those candidates eligible for promo-

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tion from sergeant to lieutenant will be held in Seoul during the week beginning May 26 Dr. P.O. Chough, Police Department director,announced today. This is another step forward in making promotion in the Police Department dependent on merit and proven ability in competition.

One hundred forty-seven candidates from the various provinces participated in the examination given during the week of May 12 for promotion from lieutenant to captain. Two hundred eighty-three candidates had applied to compete in this examination. An eligibility list will be established within the next month or two.

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Item 5: WEATHER REPORT FOR SEOUL AREA

Predicted for Thursday: Maximum temperatures 70 degrees. This morning's 67.5 degrees, clear with northwest winds. ENDIT

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

22 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE FOR AMERICAN PRESS VIA TOKYO AND ARMY NEWS SERVICE.

Item 1: NEW INTERIM LEAVE POLICY IS ESTABLISHED

Under terms of a new interim policy, dependents of military personnel and civilian employees on duty in Korea may accompany them on leaves throughout the Far East provided personal billeting and surface transportation arrangements are made by the individual requesting such leave, it was announced today. This includes trips to Japan, Shanghai, Okinawa and Manila.

Pending issuance of a permanent policy, the new ruling requires applicants to make these arrangements personally, including billeting in area where leave will be spent, and travel to and from the areas. These arrangements must be made for a definite time and mode of travel which are suitable for women and children. Applicants must also give assurance that transportation and accomodations will not interfere with official travel or travel of personnel enroute to rest centers.

Dependents may travel on Army transports on a non-revenue, space available basis, paying usual charges for subsistence and accommodations, but may not use government aircraft. Commercial aircraft may be used when available.

For military personnel and War Department civilian employees without dependents in Korea, previous leave rulings still apply, with prior clearance obtained by Headquarters United States Army Forces in Korea from the commander of the area where leave is to be spent.

Full details of the interim policy are explained in a Headquarters USAFIK Letter, TFGAP 210.711, dated April 24, including a form letter for application.

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Item 2: USAFIK GI'S TO STUDY FOOD PREPARATION IN JAPAN

As part of the program to improve troops' food in Korea, 25 enlisted men will be sent from here to the Eighth Army Food Service school near Yokohama for training to increase their efficiency as cooks, bakers and mess supervisors, it was learned today.

Four-week courses for mess stewards, mess supervisors and pastry specialists will begin on July 7 with candidates either having been graduated from cooks and bakers school or having served as first cook or mess steward for at least three months. An eight-week course of basic cooking is also being offered. Requirement for this is that the applicant must have scored at least 85 on his Army General Classification Test and have shown an aptitude for cooking. To be eligi-

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Item 2 (cont'd)
ble, students must have declared their interest in food preparation in writing and must have at least 6 months left to serve in Korea.

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Item 3: ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IN KOREA TO BE STRICTLY CONSERVED

Due to a shortage of electrical equipment and experienced repair and maintenance personnel in Korea, all commands have been directed to institute a rigid electrical conservation program, it was announced in a USAFIK directive today.

"Since there is no assurance of a continuous operation of power generating plants and distributing stations in Korea, a critical situation exists and may be expected to continue," the directive stated. "Critically needed military operational facilities must be continued in service."

The directive explained that post engineers are responsible for the supply and inspection of electric services at all dependent billets, and are the only agency authorized to make additional installations of electrical appliances.

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Item 4: DEPENDENTS OF 165 USAFIK PERSONS TO ARRIVE EARLY IN JUNE

Families of 165 military and civilian employes here will report to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation on June 2, to sail on or about June 4, it was announced today.

The places or organizations, with the number of families to arrive at each, are: Sixth Infantry Division, 57; Seventh Infantry Division, 20; Seoul, 38; Yongdung Po, 39; and Kimpo, 11.

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Item 5: KOREAN NURSE TO STUDY IN CALIFORNIA

Mrs. SOON Hang New, formerly head nurse of the Pyangyang Christian Hospital, will enter Glendale (Calif.) Sanitorium and Hospital this August to study nursing and obstetrics, it was announced today by MOON Chang Wook, Office of Foreign Affairs director.

She will remain in the United States for four years. Mrs. SOON was graduated from the Pyangyang Christian Hospital, an American missionary institution, in 1932 and was its head nurse from then until 1936.

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Item 6: NATIONAL POLICE BOARD FORMED HERE

Korea's National Police Board, whose function will be to initiate major policy and procedure matters affecting the Department of Police, has now been established, AHN Chai Hong, civil administrator, announced today.

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Item 6 (cont'd)

In addition to initiating major matters of policy and procedure, the National Police Board will act on all police matters referred to it by the military governor. It will review appeals from decisions of the Police Trial Board, and approve appointments and dismissals of police officials recommended by the Director of the Department of Police.

Directly responsible to the military governor, the board was organized upon the recommendation of the provincial governors and directors of the several departments of the government for a broader development of police policy.

A committee of 9 members, under the chairmanship of AHN Chai Hong, civil administrator, has been appointed as follows:

KOO Cha Ok	Governor of Kyunggi-Do
PAK Chong Man	Governor of Chungchong Namdo
KIM Kyung Min	Mayor of Seoul
CHUNG Yil Hyung	Director of Korean Civil Service
KIM Pyung Ro	Director,Department of Justice
MIN Hee Shik	Director,Department of Transportation
Dr. CHOUGH Pyung Ok	Director,Department of Police
CHOI Kyung Jin	Deputy Director, Department of Police
HAN Chong Kurn	Chief, Uniform Bureau, Dept. of Police

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

23 May 1947

KOREAN PRESS SUMMARY

HYERN DAI ILBO Dr. Rhee and Mr. Kim Koo issued the following statement under the date of 23 May concerning the reopening of the Joint Commission: "We the leaders cannot cooperate with the Joint Commission in carrying out the task of the Joint Commission so long as the following points are not clarified- 1. The so-called "Trusteeship" and complete independence conflict, therefore the close dealing with Trusteeship should be entirely eliminated or a clear statement should be made saying that Trusteeship and the establishment of an independent government do not conflict. 2. There are 2 kinds of democracy, one if American and the other is Russian democracy. Unless it is clearly stated that the Korean government to be set up is going to be along the American democracy lines we cannot cooperate. Moreover, if there is going to be a coalition government embracing the representatives of the two kinds of democracy confusion and dissension are bound to come. Until these 2 points are clarified we are going to wait and postpone our participation in the Joint Commission work. "

However, in the weekly press conference Gen. Lerch firmly stated that regardless of some boycotting coming from certain groups of people the Joint Commission would meet and carry on the original mission just the same and in the meetings the freedom of expression among Koreans is absolutely guaranteed.

The Joint Commission met on the 22 at 1:30 and they discussed the procedures for the meeting and adjourned.

It reports that a Leftist young man, Mr. Chun Sung Kun, stole some hand grenades and the police solved the mystery and apprehended the criminal Chun.

According to the survey made by the Bank of Chosun in the leading 6 cities in South Korea there are about 521 big firms with the capital of over 680 million won. The foreign trade comes first and construction companies come next, both in number and investment.

It also reports that in the An Sung county the Leftist young men tried to attack a police sub-station and as a result of this one was killed and some wounded and about 20 members of the Commie youth league were arrested.

It also reports that about 5 fishermen in a little motor boat went out to get seaweed along Ul Nung island off the eastern coast, and the whereabouts of the boat is causing a great deal of anxiety among the members of the fishermen's families.

The papers report that the price of meat has been reduced from 200 to 181 for 600 grams.

DONG-A ILBO During the session of the Joint Commission the Duk Soo Palace will not be open to the public, beginning 21 May.

The trains in Soon Chun, Cholla Namdo, are more or less threatened because of the shortage of coal. As to the train service between Seoul and Inchon, beginning 1 June one more train will be added.

Mr. Moon Doo Ho and Mr. Ha Jun Il have discovered the process of making the best quality of gun powder.

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CHOSUN ILBO At the 79th meeting of the Interim Legislative Assembly, which met at 1:30 p.m. on the 22nd, about 5 members walked out from the meeting because the general election bill excluded young men under 25 years of age. Being indignant over this discrimination against young men under 25, 5 members headed by Charles Kim walked out. The Assembly passed a resolution by 38 to 12 to punish these members.

It also reports that the Korean Democratic Party and the Korean Independent Party have not made up their attitude toward the Joint Commission. The prevailing conjecture is that they would follow Dr. Rhee's lead.

It also reports that Civil Administrator Ahn called on Dr. Rhee, Mr. Kim Koo and Dr. Kim in the hospital.

It also says that on 1 June the Leftist organizations may sponser a mass meeting celebrating the reopening of the Joint Commission.

HAN SUNG ILBO says that at 5 p.m. 22 May the Democratic Council invited Mr. Penfield to the Democratic Council to hear the real attitude of the Washington Government.

It also reports that about 20,000 Korean Communist troops are taking part in the civil war in China. This news was released by the head of the Propaganda Section of the Nanking Government.

KYENG HYANG SIN MUN says that the alleged cholera case in town proved to be something else and there is no cholera case in town.

The farmers musical festival will take place in the zoological garden and it will last about a week.

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Discussion 21 May 1947 - Lt. Col. Edwards and Capt. John Bojus, American Delegation - Col. Avromenko and Mr. Masloff, Soviet Delegation.

. . . . DWARDS: I am interested in exactly how we want to operate in the Secretariat.

. . MASLOFF: e would like to continue the procedure that as kept last year.

. . . DWARDS: Unfortunately I as not here last year so aybe this is just a review.

. . . Mas: I was not here either.

. . . DWARDS: e first of all want to give as much help to your Secretariat as we possibly can.

. . MASLOFF: Thank you very much. e would like to be re ry sure thing.

. . . DWARDS: Thank you.

. . . F: e want to express the interest of the mutual governments.

. . . DWARDS: Thank you. I will endorse that same conception for the U.S.Delegation. Here are some of the things bothering me a great deal. e are certain that perhaps you have the same shortage in English translator group as we have in Russian language and it is a matter of working out procedure without confusion to make sure that your people receive papers which we prepare and vice versa.

. . . Chao: our party will do anything possible so the documents which will be presented to you will be adequately prepared so as not to have to re-do them more than once.

LT.COL.EDWARDS: Mr. Masloff was here last year, would he please explain procedure followed last year and then see if our facilities will support that particular procedure. .

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...ASLOFF: Last year they did not have a Joint Secretariat. They had joint secretaries. Following is the way the work took shape: the main work is protocols and then the order of the day, then we secured a fresh Korean, Russian and English translation of all documents exchanged between the delegations. This is approximately what we wish. Do you have anything to suggest or add to it.

LT.COL. HANDS: We are interested in the mechanics.

...ASLOFF: The chairman was alternate - one week American Delegation and next week Soviet Delegation. For instance, this coming week, probably tomorrow, it will be decided the chairman will be General Brown. This means that the drafts of the protocols of the meetings will be drafted by the American Delegation.

LT.COL. HANDS: I don't understand.

...ASLOFF: Because the chairman of the Delegation will be the American head, therefore the drafts of the meetings, of the protocols, will be prepared by the Americans.

LT.COL. HANDS: When these drafts are completed, to whom should I send them for comparison for example. We must reach a joint agreement on the context.

...ASLOFF: As soon as the drafts of the protocols are ready, you notify the Secretariat, the Russian and American Secretariat come together and discuss. The Russian Secretariat is at liberty to make suggestions or corrections in order to coordinate their minutes and our minutes. After the American Secretariate and the Russian Secretariat coordinate minutes they are typed in Russian and English and are submitted for signature to the heads of the delegations. Two copies are signed in Russian and two by the Americans. Two protocols in Russian signed by the Russians and two in English signed and they are exchanged. Two copies Russian and English signed by both heads of the delegation.

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LT.COL. EDWARDS: Then it is your impression that the first meeting, which presumably is tomorrow, it will be my responsibility to have these minutes prepared in draft and then consult with the Soviet Secretariat to reconcile for comparison. Do you accept the English version or the Russian version, or do you want both?

MR. KISLOFF: Could we have both Russian and English versions?

LT.COL. EDWARDS: I think yes.

MR. KISLOFF: I do not know if the Russian Delegation have enough to supply you with Russian texts of the meetings.

LT.COL. EDWARDS: It will be a very difficult task in some respects but that is alright with me. If you wish both, then we will expect both from you.

MR. KISLOFF: For us one in English and maybe Farsi. So us can discuss it.

LT.COL. EDWARDS: We have something not used last year - a duplicating machine - so we could give you any number of copies.

MR. KISLOFF: We do not need but one.

LT.COL. EDWARDS: We have equipment for papers which pertain to the Commission as a whole which are at your disposal at any time - for instance minutes of joint meetings at which we last agreed and if you would like to have reproduced we would be very happy to do so if you desire. Would you like to have a machine of your own to use while here?

MR. KISLOFF: If we need it we will ask you for the use of it.

LT.COL. EDWARDS: Any other suggestions? I am sorry to go into so many details but I am very new on this.

MR. KISLOFF: No, at present there is nothing in mind. Tomorrow the Chairman will be General Brown so the protocol will be prepared, or drafted, by American Secretariat and I would like to get together with Capt. Bojus and discuss and

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and if there are no differences, sign by both Secretariats. In the course of work we might encounter some difficulty in translating and would like to feel at liberty to ask for help as far as translators, especially if lengthy documents have to be translated.

L. COLOMBO: We will be happy to do as much as we can. We will work together.

K. MIKOFF: We will work together.

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An Bunce

SUBCOMMISSION #1, 25 May 1947.

Bunce: Do you believe that an individual shall be excluded because of the opinion he holds and because of expressing his opinion?

Lounkin: The question is not correctly stated. You confuse two problems:

1. Freedom of opinion (eligibility for consultation).
2. Admission to consultation.

Lounkin: If a party has opposed Moscow Decision, saying that it is not correct, opposing it vehemently, and urging all Koreans to oppose it, this, in my opinion would constitute active opposition. Opinions privately held or expressed are not active opposition. Opinions expressed in public are active opposition.

Lounkin: They may express their opinions as much as they wish. But if what they say opposes any paragraphs of the Moscow Decision, we won't consult with them, because we want to consult with those who wish to take part in its fulfillment, not those who wish to oppose it.

POSITION TAKEN BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT JOINT COMMISSION MEETING, JULY 2, 1947.

Mr. Lounkin, speaking for the Soviet Delegation members of Subcommission No. 1, proposed to eliminate from consultation:

(1) Organizations which are not social,

(2) Purely local organizations, such as district organizations and other narrow local organizations,

(3) Parties and social organizations specifically organized to fight the Moscow Decision (primarily those parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee), and members of such organizations may be included if they declare their withdrawal from such organizations.

General Shtikov then stated that the Soviet Delegation has objected to including in such a list such parties as:

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(1) Those which are commercial in nature,

(2) Local organizations,

(3) Those opposed to the Moscow Decision.

General Shtikov stated:

(1) The Moscow Decision does not provide for consultation with either mercantile or local organizations.

(2) The Joint Commission Decision No. 12 states that parties and organizations will submit application through their central organization (the implication is therefore that those without central organization are not eligible for consultation).

(3) The Foreign Ministers, Marshall and Molotov, state that those who after signing the application foment and incite active opposition will be excluded from further consultation. How does the United States Delegation regard the demonstration of June 23rd in Seoul conducted by hoodlums? The Soviet Delegation demands that those responsible be excluded.

General Shtikov stated that he proposed to eliminate mercantile or producers' organizations such as Taewon Chamber of Commerce, Pusan Chamber of Commerce, Korean Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute and Associations for Coal Briquettes, 27 members of 300 Accountants, Anti-Japanese Aid Society, five societies for Study of Politics and Economics having 27 - 125, etc., members respectively, the Society of Women for Building the Future of Chunging, The Society of Social Workers in Inch'on. He states that if North Korean parties and organizations were that unserious in filing application, there would be thousands. We must have what the Moscow Decision provides for - such parties and organizations which can fully reflect the views of the Korean people concerning the formation of a representative provisional democratic government and its organs.

As to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet Delegation is guided by Joint Commission Decision No. 12 which states the conditions on the basis of which the Joint Commission was reconvened.

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The Soviet Delegation can show by a long series of published documents which nobody can prove otherwise that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee consisted of over 40 parties of South Korea and has not disbanded itself but has actually intensified its work against the Joint Commission and the Moscow Decision.

There is one document which testifies to this. On 16 June a convention of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee was open. Methods of working against trusteeship were discussed. Differences occurred over whether to participate in consultation. Those pro-Commission were invited to clear the room. The meeting was continued on 18 June. The decision was reached to continue the struggle against the Moscow decision. On 20 June the newspaper reporting stated that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had resolved to support Syngman Rhee and his foo; that during the meeting of the Commission those who signed the application for consultation would consult but would work against trusteeship. The Committee has pledged itself to fully renounce trusteeship, first, and second, in general not to participate in the work of the Joint Commission to cooperate with the Rightists which have already been included in the list for consultation with the Joint Commission in their fight against trusteeship and thus achieve full independence. See details published in Seoul Times on June 20, 1947.

Seoul Times, 21 June, Delcamtion of Propeganda Section on creation of a committee to Launch Current Events:

(a) Resolve to establish Korean Democratic Provisional Government through election, yet such government should not admit trusteeship as a policy of interference in its external affairs.

(b) That they would utilize the old Chungking Government, changing its name and institutions.

(c) Demanded liberation of political prisoners in North Korea imprisoned for anti-trusteeship.

Above statement was made by leader of Democratic Party, an official representative.

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General Shtikov asked - Can the Joint Commission believe the significance of those who subscribed to the above sentiment on applications for consultation? The United States Delegation refers to General Hodge's letter concerning freedom of expression. The Soviet Delegation has never forbid any organization from expressing its views, yet those who are antagonistic toward the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission may not consult with them. The facts are here. What further proof is needed?

Re to the 23 June demonstrations and the alleged innocence of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, even the declaration sent by Kim Koo says that the demonstration was staged by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and its members, the terrorists themselves (2,000) shows what prestige this organization has with the Korean people. We did not wish to cite Kim Koo's declaration because it is well known to the US Delegation.

QUESTION RAISED BY SOVIET DELEGATION AT JOINT COMMISSION MEETING, July 3, 1947: (page 15-16 of transcript)

General Brown proposed: Send notice to all political parties and social organizations of North - South Korea with a membership in excess of 10,000 that they appear for consultation beginning July 7. Small controversial parties not be summoned for consultation until further consideration can be given them by Joint Commission.

Shtikov: Soviet Delegation agrees to accept the proposal to commence consultation July 7 with those parties and social organizations which have signed the declaration to fully uphold the Moscow Decision and have submitted applications and to have the question of local organizations and non-social organizations discussed on a later date. Soviet Delegation proposes that the Joint Commission make a warning to parties and social organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and have been carrying out a struggle, which have been opposing the Moscow Decision, that they declare their intention of abandoning this committee.

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rown offers to again publish to all conditions agreed upon for reconvention of Joint Commission.

htikov: (P.17) Soviet Delegation would like to make this question more exacting. He asks if American Delegation would consider parties members of Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Not desire of Soviet Delegation to punish those parties for their activities in the past. Soviet Delegation intends that those parties and social organizations which do not desire to uphold Moscow Decision not be given a fair chance during consultation. Let them express their views anywhere but not during consultation.

rown: Should be regarded innocent until proven guilty.

htikov: asks:- "Can we consult with those parties and social organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee which has been carrying out the fight against the Moscow Decision.

rown: htikov produces no facts to show that any party which is a member of Anti-Trusteeship Committee has since it has signed its application for consultation fomented or instigated active opposition.

htikov: entions #224, All Korean Society of Friends Against Trusteeship. The Detachment Against Trusteeship. All of these organizations are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and participated in the disturbance of June 23. Soviet Delegation desires only to consult with those parties and social organizations who whole-heartedly and sincerely uphold the Moscow Decision.

Brown: Shtikov is accusing certain parties without proof. He offered a press release.

Shtikov: Subcommission #1 or Shtikov and Brown summon all the leaders of parties and social organizations who are members of Anti-Trusteeship Commitees and who have signed the declaration and submitted an application so as to exactly define their position towards the Moscow Decision.

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If they manage to prove the opposite, they will be included in the list for consultation. This will be an official conversation of the Soviet-American Commission with ~~official~~ political parties and organizations.

Brown: Not in accordance with American concept of law. Proposed again to commence consultation on July 7 with all parties with membership of over 10,000. Final decision on parties and social organizations with fewer than 10,000 members will be announced at a later date.

Shtikov: Soviet Delegation agrees to accept the draft press release with the reservation: What those parties and organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and are fighting against trusteeship and it means that they are fighting against the Moscow Decision, that the position of such parties and organizations be exactly clarified inasmuch as these parties and organizations have the program and as it is known from the press they stated on June 23 that they would continue their opposition in spite of the signed declaration. These statements made on behalf of those parties and organizations in the press were not denied and that is why additional clarification of this question is needed.

Brown: The sugrestion is not acceptable.

POLAD'S 176, June 28

AMERICAN POSITION:

Mere membership in an Anti-Trusteeship Committee organized months ago does not constitute per se active opposition to Moscow Agreement by organizations signing declaration prescribed in Communique #5 and that Joint Commission should proceed with consultation, taking up individual cases on their merits as they arise. Soviet proof of instigation and fomentation by opposition can then be considered with each case and referred if necessary to Joint Commission as provided.

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WAR STATE DEPT R-7156, 1 July 1947:

Department believes there can be no compromise on this issue. As stated in Secretary's letter to Molotov of May 2, the US Government holds that representatives of Korean parties and social organizations "shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government because of opinion they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." Department concurs in position of American members reported last paragraph your telegram and authorizes you to stand firm on this point.

/BROWN/

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

27 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press Via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Item 1: YOUNG U.S. TENNIS STAR TO PLAY IN SEOUL TOURNEY

Members of the U.S. Army Forces in Korea will get a chance to see one of America's budding tennis champions when the Far Eastern Inter-Command tournament begins in Seoul on June 9. Pfc. Hugh W. Stewart of San Marino, Calif., stellar net-man on the Philrycom team, is scheduled to play in the tourney here in which other leading stars will represent USAFIK, Japan, Hawaii and Marbo.

Stewart won the National Interscholastic Singles championship last year while playing for South Pasadena high school. With a partner, he also won the 1946 National Indoor Junior Doubles championship. In several other tournaments throughout the United States, Stewart placed in the top brackets.

The tennis tournament in Seoul will be the first Inter-Command athletic meet held in Korea.

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Item 2: NEW PLAN REQUIRES TICKETS FOR TRAIN TRAVEL

To establish necessary priorities and make reservations properly, tickets will be issued for all rail travel to persons in Korea who are identified with the Army Forces. Travel orders will still be issued by major commands concerned, and reservations must be made by contacting Rail Transportation Offices in local stations where tickets must be picked up not later than 30 minutes prior to the departure of the train.

With official travel given first priority, that for recreation will be granted, provided permission is shown on a new Recreational Travel Permit or written orders authorizing a delay en route. This is to be obtained from authorities which normally issue leaves, passes or delays en route. The permit is to be shown to the local Rail Transportation Office where tickets will be issued.

At stations where Railway Transportation Officers are not located, a passenger must give the military conductor a copy of travel authority in exchange for a ticket. At stations where such transportation Officers are located, conductors may grant tickets only in emergency cases.

When a group of persons are traveling on one order, group tickets will be given to the individual in charge of the party.

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Item 3: AMERICANS HERE GIVE $1,200 TO SEND 3 KOREANS TO SEMINARIES IN U.S.

The generosity of officers and enlisted men attending the XXIV Corps Headquarters Troops and Special Troops chapel will make it possible for at least three Korean ministerial students to attend seminaries and Bible colleges in the United States, it was revealed today.

The lack of an exchange rate between the yen and dollar has heretofore prevented students from going to the United States to take advantage of scholarships offered by American theological institutions.

Realizing this, donations have been made by men in the Seoul area to send deserving students to the United States. As transportation costs $400 per man, the original goal of $1,200 has been reached, but offerings will still be taken in hopes of sending additional students later.

It is expected that actual selection of students will be made in time for the fall semester. The students meeting institutional qualifications, will be selected by the Korean church groups which they will represent in their future ministry in this country.

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Item 4: LARGE QUANTITY OF BIBLES FOR KOREANS EXPECTED HERE THIS WEEK

The first increment of 60,000 Bibles printed in Korean will arrive this week from the American Bible Society for distribution by the Korean Bible Society, states Lt. Col. Vernon P. Jaeger of Port Townsend, Wash., XXIV Corps chaplain.

To obtain more, $237.75 was contributed by American troops and civilians last Sunday in observance of Bible Sunday in Korea. The donations were made at chapels in XXIV Corps Headquarters, Korea Base Command Headquarters and American Military Government Headquarters.

Shipped at no expense to the American government, the Bibles are being obtained as a result of interest shown by American personnel in the efforts of missionaries and Korean church leaders here who last year requested the Testaments from the American Bible Society, a non-profit-making, interdenominational organization. "Local printing of this country's Bible needs is not practical now," explains Chaplain Jaeger, "because of paper and binding material shortages. However, the Korean people are now collecting funds for such printing when material conditions permit it."

Last year, points out Chaplain Jaeger, 53,000 Bibles paid for by church organizations in the United States were sent to the Korean Bible Society by the American organization. immediate result was the floo g of the Korean Bible

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Item 4 (cont'd)

Society with 83,000 individual orders from Koreans here. Well geared to handle such large demands because of experience in providing millions of Testaments in more than 1,000 languages and dialects, the American Society which met Korea's order is pitching into this country's requirements, promising the balance of the 60,000 total before 1947 is out.

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Item 5: U.S.O. PERFORMERS MARRIED HERE TODAY

Miss Mabel Marie Ucker of 2531 Avalon place, Columbus, Ohio, and Emil Buzzelli of 642 Columbia avenue, Akron, Ohio, performers in a U.S.O. Camp Show now playing in Seoul, were married here today by Chaplain (Lt. Col.) Vernon P. Jaeger, of Port Townsend, Wash., XXIV Corps Headquarters.

The wedding took place in the Chung Dong Methodist Church.

Miss Esther Kelly of 60 Edenfield avenue, Watertown, Mass., was maid of honor, while Garret Nash of 3201 Barrett street, St. Louis, Mo., was best man.

All four performers have been appearing in the show, "This Has Everything."

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Item 6: FUNDS ALLOTTED FOR USAFIK ATHLETIC AWARDS

To supply suitable awards and trophies for athletic contestants, $1,390 has been allocated from the XXIV Corps Welfare Fund for the period of July 1,1947 to June 30, 1948, it was learned today. Of this sum, $180 was allocated for Inter-Command trophies while $1,210 was set aside for Intra-Command awards.

The largest single expenditure was the estimated purchase of 36 football trophies for $288, while $48 for six tennis awards was the least expensive of the group. Other sports to receive trophies were baseball, 20 awards; basketball, 14; boxing, 18; volleyball, 10; and softball, 16.

It was further estimated that 68 appropriate type medals for track and field, and 57 for swimming are planned for under the allocation program.

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Item 7: FATHER FLANAGAN TO ARRIVE IN KOREA THURSDAY

Father Edward J. Flanagan, founder of Boys' Town, will arrive in Seoul by air from Japan May 29, Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, American Military Governor, announced today.

Dr. Y.S. LEE, Director of the Department of Public Health and Welfare, requested the Military Governor to invite Father Flanagan to south Korea that he might be consulted in drawing up a program for better child care. -0-

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ITEM 8 . . 106 BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO BE CLOSED IN KOREA

In the interest of national economy, 56 branch banks and 50 Financial Associations and branches in south Korea will be closed June 30, it was announced today by Mr. H. B. YUN, Department of Finance director.

Depositors' rights will be protected and the customary 30-day notice will be given for the withdrawal of deposits.

At present there are 222 branch banks and 401 Financial Associations doing business in south Korea. It is estimated that 30% of the branch banks and 57% of the Financial Associations have been operating at a loss.

Mr. YUN pointed out that many of these branch banks and Financial Associations were part of the Japanese war effort, as indicated by the dates of their establishment. For example, 15 branch banks were established in 1941. The next year 13 branch banks and 38 Financial Associations were opened. Between 1937 and 1946 a total of 61 branch banks and 58 Financial Associations were established in south Korea.

YUN explained that no community will be left without banking facilities. Twenty per cent of the existing branch banks will be merged with other branches of the same bank. Similarly, 20 per cent of the Financial Associations either will be merged with other Financial Associations or reduced to the status of branches.

Depositors who have not withdrawn their money by the end of the 30-day period following the notice of closure may withdraw these funds from the branch into which their branch bank or Financial Association has been merged.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

28 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press Via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Item 1: CENTRAL SCHOOL REGISTRATION AND CLASSES BEGIN JUNE 2

Classes will begin at the XXIV Corps Central school on June 2, the same day that applicants register, Capt. Weldon C. McBride of May, Tex., school director, announced today. Registration for morning classes will be held from 8:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.; afternoon class registration runs from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., while that for evening classes will be held from 7 p.m. until 9 p.m. However, as classwork begins immediately after the registration process, students are urged to be at the registrar's office promptly at the beginning of each session's registration.

The curriculum for the 11th term follows the Army Education Program with subjects ranging from agriculture to typing. Complete information regarding the schedule is posted on Information and Education bulletin boards of all units and in Red Cross clubs.

Instructors have been selected from military personnel with teaching or technical backgrounds.

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Item 2: AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS REQUEST KOREAN DOCUMENTS

Forty-one universities, libraries and other institutions in the United States, among which are Harvard university, Yale university, University of Chicago, Columbia university, New York Public Library, University of California and Johns Hopkins university, have requested copies of all Korean public documents to augment their libraries on Korea and Korean affairs, LEE Chong Hark, Director, Office of Administration, announced today.

Mills college in Oakland, Calif., a college for women, was the first institution in the United States after the war to ask for copies of all documents on the newly liberated Korea and has been receiving copies of all public documents of south Korea for more than a year.

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Item 3: NEW XXIV CORPS CHAPLAIN IS APPOINTED

Col. George F. Rixey of 3831 Macomb street N.W., Wash., D.C., formerly Deputy Chief of Chaplains of the U.S. Army and Assistant Inspector General, has been assigned as XXIV Corps Chaplain, it was announced today.

He replaces Lt. Col. Vernon P. Jaeger of Port Townsend, Wash., who has been

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Item 3: (cont'd)

Corps Chaplain since February 1946 and who expects to return to the United States soon.

A holder of the Silver Star and Distinguished Service Medal, Chaplain Rixey served in Europe during World War I. He has also held assignments in the Philippines and China since his Army service began thirty-seven years ago.

A graduate of Central Wesleyan college, he was pastor of Centenary Methodist Church in Louisiana, Mo., and in 1910 served as a first lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry of the Missouri National Guard. He was appointed to the Chaplain Corps in 1917 and served in France the following year.

In December 1944 Chaplain Rixey was promoted to the temporary grade of brigadier general while he was Deputy Chief of Chaplains in Washington, D.C.

Item 4: WEATHER REPORT

Yesterday's maximum temperature, 77.4, today's, 78, to-morrow's, 78. Prediction for Thursday: Clear with southeast winds.ENDIT

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Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Bunce and Mr. Tounkin,

1100, 28 May 1947

Mr. Bunce stated that there were two issues involved as between the two proposals:

a. The number of the parties to be included for consultation.

b. The process of elimination of parties for consultation.

The American Delegation felt that roughly 100 parties from South Korea would have to be included in consultation and furthermore Joint Commission would have the right to call any groups together as later agreed upon.

The steps outlined under the American proposal would be as follows:

1. Notification of parties.
2. Application for consultation by parties and nomination of representative.
3. Review of applications by the Subcommission.
4. Invitation of groups selected in Seoul to meet in a joint meeting of the Commission.
5. Joint meeting during which the questionnaire shall be distributed.
6. Two-week interval during which parties and organizations shall prepare their recommendations.
7. Establishment of three subcommittees which shall interview the spokesmen from the Korean parties, allowing one-half hour to each for his views and amplifications of questions.
8. Parallel meeting in Pyong Yang.
9. Return of the Joint Commission to Seoul
10. Consultations with leaders, including northern leaders who would come to Seoul.

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11. Possible calling together of groups for further consultations in Seoul.

Another item which shall be given consideration is the inclusion of the full text of the correspondence concerning the reopening of the Joint Commission as exchanged between Molotov and Marshall.

Mr. Tounkin stated that the document on order of consultation should include three conditions agreed to by Marshall and Molotov. He agreed that there was only one condition for consultation, namely, signing of the declaration.

Mr. Bunce inquired what was the attitude of the Soviet Delegation regarding the freedom of opinion.

TOUNKIN: The Soviet Delegation has no objection to allowing the freedom of opinion; it is, however, a completely different matter as to whether individuals would be admitted for consultation. How would the American Delegation propose to consult with organizations whose aim is opposing Moscow Decision, such as the anti-trusteeship committee.

BUNCE: Parties have the right to hold whatever opinion they desired, but if they signed Communique No. 5 they should be consulted. If, however, after signing the Communique they started political activity against the work of the Joint Commission they would be excluded from consultation.

TOUNKIN: If an organization set up specifically to oppose Moscow Decision signs declaration, it merely indicates its intent to cheat.

BUNCE: Even though a party may disagree with trusteeship, we should value its opinion. As yet we have no definition of trusteeship; the method of aid and assistance is yet to be worked out.

TOUNKIN: If, however, they continue opposition their declaration is not valid.

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BUNCE: As long as they will cooperate they may consult with us and as long as they will not openly organize resistance. It may be useful for us to know the sort of aid and assistance they have in mind when we shall discuss trusteeship. The issue is whether we allow free discussion or not.

TOUNKIN: I have no objection to the freedom of opinion but in the United States for instance, the President selects members of the Government such as heads of departments and Cabinet Members. Even though there is freedom of opinion in the United States the President takes into consideration whom to appoint and does not appoint those whose opinions differ from his.

BUNCE: (Points out the different Cabinet Members in the United States have violent disagreement among themselves, but once the decision is made they abide by it. Inquires why the delegation should not meet with a larger group, and why a small group is being insisted on.)

TOUNKIN: Let us take into account the great democratic parties and organizations. They should be attracted closer to the Commission as a group so they could better help the Commission with practical suggestions regarding Moscow Decision.

BUNCE: (Explains the origin of the 30 parties as being the result of the consultative union plan once entertained by the American Delegation.)

TOUNKIN: Our intention was to meet the American wishes.

BUNCE: If there is to be such a group, it should be much larger than 30 parties - it should be broader.

TOUNKIN: Larger does not necessarily mean better. An instrument should have a certain degree of precision. If an instrument has a greater degree of precision than is needed, it is not as good for practical purposes.

The problem is, how to compare the views of a very small party with those of a very large party.

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What is your opinion regarding the number of representatives to be nominated by each party?

BUNCE: One from each party. It would be up to the Subcommission to weigh the views. It is very difficult to establish proper criteria.

TOUNKIN: The criteria are, in that order, number of members and influence. A big party might have 800,000 members and a small, 1,001. The ratio would seem to be 800 : 1.

BUNCE: This would be OK if we could find accurate statistics. Membership figures are very inexact. One organization, Chun Pyung, which used to claim 600,000 members now claims 250,000. It would be difficult to evaluate such claims. We should avoid friction in this respect. There is positively no way of statistical weighting. We should make representation as broad as possible. The Joint Commission itself will have to use judgment to decide what weight to attach to the individual parties' views.

TOUNKIN: Approximate number of members is usually roughly known - say, in the range of three to five hundred thousand for one party and about two to three thousand for another.

BUNCE: In the last commission meetings there was much arguing back and forth between Messrs. Thayer and Tsarapkin. If we get into that area, this would ruin the work of the subcommission. The way to get agreement is to establish a broad basis in the subcommission. Any attempt to limit the number by exclusion would result in bickering. Last year's sessions adjourned over this problem.

TOUNKIN: We cannot avoid this problem.

BUNCE: The only way to avoid the problem is to let the Joint Commission use its judgment, in that way we could avoid statistics. The Joint Commission would bog down if we try to establish statistical standards.

TOUNKIN: Why should it? We are anxious to establish a provisional government as soon as possible. We should accept the

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procedure decided last year. We had agreed on all points but paragraph 2, and this had been resolved by the Marshall-Molotov correspondence and could merely be inserted.

BUNCE: The procedure had been discussed but not agreed to. There was disagreement on that point in the Commission. If we follow the same procedure followed last year, we will reach the same impasse. We shall just waste time bickering. I don't see why we should invite so much bickering which is unnecessary. The proposed basis of the U.S. does away with that bickering. The Joint Commission should not be tied down by the terms of this agreement - it should use its judgment.

TOUNKIN: (Disagrees.)

BUNCE: The approach is too narrow.

TOUNKIN: Do you envisage joint meetings of southern and northern parties?

BUNCE: We would call such meetings any time they were desired.

TOUNKIN: Would you give me the list of parties and organizations which you intend to invite?

BUNCE: We cannot compile such a list until we receive the applications for consultation.

TOUNKIN: Could you submit a tentative list?

BUNCE: Would you prepare such a list of northern parties?

TOUNKIN: I would only want a tentative list which would indicate roughly the practical nature of the problem.

BUNCE: We could not furnish a list until the applications are in.

TOUNKIN: The US Delegation knows its parties and organizations and might compile such a list.

BUNCE: We should work out such a list together.

TOUNKIN: If such a list were presented, it might be easier to agree on general points.

BUNCE: If you want such a list limited to an agreed number you should bring a list of North Korean parties and we shall combine the two. We must avoid last year's unfortunate attempt in trying to exclude parties. If we accept the wide definition we won't have to

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argue and shall consult all important groups. I don't believe we can get anywhere on the basis of limiting the list of political parties.

TOUNKIN: I suggest that by including very small parties we shall distort the opinion of the Korean people.

BUNCE: We have to use judgment. There is no way of weighing individual parties and there could be no statistical approach.

TOUNKIN: You yourself suggested a limitation of a thousand members.

BUNCE: You hold too rigidly to only 30 parties.

TOUNKIN: We know from the experience of other countries that thirty is a large group for parties. In France only ten parties take part in political life. Our aim is to find Korean opinion. If we take a larger group we shall distort that.

BUNCE: It is impossible to arrange it on a statistical formula.

TOUNKIN: We shall give them opportunity to express themselves in writing.

BUNCE: Why do you insist on thirty?

TOUNKIN: That was agreed to last year.

BUNCE: That was the basis for the breaking up of the Commission. We tried to exclude various groups and the work ended in failure.

TOUNKIN: You are reneging on your previous agreement.

BUNCE: (Points out that no part of the old agreement valid until the whole is accepted.)

TOUNKIN: (Says that though not officially, agreement had been reached.)

BUNCE: This agreement did not work. It resulted in the breakdown of the Joint Commission.

TOUNKIN: It was not the cause of the split.

BUNCE: It is ridiculous to use an agreement which had failed.

TOUNKIN: We broke on a different point. If the US has not changed its position, it would be expeditious to accept the old agreement.

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BUNCE: We will not accept last year's agreement because it is too narrow. We want a broader agreement.

TOUNKIN: Does that mean that the US Delegation has changed its position?

BUNCE: Yes. Russian position has changed, too.

TOUNKIN: We incorporated in our proposal everything that had been agreed to by the two delegations.

BUNCE: We are not bound as to the method of consultation. Last year's method was too restrictive, and failed. We want to avoid failure, and propose a broader method. We prepared a complete new revision, but followed the same pattern. The changes in the details of procedure, we feel, are essential. The fact that the Joint Commission could not find a solution justifies the change in the tentative agreement.

TOUNKIN: So the US position differs? What are your views regarding the future work of the Joint Commission?

BUNCE: If we cannot agree on a solution, we shall transfer the matter to the Joint Commission.

TOUNKIN: We cannot change the agreement. We came here on the basis of the agreement between Molotov and Marshall regarding certain points concerning the consultation. These points have been fixed in Molotov's letter of 7 May. Do you agree to the inclusion of these points?

BUNCE: I would include them, but if they were included, we should include other parts of the correspondence.

TOUNKIN: Other points were not agreed on; if they are included, the discussion will start anew. The conditions have been fixed and accepted. We are not authorized to disregard them.

BUNCE: I don't want to omit them.

TOUNKIN: You want to change them?

BUNCE: I want to ask you a question. Do you believe that an individual shall be excluded because of the opinions he holds and because of expressing opinions?

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TOUNKIN: The question is not correctly stated. You confuse two problems:

1. Freedom of opinion (eligibility for consultation),
2. Admission to consultation.

BUNCE: (a) I want a direct answer. Would you exclude from consultation anyone for holding certain opinions regarding the Moscow Decision?

TOUNKIN: (b) If a party has opposed Moscow Decision, saying that it is not correct, opposing it vehemently, and urging all Koreans to oppose it, this in my opinion would constitute active opposition. Opinions privately held or expressed are not active opposition. Opinions expressed in public are active opposition.

BUNCE: (c) Do I understand correctly that in your view no party or organization may express opinions regarding Trusteeship, which you do not approve of?

TOUNKIN: (a) They may express their opinions as much as they wish. But if what they say opposes any paragraph of the Moscow Decision, we won't consult with them, because we want to consult with those who wish to take part in its fulfillment, not those who wish to oppose it.

BUNCE: This invalidates the Molotov-Marshall agreement. Secretary Marshall stated explicitly that in agreeing to Molotov's points he understood them consistent with his statement regarding the freedom of expression.

TOUNKIN: Three points only were accepted.

BUNCE: We want to hold to the three points and exclude anybody who actively opposes the Moscow Decision.

TOUNKIN: You misunderstood me. Every party and organization shall sign Declaration in Communique #5. You object to.....

BUNCE: I object to the list of only thirty parties. I also object to the inclusion of only a part of the Molotov-Marshall agreement. If we cannot agree on this matter, I propose that we return this

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question to the Joint Commission. I hoped that some compromise was possible, but see no such possibility.

TOUNKIN: Our proposal is:

Parties and organizations desiring to consult with the Joint Commission should sign Communique #5 without reservations.

The Joint Commission would choose a practical, limited number of parties and organizations to consult with.

This is the essence of our proposal.

BUNCE: We have a broader proposal avoiding the difficulties encountered last time. You take the position, however, that either we accept your paper without any changes, or else.....

TOUNKIN: US proposal.....

BUNCE: Old proposal failed..... We would accept modifications in the American proposals.....

TOUNKIN: Don't forget that our proposal is broad, not limited, except as required for reasons of expediency. The difference is not big.

BUNCE: It is not expedient because it is too narrow for us to reach agreement as to which 30 parties will be included.

TOUNKIN: The door is wide open to all eligible parties which may present opinions on all questions. The difference is not big.

BUNCE: The difference is big because you do not wish to yield and make any compromise.

TOUNKIN: I am amazed..... I suggest that we report to our Chief Commissioners.

BUNCE: (States that he had already reported on the matter to General Brown, and unless Tounkin wished to modify his position and consider a compromise, the matter would be discussed by the Joint Commission at 1330, May 28.)

TOUNKIN: (Agrees to have the matter discussed in the Joint Commission. Says he had not yet discussed the matter with General Shtikov.)

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EXTRACTS FROM CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR BUNCE AND MR. TOUNKIN

1100, 28 May 1947

.....

TOUNKIN: I have no objection to the freedom of opinion but in the United States for instance, the President selects members of the Government such as heads of departments and Cabinet Members. Even though there is freedom of opinion in the United States, the President takes into consideration whom to appoint and does not appoint those whose opinions differ from his.

.....

TOUNKIN: Let us take into account the great democratic parties and organizations. They should be attracted closer to the Commission as a group so they could better help the Commission with practical suggestions regarding Moscow Decision.

.....

TOUNKIN: Larger does not necessarily mean better. An instrument should have a certain degree of precision. If an instrument has a greater degree of precision than is needed, it is not as good for practical purposes.

The problem is, how to compare the views of a very small party with those of a very large party.

.....

BUNCE: I want to ask you a question. Do you believe that an individual shall be excluded because of the opinion he holds and because of expressing opinions?

TOUNKIN: The question is not correctly stated. You confuse two problems:

1. Freedom of opinion (eligibility for consultation).
2. Admission to consultation.

.....

TOUNKIN: If a party has opposed Moscow Decision, saying that it is not correct, opposing it vehemently, and urging all Koreans to oppose it, this in my opinion would constitute active opposition. Opinions privately held or expressed are not active opposition. Opinions expressed in public are active opposition.

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.....

TOUMKIN: They may express their opinions as much as they wish. But if what they say opposes any paragraph of the Moscow Decision, we won't consult with them, because we want to consult with those who wish to take part in its fulfillment, not those who wish to oppose it.

.....

TOUMKIN: Our proposal is:

Parties and organizations desiring to consult with the Joint Commission should sign Communique #5 without reservations.

The Joint Commission would choose a practical, limited number of parties and organizations to consult with.

This is the essence of our proposal.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 1130, 28 MAY, 1947, DUK SOO PALACE.

1. GENERAL BROWN wanted to know whether it would be agreeable that the American Delegation should file away various petitions, congratulatory messages, etc., addressed to the Joint Commission but sent to the American Delegation. He added that he replied to none of them.

GENERAL SHTIKOV indicated that the respective secretaries should process jointly on such communications, and report those requiring action or publication to the Chief Commissioners.

GENERAL BROWN agreed.

2. GENERAL BROWN stated that one such petition, from Dr. Rhee, asked that the Commission define the words "Trusteeship" and "Democratic". He said he proposed to ignore the request.

GENERAL SHTIKOV concurred, stated that Dr. Rhee should read the Moscow Decision.

3. GENERAL SHTIKOV ASCERTAINED that the hour of the meeting this afternoon was 1330.

4. GENERAL SHTIKOV stated that the National Front in the North is working hard making ready for the visit of the Joint Commission and has addressed a petition to the people of the North asking for their aid and cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission. This indicated great interest in the work of the Joint Commission.

GENERAL BROWN said that there was also much interest in the work of the Joint Commission in the South, including the provinces.

5. GENERAL SHTIKOV stated that he was impressed by the fine military appearance of the 31st Infantry, whose parade he witnessed the previous evening.

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GENERAL BROWN commented that he had proprietory pride in 7th Division units, having commanded that Division during the war, and appreciated General Shtikov's compliments.

6. GENERAL SHTIKOV inquired whether it would be possible to organize for the members of the Soviet Delegation a short visit to the scene of the naval battle of Chemulpo, at Inch'on. He pointed out that the memory of that battle, in 1905, is venerated in the Soviet Union, and that a motion picture based on the scuttling of the armored cruiser Varyag and the torpedo boat Koreyets had been recently completed. He suggested that he would like to have General Brown see that picture.

GENERAL BROWN said he believed there would be no objection to Soviet Delegates visiting Inch'on, and promised to take the matter up with General Hodge.

GENERAL SHTIKOV declined the offer that a meal be arranged for at Inch'on, stated he visualized a one and a half to two-hour visit some Sunday, between 1000 - 1500 o'clock. He agreed to have a qualified guide. Sunday, 1 June, was tentatively agreed to for the excursion.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAJOR GENERAL A. E. BROWN AND COLONEL GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV

1045 - 10 June 1947

1. General Brown suggests that it would be desirable to issue the text of the decisions and the communique as soon as possible.
2. General Shtikov: Communique should be completed for publication in both Soviet and American press. It is doubtful if full texts of the questionnaires would be published in Soviet press; consequently he was drafting a descriptive commentary on the questionnaire.
3. General Brown states that further delay in publication of questionnaires would be undesirable. Accordingly, he suggests that very brief communique be published now, and that both Chief Commissioners could amplify the news as they see fit. Unless the news was released soon, it would no longer be news.
4. General Shtikov agrees to have such a brief communique, and states he would draft a more detailed one for the Soviet press.
5. General Brown states that his intention is to get the text of the questionnaire in the Korean press as soon as possible, so as to enable Korean parties to begin preparing answers. Since US Delegation was not interested in what was published in the Soviet press, he would leave this to the discretion and judgment of the Chief of the Soviet Delegation, in accordance with the earlier agreement.
6. General Shtikov asks whether everything had been agreed to, in the matter of the questionnaires. General Brown comments that these documents had been agreed to by both delegations, but that there was still the question of changes introduced by the Soviet Delegation in the covering letter to accompany Joint Decisions 5 and 6.
7. General Shtikov accordingly orders that Soviet interpreter, I. I. Valenko, get together with Captain Phillips to draft a brief communique which would serve as an introductory paragraph to the text of the decisions. He also proposes that the Joint

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Commission meet at 1030, 11 June, with the following agenda:

I. Approval of minutes.

II. Approval of report of Subcommission No. 3.

III. Discussion of manner of publication of the elaborated documents:

a. Date of simultaneous publications of documents in North and South Korea.

b. What to include, and in what order (brief statement; sequence of documents).

c. Agreement on a standard technique for handing out documents to North and South Korean parties.

d. Agreement regarding the routine for receiving and assembling the answers.

As to the last item (III d), General Shtikov proposed that because of the amount of work involved answers to the questionnaire should be submitted in two copies. The Joint Commission would also decide whether one or two copies of the signed declaration for consultation should be filed.

The Secretariat should draft a decision for the approval by the Joint Commission at tomorrow's meeting, including also a provision for the routine of handing out the questions.

The copies of the questionnaire could be delivered in Pyongyang by a Joint Commission member and a member of the Joint Secretariat, as it was done last yaar. The Joint Commission could decide this matter, as well as the text of the brief communique.

8. General Brown states he understood that the communique would be released today and published in the Korean press tomorrow, together with the full text of Decisions No. 4, 5 and 6. He also indicated that this should be done as soon as possible because of the short amount of time available to parties for preparing the answers. Since there was nothing further to agree on, there was no reason why these documents were not released to the press immediately. Both Korean and American

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press had been told that decision had been reached on the above 3 points.

As regards the details of consultatiom, Subcommission #1 has been already working for two days on a detailed plan, that Mr. Tounkin has participated in the preparation of this plan, and that the plan was ready for presentation.

9. General Shtikov asks whether General Brown proposed simultaneous publication of three decisions North and South; and if that was so decided by the Joint Commission, the checked Korean translations could be dispatched to Pyongyang after 10:30 meeting, 11 June, with a 4 P.M. train, arriving at Pyongyang by 9 P.M. The text would then appear in the noon edition of Pyongyang papers for 12 June, and in morning, same day, in the Seoul papers. He said he would wire the Soviet Commanding General to alert the North Korean press, and to arrange for space for the texts.

As to the method of handing out the questionnaire, this was a purely technical problem, and so properly a matter for the Secretariat and not for the Subcommission #1. The former should formulate briefly a proposal regarding the routine of handing out and correcting questionnaires, and this could be approved by the Joint Commission.

As to the order of consultation, Subcommittee #1 would draft the appropriate document, sometime after the 10:30 meeting, 11 June. The problem was simpler in the South, where the entire US Delegation was in one place, but he had 3 experts standing by in Pyongyang. The texts would have to be dispatched, published, checked to prevent distortion. Consequently, it would be better to publish the texts simultaneoulsy in North and South Korea. He expected such a tremendous popular response to the publication, both North and South, that it would be morally unadvisable to publish them at separate times. He was against publishing them on the 13th. General Lebedeff could be dispatched in Pyongyang

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10. General Brown states that if the publication was delayed until 12 June, it would be necessary to give additional time to the parties, and change the deadline. Gen. Shtikov agrees that 10 days (until 23 June) would be sufficient for filing the declarations.

General Brown disagrees, says that the US Secretariat has been so insistent in trying to get the text out because of the shortage of time. General Shtikov says that this is sufficient time to file the declaration. General Brown points out that there are several organizations whose headquarters are located in the provinces beyond the reach of the railroads and the radio, and says that this matter would have to be resolved in the Commission. General Shtikov agrees to hold the meeting at 1030, June 11.

11. General Brown inquires whether General Shtikov has given any thought to the type of government-to-be. General Shtikov says that the estimates had not been completed, and that at this stage or within the next two or three days it would be necessary to estimate the number of the Subcommittees.

General Brown repeats his question. General Shtikov says it would be difficult to do anything before the answers are in, since Koreans might feel slighted if they learned that the matter was discussed before their answers were received by the Commission, and it would be only tactful not to discuss the question of type of government at this time. General Brown points out that this question need not be discussed in public, but General Shtikov once more refers to child-like touchiness of the Koreans, and says we must be guided by the peoples' psychology.

12. General Shtikov suggests the followed agenda for 1030 meeting, 11 June:

(1) Deadlines for publication;

(2) Time of release to the press;

(3) Order of distributing questionnaires in South and North Korea;

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(4) Procedure for receiving and evaluating answers.

General Brown says that some of these points have been already included in the documents to be published, and comments that widespread publicity in South Korean press and radio had been planned by the US Delegation. Although the US Delegation assumed that publicity arrangements would be handled separately by the Americans and Russians in their respective zones, there would be no objection to agreeing to some common plan. Shtikov inquires whether joint communique would be prepared that day, and it is decided that the secretaries should get together by 1:30 the same afternoon.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

29 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE for Army News Service.

Item 1: "OCCUPATION SUCCESS A DEBT TO WAR DEAD," SAYS GEN. HODGE

In observance of May 30 as Memorial Day, Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge, commanding general of the Army Forces in Korea, addressed the following message to occupation forces here:

"Today in all parts of the world, Americans are observing Memorial Day. Here and elsewhere where there are Americans it is a day consecrated to memories of our dead. For us in the United States Occupation Forces it is appropriate today that we recall clearly our honored dead who gave their lives in the last bitter war in order that oppression and totalitarianism should end. The memory of that conflict and of the brave men who made victory possible should impel us to think to the future.

"We are here in Korea today to help remove possible causes for another bitter conflict, as well as to remove the effects of past oppression. We are working with and for a fine people to assist them to re-establish a sovereign nation based on sound political philosophy and a sound economy. Each one of us has some part in this task--an important part.

"In performance of our duties, we should keep in mind that our responsibilities in this follow-up operation after the war do not end here in Korea. They include a debt to the hundreds of thousands of close relatives and friends of those brave men and women who gave their lives in service to their nation. Those relatives and friends look to us to do our part in building an unshakeable foundation for peace in the Orient; to do our part in making sure that those who made the supreme sacrifice shall not have died in vain.

"Therefore, on this day of remembering the dead of the past, let us also look to the future. Let us dedicate this day and every day we are in Korea, to renewed efforts of helping this country achieve her ambition of becoming a proud member of the world's family of nations." ENDIT

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

29 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press Via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Item 1: ALL-GI FACULTY TO TEACH AT CORPS CENTRAL SCHOOL

An all-GI faculty will man the classrooms of the XXIV Corps Central school when it opens its doors for the 11th term on June 2, it was learned today. Because of their interest in the teaching profession and familiarity with subjects they will teach, these enlisted men are replacing civilian teachers whose contracts have ended.

Since its opening in December, 1945, the Central school has constantly recognized the ability of GI instructors. In Army Education Program schools under conditions totally unlike stateside campuses, the military instructor has the definite advantage of already being adapted to his surroundings and of understanding the students.

Russian and Korean taught by native linguists, will be among the subjects offered along with many others listed under the Army Education Program for which there has been sufficient demand. Night classes will make it possible for students unable to attend day classes to receive instruction during off-duty hours.

Textbooks used at the school are government reprints of recognized high school and college texts. Classes in the six-week term meet Monday through Friday for three-hour or ninety-minute periods according to the subject. Evening classes meet on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays for two hours, from 7 until 9 p.m.

The school is a quarter-mile east on the main road from the Capitol. A large sign, pointing north, indicates the building. Transportation for day students is provided by their parent organizations, while a school bus for evening students leaves the Banto Hotel at 6:30 p.m. and makes the return trip at 8:50 p.m.

War Department employes and their dependents may attend classes already in operation for military personnel.

Academic credit is measured by USAFI End-of-Course examinations and by locally prepared tests. Resulting certificates may be submitted to schools in the United States for credit. Return reports from alumni indicate that stateside high schools and colleges have looked favorably on records made in overseas Army schools.

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Item 2: NEW WASHINGTON SWITCHBOARD GOES INTO OPERATION TO-NIGHT

The new 12-position Washington exchange switchboard, second in size only to Tokyo's among Far East telephone facilities, will go into operation at XXIV Corps Headquarters, stated Col. Harry L. Vitzthum of Hopkins Apartments, Baltimore, Md., Corps Signal Officer.

Built by the Nippon Electric company, the board provides simpler operation and better facilities that promise to speed up service 25 per cent. Replacing the former tactical-type board, the new set-up will be geared to handle the 2,000 calls now placed every duty hour and a total of 15,000 daily.

In charge of planning the installation has been Lt. Col. Howard E. Price of 130 Woodward avenue, Big Rapids, Mich. Raymond Spafford of 42 Holcroft road, Rochester, N.Y., who arrived here as a signal officer with the first occupation troops Sept. 8, 1945, has been technical advisor. Thomas Glennon of 34 Anson street, Bridgeport, Conn., will continue as wire chief of the Washington exchange.

Users are requested to keep calls to a minimum during early days of the change-over while operators become accustomed to the new panels. Eventually these will speed service because numbers on them are in identical places on all twelve panels. On former boards, numbers were in different positions, necessitating delays as operators adjusted themselves upon taking over a new panel. In addition, calling time will be saved by a uniform light system that instantly reveals a "busy", thus eliminating slow and tedious testing for a"busy" by sound signals.

Users are also urged to consult the new Washington directory before placing any call. This, to be issued June 1, lists numerous changes necessitated by the changeover.

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Item 3: "BOY MEETS GIRL" COMING TO SEOUL

Hollywood's pompous producers and temperamental stars get a working over by the Special Service detachment from Ernie Pyle theater in Tokyo in "Boy Meets Girl," to be presented on the XXIV Corps theater stage in Seoul on June 10, 11 and 12. There will be a special matinee performance on June 11 by these General Headquarter's GI's and actress technicians.

Poking fun at the artificiality of the film capital, the play was such a success on Broadway in the middle 30's that it was later made into a movie.

The play, which take cracks at everyone from producer to writer, has

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Item 3 (cont'd)

toured the 6th Division and will work its way through the 7th Division and Korea Base Command before reaching Seoul.

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Item 4: HAWAII BEATS USAFIK VOLLEYBALLERS IN OPENING PACIFIC MATCHES

In the first night of play in the Pacific Inter-Command volleyball tourney, Hawaii beat the USAFIK team, 15-6 and 15-10. Philrycom downed Marbo, 15-6 and 15-8 while Japan's contingent drew a bye.

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Item 5: WEATHER REPORT

Yesterday's maximum temperature was 83.3. To-day's, 80 and to-morrow's, Friday, 85. Prediction for Friday: Clear to partly cloudy with southwest winds.

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Item 6: EWHA WOMEN'S UNIVERSITY TO OBSERVE 61ST ANNIVERSARY SATURDAY

Ewha Women's university will celebrate its 61st anniversary at 1:30 p.m. on May 31 with a program of singing and folk dancing to which all interested Americans and Koreans are invited.

The singing of old Ewha songs and folk dancing of many nations by the students will spotlight the program of entertainment. Dr. Helen KIM, president, will make the anniversary address, which will be followed by gymnastic drills and choral singing. A May Queen will also be crowned as part of the ceremony.

Ewha university had its beginning in the work of Mrs. F.C. Scranton, first woman missionary to Korea. When Mrs. Scranton taught girls in her home in 1886, she established the first school for girls in Korea. Since that date, Ewha has become a "union" institution receiving the support of all Protestant denominations.

Ewha university has a small endowment which, with tuition fees, is the only source of financial support.

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Item 7: ADDITIONAL TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTED IN KOREA

Eighteen locomotives for use on Korea's railroads, and large quantities of other transportation equipment have been allocated to the Department of Transportation for distribution under the Civilian Supply Program, it was announced here today.

The equipment includes 616 vehicles, 253 trailers, 363 packages of vehicle parts, 300 sets of storage batteries, 100 pieces of auto flaps and 390 sets of

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Item 7 (cont'd)

spare car parts.

Among the vehicles are 2½-ton dump and cargo trucks, 3/4-ton weapon carriers, 3/4-ton ambulances and jeeps. All are for distribution among various governmental agencies.

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Item 8: SEVENTH DIVISION SWIMMING POOL TO OPEN FRIDAY

The Seventh Infantry Division's swimming pool in Seoul is scheduled to open to-morrow at 9 a.m., it was announced here today. Planned for use by enlisted men and officers of the Hourglass unit, their dependents and War Department civilian employes working at the division, it will be open seven days and evenings each week.

It will be reserved for enlisted men on Mondays and Fridays from 1 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.; Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays from 1 p.m. to 6 p.m.; and Sundays from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.

Officers, their dependents and civilian employes may use the pool Monday through Saturday from 9 a.m. to noon; on Monday and Friday from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m.; and on Wednesdays from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.

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Item 9: FATHER FLANAGAN ARRIVES IN KOREA

The Right Reverend Monsignor Edward J. Flanagan, famous "Boy's Town" founder, arrived here from Tokyo today by plane. He is expected to be guest of honor tonight at a dinner in the home of Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge, commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces in Korea. On Friday he will be the honored dinner guest at the home of Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, American military governor.

During his stay in Korea until next Wednesday, the Catholic leader will consult with American and Korean officials in welfare work here and will visit numerous children's institutions in Seoul and Pusan.

These include Catholic orphanages, blind and deaf schools, a reformatory, refugee centers, and a child guidance group of middle school and college students. Father Flanagan will also make a radio address over station JODK on Sunday at 7:15 p.m.

His visit here is a result of General Lerch's invitation, extended upon the request of Dr. Y.S. LEE, Department of Public Health and Welfare director, who is arranging consultations with Father Flanagan as part of a program of bettering child care in Korea.

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Item 10: ELABORATE MEMORIAL DAY EXERCISES AT SEVENTH DIVISION ARTILLERY

America's heroes who died in war will be remembered to-morrow by solemn Memorial Day exercises at the Seventh Division Artillery when Brig. Gen. Roger M. Wicks, commander of the Hourglass artillerymen, will place a wreath at the base of the unit's flagpole.

KIM Hyung Min, mayor of Seoul, will also take part in the ceremony as a representative of the Korean people, placing a commemorative wreath at the same place.

The exercises will begin at 8:45 a.m. when men of the 48th, 49th and 57th artillery battalions will answer the adjutant's call in formation. A salute to the honored dead will be fired by a special contingent of the Hourglass unit's Palace Guard.ENDIT.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

31 May 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press Via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Item 1: TWELVE USAFIK GI's TO ATTEND TRADE SCHOOL IN JAPAN

As part of the Information and Education vocational training program, 12 enlisted men of the U.S. Army Forces in Korea will attend the next class of the Keio Trade School in Keio, Japan, it was learned today. The school, conducted under the supervision of the Eighth Army Information and Education section, offers four-week courses in welding, electricity, machine shop, basic radio, mechanical drawing and carpentry.

Personnel selected will be screened to determine their fitness to attend the school, and must have at least six months left to serve in the theater after completion of the course.

The following quotas for attendance at courses commencing June 27 have been established for the major subordinate commands: 6th Division, one man to electricity and one to mechanical drawing; 7th Division, one man to welding and one to machine shop; USAMGIK, one man to basic radio and one to carpentry; Korea Base Command, one man to electricity, one to machine shop and one to carpentry; 80th Medical Group, one man to welding; XXIV Corps Special Troops, one man to basic radio and one to mechanical drawing.

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Item 2: KOREAN BUSINESSMEN TO AID NATIONAL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN

Under a new experiment, the National Property Custodian has initiated a plan to have several Korean businessmen devote part of their time to assist the Corporate Affairs Section in preliminary checks of business enterprises in which the NPC has interest as trustee.

Established on trial to determine the plan's effectiveness, the experiment includes a survey of charters to determine the extent of Japanese shareholdings and the feasibility of disposing of Property Custody interest in the reasonably near future.

Property Custody will study suggestions that will bear further study and will submit recommendations on vested properties

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Item 2 (cont'd)

to the Joint Korean-American Advisory Board.

The businessmen will be paid 1,000 yen a month as the government cannot use citizens' service without paying compensation, although when originally asked to assist, the men readily volunteered and rejected any suggestion of payment.

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Item 3: GENERAL EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TESTS TO BE GIVEN IN SEOUL

Military personnel who wish to get high school or college credits for their Army experience may do so by taking a General Educational Development test at the XXIV Corps Central school in Seoul, Capt. Weldon C. McBride of May, Tex., director, announced today.

The school has on hand all necessary application blanks and test forms for both the high school and college level examinations. Test applicants merely have to go to the school during duty hours any day, Monday through Friday, or on Tuesday or Thursday nights between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.

Recognizing that many thousands of young Americans have interrupted their schooling during their military service, the Army, in cooperation with educators throughout the nation, has developed a program to help a man make use of varied Army experiences on his return to civilian life. The GED tests measure the extent of a man's educational growth through experience and work, regardless of the means by which it was acquired.

A general question asked by prospective employers is, "Does the veteran have the equivalent of a general high school education and should he be granted a high school diploma?" Reports indicate that the majority of high schools use the results of the GED test as a basis for issuing a diploma. On the college level, the GED tests appraise the student's educational accomplishments, and are used by many colleges as a basis for granting credit in broad subject fields.

If a serviceman intends to return to work, he may still

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ITEM 3 (cont.)

profit by taking the GED test. Many employers regard a high school education essential for placement or promotion. Success on the GED test shows an employer that the man merits equal consideration with the applicant direct from school.

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ITEM 4 TRANSPORTATION UNIT SET UP AS SPECIAL STAFF SECTION OF XXIV CORPS

Headed by Col. John B. Grinstead of Phoenix, Ariz., a new transportation unit has been established as a special staff section of XXIV Corps headquarters, it was announced today.

The new section will regulate, co-ordinate and supervise all rail and water transportation of American personnel and supplies here.

Among its functions will be furnishing technical information to commanding generals and all major commands, and co-ordinating transportation agency activities between tactical and Military Government units. It will arrange through MG's Marine Bureau for shipment by water from local sources to supplement that provided by outside shipping.

The new section is also charged with supervising movement of troops, civilians and dependents to the United States, Japan and other areas. Its other functions include tallying ships bearing military cargo, and handling personal baggage matters.

For nearly a year Col. Grinstead has been commanding officer of the Third Medium Port Company at Inch'on.

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ITEM 5 WEATHER

Today's maximum temperature: 70. Sunday's: 75, clear and partly cloudy with south-easterly winds.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

2 June 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press Via Tokyo and Army News Service.

Item 1: KOREAN MINING COMPANY MAKES FIRST PAYMENT AGAINST LOAN

The Kobayoshi Mining Company, which operates the Sang Dong Scheelite Mine, has made the first payment of 2,408,514 yen against the government-guaranteed loan of 16,408,514 yen made by the Chosen Industrial Bank early in 1946, OH Chung Soo, Department of Commerce director, announced today.

This repayment is the first made since liberation by any mining company controlled by Mining Bureau, against a government-guaranteed loan. The balance of the loan will be renewed for the next six-month period.

Early in 1946 the Kobayoshi Mining Company was granted a government-guaranteed loan to rehabilitate and put into production the Sang Dong Scheelite Mine (tungsten) near Yung Wal in Kangwen Do. This mine has been producing since last October.

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Item 2: MILITARY SHIPMENTS EXPEDITED IN KOREA

Military freight and supplies from Quartermaster City will soon reach troops south of Suwon, Korea, faster as a result of the scheduling of four regular supply trains from Inchon and Ascom City each week, it was learned today.

A train for Pusan will leave each Tuesday, Wednesday and Saturday, while the fourth train will leave Fridays for Kwangju. These trains will carry freight only, and will not carry reefer cars. Reefer cars will continue to be hauled daily by passenger trains.

Schedules for these freight trains can be obtained from the Department of Transportation, USAMGIK.

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Item 3: 13TH ENGINEERS OFFICER WINS TRIP TO HAWAII AND $50

For showing how to conserve wood and coal by installation of a home-made diesel oil burning system in large boilers, First Lieut.

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Item 3 (cont'd)

Howard J. Dager of Ambler, Pa., today won the XXIV Corps Conservation award of a seven-day vacation in Hawaii with $50 expense money and air travel both ways. The presentation was made by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, USAFIK. A graduate of West Point, Lt. Dager is a member of Headquarters, 13th Engineer battalion of the 7th Division.

Lt. Dager submitted a plan he originated in August, 1946, to operate glass furnaces then idle for lack of coal, consisting of an oil burner which can be turned on a lathe from low carbon steel bar stock here in Korea. Using Army salvage material and Korean labor, the burner can be manufactured for $14.50 as compared to between $30 and $40 in the United States.

Lt. Dager contacted the Sun Young Machinery company in Seoul, showed them his plans and arranged for the manufacture of sample burners for actual use in his battalion. Last winter he conclusively proved that in using 300 gallons of fuel for a 24-hour period, he could heat water for the battalion laundry and steam-heat the barber shop, library, laundry, battalion headquarters, officer's mess and officers quarters. It was then impossible to obtain enough wood to operate this boiler on the same scale. The use of the central boiler also eliminated the individual stoves in these buildings, cutting down the fire hazard.

This same system has since been installed in the 7th Division Artillery area and the division laundry and dry cleaners. It can be adapted to practically any large type boiler, and saves money, fuel and labor.

Lt. Dager will leave for Hawaii tomorrow from Kimpo Army Air base.

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Item 4: MAJOR BECKER AWARDED SOLDIERS' MEDAL

At a program of Memorial Day services held by 1176th Engineer Construction Group at Seoul Air Field, Major Ernest C. Becker, executive officer of the 34th Engineer Combat Battalion, was

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Item 4 (cont'd)

awarded the Soldiers' Medal by Colonel Donald C. Hill of 1417 Beacon street, Brookline, Mass., Group commanding officer.

On the night of last December 11, while directing fire fighting during a disastrous fire that razed the battalion mess hall, Becker rescued a Korean fireman who had collapsed near a drum of gasoline which was in momentary danger of exploding in the blazing building.

Becker served in the Infantry during the first World War, when he was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart.

His wife, Mrs. Johanna R. Becker, lives at 75 Sylvan Avenue, Bergenfield, New Jersey.

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Item 5: USAFIK VOLLEYBALL TEAM DRAWS BYE IN SECOND NIGHT'S GAMES

Members of the USAFIK volleyball team drew a bye in the second night's play in Manila on May 29, while Philrycom maintained their lead by trouncing Hawaii in three straight games, it was learned. Japan, who drew a bye in the opening night's play, won their set, defeating Marbo two straight.

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Item 6: WEATHER

Today's maximum temperature: 75. Tuesday's: 75, clear to partly cloudy with west winds.

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Item 7: JOINT COMMISSION AGREES TO CONSULT ON BROAD BASIS WITH KOREAN PARTIES

In a communique from the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission yesterday, it was stated that the two delegations agreed in principle upon "consultation on a broad basis" with Korea's democratic parties and social organizations.

The same Communique No. 10 announced that the three subcommissions set up by the Joint Commission have been progressing on their particular assignments.

Subcommission I elaborated proposals concerning the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations with the Joint Commission.

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Item 7 (cont'd)

The report of Maj. Gen. Lebedeff, chairman of Subcommission II, proposing the adoption of the questionnaire regarding structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, was approved by the Commission. The fundamental questions concerned: (1) rights of the people; (2) general type and character of the provisional government to be established; (3) the organ or organs of authority of the central government to perform the executive and legislative functions; (4) local organs of authority; (5) judicial organs; and (6) methods of changing and amending the Provisional Charter.

Subcommission III worked on the preparation of recommendations regarding the method of selecting the personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The commission meetings, held under the chairmanship of Col. Gen. Terenty F. Shtikov who is chief commissioner of the Soviet delegation, also brought forth resolutions regarding publication of joint communiques and bulletins. The former will be issued after the settlement of each major question, while bulletins shall be published after each session. In addition, the delegation heads may conduct press conferences within the limits of their joint bulletins and communiques mutually agreed upon in the Commission and on other matters not of a secret nature.

The subcommissions' work will continue this week. Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, chief American commissioner, will be chairman of the Joint Commission's meetings this week.

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Item 8: KOREAN CHILDREN NEED LOVING CARE, SAYS FATHER FLANAGAN

"The greatest need in the lives of Korea's many thousands of beggar children and homeless waifs is love," said Father Flanagan, founder of Boy's Town, as today he entered the final stages of a five-day child welfare tour of southern Korea.

"Love and more and better institutions to house the children and get them off the street are seriously needed," he pointed out.

This observation was made during Father Flanagan's visit here

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Item 8 (cont'd)

after which he will consult with General MacArthur and President Truman.

"I have visited most of the private and public orphanages in the Seoul area," he said. "Some have impressed me as being as fine as anything in the United States." Among them was St. Paul's Catholic Orphanage conducted by the Sisters of Chartres, France, described by Father Flanagan as "a veritable Girl's Town of Korea." Tears came to the tall priest's eyes as the 250 little girls welcomed him with "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling."

He also inspected the Buddhist Orphanage of Po Wha Won and the private Hyang Nin Won Orphanage supervised by PANG Su Won. The latter began the home several years ago after being inspired by the movie, "Boy's Town," which described the development of Father Flanagan's Omaha institution.

On Sunday Father Flanagan celebrated mass at the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Seoul before the largest crowd of American and Korean worshippers in the huge cathedral's history. More than 2,000 p rsons jammed their way in to hear his inspiring sermon on the need of love in a world as torn as Korea.

Later Father Flanagan's party traveled to Kaesong near the 38th parallel, accompanied by the Right Rev. John P. Boland of Buffalo, N.Y., Labor Relations Consultant to the United States Secretary of War, who was scheduled today to leave Korea after a three-day consultation period with ranking officers and Korean labor officials.

Speaking of the Kaesong Assembly Camp where hundreds of refugees from North Korea, Manchuria and China are aided, Father Flanagan stated: "I was amazed at the wonderful consideration and care given these unfortunate displaced persons." Under the humane and expert supervision of Lt. Col. Frank E. Stillman of 938 Indiana Avenue, Trenton, N.J., commanding officer of the 54th Military Government Group, and 1st Lt. Wade Brannon of 1927 South Evanston avenue, Anniston, Ala., camp commandant, some 750 men, women and children are being fed, sheltered, cleaned and given immunization

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shots as safeguards for their health before they move south.

"Everything possible is being done for their welfare," Father Flanagan said, "and I think great credit is due those responsible for such humane consideration. Such acts are bound to react favorably in the attitude of the Korean people toward the United States."

Today Father Flanagan left for Pusan where he will make similar inspections before leaving for Tokyo on Wednesday.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV. ALSO PRESENT: COLONEL LINCOLN AND MR. PROSTOV. 1530, 12 JUNE 1947.

1. General Brown states that the U.S. Delegation proposes to stay on the special train because of the short time necessary to perform the Commission's work. The expected number of personnel, including cooks, guards, etc., is to be approximately eighty (80). He also inquires whether it would be possible to bring along a brass band of twenty-six (26), not included in the above eighty (80). The expected time of departure is in the evening of the 29th, the train to arrive early the following morning. General Brown asks that a spur be designated for the use of the conference train while at Pyongyang and states that the Delegation will expect to have its own motor transportation loaded on flat-cars. He states that it would take approximately two hours to unload the vehicles (three (3) staff cars, 4 - 5 jeeps). He says that although it is the wish of the American Delegation to have one single train, it might be necessary to break it in To two sections.

2. General Shtikov points out that it would not be convenient for the Delegation to remain On the train, that a hotel for the Delegation, a special house for General Brown and a billet for the guards are already being prepared. Cooking and dining facilities are available in all three places. As regards the brass band, it is his feeling that a program of entertainment provided by the Soviet Army and the Koreans would make it unnecessary to have such added entertainment. He promises that the delegation and its personnel will not be bored while in Pyongyang. As to the time of departure, he leaves this matter up to General Brown, subject only to traffic conditions. Night travel would be all right only if the engineer knows the line well.

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He states that it would not be necessary to be bound to one train only because of the difficulties of grades ~~and suggests that~~ two trains might be more expedient, possibly the freight train with the automobiles preceding the train with the personnel.

3. General Brown agrees to accept the billeting facilities prepared by the Soviets, except for the enlisted personnel, as it would be more expedient to take care of the men on the train. He suggests that one officer from each delegation get together to work out the detailed plan. General Shtikov concurs.

4. General Shtikov states that the Soviet delegation would leave two days ahead of the American Delegation and that the American officers detailed for preliminary arrangements could travel by that train. As to the place at which to conduct the work of the meeting, they have designated the People's Assembly building for the solemn opening, to which would be invited representatives of the Korean people. The office for the Joint Commission has been found on the same street nearby with adequate office facilities.

5. General Brown inquires whether it would be possible to have American and Korean press representatives attend the opening meeting in Seoul. General Shtikov says that there will be no objections.

6. General Brown inquires whether General Shtikov has any ideas regarding the procedure of the solemn opening ceremony. General Shtikov states that they have no concrete plans, but he assumes that in the morning meeting the Soviet Commanding General would wish to welcome the U.S. Delegation, that the representatives of the Korean Government and press will expect the two Delegations to make short addresses, stating the aims of the conference, and the American Delegation should be given an opportunity to meet Korean leaders (department heads), senior Soviet officers, etc.

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He estimates that this part of the meeting should take approximately 30 minutes time. If this part of the meeting is finished on the 30th, the business meeting could begin on the 31st. The details would be determined in accordance with the experience provided by the Seoul meeting.

7. General Brown states that since General Shtikov will be the Chairman of the Seoul meeting, he is offering him all assistance in working out the ceremony. General Shtikov asks as to the place at which such a meeting could take place and comments the Duk Soo palace would hardly be suitable for an opening meeting of this type. General Brown suggested the throne room at the Capitol, if available, and if it could be suitably arranged for the Commission's purpose, it might be convenient, but that he would have to find out the exact status. He inquires as to as to the preferences of General Shtikov regarding the hour of the meeting and whether or not there should be an orchestra.

8. General Shtikov states that Subcommission No. 1 should begin elaborating the statement to be made by the Chief of the delegation in whose zone the meeting shall take place. He suggests the statement be identical for both the South and the North, with the possible change of the word "South" to read "North". Such a statement should contain a description of the aims of the Joint Commission, advice to the representatives, etc. He urges the necessity to speed up the preparations of such statement by Subcommission No. 1. He prefers 1330 as the most convenient time for the opening meeting, since such time had been previously used and would be most convenient for everybody. He feels it inexpedient to have an orchestra because of the business-like official nature of the meeting. He suggests that reporters, photographers, motion picture photographers should be present during the first few minutes of the meeting, up to the time the statement will be read, but they should not be in the room during the reading of the

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statement. It might also be expedient to set apart a special room for correspondents, etc., so as not to let them get in our way. He says he would appoint an officer who jointly with the U.S. officer would prepare a detailed plan for the solemn opening.

9. It is agreed that there should be two messes (General Brown's house and the hotel), and the enlisted men and guards should mess on the train. General Shtikov suggests that the U.S. officer detailed to study the details might report whether or not it would be more convenient to have U.S. enlisted personnel billeted in Soviet quarters. General Brown urges that the work be completed soon, so as to finish the preparations as soon as possible.

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REMARKS OF GENERAL BROWN AT DINNER GIVEN BY CITY OF SEOUL IN HONOR OF DELEGATES OF JOINT COMMISSION, 13 JUNE 1947.

The American Delegation of the Joint Commission expresses to you, Mr. Chairman, and to our good Korean friends of Seoul our sincere appreciation for this public expression of hospitality and of support of the work of the Commission. It is a pleasure as well as an inspiration for the American Delegation to be associated with representatives of our great ally, Soviet Russia, in the task assigned the Joint Commission under the Moscow Agreement of re-establishing Korea as an independent state. We who constitute the Joint Commission feel deeply and sincerely the magnitude and seriousness of the responsibility which has been entrusted to us. We assure you that each of us will do his best to meet the challenge.

The problem of evolving principles which will govern the structure and operation of the government of an independent state is never simple. The political, agricultural, industrial, social and cultural problems facing Korea today are many and complex. Views of Koreans differ greatly as to the lines of action which should be followed in solving the major problems of their country. This lack of common agreement on basic issues increases the difficulties of the task facing the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will be governed in its work by these principles: establish over Korea the government desired by the Koreans and which best represents the interests of Korea give that government a charter and a platform which will enable it to operate as the Koreans wish it to operate.

There are a few Korean political leaders who still hesitate to give their complete support to the work of the Joint Commission. These leaders are confused by imaginary dangers which in their opinion lurk like ghosts hidden between the lines of the Moscow Agreement. It is my opinion that should these individuals carefully and honestly study the Moscow Agreement their doubts would disappear. They should seriously consider whether there is any real objectionable

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features which they believe to exist in this document. At this crucial period of the history of their country, such imaginary faults should not mislead them into a refusal to join whole-heartedly in working out a provisional government over a united Korea in accordance with the requirements of this document and the wishes of their countrymen.

The mass of the people in any true democracy speak through their political leaders. Should any one of these who claims the trust and following of a large segment of the population refuse to represent his people when a crucial issue is involved, he will surrender the democratic rights and influence of those he represents. Such rights and influence will then be acquired by other groups led by more thoughtful leaders.

It is the ernest desire of all members of the Joint Commission that the Korean people properly inform the Joint Commission through their political leaders as to the type, composition and structure of government which they desire and as to the charter and platform which should be prepared by the Joint Commission in order that that government may function as Koreans desire. Should any important segment of the population fail to make its views heard, it is possible that the government evolved or the charter or platform prepared for its operation will not fully protect the rights and privileges of such a group. The Joint Commission can determine the desires of an organization only through the representation of its leaders.

Again, in the name of the American Deleg tion, I thank you for this public expression of support of the work of the Joint Commission and assure you that the Commission will proceed as expeditiously as possible and, given your complete support, will before too long a period succeed in its effort and your desire for the creation of a united Korea under a provisional government.

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ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ ГЕНЕРАЛА БРАУНА НА ОБЕДЕ, ДАННОМ ГОРОДОМ СЕУЛОМ В ЧЕСТЬ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ СОВМЕСТНОЙ КОМИССИИ, 13 ИЮНЯ 1947 ГОДА

Американская Делегация Совместной Комиссии выражает Вам, г-н председатель, и своим добрым корейским друзьям Сеула искреннюю признательность за это общественное проявление гостеприимства и поддержку работы Совместной Комиссии. Большим удовольствием и вдохновлением для Американской делегации является работа совместно с представителями нашего великого союзника, Советского Союза, по выполнению задания, возложенного на Совместную Комиссию Московским Решением о восстановлении Кореи как независимого государства. Мы, члены Совместной Комиссии, глубоко и искренно чувствуем размер и серьезность возложенной на нас ответственности. Мы заверяем вас, что каждый из нас сделает все в своих силах, чтобы с честью выполнить это задание.

Проблема определение принципов, согласно которым зиждется структура и деятельность правительства независимого государства, некогда не бывает легка. Проблемы политические, сельскохозяйственные, промышленные, общественные и культурные, предстоящие в данный момент перед Кореей, многочисленны и сложны. Взгляды корейского народа относительно курса, по которому должно следовать разрешение главнейших проблем страны, расходятся в значительной мере. Отсутствие общего согласия по основным вопросам увеличивает отрудности, поставленного перед Совместной Комиссии задания. В своей работе Совместная Комиссия руководится следующими принципами: учредить в Корее такое правительство, которое

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ответит желаниям всего корейского народа, и которое представит интересы всей Кореи; дать этому правительству положение и платформу, которые дадут ему возможность работать так, как этого будет желать сам корейский народ.

Имеются кое какие лидеры корейских политических партий, которые еще не решаются дать полной поддержки работе Совместной Комиссии. Эти лидеры сбиты с толку воображаемыми страхами, которые, как им кажется, как привидения прячутся между строками Московского Решения. Я считаю, что если эти лица изучат внимательно и честно Московское Решение, то их сомнения исчезнут раз навсегда. Они должны серьезно разобраться в том, ~~есть ли~~, действительно ли есть там что либо нежелательное, ~~что может им казаться.~~ как это им кажется. В эту критическую эпоху истории их родины по обвине воображаемые недостатки не должны завести их к отказу приобщиться чистосердечно к выработке временного правительства об'единенной Кореи в согласии с требованиями этого документа и воле их народа.

Массы народа в любой, действительно, демократической стране говорят через своих политических лидеров. Если любой из них, претендующий на доверие и на то, что за ними идет большая часть населения, откажется представлять свой народ, когда затронута критическая проблема, он этим самым отречется от демократических прав и влияния тех, кого он представляет. Такие права и влияния перейдут к другим группам, возглавляемым более чуткими лидерами.

Самое искренне желание всех членов Совместной Комиссии - это чтобы корейский народ, через своих лидеров, выразил бы свои пожелания Совместной Комисси относительно формы, состава и структуры правительства, а также положения и платформы, которые

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будут разработаны Совместной Комиссией для того, чтобы правительство функционировало так, как этого желает корейский народ. Если же какая нибудь значительная часть населения не сможет быть выслушанной, то возникнет возможность, что созданное правительство, а также предложение и платформа, выработанные для него, не защитят полностью прав и прераготивов такой группы. Совместная Комиссия сможет узнать пожелания данной организации только путем представительства их лидеров.

Еще раз от имени Американской делегации я благодарю вас за ваше выражение поддержки работе Совместной Комиссии, и заверяю, что Комиссия будет вести свою работу так быстро и успешно, как это возможно, и если вы дадите ей свой полную поддержку, ей удастся не в чересчур долгое время создать в согласии с вашей волей Корею, об'единенную под временным правительством.

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REMARKS OF GENERAL BROWN AT DINNER GIVEN BY CITY OF SEOUL IN HONOR OF DELEGATES OF JOINT COMMISSION, 13 JUNE 1947.

The American Delegation of the Joint Commission expresses to you, Mr. Chairman, and to our good Korean friends of Seoul our sincere appreciation for this public expression of hospitality and of support of the work of the Commission. It is a pleasure as well as an inspiration for the American Delegation to be associated with representatives of our great ally, Soviet Russia, in the task assigned the Joint Commission under the Moscow Agreement of re-establishing Korea as an independent state. We who constitute the Joint Commission feel deeply and sincerely the magnitude and seriousness of the responsibility which has been entrusted to us. We assure you that each of us will do his best to meet the challenge.

The problem of evolving principles which will govern the structure and operation of the government of an independent state is never simple. The political, agricultural, industrial, social and cultural problems facing Korea today are many and complex. Views of Koreans differ greatly as to the lines of action which should be followed in solving the major problems of their country. This lack of common agreement on basic issues increases the difficulties of the task facing the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission will be governed in its work by these principles: establish over Korea the government desired by the Koreans and which best represents the interests of Korea; give that government a charter and a platform which will enable it to operate as the Koreans wish it to operate.

There are a few Korean political leaders who still hesitate to give their complete support to the work of the Joint Commission. These leaders are confused by imaginary dangers which in their opinion lurk like ghosts hidden between the lines of the Moscow Agreement. It is my opinion that should these individuals carefully

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and honestly study the Moscow Agreement their doubts would disappear. They should seriously consider whether there is any real objectionabl features which they believe to exist in this document. At this crucial period of the history of their country, such imaginary faults should not mislead them into a refusal to joint whole-hearted in working out a provisional government over a united Korea in accordance with the requirements of this document and the wishes of their countrymen.

The mass of the people in any true democracy speak through their political leaders. Should any one of these who claims the trust and following of a large segment of the population refuse to represent his people when a crucial issue is involved, he will surrender the democratic rights and influence of those he represents. Such rights and influence will then be acquired by other groups led by more thoughtful leaders.

It is the earnest desire of all members of the Joint Commission that the Korean people properly inform the Joint Commission through their political leaders as to the type, composition and structure of government which they desire and as to the charter and platform which should be prepared by the Joint Commission in order that that government may function as Koreans desire. Should any important segment of the population fail to make its views heard, it is possible that the government evolved or the charter or platform prepared for its operation will not fully protect the rights and privileges of such a group. The Joint Commission can determine the desires of an organization only through the representation of its leaders.

Again, in the name of the American Delegation, I thank you for this public expression of support of the work of the Joint Commission and assure you that the Commission will proceed as expeditiously as possible and, given your complete support, will before too long a period succeed in its effort and your desire for the creation of a united Korea under a provisional government.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 1130, 17 JUNE 1947. ALSO PRESENT - MINISTER JOSEPH E. JACOBS.

1. General Brown proposed and General Shtikov agreed to convene a Joint Commission meeting at 1330, 18 June, to discuss:
   (a) Arrangements regarding the open meeting in Seoul on 25 June,
   (b) To review the address by the Chief Commissioner of the US Delegation now being drafted by Subcommission No. 1.

   General Shtikov suggests that Messrs. Bunce and Tounkin get together beforehand to discuss the text of the address. As regards item 2 of the Agenda, General Shtikov said that he designated Mr. Maslov from his side, and that the Secretariat should prepare a draft procedure for approval by the Joint Commission.

2. General Brown informed General Shtikov of a change in the personnel of Subcommission 3, which would be headed by Mr. O. T. Jones, State Department, replacing Mr. Calvin N. Joyner, who would resume his duties with the Military Government. General Brown expected to introduce Mr. Jones shortly. He also stated that at this time he wanted to introduce Mr. Joseph E. Jacobs, U.S. Minister, who had just arrived from America to become a member of the Commanding General's Staff, and who would also replace Mr. Langdon as an alternate US member on the Joint Commission. General Shtikov suggested that official announcement of the changes be made at tomorrow's meeting, at which time the Soviet Delegation would have the opportunity of meeting Minister Jacobs.

3. Minister Joseph E. Jacobs introduced himself, saying that he had served in the Far East for 15 years, 1915-1930, having begun service in the US Legation in Peiping as a student-interpreter. During the last war Minister Jacobs served in

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Egypt, where he met the present Soviet Minister to Washington, Novikov. He was later attached to the Allied Headquarters in Naples, following which he was stationed in Albania. In Albania he knew the Soviet Minister, Chuvakin, and also the Military Attache, Colonel Sokolov. Likewise, he met Major Ivanov, who had been parachuted into Albania during German occupation. General Shtikov commented that Minister Jacobs has had continuous liaison with the Russians and hoped that this would help his work in the Joint Commission.

4. General Shtikov stated that he expected the US Delegation to stay about ten days in Pyongyang. General Brown disagreed, saying that the Delegation would have to return to Seoul by 5 July, and expected to leave Pyongyang on 3 July. General Shtikov stated that since the Delegation would be in Pyongyang anyhow, it might as well begin the consultation there on 5 July. He expected that 3 or 4 days would suffice for this work. General Brown pointed out that a subcommission could remain in Pyongyang to perform this task, but that the rest of the members of the US Delegation should be present in Seoul beginning with 5 July. He also explained that 4 July was the American National Holiday, and that he and other members were expected to attend the celebration and the parade.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, 19 JUNE, BETWEEN HEADS OF SUBCOMMISSION No. 1, MESSRS. BUNCE AND TOUNKIN. ALSO PRESENT, COL. LINCOLN, MR. PROSTOV, MR. VALENKO.

1. New draft of opening speech, combining the American and the Soviet proposals was submitted by Dr. Bunce. Mr. Tounkin asked for time to study the new draft, and suggested that it be discussed at 10:30 a.m. the following day.

2. Dr. Bunce brought up the problem of distributing invitations, and suggested that these, together with programs, be handed to designated representatives at the time applications are brought in, without waiting for compilation of lists. He indicated that time was very short between the deadline for turning in signed declarations, and the time of the meeting.

3. Mr. Tounkin objected to this proposal saying that it would be confusing, and might give some representatives the wrong impression that they had been invited to consultation. He suggested that Subcommission I begin compiling lists of parties immediately the applications are in.

4. Col. Lincoln pointed out that the invitations would not state that individual representatives had been invited for consultation, but merely to attend the joint meeting. He also stated that Mr. Tounkin's suggestion regarding the immediate compilation of lists seemed to conflict with the agreement previously reached.

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5. Dr. Bunce suggested that another alternative would be to postpone the meeting, to allow for time to distribute the invitation. Mr. Tounkin objected saying that this would change the entire schedule of consultations.

6. Col. Lincoln suggested that even if a partial list is compiled by the Subcommission, no initial consultations could take place until the Joint Commission approved such a list. He pointed out that written invitation would serve to identify representative for admission to the meeting. Dr. Bunce pointed out that in all probability there would be a last minute rush of applications, since in all probability the parties would wait to file them simultaneously with the questionnaires.

7. Mr. Tounkin said there would be no objection to approving a partial list, but that he would have to discuss the problem of invitations with the Soviet Delegation. He also pointed out that every representative should have his credentials before attending the meeting.

8. Dr. Bunce pointed out that it would be impossible to set up screening at this time, and that all applicants would have to be given invitations. Screening would take place at the time the listings are compiled.

9. Mr. Tounkin suggested that representatives bring signed copies of the declaration as their credentials. Col. Lincoln suggests that it would be more embarrassing to turn representatives away at the door of the meeting, following check up with the list.

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10. Mr. Tounkin tried unsuccessfully to find out the number of parties which had signed the declaration.

11. Dr. Bunce pointed out that the alternatives were -

a. To give out invitations at time applications are filed;

b. To postpone the meeting.

Mr. Tounkin asked for time to think the matter over.

12. Mr. Tounkin suggested that a standard form be used for compiling the lists, and submitted a form recommended by the Soviet Delegation. He also suggested that it would be more convenient for the U. S. Delegation to compile the list of the Southern parties, Soviet Delegation the list of the Northern parties, the two lists being translated into corresponding languages. The work may be carried on simultaneously by two delegations, yet parties should be arranged in the same order; i.e., in the order of application. Dr. Bunce objected to compilation of separate lists, and Mr. Tounkin explained that the only reason for this would be to facilitate handling. This would be actually the same list, on two different sheets.

13. Dr. Bunce agreed to follow the scheme suggested by Mr. Tounkin, and designated Mr. Keeney to handle the compilation of lists from the American side. It was also recommended that the lists should include transliterations of Korean names of parties so as to facilitate identification.

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LIST OF PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTHERN KOREA WHICH HAVE FILED APPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JOINT COMMISSION

No. in Order of Application	Full name of Party or Organization	Date of Est.	Declared No. of Members of Party or Organization	Name of Central Organ and Its Address	Branches of Party or Organization			Remarks
					Total No.	Location	Membership	
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VI	IX

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES DESIGNATED BY PARTIES AND SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTHERN KOREA FILING APPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JOINT COMMISSION

Association	Name of Party or Organization	Full name of Designated Representative	Date & Place of Birth	Position Occupied in Party or Organization	Home Address	Remarks
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 1650, 20 JUNE 1947. ALSO PRESENT, COLONEL LINCOLN.

1. General Shtikov stated that whereas following the solemn joint session, the southern parties would have five (5) extra days in which to prepare answers to the questionnaire (June 25 - 30), the northern parties have no time at all. He accordingly asked to have the deadline extended to July 5. General Brown said that southern parties also might need extra time, and asked whether the deadline could not be extended until 5 July for both zones. General Shtikov agreed.

2. General Brown stated that there was no reason to delay consultation on account of extending the deadline, since there would be enough returned questionnaires to initiate the work.

3. General Shtikov stated that oral consultation would begin on 5 July. Consequently Sub-Committees would have to be organized early next week, and at the same time Sub-Committee #1 would have to work out full procedural details. He mentioned that there might be translation difficulties (Korean into English and Russian), and asked whether General Brown had any idea as to how to expedite this work. General Brown explained the plan being followed, whereby duplicate copies of answer would go to each responsible secretary, English and Russian translations would be prepared simultaneously by respective secretariats, and, in case of differences, the texts would be reconciled by a special Joint Committee. General Shtikov points out that it would take each Soviet translator approximately three (3) days to translate each document from Korean into Russian. General Brown said that in his opinion only the substance would be translated, since it would be impracticable to prepare literal translations. The answers would have to be analyzed statistically so as to determine the trends. It would be impossible to discuss details until there

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an actual sample of answers. In General Brown's opinion, two weeks would suffice in order to obtain the necessary information.

4. General Shtikov asked for General Brown's estimate as to the amount of time needed for oral consultation. General Brown said that the same amount of time, two weeks, should suffice. General Shtikov agreed, stated that the work of analyzing questionnaire, and of consultation would have to proceed simultaneously. Capable people would have to be appointed on the Sub-Committees, so that work could go faster than at the rate of 18 consultations per day as estimated by Dr. Bunce (six (6) interviews per day per Sub-Committee). Some of the parties would have to have more time than others. General Brown agreed, said that some of the smallest groups could be eliminated.

General Shtikov inquired as to the number of applications, was told that 344 had registered as of close of day of 20 June. This included some groups having as little as 25 members. General Shtikov commented that organizations would have to represent the working people.

5. General Brown point out that there was only one day between the deadline for the applications and the Joint Meeting of 25 June, consequently it would be necessary to distribute invitations at the time applications were brought in. He also pointed out that the 1330 meeting, June 25, did not constitute consultation. Although it is not the intention of the American Delegation to invite any representatives not listed by Sub-Committee #1, this latter would not be completed in time so as to eliminate those few people who would not be included in the oral consultation. In his view this would be the best feasible way of distributing invitation. He wondered if General Shtikov would approve this method of distributing invitations. General Shtikov indicated that he discussed this matter with Mr. Tounkin, and had not reached any final decision. In his view only people having an invitation or a ticket of some

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type would be admitted. He said that Messrs. Bunce and Tounkin could draft a decision on Saturday. As regards oral consultation, it was his view that this could take place only following the listing and approval by the Soviet Joint Commission of the designated representatives. General Brown agreed, stated that Messrs. Bunce and Tounkin would have to meet to work out the details. General Shtikov said that they should begin compiling the list of parties on Saturday, and might even have to work on Sunday.

General Shtikov suggested that Messrs. Bunce and Tounkin work out the details regarding the invitations in the morning, and that any differences could be later straightened by phone.

6. General Shtikov stated that according to General Lebedeff, the following billeting accommodations in Pyongyang were being prepared: Hotel for delegates, accommodating 50-55 individuals; house for enlisted personnel, within 100 yards from the hotel; house for General Brown, at some distance. Arrangements had also been completed for telephone connections, water supply, and labor (house cleaning). Cooks could also be provided. General Brown indicated that American cooks would be provided. He stated that Colonel Edwards, would get in touch with Colonel Avramenko regarding the final arrangements.

General Shtikov stated that an American officer could go along with the Soviet train, so as to examine the facilities.

7. General Shtikov indicated that the text of the speech for the solemn meeting was acceptable, as worked out by Messrs. Bunce and Tounkin, and said that this was a fine speech.

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US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

SPEECH FOR THE JOINT MEETING OF THE COMMISSION
WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF DEMOCRATIC
PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the name of the American-Soviet Joint Commission I welcome you -- representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of Southern/Northern Korea.

We are gathered together to begin one more phase of the task of re-establishing Korean independence. It is our purpose so to carry out this great work that we may be able to erect a democratic state of power and dignity, which will be a worthy political edifice for the people of this ancient and cultured race.

Under the heavy yoke of Japanese imperialism, Korean people for decades have dreamt of the day when they would finally obtain liberty and the opportunity of independently governing their country. This opportunity is the result of the victory of the allied nations, which in the course of their prolonged and bloody war have decisively defeated the aggressors, both in the Occident and the Orient. The freedom-loving Korean people who have long endured the hardships and insults of colonial slavery now once and for all have been freed from the shackles of Japanese domination.

During the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, December 1945, there was achieved an historic decision which opened to the Korean people clear perspectives for its national renaissance. Three Allied Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, which were eventually joined also by the Chinese Republic, have outlined in this decision a program for restoration of Korea as an independent state, creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.

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The Moscow Decision provides that the initial task shall be the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which could take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea, and the national culture of the Korean people. The formation of such a government on the basis of broad participation of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations, as stipulated in the Moscow Decision, will lead to political and economic unification of Korea and will constitute the most important step on the way toward the creation of an independent democratic Korean state, free from foreign interference.

The present stage of the work of the Joint Commission is devoted to the fulfillment of this task. Following the completion of this first stage, the Joint Commission shall initiate, in participation with the provisional democratic government and with collaboration of Korean democratic parties and social organization, the elaboration of measures for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

This meeting today marks a momentous step in the fulfillment of paragraph II of the Moscow Decision, which prescribes how the Provisional Government of Korea shall be established. This meeting is the first formal step towards oral consultation with the leaders of Korean democratic parties and social organizations. Such consultation will be carried out in the best democratic traditions in order that the voice of the people may be given paramount consideration in the creation of the Provisional Government. Inasmuch as the people make their desires known through parties and organizations, the importance and seriousness of the task of their designated representatives is very great.

It is the intention of the Joint Commission to determine through consultation the government which is desired by and which best fulfills the interest of the Korean people and to recommend to the powers that such a Provisional Government be established,

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assure the enactment of the desired democratic reforms, the renaissance of Korea as an independent democratic state, and the development of the national economy and culture. In order that the Commission may succeed in this work, it requires the whole-hearted assistance of the Korean people, and the full cooperation of you who are to represent the views of the parties and organizations to the Joint Commission.

It is inevitable that the great number of political parties represented here should have divergent opinions on the creation of a Provisional Government. While Koreans are agreed on the general desire to achieve independence and carry out democratic social and economic reforms which will enable their country to take its proper place in the modern world, there is natural disagreement as to the policies and means by which these objectives should be achieved. Difference of opinion must not, however, lead to lack of harmony or to non-cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission.

For the purpose of consultation the Joint Commission has worked out and published questionnaires regarding the structure and principles of organization of a provisional Korean democratic government and local organs of authority, and also regarding the political platform for this government. These questionnaires embrace a wide circle of problems which are vitally important to the Korean people.

The Joint Commission has also elaborated and published the provisions governing the order of consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. In accordance with this order of consultation, Korean democratic parties and social organizations which have signed the declaration are invited to present in written and oral form their views regarding the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

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The agreed order of consultation also provides that representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations who shall be later nominated in accordance with the membership of such parties and organizations, and taking into account as far as possible their influence, shall be invited for consultation and aiding the Joint Commission in elaboration of recommendations.

We are now about to start the process of oral consultation. Because a great many parties and organizations have applied for consultation, it will be impossible for the Joint Commission as a whole to consult with each representative. However, subcommittees will be formed who will carry out this work under the instructions and supervision of the Joint Commission. In order not to unduly delay further progress in the development of recommendations regarding a Korean Democratic Provisional Government, oral consultation will deal specifically with necessary explanation or elaboration of answers submitted to the questionnaires. The subcommittees will confer with individual party and organization representatives in accordance with a schedule which will be made known to the individual. Representatives invited for oral consultation will be notified of the time and place of consultation. The results of the discussion will then be given proper consideration by the subcommissions and by the Joint Commission in making its studies.

The Joint Commission earnestly urges the Korean democratic parties and social organizations to approach this task in full awareness of their responsibility, to explain widely to the people the contents of the questionnaires, and to submit to the Joint Commission views which faithfully reflect the opinions and aspirations of the Korean people. Personal predilections should be abandoned in the course of the solution of this important problem. The interests of the Korean people must be placed above those of individual parties and leaders.

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The Commission further appeals to the representatives of the Korean press, which during these historic days in the life of Korea, must execute the important task of expounding to the Korean people the decisions of the Joint Commission and must organize widespread explanation of the efforts of the democratic parties and social organizations in submitting to the Joint Commission their views regarding the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The Joint Commission believes that the democratic parties and social organizations which are represented here and which by signing the declaration, have expressed good faith with respect to upholding the Moscow Decision, will render the Joint Commission all aid in its work and thus fulfill their duty to the Korean people. It is your proud responsibility to contribute to the rebirth of your nation. The Joint Commission believes that you appreciate the honor which your parties and organizations have bestowed upon you.

The Joint American-Soviet Commission wishes to assure you, the representatives, as well as the Korean people that it will use all its efforts to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea and, as our first duty, to form, with all possible expediency, a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

This is a most important and significant occasion. The Joint Commission hopes that Koreans, Russians and Americans together working with good will, will reach solutions to the complex questions related to the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government.

Approved 21 June 1947.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of the American Delegation

T. F. SHTIKOV
Colonel General
Chief of the Soviet Delegation

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 23 JUNE 1947, 1630. ALSO PRESENT: COLONEL LINCOLN.

1. General Shtikov addressed the following complaint:

Today at 1030 a.m., a group of Koreans threw dirt and stones at the car of Soviet responsible secretary, Colonel Avramenko, while it was proceeding from the Soviet consulate to the Duk Soo Palace, at a point 200 - 250 yards from the Soviet consulate; a similar incident took place at 1130 to a car containing Counsellor Balasanov and Mr. Shabshin, which was attacked by Korean demonstrators as it was coming out of Duk Soo Palace grounds; at 1230 Colonel Avramanko's car was again subjected to pelting by dirt and stones while in transit between the Soviet consulate and Duk Soo Palace; the same molestation befell a car containing Soviet-Korean interpreters. During the last reported incident, members of Korean police were present but took no preventive measures, but merely stood around and laughed. Counsellor Balasanov's safety was finally secured through the intervention by a group of American soldiers. I regard this as a provocation and protest against the actions of ~~rioters~~ riotous reactionaries and reactionary-terrorists. I am asking General Brown through the American Command in South Korea to take the necessary measures to assure the safety of the members of the Soviet Delegation of the US - USSR Joint Commission, and to stop, in effect, such acts.

2. General Brown answered as follows: I am sorry to hear of this incident. I was present at the Duk Soo Palace Gate at approximately 1210 - 1240 and saw the demonstration at the gate. I have not previously heard of the acts of demonstrators against the members of the Soviet Delegation. I regret that this crowd of young hoodlums has inconvenienced, threatened, or disturbed in any manner any members of the Soviet Delegation. I will bring this matter to the attention of the Commanding General. I can assure the Chief of the Soviet Delegation that proper steps shall be immediately taken to assure the security of the Soviet Delegation and to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.

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3. General Shtikov then submitted a plan for work in Pyongyang during the period 30 June - 3 July and invited comments and suggestions. General Brown stated that the plan would be discussed by the American Delegation. General Shtikov then commented that the time of the departure of the Soviet Delegation would depend upon the completion of the work by Subcommission No. 1. If that Subcommission succeeds in completing its work by the morning of 26 June, the Soviet Delegation could leave Seoul at noon of that same day arriving at Pyongyang at 1900. The work of the First Subcommission (List of Parties and Organizations, list of Representatives, Order of Oral Consultation) could be approved in a Joint Commission Meeting in Pyongyang on 2nd July. The time of the departure of the delegations from Pyongyang would also be agreed to on that date. General Brown commented that the list of parties and organizations would not be ready until tomorrow, and he doubted that the work could be completed for a meeting prior to departure. Nevertheless he would have a better idea of what is involved after he saw the list.

4. General Shtikov inquired whether the Joint Meeting would be held on 25 June, and General Brown assured him that everything would be ready by 1330 that day. General Shtikov then inquired whether everything would be completed by 2nd July prior to departure, and General Brown assured him that he saw no reason why everything should not be completed.

5. General Shtikov suggested that the decision extending the deadline to 5 July be included in a Communique for the press. General Brown stated that since he saw no reason why the deadline should be extended in the South, he had not made any release. At the same time he had no objection to making such a joint statement for release to go up to the Northern and Southern press. General Shtikov suggested that the secretaries figure out brief notification for tomorrow's release to read as follows:

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"At the request of parties and organizations working on the answers to the questionnaires, the Joint Commission extends the deadline for the answers to 5 July."

General Shtikov also pointed out that since 5 July was Saturday, oral consultations could begin on Monday, 7 July. This was also to be announced by the secretaries. General Brown agreed.

6. General Brown inquired whether General Shtikov would fly to Pyongyang and General Shtikov answered that owing to a heart condition he preferred to travel by train.

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SOUTH KOREAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Department of Public Information
Seoul, Korea

24 June 1947

SPECIAL PRESS RELEASE

STATEMENT BY GENERAL BROWN

The work of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission proceeded according to schedule on 23 June, which was the final day on which Korean political parties and social organizations could indicate their desire to participate in oral consultation with the Commission by submitting written applications.

The day was marred, however, by disturbances conducted by irresponsible groups. At a time when great world Powers are sincerely attempting to assist the Korean people in forming their own government, the occurrence of such disturbances casts serious doubt in the mind of Korea's foreign friends of her ability along lines of self-government. The disorderly conduct of a few youth groups was particularly unfortunate for the Korean nation since their own petitions and statements indicated that they were not working for the best interests of their country but for individuals seeking to gain personal power.

The persons taking part in the demonstrations in the city of Seoul yesterday were not large in number. It was very clear to me and to all reliable observers that these persons sought to swell their own disorderly ranks by staging their meetings at the same time that a genuinely patriotic, non-political Korean gathering had assembled in orderly fashion to do honor to genuine Korean heroes who had just returned from an arduous athletic mission to the United States, a mission in which they were victorious and one which brought great, world-wide interest in the Korean nation and its people. The Korean people themselves must judge whether such actions by partisan factions can be permitted to dishonor the national reputation.

The Rightist Youth Groups who staged a demonstration in front of the East Gate at noon returned to Duk Soo Palace at approximately 1320 o'clock. They seated themselves in front of the East Gate in the street and were harangued by two speakers. The civilian police maintained order.

About 1430 I was informed that three of the leaders of this crowd desired to confer with me. The conference lasted about 45 minutes. The chief spokesman, a young man of about 23 years of age, appeared extremely excited, sweating profusely and speaking in a loud and domineering manner. He presented four demands; namely: that trusteeship be defined at once, that assurance be given that there would be a general election, that an independent government to be established by KIM, Koo be recognized as the government of Korea, that they were supporting the policies of RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo and they would not employ force nor hinder the work of the Joint Commission. Two of the three youth leaders spoke. They stated that they represented the leadership of Dr. RHEE, Syngman and Mr. KIM, Koo.

When informed that over 500 political parties and social organizations had registered to cooperate with the Joint Commission, they claimed that Dr. RHEE, Syngman was leading Koreans in a unified move against trusteeship; that they would die if trusteeship were forced upon them; that they would murder various individuals if trusteeship were forced on them.

I informed them that trusteeship could not be defined at this time; that the Joint Commission, working with the Provisional Government, would work out the aid and assistance to be rendered to Korea, which in fact would then be a definition of trusteeship as it would be applied to Korea.

The final result was that the chief spokesman stated that he would order the demonstrators to disperse.

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Meanwhile, deliberate disrespect to Russian members of the Joint Commission had been committed. General Shtikov in a complaint to me mentioned that several Russian cars had been pelted by dirt and stones and that one car in which Counsellor Balasanov was riding was protected and safety secured through the intervention of a group of American soldiers.

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In my reply to General Shtikov I expressed regret that this crowd of young hoodlums had inconvenienced, threatened, or disturbed in any manner any members of the Soviet Delegation. I assured him that steps would be taken immediately to assure the security of the Soviet Delegation, now guests in Seoul.

Undoubtedly this mob in front of the East Gate of the Palace planned interference with patriotic Korean groups seeking to participate in the work of the Joint Commission. Because shortly after the mob disbursed, large numbers of Korean political parties and social organizations filed their applications for consultation, including the majority of representatives of major Rightist organizations.

During the day, a petition to the U.S.--U.S.S.R. Joint Commission signed by Mr. KIM, Koo was read in public by the demonstration youth groups as a means of continuing their unlawful acts.

In conclusion, I wish to inform the Korean people that the noble work of the Joint Commission toward establishment of a Provisional Government for all Korea will go ahead in cooperation with the patriotic majority of all existing Korean political groups. The tremendous following claimed by these groups which will participate in consultation with the Commission, in contrast to the few thoughtless persons who yesterday sought to cause trouble, is clear indication to me that the people of Korea desire early success for the work of the Commission in establishing a Provisional Government for a united Korea.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Confidential

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 24 JUNE 1947, 1630. ALSO PRESENT- MINISTER BUNCE.

1. General Brown stated that there was evidently considerable difference between American and Soviet concepts of "social organizations." Soviet concept was narrower, since it included organizations of mass character; American concept was wider, and included even such groups as the Esperantists. He requested that the Soviet Chief Commissioner give his definition of social organization.

2. General Shtikov said that although there was a multitude of social organizations in the Soviet Union, they differed in objective. Some could be said to represent public opinion, or people's opinion; others, like the Esperanto groups or Athletic groups, were organizations of individual enthusiasts, pursuing narrow objectives far removed from political problems. Surely our Foreign Ministers did not have Esperanto Clubs in mind when they drafted Moscow Decision. The Joint Commission should take into account those democratic political parties and those large organizations which represent public opinion. He was greatly disturbed today, because such a large number of organizations included in the southern list had no relation to consultation. North Korea also has many organizations -- at least 1500 athletic clubs -- yet distinction was made, since it was felt that the athletes, for example, would be represented by labor unions and similar politically-minded groups, which would reflect their interests. Subcommission No. 1 must take the necessary steps lest the multitude of insignificant organizations swamp us, make us deviate from our task and spoil the work that had been planned.

3. General Brown said that the American Delegation tried unsuccessfully to get the Joint Commission to agree on a definition of political parties and social organizations. Accordingly the Decision was made to let all parties and organizations desiring to participate in the consultation to file applications.

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Subcommission 1 would then make the lists of all those applying. Tomorrow's meeting is merely for the purpose of communicating information regarding the general principles of consultation. Even the Esperantistw would benefit from such a meeting, because it would give them some political education.

4. Minister Bunce inquired whether it would be possible for Mr. Tounkin to stay over in Seoul until the lists are completed. General Brown stated that this work would have to be completed as soon as possible before 7 July, and indicated that although, in his opinion, some of the lesser societies were foolish to register for consultation, no harm would come from their attending the Joint meeting. The speech was so worded as to make it plain that this meeting does not necessarily constitute consultation. The Joint Commission would in the meantime work out reasonable lists for consultation.

5. General Shtikov agreed to leave Mr. Tounkin in Seoul for work with Minister Bunce, but stipulated that both would have to be in Pyongyang in time for the 30 June meeting, in order not to deny the parties of North Korea their right to meet all the members of the Joint Commission. The use of a Soviet plane was also offered by General Shtikov to get Messrs. Bunce and Tounkin to Pyongyang. General Brown thanked General Shtikov, and said he also felt that the lists should be prepared as soon as possible.

6. General Shtikov invited comments on the proposed plan of work in Pyongyang, and General Brown said he approved it, and had already dispatched a formal letter of acceptance. The American Delegation would leave on June 29, to arrive in Pyongyang early in the morning the following day. It would leave not later than 22:00, July 3, in order to arrive in Seoul by the earl y mornin of July 4. General Shtikov agreed with the proposed schedule. General Brown said there was plenty of extra room in the train, and that the American Delegation would be glad to accommodate any Soviet members.

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7. General Shtikov stated that he expected that 42 members of the Soviet group would remain in Seoul. These would be headed by Col. Avramenko. The rest, 36 members, would go to Pyongyang. He was also increasing his translating staff, having requested two additional Korean interpreters to help with the lists, etc.

According to his plan, the Soviet Delegation would return from Pyongyang either at the same time with, or after the American Delegation. He understood that a part of the American Delegation (one or two subcommittees) would remain in Pyongyang, and would return by the Soviet train. The details could be arranged later, in Pyongyang. He expected that the consultations would begin simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang on 7 July. Minister Bunce commented that it was not planned that Subcommission No. 1 would go to Pyongyang. Subcommittees for oral consultation would go to Pyongyang later. General Shtikov said that since the Americans would leave Pyongyang on 3 July, and the Subcommittees would have to return by 7 July, it would be more convenient if they stayed on in Pyongyang during the intervening 3 days. Mr. Bunce said that only one member of the Subcommission would go to Pyongyang with the Delegation, but that the personnel of the Subcommittees, which was different from that of the Subcommission No. 1, would go to Pyongyang later. General Shtikov agreed to whatever would be most convenient.

8. General Brown stated that he wished to have opportunity to talk freely to Koreans in Pyongyang. He did not have any specific Koreans in mind, but would like to have the Koreans feel free to come to the American Delegation. General Shtikov agreed.

9. General Brown submitted a draft of proposed joint press release, extending the deadline for questionnaires until July 5.

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS OF GENERAL BROWN

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I am happy to join in extending a warm personal and official welcome to the Delegation of the Soviet Union.

Korea has been liberated from Japanese oppression by the heroism and sacrifice of the peoples of the allied nations. Four Great Allies, including Soviet Russia and the United States, have agreed to evolve Korea under provisions of the Moscow Agreement to a status of complete independence. We meet to resume that task commenced over a year ago.

The Korean people are hopefully looking to this Commission to successfully complete its assigned task. We have a great responsibility. There is much work to be done. Difficulties will arise.

We meet in an atmosphere of hope. With the determination which we all have to find mutually satisfactory solutions for our problems, we should proceed expeditiously to successful completion of our first task, the preparation of a plan for a Korea united under a provisional government.

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OPENING ADDRESS TO US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
BY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN R. HODGE

Personally and on behalf of the United States Government and the American Command in Korea, I extend a hearty welcome to the distinguished members of the Soviet Delegation to the United States - Soviet Joint Commission upon this reconvening of the Commission. We are here to carry out the promises of the great powers to reform and rebuild Korea as a sovereign and independent state. Those promises were summarized and crystalized in the Moscow Decision of December 1945, which at the same time established the means for carrying them out. It is agreed in correspondence between our nations that the Joint Commission shall carry out the provisions of the Moscow Decision working under the principles of democratic freedom of expression of opinion. The American Delegation headed by General Brown, has been so instructed.

The first and most pressing task of the Joint Commission is the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government for all Korea. The eyes of the world are focused on this Commission and the Korean people are anxiously awaiting the advent of this government. It is the sincere hope of the United States command and of our nation that the work of the Joint Commission may be conducted expeditiously and successfully and in the harmonious manner that results from thorough understanding between great allies. It is also our sincere hope that the results of the work of the Joint Commission will meet fully the needs and the desires of the Korean nation.

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SPEECH OF COLONEL GENERAL SHTIKOV, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE OPENING OF THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON KOREA.

General Hodge, Gentlemen:

First of all, I wish to express on behalf of the Soviet Delegation gratitude to Lieutenant General Hodge, the Commander of the American Armed Forces in South Korea, and Major General Brown, head of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission, for the hearty and warm welcome of the Soviet Delegation. I also would like to convey our cordial and friendly greetings to the Korean people.

The long awaited and joyous day has come for all the Korean people. In accordance with the recent correspondence between our governments on Korea, the Joint Soviet-American Commission resumes its work today.

We were witnesses of the political enthusiasm with which the Korean people welcomed the decisions of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.

The Korean people are impatiently waiting for the speediest realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea and first of all for the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This places still more responsibility on the Commission for the work it has to carry out.

The Korean people liberated from Japanese imperialists by the common efforts of the Allies have shown their determination and aspiration for the establishment of a responsible democratic state, independent of any external interference.

In the zone of responsibility of the Soviet Commander in North Korea considerable progress has been achieved in the field of democratization and development of national economy and culture during the period that passed after the expulsion of Japanese imperialists.

We are certain that on the basis of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, Korea will develop along democratic lines and become an independent state and will join the family of the peace-loving nations as an equal member.

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Being conscious of all the responsibility that is placed upon the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation will make every effort for the speediest and exact carrying out of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

May I greet the American Command and my colleagues in the Commission and express my confidence that the Joint Commission will fulfill the tasks it is charged with, and first of all, the task of the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government.

Now I would like to introduce the members of the Soviet Delegation:

Mr. G. Tounkin, First Class Consellor

Major General N. Lebedeff

Mr. G. Balasanov, Second Class Consellor

Colonel T. Korkulenko

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By NARS, Date

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

24 June 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: HAMMOND ORGAN TO BE DEDICATED AT KOREAN SERVICE

The Hammond organ recently purchased in the United States with $2,500 contributed by American military and civilian personnel for Seoul's Chung Dong Methodist Church will be dedicated by Dr. KIM In Yung, pastor of the church, at the regular Korean Sunday service on June 29.

In a preliminary ceremony last Sunday, it was formally presented to the church by Lt. Col. A. C. Wildman of Boonesville, Ky., assistant chief chaplain of XXIV Corps. The acceptance was made by CHANG Kei Hyung, chairman of the institutes board of trustees.

Item 2: KOREA'S OLYMPIC ACCEPTANCE IS CONFIRMED

The announcement that Korea's Olympic Committee has been recognized by the International Olympic Committee in Sweden, was confirmed today by a United Press bulletin from Stockholm. The bulletin quoted International Committee chairman, J. Sigfried Edstrom, who announced that Korea, Burma, Iran, Guatemala, Panama and Trinidad will be permitted to send representatives to the 1948 games in London.

Advance notice had been made yesterday by Brig. Gen. Charles G. Helmick, deputy Military Governor, at the home-coming celebration in Seoul for the Korean marathon team.

Item 3: COL. WOLFE IS APPOINTED CORPS QUARTERMASTER

Col. Lloyd R. Wolfe of Cheyenne, Wyo., has replaced Col. Daniel B. Cullinane of Concord, Mass. as XXIV Corps Quartermaster, it was announced today. Col. Cullinane has been transferred to Japan for duty with the 8th Army.

Col. Wolfe arrived in Korea in February and has been serving as commander of the 78th Base Depot at Inch'on. He was previously Director of Training, Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington, D. C.

Col. Wolfe entered the Army in 1917 and has served with the Quartermaster Corps since 1931. In the early part of World War II he was stationed in North Africa with the Quartermaster Corps.

(Editor note: neither subject has a street address in cities mentioned above)

Item 4: CAPTAIN POPCKE IS APPOINTED CORPS SAFETY DIRECTOR

Capt. Robert A. Popcke of 1126 Macon avenue, Pittsburgh, Penna., has replaced Major Yenne E. Snider of Petersburg, Ind., as XXIV Corps Safety Director, it was announced today. Having completed his tour of duty in this

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Item 4 (cont'd)

theatre, Major Snider will soon return to the United States.

Capt. Popcke has been serving in the Provost Marshal's office since he arrived in Korea last June.

A graduate of Valley Forge Military Academy, he entered the Army in 1940 as a second lieutenant. He served 20 months in the European Theater of Operations as commander of an infantry company. He was awarded the Combat Infantryman's Medal and battle stars for service in Normandy, Northern France and the Rhineland campaigns.

Item 5: NEB MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOW COST FEEDING

Five recommendations for low cost feeding are being considered by the National Economic Board to be put into immediate use by the National Food Administration when approved by Military Government, it was learned today.

Several departments of the South Korea Interim Government met recently and decided that the Public Health and Welfare department should continue to operate and finance relief and refugee kitchens and low cost restaurants, and that government restaurants for the Seoul area should be administered by the Office of Administration.

It was also agreed that kitchens of private companies should be financed and operated under the supervision of the Department of Labor. Vested property companies operating restaurants at a loss as a result of serving meals below cost should meet the deficit out of their operating cost, it was recommended further.

The final recommendation was that a committee composed of representatives from National Food Administration and the Departments of Labor and Commerce should determine the private industries subject to price control which are eligible to operate low cost feeding restaurants and should establish a system of control for the issuing of food for use in these restaurants.

Item 6: JOINT COMMISSION EXTENDS DATE FOR SUBMISSION OF ANSWERS TO QUESTIONNAI

Final date for the submission of answers to questionnaires distributed to Korean political parties and social organizations by the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission has been changed from July 1 to July 5 at the request of the Korean groups, it was announced today. Oral consultation between the Joint Commission and the Korean political parties and social organizations, which was scheduled to begin on July 5, will not start until Monday, July 7.

The questionnaires seek to learn the wishes of the Korean people in setting up a provisional Government.

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See Item #8

Capt. Phillips
Joint Commission

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

25 June 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: WAR DEPT. CONTEMPLATES REVISIONS IN NON-COM AND WARRANT OFFICER SYSTEMS

To build a broadly qualified, well-rounded noncommissioned and warrant officer corps which will augment the Regular Army officers' corps, a tentative plan is now in effect to determine jobs necessary. The plan, set up under War Dept. circular 118, also provides for a training system for qualifying personnel to fill each job.

Four committees of warrant officers and noncommissioned officers of the first three grades will be appointed in the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions, Korea Base Command and XXIV Corps Special Troops to make recommendations. These will be reviewed by XXIV Corps Headquarters and forwarded to the Commander-In-Chief, Far East Command, by July 31.

Throughout the Army, opinions of commanders of armies, corps, divisions and similar commands are also desired.

Among the aims of the plan is the establishment of a system of jobs offering wide opportunities to career soldiers for all-round development within a field as well as narrow specialization. A grade is contemplated for each job, with equal skills receiving equal pay regardless of type unit.

All 'T' ratings will be abolished as such, but current holders of them will remain in the same pay grades. Instead, a new series of non-com titles and chevron markings is planned, showing the job field. New Warrant officer insignia are also being planned.

New non-com titles include: first grade, master sergeant, with 'first sergeant' and 'sergeant-major' kept as occupation titles; second, senior sergeant, with 'platoon sergeant' kept as occupation title; third, sergeant first class; fourth, sergeant; fifth, corporal; sixth, private first class, seventh, private.

For warrant officers, the War Department is seeking legislation to authorize a chief warrant officer, senior warrant officer, warrant officer first class and warrant officer, with pay and allowances of officers of the fourth to first pay periods respectively.

Item 2: CIVILIAN SUPPLIES ARE ALLOCATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Nearly 150,000 ball bearings were among the supplies allocated to the Department of Commerce machine section recently under the Civilian Supply Program, it was learned today. For eventual use by the transportation industry

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in Korea, these have been turned over to local ball bearing manufacturers for processing.

For use in the manufacture of light bulbs, 140,000 tungsten filaments which arrived in the same shipment will also be distributed. Hard fibre sheets for insulation purposes also were allocated to the Department of Commerce.

Item 3: NEW KOREAN REPATRIATES ARRIVE FROM JAPAN

Six hundred seventy-two Koreans arrived in Korea from Japan on June 20 aboard the Kogane Maru, Dr. MOON Chang Wook, Office of Foreign Affairs director, announced today.

Of this group, 510 were Koreans who had requested repatriation but had been delayed in returning to south Korea. The other 162 Koreans had been repatriated previously but had illegally returned to Japan.

On June 21, 144 Japanese nationals were repatriated to Sasebo, Japan, from Korea.

Item 4: KOREAN WOMEN'S ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION PLANS RE-ORGANIZATION

Thirty women from schools, girl's organizations and professional groups met on June 21 to make plans for the re-organization of the Korean Women's Athletic association, LEE Byung Hak, chief executive of the Korean Athletic association, announced today.

To bring all rules and regulations up to date so that Korea can meet international standards in women's sports will be one of the first activities of the new organization. The association will be an official member of the Korean Athletic association and will be represented on their board of directors.

Item 5: NEW 31ST FIELD ARTILLERY SERVICE CLUB OPENS

The new 31st Field Artillery Army Service Club, staffed by American Red Cross' Betty Murfit of Newton, Bucks County, Penna., and Barbara Bowlen of 121 Madison avenue, Holyoke, Mass., had it's grand opening yesterday at 3 p.m. with dancing, entertainment and refreshments.

Brig. Gen. Roger M. Wicks, 7th Division Artillery commander, officially opened the club and announced its name, "The Loft." Pfc Daniel Girdner of Cornville, Calif., and Pfc. Earl Brasher of 2048 Piru street, Los Angeles, Calif., will each receive a week's trip to Hourglass Beach at Taechon, the 7th Division recreation center, for presenting the winning title for the club.

Following the official opening, a tea dance was held with Red Cross girls present for the occasion. The 31st F.A. "Hillbilly Band" rendered additional entertainme.

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Item 5 (cont'd)

The new club will serve the 31st F.A. battalion, the 7th Quartermaster company, 7th Infantry band and 7th Reconnaissance troops.

Item 6: LIEUT. WALLACE AND MISS BENDER WED HERE

In a candlelight ceremony on June 21, Miss Beverly B. Bender, daughter of Col. and Mrs. A. H. Bender, became the bride of Lt. George M. Wallace, son of Maj. Gen. and Mrs. Fred C. Wallace of Stony Point, Va. Col. Bender is chief of staff of the Seventh Infantry Division.

The ceremony was performed at the home of Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce, commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division, by the Reverend A. Cecil Cooper, Bishop of Seoul. Lt. George C. Hogue of Lexington, Mo., an officer of the 6th Division, was best man while Miss Linnell Bruce, daughter of General Bruce, was matron of honor.

Ushers were Lieut. Harry J. Shaw of Fort Thomas, Ky., and Lt. Thomas Devlin of 53 Bernard street, Dorchester, Mass., West Point class-mates of the groom.

Following the reception at General Bruce's home the couple left for Tokyo for a short honeymoon.

(Editor note: Addresses are as complete as subjects can provide. Col. Bender has no home town).

Item 7: INTER-BATTALION BOXING FINALS TONIGHT AT 31ST FIELD ARTILLERY GYM

The light-heavyweight and heavyweight finals of the 31st Field Artillery's inter-battalion boxing tourney will be held tonight at 8 p.m. in the 31st F.A.'s gymnasium.

Pfc. Ed McFeela of 5173 W. Deming place, Chicago, Ill., who scored the only KO last week in the semi-finals, will face Pfc. James Brown of 7219 15th street West, Seattle, Wash., in the light-heavy battle. Pfc. Ed Gonzales of 821½ Alma avenue, Los Angeles, Calif., will battle Pfc. Mike Jelenis of 8701 Kenmore avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, in the heavyweight clash.

Three other non-title bouts are scheduled on the card.

Item 8: SOVIET MEMBERS GO TO NORTH KOREA AS COMMISSION'S WORK PROGRESSES

Following a meeting with Korean leaders of democratic parties and social organizations in Seoul on Wednesday afternoon, June 25, thirty-seven members of the Soviet Delegation to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joing Commission left Thursday, June 26, to conduct a similar meeting in North Korea.

The group, which left by train at 11 a.m. for P'yongyang, capital of North Korea, was accompanied by U.S. Army Major Luke Kirillin of 2301 Francisco street, San Francisco, Calif., military interpreter now serving as liaison officer for the Joint Commission. The American Delegation, headed by Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner, saw the party off at the railroad station.

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Members of the American Delegation who will take part in the meeting with North Korea political leaders on June 30 plan to leave by train for P'yongyang on Sunday, June 29.

More than 40 members of the Soviet Delegation whose services are not required at the P'yongyang session remained in Seoul.

Wednesday's meeting of the Joint Commission and representatives of South Korean democratic parties and social organizations in the Capitol Building marked the opening of an important and significant phase of the task of re-establishing Korean independence.

This meeting was the first formal step toward oral consultation with Korean leaders, which will begin officially on Monday, July 7. These talks will deal specifically with necessary explanation or elaboration of answers contained in questionnaires submitted to party and organization leaders by the Joint Commission in its efforts to learn their wishes regarding the structure and political platform of a provisional Korean democratic government.

"Such consultation," declared Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, Chief of the American Delegation, in a prepared address, "will be carried out in the best democratic traditions in order that the voice of the people may be given paramount consideration in the creation of the Provisional Government. Inasmuch as the people make their desires known through parties and organizations, the importance and seriousness of the task of their designated representatives is very great."

Through consultation, General Brown pointed out, the Joint Commission will determine the government "which is desired by and which best fulfills the interest of the Korean people. "Then, as stipulated in the Moscow Decision, it will recommend to the Allied Powers that such a Provisional Government be established, he said. This task requires the "wholehearted assistance of the Korean people and the full cooperation of you who are to represent the views of the parties and organizations to the Joint Commission," General Brown informed the Korean leaders.

Declaring it to be "inevitable" that there should be divergent opinions among political party representatives on the creation of a Provisional Government, the Chief American Commissioner asserted that "difference of opinion must not, however, lead to lack of harmony or to non-cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission."

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Item 8 (cont'd)

As the large number of parties and organizations which have applied for consultation precludes the Joint Commission's consultation as a whole with each representative, subcommittees will be formed to work under the supervision of the Joint Commission, General Brown explained. Results of the discussions with subcommittees will then be given "proper consideration" by the subcommissions and the Joint Commission.

Korean democratic parties and social organizations were urged "to approach this task in full awareness of their responsibility, to explain widely to the people the contents of the questionnaires, and to submit to the Joint Commission views which faithfully reflect the opinions and aspirations of the Korean people."

"The interests of the Korean people must be placed above those of individual parties and leaders," said General Brown.

"The Joint Commission wishes to assure you, the representatives," he said in conclusion, "as well as the Korean people that it will use all its efforts to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea and, as our first duty, to form, with all possible expediency, a Provisional Korean Democratic Government."

As at the opening of the Joint Commission sessions on May 21, General Brown's address was translated into Korean and Russian. At the close of the meeting, members of both delegations received the Korean political party representatives informally.

Item 9: LARGE AMOUNTS OF FUEL AND OIL TO BE IMPORTED

Plans are underway to import 54,660,000 gallons of gasoline, kerosene, Diesel oil, fuel and lubricating oils, and 1,178,000 pounds of greases and wax under the Civilian Supply Program for Korean consumption during the fiscal year 1948, it was announced today by Dr. Clarence Ryee, Department of Public Information director.

The gasoline will be used to operate 7,000 pre-war trucks and 3,000 trucks imported by Military Government. The kerosene will supply light for an estimated 2,600,000 Korean homes, and operate irrigation pumps. An estimated 159,000 gallons of kerosene will be allocated to small fishing boats.

Approximately half of the estimated amount of lubricating oils and greases will be used for consumption as motor lubricants, with the remainder going to railways, marine vessels and sundry industrial purposes. Diesel oil will be furnished fishing boat pumps during the irrigation season, and an undetermined number of individual small heaters.

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Item 10: PORT CALLS ISSUED TO 35 DEPENDENT FAMILIES

Families of 35 military and civilian employees here in Korea have been issued port calls to report to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation on July 7 to sail on or about July 9, it was learned here today.

The places or organizations with the number of families expected to arrive at each one are: Kimpo, 3; Korea Base Command, 1; Yongdungpo, 1; Seoul, 15; Chunchon, 1; Chongju, 4; Taejon, 3; Chonju, 1; Kunsan, 2; Kwangju, 1; Masan, 1; Taegu, 1; Yosu, 1.

Item 11: KOREAN HORSE RACING ASSOCIATION HISTORY COMPLETED

An American translation of the history of the Korean Horse Racing Association has been completed and forwarded to the Historical Section of XXIV Corps, it was announced today by Dr. LEE Hoon Koo, Department of Agriculture director.

The 1946 report of the Horse Racing Association has also been prepared and is being translated into English for Corps' Historical Section.

The XXIV Corps Historical Section records not only the history of American participation in Korean affairs, but of Korean cultural activities.

Item 12: FREE MARKET REGULATION SET UP IN KOREA

Korea's National Price Regulation No. 2, which creates a free market in items produced by private companies with raw materials procured from non-governmental sources, is now being printed, CHOI Tai Wook, National Price Administrator announced today. This regulation confirms the policies of NPA.

Prices of such items distributed through governmental channels will be established in accordance with instructions to appropriate agencies issued by the National Price Administration.

No person will sell any item at a price higher than the agreed price. Any person violating this regulation shall be subject to penalties provided under the existing laws. Revocations of National Price Regulation No. 1 by No. 2 does not extinguish offenses under Regulation No. 1, nor does it abate or bar existing or future prosecutions based on such an offense.

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By NARS, Date

US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

SPEECH FOR THE JOINT MEETING OF THE COMMISSION WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, SEOUL 25 JUNE

General Shtikov, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the name of the American-Soviet Joint Commission I welcome you -- representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of Southern Korea.

We are gathered together to begin one more phase of the task of re-establishing Korean independence. It is our purpose so to carry out this great work that we may be able to erect a democratic state of power and dignity, which will be a worthy political edifice for the people of this ancient and cultured race.

Under the heavy yoke of Japanese imperialism, Korean people for decades have dreamt of the day when they would finally obtain liberty and the opportunity of independently governing their country. This opportunity is the result of the victory of the allied nations, which in the course of their prolonged and bloody war have decisively defeated the aggressors, both in the Occident and the Orient. The freedom-loving Korean people who have long endured the hardships and insults of colonial slavery now once and for all have been freed from the shackles of Japanese domination.

During the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britian, December 1945, there was achieved an historic decision which opened to the Korean people clear perspectives for its national renaissance. Three Allied Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britian, which were eventually joined also by the Chinese Republic, have outlined in this decision a program for restoration of Korea as an independent state, creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.

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The Moscow Decision provides that the initial task shall be the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which could take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea, and the national culture of the Korean people. The formation of such a government on the basis of broad participation of Korean Democratic parties and social organizations, as stipulated in the Moscow Decision, will lead to political and economic unification of Korea and will constitute the most important step on the way toward the creation of an independent democratic Korean state, free from foreign interference.

The present stage of the work of the Joint Commission is devoted to the fulfillment of this task. Following the completion of this first stage, the Joint Commission shall initiate, in participation with the provisional democratic government and with collaboration of Korean democratic parties and social organization, the elaboration of measures for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

This meeting today marks a momentous step in the fulfillment of paragraph II of the Moscow Decision, which prescribes how the Provisional Government of Korea shall be established. This meeting is the first formal step towards oral consultation with the leaders of Korean democratic parties and social organizations. Such consultation will be carried out in the best democratic traditions in order that the voice of the people may be given paramount consideration in the creation of the Provisional Government. Inasmuch as the people make their desires known through parties and organizations, the importance and seriousness of the task of their designated representatives is very great.

It is the intention of the Joint Commission to determine through consultation the government which is desired by and which best fulfills the interest of the Korean people and to recommend to the powers that such a Provisional Government be established,

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assure the enactment of the desired democratic reforms, the renaissance of Korea as an independent democratic state, and the development of the national economy and culture. In order that the Commission may succeed in this work, it requires the whole-hearted assistance of the Korean people, and the full cooperation of you who are to represent the views of the parties and organizations to the Joint Commission.

It is inevitable that the great number of political parties represented here should have divergent opinions on the creation of a Provisional Government. While Koreans are agreed on the general desire to achieve independence and carry out democratic social and economic reforms which will enable their country to take its proper place in the modern world, there is natural disagreement as to the policies and means by which these objectives should be achieved. Difference of opinion must not, however, lead to lack of harmony or to non-cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission.

For the purpose of consultation the Joint Commission has worked out and published questionnaires regarding the structure and principles of organization of a provisional Korean democratic government and local organs of authority, and also regarding the political platform for this government. These questionnaires embrace a wide circle of problems which are vitally important to the Korean people.

The Joint Commission has also elaborated and published the provisions governing the order of consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. In accordance with this order of consultation, Korean democratic parties and social organizations which have signed the declaration are invited to present in written and oral form their views regarding the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

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The agreed order of consultation also provides that representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations who shall be later nominated in accordance with the membership of such parties and organizations, and taking into account as far as possible their influence, shall be invited for consultation and aiding the Joint Commission in elaboration of recommendations.

We are now about to start the process of oral consultation. Because a great many parties and organizations have applied for consultation, it will be impossible for the Joint Commission as a whole to consult with each representative. However, subcommittees will be formed who will carry out this work under the instructions and supervision of the Joint Commission. In order not to unduly delay further progress in the development of recommendations regarding a Korean Democratic Provisional Government, oral consultation will deal specifically with necessary explanation or elaboration of answers submitted to the questionnaires. The subcommittees will confer with individual party and organization representatives in accordance with a schedule which will be made known to the individual. Representatives invited for oral consultation will be notified of the time and place of consultation. The results of the discussion will then be given proper consideration by the subcommissions and by the Joint Commission in making its studies.

The Joint Commission earnestly urges the Korean democratic parties and social organizations to approach this task in full awareness of their responsibility, to explain widely to the people the contents of the questionnaires, and to submit to the Joint Commission views which faithfully reflect the opinions and aspirations of the Korean people. Personal predilections should be abandoned in the course of the solution of this important problem. The interests of the Korean people must be placed above those of individual parties and leaders.

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The Commission further appeals to the representatives of the Korean press, which during these historic days in the life of Korea, must execute the important task of expounding to the Korean people the decisions of the Joint Commission and must organize widespread explanation of the efforts of the democratic parties and social organizations in submitting to the Joint Commission their views regarding the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The Joint Commission believes that the democratic parties and social organizations which are represented here and which by signing the declaration, have expressed good faith with respect to upholding the Moscow Decision, will render the Joint Commission all aid in its work and thus fulfill their duty to the Korean people. It is your proud responsibility to contribute to the rebirth of your nation. The Joint Commission believes that you appreciate the honor which your parties and organizations have bestowed upon you.

The Joint American-Soviet Commission wishes to assure you, the representatives, as well as the Korean people that it will use all its efforts to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea and, as our first duty, to form, with all possible expediency, a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

This is a most important and significant occasion. The Joint Commission hopes that Koreans, Russians and Americans together working with good will, will reach solutions to the complex questions related to the formation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government.

Approved 21 June 1947.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of the American Delegation

T. F. SHTIKOV
Colonel General
Chief of the Soviet Delegation

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Col Edwards

DRAFT
6 June

"The position of the American Delegation is that Korea must have the type of government which the Koreans desire. The Moscow agreement, while placing on the Joint Commission the responsibility for establishing a democratic government, does not specify any particular form of democracy nor, as read by the American Delegation, does it visualize either the Soviet or the American form of democracy. It is the position of the American Delegation that it visualizes the form of democracy desired by the Koreans - not by one Korean political party, but by all parties. In order to determine the desire of the Korean people, broad consultation must be had with political parties and social organizations as provided for in the Moscow Decision. The American Delegation can accept nothing less.

The Soviet Delegation, in its effort during the past weeks to narrow those parties with whom oral consultation shall be had after its specific agreement in this conference to broad consultation, is merely wasting time. If restricted oral consultation is the ultimate position of the Soviet Delegation, it is desirable that they state their position frankly and clearly and without equivocation" ~~in order that the American Delegation may seek the advice of its government~~.

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DRAFT
28 June

U.S. POSITION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CONSULTATION

The following are extracts of statements on freedom of expression in formation of a Korean Government which indicate the U.S. viewpoint:

1. Moscow Decision: para 2 . . . . "In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations." This places no restriction on freedom of speech or opinion regarding the Moscow Decision or anything else.

2. Letter, 9 May 1946, Gen. Hodge to Gen. Chistiakov: . . . . "but the American Delegation cannot agree to exclusion of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders from consultation concerning the future of their nation because of expression of their political views on the Moscow Decision."

3. Letter, 15 June 1946, Gen. Hodge to Gen. Chistiakov: . . . . "The American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in order fully to carry out the Moscow Decision in accordance with the principle of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter."

4. Letter, 12 Aug. 1946, Gen. Hodge to Gen. Chistiakov: . . . . "There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government."

5. Letter, 1 Nov. 1946, Gen. Hodge to Gen. Chistiakov: . . . . "(b) The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of

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the United States see a great difference between (1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision; and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government."

6. Letter, 24 Dec. 1946, Gen. Hodge to Gen. Chistiakov:

. . . . "Paragraphs Ix and X of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet Delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals 'regarding the formation of the Korean government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.' "

7. Letter, April 8, 1947, Mr. Marshall to Mr. Molotov:

. . . . "The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:

. . . . 2. To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people."

and, further on in the same letter Secretary Marshall adds:

. . . . "To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of democratic right for freedom of expression."

8. Letter, May 2, 1947, Mr. Marshall to Mr. Molotov:

. . . . "In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase 'exact execution', I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8, I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expeciting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. In making this statement I

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had and have in mind the well known position of the government of the United States and Korean representatives of Democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, becauseof opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission."

9. In answer to Mr. Marshall's letter of May 2, Mr. Molotov quoted the 3 proposals of Gen. Chistiakov's letter to General Hodge of November 26, 1946, and also General Hodge's proposed amendments of his December 24 letter with the statement that he was prepared to "accept the amendments set forth by the American Commander." These three proposals as amended constitute the specific formula for insuring freedom of expression and for determining which parties or organizations are ~~prepared~~ eligible to cooperate with the Joint Commission.

Secretary Marshall in his 2 May letter to Mr. Molotov stated: "These proposals were authorized by this government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of 2 May 1947."

10. Thus the U.S. position on freedom of expression in consultation has not changed nor will it change. It is clear from the agreement made by Secretary Marshall and Mr. Molotov that:

(a) A party which has signed the application in accordance with the instructions of the Joint Commission must be accepted for consultation irrespective of its previous actions.

(b) That a party or organization remains eligible for consultation unless after signing the declaration of Communique No. 5 it foments and instigates active opposition to the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers. A statement of opinion or any other

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passive action or indication of opinion is not cause for declaring a party or organization ineligible. An overt act must be committed. In the absence of proof of such overt act, the party remains eligible.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

Capt Philps

28 June 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: FLOOD CONTROL MEASURES SET UP IN SOUTH KOREA

Extensive plans are being completed to prepare for the flood season in South Korea, CHOI Kyung Yul, Department of Public Works director, announced today. The Department of Public Works is working in conjunction with the Department of Public Health and Welfare and the Korean Red Cross.

Weather forecasts, with heavy emphasis on precipitation, will be broadcast daily. In each community a Disaster Relief Committee has been organized. The committee will be responsible for warning and rescue, shelter, food and clothing for those people who are in the path of floods.

The committee has located available housing, such as warehouses, schools, auditoriums, theaters and other suitable places for housing homeless refugees. Sites have been selected that will not be inundated, and food supplied by the National Food Administration, clothing and medicinal supplies made available by the Department of Public Health and Welfare stored for use.

The Provisional Health Department will be responsible for:

(1) The provision and transportation of supplies necessary for the treatment of the sick and injured, treatment of water, and availability of vaccines and disease-killing equipment.

(2) Supervision of the work of the Gun Public Health Officers or their designated appointees for the involved areas.

(3) Holding an emergency reserve of necessary supplies so they will be available without delay for disaster relief.

The community officer will be responsible for sanitary measures in the area, including inoculations, DDT application, fly control, purification of drinking water, isolation of patients with contagious diseases, quarantines as needed, and provision of facilities for the care of the injured.

Flood Protection Teams of approximately 40 members each have been organized throughout South Korea. Such teams will check dikes and levees, and handle emergency evacuations from danger areas. Each community will have one team.

Stores of tools and supplies have been strategically placed in the provinces for use in repairing dikes, levees and bridges.

Concrete and steel highway structures replacing fords on the Seoul-Pusan Highway have been completed. Gauging stations on all important rivers have been repaired and are now in operation. Alternate highway routes have been planned in

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Item 1 (cont'd)

cases where damage is considered inevitable.

Item 2: NEW CORPS CENTRAL SCHOOL TERM FEATURES MEAL FACILITIES

With the opening of the Corps Central School's twelfth term July 17, noon and evening meals will be made available to men from outlying units. The mess hall, now under construction will minimize transportation difficulties.

Manned for the second term by an all G.I. faculty, the school will begin registration July 17 and continue through the 19th, with the same registration procedure as last term of beginning classes immediately after enrollment.

Transportation will be provided to and from school for night classes. Buses leave the Banto hotel at 6:30 p.m., passing by the USAFIK Theatre en route to the school. It makes a return trip the same way after the evening classes.

Courses in English, typewriting, languages, mathematics and psychology will be offered as part of the curriculum in on-duty and off-duty classes. Men attending the on-duty classes must have written consent of their unit commanders, to be submitted at the time of registration.

Item 3: NATIONAL PRODUCTION BOARD FORMED IN KOREA

To establish effective procedures in handling major industrial problems, the National Production Board has been established by the Department of Commerce Department Memorandum 48, OH Chung Soo, Director of the Department of Commerce, announced today.

K. H. Lah, Deputy Director of the Department of Commerce, has been appointed chairman of the National Production Board, which is composed of the specialists of the several divisions of the Department of Commerce.

The board is responsible to the Director of the Department of Commerce for the formulation and administration of governmental policies governing industries. An auxiliary section of the board composed of the engineering section and the accounting and auditing section will participate prominently in the administering of vested industries.

Industrial inspection teams of the Department of Commerce have already begun basic technical and financial inspections of vested plants in the provinces. The reports of these teams will be studied by the Production Board to improve the administration of these industries by the Department of Commerce.

Item 4: WEATHER REPORT

Maximum temperature today 75°; Sunday 77°; weather forecast: light rain today followed by cloudy tonight and tomorrow with little change in temperature.

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Item 5: NUTRITIOUS WHITE BEANS ADDED TO KOREAN RATION

White beans, a highly nutritive food, has been included in the general ration for the period that began June 26, CHEE Yong Eun, National Food Administrator, announced today.

As the Korean diet is deficient in protein, the National Food Administration made a study of available foods that would best supplement the diet and increase the protein content. A daily consumption of protein is needed to build body tissue and muscle, and build up resistance to disease and illness. This survey showed that the white bean has a protein content of 20.19% which is about 15% higher than the protein content of polished rice.

In an effort to improve the Korean diet, the general ration for the period June 26 to July 9 will be:

.7 hop of rice
1.3 hop of other grains
.2 hop of white beans
2.2

The white beans included in the general ration for this period arrived recently at Pusan under the Civilian Supply Program. This shipment was not sufficient to apportion a larger quantity for this ration period, but it will give the people of south Korea an enriched diet for the next two weeks.

Item 6: NEW PROTESTANT SUNDAY SCHOOL PLANNED IN SEOUL

A new Protestant Sunday School for American children in the Seoul area is now being organized, states Col. George F. Rixey of 3831 Macomb street NW, Washington, D. C., XXIV Corps Chaplain.

It is planned that instruction will be given at the Army School for Dependent Children in the Seventh Infantry Division area under the direction of Major Robert M. Homiston of 202½ West Cypress avenue, Glendale, Calif., a chaplain of the Hourglass Division. Religious services are now held on Sundays in the auditorium of the school.

"Religious instruction has been given on one day a week at the school as part of the curriculum," pointed out Chaplain Rixey, "but the new program will introduce the much needed element of worship."

Lt. Col. Alvie L. McKnight of 318 Second avenue, Cleveland, Miss., Seventh Division chaplain, will supervise the entire program.

A questionnaire has been sent to American families in Seoul to determine how many children wish to attend. Persons interested in instructing are requested to notify the Corps Chaplain's office.

Roman Catholic instruction on Sundays is expected to begin in the fall.

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Item 7: PORT CALLS ISSUED TO 45 DEPENDENT FAMILIES

Families of 45 military and civilian employees here in Korea have been issued port calls to report to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation on July 16 to sail on or about July 18, it was learned here today.

The places or organizations with the number of families expected to arrive at each one are: Kimpo, 2; Yungdongpo, 3; Seoul, 7; Chongju, 4; Cnyang, 1; Taejon, 15; Chinhae, 1; Kunsan, 1; Kwangju, 2; Pusan, 7; Taegu, 2.

Item 8: THREE DOUBLEHEADERS SCHEDULED IN NATIONAL BASEBALL LEAGUE OF KOREA

Three doubleheaders are scheduled in the National Baseball League of Korea this week-end, the final two days of play before the All-star team opposes the 6th Infantry Division nine in the game at Seoul Stadium on July 4. All games will begin at 2 p.m.

USAMGIK will face the 1176th Engineer Group nine at 1176th Field. Special Troops, Headquarters XXIV Corps meets the 61st Ordnance team at Ascom Field, while 80th Medical Group and XXIV Corps Headquarters Troops meet in Seoul Stadium. 6th Division and Korea Base Command teams are idle over the week-end.

Item 9: DEMOCRATIC POSTERS TO BE JUDGED JUNE 30

Final judging of the National Korean Democratic Poster Contest, sponsored by the Department of Education for all Middle School students in Korea, will take place at 11 a.m. on June 30 in the Throne Room of the Capitol, it was announced today by YU Uck Kyum, director, who will award the prize.

All students who were provincial winners of the contest will be in Seoul with their poster. From this group will be picked the grand prize winner who will receive school materials and supplies. Provincial winners will be given certificates of merit. All will have an expenses-paid three-day visit in Seoul.

The public is invited to view the winning posters in the Throne Room of the Capitol June 30 from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.

Item 10: HUGE JULY 4TH WEEK-END PROGRAM SLATED FOR INCH'ON

The biggest entertainment event in occupation history to commemorate the United States' 171st anniversary of the Declaration of Independence is planned for July 4, 5 and 6 against the oriental setting of Korea's fourth largest city - Inch'on.

Special Service and American Red Cross personnel will join to sponsor an excitement-crowded three-day holiday period, it was learned today.

Brig. Gen. Robert O. Shoe, commanding general of Korea Base Command, will review a motorized parade which will roll through the streets of Inch'on on the morning of the Fourth. More than 200 trucks and approximately 2,000 troops will

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Item 10 (cont'd)

commence passing the reviewing stand at 9:30 a.m.

The program will include a street parade with prizes for the best floats. All units in the command have been invited to enter a float to compete for the grand prize.

Korean participation in the street parade and carnival at Red Cross Square has been assured by local leaders.

Hunting and fishing trips, an air show, pleasure cruising on the Yellow Sea, a gigantic street carnival with circus acts, rides, side-shows and scores of concessions, a patriotic fireworks display, and an elaborate sports program, including a horse show, are some of the activities planned over the three-day period.

Kimpo Army Air Base will take part with a vast air show over the tidal basin and the city of Inch'on on July 5 and 6. Aerial acrobatics, massed flights and demonstrations of some of the newest Army airplanes will be featured.

Item 11: KOREA'S PRICE ON IMPORTED COTTON SET AT 30 YEN A POUND

The price of 30 yen per pound has been set on 8,000 bales of cotton imported under the Civilian Supply Program, CHOI Tai Wook, National Price Administrator, announced today.

This cotton will be mixed with Korean produced cotton to produce a better grade cloth. The imported cotton compares favorably with Korean grade 1 cotton. Allocation to Korean textile mills will be made by the Department of Commerce.

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Gen Brown Approves

PRESS INFORMATION

The following information has been received from the Chief of the American Delegation.

The American Delegation arrived at the Pyongyang station at 0800, 30 June. It was met by General Shtikov and a Soviet band and escort of honor. General A. E. Brown and the American Commissioners were then conducted to the house which had been prepared for their use by the Soviet Command. Other members of the Delegation were conducted to a hotel where accomodations had been arranged.

At 1000 General Brown called on General G. I. Korotkov, the Soviet Commander in North Korea. The interview lasted about thirty minutes during which General Korotkov extended to General Brown the freedom of the city.

At 1400 the Joint Commission met, with General Korotkov presiding. Present were the members of both Delegations, the members of the military staff of the Soviet Command, the Korean officials of North Korea, and the Soviet and Korean press of North Korea. General Korotkov welcomed the Joint Commission to Pyongyang, and a response was made by General Brown, the Chief of the American Delegation. General Shtikov, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation, also spoke. (Copies of these three speeches are attached.)

At 1630 the American and Soviet Delegations with Korean officials of the North Korea government reviewed mass demonstrations of the organizations of North Korea ~~where~~ who marched past bearing colorful banners marked with party slogans and carrying the Russian and Korean flags. Pictures of Stalin and Kim, Il Sung were also prominent in the parade. During this ceremony, Korean leaders addressed the crowd on political matters amid loud acclamations. The demonstration was well organized, well led, and conducted without any disorder.

PRESS Information - Please give to Capt. Phillips J.C.

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At 2030 the American Delegation and members of the Soviet Command in North Korea were entertained at the Soviet Army Officers' Club by a chorus known as the "Singing and Dancing Ensemble of the Soviet Army." The performance consisted of twenty-one numbers and lasted about two and one-half hours. It was greatly enjoyed by the American Delegation, and General Brown met with the artists to express his gratification. During the intermission the American Delegation met informally with representatives of the Soviet Command and their ladies. Refreshments were served.

The Joint Commission meets formally with the representatives of Korean political parties and social organizations at 1400 on 1 July. This is the counterpart of the similar meeting which was held at 1400, 25 July in Seoul for the representatives from South Korea.

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SPEECH TO BE GIVEN IN PYONGYANG
BY GENERAL BROWN

General Korotkov, General Shtikov and gentlemen:

It is indeed a pleasure to greet the leader of our great Soviet ally, General Korotkov. Personally and on behalf of the American Delegation, I convey to you, General Korotkov, Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in North Korea, and to Colonel General Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation of the Joint Commission, the gratitude of the American Delegation for the hearty welcome and hospitality which you have extended to us.

The American Delegation extends greetings to the people of North Korea. We have been looking forward for some time to visiting with you. We are here to carry out in North Korea in cooperation with the delegation of our great Soviet ally the first step of the Joint Commission's task to fulfill the promise of the Great Powers that Korea shall be free and independent. The American Delegation was happy at the opportunity to reconvene the Joint Commission in accordance with the agreement of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet nation, Mr. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the American nation, General Marshall. Under this agreement those who sign the application for consultation as contained in Joint Communique No. 5, of 17 April 1946, are eligible for initial consultation by the Joint Commission. The agreement reached by the Ministers recognizes the principle of the right of the individual to freely express himself irrespective of whether or not his views may differ from those held by certain other individuals. In South Korea the Joint Commission has already met over 400 representatives of democratic parties and social organizations and has outlined to them the task of the Joint Commission and the purposes and procedures of oral consultation.

These 400 representatives of political parties and social organizations represent all shades and degrees of political thought in South Korea. One of the main difficulties which the Joint

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Commission will face in the first phase of its task, that is, the formation of a provisional government, will be to reconcile the divergent views of the representatives of political parties and social organizations. ~~Unfortunately, each political party of South Korea seems to believe that their policies must govern the country or else that government cannot succeed.~~ It being impossible that the policies of 400 different parties and organizations should prevail, it is the task of the Joint Commission to reconci le the divergent views into a common policy. While this presents a difficult task, there is much hope for the future in Korea in the fact that so many parties and individuals are interested in the future of Korea as seems indicated by the large number of those desiring to be consulted. It is hoped that the interest taken by the Koreans of North Korea will equal in extent that shown by those of South Korea. It will be yet more difficult for the Joint Commission when another large segment of divergent opinion is added to that now facing the Joint Commission. However. if full and free expression of opinion can be obtained from the leaders of North Korean political parties and social organizations and their views can be added to those supplied by the leaders of the South Korean parties and organizations, the Joint Commission will have ample data upon which to base a sound and lasting government. It is therefore with pleasure that we anticipate a similar meeting with the leaders of the democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea.

The Korean people of all Korea, liberated from the Japanese by the efforts of the Allied Powers, will now have, in accordance with the Moscow Decision and the recent agreement reached by the two Ministers, the opportunity to freely express to the Joint Commission their views as to the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government which they desire, and the manner in which that government should operate. Despite the progress made thus far in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement, much yet remains to be done. With the aid of the representatives of the

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political parties and organizations of North and South Korea united in their determination to work with the Joint Commission, the Commission should be able to proceed with expedition to completion of the first phase of its task, the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government over a united Korea.

I should now like to introduce the members of the American Delegation:

Mr. Bunce,

General Weckerling,

Mr. Owen T. Jones,

Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln,

Mr. Joseph Jacobs,

Mr. Clyde B. Sargent.

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General Hodge:

For your concurrence.

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SPEECH TO BE GIVEN IN P'YONGYANG
BY GENERAL BROWN

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These 400 representatives of political parties and social organizations represent all shades and degrees of political thought in South Korea. One of the main difficulties which the Joint

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Commission will face in the first phase of its task, that is, the formation of a provisional government, will be to reconcile the divergent views of the representatives of political parties and social organizations. It being impossible that the individual policies of 400 different parties and organizations should prevail, it is the task of the Joint Commission to reconcile the divergent views into a common policy. While this presents a difficult task, there is much hope for the future in Korea in the fact that so many parties and individuals are interested in the future of Korea as seems indicated by the large number of those desiring to be consulted. It is hoped that the interest taken by the Koreans of North Korea will equal in extent that shown by those of South Korea. It will be yet more difficult for the Joint Commission when another large segment of divergent opinion is added to that now facing the Joint Commission. However, if full and free expression of opinion can be obtained from the leaders of North Korean political parties and social organizations and their views can be added to those supplied by the leaders of the South Korean parties and organizations, the Joint Commission will have ample data upon which to base a sound and lasting government. It is therefore with pleasure that we anticipate a similar meeting with the leaders of the democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea.

The Korean people of all Korea, liberated from the Japanese by the efforts of the Allied Powers, will now have, in accordance with the Moscow Decision and the recent agreement reached by the two Ministers, the opportunity to freely express to the Joint Commission their views as to the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government which they desire, and the manner in which that government should operate. Despite the progress made thus far in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement, much yet remains to be done. With the aid of the representatives of the political parties and organizations of North and South Korea united in their determination

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to work with the Joint Commission, the Commission should be able to proceed with expedition to completion of the first phase of its task, the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government over a united Korea.

I should now like to introduce the members of the American Delegation:

Mr. Bunce
General Weckerling
Mr. Owen T. Jones
Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln
Mr. Joseph Jacobs
Mr. Clyde B. Sargent

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Public Information Office
American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

30 June 1947

PRESS RELEASE

A train carrying 102 American passengers and two members of the Russian Delegation left Seoul Railroad Station promptly at 2200 hours Sunday June 29 for Pyongyang in Soviet occupied Korea. The train was scheduled to arrive in Pyongyang at 0800 hours 30 June. The members of the American Delegation were the same as previously announced with the addition of administrative and technical personnel.

The two members of the Russian Delegation were Mr. G. I. Tounkin and Mr. V. I. Petuhov.

Although the purpose of the meeting of the Joint Commission in Pyongyang is to meet with democratic parties and social organization of North Korea and to instruct them on the purposes and procedures for oral consultation, other meetings will be held to continue the work of the Joint Commission as deemed necessary.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

Su Item 8

30 June 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: RESERVE OFFICER COMMISSIONS OPENED TO FIRST THREE-GRADERS AND WARRANT OFFICERS

Between now and December 31, warrant officers and first three graders from 21 to 27 years of age inclusive may apply for an Officers Reserve Corps commission. Six months of active Army duty between Dec. 7, 1941 and June 30, 1947 as warrant officer, flight officer, or first three-grader is required.

This new direct appointment plan is an addition to that of appointment from ROTC's in colleges and officer candidate schools.

Persons entering the third grade may take a test to qualify for a reserve commission. Their attendance at an officer candidate school is not necessary.

Persons with professional or technical qualifications essential to the Army, and those with special qualifications in industrial mobilization may receive direct reserve commissions. Clergymen and doctors need no military training to apply for a commission.

The officer procurement program is only one phase of the new Regular Army's career guidance plan for warrant officers and non-commissioned officers. Its purpose is to build a well qualified corps which, in time of emergency, could provide a trained cadre for mobilization. This provides an over-all pattern of job fields offering wide opportunities to a career soldier.

Unit commanders are now making this program known to their troops.

Item 2: NAIL PRODUCTION IN SOUTH KOREA UP 100%

The Chosen Steel Industrial company and the Inch'on Nail Manufacturing company produced 336,683 pounds of nails during the month of May as compared with 141,099 pounds in January, CH Chung Soo, Director of the Department of Commerce, announced today. This is a 100 per cent production increase in less than a six-month period.

Both factories, which are vested properties at Inch'on, began making screws May 1, and during the first month produced 8,000 2½ inch screws, and 4,000 2 inch screws.

This expanded production has been achieved despite a need for new industrial equipment and a lack of skilled labor. These factories produced the first shipment of nails made by the South Korean Interim Government since the liberation. On June 3, the S.S. Cannonbar left south Korea for Hong Kong with 238,032 pounds of nails, approximating 58 tons, for barter sale in that market for critically needed rubber and raw cotton.

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Item 2 (cont'd)

Before 1941 the Chosen Steel Industrial Company manufactured wire rope nails, barbed wire, galvanized wire, and wood screws. Full production would again include these items

Item 3: SIGNAL CORPS EM TO STUDY IN JAPAN

Twenty-two enlisted men from the U.S. Army Forces in Korea will be accepted for August attendance at the Eighth Army Signal Corps Training school in Japan, it was announced today. Four separate courses will be offered beginning August 4 for men having specification serial numbers 187, field repeater man; 237, teletype operator; 776, radio low speed man; and 648, radio repairman.

The quota has been allocated as follows: 6th Division, 8; 7th Division, 6; Korea Base Command, 4; XXIV Corps Special Troops, 4.

Item 4: 16 USAFIK GI'S TO TAKE DISCUSSION LEADER COURSE IN TOKYO

Sixteen Troop Information and Education enlisted men of USAFIK's nine major commands will attend a week's Discussion Leader Training school in Tokyo beginning July 14, it was announced today.

The men must have at least six months and preferably one year to serve in Korea after completing the course.

Quotas set are: 6th Division, 4; 7th Division, 4; USAMGIK, 2, and one each from Korea Base Command, 1176th Engineer Group, 80th Medical Group, 61st Ordnance Group, XXIV Corps Special Troops and XXIV Corps Headquarters Troops.

Item 5: 1176TH AND USAMGIK SPLIT DOUBLE BILL

A steady downpour of rain over the week-end postponed half of the six games scheduled in the National Baseball League of Korea. USAMGIK and 1176th Engineers were the only teams able to complete their twin-bill. The 1176th took the Sunday opener, 7-4, and M.G. copped the night-cap, 6-5, at the 1176th Field.

Seventh-place 80th Medical Group increased the gap between itself and last place yesterday by taking the measure of the cellar-dwelling XXV Corps Headquarte Troops nine, 6-4, at Seoul Stadium, after Saturday's contest was rained out.

The twin-bill between Headquarters XXIV Corps Special Troops and the 61st Ordnance Group scheduled for Ascom Field was also postponed.

League standings as of June 29:	W.	L.	Pct.
6th Infantry Division	11	1	.916
Korea Base Command	11	2	.846
Special Troops, XXIV Corps	7	4	.636
USAMGIK	7	7	.500

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Item 5 (cont'd)

	W.	L.	Pct.
61st Ordnance Group	4	6	.400
1176th Engineer Group	5	8	.385
80th Medical Group	3	9	.250
Headquarters Troops XXV Corps	1	12	.077

Item 6: SATURDAY ANNOUNCED AS HOLIDAY

USAFIK personnel will receive a three-day week-end this week, it was announced today when Saturday, July 5 was declared by a XXIV Corps bulletin as being an administrative holiday.

Commanders and chiefs of sections have been authorized to reduce their operating personnel to the minimum necessary to accomplish necessary duty. However, civilian employees excused on Saturday will work compensatory time on Wednesday afternoon, July 2.

Item 7: KOREAN IS MADE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF "SKIG"

Effective July 1, Korean will be the official language of the South Korean Interim Government, Brig. Gen. Charles G. Helmick, acting military governor, proclaimed today in Executive Order number four.

With authority granted by General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, paragraph 5 of Proclamation #1 (To People of Korea) which was issued by General MacArthur, on 7 September 1945, was amended to read:

"For all purposes during the military control, English will be the official language, and in the event of any ambiguity or diversity of interpretation or definition between any English and Korean or Japanese text, the English text shall prevail, provided that, effective July 1, 1947, the official language of the South Korean Interim Government will be Korean.

Item 8: AMERICAN DELEGATION ARRIVES IN NORTH KOREA FOR TALKS

More than 100 Americans, including 50 GI's, arrived at P'yongyang, capital of North Korea, early Monday morning to continue the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission's preliminary work toward the establishment of a Provisional Government for Korea, it was announced today. In the party which left Seoul by special train at 10 p.m., Sunday, June 29, were 102 American passengers, including administrative and technical personnel, and two members of the Russian Delegation, Mr. G. I. Tunkin and Mr. V. I. Petuhov.

Purpose of the session of the Joint Co mission in P'yongyang is to meet with democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea and to instruct them on the purposes and procedures for oral consultation. The Commission met with political leaders of South Korea on June 25.

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Item 8 (cont'd)

Personnel from the Joint Commission included in the group are Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner; Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, Brig. Gen. John Weckerling, Mr. Owen T. Jones, Col. Lawrence J. Lincoln, Minister Joseph E. Jacobs, Mr. Clyde B. Sargent, members and alternate members; Lt. Col. William H. Edwards, Mr. Eugene E. Prostov, 1st Lt. Kenneth G. Althaus, Jr., 1st Lt. Leonard M. Bertsch, Maj. Luke Kirillin, Miss Anna Anderson, Miss Dorothy Cascioni, Miss Helen K. Helser, Mr. Vladimir Pekarsky, Miss Tatiana Sciugam, and HURH Hyun, Korean interpreter for General Brown.

1st Lt. Ellsworth E. Bolles of 83 Bliss Road, Longmeadow, Mass., is serving as commander of the Palace Guard detail of 37 which accompanied the group. Mess personnel is in charge of Lt. P. G. Ooliger of 3942 Mersington avenue, Kansas City, Mo., supply and mess officer, while S/Sgt. Jack Hammock of Parma, Idaho, and T/5 R. L. Smith of Liberty, Miss., are charged with the duties of mess sergeant and chief cook, respectively.

Fourteen technicians, representing the Medical Corps, Signal Corps and the Corps of Engineers; three other Korean interpreters, 13 GI drivers, and 11 Korean waiters make up the remainder of the contingent now in P'yongyang.

Generals Brown and Weckerling are sharing a private residence during the 4-day stay in the North Korea capital while other Joint Commission personnel are billeted in a hotel in that city.

Item 9: WEATHER REPORT

Yesterday's maximum temperature 75.2; today's [illegible] Tuesday's 76. Weather tonight, cloudy with light east winds.

Item 10: INCH'ON P.O.L. DUMP FIRE LOSS ESTIMATED AT $100,000

Losses in the Army petroleum, oil and lubricant dump fire at Inch'on last Thursday afternoon totaled approximately $100,000, it was revealed today at Korea Base Command headquarters.

No American fire-fighters were injured but two Koreans were burned in the blaze that started when a small Korean boat laden with gasoline and oil drums caught fire offshore and spread to the POL dump.

American and Korean fire engine teams, some from as far away as Seoul, fought the blaze as Brig. Gen. Robert O. Shoe, commanding general of Korea Base Command, personally supervised the operations.

Troops and Korean workers from surrounding areas were hastily recruited to put out the blaze and rolled 50-gallon drums to safety. After four hours the flames were brought ar control.

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PRESS INFORMATION

The following information has been received from the Chief of the American Delegation.

The American Delegation arrived at the Pyongyang station at 0800, 30 June. It was met by General Shtikov and a Soviet band and escort of honor. General A. E. Brown and the American Commissioners were then conducted to the house which had been prepared for their use by the Soviet Command. Other members of the Delegation were conducted to a hotel where accommodations had been arranged.

At 1000 General Brown called on General G. I. Korotkov, the Soviet Commander in North Korea. The interview lasted about thirty minutes during which General Korotkov extended to General Brown the freedom of the city.

At 1400 the Joint Commission met, with General Korotkov presiding. Present were the members of both Delegations, the members of the military staff of the Soviet Command, the Korean officials of North Korea, and the Soviet and Korean press of North Korea. General Korotkov welcomed the Joint Commission to Pyongyang, and a response was made by General Brown, the Chief of the American Delegation. General Shtikov, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation, also spoke. (Copies of these three speeches are attached.)

At 1630 the American and Soviet Delegations with Korean officials of the North Korea government reviewed mass demonstrations of the organizations of North Korea who marched past bearing colorful banners marked with party slogans and carrying the Russian and Korean flags. Pictures of Stalin and Kim, Il Sung were also prominent in the parade. During this ceremony, Korean leaders addressed the crowd on political matters amid loud acclamations.

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The demonstration was well organized, well led, and conducted without any disorder.

At 2030 the American Delegation and members of the Soviet Command in North Korea were entertained at the Soviet Army Officers' Club by a chorus known as the "Singing and Dancing Ensemble of the Soviet Army." The performance consisted of twenty-one numbers and lasted about two and one-half hours. It was greatly enjoyed by the American Delegation, and General Brown met with the artists to express his gratification. During the intermission the American Delegation met informally with representatives of the Soviet Command and their ladies. Refreshments were served.

The Joint Commission meets formally with the representatives of Korean political parties and social organizations at 1400 on 1 July. This is the counterpart of the similar meeting which was held at 1400, 25 July in Seoul for the representatives from South Korea.

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SPEECH GIVEN BY GENERAL KOROTKOV AT
MEETING IN PYONGYANG, 30 JUNE.

General Brown, ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of the Soviet Command and myself, I welcome General Brown and the full American Delegation arriving in Pyongyang. With great satisfaction I welcome the US - USSR Joint Commission with the assigned responsibility to fulfill the decision on Korea of the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers. Since the resumption of the Joint Commission an important step has been taken toward establishment of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The Commission has been working hard and fruitfully on the elaboration of the questionnaires on the structure of the provisional government and its political platform as well as the order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. I note with great pleasure that the Joint Commission, after the successful work in Seoul, is proceeding to the fulfillment of the most important task to carry out the consultation with democratic parties and social organizations in North Korea.

The freedom loving Korean people, liberated by the allied powers from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, are waiting eagerly and with great hope for the solemn and happy day when the Korean Provisional Democratic Government will be created. The effort of the Joint Commission must be entirely devoted to the primary task of establishment of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The Korean people firmly believe that Korea will become an independent and sovereign power and an eligible member of the world family of the freedom loving peoples. The world public opinion follows the work of the Joint Commission

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on the accomplishments of the Moscow Decision on Korea. This puts more responsibility on you for the work that you are doing.

With open heart I wish you success in the fulfillment of the tasks placed upon you.

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SPEECH GIVEN BY GENERAL SHTIKOV AT PYONGYANG
30 JUNE 1947

General Korotkov, General Brown, Gentlemen--

In the name of the Soviet Delegation, I sincerely welcome General Brown and the American Delegation arrived in North Korea to carry on the work of the Joint Commission in the town of Pyongyang. In behalf of the Soviet Delegation, I extend hearty greetings to the people of North Korea.

The long expected day which the people of North Korea have been eagerly waiting for has come. The Joint Commission is proceeding with its work in the town of Pyongyang. Somewhat more than a month has elapsed since resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. Definite progress has been achieved during this time. The Joint Commission has elaborated and published important documents which form the basis for the preliminary work of the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The work of the Commission has now reached the stage where the Korean people widely discuss and elaborate answers and proposals on the form of the future government, the rights and democratic liberties as well as the aims and tasks which will constitute the work of the future government. The Korean people won out through the thirty-six years of intolerable Japanese oppression of its political rights and liberties and are now as never before manifesting political activities, initiative and creative enthusiasm in the rebirth of their government. During the time that has passed since the liberation of Korea by the Allied Powers, the people of North Korea have accomplished a great deal in the restoration of state and national economy and national culture. The local organs of power which were created on the basis of universal and equal electoral rights by secret ballot prove by their activities their profound and democratic nature. The work of the Joint Commission is proceeding with the unabeted attention of the Korean people. The Soviet Delegation may state the fact that the

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overwhelming majority of the Korean people in the North as well as in the South of Korea regard the Commission with faith and are trying to render aid. This support may be well proved by the submittance by democratic parties and social organizations of applications on their desire to consult with the Joint Commission on its fulfilling of the Moscow Decision of the Three Foreign Ministers on Korea.

The Joint Commission receives enormous amounts of letters and greetings from both individual citizens as well as democratic parties and social organizations. However, there are still such parties and leaders who up to now continue to be antagonistic toward the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and carry on an active struggle against the Moscow Decision. We are certain that these are insignificant reactionary groups and their leaders are not able to prevent the realization of the Moscow Decision and the creation of a truly democratic government because their wishes are opposed by the absolute majority of the Korean people. The Moscow Decision stipulates help and assistance in its national and governmental rebirth--the development of Korea along democratic lines and the restoration of national economy and culture of the Korean people. The Moscow Decision, signed by the Three Great Allies, the U.S., U.S.S.R., Great Britain and eventually by the Chinese Republic, guarantees independence and sovereignty to Korea. The Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission assures the people of North Korea that it will make all efforts to exactly fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea.

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SPEECH OF COLONEL GENERAL SHTIKOV, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE OPENING OF THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON KOREA.

General Hodge, Gentlemen:

First of all, I wish to express on behalf of the Soviet Delegation gratitude to Lieutenant General Hodge, the Commander of the American Armed Forces in South Korea, and Major General Brown, head of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission, for the hearty and warm welcome of the Soviet Delegation. I also would like to convey our cordial and friendly greetings to the Korean people.

The long awaited and joyous day has come for all the Korean people. In accordance with the recent correspondence between our governments on Korea, the Joint Soviet-American Commission resumes its work today.

We were witnesses of the political enthusiasm with which the Korean people welcomed the decisions of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission.

The Korean people are impatiently waiting for the speediest realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea and first of all for the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This places still more responsibility on the Commission for the work it has to carry out.

The Korean people liberated from Japanese imperialists by the common efforts of the Allies have shown their determination and aspiration for the establishment of a responsible democratic state, independent of any external interference.

In the zone of responsibility of the Soviet Commander in North Korea considerable progress has been achieved in the field of democratization and development of national economy and culture during the period that passed after the expulsion of Japanese imperialists.

We are certain that on the basis of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, Korea will develop along democratic lines and become an independent state and will join the family of the peace-loving nations as an equal member.

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Being conscious of all the responsibility that is placed upon the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation will make every effort for the speediest and exact carrying out of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

May I greet the American Command and my colleagues in the Commission and express my confidence that the Joint Commission will fulfill the tasks it is charged with, and first of all, the task of the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government.

Now I would like to introduce the members of the Soviet Delegation:

Mr. G. Tounkin, First Class Consellor

Major General N. Lebedeff

Mr. G. Balasanov, Second Class Consellor

Colonel T. Korkulenko

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

1 July 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: JOINT COMMISSION TO MEET TODAY IN P'YONGYANG

The U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission and representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea were scheduled to meet this afternoon in P'yongyang, with Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, presiding.

Gen. T. F. Shtikov, Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation, was to deliver a speech on the purposes and procedures for oral consultation with political leaders as General Brown did when the Commission met with political leaders of South Korea on June 25.

Originally scheduled for Monday, June 30, the meeting was postponed to permit the American Delegation to be officially welcomed to P'yongyang in Soviet-occupied Korea on that date by Guard Col. Gen. I. I. Korotkov, Commanding General of Soviet Forces in North Korea. His welcoming remarks were followed by short speeches by General Brown and General Shtikov.

Declaring that the large number of parties and individuals desiring to be consulted indicated great interest in the future of Korea, General Brown expressed the hope that "the interest taken by the Koreans of North Korea will equal in extent that shown by those of South Korea."

The Joint Commission, he said, will have ample data upon which to base a sound and lasting government "if full and free expression of opinion can be obtained from the leaders of North Korean political parties and social organizations and their views can be added to those supplied by the leaders of the South Korean parties and organizations."

"With the aid of the representatives of the political parties and organizations of North and South Korea united in their determination to work with the Joint Commission, the Commission should be able to proceed with expedition to completion of the first phase of its task, the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government over a United Korea," General Brown said.

Both the American and Soviet Delegations have expressed a desire to begin consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations as soon as practicable. One other business session has been scheduled for P'yongyang on July 2 before the two delegations return to Seoul to continue their work here.

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Item 2: WALTER HAMMOND TO REPRESENT KOREA AT JAPAN REPARATIONS

Walter L. Hammond of 6102 43rd avenue, Hyattsville, Md., Mining and Industry advisor for the New Korea Company, will serve as American representative for Korea on the Japanese Reparations Mission, Dr. Clarence Ryee, Director of the Department of Public Information, announced today.

The mission, which is headed by Rufus B. Smith of the State Department, will have five members.

Hammond will be assisted by suitable technicians and engineering experts who will be added to the mission as particular types of industries, plants and equipment are made available for inspection. As he has spent the past eight months making an engineering analysis and technical study of Korean mines and industries, Hammond has a clear picture of what industries Korea needs most to balance her economy and is well qualified to present the Korean industrial situation to the mission.

Item 3: RABIES PREVENTION STRESSED BY COL. WILLIS

In a move to prevent rabies, Americans in Korea were urged today to take strict prevention measures.

With dog-bites increasing in Korea where rabies is more prevalent than in the United States, prompt action by individuals was stressed by Col. W. D. Willis of Dallas, Tex., Chief Medical Officer of USAFIK.

Persons bitten by dogs are urged to go immediately to the nearest dispensary. If possible, the dog should be brought in for observation.

All pets must be vaccinated and all dogs in military areas must be taken to the area provost marshal for registration, then medical inspection. Stray dogs will be impounded and those that habitually bite humans will be destroyed if necessary.

Item 4: MISS KARL AND CAPT. CALLOWAY WED AT INCH'ON

Miss Frances K. Karl of 5740 North Marmora Avenue, Chicago, became the bride of Capt. Carl Calloway, son of Mrs. Mamie Calloway of Coolville, Ohio, last Saturday at a ceremony performed by Chaplain H. M. Hardin in The Castle, officers' club at Inch'on.

Col. Odea Evans of Greensboro, N.C., gave the bride in marriage. Miss Doris Ross of Sherman, Tex., and 1st Lt. David Overton of Southampton, Long Island, N.Y. served as the couple's attendants.

The former Miss Karl has been in Korea since November, 1946, as a stenographer in XXIV Corps Headquarters. Captain Calloway, a graduate of Ohio University, Athens, served two ye[illegible] in the Royal Air Force and then [illegible]t five years as a

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fighter pilot with the Eighth Air Force in the European Theater. Assigned to Korea last January, he has been a customs inspector with the 97th Military Government Group at Inch'on and is now awaiting transfer to the Fifth Air Force in Japan. He and his bride expect to make their home in Japan.

Item 5: SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY PLANS TO LIBERALIZE POLICIES

Seoul National University has appointed a library committee to revise its thirteen libraries, YU Uck Kyum, Department of Education director, announced today. The library committee is expected to revise regulations, and liberalize policies regarding use of the books.

Item 6: 3 CORPS SPECIAL TROOPS MEN ON ALL-STAR NINE TO PACE 6TH DIVISION JULY 4

Third-place Headquarters XXIV Corps Special Troops won three positions on the All-star team to play the league leading 6th Infantry Division nine in the big July 4 game at 2 p. m. at Seoul Stadium.

Team coaches of the National Baseball League of Korea picked T/5 Henry Ceislak of 3736 Madison street, Gary, Ind.; T/4 Richard Larson of 3010 East 19th terrace, Kansas City, Mo.; and Pfc. Joe Babin, Jr., of 3025 Jefferson avenue, Baton Rouge, La.; as pitcher, catcher and short stop respectively.

Korea Base Command had originally posted four men on the first team but two of them, Sgt. William Glancy of Box 84, Goshen, Ohio and T/5 Donald Silkman of Battle Creek, Iowa, are unable to play. Instead, Sgt. Paul Montoya of 20 Adams, Gallop, N.M., 1176th Engineers, and Pfc. Arlen Erickson of 464 Fairview, St. Paul, Minn., XXIV Corps Headquarters Troops will play at second and third base respectively.

KBC's two other selections are T/4 Patrick Hill of 310½ W. Compton blvd., Compton, Calif. as pitcher, and T/Sgt. William Armstead of 385 Edgecomb avenue, New York City as rightfielder.

Capt. Charles W. Green of 1701 55th street, Kansas City, Mo., pitcher, and T/4 Donald Steger of Preble, New York, 1st base, were Military Government's two representatives on the first team.

T/Sgt. George VanDiver of Route 3, Oglesby, Tex., centerfielder, was the 61st Ordnance's contribution and 80th Medical Group's T/5 Gene Angelucci of Republic, Penna., leftfielder, completed the first team roster.

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

PRESS RELEASE 1 July 1947

The American Delegation of the US-USSR Joint Commission were officially welcomed to Pyongyang in Soviet occupied Korea by Guard Colonel General I. I. Korotkov, Commanding General of Soviet forces in North Korea, at the 36th meeting of the US-USSR Joint Commission held at 2:00 o'clock 30 June in Pyongyang. General Korotkov's welcoming remarks were followed by short speeches from Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown of the American Delegation and Col. Gen. T. F. Shtikov of the Soviet Delegation. (Copy of Gen. Brown's speech is attached. Gen. Korotkov and Gen. Shtikov's speeches will be released as soon as translated.)

The meeting with representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea, originally scheduled for 30 June 1947, will be held on 1 July. Gen. Brown will preside while General Shtikov will deliver a speech on the purposes and procedures for oral consultation of democratic parties and social organizations.

Both delegations have expressed a desire to begin consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations as soon as practicable.

One other business session has been scheduled for Pyongyang to be held 2 July.

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SPEECH TO BE GIVEN IN P'YONGYANG
BY GENERAL BROWN

General Korotkov, General Shtikov and gentlemen:

It is indeed a pleasure to greet the leader of our great Soviet ally, General Korotkov. Personally and on behalf of the American Delegation, I convey to you, General Korotkov, Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in North Korea, and to Colonel General Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation of the Joint Commission, the gratitude of the American Delegation for the hearty welcome and hospitality which you have extended to us.

The American Delegation extends greetings to the people of North Korea. We have been looking forward for some time to visiting with you. We are here to carry out in North Korea in cooperation with the delegation of our great Soviet ally the first step of the Joint Commission's task to fulfill the promise of the Great Powers that Korea shall be free and independent. The American Delegation was happy at the opportunity to reconvene the Joint Commission in accordance with the agreement of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet nation, Mr. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the American nation, General Marshall. Under this agreement those who sign the application for consultation as contained in Joint Communique No. 5, of 17 April 1946, are eligible for initial consultation by the Joint Commission. The agreement reached by the Ministers recognizes the principle of the right of the individual to freely express himself irrespective of whether or not his views may differ from those held by certain other individuals. In South Korea the Joint Commission has already met over 400 representatives of democratic parties and social organizations and has outlined to them the task of the Joint Commission and the purpose and procedures of oral consultation.

These 400 representatives of political parties and social organizations represent all shades and degrees of political thought in South Korea. One of the main difficulties which the Joint

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Commission will face in the first phase of its task, that is, the formation of a provisional government, will be to reconcile the divergent views of the representatives of political parties and social organizations. It being impossible that the individual policies of 400 different parties and organizations should prevail, it is the task of the Joint Commission to reconcile the divergent views into a common policy. While this presents a difficult task, there is much hope for the future in Korea in the fact that so many parties and individuals are interested in the future of Korea as seems indicated by the large number of those desiring to be consulted. It is hoped that the interest taken by the Koreans of North Korea will equal in extent that shown by those of South Korea. It will be yet more difficult for the Joint Commission when another large segment of divergent opinion is added to that now facing the Joint Commission. However, if full and free expression of opinion can be obtained from the leaders of North Korean political parties and social organizations and their views can be added to those supplied by the leaders of the South Korean parties and organizations, the Joint Commission will have ample data upon which to base a sound and lasting government. It is therefore with pleasure that we anticipate a similar meeting with the leaders of the democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea.

The Korean people of all Korea, liberated from the Japanese by the efforts of the Allied Powers, will now have, in accordance with the Moscow Decision and the recent agreement reached by the two Ministers, the opportunity to freely express to the Joint Commission their views as to the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government which they desire, and the manner in which that government should operate. Despite the progress made thus far in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement, much yet remains to be done. With the aid of the representatives of the political parties and organizations of North and South Korea united in their determination

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to work with the Joint Commission, the Commission should be able to proceed with expedition to completion of the first phase of its task, the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government over a united Korea.

I should now like to introduce the members of the American Delegation:

Mr. Bunce	Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln
General Weckerling	Mr. Joseph Jacobs
Mr. Owen T. Jones	Mr. Clyde B. Sargent

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Pyongyang, Korea

3 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HODGE:

SUBJECT: Press Release.

The attached press release was prepared by the American Delegation last night and presented to the Soviet Delegation for concurrence. The Soviet Delegation rejected this press release and advised that they were preparing a draft for presentation to the American Delegation today. General Brown has agreed with General Shtikov that the attached bulletin not be released unilaterally.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD

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Press Rel.

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by Soviet Del

JOINT PRESS COMMUNIQUE NO. 1

At a meeting of the Joint Commission in Pyongyang on 2 July 1947, a basic disagreement developed during the consideration of the list of Korean democratic parties and social organizations to be invited for consultation with the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation insisted upon wide-scale exclusion from consultation of Korean political parties and social organizations on the grounds that:

(a) Although the parties and social organizations have established their eligibility for consultation by declaring their intention to uphold fully the Moscow Decision, the Soviet Delegation did not consider certain of these declarations to have been signed in "good faith" and demanded that further commitments be erected.

(b) Many groups were not political parties or social organizations according to the Soviet interpretation of the Moscow decision.

The position of the American Delegation on each of these points was as follows:

(a) Based upon the Moscow Decision, the Marshall-Molotov statements and approved Joint Commission decisions which have been published to the world, is that the exclusions proposed by the Soviet Delegation would be a repudiation of the condition of consultation as agreed upon by Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Marshall; i.e.: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

(b) Notwithstanding the repeated recommendations of the American Delegation to define political parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission announcement establishing the basis of consultation did not provide such a definition. Consequently, there is now no basis for the exclusion of any groups

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other than ~~it~~ by mutual agreement of both delegations.

The basic substantive issues involved in the disagreement between the two delegations are:

(a) Whether the approved Joint Commission decision on consultation, which has been publicly announced to the Korean people, should be vitiated by the exclusion of political parties and social organizations that are eligible within its terms, and

(b) The insistence by the Soviet Delegation of its right by unilateral action to exclude from consultation certain political parties and social organizations.

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, ~~Major~~ Brigadier General Albert E. Brown, declared that unless the Soviet Delegation is willing to recede from its present position the success of the Joint Commission is ~~in jeopardy~~ endangered.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation, and Major General Brown agreed to meet to discuss the issues on the morning of 3 July 1947. This conference will be followed in the afternoon by a regular meeting of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation is scheduled to depart for Seoul at 1900, 3 July 1947, to resume its work in that city.

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PRESS INFORMATION

3 July 1947.

The following has been received from the Chief of the American Delegation in Pyongyang.

At 1400 July first the Commission met with 38 representatives of political parties and social organizations of North Korea. The meeting was held in the People's Assembly Hall in Pyongyang. In addition to the Joint Commission and the representatives of the organizations, about 200 invited American, Russian and Korean guests were present. General Brown was chairman and General Shtikov made the address outlining the method of oral consultation and the importance of the responsibility of the Korean representatives. A Korean orchestra opened the program with the Korean, Russian and American National Anthems. This meeting was the counterpart of the meeting held by the Joint Commission in Seoul on 25 June.

On July 2 the Joint Commission held a formal session at 1400 in which it discussed matters relating to oral consultation with parties and social organizations.

On the evening of July 2 members of the Joint Commission were guests of the Mayor of the City of Pyongyang at a concert of the North Korea Symphony Orchestra and North Korea Chorus. The program of modern music and songs and the dancing of Choi Seung Hi and her pupils were greatly enjoyed.

On July 3 the Joint Commission meets to discuss further details on consultation.

The American Delegation expects to depart for Seoul at 1800, 3 July on its special train.

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INCLOSURE I

Statement of American Delegation's Position,
3 July 1947

I will go to the basic document, Moscow Decision, Paragraph 2 states:

> "In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations."

This provision in the basic document places no restriction on freedom of speech or opinion regarding the Moscow Decision, nor does it make any other conditions such as the Soviet Delegation is now trying to write into that document for consultation.

In his letter of 9 May 1946, General Hodge stated to General Chistiakov: ....."but the American Delegation cannot agree to exclusion of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and their leaders from consultation concerning the future of their nation because of expression of their political views on the Moscow Decision." In his letter of June 15, 1946, General Hodge stated to General Chistiakov, "The American Command stands ready to resume negotiations in order fully to carry out the Moscow Decision in accordance with the principle of freedom of expression as enunciated in the Atlantic Charter." In his letter of 12 August 1946 General Hodge stated to General Chistiakov, "There is nothing in the Moscow Decision that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission or elsewhere from expressing freely their wishes and desires in formation of their own government." In his letter to General Chistiakov of November 1, 1946, General Hodge stated, "The United States has always favored the exercise of freedom of speech in Korea. The United States believes that all Korean democratic parties and social organizations should be permitted to make known their desires in the formation of their own government. The representatives of the United States see a great difference between

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(1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision; and (2) the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals, democratic parties and groups concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government." In his letter of 24 December 1946, General Hodge informed General Chistiakov, "Paragraphs 9 and 10 of your letter guarantee on the part of the Soviet Delegation complete freedom of expression to Korean political parties, social organizations and individuals 'regarding the formation of the Korean government and other questions connected with the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea.'" That this position was well understood by the Russian Commander in North Korea as illustrated by the following extract from General Chistiakov's letter of 26 November 1946 to General Hodge, "It is with regret that I have to conclude that the conditions upon which you propose to renew the negotiations of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, in substance, do not differ from the position laid down in our previous letters which in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision on Korea. Actually you propose that the Joint Commission consult with any person, political party or social organization which adheres to and abides by the declaration published in Communique No. 5. Moreover such persons, parties or social organizations must not and will not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Thus according to this formula, the Joint Commission must consult not only the democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also with those parties and organizations which are hostile to this decision. Furthermore, these latter parties and organizations are even given an opportunity to continue their activities directed against the Moscow Decision with the exception that should not instigate or foment mass opposition to the work of the

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Joint Commission or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision." This position, including the Soviet view, is further clarified by the exchange of notes of the Foreign Ministers and the full understandin of the problem and full agreement was reached by the two Ministers under which the Joint Commission has reconvened. In order briefly to review -- in his letter of April 8, 1947, Mr. Marshall informed Mr. Molotov, "The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives:.....2. To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people." And, further on in the same letter Secretary Marshall adds: "To this end I ask that our Governments agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of democratic right for freedom of expression." In his letter of May 2, 1947, Mr. Marshall informed Mr. Molotov: "In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase 'exact execution', I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of April 8, I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. In making this statement I had and have in mind the well known position of the government of the United States and Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." In answer to Mr. Marshall's letter of May 2, Mr. Molotov quoted the 3 proposals of General Chistiakov's letter to General Hodge of November 26, 1946 and also General Hodge's proposed amendments of his December 24

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letter with the statement that he was "prepared to accept the amendments set forth by the American Commander." These three proposals as amended constitute the specific formula for insuring freedom of expression and for determining which parties or organizations are eligible to cooperate with the Joint Commission. Secretary Marshall in his 2 May letter to Mr. Molotov stated: "These proposals were authorized by this government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of 2 May 1947." The Joint Commission prepared Joint Commission Decision No. 12 based on the proposals agreed to by the Ministers and rightfully incorporated in that decision the basis of reconvention of the Commission as agreed to. It is clearly seen from the facts above stated that the United States position on freedom of expression in consultation has not changed, nor will it change. It is clear from the agreement made by Secretary Marshall and Mr. Molotov that a party when it signs the application in accordance with instructions from the Joint Commission must be accepted for consultation irrespective of its previous actions. That a party or organization remains eligible for consultation unless after signing the declaration of Communique No. 5 it foments and instigates active opposition to the Moscow Decision or to either of the Allied Powers. A statement of opinion or any other passive action or indication of opinion is not cause for declaring a party or organization ineligible. An overt act must be committed. In the absence of proof of such overt act, the party remains eligible for consultation."

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Transcript of
Conversation between
General Brown and General Shtikov
1000 hours, 3 July 1947
Pyongyang, Korea

GENERAL SHTIKOV: What are the questions?

GENERAL BROWN: The General asked me to meet with him and I don't know what he has in mind.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: The first question that I would like to have discussed here is the determination of time which the American Delegation is going to leave Pyongyang because I have to give instructions for the departure.

GENERAL BROWN: 1800 today.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Do you leave by train?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: I would like to know what is the aid that you would like to have on behalf of me?

GENERAL BROWN: We need no assistence except clearence for the train. I would like to take with us any members of the Soviet Delegation whom the General would like to send. We have plenty of room and we could accommodate any of his people that he would like to send with us.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Thank you very much.

GENERAL BROWN: It is not necessary that we leave at 1800. Any time after 1800. I want to be in Seoul not later than 0600 tomorrow morning, so any time that is most convenient to the railroad system to move us out of here after 1800.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: It seems to me that the most convenient time for the departure of the American Delegation would be 6 p.m. because it will be still daytime and another thing is that the American Delegation will have a chance to arrive in Seoul at 12 0'clock in the evening. I will give the necessary instructions for the arrangement of the departure of the American Delegation, however,

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if additional questions arise connected with the departure, I would like the officer here to address me and tell me what other help is needed. I shall be glad to give it.

GENERAL BROWN: I shall ask Colonel Lincoln to keep in touch with whoever General Shtikov designates.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Alright.

GENERAL BROWN: The Joint Commission will meet at 1300 today or 1330?

GENERAL SHTIKOV: It seems to me that 1330 will be the most suitable time for the meeting.

GENERAL BROWN: I would like to pay my respects to General Korotkov before leaving and I would appreciate it if General Shtikov could arrange that for me at the General's pleasure.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: What time would you like to meet General Korotkov?

GENERAL BROWN: I think after the Joint Commission meeting--say at 5:30.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: So you would like to meet General Korotkov before departure?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes, if that is possible.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Alright, I shall get connected with General Korotkov. The plan of the Soviet Delegation is the following one. Inasmuch as the American Delegation was busy yesterday and it is the 4th of July and it plans to have Saturday off, so the Soviet Delegation plans to leave onyang on the 6th of July in the evening so as to be in Seoul the morning of the 7th of July.

GENERAL BROWN: What time do you plan to leave the train in the morning of the 7th?

GENERAL SHTIKOV: I believe it will be at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning. If we start at twelve or one o'clock in the night, I suppose it will be at about 8 or 10 o'clock in the morning.

GENERAL BROWN: General Hodge told me particularly to ask you to go with him to the baseball game on the 4th of July. Americans

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always have a championship baseball game on the 4th of July and this one is supposed to be particularly good.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: I appreciate this invitation of General Hodge very much. The thing is I plan to have these two days devoted to the study of how to approach the answers to the questions submitted by the Koreans because some of them are very long. They cover about 75 to 100 pages and in order to translations, interpreters have to work two days. I plan to work with the advisors or how to make this work more efficient.

GENERAL BROWN: That is a problem that faces all of us and the American Delegation also will have to take that problem up when we get back to Seoul. Before we leave the baseball question, I would like to ask the General if any of his officers in Seoul whom he thinks would like to attend the baseball game and could ask Mr. Vasalov to give me their names.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: The Chief Secretariat of the Soviet Delegation is over there in Seoul and I shall give him instructions to inform the Head of the American Delegation about those people who would like to attend this baseball party whether this will be officers or members of the Commission who are staying there and so on.

GENERAL BROWN: It is possible that the Joint Commission has exaggerated some of the minor questions that enter into this question of consultation. It seems to me that the important thing is for the Commission to make progress and I personally fail to see the importance of the issues which we devoted so much time to yesterday. It seems to me the most important thing is to keep faith with the Koreans and commence our discussions on the 7th of July.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: The Soviet Delegation has been discussing this question since yesterday and came to the conclusion that the Joint Commission, representing two very important nations should approach the Moscow Decision, during its work, in such a manner that no one should be able to minute its importance or try to

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compromise the Moscow Decision. A very great work has been carried out both by the Soviet Union and the Americans in the interests of small nations. Along this work that was carried out by these two nations should not permit anyone to pour dirt on such a very important document as the Moscow Decision. It is well known from the experience that the Soviet Union and the United States of America that the most important governmental questions are usually discussed with the participation of democratic parties and social organizations who will really represent the opinion of the people. That is why the Soviet Delegation has been defending so actively its points of view. We also consider it expedient to start the consultation on the 7th of July. That is why I propose that in our today's Joint session we take up the order of procedure of consultation and along side of the list of parties and social organization, the number of this is a sufficient one, and procedure work.

GENERAL DEAN: The Soviet Delegation magnifies the attitude of the Koreans. The Koreans whom they object to consulting are not attacking the Moscow Decision. They are merely expressing their objections to the word "trusteeship" contained in that Decision. The Foreign Ministers have agreed that the Koreans shall be granted the right of freedom of expression. I do not believe that the Soviet Delegation would insist that a man who is walking in front of a loaded gun would have to keep proclaiming that he was happy at the situation in which he found himself. The Koreans who object to trusteeship do not even know to what they object. The word "trusteeship"-- that is the aid and assistence to be rendered Korea, has not yet been defined nor can it be defined until the Joint Commission consults with the provisional government. As a matter of fact those Koreans who have signed the application for consultation will, it is believed, follow on through to the successful conclusion of the work of the Joint Commission. The committment which they have

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made will not mean that in parts they do not disagree with some conclusions of the Joint Commission and it is their privilege to so disagree provided they do not foment and instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. Certainly 400 representatives are not too many to represent the views of 20,000,000 people. The time required to consult with these 400 representatives by numerous subcommittees is not too long. The Joint Commission does not have to give undue weight to the views of any particular representative. The value to be gained by letting the Korean people know that the Joint Commission is going to consider all view points and is going to freely hear the Korean people certainly outweighs any disadvantage that might conceivably be implied from consulting a particular individual. If consultation is to commence on July 7 it is essential that the Joint Commission agree today. Two opposing views cannot both be adopted. Some reasonable compromise must be met. Such a compromise is not to be found in insisting that the views of one side, only, prevail. I will present the American point of view fully at the meeting this afternoon.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Alright, then we will exchange opinions in our today's session.

GENERAL BROWN: Yes. I want to take the opportunity at this time for expressing my personal appreciation and the appreciation of all Americans here in Pyongyang for the fine courtesy and hospitality extended to us by all of the personnel of the Russian Army in Pyongyang.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Thank you.

GENERAL BROWN: I also want to thank General Korotkov and General Shtikov for the excellent arrangement made for us and for the care taken to assure the security of myself and the American personnel in Pyongyang, and I want to add that they convey to the Koreans who participated in aiding the Americans, the appreciation of the American Delegation.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: Thank you.

Conversation ended at 1045 hours

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STATEMENT BY GENERAL BROWN TO PRESS:

The press release of today stated, It developed that there was not full agreement on the application of the terms set forth in Joint Decision No. 12."

It is a fact that there has not been complete agreement between the Soviet Delegation and the American Delegation concerning the application of the principle of broad consultation since the commencement of the discussion of the subject of consultation. There has been continual debate over the past five weeks concerning the application of the principle. In making arrangements for oral consultation, the practical application of the principle has led the Soviet objection to certain parties and organizations which have not yet been resolved.

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4 July 1947

PRESS RELEASE OF CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission, made the following statement to the press today.

The American Delegation of the Joint Commission arrived in Pyongyang at 0800, 30 June, and departed at 1600, 3 July.

During its stay in Pyongyang the members of the American Delegation were furnished billets by [illegible] and the Commissioners occupied [illegible] other members of the delegation a hotel in the vicinity of [illegible] offices.

Throughout their visit the American delegation were treated with courtesy by the Soviet Command.

General Korotkov, the Commanding General of the Soviet forces in North Korea, extended to General Brown freedom of the city. All Americans had freedom of movement. Their security was at all times assured by North Korean police and armed Soviet escorts. The U. S. Delegation met and interviewed a number of Korean delegations and leaders.

To provide messing, transportation, guard and administrative facilities, the special train carrying approximately 50 members of the US Command in addition to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission, remained at the Pyongyang station. Americans other than members of the Delegation were accommodated on the train throughout the period. They took many pictures and went sightseeing in all parts of the city in their free time.

In order to maintain close contact with General Hodge and Headquarters XXIV Corps in Seoul, the Delegation had constantly at its disposal, telephone, teletype and radio facilities arranged by XXIV Corps and a daily courier plane. This American C-47 plane made round trips from Seoul to Pyongyang on July 1st, 2nd and 3rd.

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The plane was permitted to remain in Pyongyang up to two hours each day.

Just prior to departure from Pyongyang, General Brown called on General Shtykov to express his appreciation for courtesies and [illegible] provided by the Soviet Command. General Brown also expressed appreciation to General Shtikov, the Chief of the Russian Delegation, for his interest in the comforts and requirements of the [illegible].

[illegible] Soviet Delegation and a Soviet Army band [illegible] the United States Delegation departed from Pyongyang. The [illegible] have been cleared of [illegible] departure of the Americans.

The primary purpose of the Joint Commission meeting in Pyongyang was to [illegible] representatives of political parties and social organizations of Korea, [illegible] established in a dignified manner [illegible].

[illegible] returned to Seoul, the Joint Commission held formal business sessions on July 2nd and 3rd, discussing the lists of parties and social organizations for oral consultation. It developed that there was not full agreement on the application of the terms set forth in Joint Decision No. 5. The matter will be discussed further by the Joint Commission in Seoul on July 7 when the next meeting will be held. Meanwhile the Joint Commission will continue the translation and analysis of the answers to the questionnaires. Inasmuch as the final date for submission of these answers has been delayed from July 1st until July 5th, there is much work to be done in preparation for oral consultation with the party representatives. For reasons outlined above, the initiation of oral consultation will be delayed from its scheduled date of July 7 until a date to be announced.

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July 5, 1947

PRESS RELEASE OF CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN
DELEGATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief of the American Delegation of the Joint Commission, made the following statement to the press today.

The American Delegation of the Joint Commission arrived in Pyongyang at 0800, 30 June, and departed at 1900, 3 July.

During its stay in Pyongyang the members of the American Delegation were furnished billets by the Soviet Command. General Brown and the Commissioners occupied a house and other members of the Delegation a hotel in the vicinity of the Joint Commission office.

Throughout their visit the American Delegation was treated with courtesy by the Soviet Command.

General Korotkov, the Commanding General of the Soviet Forces in North Korea, extended to General Brown freedom of the city. All Americans had freedom of movement. Their security was at all times assured by North Korean police and armed Soviet escorts. The U. S. Delegation met and interviewed a number of Korean delegations and leaders.

To provide messing, transportation, guard and administrative facilities, the special train carrying approximately 80 members of the US Command in addition to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission, remained at the Pyongyang station. Americans other than members of the Delegation were accommodated on the train throughout the period. They took many pictures and went sightseeing in all parts of the city in their free time.

In order to maintain close contact with General Hodge and Headquarters XXIV Corps in Seoul, the Delegation had constantly at its disposal, telephone, teletype and radio facilities arranged by XXIV Corps and a daily courier plane. This American C-47 plane made round trips from Seoul to Pyongyang on July 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The plane was permitted to remain in Pyongyang up to two hours each day.

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Just prior to departure from Pyongyang, General Brown called on General Korotkov to express his appreciation for courtesies and accommodations provided by the Soviet Command. General Brown also expressed appreciation for courtesies and accommodations provided by the Soviet Command. General Brown also expressed appreciation to General Shtikov, the Chief of the Russian Delegation, for his interest in the comforts and requirements of the Americans.

In a heavy downpour of rain, the Soviet Delegation and a Soviet Army band were at the station when the American Delegation departed from Pyongyang. Just as had been done to facilitate their arrival, the station and main streets had been cleared of Korean civilians to facilitate unhampered and efficient departure of the Americans.

The primary purpose of the Joint Commission meeting in Pyongyang was to meet the representatives of political parties and social organizations of North Korea, which was accomplished in a dignified ceremony on July 1.

During the period in Pyongyang, the Joint Commission held formal business sessions on July 2nd and 3rd, discussing the lists of parties and social organizations for oral consultation. It developed that there was not full agreement on the application of the terms set forth in Joint Decision No. 12. The matter will be discussed further by the Joint Commission in Seoul on July 7 when the next meeting will be held. Meanwhile the Joint Commission will continue the translation and analysis of the answers to the questionnaires. Inasmuch as the final date for submission of these answers has been delayed from July 1st until July 5th, there is much work to be done in preparation for oral consultation with the party representatives. For reasons outlined above, the initiation of oral consultation will be delayed from its scheduled date of July 7 until a date to be announced.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

8 July 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: BUICK RAFFLE TO RAISE FUNDS FOR SCHOOL HERE

First in a series of drives to raise $50,000 for Army dependent schools in South Korea officially got under way this week when tickets for the raffle of a 1946 Buick deluxe sedan went on sale to American personnel.

Established with the approval of Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, commander of the United States Army Forces in Korea, the American School Fund will supply money for the purchase of playground and classroom equipment for schools attended by children of American personnel in Korea. These schools are now operating with limited quantities of such equipment.

It is pointed out by Lt. Col. Jeff S. Henderson of Texarkana, Tex., Director of the Office of Civilian Personnel and Fund Chairman, that this is an All-American project which in no way conflicts with or is related to the Korean Central Welfare Fund or other Korean-American projects undertaken for the benefit of the Korean people.

Tickets for the Buick raffle are being sold at 50 cents each and are available to all American personnel throughout South Korea. Holder of the winning ticket on Sept. 1 may accept the car or its cash value of $2,800. The winner, whether he be military or civilian, officer or enlisted man, will be permitted to drive the car during his stay in Korea and may sell it to another American, through Army facilities, when he leaves Korea.

The 1946 Buick sedan was obtained for this purpose from Lt. Col. Norman C. Finney of 954 Stanwood Ave., Akron, Ohio, Executive Officer in the Adjutant General Section, who will be returning to the United States soon.

An initial quota of $50,000 has been set for the American School Fund, with additional money-raising events planned for the near future.

Item 2: ANNUAL DRIVER'S TEST TO BE REQUIRED IN KOREA

In a move to cut down traffic accidents among Americans in Korea, all persons possessing standard military driver's licenses will be re-tested each year beginning July 10, it was announced today by Capt. Robert A. Popcke of 1126 Macon avenue, Pittsburgh, Penna., XXIV Corps Safety Director.

In addition to the regular driver's test, this examination will test the applicant in first echelon maintenance.

"Any person found guilty of a traffic violation will have it recorded on his license by his commanding officer," Captain Popcke said. "Accidents will be

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Item 2 (cont'd)

recorded similarly on the permit."

Suspension or revocation of the operator's permit for traffic violations is not punishment, but an administrative act and does not bar disciplinary action.

Item 3: KOREAN RED CROSS PREPARES FOR ANY FLOOD AID NEEDED

In the event of floods, the Korean Red Cross will get a chance to play its first major role in disaster relief in south Korea, Dr. Y. S. LEE, Department of Public Health and Welfare director, said today. The KRC will be responsible for flood relief in Taegu, Chungju, Taejon and counties in which they are located.

As part of the program to meet any emergency, the Red Cross will make recommendations regarding food, clothing and shelter according to needs.

The food committee will prepare food in shelters and obtain utensils for cooking and serving. Clothing will also be distributed as needed.

The shelter committee will locate adequate living quarters for any persons made homeless. Three medical first aid teams will work under the direction of the Department of Public Health and Welfare which will provide medical supplies.

Item 4: BLISTER COPPER PRODUCED HERE FOR FIRST TIME IN FIVE YEARS

For the first time in five years, blister copper is again being poured in South Korea, OH Chung Soo, Department of Commerce director, stated today. It began recently with the "blowing in" of the copper blast furnace at the Chang Hang Smelter and Refinery in Chungchong Namdo where production of refined copper is expected to be increased 75 per cent.

During the past 15 months the refinery has produced 40 metric tons of electrolytically refined cathode copper a month from ingots cast from Japanese-collected Chinese coins. The newly begun blast furnace, it is planned, will boost output to 70 tons a month.

The refinery will serve the Ilkwang, Haman, Kosung, Ku Ryung and Sunchon mines, all vested properties operating with government-guaranteed loans. The refinery will also buy and process copper and gold-bearing ores from other mines.

KIM Ki Duk, Bureau of Mining chief in the Department of Commerce, and K. I. Kim, the refinery's manager, started the new smelting operation by inserting burning faggots into the furnace. Addresses to the large audience were made by government and finance representatives.

Item 5: WEATHER REPORT

Maximum temperature yesterday 77.9; today 78, Wednesday 78. Weather tonight and tomorrow, cloudy to partly cloudy with southeast winds.

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Item 6: YONGWOL BRIDGE OPENED

The Yongwol Bridge in Kangwon-Do has been opened for travel, CHOI Kyung Yu', Department of Public Works director, announced today. The bridge affords access to the main route of the large tungsten mine and steamplant electric works near Yongwol.

The bridge, approximately four hundred feet long, also provides the only alternate route of coal supply for these two plants in the event the overhead trolley carrier system fails.

Item 7: GOOD CROPS PREDICTED IN SOUTH KOREA

The Department of Agriculture commented today that unless a long drought occurs between now and harvest time, good crops are assured in South Korea for the oncoming harvest, especially in the lowlands where precipitation is heavier.

The Bureau of Meteorology said that practically all sections of south Korea reportedly received a hundred millimeters of rain, or better, during the June period.

Item 8: USAFIK TEAM PLACES SECOND IN JAPAN TRACK MEET

Eleven members of the USAFIK track team which won second place behind Japan, placed 12 spots to garner 43 points against the victor's 93 1/6, in the Pacific Inter-command track meet in Japan last week.

Placing third in the meet was the Hawaii team, scoring 26 1/3 points, followed by Philrycom with nine, and the Marbo team last with 4½ markers.

One member of the USAFIK team, T/5 George A. Wilson of the 4478th Quartermaster Company, placed third in the 200-meter dash and tied for fourth in the 100-meter dash.

Taking first places were: T/5 Robert Watanabe of XXIV Corps Headquarters, running the 100-meter dash in 10.5 seconds; T/5 Robert E. Gordon of the 340th Engineer Construction Battalion, clearing 6 feet, 2 inches in the high jump; T/4 Robert A. Thomason of the 76th Signal Service Battalion, running the 1500-meter distance in 4 minutes, 15 seconds; Pfc. John Aiello of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, tossing the javelin 172 feet, 5 inches; and 2nd Lt. Ralph ... Davis of the 865 AAA AW Battalion, tossing the shot 46 feet, 11 inches.

Pfc. John A. Taylor of the 3255th Quartermaster Service Company, placed second in the high jump.

Third spot winner was Pfc. George F. Nickel of the 69th Engineer Topographical Company, in the discus throw. Also garnering a third place was the USAFIK relay team in the 400-meter and 1600-meter relays.

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Item 8 (cont'd)

Gathering fourth spots were Pfc. David DeProspero of XXIV Corps Headquarters Company, in the 110-meter high hurdles and Pfc. Jack M. Smith of the 1097th Engineer Utility Battalion, in the 200-meter low hurdles.

Item 9: JAPAN REST CENTERS NOW PROVIDE ONE-DAY TOURS TO TOKYO

Military personnel, War Department civilians and dependents visiting Kyoto and Camp Fisher rest centers in Japan may enjoy conducted daytime tours to Tokyo, it was announced today.

The tours, conducted primarily for enlisted men but with provisions for other personnel, provides train transportation leaving Kyoto at night and returning the next night, allowing a full day in Tokyo.

Personnel in Kyoto may visit friends or relatives in Tokyo provided non-governmental messing and billeting arrangements are made in advance. With assurance that these arrangements have been made, travel permits for personal visits will be issued by Headquarters I Corps.

The Biwako Hotel in Kyoto, formerly used for rest leaves is being converted to a permanent billet, and is now used temporarily for female guests only. Officers, enlisted men, and male War Department civilian employees are now billeted at Camp Fisher, a new site four-and-one-half miles from Kyoto. Bus service between these two points is available and conducted tours through the historic areas in Kyoto will continue.

Item 10: REFUGEES FROM NORTH KOREA TO BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG PROVINCES

As Seoul's ability to accommodate refugees from North Korea has reached the saturation point, homeless persons coming from the Soviet-occupied zone will now be sent to southern provinces instead of concentrating in Seoul, it was announced today by the National Refugee Board.

The new schedule, states the board, will protect the health and well-being of people in the capital and of refugees. The latter, points out the Board, will find better living facilities in rural districts and can better aid Korea's economy.

Homeless persons will be conducted from assembly camps at Kaesong, Uijungbu, Chuminjin and Chunchon to Area Distribution Centers in South Korea's eight provinces, each of which will have an established quota.

To help avoid dislocation of families, however, refugees with relatives in Seoul who can support them until they are self-maintaining will be aided by welfare authorities in joining those relatives.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF OF AMERICAN DELEGATION
40th Meeting

9 July 1947

The American Delegation has considered the statement submitted by the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission meeting of July 8th. The American Delegation is amazed by the position taken by the Soviet Delegation. The position of the Soviet Delegation, as interpreted by the American Delegation, varies so radically from the position taken by Mr. Molotov in his exchange of correspondence with the United States Secretary of State, that the American Delegation is not able to understand how a subordinate agency of a great government can undertake to modify the terms agreed upon by their government with another sovereign power; specifically, the confusion arises from the conflict between the statements made in the paper presented by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation with the following statements made in the exchange of correspondence between Mr. Molotov and General Marshall.

In his note of April 8, 1947, to Mr. Molotov, General Marshall stated the following as objectives of the policy of the United States towards Korea:

1. To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing sovereign Korea independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations.

2. To insure that the national government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.

3. To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state.

In his reply of 19 April 1947, Mr. Molotov stated as a primary Soviet objective "the establishment of Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale of participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations." I wish to

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invite particular attention to the word "wide-scale" in Mr. Molotov's statement just quoted.

In his letter to Mr. Molotov of 2 May 1947, General Marshall stated: "I had and have in mind the well-known position of the Government of the United States that Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission."

In his reply of 10 May 1947, Mr. Molotov stated: "Your proposal, as I understand it, is to the effect that before the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, agreement should be reached concerning the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. This was the subject of my exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea, as a result of which, as I already answered in my previous letter, the points of view of the two sides were brought considerably closer." Mr. Molotov then submitted the three proposals made by General Shsitikov in his letter of November 26, 1946. This resulted, as you well know, in mutual agreement on the following provisions:

1. "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

3. "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

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Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

The agreements above stated, including in addition the second agreement not quoted above, were properly published in Joint Commission Decision No. 12 as the basis upon which the Joint Commission would conduct consultation. The American Delegation must abide by the agreement of the two Ministers and the Joint Commission Decision No. 12 to which they agreed in formal meetings of this Commission. The only view which the American Delegation can follow, based on sound interpretation of these documents, is as follows:

1. Parties and organizations which submit a properly signed application for consultation as provided in Joint Commission Decision No. 12, which quotes proposal No. 1 of the two Ministers, must be accepted for initial, I repeat initial, consultation.

2. In view of the fact that the Moscow Decision is silent as to definition of a political party or social organization, the American Delegation must be guided in its acceptance of those parties and organizations which claim eligibility for consultation by the normally accepted definitions of these terms throughout the languages of the world, rather than some narrow definition which the Soviet Delegation seems to be attempting to apply.

3. After acceptance and appearance for initial consultation, a party or organization will only be denied further hearing if, under the provision of proposal No. 3 agreed to by the two Ministers, proper, adequate and credible evidence is produced (not newspaper reports) to show that after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 the individual, the party or the organization did foment or instigate active opposition to ~~the work of~~ the Joint

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Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. When such evidence is produced, it shall be presented before the Joint Commission which shall hear the indictment and determine under Proposal No. 3 whether or not the party should be excluded.

4. To eliminate parties from the list prepared of those submitting properly signed and attested applications for consultation as provided by Joint Commission Decision No. 12, only:

(a) Upon acceptable evidence of specific cause such as fraud or serious misrepresentation of facts required as basis for registration (exaggeration of membership, having been generally committed in both North and South Korea, shall not be an acceptable basis of elimination for fraud),

(b) Upon presentation of adequate acceptable evidence to the Joint Commission that since signing the declaration, a party or organization has fomented or instigated active opposition to the Moscow Decision, and then only as stated above - that is, in strict accordance with the provision of the 3rd proposal agreed to by the Ministers.

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Seoul, Korea

10 July 1947

PRESS RELEASE for American Press via Tokyo and Army News Service

Item 1: EX-GI'S ENROLLED IN 322 FOREIGN SCHOOLS

United States veterans of World War II are enrolled in 322 foreign institutions in 34 countries, under educational provisions of the GI Bill of Rights, the Veterans Administration has reported.

Of the more than 3,000 ex-GI's studying abroad under this program, 662 are studying in 13 European countries, 1,411 in the Philippine republic and 571 in Canada.

The large numbers of students in the Philippines is due to the fact that most are Filipinos who served in the U.S. Army during the war. It is expected that the number of the former servicemen studying abroad, especially in Europe, will increase as living conditions improve.

Ex-GI students in United Kingdom colleges number 217; in France, 175; Switzerland, 141; Sweden, 54; Italy, 35 and Eire, 19. Greece and Norway accounted for two each and Czechoslovakia and Denmark three apiece. Belgium and the Netherlands each have five while Spain has only one.

Of the 279 students in Latin America under this program, 231 are in Mexico. Cuba has 22.

Palestine has 63 students and Australia accounts for 38. Veterans are also studying in China, Syria, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa.

In addition, 53 veterans living abroad are taking courses by mail from the United States under the GI Bill.

Item 2: EISENHOWER: KNOWING PERSONAL PURPOSE IS ESSENTIAL TO ARMY SUCCESS

"Every man who wears the uniform must realize why he is in the Army," stated General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, chief of staff. "The soldier's duty is not just to perform his job. He has got to hold always in mind, "Why am I doing this?" and "Why does the United States need me?" Any other type of soldier is a detriment to the Army."

General Eisenhower was speaking to the graduating class at the Army Information school, Carlisle Barracks, Penna., when he explained that "no investment by the American Government has returned such tremendous dividends as the amount of money spent on the Army school system during the years between the two world wars.

"The American people constantly must be made aware of their share in the National Security," he stated. "It is a job as wide as democracy, because it is democracy that we are trying to defend.

"Army schools have an influence far beyond the immediate understanding of those who are undergoing instruction. For at these schools is inculcated the doctrine that we of the military profession do not own the Army; rather, the people own the Army, and we are a part of the people. As long as we try to serve the Nation in this spirit, there will be no question of the effectiveness and efficiency of our public relations."

Item 3: GENERAL WICKS OPENS 31 F.A. ENLISTED MEN'S CLUB

When Brig. Gen. Roger M. Wicks, 7th Division artillery commander officially opened the new 31st F.A. Enlisted Men's Club recently, "Marble Hall" celebrated its grand opening with free food and drinks for all first-day GI visitors.

The club was named by Pfc. Anthony J. DeCaprio of 1535 E. 27th street, Cleveland, Ohio, in a battalion-wide club-naming contest. He received $15 in trade at the Corps Post Exchange as a prize.

Lt. Col. Jess E. Newland, battalion commander, commended the men on "Marble Hall" after which General Wicks cut the tape to open the club.

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Item 4: CORPS SPECIAL TROOPS NINE TO PLAY CHOSEN CHRISTIAN COLLEGE ALUMNI

The XXIV Corps Headquarters Special Troops nine, currently holding down the third spot in the National Baseball League of Korea, will oppose an alumni team from the Chosen Christian College in an exhibition game July 19 at 2 p.m. in Seoul Stadium.

The Special Troops combine, boasting nine victories and four defeats, is 2½ games behind the league-leading 6th Infantry Division team. The battery for the Special Troops nine is expected to be T/5 Henry Ceislak of 3736 Madison street Gary, Ind., pitching, and Pfc. Charles Putman of Town Creek, Ala., behind the plate.

Item 5: "MARINE JUMPER" TO CARRY STUDENTS TO EUROPE

Former U.S. troop transport and now student exchange ship, "Marine Jumper, is en route to Europe with the largest group of students and teachers to leave the United States for studies abroad since before the war.

There were 800 persons leaving on the ship to attend schools and seminars and participants in work projects in Europe under the student exchange program arranged by the State Department in cooperation with private educational groups. More than 8,000 persons are expected to participate in the program during the next few months.

"It is appropriate," a State Department spokesman told the departing students and teachers, "that you should be sailing on a ship which once carried thousands of troops to distant battles. You are fighting another phase of the same war your brothers fought by force of arms...we are still fighting against intolerance, hate and prejudice."

He said the students and teachers should stress the U.S. desire for peace and friendship with other nations. "We are not interested in peace at any price. We are interested in peace that permits free people everywhere to live their lives and express themselves through their own cultures, through their own ways of life."

Item 6: NATIONAL PROPERTY CUSTODIAN ANNOUNCES SALE OF VESTED PROPERTY

The National Property Custodian, as trustee for all former Japanese owned assets in south Korea, recently made its first sale of vested shares in a corporation and is expected to follow it with many more.

To permit the Chosun Life Insurance company to increase its capitalization without being restricted by the limitation imposed on the National Property Custodian by higher authority, the 1,441 vested shares were sold to 36 Korean shareholders and 12 Korean employees, it was announced today. The entire proceeds of the sale will be held in trust for the Korean people in conformity with United States policy.

This sale represents only a small percentage of the 10,000 outstanding shares of the company but marks the beginning of a program to put former Japanese-owned property in the hands of Koreans.

Item 7: SUMMER INSTITUTE TO EMPHASIZE EDUCATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS

A National Summer Institute for Korean educational administrators from all provinces will be held July 21 through 26, YU Uck Kyum, Department of Education director announced today.

The main emphasis of the institute will be on changes and improvements in the public school curriculum. Brig. Gen. C. G. Helmick, acting military governor, will open the institute on July 21 with a short talk. Prominent Koreans in the Department of Education will be instructors along with American advisors to that department.

Each person who attends the institute will hold a similar program in his province before the beginning of the next school year.

Item 8: WEATHER REPORT

Maximum temperature yesterday, 70.9; today, 75; tomorrow, 75. Weather tonight will be cloudy with occasional showers and southwest winds.

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Item 9: NEW FOREIGN TRADE PROCEDURES EXPLAINED

New procedures governing foreign trade which will become effective July 16 were explained today by OH Chung Soo, Department of Commerce director.

Provisions have been formulated to increase volume of imports and exports and to bring about a better balance in the private trade conducted on a merchant-to-merchant basis between south Korea and other countries. This commerce will continue to be conducted on a barter system with a minimum of government restrictions or control.

The Department of Commerce will periodically select and announce commodities acceptable for import into or export from south Korea. The import emphasis will be on a flow of goods essential to the industrial development of this area. Export of products deemed surplus in south Korea will be encouraged.

On July 15, the Korean Foreign Exchange Bank, Ltd., will commence handling drafts, bills and other documents resulting from Korean foreign trade transactions, insuring the stability of export in relation to import volume.

The new regulations governing the expansion of foreign trade provides that exports will not leave south Korea until they are paid for by direct barter, yen, or foreign exchange.

Licenses to engage generally in foreign trade are no longer required. All applicants will be eligible to receive a license for each import or export transaction if they satisfy routine control requirements.

Item 10: $57.90 FROM SEOUL BILLETING SECTION BRINGS WELFARE FUND TOTAL TO $4,701.10

A contribution of $57.90 to the Central Korean Welfare Fund from members of the Seoul Billeting Section was presented today by Lt. Col. Arthur Salinger of 325 W. 18th avenue, Portland, Ore., executive officer to the fund custodian. This brings the total to $4,701.10 with contributions still being received.

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July 11, 1947

PRESS RELEASE OF CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

The U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission held its 41st meeting, 1330, 11 July 1947, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea. General Shtikov was Chairman.

Lt. General Charles P. Gairdner, personal representative in Japan of Prime Minister Atlee, attended the 40th meeting held the afternoon of 9 July as a guest of the Joint Commission.

The Joint Commission continued discussion of a disagreement which arose in the 39th and extended through the 39th, 40th, 40th and 41st meetings, on the list of parties and organizations to be invited for initial consultation, as follows:

I. Soviet Delegation's General Position:

1. That parties and organizations falling within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation, specifically:

a. Those not classified by them as social organizations,

b. District and other purely local organizations, and

c. Those which it contends do not intend to support fully the Moscow Decision, especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations.

I. American Delegation's General Position:

1. That Soviet Delegation's proposals are contrary to:

a. Paragraph 1 of the three principles of the Foreign Ministers upon which agreement for reconvention of the Joint Commission was reached: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

b. Paragraph 5, Joint Commission Decision published in Communique No. 11, mutually

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agreed to and signed by the Chief Commissioner of each Delegation:

"Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration. . . ."

II. The Soviet Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. That industrial, mercantile and producers' organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce, Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute, Accountants' Society and societies organized for the study of politics and economics, are not in fact social organizations as the word "social" is used in the Moscow Decision.

II. The American Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. a. The Moscow Decision does not define the term "social organization."

b. The Soviet Delegation refused requests of the American Delegation to define the terms in the Joint Commission Decision.

c. The American Delegation served notice on the Soviet Delegation prior to final decision that after joint approval of the Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the American Delegation would not agree to amendment or change in the decision as finally agreed upon. Therefore, the term "social organization" must be interpreted as defined in the dictionaries of the world.

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2. A party or organization local in character which has no central zonal office is not eligible for consultation.

2. District and other purely local organizations are not barred by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall - Molotov agreement, or Joint Commission Decision. In order to eliminate small organizations, the American Delegation several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation.

3. The good faith of a party or organization which signs the declaration and applies for consultation, and thus agrees to uphold the Moscow Decision, is challenged by the Soviet Delegation if such party or organization continues membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or a similar organization. Such party or organization is acceptable for consultation only if it publicly withdraws from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization.

3. a. Parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations are clearly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall - Molotov agreement if they have applied for consultation and signed the required declaration.

b. They remain eligible unless and until they are by mutual agreement excluded after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers - namely, "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not, after signing the

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4. The fact that a party is eligible for consultation under the agreement of the Ministers, as published in Joint Commission Decision, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

5. In order for a party to be placed on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both Delegations.

declaration contained in Communique No. 5, foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the ful fillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which, after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

4. The arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation", nullifies the agreements reached by the two Ministers (quoted in 1. a. above) and by the Joint Commission.

5. The first paragraph of the agreement adopted by Mr. Molotov and rewritten into Joint Commission Decisions specifically states that all parties and social organizations which sign the application

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for consultation are eligible and must be accepted for consultation. The contention by the Soviet Delegation is an attempt to establish an arbitrary veto power over consultation, which is implicit in the method of work now desired by the Soviet Delegation. There is no provision in any of the agreements reached which provides such veto power.

There are two basic issues involved in the differences outlined above:

The first issue is whether one delegation can unilaterally exercise veto power and exclude from consultation any party or social organization that it does not approve. The Soviet Delegation wishes to exercise such veto power. The American Delegation maintains that this is an arbitrary position and is contrary to the agreement of the Foreign Ministers. Furthermore, it is impractical in application because it could be used to exclude parties and social organizations to such a degree that consultation would not represent a fair sample of Korean opinion. The U.S. position is that exclusion from consultation can only be by mutual agreement of both delegations as specifically stated in the Marshall- Molotov letters. The U.S. Delegation has many times offered to review systematically the whole list of applicants and consider any and all objections by either delegation to various parties and organizations in order to make a decision as to which should be excluded through mutual agreement. (Example attached) The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly refused such proposals.

The second issue is in regard to membership of a party or organization in the so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization. The Soviet Delegation has not brought specific charges

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against any one party that it has actually fomented or instigated active opposition to the Joint Commission or the Moscow Decision after signing the declaration, but has arbitrarily accused all the member parties of bad faith and imply that they are guilty even before they have been indicted. The U.S. position is that no party or social organization can be assumed guilty of acting in bad faith until it has been indicted and proven guilty of actions which do in fact incite and foment active opposition to the Joint Commission, the Moscow Decision, or either of the Allies.

The Joint Commission is continuing its meetings in an attempt to resolve these basic differences.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV. 11 JULY 1947, 1315. ALSO PRESENT: MR. STEWART.

1. General Brown inquired about the proposed Joint Bulletin #7, containing data on enrollment for consultation which had been sent to the Soviet Delegation yesterday. General Shtikov felt that it would be inexpedient to publish this information since it was already known to the press. He asked whether the fact that so many local and non-social organizations had registered for consultation could be regarded as a positive or negative development. The U.S. Delegation seemed to regard it as a positive development, the Soviet Delegation as a negative development, because those parties had no right to consultation under the terms of the Joint Decision No. 12 and the Moscow Decision.

Despite General Brown's insistence, General Shtikov would not agree to the publication of the Joint Bulletin on the grounds of inexpediency.

2. General Brown stated that the American Delegation was working on our Joint Communique, presenting both the American and the Russian points of view. He expected that this Communique would be completed tomorrow and said that he felt that because of the failure of the Joint Commission to reach agreement, it was necessary to publish a full statement of the two opposite points of view. This information should be available to both the American and Korean press. He expected that the draft would be ready in the morning.

3. General Brown stated that in his opinion the time had come to throw the meeting open to the press representatives, so as to enable them to hear firsthand the opposite points of view as presented in the actual discussions. He asked whether General Shtikov would object to having American and Korean press representatives attend the meeting following Monday. General Shtikov objected, saying there would be no Soviet press representative. General Brown agreed to include a Soviet press representative in the meeting along with the other reporters.

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4. General Brown brought to General Shtikov's attention ~~to the~~ a statement regarding the TASS dispatch giving a detailed account of the disagreement between the American and Soviet points of view. (See appendix.) General Brown wanted to know whether a TASS representative had been present at any of the Joint Commission meetings. General Shtikov stated that a TASS representative was present only at the open meetings of 30 June and 1 July in Pyongyang. He had not seen for himself the release in question and promised to explain the matter following due inquiry. He refused to accept the cabled version from NY Herald Tribune as evidence. When General Brown stated that the cabled version from NY was a better proof than Korean news stories in the local press, General Shtikov read long story from Han Sung Ilbo of 9 July purporting to quote highly qualified American observer to the effect that:

a. The approaching deadline for the formation of the provisional government made the present period in the work of the Commission a very important one.

b. Reported firm Soviet stand against the admission of those parties which had been identified with Anti-Trusteeship activities.

c. Predicted likely failure of the Joint Commission unless the Soviet Delegation receded from its firm position.

General Shtikov questioned the origin of the story and was informed that it was probably the same as that of the TASS story.

5. The meeting was conducted in a very friendly fashion and the usual amenities were exchanged.

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NY HERALD TRIBUNE CORRESPONDENT JOSEPH NEWMAN MOSCOW 7 JULY

THE NEW DEADLOCK IN THE JOINT SOVIET AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR KOREA WAS ATTRIBUTED TODAY BY TASS, THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY, TO AN AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO PICK THE LIST OF KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS TO BE CONSULTED BY THE COMMISSION IN ESTABLISHING AN INDEPENDENT KOREAN STATE. EVEN MORE SERIOUS WAS THE DISCOVERY BY TASS THAT SOME OF THE ORGANIZATIONS WHICH CLAIM A RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION FROM THE AMERICAN ZONE WAS SEEKING DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE JOINT COMMISSION BY CREATING FALSE ENTITIES WHICH EXIST ONLY ON PAPER. AT THE 2 JUL SESSION OF THE COMMISSION, TASS SAID, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED THAT ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH, IT MAINTAINED, WERE CREATED SPECIALLY TO COMBAT THE MOSCOW DECISION AND THE PROPOSED TRUSTEESHIP, THE NEWS AGENCY SAID THE SOVIET DELEGATION ALSO PROPOSED EXCLUSION OF ALL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WERE NOT POLITICAL OR SOCIAL SO AS NOT TO DELAY THE BEGINNING OF CONSULTATIONS WITH KOREAN ORGANIZATIONS. TASS WENT ON, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED THAT THE COMMISSION APPROVE A TEMPORARY LIST OF PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH THERE WERE NO OBJECTIONS. THIS PROPOSAL, IT REPORTED, WAS REJECTED BY THE AMERICAN DELEGATION. TASS THEN OFFERED DATA PURPORTING TO EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF THE JOINT COMMISSIONS SUBCOMMITTEE NBR 1 TO AGREE ON THE ADMISSION OF ORGANIZATIONS FROM THE AMERICAN ZONE OF KOREA. IT SAID 25 POLITICAL PARTIES AND 400 ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHERN KOREA APPLIED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSULTATIONS, AND THESE INCLUDED 22 TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL GPS, 5 CLUBS, 5 HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND A NBR OF DISTRICT, TOWN AND STREET ORGANIZATIONS. TASS CONTENDED THAT THE LIST ADVANCED BY SOUTHERN KOREA INCLUDED 37 PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WHICH BELONG TO A COMMITTEE ORGANIZED ON 16 JAN TO RESIST A TRUSTEESHIP AND WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY, COMBATED THE MOSCOW DECISION AND THE JOINT COMMISSION.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

In the meetings of the Joint Commission in 1946 the Soviet Delegation took the position that those Koreans who did not fully support the Moscow Decision would not be accepted for consultation by the Joint Commission. They even insisted that objection to one word of the Moscow Decision was failure to fully support the Moscow Decision. The Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, followed this contention up to his letter of February 28, 1947, in reply to the letter of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, of December 24, 1946. During the exchange of letters between the Commanders, attempt was made to reach a formula which would define the limit of objection to the Moscow Decision beyond which a Korean could not go without being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission. The Soviet Commander of North Korea in his letter of 26 November 1946 recommended a formula to cover this matter. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946, recommended certain modifications to the formula proposed. The matter was taken up by the two Ministers, and they agreed to accept the formula proposed by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946. Under this formula a Korean representative of a political party or social organization, which party or organization signs the application for consultation, may freely express his opinion publicly or privately concerning the Moscow Decision, the future formation of his government or any words, phrases or thoughts involved in either, provided he does not instigate or foment active opposition against the Moscow Decision or either of the Allies.

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation has throughout the past several weeks attempted to return to his position of a year

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ago. He apparently has not understood the efforts of the two Commanders in Korea to resolve this difficulty and the decision reached by the two Ministers, which has in fact resolved the difficulty if it is faithfully followed. As a matter of fact, in the Subcommission No. 1 meeting of May 28, 1947, the Soviet representative, Mr. Tounkin, made the statement that the Soviet Delegation would not agree to consultation with any Korean who did not fully support the Moscow Decision and every paragraph of that decision. While this statement does not go as far as the intent of the Soviet Delegation to oppose those who object to a word contained in the Moscow Decision, it still goes a long distance back from the agreement by the two Ministers and in fact destroys the value of that agreement, returning the Soviets as it does to their original position of May 1946.

Furthermore, in the 43rd meeting on July 16 the Chief of the Soviet Delegation made the following statement: "The Soviet Delegation does not wish to speak with and consult those which carry on a fight against the Moscow Decision even if it is one word or one ~~point~~ period in ~~any item of~~ the Moscow Decision."

The Moscow Decision is so written that practically each provision contained in it is subject to wide interpretation. There is one word in this decision, however, to which a partial interpretation is given - that is the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision interprets trusteeship as "aid and assistance." It further guarantees to the Korean people independence. The Korean people are a proud race. They were subject to Japanese domination for 40 years. It is perfectly natural that they should crave full and complete independence. The Korean people naturally fear that in offering them aid and assistance as provided by the Moscow Decision, attempts will be made to control the government of the nation and to delay or destroy their independence. It is possible that control will be necessary. However, the Moscow Decision clearly envisages the extent of that control as that required to make effective the aid and assistance rendered. The aid and assistance rendered likewise being limited to that essential to assure that Korea is properly evolved during the period of aid and assistance into a full, free and independent nation. It is perfectly natural, the exact extent of the aid and assistance to be

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that Koreans should have different ideas as to the interpretation of the Moscow Decision on this point. Having these ideas, it is natural that they should express them. It is also natural that they should state their objection to any interference with the sovereignty of their nation. It is this right of any free man to express his thoughts in private or in public that the United States Government has consistently insisted upon in its dealings with the Soviet Government concerning the establishment of a Provisional Government for Korea. It is this principle to which the Russians reluctantly agreed after almost one year of exchange of views. It is this principle which the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Delegation is now trying to destroy, thus repudiating the agreement signed by their Minister and their own signed agreement on Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

The American Delegation does not regard opposition to "trusteeship" as opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Moscow Decision is a broad document which by direct statement or by implication covers all requirements included in the creation and evolution of a government over a reunited Korea. As previously stated, every loyal Korean craves independence for his country. They all welcome the opportunity to secure that independence [redacted] Do not fear and distrust but one concept of that decision - the unknown implication of the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision states in paragraph 1 the intent of the document - that is, "to reestablish Korea as an independent state; to create conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea. Surely those who wrote it had no such intention as to insert in paragraph 3 one word of such subtle, wide and undiscernible meaning as to vitiate the provision of the entire document. How then can discussion of and statement of opinions against an unconscionable

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use of this word be considered as opposition to the document? Such a contention is untenable.

The American Delegation does not regard membership by a political party or social organization in an anti-trusteeship committee or any similar organization as a bar to its admission for consultation by the Joint Commission. It is perfectly natural that political parties and social organizations should join together in committees for the discussion and consideration of the aid and assistance to be rendered to their country and should call themselves anti-trusteeship or similar named committees. As long as these committees confine their activities to free expression of opinion and stop short of fomenting and instigating active opposition, they are permitted under the agreement of our Ministers to express their opposition.

As a matter of fact, paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision assigns to the Joint Commission the task, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. How can the Joint Commission expect any Korean who remains silent on this matter to be of any assistance to the Joint Commission in determining and resolving its responsibility under this requirement of the Moscow Decision. The Joint Commission has recently broadcast throughout Korea an invitation to all Koreans to freely express themselves as to the formation of their government, its charter and platform. This is an invitation to Koreans to think, discuss and present views on the matters in question. One of the most vital and important topics involved in this discussion from the Korean point of view is trusteeship. What are the Soviets trying to do? Goad the Koreans to the point of opposition where they can discredit him from consultation with this Commission, or are they actually proceeding in good faith to attempt to evolve a Provisional Government under the provision of the Moscow Decision? Do they intend to follow the

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signed agreement reached by their Minister, or are they departing on an idea evolved by some bright individual of their Delegation who has not taken the time nor made the effort to properly acquaint himself with the problem upon which he is supposed to be working?

Trusteeship differs as to degrees. That exercised by the United Nations is one form known throughout the world. That prescribed in the Atlantic Charter is another. That prescribed in the Moscow Decision is not known nor can it be known until its definition is worked out as provided by and under the Moscow Decision. When Koreans say that they object to trusteeship, they are objecting to an imaginary concept, not an actuality. It should be the effort of the Joint Commission to quiet the fears of the Koreans, to educate and guide them in a proper understanding of this term, and methods which will be employed in applying it, not to condemn them, to convict them without a hearing and to bar them from proper participation in what to them is the most vital of their life - the formation for the first time of a free and independent government for their country.

The American Delegation requests the Soviet Delegation to join with it in a sincere and honest effort to create a provisional government over a united Korea as provided for by the Moscow Decision and thus to demonstrate to the world that two great powers can unselfishly work together in the interest of a small, weak and dependent nation.

/BROWN/

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~~DRAFT~~

PRESS RELEASE

12 July 1947

In a hearty response to the Joint Commission's invitation to Koreans for consultation regarding formation of a Korean Provisional Government, 463 political parties and social organizations submitted applications. Of these applicants for consultation, 425 were from the American zone of occupation in southern Korea and 38 from Korea north of the 38th parallel.

Although Koreans both north and south of the 38th parallel were asked to submit applications under identical conditions, there is a sharp contrast between the lists of applicants from North and South Korea. All organizations on the North Korea list are members of the People's Front, and [redacted] are affiliated with the North Korea People's Committee. The groups applying from southern Korea are almost entirely non-official and represent all shades of political opinion. More than two-thirds of the South Korean applicants are of right, middle-of-the-road, or moderate left political complexion. Less than twenty-five per cent of the applicants are in the People's Front, both with regard to numbers of organizations and total membership.

Applicants from South Korea represent a broad cross-section of Korean society, including 39 political parties, 101 civil organizations, 54 cooperative, economic and business associations, 43 professional, scientific, and technical societies, 40 cultural groups, 35 labor unions, 34 young men's organizations, 31 religious groups, 19 relief and welfare agencies, 15 farmers' unions and agricultural organizations, and 14 women's organizations.

The North Korea list includes three political parties, 18 labor unions, five cultural groups, three religious organizations, two welfare groups, two civic organizations, and one each of

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the following organizations: farmers' union, consumers cooperative, women's, youth, and technical.

The single organization with the highest claimed membership applying was the Democratic People's Front of South Korea, with 6,217,819 members. The second highest was the Federation of Women's Associations in South Korea with 4,525,150 members. The group with the lowest membership was the Korean Patriots' Relief Association, with 22 members. The largest single political party registered in all Korea was the Hankook Democratic Party in South Korea, with a claimed membership of 865,706.

The largest religious groups to apply for consultation include the Central Headquarters of the Korea Buddhists, with 4,250,120 members and the Headquarters of the Chun Do Kyo, native religion, with 4,064,000 members. The largest individual organization to apply for consultation is the Women's Association of the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, with a claimed membership of 3,281,724. The largest farmers organization applying is the North Korea Peasants Alliance, with a claimed membership of 2,572,714. The largest economic group is the North Korea Consumers Cooperative Alliance with claimed membership of 2,751,798. The largest youth group to apply is the Young Korea Party of South Korea, with 1,889,000 claimed membership.

Eighteen of the organizations applying for consultation have claimed memberships of more than one million. However, the bulk of those applying are relatively small, 291 having less than 10,000 members. There is considerable duplication of membership on the list; for example, membership is given for both individual political parties and coalitions of parties. There is additional duplication of membership because many

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individual Koreans are members of several of the various organizations applying for consultation. Claimed membership of all 463 organizations applying for consultation totals about 6,000,000, of whom about eighty per cent are from south of the 38th parallel, and twenty per cent from North Korea. Several fraudulent applications have been discovered; for example, one large youth organization registered under three different names.

The large number of applications started in part from Soviet refusal to agree to any definition in Joint Decision No. 12 regarding political parties and social organizations, or to any limitation on applications with respect to membership or types of organizations. Social organizations applying include a wide variety of organizations, such as the North Korea Society of the People's Air Fleet, the Merchants Association for Long Tae Moon Market, the Kyongi Province Kul-Tiver Association, and the Korean Women Won's Syndicato League.

Of the 463 organizations applying for consultation, 435 handed in answers to the Joint Commission questionnaires concerning the provisional Charter and Political Platform of the Korean Provisional Government by the deadline of 5 July 1947. The Joint Commission is engaged in translation, tabulation and analysis of these answers.

This list of democratic parties and social organizations to be consulted by the Joint Commission will be published as soon as it has been agreed upon by the Joint Commission.

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American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

PRESS RELEASE BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN: 12 July 1947

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The large number of applications stemmed in part from Soviet refusal to agree to any definition in Joint Decision No. 12 regarding political parties and social organizations, or to any limitation on applications with respect to membership or types of organizations. Social organizations applying include a wide variety of organizations, such as the North Korea Society of the People's Air Fleet, the Merchants Association for Dong Dae Moon Market, the Kyonggi Province Mid-Wives Association, and the Korean Young Men's Esperanto League.

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE NO. ____ Press Release of the Chief of the Soviet Delegation of the J.C. 1 July 1947

At its meetings of 2 and 3 July in Pyongyang and 8, 9, and 10 July in Seoul, the Joint Commission discussed the question regarding the compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations with which it would consult.

The Soviet Delegation declared that among the parties and organizations of Southern Korea, which had filed applications for participation in the consultation, there were some which were other than social--for instance, the commercial and industrial companies, administrative institutions, and institutions of learning. The Soviet Delegation proposed that such institutions should not be included in the list for consultation. The Soviet Delegation also noted that among those filing applications for participation in consultation were included narrowly local organizations of non-zonal character. In the opinion of the Soviet Delegation admitting such organizations to consultation would not correspond to the Moscow Decision and the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission. At the same time, the Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations is very great both in the North and the South of Korea, and that if the Commission would initiate consultations with all local organizations, this could only protact its work and create an incorrect impression regarding the state of public opinion in Korea.

The Soviet Delegation insisted on non-admission to consultation of parties and organizations specially created for struggling against the Moscow Decision or affilated organizations created for struggling against the Moscow Decision. In particular, the Soviet Delegation insisted on non-admission to consultation of parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, indicating that such parties and organizations could be admitted to consultation provided they would withdraw from that Committee and cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision.

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Having noted that non-existing organizations had been discovered among the parties and organizations of Southern Korea that had filed applications for participation in consultation, the Soviet Delegation proposed that existence be verified of parties and social organizations which arouse suspicion in this regard. The Soviet Delegation further pointed out that the total membership claimed by parties and organizations of Southern Korea, and namely 70,000,000 members, arouses suspicion regarding the correctness of membership data submitted by various parties and organizations; and that in this connection, the Joint Commission should have to verify the number of members ofsome parties and organizations filing applications.

The Soviet Delegation noted that in introducing this proposal it was being guided by the Moscow Decision and the Joint Decision 12 of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation declined these proposals of the Soviet Delegation. Doing this, the American Delegation pointed out that whereas the Moscow Decision does not indicate what organizations are regarded as social, the Commission must consult with all organizations, including also the non-social ones which had filed applications for consultation and which had signed the declaration. The American Delegation spoke in favor of Commission's consulting also with local organizations which had signed applications for consultation. Regarding the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the American Delegation declared that it would prefer to consult with such organizations, also, and that barring of these parties and social organizations would contradict the freedom of expression, opinion.

The American Delegation proposed to commence the consultation with all parties and organizations filing applications, having more than 1 ,000 members, and to discuss at a later date the problem of consulting with the remaining parties and social organizations which had applied.

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The Soviet Delegation agreed to adopt this proposal on the condition that parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and continuing work directed against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission would be warned of the necessity of declaring that they withdraw from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, following which they could participate in consultation as organizations sincerely upholding the Moscow Decision.

This amendment was not accepted by the American Delegation.

Following this, the Soviet Delegation proposed to summon the leaders of parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, to the Duk Soo Palace on 7 July, in order that they elucidate their position regarding the Moscow Decision. Should they declare that they uphold the Moscow Decision they could be admitted to consultation.

This proposal, also, proved to be unacceptable to the American Delegation.

In the process of further discussion, the Soviet Delegation continued to insist on its proposal that parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, could be admitted to consultation only after they declare that they had withdrawn from that Committee and cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation proposed to take into consideration the written views in answer to the questionnaires, submitted by the local organizations. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation stated that local organizations would not be included into the list for consultation with parties and social organizations included in the list, the Joint Commission would announce that local social organizations, which had applied for participation in consultation, could send their representatives for oral consultation, if they

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had anything to add to the written views submitted by them in answer to the questionnaires.

The Soviet Delegation again insisted on commencing consultation with parties and organizations, which did not arouse objections, while the final list could be examined and approved in the next few days.

The American Delegation declined the proposal of the Soviet Delegation declaring that commercial and industrial organizations, and chambers of commerce in particular, should be admitted to consultation; that if such organizations are not admitted to consultation, trade unions should not be admitted also. Regarding the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the American Delegation declared that it does not consider as proven the accusations of the Soviet Delegation that these organizations continue to struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

A proposal was introduced by the Soviet Delegation to entrust Subcommission No. 1 with submitting a list for consultation with the Joint Commission of parties and social organizations claiming more than 10,000 members, with exception of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and also with discussing the problem of and submitting its proposals regarding organizations having less than 10,000 members and also of organizations whose membership and the very fact of whose existence arouse suspicions. Regarding the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet Delegation reaffirmed its former position.

At the Joint Commission meeting, the American Delegation reported on the results of its investigation of the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The report submitted by the American Delegation stated that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had in fact ceased its existence, and that having signed the

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declaration, parties and organizations, which were formerly affiliated with this Committee, had ceased participation in the work of the Committee. The report further stated that not one of the parties, formerly affiliated with Committee or still nominally considered to be members of this Committee, had not, subsequent to the signing of the declaration compromised itself by any act that could justify its being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation declared that data at its disposal testifies that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee continues its activity directed against the Moscow Decision. In particular, on 23 June, this year, it has organized a demonstration against the Moscow Decision in Seoul, and a series of analogous demonstrations in other cities of Southern Korea. On 23 June the Joint Commission received a petition from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee in which the latter expresses itself as being decisively opposed to the work of the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation proposed to recommend to parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee which had applied for consultation that they publish declarations stating that they had with withdrawn from that Committee, and pointing out that unless they publish such declarations, aforementioned parties would continue to bear responsibility for the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The American Delegation declined this proposal declaring that whereas the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee signed the declaration, the Joint Commission could not demand that they publish the statements as proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

Following this, the Soviet Delegation proposed to conduct a joint investigation of activities of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which had signed the declaration, utilizing for this purpose the materials from

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the unilateral investigation conducted by the American Delegation.

The American Delegation did not agree with this proposal.

At the end of the meeting on 10 July 1947, the Soviet Delegation transmitted to the American Delegation a list of parties and organizations of Southern and Northern Korea claiming over 10,000 members, and proposed that Subcommission No. 1 be entrusted to examine this list. The proposals of the Soviet Delegation stated that Subcommission No. 1 should establish which organizations, of those included in the list, are social, and also to verify the fact of existence of parties and social organizations, and the membership of parties and organizations whose existence or membership, respectively, arouse suspicions; and that the Subcommission should present its views to the Joint Commission. It was proposed not to include in the list parties and social organizations claiming fewer than 10,000 members but to take into account submitted by them written views in answer to the questionnaires. Following the competion of the consultation with parties and social organizations included in the the Joint Commission should announce
list ~~xxxxxxxx~~ that parties and social organizations which had filed applications and which are not included in the list could send their representatives for oral consultation if they had anything to add to the written views submitted by them in answer to the questionnaires. Further, the proposal indicated that parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee coul be admitted to consultation provided they would withdraw from that committee and cease struggling against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation declared that it would attentively examine the proposal of the Soviet Delegation.

The next meeting of the Joint Commission has been scheduled for 14 July 1947.

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ZLWT
14 July

COMMENTS ON GENERAL BROWN'S PAPER

1. Do not use it now but hold it until Soviets make their position more clear., i.e., lead them to state their position and answer question - May a delegate oppose certain types of trusteeship or may he announce beforehand that he will do so? May he associate with others of similar ideas to discuss these problems?

A. Our overall strategy:

A. Present position.

(a) It is becoming clearer that Soviet delegation will strive for a Communist dominated interim government. There appears little hope of establishing a non-Communist provisional government

(b) We are now deadlocked on preparation of list with 3 issues before us:

(1) Unilateral exclusion or veto power,

(2) Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and

(3) Exclusion by other means of rightist parties.

(c) Of these 3 points in (b), our position is sound on prohibiting unilateral exclusion and the exclusion of rightist parties. We are weak in respect to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee because all that is required is repudiation.

B. Objectives.

(a) To achieve a non-Communist dominated Korean Provisional Government.

(b) To place U.S. in an unassailable position in event the Joint Commission breaks up; to expose policies of Soviets, and to avoid bringing any credit to the extreme right wing.

(c) To make it quite clear to the U.S. people that we are not supporting the extreme right nor that we were unwilling to make reasonable compromises to attain our main objective.

C. A guide to policy.

(a) Our first stand should be an opposition to unilateral

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exclusion. We are on perfectly sound ground here and Marshall-Molotov letters and Joint Decision 12 completely support us. This will also stop any exclusion of rightist parties.

(b) On the Anti-Trusteeship Committee issue, we should go carefully. Our strategy should be to lead Chitikov into a position where he defines what he means by active opposition. If he can come out and claim voicing opposition is fomenting and inciting, etc., then we are on much firmer ground.

(c) In regards to compromising on these issues, there are several alternatives:

(1) We can eliminate all oral consultation and use questionnaires. We cannot, however, compromise on the unilateral exclusion issue without it being interpreted as "selling out" to the Soviets.

(2) We can skip the individual consultation and go to the group consultation on the basis of exclusion by mutual agreement.

(3) We can show Kim Koo's letter to rightists and ask them if they approve of demonstrations against trusteeship. Explain our position to them and ask them to sign a statement saying they are opposed to inciting and fomenting, etc. (demonstrations), that they do not agree with Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee, but that they are opposed to any great limitation on sovereignty to obtain aid and assistance and that they believe it to be their right to express these views to the Joint Commission when paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision is discussed; and furthermore, that they believe it to be their privilege to state this position to the public. If this could be done, we would alienate their support to Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo and place the Soviets in the position of refusing freedom of expression if this statement was not acceptable to them.

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4. As to compromise on all these issues, alienating of the right, and consultation with left and moderate left elements until a discussion of the government brings all issues to a head, we must consider the following factors.

(1) In the event of failure, both left and right in South Korea will fight the U.S. occupation. It will be difficult for us to develop a middle of the road group.

(2) In U.S. opinion we would face criticism for allowing a non-representative group to advise us.

(3) We could claim we had yielded to [illegible] demand to obtain a government and repeat all the history to show up Soviet pattern.

5. Recommendations.

(a) That we do not compromise on unilateral exclusion.

(b) That we attempt to find a compromise to the Anti-Trusteeship committee issue on the basis of Mr Hon's letter and a statement of the type outlined above.

(c) That we do not at this time introduce the question of freedom of speech from the UN point of view, but try to make the rightists declare their hand by questioning them.

/HJWC/

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July 15, 1947

PRESS RELEASE OF CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE JOINT COMMISSION

The US - Soviet Joint Commission held its 42nd meeting, 1330, 14 July 1947, Duk Soo Palace, Seoul, Korea. General Brown was Chairman.

The Joint Commission has continued the discussion of a disagreement which arose in the 37th meeting and extended through to the 42nd meeting, on the list of parties and organizations to be invited for initial consultation. The basic issues involved in this disagreement are as follows :

I. Soviet Delegation's General Position:

1. That parties and organizations falling within the following categories should not be included in the list for initial consultation, specifically:

a. Those not classified by them as social organizations,

b. District and other purely local organizations, and

c. Those which it contends do not intend to support fully the Moscow Decision, especially members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations.

I. American Delegation's General Position:

1. That Soviet Delegation's proposals are contrary to:

a. Paragraph 1 of the three principles of the Foreign Ministers upon which agreement for reconvention of the Joint Commission was reached: "Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation."

b. Paragraph 5, Joint Commission Decision published in Communique No. 11, mutually

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agreed to and signed by the Chief Commissioner of each Delegation:

"Subcommission No. 1, upon receiving the applications for consulation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration. . . ."

II. The Soviet Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. That industrial, mercantile and producers' organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce, Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute, Accountants' Society and societies organized for the study of politics and economics, are not in fact social organizations as the word "social" is used in the Moscow Decision.

II. The American Delegation's Specific Contentions are:

1. a. The Moscow Decision does not define the term "social organization."

b. The Soviet Delegation refused requests of the American Delegation to define the terms in the Joint Commission Decision.

c. The American Delegation served notice on the Soviet Delegation prior to final decision that after joint approval of the Joint Commission Decision No. 12, the American Delegation would not agree to amendment or change in the decision as finally agreed upon. Therefore, the term "social organization" must be interpreted as defined in the dictionaries of the world.

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2. A party or organization local in character which has no central zonal office is not eligible for consultation.

3. The good faith of a party or organization which signs the declaration and applies for consultation, and thus agrees to uphold the Moscow Decision, is challenged by the Soviet Delegation if such party or organization continues membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or a similar organization. Such party or organization is acceptable for consultation only if it publicly withdraws from membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization.

2. District and other purely local organizations are not barred by any provision of the Moscow Agreement, the Marshall - Molotov agreement, or Joint Commission Decision. In order to eliminate small organizations, the American Delegation several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000 or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation

3. a. Parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and similar organizations are clearly eligible for initial consultation under the Marshall - Molotov agreement if they have applied for consultation and signed the required declaration.

b. They remain eligible unless and until they are by mutual agreement excluded after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers - namely "Individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission

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4. The fact that a party is eligible for consultation under the agreement of the Ministers, as published in Joint Commission Decision, does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission.

5. In order for a party to be placed on the list for consultation, it must be acceptable to both Delegations.

should not, after signing the declaration contained in communique No. 5, foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which, after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission."

4. The arbitrary line of distinction drawn by the Soviet Delegation between "eligibility for consultation" and "admission for consultation", nullifies the agreements reached by the two Ministers (quoted in 1. a. above) and by the Joint Commission.

5. The first paragraph of the agreement accepted by Mr. Molotov and rewritten into Joint Commission Decisions specifically states that all parties and social organizations which sign the application

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for consultation are eligible and must be accepted for consultation. The contention by the Soviet Delegation is an attempt to establish an arbitrary veto power over consultation, which is implicit in the method of compiling the list proposed by the Soviet Delegation. There is no provision in any of the agreements reached which provides such veto power.

There are two basic issues involved in the differences outlined above:

The first issue is whether one delegation may unilaterally exercise veto power and exclude from consultation any party or social organization that it does not approve. The Soviet Delegation wishes to exercise such veto power. The American Delegation maintains that this is an arbitrary position and is contrary to the agreement of the Foreign Ministers. Furthermore, it is impractical in application because it could be used to exclude parties and social organizations to such a degree that consultation would not represent a fair sample of Korean opinion. The U.S. position is that exclusion from consultation can only be by mutual agreement of both delegations as specifically stated in the Marshall - Molotov letters. The U.S. Delegation has many times offered to review systematically the whole list of applicants and consider any and all objections by either delegation to various parties and organizations in order to make a decision as to which should be excluded through mutual agreement. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly refused such proposals.

The second issue is in regard to membership of a party or organization in the so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organization. The Soviet Delegation has not brought specific charges

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against any one party that it has actually fomented or instigated active opposition to the Joint Commission or the Moscow Decision after signing the declaration, but has arbitrarily accused all the member parties of bad faith and imply that they are guilty even before they have been indicted. The U.S. position is that no party or social organization can be assumed guilty of acting in bad faith until it has been indicted and proven guilty of actions which do in fact incite and foment active opposition to the Joint Commission, the Moscow Decision, or either of the Allies.

The American Delegation has consistently upheld and will continue to insist on complete implementation of the Marshall - Molotov agreements which guarantee wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans.

The Joint Commission is continuing its meetings in an attempt to resolve these basic differences.

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION DECLARATION BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, COL. GEN. SHTIKOV

Press Conference - 21 July 1947

In connection with the fact that the American Delegation declined the proposal of the Soviet Delegation to publish a joint communique regarding the last sessions of the Commission and, contrary to the decision of the Joint Commission, has published a unilateral communique regarding this problem, the Soviet Delegation feels that it is necessary to make the following declaration in order to provide correct information to the public opinion regarding the work of the Joint Commission:

At the Joint Commission meetings on 2 and 3 July in Pyongyang and of 8, 9, 10 and 16 July in Seoul, the Discussions concerned the question on the compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission would consult.

The position of the Soviet Delegation on this issue consists of exact implementation of the Moscow Decision on Korea and of the agreement reached between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the United States, G. Marshall. The Soviet Delegation has always striven and is still striving to create as soon as possible in Korea a truly democratic government on the basis of the Moscow Decision, a government which would correspond to the wishes of the Korean people and would be capable of defending the interests of the people. The consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations is an important means for discovering the opinion of the Koreans regarding the questions connected with the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and consequently the Soviet Delegation

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attributes great importance to the consultation.

Having become familiarized with the applications for participation in the consultation which had been submitted, the Soviet Delegation has established the fact that among the parties and organizations of South Korea which had submitted applications there are present organizations which are not social: commercial and industrial companies, administrative institutions, institutions of learning, etc.

Among those filing applications for participation in consultation in South Korea are found branches of central organizations and narrowly local and insignificant organizations which do not have zonal character, for example, The Automobile Society of Mi Sang CO, Youth Organization of Anam Street in Seoul, Young People's Christian Association of Kyesoo, etc. There were also found non-existing organizations such as the so-called Korea Civil Engineers and Architects League which indicated a total membership of 1,220,000. The Soviet representative in Subcommission No. 1, G. F. Tounkin, had expressed doubt regarding the size of this organization, pointing out that it could not have 1,220,000 members because all Korea has less than 1,000,000 workers. Later the American representative in Subcommission No. 1, A. C. Bunce, declared that by checking it had been determined that such an organization does not actually exist.

The total number of members of parties and organizations of South Korea which had filed applications totals 70,000,000 people. This means that every adult Korean, both men and women, holds membership in eight organizations which is remote from actuality. There are organizations like the Great Korea Independent Labor League which had indicated a total membership of 1,001,790. The Korean

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Civil Engineers and Architects Association claims 195,183 members, etc. This arouses suspicions regarding the accuracy of information regarding membership which had been submitted by some of the parties and organizations. Being guided by the Moscow Decision on Korea and the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission, which provide for consultation with parties and social organizations zonal in nature, the Soviet Delegation proposed that non-social and narrowly local insignificant organizations be not included in the list for consultation.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations is very great, both in Northern Zone in Southern Korea, and that if the Commission would overwhelm with all local insignificant organizations this would greatly delay and confuse its work.

The Soviet Delegation had further proposed to check the organizations whose existence or membership aroused suspicion.

In accordance with agreements reached between Molotov and Marshall, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea and which after signing the declaration do not incite active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission or either of the Allied powers or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, that is to say, those who do not struggle against the Moscow Decision, against the Allied nations, or against the Joint Commission.

Being guided by this premise, the Soviet Delegation moved that parties and social organizations which had been specially created for struggle against the Moscow Decision or affiliated with organizations created for struggle against the Moscow Decision be not admitted for consultation. The Soviet Delegation insisted in particular upon the non-admission to consultation of parties and social

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organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that, following the renewal of the work of the Commission and even following the publication of the decision of the Joint Commission regarding the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee not only did not cease but has actually intensified its struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission endeavoring to wreck its work of forming the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until parties and organizations affiliated with that Committee declare that they have withdrawn from it, they continue to bear responsibility for its activities.

The Soviet Delegation further pointed out that parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, have assumed obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time, combining to be members of this Committee, the aforementioned parties and organizations have their signatures under the program of the Committee which contains the obligation to struggle against the Moscow Decision, and they continue actually to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. One is not compatible with the other.

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Consequently the Soviet Delegation has declared that parties and organizations which had signed the declaration and which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation only if they withdraw from this Committee and cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation declined these proposals of the Soviet Delegation.

The position of the American Delegation contradicts the Moscow Decision. Notwithstanding the fact that the Moscow Decision clearly states that the Joint Commission should consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the American Delegation has proposed to include indiscriminately in the list for consultation all organizations which had filed applications, among them commercial and industrial companies, administrative institutions, institutions of learning, and other non-social organizations and also local and even fictitious organizations, etc. The American Delegation insisted that if commercial and industrial organizations, chambers of commerce in particular, should not be admitted to consultation, trade unions should not be admitted to consultation either.

The American Delegation has, as a matter of fact, insisted on the Joint Commission's consulting with any party and organization filing application which the American Delegation deems it desirable to invite for consultation.

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Although in words it has expressed itself to be in favor of the fulfillment of the agreement reached between Molotov and Marshall, the American Delegation refused to apply this agreement in practice. The American Delegation declined the proposal of the Soviet Delegation regarding the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, stating that since in its opinion the references to Korean press stories do not constitute proof, the accusations advanced by the Soviet Delegation against these parties and organizations have not been proven.

Furthermore, at the Joint Commission meeting of 10 July, the American Delegation reported on the results of its verification of activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. In the report of the American Delegation it was pointed out that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had in fact ceased to exist and that not one of the parties filing applications which had formerly been affiliated with the Committee or still continue to be affiliated with this Committee nominally does participate in its work and has compromised itself by any acts which could provide the basis for being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission. In particular the communication stated:

> "It is possibly known to the Soviet Delegation the original Anti-Trusteeship Committee was first organized in January 1946. In June 1946 it was reorganized. Following June 1946, it died down and was resurrected only on 19 May 1947. This latest Anti-Trusteeship Committee is apparently the Committee to which refers the Soviet Delegation; it began its activity on 19 May 1947 and is closely related in its composition to the original committee. The Committee organized in May has declared

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that it was composed of 35 political parties. It was nominally headed by RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo. Following one month's assiduous but unsuccessful attempts to unite all rightist parties for active struggle against Trusteeship, this organization by 19 June had completely ceased its activities, having completely failed in attaining its objective. From that time on this so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee does not in the main show any signs of life and can probably be regarded as dead. From the practical point of view, this is a non-existing organization."

And further:

"During the day of the demonstration, 23 June, KIM, Koo addressed a letter to the American Delegation in the Joint Commission recognizing his responsibility for the demonstrations and signing in the name of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. As an Anti-Trusteeship Committee document this letter may be regarded as falsification. The Anti-Trusteeship Committee has already ceased its activities, but KIM, Koo sent this letter on his own initiative, attempting in a swindling manner to speak in the name of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Nobody knew about this letter except KIM, Koo and his closest lieutenants and they should not be held responsible for it."

Having pointed out that the data at its disposal does not agree with this report by the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation proposed to institute a joint investigation of the activities of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which had filed applications for consultation, utilizing this investigation, the materials from the unilateral investigation, conducted by the American Delegation.

 The American Delegation did not agree to this proposal.

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The Soviet Delegation taking into consideration the wishes of the Korean people to have their own democratic government applied all its efforts in order to achieve, as soon as possible, an agreed decision regarding the question of compilation of lists of democratic parties and social organizations, and introduced for that purpose a series of proposals which, however, were declined by the American Delegation.

Whereas the American Delegation insisted that the accusations against the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, had not been proven, the Soviet Delegation more than once proposed to conduct a joint verification of the facts submitted in connection with this question by the Soviet Delegation.

The Soviet Delegation proposed to summon to the Duk Soo Palace the leaders of parties and social organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee in order to elucidate their position toward the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation proposed that following the consultation with the parties and social organizations included in the list, the local organizations which had not been included into the list for consultation be given opportunity to present through their representatives oral consultations in addition to the views submitted in written form in answer to the questionnaires.

In order to expedite the work of the Commission, the Soviet Delegation has many times proposed to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding whom there were no objections on the part of either the Soviet or the American Delegation, without waiting for the compilation of the final list.

The Soviet Delegation also more than once proposed to examine concretely the objections or comments on each organization separately,

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but the American Delegation declined to do so.

At the 10 July session of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation proposed to include in the list for consultation democratic parties and social organizations claiming over 10,000 members and to entrust Subcommission No. 1 with the compilation of such a list. The proposal further stated that if parties and social organizations which had not been included in the list should wish to add anything to the written proposals submitted by them, they would be given the opportunity to send their representatives for oral consultation, after the completion of consultation with the parties and social organizations included in the list. The proposal further pointed out that parties and social organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee could be admitted to consultation provided they would withdraw from this committee and would cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

At the 16 July session of the Joint Commission the American Delegation declared that it accepted with insignificant corrections this proposal of the Soviet Delegation with the exception of the paragraph regarding the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

Thus it may be considered that only the question regarding the admission to consultation of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is the only one

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not mutually agreed upon in connection with the compilation of the list of parties and social organizations for oral consultation. The Soviet Delegation feels that if both delegations would strictly abide by the Moscow Decision and the agreement between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, this problem also could be resolved rapidly and successfully.

On its part, the Soviet Delegation shall continue in the future to strive for exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and of the agreement reached between Molotov and Marshall and to direct all its efforts toward creating as soon as possible on the basis of the Moscow Decision a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which is so impatiently awaited by the Korean people.

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In connection with the fact that the American Delegation declined the proposal of the Soviet Delegation to publish a joint communique regarding the last sessions of the Commission and, contrary to the decision of the Joint Commission, has published a unilateral communique regarding this problem, the Soviet Delegation feels that it is necessary to make the following declaration in order to provide correct information to the public opinion regarding the work of the Joint Commission:

At the Joint Commission meetings on 2 and 3 July in Pyongyang and of 8, 9, 10 and 16 July in Seoul, the Discussions concerned the question on the compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission would consult.

The position of the Soviet Delegation on this issue consists of exact implementation of the Moscow Decision on Korea and of the agreement reached between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, and the Secretary of State of the United States, G. Marshall. The Soviet Delegation has always striven and is still striving to create as soon as possible in Korea a truly democratic government on the basis of the Moscow Decision, a government which would correspond to the wishes of the Korean people and would be capable of defending the interests of the people. The consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations is an important means for discovering the opinion of the Koreans regarding the questions connected with the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and consequently the Soviet Delegation attributes great importance to the consultation.

Having become familiarized with the applications for participation in the consultation which had been submitted, the Soviet Delegation has established the fact that among the parties and organizations of South Korea which had submitted applications

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there are present organizations which are not social; commercial and industrial companies, administrative institutions of learning, etc.

Among those filing applications for participation in consultation in South Korea are found branches of central organizations and narrowly local and insignificant organizations which do not have zonal character, for example, the Automobile Society of Yi Sang 00, Youth Organization of Anam Street in Seoul, Young People's Christian Association of Ryesoo, etc. There were also found non-existing organizations such as the so-called Korea Civil Engineers and Architects League which indicated a total membership of 1,220,000. The Soviet representative in Subcommission No. 1, G. I. Tounkin, has expressed doubt regarding the size of this organization, pointing out that it could not have 1,220,000 members because all Korea has less than 1,000,000 workers. Later the American representative in Subcommission No. 1, A. C. Bunce, declared that by checking it had been determined that such an organization does not actually exist.

The total number of members of parties and organizations of South Korea which had filed applications totals 70,000,000 people. This means that every adult Korean, both men and women, holds membership in eight organizations which is remote from actuality. There are organizations like the Great Korea Independent Labor League which had indicated a total membership of 1,001,790. The Korean Civil Engineers and Architects Association claims 195,183 members, etc. This arouses suspicions regarding the accuracy of information regarding membership which had been submitted by some of the parties and organizations. Being guided by the Moscow Decision on Korea and the Decision No. 12 of the Joint Commission, which provide for consultation with parties and social organizations zonal in nature, the Soviet Delegation proposed that non-social and narrowly local insignificant organizations be not included in the list for consultation.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that the number of local organizations is very great, both in Northern and Southern Korea,

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and that if the mission would consult wit l local insignificant organizations this could greatly delay and confuse its work.

The Soviet Delegation had further proposed to check the organizations whose existence or membership aroused suspicion.

In accordance with agreements reached between Molotov and Marshall, the Joint Commission must consult with democratic parti and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Kore and which after signing the declaration do not incite active opposition against the work of the Joint Commission or either of the Allied powers or against the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, that is to say, those who do not struggle against the Moscow Decision, against the Allied nations, or against the Joint Commission.

Being guided by this promise, the Soviet Delegation moved that parties and social organizations which had been specially created for struggle against the Moscow Decision or affiliated with organizations created for struggle against the Moscow Decision be not admitted for consultation. The Soviet Delegation insisted in particular upon the non-admission to consultation of parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The Soviet Delegation pointed out that, following the renewal of the work of the Commission and even following the publication of the decision of the Joint Commission regarding the order of consultation, the Anti-Trusteeship Committee not only did not cease but has actually intensified the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission endeavoring to wreck its work of forming the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Until parties and organizations affiliated with that Committee declare that they have withdrawn from it, they continue to bear responsibility for its activities.

The Soviet Delegation further pointed out that parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, having signed the declaration, had assumed obligation to uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea. At the same time, continuing to be members of this Committee, the aforementioned parties and

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organizations leave their signatures under the program of the Committee which contains the obligation to struggle against the Moscow Decision, and they continue actually to participate in the struggle against the Moscow Decision. One is not compatible with the other.

Consequently the Soviet Delegation has declared that parties and organizations which had signed the declaration and which are affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee may be admitted to consultation only if they withdraw from this Committee and cease the sturggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation declined these proposals of the Soviet Delegation.

The position of the American Delegation contradicts the Moscow Decision. Notwithstanding the fact that the Moscow Decision clearly states that the Joint Commission should consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the American Delegation has proposed to include indiscriminately in the list for consultation all organizations which had filed applications, among them commercial and industrial companies, administrative institutions, institutions of learning, and other non-social organizations and also local and even fictitious organizations, etc. The American Delegation insisted that if commercial and industrial organizations, chambers of commerce in particular, should not be admitted to consultation, trade unions should not be admitted to consultation either.

The American Delegation has, as a matter of fact, insisted on the Joint Commission's consulting with any party and organization filing application which the American Delegation deems it desirable to invite for consultation.

Although in words it has expressed itself to be in favor of the fulfillment of the agreement reached between Molotov and Marshall, the American Delegation refused to apply this agreement in practice. The American Delegation declined the proposal of the Soviet Delegation regarding the parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Commitee, stating that

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since in its opinion the references to Korean press stories do not constitute proof, the accusations advanced by the Soviet Delegation against these parties and organizations have not been proven.

Furthermore, at the Joint Commission meeting of 10 July, the American Delegation reported on the results of its verification of activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. In the report of the American Delegation it was pointed out that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had in fact ceased to exist and that not one of the parties filing applications which had formerly been affiliated with the Committee or still continue to be affiliated with this Committee nominally does participate in its work and has compromised itself by any acts which could provide the basis for being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission. In particular the communication stated:

"It is possibly known to the Soviet Delegation the original Anti-Trusteeship Commitee was first organized in January 1946. In June 1946 it was reorganized. Following June 1946, it died down and was resurrected only on 19 May 1947. This latest Anti-Trusteeship Committee is apparently the Committee to which refers the Soviet Delegation; it began its activity on 19 May 1947 and is closely related in its composition to the original committee . The Committee organized in May has declared that it was composed of 35 political parties. It was nominally headed by RHEE, Syngman and KIM, Koo. Following one month's assiduous but unsuccessful attempts to unite all rightist parties for active struggle against Trusteeship, this organization by 19 June had completely ceased its activities, having completely failed in attaining its objective. From that time on this so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee does not in the main show any signs of life and can probably be regarded as dead. From the practical point of view, this is a non-existing organization."

And further:

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'During the day of the demonstration, 23 June, KIM, Koo addressed a letter to the American Delegation in the Joint Commission recognizing his responsibility for the demonstrations and signing in the name of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. As an Anti-Trusteeship Committee document this letter may be regarded as falsification. The Anti-Trusteeship Committee has laready ceased its activities, but KIM, Koo sent this letter on his own initiative, attempting in a swindling manner to speak in the name of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Nobody knew about this letter except KIM, Koo and his closest lieutenants and they should not be held responsible for it."

Having pointed out that the data at its disposal does not agree with this report by the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation proposed to institute a joint investigation of the activities of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which had filed applications for consultation, utilizing this investigation, the materials from the unilateral investigation, conducted by the American Delegation.

The American Delegation did not agree to this proposal.

The Soviet Delegation taking into consideration the wishes of the Korean people to have their own democratic government applied all its efforts in order to achieve, as soon as possible, an agreed decision regarding the question of compilation of lists of democratic parties and social organizations, and introduced for that purpose a series of proposals which, however, were declined by the American Delegation.

Whereas the American Delegation insisted that the accusations against the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, had not been proven, the Soviet Delegation more than once proposed to conduct a joint verification of the facts submitted in connection with this question by the Soviet Delegation.

The Soviet Delegation proposed to summon to the Duk Soo Palace the leaders of parties and social organizations affiliated

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The Soviet Delegation ovoposed to summon to the Duk Soo Palace the leaders of parties and social organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee in order to elucidate their position toward the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation proposed that following the consultation with the parties and social organizations included in the list, the local organizations which had not been included into the list for consultation be given opportunity to present through their representatives oral consultations in addition to the views submitted in written form in answer to the questionnaires.

In order to expedite the work of the Commission, the Soviet Delegation has many times proposed to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations regarding whom there are no objections on the part of either the Soviet or the American Delegation, without waiting for the compilation of the final list.

The Soviet Delegation also more than once proposed to examine concretely the objections or comments on each organization separately, but the American D-legation declined to do so.

At the 10 July session of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation proposed to include in the list for consultation democratic parties and social organizations claiming over 10,000 members and to entrust Subcommission No. 1 with the compilation of such a list. The proposal further stated that if parties and social organizations which had not been included in the list should wish to add anything to the written proposals submitted by them, they would be given the opportunity to send their representatives for oral consultation, after the completion of consultation with the parties and social organizations included in the list. The proposal further pointed out that parties and social organizations affiliated with Anti-Trusteeship Committee could be admitted to consultation provided they would

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withdraw from this committee and would cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

At the 16 July session of the Joint Commission the American Delegation declared that it accepted with insignificant corrections this proposal of the Soviet Delegation with the exception of the paragraph regarding the parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

Thus it may be considered that only the question regarding the admission to consultation of parties and organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is the only one not mutually agreed upon in connection with the compilation of the list of parties and social organizations for oral consultation. The Soviet Delegation feels that if both delegations would strictly abide by the Moscow Decision and the agreement between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, this problem also could be resolved rapidly and successfully.

On its part, the Soviet Delegation shall continue in the future to strive for exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and of the agreement reached between Molotov and Marshall and to direct all its efforts toward creating as soon as possible on the basis of the Moscow Decision a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which is so impatiently awaited by the Korean people.

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE 45th MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON 22 JULY 1947

The Soviet Delegation has thoroughly acquainted itself with the statement made by the American Delegation in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 18 July 1947.

The American Delegation in its statement took the stand of defending the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee as well as the activities of the parties and organizations comprising this committee which are directed against the Moscow Decision on Korea.

As it is known, the aim of the Moscow Decision is the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disasterous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea. For the realization of this aim, the Moscow Decision provides, first of all, the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. In Point 3 of this Decision which mentions the word "trusteeship", the Joint Commission is directed with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and with the participation of Korean Democratic organizations to work out measures of aid and assistance for the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of a democratic self-government and the establishment of independence for Korea. This is not the type of trusteeship which is employed by some governments with the purpose of colonial oppression of the peoples. The trusteeship foreseen by the Moscow Decision gives the Korean people their own government, guarantees the establishment of a democracy and the conversion of a former colony into a democratic, independent state within the shortest space of time known in history.

Stating that the Koreans have fears concerning Point 3 of the Moscow Decision, the American Delegation identifies with all the Korean people a small group of anti-democratic organizations and their active leaders, who oppose the Moscow Decision.

The question arises why some active members and parties of South Korea oppose the Moscow Decision? Is it because as the American Delegation

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insists, the Koreans fear the establishment of such a form of trusteeship over Korea, as applied by Japan? But Japan does not participate in the Moscow Decision. As it is known, The United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China, which joined at a later date, participates in this decision. Therefore, such a form of trusteeship, as was applied by Japan, cannot take place. Evidently, this is not the essence of the matter. The essence of the matter lies elsewhere. We know that the opposition against trusteeship was organized by the so called "leaders" of certain parties and their associates, who saw in the Moscow Decision, the failure of their anti-democratic intentions. These "leaders" without any basis aspire to power in Korea. It is obvious, that they were the individuals, who did not like the decision on Korea made by the Allies, that Korea will become a democratic government, and that in Korea, people shall participate in governing their state. The "leaders" of these parties and their followers distorted with premeditation the spirit of the Moscow Decision in their mercenary pursuits. Last year they objected to the Moscow Decision and made libel against the Allies who signed it; again this year they continue to struggle against the Moscow Decision and against the Allies.

The absolute majority of Koreans is upholding the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, and is awaiting impatiently the time when in accordance with this decision, the Democratic Korean Government will be formed, which will be able to defend the interests of the people and to introduce democratic reforms. What do the Korean people really fear? The Koreans fear a deliberate disruption of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. The Korean people know that if the parties and organizations who struggle against the Moscow Decision, could succeed in a deliberate disruption of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and seize power in the country, it would mean, that the power would be in the hands of those who collaborated with the Japanese, of those who endeavor to seize power in Korea forcibly; those who wish to deprive the Korean people of democratic reforms, improvements and political power.

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The American Delegation tried to prove that the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are limited to expressions of opinion alone and that this Committee, presumably is somewhat like a discussion club. The American Delegation in its declaration states that "inasmuch as these parties limit their activities to expression of opinion, and do not foment and instigate active opposition they are permitted to express their opposition according to the agreement of our Ministers". The Soviet Delegation as well as the American Delegation is aware that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee did and does foment and instigate active opposition against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation has already presented many facts concerning this question, giving evidence of the active operations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and therefore, the parties and organizations comprising this Committee. Do not the oppositions and the statements of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee published day-in and day-out on the pages of certain South Korean newspapers, point out the fact that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is carrying on a fight against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission, and also, do not the meetings and various conferences organized by this Committee, where measures directed against the Moscow Decision and against the Soviet Delegation are being discussed, point out the fact that the Committee and parties and organizations comprising it conduct a fight against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission? The Soviet Delegation believes that those are the facts which confirm that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and parties and organizations comprising it, foment and instigate active opposition to the Moscow Decision and to the work of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation is attempting to affirm that the discussion is supposedly only concerning the fight against the word "trusteeship", and not concerning the fight against the Moscow Decision as a whole. This is an entirely naive statement. Firstly, the Moscow Decision should not be taken partially, and secondly, it is known, that the elements opposing the Moscow Decision will only use the word "trusteeship" to cover up their fight against the Moscow Decision as a whole.

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The American Delegation stated for the second time that parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and which submitted their applications for participation in consultation, actually had withdrawn from the body of the committee. Nevertheless, the American Delegation until now did not present any facts proving their statement. The Committee itself declares that the indicated parties and organizations have not withdrawn from it and continue to participate in the Committee's work.

Why does not the American Delegation desire to define the position of these parties and organizations?

The Soviet Delegation feels that until parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee announce publicly their withdrawal from the Committee, they continue to be responsible for the activities of this Committee.

The American Delegation points out that the Soviet Delegation supposedly violates the agreement reached by Mr. Molotov and Secretary Marshall in submitting their demands that parties and social organizations which are to consult with the Joint Commission should fully support the Moscow Decision.

Does it actually constitute violation of the agreement? Item 1 of the Agreements reached by the two Ministers states:

> "Signing of the declaration set forth in Communique No. 5 shall be considered as a statement of good faith to support fully the Moscow Decision, and shall give the right to parties and organizations which have signed it to be admitted for initial consultation."

As it is seen from this paragraph, agreed upon by the Ministers, the demands of the Soviet Delegation do not contradict, but, on the contrary, precisely correspond with this agreement.

Regarding the freedom of opinion, the Soviet Delegation gave its reply on this matter in its statement of 8 July 1947. The Soviet Delegation continues to adhere to the opinion that the American Delegation, having set itself up, without sufficient grounds for it, in the role of the defender of freedom of opinion, is trying thus to create an impression that the

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Soviet Delegation appears to be against freedom of opinion. Such attempts are doomed to failure. If necessity arises the Soviet Delegation will once more return to this matter and will show through examples of Korean actuality how the matter stands regarding the application of the principle of freedom of opinion in Korea. The Soviet Delegation feels it necessary to emphasize once more that the three provisions for consultation which have been agreed upon by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, do not contradict freedom of expression of opinion, and that the American Delegation resorts to the reference to freedom of expression of opinion when the question arises regarding application of concrete conditions for consultation, evidently with the aim of departing from these conditions.

The American Delegation stated that if the Soviet proposals regarding parties and organizations which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, are to be adopted, then it will lead to the exclusion from consultation of a large group of rightist political parties. As it is known to the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation throughout the duration of the work of the Joint Commission, proposed that parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, may be admitted to consultation only in case they declare their withdrawal from the Committee and cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission. But the American Delegation rejected this proposal of the Soviet Delegation, and thereby, the work of the Joint Commission was prolonged and is being prolonged indefinitely.

The Soviet Delegation once again suggests to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations, which fully uphold the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. There is a great number of such parties and organizations, both leftist and rightist.

The Soviet Delegation considers that the Joint Commission has no reason, because of a small group of parties and organizations which oppose the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, to retard the work of establishing a Provisional Democratic Government.

The Korean people are full of determination to assist the work of the

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Joint Commission in establishing a Provisional Government. This can be confirmed by the numerous greetings, which come to the Joint Commission in North as well as in South Korea, and by visits of delegations from different parties, organizations and the population which demand that the Joint Commission successfully solve the question of establishing a central government. The Soviet Delegation understands the hopes and aspirations of the Korean people in regard to unification of Korea under a unified power of a Provisional Democratic Government, provided for in the Moscow Decision. The people will never forgive the Joint Commission, if the commission, because of some group unwilling to renounce its principles of struggle against the Moscow Decision, against the Joint Commission and against the Allies, will retard the work of unification of Korea and the establishment of a Provisional Government.

The Soviet Delegation appeals to the American Delegation to take the road leading to the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and of the agreement between the two Ministers, and to apply sincere and honest efforts towards the speediest establishment of a Provisional Democratic Government and the unification under its leadership of all Korea, as it was provided for in the Moscow Decision.

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OFF THE RECORD

PRESS CONFERENCE - 0900 Hours, 23 July 1947

Newspaper Editors and Publishers Present:

Mr. Wright Bryan
Mr. William Chenery
Mr. Marshall Dana
Mr. Sidney F. Harris
Mr. Lee Hills
Mr. Earl Johnson
Mr. Hamilton Owens
Mr. Lee F. Payne
Mr. Joseph J. Packman
Mr. Walker Stone

GENERAL HODGE: These imposing charts you can take along with you to study at your leisure. General Brown will give you a resume of the current Joint Commission situation later. I want this entirely informal. I thought I'd just begin by giving you some information, you may stop me at any time and ask questions to clear up anything as we go along. I want to give you some background, or a resume of the problems here. Before I start, I would like to say that I will be available at my office any time any of you want to see me today, and I'll be available at my home tonight or tomorrow night. If any of you want to clear up any questions on any particular thing you are interested in, if I can help, I'll do it. I am sincere in my desire to have the American people know what our problems are, not from my standpoint alone, but from the standpoint of our mission here -- of the job we are doing. We, as you know, are one segment of the world battlefront, and that situation is getting more serious every day.

We are confronted with certain basic conditions which I will go into briefly as we go along, so that you will understand the background and when you get the news you will have something to hang it on. Feel free to ask any questions you want. This is off the record, of course, and I will leave it to your judgement as to how to use it. I prefer not to be quoted -- I hate to see my name in print, but I do want to get information before the American public. When I was back in the States in February and March, I made every effort I could to give the picture without scareheads -- they may come later -- I am not so sure they won't.

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This is one of the hot spots of the world, and there is no question that it is the hot spot of the Orient. We have here certain basic conditions confronting us which we have to accept.

One is that there were early agreements made by our people who believed we could deal with the Russians. Our country, in my opinion, can deal with the Russians only when the Russians believe that the entire nation is backing the foreign policy. They do not believe that now. There is too much "liberalism" expressed by too many Americans, and too much talk. But it is a liberalism that is not realistic in its dealings. Our dealings with Soviet Russia during the War were one way deals, and practically nothing has been returned in reciprocity. The first of these conditions is the 38th Parallel; the second condition which we face is the Moscow Decision, which was made in December 1945. I will go into that a little later.

Another condition we face, not of our own making, is a people whom I call "The Irish of the Orient". When I make that statement I mean that these people have a tremendous similarity in nature with the Irish. They are a gregarious people. They love fun. They have a good sense of humor. They enjoy fighting. They are argumentative. They are very fanciful -- their folklore is much like the Irish folklore. They like to get drunk. They love parties and holidays and political power. They have good qualities -- as well as some qualities that make them difficult to handle. They are a people rather homogeneous -- they are not Chinese, nor Japanese. They stem from the Mongol race that came down to this peninsula. They got a lot of their culture from the Chinese, and they have in the past risen to a high culture by Oriental standards. They are reported to be the first people to use movable type. They whipped the Japanese with armored ships in the 16th Century.

In their history, during the last few hundred years of the Li Dynasty, they deteriorated quite a lot. Their government was

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run by the Chinese, who took over, more or less. The empire has deteriorated, and they became corrupt all the way through. They paid tribute to the Chinese, and their trade was run by the Chinese. The Japanese became interested in them several times, and a few hundred years ago they did get a foothold in the lower tip, in Pusan. The Japanese wanted to get the Chinese out, and in about 1895 a war was fought in the Seoul - Inchon area between the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese won that war, and their influence became considerable. The Russians had always been somewhat interested, but their interest was more in the North. Prior to the Russo-Japanese war there was quite a row over control of that part of Korea north of the 38th Parallel. When the Japs beat the Russians in the war of 1904, they set up a protectorate and took over Korea in 1905. The translation of "protectorate" in Korean is the same as the translation of "trusteeship", and that word is tied in with the history of Japanese oppression. In 1910 the Japanese took over this country without equivocation, moved out the Korean Government and set up a Japanese Government. From that day on it became Japanese territory recognized by the world without question.

Up until 1882, Korea had been a hermit nation. Around that time we sent in a naval officer, and he made a treaty with the emperor, which was later ratified in the U. S. Senate, to the effect that no third power would interfere in Korean affairs. Yet in 1904-05, Mr. Theodore Roosevelt intervened and was instrumental in bringing about the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War and gave the Japanese the protectorate.

Do not forget the history of promises made and not lived up to by the Japanese. They made beautiful promises in 1905 -- I think we have a copy of that protectorate agreement. Again in 1910 the Korean emperor signed over the country to the Japanese for development under beautiful terms. Some of that history I bring

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out because it gives you some picture of the importance of the question of trusteeship.

By the end of the war, as you know, announcements had been made at Cairo, Yalta, Moscow and various places where they agreed that Korea would have independence "in due course" after the war. The Koreans translated that to mean "in a few days", not "in due course". That is interesting. They were all well indoctrinated before the war ended, and had learned through their underground that they were to be given their independence, and they expected it in a few days. We came in, in September 1945, and we were to take over the southern half of Korea. I went down to Manila from Okinawa to find out about it, but could find out very little, except that this was a recently made arrangement. First I got in touch with the Japanese general up here by radio, through a communication system we had set up. Then I sent in an advance detachment by air the 4th of September. We went on the psychology we could have used. We assumed they had quit and handled them that way. Our people came in here -- an advance party of about 20 of them, before the landing of the troops and arranged for the troop arrival. Our move in here was a scramble-move. There were many other moves in the Pacific with higher priority -- the move to Japan, for instance, and the Navy into Shanghai. I didn't get all of my troops in here until in December 1945 which was a handicap.

We got the Japanese out without one single incident. We had 186,000 armed Japs here, and had no trouble with them at all. They got out in about six weeks. Then we followed with about 500,000 civilians, plus many more who came later down from the North.

We would like very much to have kept all the technicians. We kept them as long as we could, we kept them until the Koreans simply couldn't work with them any more. We still have a few --

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not many, probably 50 all told. There are a few key places where they are very necessary and where we are training Koreans.

Our repatriation of Koreans, especially from outside, not including North Korea, was about one million and three-quarters all told. That includes China, Japan, and various places in all the Pacific. The official count in the North is well over one million; the unofficial count, if we knew what it was, might double that. When we came in, about a month after the war ended, the place was crowded. We don't know how many Koreans came South before we got in. The only way we could measure that was by a census and comparison with the Japanese census in this area before. We handled, however, around three million recorded displaced persons plus over a million unrecorded. That's quite a problem when you consider the health angle.

Displaced persons smuggled in from China brought cholera in last summer. We had floods at the same time, about the same thing that's starting now. Part of our job on that was about 32 million cholera shots. These are just little sidelights on the occupation.

When we got in we ran into the turbulence of the Koreans immediately. They were taking over everything that the Japs had -- beating them up, and killing them. They had gone wild, as people do under conditions of this kind. They were perfectly willing to tear up factories and so forth -- it had no consequence to them, and there was no realization that this was to be their property. The Japanese had paid them "tear" money on discharge, some of them as much as a year's pay. The Japs had given them quite a sum of money in paying off their debts, and to save face with the Koreans, and maybe even to help us out with an inflation, which was well underway when we got in. Most of the gold and stuff had been moved out. All of that was listed as Jap gold anyway. The Japs had used this place, exploited it for their expansion move and for the war. The industries here were war designed. There was little industry

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that could compete in the world market with peacetime operations. A lot of the industry is tied to the ground -- mining and smelting, for instance, and power -- which is almost all in the North. We have some power here and some stand-by stuff we are still repairing.

As regards the political history -- we came in under the directive that we would utilize the existing government until that could be replaced in an orderly manner. That was not well received by the Koreans. Also, it was not well received by the Americans at home. We started out that way, but we had to remove the Japs very rapidly and put combat officers in key positions. I had just a very few trained Military Government people. We replaced the Japanese police with Korean youngsters, after using soldiers for a long time. We removed the objectionable Koreans from the Police. Incidentally, I got a good quote in the early days -- some of you may have heard of it. It is alleged I said that "the Koreans and Japanese were the same breed of cats". I did say that, but I said it this way -- talking about the police force -- "some of the Korean members of the police force and the Japanese are in the eyes of the Koreans the same breed of cats". In other words, some of the Korean members of the police force were hated worse than the Japanese. That hampered the development of the police force that we had, we had to have some people of experience, and the only ones available were Koreans that were trained under the Japanese. The ones we have left are those whose records are perfectly clear, although they are occasionally sniped at by the Communists. We have now only about 200 Koreans as officials of the police who had any service under the Japs that Koreans can rate as more than those who labored for the Japs. They are skilled technicians, and they have very little power, but they have a technical background which we have to use in police organization and technical work. They are not in a position where they can harm the Koreans. There are additional ones who had served the

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Japanese, as privates in the Jap Army, which nobody objected to. About eight months after we got here we had developed to the point where the Korean police could handle affairs themselves. We do have criticism of the police, because the Oriental policemen, wherever you find him -- in China, Japan, etc. -- is a great beater-upper. We have had difficulty stopping that. It is mostly stopped now. It is the old idea they have -- the Oriental idea to get evidence for the court. The old Korean police before the Japs were among the worst.

CORRESPONDENT: I've heard of the third degree myself.

HODGE: Yes, they're a little bit rough. Eventually we got our Military Government trained people in. They closed in about December, and about then we were able to take over all the area down south. Up until that time that area was rather free -- the Korean Communists had moved in on it, and had taken over control under the Communist program.

Back again on the history politically of Korea during Japanese occupation. The underground against the Japs operated by the Koreans had a difficult time. The Japanese did not allow any gatherings. If more than three people got together, a Jap police had to be with them, who reported on the meeting. If they had a meeting surreptitiously, the Jap police would arrest them. That made it hard for the political leaders. Also, travel was restricted throughout the villages and towns. However, some of the leaders got in touch with Moscow and Yenan -- the latter was the Oriental center of Communism. In 1925 the Comintern took over the Communist party in Korea. That was the beginning of Korean Communism. Koreans worked in the underground under the technique that the Communists had developed. When we came in, they were well organized. They had also reinforced recently by agents out of Moscow, out of Leningrad and Vladivostok. The Russians had about thirty thousand Korean in their own forces

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in Siberia. They were well organized and well set up to take over. The Russian desire through here has always been to control eastern Asia, throughout Manchuria and Korea, particularly. North Korea has two fine ports -- one at Munsan and one at Chinnampo. These tie in with the railways across Manchuria. Otherwise Vladivostok is reached through Siberia.

There was set up here when we got in, established by the Korean people, a quasi People's government, the Korean People's Republic. They had a staff selected from Korean patriots, but under our directives we were not authorized to recognize any government. We looked this thing over, and made some attempt to get their assistance in operating a government under the occupation. All they did was fight -- they had no intention of assisting or cooperating. It developed later that this was the Communist center. They had the aid and assistance of the Russian Consulate here and were well organized and developed throughout South Korea. That fact later caused some difficulty in taking over control in South Korea. We had only a small part of our troops here at the time, and there was disorder in the south part of the zone because their units were well organized.

CORRESPONDENT: Where was the center of this People's Republic?

HODGE: It was right here in Seoul. However, they finally gave it up and openly went into the Communist party. The next big event was the Moscow Decision. The Koreans had heard about "trusteeship". Their legendary leader in exile, Syngman Rhee, arrived in October 1945. His idea was immediate independence without regard to the facts or conditions of the international situation. The United Nations Charter set up Trusteeship for "former enemy territory". Koreans made a great fuss over that. Korea was not a "former enemy territory" in the eyes of the Koreans. Then one of our State Department men in the States made some statement about Trusteeship for Korea. All this was before the Moscow Decision came out. Remember the meaning of this word "trusteeship" in Korea

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-- these people are not educated but they have that idea well fixed. A group of editors and publishers was here last January and we said something about political education. Roy Howard insisted that they were adolescents, but after about two days he said they were infantile. Under the Japs they had no opportunity for discussion of politics. They tend to swallow ideas whole without thought and once in their heads it is hard to get an idea out. The Moscow Decision was made in late December, and it was announced in January through UP. They did not give any details. It merely said "five-year Trusteeship for Korea". Koreans went wild. They ran crazy all over the streets. I didn't get the Moscow Decision in toto for two or three days -- I didn't know the terms of it. When I got it, I talked to several of these people, and was able to convince one rightist group that it would not be injurious to Korea. The leader of the group went out and made a statement to that effect, and the next morning he was dead -- the first political assassination. He was a Rightist - Song Jin Nu. The ones I had the most trouble with were the Leftists. They were hard-headed. They wouldn't even listen. They would shake their heads and shut their ears. The demonstrations started -- Kim Koo and his gang tried to take over the government, and did not succeed. The demonstrations came one after the other. We put a slight clamp on it and said they would have to have permission to hold a demonstration to keep them from starting riots, but the Communists wanted their big demonstration to end all demonstrations against trusteeship. I told them they shouldn't have it. The next day they came in and said it was okay, that they were going to have a demonstration for trusteeship. They got their orders that day. So, that further divided the left from the right line at that time. I don't think I am exaggerating one bit when I say that since that day the entire political turmoil for the man in the street in Korea has centered around

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trusteeship. The Rightists have used it for political purposes. They will not agree to understand its significance because if they lost the slogan "Anti-Trusteeship" they won't have any great emotional plea.

CORRESPONDENT: You say the Rightists, General?

HODGE: Yes, we tried everything possible to educate them on the Moscow Decision -- that it is not the end of the Koreans' world. Of course the only definition we have of trusteeship is "measures for aid and assistance" (trusteeship). Later it says "preparatory measures for a trusteeship up to five years", which we assume to be the same expressed synonymous meaning, but to the Koreans with the translation they have, it is hard to understand. That thing has come all the way through, and you get your biggest political turmoil because of it. The Moscow Agreement was made with the Russians, but to my knowledge, the only way we can get it to work, is by Russian cooperation. We tried last year and failed because the Russians did not agree. This year we are stalemated on the same thing. General Brown will cover the Joint Commission conferences a little later. The word "Communist", after last year's Joint Commission meeting, became very smelly. They very smartly reorganized as the South Korea Labor Party. They have many other units organized under the Democratic Front, with rigid Communist control. They have trouble with their discipline at times, but they have a good foundation and work very hard.

CORRESPONDENT: In what respect did they become smelly?

HODGE: The name "Communist" to these Koreans became a little smelly. To these Koreans who became a little educated as to the common term "Communist", it meant working for the Comintern and Moscow.

CORRESPONDENT: The people got on to that?

HODGE: Yes. In other words, these people are basically nationalistic. You must remember that during the entire Jap occupation they were always thinking of the day of independence. Remember

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also, that it has been almost two years now since the war ended, and there is still no independence. The Communist slogans in the early days were about Russia and the Fatherland, they made no bones about it. They had banners in their halls and they carried nothing but the Soviet flag -- "I am loyal to the Soviet Nation", was the first pledge in their youth program. They changed their name later, however, and amalgamated with other parties. We can't keep the issue of trusteeship down. The Rightists object to the Joint Commission because it carries with it the concept of the trusteeship that is going to result. We have tried all we can to get them to cooperate to set up the provisional government under this international agreement. The Moscow Decision provides that the measures for this aid and assistance will be done in consultation with the Korean Provisional Government and participation by them, but the rightists don't want to be a party to anything that constitutes trusteeship. They have no alternative except a wish to set up a separate government for South Korea, which is not our mission. Our policy is a United North and South Korea. At present there is no way to do that except through cooperation with the Joint Commission. The fight last summer became rather bitter following the breakdown of the Joint Commission, it broke down because the Rightists kept saying they did not like trusteeship, and the Soviets said they wouldn't talk to people that objected to the Moscow Decision. They still say so. During the summer the Communists made a change in their tactics. They gained a lot of followers through their beautiful promises. The promises made by the Communist controlled Democratic Front are promises that we know cannot be fulfilled, but they are better promises than anyone else has made. With their line of "Let's get the Joint Commission going and wipe out these people who won't cooperate" they make a big hit with people who don't have any idea of the aims of Communism. Last fall they watched our

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strength go down. It was a very critical moment. They started a revolution in September -- a general strike which spread out in many areas. They started riots down south. They were well organized, and led by people unknown in the area locally.

CORRESPONDENT: What was the date of that?

HODGE: Late September and early October. The exact date I don't remember. We had a little difficulty in Seoul -- not in the nature of riots necessarily, but fighting between Rightists and Leftists. But at Taegu the Communists lead groups, started riots and killed about 50 police one day, and nearly a hundred additional people. Here at Pohang (pointing) is one of their favorite places for landing the boys from the North. The riots moved across South Korea day after day; as these organizers advanced across, they carried disorders with them. The police at Taegu did not believe they would actually attack them. The Communist rounded up a big crowd, telling them they would be given free rice. Under cover of this crowd that drew police reserves, they had gangs to attack the police in their small detachments throughout the town. Their idea was to get rid of the police so there wouldn't be any further interference. That was their plan. Their master plan calls for revolution in Korea with a Communist take-over. How much help comes from the North is still a puzzle, but that master plan, as far as we can find out, has not been abandoned.

We picked up several leaders, tried them for murder in American courts and convicted them without any question. The Revolution broke up and then they changed tactics. The real terrorists went underground and became hard to find but they quieted down. They are now carrying on increasing numbers of small disturbances in which they are apparently trying to get an incident started. I don't know how long it is going to be until the real blow-up comes. Since the Joint Commission has been in session, the Communists have been very quiet, but we are having constant irritating gang fights between gangs of youngsters down in the south (mostly down in this

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area), (pointing to map). A lot of that comes out of frustration because the situation goes on and on, and no progress is made for uniting their country or obtaining their independence. That is playing into the hands of the Russians.

During this time we are trying to develop an all Korean government in South Korea. We have trained and picked out the best men we could find. We have very able men in most of the posts -- men who can learn and will eventually be able to handle administration. Most of them are reasonably young. We tried when we started out to get men who had not been in politics but with some ability and who knew how to handle various types of jobs. We found out after several months that no so-called Leftist (Communist) would participate. We got some of them to come in, but they resigned, apparently on order from the Party. Their controllers would not let them stay in. They will not get in and cooperate unless they control. The fact that we have a Rightist government is not the fault of our effort to coalesce. It was the only government we could get. We have several Liberals in this government, but no Communists that I know of.

The present situation I think is rather serious. Since the opening of the Joint Commission we have made every effort to get the Koreans to come in and cooperate with it and set up a provisional government that would be representative of the people. Syngman Rhee went back to the States last December, quite unhappy because we did not let him take over South Korea and do exactly as he pleased. He would be a good dictator. He tried to be that. I tried to use him to get a coalition here when we first came in, and it looked as though that coalition might be coming along. He is very dictatorial and intolerant, but it looked as though we might have something. Then came the Moscow Decision, which blew it sky high. Then we started over again with a group in the early spring of '46, in an effort for a coalition. This was an all-Korean

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effort, and we got something again that looked like it might be a coalition group, which we would call the Advisory Council -- the Democratic Council. At the official inaugural meeting, that blew up, and the Leftists in it withdrew so that it became almost, if not entirely, Right. There were some Liberals in it, but they later drew out. It has no official standing. Then last Summer and Fall we worked to set up a coalition committee. We got the democratic council to send five men, and the Leftist group to send five men. When these men got out in the middle and the bitter factional fights started, we lost hope of a real coalition. The coalition group then set up a "moderate" party which was showing some progress until the question of trusteeship came up again, and the "middle" got extremely dangerous. Anyone who said he believed that the Joint Commission is a way of settlement was thrown out of any cooperation with the Rightist group. As I have said, the whole thing continues to revolve around that word "Trusteeship". Syngman Rhee led his group against the Joint Commission, and they have fought it bitterly. He doesn't want it to succeed. He is doing everything he can to discredit the Americans here who back any moderation in politics -- particularly me. He hates me, though I have never done anything to him. But I am here to carry out the policy of the United States, which does not include his setting up a separate independent government for South Korea. From the standpoint of accomplishing our mission we are handicapped because Rhee has quite a following, and it is a good sound following, but we are not getting the support of the people who are trying to help against establishment of Communism, because of the conditions existing. They will not face the factual conditions. The Russians occupy half, and we occupy the other half of their country and we are trying to get together to carry out the Moscow Decision.

CORRESPONDENT: Have you figured out what would be a desirable alternative to trusteeship? Would the Koreans accept a one nation

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Trusteeship?

HODGE: Yes, if the United States would take the trusteeship, it would be fine. In their minds now, trusteeship, Communism, and Russian control are all synonomous. You can't get them to separate the ideas.

CORRESPONDENT: Is there a way to work out that thing?

HODGE: If we can get the Provisional Government, we could work out a trusteeship to which they would have no objection. They think trusteeship will give them no sovereignty at all. They say, "We need aid and assistance, but we don't want trusteeship".

CORRESPONDENT: Do you presume then that you could get agreement with the northern section to create a provisional government?

HODGE: The only way we could do that is through Russian help.

CORRESPONDENT: Are they helpful?

HODGE: They are very unhelpful.

CORRESPONDENT: Is it your opinion that you could change the Moscow Decision and operate South Korea as under the sole trusteeship of the United States. Could they make a go of it?

HODGE: Yes, except that I cannot foresee any change in the Moscow Decision.

CORRESPONDENT: Is the Joint Commission trying to get a united government?

HODGE: The Joint Commission operating under the Moscow Decision is working for a united government of all Korea, to include both north and south. They are stuck on the working out of details of consultation with the various political parties with the Joint Consultation.

CORRESPONDENT: General, suppose you just picked up and left, and said, "To hell with it"?

HODGE: You would have a revolution in South Korea and the Russians would take over control.

CORRESPONDENT: But not in the United States. How would the United States be adversely affected by a complete withdrawal from Korea?

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HODGE: That would depend entirely on our foreign policy. If we make a complete withdrawal from Korea, we would be making a complete withdrawal from Asia.

CORRESPONDENT: Suppose we maintain our bases wherever we have them now, including Japan, and withdraw from Korea and give it back to the Koreas or Russians. How would we be adversely affected?

HODGE: Again I go back to what is our foreign policy. Say we abandon Korea to Communism -- the Japanese are pretty close in this sphere. They have nobody to turn to but the U.S. or Russia, and we are several thousand miles away. When the peace treaty is made the Japs will be scared to death if we have abandoned Asia to Soviet Russian influence and ideology.

CORRESPONDENT: I think we should defend Japan.

HODGE: All right, then, we should have friends in a nearby area. Korea is a very strategic area.

CORRESPONDENT: How far is Japan?

HODGE: About 100 miles.

CORRESPONDENT: Well, take the case of Ireland. The British could not maintain political control in Ireland. I don't know how you can persuade the American people to spend much money and many lives in Korea.

HODGE: I am just a soldier carrying out the American policy as is given to me in my directives.

CORRESPONDENT: Well, we're thinking of whether or not our American policy isn't foolish.

HODGE: We've announced a lot of things. We say we're going to do this, and stay in Korea until the problem is solved. We can't just get up and walk out. It affects this whole area. Now Wedemeyer, acting for the President, has gone into China on a mission and announced he was going in there to see what we were going to do there. He is coming to Korea. This place is economically flat; the Southern part is helpless if left by itself.

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About the only thing they have here is food, and not enough of that. They do have some textiles, but the textile factories need power.

CORRESPONDENT: May I ask you this -- aside from the international implications of such a move, if the United States took unilateral action in Korea and took over the entire peninsula, would that be possible to deal with the Koreans?

HODGE: I believe it would, after upsetting the Communist regime in the North, but how is the United States going to do that? Koreans as a whole would accept it all right. However, North Korea is very definitely a Sovietized area.

CORRESPONDENT: From a practical standpoint, do you think it would start a war?

HODGE: There is a strong possibility -- this is outside my province -- but my personal opinion is that if we could make some agreement with the Soviets to both withdraw, letting the South Korean and North Korean representatives set up a government, something like that might let us get out without too much loss of face. If we get out, we won't come back. The Russians won't have to come back. They have their Koreans well trained and a Korean Army capable of exerting considerable influence.

CORRESPONDENT: If we both abandoned simultaneously it is a hand-over to the Russians?

HODGE: I would so consider it. It might save face, but I would hate to take the responsibility after promises we have made.

CORRESPONDENT: But you consider Korea essential to the defense of Japan and Japan essential to the defense of our outlying bases?

HODGE: It isn't primarily a question of the defense of Japan, but it is more a matter of prestige. Out here in this country -- you don't know what face means. In all dealings you have to keep that in mind. If we pull out of here after all the announcements, without solving the problem satifactory -- the Japs are looking over their shoulder at the Russians anyway, and the Russians are

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doing a pretty good job of propaganda in Japan now. A turn of the wheel might give them a lot more prestige. Japan would say, "The hell with the United States. They are getting out of Korea--the next thing, they will get out of Japan." They know we don't like to stay in occupied areas; we never have. In the last war we got out of Germany after a couple of years, and the next war started in the same spot. Maybe that might not have happened if we'd had a longer occupation or insisted on carrying out our policy. Certainly our occupation there was not successful in accomplishing the aim of no future war there. Part of our job here is to wipe out the effects of the last war and help prevent a new one. Maybe we can't wipe them all out, but we can put a crimp in the spread of Communism in all Asia. To look out a window and see faces of bogeymen is not very pleasant after you think over the world situation and listen to the world news. Of course, I am outside of my own country, and sometimes I think my view is a little more objective than if I were at home. I am inclined to be a little pessimistic at times as to where we are heading, after dealing with the Soviets and their stooges here. They mean business.

CORRESPONDENT: Are the Koreans under the Russians more or less turbulent than under the Americans?

HODGE: They are less turbulent. Under the Russians they are shot down if they disturb. We have been too easy on them to keep them quiet. We came in here and gave them our freedoms. They understand force better -- force will shut them down.

CORRESPONDENT: This trusteeship of five years, is that a limit? Is there a time limit?

HODGE: The wording says "up to". It could be terminated at any time.

CORRESPONDENT: But you are not going to get a solution in five years, are you? First you have to find a provisional government, and then five years after that?

HODGE: That is the way the Moscow Decision reads.

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CORRESPONDENT: But so far you haven't got a provisional government?

HODGE: That's right.

CORRESPONDENT: It may take from now until forever -- life and 5 years?

HODGE: That's right, but if we can get cooperation we can get it in a short time. The Koreans need guidance and help. The Japs gave them no opportunity to learn anything. You have here men up to my age that don't know anything except what they learned under the Japs, and they were never given any responsibility. As a matter of fact, the first spring here we found a lot of land that had not been planted because farmers hadn't been told when to plant crops. They take no initiative and no responsibility. It is not the fault of the people. It is the lack of any opportunity ever to exercise intiative, judgement or responsibility.

CORRESPONDENT: Can you think of any practical way of folding up the Korean occupation without losing face? I ask that because I think it is almost certain that after the next presidential election it will be folded up.

HODGE: The only way I could see would be to get a mutual withdrawal with a short abridgement of the steps of the Moscow Decision.

CORRESPONDENT: And you are not very sure of that?

HODGE: I don't know -- right now we are operating under the Moscow Decision. I can't predict beyond that.

CORRESPONDENT: Is it certain there may be a lot of turmoil if we stay here?

HODGE: Yes, I consider it so. It is growing, for the simple reason that we stay on and on and nothing happens.

CORRESPONT: If the Russians have three or four times as many men and equipment, and determination, and we have all this equipment and no determination .....

HODGE: The Soviet forces in North Korea do not have it in their own troops. They do have a Korean Army. We do not have a Korean

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army, and I think rightly so. The only reason either of us would build up a Korean army of 150,000 would be for offensive purposes. Up there they have apparently built up a big army, as they have done in all their satellites.

CORRESPONDENT: How big is the North Korean army?

HODGE: The best estimate we can make is about one hundred and fifty thousand, but it is increasing and rumors are they aim at 500,000.

CORRESPONDENT: In your opening remarks you mentioned the possibility of rather sensational headlines coming from this part of the world. What is that possibility?

HODGE: Here is the possibility I mentioned -- I don't want to be quoted: this North Korea army is not an accident. The Communist (Soviet) master plan indicates that they plan a revolution in South Korea -- a good, old-fashioned Communist revolution. They can completely break up the railroad system, bridges, and so forth; they can make life miserable for everyone here. They can prepare the way for that thru their local 5th Column and the following built up because of this fight around trusteeship. Any man who gets disgusted with this question of trusteeship can join with the Joint Commission cooperators, but he is cast off by the strong Anti-trusteeship group. He then has no one to follow, except the Communist group, but the 30,000 real Communist may control nearly half the population. With the rest disorganized as they are, you can see the results.

CORRESPONDENT: From the physical standpoint then, that would be just an advance across the dividing line in the north? Since these people are all Koreans, you can't keep them out?

HODGE: There is no way to keep them out. It is a long boundary. I could put every man I have on that boundary and still not keep them out. We are not set up to keep them out, nor are we set to fight an invading army.

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CORRESPONDENT: Of the 250 who are coming in daily, as I understand it, how many are Russian-trained operators?

HODGE: Very few -- they wouldn't send them in openly, though. Usually, they come down along this coastline in boats (pointing). It is the most perfect coastline in the world for smuggling men, arms and merchandise.

CORRESPONDENT: Do you have any idea as to how many are coming down?

HODGE: No, I don't, except we know they are coming. Reports indicate a considerable flow.

CORRESPONDENT: Is that also part of the master plan?

HODGE: Yes.

CORRESPONDENT: You said you had seen the master plan?

HODGE: We have the old plan, which is over a year old. We have some modifications. This is all stuff that has been published from time to time, and they shift target dates in their plan as circumstances require.

CORRESPONDENT: What is your estimate of the number of Communists in South Korea?

HODGE: It is hard to estimate, since they have changed over on the name. There were at least twenty to thirty thousand last fall, but they are going into this business now the same as in the States, through front organizations.

BROWN: We mentioned to General Shtikov the other day that all of the political parties and social organizations which had registered in North Korea were Communist parties, and his reply was that they are not yet ready to become Communists.

CORRESPONDENT: They haven't completed school yet, is that it?

BROWN: I judge that is what he means. But they are one hundred percent Communists in spite of that fact.

JACOBS: There is actually no named Communist party probably, like in Albania. They have another name, but they are actually Communists.

HODGE: I hope all of you have, or do read the report of the

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Canadian Royal Commission on the Soviet spying in Canada. That is a "must" reading.

CORRESPONDENT: Was that the Canadian Royal Commission?

HODGE: Yes. What you see in there is this picture -- the picture that those who sold the secrets were, with one or two exceptions, not Communists; they were people swayed by a beautiful picture -- Liberalists. They are the ones who do the harm. A Communist living up to all the precepts of the Communist party begins to smell like a skunk very quickly. These Liberalists who are persuaded to serve the Communist party by their talk are far more dangerous.

CORRESPONDENT: You mentioned the turning on of a revolution in South Korea by the Korean army as the main thing that might put our troops here in jeopardy. Are there any other plans you know of?

HODGE: I can't believe that this North Korean army, as an organized unit, will attack while the Russians are in North Korea, or until they are ready for war. They won't ever let them come down as an organized force -- I don't fear that. But there will be an infiltration of men, weapons and munitions when these people decide to come down and organize revolution. I believe it has already started.

CORRESPONDENT: How imminent do you think that spontaneous movement might be?

HODGE: I can't tell. It could have gotten under way last fall. They were not intending to kill everybody, but they were intending to take over. That is their aim. How violent it will be, I don't know. It became pretty violent in Russia. In that revolution, indications are that they killed more people than died in both World Wars I and II.

CORRESPONDENT: Does that master plan include any plan for the disposal of American troops here?

HODGE: No, that plan is only a generalized plan with key phases

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-- the final phase being liberation. They may or may not oppose American troops. I am merely presenting this discussion for your thinking. I am not predicting that it will come, necessarily, but I am predicting that there is a high probability of precipitated action, if this thing goes on as it is now. In other words, these people are getting tired of occupation, of not having their own government. That is a basic fact, and you can't blame them. They are getting to the point of where they would accept any idea which looks as though it might have some chance of success. They don't dislike the Americans -- they just don't like any occupation troops. They had them too long under the Japs. Of all the occupation troops that could have been here I think they like the Americans the best. Most of them certainly know the Americans are their friends.

CORRESPONDENT: You say we have not organized a Korean army because that would be regarded as an offensive army?

HODGE: Of any size -- yes. We have here now a constabulary of about 10,000 and police numbering about 28,000 which is enough for internal security -- interior defense.

CORRESPONDENT: This North Korea People's Army -- do you regard that as an offensive army?

HODGE: I don't know how we could regard it -- maybe as an offensive army against their own people in the South or to put down uprisings in the North. There is a lot of indication that some of these boys fight in China. The Chinese make a lot of claims that many Koreans are in the Communist army.

I would like to go just a little bit into our own troop troubles here. We are now on our fourth turnover of personnel since we came into Korea. That in itself makes for considerable difficulty in continuity of effort and the smooth operation of an organization. Maintaining an Army, after all, is a business, and we are running a business here. That rapid turnover has handicapped

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us a lot. This is no alibi, but I point out that between September 1st of last year and March 1st we received about 50,000, many of whom are already gone. We do not have 50,000 now, and it is dropping off rapidly, with no replacements. About 95 percent of the Command had joined since September 1. That in itself causes considerable confusion among the troops. Almost all of these youngsters are 17, 18, and 19 years old. Twenty years is an old man -- he shaves -- most of them don't even shave. They came in unindoctrinated in what they were here for. They are fine American kids and they are doing a swell job. If we could only keep them for a while and train them! I'm very proud of this Command, and what they are doing, but they are still kids. You see them wandering around like a bunch of high school boys, but their understanding has increased a lot since their arrival. They've grown up a lot. During the first winter we were here we had really rugged living conditions -- little heat, broken windows in some barracks ... we didn't have any gripes during that winter; they were seasoned soldiers. But last year about one hundred men, probably, sent letters back home regarding how unhappy they were that were made public. That started the "Saga of the Bobby Soxers", as we call it. One newspaper got involved in this thing, in fact about eighteen boys from that town wrote letters from here, some of which were printed in newspapers. We made quite a study of the thing, and found that in most cases these youngsters come out here -- it's cold and rugged here, they don't have the country club in the afternoon, and dances at night, and big weekends -- they come out -- nobody had told them that in this place they have a mission to accomplish -- they haven't been educated at home regarding conditions here -- very often the recruiting sergeant hasn't been too good. He tells them about the glories of travel -- education under the GI Bill of Rights, and they come out with the wrong attitude.

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CORRESPONDENT: This is no place to work your way through college?

HODGE: No, but we do have the Corps University to which the youngsters can go, when we can spare them, to study certain subjects which further their military work, or at night, subjects for self-education. But a lot of them come out and want to finish high school here. The only way they can do that is the hard way -- by correspondence school. An important factor is the psychology of these youngsters. Their older brothers were in the last war, and they heard a lot of tales about how tough things were. They come out here, and in almost nine out of ten cases where they cry how tough it is, it comes out of the fact that they have to convince the folks at home that they also are having a tough time. Another factor is that often Mom won't give up her baby. He comes out here, and she starts to write him, "We miss you so, we cry when we sit down to the dinner table at night .... Christmas Day when you weren't here was the saddest day of the year instead of the happiest". Things like that. Meantime Johnny has written home, "We had a grand Christmas dinner, with all the trimmings... things aren't so bad here...", and so forth. Then Mom starts writing, "Isn't there something you'd like to have us send you over there?" Johnny who is now eating three meals a day starts remembering the four and five meals he used to eat at home, including ice box raids and corner restaurant snacks, and decides that he might as well ask them to send him some extra food. When mom hears this, she begins crying, "Johnny is starving in Korea. He isn't getting enough to eat." (He's only gained sixteen pounds.) And she runs around, tells everyone she meets, and the other moms with their sons over here begin the same cry. This is taken from actual cases. The mothers write letters to their congressmen, and that's the sort of thing that gives us headaches. Complaints about the mail, too -- these things have all caused us some headaches, and mostly because of the folks back home who don't know the real

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situation. This one particular newspaper that got sucked in on the thing -- you all know the name, I'm sure -- the Detroit News -- send Adler out, and I gave him the files and let him go thru the records. He studied those, and went out by himself to look over the area, and he talked to these kids. He wrote up seven very fine articles on the psychology of the whole thing, which I wish all our people could read. The editorial page of the News gave a good resume showing the need of some adjustment for these kids. I am just pointing this out as one of the difficulties in the occupation command, but don't misunderstand me, the youngsters are the finest of American kids, and they are doing a swell job. Most of them get along fine. As I say, this saga came out of about only one hundred letters out of the whole Command, but the danger comes from other people who have their boys out here. They get all excited, and that hysteria is the thing that gets embarrassing.

CORRESPONDENT: Were any of these letters stimulated by insidious forces?

HODGE: That I can't positively say. However, I will say that there have been some peculiar circumstances surrounding some of the "smear Korea" campaign, both in and outside of Korea.

Our sick rate here has been consistently low. It went up a little last winter because ships came in with a lot of juvenile diseases. They began to develop different -- all sorts of things. That sort of thing, if it happens in a camp, can be checked, but on board ship for a long trip is difficult to stop.

We had one batch of smallpox after we first got in here, but gave them vaccinations and have had no cases of smallpox since December of 1945. We had an epidemic of Cholera last summer. 16,000 Koreans had it, but we didn't have a single case among the Americans. In other words, we have been able to take care of ourselves in a disease-ridden area. However, we have had to take strong sanitary measures. We don't drink the untreated water, and

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We don't eat the local food. We have had a few cases of liquor poisoning, so we don't drink local liquor.

CORRESPONDENT: Any girl problems?

HODGE: Girl problems are in reverse. The Korean people live under the old Confucian code and are quite influenced by it. The boys and girls are separated when young. They don't run around together as twosomes. The youngsters cannot go out publicly in pairs. The Koreans blame the girls if they are seen with men. The girls must not be seen out with Korean, Chinese, American, or any other men. It just isn't done. It is a code which they will grow out of in time, but which they still believe in. We have many cases of soldiers driving a girl in a jeep. Her family, if she is seen, will beat the heck out of her when she gets home, or the soldier may be accused of rape. We have no prohibition against the soldiers fraternizing, but we tell them the facts of this thing so that they may use their own judgement. Authorized dance halls and Kisang clubs are all right. The girls are paid for that. the lower brackets of kisangs (geishas) degenerate into prostitutes. There are the usual number of prostitutes here with a very high rate of venereal disease. We control it by education, and the venereal disease rate is down. As far as I can find out, it is the lowest of the occupied areas.

CORRESPONDENT: How do you spell the local type of geisha?

HODGE: Either Kisang or kaesong. It corresponds to the Japanese geisha. Our turn-over of officers has been extremely high. We are now getting officers that we can expect to keep. The greatest difficulty in turn-over is the constant re-education, re-orientation, and realignment. You think you have something working and the first thing you know it breaks down -- like a machine with a broken part. You have to keep replacing parts all the time. That will adjust itself under the new regulations, but we are in for

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one more early turn-over -- almost complete turn-over -- by early next year.

CORRESPONDENT: About every six months?

HODGE: It has been, but this last turn-over will take almost a year. The enlistments now are for a definite period so we can at least predict. Before we had draftees, the frequent changes in criteria for discharge kept us constantly off balance.

CORRESPONDENT: Are you getting many three year enlistments?

HODGE: They are increasing now. The 18 months enlistment was a draft law enlistment that was used to avoid the draft or to cash in on the GI Bill of Rights for some young fellows who were wanting something in the future. The newly established two, three, and five year enlistments will help, if they get recruits. In the past few months, we have obtained a lot of fine non-commissioned officers, about 3,000. These are all three year enlistment men with past service during the war. They are professional men more or less, and are a tremendous help. Without them, we would have even greater difficulty. I don't think of anything else right now unless there are some questions. I want to repeat that I am available to you at any time while you are here and would be glad if any of you have anything you want to discuss.

CORRESPONDENT: A moment ago you mentioned the Wedemeyer visit. Do you care to enlarge on that? You indicated that he already knows what he wants to do.

HODGE: No, I didn't state that. I don't want you to get me wrong. I said that he is a friend of Chaing-kai-shek and he is reputed not to like the Communists. You know as much about the mission as I do. He will be here for a few days, as I understand it. He is on a fact finding tour. It looks as if it is a move that might develop the strengthening or changing of policy in the Far East.

CORRESPONDENT: When do you look for him?

HODGE: Sometime in August. I have no definite information. He is not tied down to dates.

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CORRESPONDENT: Are you making transcript of this discussion that will be available?

HODGE: I can make it available to you later, but not before you leave. If you are interested, I will send it to you.

CORRESPONDENT: Could you mail it to all of us. Would that be too much trouble?

HODGE: No, with the understanding that it will be off the record. It is background stuff that I feel the American people should know about. Some of the things I have said would hurt us if quoted from me. Some of my discussions of the Korean people would hurt very much. I can't let them know that they have too many dlficiencies. We are educating them. It's like trying to raise our children. We have to keep their respect and good will.

CORRESPONDENT: A few minutes ago, you spoke of an organization in Detroit called Mom's Incorporated. Was that facetious?

HODGE: The Mom's Club of America, Incorporated is a name. I received many calls, telegrams and letters when in Washington in March. All the suburban areas of Detroit have chapters that seemed particularly active.

CORRESPONDENT: They got to be a headache to you, didn't they?

HODGE: They were a headache. If our people at home had any idea of understanding, I would not care, but the more fantastic the kid's bleats are, the more they believe him.

CORRESPONDENT: Has there been a flare up of that since the Detroit episode?

HODGE: No great amount. The Detroit News was in good faith. They thought that they were helping. They thought conditions were terrible here and that people were dying from lack of food, medical care, or freezing to death -- all far from the truth. The paper withdrew the campaign around 20 April and put out a good strong editorial. They sent Phil Adler out here to check. I allowed him to check the confidential files, to talk to the soldiers without officers being present and to come to his own conclusions. I

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helped him check soldiers' letters from the files to find out why. I gave him all my confidential records -- the whole story.

CORRESPONDENT: Have you read Philip Wylie's "Generation of Vipers"?

HODGE: Yes.

CORRESPONDENT: Then you probably enjoyed the chapter on "Mom's".

HODGE: I don't subscribe to it in full, but there is a basis there that is certainly true. I don't like it as applied to my mother. I earned every nickel since I was 15 and my mother pushed me so I would grow up and I'm glad that she did. What Wylie says has a lot of basis in fact. I think a little break here would be welcome, and then I will let General Brown take over.

HODGE continues after break in session:

There is one thing I think is a very vital piece of information that I haven't particularly mentioned -- the education level of these people. The Japanese did not provide education for the Koreans in any great amount. They provided only enough for a few who worked for them. The result of that is that one-half of the Korean people do not read nor write. It is difficult to get information to them. We have adult education programs which has reduced this somewhat, but they are ear-minded. They are suckers for all propaganda. The Communists make full use of that. In the villages, they have teams of six or eight men that go one at a time through the village and spend a few days there, telling stories -- propaganda. A few days later, another man visits the village and he tells the same stories -- identical ones -- that the Americans are shipping rice to the U.S. in oil drums or whatnot. All the stories are good. By the time five or six go through the villages and assure the people that these stories are true, they have heard it from so many they believe it to be true. One of the difficulties in counteracting it and in getting word to the people is lack of radio receivers and lack of ability to read. We have several thousand of radio receivers on order. We have some in and are placing them in the villages to

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get out information, not propaganda. We have not gone into any propaganda. By that, I mean colored information -- we give facts.

I have here one of the finest charts that I have ever seen. I have no responsibility for it whatever. My Historical Section did it. It will give you the highlights of the complicated political situation -- Right, Left, and the shifts that have taken place. It will be a help in clarifying Korean political shifts if you are interested.

CORRESPONDENT: It gives the cast of characters?

HODGE: The principal characters -- not all of them -- just the general over-all picture. This is only the frame-work. There are no political parties as we know them in the states. But the local political parties are many and active. There are hundreds of groups that call themselves political parties. The real political parties here are -- I won't discuss it too much. Generally speaking, there is Right and Left. I will give you a copy of these charts. We can't go into it now as it would take too much time. I am now going to ask General Brown if he will give you some of the Joint Commission information which is now current.

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE 46TH MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON 24 JULY 1947

Since the points of view of both delegations concerning the question of compilation of thelist of parties and social organizations for participation in consultation have drawn closer together and the only question which remains unsolved is that of parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which comprise a comparetively small group in relation to the total number of parties and organizations which expressed their desire to consult with the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation considers, that further delay in consultation and further delay in establishment of a Provisional Korean democratic Government is not permissible and introduces for consideration to the Joint Comission the following proposals:

1. To direct Subcommission #1 to define the list of parties and organizations which selected membership over 10,000 which was represented by the Soviet Delegation in the meeting of July 10, 1947, and to submit it for the approval by the Joint Commission on 28 July 1947.

2. To direct Subcommission #1 to review individually the representatives, selected by the parties and organizations included in the list according to Item 1 of the present Decision.

To compile a list of these representatives and submit it for the approval of the Joint Commission on 28 July 1947. unilateral Consultation

3. To review the draft of proposals on the order of conducting of oral consultation and creation for this purpose of the necessary number of subcommittees, whihh was presented by the Soviet Delegation to Subcommission #1 on 23 June 1947.

4. To start oral consultation with the representatives of parties and organizations who were included in the list which will be approved bythe Joint Commission on 30 July 1947 in Seoul, and to start oral consultation with the representatives of parties and organizations of North Korea on 1 August 1947, in Pyongyang.

5. To announce on behalf of the Joint Commission that parties and organizations, who comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and who submitted applications for participation in consultation, may be

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permi ted for consultation with the Joint Commission after they announce their withdrawal from this Committee and cease their struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

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Speech at the Meeting in Seoul on 27 July 1947

Citizens of Seoul!

In the name of the Soviet Delegation and from myself personally I warmly welcome the democratic public of the city of Seoul and all of the Korean people represented by you.

Numerous letters and greetings, received by the Joint Commission, as well as large numbers of delegations from democratic parties, social organizations and from the population of South and North Korea, who have visited the Joint Commission, testify to the fact that the Korean people associated with importance the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission on fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

The Korean people know that as a result of the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, Korea will be able to become a independent democratic state free from foreign interference in the shortest possible period of time.

Great are the devotion of the Democratic People's Front which militates for full support of the Moscow Decision, explains to the masses the import (significance) and historical significance of the Moscow Decision, and in every way renders support and assistance to the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation expresses its appreciation to the parties and organizations of the Democratic National Front of South Korea, which further the success of the Joint Commission in its work on the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

The US-USSR Joint Commission in the course of its two months work, and surmounting difficulties, was able to solve several important issues. The Joint Commission held meetings with the representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of South and North Korea. Parties and organizations, of South as well as North Korea have already submitted for the

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Joint Commission their written statements on the questions regarding the establishment of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and its platform.

The work is now being conducted in studying and coordinating the proposals, expressed by the democratic parties and social organizations in their answers to the questions.

Nevertheless, in the discussion of the list of parties and organizations who should be invited for consultation there exist certain differences of opinion within the Joint Commission. But lately points of view of both delegations have drawn considerably closer in regard to this question.

Not withstanding the fact that two months have already elapsed from the time of the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission there still exist certain parties and organizations in Southern Korea which continue the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

Every day of struggling against the Moscow Decision is one more day separating the Korean people from the creation of its own democratic government.

If the Joint Commission had encountered unanimous support on the part of all the parties and social organizations of South Korea in its work on fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, Korea would have had its own Provisional Democratic Government during the last year.

After the passage of a short period of time Korea aided bythe Allied Powers, which wax in strength, will create its own democratic organs of authority, will give rebirth to national economy and culture, and will obtain full independence. Those who opposed the Moscow Decision and the Allied Powers will be ashamed to look in the eyes those honest patriots who are struggling for democratic independence of their country by supporting the Moscow Decision.

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The Soviet Delegation is confident that by close cooperation with the American Delegation the difficulties which are encountered in the work of the Joint Commission shall be overcome and there will be created with the aid and assistance of Korean Democratic Parties and Social Organizations and in strict consonance with the Moscow Decision, a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, while Korea will be united as a integral whole under the guidance of thatgovernment.

Once more I greet the Democratic Parties and Social Organizations of Southern Korea which support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commissinn.

Long live the United Independent Democratic Korea and its freedom loving people!

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ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ НА МИТИНГЕ В Г.СЕУЛЕ 27 ИЮЛЯ 1947 Г.

Граждане и гражданки города Сеула!

От имени Советской делегации и от себя лично горячо приветствую демократическую общественность г.Сеула и в Вашем лице весь корейский народ.

Многочисленные письма и приветствия, поступавшие в адрес Совместной Комиссии, а также большое количество делегаций от демократических партий, общественных организаций и от населения Южной и Северной Кореи, посещавших Совместную Комиссию , - свидетельствуют о том, что корейский народ с нетерпением ожидал возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии по выполнению Московского решения о Корее.

Корейский народ знает, что в результате точного выполнения Московского решения Корея сумеет в кратчайший срок превратиться в самостоятельное демократическое и независимое от иностранного вмешательства государство.

Велика заслуга Демократического Национального Фронта, который выступает за полную поддержку Московского решения, разъясняет массам смысл и историческое значение Московского решения и оказывает всяческую поддержку и помощь Совместной Комиссии.

Советская делегация выражает свою признательность партиям и организациям Демократического Национального Фронта Южной Кореи, содействующим успеху Совместной Комиссии в ее работе по выполнению Московского решения.

Совместная Советско-Американская Комиссия за два месяца работы, преодолевая трудности, сумела разрешить ряд важных вопросов. Совместная Комиссия провела заседания с представителями демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной и Северной Кореи. Партии и организации как Южной, так и Северной Кореи уже подали в Совместную Комиссию свои письменные соображения по вопросам, касающимся создания Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и его платформы.

Сейчас идет работа по изучению и обобщению предложений высказанных демократическими партиями и общественными организациями в своих ответах на вопросы.

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Однако, при обсуждении списка партий и организаций, которые должны быть приглашены для консультации, в Совместной Комиссии имеются некоторые разногласия. Но в этом вопросе за последнее время точки зрения обеих делегаций значительно сблизились.

Несмотря на то, что уже прошло два месяца с момента возобновления работы Совместной Комиссии, все же на юге Кореи имеются некоторые партии и организации, которые продолжают борьбу против [illegible] и Совместной Комиссии.

Каждый день борьбы против Московского решения это лишь день, отделяющий корейский народ от создания его собственного демократического Правительства.

Если бы Совместная Комиссия встретила единодушную поддержку в своей работе по осуществлению Московского решения со стороны всех партий и общественных организаций Южной Кореи, то Корея еще в нынешнем году имела бы свое Временное Демократическое Правительство.

Пройдет немного времени, когда Корея, с помощью союзных держав, окрепнет, создаст свои демократические органы управления, возродит национальную экономику и культуру и получит полную независимость. Тем, кто выступил против Московского решения и против союзных держав, будет стыдно взглянуть в глаза честным патриотам, которые борются за демократическую независимость своей страны путем поддержки Московского решения.

Советская делегация уверена, что в тесном сотрудничестве с Американской делегацией трудности, которые встретятся в работе Совместной Комиссии, будут преодолены, и с помощью и при поддержке корейских демократических партий и общественных организаций, будет создано, в строгом соответствии с Московским решением, Временное Корейское Демократическое Правительство, и Корея будет объединена как единое целое под руководством этого Правительства.

Еще раз приветствуя демократические партии и общественные организации Южной Кореи, поддерживающие Московское решение и работу Совместной Комиссии.

Да здравствует единая независимая демократическая Корея и ее освободолюбивый народ !

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Delivered about 1130-21 July

[redacted] Address of Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief Commissioner of American Delegation of US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION - at meeting of Democratic Peoples Front, 27 July 1947

Lt. General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Kore , has asked that I represent him today and extend to you his greetings and best wishes.

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express to you Mr. Chairman and to the members of the Democratic People's Front the appreciation of the American Delegation for this large and enthusiastic gathering in support of the work of the Joint Commission. The American Delegation well knows the burning desire of all Koreans for independence. I can assure you that the American Delegation will work earnestly towards the immediate objective of the Joint Commission - that is, the establishment of a provisional government over a united Korea.

The Joint Commission is meeting some difficulty in its work due to a concept which is apparently held by some individuals that the provisional government should be formed by a certain party or group of parties and that certain other parties and groups should be excluded from participation in the government. The American Delegation is guided by that concept of democracy which recognizes the right of the individual. Under that concept the government of a nation is the servant of the people. Each citizen has as much right to share in his government as does any other citizen. Under this concept no political party or group can be given complete control of the government unless such control is given by the people under a completely free election including multiple party nominations of candidates. There must be periodic elections thereafter to obtain a new mandate from the people.

The recent press releases of the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation and the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation have given information to the Korean people that the two Delegations have not in several weeks been able to agree as to the

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method of conducting oral consultation. The only difference now dividing the Joint Commission has recently been stated by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation as to whether or not parties and organizations which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee should be accepted for consultation by the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation has proposed to eliminate ~~24 of the~~ certain large rightist parties with a total ~~claimed~~ membership in excess of 15 million. The American Delegation cannot agree to eliminate these parties because: (1) these parties having signed the Declaration indicating their intention to cooperate with the Joint Commission are clearly eligible for initial consultation; (2) they have not been proven guilty of inciting or fomenting active opposition within the meaning of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence; and (3) the result would be to deny representation to an important segment of Korean opinion.

As previously stated, it is the opinion of the American Delegation that the government belongs to the people - that means to all the people and to all political parties into which the people have organized themselves. To deny to a large group of the people and to ~~24~~ the parties ~~created by~~ representing them a right to participate in the most important happening of their life - that is, the creation of their own government - would be an injustice to which the American Delegation ~~could~~ can never agree. The American Delegation hopes that this divergency in viewpoint with the Soviet Delegation can be shortly overcome and that the Joint Commission can proceed to successfully accomplish the Koreans' urgent desire for their own government over a united Korea.

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Proposed Address of Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief Commissioner of American Delegation of US-USSR
Joint Commission - at meeting of Democratic Peoples
Front, 27 July 1947

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
AMERICAN DELEGATION.

The position of the Soviet Delegation is:

1. That political parties or organizations can only be placed on the list for consultation by mutual agreement of Subcommission No. 1, which means that the Soviets could, by withholding approval to the inclusion on the list of any party, dictate the makeup of the list. This is in fact a contention that the Soviets must hold the veto power.

2. That rightist parties of any prominence must be denied consultation through the device of excluding:

(a) Party members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations,

(b) Those without zonal headquarters,

(c) Those not social.

The list of parties and organizations with membership in excess of 10,000 submitted by the Soviets as the parties and organizations which are not suspicious to them and with which they are apparently willing to consult omits 24 important parties with membership in excess of 10,000, all but one of these 24 are apparently rightist, and contain the most important rightist parties requesting consultation. The Soviet Delegation states that these 24 parties are omitted because they are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. As far as the American Delegation can determine, only 9 of these 24 parties are in fact members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The others are apparently eliminated arbitrarily; at least, the Soviets refuse to state their reasons for their elimination. The Soviets have apparently also included on the list presented by them certain parties and organizations which are in fact members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They do not explain why they are willing to consult with certain parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee while they refuse to consult with certain other parties which are also members of this committee. It is a reasonable conclusion that they

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are reserving the right to question these parties at a later date and deny them consultation in the improbable event that the American Delegation should accept their principles of excluding parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. It is likely that there are other parties and organizations that are on the list submitted by the Soviet Delegation with which at a later date they will refuse to consult because they are not "social" organizations or are "purely local" organizations, or to which the Soviets will find other objections.

The Soviet proposal to deny consultation to the 24 parties omitted from their list is in furtherance of the plan to eliminate from consultation an important segment of Korean life which holds different political views. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked the Soviet Delegation to produce evidence upon which the American Delegation could base proper decision as to whether or not the contentions of the Soviet Delegation as regards their elimination of these parties are well founded. The contentions of the Soviet Delegation are:

1. <u>That these 24 parties are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee</u>. They have produced no evidence to substantiate this contention. They simply make the statement. They vaguely mention certain newspaper articles. The reliability of newspaper articles is doubtful. However, they have not even produced these newspaper articles, OK MC ~~read them into the record as evidence~~. When the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation attempted to get the Soviet Delegation to discuss their reasons for excluding these 24 parties by discussing each party as a separate entity, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet not only refused to discuss the issue but even refused to answer the questions of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation.

2. <u>That the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is engaged in fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision</u>. The Soviet Delegation has produced no evidence to prove this contention. The

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Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked them for evidence. They seem to think that their unsupported statements are sufficient. ~~The Soviet Delegation mentions a letter to the Joint Commission written by Kim, Koo. They have not produced such a letter. The American Delegation does not know whether such a letter exists or if so whether it is in fact a credible and acceptable letter. Should the Soviet Delegation have such a letter, they should produce it and they should substantiate the fact that it was in fact written by Kim, Koo.~~ No documents have been produced to support the Soviet statements. The Soviet Delegation again mentions certain newspaper articles, but they have not produced these articles, established their accuracy, nor read them into the record.

3. That the 24 parties bear responsibility for an Anti-Trusteeship ~~Committee~~ demonstration on 23 June. They contend that this Anti-Trusteeship ~~Committee~~ demonstration was instigated and participated in by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They have offered no proof of this fact ~~other than a statement that they have a letter signed by Kim, Koo, as mentioned above.~~ If they have such evidence they should produce it and read it into the record. They have made no attempt to link any one of these 24 parties specifically with that demonstration. As a matter of fact, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation has twice stated in his remarks, and his statement is written in the record, to the effect that the Soviet Delegation has no specific ~~evidence which would~~ prove this contention. It appears that [illegible]

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has written into the record the results which approval of the Soviet proposal would produce. In effect it would change the three to two rightist majority of applicant parties in all Korea to an overwhelming leftist majority. It would actually at this early stage of the meeting of the Joint Commission assure an entirely unwarranted, definite leftist control over a united Korea, which in fact would mean domination by groups imbued with Communist Party principles. It is highly naive of the Soviet Delegation to expect that this could be accepted by the American Delegation. Should the American Delegation agree to any such

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politicla maneuver, it would be contrary to the role of the Joint Commission and such action would be condemned by the ~~right thinking~~ ? people throughout the world.

The right is not a unified group and some of the more extreme elements have revealed their political immaturity and instability by eliminating themselves from consultation through refusing to apply. These extremists continue their clamoring against an as yet undefined arrangement - trusteeship;- the maneuvers of this group are not the business of the Joint Commission, but of the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea. I assure you that any attempt to disturb public order will be promptly dealt with.

The American Delegation believes that all shades of public opinion among the Korean population which have applied for consultation should be given a hearing. However, if any parties and organizations are uncooperative with the Joint Commission or inimical to the best interests of Korea, then the American Delegation is willing to push aside these obstacles to the accomplishment of its most pressing task - the establishment of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. However, if the extreme right is arbitrarily eliminated, a proper balance is restored only by arbitrary elimination of the extreme left also. Should both of these groups be eliminated we could get on to the business at hand with the moderates of the Korean political scene. However, two large segments of the people would have no voice in consultation.

The immediate mission of the Joint Commission is to form a provisional government over a united Korea. Consultation is but one element of the work facing this Commission. In order to get on with the work of the Commission and cease the useless wrangling which has occurred throughout the past three weeks, the American Delegation requests the Soviet Delegation to submit their views as to an effective workmanlike proposal which the Joint Commission can adopt as a basis for proceeding with the assigned task.

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The American Delegation proposes:

A. Modified consultation plans.

1. That the Soviets conduct consultation north of the 38th parallel and the Americans conduct consultation south of the 38th.

2. That consultation be jointly conducted north and south of the 38th with those parties which the Soviet Delegation is willing to hear, and that the American Delegation conduct unilateral consultation south of the 38th with those parties which the Soviets claim are suspicious to them. Such consultation will be considered consultation with the Joint Commission.

B. Elimination of oral consultation.

The American Delegation, mindful of the solemn obligations of its government under the Moscow Agreement and conscious of its duty to the Korean people to establish as early as possible a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, makes the following proposals to overcome the present impasse regarding consultation:

1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government to be formed on the above basis. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

3. The Joint Commission shall in the Charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national government and a legislature which shall be held with free electioneering, secret ballots, competitive parties and joint supervision (by the four powers) guaranteed. That Subcommission No. 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed Charter.

4. That Subcommission No. 3 be directed to prepare a plan for

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for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea.

C. If none of the above proposals are acceptable to the Soviets, then it is proposed that the Joint Commission drop for the time being the question of consultation and:

1. Proceed under paragraph 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12 to discuss the creation of the consultative body.

2. Discuss other possible types, compositions and methods of creation of the provisional government.

It is believed that if decision can be reached to create the provisional government by the elective method, the free election to be conducted by properly organized supervision of U.N. ~~troops~~ supervised by selected persons, the American Delegation could find a basis for compromise basis for agreement. In this connection the following should be quoted:

> Proposal No. 2 of Mr. Molotov's letter to General Marshall of April 19, 1947: "Part 2. The establishment of democratic authority agencies throughout Korea by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right." and the following paragraph taken from General Marshall's letter to Mr. Molotov of 2 May 1947: "I interpret your second point with respect to the establishment of 'Democratic Authority Agencies' throughout Korea as referring to local, provincial and national government agencies chosen, as you state, by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right."

If the Soviets can agree to none of the approaches above mentioned, then it is quite evident that nothing further can be accomplished by the Joint Commission without further directives from our Ministers. It is therefore proposed that a report be prepared by each delegation and submitted to our Ministers which will give the situation as it now faces the Joint Commission.

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SOVIET DELEGATION
USSR-US JOINT COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON 29 JULY 1947

The Soviet Delegation has studied thoroughly the statement and the proposals of the Chief of the American Delegation, made in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 July 1947, and in connection with these wishes to make the the following remarks:

There was nothing new in the statement of the Chief of the American Delegation as compared to what the American Delegation has expressed in its previous statements, and it does not contain any new proposals, directed toward the progress of th work of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation in its statement has expressed several points, which have no direct connection with the question under discussion, that is, the evaluation of the political and economic situation in North Korea.

The statement indicates that: "The American Delegation once more reiterates its firm determination to fulfill the Moscow Decision completely and unequivocally and to establish a Korean Provisional Democratic Government at the earliest possible time. Following the formation of that government, the American Delegation is as firmly determined to develop, with the participation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government and the Korean democratic organizations, methods of aid and assistance (trusteeship), thus carrying out the provisions of Paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision on Korea.

As it is known, this statement was made by the American Delegation during the course of work at the Joint Commission in 1946, and after the resumption of work at the Joint Commission in 1947. The Soviet Delegation can not understand why the American Delegation, while stating in the meetings of the Commission, that Korea should have trusteeship, at the same time, in the meetings with the Koreans gives them to understand that the American Delegation does not insist upon trusteeship. Why does not the American Delegation protect the Moscow Decision, and does not agree to announce to parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and continuing the struggle against the Moscow Decision, that unless they renounce their opposition to the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, that they would not be admitted for participation in consultation with the Joint Commission.

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The Soviet Delegation considers that such a move on the part of the American Delegation would be the most useful, would bring the Commission out of a difficult situation, and would insure progress in its work.

The Soviet Delegation can not consider the American Delegation's assumptions as being correct and in regard to the disagreement caused by lack of full understanding on the part of both Delegations of the positions of both delegations. If the Soviet Delegation has any suspicion, as the American Delegation hints, in its statement regarding the attempts of the American Delegation to create a Provisional Government in Korea, in which the rightist elements would predominate, then this could have resulted from the fact that the American Delegation in the meetings of the Joint Commission repeatedly attempted to assert that the right front in Korea is the most powerful, and that it is supported by an overwhelming majority of Koreans. The American Delegation considers this correlation as 3 to 2 in favor of the rightists. Such ascertion of the American Delegation can hardly correspont to reality.

The American Delegation in its last statements is attempting to divide the political parties of South Korea into so call rightist, moderate rightist, leftist and moderate leftist, and to prove that supposedly the Soviet Delegation wishes to exclude from consultation all the rightist and even the moderate rightist. The Soviet Delegation was always guided by the attitude of parties and organizations toward the Moscow Decision, independent of the fact whether a party is leftist or rightist, so long as it fully supports the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission it will be permitted to participate in consultation. Those parties and organizations which conduct the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, no matter to which political trend they belong must not participate in consultation.

The American Delegation affirms that the Soviet Delegation supposedly, for the realization of the ideas of parties and organizations which comprise the Democratic People's Front, wishes the exclusion from consultation of rightist parties, even those which are not members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. This is pure fiction, meant to mislead public opinion, and through any means and ways to defend the parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and and continuing their undermining work against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

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The American Delegation, in their attempts to explain the loss of authority by the rightist parties and organizations in the eyes of the Korean people, and in particular the parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, began to assert that, presumably even the leftist organizations of South Korea, that is, the parties and organizations comprising the Democratic People's Front, also do not enjoy prestige and have no support of the people. In addition, in order to emphasize its statement concerning the loss of prestige by parties and organizations comprising the Democratic People's Front, The American Delegation for some reason had to resort to very shaky and dubious evidence, such as, that presumably, the influx of one million Koreansfrom North Korea, who brought with them extensive proof of poor conditions existing in North Korea, injured the prestige of the left front of South Korea.

The Soviet Delegation agrees with the American Delegation, in that the rightist group does not have the support of the majority of the Korean people. The reasons are quite obvious. One of the reasons, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation, might be, that the rightist parties, and, first of all, parties comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, are carrying the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, thus delaying the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government as provided by the Moscow Decision. As for the Korean people, they desire success in the work of the Joint Commission and are awaiting with anxiety the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Government in accordance with the Moscow Decision.

Regarding the prestige of the leftist front the Soviet Delegation can not agree with the assertion of the American Delegation that the prestige presumably, of the leftist front/ presumably, suffered because of the rumors being spread concerning hard living conditions in North Korea. The people in South Korea know about actual conditions in North Korea. Koreans also know that as a result of reforms and democratic reorganization, which took place in North Korea, the people of the North live much better than they have lived under the Japanese, and better than the population of South Korea is living. Obviously, only the American Delegation was left uninformed on this question. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation wants to inform the American Delegation about the following facts, concerning the actual state of affairs in North Korea.

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In North Korea, from the moment of the capitulation of the Japanese forces, broad democratic reforms were put into practice which guarantee political freedom and the raise in welfare of the population.

The People's Committee worked out and adopted the law of universal suffrage for the citizens of North Korea. This law provides for election of all local organs of power on the basis of universal, equal and direct votes by secret ballot, and complete responsibility of the elected organs to their representatives, i.e. to the people. On the basis of this law for the first time in the history of Korea, on 3 November 1946, truly democratic universal elections of Provincial, town and district People's Commitee were conducted; on 25 February-elections of the village People's Committees and on 5 March 1947-elections of Volost People's Committees. All citizens of North Korea, upon reaching the age of 20, regardless of sex, state of property, education, established residence and religion, were given the right to vote and to be elected to their own organs of Peoples power. At the elections of the Provincial, town and district Committees, the following were deprived of the right to vote: pro-Japanese elements - 575 persons; deprived of the right to vote by the order of the Court - 198 persons, and insane - 3,614 persons which comprised 0.1% of the total number of voters. All existing democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea had equal unimpeded rights in nominating their candidates as members to the People's Committees. In order to conduct the elections, two central electoral commissions, comprised of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations, and also 39,950 Provincial, town, district, volost and village electoral commissions, with a total membership of 205,532 persons were established. The tasks of the commissions consisted of: preparation of premises for electoral precincts, preparation of electoral ballots, and on the day of elections the insurance to the citizens of the possibility to exercise their electoral right, and the insurance of the secret ballot for every voter. In order to preserve the secret balloting and to create most convenience in balloting for the illiterate, the electoral commissions prepared electoral tickets with the seal of the electoral commission, and also prepared for each of the designated areal candidatestwo ballot boxes-one black, one white. The voter, by placing the ballot into the white ballot box-voted for the candidate, and by placing the ballot into the black ballot box-voted against the candidate.

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In the elections of Provincial, Township and County People's Committees 99.6% of voters took part and 97% of voters voted for the candidates of United Democratic People's Front. In the elections of Volost and Village People's Committees, 99.8% of voters took part and 86.63% of voters cast their votes for the candidates. In the composition of the People's Committees of North Korea all democratic parties and social organizations are represented correspondingly to t their number and their political influence in the country, as well as all the strata of population. In all 70,454 persons have been elected to the People's Committee, of these there are: peasants 55,456, 4,182 laborers, 8,697 employees, 829 of intelligentzia, 877 merchants, 255 industrialists and businessmen, 211 clergymen, 32 former land owners, 5 artisans. During these elections the people of North Korea once more demonstrated their ~~unanimous~~ wish to have local organs of authority in the form of the People's Committees, which were born and created by the very people right after the capitulation of Japan.

In February 1947, the People's Assembly of 237 delegates was elected at the convention of the People's Committees of North Korea. The People's Assembly is the people's supreme authority in North Korea prior to the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Government of Korea. All the legislative power in North Korea is being executed by the People's Assembly.

As the Soviet Delegation knows from the press , from reports of refugees from South Korea and members of delegations calling on the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission, there also are People's Committees, in South Korea created in August 1945 as local organs of authority, but which at present have no political, or administrative powers, and are not recognized by the Military Command. In South Korea, up to this time, there are no elected organs of authority but the system of governors which existed during the Japanese regime and which is hateful to the people still remains. There is in South Korea the so called Interim Legislative Assembly, which does not consitute a representative organ of democratic authority insofar as out of 90 representatives 45 are appointed and only 45 are elected. As it is known, such authoritative and influencial organizations among Koreans such as the Democratic Front, do not take anypart in this Legislative Assembly.

The American Delegation relying, as it asserts on rumors which "may not be quite correct", attempts to accuse the People's Committees of North Korea, that due

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to their fault, bad living conditions were created for the people of North Korea, especially hard for the peasants, because of unbearable taxes. With the purpose of informing the American Delegation the Soviet Delegation reports certain factual data concerning this question.

As a result of passing democratic reforms by the People's Committees the living conditions and the welfare of the people in North Korea improved considerably The land reform was carried out as a result of which feudal relations, in villages were liquidated and proverty of the peasantry was eliminated forever. 725,000 of the landless and partly landless peasants, who constitute 72% of all peasant farms in North Korea, received free of charge more than 1,300,000 hectares of the former Japanese and landowners' land; monetary taxes for land were abolished and taxes in kind were established. In 1946 the amount of the taxes in kind comprised 25% of the harvest. In May, 1947, the People's Assembly, complying with the wishes of the peasants introduced an amendment to the law concerning the land tax in kind during one of its sessions. The tax for irrigated rice fields was established in the amount of 27% of the harvest, for dry grain and bean cultivations 23% of the harvest, and the tax for peasants of mountain districts was established in the amount of 10% of the harvest. Peasants who begin the cultivating of virgin soil are freed of taxes entirely for a period of 3 years. Living conditions of the peasantry of North Korea may be exemplified by the data of at least one county of Kanse of South Pyongyang province. According to the data of the People's Committee after the land reform was carried out, [illegible] 1886 well equipted peasant homes were built by the peasants of this county, 2865 households were equipped with electricity, 413 radio contact points were established, 3 people's clubs, 3 reading rooms, 36 preparatory, 15 elementary, 5 middle schools and 3 schools for adults were built, and 117 schools for liquidation of illiteracy were organized. Such is the situation of the peasants in North Korea.

In North Korea the working conditions of laborers, employees and intellectual workers have been considerably improved. The labor law passed by the People's Committee established an 8 hour working day for adults and a 6 hour working day for minors one day of leave with pay per week and 11 holidays with pay per year; workmen and employees have a two week annual leave with pay, and minors have a leave of one month; the labor law provides for obligatory social security, for protection

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of labor of workmen and employees, and for women's wages comparable to that of men.

As it is known, North Korea is a rich industrial region with a great number of factories, mines, and electric power stations. Agriculture, as compared to South Korea, is less developed in the North, and up to 1945, North Korea was receiving cereal stuffs in considerable quantities from South Korea. However, as a result of measures carried out by the People's Committee of North Korea, the food supply situation in North Korea is in a satisfactory state. There is a stable rate of food supply for the population of North Korea: for the workmen in heavy industries and for the engineering and technical personnel, 700 grams, for the workmen in other branches of industries, 600 grams, for employees, 500 grams, and for the unemployed and dependents 300 grams. Whereas, over 60% of the ration consists of rice, and the rest of other grain products. The amounts of rations, since their establishment, have not been cut down, and are distributed at stabilized prices. The cost at a monthly food supply ration for one person is 150-170 yen.

There are some difficulties in North Korea, especially, if one takes into consideration the fact that 700,000 people, who during the military operation in August of 1945, fled to South Korea returned to North Korea during 1946-47. Besides, up to 400,000 people came to North Korea from the South, escaping from persecutions, terror and poor living conditions. The influx of such great numbers of people, naturally, created additional difficulties; however, due to the measures taken, these people were housed and supplied with food-stuffs, without lowering amounts of rations for the rest of the population.

Such are the living conditions in North Korea.

At the same time, numerous facts concerning the life of the people in South Korea are known to the Soviet Delegation from the stories told by refugees, and also from the delegations which have visited the Commission. Inspite of the demand on the part of the people of South Korea, the land reform has not yet been passed, and about 80% of all the peasants in South Korea are either entirely without land or have an unsufficient piece of land which can not even provide enough food for a family. The peasants' delegations which visited the Soviet Delegat state that they pay unbearable taxes. The amount of the tax is officially set for 30%, but as the harvest is poor due to absence of ferterlizers, the peasants are compelled to give about 60% of their harvest. No attention is paid to the

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complains of the peasants to thelocal organs of authority that they have nothing with which to pay the taxes due to poor harvest, and in case of delay in delivery of ceral stuffs on the stipulated dates and in stipulated amounts, the peasants are subjected to fine, arrest and imprisonment.

All refugees and peasants delegations who visited the Soviet Delegation requested to expedite the work of establishing the government so that this government can pass land reforms and stablize just taxes.

Such is the state of living conditions of the peasants.

The refugees from South Korea and the representatives of the various labor and employees organizations who visited the Soviet Delegation, reparted that there is no labor law in South Korea. There has been established only an eight hour working day but the people have to work longer hours. A laborer who is absent from work because of illness is not paid for that day.

The laborers who are democratically inclined and who do not wish to belong to righist unions are dismissed from work. Food rations are issued irregularly, and in many cases rice, which is indespensible to Koreans, is substitued with other less suitable products. Several times food rations were decreased under various pretexes and the reason for decrease in rations is explained by a large influx of refugees from North Korea. One of the members of the delegations which visited the Soviet Delegation stated that: "If one were to believe statements of our South Korean newspapers that the people are fleeing from North Korea, then probably if such were the case the country would become depopulated." And further he added: "We understand that all this is being done to justify the shortage of food stuffs which exists in South Korea."

Such is the state of living conditions in South Korea.

The Soviet Delegation received the data on North Korea from People's Committee, and submitted it in connection with the statement of the American Delegation made on 25 July on the question of conditions in North Korea.

As it is known there are many parties in South Korea which made and continue making fictitious statements and even slander against the Soviet Union and the Soviet Command in North Korea. But the Soviet Delegation has not yet preferred charges for disloyal attitude toward the Soviet Union. The demand of the Soviet Delegation in oral consultation with democratic parties and social organizations

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is actually full support of the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission

The Soviet Delegation continues to uphold its point of view that parties and social organizations, which comprise the so called Anti-Trusteeship Committees, may be admitted to consultation only in case they withdraw from this Committee and cease the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation will hear at oral consultation all these parties and their representatives, which full support the Moscow Decision and offer their aid and assistance to the work of the Joint Commission, no matter, whether they are left or right.

The Soviet Delegation studied the proposals of the American Delegation, and feels that in them the American Delegation proposes nothing new when comparing these proposals with those previously made. On the countary, the proposals of the American Delegation introduced on 25 July, again return the Joint Commission to its initial stage of deliberation regarding the list, and reject everything that was gained in the process of this deliberation.

The American Delegation in its proposals is again trying to prove that the list exists and that, supposedly parties and organizations should be excluded from the list while in accordance with Joint Commission Decision No. 12 the list should be compiled, and this means that the two delegations will include in the list parties and organizations only on the basis of mutual agreement, and that this list should be approved by the Joint Commission.

The proposals of the American Delegation are not acceptable to the Soviet Delegation, because they set back the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation insists on the approval of the proposals, submitted by the Soviet Delegation in the meeting of the Joint Commission of 24 July 1947.

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31 July 1947

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION, MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

On July 15 the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation issued a statement to the Press. Since that time the issues presented in that release have continued to be the subject of Joint Commission meeting through July 29.

In the meeting of July 29 the Soviet Delegation rejected a proposal made by the American Delegation.

This American proposal, made on July 25, would give the Joint Commission an accurate listing of all applicant parties and the position of each delegation with respect to each of the parties. The American Delegation proposed specifically that Subcommission Number 1 be directed to reconvene and to consider the application of all parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission and to prepare:

(1) A list of all of those parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation;

(2) A list of those parties and social organizations appearing on the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) which <u>both</u> the Soviet and American Delegations are willing to exclude from oral consultation, with the reasons for exclusion;

(3) An additional list of those parties and social organizations appearing on the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) with which <u>either</u> delegation does not wish to consult, orally, together with a statement of specific objections in each case;

(4) To prepare a complete list of all representatives of parties and social organizations appearing in the list prepared in accordance with paragraph (1) and a list of those with which either delegation does not wish to consult, together with a statement

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of the specific objections in each case.

This American proposal would not prejudice the Soviet position in the Joint Commission nor would it assist the American position. It would, however, result in a clear factual picture of both positions.

This proposal was made after the Soviet Delegation had reintroduced without substantial modification a proposal which had been presented by them on 10 July and reiterated on many previous occasions. The Soviet Delegation has not since then manifested any willingness to alter this proposal in any way to effect a compromise with the many proposals which had been made by the American Delegation. In this Soviet proposal was contained a list of parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership of over 10,000, for consideration by Subcommission No. 1. However, the Soviet list did not include certain important parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership of over 10,000, which have qualified for consultation with the Joint Commission. It has been the Soviet contention that these parties and organizations being members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee could not be placed on the list for initial consultation.

The American Delegation has always been ready to exclude from oral consultation parties and social organizations that are fraudulent or duplicative, or which for just cause are indicted before the Commission and adequate and proper evidence is presented to prove the guilt of the accused parties.

The eligible parties and organizations can be removed from the list only by mutual agreement after indictment as provided by paragraph 3 of the agreement of the Foreign Ministers: "Those individuals, parties and social organizations, which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Com-

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mission."

The American Delegation has always insisted on full and free consultation. It will not agree to the unilateral exclusion by the Soviet Delegation of parties and social organizations which are entitled to consultation. The American Delegation has agreed to review systematically the list of applicant parties and organizations with a view to excluding for cause those that may not be eligible for consultation. The Soviet Delegation has refused to review the list in this manner.

If we examine in detail the 10 July Soviet proposal, we find that the Soviet list eliminated 27 parties, 3 for fraud and 24 others which represent large and important groups of the rightists and moderates. The 24 parties eliminated have a claimed membership of over 15 million. The Soviet list includes for South Korea 118 parties and organizations which, from records available to the American Delegation, should be classified as follows:

A - SOUTH KOREA:

	Political Orientation				
	Right	Moderate Right	Moderate	Left Moderate	People's Front
Number of parties	44	18	9	6	41
Total Membership (in thousands)	12,483	4,029	2,882	4,609	14,450

If to the above tabulation are added the 28 People's Front groups with membership in excess of 10,000, included in the list from North Korea, the classification of Parties and Social organizations of all Korea would be as follows:

B - ALL KOREA:

Number of parties	44	18	9	6	69
Total membership (in thousands)	12,483	4,029	2,882	4,609	27,707

Examination of the tables above show that if the Soviet proposal is followed, and if the moderate are considered as right, there are 71 rightist parties in South Korea as against 47 leftist. Claimed

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membership of the 71 rightist parties is 19.3 million, and claimed membership of the 47 leftist parties slightly over 19 million. By adding the 28 parties and organizations of North Korea, each of over 10,000 membership, all members of the People's Front, we get actually 71 parties of the right, with a total claimed membership of 19.3 million, but an increase of leftist representation to 75 parties with a claimed membership of 32.3 million.

Furthermore, there is no assurance that further elimination of rightist parties and organizations would not be attempted by the Soviet Delegation.

Although the Soviets deny that it is their intention to eliminate the rightist from proper participation in the government, and also deny that they intend by such elimination to bring about a future government of Korea predominantly People's Front, acceptance of their proposal by the American Delegation would nevertheless inevitably lead to this result, because the People's Front groups would be given an overwhelming majority.

The only objective of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission is to establish a Korean Provisional Democratic Government that fully reflects the wishes of the Korean people. The position taken by the American Delegation is that no one faction shall dominate the creation of this government because no one group enjoys a majority support of the masses of the Korean people. It is highly undesirable, therefore, that either the extreme right or the extreme left have a dominating position in consultation with the Joint Commission.

At the meeting of July 29 the Soviet Delegation summarily rejected the proposal of the American Delegation without discussion and without stating proper cause. The balance of the meeting was taken up with general discussion.

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION COLONEL-GENERAL SHTIKOV IN THE PRESS-CONFERENCE

2 AUGUST 1947

The Soviet Delegation feels its duty to inform the public regarding the progress of work and the carses of delay in the work of the US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION.

In the meetings of 22, 24, 25 and 29 July, the US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION continued to discuss the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations of Korea, for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission.

In its statement in the press-conference of 21 July, the Soviet Delegation pointed out that, in the compilation of the list of parties and social organizations for oral consultation, only one question remains upon which agreement has not been reached, i.e. the question of admission for consultation of parties and social organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 July, the Soviet Delegation repeated its previous proposal that the Joint Commission begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations which arouse no doubt on the part of either the Soviet or the American Delegation, in order to avoid delay in the work of the Joint Commission. The list of such parties and organizations with a declared membership of over 10,000 was submitted by the Soviet Delegation at the request of the American Delegation on 10 July. This list consisted of 147 parties and organizations, including 28 from North Korea and 119 from South Korea, which represented all political trends and shades of social life of Korea. The only parties and organizations not included in this list, were those comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The American Delegation declined the proposal of the Soviet Delegation to begin consultation, pointing out that the Soviet Delegation, supposedly, tries not to admit to consultation all the rightist parties, and wishes to limit consultation only to parties and organizations comprising the Democratic National Front. In its

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statements and press releases, the American Delegation continues to repeat this assertion, thus misleading the public opinion.

The Soviet Delegation, in the meetings of the Joint Commission, repeatedly pointed out to the American Delegation the groundlessness of such assertions. In compiling the list of parties and organizations, the Soviet Delegation has been and is guided by the Moscow Decision, by the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall and by Joint Commission Decision No. 12, and by the fact whether parties and organizations are leftist or rightist. This is evident, from the list submitted by the Soviet Delegation. Out of 119 parties and organizations of South Korea in the list, submitted by the Soviet Delegation, 74 parties are of rightist trend, 34 of the leftist and 11 are center.

In the opinion of the Soviet Delegation there exist all the necessary grounds for beginning of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. The Soviet Delegation has felt and still feels that the 20 parties and organizations which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and who, up to date, have refused to renounce the principles of the struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, should not be the reason for delay of the work of the Joint Commission.

In regard to the indicated parties and organizations, the Soviet Delegation continues to adhere to the point of view that these parties and organizations may be admitted to consultation only if they declare their withdrawal from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, of which the Soviet Delegation repeatedly proposed to inform the indicated parties and organizations. However, the American Delegation declined these proposals.

Thus the work of the Joint Commission continues to be delayed because of the question regarding parties and organizations which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The American Delegation has taken the indicated parties under its protection, stubbornly refusing to apply to them the agreement, reached by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, according to which the Joint Commission should

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consult only with democratic parties and social organizations which support fully the Moscow Decision.

The Soviet Delegation introduced the following proposal in the meeting of the Joint Commission:

"Since the points of view of both delegations concerning the question of compilation of the list of parties and social organizations for participation in consultation have drawn closer together and the only question which remains unsolved is that of parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which comprise a comparatively small group in relation to the total number of parties and organizations which expressed their desire to consult with the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation considers that further delay in consultation and further delay in establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government is not permissible and introduces for consideration of the Joint Commission the following proposals:

1. To direct Subcommission #1 to define the list of parties and organizations with a stated membership over 10,000 which was presented by the Soviet Delegation in the meeting of July 10, 1947, and to submit it for the approval by the Joint Commission on 28 July 1947.

2. To direct Subcommission #1 to review individually the representatives, selected by the parties and organizations included in the list according to Item 1 of the present Decision.

To compile a list of these representatives and submit it for the approval of the Joint Commission on 28 July 1947.

3. To review the draft of proposals on the order of conducting of oral consultation and creation for this purpose of the necessary number of subcommittees, which was presented by the Soviet Delegation to Subcommission #1 on 23 June 1947.

4. To start oral consultation with the representatives of parties and organizations who were included in the list which will be approved by the Joint Commission 30 July 1947 in Seoul, and to start oral consultation with the representatives of parties and organizations of North Korea on 1 August 1947, in Pyongyang.

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5. To announce on behalf of the Joint Commission that parties and organizations, who comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and who submitted applications for participation in consultation, may be permitted for consultation with the Joint Commission after they announce their withdrawal from this Committee and cease their struggle against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission."

The American Delegation rejected this proposal and in the meeting of 25 July introduced its own proposal. The essence of the American proposal is that Subcommission #1 should resume its work on the basis of the American position and should compile the list of all parties and organizations which have submitted applications for consultation, including parties and organizations which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee as well as fictitious and non-social organizations. The acceptance of such a proposal would have resulted in that the Joint Commission would have had to consult with any party and organization which has submitted an application and which the American Delegation considers desirable to invite for consultation.

Thus the American Delegation has claimed the right of unilateral inclusion into the list for consultation of parties and organizations which have submitted their applications.

The order of compilation of the list of parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission was determined by Joint Commission Decisions #12 and #16, in conformity with which Subcommission #1 should compile the list of democratic parties and social organizations upon which agreement has been reached, and should submit it to the Joint Commission for approval.

The Soviet Delegation, being guided by these decisions of the Joint Commission, has insisted and still insists that Subcommission #1 should resume its work and compile the mutually agreed upon list to be submitted to the Joint Commission for approval. The Soviet Delegation has repeatedly pointed out that Subcommission #1 in its meetings must hear all the arguments and objections of both sides, must define more clearly the facts concerning each party and

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organization which must be included or must not be included into the list for consultation with the Joint Commission, and must submit its findings to the Joint Commission for approval. The Soviet Delegation in particular made such a proposal, in the Joint Commission meeting on 2 July, when the question of compilation of the list was discussed for the first time. At that time, this proposal was rejected by the American Delegation. Since then, certain progress was made in the discussions on the compilation of the list, and the only unsolved question was that of the inclusion into the list of parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

The proposal of the American Delegation ignores the progress made by the Joint Commission on the question of compilation of the list, and in this respect the work of the Joint Commission, because of the proposal of the American Delegation reverts to its initial stage.

This proposal complicates the work of the Joint Commission, inasmuch as it reverts to consideration of questions upon which agreement was already reached by the Delegations. This proposal, apparently came as result of the fact that the American Delegation, calculating the ratio between the number of rightist and the leftist parties and organizations and their membership, arrived at the conclusion that the reached agreement does not guarantee the ratio of 3:2 in favor of the rightists between the rightist and leftist parties and organizations in the consultation and in formation of the government, a goal toward which the American Delegation aspires, judging by its numerous statements in the meetings of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation has rejected the above mentioned proposal of the American Delegation and explained, in detail, the reasons why it considers that this proposal is not acceptable in the Joint Commission meeting on 29 July.

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The Soviet Delegation well understands the desire of the Korean people to have their own democratic government. It is constantly conscious of the support which the Korean people give to the work of the Joint Commission in fulfillment of the Moscow Decision.

Attempting to achieve the quickest possible formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision, the Soviet Delegation continues to seek ways to overcome the obstacles which arose in the work of the Joint Commission.

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Soviet Delegation
USSR-US JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION
August 5, 1947

The Joint Commission for more than a month has been discussing the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations to be invited for consultation with the Joint Commission, but as yet did not reach an agreement.

The Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the work of the Joint Commission, submitted a number of proposals in order to reach the quickest possible agreement concerning the question of compilation of the list. In particular, the Soviet Delegation repeatedly and persistently insisted to direct Subcommission No. 1 to reexamine all parties and organizations which submitted declarations concerning their inclusion in the list for consultation. However, the American Delegation systematically declined these proposals of the Soviet Delegation.

The American Delegation, contrary to the order of compilation of the list, agreed upon in Joint Commission Decisions No. 12 and No. 16, proposed to begin the examination of proposals bearing in mind not the inclusion of parties and organizations in the list for consultation, but bearing in mind their exclusion from the list, although, as it is known, the Joint Commission as yet does not have such a list. In order to be able to exclude from the list, it is necessary to have the list which has been approved by the Joint Commission, and in order to approve such a list, it is necessary that both sides reach an agreement concerning the question which parties and organizations from those which submitted their applications are to be included in the list for consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall and the Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

The proposals of the American Delegation on this question contradict not only the Joint Commission Decisions No. 12 and 16, but also common sense. The acdeptance of the American proposal would result in that the Joint Commission would be obliged to consult with any party and organization which submitted an appli-

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cation and which the American Delegation would consider desirable to invite for consultation.

The American Delegation repeatedly accused the Soviet Delegation of attempting to exclude from consultation certain parties and organizations through unilateral decision. Actually, the situation is just the opposite. The demands of the American Delegation amount to the inclusion of parties and organizations in the list for consultation by a unilateral decision, to which of course the Soviet Delegation cannot agree.

In connection with the fact that the American Delegation, in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 16 July, stated that it accepted the proposal of the Soviet Delegation of 10 July, with minor corrections, and with the exception of the point which concerns parties and organizations that comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the question of these parties and organizations remained the only question, in connection with the compilation of the list for consultation, upon which agreement has not been reached between the two Delegations.

Taking into consideration this circumstance, the Soviet Delegation introduced a new proposal on 24 July, which was aimed to give to the Joint Commission the possibility of commencing oral consultation on 30 July 1947. This proposal was, however, rejected by the American Delegation.

The American Delegation not only refuses to apply the Molotov-Marshall agreement toward parties and organizations which submitted applications for participation in consultation, and which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, but stubbornly refuse to define more clearly the position of these parties and organizations toward the Moscow Decision and participation in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 25 July, the American Delegation submitted a proposal which complicates considerably the work of the Joint Commission, completely ignoring the progress attained by the Joint Commission in the matter of compilation of

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the list, and returning the Joint Commission to the review of the questions upon which agreement already has been reached between the two Delegations.

This proposal of the American Delegation seems not to be accidental. During this years course of work of the Joint Commission, the American Delegation gave sufficient examples of refusals of the reached agreements and, even of the agreements adopted by the Joint Commission. If such a course of work were followed, the work of the Joint Commission would be delayed indefinitely.

Two and one-half months have passed since the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the Joint Commission has not yet began to discuss questions, which are directly connected with the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Soviet Delegation considers that further delay of discussion of these questions is inadmissible.

The Soviet Delegation considers, that the compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission is an important matter, discussion of which should be continued in order to reach agreement. However, this should not delay the work of the Commission concerning other questions. The Soviet Delegation considers, that the discussion of the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations can be entrusted to the two Chief Commissioners jointly with Subcommission No. 1, at the same time, the other members of the Delegations will be able to work upon important questions which are connected with the formation of a Provisional Government.

The Korean democratic parties and social organizations have already submitted to the Joint Commission their suggestions relative to the structure and principles of organizations of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), and also regarding political platform for a Provisional Government.

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The Soviet Delegation feels that the Joint Commission should, without delay, begin the consideration of the written suggestions submitted by democratic parties and social organizations, the elaboration of their proposals regarding the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), the political platform for that Government, and also the questions of the executive personnel of a Provisional Government, the order of assumption of power by a Provisional Government and selection of personnel.

Proceeding from the above stated, the Soviet Delegation introduces the following proposal.

(Soviet proposal attached as inclosure no. 1)

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Soviet Delegation
USSR-US JOINT COMMISSION

The Proposal of the Soviet Delegation on 5 August 1947

Taking into consideration that the Joint Commission, during an entire month could not attain any progress in the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations, in connection with which all the work of the Joint Commission is being delayed, the Soviet Delegation, with the object of expediting the work of the Commission, introduces the following proposals:

1. To commence the elaboration of the proposals concerning the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), the political platform for this government, and also questions of the executive personnel of a Provisional Government, the order of assumption of power by a Provisional Government and the selection of personnel, for the purpose of which:

a. In accordance with point 8 of Joint Commission Decision # 12, to transfer the considerations and proposals received from Korean democratic parties and social organizations of North, as well as, South Korea, to Subcommission # 2 for study and elaboration of the conciliated proposals.

b. To direct Subcommissions # 2 and 3, to present the plans for their work to the Joint Commission, within a 5 day period.

c. To direct Subcommissions # 2 and 3 to present their considerations regarding the formation of Subcommittees.

2. To direct the Chief Commissioners of both Delegations, jointly with Subcommission # 1 to:

a. To continue consideration of the question regarding the list of democratic parties and social organizations for oral consultation, with the purpose of reaching an agreement.

b. To prepare the list of representatives of parties and social organizations for oral consultation.

c. To elaborate the proposals according to point 9 of the Joint Commission Decision # 12.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

7 August 1947

A Soviet proposal that representatives of 15 South Korean parties under Soviet suspicion be called before the Joint Commission for questioning marked the 51st Meeting of the Commission, August 5th.

Colonel General T. F. Shtikov gave as his reason for the questioning of the representatives, a desire to have them clarify points in a letter which the representatives of the 15 organizations sent to the Commission when they learned that the Soviet Delegation desired to exclude certain organizations from oral consultation with the Joint Commission on the grounds that the parties opposed the Moscow Decision.

Major General Albert E. Brown, in an attempt to understand the Soviet view, inquired of General Shtikov what questions were to be asked. The Chief Soviet Commissioner replied only that he would ask questions designed to clarify the letter. General Shtikov stated he also desired to verify the signature in the letter.

The U.S. Delegation pointed out that the letter was a voluntary effort of these parties and social organizations to assist the Joint Commission to overcome the deadlock announced in the press over the Soviet refusal to consult with parties and social organizations affiliated with the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The U.S. Delegation has upheld the right of all parties and social organizations to be consulted which have signed the declaration contained in Communique No. 5, and no evidence against any of these parties has been produced. The American Delegation maintained that any questions which either Delegation desired to ask any representatives could and should be asked when the representatives appeared for oral consultation and not in special examination proceedings. The American Delegation, therefore, rejected the Soviet proposal.

The letter, which had been introduced during the 49th Meeting of the Joint Commission, on July 31st, is as follows:

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LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED COUNCIL

28 July 1947

TO: Chief Commissioners
Soviet and American Delegations
US-USSR Joint Commission

Gentlemen:

This is on behalf of the member organizations of the United Council, to express our sincere appreciation of the hard and fine work that you and your colleagues have been rendering in the US-Soviet Joint Commission for the cause of Korean independence, and, at the same time, to offer to you our loyal cooperation in every possible way to a successful conclusion of the great and difficult task that is, we feel, both yours and ours also.

We are informed that one of the issues upon which the U.S. and the Soviet delegations have not been able to come to an agreement is the membership in the so called anti-trusteeship committee of some of our member organizations. The position of the Soviet delegation as reported in the press is that certain parties who were formerly active in the anti-trusteeship committee should be excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission.

It is true that the anti-trusteeship committee had been formed with a view to oppose in the future the trusteeship that is foreshadowed but not explained in the Moscow Decision. However the basic right of free expression of opinion has been guaranteed to the Koreans, as you will readily agree, in the official letters exchanged between General Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State and Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, prior to the reconvention of the Joint Commission at Seoul on May 21. Furthermore, we can assure you that the anti-trusteeship committee has never actively opposed or instigated active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. This is well proved by its action that, in the early part of June, the committee called its member organizations together in a great conference for discussion on the matter

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of the participation in the Joint Commission and upon the finding that the organizations could not come to an agreement it was decided that the matter of participation in the Joint Commission should be left to the free choice of each individual organization affiliated with the anti-trusteeship committee and that there should be no active opposition between those organizations which will consult with the Joint Commission and those which will not.

Furthermore none of the organizations which applied for consultation participated in any way in the so-called June 23 demonstration.

Those organizations which are members of the anti-trusteeship committee and have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission are definitely of the opinion that they should fully cooperate with the Joint Commission in the formation of a provisional government which is its task in the first stage, and, after the formation of the provisional government, in the discussion of the measures of aid and assistance that is its task in the second stage by expressing their honest opinions, and by expressing even an honest expression of difference to any measure should it infringe upon Korean national sovereignty or interfere with Korean internal politics. Apart from these reservations of right the organizations have never instigated, nor will instigate, any active opposition to the work of the Joint Committee. An active opposition to it is indeed contrary to their own policy of consultation with the Joint Commission.

(Signed with Seal By)

Yi, Yun Yung - Vice Chairman of the United Council for the Establishment of Provisional Government.

Yi Yun Yung, Vice Chairman of the Chosun Democratic Party.

Duk, Soo Chong, The Democratic Party of Korea.

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Sim, Yi Sung, The Popular Party.

Son, Ta Ri, - The Tehundo Kyo Bokik Party.

You, Hong, - The 1919 Independence Declaration Memorial Association.

Ryu, Chin San, The General League of Youngmen's Korea.

Sun, Chung Hi, The Korean Military Affairs Association.

Esther Whong, Union of All Womens' Associations in Korea.

Pahk, Sang Ho, Women's Patriotic Association.

Choi, Yun Dong - The Kwang Bok Hoi.

Chun, Chin Han, - General Labor League for the Korean Independence.

Chal, Tak Ryong, The Korean Independent Young Men's Association.

Choi, Hueng Cho, - Korean Youngmen's Association.

Lee, Sun Keun, Young Korean Party.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN
DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

9 August 1947

The present failure of agreement in the Joint Commission and the letter recently written the Commission by certain members of the United Council has again raised the question of "Freedom of Expression." The opinions of the American Delegation on this question were presented to the Joint Commission and read into the records at its 52nd meeting. These views have been previously released to the Korean press by the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation. It appears advisable at this time that they be restated.

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August 9,, 1947

STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

In the meetings of the Joint Commission in 1946 the Soviet Delegation took the position that those Koreans who did not fully support the Moscow Decision would not be accepted for consultation by the Joint Commission. They even insisted that objection to one word of the Moscow Decision was failure to fully support the Moscow Decision. The Commanding General, Soviet Forces in North Korea, followed this contention up to his letter of February 28, 1947, in reply to the letter of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, of December 24, 1946. During the exchange of letters between the Commanders, attempt was made to reach a formula which would define the limit of objection to the Moscow Decision beyond which a Korean could not go without being barred from consultation with the Joint Commission. The Soviet Commander of North Korea in his letter of 26 November 1946 recommended a formula to cover this matter. The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946, recommended certain modifications to the formula proposed. The matter was taken up by the two Ministers, and they agreed to accept the formula proposed by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in South Korea, in his letter of December 24, 1946. Under this formula a Korean representative of a political party or social organization, which party or organization signs the application for consultation, may freely express his opinion publicly or privately concerning the Moscow Decision, the future formation of his government or any words, phrases or thoughts involved in either, provided he does not instigate or foment active opposition against the Moscow Decision or either of the Allies.

The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation has throughout the past several weeks attempted to return to his position of a year

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ago. He apparently has not understood the efforts of the two Commanders in Korea to resolve this difficulty and the decision reached by the two Ministers, which has in fact resolved the difficulty if it is faithfully followed. As a matter of fact, in the Subcommission No. 1 meeting of May 28, 1947, the Soviet representative, Mr. Tounkin, made the statement that the Soviet Delegation would not agree to consultation with any Korean who did not fully support the Moscow Decision and every paragraph of that decision. While this statement does not go as far as the intent of the Soviet Delegation to oppose those who object to a word contained in the Moscow Decision, it still goes a long distance back from the agreement by the two Ministers and in fact destroys the value of that agreement, returning the Soviets as it does to their original position of May 1946.

Furthermore, in the 43rd meeting on July 16, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation made the following statement: "The Soviet Delegation does not wish to speak with and consult those which carry on a fight against the Moscow Decision even if it is one word or one period in the Moscow Decision."

The Moscow Decision is so written that practically each provision contained in it is subject to wide interpretion. There is one word in this decision, however, to which a partial interpretion is given--that is the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision interprets trusteeship as "aid and assistance." It further guarantees to the Korean people independence. The Korean people are a proud race. They were subject to Japanese domination for 40 years. It is perfectly natural that they should crave full and complete independence. The Korean people naturally fear that in offering them aid and assistance as provided by the Moscow Decision, attempts will be made to control the government of the nation and to delay or destroy their independence. It is possible that control will be necessary. However, the Moscow Decision clearly envisages the extent of that

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control as that required to make effective the aid and assistance rendered. The aid and assistance rendered likewise being limited to that essential to assure that Korea is properly evolved during the period of aid and assistance into a full, free and independent nation. It is perfectly natural, the exact extent of the aid and assistance to be rendered not being defined, that Koreans should have different ideas as to the interpretion of the Moscow Decision on this point. Having these ideas, it is natural that they should express them. It is also natural that they should state their objection to any interference with the sovereignty of their nation. It is this right of any free man to express his thoughts in private or in public without being excluded from consultation that the United States Government has consistently insisted upon in its dealings with the Soviet Government concerning the establishment of a Provisional Government for Korea. It is this principle to which the Soviet authorities agreed after almost one year of exchange of views. It is this principle which the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Delegation is now trying to destroy, thus repudiating the agreement signed by their Minister and their own signed agreement on Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

The American Delegation does not regard expression of opposition to "trusteeship" as fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Moscow Decision is a broad document which by direct statement or by implication covers all requirements included in the creation and evolution of a government over a reunited Korea. As previously stated, every loyal Korean craves independence for his country. All Koreans welcome the opportunity to secure that independence under the Moscow Decision. They fear and distrust but one concept of that decision--the unknown implication of the word "trusteeship." The Moscow Decision states in paragraph 1 the intent of the document--that is, "to reestablish Korea as an in-

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dependent state; to create conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea." Unquestionably those who wrote it had no intention by inserting in paragraph 3 the word "trusteeship", to vitiate the provision of the entire document. How then can discussion of and statement of opinions against fancied or exaggerated meanings of this word be considered as opposition to the document? Such a contention is untenable.

The American Delegation does not regard membership by a political party or social organization in an anti-trusteeship committee or any similar organization as a bar to its admission for consultation by the Joint Commission. It is perfectly natural that political parties and social organizations should join together in committees for the discussion and consideration of the aid and assistance to be rendered to their country and should call themselves anti-trusteeship or similar named committees. As long as these committees confine their activities to free expression of opinion and stop short of fomenting and instigating active opposition, they are permitted under the agreement of our Ministers to express their opposition.

As a matter of fact, paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision assigns to the Joint Commission the task, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. How can the Joint Commission expect any Korean who remains silent on this important matter to be of any assistance to the Joint Commission at the time when it must determine and resolve its responsibility under this requirement of paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision. The Joint

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Commission has recently broadcast throughout Korea an invitiation to all Koreans to freely express themselves as to the formation of their government, its charter and platform. This is an invitation to Koreans to think, discuss and present views on the future of Korea. After the Provisional Government is formed, one of the most vital and important topics involved in any such discussion, from the Korean point of view, is trusteeship. What are the Soviets trying to do? Goad patriotic Koreans to the point of actually fomenting and instigating active opposition so that they can discredit them from consultation with this Commission, or are they actually proceeding in good faith to attempt to evolve a Provisional Government and Korean independence under the provision of the Moscow Decision? Do they intend to follow the signed agreement reached by their Ministers?

There are different kinds of trusteeship. That exercised by the United Nations is one form known throughout the world. Before Japan annexed Korea it pretended to exercise another form, now hated and feared by all loyal Koreans. Trusteeship as prescribed in the Moscow Decision is not known nor can it be known until its definition is worked out as provided under the Moscow Decision. When Koreans say that they object to trusteeship, they are objecting to an imaginary concept or to the hated Japanese concept, not an actuality. It should be the effort of the Joint Commission to quiet the fears of the Koreans, to educate and guide them in a proper understanding of this term, and methods which will be employed in applying it, not to condemn them, to convict them without a hearing and to bar them from proper participation in what to them is the most vital interest of their life - the formation of a free and independent government for their country.

The American Delegation requests the Soviet Delegation to join with it in a sincere and honest effort to create a provisional government over a united Korea as provided for by the Moscow Decision and thus to demonstrate to the world that two great powers can unselfishly work together in the interest of a small, weak and dependent nation.

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION
COLONEL GENERAL SHTIKOV AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 AUGUST 1947

The Soviet Delegation wishes to inform the public on the development of work of the Joint Soviet American Commission.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 31 July, the American Delegation presented to the Soviet Delegation a letter, which was sent to Commission from 15 parties and organizations of the so called United Council, dated 28 July.

The parties and organizations which signed the letter, are defending the position of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and the parties and organizations comprising it. The argumentation used in the above mentioned letter in defence of these parties and organizations coincides with the statements of the American Delegation in the last meetings of the Joint Commission.

During the study of the letter from these parties and organizations, a number of questions arose in the minds of the Soviet Delegation. Therefore, in the Joint Commission meeting on 5 August, the Soviet Delegation introduced a proposal to invite to a meeting of the Joint Commission the representatives of parties and organizations which signed the letter and which comprise the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, in order to receive the necessary explanation concerning the questions, which have arisen in connection with the study of the letter. At the same time, the Soviet Delegation pointed out, that the summoning of representatives of these parties and organizations to a Joint Commission meeting might solve this vague question, the discussion of which has already delayed the Joint Commission a whole month.

However, the American Delegation rejected the proposal of the Soviet Delegation, stating, that any question which either Delegation would like to ask the representatives of any party and organization can be asked only, when these representatives appear for oral consultation.

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The Soviet Delegation is surprised at the persistance with which the American Delegation rejects the Soviet Delegation proposal to summon the representatives of parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and which presented their applications for participation in consultation, to a meeting of the Joint Commission. The proposal of the Soviet Delegation is dictated by the desire to resolve, at last, the main unsolved question concerning the compilation of the list of parties and organizations, and this fully coincides with the practice of international conferences. The impression is created that the American Delegation definitely does not want to let the Soviet Delegation meet the representatives of the above mentioned parties and organizations in a meeting of the Joint Commission, though, it is not clear to the Soviet Delegation why the American Delegation is afraid of such a meeting.

Continuing the search for the means of overcoming the obstacles which arose in the work of the Joint Commission as the result of the practical refusal of the American Delegation to apply the MOLOTOV-MARSHALL agreement to the parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which have submitted applications for participation in consultation, the Soviet Delegation, in the Joint Commission meeting on 5 August, introduced the following proposal:

> Taking into consideration that the Joint Commission durin the whole month could not achieve progress on the question of compilation of a list of democratic parties and social organizations and it is on this question that the work of the Joint Commission is being further delayed, the Soviet Delegation with the aim of expediting the work of the Joint Commission makes the following proposal:

1. To start elaboration of proposals on the question of structure and principles of a Provisional Korean

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Democratic Government and local organs of government (Provisional Charter), political platform for this government and also personnel composition of Provisional Government, procedure for Assumption of power by Provisional Government, selection of personnel.

a. In compliance with and in connection with this aim--in compliance with point 8 of Joint Commission Decision 12, to refer to Subcommission 2, those considerations which were recieved from Korean democratic parties and social organizations both in South and North Korea, and also the proposals for a study and elaboration of agreed suggestions.

b. To entrust to Subcommissions 2 and 3 in five days to submit for approval by the Joint Commission plans of their work.

c. To direct Subcommission No. 2 and 3 to submit their proposals on the creation of subcommittees.

2. To entrust both head commissioners together with Subcommission No. 1:

a. To continue discussion of question of compilation of list of democratic parties and social organizations to be invited for oral consultation, with a view to achieving agreement.

b. To prepare a list of representatives of parties and social organizations for oral consultation.

c. To elaborate proposals on point 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

Introducing this proposal, the Soviet Delegation was guided by the consideration that although the compilation of the list of parties and organizations is an important question, the consideration of which it is necessary to continue with the aim of reaching agreement, it must not delay the solution of other questions by

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the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation, in its statement in the meeting on 5 August, has pointed out that although from the moment of the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission 2.5 months have passed, the Joint Commission still has not begun the elaboration of the questions which are immediately connected with the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Soviet Delegation has stated that it considers the further delay of elaboration of these questions to be inexcusable. Pointing out that the Korean democratic parties and social organizations have already submitted their considerations on questionnaires to the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation has proposed to begin without delay the elaboration of the proposals on the above mentioned questions, taking into account these considerations.

The acceptance of the Soviet proposal would give the Joint Commission an opportunity to begin the work of Sub-Commissions No. 2 and No. 3, together with the consideration of the question concerning the list of parties and organizations for consultation, and to proceed with the consultation and preparation of the proposals on the questions immediately connected with the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 7 August, the American Delegation rejected the Soviet proposal, absolutely and unconvincingly stating, that it would be without use to begin the discussion of the other questions, until the question of the list of parties and organizations for consultation has been solved.

The rejection of this proposal of the Soviet Delegation, as well as the position taken by the American Delegation on the question concerning parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee cannot but create the impression that the American Delegation deliberately delays the work of the Joint Commission.

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PRESS RELEASE

For release 13 August 1947

In a recent change of personnel in the American Delegation, Colonel Thomas M. Watlington of Silver Spring, Maryland, is replacing Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln of Harbor Beach, Michigan as executive officer of the American Delegation to the US-USSR Joint Commission in Korea. Colonel Lincoln will return to his regular assignment with Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Pacific Area in Hawaii.

Colonel Watlington comes to the Commission from Fort Knox, Kentucky where he was Director of the Extension Course Department of the Armored School.

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy in the Class of 1927, he has a well rounded military career including a two years of duty as Plans and Training Officer of the 17th Field Artillery under then Lt. Col. now Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold, former Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation to the Joint Commission.

Some of the many interesting assignments of Colonel Watlington are a tour of duty as an English instructor with the U.S. Military Academy, service with Army-Navy Selective Service Committee where he was charged with preparing the regulations governing the operation of the selective service system, and a tour of duty overseas with the III Corps as Assistant Corps Artillery Officer from August 1944 until July of 1946.

Colonel Watlington's state-side home is Silver Spring, Maryland where his wife, Mrs. Mary C. Watlington, is now staying.

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Statement of Gen. Ohlikov & press, 14 Aug.

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation handed to the press his statement which was made by the American Delegation in the 44th Joint Commission Session that took place on July 18, 1947. The Soviet Delegation aiming to correctly elucidate how things stand in reality and to expound its point of view on freedom of expression of opinion has resulted in publishing the following statement that was made in Joint Commission Session on July 22, 1947 as a reply to the statement of the American Delegation dated July 19, 1947: "The American Delegation in its statement took on the protection of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee activities and also the activities of parties and organizations comprised by this Committee and activities that are directed against the Moscow Decision on Korea.

'As it is known, the aim of the Moscow Decision is to rehabilitate Korea as an independent state, to create conditions for the development of the country on a democratic basis and to speedily eliminate the evil consequences of the prolonged Japanese domination in Korea. For the accomplishment of this aim, the Moscow Decision envisages first of all the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. Paragraph 3 of the same decision where the word 'Trusteeship' occurs directs the Joint Commission with the participation of the PKDG and attraction of Korean democratic organizations to elaborate measures to help and assist the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and establishing of governmental independence for Korea. The trusteeship envisaged by the Moscow Decision gives the Korean people their government, guarantees the establishment of democracy and the conversion of a former colony in the shortest period of time into a democratic independent government.

In stating that the Koreans have a feeling of apprehension towards para. 3 of the Moscow Decision, the American Delegation does identify a small group of anti-democratic organizations and their leaders who

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who
/are opposing the Moscow Decision with the Korean people. It is then asked why do certain leaders and parties of South Korea oppose the Moscow Decision. Is this because of the fact, as the American Delegation maintains, that they fear the establishment of such a form of trusteeship over Korea as applied by Japanese. As it is known, this decision was participated in by America, USSR, England and later joined by China. Consequently, that form of trusteeship which was established by/Japanese cannot be. It means that this is not the point. The things stand like this. We know that opposition against trusteeship was organized by the so-called "leader" of certain parties and by their fellow champions who see the Moscow Decision as a frustration of their anti-democratic intentions. "These leaders" without any reason lay claim to power in Korea. Certainly it is they who did not like the decision of the Allies on Korea that Korea would be a democratic country, that the people in Korea would participate in the government of the country. "Leaders" of these parties and their collaborators have deliberately distorted the substance of the Moscow Decision for their selfish aims. It was last year that they opposed the Moscow Decision and slandered the Allies who signed it, and it is this year that they up until now continue their fight against the Moscow Decision and against the Allies. The absolute majority of the Korean people favor the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea and are impatiently awaiting when, in compliance with this decision, there will be established a KDG capable of defending the interests of the people and of carrying out democratic reforms. What do the people of Korea really fear. The Korean people are afraid of the disruption of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. The Korean people are aware of the fact that should the parties and organizations opposing the Moscow Decision succeed in disrupting the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and seize power in the country, it would mean that those who had collaborated with the Japanese came to power; those who want to deprive the Korean people of democratic reforms, changes and political power.

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The American Delegation tried to prove that the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are limited to expression of opinion and as if this Committee represents something like a discussionX club. The American Delegation maintains that "Inasmuch as these parties restrict their actions to expression of opinion and do not go so far as to foment or instigate active opposition, they are allowed to express their opposition on the agreement of our Ministers." The Soviet Delegation feels the American Delegation knows that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee was engaged and is now engaged in fomenting and instigating opposition to the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation has already presented many facts to this effect, testifying to these activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee--parties and organizations members of this Committee. Are the statements of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee that appear deaily in newspapers in South Korea and which show that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee carries on a fight against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, and also the meetings and various conferences with discussions of policies directed against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission not proof that these parties comprised by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee still carry on the fight against the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation feels that these are facts that prove the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and parties and organizations which are members of it foment and instigate active opposition against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission.

The America Delegation tries to affirm that the question at issue is fight against the word "trusteeship" but not fight against the Moscow Decision as a whole. This is quite a naive contention. First, we should not tear the Moscow Decision into parts. Second, it is known that the enemies of the Moscow Decision used the word "trusteeship" to screen their fight against the Moscow Decision as a whole.

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The American Delegation declared for a second time that parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, and which applied for consultation have actually withdrawn from this Committee. However, the American Delegation has failed until now to present any facts so as to prove their contention. The Committee itself indicates that the above parties and organizations have not withdrawn from it and continue to participate in its work.

Why is the American Delegation unwilling to define accurately the position of these parties and organizations?

The Soviet Delegation believes that unless these parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, publicly declare their withdrawal from this Committee, they will be held responsible for the activities of this Committee. The American Delegation states as if the Soviet Delegation in demanding that parties and social organization which will consult the Joint Commission fully uphold the Moscow Decision, violates the Agreement reached bytween Molotov and Marshall.

Is this in reality a violation of the above agreement. Point 1 of the agreed upon provision reads: Signing the declaration contained in Communique 5 will be considered as a statement of good faith to fully uphold the Moscow Decision and makes the signatory parties eligible for initial oral consultation."

As it is seen from this point agreed upon by the Ministers, the demands of the Soviet Delegation do not contradict, but on the contary they exactly correspond to this Decision. As to freedom of expression of opinion, the Soviet Delegation answered this question in its statement dated July 8, 1947. This statement says: "The American Delegation in its statement in Joint Commission session on July 3 has again approached the question concerning expression of opinion. First of all the Soviet Delegation has never opposed freedom of expression of opinion, and, second, the American Delegation has hardly sufficient reasons in order to attribute to itself the part of a defender of expression of opinion. The Soviet Delegation feels that the policies of the Soviet Command in North

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Korea with sufficient clearness show that the Soviet Delegation defends freedom of expression not in words but in deeds. As it is known, the Soviet Command in North Korea did not only not prevent the Koreans to freely express their opinion but helped to rebuild their life on a democratic basis and to eliminate the remnants of the continuous Japanese domination in Korea, as a result of which there has been achieved considerable progress in the field of democratization and development of national economy and culture.

The letter of Foreign Minister of the USSR Mr. Molotov to the State Secretary of the USA dated April 19, 1947, stated to this effect, as follows:

"As to Nor Korea, during the period that passed since the surrender of the Japanese, considerable progress has been achieved in the field of democratization and also in respect to rebuilding of national economy and culture. There have been carried out broad democratic reforms which guarantee political freedom and the well being of the population. I have first of all in mind the introduction of the general electoral right, the law on the equality of women, the creation of local organs of power and the People's Committee of North Korea on the basis of a free democratic elections, the land reform resulting in 725,000 landless and peasants with little land receiving free of charge one million (?) of land which formerly belonged to the Japanese colonizers and their helpers in Korea, the nationalization of former Japanese lands, the eight hour working day law, protection of labor and social insurance, the reform of public information as a result of which the Korean language has been restored in schools, the increase in the number of schools and number of students, etc.

However, no more similar broad democratic reforms have been carried out only in North Korea where two-fifth of the Korean population dwells."

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The three provisions of consultation that have been agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation do not contradict freedom of expression of opinion. The Soviet Delegation is striving toward the fulfillment of these conditions. The Soviet Delegation continues to hold the opinion that the American Delegation in presenting itself without sufficient reasons as a defender of freedom of expression does attempt to create the impression that the Soviet Delegation opposes freedom of expression of opinion. Such attempts are doomed to failure. If it is necessary, the Soviet Delegation will again return to this question and will show with examples of Korean reality how things, with the appliance of the principle of freedom of expression, in Korea stand. The Soviet Delegation considers it necessary to another time underline these three conditions on consultation which were agreed upon by the two Foreign Minister do not contradict freedom of expression of opinion, and thus the reference of the American Delegation to freedom of expression of opinion has nothing to do with the given issue. Such reference is apparently intended to cover the tendency of departing from these provisions.

The American Delegation declared as if the Soviet proposal concerning parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, if accepted then will lead to exclusion from consultation of a large group of rightist parties. As it is known to the American Delegation throughout the whole work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation moved that parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, may be admitted only in case they declare their intention to withdraw from the Committee and cease their fight against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission, but the American Delegation rejected this proposal of the Soviet Delegation and thus the responsibility and consequences that follow this refusal and also the delay of the work of the Commission must fully rest on the American Delegation. The Soviet Delegation once again suggests to commence consultation with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the

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Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. There are a number of such parties and organizations--leftists as well as rightists.

The Soviet Delegation feels that the Joint Commission has no grounds because of a small group of parties and organizations that are opposing the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission to delay the work of the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The Korean people are full of determination to render help to the work of the Joint Commission in the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government. This may be proved by numerous greetings addressed to the Joint Commission in the North as well as in the South and by the visits to the Joint Comm. by delegations of various parties and organizations and people who demand that the Joint Commission successfuly resolve the question on the creation of a central government. The Soviet Delegation understands the aspirations and tendencies of the Korean people to unite Korean under united power of the Provisional Democratic Government stipulated by the Moscow Decision. The Korean people will never forgive the Joint Commission because of a certain group which does not wish to give up its principle of fight against the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission and the Allies and the delay in the work of the unification of Korea and creation of a Provisional Government. The Soviet Delegation calls upon the American Delegation to take the way of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and the Agreement reached between the two Ministers and assert all efforts to the speediest creation of a Provisional Democratic Government and a unification under its guidance of all Korea as stipulated by the Moscow Decision.

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PRESS RELEASE OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER AMERICAN DELEGATION OF THE US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

14 August 1947

On 12 August 1947 the United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, wrote to the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. M. Molotov, calling his attention to the deadlock that has existed in the proceedings of the US-USSR Joint Commission which has been meeting in Seoul to recommend to the Four Powers the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

General Marshall suggested in his letter to Mr. Molotov that the respective delegations of the Joint Commission be called upon to submit a report of their work to their governments by 21 August 1947 in order "that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations."

Verbatim copies of this letter, copies attached, were sent to the governments of the United Kingdom and China.

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LETTER MARSHALL TO MOLOTOV

12 August 1947

Dear Mr. Molotov:

In your letter of April 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea resume its work on May 20 in Seoul "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea" and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and United States Governments in July and August, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situtation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the government of the United States.

You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be "on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement" and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the United States Government that "Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission." In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commission the suggestion outlined by General Hodge in his letter to General Chistiakov of December 24, 1946, which was in accordance with the United States position described above. In further-

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ance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction on freedom of expression and opinion of all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the U.S. Delegation has several times offerred to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet Delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet Delegation.

The United States Government believes that, in justice to the Korean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this government that by August 21, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.

I am providing copies of this message to the Governments of China and the United Kingdom.

I have the honor to be, etc. . .

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THE STATEMENT OF COLONEL GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV, CHIEF OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE JOINT SOVIET -AMERICAN DELEGATION

14 August 1947

On 9 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation handed to the press his statement which was made by the American Delegation in the 44th meeting of the Joint Commission, held on 18 July 1947.

With the purpose of correct lighting of the true situation of affairs and presentation of its point of view in regard to the freedom of expression of opinion, the Soviet Delegation decided to publish the following statement, made in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 July 1947 in answer to the statement of the American Delegation on 18 July 1947.

"The American Delegation in its statement took the stand of defending the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee as well as the activities of the parties and organizations comprising this committee which are directed against the Moscow Decision on Korea.

As it is known, the aim of the Moscow Decision is the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastarous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea. For the realization of this aim, the Moscow Decision provides, first of all, the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. In Point 3 of this Decision which mentions the word "trusteeship", the Joint Commission is directed with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and with the participation of Korean democratic organizations to work out measures of aid and assistance for the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of a democratic self-government and the establishment of state independence for Korea. This is not the type of trusteeship which is employed by some governments with the purpose of colonial oppression of the peoples. The trusteeship forseen by the Moscow Decision gives the Korean people

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their own government, guarantees the establishment of a democracy and the conversion of a former colony into a democratic, independent state within the shortest space of time known in history.

Stating that the Koreans have fears concerning Point 3 of the Moscow Decision, the American Delegation identifies a small group of anti-democratic organizations and their active leaders, who oppose the Moscow Decision, with all the Korean people.

The question arises, why some active members and parties of South Korea oppose the Moscow Decision? Is it because as the American Delegation insists, the Koreans fear the establishment of such a form of trusteeship over Korea, as applied by Japan? As it is known, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and China, which joined at a later date, participate in this decision. Therefore, such a form of trusteeship, as was applied by Japan, can not take place. Evidently, this is not the essence of the matter. The essence of the matter lies elsewhere. We know that the opposition against trusteeship was organized by the so-called "leaders" of certain parties and their associates, who saw in the Moscow Decision, the failure of their anti-democratic intentions. These "leaders" without any basis aspire for power in Korea. It is obvious, that they were the individuals, who did not like the decision on Korea made by the Allies, that Korea will become a democratic government, and that in Korea, the people shall participate in governing their State. The "leaders" of these parties and their followers distorted with premeditation the spirit of the Moscow Decision in their mercenary pursuits. Last year they objected to the Moscow Decision and made libel against the Allies who signed it; again this year they continue to struggle against the Moscow Decision and against the Allies.

The absolute majority of Koreans are upholding the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, and are awaiting impatiently the time when in accordance with this decision, the

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Democratic Korean Government will be formed, which will be able to defend the interests of the people and to introduce democratic reforms. What do the Korean people really fear? The Koreans fear a deliberate disruption of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. The Korean people know that if the parties and organizations who struggle against the Moscow Decision, could succeed in a deliberate disruption of the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and seize power in the country, it would mean, that the power would be in the hands of those who collaborated with the Japanese, of those who endeavor to seize power in Korea forcibly; those who wish to deprive the Korean people of democratic reforms, improvements and political power.

The American Delegation tried to prove that the activities of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are limited to expressions of opinion alone and that this Committee, presumably is somewhat like a discussion club. The American Delegation in its declaration states that "inasmuch as these parties limit their activities to expression of opinion, and do not foment and instigate active opposition they are permitted to express their opposition according to the agreement of our Ministers". The Soviet Delegation as well as the American Delegation are aware that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee did and does foment and instigate active opposition against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission. The Soviet Delegation has already presented many facts concerning this question, giving evidence of the active operations of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and therefore, the parties and organizations comprising this Committee. Do not the oppositions and the statements of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee published day-in and day-out on the pages of certain South Korean newspapers, point out the fact that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is carrying on a fight against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission, and also, do not the meetings and various conferences organized

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by this Committee, where measures directed against the Moscow Decision and against the Soviet Commission are being discussed, point out the fact that the Committee and parties and organizations comprising it conduct a fight against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission? The Soviet Delegation believes that those are the facts which confirm that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and parties and organizations comprising it, foment and instigate active opposition to the Moscow Decision and to the work of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation is attempting to affirm that the discussion is supposedly only concerning the fight against the word "trusteeship", and not concerning the fight aginst the Moscow Decision as a whole. This is an entirely naive statement. Firstly, the Moscow Decision should not be taken partially, and secondly, it is known, that the opponents opposing the Moscow Decision will only use the word "trusteeship" to cover up their fight against the Moscow Decision as a whole.

The American Delegation stated for the second time that parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and which submitted their applications for participation in consultation, actually had withdrawn from the body of the committee. Nevertheless, the American Delegation until now did not present any facts proving their statement. The Committee itself declares that the indicated parties and organizations have not withdrawn from it and continue to participate in the Committee's work.

Why does not the American Delegation desire to define the position of these parties and organizations?

The Soviet Delegation feels that until parties and organizations comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committtee will not announce publicly of their withdrawal from the Committee, they continue to be responsible for the activities of this Committee.

The American Delegation points out that the Soviet Delegation, in submitting their demands that parties and social organizations

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which are to consult with the Joint Commission should fully support the Moscow Decision, thereby supposedly violate the agreement reached by Mr. Molotov and Secretary Marshall.

Does it actually constitute the violation of the agreement? Item 1 of the Agreements reached by the two Ministers states:

> "Signing of the declaration set forth in Communique No. 5 shall be considered as a statement of good faith to support fully the Moscow Decision, and shall give the right to parties and organizations which have signed it to be admitted for initial consultation."

As it is seen from this paragraph, agreed upon by the Ministers, the demands of the Soviet Delegation do not contradict, but, on the contrary, precisely correspond with this agreement.

Regarding the freedom of opinion, the Soviet Delegation gave its reply on this matter in its statement of 8 July 1947.

The following is said in this statement:

"The American Delegation in its statement made at the meeting of the Joint Commission on 3 July 1947 again broached the question of freedom of expression of opinion. Firstly, the Soviet Delegation never took a stand against the freedom of expression of opinion, and secondly, it is doubtful whether the American Delegation has sufficient foundation to assume the role of the defender of freedom of expression of opinion. The Soviet Delegation feels that the policies of the Soviet Command in North Korea showed with sufficient clarity that the Soviet side stands for freedom of expression of opinion not only in words but in deeds. As it is known, the Soviet Command in North Korea did not prevent Koreans from expressing their opinions freely nor from rebuilding their lives on democratic beginnings or to eliminate the remnants of the long Japanese domination of Korea, as a result of which considerable progress in the field of democratization and development of national economy and culture has been achieved in North Korea."

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In the letter of Foreign Minister of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, to Secretary of the USA, G.C. Marshall dated 19 April 1947, the following was siad in connection with this matter:

"In connection with Northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratic action, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women, the establishment of local authority agencies and the peoples committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a reulst of which 725,000 landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1,000,000 hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8-hour work day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; CIC educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the network of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in Northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea."

The three conditions for consultation which were agreed upon by the two Foreign Ministers, in the opinion of the Soviet Delegation, do not oppose the freedom of expression of opinion. The Soviet Delegation is anxious to achieve the exact fulfillment of these conditions. The Soviet Delegation continues to hold to the opinion that the American Delegation, presenting itself in the role of the defender of freedom of expression of opinion, without having sufficient basis for doing so, thus, attempts to create the impression that the Soviet Delegation takes the stand

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against the freedom of expression of opinion. Such attempts are doomed to failure. Should it become necessary, the Soviet Delegation will come back to this question, and will show through examples of Korean actuality, how the situation stands in regard to the application of the principle of freedom of expression of opinion in Korea. The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to emphasize once more, that the three conditions for consultation, upon which the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs agreed, do not contradict the freedom of expression of opinion, and thus, the reference of the American Delegation to freedom of expression of opinion has no connection with this particular matter. Such a reference, apparently is meant for the purpose of covering the aspiration of the American Delegation to deviate from these conditions.

The American Delegation declared, that if the Soviet proposal concerning parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, were to be accepted this would lead to exclusion from consultation of a large group of rightist political parties. As it is known to the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation, during the course of work of the Joint Commission proposed that parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee might be admitted for consultation in case they declare of their withdrawal from the Committee and cease their struggle against the Moscow Decision and against the Joint Commission. But the American Delegation refuted the Soviet Delegation's proposal, and through this, the responsibility for the consequences evolving from such a refusal, as well as for the delay of the Commission's work, will lie fully upon the American Delegation. The Soviet Delegation proposes once more to begin consultation with democratic parties and social organizations which fully uphold the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. There is a great number of such leftist parties and organizations, as well as rightist parties and organizations.

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The Soviet Delegation considers that the Joint Commission has no basis for delaying the work on the formation of a Provisional Democratic Government because of a small group of parties and organizations which oppose the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

The Korean people are full of determination to give assistance in the work of the Joint Commission on the formation of a Provisional Democratic Government. This can be proved by numerous greetings which come to the Joint Commission in North as well as in South Korea, and by visits to the Joint Commission of delegations from different parties, organizations and the people, who demand that the Joint Commission successfully solve the problem of formation of a central government.

The Soviet Delegation understands the hopes and aspirations of the Korean people toward the unification of Korea, under a unified authority of a Provisional Democratic Government, provided for by the Moscow Decision. The Korean people will never forgive the Joint Commission, if, because of a certain group, which is unwilling to renounce their principles of struggle against the Moscow Decision, against the Joint Commission, and against the Allies, it will delay the work on the unification of Korea, and the formation of a Provisional Government.

The Soviet Delegation appeals to the American Delegation to take the road toward the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and the agreement between the two Ministers and to exert their efforts toward the quickest possible formation of a Provisional Democratic Government and toward the unification of all Korea under its leadership, as it is provided for by the Moscow Decision.

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN DELEGATION,
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

14 August 1947

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has received many questions concerning the work of the Joint Commission by members of the Press, the Korean public, and by parties and social organizations who have applied for consultation. The American Delegation would like to answer the more frequently asked questions in the following statement.

The position of the Soviet Delegation as the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation sees it is:

1. That political parties or organizations can only be placed on the list for consultation by mutual agreement of Subcommission No. 1, which means that the Soviets could by withholding approval to the inclusion on the list of any party dictate the makeup of the list. This is in fact a contention that the Soviets must hold the veto power.

2. That certain parties (almost all are rightist) must be denied consultation through the device of excluding:

(a) Parties alleged to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations,

(b) Those without zonal headquarters,

(c) Those not social.

The list of parties and organizations with membership in excess of 10,000 submitted by the Soviets as the parties and organizations which are not suspicious to them and with which they are apparently willing to consult omits 24 important parties each of which has a membership in excess of 10,000, all but one of these 24 are apparently rightist, and contain the most important rightist parties requesting consultation. The Soviet Delegation states that these 24 parties are omitted because they are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. In the first place, the American Delegation is unwilling to concede that mere membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee a basis for denying the right of consultation to any group. In the second place, as far as the American Delegation can determine, only 9 of these 24 parties were at one time members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The others are apparently eliminated arbitrarily; at least, the Soviets refused to state their reasons for their elimination. The Soviets have apparently also included on the list presented by them certain parties and organizations which were reported at one time to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. They do not explain why they are willing to consult with certain parties which were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee while they refused to consult with certain other parties which were also reported to be members of this committee. It is a reasonable conclusion that they were reserving the right to question these parties at a later date and deny them consultation in the improbable event that the American Delegation should accept the Soviet view. It is likely that there were other parties and organizations on the list submitted by the Soviet Delegation with which at a later date they would refuse to consult because of their "non-social" or "local" character.

The Soviet proposal to deny consultation to the 24 parties omitted from their list is apparently in furtherance of the plan to eliminate from consultation an important segment of Korean public opinion which holds different political views. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked the Soviet Delegation to produce adequate and satisfactory evidence upon which the American Delegation could determine the validity of the Soviet contentions. None has been produced.

The Soviet contentions are:

1. <u>That these 24 parties are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee</u>. They have produced no evidence to substantiate this contention. They simply make the statement. They vaguely mention certain newspaper articles. The reliability of newspaper articles is doubtful. However, they have not even produced these newspaper articles nor read them into the record as evidence. When the Chief

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Commissioner of the American Delegation attempted to get the Soviet Delegation to discuss their reasons for excluding these 24 parties by discussing each party as a separate entity, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation not only refused to discuss the issue but even refused to answer the questions of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation.

2. <u>That the Anti-Trusteeship Committee is engaged in fomenting and instigating active opposition to the Moscow Decision</u>. The Soviet Delegation has produced no evidence to prove this contention. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has many times asked them for evidence.

3. <u>That the 24 parties bear responsibility for an Anti-Trusteeship Committee demonstration on 23 June</u>. They contend that this Anti-Trusteeship Committee demonstration was instigated and participated in by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee They have offered no proof of this fact other than a statement that they have a letter signed by KIM, Koo. They have made no attempt to link any one of these 24 parties specifically with that demonstration.

The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation has written in to the record the results which approval of the Soviet proposal would produce. In effect it would change the three to two rightist majority of applicant parties in all Korea to an overwhelming leftist majority. It would actually at this early stage of the meeting of the Joint Commission assure an entirely unwarranted, definite leftist control over a united Korea, which in fact would mean domination by groups imbued with Communist Party principles. It is highly naive of the Soviet Delegation to expect that this could be accepted by the American Delegation. Should the American Delegation agree to any such political maneuver, it would be contrary to the role of the Joint Commission and such action would be condemned by the honest people throughout the world.

The right is not a unified group and some of the more extreme elements have revealed their political immaturity and instability by eliminating themselves from consultation through refusing to apply. These extremists continue their clamoring against an as yet undefined arrangement - trusteeship; the maneuvers of this group are not the business of the Joint Commission, but of the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea. General Brown assures you that any attempt to disturb public order by the group will be promptly dealt with.

The American Delegation believes that all shades of public opinion among the Korean population which have applied for consultation should be given a hearing. However, if any parties and organizations are uncooperative with the Joint Commission or inimical to the best interests of Korea, then the American Delegation is willing to push aside these obstacles to the accomplishment of its most pressing task - the establishment of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. However, if the right is arbitrarily eliminated, a proper balance is restored only by arbitrary elimination of the extreme left also. Should both of these groups be eliminated, two of the largest segments of the people would have no voice in consultation.

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SPEECH OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER, AMERICAN DELEGATION OF US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION, Seoul Stadium, 15 August 1947.

On this anniversary of the liberation of Korea from the Japanese oppression, I wish that it were possible for me to congratulate the Korean people on having achieved full independence. It is a matter of regret to us, as it is to you, that the road to independence is yet beset with difficulties.

Two immediate problems face us and you. The first relates to the present government of your country. The second relates to the problem of securing your complete independence as promised by the Foreign Powers.

With reference to the immediate problem of government, there are many problems - political, social and economic - the solution of which are a part of orderly government and are directly connected with the winning of independence. These problems are not insurmountable. They can be met and mastered in the spirit of conciliation and of freedom from partisan rancor. If Korea is to become a democratic nation, Koreans must remember to respect the right of political differences of opinion. Those who seek to exclude from government all who disagree with them are not democratic. They do not understand democracy.

Because of their impatience for immediate independence, it is the tendency of Koreans to readily submit to propaganda purposely instigated by certain individuals and groups which work upon this impatience to lead Koreans to commit acts which are detrimental not only to the orderly execution of efficient government, but which also interfere with and delay the procurement of their independence. The Korean people must realize that life under conditions of complete freedom from oppression carries not only benefits but also responsibilities for the individual citizen, as well as benefits and responsibilities for their government.

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There is a distinct difference between the right of an individual to live under a free government and the right of an individual to do anything which in his opinion he should be able to do, whether it interferes with the rights of others or not.

With reference to the second problem. The aspirations of the Korean people for complete independence and the union of their country is appreciated. It is a laudable aspiration which has been assured to them by the Great Powers. The Korean people have a clear moral right to existence as a separate nation united and independent. That right the United States has solemnly undertaken to secure. Regardless of the time and effort that may be involved, the United States and all of its representatives will continue to work for that result.

The best way for the Koreans to achieve their early independence and to assist in developing the life and welfare of their people is to render whole-hearted and unselfish assistance to the effort of governing Korea and to the effort of the representatives of the Great Powers which are working to secure their independence. They should join their government and lend their efforts to correcting any faults which may exist in it and to aid it in avoiding the commission of faults in the future.

You have been well acquainted through publications in your press as to the existing disagreement between the American and Soviet Delegations on the Joint Commission as to the consultation issue. You may not be so well informed that on August 12th General George C. Marshall, the Secretary of State of the United States, addressed to Mr. V. M. Molotov, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Government, a letter requesting that the Joint Commission report to the two governments by August 21 the progress in their work in order that these governments might decide what further steps, if any are necessary, to take toward securing your independence.

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May all Koreans take this anniversary as a solemn occasion to dedicate themselves anew in the spirit of patriotism and of understanding. Let us all resolve anew that Korea will be well governed pending the creation of a united, free and independent Korea.

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GREETINGS OF THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO

THE KOREAN PEOPLE

On August the 15 1947 the Korean People celebrate the second anniversary of their liberation from the colonial yoke of Japanese imperialism. On this solemn day I, on behalf of the Soviet Delegation of the USSR-USA Joint Commission and of myself, transmit to the citizens of South Korea my hearty greetings and warm congratulations. Exactly two years ago following annihilation of fascist Germany, imperialistic Japan was defeated. The Soviet army which played such a decisive role in the annihilation of the aggressors landed on the territory of Korea in August 1945, defeated the Japanese army in fierce battles, and forced her to capitulate, thus bringing her immediate contribution in the freeing of Korea from Japanese oppression. The Soviet Delegation is proud of this and is now imbued with only one aspiration to render to the Korean people friendly aid in the creation of a soverign state. The Soviet Delegation sincerely wishes and exerts all efforts that the Korean people have their own unified democratic government and a United Korea as soon as possible and that Korea in the most immediate future become an independent democratic state free of all foreign interference as is provided for by the Moscow Decision.

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NT 838
Translation-Kyeng Hyang Shinmun

Hdqs. USAMGIK BPO
17 August 1947

IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT GENERAL SHTIKOV'S ADDRESS WAS DISTURBED.

To the questions by newspapermen concerning the "8.15" ceremony held on 15 August, KIM Hyong Min, the Mayor of SEOUL CITY, answered as follows:

QUESTION: At the memorial ceremony of the "8.15" General Shtikov's address was disturbed by the assembly. What do you think about it?
ANSWER: I am very xxxx regretful, but it was done by a number of people, and was caused by lack of training.
QUESTION: Civil Administratof AHN was also disturbed while making an address. What do you think of this?
ANSWER: I am very sorry about it. But the city authorities, even though they sponsored the ceremony, cannot take direct responsibility for it, because the ceremony was an assembly of citizens. The city hall sponsored the ceremony in cooperation with the Interim Government.
QUESTION: Do you know that Mr. YU Dong Yol, Director of the National Defense Department, left the ceremony as he could not find a seat?
ANSWER: I am very sorry, but I didn't notice it. Of course seats were to be appointed. Any rate, I couldn't make complete arrangements for the ceremony, because there was not enough time.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV, 18 AUGUST 1947, 1330 hours.

GENERAL SHTIKOV inquired whether General Brown wished to settle the time of the next meeting.

GENERAL BROWN stated that the American Delegation had received a copy of the letter addressed by Secretary of State Marshall to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov asking the Joint Commission to report on the present status of the Joint Commission's effort to form a provisional government for Korea as of 21 August. The reason why the Chief of the American Delegation asked for a meeting of the Joint Commission was to discuss the outline of preparation of such a report.

GENERAL SHTIKOV stated that on 14 August he had notified the Chief of the American Delegation that he knew of the existence of such a letter, but that he had still no instructions from the Soviet Government regarding this matter and no answer had arrived yet; consequently, the Soviet Delegation felt that it could not hold a meeting to discuss this letter, particularly since the letter was addressed to Foreign Minister Molotov. Consequently, he could not engage in the discussion of the meeting until he had the instructions.

GENERAL BROWN agreed and stated that the American Delegation would proceed to preparing a report, trying to complete it by 21 August. Should the Soviet Delegation not receive its instructions, the US Delegation would decide further what action to take.

GENERAL SHTIKOV AND GENERAL BROWN agreed that the matter was up to the respective governments and no doubt the Soviet Government would answer the letter of General Marshall.

GENERAL BROWN informed General Shtikov that so far as the US Delegation is concerned, there were no reasons why the Joint Commission

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should not proceed with the fulfillment of its task. Should the Soviet Delegation be ready to convene the Joint Commission, the latter could engage in its normal business.

GENERAL SHTIKOV informed General Brown that the Soviet Delegation was still working on the materials pertaining to the 12th August meeting.

It was agreed that the American Delegation would wait for the Soviet Delegation's convenience in calling the next meeting at the time when it would be ready for such a meeting.

General SHTIKOV commented that the Subcommissions should begin their work as soon as possible, and General Brown commented that they could do so as soon as there will be agreement in the Joint Commission.

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION

US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

20 August 1947

As it is known, the US-USSR Joint Commission was created in accordance with the Moscow Agreement"in order to assist the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures." According to paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision, "in preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations."

During the course of its work this year, the Joint Commission adopted the coordinated Decision #12 on the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, worked out and approved questionnaires on governmental structure of Korea and on a political platform of a future Provisional Korean Democratic Government, sent out these questionnaires to all the Korean democratic parties and organizations, which expressed their desire to participate in consultation with the Joint Commission.

Democratic parties and social organizations of North as well as South Korea signed the declaration, set forth in Joint Communique #5, submitted declarations to the Joint Commission for participation in consultation, designated their representatives for oral consultation with the Joint Commission, and also submitted their considerations on the structure and principles of organization of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter), and on a political platform for a Provisional Government.

During the study of a list of democratic parties and social organizations by the Joint Commission, essential differences of opinions arose and the work of the Joint Commission is being delayed because of this.

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The Korean people follow the work of the Joint Commission with anxiety and with understandable and legitimate impatience await the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

And now, in this responsible and tense moment in the work of the Joint Commission, mass arrests of leaders and actual closing down of democratic parties and social organizations of the Leftist trend, pograms of Leftist Democratic newspapers, arrests of workers of the Leftist Democratic press, began in South Korea. Arrests are being carried out in Seoul, as well as in the provinces.

It should be noted that the repression is carried out only against those democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, which actually support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

Among those arrested, some are representatives of democratic parties and social organizations, designated for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission.

I shall cite several instances which, nevertheless, vividly show the amplitude of repressions in South Korea, directed against the above mentioned democratic parties and social organizations.

These instances became known to the Soviet Delegation from conversations with numerous Korean delegations, as well as from the news releases of the South Korean press.

During the People's meeting of 27 July 1947 in Seoul, organized by the Democratic People's Front of South Korea for the support of the work of the Joint Commission, where, as it is known, the Chief Commissioners of both delegations were present, the Korean police, in the presence of the members of the Joint Commission, arrested the representative of the Trade Union and the representative of the Women's Union immediately following their appearance at this meeting with the appeal to support the work of the Joint Commission. A few days later one of the organizers of this meeting, KIM KWAN SU, was arrested.

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The Deputy Leader of the Labor Party of South Korea, LEE GEE SOK, was arrested as well as other members of the Central Committee of the Labor Party.

On 12 August in the office of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front and on the premises of the "Moon Hack" Publishing Company, a large number of leading workers and working personnel of the Central Committee of the DPF and of the Publishing Company were arrested. During 11 and 12 August leading workers of the city and region committees of the Democratic People's Front of Seoul were arrested on working premises and in their quarters.

At the beginning of August, PAIK, YONG HI, chairman of All Korea Farmer's Alliance, was arrested; on 12 August, LEE, KOO HOON, deputy chairman of the All Korea Farmer's Alliance, KIM, KI YOUNG, chief of the General Affairs Department, HYUNG SONG OOK (?), chief of Propaganda Department, CHOI, HAN CHOL (?), member of the Presidiam and many other members of the All Korea Farmer's Alliance were arrested.

MOON, EUN CHONG and PAK BONG OO (?), members of the Central Committee of the Confederation of Trade Unions, were arrested as well as many other leading workers.

The leading workers of the Democratic Women's Union, among them, YOO, YAWNG CHOON, chairman of the Women's Union, and CHAN, CHIL SON (?), deputy chairman, were arrested.

Also the leading staff of the Cooperative Union (PAK, KYON SOO (?), the chairman, and AN, KI SUNG (?), a member of the Central Committee), the leading staff of the Union of Literary Men (PAK, CHAN MO (?), chief of the Propaganda Department), YOON, HAK KI (?), a member of the Central Committee of the Lawyers Union, workers of the newspapers "Taklin Sinbo" and "Noryok Inmin," CHAN, SUN HAK (?), LEE, SIN SIK (?), KIM, HO DGIN (?), and others were arrested.

In addition the leading staff of the Laboring People's Party (PAIK, NAM UN, LEE, YAH SUNG, HAN IL TE (?), SIN, DON IL (?), PAK,

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TAN CHAL (?), and many others), as well as the leading staff of the Young Friends' Party (PAK, OO CHEN (?), KIM, BEN DE (?), and others) were arrested.

Upon orders of authorities, the premises of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front, of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, of the Central Committee of the Republican People's Party, of the Central Committee of All Korea Confederation of Trade Unions and other democratic organizations were closed down.

Many of those arrested are members of the delegations which visited the Joint Commission with the purpose of conveying to it the demands and good wishes of the people.

A group of correspondents of democratic newspapers, which attended a press conference held by the Soviet Delegation for the purpose of informing the press and the public opinion of the course of work of the Joint Commission, was arrested upon leaving the Duk Soo Palace on 14 August.

The numerous arrests of the leaders of the democratic parties and organizations, many of whom are designated representatives of these parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission, created in South Korea conditions which impede the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement reached between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall.

Such a situation is being created, it seems, with the aim of undermining the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation draws the attention of the American delegation in the Joint Commission toward serious consideration of these circumstances and insists on taking of immediate measures for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea, and for appropriate conditions for work of the Joint Commission.

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August 21, 1947

AMERICA AND THE ORIENT

By Pyun Young-tai, Prof. of Korea University

The possible courses for America to pursue in the Orient may include (1) leaving it to the domination of Japan, a course already tried and discarded with a bitter lesson; (2) stabilizing the Orient by stabilizing China, a policy now pursued by America, to all appearance, but not persistently and consistently enough, though it is the only sensible thing America should carry through to a finish; (3) starting imperialistic domination by force by emasculating oriental peoples, encouraging their internal factions, a plan utterly incompatible with the age-long American stand on world peace and bound to bring the hornets' nest about her ears; (4) halving the Orient with Russia, bringing about a short truce exclusively convenient to Russia in forging an overwhelming advantage over America for the coming struggle which is bound to come on the Russian initiative, for to find a workable system of cooperation with the Soviets is the wildest of all dreams.

There is an insistent and insidious Japanese propaganda aimed at inclining Uncle Sam to rearm the island nation with a view to using her in the coming armed conflict with Russia. Some US citizens already publicly suggest the advisability of allowing Japan to bite off Siberia east of the Baikal. Uncle Sam must be on guard not to be taken in by the kissing of his hand by the Japanese. They usually kiss a hand they cannot bite. They will leave off kissing the moment they think they can afford a bite. A bite from the Maritime Provinces may be smarter than across the spacious Pacific Ocean. You will not so easily lay the Japanese devils as you raise them. The end sought will defeat itself. You will simply have a panther in your back yard in the place of a bear.

America should turn to a people for cooperation, through whose veins the love for international peace and order has run for scores of centuries. China may be inclined to regard the Maritime Provinces as China Irridenta when she has grown strong enough. Peopling those areas with Chinese may only fire their irridentism. China, however, will have no objection to Korea finding an outlet in that direction, for she knows that Korea will never be hostile to her, our mutual friendship proved beneficial by centuries of history. Certainly she would welcome us in preference to the Japanese marauders. Such an expansion would only mean elevating Korea into the status of a world buffer state from that of an oriental one.

But this should not be construed as any aggressive design on our part. Our wish is only that, should international situation create a vacuum contiguous to us, it be filled with our peace-meaning people, to the better service for world peace and order. It is a Japanese myth that Koreans are incapable of ruling or fighting. Equally equipped and trained, the chances are that a Korean army will beat hollow a Japanese one of equal number. No doubt, we shall make finer troops either than the Japanese or the Chinese. The fact that a comparatively small Russian-trained Korean reenforcement to the Chinese communists in Manchuria has largely turned the fortune of battle in their favour bears an eloquent witness to our ability to fight. But nevertheless, at no period in our history of 40 centuries, we were even once soldier-ridden in the same degree as the Japanese have always been. Our tradition of fighting only for defence, only for peace, shall be preserved.

For the past thousand years, Korea and China have stood together against the aggression of the Japanese. China always treated Korea, in substance, as an independent nation, refraining from any interference in our internal affairs. She wisely feared that any overbearing attitude on her part might make us play into any of her potential enemies. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek says, "Without full Korean independence, there is no guaranty for Chinese

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independence." He simply reaffirms the old traditional Chinese policy toward Korea. No sane Chinese statesman in future will break away from this tradition.

Japanese invasion of Korea led to that of Manchuria, sowing seed for the World War II. Russian absorption of Korea would have a dagger ready to rip up the American Pacific traffic, besides placing whole China and Japan within the implacable grip of the Soviets. American domination of Korea, on the other hand, would not be a paying business, earning the enmity of the freedom-loving Koreans and deep-seated suspicions of the Chinese. Korea is, at best, part of the American defence wall. Nobody puts money into a wall to profit. One does so in order to make the wall-protected space productive. One should not be so foolish as to make holes in the wall to pick a few niggardly nickels out of it.

Korean independence is absolutely necessary for the peace in the Orient and for the peace of the whole world. The world, therefore, should well afford to see her independent at its own expense. Once helped to get on her own feet, she will prove herself a fine little industrious nation, paying off her debt of gratitude in service and helpfulness.

Undoubtedly the first step for stabilizing China is to see her fight out her communist insurgents. Communism is a disease on civilization. An epidemic is no private concern. The entire civilized society should tackle it. As yet, no nation has put up such organized fight to communism as China has. In a sense, China fights communism as the vanguard of the non-communist world. The world must not stand by and see China succumb to communism because of lack of succour. The USA should see her own ailment in China's case. A drunkard always thinks himself stronger than his liquor, until he is down reeling to the ground. The infiltration of communism in America, even as it is, may be too strong for her. Its strength can not be known until it is tested, and no other test than a direct fight with the Soviets can be a thorough-going one. Time usually strengthens the virus while weakening the bodily resistance.

China is now going through a major operation, and minor ones must be postponed. America must give sufficient direct assistance to the nationalists and that at once, without making nagging demands on reforms. No sensible person would nudge at another in an unhealthy coma and tell him to behave better at table. There is no sense in hesitating to relieve the Chinese nationalists because they are not all reformist angels. Mark those unworthy citizens that militate against aiding China if they are not precisely the same people as the Chinese communists and their fellow-travellers, who will make Uncle Sam reel as their Chinese comrades do ~~in~~ China now.

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STATEMENT OF THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE PRESS ON 22 AUGUST 1947

In Joint Commission's Session on the 20th of August the Soviet delegation made a statement pertaining to the mass arrests which take place in South Korea.

Following is the text of this statement:

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION

U.S. - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

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TAN CHAL (?), and many others), as well as the leading staff of the Young Friends' Party (PAK, OO CHEN (?), KIM, BEN DE (?), and others) were arrested.

Upon orders of authorities, the premises of the Central Committee of the Democratic People's Front, of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, of the Central Committee of the Republican People's Party, of the Central Committee of All Korea Confederation of Trade Unions and other democratic organizations were closed down.

Many of those arrested are members of the delegations which visited the Joint Commission with the purpose of conveying to it the demands and good wishes of the people.

A group of correspondents of democratic newspapers, which attended a press conference held by the Soviet Delegation for the purpose of informing the press and the public opinion of the course of work of the Joint Commission, was arrested upon leaving the Duk Soo Palace on 14 August.

The numerous arrests of the leaders of the democratic parties and organizations, many of whom are designated representatives of these parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission, created in South Korea conditions which impede the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement reached between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall.

Such a situation is being created, it seems, with the aim of undermining the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Delegation draws the attention of the American delegation in the Joint Commission toward serious consideration of these circumstances and insists on taking of immediate measures for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea, and for appropriate conditions for work of the Joint Commission.

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Statement of the Head of the Soviet Delegation for the Press on 22 August 1947.

In Joint Commission's Session on the 20th of August the Soviet delegation made a statement pertaining to the mass arrests which take place in South Korea.

Following is the text of this statement:

"As is know, the Joint Soviet-American Commission is set up in compliance with the Moscow Decision to render assistance in the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and for preliminary elaboration of corresponding measures." According to point 2 of the Moscow Decision, the Joint Commission should in elaborating its proposals consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations."

In the course of its work this year the Joint Commission adopted an agreed upon decision #12 on the procedure for consultation with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations it has elaborated and approved questionaires on the state organization of Korea and on the political platform of the future provisional Provisional Democratic Government of Korea, and has distributed these questionaires to all Korean democratic parties and organizations who were willing to participate in consultation with the Joint Commission.

The democratic parties and social organizations of both North and South Korea have signed the declaration contained in communique #5, have applied with the Joint Commission for participation in consultation, have designated their representatives for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission and have also submitted their considerations on the structure and principles of organization of a provisional Korean Democratic government and local organs of power (Provisional Charter) and on the political platform for the Provisional Government.

During the discussion of a list of democratic parties and social organizations there arouse essential divergencies and this the point for a further delay in the work of the Commission.

The Korean people with strained attention follow the work of the Joint Commission and with a comprehensible and rightful impatience are awaiting the creation of a provisional Korean democratic Government.

And here during this responsible and intense moment in the work of the Joint Commission there began in South Korea mass arrests of leaders and an actual closing of democratic parties and social organizations of the leftist trend, programs of leftist newspapers, arrests of employees of the leftist democratic press. Arrests are exeduted in the town of Seoul as well as in the provinces.

One cannot but note that the reprisals are directed only against those democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea which actively uphold the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

Some of the apprehended are representatives of democratic parties and social organizations designated for participation in oral consultation with the Joint Commission.

I shall mention only a few facts which nevertheless vividly demonstrate the amplitude of preprisals of South Korea directed against the above democratic parties and social organizations.

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These facts came to the attention of the Soviet delegation from conversations with numerous delegations of Koreans and also from informations of the South Korean press.

During the people's meeting on 27th July 1947 in the town of Seoul organized by the Democratic National Front of South Korea as an expression of upholding the work of the Joint Commission at which, as is known, there were present both delegations, the Korean police in the presence of members of the Joint Commission arrested the representative of the trade union and the representative of the Women's Union right after they had held speeches and in which they appealed to uphold the work of the Joint Commission. In some days the organizer of the meeting, Mr. Kim Kwan Su was arrested.

On 12 August in the building of the Central Committee of the Democratic National Front and in the publishing house "Mun Mak" there was arrested a great number of leading workers and working personnel of the Central Committee of the Democratic National Front and of the publishing house. During August 11th and 12th there were arrested leading workers of town and district Committees of the Democratic National Front of the town of Seoul. The arrest took place both in business offices and private quarters.

In the beginning of August the Chairman of the Peasants' Union, Mr. Pak You Hi was arrested and on the 12th of August the deputy the chairman of the Peasants' Union, Mr. Rhee Gu Mun was arrested alongside with the Chief of the General Department, Mr. Kim Ju You, Chief of the Department of Propaganda, Mr. Won Don Uk, Member of the Presidium, Mr. Doi Man Choe and many other workers of the Peasant Union.

There were arrested members of the Central Committee of the Confederation of Trade Unions, Mr. Mun In Chon and Mr. U Youi Dun and deputy of the chairman Con Chil Son.

There was arrested also the leadership of the Union Cooperation (Chairman Mr. Pak Kion Su, member the Central Committee, Mr. U Mi Sun, the union of literary men (Chief of the Department of Propaganda, Mr. Pak Chon Mo) member of the Central Committee of the Union of lawyers, Mr. U Hak Ku, employees of the newspapers "Toklik Simbo" and "Noriok Tu Min" Mr. Chan Sun Yak, Rhee Sin Suk, Kim Cho Din and others. Besides there was arrested the leadership of the party of the labouring people (Pak Nam Un, Rhe I Sou, Man Il Te, Sun Don Il, Pak Wan Cho and many others) and also the leadership of the Party of Young Friends (Pak U Chen, Kim Ben Do and others).

By an order of authorities the buildings of the Central Committee of the Democratic National Front, the Central Committee of the labouring Party, the Central Committee of the People, Republic Party, the Central Committee of the All Korean Confederation of trade unions and buildings of other organizations were closed.

Many of the arrested are members of the delegations which had visited the Joint Commission to deliver to them the demands and desires of the people.

On 14th August when leaving Duc Su Palace a group of correspondents of democratic papers was arrested. This group had visited the press conference arranged by the Soviet delegation with a view to inform the press and the public opinion on the course of work in the Joint Commission.

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Numberous arrests of leaders of democratic parties and organizations, many of which are representatives of parties and organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission have created a situation in South Korea, which prevents the realization of the Moscow Decision on Korea and the Agreement reached between Molotov and Marshall.

Such a situation is apparently created with an aim to disrupt the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet delegation turns the serious attention of the American Delegation in the Joint Commission to these circumstances and insists upon the adoption of immediate measures to reestablish normal conditions for the existence and activity of democratic parties and organizations of South Korea and proper conditions for the work of the Joint Commission."

Ollaslok

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Questions in Shtikov's Press Conf.
as taken down by representatives of
the Dept. of Public Information.
Gen. /

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General Shikov's Questions and Answers

Q-1: Anti-trusteeship aims at sovereign independence in the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government without any interference of foreign powers which the Soviet Delegation stated, and also is different from the objection to the Moscow Decision originally.

Why does the Soviet Delegation wish to exclude the anti-trusteeship organizations from consultation with the Joint Commission?

A-1: The Moscow Decision assured to the Korean people, the establishment of democratic government and complete independence with the support from the people of North and South Korea. But the anti-trusteeship committee cannot represent the whole Korean people. The part of anti-trusteeship committee is only from south of the 38th. They object to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission.

Mr. Li, Yuo, chairman of the joint committee stated in this afternoon's meeting that the Joint Commission cannot be successful and will also fail to establish the Korean Government. If organizations who attempt to overthrow the anti-trusteeship movement participate in consultations with the Joint Commission. There are evidences that they will obstruct the work of the Joint Commission. In all political activities and social organizations who participate in the anti-trusteeship committee, many of the Molotov-Marshall decision.

Q-2: If the present disagreement between the two delegations continues indefinitely, isn't there a probability of the break-up of the Joint Commission?

A-2: The Joint Commission was organized to put the Moscow Decision into practice. Accordingly, the opposite opinions in the Joint Commission were because of the attitude of the American delegation who do not want to fulfill the exact duties of the Three Ministers' decision and the agreement between Marshall and Molotov.

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Q-3: Even if trusteeship means rule and interference, is it the duty of the Korean people to accept it?

A-3: In the Moscow decision there is no provision that any country rules Korea. The Moscow decision assures all assistance in the establishment of an independent, democratic government, politically, economically and culturally in the very near future.

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USAMGIK, Bureau of Public Opinion
25 August 1947

Translation #852

JAYU SHINMUN for 23 August 1947

GENERAL SHTIKOV'S STATEMENT CONCERNING ROUND-UP OF LEFTIST LEADERS

On the 20th of this month, General Shtikov made the following statement:

"(Some omitted) The Joint Commission has come to disagreement in making a list of political parties and social organizations with whom to confer, and this disagreement has become a deadlock. The Korean people have a vital interest in the Commission, and they clearly desire a Korean democratic provisional government.

"At this important time, the general arrest of Leftist leaders has been boldly carried out; Leftist political parties and social organizations have been ordered to dissolve; the democratic publications of the Leftists have been suppressed, and some of the employees have been arrested. This round-up is now being carried out in the provinces, as well as in SEOUL City.

"I cannot help pointing out the fact that only those democratic elements of the parties and organizations in South Korea which enthusiastically support the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission are now being oppressed. Some of the persons arrested are those representatives of parties and organizations who were selected to attend the oral consultation in the Joint Commission.

"I will enumerate several examples to show clearly the extent of the oppression against the democratic political parties and social organizations in South Korea. The Soviet Representative has come to know the following facts through many interviews with Koreans, and through newspapers in South Korea: that is, the South Korean Democratic National Front held a people's mass meeting to promote the Joint Commission at NAMSAN Hill on July 27th, 1947. As you know, both chiefs of the Joint Commission representatives were present at this meeting. In our presence, the South Korean police arrested the representative of the Vocation Alliance and that of the Women's Alliance, both of whom supported and spoke for the Joint Commission at that meeting. A few days later, the police arrested KIM Kwang Soo, one of those who organized this mass meeting.

"Mr. LEE Ki Sok, Vice-Chairman of the South Korea Labor Party, and certain other central committeemen of the Party, were arrested. On August 12th, a number of staff members of the Democratic National Front were arrested in its central office; and many employees of the MUNHAK Printing Office were arrested at their work. During two days, on the 11th and 12th of August, the police arrested staff members of the SEOUL City Branch and each of the Ward Branches ~~xxxxxx~~ of the Front in their offices or in their homes.

"At the beginning of August, Mr. PAIK Yong Hi, a representative of the National Farmers' League, was arrested, and on the 12th of August, the police arrested its Vice-Chairman, LEE Koo Soon, Director of the General Affairs Department KIM Ki Yong, Director of Public Relations Bureau HYON Dong Hun, Standing Committeeman CHOI Han Chel, and many other members. As for the National Conference of Korean Labor Unions, Committeeman MUN Un Cheng and PARK Bong Woo, and other leaders were arrested. Of the arrested members of the Democratic Women's Alliance, we find Chairman YU Yong Jun and Vice-Chairman JONG Chil Song. Besides these, the police arrested PARK Kyong Soo, Chairman of the Co-operation Guild, and PARK Kyong Soo, a central

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committeeman of the Guild, and PARK Chan Mo, Director of the Public Relations Bureau of the Writers' Association; YUN Hak Ki, a central committeeman of the Jurists' Association; and also CHANG Soon Kak, LEE Sin Jik, KIM Ho Jin, and other employees of the NO RYUK INMIN and the DOKLIP SHINBO.

"In addition to these men, there are also under arrest PAHK Nam Un, LEE Yu Sun, HAHN Il Ie, SIN Dong Il, PAK Chang Chul, who are xxx leaders of the Laboring People's Party, and PAK Yu Chun and KIM Byung Je, who are leaders of the Young Friends Party.

"Moreover, the offices were closed of the Central Committee of the Democratic National Front, the Central Committee of the Labor Party, the Central Committee of the People's Republican Party, the Central Committee of the National Conference of Korean Labor Unions and of other democratic parties.

"Among the persons thus restrained, there are many representatives who recently called on the Joint Commission in order to convey the expressed desires of the people.

"On August 14 at Duk Soo Palace, the USSR delegation held a press conference in order to report, for the information of the general public, social organizations and newspapers, concerning the progress of the business of the Joint Commission. At the close of that press conference, certain democratic pressmen who had taken part in that meeting were also hunted out at the gateway of Duk Soo Palace and placed under arrest.

"These restrictions of democratic parties and leaders of social organizations who are official delegates of political parties and social organizations appointed to consult with the Joint Commission, is creating a condition to disturb the success of the Moscow Decision, as set forth in the letters between Marshall and Molotov.

"I am now giving much thought to these matters. Such things may have been designed to bring about the failure of the Joint Commission."

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STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION
MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN

23 August 1947

In view of the fact that three weeks have passed since the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation issued a report on the progress of the Joint Commission, it is deemed advisable to inform representatives of the Korean and American press, so they can inform the people, what efforts have been and are now being made to resolve the Commission's present impasse.

Little progress has been made, despite continued meetings and discussions, on the compilation of a list of parties and social organizations to be admitted for oral consultation.

The Soviet Delegation continues to uphold its right to exercise a veto power over certain parties of which it is suspicious. The American Delegation, on the other hand, remains firm in its stand for full and free consultation, based on the contention that all parties and organizations in Korea must receive equitable and fair treatment in accordance with the principle of fair play.

Repeated proposals have been made by the American Delegation to review systematically the list of applicants for consultation to determine if any should be excluded for cause. Each time such proposals have been rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

Within the past three weeks the American Delegation has made three specific proposals as part of a concentrated effort to resolve the present disagreement over consultation and thus to expedite other phases of the Joint Commission's work. Two of these proposals have been rejected by the Soviet Delegation and there has been no answer, up to the present time, to the third proposal.

At the 48th meeting, on 29 July 1947, it was proposed:

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"That the Soviet Delegation conduct consultation with those political parties and social organizations of North Korea and the American Delegation consult with those political parties and social organizations of South Korea."

At the 50th meeting, on 1 August 1947, the American Delegation made the following proposal:

"That consultation be conducted jointly north and south of the 38th Parallel with those parties which the Soviet Delegation is willing to hear, and that the American Delegation conduct unilateral consultation south of the 38th with those parties they (the Soviet Delegation) claim are suspicious to them. Such consultation by the American Delegation will be considered consultation with the Joint Commission."

Both of these proposals were rejected by the Soviet Delegation.

The third proposal, made at the 53rd meeting, on 12 August 1947, and to which no reply has been received, reads as follows:

"1. Oral consultation shall be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement.

"2. Directive to be issued to Subcommission No. 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective.

"3. The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government as the charter may specify, which election shall be held with <u>free electioneering</u>, <u>secret and multi-party ballots</u>, <u>under international supervision</u>. That Sub-

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commission No. 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter.

"4. That Subcommission No. 3 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government together with a plan for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea."

Through a general free election as outlined in this proposal, the American Delegation feels the Korean people could express opinions which because of the position taken by the Soviet Delegation cannot be obtained through oral consultation on a broad basis. It is the belief of the American Delegation that a general election, where a clear and free election under international supervision is guaranteed, would permit even wider expression of opinion than would consultation.

The third proposal made at the 53rd meeting on 12 August 1947 visualized that the only change which would be made in Joint Commission Decision No. 12 would be that initial oral consultation as specified in paragraph 7 of that Decision would be cancelled and the written answers to questionnaires substituted therefor. The proposal did not abandon the creation of the consultative body as required by paragraph 9, Joint Commission Decision No. 12. With the consultative body, representing all shades of Korean opinion to advise it, the Joint Commission should be able to organize a general election which would lead to free expression of the desires of the Korean people as to their government.

On several occasions since the receipt of Secretary Marshall's letter to Foreign Minister Molotov requesting both delegations to submit a report to their respective governments

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by August 21, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation made overtures looking toward the preparation of a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation said he would be unable to collaborate on a joint report pending instructions from his government, which had not been received.

The American Delegation compiled its own confidential report on progress of the Joint Commission and the document has been forwarded to Secretary Marshall.

At the Commission's 54th meeting, on 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation registered a vehement protest over what he called "repression" of Leftist leaders and organizations in South Korea. Many of them, he said, support the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission and have applied for consultation. He cited numerous instances of arrests, declaring these arrests created conditions which "impede" fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and the Marshall-Molotov Agreement and charging that the situation has been created to undermine the work of the Joint Commission.

The Soviet Commissioner insisted that the American Delegation take immediate measures "for restoration of the normal conditions for existence and activities of democratic parties and organizations of Sout' Korea."

The American Delegation replied it would need time to have this document translated and prepare a reply, and stated:

"In listening to the document, it is the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation that the Soviet Delegation is attempting to interfere in the conduct of the government of South Korea. It is not the function of the Joint Commission to govern Korea, but to prepare plans which will establish a government which in the future will govern Korea. There are others who have present responsibilities for governing Korea. The American Delegation will reply to this statement at a later date."

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S.C. #2

STATEMENT OF ALBERT E. BROWN, CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
AMERICAN DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

25 August 1947.

At the 54th meeting of the Joint Commission, 20 August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation read a statement concerning the arrest of certain leftist leaders of South Korea. In this statement he requested the American Delegation to join with the Soviet Delegation in initiating certain action. The Chief Commissoner of the American Delegation informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation that before the American Delegation could comment on his statement it would be necessary to have it translated, that comment would be made at a later meeting. He also informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation that in listening to the Soviet statement it appeared to the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation as though the Soviet Delegation was attempting to interfere with the Government of South Korea, that the Joint Commission had no responsibility at this time for governing Korea, but did have responsibility for preparing plans for the formation of a government which would later govern Korea.

On August 22nd the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation released to the American and Korean press the above mentioned statement. By informing the people of the world of a complaint against an outside third party - the South Korean Government - prior to agreement by the American Delegation, which was not even given a chance to reply, the Soviet Delegation is in fact attempting to usurp the functions of the Joint Commission and to take upon itself action which the Joint Commission could only take by mutual agreement of both delegations. The Soviet Delegation overlooks the fact that while in South Korea it is actually a guest of the South Korea Government and of the United States which this government represents, and that it should follow the normal dictates of

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common courtesy in conducting its business.

The statement that fulfillment of the Moscow Decision is being impeded by the arrest of the few individuals reported in the Soviet statement is absurd. There remain tens of thousands of individuals left in the political parties and organizations represented by those arrested who can substitute for them if necessary as representatives of their parties and organizations. Moreover, for reasons totally unrelated to the arrests, the Joint Commission has had no prospect of holding oral consultation since the meeting of 2nd July. The arrests, therefore, have no bearing whatsoever on the conduct of oral consultation. Furthermore, the Soviet Delegation does not know whether, if oral consultation should commence tomorrow, the individuals of whose arrests it complains would or would not be made available for consultation. I can assure the Soviet Delegation that the American Delegation will join with it in requesting that any individual with whom the Joint Commission desires to consult be made available to the Joint Commission for that purpose. The American Delegation also expects that the Soviet Delegation will join with it in producing certain individuals now held under arrest in North Korea with whom the American Delegation is most anxious to consult.

The statement of the Soviet Delegation that these arrests seem to have been made for the purpose of creating conditions which would undermine the work of the Joint Commission is pure fantasy. The Soviet Delegation is bringing these charges for purposes of pure propaganda and of creating a smoke-screen to obscure certain strategic blunders of the Soviet Delegation. These blunders have placed the Soviet Delegation, through its inexcusable refusal to consult broadly with Korean parties and social organizations, in the position of repudiating the Marshall-Molotov Agreement and holding up the work of the Joint Commission, the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea and the final establishment of Korean

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independence.

While the American Delegation did not and would not have raised the issue, since the Soviet Delegation itself raised it, the American Delegation desires to make the following comments on the activities of the parties and organizations in South Korea which the Soviet Delegation is attempting to defend.

The South Korea Labor Party and other parties and organizations, members of the Democratic People's Front of South Korea, have since their inception been disloyal to the government of South Korea and hostile to the United States. They have used illegal means, including subversive action, to embarrass and undermine the governmental functions in the United States zone.

They have been aided and abetted in such actions by the Democratic People's Front of North Korea.

Agents from without South Korea have been sent into South Korea to organize disorders against the government and to lead parties and organizations, members of the Democratic People's Front, in such disorders.

Unless and until the parties and organizations holding membership in the Democratic People's Front cease their present policy of intrigue and disloyalty to the existing government, their leaders must accept the responsibility for the illegal acts of the parties which they lead and which they presumably plan and direct. Such responsibility includes the ever present possibility of arrest, fine and/or imprisonment.

The government of South Korea has authority to take such action as is necessary to protect itself.

The American Delegation once again advises the Soviet Delegation to avoid entanglement in Korean politics, particularly in support of parties and organizations hostile to the United States.

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THE SOVIET DELEGATION
USSR-US JOINT COMMISSION

THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

26 August 1947

The Soviet Delegation has carefully studied the proposal, submitted by the American Delegation in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 12 August. This proposal appears unsatisfactory to the Soviet Delegation.

First of all, it should be noted that the American proposal does not actually state anything definite concerning the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The proposal specifies only that Subcommission No. 3 must prepare "a plan for selection of appointed personnel for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government." It is evident, however, that the formation of a government and a compilation of a plan for selection of personnel is not the same thing. When, in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 12 August, for the purpose of clarification, the Soviet Delegation submitted the question as to how the American Delegation visualizes the formation of a Provisional Government, and when and by whom it would be formed according to the American proposal, the American Delegation evaded the answer to this question.

Thus, the basic task of the Joint Commission, that of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, is avoided and made complicated in the American proposal, while the Korean people expect from the Joint Commission, primarily, the solution of this very question.

The American proposal does not mention consultation provided for in paragraph 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12, but the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, replying to the question of the Soviet Delegation, explained that this consultation must take place. If it is so, then the American Delegation, had it really

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desired to advance de facto the work of the Joint Commission, it should have indicated in its proposal how it plans to organize oral consultation in accordance with paragraph 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12. Without this, talk of what principles should be included in the Provisional Charter has little meaning, inasmuch as no practical way is indicated for the working out of this Provisional Charter.

The statement of the American Delegation in the meeting of the Joint Commission of 12 August and especially the press communique of the American Delegation of 23 August, do not leave any doubt that the proposal of the American Delegation of 12 August, was made with a purely propagandistic purpose. The American Delegation in its press communique declined the word "elections" in every possible way. The American Delegation, in its proposal, has supposedly foreseen all the questions connected with the elections, but the American Delegation has "forgotten" or has deliberately neglected to state the role and the position of the Koreans, themselves, in conducting the elections for their own legislative body.

It is pointed out in the American proposal that a Provisional Charter should provide for the creation of an elective legislative body. The Soviet Delegation considers it self-evident that a Provisional Charter should provide for a formation of a legislative body, elected on the basis of general, direct and equal suffrage by a secret ballot.

The Joint Commission spent almost two months discussing the question of compilation of a list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation. The American Delegation actually refused to apply the decision of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, according to which the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision.

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Moscow Decision.

The compilation of the list of Korean democratic parties and social organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission proved to be impossible due to the position taken by the American Delegation.

For the purpose of expediting work of the Joint Commission on the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, the Soviet Delegation is ready to agree with the proposal of the American Delegation of 12 August 1947 not to conduct oral consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations as provided in paragraph 7 of Joint Commission Decision #12, and submits the following proposals:

1. To charge:

(a) Subcommission No. 2 to begin immediately the study of the written proposals of democratic parties and social organizations submitted to the Joint Commission pertaining to the questionnaires which were distributed by the Joint Commission, and to submit the drafts for the structure of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) and of political platform to the Joint Commission;

(b) Subcommission No. 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel of a Provisional Government, and the order of acceptance of authority by the Government.

2. To create a consultative body, a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly, composed of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations.

A Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly should be formed from representatives of democratic parties and social organizations with a declared membership of over 10,000 which submitted applications to the Joint Commission for consultation and which fully support the Moscow Decision, and do not fight against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

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The number of representatives in a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly from North and from South Korea must be equal.

Representation from various parties and organizations will be determined by the Joint Commission in accordance with their membership, and taking into consideration, as much as possible, their influence.

3. The Joint Commission invites the Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly for the purpose of the working out of proposals regarding structure and principles for formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) for the formation of a political platform and selection of personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and for the order of acceptance of authority by the Government as well as other matters.

The Provisional Charter should provide for the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The Soviet Delegation understands that the Korean people are impatiently awaiting the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which could unite Korea and realize those democratic reforms which the Korean people want.

The Soviet Delegation's proposal clearly indicates that a consultative body, a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly, composed of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations must be formed. This Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly being composed of Koreans, themselves, and representing the opinions of the most diverse classes of population, will take direct part in working out of all the questions which are connected with the formation of a Provisional Government and with the program of its activity.

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The Soviet proposal also contains a recommendation for the necessity of providing for the formation of a legislative body in the Provisional Charter for which election should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general direct and equal suffrage, by secret ballot. In these elections all democratic parties and social organizations must have equal rights to nominate their candidates and to conduct free campaigns for their candidates and for their program.

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NT 858
Translation-The Seoul Shinmun

Hdqs. USAMGIK BPO
27 August 1947

GENERAL WEDEMYER REACHED KIMPO YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

At 1430 on the 26th of this month, General Wedemyer and his party, after making inspection in China for about 40 days, reached KIMPO Airbase by way of Tokyo. They were welcomed by General Hodge, General Lerch, Dr. KIM Kiu Sik, Civil Administrator AHN Jai Hong, Mr. KIM Koo and many other important Korean persons -- with whom General Wedemyer shook hands, after he reviewed the US troops there. Afterwards, he and his party came into Seoul, at 15:40 on that day, and stopped at the CHOSUN Hotel. He is to attend his business in the room of Deputy Military Governor Helmick, in the Capitol Building, and on the coming 28th of this month, he will be interviewed by the press.

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STATE DEPT.
JOINT COMMISSION
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NERAL BROWN - GENERAL HEDEMEYER CONFERENCE 27 August 1947
515 Hours.

GENERAL BROWN: Gentlemen, you have in front of you a pamphlet that has in it a great deal of material which I will touch on as I go along. It is given you purely for reference. You can take it with you and use it as you wish.

I am going to speak today about the Joint Commission, and bring in the political situation in Korea briefly as it relates thereto. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943, participated in by the U.S., the United Kingdom and China, promised Korea their independence in due course. That promise was reaffirmed at Potsdam. After Soviet Russia declared war on Japan they subscribed to the Potsdam Declaration. Prior to Russia's declaration of war an agreement was reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under which Russia and the U.S. occupied Korea for the purpose of accepting the surrender of Japan, imposing the terms of surrender, and the U.S. Forces were directed to establish Military Government in the area of Korea occupied by them. The 38th Degree Parallel divided the two areas, as you know.

GENERAL HEDEMEYER: That isn't quite clear to me -- the delineation between the responsibility for establishing a government between Russia and the U.S.

GENERAL BROWN: The only thing that we have on it is an extract from Gen Hq AFPAC, Operational Instruction No. 4, August 15, 1945, para 2a of which reads: (reads para referred to).

GENERAL HEDEMEYER: What were the Russians' responsibilities? Were they agreed to by the US and Russia, or did Russia just assume responsibility?

GENERAL BROWN: This is all the information we have. General Hodge has told me that he has talked to several people with knowledge of this, but as far as I know, General Hodge has no other information on it.

GENERAL HEDEMEYER: It seems to me that that is going to cause continued friction and misunderstanding relative to responsibilities between Russia and the U.S.

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GENERAL BROWN: No, because the 38th Parallel is the boundary line between the two responsibilities.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Yes, but going back to the Cairo Agreement, reaffirmed at Potsdam, it was agreed that Korea would have independence, that Russia would work along unilaterally and that the section occupied by Russia would be entirely different from ours.

GENERAL [illegible]: I think that is answered by the next section. On 27 December 1945 the Moscow Agreement was signed between the US, Russia and Great Britain. China subsequently acceded to that agreement. You have Tab II in the folder in front of you, and Section 3 of the Moscow Agreement is the one which relates to Korea. If you will observe that agreement, you will find there are three provisions in it. The first paragraph relates to the establishment by the two commands in Korea of a commission for certain purposes, the purposes as stated in para 1. Para 2 establishes a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the US Command in Southern Korea, and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea, in order to assist in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government. It requires that the recommendations worked out by this commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of Russia, China, the United Kingdom and the US, prior to the final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission. After the Provisional Government is established, para 3 provides that the Joint Commission in consultation with that government and with Korean democratic organizations shall work out plans for aiding and assisting the government to accomplish certain things. That "aiding and assisting" is the trusteeship issue of the Moscow Agreement which has caused so much difficulty. I would like to call your attention to para 2, to the second sentence which provides that in preparing their proposal, the commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations -- that is, in preparing their recommendations for the formation of a Provisional Government, the Moscow Agreement requires the Joint Commission to consult with representatives of all the democratic parties and social organizations of Korea.

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QUESTION: Is there any way to define those democratic parties?

GENERAL BROWN: The most I can say is just that which you have before you. That is the only document guiding the work of the Joint Commission. Does that answer the question?

- - - - -: Yes, sir, very clearly.

GENERAL BROWN: The Joint Commission convened under the Moscow Agreement in Seoul on 20 March 1946. It remained in session until 8 May 1946. It failed to reach agreement on its first task, which was the formation of a Provisional Government. The reason why it failed to reach agreement was that the Soviet Delegation insisted upon creating that government through wide unification of all democratic parties and social organizations supporting the Moscow Agreement. They insisted on denying participation in the formation of the government to reactionary, anti-democratic groups, and those attempting to undermine the work of the Joint Commission. They stated their desire to create in Korea a true democratic and independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union, so that in the future it would not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union. The specific disagreement which caused adjournment arose over the implementation of that sentence in par 2 of the Moscow Decision which requires the Joint Commission to consult with democratic parties and social organizations in its work of setting up the Provisional Government, the Soviet Delegation specifically insisting on excluding from consultation all parties and organizations which do not fully support the Moscow Decision. General Hodge mentioned to you this morning the furor created in Korea over the trusteeship issue. He mentioned that in general all Rightists were opposed to the Trusteeship feature of the Moscow Decision. He mentioned also that the Leftists were equally opposed to it until about 2 January, the Moscow Agreement having been agreed to on 27 December. They apparently received orders from Moscow to change their position from one of opposition to trusteeship to one favoring trusteeship. When the Joint Commission met, the Russians refused to consult any party or organization which did not fully support the Moscow Decision, including the trusteeship provision, or conversely, they refused to consult with parties and organizations which opposed

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trusteeship, and that was all the Right. They were willing to consult those fully supporting the Moscow Decision, including the Trusteeship issue, which was all the Left. The American Delegation therefore found themselves in the position of where the Soviet Delegation refused to consult with the parties and organizations with which the American Delegation demanded they consult, and the Soviet Delegation insisted on replacing these Rightist parties with party members of the Democratic People's Front, all Leftist parties, Communist dominated or Communist led. That was what led to the breakup of the Joint Commission in May 1946. Prior to the breakup of the Joint Commission both delegations could foresee the impasse, so an attempt was made to try and reach a formula on which both delegations could agree. Such a formula was agreed to by both the Russians and Americans. If you will turn to Tab 12, page 3, par 2, you will find there an agreement reached between the American and Soviet Delegations: (Reads agreement). Both delegations agreed that if the leader of a political party or social organization would sign that declaration which was published in the very famous document called Joint Communique No. 5, that they would accept them for consultation. That document was published, and there was a rather general response by Koreans. They were willing to sign it. In the meantime at a meeting of what was called the Representative Democratic Council, Dr. Kimm Kiusic, a Rightist political leader, made the statement that signing that document did not mean that a party or organization could not at a later discussion with the Joint Commission oppose trusteeship. When the Soviet Delegation heard that, they refused to have anything further to do with trying to implement the Moscow Decision in 1946, and the Commission broke up. I would like to read an extract from the statement of the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation, made at the 13th meeting, 11 April 1946: "The Soviet Delegation has once more assured itself in the correctness and in the rightness of its proposal; namely, to consult those who support the Moscow Decision and those who strive to its fulfillment. The newspapers of the parties who form the United Democratic National (People's) Front of South Korea declare in each issue about

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their readiness to support the Moscow Decision and they also declare their readiness to render assistance to the Joint Commission. They express all kinds of favor towards the measures taken by the Allies to create a provisional government. At the same time newspapers of other parties continue to oppose the Moscow Decision and at the same time they oppose the Joint Commission." Before the departure of the Soviet Delegation, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation, General Shtikov, held a conference with the CG, US Forces in Korea, General Hodge, and in that conference, among other statements General Shtikov said: "The main reason why the Soviet Delegation insisted on barring certain persons from consultation is that Russia is a close neighbor to Korea, and because of this is interested in establishing in Korea a Provisional Government which would be loyal to the Soviet Union." The day after the Joint Commission adjourned, the 9th of May to be exact, General Hodge wrote the Commanding General of Soviet Forces in North Korea, General Chistiakov, informing him that the American Delegation was prepared at any time to resume the work of the Joint Commission, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Delegation would return to Seoul. That correspondence extended from 9 May 1946 to 28 February 1947, in an exchange of letters between the two commands in an effort to try and find a formula under which, if the Joint Commission reconvened, the two delegations could proceed to implement the Moscow Decision. In a letter of 1 November 1946 General Hodge proposed to General Chistiakov that the agreement signed by the Korean people, which I have called to your attention -- Joint Commission Communique No. 5 -- should be so interpreted that if after signing that agreement one abstained from fomenting or inciting active opposition against the Moscow Decision, he would be eligible for consultation. In other words, the Americans insisted on the right of Koreans to freely express their views on opposition to trusteeship, or to any other condition of the Moscow Decision.

If you will turn again to Exhibit 12 on page 1 you will find three proposals as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission. In other words, on 1 November General Hodge made the proposal

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that the agreement signed by the Koreans would be acceptable, providing the Koreans who signed it did not foment or instigate active opposition to the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Commander in North Korea replied and made three proposals: (1) The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision in Korea (2) Those invited for consultation must not nominate as representatives those who have compromised themselves by active opposition. (3) Those invited must not nor will not actively oppose, nor will they incite others to actively oppose the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. That formula was not acceptable to the Americans. On the next page you will find that on 24 December General Hodge replied with three counter proposals. The first counter proposal was that signing the declaration in Communique Number 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding the Moscow Decision, and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for consultation. That is the most important part of that quotation. The third part provides that after signing it, if these people instigate or foment active opposition to the Moscow Decision or to any Allied Power, they will be thrown out. That was the proposal that was adopted finally. The Soviet Commander replied to that letter of General Hodge, 24 December, and rejected those proposals, and came back with counter proposals which could not be accepted by the Americans. Before that letter was answered, a copy of it was sent to Washington and the matter was taken up on an administrative level. The Americans did not reply to the Soviet letter.

As a result of the exchange of correspondence between General Marshall and Mr. Molotov, with the three proposals in General Chistiakov's letter of November 26, as countered by General Hodge in his letter of 24 December, which are the proposals set forth in Pages 1 and 2 of this, were accepted by both ministers as the basis for reconvention of the Joint Commission. Before the Joint Commission reconvened, General Hodge sent to the War Department a radio in which he invited their attention to the fact that in his opinion these proposals did not form a firm basis on which the Joint Commission could reconvene,

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because they did not positively resolve the issues which led to the breakdown of the Commission in 1946. He pointed out that in a letter of February 28, 1947, the Soviet Commander in North Korea had refused the proposal in General Hodge's letter of 24 December, and offered counter proposals which were not acceptable. On these conditions the Joint Commission reconvened on 21 May 1947. (Pointing to chart). This shows the American organization and the Soviet parallel, with the Chief Commissioner, the Secretariat, and the Joint Commission proper, composed of five members, divided into three subcommissions, one member acting as executive to the Chief Commissioner; and three Subcommissioners doing the primary work of the Joint Commission. In Subcommission No. 1 the American member is Dr. Bunce. He has with him the Soviet member, Mr. Tounkin. The American member and Soviet member act as chairmen week by week. When the American Chief Commissioner is chairman, the American member of the Subcommission is chairman. General Weckerling is the American member of Subcommission 2, and Mr. Jones, Subcommission 3. General Lebedeff is the Russian member of Subcommission 2, and Mr. Balasanov, Subcommission 3. Regarding the task assigned the subcommissions -- No. 1 was to prepare plans and do all the work in connection with consultation with Korean parties and organizations; Subcommission 2 was to draft a charter and a platform forthe Provisional Government; Subcommission 3 was to study the governments of North and South Korea and plan for integration of the existing governments, and also to study the method of procuring personnel which would be required by the charter prepared by Subcommission 2, either secured by election, by appointment, or by any other method. We created a Political Advisory Group, which is not included in the organization proper of the Joint Commission, headed by Mr. Sargent, in order to keep in contact with the Koreans throughout the work of the Joint Commission and keep the American Delegation informed of the Korean views. That Advisory Group has done a great service to the American Delegation. It has nothing to do with the Russians nor have the Russians anything to do with it.

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I would like to diverge here a moment to mention that the task of the Joint Commission in this session is implementation of par 2 of the Moscow Decision -- to assist in the formation of the Provisional Government. The trusteeship issue will not arise, and cannot arise until after the four powers review the plans of the two powers concerned with the creation of that Provisional Government, because par 3 of the Moscow Decision is not to be implemented until after the Provisional Government is organized. The American Delegation hoped therefore that the trusteeship issue would not arise during this first stage of the Joint Commission, and that agreement could be reached for the creation of a Provisional Government over a united Korea before the issue of trusteeship came up.

The first and most immediate task of the Joint Commission was to take up the question of consultation -- with whom would consultation be had, and how would it be held? That task, as I stated a moment ago, was assigned to Subcommission No. 1, with Dr. Bunce and Mr. Tounkin as co-chairmen. About the first time that subcommission met, the Soviets came forward with the proposal that the Joint Commission consult this year with 30 parties and organizations. In other words, a very narrow consultation. Dr. Bunce tried to get the Soviet members to define social organizations and political parties, as those words are used in the Moscow Decision, as a basis for possible elimination of certain small organizations, and those which could not be considered under those terms. The Russians refused to make any definition. The Russians insisted that parties and organizations admitted for consultation must fully uphold the Moscow Decision, as Mr. Tounkin stated, including every paragraph of that agreement. That returned the Soviets pretty much to the views which disrupted the work of the Joint Commission in 1946. In the exchange of correspondence between the two commanders, General Hodge stated the American desire for broad consultation. General Chistiakov accepted that statement and stated the Russian desire for broad consultation. General Marshall in his letters to Mr. Molotov mentioned

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the American principle of freedom of expression and broad consultation. Mr. Molotov apparently accepted both principles, and yet immediately on the reconvention of the Joint Commission, when Subcommission No. 1 took up this work, the Soviets prepared to narrow consultation and insist on exclusion of many parties and organizations which in its opinion should not be consulted with. That failure of Subcommission 1 to agree caused the matter to be referred to the Joint Commission, and for a period of ten days the Joint Commission debated that issue. The views expressed by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation before the Joint Commission paralleled the views expressed by the Soviet chairman of Subcommission 1. After ten days of discussion, late one afternoon at the close of the meeting, the Soviet Delegation suddenly surrendered and agreed to broad consultation, apparently on the basis of the American desire. Based on the agreement, Subcommission 1 was requested to draft a Joint Decision which would promulgate that agreement to the Koreans, and which would enable the Koreans to commence consultation. That Joint Decision is your Tab 12, one of the most important documents of this session of the Joint Commission. You will find if you go through that Joint Decision, headed Communique No. 11, which published Joint Commission Decision 12, that that document presents full extracts from the Marshall-Molotov agreement. Those extracts deal primarily with the Soviet Commanding General's proposal of 26 November to General Hodge, and General Hodge's reply of December 24 as to the counter proposals which he would accept for reconvention of the Joint Commission. Those counter proposals were accepted by the ministers and became the basis for reconvention. The Soviets objected strenuously to publishing Chistiakov's letter of November 26. The reason we wanted to publish it was because you cannot take General Hodge's agreements alone; so they finally gave in to that and they were published. The next item in par 2, refers to the signing of the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 of 1946, which I invited your attention to, and which is the agreement reached by the ministers

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stating that signature to that declaration would be accepted in good faith as making a party eligible for initial consultation. We had published instructions to those regarding submission of applications. published two questionnaires with the Joint Decision, one asked the views of the Koreans as to what should be included in the charter, and the other their views as to what should be included in their political platform. Par 5 covered the question as to how the list of those who desired to be consulted would be compiled. I would like to invite your attention to that paragraph which requires that when the applications are received they shall be referred to Subcommission no. 1, which shall prepare a list of those parties and organizations applying for consultation. Par 6 provided for mass meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang with representatives of those parties applying for consultation. Those meetings were held. Par 7 provided individual oral consultation. Par 9 set up a consultative body which would be formed from parties and organizations applying for consultation in accordance with their membership and influence. That consultative body was to advise the Joint Commission as it proceeded with its work. The other paragraphs carried certain instructions on the question of procedure in order to carry into effect the consultative issue and the relationship of consultation to the formation of the Provisional Government. As I stated, that decision was accepted by the Soviet Delegation, was signed by their Chief Commissioner and was promulgated broadly throughout Korea. In South Korea we publish it in the press and put it over the radio; we dropped it from the air; we sent our agents out to contact leaders of political parties and social organizations and urged them to sign applications for consultation. In other words, the American Delegation did everything it could to assure a broad basis of consultation in South Korea. Under that Decision No. 12 these applications for consultation had to be submitted not later than June 23rd. This paper went out on 12 June. Between the 12th of June and 20 June in South Korea only 53 parties and organizations had submitted applications for consultation. The Soviets were very

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happy. They felt that what we believe was their political preparation for the reconvention of the Joint Commission had succeeded and that they had blocked out large groups of Rightist parties. However, on 20 June, 3 days before the deadline, about 100 parties registered. On the afternoon of 23 June Kim Koo apparently instigated an anti-trusteeship demonstration. About two or three hundred students gathered in front of the Duk Soo palace and made an effort to break into the grounds here, and staged an Anti-Trusteeship demonstration. About two o'clock they left the Duk Soo Palace and proceeded to the Soviet Embassy. Immediately after the gates were opened -- they had been closed from about noon to 2:30 -- registrants flocked into the Duk Soo Palace, and by the end of that day, June 23, or the deadline, 425 had applied from South Korea. 38 had applied from North Korea. Of the 425, three were fraudulent and were thrown out. (Pointing to chart) This breakdown is not entirely correct, but it gives in general the claimed membership: there were 252 Right groups; 72 Moderate or center-of-the-road groups; and 98 People's Front. That is South Korea. When you come to North Korea, there were 38 applicants, all Democratic People's Front, Communist dominated. When the Soviet Delegation saw what had happened, they repudiated Joint Commission Decision No. 12. That repudiation occurred a few days after registration was completed, in a discussion in Subcommission No. 1. I stated that under Joint Commission Decision No. 12 the applicants for consultation were referred to Subcommission 1 which was to compile a list of those to be consulted. The Soviet member of Subcommission 1 proposed that small local organizations be eliminated. You will find in Joint Commission Decision No. 12 the requirement that applications for consultation be submitted through central zonal offices. The Soviet contention was that by that condition any organization that did not have a central zonal office became a local organization and therefore not eligible for consultation. They wanted to eliminate what they called small local organizations and non-social organizations. In the Joint Commission, prior to the preparation of Joint

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Commission Decision No. 12 the American Delegation tried to get the Soviet Delegation to agree on a definition of those terms used in the Moscow Decision, "political parties and social organizations." Dr. Bunce tried to get Mr. Tounkin to agree on the same issue in Sub-Commission 1. The Soviets refused all such efforts. We tried to write into Joint Decision that we could consult with political parties and social organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, in order to eliminate many of these small organizations. The Soviets refused. We offered 5,000; they refused. We offered any figure or formula which they would suggest. They refused to submit any figure or suggest a formula. Now when the applications were in, they endeavored to do that which they had previously refused to do. I had specifically advised Shtikov during the preparation of Joint Commission Decision #12 once this decision was agreed to the American Delegation would not permit subsequent amendment. None the less when Subcommission No. 1 met, Mr. Tounkin proposed to eliminate small organizations and non-social organizations, and after two or three days of getting nowhere, he then proposed that parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship committee, not be consulted with.

There is a little history to that. It is a fact that most of the Rightist parties belonged to what they called an Anti-Trusteeship committee. That committee was formed to oppose trusteeship. When the Joint Commission met and these Rightist leaders began to see where their actions were leading them and possible objections by the Soviets, they had a big meeting of this group under the leadership of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, and about 70 Right parties led by Kim Suhg Soo, who heads the Democratic Party, agreed they would cooperate with the Joint Commission. Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo permitted them to cooperate, but they did not withdraw from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Kim Koo announced that this demonstration in Seoul at the Duk Soo Palace was under his leadership and was staged by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Based on a statement published in the Korean press to that effect, the Soviet Delegation insisted that parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee

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not be consulted with because they were struggling against the Moscow Decision. Dr. Bunce would not agree to that, so a few days later Mr. Tounkin came up with a brand new proposal. He says par 5 of Joint Commission Decision 12 requires that while all parties and organizations applying for consultation be put on the list, that there was a difference between eligibility and acceptance for consultation; that all those who signed applications were eligible for consultation, but could only be accepted for consultation by mutual agreement of both delegations of Subcommission No. 1. That in fact gives them the veto power, because if they would not agree to put a party on the list, that party was not consulted with. Bunce, not making any headway with Tounkin, referred the matter back to the Joint Commission. On 2 July in Pyongyang, where the American Delegation was to meet with these 38 parties of Northern Korea who applied for consultation, the Joint Commission began to debate this issue, and became stalemated. That issue has been debated at least three times a week since 2 July, and it is not yet resolved. You will find a press release, Chart 15 in your folder, which sets up quite clearly the Soviet position and the American position on this issue, as it was developed in the Joint Commission. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation backed up Mr. Tounkin, Soviet member of Subcommission No. 1, during the debates on this matter. He followed the principle that small local organizations must be deleted; non-social organizations must be deleted; and parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, must not be consulted with. He adhered to the position that there is a difference between eligibility for and acceptance for consultation, and he insisted on acceptance of inclusion into the list, rather than deletion by exclusion; or he insisted on the veto power. During the course of the debate he agreed to consult with those parties and organizations, members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, if those parties would publicly announce their withdrawal from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and cease, as he said, their struggle against the Moscow Decision. You can readily see how a

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political party cannot publicly state they will support trusteeship. It would have meant the political death of those parties which signed any such statement. At one stage of the argument he insisted those parties be brought before the Joint Commission for examination by the Joint Commission, and be subject to questioning. The American Delegation refused to do that. His contention was that their signatures on the applications were not given in good faith, because while signing the declaration they continued as members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, an organization formed to struggle against the Moscow Decision -- but the first agreement of the Ministers stated that signature of the declaration, Communique No. 5, would be accepted as a declaration of good faith to support the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation, in the opinion of the American Delegation, repudiated the agreement of the Ministers on which the Joint Commission reconvened.

GENERAL HODGE: Your position was that even though they had demonstrated against trusteeship subsequent to these agreements, signature on the declaration would be taken in good faith?

GENERAL BROWN: Our position was that if the Soviet Delegation wanted to challenge a party or organization, they must proceed to do so under the third agreement of the Ministers which states that a party or organization accepted for initial consultation which foments or incites active opposition against the Moscow Decision, the work of the Joint Commission, or either of the allies may by mutual agreement be excluded. That contingency was foreseen when those three agreements were drawn. The Soviets accepted those agreements, but failed to live up to them. The whole issue, gentlemen, is this: the Soviets had insisted last year that even a statement opposing trusteeship barred the Koreans from consultation. The Americans insisted that a Korean can do anything short of fomenting or inciting opposition. In other words, a Korean can speak his mind in opposition to trusteeship or any other condition of the Moscow Decision, but if he foments or instigates active opposition, he is excluded. It was pointed out

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to the Soviet Delegation that the 23 June demonstration was not participated in by any party applying for consultation, and that it was organized by Kim Koo, a man whom we believe wants to break up the Joint Commission. That it was staged by a few hundred students, and that these parties and organizations the Soviets objected to had no part in it. They wrote a letter to the Joint Commission, during this debate, a copy of which is in your folder, in which they stated they had no part in this demonstration and that they would support the work of the Joint Commission, but that letter was not acceptable to the Russians. I will show you shortly the effect of this action of the Russians, but before doing so, I want to go back a little into Korean politics. I believe that it is essential. I want to take you back, and I will ask General Hodge and Lt. Pertsch to correct any erroneous statements I make. I take you back to 15 August 1945, prior to the American troops arriving in Korea. Mr. Endo, who was the Japanese Civil Administrator, called in two or three Koreans, one of whom was Lyuh Woon Hyung, and asked them to organize a government in Korea and keep order until the arrival of the Americans. He is supposed to have given Lyuh Woon Hyung 70 million yen, and agreed to Lyuh's acceptance of that responsibility. Lyuh Woon Hyung set up a People's Committee type of government throughout South Korea. That People's Committee organization was what the Americans found in effect in South Korea when they came. Shortly after the arrival of the Americans, the Communist party, under the leadership of Park Heun Young appeared. The Americans early in their occupation saw there was a cleavage between the Right and the Left in Korea, and attempted to bring these groups together, and in September what was known as the Korean Advisory Council to be composed of both right and left parties came into being. Lyuh Woon Hyung refused to have any part in it, and it became a Rightist organization. The Americans in the meantime began to form a military government in South Korea which superseded the people's type of government established by Lyuh. In October Lyuh formed the People's Party which rapidly developed into one of the

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leading leftist parties of South Korea. Syngman Rhee returned to Korea in October. He was a great Right leader who had gone into exile. Shortly thereafter, the Chungking Provisional Government, under the leadership of Kim Koo, returned. As General Hodge told you this morning the members of that government were permitted to return as individuals and under the promise that the government as such would take no part in the government of Korea. During November and December conflict arose between the Military Government and the People's Republic that Lyuh Woon Hyung set up, and as a result the People's Republic was ordered dissolved on 12 December. The trusteeship issue arose on 27 December. Leftist and Rightist demonstrations against trusteeship broke out in South Korea early in January. All of South Korea was in turmoil. The Leftist shifted their position from one of opposition to one favoring trusteeship. The Rightist continued bitter opposition to the trusteeship issue. On New Year's eve of 1946, the Chungking Provisional Government attempted to take over the government and set up the Chungking Provosional Government as the government of South Korea. That effort failed, largely due to loyalty of the Korean police. Syngman Rhee made an effort to bring the Right and Left together, and on 1 February he organized the National Emergency Congress. The Communists refused to join that Congress, and it became purely a Rightist organization. The Americans in December, realizing the danger that existed in the divergence and cleavage of the political parties attempted to form a coalition in which both Rightist and Leftists agreed to participate. This effort resulted on 14 February in the formation of the Representative Democratic Council. After the first meeting Lyuh Woon Hyung and all other Leftists walked out. That left the body a Rightist organization. That body after it was purged by the Left included five major Rightist parties -- the Korean Democratic Party, which is now leading Rightist support of the Joint Commission; the Chungking Provisional Government group of Kim

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oo; the Korean Independence Party; the National Emergency Congress of Syngman Rhee which includes a large number of Rightist parties; and the New Korea Democratic Party. To counter, the Leftists on 15 February organized the Communist dominated Democratic People's Front. The Democratic People's Front initially consisted of Lyuh Woon Hyung's People's Party; the Communist Party, led by Pak Hyung Young; the new People's Party; the Korean Revolutionary Party and the Korean People's Republic. The Joint Commission met on 20 March and adjourned 6 May. During its sessions the political rivalry of these two groups over the trusteeship issue was an influence in breaking up the Joint Commission. The Soviets were pursuing only Leftist parties and organizations members of the Democratic People's Front. The Americans desired to consult with Rightist as well as Leftist parties and organizations. After adjournment of the Joint Commission the Americans made a third effort to unify Right and Left by creating a Coalition Committee. They took the matter up both with the Democratic People's Front and the Representative Democratic Council. Each of these bodies agreed to send five delegates to represent them in a coalition group. I have a few charts that I will refer to as I go along. You will find them a little divergent in the number of parties -- these people form political parties almost overnight. You have here (referring to chart, not included in folder) the representative Democratic Council and the Democratic People's Front, each of which agreed to send five members to form a Coalition Committee. The chairmanship of that committee was assumed by Kimm Kiusic, at present chairman of the Interim Legislative Assembly. He had been a member of the Chungking Provisional Government. He also was known generally as a Rightist. He at a later date fell out with Syngman Rhee and eventually left the Representative Democratic Council. However, Syngman Rhee at the time of the creation of the Coalition Committee thought highly enough of him to give him this responsibility. When the Coalition Committee met, instead of five members from the Democratic People's Front, there were only three, and they were second-rate Leftists. Lyuh Woon Hyun, head of the People's

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Party, was one of the members, however he was a very poor member. He attended a time or two, but did very little work. It is a long and interesting story. As you know, he was assassinated here last month, and subsequent to his death concrete evidence was obtained which shows that he was in constant contact with the Communist Party. He often denied that he was a Communist. He, however, attempted to influence the Coalition Committee, and had considerable success with Kimm Kiusic in influencing that Committee towards the extreme Left.

GEN HAN FOR GN: It might be interesting to add right there that Kimm Kiusic is a used-to-be Communist -- a member of the Yenan group.

GEN HAN [illegible]: I have been very close to Kimm Kiusic and followed this Coalition Committee rather closely. I accused Kimm Kiusic several times of being a Communist, and his answer to me was always, "You see what small leftist support we have in the Coalition Committee. I have to get stronger Communist support, and the only way I can do it is thru Lyuh Woon Hyung," so he gave him certain considerations, including publication of five principles of the Coalition Committee, one of which was a straight Communist principle, including confiscation and free distribution of land. I have been informed that Kimm Kiusic while in China at one time was to be sent to Russia as a Communist delegate. That the Russians took him up north and put the delegates on a train. They put Kimm Kiusic and those accompanying him in boxcars. Kim Kiusic refused to travel in a boxcar. He demanded a pullman and a dining car, which they refused to furnish, whereupon Kimm left the train. Then a pullman and dining car came along for him and he went to Moscow. He stayed there a while. It took him about nine months to get home. When he returned, he said he was cured of Communism.

All of this time, Lyuh Woon Hyung People's Party was fighting the Communist party of Park Heun Yong. Frequently Lyuh would go up to North Korea to confer with Kim Il Sung and Kim Do Bong, and try to get their help against Park Heun Yong, and would come back and tell the people that they were supporting him. He tried to get the Communist party leadership away from Park. Two incidents occurred which assisted

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Lyuh's effort for leadership: (1) On 3 May a counterfeit plot was uncovered here in Seoul. They were printing money on a wide scale and using it in the Communist effort. When it was tied to the Communist Party, that hurt Park's leadership. (2) On 1 October the Communists staged a series of attacks down in Taegu against the police. These riots because led by outsiders and because of their brutal nature had a great deal to do with hurting the leadership of Park Heun Yong and helping Lyuh to attain leadership. So Park Heun Yong, realizing his leadership was waning, organized the South Korea Labor Party. In other words, he dropped the name Communist and called his party by another name -- it was the same party. That put a dent in Lyuh Woon Hyung, so to offset that he started and organized the Socialist Labor Party. The developments left the old party of Lyuh Woon Hyung, the People's Party, befuddled by the struggle. It split three ways. Part went to the South Korea Labor party; part went into the Socialist Labor Party; and part drifted without leadership. The struggle between Lyuh and Park was intensified. Lyuh went north and came back, and informed me that he had been offered the chairmanship of both the South Korean Labor Party and the Socialist Labor Party. He stated that he would accept the overall chairmanship providing they would give him two vice chairmen, one to head the South Korea Labor Party; one the Socialist Labor Party. Apparently the Communists would not agree to that. Lyuh Woon Hyung then went into retirement, and his party disintegrated.

Park Hyung Young and the Communist influence became correspondingly stronger. On December 12th, due largely to the insistence of the Coalition Committee and the efforts of the Commanding General, the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly met. That Assembly was composed of 90 members, 45 elected and 45 appointed. The Leftists boycotted the election. There was a great furor over the election. The Coalition Committee tried to get it cancelled. They claimed it was not properly conducted, and that the Leftists had no chance to participate. It did not result in a Rightist majority because of the urging of the Coalition Committee and, after due investigation, the Commanding General USAFIK cancelled the election in the City of Seoul and in one of the provinces, and announced new elections in these places. The Commanding General appointed 45 of the 90 members and attempted in appointing them, knowing the results of the

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election, to equalize the political setup in the legislature, which he did to a large extent. He mentioned this morning the two Leftist members elected from Cheju Do whom he flew to Seoul to take their seats on opening day. They disappeared after arrival at Seoul and we have never seen them since. Five of the Leftists appointed by the Commanding General did not sit. Lyuh Woon Hyung refused to sit, so the Leftists were a minority group.

In the fall of 1947 the Rightists again started to agitate against trusteeship. Syngman Rhee was in the United States. He was looking for an issue. He had lost some of his popularity, so he again raised the Anti-Trusteeship issue and started to agitate Anti-Trusteeship demonstrations. The Right was becoming hostile to American policies. When the Legislature met, 21 of the Rightist people refused to sit because of the cancellation of the two elections, one here in the City of Seoul and one in Kyonggi Do. It took a great deal of persuasion to get those 21 Rightist members to sit. The Syngman Rhee campaign against American policies in Korea was bearing fruit. Syngman Rhee began to work not only thru the press, but in the Legislature also. In January the Legislature passed an Anti-Trusteeship resolution sparked by Rightist groups of the Legislature. That resolution was signed by 41 Rightists. It was passed by a vote of 44 to 1, with 67 members out of 80 present. It had no effect. It caused a great deal of loss of face to certain members of the Legislature, and it was more or less what the French call a vol au vent.

I want to come back now to what might be called the situation faced by the American Delegation when the Joint Commission reconvened -- The Democratic People's Front solidly supporting the Trusteeship issue, and, as the Soviet Delegation says, fully supporting the Moscow Decision; the Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee extreme Right faction solidly opposing Trusteeship; and persuading four of the largest Rightist political parties in South Korea not to cooperate with the Joint Commission when it reconvened and persuading these four not to apply for consultation, and as the Soviets say all these parties were struggling against the Moscow Agreement. Approximately 70 Rightist parties of the Emergency

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National Congress under the leadership of Kimm Sung Soo, head of the Democratic Party, agreed to support the Joint Commission. These parties were given the blessings of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo in that support, apparently under the assumption that they would not in any way change their position covering the trusteeship issue, no doubt reserving to themselves the right to fully and strongly oppose trusteeship when par 3 of the Moscow Decision was to be implemented after the creation of the Provisional Government. The total claimed membership of the 460 groups that applied for consultation was 67,000,000 -- remember the total population is 30,000,000. These 460 parties and organizations break down People's Front 41%, Moderates 22%, and Right 37%. Remember that I stated that Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo had kept out of this group four large extreme Right political parties with a claimed membership of 11,250,000. During the debate in the Joint Commission on the consultation issue the Soviets contended that a party can only be placed on the list by mutual agreement. The American contention was that all parties go on the list unless excluded by mutual agreement. I challenged the Soviet Delegation to tell me what parties they did not want to consult with, and finally they gave me a list of parties with membership in excess of 10,000 which they were willing to discuss as to their eligibility for consultation. You will find that this Soviet list excluded 24 parties, all Right and Moderate Right, which they claim are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, but included 71 groups, Right Moderate with a claimed membership of 18-1/2 million, and 47 Leftist groups with a claimed membership of 19 million. Even this list, however, was not a list they would be willing to consult with. It was a list with which they were willing to start discussion in Subcommission No. 1 to determine whether they would consult all parties and organizations on that list. Remember, it excluded 24 large Rightist parties with membership in excess of 10,000. This is South Korea. North Korea had 38 parties solidly Left. So when you add those 38 parties to the Soviet list this is the setup: this part of it here (pointing to chart) doesn't change because those in North Korea were Soviet controlled, but this part makes a tremendous change. It jumps to 75 Leftist groups with

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32-1/2 million claimed membership as against 71 Rightist groups with 18-1/2 million claimed membership. The Soviet Delegation had eliminated 24 groups. I told you that Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo had eliminated another four groups with 15 million membership that was just not available to us at all. They had not applied for consultation. If we had accepted the Soviet position we would have lost 28 Rightist groups with 28 million claimed membership. This would have assured a definite and overwhelming Leftist majority throughout Korea as a substitute for the normal Rightist majority. That is what the Soviets hoped to achieve. The American Delegation could not agree. That is where we stand today. In an effort to break this deadlock the American Delegation made three additional proposals: (1) That the Soviet Delegation conduct oral consultation in South Korea. The Soviets laughed that off the record. (2) That the Americans and Soviets join in oral consultation both in North and South Korea, except that the American Delegation would consult in South Korea unilaterally with those parties and organizations suspicious to the Soviet Delegation -- that is, those 24 Rightist Anti-Trusteeship Committee parties. (3) That oral consultation as contemplated in par 7, Joint Commission Decision 12 be dispensed with and replaced by consideration of the answers to the written questionnaires returned by these parties and organizations. That the consultative body contemplated in par 9 of Joint Commission Decision 12 be organized to advise the Joint Commission; and that the Joint Commission recommend to the Four Powers that the government be established by creating a Legislative Assembly thru general election, secret ballot and properly controlled. The Soviet Delegation took that proposal under study. I think they sent it to Moscow. Yesterday they came back with a counter proposal. That counter proposal provides that there shall be created a consultative body (a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly) composed of representatives of democratic parties and organizations with a declared membership of over 10,000 which have applied for consultation and which fully support the Moscow Decision and do not fight against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers. North and South Korea to have equal representation. In other words, they threw back at us our original proposal in a new form,

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but they held out the bait that in the future sometime there shall be a free election. We cannot accept that proposal and will reject it in our next meeting. That is where the Joint Commission stands as of today.

Meeting recessed for ten minutes at 1630.

GENERAL BROWN: I want to bore you a moment, gentlemen, by reading from a copy of a report submitted by the American Delegation to the State Department 20 August - the conclusions of the American Delegation:

The U. S. Delegation concludes:

a. The soviet objective was announced by the Soviet Chief Commissioner to the Joint Commission in March 1946. This objective is:

(1) To create the Provisional Korean Democratic Government by a wide unification of all "democratic parties and organizations supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs";

(2) Through such a government, to eliminate "reactionary, pro-Japanese, anti-democratic elements" and "to carry out radical measures of economic and political reform";

(3) To establish a Korea "friendly to the Soviet Union so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union".

b. The Soviet government and its agents have followed the Soviet objective as above announced during:

(1) The 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission;

(2) The exchange of correspondence between the commanders;

(3) The 1947 session of the Joint Commission.

c. The Moscow Agreement, the Marshall-Molotov correspondence, and Joint Commission Decision No. 12 constitute adequate and detailed terms for conducting consultation and for the implementation of the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

d. The Soviet Delegation to the 1947 sessions of the Joint Commission shows no intention of divergence from the objectives announced by the then and present Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation at the opening session of the Joint Commission in 1946.

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e. Unless and until the Soviet government directs the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission to follow policies other than those announced by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation in 1946 as the Soviet objective, it will be impossible to draft any agreement with the Soviet government which will lead to successful evolvement of Korean independence through the medium of the Joint Commission.

I also want to bore you by reading a letter dated 22 August which is a reply to the letter from General Marshall, by Mr. Molotov, which was sent on 12 August. (General Brown read letter.)

That letter appears under Tab 21 in your folder, as does the letter of General Marshall under Tab 20. The reference in that letter to arrests in South Korea you will find in your folder as Tab 22 - a complaint submitted in the Joint Commission at a meeting last week by General Shtikov concerning certain arrests in South Korea and the interference which in their opinion these arrests cause to the work of the Joint Commission, and under Tab 24, the reply of the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation to that complaint, which was delivered two days ago.

There is one other tab to which your attention is invited: Tab 13 which gives preliminary analysis of the views of the Koreans presented in answer to the questionnaires as to what their charter and platform should be. That is a rather interesting chart. It shows no political group in favor of the free election principle.

In closing I want to mention one or two additional points. First, the Joint Commission last year and the Joint Commission this year has been stopped on what might be considered to be its initial task -- oral consultation. If the oral consultation hurdle is jumped, there are still several others that will have to be jumped. The next one is the formation of the consultative body as provided for in par 9, Joint Commission Decision 12. It is to be formed by representatives of political parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation in accordance with their membership and influence. The hope of the Soviets is to be able to control that consultative body. To create it with a large Democratic People's Front majority. Then to form a government by appoint-

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ment from members of the consultative body. Undoubtedly their next effort will be to form the consultative body in this manner, and we will have another debate over the membership in the consultative body. Following that, we have the preparation of a charter which necessarily contains the principles under which the government is to be formed. The Soviets want a People's Front government -- the Americans want what we consider a democratic form of government with normal elements of government. How we are going to reach agreement on that I don't know.

On the platform they want confiscation and the free distribution of land. They want a centralized government along all the usual Communist lines. How we are ever going to achieve agreement on the platform, I don't know. Then, assuming we can agree on those matters -- the consultative body, the charter, the platform, type, and composition of the Provisional Government, if there is to be any appointive personnel in it we are going to battle over that -- police, finance, and other key positions. Then if we agree all the way through, we come to integration of the existing governments of North and South Korea. What we are going to do about the 99-year contracts negotiated by the Soviet with basic industries in North Korea. Even assuming agreement on oral consultation, there yet remains many hurdles each one of which undoubtedly will cause many disagreements before final conclusions can be reached by both delegations. It must be remembered that agreement must be mutual. Each delegation therefore is really able to hold the veto power by insisting on exercising it, even though the Soviets will not accept that principle from the American Delegation, but insist on exercising it themselves. That principle of veto, or mutual agreement, governs the entire future work of the Joint Commission-further under the Moscow Agreement the Joint Commission will become in fact a sort of Board of Directors which will undoubtedly to some extent control the Provisional government and supervise the aid and assistance (Trusteeship) clause in the evolvement from provisional to permanent government.

That is the problem. It is a confusing problem. I apologize for making it more confusing than necessary. I will attempt to answer any questions.

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GENERAL HEDEMEYER: I would like to say I know that all the members of the committee are not confused, nor am I. I think your speech has been very fine, and we are clear on several points. Does any member want to ask General Brown a question?

QUESTION: How do you differentiate between the major rightist parties? What is the difference between one rightist party and another?

GENERAL BROWN: We have a list of the 422 parties. You will find parties with a claimed membership of only 25; you will find parties with a claimed membership of 1,500, or 200,000. On the other hand you have the Democratic Party with a claimed membership of 800,000. You have the Rapid Realization of Independence group with a claimed membership of four and one-half million. That is what I mean. As the Soviets state, in accordance with membership and influence.

QUESTION: What is the difference between their platforms?

GENERAL BROWN: The platforms of all the parties are quite similar. As General Hodge told you, even the rightist parties are socialist to a large extent. Even the right should be considered as left, under our concept. When you take the various platforms of these parties you won't find too much difference. For instance you will find almost common agreement that there should be land reform, etc. In South Korea you will find difference of opinion as to how it should be brought about. The disagreement arises as to whether it should be distributed free, sold, if sold on what basis, full payment over a long period, paid for thru taxation, held in fee simple, revert to government, etc. Much of this disagreement comes from the political immaturity of the Koreans. Remember, under the King the Koreans had no power. For 40 years they had no power under the Japanese. We have given them liberation. To most of them that meant the achievement of their own desires. If a man wanted a cow, the liberation meant that he would get the cow. If a man wanted to get married, the liberation meant that he could get married. But liberation did not bring those things. He doesn't know what has happened. He is a child politically. That is my personal opinion.

QUESTION: What prevents the parties from forming into larger units?

GENERAL BROWN: The intense rivalry of the Koreans and the fact that they

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all want to lead. Every leader believes he should be president, and that his party should govern. That extends from the largest to the smallest, and it is that rivalry and unwillingness to meet the other man on the basis of agreement that is one of the stumbling blocks toward

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the formation of orderly government. Right now the two important rightist leaders, Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, are in disagreement, and yet they are in agreement in that they both want to be president of Korea. If you ask either one as to how he is going to organize the government, he can't tell you. They tried to stage a revolution last March, and I asked Kim Koo at that time what were his plans for forming and operating a government. He couldn't answer any of the basic questions - how are you going to organize the government? how are you going to finance it? Etc.? Their political thinking seems immature.

GENERAL EDDLEMEYER: I have two questions. (1) In the course of your discussions with the Russians, the words "friendly" and then "loyal to the Soviet" - have you developed the Russian concept of friendly or loyalty to their government on the part of the Koreans? In other words, is it a defensive measure? Do they fear attack from the outside? And whom do they fear? Has that been developed?
(2) "Democratic" -- that word appears often in writings and apparently in dicussions. Have you developed their concept -- their thought as to what democratic or democracy means?

GENERAL BROWN: That was developed in considerable detail in 1946-- what they mean is what they have in Russia. Their concept of democracy is a communist type of government. I have not this year been able to get Shtikov to commit himself specifically on any such issues. He avoids it. Last year he and Arnold had some debate on the word "democratic". They keep telling you "complete fulfillment of the Moscow Decision by democratic parties and social organizations", "truly democratic". We American members believe that they mean by truly democratic those who subscribe to the principles prescribed by the Communists which the parties must follow to be admitted to membership in the Democratic People's Front. Shtikov told me the other day that they have not had to arrest any party leaders in North Korea, and had no trouble in North Korea - that they are truly democratic. He defends North Korea very strongly. I accused him

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one day of all North Korea parties being Communists and he answered me by saying "they are not yet ready to be Communists". They are all following the Moscow line and that is definitely democratic in their minds.

DR. BUNCE: I think the best illustration is that no objections are permitted. Opposition has all been liquidated by taking over parties and simply establishing control by a minority. Rump sessions were called at which the minority had control and put their party line men in office.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Do you have evidence in support of that statement?

DR. BUNCE: We have a report from Cho Man Sik on how the democratic party was taken over by the Communist supporters. We also get reports from refugees coming down to South Korea. There is no such thing as freedom of expression -- but at the same time they go through with all these reforms -- land reforms, etc. They broadcast that. Some of the land has been distributed to the tenant farmers in small three acre plots. The people are either for the People's Committee or they keep quiet.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: How would they handle Japanese government property, or Japanese privately owned property?

DR. BUNCE: It was all taken over and turned over to the cooperatives and distributed.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: South of the 38th no decision has been reached about the distribution of Japanese property?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes, we have been working on that a great deal. You will get the details on it tomorrow.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Are three acres enough to support an individual?

DR. BUNCE: Three acres of rice land is adequate and we have some with much less than that. One thing that had early support and later much criticism in North Korea was the land reform program. They confiscated large holdings of land; distributed it without change to the tenants, and then put on a 25% tax and applied that to all small farmers who already owned land as well as to those receiving land free. Approximately 40% of the farms in North Korea were individually owned and these farmers felt the new tax was unjust.

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On top of this tax they also had a collection program of 25%.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Brown, in your relations with the Russians in these conferences, do you sense they are definitely playing for time, or is there any effort to get down to business and get something done?

GENERAL BROWN: The Russians for the past several weeks have been definitely playing for time. They show no inclination to adjourn. They seem willing to sit day after day and discuss nothing. They seem perfectly willing to meet two to three days a week. We've all wondered just what they have in mind. It doesn't make sense to me. At first they were urging speed - "We have to get this government set up - we have to get it formed by July" - then when they found out we were not going to agree with them, since then they seem perfectly willing to just sit and talk.

GENERAL HODGE: They seem to follow the ups and downs of the United States. In July the new Congress adjourned. When they first came down, the chances of grant and aid looked high. As the chances faded, their anxiety faded and they seemed to be perfectly willing to sit and wait. We think that it may have been connected with the adjournment of Congress and the disappearance of the chance of any immediate action in this zone. And now it may be tied to putting the task to the United Nations. Those are just things to think about. It ties in coincidentally with the time.

MR. JACOBS: It also seems to be synchronized with what happened in Paris -- Marshall's plan at the beginning of July -- also the fact that when Congress was adjourned they saw that there was not much chance of getting a grant and aid.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Does the Soviet Delegation here appear to have the power of decision, or must they refer matters to higher authority?

GENERAL BROWN: Everything goes to Moscow, as far as we know. Everything of any importance - this letter of Mr. Molotov's confirmed that. That and Shtikov's speech. Shtikov could just as well have written it.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Or vice versa?

GENERAL BROWN: Shtikov carries a set of little books, and when he gets

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in hot water he goes in one of those little books. He has Tounkin from Moscow on his left. Tounkin undoubtedly came down here with the policy, and he is guiding Shtikov in the policy. It is my opinion that they sent this last report to Moscow, and the answer they gave us yesterday was written in Moscow. That is my personal opinion.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Another thing - we are perfectly open and above-board about everything we do over all the world. We Americans are happy to have representatives of other governments come in and see what we are doing. We have no visas or passports. That does not apply to North Korea, does it? You can't go up there freely and observe what the Russians are doing. Is that correct?

GENERAL BROWN: Yes.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Has that been discussed here?

GENERAL BROWN: We have not tried to accuse the Russians of having unfavoreble conditions in North Korea, because there is nothing we can accuse them of that they don't know, and they will throw it back at us. But we spent several days there, and we know what it is - it is a police controlled state. I can furnish three instances. Mr. Jacobs and I told the American soldier driver of my car to show us something of Pyongyang, so the driver pulled up to the curb and our Korean interpreter who had accompanied us from South Korea asked a Korean where the University was. The first thing I knew, this Korean was getting in the car. I told our Korean interpreter to get him out of the car before there was trouble. A Korean policeman came along and grabbed the Korean. The first thing he asked was to see his identification. The Korean pulled out a card similar to our AGO identification card but the policeman was not satisfied. I told our interpreter to explain to the policeman that we had merely asked directions of the man, but it took about five minutes of heated debate before thepoliceman finally left. We were trailed everywhere we went by two motorcycles filled with Russian soldiers.

On one occasion we got out of the car and walked down the street looking in the windows. A Korean smiled at me and I asked him, "Do you speak English?" He shook his head, and I went on. One

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of the Russians following me then took that man by the arm and walked with him for several blocks. Whether or not he eventually let the Korean go, I don't know. Another time, Mr. Jacobs was interested in buying some Communist literature and we went into a bookstore. While our interpreter at Mr. Jacobs' request was selecting the books, a Russian and a Korean policeman watched every move we made. Finally we left the store and got in the car. Our Korean interpreter was sitting in the car, and before we could drive off a North Korean policeman ordered him out. I explained that he was my interpreter, but they insisted this man get out of the car. I told the Korean interpreter to explain who I was, and that I had been given the freedom of the city. They then tried to pull the man out of the car, and about then a Russian officer came up and stopped them. That happened to me. The other members of the American Delegation can tell you stories that go way beyond that. The people of North Korea have no freedom. They are supervised in everything. They are slapped, they are pushed, they are herded here and there. That is why the million or more have come down south. We can accuse the Soviets of that, but if I tell them that chart is black, they will say, "No, it is white." They tell me two plus two equals five. There is very little you can accomplish with people like that. There isn't a statement I make but what the next day they don't throw it back at me, stated in a different way, with a different meaning. Logic, common sense, plain statements of facts mean nothing to them. I think the American Delegation will all tell you the same - we have had three months of it.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Do you think that the continuation of the Joint Commission has merit - has prospects of accomplishing anything?

GENERAL BROWN: I don't think the Joint Commission will come to any conclusion, unless the Russian Delegation will change its attitude. Unless Molotov orders it to proceed under a reasonable interpretation of the Moscow Decision, we can expect no results. The Moscow Decision, the Marshall-Molotov agreement and the agreement of the two delegations on Joint Commission Decision 12 form ample basis for proceeding to establish a Provisional Government, but every time we gain an inch, the Russians raise a new objection.

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GENERAL WEDEMEYER: Let's project our minds forward and assume we do get together here. We have undertaken a cultural program that would visualize democracy to these people. We have tried to explain democracy, I assume, to the people in the south. Up north as time goes on they will be imbued with these ideas of the Russians. Do you think we can accomplish anything with the Joint Commission that will effect our final objective, namely that a free, democratic area here in Korea will be established, or will it ultimately become a Soviet Union? Do we have a clear cut objective to attain?

GENERAL BROWN: I have two divergent views on that. I was very much impressed in North Korea by the apparent spontaneous acceptance by the many Koreans who seemed willing to accept the Russian effort.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: In spite of these brutalities and being fully devoid of liberty - in spite of that, you say the Korean people accept it?

GENERAL BROWN: I was impressed by the apparent willingness of the people to accept that condition. I talked to Cho Man Sik when I was in North Korea. He is under protective custody - cannot even see his wife. I asked General Korotov to let me see Cho Man Sik, and after a day or two he sent him to my house. I took him down to my private car to talk to him, and two cars of Soviet police were outside my window while we talked for two and one-half hours. Cho Man Sik tells me that only 15% of the people in North Korea actually accept Communism. I have heard that from many Korean leaders. If that is true, and if a large part of the Northern Korean populace are opposed to Russian control, then any little thing might throw the balance to those people - but you have the same condition in Russia.

GENERAL WEDEMEYER: You are exactly right. Possibly 196 million people in Russia are dyed in the wool Stalinists or Marxists, but our problem is to bring about this little thing to make it possible for them to express themselves.

GENERAL BROWN: If there were any practicable way to reach those people - even if you can reach them, how can you hope to accomplish anything, with the Russians there? They have accepted living that way or else - or they have come down here. It is my opinion that the

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people who remain in North Korea are willing to accept conditions as they are in order to continue to live. If you can get ride of those people -- that's the only answer I can give. I don't think any sort of propaganda will help them one bit. It is like giving a man in a cell a drink of liquor. It will boost his spirits a little bit, but it will not get him out of jail.

GENERAL HODGE: I have one thought I would like to add to this business of the minority of the Communists. The Communist is a fanatic. He works hard. The mass of these people are lifeless. They have had 40 years under Japanese oppression and most of them accept such conditions. They will not fight the Communist minority which controls them. The same thing has happened in Europe where Communist minorities have definitely set up a Communist type government. I've studied those countries there, and a definitely Communist minority set up that government, because they worked at the job, and the rest of the people were apathetic on the subject. I think that same thing is true in Russia. The Communist party is in the minority, even though it is in control.

CHAIRMAN MEYER: On behalf of the members of the Commission, General Brown, I wish to thank you.

Meeting adjourned at 1725.

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USSR-US JOINT COMMISSION
SOVIET DELEGATION

STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER, COLONEL GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV

28 August 1947

Through this statement the Soviet Delegation wishes to inform the public of the course of workof the USSR-US Joint Commission.

As it is known, the Soviet Delegation made a statement in regard to the mass arrests of the active members of democratic parties and organizations in South Korea, in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 20 August.

In the meeting of 25 August, the American Delegation made a return statement, in which it not only did not deny the facts of arrests and pogroms cited by the Soviet Delegation, but actually confirmed these facts. The American Delegation rebuked the Soviet Delegation in that the Soviet Delegation supposedly attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of South Korea, while it sojourns in South Korea as a guest of the American authorities.

The Soviet Delegation replied that is it not merely a guest, but a member of an international commis ion, provided by the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers in Korea, and which bears responsibility for the fulfillment of this decision. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation cannot be indifferent toward the events under discussion.

The American Delegation in its statement also expressed hope that the Soviet Delegation on its part, will not refuse to invite for consultation certain persons, who are not at present held under arrest in North Korea and with whom the American Delegation wishes to hold consultation very much.

The Soviet Delegation stated thatthe American Delegation did not name even one leader who might have been arrested by authorities in North Korea. The Soviet Delegation pointed out that in North Korea leaders of parties and organizations are not arrested, parties and organizations are not persecuted, their premises and newspapers are not closed down, and from the moment of liberation, there were no occurrences in North Korea where a

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newspaper of some party or organization was closed down or destroyed or where the premises of one or another party or organization was closed down. All parties, having equal opportunties and equal rights, cooperate among themselves and resolve problems.

In the meeting of the Joint Commission on 26 August, the Soviet Delegation made a statement in which it presented its reply to the proposal of the American Delegation of 12 August. The Soviet Delegation introduced a new proposal in this meeting, with the purpose of expediting the work of the Joint Commission. The text of this statement and this proposal follow:

"The Soviet Delegation has carefully studied the proposal, submitted by the American Delegation in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 12 August. This proposal appears unsatisfactory to the Soviet Delegation.

First of all, it should be noted that the American proposal does not actually state anything definite concerning the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The proposal specifies only that Subcommission No. 3 must prepare 'a plan for selection of appointed personnel for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.' It is evident, however, that the formation of a government and a compilation of a plan for selection of personnel is not the same thing. When, in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 12 August, for the purpose of clarification, the Soviet Delegation submitted the question as to how the American Delegation visualizes the formation of a Provisional Government, and when and by whom it would be formed according to the American proposal, the American Delegation evaded the answer to this question.

Thus, the basic task of the Joint Commission, that of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, is avoided and made complicated in the American proposal, while the Korean people expect from the Joint Commission, primarily, the solution of this very question.

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The American proposal does not mention consultation provided for in paragraph 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12, but the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, replying to the question of the Soviet Delegation, explained that this consultation must take place. If it is so, then the American Delegation, had it really desired to advance de facto the work of the Joint Commission, it should have indicated in its proposal how it plans to organize oral consultation in accordance with paragraph 9 of Joint Commission Decision No. 12. Without this, talk of what principles should be included in the Provisional Charter has little meaning, inasmuch as no practical way is indicated for the working out of this Provisional Charter.

The statement of the American Delegation in the meeting of the Joint Commission of 12 August and especially the press communique of the American Delegation of 23 August, do not leave any doubt that the proposal of the American Delegation of 12 August, was made with a purely propagandistic purpose. The American Delegation in its press communique uses all the types of declension of the word 'elections' in every possible way. The American Delegation, in its proposal, has supposedly foreseen all the questions connected with the elections, but the American Delegation has 'forgotten' or has deliberately neglected to state the role and the position of the Koreans, themselves, in conducting the elections for their own legislative body.

It is pointed out in the American proposal that a Provisional Charter should provide for the creation of an elective legislative body. The Soviet Delegation considers it self-evident that a Provisional Charter should provide for a formation of a legislative body, elected on the basis of general, direct and equal suffrage by a secret ballot.

The Joint Commission spent almost two months discussing

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the question of compilation of a list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation. The American Delegation actually refused to apply the decision of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, according to which the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision.

The compilation of the list of Korean democratic parties and social organizations for consultation with the Joint Commission proved to be impossible due to the position taken by the American Delegation.

For the purpose of expediting the work of the Joint Commission on the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, the Soviet Delegation is ready to agree with the proposal of the American Delegation of 12 August 1947 not to conduct oral consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations as provided in paragraph 7 of Joint Commission Decision #13, and submits the following proposals:

1. To charge:

(a) Subcommission No. 2 to begin immediately the study of the written proposals of democratic parties and social organizations submitted to the Joint Commission pertaining to the questionnaires which were distributed by the Joint Commission, and to submit the drafts for the structure of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, of local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) and of political platform to the Joint Commission;

(b) Subcommission No. 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel of a Provisional Government, and the order of acceptance of authority by the Government.

2. To create a consultative body, a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly, composed of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations.

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A Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly should be formed from representatives of democratic parties and social organizations with a declared membership of over 10,000 which submitted applications to the Joint Commission for consultation and which fully support the Moscow Decision, and do not fight against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

The number of representatives in a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly from North and from South Korea must be equal.

Representation from various parties and organizations will be determined by the Joint Commission in accordance with their membership, and with the taking into consideration, as much as possible, their influence.

3. The Joint Commission invites the Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly for the purpose of the working out of proposals regarding structure and principles for the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter) for the formation of a political platform and selection of personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and for the order of acceptance of authority by the Government as well as other matters.

The Provisional Charter should provide for the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage by secret ballot.

The Soviet Delegation understands that the Korean people are impatiently awaiting the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which could unite Korea and realize those democratic reforms which the Korean people desire.

The Soviet Delegation's proposal clearly indicates that a consultative body, a Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly, composed of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations must be formed. This Provisional All-Korean

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People's Assembly being composed of Koreans, themselv s, and representing the opinionsof the most diverse classes of population, will take direct part in working out of all the questions which are connected with the formation of a Provisional Government and with the program of its activity.

The Soviet proposal also recommends the necessity of providing for the formation of a legislative body in the Provisional Charter for which election should be conducted throughout all Kore- on the basis of general direct and equal suffrage, by secret ballot. In these elections all democratic parties and social orga izations must have equal rights to nominate their candidates and to conduct free campaigns for their candidates and for their program.'

On 25 August the Soviet Delegation handed to the American Delegation, the text of the reply of 22 August 1947 of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. V. M. Molotov to the Secretary of State of the USA, Mr. G. Marshall.

The Joint Commission adopted a decision directing Mr. Tounkin and Mr. Bunce, chairmen of Subcommission No. 1, to compile a report on the work of the Joint Commission.

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NT 866
Translation-The Dok Lip Shinbo

Hdqs. USAMGIK BPO
29 August 1947

GENERAL SHTIKOV'S STATEMENT Joint Commission

The US representative, in his statement dated 25 August, acknowledged the facts of oppression upon the Leftists in South Korea picked up by the Soviet representative rather than he denied it.

The US representative reproached the Soviet representative, saying he was a mere agues of the USAMG in South Korea, and intended to interfere in internal affairs in South Korea. But, the Soviet representative is a committeeman of the international committee provided by the Moscow Decision. The Soviet representative, therefore, is allotted a responsibility for the carrying out of the Decision. On that account, the Soviet representative cannot help being interested in the cases concerned.

The Soviet representative announced that the US could not point out the name of anyone of the political persons who, the US stated, were arrested in North Korea.

The Soviet representative pointed out that neither political party nor social organization is oppressed in North Korea; that is, no political leader has been arrested, no office or press of any party has ever been closed; since the Liberation, no press or printing office has ever been ordered to suspend publication. In North Korea, all the parties are mutually cooperating to settle every problem under the equality of right and under impartial conditions.

In the regular conference of the Joint Commission on 26 August, the Soviet representative made a statement, which was a reply to the proposal of the US representative on 12 August. Moreover, the Soviet representative made new proposals in the conference, in order to promote the business of the Commission. The statement and the proposals are as follows:

"(some omitted) For the purpose of promoting the establishment of a Korean provisional government in the Joint Commission, the Soviet representatives agree to the US representative's proposal dated 12 August, and made the following proposals:

1. The following responsibilities should be allotted:
   (a) omitted
   (b) omitted

2. Representatives of the democratic political parties, social organizations should form a Korean Provisional People's Conference: This conference should comprise only the representatives of those parties and organizations which, supporting the Moscow Decision, and not rejecting any of the Allied Forces and also the Joint Comission, submitted petitions already, and each of which should hold more than 10,000 members.

Number of representatives to ~~[illegible]~~ join in the people's

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conference should be the same -- both in South and North Korea.

Number of representatives which each party and organization can send to the people's conference should be decided according to the number of its members by the Joint Commission itself.

3. (omitted)

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

3 September 1947

The American Delegation has carefully studied the counter-proposals submitted by the Soviet Delegation on 26 August 1947 in reply to the American Delegation proposals of 12 August 1947.

The Soviet counter-proposals contain the same objectionable features which have characterized almost every proposal which the Soviet Delegation has made since the Joint Commission first met on 20 Mar. 1946 and reconvened on 21 May 1947.

The Soviet counter-proposals maintain the position of "exclusion" and the right to the veto power as insisted upon by them throughout the recent discussion of consultation. More specifically, they exclude from membership in the consultative body representatives of parties stated by them to be non-democratic, representatives of all parties and organizations with membership less than 10,000, those who do not fully support the Moscow Decision and those who struggle against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

Paragraph 2 of the Soviet counter-proposals visualizes the creation of a "Provisional All Korean People's Assembly", which resembles a consultative body. The creation of a consultative group on a fair and liberal basis and the methods by which it is to be established were already agreed to by the American and Soviet Delegations and included in Joint Commission Decision No. 12. The counter-proposal presently submitted by the Soviet Delegation in fact would create a consultative body of a type and in a manner different from that agreed upon by the Soviet and American Delegations, as promulgated in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

Acceptance of the Soviet counter-proposals would create a consultative body from which would be excluded representatives of 24 major rightist groups of South Korea, with a claimed membership in excess of 1½ million. Should the American Delegation be foolish enough to accept

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these counter-proposals, it would change the normally substantial rightist-moderate majority throughout North and South Koreato an overwhelming and unrealistic leftist majority. It thus reverses the actual political situation ~~and makes an absurdity of the Soviet contention~~.

The Soviet Delegation offers what is ostensibly a fair proposal - "the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage, by secret ballot." However, closer study indicates that the "elections" would without doubt only be conducted after the leftist dominated consultative body and the government created by it had organized and prepared Korea for the type of election recently conducted in North Korea under which 99 percent of the people, as the Soviets said, "willingly and voluntarily dropped their ballots into the white box" - an election typical of those being held in other Soviet satellite countries.

What have the Soviets to be afraid of in forming a government by free participation of all political groups? They have a deep and serious fear, otherwise they would be content to proceed to form a government which would assure to all of the political groups in Korea an equal opportunity at the polls.

The position of the Soviet Delegation has been made crystal clear, more so than ever before, by the statement in the latest Soviet proposals that "The number of representatives in a Provisional All Korean People's Assembly for North and South Korea must be equal", when as a matter of fact everyone will admit that the population of South Korea is more than double that of North Korea.

There is nothing in the Moscow Agreement with respct to Korea which justifies or supports the Soviet position as indicated above. That Agreement is a brief, simple document, the clear purpose of which was the setting up of an independent government for all Korea of a democratic nature through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organizations and by the rendering of such aid and assistance as might later be determined, with the participation of the Korean

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Provisional Democratic Government, to develop and maintain democratic self-government in Korea.

The American Delegation cannot therefore agree to these counter-proposals as presented by the Soviet Delegation.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRES BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

3 September 1947

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The Soviet counter-proposals maintain the position of "exclusion" and the right to the veto power as insisted upon by them throughout the recent discussion of consultation. More specifically, they exclude from membership in the consultative body representatives of parties stated by them to be non-democratic, representatives of all parties and organizations with membership less than 10,000, those who do not fully support the Moscow Decision, and those who struggle against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers.

Paragraph 2 of the Soviet counter-proposals visualizes the creation of a "Provisional All Korean People's Assembly", which resembles a consultative body. The creation of a consultative group on a fair and liberal basis and the methods by which it is to be established were already agreed to by the American and Soviet Delegations and included in Joint Commission Decision No. 12. The counter-proposal presently submitted by the Soviet Delegation would, therefore, in fact create a consultative body of a type and in a manner different from that agreed upon by the Soviet and American Delegations, as promulgated in Joint Commission Decision No. 12.

Acceptance of the Soviet counter-proposals would create a consultative body from which would be excluded representatives of 24 major rightist groups of South Korea, with a claimed membership in excess of 15½ million. Should the American Delegation be foolish enough to accept these counter-proposals, it would change

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the normally substantial rightist-moderate majority throughout North and South Korea to an overwhelming and unrealistic leftist majority. It thus reverses the actual political situation.

The Soviet Delegation offers what is ostensibly a fair proposal - "the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage, by secret ballot." However, closer study indicates that the "election" would without doubt only be conducted after the leftist dominated consultative body and the government created by it had organized and prepared Korea for the type of election recently conducted in North Korea under which 99 percent of the people, as the Soviets said, "willingly and voluntarily dropped their ballots into the white box" - an election typical of those being held in other Soviet satellite countries.

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The position of the Soviet Delegation has been made crystal clear, more so than ever before, by the statement in the latest Soviet proposals that "The number of representatives in a Provisional All Korean People's Assembly for North and South Korea must be equal", when as a matter of fact everyone will admit that the population of South Korea is more than double that of North Korea.

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purpose of which was the setting up of an independent government for all Korea of a democratic nature through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organizations and by the rendering of such aid and assistance as might later be determined, with the participation of the Korean Provisional Democratic Government, to develop and maintain democratic self-government in Korea.

The American Delegation cannot, therefore, agree to these counter-proposals as presented by the Soviet Delegation.

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PRESS RELEASE OF MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

8 September 1947

In compliance with the letter of August 26, 1947, of the Acting Secretary of State of the United States, Robert A. Lovett, to the Foreign Minister of USSR, V. M. Molotov, the American Delegation has been attempting for the past ten days to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Delegation to a joint report. The purpose of this report was to inform the two governments as to the reason why the Joint Commission had been unable to agree on the principles involved in the first task facing the Commission at its present session - the establishment of a provisional government over a united Korea. This report was to have been presented to the Powers not later than September 5th.

Initial responsibility for the preparation of this report was placed upon Subcommission No. 1, which after several meetings found it impossible to reconcile the divergent points of view presented in the two draft reports which had been prepared by each Delegation. The problem was then discussed at one full meeting of the Joint Commission which referred it back to Subcommission No. 1 for further consideration. After several meetings, Subcommission No. 1 again failed to agree and the matter was referred back to the Joint Commission. On the initiative of the American Delegation, the Joint Commission then took each report and discussed them paragraph by paragraph. After completion of this discussion, it was found that each side had made so many objections and reservations with regard to the report of the other that no joint report was possible.

Thereupon the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation proposed that the full report of each Delegation be transmitted to the two governments concerned with a covering letter signed by the two Chief Commissioners stating that neither side agreed fully

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with the contents of the other's report. The Soviet Delegation declined this proposal. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation then proposed that the sections of the two reports dealing with the positions of the two Delegations be extracted from the full reports and transmitted to the governments concerned with a covering letter of the nature indicated above. This proposal the Soviet Delegation also declined, and gave no reason for refusing to forward both statements except that this would not constitute a "joint" report. When the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation then inquired of the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation what suggestions he had for resolving the difficulties, he replied that he had no proposals to make. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation proposed, as the only other alternative, that each Delegation report to its government that no agreement could be reached on a joint report. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation accepted this proposal.

In the discussions it became quite clear that the Soviet Delegation wished to prepare a joint report which would obscure the basic disagreements regarding consultation which have been stated in previous releases. The Soviet Delegation attempted to remove from the U. S. statement of its position all factual statements which accurately portrayed the U. S. position and explained essential points of difference between the American and the Soviet positions.

For example, the Soviet Delegation wished to remove from the U. S. statement of its position all references to the published letter, written by the nine members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee excluded from the Soviet list and other members of the United Council, in which full cooperation was promised the Joint Commission. It also wished to delete all references to the 24 parties excluded from the proposed Soviet list of democratic parties and social organizations with a membership of 10,000 or

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above, together with the statistical analysis that showed that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would have given the Democratic People's Front an overwhelming majority. To have acceded to these proposals would have meant that the report would not contain a true statement of the U. S. position.

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THE STATEMENT OF THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, COLONEL-GENERAL T. F. SHTIKOV, AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE

9 September 1947

On 4 September 1947, the U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. V. M. Molotov, sent through the Soviet Ambassador to the United States to the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. G. C. Marshall, the following reply to the letter of the U. S. Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lovett, of 26 August 1947, on the question of Korea:

"Dear Mr. Marshall,

"I acknowledge the receipt of the letter from Mr. Lovett of 26 August 1947.

"I deem it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that the preliminary elaboration of measures to assist in the establishment of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, according to the Decision of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, is being carried out by the Joint Commission, which had been formed of the representatives of the Soviet Command in North Korea and the representatives of the American Command in South Korea.

"The recommendations elaborated by the Joint Commission prior to their final acceptance, according to the Moscow Decision, should be presented for the consideration of the four powers, which include the governments of Great Britain and China.

"Furthermore, the governments of Great Britain and China, together with the governments of the U. S. S. R. and the U. S., will participate in the consideration of the proposals elaborated by the Joint Soviet-American Commission on the measures of helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, in order to work out an agreement on a four-power trusteeship representing Korea.

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"The task of the Soviet American Joint Commission, as it is known, consists in assisting the formation of one Provisional Democratic Government for all Korea. It is true that the Joint Commission has as yet done little in this direction, but such a circumstance resulted mainly from the position taken by the American Delegation regarding the question of consultation of the Commission with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, which had been noted in my last letter addressed to you.

"Had the American Delegation displayed a proper inclination to the rendering of aid in the formation of a truly democratic government in Korea, then the work of the Joint Commission would have been more successful; the task, imposed on it, may have been fulfilled and there would not have been such a stagnant condition in the work of the Joint Commission, which in the letter of Mr. Lovett was called a stalemate.

"As you know, the Soviet Delegation, desiring to resolve the situation existing in the Joint Commission, and striving to expedite the work on the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, agreed with the proposal of the American Delegation to dispense with oral consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and on 26 August 1947 submitted a new proposal on the formation of a consultative body -- a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly -- of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of all Korea. This proposal should not, in our opinion, meet with any objection on the part of the American Delegation, because it could eliminate the difficulties which confront the Joint Commission.

"We deem it necessary to add to the above statement that the successful realization of the measures indicated in the proposal of the Soviet Delegation is only possible on the basis of free and unhindered activity of democratic parties and organizations, representatives of which are currently subjected in South Korea to

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arrests and other repressions, which fact is incompatible with the principles of democracy and justice, as well as with those commitments which the governments of the USA and the USSR assumed towards Korea.

"Regarding the assertions stated in the letter of Mr. Lovett, pertaining to the position of the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission, the sense of which is that the Soviet Delegation, allegedly, does not evince any understanding of the proposals of the American Delegation, I do not see any necessity of dwelling upon these assertions in view of their obvious unfounded nature.

"At the same time, I cannot refrain from expressing regret in regard to actions undertaken by you unilaterally, such as your extension of invitations to the governments of Great Britain and China to participate in the discussions of this question, in which were set the place and date for the conference. Your proposal of transferring the question concerning the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government for consideration by the governments of t he four countries the Soviet Government considers inexpedient, because the Joint Commission is far from having exhausted all its possibilities for the working out of coordinated recommendations, which is entirely feasible.

" 'The U. S. proposals on Korea', as indicated in Mr. Lovett's letter, are also unacceptable. These proposals cannot help but result in further disunity of Korea, since they stipulate formation of separate legislative assemblies in South and North Korea (in the Soviet and American zones), whereas the urgent problem consists in securing as soon as possible a joint, even though provisional, but unified organ of power, i.e. of an All-Korea Provisional Democratic Government.

"The American proposal does not remove the now existing situation in Korea, which is the division of the country into two zones, for the liquidation of which all the efforts should be directed, but on the contrary the American proposal perpetuates this abnormal situation.

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"Bearing in mind that the proposal to review the question on Korea in a joint conference of the four-power representatives does not derive from the Moscow Decision of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Korea, and taking into consideration the above-mentioned reasons, the Soviet Government does not see the possibility of accepting Mr. Lovett's proposals advanced in his letter.

"Copies of this letter are being forwarded to the governments of Great Britain and China.

"I beg Mr. Secretary of State to accept the assurances of my very high respect.

V. M. Molotov"

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TALK BY MAJOR GENERAL A. E. BROWN AT SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KOREA.

16 September 1947.

I appreciate the invitation which you have extended me to be present with you on the second anniversary of the founding of your party.

A birthday is always a happy occasion. It is particularly so when it celebrates the transition from the stage of young manhood to the feeling of strength and power which knowledge of growth to full manhood carries with it.

Political parties are essential elements in the scheme of any true democracy. Democratic government is a government of the people, a government by the people and a government which represents the people. All of the people cannot directly participate in that government. They must do so through their selected representatives. All of the people do not have common ideas on political questions. Those who hold common ideas on major political issues group themselves into political parties under leadership competent to support and present their views, which in turn become the views of the party.

The Democratic Party represents a large segment of the Korean population. It speaks for them. It is their agent. Not alone does it speak for the people. It also furnishes to them the knowledge of political activity and development which they should have.

A political party, in addition to acting as the agent of the people, becomes in large measure their guide. Certainly in a nation, the people of which have but recently acquired full political stature, it must assume responsibility for the action of its members. The task of leading and guiding a political party is not an easy one. It is essential that the most capable men available be procured for that heavy responsibility.

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The world of the twentieth century has seen in many lands an unhappy perversion of the pattern of the political party, a development at variance with the democratic concept which gave political parties their meaning.

The concept of a political party as being dominant in the life of the community, or as seeking to acquire a monopoly over the political life of the people, is a concept foreign to and hostile to the democratic ideal.

The life blood of democracy is the friendly competition of democratic parties.

The Democratic Party is one of the leading parties of South Korea. It is today moving from young manhood into the full power, strength and responsibilities of manhood. May it continue to develop as a truly democratic party. May it assist in leading Korea to the development of a truly democratic government where full, equal and free participation in government is assured to all citizens.

This is a happy occasion for the Democratic Party. It is a pleasure for me to be able to be here at this birthday ceremony and to assist in extending to the members of this party felicitations on this happy event.

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STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, COLONEL GENERAL SHTIKOV FOR THE PRESS:

18 September 1947

The 60th meeting of the Joint Commission was held on the 17th of September at which the Soviet Delegation made the following statement:

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION

17 September 1947

The work of the Joint Commission already has been at a standstill over a prolonged period of time. The Soviet Delegation regrets to recognize the unwillingness of the American Delegation to work in the Joint Commission on the solution of the questions connected with the formation of a unified Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which became so evident lately. Instead of striving for the overcoming of the difficulties arisen in the Joint Commission and for the acceptance of coordinated decisions, the American Delegation resorted to an artificial complication and prolonging of the Joint Commission work, emphasizing and sharpening of dissensions between the delegations with the purpose of proving the impossibility of resolving the questions confronting the Joint Commission.

It became especially apparent during the working out of the joint report by the Commission. Prior to the discussion of the presented joint draft reports by both delegations, the American Delegation proposed to dispense with the compilation of a joint report, and to forward the draft reports presented by the Soviet and American Delegations to the Governments along with an accompanying letter pointing out, that both Delegations could not reach an agreement regarding the joint report. Instead of a business-like discussion of the presented drafts, which should have as its aim the compilation of an acceptable joint report, the American Delegation resorted to trifling fault-findings, emphasizing the differences in the drafts, attempting to exclude any possibility of the compilation of a joint report, and thus, attempting also in this instance to show the impossibility of reaching an agreement in the Joint Commission.

The events which took place lately in the Joint Commission itself and outside of it, fully confirmed the apprehensions in connection with the true attitude of the American Delegation toward the

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work of the Joint Commission, which involuntarily arose even before in connection with the position of the American Delegation in regard to the proposals, submitted by the Soviet Delegation with the object of speeding up the work of the Joint Commission.

As it is known, the work of the Joint Commission was being delayed because of differences of opinion between the delegations on the question of compilation of the list of democratic parties and social organizations for consultation.

The Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the solution of the question on the compilation of the list for consultation, repeatedly proposed to instruct Subcommission No. 1 to begin reviewing the applications for participation in consultation received from parties and organizations, to include in the list and immediately begin consultation with those parties and organizations whose admission to consultation in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall as well as Joint Commission Decision No. 12, did not arouse suspicion, and then to continue consideration and verification of the remaining statements as to parties and organizations, comprising the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, the Soviet Delegation made several proposals, whose object is the resolution of this question in compliance with the Molotov-Marshall agreement. If the American Delegation would have shown sufficient willingness to expedite the resolution of the disputed questions, the work of the Joint Commission would have considerably advanced as early as July. However, the aforementioned proposals of the Soviet Delegation were rejected by the American Delegation, which preferred to carry on discussions on general issues, avoiding the concrete individual considerations of applications for participation in consultation, submitted by parties and organizations, and by this prolonging the work of the Joint Commission.

Considering that as a result of the position taken by the

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American Delegation on the question of compilation of the list, the entire work of the Joint Commission was held up, the Soviet Delegation as early as 5 August 1947 suggested the commencement of the elaboration of proposals on the Provisional Charter, political platform, as well as on the questions of personnel of the Provisional Government the order of assumption of power by the Provisional Government and the selection of personnel.

The Soviet Delegation proceeded from the consideration that the Joint Commission has to perform a great amount of work on the elaboration of aforementioned proposals and that it is necessary to begin this work as soon as possible. However, even this proposal of the Soviet Delegation was rejected by the American Delegation, which refused to consider other questions listed on the program of work of the Joint Commission until the question of the list of parties and organizations would be solved.

26 August 1947, the Soviet Delegation introduced new proposals in reply to the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August 1947. The Soviet Delegation accepted point 1 of the proposals of the American Delegation - to dispense with oral consultation and to substitute it with the written proposals of Korean parties and organizations which were submitted to the Joint Commission as returns to the questionnaires. Therefore, the Delegations have reached an agreement on this question.

The Soviet Delegation proposed - to direct Subcommission #2 and #3 to commence the study of written proposals of democratic parties and social organizations on the questionnaires which were submitted to the Joint Commission and to present the drafts of proposals on corresponding questions to the Joint Commission. These proposals ensue from the plan of work which was accepted in the meeting of the Joint Commission on 22 May 1947, according to which the first stage of work of the Joint Commission includes the following questions:

1. Conditions and order of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations.

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2. Elaboration of recommendations on the structure and principles of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and local organs of authority (Provisional Charter).

3. Preliminary elaboration of the political platform and other appropriate measures for the future Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

4. Elaboration of recommendations on the personnel of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

5. Order of assumption of power by a Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the order of selection of personnel for a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

The proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August concerning the work of Subcommissions #2 and #3 correspond in many ways with the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August.

The proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August also provided for the creation of a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations. This consultative body should be created in order to draw Koreans now towards a direct participation in the working out of all questions connected with the establishment of a Korean Provisional Government.

The American Delegation in the meeting on 3 September, stated that on the whole it was against the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August, but actually presented objections only against the proposals concerning the creation of a Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly.

The American Delegation, in substance, did not object to other points of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government, insists upon the realization of those items

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from the proposals of the American Delegation of 12 August and the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 26 August regarding which the points of view of the two delegations are closer together and which correspond to the above cited decision of the Joint Commission of 22 May 1947, and it proposes to entrust:

(1) Subcommission No. 2 immediately to initiate the study of the written answers to the questionnaires distributed by the Joint Commission which had been submitted to the Joint Commission in written form by the democratic parties and social organizations, and to submit to the Joint Commission projects for the structure of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government and the local bodies of authority (Provisional Charter) and the political platform.

(2) Subcommission No. 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel composition of the Provisional Government and regarding the order of assumption of authority by that government.

As regards the problem of the formation of the Provisional All-Korea People's Assembly, the Soviet Delegation considers that the objections regarding that question advanced by the American Delegation in its statement of 3 September to be not well founded and supposes that it is necessary to continue the discussion of this problem for the purpose of reaching agreement.

If this proposal will be accepted by the American Delegation, the Joint Commission directly will be able to begin elaboration on the proposals regarding the questions connected with the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which, in accordance with the Moscow Decision, the Joint Commission must present to the respective governments.

The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to add that the successful work of the Joint Commission on the formation of a

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Provisional Korean Democratic Government is possible only on the condition of complete abolishment of the repressions regarding the democratic parties and social organizations of South Korea, the release of arrested leaders and members of these organizations, and the assurance of free and unimpeded activities of the said parties and organizations.

The Soviet Delegation proceeds from the fact that all efforts should be directed toward the formation of a unified All-Korean organ of power, that is of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, and considers that the plans recently introduced which are actually leading to the re-enforcement of the already existent division of the country into two zones, conceal an even greater peril for the Korean people.

The Soviet Delegation still holds to the point of view that if both delegations desire to fulfill exactly and completely the Moscow Decision on Korea, and the agreement between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Marshall, the Joint Commission can successfully solve the problem, put before it, on the formation of a unified Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which is so impatiently awaited by the Korean people.

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ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ ГЛАВЫ СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ

ГЕНЕРАЛ-ПОЛКОВНИКА ШТЫКОВА ДЛЯ ПЕЧАТИ

18 сентября 1947 года.

17 сентября состоялось 60-е заседание Совместной Комиссии, на котором Советская делегация сделала следующее заявление:

"Работа Совместной Комиссии уже в течение длительного времени находится в состоянии застоя. Советская делегация с сожалением констатирует ясно выявившееся за последнее время нежелание Американской делегации работать в Совместной Комиссии над разрешением вопросов, связанных с созданием единого Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства. Вместо того, чтобы стремиться к преодолению возникших в Совместной Комиссии трудностей и к принятию согласованных решений, Американская делегация пошла по пути искуственного осложнения и затягивания работы Комиссии, подчеркивания и обострения разногласий между делегациями с целью доказать невозможность разрешения стоящих перед Комиссией вопросов.

Это особенно ярко выявилось при составлении Комиссией совместного доклада. Еще до обсуждения представленных обеими делегациями проектов совместного доклада, Американская делегация предложила отказаться от составления совместного доклада, и направить представленные Советской и Американской делегациями проекты доклада правительствам с сопроводительным письмом, в котором указать, что делегации не могли достигнуть соглашения относительно совместного доклада. Вместо делового обсуждения представленных проектов, с целью составления приемлемого совместного доклада, Американская делегация пошла по

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пути мелочных придирок, подчеркивая расхождения между проектами, стремясь исключить всякую возможность составления совместного доклада, и, таким образом, попытаться и на этом примере показать невозможность достижения соглашения в Совместной Комиссии.

События, имевшие за последнее время место в Совместной Комиссии и вне ее, полностью подтвердили опасения, касающиеся действительного отношения Американской делегации к работе Совместной Комиссии, которые невольно возникали и ранее в связи с позицией Американской делегации в отношении предложений, которые выдвигались Советской делегацией с целью ускорения работы Совместной Комиссии.

Как известно, работа Совместной Комиссии задержалась в следствие разногласий между делегациями по вопросу о составлении списка демократических партий и общественных организаций для консультации.

Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить разрешение вопроса о составлении списка для консультации, неоднократно предлагала - поручить подкомиссии № 1 приступить к рассмотрению поступивших от партий и организаций заявлений на участие в консультации, включить в список и немедленно приступить к устной консультации с теми партиями и организациями, допущение которых к консультации, в соответствии с Московским решением, соглашением между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, а также решения № 12 Совместной Комиссии, не вызвало сомнений, а затем продолжать обсуждение и проверку остальных заявлений. Что касается партий и организаций, входящих в Комитет борьбы против опеки, то Советская делегация сделала несколько предложений, имеющих целью разрешить этот вопрос в соответствии с соглашением МОЛОТОВА-МАРШАЛЛА. Если бы Американская

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делегация проявила достаточное желание ускорить разрешение спорных вопросов, то работа Совместной Комиссии еще в июле месяце могла бы значительно двинуться вперед. Однако, вышеупомянутые предложения Советской делегации были отвергнуты Американской делегацией, которая предпочитала вести дискуссию по общим вопросам, уклоняясь от конкретного обсуждения представленных партиями и организациями заявлений на участие в консультации, каждого в отдельности, и тем самым затягивая работу Комиссии.

Учитывая, что в следствие позиции, занятой Американской делегацией по вопросу о составлении списка, задержалась вся работа Совместной Комиссии, Советская делегация еще 5 августа 1947 года предложила приступить к разработке предложений по Временному Положению, политической платформе, а также по вопросам персонального состава Временного Правительства, порядка приема власти Временным Правительством и подбора аппарата.

Советская делегация исходила из того, что Совместной Комиссии предстоит большая работа по разработке вышеуказанных предложений, и что к этой работе необходимо приступить как можно раньше. Однако, и это предложение Советской делегации было отвергнуто Американской делегацией, которая отказалась обсуждать другие вопросы, стоящие в программе работы Комиссии, пока не решен вопрос о списке партий и организаций для консультации.

26 августа 1947 года Советская делегация внесла новые предложения в ответ на предложения Американской делегации от 12 августа 1947 года. Советская делегация приняла пункт 1 предложения Американской делегации - не проводить устной консультации и заменить ее письменными предложениями корейских партий и организаций поступившими в Комиссию в ответ на вопросники. Таким образом, по этому вопросу между делегациями имеется соглашение.

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Советская делегация предложила - поручить подкомиссиям № 2 и № 3 приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты предложений по соответствующим вопросам. Эти предложения вытекают из принятого на заседании Совместной Комиссии 22 мая 1947 года плана работы, согласно которому первый этап работы Совместной Комиссии включает следующие вопросы:

1. Условия и порядок консультации с демократическими партиями и общественными организациями.

2. Выработка рекомендаций о структуре и принципах организации Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное Положение/.

3. Предварительная выработка политической платформы и других надлежащих мероприятий для будущего Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

4. Выработка рекомендаций о персональном составе Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

5. Порядок приема власти Временным Корейским Демократическим Правительством и порядок подбора аппарата для Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства.

Предложения Советской делегации от 26 августа относительно работы подкомиссий № 2 и № 3 во многом сходятся с предложениями Американской делегации от 12 августа.

Предложения Советской делегации от 26 августа предусматривали также создание Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания из представителей демократических партий и общественных организаций. Этот консультативный орган должен быть создан

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для того, чтобы уже сейчас привлечь корейцев к непосредственному участию в разработке всех вопросов, связанных с образованием Временного Правительства.

Американская делегация на заседании Совместной Комиссии 5 сентября высказалась против предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа в целом, но выдвинула возражения только против предложений о создании Временного Общекорейского Народного Собрания.

Американская делегация, по существу, не возражала против других пунктов предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа.

Учитывая вышеизложенное, Советская делегация, стремясь ускорить создание Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, настаивает на реализации тех положений из предложений Американской делегации от 12 августа и предложений Советской делегации от 26 августа, по которым точки зрения обеих делегаций сближаются, и которые соответствуют приведенному выше решению Совместной Комиссии от 22 мая 1947 года, и предлагает поручить:

1. Подкомиссии № 2 немедленно приступить к изучению представленных в Совместную Комиссию письменных предложений демократических партий и общественных организаций по вопросникам, которые были разосланы Совместной Комиссией, и представить в Совместную Комиссию проекты структуры Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и местных органов власти /Временное положение/ и политической платформы.

2. Подкомиссии № 3 представить в Совместную Комиссию предложения относительно персонального состава Временного Правительства и о порядке приема правительством власти.

Что касается вопроса о создании Временного Общекорейс-

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кого Народного Собрания, то Советская делегаций считает возражения, выдвинутые по этому вопросу Американской делегацией в заявлении от 3 сентября, неосновательными, и полагает, что обсуждение этого вопроса следует продолжить с целью достижения соглашения.

Если это предложение будет принято Американской делегацией, то Совместная Комиссия сможет непосредственно приступить к разработке предложений по вопросам, связанным с образованием Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, которое, в соответствии с Московским решением, она должна представить соответствующим правительствам.

Советская делегация считает необходимым добавить, что успешная работа Совместной Комиссии по созданию Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства возможна лишь при условии полной отмены репрессий в отношении демократических партий и общественных организаций Южной Кореи, освобождения арестованных руководителей и членов этих организаций и обеспечения свободной и невоспрепятствованной деятельности указанных партий и организаций.

Советская делегация исходит из того, что все усилия должны быть направлены на создание единого общекорейского органа власти - Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства и считает, что выдвигаемые за последнее время планы, ведущие фактически к закреплению существующего разделения страны на две зоны, таят большую опасность для корейского народа.

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Советская делегация попрежнему придерживается той точки зрения, что при наличии желания обеих делегаций точно и полностью выполнить Московское решение о Корее и соглашение между МОЛОТОВЫМ и МАРШАЛЛОМ, Совместная Комиссия может успешно разрешить поставленную перед ней задачу образования единого Временного Корейского Демократического Правительства, чего с таким нетерпением ожидает корейский народ."

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN THE MEETING
OF THE JOINT COMMISSION, 26 September 1947

The Soviet Delegation in the Joint-Soviet American Commission has repeatedly made declarations regarding the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs on Korea and has insisted on them.

The Korean people with the assistance of the great allies must obtain its democratic government and independence. The basic document which expresses the aims of the allied governments to assist the Korean people in the rebirth of its statehood is the Moscow Decision on Korea of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This decision expounds the program of the allies on the restoration of Korea as a free and independent state.

As it is known, the majority of the Korean people and of the democratic parties and social organizations regarded with approval this decision. It is also known that certain political parties and their reactionary leaders have opposed and are still opposing the Moscow Decision. Up to date it is the fault of these reactionary leaders and their patrons that the Provisional Democratic Government of Korea has not yet been formed.

The Soviet Delegation, which represents the Soviet Command in Korea and which, in the course of a year and a half, has observed events, moods and aspirations of the Korean people, can note that the Korean people from the very first days of its liberation from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, began to evince a tremendous interest in political life, and is striving to acquire the experience in independent governing of its state.

At the moment of the arrival of the Soviet Army in Korea in August 1945 the Korean people have created throughout Korea organs of people's authority - local People's Committees as well as the Central People's Committee, the People's Republic. Representatives of all strata of the Korean people took part in these organs of authority.

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The Soviet Delegation can also note that in the course of two years of work the People's Committees, as organs of people's authority in North Korea, have performed a tremendous task and have realized a series of democratic reforms, supported and approved by the people. However, it should be noted that there were great difficulties in the progress of this work. These difficulties consisted in the guiding cadres having no necessary experience in solving the questions of state. It is true, as we know, that peoples are not born with experience, the experience is acquired through practical work. Therefore, the five-year term of trusteeship, anticipated in the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers, is fully sufficient for the growth of the national governmental cadres.

A different situation arose in South Korea. The People's Committees were not recognized by the American Military Command as organs of people's authority. The People's Committees of South Korea have not been admitted to govern the political and economic life, and, consequently, the growth of the guiding governmental personnel in the ranks of the Korean people was hindered. No democratic reforms have been introduced. Democratic parties and social organizations, upholding the Moscow Decision on Korea, their leaders, members and even sympathizers of these organizations, are subjected to cruel persecution.

Reactionary leaders of certain political parties of South Korea, being disposed against democratic reforms and against developing Korea along the democratic lines, opposed and are opposing the Moscow Decision of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. They explain their opposition by the fact that the Moscow Decision stipulates trusteeship, which is allegedly not acceptable to Korean people. The Korean reactionary press, as well as some American newspapers, attempted to prompt the Korean people that the trusteeship was adopted because of the demand of the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union alledgedly strives to seize Korea and to establish there the Soviet ways.

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The Soviet Delegation deems it necessary to refute the rumors originating from the reactionary circles that the Soviet Union intends to seize Korea and to establish there Soviet ways as fictitious and inimical towards the Soviet Union. As it is known, the question of Korea was discussed at the Conference of Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow at the initiative of the American Delegation. The American draft proposed to establish a unified administration headed by the two commanders, who would have to govern Korea until the establishment of the trusteeship. The American draft anticipated the creation of an administrative organ composed of the representatives of the Four States (USA, China, United Kingdom and USSR), which would have to act in the name of the United Nations and in the name of the people of Korea. This administrative organ would have to be vested with such executive, legislative and judiciary authority which might be necessary for effective governing of Korea until the establishment of a Korean Government. At the same time, this administrative organ would have to realize its powers and functions through a high commissioner. It was proposed to carry out such governing of Korea in the course of five years. This term could have been extended by a further five years which would constitute in fact a ten year mandate type of government over Korea. The American draft did not anticipate the creation of a Korean Government.

The Soviet Union could not, of course, agree with such proposals of the American Delegation, in the first place because Korea had not been a belligerent against the Allies and in the second place because a five year term could be fully sufficient for restoration of statehood of Korea, for creating state institutions and for training the cadres for independent governing of the state.

The Soviet Delegation submitted its draft proposals for the consideration of the Ministers. The Soviet proposal took into account the interests and aspirations of the Korean people and provided for the formation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Govern-

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ment with the participation of which there would have to be worked out measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposal of the Soviet Delegation, with slight amendments, was adopted in the Conference of the Ministers. If the American proposal on Korea, submitted for consideration by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, should be compared with the decision adopted by the Three Ministers, it will become clear to every Korean that the Moscow Decision is the more progressive decision respecting Korea and that it takes into account the interests of the Korean people. The Korean reactionaries are opposing this decision because they do not desire a democratic development for Korea. Nor do they desire democratic reforms demanded by the Korean people.

We are convinced that it is impossible to deceive or to intimidate the Korean people with clamor and slander. There are parties and leaders in Korea who are closely bound to the people, know their aspirations and expectations and who are able to discern what is more to their advantage: lawlessness, tyranny, want of rights, poverty, and colonial dependence or liberty, democratic rights and a free democratic independent Korean state. The Korean people cannot be bought with riches from beyond the seas; it has enough riches in its own country, with the mastery of which it could in a short time enter the ranks of most advanced countries of Asia.

The Soviet Delegation cannot understand the behavior of the American Delegation, which considers that whereas there are some Koreans who do not desire trusteeship, therefore, it is possible to get along without trusteeship. The Soviet Delegation is for trusteeship only because this trusteeship is stipulated by the Moscow Decision, which had been signed by our Ministers and must be exactly fulfilled. The Soviet Delegation cannot understand why the American

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Delegation, which regards with favor the activities of a small coterie of Korean reactionaries who appear under the motto of struggling against trusteeship, does not wish for the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea, which had been adopted by the American Delegation itself. For its part, the Soviet Delegation has applied all its efforts in order to expedite the establishment of one democratic government for all Korea on the basis of exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. However, the position taken by the American Delegation has up to now impeded the formation of this government.

The Soviet Delegation considers that it would be a deception to the Korean people to state that they could get along without trusteeship while American and Soviet troops remained upon the territory of Korea.

The Soviet Delegation has always regarded small peoples with respect and still so regards them. It has struggled and it shall continue to struggle for their independence and sovereignty. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea. The Soviet Delegation declares that if the American Delegation would agree with a proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops during the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be ready to evacuate Korea simultaneously with the American troops.

The Soviet Delegation has no other proposals. In the course of the work of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation with sufficient completeness has expounded its point of view concerning the ways of re-establishing Korea as an independent democratic state.

The Soviet Delegation awaits the answer and the proposals of the American Delegation.

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This list of names of Soviet Delegation personnel was received by G-2 from official Russian Delegate.

COMMISSION MEMBERS

1. Colonel General T.F. Shtikov - Chairman of Delegation.
2. Mr. G. I. Tounkin - Member of Delegation.
3. Major General N.G. Lebedeff - Member of Delegation.
4. Mr. G.M. Balasanov - Member of Delegation.
5. Colonel T.I. Korkulenko - Member of Delegation.
6. Lt.Colonel I.V.Kravtsov - Aid to the Chairman of Delegation.
7. Capt. V.M. Korneev - Adjutant.
8. Lt. Kadishnikov - Adjutant.

ADVISORS AND EXPERTS

1. Colonel Tupikov.
2. T.I. Zagotnii.
3. G.F. Latunkin.
4. V.I. Petuhov.

SECRETARIAT

1. Colonel Avramenko - In charge.
2. A.S. Maslov - Assistant.
3. I.I. Volenko - Assistant.
4. K.M. Ilyushchenko - Assistant (woman).
5. O.P. Mironenko - Assistant (woman).
6. I.D. Mesiats - Assistant (woman).
7. U.A. Klepikova - Assistant (woman).
8. A.S. Kramar - Assistant (woman).
9. M.G. Shargorodskaya - Assistant (woman).
10. O.V. Galikova - Assistant (woman).
11. O.Z. Maslova - Assistant (woman).
12. Captain Molchanov - Assistant.
13. Senior Lt. Proschenko - Assistant.
14. Pak Thia Seb - Assistant.

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15. Pan En Gin - Assistant.

16. Nam, S.T. - Assistant.

TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND SERVICE PERSONNEL

1. Major P.M. Tourkin
2. Major P.S. Riabov
3. Capt. A. I. Mironiuk
4. Capt. N.I. Roudakov
5. Capt. V.A. Dementiev
6. Capt. V.G. Saharov
7. Capt. V.V. Stavrovsky
8. Capt. I.S. Panek
9. Senior Lt. K.G. Kuksin
10. Pfc. V.Z. Moshnikov
11. Sgt. V.I. Balabuha
12. Jr.Sgt. V.G. Lizunov
13. Jr.Sgt. F.F. Fedotov
14. Sgt. G.M. Barabanov
15. Sgt. M.J. Treiger
16. Jr.Sgt. V.M. Svidersky
17. Jr.Sgt. V.K. Yakovlev
18. Jr.Sgt. V.D. Sidorkin
19. Jr.Sgt. V.A. Kirushin
20. Jr.Sgt. S.S. Arnautov
21. Pfc. N.P. Demidov
22. Jr.Sgt. M.H. Isangeldin
23. Pfc. V.S. Trofimov
24. Pvt. G.A. Sharov
25. Pvt. A.F. Trusov
26. Pvt. I.S. Noskov
27. Pvt. A.D. Zarva
28. Pvt. P.V. Santalov
29. Pfc. P.I. Faenkov
30. Jr.Sgt. I.A. Krainov

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31. Sgt. Maj. F.I. Firyulin
32. Sr. Sgt. Klemnikov
33. Pvt. V.I. Lovchikov
34. Pvt. N.V. Zaitsev
35. Pvt. N.N. Gavrilov
36. Pvt. Ryachkin
37. Pvt. Dmitriev
38. Pvt. S.F. Shturmarevich
39. Pvt. Z.K. Oleinik
40. Pvt. V.M. Evtushenko
41. Pvt. T.I. Monahova
42. Pvt. O.E. Strogaya
43. Pvt. O.M. Virtuozova
44. Pvt. A.I. Nikolaeva
45. Pvt. A.G. Vasil'ev

Arriving 2000 - 27 May 1947

Lt.Colonel Zagotnii

Lt. Chamladze - Train Commander

Jr. Sgt. Sidorkin

Mr. Shabshin - Authority on Korea

Mr. B.F. Molchanov - Interpreter

Mr. V.G. Vishniak - Interpreter

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Press Release

26 September 1947

STATEMENT OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

At the 60th meeting of the Joint Commission, the Soviet Delegation presented a formal statement, which was given to the press on the 18th of September.

The Soviet statement is illustrative of what the American Delegation has with regret come to accept as typical Soviet propaganda. It is replete with misstatements. It manipulates facts in such a way as to distort them to bolster the Soviet Delegation's weak position. It deliberately omits reference to facts which support the American position and highlights those which support the Soviet position.

It would be both useless and pointless for the American Delegation to attempt to make specific replies to the false allegations or to correct the misstatements contained in the Soviet paper. The Soviet Delegation well knows the real point of disagreement between the two delegations. Briefly stated, it is the refusal of the Soviet Delegation to permit all segments of the Korean people to participate in the formation of their government and by the exclusion of certain groups which it does not like to insure the setting up of a Communist-dominated leftist government over a United Korea.

The methods used by the Soviet Delegation to sell a false concept to the peoples of the world are interesting. They undoubtedly will fool some people, particularly those who are blinded by propaganda. Fortunately the devious methods followed by the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Commission in 1946 and 1947 to attain its ends have been written into the record of the Joint Commission. There is no statement which it can now prepare which can change the written record. Any accusation which it may make can be answered by pages of quotations from the written record.

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The Soviet Delegation refuses to admit that any political party or social organization can be defined as "democratic" unless it follows the Moscow line. In doing this it has adopted the word "democratic" for its own purposes, using a definition without historical precedent and in violation of over two centuries of usage and development. Its refusal to consult with or to permit any political party or social organization other than one which is "democratic" by Soviet definition to participate in the formation of the provisional government naturally follows as a means of implementation.

The Soviet Delegation attempts to assure successful attainment of its objective by refusing to deal with any political party or social organization which "struggled against" the Moscow Decision. This was a particularly valuable fiction, which it invented to inflame an already volatile opposition.

The U. S. Delegation attempted to find a solution and has proposed many alternatives, one of which was a general supervised election which is recognized throughout the world as a democratic method of expression by a people. These were all refused by the Soviet Delegation, which instead proposed an unrepresentative consultative assembly. Not only did it exclude from this suggested consultative assembly all parties and organizations which opposed certain phrases in the Moscow Decision but it also claimed that representation from North Korea (where only Democratic People's Front parties and organizations were permitted to apply for consultation) should have equality of representation with South Korea, in spite of the fact that the population statistics show there are twice as many people in South Korea as in North Korea. The only possible result from accepting such a proposal

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would be the establishment of a Communist-controlled provisional government, with the majority of patriotic Koreans being excluded from participation.

The recent effort to reach agreement on a joint report to be submitted to the two governments also fully reflects the Soviet attitude. The Soviet Delegation openly and determinedly attempted to write a joint report which concealed the Soviet attempt to deny consultation with and participation by a large segment of Korean opinion in the formation of a provisional government for the specific purpose of arbitrarily setting up a Communist-dominated government.

The Soviet Delegation has the effrontery to demand the release of certain leftist leaders who have been arrested by the South Korean authorities for plotting subversive activities. The Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation again suggests that the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation confine his activities to matters which are of proper concern to him--the establishment of a provisional government and an independent Korea free from foreign domination. The arrest and punishment of subversive elements are the concern of the proper authorities, namely those who are responsible for the government of South Korea.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that unless and until the Soviet Delegation is willing to accept the principle of equality of consideration for participation in the formation of the provisional government of all political parties and social organizations which are not barred for specific cause by mutual agreement of both delegations, the American Delegation perceives no object in assigning tasks to Subcommissions 2 and 3 or in the further discussion of the formation of the Provisional All-Korean People's Assembly under the conditions proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

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The position of the American Delegation as expressed in the preceding paragraph is in exact accord with the agreements reached in the Marshall-Molotov exchange of letters on the basis of which the Joint Commission resumed its discussion.

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(Translation)

FOR RELEASE

October 7, 1947

R E S O L U T I O N

(Adopted October 6, 1947 at the Delegates Conference of the Korean National Association now in session since October 4. The Association has a membership of 7 million in the South.)

It has been decided that the following resolutions should be declared as of the will of the Korean people, subject to the final approval by all the sectional conferences to be held on or about October 12, in all the important cities, regarding the current political issues:

(1) Delegation to the U.N. Conference:

Whereas, the delegates to the U.N. General Assembly to participate in the discussions on the Korean independence question should be chosen in concurrence with the wishes of the Korean people without any interference from foreign quarters.

Be it resolved therefore, that Dr. Syngman Rhee, our great national leader, be nominated and chosen as chairman of the Korean delegation with Miss Louise Yim and Col. Ben C. Limb, who are already attending the U.N. meetings, as fully accredited members of the delegation.

(2) General Election:

Whereas, we have been putting forth every efforts to restore through general election our sovereign rights as an independent nation with a view to improving our economic situation and to effect the reunification of north and south Korea, but General Hodge insisted on working out his own program to bring about an agreement through the USA-USSR Joint Commission.

Whereas, since we sincerely hoped to find a solution through cooperation with General Hodge, we waited patiently all this time without a government or a fully elected legislature to represent the Korean people.

Whereas, General Hodge declared last winter that as soon as the Interim Legislature passed the election law, the general election would be held. Months elapsed without the enactment, due to the obstruction tactics of the appointed legislators. Since the law was finally adopted, three months have passed, yet the election date has not been announced. This dilatory measure should not be allowed to continue indefinitely, for any further delay will cause our people to be hopelessly lost in the quackmire of misery. The Korean Representative Assembly met three times in Seoul and urged the Military Government authorities to carry out the election program earnestly and speedily but all in vain.

Therefore, be it resolved that, if the Military Government fails to name the election date without further delay, we will decide it by ourselves and expedite the election.

(3) Coalition Committee:

Whereas, General Hodge was determined to achieve the unification of Korea through the USA-USSR Joint Commission, and with that in view he organized the Coalition Committee for the purpose of securing the cooperation between the rightists and the leftists, and the rightists acquiesced at his requests. Taking advantage of the coalition movement as their shield, however, the Communists expanded their organizations in the South and revived their terroristic activities of killing and destroying on a nation-wide scale.

(Over)

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Whereas, the Joint Commission has now once again proved a complete failure, as expected, and the U.S. Government has officially discarded the trusteeship question, it has become necessary to hitch the policies regarding Communism in Korea in line with the Truman Doctrine now taking effect in America.

Therefore, be it resolved that we request General Hodge to dissolve the Coalition Committee and cease from encouraging the so-called center groups that act as shield and cover for Communists.

(4) Overlordship:

Whereas, the Military Government Ordinances and public statements issued from time to time in the past have given the Koreans to understand that even after the legislature has been elected and government set up, the American Military Command will retain the veto power and that it will continue to control the Korean military, financial and diplomatic affairs. We at first ignored all this in the firm belief that when a legislature has been formed by the people themselves, all these misgivings might be removed without difficulty.

Whereas, these apprehensions, however, have now made a serious rift in the rightist camp inevitable. Many of our people believe that a Korean Government, when formed, would be under an overlordship of the American Military Command, which would mean an American trusteeship in place of the proposed and abandoned Four Power trusteeship, against which all the Korean people have consistently fought.

Therefore, be it resolved that we urge General Hodge to make this point publicly clear in order to work off the Korean apprehensions, the stumbling block to concerted nationalist actions, and thus pave the way to a complete Korean-American cooperation.

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SPEECH OF MAJOR GENERAL A. E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION, US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION,
at meeting of National Council

9 October 1947.

Mr. President:

I wish to express to you and to the officers and members of the National Council my appreciation for the opportunity which you have extended me of witnessing this splendid demonstration. It is an inspiration for a man of my age to stand before the young men of Korea, those who will assume a prominent part in leading their country to independence and in developing it as a strong and peaceful member of the family of nations.

Korea offers an opportunity to her youth of today which has never in the prior history of their country been offered them. Liberated from the restrictions imposed by the Japanese occupancy and with the unlimited freedom to develop under a democratic government, the individual is for the first time in the history of the nation offered an opportunity to attain that level which his ability and energy can achieve. One of the primary, if not the fundamental, principle of democratic government is to permit the individual to develop to the maximum possible extent of his abilities. While giving to the individual this right, it denies him the right of trespassing on similar rights held by other individuals.

One of the many advantages of bringing you together in the type of organization which your able leader is developing is that you will learn to live with your fellow man, within an organization which assures to you your rights and privileges while at the same time denying to you the privilege of trespassing on those associated with you. Becoming thoroughly accustomed to this discipline, you will be fitted to assume the responsibility involved in the exercise of political rights and will be in position to seek appointment to political office from which you can guide and develop the destiny

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of your fellow men and your country. It is essential today that Korea be well governed, that the able leaders come forward and seek political appointment in order that they may inform and guide those of their citizens who have not had equal opportunity for educational development in the fundamental principles of democratic government.

Not alone are the opportunities offered you for participation in your government great; similar opportunities are open in all fields of endeavor. As time goes on, your country will develop along industrial lines. The opportunity for employment in manufacturing, industry, finance, and commerce is equally great as is the opportunity for political office. As a matter of fact, only those individuals should engage in the science of politics who have special aptitude for that profession. The fields other than politics now opening before you are sufficiently broad to absorb the talents of any individual, giving to him a choice of occupation which has never previously been offered to the young men of your country.

Due to war conditions, Korea was left by the Japanese in a condition of bankruptcy. Industry and commerce are developing slowly. It will take time to integrate Korea into an industrial area where, through exchange of goods, she will be able to increase the business activity of her nationals. Since the occupancy, because of this condition, the opportunity for employment has been mainly in the field of politics. The result is that the number of men seeking political office is considerably in excess of the needs of the country and of the vacancies to be filled. This has caused a keen rivalry and some unfortunate practices. This is a temporary situation which will be corrected as time goes on and the fields for employment outside of politics develop. This improvement will not occur too quickly. It takes time to heal the wounds of a great war. It is essential that you have patience and that you teach your fellow countrymen to have patience. They must be informed of the true state of affairs, the reason why certain conditions exist, the efforts being made to correct them, and the probably future

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developments to be expected. You can render your country a great service by assisting in this orientation of your people.

There are in Korea certain organizations which call themselves youth groups. Many of these organizations are not well led, nor do they observe the rudiments of disciplinary control which are essential for the guidance of such organizations. They are, in fact, the tools of political leaders and are used by them to enforce their political policies. These organizations have a tendency to collect funds, to mete out punishment and in general to take the law into their own hands. It is not necessary for me to point out that there can be only one government in a nation at one time. When numerous organizations such as those mentioned attempt to set themselves up as governmental agencies and to dictate the principles which govern the citizens of the nation in their conduct with each other, then these organizations are in fact trying to assume the power and responsibility of government. The next step to be expected is that they shall enter into conflict, the one with the other, in order to determine which shall acquire the actual powers of government. This condition borders on anarchy; the inevitable result, if unchecked, would be civil war.

You and your organization can render your country a great service not only along the lines previously pointed out to you, but by absorbing into your midst the individual members of the misguided organizations above mentioned and converting them into law-abiding, useful citizens rather than to leave them as they are now -- discordant elements in the political life of your nation.

The United States has sought by every international device known to assure an independent Korea which shall be free of any foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations. It first formally proclaimed this intention in the 1943 Cairo Declaration. Later, after the war ended, the United States joined

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with Russian in the Moscow Agreement which, if carried out sincerely and faithfully by the Soviet Union, would have resulted in the independence of Korea long ago. The United States, when its efforts to establish an independent Korea were blocked by the Soviet Union, then proposed Four-Power consideration of Korean independence, which the Soviet Union again refused, and finally, as you are well aware, the United States has now placed the Korean problem before the United Nations.

The United States is determined to establish an independent Korea and a Korean government at the earliest possible moment. I am sure it is unnecessary for me to reiterate this chain of events before such an intelligent group but, because of the significance of the international picture on the domestic scene in Korea, I feel that all Koreans should be aware of what the United States is doing and to support its efforts in South Korea.

I congratulate you on this, the first anniversary of the founding of the Korean National Youth, Incorporated. You have before you a great future. You are rendering your country a distinct service. If you continue along the paths which you have started to follow, you can aid materially in the logical, peaceful and rapid development of democratic government within Korea and in fitting Korea to take her place as a member of the family of nations.

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Capt. Phillips

TALK BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN
at Memorial Services for National Police
11 October 1947

It is a privilege for me to be with you and to participate in the memorial services for those of your fellow officers who have been killed in the performance of their duties. A memorial service is a sad occasion. However, when it is held as on this occasion in recognition of services rendered through the forfeiture of life in the performance of duty, it takes upon itself a magnificence which makes it in fact a glorious occasion.

Policemen are in fact ~~soldiers~~ Servants of their country. It is their duty and responsibility to maintain law and order and to safeguard the lives and property of the individual members of the community. They must be men who will subordinate their own interest to the welfare of the mass of the people whom they serve. While they must be quick to arrest those who violate the law, they must be constantly alert to avoid injury to those who are not violating the law. The people will respect a good police force; they will hate a poor police force. All members of the force must insist on such performance of duty from all as will instill confidence in the police and obtain respect from the mass of the people. This will be accomplished by a strict and honest performance of duty by a policeman who realizes his responsibility to his country and serves it as a true patriot. No greater example of patriotism can be given than for a policeman to sacrifice his life in the proper performance of his duty.

While I grieve with you over the loss of those who have left your ranks under the call of duty, I join with you in rendering to them the honor which is due their performance and to congratulate all members of the National Police on having such men as members of this fine organization.

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FILE

PRESS CONFERENCE - 14 October 1947

MRS. MASLOV: I was asked to read this letter in order to expedite our work, because we haven't any copies typed yet. This letter will be read in the Korean language, and here I shall read it to you in English. I shall present you with the formal copy in Russian after I have read the letter.

Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. Molotov, forwarded on the 9th of October 1947 to the Secretary of State of the U. S., G. Marshall, on Korea:

Dear Mr. Marshall:

The position taken by the delegation of the US in the Joint Soviet-American Commission at Seoul says that the delegation of the US does not wish to continue the work of the Joint Commission with an aim to achieve on the basis of an exact observance of the Moscow Decision on Korea agreed upon decisions on the questions connected with the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. In violating the Moscow Decision on Korea and the agreement reached between the governments of the USSR and the US in May 1947, concerning the conditions of resumption of the work of the Joint Commission, the delegation of the US insists upon participation in the formation of the Korean government not only of democratic parties and groups of North and South Korea who signed the declaration on the support of the aims of the Moscow Decision and to loyally fulfill the agreement of this declaration, but of reactionary groups who in having signed this declaration carry out the fight against the Moscow Decision agreement and continue to be affiliated with the so-called Anti-Trusteeship Committee, which contradicts the above-mentioned agreement between the governments of the USSR and the USA.

The Soviet Delegation consistently defending the principles of the Moscow Decision, it is understood cannot agree with this. The position of the delegation of the USA made impossible the creation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government in compliance with the Moscow Agreement, which hampers the restoration of Korea as a

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united democratic government.

In view of the situation which has presented itself, the government of the USSR has directed the Soviet Delegation to submit a new proposal in the Joint Commission in Seoul, namely, to give the opportunity to the Koreans to form a government themselves without the help and participation on the part of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, upon the condition of the withdrawal of the American and Soviet troops from Korea. If the government of the USA agrees with this proposal concerning the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops at the beginning of 1948, then the Soviet troops will be ready to leave Korea simultaneously with the American troops.

In spite of the fact that this proposal was submitted by the Soviet Delegation in Joint Commission session as early as September 26, 1947, the delegation of the US, to our regret, has up till now not given a reply to this, which cannot but hamper the resolution of the Korean question.

As to the consideration of the Korean question in the session of the general assembly of the United Nations, as was proposed in the letter of Mr. Lovett of September 17, 1947, as it is known, the position of the Soviet government concerning this question has already been stated by the Soviet Delegation in the general assembly.

Copies of this letter are being forwarded by me to the governments of Great Britain and China. Please, Mr. State Secretary, accept the assurance of my high estimation.

V. Molotov
Moscow, 9 October 1947

QUESTION: Is there anything to add to that?

MASLOV: No.

QUESTION: Is General Shtikov available for answering questions?

MASLOV: No, he won't be available today -- he is not here.

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION
FOR THE PRESS

17 October 1947

On 17 October 1947, Colonel General Shtikov has visited the Commanding General of American Forces in South Korea, Lt. General Hodge, and submitted to him a protest regarding the statement of the Seoul Chief of Police of 13 October 1947 which was published in Seoul newspapers on 14 October 1947.

General Shtikov noted that in his statement the Chief of Police of Seoul has allowed himself to indulge in infidel attacks against the Soviet Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission as well attempted to advance ludicrous slanderous accusations regarding one of the collaborators of the Soviet Delegation.

General Shtikov further pointed out that such a statement by the Chief of Police of Seoul, whose actions are controlled by the American military authorities, may have taken place only with the permission of those latter, in view of which he was placing full responsibility for this statement upon the American military command in South Korea.

General Shtikov has registered a protest in this matter and has demanded immediate removal of the Chief of Police of Seoul from his duties and the adoption of such measures which would guarantee that it would be impossible in future to make public slanderous and provoking attacks against the Soviet Delegation in Seoul and of its collaborators.

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STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY MAJOR GENERAL ALBERT E. BROWN,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN DELEGATION

18 October 1947

In accordance with instructions of my government, the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation presents to you the following proposal on Korea submitted to the United Nations by the Government of the United States.

Following is the text of a letter which was addressed on October 17th, 1947, to his Excellency, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, New York:

"Excellency:

"I have the honor to refer to the facts that on September 17, 1947, the United States Secretary of State announced that the United States was placing the problem of Korean independence before the General Assembly and on September 23, 1947, the General Assembly voted to place that problem upon its agenda. On September 26 the Chief Soviet Delegate on the Joint United States - USSR Commission meeting in Seoul, Korea, made the following statement, in translation:

> 'Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea.'

"The United States Government desires to take any practicable step which will further the speedy establishment of a truly independent Korea. The only concern of this government is to make certain that its responsibilities to the Korean people and to the United Nations are properly carried out. It will be recalled that, after negotiations in the Joint Commission had reached a stalemate, the United States Government proposed that the question of forming a

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government for Korea be discussed in Washington by representatives of all powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea: China, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. China and the United Kingdom accepted this suggestion but the USSR did not. It was only after this that the matter was presented to the United Nations. It is believed that inasmuch as the General Assembly has already voted to consider the problem of Korean independence, its attention should be called to the most recent Soviet proposal, referred to above, as well as the suggestions for a solution of the problem which the Secretary of State said the United States Government would be prepared to advance. With these proposals before it, the General Assembly will, it is hoped, be able to recommend measures for orderly transition from the present systems of government in North and South Korea to an independent, united Korean Government and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupying forces.

"There is therefore transmitted herewith a Resolution which contains the suggestions the United States Delegation will submit for the consideration of Committee members of the General Assembly when the problem of Korean independence comes before that Board. It is considered that an arrangement of the nature indicated in this Resolution should make possible the early establishment by the Korean people themselves of their own government and the withdrawal of all Soviet and United States armed forces from Korea. It is requested that copies of this letter together with its enclosure be circulated to the various delegations to the General Assembly for their information.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

"Warren Roger Austin,
"United States Representative."

RESOLUTION

"The General Assembly, recognizing the urgent and rightful

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claims to independence of the people of Korea:

"Having in mind that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

"Having noted the international obligations undertaken with respect to Korea, including the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, in which China, the United Kingdom and the United States stated their determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, in which China, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration and to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered upon entering the war in the Pacific, and the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, with the adherence of China, provided that there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government with a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state;

"Believing that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished and all occupying forces should be withdrawn from Korea at the earliest practicable date;

"To this end, recommends that the occupying powers hold elections in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, under the observation of the United Nations, as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a national government of Korea in conformity with the procedure set out in the annex to this Resolution;

"Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of the national government of Korea referred to above, that government will constitute its own national security forces and will arrange with the occupying powers for the early and complete withdrawal from Korea of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the United States;

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"Resolves that the responsibilities assumed by the United Nations under this Resolution should be discharged by a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, consisting of the representatives of (names of states).

"This United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall:

"(1) Be present in Korea during the elections in each zone with the right of freedom of travel and observation throughout all of Korea,

"(2) Be available for such consultation as may be appropriate in connection with the elections, the organization of the National Assembly, the formation of the national government and the conclusion of agreements for the withdrawal of the occupying forces,

"(3) Report to the General Assembly or, if in its judgment developments so require, to any competent agency of the Assembly, with respect to its activities under the terms of this Resolution, and make any recommendations that it may wish concerning further United Nations action in maintaining the independence of Korea;

"Calls upon the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the United Nations Temporary Commission On Korea in the fulfillment of these responsibilities."

Annex and Recommended Procedure for the Holding of Election for the Establishment of a National Government OF Korea.

"(1) The elections to be held by the occupying powers in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, shall be for the purpose of choosing representatives to a National Assembly. The number of representatives elected to the National Assembly from each zone shall bear the same proportion to the total membership of the National Assembly as the population of that zone bears to the total population of Korea. Subject to this principle, the number of representatives to be elected from each zone shall be determined by the United Nations Commission on Korea in consultation with the occupying powers.

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"(2) As soon as possible after the elections the National Assembly of Korea shall meet and form a government and shall notify the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of this government.

"(3) Upon notification to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of a national government of Korea, that government shall take over the functions of North and South Korea, respectively, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed upon under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea between the Government of Korea and the respective occupying authorities.

"(4) The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall be available for such consultation and assistance as may be requested and appropriate in connection with the decisions and actions contemplated in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) above."

Proposal of American Delegation:

In view of the action taken by its government, as stated above, and with the approval of its government, the U. S. Delegation proposes that, pending consideration of the Korean question by the United Nations, the Joint Commis ion recess and the two delegations hold themselves in readiness at the headquarters of the respective occupation forces for such assistance as may be requested by the United Nations.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION FOR THE PRESS
October 20, 1947

In view of the fact that the American Delegation in Joint Commission session on October 18, 1947 made the proposal to recess the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Chief of the Soviet Delegation, Colonel General Shitkov met the Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, Major General Brown on October 20, 1947 and handed him the following reply of the Soviet Delegation to the proposal of the American Delegation:

"Dear General Brown:

In answer to your proposal at the meeting of the Joint Commission of 18 October 1947 I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

'During the period of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Soviet Delegation has exerted all its efforts toward the speediest fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement on Korea and, on the basis of that decision, toward the creation of a united independent Korea under the guidance of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

In view of the position of the American Delegation, which made impossible the realization of the Moscow Decision, the Soviet Delegation, striving to expedite the creation of a united independent Korea, on 26 September 1947 introduced, at the direction of its government, a proposal to withdraw simultaneously the American and Soviet troops from Korea during the beginning of 1948 and to afford Koreans themselves the opportunity of forming the government of Korea.

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The American Delegation refused to discuss this proposal and at the Joint Commission meeting of 18 October 1947, referring to the direction of its government, proposed to interrupt the work of the Joint Commission.'

In connection with the above stated, the Soviet Delegation has received from its government, a direction to depart for Pyongyang."

Chief of the Soviet Delegation
in the Joint Soviet-American
Commission
Colonel General Shitkov

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

~~Cat to Brad~~ : Mr. Hopkins
file / not previously filed.
A part of my conversation with Gen. Shtikov
20 Oct Prosfly / has earlier read

20 October 1947

GENERAL SHTIKOV:

I have listened to the answer of General Hodge, read by General Brown, on my statement in which I expressed the protest on the slanderous attacks of the Chief of Seoul Police with reference to the Soviet Delegation. I consider this answer as on its form and also in contents unsatisfactory. As far as the accusation of Chief of Seoul Police was mentioned on the participation in the plot against Americans by members of the Soviet Delegation, the Soviet Delegation and its members fulfilled in Seoul only those functions which were placed upon them by the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation does not understand this aim upon which instructions was fabricated this provocational documents.

To me, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation, this gives the right to consider this accusation which was raised against members of the Soviet Delegation directed on the covering up of its own sins. I consider these attacks are aimed in order to create hostility between Soviet Delegation and Korean people by the authors of this document which won't be able to decive Korean people.

That is all I can say in answer to this statement. Concerning the propaganda through the radio from South Korea against the American Command in South Korea from North Korea, I do not know of such propaganda. Concerning the reactionary provocational propaganda of some Koreans against Soviet Union and Soviet Delegation, General Brown himself read these fabricated slanders in meetings of the Joint Commission. The Soviet Command does not meddle in the political struggle and polemics between Koreans for their opinions. These polemical Koreans lead through their newspapers, through their radio broadcast their own Korean business and it does not concern us.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL BROWN AND GENERAL SHTIKOV
1300-20 October 1947

GENERAL SHTIKOV: I have an answer to the American Delegation on the proposal made by the American Delegation in the Joint Commission meeting on October 18.

GENERAL BROWN: Why was this answer not given at a Joint Commission meeting?

GENERAL SHTIKOV: I do not consider it necessary to hold an official meeting. I will give an officially signed letter to General Brown.

During the period of work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Soviet Delegation has exerted all efforts to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision on Korea and creation on the basis of this decision of a united and independent Korea under the guidance of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government. In view of that stated, the stand taken by the American Delegation which made impossible the realization of the Moscow Decision, the Soviet Delegation striving to expedite the creation of a united and independent Korea, presented upon instruction of its government on September 26, 1947 a proposal simultaneously to withdraw from Korea Soviet and American troops in the beginning of 1948 and give the Koreans the opportunity to form their government of Korea themselves. The American Delegation refused to discuss this proposal in Joint Commission session. On October 18, 1947, referring to the instructions of its government, moved to recess the work of the Joint Commission.In connection with above statement, the Soviet Delegation has received from its government instructions to leave for Pyongyang.

In connection with this I have a request of General Brown. Will General Brown give the necessary instructions to help the Soviet Delegation leave for Pyongyang.

Following is the plan for leaving. Tomorrow, 21 October 1947, approximately 7 people, together with General Shtikov, will leave by plane. Also tomorrow at 11 o'clock, party of the Soviet Delegation will leave for Pyongyang by train. The train will consist of eight

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cars. The train will come today from Pyongyand to Seoul. The list of persons who will go by the first train will be submitted by the Soviet Secretariat later. The second train - after we will give over our billets and some property which was taken from the Americans - will leave on 22 or 23 October - that date is not set yet. That train will consist of 9 cars. The list of persons which will go by the second train will be given to the Americans later. The persons which will stay here in Seoul after the first train will go to Pyongyang will be Soviet Secretary Maslov.

GENERAL BROWN: I have two questions. Do I understand that the Soviets have accepted the proposal of the American Delegation of 18 October that the Joint Commission recess.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: I stated in my letter, the American Delegation refused to discuss this proposal and in the session of October 18, 1948 referring on the instructions from its government and proposed to discontinue the work of the Joint Commission. In accordance with above statement, Soviet Delegation received from its government instructions to leave for Pyongyang.

GENERAL BROWN: Is the Soviet Delegation leaving on the status of a recess, or is the Soviet Delegation requesting that the Joint Commission adjourn?

GENERAL SHTIKOV: The American Delegation moved a proposal to recess work of the Joint Commission. In accordance with this and by instructions of its government, the Soviet Delegation is leaving for Pyongyang and will wait for further instructions from its government.

GENERAL BROWN: What time will the plane that leaves at 1300 tomorrow get in?

GENERAL SHTIKOV: We would like to compile some plans for the arrival of the plane and would like you to appoint a person to help with this plan. The plane can leave Pyongyang tomorrow at 11 or 11:30 in order to be here 15 minutes before 1 o'clock. We would like to have all necessary instructions for the plane crew's arrival here.

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GENERAL BROWN: I will arrange with the Commanding General, XXIV Corps, to appoint the necessary person to make arrangements for the departure of the Soviet Delegation.

GENERAL SHTIKOV: We have the same crew and they are familiar with signals, etc.

GENERAL BROWN: I will see the General before he gets away.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

3 February 1947.

Memorandum to: Military Governor.

SUBJECT: Office Space for Political Parties.

Item I.

1. Reference is made to the building formerly occupied by the Sin Min Dang (New People's Party), the Yenan Communist group, whose building was located on the side street approximately 100 yards south of the Chosun Hotel.

2. This party has passed out of existence. Various members of the party disagree as to whether it joined the Labor Party or the Socialist Labor Party, but all agree that it no longer exists. Each of the two claimed successor parties occupies other quarters.

3. It is believed probable that the present occupancy of the building is unauthorized. A group of uncertain origin and membership, calling itself a "cultural society", and apparently of Communist affiliation, is occupying the building. It is noteworthy that the name of the group is given in Korean and Russian.

4. It is suggested that the matter be brought to the attention of the Property Custodian for possible dispossession of the present occupants, and more advantageous use of the building.

Item II.

1. The Chosun Democratic Party is composed of followers of CHO, Man Sik. It lays claim to a large membership and says that its activities are circumscribed by lack of quarters. This group has made a request to this office for the assignment of space for its operations. This request is transmitted to you for your consideration.

Item III.

1. It is requested that you have the office of the Property Custodian of the City of Seoul prepare for the guidance of this office a statement of property under its control now occupied by political parties or similar organizations and of other property, if any, available for such use.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

13 March 1947.

Mr. KIM, Myung Up,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. KIM:

With reference to your petition from the people of the Ongjin Peninsula, for more effective transportation to the mainland, I have made inquiry as to the proper location at which this request should be presented.

I find that the Highway Bureau is responsible for that portion of your request which deals with the providing of a truck.

Mr. Tobias of the Bureau can be found in the Highway Building which is located on the east side of the main road in Seoul, one block south of the railway station.

With reference to the request for air transportation, this matter comes under the Air Transportation Division, headed by Captain Butenko. The Captain will return from Tokyo on or about the 18th of March. He is located in the Transportation Building at Yonsan.

I trust that this matter will be adjusted to the satisfaction and betterment of yourself and the people of your area.

Cordially yours,

LEONARD M. BERTSCH,
1st Lt., CMP.

for information
Jen Wiebeling

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

29 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: G-2, XXIV Corps

SUBJECT: Possible Decrease in Distribution of G-2 Intelligence Summaries and Periodic Reports.

1. Reference is made to the request on the above subject in the letter of 28 March 1947 contained in G-2 Summary No. 80.

2. The present status and future needs of this office for the various publications are indicated in the following chart:

	Daily Periodic Report	Weekly Summary	North Korea Summaries
No. copies being received	2 *	2 *	1
Minimum requirements	1	1	1

3. The press summaries and translations of headlines in newspaper articles are of substantial value to this office in keeping in contact with the Korean thinking on political and economic matters. If economy of paper is essential, it is suggested that the volume of the reports be reduced by a more careful selection of significant headlines and of newspaper articles rather than by a complete elimination of any feature.

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel CE

* One copy to General Weckerling personally.

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By NARS, Date

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

29 March 1947

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L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel CE

* One copy to General Weckerling personally.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

3 April 1947

SUBJECT: Charges for Electricity

TO: Seoul Electric Company, Seoul, Korea

1. At the present time, the consumption of electricity of all buildings within the Duk-Soo Palace grounds is being charged to the US-USSR Joint Commission.

2. Since the US-USSR Joint Commission occupies only one building, the Duk-Soo Palace, it is requested that arrangements be made to charge this Delegation for consumption of electricity used in this building only.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col., AGD
Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr. American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Comm. APO 235, dtd 3 Apr 47, Dependent Housing Maps.

TFBIL 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS, SEOUL BILLETING SECTION, APO 235, 5 April 1947.

TO: American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, APO 235.
Attn: Lt Col William H Edwards.

Because of their scarcity, we are forwarding to your Section only 6 Dependent Housing Maps. There are not more available for distribution at the present time.

HALVOR T DARRACOTT
Major Sig C

6 Incl.
6 DH. MAPS

2d Ind

AMERICAN DELEGATION, US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION, APO 235, 9 April 1947

TO: Headquarters XXIV Corps, Seoul Billeting Section, APO 235

Correspondence received without inclosures.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

R. B. HOPKINS,
CWO USA
Adm Officer.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

3 April 1947

SUBJECT: Dependent Housing Maps

TO: Billeting Officer, Seoul Billeting Section,
Hq. XXIV Corps, APO 235

Request is made for twelve (12) Dependent Housing maps of the Seoul Area, for use as reference and information as follows:

American Delegation (5 Commissioners)	5
State Department (Minister and Advisors)	2
Political Advisor (Lt. Bertsch)	1
Interpreters (Russian and Korean)	1
Russian Delegation	3
Total	12

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col., AGD
Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
AIC 235

9 April 1947

SUBJECT: Installation of Switch

TO: Signal Officer, XXIV Corps, AIC 235,
Attn: Asst. Communications Officer

Request that a switch be installed in Room 4 of the Duk-Soo Palace for telephone numbers Washington 356 and 408 in order that both phones may be answered by the secretary to Dr. Arthur C. Bunce, Minister, State Department.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col., AGD
Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

9 April 1947

SUBJECT: Russian Dictionaries

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235
Attn: Corps Librarian

1. The following listed dictionaries are required by this organization:

12 ea V. K. Muller, September 1945, Third Edition
English-Russian Dictionary

12 ea V. K. Muller, September 1945, Third Edition
Russian-English Dictionary

2. The need for these manuals will be critical and urgent upon resumption of joint sessions of the Joint Commission. There is an immediate need for six copies of each publication.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col., AGD
Secretary

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - CANADA JOINT COMMISSION
Coun. Corps

30 April 1947

[illegible] Staff

[illegible] Secretariat Personnel

1. [illegible] the critical importance that will [illegible] the preparation of joint Canadian-American [illegible] final form of recommendations to handle the problems of the two committees. Secretarial action [illegible] Secretariat will relieve the Corps [illegible] but will inevitably result in [illegible] complete records of the proceedings.

2. It is my desire to [illegible] employed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat in Washington. Unfortunately, the static situation now prevailing [illegible] under the tight ceiling on civilian [illegible].

3. [illegible] procedure [illegible] the least possible [illegible] would be to secure permission of the Secretary. [illegible] officers, Army and Navy officers [illegible] from Army Corps of Engineers for training in [illegible] procedures and methods. These officers need [illegible] assigned to the Joint Commission but [illegible] from which required officers [illegible].

4. I recommend that:

a. The foregoing plan be approved.

b. That informal concurrence be obtained from the Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to initiation of formal request.

c. For planning purposes, a total of eight officers be considered for such training.

WILLIAM E. [illegible]
Lieut. Colonel, [illegible]

[illegible] Col. Fisher
[illegible] 1 or 10 days. Waiting for the recommendation

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American Delegation
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

14 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO LT COLONEL EDWARDS

SUBJECT: Routing of Correspondence

1. Until a few months ago the channel for correspondence received by the Joint Commission was from message center to Administrative Officer, to Acting Secretary, to the Secretary in the Delegates' office, in that order. To expedite the routing of correspondence the Administrative Officer screened the correspondence as it was registered-in thus eliminating one channel.

2. The first message center pick-up returns to the Joint Commission between 0940 and 1000; for some unknown reason our volume of correspondence is in this morning pick-up. Special pick-ups from G-2, C/S, etc., slows down the message center pickups. Considering time required to register-in, date-time received, and attach routing slips, correspondence is delivered to the Administrative Secretary in approximately 20 minutes. Correspondence received on other pickups during the day is so small that very little time is required for processing in Administrative Section. The drag is mostly in the morning runs.

3. Correspondence routed from Administrative Secretary to Miss Anderson may be held up for a period of time if Miss Anderson has some urgent typing or is taking dictation and is unable to distribute the correspondence immediately.

4. To expedite the routing of correspondence it is recommended that in-coming correspondence be routed directly from Administrative Secretary to the Secretary.

RODNEY B. HOPKINS
CWO USA
Admin. Officer

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr, American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission, dtd 9 Apr 47, subject: Russian Dictionaries

CE/rb

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1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS, APO 235 16 APR 1947

TO: Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission, APO 235

1. These dictionaries being commercial books, are not available through Adjutant General Publications supply channels.

2. Action has been taken to procure them through Quartermaster supply channels. You will be advised concerning the results of this action.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

Norman G. Finney

NORMAN G. FINNEY
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

314

File

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

17 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: The Commanding General, Hqs. XXIV Corps, Seoul, Korea

SUBJECT : Speeding by Russians in Seoul.

1. In conversation today with Major Lacey, G-2 of the 31st Field Artillery, the Major mentioned a point with which he is concerned, that is, the frequent violation of regulations and of safety factors by Russian military personnel operating vehicles in Seoul.

2. Major Lacey was told that in my work with the Commission, I had any knowledge of any policy having been established in that field. He knew of that some form of international courtesy might apply.

3. In the absence of a specifically enunciated contrary policy, the officers of the 31st have assumed that they should make no arrest.

4. Major Lacey added it to be his impression that the Russian military personnel appear to deliberately defy the regulations.

5. I stated to the Major that the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission has no place in the consideration of the problem, but that I would submit the question for the consideration of the appropriate authorities.

LEONARD R. PERLICH
1st Lieutenant, CMP

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

5: 23 May 1947

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

TFXAG 313

22 April 1947

SUBJECT: Files for Official Papers

TO: Chief Commissioner, American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
Political Advisor, XXIV Corps

1. The Adjutant General, United States Army Forces in Korea, is designated the official custodian of all papers pertaining to your office.

2. It is directed that you take the following action:

a. Transmit to the Adjutant General, at a time to be determined by him, all files for which you do not have current use.

b. Henceforth, transmit to the Adjutant General a file copy of all communications originating in your office.

c. Henceforth, transmit to the Adjutant General a copy of all official communications received by you.

d. Notes, memorandum, routing slips and other informal papers will be delivered to the Adjutant General when no longer required by you.

3. The Adjutant General, United States Army Forces in Korea, will establish files which will be available to you, when needed.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

CHARLES ENNIS
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Confidential

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Weckerling
Dr. Bunce
Mr. Langdon
Mr. Sargent
Mr. Prostov
Mr. Howe

1. The enclosed report, prepared by the undersigned on his own initiative, is circulated for comment or concurrence.

WILLIAM F. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel AGD
Secretary

2[illegible] April 1947

[illegible]lonel Edwards:

When the official text of the anticipated U.S. reply is known, we will probably know:

1. Whether the Joint Commission meets soon, or

2. Will be adjourned for sometime.

In the latter case I think that paras. 3, b and c, Appendix A, should be reviewed and included in a recommendation for unilateral functioning of American Delegation of US - USSR Joint Commission on work preparatory to such procedure.

Please bear in mind.

J.W.

Confidential

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The Problem

1. To determine the immediate measures which should be taken with a view to the effective implementation of United States commitments under the Moscow Agreement in the light of the Marshall letter of April 9, 1947. (Appendix "B")

Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion

2. Paragraph 2, Section III - (Korea) of the Moscow Agreement is quoted: "In order to assist the formulation of a Provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendation worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States prior to final decision by the two governments represented on the Joint Commission."

3. The Joint Commission met during the period 20 March to 6 May 1946. These joint meetings ended in disagreement on certain basic issues. Exchanges of letters between the United States and Soviet Commanders have failed to resolve the issues.

4. At Moscow on 11 April 1947, Secretary of State Marshall handed Mr. Molotov a letter (Appendix B) blaming the Russians for the failure of the Joint Commission, proposing a review of its work by both governments, and threatening to take such steps in the United States zone as will advance the purposes of the Moscow Agreement unless the Joint Commission is reconvened without further delay. The scope and nature of these steps are matters for conjecture.

5. It is obvious that whether or not joint meetings of the Commission are resumed, the preparatory work on the part of the

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United States Delegation will be essentially the same. It must be prepared to meet either eventuality realistically, promptly and effectively.

6. It is generally believed that adequate plans and studies are available to enable the American Delegation to function. This is not true, and such papers as are in existence, with few exceptions, have been overtaken by time or events.

7. Complete reliance on the personal knowledge of any individual to provide critical information from memory is fraught with pitfalls. The loss of the services of a single individual could conceivable cause irreparable damage through the loss of his intimate personal knowledge in a given field. Such extemporaneous and expedient practices are inexcusable and unjustifiable.

8. There is a definite possibility that the Joint Commission may reconvene on short notice at any time. In such an event, the American Delegation would be placed in a most disadvantageous position due to its present inadequate organization and the lack of authoritative, well considered, comprehensive plans. Thus it would be placed on the defensive at the outset which condition would be difficult to remedy. It is fair to assume that under these circumstances the American Delegation would be subjected to considerable embarrassment.

9. The immediate task is the preparation of comprehensive plans and studies which, among other things, will provide:

a. A basis for negotiation of the several matters contained in the Moscow Agreement.

b. Delineation of the optimum and the minimum acceptable terms of the several issues apparent in the task to provide guidance in the event compromise solutions are indicated.

c. The War and State Departments an opportunity to review in advance and to revise or alter the views of the Delegation prior to presentation or implementation.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

d. A readily accessible reservoir of essential information and data concerning political, governmental, and economic matters pertinent to the task.

e. A medium which will tend to crystallize United States views vis-a-vis the several elements of the task.

f. An adequate basis for the prompt and efficient implementation of the provisions of the Moscow Agreement in the United States zone in the event such a decision is made.

g. Proper and adequate background for the rapid orientation of newly assigned personnel in the event of augmentation of the Delegation on short notice.

10. In addition to the foregoing, the preparation of comprehensive plans and studies will serve to provide a functioning corps of advisers, well grounded in the essentials, to assist the American Delegation in the accomplishment of its assigned tasks. Further, it will bring into sharp focus deficiencies in organization, facilities, personnel, and skills.

11. In order to meet the urgent and immediate needs of the American Delegation, as outlined in paragraph 5 above, appropriate reorganization and redefinition of its scope and authority are indicated.

Recommendation

12. It is recommended that the Commanding General, USAFIK:

a. Forward the directive in Appendix "A" to the Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

b. Note that the Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission will study the present organization of the American Delegation and submit appropriate recommendations.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Confidential

APPENDIX "A"

Directive to the Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

1. It is desired that plans and studies be undertaken at once to facilitate the prompt and effective implementation of United States commitments under Section III of the Moscow Agreement in the light of the Marshall letter of 9 April 1947.

2. In the development of its plans and studies, the American Delegation will be guided by announced United States policy and current directives.

3. The American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission, in order to accomplish this mission, is authorized to:

a. Appoint committees composed of such military and civilian personnel of this command as it shall determine to be necessary and desirable.

b. Obtain information and assistance from, and consult with, all United States agencies, installations and offices of this command.

c. Consult Korean individuals and agencies south of the 38° parallel as desired.

4. It is contemplated that each completed plan and study, after review and approval by me, will be forwarded to CINCFE and to the War Department inviting comment or concurrence.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Gen Brown
Gen Hinshaw
Lt Col Bonesteel
Lt Bonesteel
Mr Kinney
Mr Dow
Weems Ford

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

1 May 1947.

Memorandum for: Mr. Benjamin B. Weems,
American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission.

SUBJECT : Survey of Biographic Information Files.

1. Letter, Headquarters USAFIK (Subject: Mission of the American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission, File TFGCG 092.3), dated 28 April 1947, charges the American Delegation with staff supervision and coordination of certain matters affecting political and economic developments in Korea.

2. In furtherance of the above, it is desired that you undertake a survey of biographic information files available in the Command.

3. It is desired that the report of your survey include the following data on each existing file:

(a) Organization maintaining file and physical location thereof.
(b) General appraisal of file:
(1) Estimate of number of names included.
(2) Extensiveness of individual coverage - i.e., completion of factual biographic data, and of commentary on views, attitudes, habits, etc.
(3) Any special emphasis that directs selection of names of persons such as politicians, educators, civil servants, etc.
(4) Filing system. Are names filed by categories, alphabetically, or both? How? Are Chinese characters used? What system, if any, of romanization is used? Is the alphabetical file according to romanization or characters?
(5) Principal sources of information used in maintaining the file. Are sources indicated in the file?
(6) Are the files classified?

4. It is understood that files are maintained by the following named individuals:

Mr. James L. Stewart, Bureau of Public Opinion, M.G.,
Captain J. P. Tobin, AC of S, G-2, XXIV Corps,
Mr. E. V. Prostov, US - USSR Joint Commission,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SUBJ: Survey of Biographic Information Files. 1 May '47

Mr. Philip C. Rowe, US - USSR Joint Commission,
Captain J. O. Sargent, Historical Section, XXIV Corps,
Major C. N. Weems, Jr., Office of Military Governor,
Major F. E. Richardson, Dept. of National Police, M.G.,
Lt. Col. Hugh Bledsoe, Korean Civil Service, M.G.,
Col. William F. Centner, Foreign Affairs, M.G.,
Mr. Harry H. Holloway, Dept. of Labor, M. G.,
Lt. James K. Patchell, Counter Intelligence Corps,
XXIV Corps.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

file

UNCLASSIFIED

AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

SM - 1
6 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip C. Rowe

SUBJECT: List of Principal Korean Political Parties and Groups.

1. The American Delegation at its meeting on 5 May 1947 agreed to direct the compilation of a list of Korean political parties and groups in the order of their relative importance; the list to contain estimates of total membership and numerical estimates of population each party or group represents.

2. This matter has been referred to you for the action indicated above.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

file

TFURC 312

Procedures for Air Navigation Services - PICAO, Montreal, Canada.

1	8 May 1947	Jt. Comm.	Bureau Air Transp., M.C.,	1. Attached are three copies of PICAO Recommendations for Standards, Practices and Procedures on Airworthiness, which were received by us today.
			ATTN: Capt. Butanko	2. Explanation of these Recommendations is contained in letter from Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, Canada, which was forwarded to you with our Routing Slip of 25 Apr 1947.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

Attachment:
3 copies of PICAO Recommendations.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

31

Procedures for Air Navigation Services - PICAO, Montreal, Canada.

1	25 Apr 1947	Jt. Comm.	Bureau Air Transp., M.G., ATTN: Capt. Butanko	1. Attached is letter received from Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal, Canada, and our reply thereto. 2. PICAO Recommendations for Standards, Practices and Procedures on Airworthiness, referred to in this letter, were received by the Joint Commission and forwarded to you on 21 March 1947.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Col., AGD,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation,
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

25 April 1947.

Mr. Albert Roper,
Secretary General,
Provisional International Civil
Aviation Organization,
Dominion Square Building,
Montreal, Canada.

Dear Mr. Roper:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 7, 1947, and copies of the PICAO Recommendations for Standards, Practices and Procedures on Airworthiness.

This Delegation is not so constituted as to provide authoritative or technical recommendations which you require. This matter has been referred to Bureau of Air Transportation, United States Army Military Government in Korea, for appropriate action. You will no doubt hear from this agency in due course.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Ref. No. A 10/9.3/IHMcC
(Recommendations for Standards,
Practices and Procedures on AIR)

FEB 7 1947

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you three copies of the PICAO Recommendations for Standards, Practices and Procedures on Airworthiness, This Publication was prepared by the AIR Division of the Air Navigation Committee at its first Session, held in Montreal during March and April 1946.

Copies of these recommendations have been sent to all the Member States of PICAO who have been urged by the Interim Council of PICAO to adopt and apply them at the earliest practicable date in order that the greatest degree of uniformity may be secured in international civil aviation practice. The ultimate purpose of these recommendations is set out in the foreword.

I would invite the American-Soviet Military Commission for Korea to study these recommendations with a view to their adoption in order that the fullest advantage of uniformity in civil aviation may be obtained by all States, including those that are not at present members of PICAO.

These recommendations form part of a series which will cover the work of all the Technical Divisions of PICAO. Printed copies of other publications in this series will be sent to you from time to time, as they are issued. Meanwhile additional copies of the present publications can be obtained from PICAO at the prices shown on the back of the title page.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Albert Roper
Secretary General

American-Soviet Military Commission for
Korea,
Seoul, Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

3

BASIC: Memo from Colonel Robinson, AC of S, G-2,
Subj: Censorship Intercepts, FBIB, dtd 7 May 1947

1st Ind.

American Deleg tion, US - USSR Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea,
17 May 1947.

TO: AC of S, G-2, Hqs. XXIV Corps.

1. The following individuals of this Delegation are authorized to examine FBIB materials:

Miss Tatiana Sciugam,
Mr. E. V. Prostov,
Mr. Philip C. Rowe,
Mr. Benjamin Weems.

2. The followin items of information are of interest to this Delegation:

a. Activities of parties and organizations in both North and South Korea (conventions, resolutions, official announcements),

b. Activities of the People's Committee and the People's Assembly of North Korea,

c. References whatsoever to the Moscow Decision and the Joint Commission,

d. References to the American Command, Military Government, and KILA.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 235

7 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL EDWARDS - JOINT COMMISSION.

SUBJECT: Censorship Intercepts FEIB.

1. Full distribution of above named intercepts come to the G-2 section daily in the form of teletype reports - single copy.

2. The subject matter is sometimes quite voluminous and much of it is unimportant and uninteresting.

3. This section is willing to make this matter available to the Joint Commission but we lack the clerical force to edit it or to reproduce it.

4. I suggest that it be made available to your representative daily in the G-2 office.

JOHN F. ROBINSON
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Memorandum for: Col. Edwards

SUBJECT: Censorship intercepts of the CCIG-K

1. The Delegation is not currently included on the full distribution of the above material.

2. Such material is necessary for the current work of the Delegation.

3. Arrangement should be made whereby the Delegation would be authorized to destroy or return intercepts not needed in the current work.

EUGENE V. PROSKOV
Foreign Service Staff Officer
Political Advisor

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY 312

1	May 16 1947	POLAD	In turn: Joint Comm.	1. It will be appreciated if the Grey House Billet, located at Chung Dong Chung, Seoul, in close proximity to the American Consulate General, be assigned to the U. S. Political Adviser (American Consul General) for his management and use in billeting female employees of the Department of State (U.S. Foreign Service), and those War Department or other U. S. Government female employees who are assigned to duty with the US-USSR Joint Commission.
			Seoul Billeting Sect.	
			Quartermaster	
			C/S XXIV Corps	2. In the event there is an insufficient number of persons in the categories mentioned in paragraph 1, authority is requested for the Political Adviser to billet additional U. S. Government employees on a second-preference and space-available basis in order to insure that a maximum of twelve (12) government employees will be billeted at the Grey House at any one time. In the event persons other than State Department or Joint Commission employees are billeted in the Grey House, and should the space occupied by such persons be needed by the Political Adviser for additional State Department or Joint Commission personnel, such persons should be required to vacate, but they will be permitted to remain in the Grey House billet for any unexpired monthly rental period.

3. Financial arrangements for the payment of rent are proposed as follows:

(a) The Political Adviser will pay monthly the rentals charged each State Department occupant by Headquarters, USAFIK;

(b) The collection of rentals from those occupants who are not State Department employees will be by Headquarters, USAFIK.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

4. Authority is also requested for one occupant, designated by the Political Adviser as Billet Manager of the Grey House, to purchase for persons billeted therein subsistence items at the Seoul Commissary.

5. Approval is requested for the Political Adviser to obtain from Headquarters, USAFIK, adequate maintenance for this billet, including cleaning and preserving materials, fuel, bedding, appropriate household furniture and equipment, and miscellaneous maintenance supplies.

6. Authority is also requested for the Political Adviser to hire a maximum of seven (7) servants of the following or similar classifications: one cook, one cook's helper, two housekeepers, one cleaning woman, one furnace man, one gardener. It is requested that funds for the payment of wages of these servants be supplied by Headquarters, USAFIK.

7. The above requests are submitted in an effort to provide adequate living accommodations for the special categories of persons described in par 1. In view of the forth coming reconvening of the US-USSR Joint Commission, persons assigned thereto will be required to work under difficult and trying conditions, including a great amount of overtime work. Because of close association with the Joint Commission activities, Department of State personnel, who in many cases are assigned to this post on a more or less permanent basis, also will be required to work under unusually difficult conditions. In order that such personnel may be able to perform their tasks with maximum efficiency, it is felt that they require private rooms so far as possible and other special considerations insofar as their living conditions are concerned.

/s/ Wm. R. Langdon
Political Adviser and
Consul General

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

(Cont.) Grey House Fillet.

2.	May 18 1947	Amer. Del. Jt. Comm.	Officer in Charge Seoul Pillet-ing Sect.	1. The proposals of Mr. William R. Langdon are concurred in by the American Delegation. This arrangement would be beneficial to the efficient operation of the Joint Commission.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel AGD
U.S. Secretary

- - - -

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Gen Brown
Gen Weckerling
Lt Col Edwards
Lt Bertsch
Mr Bunce
Mr Sargent CBS
Mr Kinney
Mr Prostov
Mr Rowe

THE FOREIGN SERVI
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 134

SECRET

Office of the Political Adviser
HQ XXIV Corps, APO 235
May 16, 1947

Subject: Air Coordinating Committee Policy Directives Nos. 66.5 and 66.6.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction No. 61 dated March 25, 1947, by which the Political Adviser's comments were requested on the Air Coordinating Committee's policy as stated in its directives Nos. 66.5 and 66.6, copies of which were enclosed.

While it is difficult to comment fully on this policy due principally to the very limited relations in aviation matters that have existed between the United States and Soviet Occupation Forces in Korea, the Air Coordinating Committee's directives were brought to the attention of Headquarters, USAFIK, and the Commanding General's approval has been given to the following report of United States-Soviet relations in this matter:

Since the beginning of the joint occupation of Korea by United States and Soviet forces in September, 1945, there have been only three instances of scheduled American military flights into Soviet-controlled North Korea. While other occasions have arisen which would normally require the operation of an air flight as, for example, the transport of liaison personnel to Soviet military command, United States Army Headquarters in Korea has limited to a minimum its requests for Soviet clearances, due principally to the difficulties it has experienced with the Soviet command in such matters. During the first flight of American military planes into north Korea in September, 1945, a misunderstanding arose over the prearranged plans which resulted in Soviet authorities requiring one of the

two American

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

two American planes to return to south Korea, thereby preventing it from carrying out its assigned mission of transporting a prisoner of war inspection and liaison team. Two subsequent military flights were made in the late Spring and early Summer of 1946 for the purpose of transporting liaison personnel to the Soviet headquarters at Pyengyang in north Korea. On these occasions it took an average of two weeks for the Soviet command to approve the requests for clearance and, in addition, advance information was required giving the types and markings of the airplanes, the names of passengers and the names and titles of each crew member, and detailed schedules of take-off time, landing time, and time of flight over designated localities enroute. During the period that these flights were in Soviet controlled territory, the passengers and crew members experienced no mistreatment.

There have been two instances of American military planes making uncheduled landings in the Soviet zone of occupation: one occurring in November, 1945, when a C-46 carrying passengers made an emergency landing at Pyengyang after being lost in bad weather, and the other occurring in the Fall of 1945 when an L-5 made a forced landing a few miles within the Soviet zone. The passengers and crew members of these flights suffered no mistreatment other than considerable delay in being released by Soviet authorities, the pilot of the L-5 having been retained for ten days.

The single Soviet request in April 1946 for clearance of a military plane to land in south Korea was granted by the American command after the route and schedule had been designated and after information had been received giving the markings of the plane and the names of flight personnel. This flight, which was intended for the transportation of Soviet members of the Joint Us-USSR Commission, did not materialize. Not more than three emergency landings of Soviet planes in American-occupied territory have occurred. In these instances the planes and flight personnel have been released after an average period of two days.

In connection with the operation of military air services in south Korea, the American command has sought unsuccessfully either to obtain weather forecasts from areas in Korea under Soviet control and from localities in Siberia, or to obtain Soviet permission to station United States meteorologists in such areas. Soviet authorities have not approved the American requests and have replied that their weather station at Vladivostok broadcasts adequate information. The American command, however, has not been able to receive any such forecasts from Vladivostok.

While there has

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

While there has been no effort made by USAFIK to pioneer United States national interest air routes into or over Soviet controlled Korea, through the operation of military aircraft, a request (dated April 17, 1947) has been submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for authorization to organize and operate a Korean commercial airline for the purpose of providing limited scheduled air transport in Korea south of the 38th parallel. In the event this authorization is granted, the extension of air service to north Korea is not contemplated, at least until such time as a provisional government for the whole of Korea is in operation.

No information has been received which would indicate that Soviet authorities have planned the operation of commercial air service, either civilian or military, within north Korea. Reports have been received, however, that regular air service for Soviet military personnel and cargo operates between Vladivostok and Pyengyang, with a stop enroute at Hamhung, and possibly an alternative stop at Wonsan. There are indications that this service is becoming less frequent. Reports have also been received that Soviet authorities are constructing a large airfield at Kupyong-Ni (approximately twenty miles northwest of Wonsan) which probably would permit the servicing of large transport planes. Additional information from north Korea states that Soviet military authorities are training Korean pilots and ground personnel. It is believed that the principal objection in such training is to organize an air arm for the North Korea Army, and not to train potential commercial aviation personnel.

During the period September to December, 1946, USAFIK operated a weekly military air service between Seoul and Peking, and a semi-weekly service between Seoul and Shanghai. These pioneer routes which do not require flight into or over Soviet controlled territory, are expected eventually to be flown by Northwest Airlines as an extension of its service between the United States and Tokyo. In the event Northwest Airlines further extends its operations by service from Seoul to Dairen and to Harbin, an air route has been planned which would not require flight over Soviet controlled north Korea.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon
Political Adviser

HB/rh
File: 879.6
To the Department in original and ozalid.
Copies to: Joint Commission
HQ XXIV Corps

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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SM

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

SM - 2
14 May 1947.

Memorandum for Mr. Phillip C. Rowe.

SUBJECT: List of Political Parties and Social Organizations.

Refs : (a) Item 2, 104th Meeting, 14 May 1947.
(b) Para. 2, Joint Commission Decision No. 4.

1. The United States Commissioners have directed that you undertake a study of the list of Political Parties and Social Organizations submitted by the respective delegations at previous joint meetings with the view to determining whether:

(a) The lists are acceptable in their entirety.

(b) Additional moderate and rightist groups might be added to the United States list to maintain a balance of power.

2. The report prepared in compliance with the foregoing is required for consideration not later than Friday, 16 May 1947.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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SM

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

18 May 1947
SM - 4

MEMORANDUM FOR: U.S. Subcommission No. 2.

SUBJECT : Review of Joint Commission Decision No. 5.

REFERENCE : 106th Meeting, Item 5.

The U.S. Commissioners on 18 May 1947 referred Joint Commission Decision No. 5 to U.S. Subcommission No. 2 for revision.

E. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel, AGD
U.S. Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

SM

American Delegation
US - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

18 May 1947
SM - 5

MEMORANDUM FOR: U.S. Subcommission No. 2.

SUBJECT : Draft of Proposed Charter for the Provisional Korean Government.

REFERENCE : 106th Meeting, Item 5.

The U.S. Commissioners on May 15, 1947 directed that U.S. Subcommission No. 2 draft a proposed charter for the Provisional Korean Government.

L. H. DEARDS
Lt. Colonel, AGD
U.S. Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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File

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SM

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

18 May 1947
SM - 6

MEMORANDUM FOR: U.S. Subcommission No. 1
U.S. Subcommission No. 2
U.S. Subcommission No. 3
Political Advisory Group.

SUBJECT: Working Procedures within the American Delegation.

The U.S. Commissioners on 17 May 1947 directed that recommendations be presented by each of the sub-divisions named above pertaining to policies and procedures which should be adopted governing the work of the American Delegation.

A. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel, AGD
U.S. Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

19 May 1947
JM - 7

MEMORANDUM FOR: U.S. Subcommission No. 2

SUBJECT : Revision of Draft of Joint Commission Decision No. 5.

REFERENCE : a. 108th Meeting, Item 3

The United States Commissioners in the reference returned the draft of Joint Commission Decision No. 5 by General Heckerling to the U. S. Subcommission No. 2 for revision in the light of the discussion.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U. S. Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

312

HEADQUARTERS 6TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Commanding General
APO 6

20 May 1947

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge
Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO 235

Dear General Hodge,

I am inclosing an extract letter of the publication by the 20th Infantry which might be of interest to you. Brown has written to all of the parents of boys in his regiment in the Detroit area and has received some very interesting replies. This is one of them.

Sincerely,

ORLANDO WARD
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

1 Incl
Extract letter

22-5-23

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PARENT CITES "UNFAIR" GENERALIZATION

Colonel Rothwell H. Brown
Hq. 20th Inf. Regt, APO 6
c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel Brown:

Thank you for your April 8th letter in regard to my son, who is under your command. It was very thoughtful and considerate of you to write as you did.

Although I have read considerable in Detroit newspapers concerning the reports boys send to their parents from Korea, I haven't been seriously concerned at all about my son because he has written of nothing other than occasional inconveniences and I am sure he feels, and I concur with him, that these are of no great importance.

He has remarked about ice on the shower room floor in the absence of hot water and the absence of soap for a few weeks. I understand his camp also ran out of toilet paper, ink, candy, etc., but again these are only inconveniences and of no great importance. I think the only reason the boy has written at all in regards to the things mentioned here is because of scarcity of news at the point where he is located.

I have only been concerned with one thing in the reporting of the Korean situation and that was the report, hereenclosed, which appeared in the Detroit News of April 17th and my annoyance at that report here given was only because of the implication that the soldiers in Korea were a bunch of irresponsible youngsters rather than capable soldiers in the United States Army. Just because a few of these soldiers make complaints it is no reason why the Army should assume, as the article implies, that many of them are in the same class.

Again let me thank you most sincerely for your letter of reassurance.

Yours very truly,
(Name withheld)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Memo from Clyde B. Sargent to Chief Commissioner,
Subj: Political Parties Handbook, dtd 14 May 1947

1st Ind.

Chief Commissioner, American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea. 17 May 1947.

TO: Assistant C/S, G-2, Hqs., XXIV Corps.

1. Forwarded in accordance with conversation among Lt. Col. Choniski, Mr. Sargent and Lt. Col. Edwards.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt.Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

TFGBI 2d Ind. JNR/fk

OFFICE OF THE AC OF S, G-2, XXIV CORPS, APO 235, 21 MAY 1947.

TO: Chief, Commissioner, American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, Seoul, Korea.

1. Owing to increased pressure of business and lack of qualified personnel, the G-2 Section, XXIV Corps is unable to undertake the project suggested in basic communication at this time.

2. It is believed that the work already completed by Mr. Philip C. Rowe, under dates of 19 March and 25 April is quite comprehensive and contains the essential information desired.

JOHN N. ROBINSON
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

22-5-18

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 May 1947.

Memorandum for: Chief Commissioner.

SUBJECT : Political Parties Handbook.

1. It is suggested that the AC of S, G-2, be requested to sponsor compilation of a Political Parties Handbook primarily for the use of the Joint Commission, and secondarily for use of other agencies in USAFIK and Washington.

2. Such a handbook for spot reference will be extremely useful to the Joint Commission. It also will be useful for continual study of parties by agencies in Korea and in Washington.

3. This recommendation envisages a simple identification manual, for quick, easy reference, including in succinct, terse form the following:

Name - Korean and English versions, with Chinese characters - also, all other names under which the group has been organized, dating periods for use of each name.
Alleged membership,
Estimated membership,
Platform comments,
Leaders and prominent members (no biographic information except terse characterization where possible),
Affiliations with other groups,
Scope and nature of activities,
Pertinent comments of analysts.

4. It is suggested that G-2 be requested to make available this study sheet-by-sheet as completed, rather than delay distribution until the study is completed. The Joint Commission probably will desire a minimum of 50 copies.

5. It is suggested that in planning details of this project, Mr. Rowe of this Delegation be consulted.

CLYDE B. SARGENT.

22-5-18

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MR. HOPKINS

Unclassified

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

21 May 1947

Memorandum for Information No. 2

Subject: Organization of Russian Language Interpreters and Translators.

Organizational structure of the Russian Language Interpreters and Translators of the American Delegation.

	DUTIES
Mr. Prostov	1. Interprets in Joint Commission Meetings and Sub Commission No. 2. Approves final texts of Documents. 3. Supervises work of section.
Major Kirilin	1. Has charge of administrative detail (transportation, supplie 2. Has charge of security. 3. Has charge, as Commanding Offic of Military interpreters.

INTERPRETERS

Miss Sciugam, in charge	1. Assigned to Joint Secretariat. 2. Substitutes for Mr. Prostov as needed. 3. Has charge of training new interpreters. 4. Helps Major Kirilin with administrative details.
Miss Sadkovsky	1. Assigned to Sub Commission No. 2
Mr. Soloviev	1. Assigned to Sub Commission No. 3
Mr. Antonaitis	1. Assigned as alternate to Sub Commission No. 3.
Mr. Pekarsky	1. Assigned as alternate to Sub Commission No. 2.
Miss Grichuhin	1. Assigned as alternate to Sub Commission No. 1.

TRANSLATORS

Mr. Palakshin, in charge	1. Edits Russian texts, and Englis texts as needed. 2. Supervises the work of the translators.
Miss Jones	1. Edits English texts, and Russia texts as needed. 2. Has charge of administrative detail (translations).

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Unclassified

Mrs. Kogan	1. Translates into Russian and into English as necessary.
Mr. Brazhnikov	1. Translates into English, and into Russian as necessary.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Fil

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

27 May 1947

Memorandum for: Administrative Secretary

Subject: Instructions Regarding Distribution of Papers

1. Instructions regarding distribution of papers by the Administrative Secretary are amended to the extent that a copy of the following listed documents will be delivered direct to the U. S. Chief Commissioner upon receipt:

a. One copy Korean Press Summary.
b. World News Summaries (Teletype copies received from PRO).
c. One copy G-2 Periodic Reports.
d. One copy G-2 Summaries.
e. Information Bulletin XXIV Corps.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FILE

SECRET
SM

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

28 May 1947
SM - ~~3~~ 9

Memorandum for: U.S. Subcommission No. 2

Subject : Questionnaire Pertaining to the Draft of a Charter for the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

References: a. AMD 2/1.
b. AMD 2/2.
c. 113th Meeting, Item 1.

1. The U.S. Commissioners in Reference c approved AMD 2/1, as amended, and directed that it be referred to U.S. Subcommission No. 2 for guidance in negotiations with the Soviet Delegation.

2. AMD 2/1, as amended, has subsequently been circulated as AMD 2/2.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel, AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

- COPY -
SECRET
SM

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

28 May 1947
SM - 8

Memorandum for: U.S. Subcommission No. 1.

Subject : Joint Commission Decision No. 4.

References: a. 106th Meeting, Item 4.
b. J.C. 25th Meeting.

The directive contained in SM - 3, 18 May 1947, has been withdrawn and cancelled.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel, AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

File KOR

2 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Edwards

SUBJECT: Letters to Commission

Mr. Choi Tai Ryong of the Democratic Peoples Front called today with the allegation that letters addressed to the Commission were being impounded in the Post Office upon the claim that no facilities for delivery existed.

This complaint has not been investigated.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
Lt., CMP

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

3 June 1947

Subject: Invitation to Dinner Party from Mayor of Seoul.

To : Secretary, Soviet Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission.

1. The list of individuals of both the American and Soviet Delegations was transmitted to the Mayor of Seoul at 0845 today.

2. Mayor Kim informs me that due to the late acceptance insufficient time remains to make adequate preparations for the dinner party on Friday, 6 May.

3. He requests that in the light of the foregoing this dinner party be held on the following Friday, 13 May.

W. M. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. U.S. Army
U.S. Secretary

Copies furnished
American Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Hello
Corrected Copy

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

3 June 1947

Subject: Invitation to Dinner Party from Mayor of Seoul.

To : Secretary, Soviet Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission.

1. The list of individuals of both the American and Soviet Delegations was transmitted to the Mayor of Seoul at 0845 today.

2. Mayor Kim informs me that due to the late acceptance insufficient time remains to make adequate preparations for the dinner party on Friday, 6 June.

3. He requests that in the light of the foregoing this dinner party be held on the following Friday, 13 June.

W. E. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. U.S. Army
U.S. Secretary

Copies furnished
American Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

3 June 1947.

Southern Korean Federation of
Democratic Women's Leagues,
Seoul, Korea.

Appreciation is expressed for the flowers which you sent the US - USSR Joint Commission yesterday afternoon as an expression of support of your organization to the effort now being made to develop a provisional government for Korea under the terms of the Moscow Agreement.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Chief Commissioner - American
Delegation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

6 June 1947

Memorandum for: U.S. Commissioners
Major General Albert L. Brown
Dr. Arthur C. Bunce
Brigadier General John Weckerling
Mr. Calvin N. Joyner
Mr. William R. Langdon, Alternate U.S. Commissioner
Mr. Clyde B. Sargent, Alternate U.S. Commissioner
Colonel L. J. Lincoln

Subject : Meeting, US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION.

The US-USSR Joint Commission Meeting has been postponed from 1330 to 1500 hours, Friday, 6 June 1947.

T. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FILE

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

7 June 1947

Mayor of the
City of Seoul
Military Government
City Hall
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mayor Kim:

Major General Albert E. Brown has instructed me to inform you as follows:

"General Brown deeply regrets his inability to attend the concert by the Korea Symphony Orchestra on 6 June 1947 due to pressure of official duties. He further regrets that he will be unable to attend the concert this evening due to a previous official engagement.

"General Brown appreciates the invitation and wishes to express gratitude for your thoughtfulness in proffering the invitation."

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Ltr. AG, Hdqs. XXIV Corps, File TFOIK 353, dtd 8 June 1947, Subj: Request for TIH Speakers.

1st Ind.

American Delegation, US - USSR Joint Commission,
Seoul, Korea. 10 June 1947.

TO: Adjutant General, Headquarters XXIV Corps,
Seoul, Korea.

1. Lt. L. M. Bertsch is designated as the speaker requested in basic letter. It is suggested that the appropriate staff officer contact Lt. Bertsch directly regarding the details.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

L. J. LINCOLN,
Colonel, CE.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

8 Jun 1947

TFOIE 353

SUBJECT: Request for TIH Speakers

TO: Chief, American Delegation
U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission

1. The services of one (1) member of the American Delegation to the Joint Commission are requested to present the Troop Information Hour at the Corps Theatre during the week of 22-28 June 1947.

2. The speaker would address the personnel of the Headquarters and Headquarters Troops XXIV Corps for approximately 40 minutes between the hours of 1600 and 1700 on the 24th and 26th of June 1947 on the topic: "The US - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission". Each presentation would be the same inasmuch as the audience consists of different personnel at each meeting.

3. a. This Headquarters is particularly desirous of presenting such a program at this time to acquaint Headquarters and Headquarters Troops XXIV Corps with the problems facing the Commission and the aims of the American Delegation.

b. It is desired that another Troop Information Hour be presented at the conclusion of the present meetings and/or in two or three months to summarize the achievements of the Commission up to the date of presentation.

4. Lt. Bertsch and Mr. Phillip Rowe have been contacted personally in this regard by representatives of the Troop Information and Education Section, this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

CHARLES ENNIS
Colonel AGD
Adjutant General

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

312

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

10 June 1947.

Memorandum to: C.G., XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT : Use of XXIV Corps Theater.

1. I have discussed subject matter with Mr. Stewart, who is sponsoring this performance. He is now endeavoring to obtain the use of the International Theater for an evening performance. If he is able to do so, this will remove the requirement from the Corps Theatre. If not, request will be made for the use of the Corps Theatre for a matinee performance.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN KOREA
Office of Civil Information
APO 235

TFOCI 335.14 9 June 1947

SUBJECT: Use of XXIV Corps Theatre for Invitation Performance.

TO : Commanding General
XXIV Corps
APO 235

1. As a combined American-Russian-Korean goodwill gesture it has been proposed that an invitation performance be given of the classical Korean play, "Chun Hyung Jun".

2. Invitations to attend this showing will be extended by the Chief American Delegate to the Commission, Major General A. E. Brown, to the American and Russian delegates, prominent Koreans, and to others.

3. Permission is requested to give this performance in approximately two weeks at the XXIV Corp Theatre.

ARTHUR REEF
Chief, Planning Staff
Office of Civil Information

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

312

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

TFURC 062.2

13 June 1947

SUBJECT: Missing Entertainment Film

TO : Commanding General, XXIV Corps
Attn: Special Service Officer

Reference letter Hq. XXIV Corps, TFREC 062.2, dated 9 June 1947, subject: Missing Entertainment Film, a check has been made of Major General Albert E. Brown's and Brigadier General John Weckerling's quarters and a negative report is submitted.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
U. S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 June 1947.

Korean Athletic Association
Funeral Committee,
Seoul, Korea.

Gentlemen:

Lt. L. M. Bertsch will represent the American Delegation of the Joint Commission at the funeral services for the late Mr. DUNN, Kyung Moo at 10:00, 18 June, at Seoul Stadium.

Very truly yours,

W. H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Colonel, AGD,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Political Advisory Group
American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

14 June 1947

H/ Sargeant

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN:

SUBJECT: Chinese Consuls

1. It has been brought to my attention indirectly that the Chinese consuls are intending to take another trip to Pusan in the near future to check into the business of some of their nationals there.

2. On the occasion of the last such trip, considerable embarrassment was caused by the regulation of the Transportation Department of Military Government, to the effect that no orientals can ride on the American train. In order to find away around the manifest discourtesy to a friendly power, a separate car was provided for the two people and guard. On the return trip from Pusan to Seoul, the car was not available; and since the Pusan officials did not know of the regulation, the consuls returned in the same car with the Americans.

3. It is suggested that steps should be taken to see that this regulation is reversed and that the Chinese officials will be treated with due courtesy, before their next trip is arranged.

4. Making due allowance for the necessity of a policy limiting the available transportation for the benefit of Americans, the inclusion of the official representatives of the Allied powers is a reasonable modification of such policy. The present attitute of the Transportation Department, in placing the matter upon a racial basis, is distinctly and directly detrimental to international comity. It appears to be a matter of sufficient importance to warrant being brought to the attention of the Commanding General.

5. Such a policy as is here considered does damage to us in a peculiarly vulnerable spot, leading the Koreans to believe that we regard them as inferiors in their own country.

6. It is recognized that a practical necessity is involved, but it would be simpler and vastly more expedient politically if some such rule were enacted as would provide for the inclusion of the official representatives of the Allied powers and the further inclusion of a very small, carefully limited category of high Korean officials, such as department heads, the Chairman of the Legislature, and the Chief Justice of the Court.

Leonard Bertsch

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lieut., CMP

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

16 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief Commissioner
US - USSR Joint Commission

SUBJECT: Transportation Facilities for Non-American VIPs

1. I concur in full with the opinion of Lieutenant Bertsch's memorandum, attached herewith.

2. As a possible solution, not only for this specific occasion, but for all such future occasions, I suggest that appropriate authorities consider the following plan:

That the standard equipment on the American train be increased to include one sleeping car to be used as a VIP car, such car to be used to accommodate all non-American dignitaries, including high ranking Korean officials and also certain Americans who discretely could travel in this car.

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief, Political Advisory Group

Incl. referred to above
cc: Lt. Bertsch

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

2.0.6

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

16 June 1947

Memorandum for: American Delegation.

Subject : Circulation of Documents.

1. It is requested that every effort be made to expedite the circulation of documents. It now requires an average of from seven to ten days to complete the circulation of documents received from other sources, among the U.S. Commissioners and other offices of the American Delegation.

2. Members of the American Delegation are requested to clear baskets of circulating material as frequently as possible and at least once daily.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

3/2

P.C. files

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

17 June 1947.

Cholla-Namdo Farmers' Federation
(Branch of all Korean Federation
of Farmers' Union)

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful flowers, bamboo screen and fans which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

17 June 1947

SUBJECT: Travel Facilities for Non-American Dignitaries

TO: Lieutenant Leonard M. Bertsch
Political Advisory Group

1. By telephone this afternoon General Herron told me that the two nightly trains from Seoul to Pusan will continue to operate without change. However, the early train is regarded as a train for occupation personnel. As such all persons, regardless of nationality, who are officially connected with the American occupation may take advantage of its facilities insofar as space permits.

2. Occupation personnel includes such persons as Consular officials and high ranking Koreans. The later train is an all Korean train for civil unofficial persons.

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief, Political Advisory Group

cc: General Brown

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

17 June 1947

Mr. Lee Song Ho
Editor, No Riuk In Min
Tai Chung Shimbo
Han Yeung Building
Chongro 2
Chung Mok, Seoul

Dear Sir:

General Brown has instructed me to inform you that he appreciates very much the opportunity you have offered him to make a statement through your paper. However, General Brown does not deem it advisable at this time to present such a statement to only one publication.

We shall be very happy to give you all the information about the Joint Commission as has been released to the press through the Department of Public Information and our own office in the Duk Soo Palace. We would advise you to keep in contact with these sources for future press releases.

Sincerely yours,

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

312 US

gc file

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 June 1947.

Mr. KIM, Hyung Min,
Mayor of Seoul,
City Hall,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Mr. KIM:

The American Delegation of the Joint Commission wishes to express to you and to the citizens of Seoul its sincere appreciation for the dinner held the evening of June 13th at the Chang Duk Palace in honor of the Joint Commission. The dinner and the entertainment connected therewith were well planned, efficiently organized , and resulted in a great success. All members of the Commission and their guests appreciate the effort and enjoyed the fine performance of those who assisted in our entertainment.

Please express to the young ladies of Ewha College our sincere appreciation for their lovely performance.

The warm welcome extended the Commission is indicative of the interest of the people of Seoul and of Korea in the work of the Commission. The task of the Joint Commission will be made easier by the cooperation and support rendered them by loyal Koreans.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

21 June 1947.

Taegu Chapter of All Korean Trade Union,
Taegu, Korea.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful gifts of brass which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

23 June 1947.

Citizens of Taejon,
Taejon, Korea.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful grass linen shirts which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

23 June 1947.

Taeku Branch,
Korean Federation of Trade Unions,
Taeku, Korea.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful lacquer boxes which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Kyonggi-Do Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful flowers which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Ansung District Farmers Union
(Branch of All Korea Farmers Union)

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful gifts of engraved brass which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfuly evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

(NOTE FOR RECORD: Engraving on the brass is as follows:

"Hurrah for the success of the Joint Commission" and name of group.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Combined Trading Unions of Kaesong,
Kaesong, Korea.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of five pounds of ginseng which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

this gift sent to orphanage 6/26.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Tamyang Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union,
Tamyang, Cholla-Namdo.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful fans which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

26 June 1947.

Antong Committee,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union,

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of beautiful Korean purses and silk embroidered scroll which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Kyongsang-Pukto Headquarters,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful gifts of brass which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

TO: Antong-Gun Committee, Democratic National Front,
Antong Committee, South Korea Labor Party,
Antong Branch, Korean Federation of Trade Unions,
Antong Branch, Railway Workers' Trade Union,
Antong Committee, Korean Federation of Farmers,
Antong-Gun People's Committee,
Antong Branch, Relief Society for Anti-Japs, Patriots.

Dear Friends of Antong:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful gifts of cloth which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947

Paju Branch,
All Korea Farmers' Federation,
Paju, Kyonggi-do

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful flowers and brass bowls which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Chinchun Farmers' Committee,
Chongchung-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of a beautiful grass mat made in your community which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 June 1947.

Puyo Branch,
All Korea Farmers' Federation,
Puyo, Chongchung-Namdo.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of honey which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

3/2

Plans &

P&O 337 (12 Jun 47)

27 June 1947

SUBJECT: Joint Commission Decisions

TO: U.S. Secretary, American Delegation, U.S-USSR Commission, APO 235, %Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Receipt of Decisions 1 - 15 of US-USSR Joint Commission is acknowledged under cover your memorandum dated 12 June 1947.

2. Comparison of the lists of questions detailed in Decision Nos. 6 and 13 indicate a possibility that there may be additional questions in Decision No. 6 over and above those enumerated on pages 1 and 2 received.

3. Your verification of the number of pages constituting Joint Decision No. 6 would be appreciated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

JAMES L. CANTRELL
Lt Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Memo of 27 June 1947, from Director of Plans and Operations, War Dept Gen Staff, Washington, D.C., to U.S. Sec'y, Amer Delegation, US-USSR Comm, APO 235, file No. P&O 337 (12 June 1947); Subj: Joint Commission Decisions

1st Ind.

American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, APO 235, 12 July 1947

To: The Director of Plans and Operations, War Department General Staff, The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

1. A complete copy of Joint Commission Decision No. 6 is enclosed. Since two editions of this decision are in existence, it is difficult to state whether or not the copy in your possession is complete.

2. It should be noted that Joint Commission Decision No. 6 was superseded by Joint Commission Decision No. 13, a copy of which is enclosed.

3. A copy of Joint Commission Decision No. 16, which was approved 18 June 1947, is furnished for information. This is the last Decision which has been issued by the Joint Commission.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

3 Incls.
Decision No. 6
Decision No. 13
Decision No. 16

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

27 June 1947

Mr. Se Hong Pil
Korean Symphony Orchestra
Nam San
Seoul, Korea

Dear Sir:

The American Delegation wishes to express to you and to the members of the Korean Symphony Orchestra its sincere appreciation of the services rendered at the open meeting of the Joint Commission in the Assembly Hall of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly on the 25th of June. All members of the Commission appreciate the participation of your fine orchestra and enjoyed the rendition of the national anthems of the three nations.

Please express to the individual members of the Korean Symphony Orchestra our sincere appreciation of their excellent performance.

The service extended the Joint Commission is indicative of the interest of the people of Seoul and of all Koreans in success of the Joint Commission.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

27 June 1947

Mr. Lee Chong Hark
Director, Office of Administration
National Capitol Building
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Lee:

The American Delegation wishes to express to you and members of your office its sincere appreciation for the assistance offered on the 25th of June in preparing the Assembly Hall of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly for the open meeting of the Joint Commission. The efforts of your representative, Mr. Pyen, Sa Bong, are especially commendable.

This service extended the Joint Commission is indicative of the interest of the employees of the City of Seoul and of Korea in the success of the Joint Commission.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 June 1947.

All Labor Unions,
Yongil Kun,
Kyongsang-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of honey which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

NOTE: 3 jars of honey sent to orphanage 6/26.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 June 1947.

Farmers Committee,
Kangwha-Gun,
Kyonggi-Do Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful grass mat which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted this gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 June 1947.

Farmers Committee,
Pongwha Gun,
Kyongsang-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful gifts of brass which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted these gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 June 1947.

Farmers' Committee,
Tangchin,
Choongchung-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of Korean cloth which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 July 1947.

South Korea Democratic Women's League
of Mokpo,
Cholla-Namdo Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of Korean purses and flowers which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 July 1947.

Women's Democratic League of
Choon Chun,
Choon Chun, Kangwan-do Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful flowers and bolt of homespun cotton cloth made by the women of Kangwon-do, which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 July 1947.

Suh San Gun Farmers Committee,
National Farmers Union,
Suh San Gun, Ch'ungch'ong-Namdo Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful silver saki cups with trays which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

2/4

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 July 1947.

Cholla-Pukto Farmers Committee,
(All Korean Farmers Federation),
Cholla-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful fans which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 July 1947.

Cholla-Pukto Farmers Union,
Cholla-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the grass baskets which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gifts. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

31

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

14 July 1947.

Koryong Branch,
All Korea Farmers Federation,
Koryong, Kyongsang-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the lovely basket of fruit which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

J. C. Jillson

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

16 July 1947.

Employees of
Seoul Electric Company,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the silk embroidered picture which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

16 July 1947.

Samchok Branch,
All Korean Farmers' Federation,
Samchok, Kangwon-do Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the gift of pine nuts, basket and hemp cloth which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

16 July 1947.

Samchok Branch,
South Korea Democratic National Front,
Samchok, Kangwon-do Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful embroidered cushion and lacquer ash tray which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

16 July 1947.

Samchok Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union,
Samchok, Kangwon-do Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful Korean purses, grass basket and embroidered picture which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

17 July 1947

SUBJECT: Request for 3/4 ton Vehicle

TO : Ordnance Officer, XXIV Corps

THRU : Commanding Officer
Special Troops, XXIV Corps
(Attn: Colonel Bell)

1. Request this organization be assigned one (1) 3/4 ton truck (Personnel carrier). The driver to be picked from personnel assigned, who have drivers permits, and this driver is to be responsible for the first echelon maintenance under the supervision of the Supply Officer.

2. The recent movement of the enlisted personnel of this organization to billet in the Hq. Division Artillery Area has caused a great deal of disorganization due to inadequate transportation. This is especially true during meal hours. Present bus service is inadequate and does not fully meet the needs of this Delegation.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

1st Ind

Hq Sp Trs, XXIV Corps, APO 235, 28 July 1947

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, APO 235
ATTENTION: Ordnance Officer

Forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

CURRY N. VAUGHAN
Major, Cavalry
Adjutant

623/C

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

673

SUBJ: Ltr, American Delegation, U-USSR JT COMM, dtd 17 Jul 1947, Subj: "Req for 3/4 ton Vehicle".

AFDC 451 2nd Ind. M/bcs

HQ, XXIV Corps, APO 235 1 AUG 1947

TO: Commanding Officer, SP Trps, XXIV Corps, APO 235

1. On 1st May 1947 the following vehicles were allocated (T/A 7-34 K) to the 55and TC Car Co. for use of the US-USSR Joint Commission.

10 ea Trucks 1/4 Ton.
3 ea Trucks 3/4 Ton WC.
2 ea Trucks 2½ Ton Cargo.

2. Drivers from the 6th and 7th Infantry Division were placed on detached service to the 55and Car Co to operate these vehicles for the duration of the Joint Commission session. A 3/4 Ton Truck for transporting enlisted men to and from meals will be made available by the Headquarters Commandant, telephone Wash. 34, upon call.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HODGE:

G L Albert
[illegible]
Capt, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen

3rd Ind

Hq Sp Trs, XXIV Corps, APO 235, 2 August 1947

TO: Commanding Officer, American Del, US-USSR Jt Comm, APO 235

Attention is invited to preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Curry N. Vaughan
CURRY N. VAUGHAN
Major, Cavalry
Adjutant

4-8-745 6231C

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 July 1947.

Chongno District Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's League,
Chongno District, Seoul, Korea.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the basket of fruit which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 July 1947.

Kyongsang-Namdo General Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union,
Kyongsang-Namdo Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the beautiful silk embroidered handkerchiefs and lacquer cigarette set which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 July 1947.

Mapo Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's League,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the basket of fruit which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 July 1947.

Sutaeman Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's League,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the basket of fruit which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 July 1947.

Democratic Women's Front,
Yongdongpo Branch,
Yongdongpo,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the lovely flowers and basket of fruit which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

22 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Personnel, Administration Office, Joint Commission

SUBJECT: Letter Writing During Duty Hours

1. This office is strictly a business office; personal correspondence will not be written during duty hours. A person writing letters of a personal nature is putting their job on some one else's shoulders.

2. The volume of work of this office is so great and of such an expeditious nature that everyone must cooperate in order to get the finished product out on time.

3. Typewriters will be available for those desiring to use them on off duty hours.

R. B. HOPKINS
CWO USA
Adm. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

A PETITION TO

Major General A. E. Brown
Chief American Delegate to
the US-USSR Joint Commission

Dear Sir,

After thirty-six years of the barbarious Japanese suppression, we, Korean farmers, are promised to be liberated and doing our best for the foundation of a democratic independent Korea through increasing agricultural production.

But even today, after two years since the liberation, our own government is not yet established, and we farmers are groaning in the darkness of terror and slaughter. We, however, believe in the success of the Joint Commission in its mission, and in the implementation of the Moscow Decision which will bring independence to our nation. Meanwhile beast-like terrorists are rioting about in our district. They are ravaging about openly with the motto of anti-trusteeship. They are coercing the farmers to make contribution (over a thousand won per family) for the anti-trusteeship fund, and to put signature on the anti-trusteeship paper. If any farmer should be so bold as to take a disagreeing attitude to such coerce, he is sure to be beaten and his house be knocked down at an instant's notice.

One of such riots took place as described below at 1 p.m. on 30th of June, six members of the West-North Youngmen's Association (Supook Chung-Nyun Hwai) and seven members of the Independence Urging Youngmen's Association (Takchok Chung-Nyun Hwai) came into Chideng-Ni village of our Myon. They went around from house to house and coerced the farmers to assemble. When they went into the house of Mr. Bae Nyung Ho. they ordered to prepare their food of pure white rice, chickens and eggs, saying that they should be well treated as they are engaged in the independence movement. When they went so far as to strike down unripe fruit(apricots) from the tree, the owner of the tree, Mr. Kim (a child of 14 years old) asked them why they were striking away such uneatable fruit, and he was beaten severely on the spot.

They ordered a certain Mr. Pak to call together all of the villagers threatening him to death. He managed to bring twenty or more people together in one and a half hour's time. Then those rioters demanded them to become the members of Dokchok and to contribute one thousand won(yen) per family.

When, one of the villagers assembled, Mr. Rim Pyung Wook (27) asked them to tell him the regulations and policies of the Dok-Chok, they began to beat him with wooden swords. Blood streamed on the ground and by-standers raised a cry for help. Seeing more villagers were coming, they ran away leaving their weapons and other things behind (two mountaineer sticks, membership certificates, application papers, and notebook).

On the 8th of July, the Chief (Myun-Jang) of Myong Jin Myun, Mr. Chun Keedong, carried away two ox-cartfuls of rice, amount to 24 kamani, to the Supook Chung Myun Hwai (West-North Y.M.A.). The rice was to be rationed to the villagers.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The fact that he is conniving at the usurpation of 180 kamani of rice of official collection of 1946 and nine hundred sixty thousand won of public money is known to the people. On 11th day of July a conference of village heads (Ree Jang) was held, and at that meeting his foul conniving was to be pointed out and questioned.

This Chun Hee Dong, knowing the atmosphere of this meeting, brought seven members of the West-North YMA to the meeting and coerced them not to make any utterance about that matter. They, Mr. Chun and W.N.Y.M.A. members, took two village heads, Mr. Pak and Mr. Paik to the office of Dok Chok, and there they demanded the two village heads not to meddle with the question. Mr. Pak and Mr. Paik presented their resignation and came out.

Later, Mr. Pak and Mr. Paik were sent for by the WNYMA. At the office of WNYMA they were beaten without any other reason than their resignation. When the beating reached to an unbearable degree, Mr. Pak begged to be released because he was a Christian, and so he was allowed to go, but as to Mr. Paik they called him "red element" because he is a grandson of the Chief of Chun-Hong (All Korea Farmers Association), and increased their beating. When he became unconscious, he was dragged out of the gate and left there. A servant of the Myun office, who had witnessed it, carried him on his back to a house of a nearby village and an urgent medical treatment was given.

When this was known to his relations and other inhabitants of that Myun, they get alarmed and vexed and went to the office to drive away those wicked and vicious rioters of the West-North YMA on 12th of July. Then, three armed policemen stationed at that Myun fired at them, and one of them was killed and another severely wounded.

Soon, more than 20 policemen from Chun-Jo Police Station, the three above mentioned, and more than ten members of the WNYMA came and seized Nah-i-ki village of the same Myun. They fired blindly and beat the dwellers without making any distinction between male and female, and old and young. Five men and two school boys were arrested from that village and fourteen more from another village called Moran Dong. They were arrested on the false accusation that they plotted to assault the Branch Station of Police. Two dogs were shot dead by them later when they came and seized the village again. In the following morning at about 5 a.m.Mr. Ryang and two more policemen stationed there, and eight members of WNYMA stormed Nah-I-Ri once more.They captured Mr. Hwang Il Ok who was just coming out of his bedroom and Mr. Oh Bok Dong (50 and more years old) who was still sleeping in his room. They made the two men sit down on the ground before them and fired at them from behind, saying that all such fellows should be killed. A bullet passed through Mr. Hwang's head breaking a front tooth. And Mr. Oh received three piercing bulletwounds in his stomach. They covered the wounded bodies with straw mats, went rioting about like so many madmen, beating the villagers without any discrimination.

At least they made the women folks to wash away the blood from the straw mats and cover up the bloody ground with earth, and went away.

It is outrageous that policemen, whose duty is to safeguard the order and peace of the place, should collaborate with those rioters in their anti-trusteeship movement, coercing and killing innocent and ignorant farmers.

Is this the so-called democratic police?

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Innocent farmers are toiling on their fields, struggling in every bad condition. And they are trembling under the anarchistic state of coercing, beating, and killing created by insane bagabonds in collaboration with the police! What is meant by it?

We sincerely and earnestly hope that your Excellency will understand such a state of things and will take proper measures to punish and eliminate these vicious terrorist groups and murderous police officials.

Therefore we propose the following suggestions for your consideration.

1. Strict prohibition of all activities of anti-trusteeship movement, for the purpose of establishing a unified democratic government of whole Korea.
2. Immediate dissolution of the terroristic West-North Youngmen's Association and Dok Chok Kock Min Hoei (Independence Urging National Assembly).
3. Punishment of those who are pulling wires behind the terroristic activities.
4. Making compensation for the bereaved families and the wounded caused by these terrorists.
5. Severe punishment and elimination of murderous policemen.
6. Immediate release of the farmers arrested.

22nd of July 1947

Signed by

HWANG IL OK

PAIK TOO HEUM

HWANG TONG JU

HAK-I-RI, KOO-UK-HI

Address:

YONG-JIN MYUN, WAN-JU GOON

CHOLLA PUKPO

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

23 July 1947.

National Democratic Front,
Kumsan,
Kyongsang-Pukto Province.

Gentlemen:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the lovely silver spoon and chopsticks which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

23 July 1947.

Masan Branch,
South Korea Democratic Women's Union,
Masan, Kyongsang-Namdo Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the lovely silver spoons and beautiful flowers which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

23 July 1947.

Sangdo Democratic Women's League,
Kaesong,
Kyonggi-do Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the lovely Korean purses which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all ppssible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

23 July 1947.

Farmers Committee,
(All Korea Farmers Union),
Wha Soon Gun,
Cholla-Namdo Province.

Dear Friends:

As Chief Commissioner of the American Delegation, I desire to express my appreciation for the bolt of lovely silk cloth which you recently sent to the American Delegation of the Joint Commission.

The American Delegation appreciates the sentiment of cooperation with the Joint Commission which prompted the gift. I can assure you that we will do all possible to successfully evolve a provisional government over a united Korea.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

24 July 1947

Memorandum for the Record:

1. Members of the Secretariat, American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, who contributed toward the $100 War Bond Wedding Gift for Miss Jacqueline Weckerling and Lt. Dorsey D. Schaper, are as follows:

Anderson, A.	1.00	Van Note, E.	2.00
Bojus, Capt. J.	5.00	Grichuhin, M.	1.00
Cascioni, D.	1.00	Balaskin, P.	2.00
Edwards, Lt. Col.	6.00	Antonaytis, S.	2.00
Hopkins, R. CWO	5.00	Jones, Helen	1.00
Jaffe, Capt. M.	5.00	Kogan, Lea	2.00
Jones, Capt J.	5.00	Scuigam, T.	3.00
Miller, Capt E.	5.00	Sadkowsky, V.	1.00
Phillips, Capt W.	5.00	Brajnikoff, B.	1.00
Quigley, V.	1.00	Pekarsky, V.	1.00
Rains, C.	5.00	Wright, Mrs. M.	5.00
Robinson, E.	1.00	Johnson, Capt Marg.	5.00
Stalcup, E.	1.00	Royce, E.	3.00

Total amount collected $75.00

2. Although Mr. Monagan and Dr. Fraenkel gave $5.00 each, their money was refunded as they are not considered members of the Secretariat.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

1 Incl
Initial letter

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

3 July 1947

Subject: Forthcoming Wedding of Miss Jacqueline Weckerling

To : Members of the Secretariat, American Delegation

In view of the forthcoming wedding of Miss Jacqueline Weckerling, daughter of Brigadier General Weckerling, members of the Secretariat might prefer to make a joint gift rather than presenting the traditional individual gift. Miss Claire Rains has agreed to contact the individual members of the Secretariat to ascertain their wishes.

The most feasible course of action apparent at this time would perhaps be the presentation of a lump-sum gift on behalf of the Secretariat in the form of a Savings Bond, with the suggestion that at a propitious time this Savings Bond be converted into one of the following:

a. Silver
b. China
c. Other appropriate items

This movement is entirely spontaneous and you are invited to join on a purely voluntary basis. If you care to contribute toward such a gift, please return your contribution in the enclosed envelope to Miss Rains.

W.H.E.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

C-0-244

W.T. AGO Form No. 14-4
14 July 1944 Modified

WAR DEPARTMENT
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
RECEIPT FOR MISCELLANEOUS COLLECTIONS

WAR BONDS
(Type of Collection)

$_____

APO 235, _____ 194[illegible]

Received in cash of Secretariat American Delegation U.S. USSR Joint Commission
(Rank, Name, and Serial Number)

Seventy-five DOLLARS _____ CENTS

For Purchase of # 1 War Bonds at $ 100.00 (Maturity Value), each 75.00 (Purchase Price)

Make Bond Payable To: Mrs Jacqueline Weckerling Schaper
(Mr. Mrs. or Miss, Use Given Name, Mrs Mary NOT Mrs John)

List as: (Co-Owner) ~~(Beneficiary)~~ Lt Dorsey D. Schaper

Mail Bond To: Hdq Sandra Jay [illegible] Mail Rm APO 235
110 Tong Sa Hon Chung, Seoul, Korea
(Name and address or state that bonds to be held by Treasury and address to which receipt should be mailed.)

c/o General John Weckerling

TF 219917 Deposits, Cash Collections, United States Savings Bonds, Overseas, War Department.

F. E. BARR, Lt. Col., F.D.

(If married woman, Name must include own Christian name, not husbands name.)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CIRCULAR - MUSEUM

300.6
Memo 1

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

24 July 1947

MEMORANDUM:

Motion pictures of the open sessions of the Joint Commission held in Seoul on 21 May and 30 June will be shown at 1030, 26 July 1947, at the XXIV Corps Theatre. Running time: 90 minutes. All who can be spared from duty during the scheduled performance are urged to attend. An alternate showing will be made for personnel unable to attend on 26 July.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

29 July 1947

Brigadier General John Weckerling
Member, American Delegation US USSR Joint Commission
XXIV Corps

Dear General Weckerling:

Enclosed is a copy of a brochure which outlines the courses at the Army Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

When the Chief of Staff addressed the graduation class there recently, he said:

> "I am so convinced of the importance of the information and education program and of public relations that, if it can possibly be arranged, eventually even Army graduates of the National War College will attend this school."

The courses at the Army Information School are short, but they are important. They are concerned with immediate, practical problems of the armed forces; and even the best field grade officers can profit by one of these 14-week courses. I often wish I could have attended this school a few years ago.

The problems of troop information and education, and of public information particularly require the personal attention of commanders, since the tone set by the leader in these matters governs all lower echelons. Those officers who hope to succeed in command assignments in the years ahead will do well to get a clear understanding of the influence of public opinion on the operations of the Army of the United States. It is our hope that you will be able to send a substantial number of your most promising officers to the Army Information School for future courses.

Sincerely yours,

J. Lawton Collins

J. LAWTON COLLINS,
Lieutenant General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Information.

Incl -
Army Information School
Brochure

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

31 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: U. S. Commissioners

SUBJECT: Attendance at Joint Commission Meetings

1. The Chief Commissioner has directed that attendance of Americans at Joint Commission meetings be limited to those persons whose presence is essential.

2. Admission will be denied to all persons except those for whom a request is specifically made. Blanket authority to attend all sessions, except for U. S. Commissioners and essential members of the Secretariat, will be granted only by the Chief Commissioner.

3. Requests for permission to attend specific meetings will be made to the Secretary.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

11 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: AC of S G-4

SUBJECT: Procurement of Paper for the Soviet Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission.

The inclosed request for 60 reams of white manifold paper, size 8" x 13", for use by the Soviet Delegation, is transmitted as a matter pertaining to your office.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

1 Incl
Soviet Request for Paper

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

CABLE ADDRESS: ICAO, MONTREAL

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
DOMINION SQUARE BUILDING
MONTREAL

Ref. No. T 7/6
("Q" Code)

AUG 12 1947

Sir,

I have the honour to invite your attention to the world wide introduction on 1 July, 1947, of the ICAO Communications Codes and Abbreviations for use in civil aviation.

It is not known to what extent you may desire to introduce these codes and abbreviations within territories under your control; I am accordingly sending you, under separate cover, three copies of the appropriate document for your consideration.

This publication is available in the English, French and Spanish languages, and should you wish to obtain further supplies these are available in Montreal, Dublin or Paris and may be purchased at the following prices per copy:

Montreal - 50 cents (Canadian)
Dublin - 3s/6d (Sterling)
Paris - 60 French francs.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Albert Roper
Secretary General

American-Soviet Military Commission for Korea,
SEOUL,
Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DC files

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

16 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. At 1155, 16 August1947, Chief of National Police CHOUGH PYUNG OK and Director of Public Information DR. CLARENCE RYEE contacted the U.S. Secretary to make an arrangement for a meeting with the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation in order to make a formal apology for the incident which occurred at the Liberation Day ceremony at Seoul Stadium on 15 August 1947. At 1210 Mr. Molchanov was contacted at the Soviet Consulate and asked to convey the request for an audience with General Shtikov. At 1235 the U.S. Secretary was notified that the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation was too busy for an interview. When asked whether a later meeting could be arranged the reply was that no answer had been given on this point by General Shitkov.

2. The foregoing response by General Shtikov was conveyed to Dr. Chough and Dr. Rhee.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Chai Hi Kim
Department of Public Information
South Korea Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Kim:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Civil Administrator,
South Korea Interim
Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Chin Hong Kim
Office of Foreign Affairs
South Korea Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Kim:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achieverent.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Civil Administrator,
South Korea Interim
Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Tai Han Kim
Department of Finance
South Korea Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Kim:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ABLERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Civil Administrator,
South Korea Interim
Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Byong Kil Lee
Department of Agriculture
South Korea Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Lee:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

copy to:

The Civil Administrator,
South Korea Interim
Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APC 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Kun Tak Tong
Office of Foreign Affairs
South Korea Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Tong:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Civil Administrator,
South Korea Interim
Government.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Chang Hi Lee
War Department Civilian Employee
Department of Commerce
United States Army Military Government in Korea
APO 235 Unit 2

Dear Mr. Lee:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Commanding General
USAMGIK

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Pyeng Kan Lee
War Department Civilian Employee
Department of National Police
United States Army Military Government in Korea
APO 235 Unit 2

Dear Mr. Lee:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Commanding General
USAMGIK

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Dr. Kei Won Chung
War Department Civilian Employee
98th Military Government Group
APO 6

Dear Dr. Chung:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Commanding General
USAMGIK

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Peter Kwan
War Department Civilian Employee
104th Military Government Group
APO 7 Unit 1

Dear Mr. Kwan:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

The Commanding General
USAMGIK

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

23 August 1947

Mr. Roy C. Kim
Puk A-Hyun Dong
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Kim:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

BASIC: Letter from Dr. E. Fraenkel to Post Engineer, 25 August 1947, Subj: Needed Repairs and Equipment Replacements for BE 134.

201 - Fraenkel, Dr. E. 1st Ind

American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, APO 235, 26 August 1947.

TO: Post Engineer

Transmitted.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

U 312

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

25 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Post Engineer

SUBJECT: Needed Repairs and Equipment Replacements for DH 134

1. The following is an enumeration of needed repairs and equipment replacements in DH 134, residence of Dr. E. Fraenkel.

a. Toilet and benyo are not working.

b. No wash basin in washroom.

c. Kitchen sink leaks.

d. Hot water system is unsatisfactory.

e. Window glass is broken.

f. Doors downstairs need repairs.

g. Mats should be replaced in two rooms; in one of these rooms there are holes in the wooden floor.

2. On August 14 the Post Engineer promised emergency repair of the toilets. There are seven people in DH 134 (four Americans and three Koreans). All are obliged to use the leaking toilets. Work orders were filed for the wash basin, leaky kitchen sink and hot water system weeks ago. A work order for the broken window glass was filed August 14; for the downstairs doors repair, April (this order was lost by the Post Engineer and a new one was filed in June or July); and for the replacement of the mats, January 1947.

Dr. E. Fraenkel
Civilian Employee, P-7

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

300.6
Misc. Gen.

FILE

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

25 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: U. S. Commissioners

SUBJECT: Visit of General Wedemeyer

The Chief Commissioner requests that the members of the American Delegation named below be present in the Main Conference Room, Duk So- Palace, ~~1830~~ 1315 hours, Wednesday, 27 August, 1947, ~~to meet~~ General Wedemeyer.

WMB.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U. S. Secretary

cc-Gen. Brown
Dr. Bunce
Gen. Weckerling
Mr. Jones
Mr. Jacobs
Mr. Sargent
Col. Watlington

Dr Kinney
Mr Roule WMB

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

25 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Thomas M. Watlington

SUBJECT: Attached Document

1. Some time ago I verbally requested of Major Connolly, Head of the Department of Justice, a check of the accuracy of the allegations in the enclosed excerpt.

2. Major Connolly called last week to say that he would prefer to have the request made formally in writing. The attached memorandum was drawn in the form requested by him.

3. Mr. Sargent expresses the thought that it might be best to have it read "By Command of General Brown."

4. May I have your consent to attach this phrase, or your contrary instructions?

Encl. document referred to above

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lieut., CMP

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

2 Sept 1947

Guard Lt. General S. F. Koretkov
Commanding General
Soviet Forces in North Korea

Dear General Koretkov:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 20 August 1947 regarding arrangements for a meeting to be held to discuss payment for operation and maintenance of the Kuan Reservoir.

I suggest that the meeting be held at 1300 hours on 16 September 1947 at the office of the Yong Baek Irrigation Association in Yenan, Yong Baek Gun.

Representing me at the meeting will be Lt. Col. Charles A. Anderson and Major Kenneth A. Omstead. Representing the South Korean Interim Government will be personnel from the Bureau of Agriculture, Kyunggi Province, and from the offices of the Gunsu and the Yong Baek Irrigation Association of Yong Baek Gun.

It is suggested that a similarly representative group from your Command and the Peoples Committee of North Korea be present.

If this is satisfactory to you, the names of personnel who will attend from North Korea should be forwarded immediately in order that arrangements can be made for passage to and from the place of the meeting.

Respectfully,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

D - 6.20

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

8 September 1947

Mr. Yong Won Kim
262 Ton Am Dong
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Kim:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. The leadership you exhibited is especially noteworthy. The initiative, devotion to duty, intelligence and integrity provided an inspiration to your co-workers. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

8 September 1947

Mr. Eugene Yu
25 Tong Sun Dong
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Yu:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

8 September 1947

Mr. Chong Din Son
60-2 Hyo Ja Dong
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Son:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

8 September 1947

Mr. Bung Jung Lee
National Food Administration
South Korea Interim Government
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. Lee:

It is my desire to express my personal appreciation of the splendid services you have rendered to the American Delegation in connection with the completion of an extremely important task for the US-USSR Joint Commission.

The task of translating and editing more than 1300 documents received from Korean democratic political parties and social organizations, in which you participated, was accomplished with energy and dispatch. You may be justly proud of this splendid achievement.

Please accept my sincere wishes for your continued success.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:
The Civil Administrator
South Korea Interim Government

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

300.6
Memo

American Delegation
US - USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

9 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea.

SUBJECT : Invitation to Designate a Representative of US-USSR Joint Commission to attend United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment.

The inclosed copy of radiogram from the Secretary General, United Nations, and copy of reply which was dispatched today in both English and Russian languages, are furnished for information.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Colonel, AGD
U.S. Secretary

2 Inclosures: (1) Copy of Radiogram 29 Aug 47
(2) Copy of Ltr to Secretary General, UN 5 Sept 47

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY - RADIOGRAM RECEIVED FROM TRYGVE LIE, SECRETARY GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL, 29 AUG 1947

317/RCF198 LAKE SUCCESS NY 84/83 UNGOVT 29 1115A M

JOINT COMMISSION FOR KOREA
SEOUL

9147 HAVE HONOR INVITE JOINT COMMISSION FOR KOREA TO SEND QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE TO SERVE IN CONSULTATIVE CAPACITY UNITEDNATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT CONVENING AT HAVANA CUBA 3 PM 21 NOVEMBER 1947 IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION OF ECONOMIC SOCIAL COUNCIL ADOPTED 26 JULY 1947 DRAFT CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION PREPARED BY PREPARATORY COMMITTEE IS EXPECTED CONSTITUTE MAIN BASIS OF DISCUSSION LETTER OF INVITATION WITH AGENDA AND REPORT OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOLLOWS
TRYGVE LIE SECRETARYGENERAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

C O P Y

US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

5 September 1947

Honorable Trygve Lie, Secretary-General
United Nations
Lake Success, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Lie:

Receipt is acknowledged of your radiogram dated 29 August 1947. Your invitation to this Joint Commission to send a qualified representative to serve in a consultative capacity at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment convening at Havana, Cuba, 21 November 1947, is appreciated.

This Commission has been established for the sole purpose of implementing the Moscow Decision, and therefore designation of a representative to the conference in question is not considered to be within our province.

Your radiogram has been transmitted to the Commanding General, United States Forces in Korea, and the Commanding General, Soviet Forces in Korea.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief Commissioner,
American Delegation

T. F. SHTIKOV
Colonel General
Chief Commissioner,
Soviet Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

СОВЕТСКО-АМЕРИКАНСКАЯ СОВМЕСТНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
Сеул, Корея

5 сентября 1947 года

Генеральному Секретарю
Объединенных Наций
Г-ну Трюгве Ли
Озеро Успеха, Штат Нью-Йорк

Дорогой господин ЛИ :

Подтверждаем получение Вашей радиограммы от 29 августа 1947 г. Благодарим Вас за приглашение Совместной Комиссии послать уполномоченного представителя в качестве консультанта на конференцию Объединенных Наций по вопросу труда и торговли, которая созывается в гор.Гаванна, остров Куба, 21 ноября 1947 года.

Наша Комиссия создана с единственной целью осуществления Московского решения и поэтому назначение представителя на конференцию, о которой идет речь, не входит в нашу компетенцию.

Ваша радиограмма передана Командующему Советскими войсками в Северной Корее и Командующему Американскими войсками в Южной Корее.

С уважением Вам

ГЛАВА СОВЕТСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТ

Т.Ф.ШТИКОВ

ГЛАВА АМЕРИКАНСКОЙ ДЕЛЕГАЦИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР

АЛЬБЕРТ Е.БРАУН

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]
files.

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

9 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General A. M. Brown
Chief Commissioner
US-USSR Joint Commission

Following the discussion the other day with General Helmick, General Helmick suggested that PAG be requested to comment, from a political point of view, on Koreans applying for permission to travel abroad. It seems to me that this is a desirable procedure: first in order that a clearance may be made in the light of any possible political implications attending the individual's travel; and, second in order that we may be aware of the foreign travel by persons whose travel may carry some political implications. Colonel Gentner telephoned me this morning to say that this was going to be adopted as standard procedure. Do you approve?

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief, Political Advisory Group

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Joint Comm...

SOVIET-AMERICAN JOINT COMMISSION

SOVIET DELEGATION

Seoul, Korea.

11 September 1947

3/2

Lt. General John R. Hodge

Commanding General of US Forces

In South Korea.

Dear General Hodge:

On behalf of the Soviet Delegation of the Soviet-American Joint Commission and myself, I wish to express deep condolences on the untimely death of Major General Arthur L. Lerch, United States Military Governor in South Korea.

With my deepest respect,

T. F. Shtikov, Colonel-General

Chief of the Soviet Delegation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

12 September 1947.

Mrs. Archer L. Lerch,
101 Sampan Tong,
Seoul, Korea.

My dear Mrs. Lerch:

Personally, and on behalf of the American Delegation, I wish to express deepest sympathy to you in the passing of your husband, Major General Archer L. Lerch.

The Army has lost a splendid officer. We of the American Delegation have lost a colleague whose invaluable assistance and cooperation we shall never forget.

Sincerely yours,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

15 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Brown
Dr. Bunce
General Weckerling
Mr. Jones

SUBJECT: Funeral Ceremony
1000 16 September 1947

1. Information has been received that members of the American Delegation and their wives should be present and in their seats by 0945 if possible. Ladies will not be seated on the platform with their husbands. Ushers will be available to assist with seating. Cars should enter the Capitol grounds through the West gate.

2. The following named will represent the Soviet Delegation:

General Lebedeff
Mr. Balasanov
Colonel Avramenko
Mr. Valenko (Interpreter).

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

16 September 1947

SUBJECT: Installation of Heating Equipment.

TO : Post Engineers, Camp Seoul, APO 235

1. Request heating equipment be installed in that portion of the Museum now occupied by the US-USSR Joint Commission.

2. There are five (5) offices and one (1) toilet located in museum.

3. The largest office is approximately 60 x 20 ft. The others are approximately 14 x 16 ft.

3. Major O'Brien, Post Engineers, has been contacted concerning this matter and has stated that the existing furnace would not supply heat to the Joint Commission Building and Museum as well, without enlarging furnace and conversion to oil heat.

4. Request stoves be installed in that part of Museum now occupied by American Delegation, Joint Commission.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

file.

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

23 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR BUERKLE, XXIV CORPS SIGNAL OFFICE:

SUBJECT: Request for Photographs of Political Leaders

Several weeks ago we informally discussed the possibility of your office's providing us with photographs of Korean political leaders.

As an original request I should like to receive, in duplicate, identification photographs of the persons listed in G-2's Who's Who in Korea (Second Revision, 13 March 1947), copy of which is attached for your convenience.

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief
Political Advisory Group

Incl
As noted above

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

30 September 1947.

SUBJECT: Permission to Purchase Surplus Used U.S. Army Truck, ¼ ton 4 x 4.

TO : Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in Korea.

1. Request authority to purchase from the Army Exchange Service, Korea, one (1) used truck, ¼ ton 4x4.

2. Dependents arrived in Korea 20 September 1946. I have 18 months overseas service as of 1 October 1947 since 7 December 1941. I have 16 months service in this theatre as of 1 October 1947.

3. I desire to purchase a truck classified as "Used Poor", price $225.00.

4. I desire to take delivery in person.

5. I understand that these vehicles are sold in an "AS IS" condition, without any guarantee whatsoever, that they have not been reconditioned, and that missing accessories have not been replaced.

6. I further understand that all sales are final, and that no refunds or exchange may be made once the sale is consummated.

7. I have read and understand the provisions of USAFIK Circular Number 11, dated 8 July 1946, with regard to the ownership, resale within Korea and return to the United States of surplus Army Vehicles purchased under that Circular.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

1 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ROBINSON, G-2:

1. At General Brown's request, I am sending you herewith copy of a translation of a letter recently received by the Joint Commission from LEE, Choong-Mo, transmitting from Peiping, China, a long mimeographed paper entitled Draft on National Construction Program in Korea, prepared and published by the Staff Training Class of the Staff for Establishing the Nation.

2. The only information I have on LEE, Choong-mo is that some years ago he went from Russia to China where he has remained since then, mostly in the Peiping-Tientsin area. He has a reputation for being a crook. (This information is unconfirmed but believed to be reliable).

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief
Political Advisory Group

Incl
As noted above

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY

SUBJECT: Korean Independence Problem

TO : U.S. - USSR Joint Commission

Gentlemen:

We Koreans wish to pay our respects to you for your efforts at the most important conference of the Joint Commission which is being held in Seoul, Korea. We hope that you make a great success on your mission.

I, one of the Korean revolutionaries, wish to submit this draft on national construction program to you for your reference.

If you send me a wire for my coming to Korea, I will return to Seoul and will be of your service presenting my views of Korean problems to your commission.

I am an exile for more than 30 years. Two years have already been passed since the Japanese surrender, but I am sorry to say that I have not been able to return to my father-land because Korea has been divided by two powers, and there is no place where I can ask for my passage.

I wish that you call for me, and I shall be of your service wherever you think I can do best.

Please let me hear from you.

Sincerely yours,

Choong Mo Lee (Seal)
14 Hoikeisa, Bukchang-ka,
Pei-ping

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

E. W. Brown
File

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

2 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Record

SUBJECT: Meeting of Joint Commission

1. Mr. Maslov, Assistant Secretary, Soviet Delegation, called the undersigned by telephone at about 0945, 2 October 1947 and stated that General Shtikov desired to call a meeting of the Joint Commission with the following proposed agenda:

a. Approval of the minutes of preceding meetings.

b. Answer of the American Delegation to the Soviet statement of 26 September 1947.

2. The Soviet Secretary was informed as follows:

"The American Delegation has no matters to take up in a Joint Commission meeting, but does not object to a meeting if the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation desires to call one."

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Box 4
See Memo

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
Seoul, Korea

2 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Administrative Secretary
Secretary, Subcommission No. 1
Secretary, Subcommission No.2
Secretary, Subcommission No. 3
Supply Secretary
Public Information Officer

SUBJECT: Presentation of Economic Situation in Korea for the Congressional Committee

1. The presentation of the economic situation in Korea for the Congressional Committee is scheduled for the afternoon of Saturday, 4 October 1947. This information is furnished for planning purposes.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US -USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

3 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Brown

SUBJECT: Joint Commission Meeting of 3 October 1947

1. The reply of General Brown to the effect that the American Delegation agreed to meet on 3 October 1947 at 1330 hours was conveyed to Mr. Maslov of the Soviet Secretariat with the comment that the American Delegation recommended deletion of Item 2 of the proposed agenda.

2. Mr. Maslov explained to me this morning that in transmitting the response of the American Delegation to General Shtikov Colonel Avramenko did not indicate the request for deletion made by General Brown. He further stated that General Shtikov this morning when he became aware of the American proposal to delete Item 2 of the proposed agenda indicated that no useful purpose would be served by meeting today.

3. General Shtikov has recommended through Mr. Maslov that unless both items of the proposed agenda are accepted that no meeting be held today.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

320.6
Mtgs. Jurisdiction

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

16 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Watlington

SUBJECT: Arrival of Congressmen 18 October 1947

1. Latest radio received by Lieutenant Baxter, G-1 Section, indicates that four congressmen from the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce will arrive at Kimpo Air Base 18 October 1947. General Wolfe of the Fifth Air Forces will then conduct them on an orientation and tour of the Kimpo Air Base. Following this they will go to Military Government where they will see and talk to Colonel Cornelson of the Department of Transportation.

2. The party will leave Sunday, 19 October 1947.

3. Their principal interest is air routes, airports and foreign air transportation.

4. Present plans do not call for anything from the Commission.

5. The four congressmen are:

Leonard W. Hall, Chairman
Republican, New York
James I. Dolliver
Republican, Iowa
Hugh D. Scott, Jr.
Republican, Pennsylvania
Richard F. Harless
Democrat, Arizona

WBP.
W. B. P.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[illegible]

[illegible]
American Delegation
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission
APO 235

17 October 1947

[illegible]:

[illegible]: [illegible]Contact Program and Directives

1. The [illegible]G contact program now is organized to provide continuing weekly contact with most major political parties and more frequent contact when required. Steps also are being made to extend the scope of this contact.

2. It is intended to prepare a basic standing directive and a weekly directive to guide all [illegible]G contact personnel in order to improve the quality of information received in accordance with requirements of the American Delegation. It is intended that these directives indicate (a) specific information sought by the American Delegation, in addition to miscellaneous information acquired at the discretion of each contact officer, and (b) any specific views or remarks the American Delegation believes best can be transmitted to Koreans through informal contacts. In the case of (b), it is thought that this should consist primarily of views that are to be expressed personally and not officially.

3. As a basis for [illegible]G directives to contact personnel, it is desired that the American Delegation, weekly, indicate special interests under 2(a) and (b), above, that it desires included in the [illegible]AG weekly directive.

4. The routine weekly directive is to be prepared on Wednesdays. It will be appreciated if suggestions can be received each Tuesday before 1700 hours.

CLYDE D. [illegible]NT
Chief
Political Advisory Group

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

7 October 1947

SUBJECT: Request for Information Concerning Writer of Open Letter to General Shtikov

TO : Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq. XXIV Corps, APO 235

1. Request the Political Advisory Group, American Delegation, U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission be supplied with all available information regarding SON, Byong Tai, writer of the open letter to General Shtikov dated 12 September 1947 and recorded 17 September 1947 by CCIGK, G-2 Section, Hq. XXIV Corps.

2. Copy of original letter forwarded to American Delegation from CCIGK is attached as inclosure #1.

3. It is further requested that the attached copy of SON, Byong Tai's letter be returned with the available information on individual in question.

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief
Political Advisory Group

1 Incl
Copy of letter from
SON, Byong Tai to
Editor, Seoul Times

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION, AMERICAN DELEGATION
Seoul, Korea

20 October 1947

SUBJECT: Permission to Purchase Surplus Used U.S. Army Truck, 1/4 ton 4x4.

TO : Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in Korea.

THRU: CHANNELS

1. Request authority to purchase from the Army Exchange Service, Korea, one (1) used truck, 1/4 ton 4 x 4.

2. Dependent has been in Korea since 6 December 1946. I departed from U.S. on current tour 6 November 1946. Prior overseas service from 3 August 1943 to 7 December 1945. Current dependent acquired 10 August 1947.

3. I desire to purchase a truck classified as "USED FAIR," price $382.50.

4. I desire to take delivery in person.

5. I understand that these vehicles are sold in an "AS IS" condition, without any guarantee whatsoever, that they have not been reconditioned, and that missing accessories have not been replaced.

6. I further understand that all sales are final, and that no refunds or exchange may be made once the sale is consummated.

7. I have read and understand the provisions of USAFIK Circular Number II, dated 8 July 1946, with regard to the ownership, resale within Korea and return to the United States of surplus Army Vehicles purchased under that Circular.

JUSTIN SLOANE
Political Advisory Group

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Basic: Ltr from Justin Sloane, 20 Oct 47 Subj: "Permission to Purchase Surplus Used U.S. Army Truck, 1/4 ton 4x4."

1st Ind.

American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, APO 235, US Army, 21 October 1947

TO: Commanding General, USAFIK, APO 235, US Army

Approved.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
U. S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

3-2-4

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

23 October 1947

Memorandum for the Record:

Members of the Secretariat, American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, who contributed toward the $100 War Bond Wedding Gift for Miss Anne Anderson and Lt. Lee E. Beahler, are as follows:

Bernheisel, Lt.	5.00	Hopkins, Mrs.	5.00
Bojus, Capt.	5.00	Johnson, Capt.	2.50
Brajnikoff, B.	2.00	Miller, Capt.	5.00
Dean, Eileen	5.00	Parker, M.	5.00
Edwards, Lt. Col.	5.00	Phillips, Capt.	5.00
Elliott, L.	5.00	Quigley, V.	5.00
Grechuhin, N.	3.00	Stalcup, E.	5.00
Hobbs, W.	2.50	Van Note, E.	5.00
Hopkins, CWO R.	5.00		

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

23 October 1947

Memorandum for the Record:

Enlisted men of the American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, who contributed toward the $50 War Bond Wedding Gift for Miss Anne Anderson and Lt. Lee E. Beahler, are as follows:

Babicz, T/4	$3.50
Chekmareff, M/sgt	$3.50
Donnelly, M/sgt	$3.50
Hudson, T/4	$3.50
Johnson, T/4	$3.50
Kennedy, T/4	$3.50
Lerman, T/4	$3.50
Miller, T/5	$3.50
O'Brien, Pfc	$3.50
Seabrook, T/sgt	$3.50
Thomas, T/5	$3.50

F.P. Donnelly
F.P. Donnelly
M/sgt QMC
Asst Admin Secty

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

24 October 1947

SUBJECT: Designation of U. S. Chairmen of Subcommissions

TO : All concerned.

1. The following changes in assignments to Subcommissions are announced:

To be U. S. Chairman, Subcommission No. 1

Career Minister Joseph E. Jacobs, United States Department of State, vice Minister Arthur C. Bunce, United States Department of State, relieved.

To be U.S. Chairman, Subcommission No. 3

Minister Arthur C. Bunce, United States Department of State, vice Mr. Owen T. Jones, United States Department of State, relieved.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. E. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

24 October 1947

Secretary General
Provisional International Civil
Aviation Organization
Dominion Square Building
Montreal, Canada.

Gentlemen:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your packing list of 4 September 1947.

This correspondence has been referred to Bureau of Air Transportation, United States Army Military Government in Korea, for appropriate action.

In the future and to expedite the receipt of this matter, we recommend mailing it direct to the above bureau at APO 235, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt Col, AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP
American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

31 October 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER, US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION:

SUBJECT: Report of Accident

1. Attached herewith is formal accident report and below is all information known about damage done to government vehicle, 1/4 ton truck (jeep), No. 2043/760 assigned to the undersigned for official use.

2. The following information is all that is known regarding damage to government vehicle assigned to me--

> At approximately 1345 hours on 29 October, I left the vehicle in front of the Joint Commission Building, just west of the main steps, in the grounds of the Duk Soo Palace, while I accompanied General Weckerling in his car on a trip we were taking together. The vehicle was facing west. I did not return for the vehicle on 29 October but rode directly home with General Weckerling.
>
> At approximately 0800 hours on 30 October, I arrived at the Palace, approached the vehicle from the rear and moved it to the west side of the building where, without turning it, I parked it in my usual place, facing north. In starting the vehicle I noted that, contrary to the usual, it started immediately.
>
> At approximately 1000 hours a member of the Joint Commission motor pool inquired about the accident to my vehicle. I stated lack of knowledge of any accident and then examined the vehicle, observing the damaged bumper, particularly noting what appeared to be finely ground stone powder all around the area of contact. As the shape of the bumper and the presence of what appeared to be ground stone suggested collision with a sharp stone object resembling one of the corners of the building or of the pillars around the building, I later examined the entire area of the building for evidence of the point of collision. The only possible evidence was a chip from a corner of the western wall that lines the main steps into the Joint Commission building.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

However, when the vehicle was driven to this point to compare the height of the chip with that of the bumper, it was observed that the chip was about six inches above the normal location of the bumper.

3. The following is my speculation regarding the accident:

An unknown driver removed the vehicle from the place in which I had parked it, and drove it around the Palace grounds. The vehicle was being operated at fairly high speed (as suggested by the extent to which the bumper was deformed). It was operated into the square corner of a building or pillar (suggested by the shape of the deformation). The corner was of stone, possibly granite similar to that used in construction of the foundations of the two main buildings in the Palace grounds (suggested by the residue resembling ground stone powder on the bumper at the point of contact). The accident occurred between about 0700 and 0800 hours on 30 October 1947 (suggested by the ease with which the engine started after an unusually cold night).

4. So far as is known, no persons other than the unidentified driver were involved, no one was injured, and no damage was done other than that done to the vehicle.

5. The damage was reported, with all available details, to the Commanding Officer of the Palace Guard, with request for any information that may be possessed by guards on duty during the period the vehicle was parked in front of the Joint Commission building.

CLYDE B. SARGENT
Chief
Political Advisory Group

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

BASIC: Memorandum for Chief Commissioner of US-USSR Joint Commission from Mr. Clyde B. Sargent, dated 31 October 1947, subj: Report of Accident.

1st Ind

American Delegation, US-USSR Joint Commission, APO 235, 1 November 1947.

TO: Hq Special Troops, XXIV Corps, APO 235

1. Forwarded.

2. Preliminary investigation of this matter by 1st Lt. Ellsworth Bolles, Commanding Officer, 7th Infantry Division Palace Guard was undertaken on 31 October 1947. He has reported that it has been established that the vehicle was operated by a member of the Palace Guard. Further details are unknown.

3. Mr. Sargent states that after two separate requests he has been unable to obtain a lock for this vehicle.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commissi
APO 235

13 November 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gen. Brown (Lt. Althaus)
Mr. Frostov
Dr. Fraenkel
Mr. Hopkins
Lt. Bertsch
Mrs. Stalcup

SUBJECT: Privately Owned Vehicles

1. All motor vehicles privately owned by U.S. military personnel, Department of the Army civilians, and Department of the Army accredited civilians in the U.S. occupational zone of Korea, will be re-registered between the period 15 November 1947 through 31 December 1947.

2. A set of new "A" license plates will be issued for each vehicle upon re-registration in accordance with USAFIK Circular 112, 25 September 1947, as amended.

3. All vehicles owned by individuals indicated in list above will be registered with the Seoul area Provost Marshal (31st FA (MP) BN Hqs).

Ref. Par. C. Cir 112, 25 September 1947:--

4. Owner of vehicle will obtain a certificate of inspection <u>before</u> such vehicle can be registered or re-registered. Certificate of inspection will be completed by ordnance unit designated by area Provost Marshal and will show that the following has been inspected: lights, horn, windshield wiper, brakes, tires, rear view mirror, and steering assembly. Area Provost Marshal will provide a windshield sticker to show that vehicle has been so inspected. This windshield sticker will be displayed on the lower right hand corner of the right windshield. Note: Provost Marshal's office says "AES garage can inspect and issue sticker".

5. After sticker has been obtained the rest can be completed at the 31st MP BN. Hq. This will consist of filling out "Application for registration of privately owned motor vehicle."

JAMES P. JONES
Capt Inf

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By ____ NARS, Date ____

memo
USSC 300.6

AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
APO 235

12 December 1947

MEMO TO : Lt. Col. Wilmeth.

1. From estimate given me by Mr. Yun the cost of these characters for the Korean typewriter will be ₩1305.00. Number of characters, 221 chinese - 60 English.

2. This typewriter is used by Mrs. Pak.

3. I don't believe we have ever had a complete file or characters but any rate, they break up after use.

4. Do you approve of my purchase of these?

JAMES P. JONES
Capt Inf

Approved.

13 Dec 47
J. D. Wilmeth
Lt. Col. Inf.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

312
Trieb Comm.

COALITION COMMITTEE
Seoul, Korea

12 December 1947

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, USAFIK
Headquarters, XXIV Corps
APO 235
Seoul, Korea

Dear Gen. Hodge:

With the report of [illegible] December 10th the Coalition Committee has [illegible] itself.

The reason for this decision was because we [illegible] on a circle composed of [illegible] who are really the initiator of the coalition movement and who further objects of political [illegible] internally and internationally. There seems to be no possibility of fully realizing the original aims of the Committee.

As per our final directive report in connection with the Committee's work, a final report was made as outlined by letter of 4th November 1947 in Washington, which will be telegraphed to you and a copy forwarded to you for your reference.

Kindly accept for Mrs. Hodge and yourself deep appreciation and gratitude for the splendid support and wholehearted cooperation rendered the Committee from beginning to end by yourself and your associates.

Yours very sincerely

Arnold Kiss, Chairman
Coalition Committee

cc: Brig. Gen. Dunn
Col. Gibson
Lt. Col. Brown
Lt. Col. Scherling
Maj. C. [illegible]son
Capt. Hersch

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

FORMER COMMUNIST LEADER REVEALS:
CONQUEST OF UNITED STATES
PLOTTED BY RED MASTER MINDS

This is an inside story of Communism, the No. 1 threat to America and world peace, written by a man who for years was a repository of the secrets of the Communist high command--Louis F. Budenz.

As president and managing editor of the Daily Worker, official Red voice in America, Budenz had a grandstand seat from which to witness, step by step, the clever machinations of the Red master minds.

From his vantage point he saw the Red blueprint for destruction of law and order being developed before and during the war. Through their own statements and printed record he develops the case against political anarchists and exposes their greed for world power, position and property.

When he finally realized Communism was a false doctrine, a mad ideology which led to a fury of class-hatred, anti-religious thought and mob rule, he turned his back on it, returning to the ways of his American heritage.

A student of labor relations, he joined the faculty at Notre Dame University and later he moved to Fordham University, where he now is.

Budenz' timely message, frankly and factually related, is recommended as must reading for every American gravely concerned about preserving that which Americans fought for--Government of ALL the people, by ALL the people and for ALL the people. Here is the first installment:

By LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ

I

Soviet Russia has opened a battle of nerves which it proposes to develop into World War III against the United States.

Every present Soviet act is preliminary to planned armed conflict against our country. Every Soviet move in the United Nations and elsewhere throughout the world is for the purpose of atomising America.

Actual large-scale warfare will be unleashed, according to Soviet plans, when Russia can hurl the continents of Europe and Asia at the U.S.A.

That is what I learned as managing editor of the Daily Worker, official organ of the Communist Party in America. Oral instructions and secret orders which came to my desk in Communist national headquarters--particularly in 1945, just before I left the Red ranks--were aimed at undermining the United States and establishing Soviet world domination by armed force.

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These orders were conveyed through such a person as Eugene Dennis, the mysterious individual elected "general secretary" of the party in July of this year. He was a chief proponent of "the return to Marxistleninism," which means a return to Lenin's aim of destroying "the capitalist and imperialist" states, at whose head stands our own America.

That is what the American people must know today, if they are to save themselves from the horrors of war. Only a strong stand by our Government against Soviet expansion--a stand based on the rights of ALL nations to freedom--will prevent this catastrophe.

"What DOES Russia want?"

A number of papers and people have asked that question recently, when observing the arrogant attitude of the Soviet officials. The answer, which one who has been a leading Communist editor can supply, is comparatively simple.

Russia wants what Hitler wanted. RUSSIA WANTS THE WORLD.

And the Soviet dictatorship plans to get what it wants by the same methods used by Hitler, armed conquest of all nations through the aid of subversive fifth columns.

That is what Dimitri Z. Manuilsky, one of the most sinister figures in the Soviet setup, told the world plainly in his recent warning of the power of the Communist "parties" in all countries.

The furtherance of this Communist conspiracy was the purpose of the celebrated article of instructions to the American Communist Party from Jacques Duclos, the French Communist leader, through which Moscow in 1945 deposed Earl Browder from leadership.

U.S. CALLED AGGRESSOR

The resolution adopted by the Communist Party convention in New York, at the behest of the Kremlin and Duclos in July of last year, was patterned after the same design. It turned its guns on "American imperialism" and hailed the aggressive Soviet Union as "the staunchest champion of national freedom, democracy and world peace."

Our country was blamed for any "aggressions or wars" that might be forthcoming, the same theme as that of Joseph Stalin in his sword-rattling speech at Moscow in February, 1946.

In secret discussions within the Communist Party top officials and writers, centered around the Duclos article, it was brought out that the United States was a "hopelessly capitalist country."

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Our land could be subjected to Communism, it was agreed, only through "the might of the Red army." And the representative of the Communist International in this country--for the Communist International exists in fact if not in name--indorsed that position.

One of the chief of these anti-American discussions on the Duclos article--and leading to understanding by the Reds here of Soviet aims against the United States--lasted three weeks in the summer of 1945. It was attended by such representatives of the political committee as John Williamson, Jack Stachel, Eugene Dennis and V. J. Jerome for the official theoretical organ of the Communist Party, now entitled Political Affairs.

The party simultaneously declared in 1945 for a return to Marxist-Leninism. Such a position makes the United States the most to be fought because it is the most prosperous. That position was publicly reaffirmed in July of this year by the "enlarged national committee."

It was little wonder, then, to note in August, 1946, that Eugene Tarle, the Soviet historian and journalistic hack, assailed the United States as a "Fascist nation" in the Russian paper, Red Star.

He had the gall, this Soviet mouthpiece, to link our democratic nation with "Fascist Hitlerite Germany." And one month later the British Reds uttered a similar libel against the United States, declaring it to be no different from Nazi Germany.

CONQUEST OF AMERICA

Every intelligent person should be able, with his eyes closed, to understand what these false accusations mean.

There was only one remedy for the Fascism of Hitlerite Germany, its extirpation, the Allied Nations agreed.

And so today the Reds declare for extirpation as the fate to be meted out to "Fascist" America.

As editor formany years of the Communist official daily organ, I became intimately acquainted with this plot for the conquest of America and the part that the American Reds are ordered to play in it.

The Daily Worker was definitely expected to forward this conspiracy and to use every means in its pages to break down American unity and American morale, and to breed subservience to the Soviet aims.

That is the secret (as shall be seen later) of its ferocious assault on General MacArthur just when the Soviet Union wanted to discredit the American administrator of Japan.

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All-out statism--whether it is Hitlerism or Red Fascism--must try to silence opposition at home by armed expansion abroad. It is not surprising to know that this conspiracy against the United States as the "most prosperous of the capitalist nations" has been long in the hatching. Every one of the Soviet actors on the scene today was long ago committed to this war on America.

NATION SOVIET MUST FIGHT

At the 6th Congress of the Communist International in 1926, for instance, our country was singled out for denunciation as "the Dollar Republic" and the capitalist nation which the Soviet Union must fight.

In that year the decisions of this congress were explained to the Leningrad functionaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by none other than V. M. Molotov, new foreign minister of the USSR. In that report he stressed in particular the coming world rule by the Soviet dictatorship.

"What is the fundamental idea of the program of the Comintern?" he asked, only to answer it:

"It is that the program of the Comintern is the program of the world proletarian dictatorship."

American Communists were then urging American soldiers to "turn their guns on their oppressors," namely, to mutiny, and were openly using the pages of the Daily Worker to call on American Marines to desert.

Indeed, the late J. Louis Engdahl, as a representative of the Communist International here, reported to his Moscow masters February 16, 1928, that this call to the Marines to betray their country was a "rehearsal for the successful war that must be waged to combat the new war planned against the Soviet Union, in which American imperialism will take a leading role." (From the Communist International's International Press Correspondence, Vol 8, No. 8, Page 175.)

STALIN AS RULER

Even at the seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935 -- when fear of the efficient German war machine had made the Soviet leaders speak more softly to the democratic nations--this theme of world domination continued.

It is to be found in speech after speech of the Red leaders, proclaiming the world proletarian rule with Stalin as the leader and ruler.

The idea was to be preserved among the Red fifth columns for future use!

After the United States--with its lend-lease in colossal amounts and its

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armed assistance--had saved the Soviet government in the war, this idea was brought out of the political cupboard and dusted off for an attack on our country.

Today--as I found from bitter experience in a high post in the Communist Party--the whole aim of Soviet activity is to prepare for the DAY when America can be destroyed.

As Jacques Duclos, Moscow's phonograph to the American Communists, declared, the Teheran pledge of Stalin for "generations of peace" was only a diplomatic gesture. It was, in other words, a ruse to deceive America and lull Americans to sleep.

As a result, the United States is now confronted with a slippery, unscrupulous adversary--the Soviet State--which employs every act to hasten the day when it can shatter our defenses and destroy our strength.

II

In the continued existence of the Communist Party here, Soviet Russia has flagrantly broken its word to the United States.

The whole experience in this regard tells us very definitely that Russia can't be trusted around the corner.

In the November 16, 1933 agreement which led to American recognition, the Soviet government pledged itself solemnly not to carry on "propaganda" within our shores.

The pledge was never kept. The Communist Party conducts such propaganda as the agreement barred, never varying in one iota from Soviet views and objectives.

That party, the record of its acts indicates, is, in effect, as much a puppet to Soviet policies as the Nazi Bund was a marionette of Hitler.

On August 25, 1935, the United States Government was obliged to declare to the Kremlin that the recognition agreement had been broken by the calling of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in the Soviet capital.

This was the charge of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, both friendly to the Soviet government and to recognition.

A DOWNRIGHT LIE

What was the Soviet reply? In a note by Assistant Foreign Commissar Nicholas Krestinsky, the Soviet government stated that it had no responsibility for that organization or its affiliated parties.

That was, of course, a downright lie.

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That it was such a lie was admitted, in effect, by every outstanding leader at that Communist congress. Let us hear what some of them said there, on the spot.

George Dimitrov was elected general secretary of the Communist International on that occasion. He should have known what the organization was.

And amid frenzied applause which the official record shows was a huge demonstration at the congress, Dimitrov proclaimed Joseph Stalin to be the leader of the Communist International and its affiliated parties.

DIMITROV IS NOW PURGING BULGARIA.

After outlining what each of the parties in each country--and specifically in the United States--had to do to advance "the world proletarian revolution," Dimitrov burst forth:

"And we want all this because only in this way will the working class at the head of all the toilers, welded into a million-strong revolutionary army, LED BY THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND POSSESSED OF SO GREAT AND WISE A PILOT AS OUR LEADER, COMRADE STALIN (a storm of applause is reported here), be able to fulfill its historic mission."

That mission was to sweep capitalism off the face of the earth, Dimitrov added.

Among those present at Moscow on that occasion in 1935 and applauding Dimitrov to the echo were all the leaders of the Communist Party here, led by Earl Browder.

FATHERLAND FOR OPPRESSED

Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, now masquerading as the foreign minister of the Ukraine and a delegate to the United Nations, had been general secretary of the Communist International up to this 1935 session.

He should have known to whom the organization was responsible. And he said, in his address to the 1935 congress:

"Long live the Communist International, the great invincible party of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin."

In a further report Manuilsky declared that the "exploited and oppressed in all parts of the world regard our land of victorious socialism as their fatherland (and) . . . our Stalin as the great, wise and beloved leader of the whole of toiling humanity."

This report, published in pamphlet form, was distributed widely by the Communist Party in this country.

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Wilhelm Pieck, the leader of the German Communists, also had his say. And these were his concluding words--with most more to the same effect:

"Our main slogan is--struggle for Soviet power. Our banner is--the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Our leader is--Stalin."

All these reports and many more like them are presented in full in the official report of that congress, appearing in the International Press Correspondence for 1935--Vol. 15.

ADMIT STALIN AS LEADER

They proclaim--out of the mouths of the leaders of the Communist International themselves--that the Soviet government's assertion that it had nothing to do with that body was a lie.

They said, beyond question of a doubt, that the Soviet Russian dictator, Joseph Stalin, was the leader of the Communist Parties in every country and that they took orders from him.

In 1940, when Americans' dislike for the Hitler-Stalin pact made it advisable for the Communist Party in this country to appear as an independent agency, that party "withdrew" from the Communist International.

Earl Browder, then head of the organization, bluntly stated that the act was dictated by "tactical" and "defensive" considerations. Within the confidential party circles--where I functioned as a member of the national committee--it was made even clearer that the move was for "protective purposes."

By 1943, the time had come when the Soviet Union's welfare called for "dissolution" of the Communist International. And so it was "dissolved."

And it is more significant that Stalin, whose government was supposed to have no interest in the body, went out of his way to commend this decision.

But is not one of the seven wonders of the world that the Communist Party continued to echo Moscow's aims and ambitions, whether "withdrawal" or "dissolution" was the rule?

By some strange legerdemain, the Communist Party in America went on being a faithful camp follower of every Moscow change of line!

HITLER FOES ATTACKED

When the Hitler-Stalin pact was in full force and effect, in 1940, Earl Browder issued a book entitled "The Second Imperialist War", exactly the name the Soviet officials had given the conflict.

The book was filled with attacks on the British and French enemies of Hitler as "imperialists", while the Nazis are treated lightly.

The book's final chapter is entitled "The War Plans of Roosevelt and Wall Street", and the pages are filled with praise for the Soviet Union for making its agreement with the Nazis and in condemnation of Mr. Roosevelt

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for trying to help Britain.

The charming independence of the party here, which had "divorced" itself from the Communist International, is presented by Browder's statement on Stalin in the final chapter:

"Upon the foundation laid by Marx, Engels and Lenin our great Stalin has further demonstrated the practical road to peace."

The party resolutions were of the same character, reflecting faithfully the expressions of the Communist International and the statements by Soviet leaders.

In the magazine Communist International, No. 6 for 1940, there appeared an article or call to the Communist Parties of the world, written by George Dimitrov, the general secretary of the Communist International. Its title was "The Struggle Against the Imperialist War."

ALL SENTIMENTS REPEATED

All the sentiments which it uttered, all the thoughts it conveyed, are repeated in the pages of The Communist of the same year, and that means in the official organ of the party in this country.

There was never, at any time, the slightest difference of viewpoint between the official organ of the international Communist organization and that of the Communist Party here.

And so today Political Affairs--which is the new name for The Communist--echoes every idea and battle-cry of New Times--the new name for The Communist International.

And so it went, on and on. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, the Communist Party here shouted:

"Support the USSR in its fight against Nazi war."

That was the title of the statement of the national committee of the party, made June 22, 1941. When Stalin signed the Teheran agreement pledging "generations" of postwar peace, the Communists shouted "Teheran" and "generations" of peace. When Moscow came out for an anti-American war of nerves after V-J Day, the Reds here obligingly changed front and headers--and began a war of nerves of their own.

If Soviet Russia had meant to keep its recognition agreement, it would have denounced the Communists here for acting thus in its name. It is free enough in assailing the United States Government and the American nations.

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QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED THE POLICE FORCE OFFICIALS BY CHAIRMAN

1. Strength, organization, distribution of Police Force at present.

2. Strength, organization, distribution of Police Force at time of organization.

3. Primary difficulty experienced in creating an expanded Police Force.

4. Primary difficulties now being encountered in operating the Police Force.

5. Statements have been made to the Conference that many Koreans who served as policemen under the Japanese have been taken in as members of the Police Force. To what extent is this correct?

6. To what extent are individuals above-mentioned officers or non-commissioned officers in the Police Force?

7. Is the salary paid policemen plus the living differential reasonable?

8. To your knowledge is there much dishonesty in the Police Force?

9. If the answer to (8) is yes, what methods are utilized to combat it?

10. To what extent does politics influence the organization and operation of the Police Force?

11. Any general information you desire to give the Conference.

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To the Korean People:

Internal strife wastes the strength of the people and retards the reconstruction of the Fatherland. Futhermore, the recent excesses only serve to discredit the Korean people in the eyes of the nations and obstructs independence. This is a critical moment!

Whatever discontent or dissatisfaction you may have with the Government, do not be deceived by incitement to evil from any poltical ideological group but have confidence in the legal authorities for the alleviation of your difficulties. Live patiently through these difficult days! Cease these riotous actions among yourselves.

Wanton destruction, murder and arson are terrible crimes and a calamity for any people. Put heart and faith into the gigantic task of uniting under coalition and work for the solution of the grave problems of this hour.

Support the course of coalition as the only road to the solution of the problems of Korea, the realization of the Provisional Government, freedom and independence.

Let this be engraved in your minds: be patient and calm while carrying on the daily tasks.

October 25, 1946

For the Joint Korean - American Conference

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U.S. Army
Personal Representative of
General Hodge.

KIMM, Kiusic
LYUH, Won Hyung
Chairmen of the Coalition Committee

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SUBJECT: Discharge of 8 Heads of Police Stations
Kim, Chung Ho to be Police Chief.

Chief of Police Department Cho, Kyung Ok, announced the following changes in personnel of the Police Staff. The announcement was made at the Police Headquarters of Fifth District in the presence of news paper reporters yesterday 22nd, at 3:30 in the afternoon:

DISCHARGED

Public Safety Chief	Park, Ul Soo
Chief of Kern Chun Station	Chung, Hoo Cho
Chief of Sun San Station	Paik, Soo Jang
Chief of General Affairs of Dai Sung Station	Kim, Dong Pai
Chief of General Affairs	Kim, Pyung Dai
Chief of San Choo Station	Chun, Kyu Hoon
Chief of Sung Choo Station	Yun, Yoon Chan
Chief of Ko Kyung Station	Kim, In Choon

APPOINTMENTS

Kim, Chung Ho	To the post of Chief of Police Headquarters of Fifth District (now President of Police School and Head of Department of Education)
Lang, Soo Chang	To the Post of Assistant Chief of Police Headquarters Fifth District (now not working)
Sung, Dai Kyung	To the Post of 3rd District Police (now working in the General Affairs of the Police)
Park, Dai Sik	Head of General Affairs of Police (now working Chief of An Dong Station)
Pai, Young Hon	Head office of Temporary Investigation (now working Investigation office of First District)
Lui, Dan Ha	Chief of Kern Chun Police Station
Chung, Young Dal	Antung Police Station
Kim, Kyu In	Public Safety (acting)
Lee, Ju Ok	Head of General Affairs of Dai Poo Police Station
Chung, Po Soo	Replace Ko Ryung Police Station
Chi, Kong Hai	Sang Choo Police Head (Acting)
Park, Do Dal	Po Sung Choi Police Head

EXHIBIT 8

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Misc ! File @

PROPOSED EXECUTIVE CABINET

1. The Commanding General in a desire to increase the participation of Koreans in the government of southern Korea is prepared to establish a Korean Executive Cabinet to administer southern Korea provided a genuine coalition of the major parties of southern Korea is achieved.
2. Such a coalition must fulfill the following conditions:
   (a) It must include all southern Korean major parties.
   (b) Each party must enter the coalition independently free of any private alliances, with other parties or groups of parties or "Fronts."
   (c) Each party must agree to accept its share of responsibility for the actions of the coalition and abide by the decisions of the majority.
3. If such a coalition is achieved by the Korean leaders themselves, General Hodge is prepared to install a Korean Executive Cabinet with the following composition and functions:
   (a) The Executive Cabinet shall consist of a praesidium of 4 - 5 members who shall preside over a policy cabinet of 6 - 10 representatives of the major southern parties, (subsequently to be increased by representatives to be selected from each of the 8 southern provinces); and the 10 Korean heads of the departments and bureaus of the present military government.
   (b) The Executive Cabinet shall be responsible for determining, and supervising the execution of, all policies in the

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internal administration of southern Korea. They shall also have authority to make appointments to the Korean civil administration and to review appointments previously made by military government. In carrying out its functions, the Executive Cabinet shall be subject to the supreme authority of the Commanding General as exercised through his deputies.

(c) The Executive Cabinet will exercise its functions only temporarily pending the establishment of a provisional government of all Korea as specified in the Moscow Decision. None of its policies or appointments shall extend beyond its own life, nor shall they prejudice the freedom of action of a provisional government established under the Moscow Decision to determine new policies and make new appointments. Furthermore, the efforts of the Executive Cabinet must be directed toward its self-liquidation through the unification of the north and south, and to this end shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible with the Korean authorities in the north.

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Mr. Melvin called and gave the following information:

These are statements taken from a short manuscript that is being sent to the Farmers Weekly:

A total of 67,060 metric tons of chemical fertilizer has been received in south Korea and is now on the road from the ports to the farmers. This fertilizer consists of:

56,345 metric tons of ammonian nitrate.
8,692.5 metric tons of pot ash
1,900 metric tons of rock phosphate.
66 937

These fertilizers have been imported into South Korea from the United States through the efforts of the Department of Agriculture. All farmers who are coopemating in the rice collection program will have an opportunity to buy these fertilizers at a low price. The fertilizers are being distributed by the Korea Agricultural Association direct to the farmers.

It is generally considered that for each ton of fertilizer there will be an increase in the rice crop of two tons. Thus, from the amount imported we can assume that the increase from this source alone will reach roughly 134,000 metric tons of rice.

The ammonian nitrate fertilizer is very strong. It should be used carefully, only about half as much as ordinary nitrate fertilizer. It is recommended especially for dry land crops. It can be used, however, on rice paddies and when so used waste will be reduced by applying in small quantities in four or five separate applications after transplanting.

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Initial
1
2
3

HOW AN ELECTION IS HELD

First a meeting is called of the Gun masters which are the subdivisions of a province (counties) and information is given as to what will be voted on and the printed and sample ballots are handed out. Home Affairs handle all ballots and administration. The Gun masters leave and then call a meeting of the Myun Jans and give them the same information. They leave and call a meeting of the Ku Jans who in turn leave and call a meeting of the Ban leaders. A Ban is around 10 families. The Bans hold an election and each head of a family votes. Thus, with the head of each family voting, 10 persons would be voting from 10 families. If the voting would be on representatives, 1 representative would be voted for each 10 families or major fraction thereof. In the case of the 4-H, they vote for or against. Then after the Bans hold their election, they send the results of the election up to the Ku. In this case, they count the votes to decide whether the Ku was for or against. The results of this were sent up to the Myun to see whether they were for or against. After the results are sent up to the Gun and they decide whether the Gun was for or against, they go up to the Province and there they are decided whether for or against. In the case of representatives, the Ban would elect a representative, either one or two. If just 10 families or under, they would elect 1. If 10 and a major fraction over, they would elect 2. They would go up to the Ku. At the Ku they would elect 4 in this province, from the 4 that the Ban sent up. They would go from the Ku up to the Myun and they would elect 4 that would go up to the Gun. The Gun would elect 4 that would go up to the Province and that would go up to the Province which would give 4 in the Province. All Guns are entitled to elect 4. There are 23 Guns which would elect 92.

The very minimum of time in which this election could be made would be two weeks.

Described by Col. Anderson, Gov. of Kyonggi, where a test election on 4-H club is being held.

Gen Arnold

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE
Seoul, Korea

11 February 1946

SUBJECT: Forwarding of Classified Mail.

TO: The War Department, Operations Division, attention Brigadier General Ritchie.

1. Enclosed are two sheets, corrections for the copy of "Urgent Economic Problems pertaining to Renewal of Interchange of Goods and Services between North and South Korea - Statement by U.S. Delegation. Agenda Items 1, 2, 5a. Seoul Conference, 4 February 1946" which was given to General Ritchie by Major General Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Delegation, in Seoul Korea about the fifth of February 1946.

2. Enclosed is a receipt for the above documents, for signature and return to Office of Major General Arnold, United States Army Military Government In Korea, APO 235, Postmaster, San Francisco.

BY DIRECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

PAGE H GILMAN
1st Lt
Aide-de-Camp

3 Encl:

1 - Erratum for Statement by U.S. Delegation
2 - Substiution for Statement by U.S. Delegation
3 - Receipt for 1 and 2.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

RECEIVED OF 1st Lt Page H Gilman, the following SECRET Documents:

1. Erratum for Statement of U.S. Delegation, 4 February 1946
2. Substitution for Statement of U.S. Delegation, 4 February 1946.

JAMES R. LANEY
Lt Col, GSC
Asst Executive
Strategy and Policy Group, OPD

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE
Seoul, Korea

6 February 1946

SUBJECT: Classified Documents.

TO: Colonel F.H. Britton.

1. Our records indicate that the following Classified Documents have been given to you in the past two weeks:

100/8, 105/5, 111/4, 114/2, 118/2, 128/7, 129/7, 130/7,

132/7, 134/7, 137/5, 139/5, 157/4,

2. Please indicate by indoresement that these documents have been destroyed as required by Army Regulations, or delivered to a named higher headquarters.

BY DIRECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

PHG
PAGE H GILMAN
1st Lt
Aide-de-Camp

(6 Feb 46) 1st Ind.

Colonel F. H. Britton.

TO: Chief, U. S. Delegation, U.S.-Soviet Joint Conference, Seoul, Korea. 13 February 1946.

Above numbered documents forwarded to Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

F. H. BRITTON
Colonel, G. S. C.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE
Seoul, Korea

6 February 1946

SUBJECT: Classified Documents.

TO: Colonel J.C. Underwood.

1. Our records indicate that the following Classified Documents have been given to you in the past two weeks:

$\frac{110}{2}$, $\frac{111}{2}$, $\frac{114}{6}$, $\frac{118}{10}$, $\frac{128}{3}$, $\frac{129}{3}$, $\frac{130}{3}$, $\frac{132}{8}$,

$\frac{134}{5}$, $\frac{137}{7}$, $\frac{139}{7}$, $\frac{142}{3}$, $\frac{158}{7}$,

2. Please indicate by indorsement that these documents have been destroyed as required by Army Regulations.

BY DIRECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

PAGE H GILMAN
1st Lt
Aide-de-Camp

1st Ind 7 February 1946

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA, BUREAU OF MINING AND INDUSTRY, Seoul, Korea

TO : United States-Soviet Joint Conference, Seoul, Korea.
Attn: PAGE H. GILMAN, 1st Lt., Aide-de-Camp.

Classified documents indicated above have been destroyed by burning.

JOHN C. UNDERWOOD
Colonel, CAC

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE
Seoul, Korea

6 February 1946

SUBJECT: Classified Documents

TO: Mr. H.W. Benninghoff

1. Our records indicate the following Classified Documents have been given to you and Mr. Emmons in the past two weeks:

$\frac{100}{9}$, $\frac{105}{2}$, $\frac{110}{5}$, $\frac{111}{6}$, $\frac{114}{11}$, $\frac{118}{6}$, $\frac{128}{6}$, $\frac{129}{6}$,

$\frac{130}{6}$, $\frac{132}{6}$, $\frac{134}{6}$, $\frac{137}{6}$, $\frac{139}{6}$, $\frac{158}{6}$, $\frac{111}{9}$.

2. Please indicate by indorsement that these documents have been destroyed or forwarded to a named higher headquarters.

BY DIRECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Page H Gilman

PAGE H GILMAN
1st Lt
Aide-de-Camp

TO: Lt. Page H. Gilman

From: H.M.Benninghoff

Receipt is acknowledged of the documents enumerated above, except that I have 132/7, not 132/6.

These documents will be forwarded to the Department of State by safe hand. In the meantime they are kept in my safe.

H. M. Benninghoff

H.M.Benninghoff

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE
Seoul, Korea

6 February 1946

SUBJECT: Classified Documents

TO: Lt.Colonel G.B. Enders.

1. Our records indicate that the following Classified Documents have been given to you in the past two weeks:

$\frac{114}{5}$, $\frac{118}{5}$,

2. Please indicate by indorsement that these documents have been destroyed as required by Army Regulations.

BY DIRECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

PAGE H GILMAN
1st Lt
Aide-de-Camp

(MGFOR) 1st Ind GBE/tdl

TO: HQ U.S. - SOVIET JOINT CONFERENCE, Seoul, Korea.
7 February 1946.

1. Above mentioned documents were burned this date by me in the presence of Captain Charles Jens 0472494, a disinterested officer.

GORDON B. ENDERS
Lt Col MI
Chief For Aff Sec

CHARLES A. JENS
Capt CMP
For Aff Section

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Civil Administrator
Seoul, Korea

14 February 1946

SUBJECT: Survey of Political Parties in South Korea

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department
General Staff, Washington, 25, D. C.

In compliance with your radio cite WAR 93923, the following report on political parties in Korea South of the 38th degree parallel is submitted.

Name	Leaders		
	Pres.	Vice-Pres.	Other Prominent Members
Korean Democratic Party Han Kook Min Chu Dang (Conservative)	KIM Syung Su	Woon Sei Hun	Sin Ik Hwan KIM Lyun Yun KIM Syung No Lyn Gong Yo CHO Han Koo Kang Syung Syn

Estimated Strength: 50,000
Political Program:
Establish freedom of speech, press, open assembly, association, political thought, and religion
Government control of public utilities and important basic industries.
Organized land system to promote welfare of the farmers.
Affiliations: Korean Patriotic Women's Associations(Koryo Chong Nyung Fyn Dang)
Young Korea Party(Koryo Chong Nyung Dang)

Korean Communist Party ChoSun Kong San Dang (liberal, leftist organization)	PARK Hawn Yawng	Lee Kwan Sul	LEE Yung Choi LEE Chu Ho CHAI Yung Bal Ha Pyo Won CHO Bu Won

Estimated Strength: 3,000. At the present time there are very few (Russian-trained Communists) in South Korea. The followers of the Communist Party are poor, ignorant peasants who, after the Japanese surrender, succumbed to the propaganda of the Communist leaders. The very large number of farmers who are followers of the Communist leaders should not be considered members of the party.
Program:

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Establish construction of the nation on the basis of Bourgeoisie democracy
Establish freedom of speech, assembly, religion, compulsory education, the 8-hour day, and equality of men and women.
Confiscate lands of Japanese imperialists and Korean "Racial Traitors", Korean landlords, temples, Confucian monasteries, middle-class landowners, except such portions as shall be left to them for subsistance.
Distribute such territories to farmers who have little or no cultivated land.
The custody of the appropriated lands shall be vested in the "farmers'" Committee until the Revolutionary Government of the Korean people is established.
Nationalization of forests and rivers and utilities.
Affiliations:
Young Communist League(Long [illegible] Chun Yun Kyun Lang Maing)

Korean Nationalist Party — KIM Chai Lung
Cho Sun Nook Min Dang

KYUNG Chai Lei and
[illegible] Yung Mi
LEE Kong Bok
LEE Kyung Jin
LEE I Chik
PAK Tei Yung

(liberal, nationalist, rightist organization)

Estimated strength: 150,522
Program:
Establish a new, democratic principle, based upon labor and upon raising standard of living of the masses.
Call an assembly representative of all men and women.
Establish government control of basic industries and restraint on huge profits.
Affiliations:
Social Democratic Party (Saw Hay Min Chu Dan
Republican Party (Kong Ha Dang)
The Freedom Party (Chei OO Dang)

Korean People's Party — LYUH Woon Kyung
Cho Sun In Min Dang

None

LEE U Sung
Hyawn O Kywan
KIM Cha Yong
HAN Il Chai
PAK Yung Chil
LEE Sok Kan

(liberal, leftist organization)

Estimated strength: 300,000
Program:
Establish freedom of speech, publication, assembly, union, and religion.

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Distribute arable lands justly to farmers and establish an agricultural program.
Establish state management of key industries, leaving medium industries to be managed freely under the supervision of the state.
Have state control of medical associations, and establish more of these public institutions.
Affiliations: None known

Korean Nationalist Party — Man Yong Shin
or
Korean Racialist Party — O Sei Chan
Sin Han Min Chok Dang — Lee Kyu Hop
Lee Hap Sung
Lee [illegible]

(Conservative organization)
Estimated Strength: Unknown
Program:
Break up the social partiality of the large family system.
Confiscate the property of the Japanese and traitors and divide them among the farmers in accordance with their families and labor power.
Prevent foreigners from carrying away Korean equipment.
Affiliations: Unknown

FOR THE MILITARY GOVERNOR:

[illegible] H.Y., Jr
Colonel [illegible]
Civil Administrator

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5 March 1946

The following is a transcript of a meeting held on 4 March 1946 at Pyongyang, Korea between General Shamin and Colonel R. H. Booth:

Colonel Booth: First we want to get all the papers signed. General Hodge has signed all copies. I would like to go over some points in protocol. Has General Chistiakov approved them as submitted?

General Shamin: No, the following changes were made:

Item No. 7 Control Points.
Paragraph 3. Formulated differently. Signed and mentioned changes are attached. Stop after the word commands and the balance eliminated.

Item No. 8 Eliminate paragraph 2 and changed paragraph 3 to read, "Mutually permit movement from one zone to another of students of universities. School pupils living in the vicinity of the boundary between the zones of military responsibility will be permitted to attend schools in either zone.

Item No. 13 The broadcasting frequency for Seoul station changed to 2450 kc (or 2460 if technically preferable). The reason for this change is to prevent interference with a Russian station outside Korea.

Colonel Booth: Cannot put any change into effect until General Hodge has approved. Lets go over each item. Starting with Item No. 3, paragraph 11. When will your group be ready to operate and in Seoul.

General Shamin: General Chistiakov just signed the papers yesterday so committee is not ready. Do you have any changes?

Colonel Booth: No, General Hodge approved all items as submitted.

General Shamin: I propose the transportation committee be established in two (2) weeks.

Colonel Booth: Would like it to be earlier, <u>within</u> two (2) weeks.

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General Shamin: OK, paragraph 4 has no changes.

Colonel Booth: Paragraph 5 of Item 3. What about the exchange points?

General Shamin: The committe will decide.

Colonel Booth: I have nothing additional on Item No. 5b at this time so will leave it open. Item No. 7, change is acceptable.

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General Shamin: Our headquarters will have to arrange (within two (2) weeks) the location of control points. Would like General Garvin to submit a plan.

No 8

Colonel Booth: Item No. 8 will not be acted upon at all until General Hodge has seen General Chistiakov's changes and has approved them. If General Hodge approves changes a telephone call from General Hodge indicating approval will be sufficient to put the item into effect (Such will do away with travel).

General Shamin: OK

Colonel Booth: Item No. 9. Can we set date for mail exchange?

General Shamin: Within two (2) weeks.

Colonel Booth: Why not set a date? We have Colonel May, Civil Administrator, here. Communications come under him and he can direct Colonel Herlihy.

General Shamin: First exchange will be on 15th.

Colonel Booth : Can we make it earlier?

General Shamin:(Balasanov) We must make plans at Kaesong. We'll have to get a building and necessary personnel.

Colonel Booth: Lets set the date as 1000 on 15th, with later exchange made as requested by either commands. On Item N. 11 do you have an answer?

General Shamin: No.

Colonel Booth: When might we expect an answer?

General Shamin: I don't know.

Colonel Booth: Communications between here and Seoul are poor. Would like to make arrangements to keep those lines operating. They are not in number one condition now.

General Shamin: Its an American responsibility because on Soviet zone the operation is OK.

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Colonel Booth: I disagree, as soon as I got accross the 38th degree line into American zone communications were OK. Main trouble is at border because lines are not continious. We must have two (2) thru lines. That is what I want to organize here.

General Shamin: That comes under Item No. 15.

Colonel Booth: What about Item No. 14?

General Shamin: It is being studied.

Colonel Booth: Don't you have an answer yet? General Hodge is anxious for an answer. Item No. 8 is contingent upon this item. We don't want to establish control points if there is going to be change in boundry in the very near future.

General Shamin: We will use the posts as exist on 38 now and if there are changes we will move them up.

Colonel Booth: That puts a different light on Item No. 8. I said at first the change in Item No. 8 were acceptable. We should be able to get a decision on ~~this~~ item 14 by this time. General Hodge will want to know whether there is going to be a change in boundary before acting on No. 8.

General Shamin: There is no relations between these items. The posts have to be established on existing boundary anyway.

Colonel Booth: It is difficult to move troops around. It seems unnecessary to do all this work of establishing billets and communications if changes are in offing within the next 2 or 3 days. When may we expect an answer on this?

General Shamin: As soon as study is completed.

Colonel Booth: It has been six (6) weeks since these proposed changes were presented. How much longer will it take?

General Shamin: That is hard to answer.

Colonel Booth: General Hodge instructed me to emphasize the importance of this point. I want an answer one way or the other.

General Shamin: I cannot give a final answer because I have no answer from the experts.

Colonel Booth: In view of General Hodges interest as the American Commander in South Korea I suggest a request be forwarded to experts to expedite this matter.

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General Shamin: It is being studied by the experts.

Colonel Booth: They've had six (6) weeks and apparently are working slowly. Lets see if we can give them the needle. I would like to tell General Hodge that General Chistiakov has sent a message to the experts to speed them up. Our government has asked about this several times and General Hodge would like to give them an answer.

General Shamin: Will report General Hodges request to General Chistiakov.

Action

Colonel Booth: Item No. 15. When will you be ready for this exchange? (Liaison groups)

General Shamin: Within two (2) weeks.

Colonel Booth: Why don't you send someone back with me? Lets put it into effect. It is agreed upon. Why wait?

General Shamin: Within Two (2) weeks.

Colonel Booth: Lets make it sooner. We have lot of work to do before commission meets.

General Shamin: Representatives of American command can come immediately, representatives of Soviet command within two (2) weeks.

Colonel Booth: Our representatives may fly to Pyongyang tomorrow?

General Shamin: We need two (2) days notice.

Action

Colonel Booth: I will set the date as the 6th or 7th. We will send a jeep. They will come by train. In the meantime I want one telephone line fixed with no switchboard, etc.

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General Shamin: OK. Would like to know names.

Colonel Booth: Will phone tomorrow. There will be two or three persons. Will they have an office in this building?

General Shamin: We will give them an office and good quarters. They will be satisfied. Will probably get a separate house.

Colonel Booth: Fine.

General Shamin: I am ready to give you the minutes signed by General Chistiakov.

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Colonel Booth: General Chistiakov will sign the papers I brought so we can take our copies back as agreed previously.

General Shamin: Our copies are all signed with the changes as discussed.

Colonel Booth: You got the letter regarding fertilizer and the Joint Secretariat.

General Shamin: Yes.

Colonel Booth: Have you any information which I can give General Hodge regarding the fertilizer?

General Shamin: We have a factory in operation manufacturing fertilizer and have some on hand but cannot determine the amount to send because of transportation difficulties. Under what condition can we send the fertilizer? General Hodge knows point of view on exchange of this command. General Hodge has'nt given any definite answer. How will we settle accounts?

Colonel Booth: General Hodge's letter states that we will have a meeting. The last paragraph of the letter calls for an early meeting to determine the methods of payment.

General Shamin: Our representatives met and discussed this item at Seoul but did not come to any decision. Would like to know conditions for payment so delivery can be started.

Colonel Booth: I am not authorized to make any committments. General Hodge did not delegate that authority to me. All I would like to get is a decision whether General Chistiakov will agree to a meeting of representatives to discuss this matter.

General Shamin: General Chistiakov is sick and cannot discuss the question. I will speak to him about it.

Colonel Booth: Would like to get names of your commissioners and the number of personnel accompanying for the commission so we can work all details be forehand.

General Shamin: Will be able to give you a list on 8th of month and will then send an officer to Seoul to handle the planning.

Colonel Booth: I must know before that, approximately how many.

General Shamin: There will be 5 commissioners, 10 experts, 10 secretaries and interpreters (5 or 6 women), 7 or 6 cars with drivers, 15 guards, cooks and some housekeeping personnel totalling approximately 80 people.

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Colonel Booth: Will any of them live on the train?

General Shamin: Some on the train, some in houses. The communications detail will stay on train.

Colonel Booth: How many will stay on train?

General Shamin: Rather hard to say.

Colonel Booth: The approximate number.

General Shamin: About 30 on train.

Colonel Booth: That means quarters for about 50. We have a house for the chairman who I believe is General Shtikov. The house in which a number lived last time is available and will be used again. We have no room in the hotel now. There will be a barracks building for the troops.

General Shamin: No rooms in hotel?

Colonel Booth: Maybe in an emergency but not of permanent nature. You will have all your housekeeping personnel and rations?

General Shamin: Yes.

Colonel Booth: How about office supplies, typewriters, etc?

General Shamin: Our own.

Colonel Booth: How about your transportation?

General Shamin: Will have our own.

Colonel Booth: Will you need gas or oil?

General Shamin: Yes. You will meet us at the station because our transport will be loaded.

Colonel Booth: We will arrange for gas and oil. What about the joint secretariat? We sent a proposal.

General Shamin: We received your letter but could'nt study it because General Chistiakov is sick. I believe it will be approved.

Colonel Booth: We believe such will help the situation and eliminate some of the trouble we had before. Will you bring cots, sheets and pillows?

General Shamin: Will bring only for those who live on train.

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Colonel Booth: What about cooking utensils and dishes?

General Shamin: Would like to have it all fixed up. We will need bread.

Colonel Booth: I understood you to say that before the group arrives someone will come ahead to check details.

General Shamin: That is correct.

Colonel Booth: I will have the liaison group report to you General Shamin for duty and would like to have it so it can report to you for instructions. It will have a letter of instructions and we'll send you a copy so you will know what it can do.

General Shamin: OK

Colonel Booth: I have a letter from General Hodge to General Chistiakov which I would like to explain. It has to do with a ship from Dairen which came directly to Inch'on with Korean repatriates. Got clearance at Dairen and came directly to Inch'on without notification. I realize this is out of General Chistiakov's authority but would like to deal through General Chistiakov to get the information to the Manchuria commander and get these movements coordinated in the future. This is the only means of communication we have now.

General Shamin: How many aboard?

Colonel Booth: 317 Koreans.

General Shamin: Would you like for General Chistiakov to refer this to higher command?

Colonel Booth: This is only way we have to get this to higher command and would like for General Chistiakov to handle the matter and get General Hodge's viewpoint in this matter. Yesterday we set a tenative date for opening commission on 11 March. Is that agreeable with General Chistiakov?

General Shamin: General Shtikov will be chairman. He is sick now and has to stay indoors. Will start the first meeting on 13th and maybe 11th. Will try to be there on 11th but perhaps it will be 13th. Will report definitely on 8 March.

Colonel Booth: Will balance report on 8th?

General Shamin: on 8th one person will come to give information as to when balance will come.

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General Shamin (Con't): Monday in Russian is a bad day to start anything. It should start on 11th but since General Shtikov is undergoing treatment it may be delayed.

Colonel Booth: If possible I would like to meet General Chistiakov while I am here.

General Shamin: General Chistiakov appologizes that he cannot see you. He is being attended by a doctor at his house. He regrets that he is not able to meet you.

Colonel Booth: Can you give me the names of the five members of the commission at this time.

General Shamin: The members have'nt been appointed because General Chistiakov and Shtikov are sick. They have to meet and discuss some things. That is why we have had delays in decisions.

Colonel Booth: Any other points. Will call tomorrow giving names of liaison group. They will be up on 6th or 7th. Do you have anything General Shamin which we have not covered.

General Shamin: No questions. The American Commander requests liquid chlorine; first would like the return of containers previously sent. Would like payment but we don't want money.

Colonel Booth: Such as what?

General Shamin: Foodstuffs such as rice.

Colonel Booth: I might give you this information. The rice situation is bad in South Korea too. Mr Maslov is going to have to drink bad water if we do not get chlorine. We can arrange for containers. How much can we get -- without rice?

General Shamin: We will give you chlorine without rice but will put it on the bill.

Colonel Booth: We expect to pay, but not rice. We will send information with liaison officer relative to our minimum chlorine need. Will present a plan regarding the transportation of the chlorine and the return of the containers. The plans will indicate how much chlorine is necessary to take care of an emergency condition.

General Shamin: Would like liaison officers to bring conditions regarding the fertilizer.

Colonel Booth: OK. We must needle the experts regarding the boundary situation. Can you let me know before we leave this evening what General Chistiakov says?

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General Shamin: He is sick.

Colonel Booth: Thought maybe you would talk to him.

General Shamin: We will give two needles.

Colonel Booth: We plan to leave about 7 this evening. We want to get back in time to go to the office tomorrow morning.

General Shamin: Colonel Booth you are invited to a dinner at General Shamin's place after dinner you can leave.

Colonel Booth: OK.

Note----Russians decided not to bring guards for Palace because they thought our guards would be adequate.

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CONFERENCE HELD BY COMMANDING GENERAL IN HIS OFFICE AT 051630 MARCH

PRESENT WERE: Major General Albert E. Brown
Brig. General John Weckerling
Major C. N. Weems, Jr., Military Government
1st Lt Kenneth G. Althaus, ADC
Dr. M. M. Lee, Interpreter
Mr. Kim, Koo
Mr. Yi, Si Yung
Mr. Cho, Wang Gyu
Mr. Yu, Rim

J-C
Gen. Weckerling

GENERAL BROWN: I appreciate very much the gentlemen coming to see me. I asked them to come in to talk about a proclamation a copy of which I have in my possession. This proclamation concerns the formation of a Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. It is Proclamation No. 1. It reads: "Whether our country continues to exist or is lost, Japan is right on today. We, the Korean people, who are the sons of Tan Koo, let us not regret in the future." You are asked to keep this Proclamation from the Headquartersof the Special Action Group. In the event anyone violates the following article, he will be punished severely. Pay especial attention. One, any official of the present Military Government who violates the orders of the Korean National Provisional Government, all people who useinflammatory language or inflammatory literature against the Korean National Provisional Government, those individuals who help perpetuate or anyone disturbing the public, any profiteer who threatens the public livelihood, any person performing any action hurting morals or anyone who does anything bringing shame to the Nation, take han nation, 29 year, 3rd month, 3rd day, Korean National Provisional Government, Special Action Headquarters.

Now, that Proclamation constitutes a practical declaration of war against the United States of America. The Commanding General of the United

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States forcesin Korea is the agent of the United States of America. I am informed that the four gentlemen seated in front of me are four of the leaders in the Orgnization charged with the responsibility for that Proclamation. I want to ask these gentlemen how they are going to govern Korea under a Provisional Government. I would like to ask specifically how they plan to run the railroads, how they plan to get the necessary money, how they plan on getting gasoline and oil and motor transportation, and finally, how do they plan on getting rid of the United States Government in Korea. I would be glad to have any of you gentlemen answer those questions.

MR. KIM, KOO: I do not know the existence of such a document.

GENERAL BROWN: You tell Mr. Kim, Koo that I asked him questions and I want to add to those questions: How ishegoing to collect and distribute rice, how is he going to maintain law and order in South Korea. Tell him I would like answers to those questions. He and his fellow leaders set themselves up as headsof the new government. Tell him I would like to knowhowhe is going to run that government.

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee interprets): May I continue and interpret what Mr. Kim, Koo had to say. He says he doesn't know of the existence of this document, and he also says he intended to call on you to take up this matter pertaining to the so-called Provisional Government, and he maintains that there is no foundation whatsoever concerning the organization of the Provisional Government for Korea.

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GENERAL BROWN: You tell Mr. Kim, Koo that I asked him to come to my office about ten days ago to discussthis matter, that he did not come but sent Miss Susane Ahn. I gave Miss Susana Ahn a message for Mr. Kim, Koo, and amongst other statements in that message I told her to caution him against the foolishness of the action that he now apparently has taken. In view of the evidence before me, I have no other course than to believe that Mr. Kim, Koo hasactually participated in an effort to bring into being a Provisional Government. I have asked him and these other gentlemen to come here this afternoon to simply point out to them a few facts. I assume that not answering my questions as to how they propose to conduct this government after its creation, that they are not able to do so. I want to invite attention to the fact that the Commanding General of the United States forces in Korea, in addition to the Police force constabulary, has a strong American force in Korea. In addition to the forces in Korea, there are ample reinforcements in Japan. The United States Government stands behind the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Korea to help enforce thepolicies of the United States. It is the duty of the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Korea to maintain law and order. The action of Proclamation I is a direct threat to law and order. If that Proclamation is distributed, quite likely great disorder will result. If disorder did result, the Commanding General would be forced to use the means at his disposal to suppress it. The inevitable result would be the death of many innocent persons. The responsibility for such deaths would rest on the leaders who have instigated this Provisional Government. Those leaders will be held responsible by me, by my Government and by the world. and that responsibility will include one absent leader who from the United States has been assisting in this movement.

I appreciate, General Hodge appreciates, the President of the United States and many Americans appreciate the desire of Koreans for independence.

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That independence can only be obtained in a legal manner. Illegal action such as the Proclamation of a Provisional Government can only lead to death, destruction and defeat. If those responsible for this movement persist in carrying it through, I will have no other course to take except to proceed with all the power at my disposal to suppress it, and I can assure you gentlemen that I will do so promptly, aggressively and completely. The result will probably be that many innocent persons will be injured or killed, Korea will be disgraced in the eyes of the world. When it is all over, Military Government will still be in Korea and the Provisional Government will be non-existent.

Now, if, as Mr. Kim Koo says, he and hisassociates know nothing of Proclamation No. I, I am happy to learn that. If that is the case, I am going to ask Mr. Kim Koo and the other leaders associated with him to assist me in preventing this disgraceful action which can bring only harm to his nation.

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): He says that it is regrettable for the fact that you and other Americans are taking the Provisional Government as a revolting or defiant institution; in fact, the Provisional Government is not anything new. They formed this Provisional Government about 29 years ago, and it hasbeen existing as a Provisional Government since the Declaration of Independence in 1919. When the members of the Provisional Government were about to return to Korea, they proclaimed fourteen points, and after their return to Korea, they told the people that they would set up a complete independent government for Korea. Some time ago four million Koreans sent petition to him to strengthen the Provisional Government, and the Provisional Government has two objects to achieve: First, they want to appeal to the foreign powers to recognize the Provisional Government. He read five articles

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that you issued on the Moscow Decision and he confessed that he cannot accept Trusteeship without any objection. Now he also hadsecond object in mind, in accordence with appeal of the four million people, he filled up some vacancies and reorganized the Provisional Government, and he wanted to proclaim the newly set up Provisional Government to the People. Before he does it, he wanted to take up this matter with you.

GENERAL BROWN: There can be no Provisional Government in South Korea. There can be but one government in South Korea and that is the United States Government. There can be but one legal government in any one country at one time. The Military Government as established by the United States of America is the only legal government in South Korea and will remain so until the Provisional Government is created under the Moscow Agreement. Any attempt by any group of Koreans to establish any other government in South Korea can lead to nothing but failure. It can accomplish no other purpose than injury to Koreans and to Korea.

MR. CHO, WANG GYU (Interpreter): Mr. Cho, Wang Gyu says that he does not know the existence of the Proclamation you read. In fact he and hisassociates wouldn't have done anything of that kind. When they returned to Korea, they returned to this land in their individual and personal capacity. However, after their return to this land, the people wanted them to act as a government, but they didn't do so because: first, they want to form an interim government; and moreover, they appreciate what the Allies did for liberating Korea and for the promise they made to restore the independence to Korea. Therefore, ever since their return to Korea, they have been waiting for the establishment of a Provisional Government. Almost a year and a half passed and nothing has been done, except an imposition of Trusteeship on Korea, and

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he and his associates do not like this Trusteeship Provision in the Moscow Decision, and he and his associates and the Korean people are rather uneasy about the Trusteeship Provision, and the people try to get some sort of solution and they want to devise some sort of means to solve the deadlock in Korea. You are referring to the ways and means whereby they could operate the Military Government, and Mr. Cho, Pang Gyu confessed that he hasn't given much thought to the ways and means to operate a government. Although it is known as Provisional Government in name, it is not a Provisional Government in the strict sense. It is only the leading organization, or, if you want to call it, the headquarters of the Korean Independence Movement. In 1919 the Provisional Government was formed, and there were a good many Koreans who had blood shed in order to bring about this precious provisional government, and for that reason, the people have great respect and love for this Provisional Government, andin the midst of this confusion, the people wanted them to act as Provisional Government and to expand or reorganize the Provisional Government. And he says that he and his associates have no intention of declaring a war against America and they are not going to act as a government, and if this Provisional Government means anything at all, this is an expression of the aspirations of the people and the Provisional Government is going to be the leading force of the Korean Independence Movement, and he hopes that you and your associates in the Military Government will understand the pain and the trouble they have in their hearts. He assures you that he and his associates are not going to run a Provisional Government in Korea, and he and hisassociates have no intention of disturbing peace and order in Korea.

GENERAL BROWN: Ask him who issued Proclamation No. I.

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MR. CHO, WANG GYU (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Cho, Wang Gyu says that he does not know, and Mr. Kim, Koo says

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Kim, Koo says to the extent that sort of literature was manufactured by somebody in order to damage the cause of the Provisional Government.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell him that inasmuch as that Proclamation has been sent to the Provinces and some people believe it, I want them to deny it tomorrow as having come from the Provisional Government. I want that done publicly tomorrow in the press.

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Kim, Koo says that would not be a difficult task because he and his associates never made it.

GENERAL BROWN: Ask him if he will publicly deny it ?

MR. CHO, WANG GYU (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): He says that it could be done easily, but even if they issued a denial today, it couldn't be put in tomorrow. And he further says that since he and his associates haven't done it, reading between lines, he doesn't see the reason why they have to deny it.

GENERAL BROWN: Because everybody believes they did do it and in order to settle the question they must deny it. If they don't want to publish a press release tonight, ask Mr. Kim Koo to write me a letter stating that he and his associates are not responsible for it and I will publish the letter.

MR. CHO, WANG GYU: It is worth considering.

MR. KIM, KOO: It is not such a difficult problem.

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MR. CHO, MAN GYU (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Cho says that he may consider your situation, but even this morning he and his associates talked about this Proclamation No. I and they did not know the source of it, and without knowing the source of it, how could they deny it. That is to say, if somebody issues that sort of Proclamation in order to damage their cause, then even without knowing who did it, they have to deny it every time it comes out, so he doesn't see any logic to it. He says that if this document is published with a name of the Korean Provisional Government, then it is a different matter, but it is published by Korean Provisional Government Special ctivitiesCommittee or something to that effect, and he says that he and his associates would not be so coward to issue any proclamation with the name which is something different from the Korean Provisional Government.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell him that all I want him to do is either make a statement or write me a letter stating that the Korean Provisional Government did not publish this, does not support it and knows anything about it. If I cannot get such a statement then I must assume that they are responsible for it as it comes from their organization. And it is a very serious charge because it means that every leader of that organization is guilty under General MacArthur's Proclamation II of endangering the security of the United States Forces and isliable to imprisonment and prosecution. And if that proclamation is published, I will have no other course except to proceed to take action against those charged with the guilt.

MR KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Kim Koo says that you have Police force in South Korea, and using them you must have ways of tracing back the source of this Proclamation No. I.

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GENERAL BROWN: Tell him we have traced it directly to his organization.

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr Lee, Interpreter): He says that it is a framed work and somebody wants to pass that responsibility to them for which they are not responsible.

GENERAL BROWN: All right, then; tell him to deny it.

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): And he cannot deny every statement comes out which he does not know, and it would be an endless work; and if he is to cooperate with the Military Government, he would do it in a constructive way instead of making denial every time this sort of statement is popped up.

GENERAL BROWN: O.K., if that is his word on it.

MR. YU, RIM (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Yu, Rim says both Koreans and Americans want to have Korean Independence. Koreans had their own way of fighting for their own independance, whereas America sacrificed a great deal in order to free Korea. Since American is Korea's best friend, even today Koreans expect a great deal out of the United States and Americans. As to the history of this Military Government, everybody knows it well. While the Provisional Government was formed first in Shanghai, they had their headquarters in the French Settlement with the understanding of the French authorities. During World War No. II, the Provisional Government moved to Chung King, and with the understanding and aid of the Chinese Government, they had their headquarters right in Chung King. The Provisional Government negotiated with various nations to get recognition, but they could not get

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the recognition; therefore, when they returned to Korea, they had to come back in an individual capacity instead of in the collective capacity, and ever since their return to Korea, they have expected the United States and Russia to do a great deal for Korea in restoring her independence. As time went by there was no sign of obtaining this independence; but on the contrary, the Trusteeship was to be imposed upon Korea, and all those who have been working for Korean independence the last 40 or 50 years cannot endure this, and not only the leaders but the masses, 30 million masses, are disappointed. The masses are associating Trusteeship with the Japanese domination, and they actually have fear--they don't want anything but a complete independence for their own country. So the people in provinces, numbering four million, representing 408 various patriotic organizations, sent petition to these gentlemen to act as an agent in bringing about Korean independence as soon as possible; and moreover, the people wanted them to get recognition of the Provisional Government from various powers. When they received this petition from forty million people, they could not turn down their appeal, even if they received punishment as a result of the violation of General MacArthur's Proclamation No. II--they simply had no heart to turn down the people. What they actually wanted to do is to retain the same organization of the Provisional Government and the same personnel, but unfortunately there was some members of the Provisional Government who took sides with the Communists and some died; so there was the question of filling up the vacancies. This Provisional Government is nothing but the leading force of the Korean Independence Movement. They have no desire to clash with Americans in Korea. Infact, they rather expect help, very generous help, from the United States, because they believe that the Provisional Government is something old and something respected by every patriotic Korean, and this Provisional Government is an agent which will

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lead the people to obtain their independence. Mr. Yu does not understand why you andother American friends would be dissatisfied with the reorganization of the Provisional Government. Since your main duty is to maintain law and order in Korea, it is natural that you fear lest the public safety would be disripted; but there is no worry, because they are not going to disturb the peace and order in South Korea, and infact they want to cooperate with the Military Government, because they want to obtain their independence as soon as possible. Therefore, if you are worrying about the disturbances, then there is no use for the worry, because they do not see the wisdom of disturbing the peace. As to this Proclamation No. II that you referred to, Mr. Yu confessed that he doesnot know the existence of it and the source of it, and if you want them to make any kind of public denial, it could be done. But you have to trust them and you have to accept them as leaders with respectable reputation and personality, and if you do not trust them at all, there is no use of obtaining a certain pledge or document with their names and seals because they will do something again to cause you trouble; but they assure you that they are honorable and respectful leaders and they are men of integrity, and if they say "no" it means "no". Therefore, Mr. Yu wishes you to accept their "no" at its face value, and if you do not trust them, it is really regrettable. He says that he didn't know what was going on and who did issue this kind of proclamation, andif you have any evidence proving that he and his associates participated in publishing this Proclamation No. I, they are willing to accept and assume the responsibility coming therefrom. So it is a matter of trusting each other.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell Mr. Yu that if one publishes a document accusing me of doing something, it seems to me that the least I can do is to deny it, that I am responsible. The document which I have in front of me has on it

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Korean National Provisional Special Action Group Headquarters.

DR. LEE: You don't have the original ?

GENERAL BROWN: No, I do not have the original.

MR. YU, HIM: Mr. Yu says there is no organization like that and even now he does not know the existence of such an organization.

MR. KIM, KOO: Mr. Kim Koo says that while the Provisional Government was in Chung King, China, he approached General Wedemeyer to recognize the Provisional Government as a Defacto Government, but the General said that that matter should be referred to the State Department because he had military affairs only under his charge. So he referred that matter to the State Department in Washington and they received a reply from the State Department giving two reasons why the American Government could not recognize the Korean Provisional Government. First, the Provisional Government is made up of the Koreans who hadbeen away from their land over thirty years, and if the Washington Government recognized the Provisional Government, either as a dejure government or as a defacto government, then a delicate problem comes up when a government is set up in Korea by the general will of the people in Korea. So, in order to avoid any complications to that effect, the State Department could not recognize the Provisional Government. And in the second place, the State Department maintained that there was no way of knowing whether these gentlemen of the Provisional Government were supported by the people in Korea or not. This reply brought an end to their negotiations with the Washington Government concerning the recognition. Mr. Kim Koo says that when heand his associates returned to Korea, everybody acclaimed them and everybody called Mr. Kim Koo the President of this Provisional Government. Wherever they went they were welcomed enthusiastically by the people. And why? He says that

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it is not because he is a great figure himself but because he and his associates kept the Provisional Government intact during all the treacherous years abroad. Now, Mr. Kim Koo maintains that the two objections that the State Department proposed have no place in Korea; for example, the people in town gave a grand reception, welcoming the return of the Provisional Government, and the same thing took place throughout the provinces. Then that indicates the people in Korea support the Provisional Government. And he is audacious enough to ask you to use your good office in obtaining the recognition for the Provisional Government. If you do that, you kill a good many birds with one stone. First, you eliminate all the restless atmosphere prevailing among the people because of the proposed Trusteeship for Korea. Moreover, you are giving a government, a good government to the Koreans. If you are going to transfer the administrative power from Americans to Koreans, do it to the Provisional Government. As to this talk about their hostile attitude toward the United States, there is no grounds, and even Dr. Rhee said that American troops should remain in South Korea. If the troops are going to evacuate from Korea at all, the American and Russian troops should evacuate simultaneously.

In conclusion, Mr. Kim Koo says that recognizing the Provisional Government is the best way, perhaps the only way, of solving the Korean problem very quickly and satisfactorily.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell Mr. Kim Koo the Provisional Government cannot be recognized as a government because the United States won't stand another government in South Korea.

I have one other question I wish to ask. I have before me a translation of an outline of congratulatory ceremonial procedure. This congratulatory procedure covers 13 items.

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Conference held by Commanding General in his office at 051630 March

DR. LEE: Where did it take place, what kind of document is it ?

GENERAL BROWN: We have confiscated over a thousand copies of this message. The decision at the end of this paper on Page 4 reads as follows: "We absolutely support the Korean temporary government which isinstalled under the decision that was made at the all-Korea representative meeting on March 1, Korea, 29, and we have decided to submit to its order. Korean year 29 March, name of Province, Hum Min Yon Wa Tel, and also the name of the group. To be signed by the Chairman and other members. The Congratulatory Meeting for the Installation of the Korean Government. We carefully present this decision. The date, March, blank, 29 Korean year. Addressed to the Chief of State, Korean Temporary Government."

The outline of the congratulatory ceremonial procedure covers the date of the congratulatory ceremony, which is to be seven days from the time that the cabinet is announced, which is designated as Congratulation Week. The Congratulatory Ceremony is described in detail; for instance, as follows: "Processions, ringing of bells, congratulatory feasts, ceremonies of various sorts, including unauthorized assemblies and parades, congratulatory cannon shots and fire-crackers, congratulatory lecture meetings requiring each school to have a talk before the students begin their lessons," and many similar instructions, that only an autocratic government would issue to its people.

I would like to ask these gentlemen if they are responsible for that document.

MR. KIM, KOO (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): Mr. Kim Koo says that he does not know the existence of such a document, but it would be only logical for those who want to have a Provisional Government set up for Korea to plan for

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a festival like this. He never received any document like that himself.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell these gentlemen that I appreciate their coming in. It is getting late and I have to run along. I want to show them that as long as they function as a political party within the law, they will get the same support from the government that all other political parties get; but if they insist on going outside of the law, they will be treated accordingly.

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6 Mar 46, Disposition Original Communication passed:

From: PUK CHOSUN IMSHI INMIN UI WON HWAE (Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea) Pyongyang Pyongan-Namdo, Korea

To: KANGWON-DO INMIN UI WON CHANG (Chairman of the People's Commissariat of Kangwon-Do (no address given)

POLITICAL ACTIVITY: REVISED RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PROVISIONAL PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF NORTH KOREA

A registered letter intercepted in the exchange of mail with the Russian authorities contains a pamphlet issued by the Puk Chosun Imshi Inmin Ui Won Hwae (Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea) and addressed to Kangwon-Do Inmin Ui Won Chang (Chairman of the People' Commissariat of Kangwon-Do Province. The pamphlet reads as follows:

Decision Number 3 6 March 1946

The Puk Chosun Imshi Inmin Ui Won Hwae (Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea) decided after serious debate at its second session, to adopt the Regulations of the Organization of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea which had been proposed by CHOI Yong Dal, the Director of the Bureau of Justice.

KIM Il Sawng (Ex: List KO 158)
The Chairman of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea

KANG Lyang Uk
Secretary of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea

REGULATIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROVISIONAL PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF NORTH KOREA

"I. The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea is organized as the supreme administrative governing body in North Korea under the decision of the combined committee which was composed of the representatives of the Local People's Commissariats, Democratic Parties and Public Organizations. Our objective is to improve and promote politics, economics and culture in North Korea.

II. The immediate tasks for the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea are:

1. Eliminating entirely the pro-Japanese and democratic reactionary elements, to employ men of ability to direct our work in all quarters and to enforce all local administrative rules and regulations.

2. To make every effort to prepare for and establish at the earliest possible time the Land Reformation, through which lands will be given to the farmers without cost. To adjust the matter of the lands and forests which have been forfeited by the Japanese invaders and pro-Japanese reactionary elements. To nationalize, in proper manner, the lands and forests of the great Korean landowners and to abolish the tenant system under which the tenant-farmer receives only half of the crop he has cultivated on the leased land.

3. Change the industrial enterprise so that they will supply the articles necessary for the people's lives and to develop further industries.

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4. To take control of railway traffic, water transportation, communications and highway transportation.

5. To adjust the system of monetary circulation, establish banks and formulate a firm policy for trade and business.

6. To reform and develop the small and middle class businesses and encourage and stimulate new enterprises and business men.

7. To further all possible labor movement. To thoroughly organize factory and workers committees in mining and transportation businesses.

8. To reform the educational system on a democratic basis, increasing the primary and middle schools. To arrange to train more teachers and to edit the Korean language textbooks.

9. In order to cleanse the people of the habits of servility due to the education system under the Japanese, we will train the people in the true democratic spirit and carry out the development of culture so that all classes will be enlightened.

10. To organize and develop a democratic system of justice and a Public Procurator's system.

11. To secure the public peace and protect the social order in North Korea.

12. To explain fully to all the people that the decision of the Moscow Conference of Prime Ministers as it pertains to Korea is the correct decision and the one that in the long run will prove the most advantageous for Korea.

13. To assist the General Headquarters of the Soviet forces in Korea in all their works.

III. The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea has, as the central governing body of North Korea, the authority to enact and promulgate those special laws and ordinances which shall be obeyed by all the people, public organizations and state departments in North Korea.

IV. The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea can correct or veto any decisions of any bureau of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea, the Provincial People's Commissariats or any other body, on its own volition or on recommendation of the Supreme Prosecutor of North Korea or the Headquarters of the Soviet Forces in Korea.

V. The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea shall be composed of twenty three commissars.

VI. The make-up of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea will be as follows:

1. The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea:

The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea is formed of the entire People's Commissars, twenty three in number.

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2. The Governing Committee.

The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea has a Governing Committee which is composed of five Commissars.

The members are:

a. The Chairman of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea
b. The Vice-Chairman of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea
c. The Secretary
d. Two Commissars

3. Bureaus and Departments of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea.

The Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea has established the following Bureaus and Departments:

A. Bureaus

a. The Bureau of Industry
b. The Bureau of Transportation
c. The Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry
d. The Bureau of Communications
e. The Bureau of Finance
f. The Bureau of Commerce (and Purchases)
g. The Bureau of Education
h. The Bureau of Health
i. The Bureau of Justice
j. The Policy Bureau

B. Departments:

a. The Department of Propaganda
b. The Planning Department
c. The Department of General Affairs

VII. The Governing Committee of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea is the supreme administrative body while the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea is not in session.

The Governing Committee has the right to enact and promulgate any special ordinances which the people, public organizations and state departments shall observe.

The Governing Committee is under obligation to report all of their acts to the whole Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea.

VIII. All of the Bureaus which heretofore have been under the direction of the Headquarters of the Soviet Military Government are now transferred to the control of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea and become part of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea as of the date the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea was organized.

Every Director or Bureau Chief is to be selected from among the Commissars and their appointment confirmed by the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea.

Any Director or Bureau Chief may be discharged or transferred by the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea.

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IX. In order to put into effect a democratic judicial system in North Korea, the Supreme Law Court and the Supreme Procurator's Office are to be organized.

The selections of the head of the Supreme Law Court and the justices are to be dicided by a majority of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea. The names shall be recommended by the Director of the Bureau of Justice.

The head of the Supreme Public Procurator's Office shall be appointed by the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea.

His name shall be recommended by the Director of the Bureau of Justice.

X. The functions of the Bureaus of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea are as follows:

a. To draft ordinances and rules to be presented to the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea and the Headquarters of the Soviet Forces in Korea.

b. Execute all ordinances and decisions which are issued by the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea and Headquarters of the Soviet Forces in Korea.

c. Control the actions of the various Provincial People's Commissariat Bureaus.

XI. Each Director is to carry out his routine work under the supervision of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea.

XII. Each Director has the right to issue such proclamations and orders as are necessary to carry out the work of his department, providing these do not infringe or conflict with any which have been issued by the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea or the Headquarters of the Soviet Forces in Korea.

XIII. Meetings of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea are to be held more often than once a month, and are to be held at the time set by the Chairman.

xXIV. The head office of the Provisional People's Commissariat of North Korea is located in Pyongyang, Pyongan-Namdo."

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HEAD QUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the G-2

29 April 1946

ORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL & LOWER LEVEL OF NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT

Foreword: In a registered letter, mailed at P'YONGYANG (980-1820) on 27 Mar by the North Korea Interim People's Committee (CHOSEN IN-MIN CHUI-UI IN-MIN WEI-YUAN HUEY), and addressed to the Chief of the KANG-DONG Province People's Committee (KANG GUN-SU CHUI-UI IN-MIN WEI-YUAN HUEY), there were enclosed organizational charts for Provincial, County, City and Town Governments, as well as for Police and Taxation Sections. In effect the letter is an order by the central government establishing a Table of Organization for lower echelons. The text follows.

I. 1. **Provincial Organization**

Chairman of Committee.
Vice-Chairman of Committee.

1. General Business Department.

   a. General Business Section.
   b. Social Affairs Section.

2. Finance Department.

   a. Taxation Section.
   b. Finance Control Section. (Supervision Section)
   c. Auditing Section.
   d. Accounting Section.

3. Commerce and Industrial Department.

   a. Commerce Section.
   b. Industrial Section.
   c. Mining Section.

4. Agriculture and Forestry Department.

   a. Land Cultivation Section.
   b. Agricultural Industry Section.
   c. Forestry Section.
   d. Food Section.
   e. Livestock Section.
   f. Fishery Section.

5. Justice Department.

   a. General Business Section
   b. Supervision and Order Section.

6. Education Department.

   a. Education Section.
   b. Cultural Section.

7. Police Department. (Po An Kwa)

   a. General Affairs Section.
   b. Inspection Section.
   c. Protection Section.

8. Public Health Department.

   a. Medical and Drug Section.
   b. Child Health Section.

9. Construction Department.

   a. Civil Engineering Section.
   b. Architectural Section.

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ORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL & LOWER LEVEL OF NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT

Foreword: In a registered letter, mailed at P'YONGYANG (280-1820) on 27 Mar by the North Korea Interim People's Committee (I[illegible] CHOSEN IN-[illegible]), and addressed to the Chief of the [illegible]-DO Provin ce People's Committee ([illegible]), there were enclosed organizational charts for Provincial, County, City and Town Governments, as well as for Police and Taxation Sections. In effect the letter is an order by the central government establishing a Table of Organization for lower echelons. The text follows.

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   a. General Business Section.
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   a. Taxation Section.
   b. Finance Control Section. (Supervision Section)
   c. Auditing Section.
   d. Accounting Section.

3. Commerce and Industrial Department.

   a. Commerce Section.
   b. Industrial Section.
   c. Mining Section.

4. Agriculture and Forestry Department.

   a. Land Cultivation Section.
   b. Agricultural Industry Section.
   c. Forestry Section.
   d. Food Section.
   e. Livestock Section.
   f. Fishery Section.

5. Justice Department.

   a. General Business Section
   b. Supervision and Order Section.

6. Education Department.

   a. Education Section.
   b. Cultural Section.

7. Police Department. (Do An Kwa)

   a. General Affairs Section.
   b. Inspection Section.
   c. Protection Section.

8. Public Health Department.

   a. Medical and Drug Section.
   b. Child Health Section.

9. Construction Department.

   a. Civil Engineering Section.
   b. Architectural Section.

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10. Communication and Postal Department

a. Communication Section
b. Transportation Section

Livestock Section and Fishery Section of Agriculture and Forestry Department should be optional according to provincial need.

2. Number of the staff members.

Number of members of the Provincial People's Committee should be 4[illegible] to 47, including the emergency committee members as follows:

1 Committee Chairman, 2 Vice-Chairman of Committee, 5 Secretarys, 10 Department Chiefs, 10 Vice-Chairman of Departments, and 27 Section Chiefs. (However, the 10 Vice-Chairmanships should be filled by the Department Chiefs.)

Staff members for the Section should total 378, comprising an average of 14 for each section from Kyongan Namdo, Kyongan Pukto, Kwanghae Do, and Chungyong Namdo.

Staff members for the Section Hamgyong Namdo should total 324, comprising an average of 12 members to each section.

Staff members of the Section in Kangwon Do should total 270, comprising an average of 10 members to each section.

The grand total of staff members should be:

423 members each in Kyongan Namdo, Kyongan Pukto, Kwanghae Do, and Hamgyong Namdo.

360 members in Hamgyong Pukto.

[illegible]4 members in Kangwon Do.

3. Number of employees.

[illegible]0 each in Kyongan Namdo, Kyongan Pukto, Kwanghae Do, and Hamgyong Namdo.

70 each in Hamgyong Pukto and Kangwon Do.

11. 1. County Organization

Chairman of the Committee.
Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

General Business Section - General Affairs Division, Finance Division, Health Division, and Construction Division.

Industry Section - Commerce and Industry Division, Agriculture and Forestry Division.

Education Section - Education Division

2. Number of the staff members

1. The number of the Gun People's Committee should be 15 to 17 including the members of the emergency committee.

2. The number of the staff members for each Province should be determined according to the following charts. The Provincial People's Committee will allocate the number of each County's staff members according to the needs of the counties.

3. One of the Vice-Chairman could duplicate the job as Chairman of Section

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Name of Provinces	Chairmen of Committees	Vice Chairmen of Committees	Members of Sections	Grand Totals	Remarks
Pyongan Namdo	14	28	42	476	560 14 counties Average 40 members to each county
Pyongan Pukto	19	38	57	646	760 19 counties Average 40 members to each county
Hwanghae	16	32	48	544	640 16 counties Average 40 members to each county
Hamgyong Namdo	16	32	48	544	640 "
Hamgyong Pukto	11	22	33	374	440 11 counties Average 40 members to each county
Kangwon Do	13	26	39	442	520 13 counties Average 40 members to each county
Total	89	178	267	3026	3580 89 counties

Employees should be appointed and allocated by the Provincial People's Committee according to the conditions prevailing in each county.

III. 1. City Organization

Chairman of Committee.
Vice-Chairman of Committee.

General Business Section.
Finance Section.
Commerce and Industry Section. (If the city includes the business of Agriculture and Forestry, this section will handle same.)

Education Section.
Public Section.
Preparatory Section. (Junghi Kwa)

1. The regular membership of the Committee should be 25 to 27, including the members of the emergency committee.

SIXX

Population	Chairman of Committee	Vice-Chairman of Committee	Secretaries	Chairman of Sections	M/members of section	Total	Remarks
City of more than 200,000	1	2	3	6	360	372	Average 60 to each section
City of more than 100,000	1	2	2	6	240	251	Average 40 to each section

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City of more than 50,000	1	1	1	6	150	159	Average 25 to each section
City of less than 50,000	1	1	None	6	90	98	Average 15 to each section

REMARKS 1. Each individual city will appoint employees according to their own needs.

2. This chart indicates the maximum number of staff members, therefore, the Provincial People's Committee should keep their requirements within these limits.

IV. 1. Myun Organization (District)

Chairman of Committee.
Vice-Chairman of Committee.

General Business Division (This Division will handle the business of Education and Construction Divisions
Finance Division
Industry Division
Vital Statistics Division
Welfare Division

2. The number of the staff members.

1. The Committee members shall number 7 to 9 including the members of the emergency committee.

2. The members of each Myun staff will be appointed in propertion to the financial condition of the Myun and according to the amount of offical work to be carried on.

3. Vice-Chairmanship shall be limited to one person.

V. 1. Police Organization.

Chief of Police.
Vice-Chief of Police.

General Affairs Division.
Inspection Division.
Protection Division.

2. Number of Police.

The number of the police shall be determined by each Province as perchart shown on the next chart. The members shall be appointed and allocated by the Provincial People's Committee.

POLICE

Name of Province	Police Chiefs in City	Police Chiefs in County	Vice-Chiefs of Police in County	Division Chiefs in Police	Members of Police Force	Total number of police Force	Number Police Stations
Pyongan Namdo	4	13	17	251	2515	2600	17
Pyongan	1	22	24	72	3980	3900	23
Hwanghee Do	3	14	17	51	2255	2340	17

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Hamkyong Namdo	3	16	19	57	2505	2600	19
Hamkyong Pukto	3	13	16	48	2520	2600	16
Kangwon Do	1	12	13	39	1495	1560	13
Total	15	91	106	318	15070	15600	

The employees of the each individual police station will be appointed and allocated by the Provincial People's Committee according to the condition of each police station.

VI. 1. Taxation Office Organization
Chief of Taxation
General Affairs Section
Direct Taxation Section
Indirect Taxation Section

2. The number of staff.

The number of staff members will be decided upon according to the needs of the different Provinces as shown in the attached chart. The members of the staff shall be appointed and allocated by the Provincial People's Committee according to the situation prevailing at each individual taxation station.

TAXATION

Name of Province	Chiefs of Tax Stations	Chiefs of Sections	Number of Staff Members	Total	Remarks
Pyongan Namdo	7	21	252	280	7 stations, about 40 members each
Pyongan Pukto	10	30	260	300	10 stations, about 30 members each
Hwanghae Do	8	24	208	240	8 stations, about 30 members each
Hankyong Namdo	6	18	174	198	6 stations, about 33 members each
Hankyong Pukto	6	18	174	198	6 stations, about 33 members each
Kangwon Do	4	12	104	120	4 stations, about 30 members each
Total	41	123	1172	1336	41 stations

REMARKS: The members of each station shall be appointed and allocated by the Provincial People's Committee according to the individual station's requirements.

Incl #3 to XXIV Corps G-2 W/S #33 - 5 -

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Office of the Political Advisor
HQ XXIV Corps, Seoul, Korea
APO 235
April 29, 1946

Subject: Soviet-American Joint Commission for Korea, Task of, following formation of Provisional Korean Government.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

Sir:

Reference is made to the Department's telegram No. 45 of March 29, 1946, requesting that suggestions be made from time to time, combining the views of the other members of the American delegation on the Soviet-American Joint Commission for Korea, which might guide the Department in revising paragraph 4B of SWNCC 176/18 of January 28, 1946, relating to plans for a permanent Korean government.

The Department's wish will be borne in mind and, as the Joint Commission's work progresses and the general scheme of government desired by the Korean people becomes known as a result of consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations, recommendations and suggestions for the permanent government of Korea will be submitted to the Department. In the meantime, in order to orient and prepare the American delegation in pre-planning for its talks under paragraph III of the Moscow Communique, Section III, Korea, of December 29, 1945, it would be helpful if the Department outlined for the delegation specific measures under the following headings which presumably will have to be worked out by the Commission:

Measures for helping and assisting the

Political Progress

Economic Progress

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Social Progress of the Korean people

Development of Democratic Self-Government of the Korean people

Establishment of National Independence of Korea.

(The development of the industry, transport, agriculture and national culture of Korea is the function of the Korean Democratic Provisional Government under the terms of the Moscow Communique, and it is the position of the Soviet delegation on the Commission that such development must not be undertaken by the Commission.)

For the Department's possible guidance, a statement roughly indicating the American delegation's concepts of what is involved in the task of the Joint Commission under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communique is enclosed.

TRUSTEESHIP

It might be appropriate at this time to make some observations on the question of a trusteeship for Korea as envisaged in paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communique.

Judging from the attitude of the Soviet delegation up to now, the Soviet Government will probably take the position that the measures worked out by the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Korean Government and Korean parties, for "helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea" will be supervised if not partially administered by the authority in Korea, in whatever form it may take, representing the four interested powers or United Nations Organization. For example, the Soviet chairman of the Sub-commission on organization (of the Provisional Government) has formally proposed to his American colleague that, in the preamble of the Provisional Government's "charter," there be

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acknowledgment of the derivation of that government's authority from the Moscow Communique and a statement of "the principles of the (Provisional Government's) relations with the bodies affecting the trusteeship." Again, throughout the discussions so far in the Joint Commission, the Soviet delegation has stressed the need of recognition by all Korean parties and social organizations that Korea is to be subjected to four-power trusteeship during the life of the Provisional Government. Unlike the American authorities in south Korea, who have played the trusteeship theme pianissimo and placed much stock in Mr. Byrnes remark in his radio address of December 30, 1945, that the Joint Commission, working with the Provisional Government "may find it possible to dispense with a trusteeship," the Soviet authorities in north Korea have made it plain to the Koreans that trusteeship is the meat of the Moscow Communique, that there is no alternative to it and that opposition to it is subversive.

Whatever Moscow's reasons for its seemingly wholehearted support of a trusteeship may be, individual members of the Soviet delegation have privately put forward sound arguments for trusteeship: the unpreparedness of Koreans for immediate independence, the present quarrelsomeness of Korean factions and need of Allied umpires; the advantages of Korea starting toward nationhood on a well-organized and better trained basis, the need for technical and material assistance, et cetera. Thus, the delegation approaches the problem realistically and has no sympathy with Korean sensibilities over trusteeship. Rather it loses patience with Korean boasts that no Allied help is needed. The delegation also takes the view that Koreans contributed little, if anything, to their liberation and therefore, have no moral right to question the plans which their liberators have for their independence.

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For the following reasons, it is now thought advisable that the United States Government decide firmly on a trusteeship for Korea for the whole or part of the probationary period and direct the American delegation on the Joint Commission to approach on that premise its assignment under paragraph 3 of the Moscow Communique.

(a) Two or three years of stable, centralized administration are essential for the Korean people to cool off from their excitements since the Japanese surrender, to learn discipline and team-work and to develop some elementary sense of individual responsibility for their national well-being;

(b) The Koreans will need initial help; guidance, training in organization and orderly procedures, and supervision backed by authority if they are to get a good start for independence;

(c) The Soviet Government is treating a trusteeship as something absolute and almost sacred;

(d) The United States has from the beginning been the chief proponent of a trusteeship for Korea;

(e) The Korean people will become reconciled to a trusteeship as the work of the Joint Commission progresses, if they are not already reconciled to it.

(f) It will be easier for the American delegation to formulate concrete, definitive proposals if it postulates the existence of an authoritative organ to give effect to its proposals; also such postulation will make for greater harmony in working out proposals with the Russian delegation, which at times has misinterpreted the American delegation's defense of freedom of expression (by Koreans voicing dislike of trusteeship) as evasiveness with respect to the trusteeship feature of the Moscow agreement.

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(g) An absolutist, repressive regime of Korean Communists is getting ensconced behind the Soviet Command in North Korea, which may conceivably, with Soviet Army connivance if Soviet troops prolong their occupation unduly, interfere with, defy or nullify the authority and measures of the Provincial Government for the whole of Korea---the advantages of four-power responsibility for, and support of, the Provisional Government's authority in such a situation are obvious.

AGENCY OF TRSUTEESHIP

If the United States Government should revise its present position that it may be possible to dispense with a trusteeship and decide that a trusteeship up to five years from the time of the issuance of the Moscow Communique is mandatory, a major premise in approaching its tasks under paragraph 3, as far as the American delegation is concerned, would be a clear idea of the nature of the initial supervisory or control agency in Korea of the four interested powers or United Nations Organization. In this connection the following thoughts are projected:

The agency might be an organization of qualified advisors, instructors and experts from the four interested powers. Because of their intimate current experience with Korean affairs, the United States and the Soviet Union would be called upon to supply the majority of the personnel for the organization. For instance, if the organization (including military, constabulary and police) required 1,000 persons, it would be practical for the United States and the Soviet Union to provide say, 400 each and Great Britain and China the remainder. Each of the four powers would be represented by a High Commissioner, who would also be administrative head of his nationals in the organization and head, in rotation, of the whole organization. The rules for the organization's administration, proceedings, chairmanship, discipline, etc., would be drawn up by

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the four commissioners. The organization would work parallel with but independently of the Provisional Government, and an instrument would be drawn up with the latter subjecting it to the controls and supervision and perhaps veto power of the organization. The salaries of the organization's personnel would be outside the Provisional Government's budget and be paid directly by the Government concerned.

NAME OF AGENCY OF TRUSTEESHIP

Although the organization of the four powers would be a substantive trusteeship, a concession might be made to Korean susceptibilities by calling it, say, "Allied Commission for Korea", or "Allied Cooperating Commission in Korea," or by some other name, and by regulating it by a four-power agreement independent of and unrelated to the United Nations Organization. The Koreans feel, and with some justice, that their cultural level and history entitle them to different treatment at the hands of the United Nations from that applicable to peoples of mandated territories in Africa and backward races in southeast Asia which have not yet made any contributions to mankind or history.

FOREIGN NATIONAL REPRESENTATION AND KOREAN REPRESENTATION ABROAD.

During the period of the trusteeship, foreign national interests in Korea might be represented by a Diplomatic Agent and Consul General, as in Tangier and, earlier, in Baghdad. Korean interests abroad might be represented by diplomatic agencies at the capitals and branches thereof at important places, controlled to some extent by personnel of the trusteeship organization in the Foreign Affairs Department in Seoul. This is suggested as a means of developing a Korean foreign service. With the establishment of foreign national representation as above indicated, the Soviet and United States Commanders, while still being vested with supreme authority, should perhaps

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have tactical jurisdiction only until the withdrawal of their forces.

DISPOSAL OF ZONAL GOVERNMENTS

The American delegation has proposed that the administrative system for southern Korea that has been set up and developed by American Military Government be adopted and enlarged as the administrative and executive machinery of the Provisional Government. There is no comparable Soviet military government or centralized Korean regime in northern Korea and the absorption by the southern Korean administrative system of the central and local "committees" governing north Korea ought to present no great mechanical difficulty. When or if the Soviet delegation accepts this proposal, American Military Government as such will automatically go out of existence and American personnel, which would assume advisory status, will progressively be withdrawn in favor of Korean personnel, as favored by the United States Government.

SCHEDULE OF TRANSITION FROM PRESENT TO FINAL STATE OF KOREAN CONTROL.

The following is a very tentative schedule of the successive stages in Allied control of Korea, beginning with the present proceedings in the Joint Commission and ending with the liquidation of the trusteeship organization.

1946, June 30 - Final selection of personnel and determination of "charter" and platform of Korean Provisional Democratic Government. Submission of proposals regarding same to United States and Soviet Governments.

July - Provisional Government being familiarized with existing administrative system in south Korea and central committee system in north Korea. Joint Commission studying on behalf of Provisional Government extension of south Korea administrative system to, or merger with, north Korean system.

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July 30 - Acceptance by four governments of proposals of Joint Commission for personnel, charter and platform of Provisional Government.

August 1 - Inauguration of Provisional Government. First substantial mutual troop withdrawal begins.

August - November - Installation of Provisional Government and assumption by it of nominal authority over zonal administrative systems, which nominally cease to exist and actually begin to unite. Progressive actual authority and administration of affairs are assumed by Provisional Government. Consultation with Provisional Government and parties on measures of assistance (trusteeship) begins and proposals for four governments are drafted. American personnel of trusteeship organization is enlisted (chiefly from Military Government), also possibly Soviet personnel, according to needs therefor of trusteeship as determined by Joint Commission in consultation with Provisional Government. Proposals of Joint Commission submitted to four governments, including need of additional personnel for trusteeship organization to be supplied, if so desired, by Great Britain and China. Second substantial reciprocal troop withdrawal begins.

December - January - Joint Commission's proposals studied by four governments. Additional (British and Chinese) personnel for trusteeship organization selected. Four-power agreement concluded. The several national high commissioners appointed. Trusteeship organization installed in Korea. Joint Commission liquidated.

February - Last troops withdrawn. (Note: Up to this point, supreme authority will have resided in the two Commanders. Following the final withdrawal of troops, supreme authority for the pre-determined trusteeship period will be vested in the trusteeship organization, and an instrument suspending the complete independence of Korea and recognizing the supreme authority of the trusteeship organization during the period

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will be concluded with the Provisional Government before the final withdrawal of troops).

TROOP WITHDRAWAL

It was gathered from private conversation with a member of the Soviet delegation that the Soviet Government has no plan of withdrawing its troops from north Korea during the probationary period. The foregoing schedule provides for three stages of withdrawal, with all troops to be gone by February, 1947, and is in line with the Government's policy that military occupation should end as early as practicable.* In view of the probable absence of any plan of troop withdrawal on the part of the Soviets, the Government might wish to consider immediate conversations with Moscow looking to withdrawal along the lines just indicated, so that the record will be in order for three-power pressure for an agreement on early total withdrawal when the time comes for the Joint Commission's proposals for "helping and assisting (trusteeship)" to be studied by the four powers. It is very clear to us here in Korea that there will never be any normal political or economic life in Korea or unhampered operation of a trusteeship so long as Soviet troops remain in the country.

The foregoing observations and enclosures have been submitted for review and comment to the Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in Korea and to my associates on the Joint Commission and have their general concurrence.

Respectfully yours,

*SWNCC 101/4, 24 Oct. 1945

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U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

15 May 1946

REPORT

A meeting was held at the residence of General Arnold at 1900, 14 May 1946. The following were present: General Arnold, Colonel Booth, Colonel Thayer, Dr. Underwood, Kimm Kiu Sik, Pack San Kiu, Ko Chung Il, An Chai Hong, Choi Tong O, Kim Jun Yun, Cho So Ang, Son Sei Hoon, and Lieutenant Bertsch. Choi Tong O is the vice-chairman of the Emergency National Assembly. The other seven Koreans are the liaison committee appointed to act with the Joint Commission. Six of these are regular members of the Representative Democratic Council. The seventh, Ko Chung Il, is a fluent Russian speaker who was added to the committee.

The declared purpose of the meeting was to request advice as to the best course which the members of the American Delegation, or the American Command, could take to increase the prospects of Korean unity.

General Arnold started the discussion by reading excerpts from the Commission's communiques in the effort to make it perfectly clear that what the Americans had contended for was not the success of any particular political philosophy but rather the principle of free expression. This principle, he said, applied no less to those who favor trusteeship than to those who oppose it. Dr. Kimm Kiu Sik did most of the talking for the Koreans present. He indicated a very considerable degree of resentment against Military Government, some of it being left undocumented.

It was readily apparent that greater resentment was directed against the Russians and against the leftist parties in southern Korea.

General Arnold, in attempting to bring out the point that the two occupying powers are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the respective zones, used language which Dr. Kimm Kiu Sik chose to misconstrue as meaning that the Russians were protecting the people in the northern zone. Dr. Kimm went into one of his not uncommon spasms of almost uncontrollable rage, gesturing violently and shouting at the top of his voice. He declared that the Russians are "protecting" the Koreans in the northern zone by wholesale robbery, rape, murder, and deportation of Korean political leaders. He said, "If the Russians had done even to the Indians in Alaska

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a small portion of what they have done to our brethren in the North, you would have long since made war upon them". He further gave indication of a possibly understandable bias against the white world, a bias which he generally keeps rather carefully concealed, when he said, "When I was in Virginia, I have known of the lynching of negroes for individual acts of the same character which are commonplace with the Russian soldiers.

It was the general desire of the others present to calm the troubled atmosphere after Dr. Kimm's outbreak. In this connection, Hon Sei Hoon made a quiet comment that carried much more conviction than Dr. Kimm's oratorical outburst. Mr. Hon said, "In the city of Hamhyeung there are the fresh graves of thousands of Japanese who died this past winter frozen and starved to death by the cruelty of the Russians. These Japanese were our enemies, but they were humans, and we are also human. To these things we cannot blind ourselves; these things we cannot condone."

Despite General Arnold's frank efforts to bring the session back to a consideration of what steps could be taken towards unity, the discussion centered largely about the statement of reasons why the Korean rightist leaders regard unity as impossible. Clearly apparent were three obvious factors; bitter hatred of the Russians, hatred and contempt for the Communists and their allies, and a feeling of frustration over the failure of the Commission thus far to achieve a government. Also present was a feeling of resentment that Koreans have been given no share in the administrative responsibility of government in the southern zone.

General Arnold attempted to convey the thought that through unity it would be possible to secure a measure of control over policy and administration. This message appears to have been largely disregarded. Nevertheless, certain tangible gains can be marked from the session. Most notably, the General seems to have succeeded in killing completely the discussion of a new movement for the Democratic Council to create a Korean government by unilateral action. Further, he made it perfectly clear that the Moscow Decision must be regarded as the basic law of Korea, and that under the decision there is provided sufficient amount of leeway for Koreans to work freely for their objectives.

It must be added that there have been a few faint indications that a wider measure of unity is not at the present time beyond the bounds of possibility. Kimm Kiu Sik, himself, voiced the viewpoint

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that it should be possible to unite with all parties that pledged t' mselves to the cause of independence. This could conceivably be a formula which could be worked out further. Ko Chung Il said that he believed the people would fall in line behind the movement to create a government in the South under Military Government. An Chai Hong assured the General that Koreans would continue to cooperate. Won Wei Hoon went further, saying that Koreans continue to have faith in the United States and will continue to work with us even when they disagree.

The position of Kimm Kiu Sik should be considered as being one of some remaining uncertainty, which leads him necessarily to talk more vigorously against us in the presence of his followers than he does when with them alone. It is submitted that he can still be depended upon to work as a stabilizing influence.

It is respectfully recommended that there be an effort made to maintain more continuous liaison between the military authorities and Koreans basically friendly to our cause, and that further discussions continue with a view to implementing Korean party unity. In this latter connection, it will be desirable to use the approach that what we now have is a system which is temporarily forced upon us and which is in fact worse than trusteeship, that we and the Koreans share the same desire to achieve independence as rapidly as possible, that we must work together to that end, and that the attainment of party unity in the South is a stepping stone to a wider unity, and thus to independence.

It should be emphasized that we do not ask the rightists to surrender their principles but only to cooperate practically so that those principles can be attained sooner. It should further be promised and emphasized that the government of the United States will not turn the full power over to any Korean government other than one freely and honestly elected, and that for this reason the parties of the Right can afford to be liberal in seeking unity at present, since they may safely conclude that their stock is improving, and that they can count upon eventual success in the polls.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
2nd Lt. CMP

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REPORT ON TRIP THROUGH SOUTH KOREA 22 - 31 May 1946

File

In submitting this report I emphasize that stop-overs were brief and that the following are impressions and should be treated as such.

CHONJU Cholla Pukto

Korean Governor Dr. Jong (ex-Warrant Officer, U.S. Medical Corps) had travelled extensively through Province, had good picture of status. Barley crop 80 percent normal. Only food problem transportation. 80 percent factories operating producing 10 percent capacity, reason, lack of raw materials, lack of maintenance, lack of experienced labor. Claims Communist Party underground. In 7 of 9 guns Rightist effort exceeds Leftist. Initially Rightist instruction from higher level ordered sit quiet. Independence will come. Now they have started working. People's Party considered as Communist Party. Dr. Jong claimed 80 percent of Province are farmers. Majority are dangerous because they go with the wind, that is with latest speaker. Dr. Rhee did not visit Cholla Pukto. Several towns spent money on preparations for welcome. He should return. Filter plant lacks capacity. Shortage of city water. Thought Kim Koo, Kim Kiu Sic, Kim Sung Soo would be helpful speakers. Governor recommends greater decentralization to Provincial Government. New Korea Co. agents causing confusion. Recommends allotment of paddy land by local officials who know worthy people. Food for M.G. personnel very poor - fresh meat and vegetables rare - no complaint against 6th Division which is trying to help.

MANWON

Labor Union (Leftist) has 300 members. People's Party strong. Communists small but noisy. M.G. Co. was to be withdrawn but Communist agitation may delay it. 5 Communists in jail, 2 of whom came from North of 38th. Communist Party endeavoring to explain break-up of Joint Commission to favor Soviets. Communist Party claims counterfeiting may have involved some Communists but not important members. One Rightist said withdrawal of U.S. troops would permit contest

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between Right and Left but doubted much bleed shed. Considerable hesitation to discuss politics or to give individual's stand.

SUNCHON Chella Namdo

Very clean town--Rightist in control--no trouble--Lt. Col. Diller, in charge, has had prepared a Korean translation of the 850 words of basic English. I recommend that this be printed for use by U.S. personnel. There are many officers and men with sincere desire to learn Korean to improve their contacts.

Enroute to Yosu visited Leprosarium where there were 850 Lepers segregated in 3 groups, men, women and families. This is reported as pre-war capacity. Buildings are of stone, apparently in good repair, barley was nearly ready for harvest. All appeared busy. Their one request, a slide trombone and a cornet.

YOSU

A strong Communist fishing village, is handled by daily visits from Sunchon. Three days before our visit trouble appeared brewing. Leaders of all political parties were assembled and ordered to maintain order. This appeared to be effective. Democratic Party Headquarters was very active, resembled parallel organization in U.S. the day before election. This method of periodic check is worthy of further trial since the maximum responsibility is placed on Korean officials.

Visited 1st Bn. 20th Inf. located in Seaplane Base, exceptionally good set up. Few EM visited town.

KWANGJU

Leftist and Rightist Party leaders have been assembled periodically for conferences by Provincial Governor, Colonel Price, with excellent results. Trend is to Right since replacement of many Leftist officials. Both Right and Left play favorites. Rightist police are prone to take advantage of their position. Believe education in cooperation is bearing results and that Kwangju properly supervised will cease being a hot spot. Conferred with 7 Leftist 5 Rightist Party leaders, a very representative group. One Rightist leader sounded biased. Communist recommended economic effort and

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unification of people start after Provisional Government was established. Rightist gave impression that Leftists were inferior. Both sides need to work together more. Dr. Rhee's visit much appreciated.

I feel that M.G. officers, who are most enthusiastic, could give Koreans more responsibility.

Visited 20th Inf. quonset camp on airfield 6 miles from Kwangju. Uniform camp, only partially complete.

Ample recreation facilities and flat training areas. N.C.O. Club in old Jap Shrine being established in Kwangju. Attended good party in 20th Inf. Officers' Club in honor of departing C.O. Col. Peploe and arriving C.O. Col. Stanton.

Visited constabulary, battalion strength 331, well quartered in permanent building not far from 20th Inf. Men were young, clean, bright. N.C.O.'s looked able. 2 officers, lieutenants, were impressive. Most enthusiastic about training. Mess clean and rice ration adequate. U.S. Army officer in charge reported discipline excellent. Enthusiasm and interest in training superior. One group ready to start preliminary rifle marksmanship. Considerable progress being made in training.

Mokpo was not visited because of cholera quarantine.

CHINHAE

Flood of repatriates from Japan, brought 1000 ¥ money which is now gone, mayor suggests public works. Has 3000 men for work. 6th Div. projects may provide employment. Chinhae Agriculture Financial Ass'n. functioning. Mayor complains streets too wide. Require too much repair effort.

Political house cleaning early May. Jailed 30 Leftists. New Mayor of middle class, practical and getting on well. Capt. Edwards, M.G., had good understanding of area--giving Koreans responsibility. Mayor wanted to transfer Gun capitol from Masan to Chinhae.

Inspected officers, midshipmen and men of Coast Guard Academy and found them outstanding in appearance, snap and pride in themselves. The U.S. officers were enthusiastic. The senior Korean officer, Capt. Sun, was superior. The Academy provided a guard for

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our train which was most military in all its actions. 6th Div. reported no friction between occupation troops and Coast Guard. Supply Officer reported half men without shoes. Cloth for making uniforms and shoes had been on requisition for some time, were availsble in Puson. Coast Guard wished to take over Radio Station in Chinhae. Visited Radio Station, found 9 Koreans of Dept. of Communications, quarters clean. It is a good layout, and apparently has excellent equipment. Feeble effort being made to organize station. Instructed personnel in need to safeguard valuable surplus equipment, clean up and maintain operating equipment. Arranged for inspection by 6th Div. on June 15. This station is isolated. If Coast Guard need it, suggest it be made their responsibility. Coast Guard needs boats.

MASAN

Wet Myun heads--report no political trouble but U.S. officers indicate Leftists still have strength. Mayor reports food difficult, 40,000 population. No special manufacturing. Harbor small, sea wall docking. 6th Div. report Masan still suffering from poor administration of former M.G. officer.

PUSON Cholla Namdo

Met 12 prominent Koreans, 1 Leftist. They were anxious to set up Korean government by own action. Mayor complained that Army still occupied some permanent buildings while city officials with valuable records worked in wooden buildings. Col. Benton said the city hall was building in question.

Col. Benton and group officers, enthusiastic. Cholera deaths 3. Army quarantine exists. Market full of Jap junk. Few stalls of fish and other food. Stores had luxuries, cakes, candy, clothing. Barley yellowing. Harvest June 15th, expecting good yield.

TONGYONG Cholla Namdo

Fishing village, active. Mayor (3 years Albany, N.Y., 1 year Chicago) confident city was in good shape. Grain scarce, barley harvest 10 days. Political situation normal, no difficulty. Ferries to Masan and Chinhae filled.

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IRI, Cholla Namdo

Reported Communists stronger among farmers than in city. Counterfeiting in Seoul responsible. Lyuh reported losing popularity as result. The railroad police here are unnecessarily ruthless in controlling crowds. One policeman grabbed a 10 year old girl by the hair while she was giving drinking water to people packed in box car. He then proceeded to smash tin can which she was using as drinking cup. Others kicked people around and pushed them with rifle butts. Crowds were very gentle and obedient at all stations making such brutality entirely unnecessary.

POHANG

This area fairly evenly divided between Right and Left. Rhee well known and admittedly powerful in public opinion. Rightists may win election now but would be stronger later. U.S. officer reports farmers in Myuns north of Pohang had sold many bulls to buy food. About 50 percent informed enough for any election. This area needs political guidance and education.

Fishing village of 500 boats, has jettied entrance to harbor which is filling with sand. Citizens have volunteered to contribute sizeable sums for extending jetty and dredging. Could be supported by M.G. as a public works program.

KYUNGJU

Communist and People's Party most active. Fair election could not be held because of Communist terrorism and propaganda. People probably favor Kim Kiu Sik over Rhee.

ANDONG

Rightist parties appear to be most prominent--Communists losing ground. Rhee most well known. All national characters are known to people. Rhee would win election by large majority with 50/50 split between Right and Left in other elective offices. Andong community basically conservative and Right but many officials in village, Myun and Kun, are Left. Schoolteachers also Leftist. Farmers weekly not distributed by Leftist officials.

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YEA CHON

Steady increase in Right brought conflict between Right and Left. The correctness of following is unknown: "M.G.(?) officer arrested Rightist. Prominent Right leaders called on him to protest. He threatened them with revolver (waved revolver at them) told all 'get out and keep still'".

SAMMANGJIN

Sammangjim is just north of Puson. Dr. Rhee best known. Dr. Rhee would be elected. Lyuh Woon Hyung losing popularity. Communists losing strength. Police improving. Barley crops look promising.

GENERAL

Horses: Condition of draft animals outside Seoul area is poor.

Forests: There were only a few areas outside of Kyonggi Province where there was tree cutting which denuded whole hillsides. Only two forest fires were observed.

SUGGESTIONS

That a study be made of the supervisory system established by Lt. Col. Diller (Sunchon) in Yosu with a view to its adoption in other communities. A M.G. officer makes periodic visits to check progress. When there is need all political leaders are assembled to receive instructions to maintain peace and order. It appeared to work in Yosu, Cholla Namdo. It is possible that M.G. officers in their enthusiasm to attain 100 percent occidental efficiency are doing too much themselves at the expense of the Koreans development.

If disturbances are caused by political effort, the placing of responsibility on all political parties' leaders appears to be effective in preserving law and order. This should be better psychologically than the advisory council since it provides practice in cooperation of all parties.

That Col. Dillers Korean dictionary of the 850 words of basic English be printed for distribution to M.G. and occupational personnel.

That a check be made of repatriates money situation. It was

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reported that all money over 1000 Yen was confiscated in entering the country. Possibly they have deposited it in postal savings and do not understand how to draw it out. Repatriates in southern cities are a problem. The thousand yen is soon spent. There is food available but these repatriates have no money. Five thousand penniless persons present a tremendous responsibility for any community. One mayor asked for a public works program offering 2000 laborers who needed to earn food money.

That police be educated further in the necessity of administrative justice impartially. In some communities police were taking political sides or were overbearing and oppressive.

It is believed that better use could be made of rolling stock. People were jammed like animals into box cars while passenger cars sat idly at almost every station. "The Liberator" should be made useable by more Koreans. The sight of an empty long train does not increase our prestige in the eyes of the Koreans who see it.

A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.

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Dr. Perglers Proposal
1 Aug 1946

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1. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States, again affirm and proclaim as one of their objectives the re-establishment of a unified Korea as an independent state with all the attributes of sovereignty. In order to achieve this purpose, and to aid in the creation of conditions for developing the country on the basis of democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous and oppressive results of the protracted Japanese domination of Korea, there shall be established a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, which, subject to consultation with and advice from the Joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the ~~United States~~ Governments of the United States, USSR, Great Britain and China ~~in southern Korea and~~ the Soviet ~~Government in northern Korea~~, shall take all the necessary steps for developing and improving the social, economic, cultural and political life of the Korean people. The Provisional Government, upon recommendation by, or approval of, the Joint Commission, shall further take the necessary steps to establish all required governmental organs and in providing for such organs shall have due regard for the traditional institutions of the Korean people, consistent with democratic principles, and for such organs of government as are already functioning in the various governmental spheres within Korea.

2. In establishing the Provisional Government of a unified Korea the Joint Commission will adhere to the principles of true democracy and shall have due regard to representation of all major phases of Korean life, political, economic and intellectual, always bearing in mind that the aim is a democratic Korea, but that the form of Korean democracy in the end must be determined by the Korean people themselves, freely and without outside pressure of any kind. Recommendations proposed or approved by

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the Joint Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States.

3. It is further the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the Provisional Democratic Government and with due regard to the views of Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures for assisting the political, economic, social and cultural progress of the Korean people and the final and complete establishment of the national independence of the Korean people. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the Korean Provisional Government, for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China, for the formulation of plans for advising and aiding the Korean Government for such period as may appear necessary in view of the progress which shall be made by the Korean people toward assuming full and complete responsibility for the conduct of their national affairs.

4. The Joint Commission shall consider urgent problems, affecting both southern and northern Korea, and shall also consider questions of harmonizing and unifying legislative measures, if found necessary, as well as coordination in administrative and economic matters.

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Explanatory notes.

1. The Moscow Declaration, as a statement of purpose, provides that "there shall be set up a Provisional Korean Democratic Government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people". The Russians have taken the view that this authorizes the creation of only four departments, Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation and Education. This is too literal and to implement the purpose stated other departments will be necessary, aside from the fact that the Russian conception is too restrictive and would delay establishment of a self-governing Korea for an indefinite and probably very long period. On the other hand, to go into detail, by way of enumeration of departments which should be established in addition to those mentioned, would give the Soviet representatives an opportunity for further literalism. Pettifogging might be the word. Therefore, it has occurred to the undersigned that probably a general formula, calling for institution of the usual governmental departments, would meet the need better, and also give better opportunities for negotiation, for give and take. Also, such a general formula would appeal to the Koreans, and would better satisfy the public at home.

2. In the draft, and it is merely a draft, the word "trusteeship" has been avoided, although the same object would be achieved by the language of paragraph three. In the matter of protectorates the term "advice", as also "consultation", has its recognized meaning. What the Koreans objected to was rather the word "trusteeship" than aid and advice. Here again, if such a declaration proved possible, the Koreans would be well pleased, and the matter would redound to the benefit of the United States

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3. The matter of a constitution, provisional or permanent, would probably be for the Joint Commission, following consultation with the Koreans. The question may very well occur whether it would not be premature to submit a draft of a constitution to the powers. This could lead to renewed quibbling by the Russians. However, the possible provisions of a constitution are being studied.

4. The idea of the draft submitted is to give the Russians as little chance as possible to raise questions of detail before the Commission reassembles, if it does so, and to leave as much as possible to discussion, with the fundamental principles still outlined.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles Pergler

Charles Pergler

立法議院

慶祝四二八〇年六月二十日

南朝鮮過渡立法議院議長金奎植

民政長官安在鴻貞下

本院美蘇共同委員會對於本院美蘇共同委員會所參考材料呈遞達於四本月首仰望於十一日

對於一月中旬

副本送達

美蘇共委第二分科委員會

以上

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美蘇共同委員會決議第五號及六號에對한答申書

南朝鮮過渡立法議院美蘇共同委員會對策委員會

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美蘇共同委員會決議第五號及六號에對한答申書

南朝鮮過渡立法議院美蘇共同委員會對策委員會

一、民 權

1、朝鮮人民의定義

가 朝鮮에戶籍을갖인者

나 朝鮮人兩親사이에出生한者

다 朝鮮人父親下에出生한者로서他國의國籍또는市民權이없는者

라 外國人으로서外國國籍또는府民權을永遠히拋棄하고朝鮮이歸化한者

以上의原則을前提로國民의要件은法律로定함

2、主權의所在

朝鮮의主權은朝鮮人民全體에屬하고如何한權力이라도朝鮮人民에서發源하지않는것을行使할수없음

3、自由權

가 人身의自由(逮捕、監禁、審問、處罰을當하지않는自由)

ㄱ 人身의自由와生命權의安全함은安固히保障되어야한다

ㄴ 人身의自由를制限함에는반다시全國民의代表로組織된國會에서制定된法律에依하여야한다

ㄷ 人身의自由를制限하는法律의制定는반다시具體的인犯罪行爲發生의境過또는事件을列擧하여야되며一般的이며包括的階級追放은制定하지못한다

ㄹ 누구든지現行犯以外에는權限있는司法機關의適法인令狀에依하지않으면逮捕를當하지않는다

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ㅁ 如何한境遇라도奴隷的인拘束이나殘忍한虐待는받지않는다

나 信仰思想學問의自由

ㄱ 信仰思想學問의自由는侵害하지못한다

ㄴ 如何한宗教團體라도國家에서特別한權力이나援助를附與하지못한다

다 言論出版結社의自由

ㄱ 言論出版의自由는侵害하지못한다

ㄴ 人民의平穩한集會結社는保障되어야한다

ㄷ 通信의秘密은侵害하지못한다

라 居住移轉의自由

ㄱ 公共의福利에反하지않는限居住移轉의自由를侵害하지못한다

ㄴ 家宅의安全은保障되여야하며法律에依하야家宅의搜索을한境遇에는받다서權限있는司法機關의適法인令狀에依하여야한다

마 其他人間의天職의自由는憲法에列擧되지않는理由로서輕視되거나할부로剝奪當하지않는다(例職業選擇의自由 婚姻의自由 服裝의自由 旅行의自由等)

4、財產權

가 財產權은保障한다

나 財產權의內容은社會의利益과調和되도록法律로서規定한다

다 私有財產은正當한補償으로서公共의福利를爲하야使用할수있다

5、選擧權

가 二十二歲에達한國民은階級性別財產財產教育宗教의如何를不問하고國家機關이될사람을選定할權利가있다

나 二十五歲에達한國民은階級性別財產教育宗教의如何를不問하고國家機關에被選될權利가있다

다 選擧의自由는嚴格히保障되여야한다候補者推薦의自由立候補의自由書面이나口頭로서立候補者를支持하는自由意思를保障하기爲하야秘密하는自由는侵害할수없다

라 法律로서國家機關이될公務員의資格을定할수가있으나成年에達한國民은平等히이에參與할機會가있어야한다

6、平等權

가 國民은法律上一切平等한對遇를받어야한다

ㄱ 男子及女子는原則으로公民으로서의同一한權利와義務을지다

ㄴ 出生또는身分에基因한特權또는不利益은이것을줄수가없다

ㄷ 稱號는學位를授與하거나公務員의區別을表示하는이外의特別한動稱은附與하지못한다

ㄹ 如何한境遇라도一般的으로어느階級에特權을附與하거나어느階級이逸放을不許한다

나 國民은經濟的으로平等한基本生活權을確保할權利가있다

ㄱ 國民의法律上의平等은적어도經濟的文化的으로基本生活權의平等이確保되여야하겠음으로經濟政策 文教政策保健厚生政策等은모다이것을目標하여야한다

ㄴ 國民勤勞의權利와義務가있으며勤勞하여도基本生活權이確保하지못하는境遇에는國家機關은그責任義務를지야한다

7、國家機關에對한權利

가 누구든지平穩히立法機關이나行政機關에對하야請願할權利가있다

나 누구든지法律에定한司法機關의審判을받을權利가있으며또언제든지辯護人을選定할權利를侵害當하지않는다

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다 國家機關에 依하야 理由없이 權利의 侵害를 當하였을 때에는 國家그 損害賠償할 義務가 있다 四

二、樹立할 臨時政府의 一般的 形態或은 性格

1、朝鮮의 主權은 朝鮮人民 全體에 屬함으로 政權의 形態는 全國民을 代表하는 民主共和政體를 容許하지 못한다

2、基本的 인 人權의 保障을 確實하게 하기 爲하야 權力分立의 政治理念을 基礎로 한 臨時政府를 構成하여야 한다

3、臨時政府의 構成은 臨時憲章에 基礎하야 大統領 及 國會議員을 總選擧하여야 하며 非民主主義的 인 任命式의 政府는 容許하지 못한다

4、聯邦式의 政府形態는 排擊하고 單一國家의 政府形態를 取한다

三、行政及立法機能을 遂行할 中央政府의 機關或은 機關들

(가) 總選擧에 依한 立法機關을 創設하기 前에 朝鮮臨時政府에게 法律制定權을 賦與함의 與否

1、臨時政府는 (國會를 包含함) 總選擧에 依하여만 構成하겠음으로 本問題는 該當함이 없다

2、總選擧에 必要한 選擧法은 現存南北民意機關에서 南北人口比例에 依한 代表者를 選出하야 制定케 한다

(나) 以上政務를 遂行하는 機關或은 機關들의 性質及構成

1、行政機關

行政執行機關으로 大統領 副大統領을 採用하고 大統領直屬下에 重要한 國策決議機關으로 國務委員會를 두고 다시 行政을 各部門으로 나누어 部長制를 採用하는 同時에 行政執行을 補佐監視하는 法制考試監察機關을 特設함

가、大統領 副大統領

ㄱ 大統領은 外國에 對하야 國家를 代表하고 法律을 誠實히 執行하야 左의 次限을 行使한다

1、一切行政權의 總括
2、陸海軍의 統轄
3、法律案의 提出
4、法律의 認准公布
5、法律에서 一定한 範圍를 定하야 委任을 받은 命令及 法律施行에 必要한 命令의 發布
6、外國大使公使及 領事의 接受
7、條約締結及 宣戰媾和
8、法律에 別다른 規定이 없는 限 公務員의 任免及 그 委任
9、大赦特赦減刑及 復權案의 提出及 公布
10、法律의 定한 바에 依한 戒嚴의 公布

ㄴ 大統領이 그 權限을 行使함에는 반다시 國務委員會의 決議 또는 主管國務委員의 副署가 있어야 效力이 있다

ㄷ 副大統領은 大統領이 有故할 때 그 職權을 代理하며 大統領이 闕位時에 그 職을 承한다

나、國務委員會

ㄱ 國務委員會는 國務總長及 國務委員 九人以上十五人以內로서 組織하고 國務總長이 그 委員長이 된다

ㄴ 國務委員會는 左의 事項을 議決할 權限이 있다

1、法律에서 委任받은 命令及 法律施行에 必要한 命令의 制定
2、國會에 提出할 議案及 國會에서 同附된 案件

3. 行政各部處의 權限爭議 及 連絡事項
4. 其他重要한 政策政務의 樹立運營에 關한 事項

다 行政各部長

ㄱ 中央行政機構를 內務, 外務, 學務, 財務, 司法, 農林, 商工, 勞働, 文敎, 厚生, 運輸, 遞信의 十二部로 나누어

各部에 責任者로 部長을 둔다

ㄴ 各部長은 國務委員中에서 大統領이 任命하야 國策樹立과 行政運營의 進擧을 期한다

라 法制委員長, 考試委員長, 監察委員長

ㄱ 法制委員長은 大統領 及 國務委員會를 補佐하야 法令案의 起草審査에 關한 事項을 管理한다

ㄴ 考試委員長은 大統領 及 國務委員會를 補佐하야 公務員의 資格考試統裁에 關한 事項을 管理한다

ㄷ 監察委員長은 大統領 及 國務委員會를 補佐하야 公務員의 懲戒彈劾과 政府의 會計監査에 關한 事項을 管理한다

2. 立法機關

가 全國的 唯一한 立法機關으로 國會를 둔다

나 國會는 兩院制로하고 全國的으로 階級, 財産, 敎育, 宗敎, 性別의 區別이 없이 普通均等直接秘密投票의 方法으로 選擧된 議員으로 組織한다

다 國會는 國權의 最高機關으로 그 權限은 아래와 같다

ㄱ 一切法律의 制定

ㄴ 豫算의 議決

ㄷ 決算의 審査

ㄹ 國債의 募集 及 國庫負担이 될 契約의 議決

ㅁ 大赦特赦減刑 及 復權에 對한 同意

ㅂ 行政各機關의 違法行爲에 對한 彈劾의 議決

ㅅ 請願의 受理 及 이에 對한 建議

○ 議員의 資格審査 及 懲罰

다 國會議員의 任期는 二年으로 한다

國會議員이 國會內에서 한 言論 及 表決은 國會밖에서 責任을 지지 않는다

國會議員은 內亂外患의 犯罪 또는 現行犯이 아니면 開會中 國會의 許諾이 없이 逮捕하지 못한다

(라) 各閣員 及 要職人의 權限 及 責務

1. 國務總理는 大統領의 監督을 받고 國務委員會의 首班으로서 行政各部를 總括하는 責任을 진다

2. 國務總理의 直屬機關으로 秘書長을 두고 秘書長은 國務委員會의 庶務와 機密文書 人事統計 及 公報에 關한 事務를 管理한다

3. 內務部長은 地方行政, 議員選擧, 警察, 消防, 土木 及 建築에 關한 事務를 管理하고 市長 及 道長을 管理한다

4. 外務部長은 外交 及 在外僑民에 關한 事務를 管理한다

5. 軍務部長은 陸海空軍政을 管理한다

6. 財務部長은 一切財務를 總括하고 會計, 出納, 國債, 租稅, 貨幣, 金融 及 專賣事業에 關한 事務를 管理하며 地方自治團體의 財務를 監督한다

7. 司法部長은 刑政, 登記, 供托, 法典編纂 等 司法行政에 關한 事務를 管理한다

8. 農林部長은 農業, 林業, 水産, 畜産 及 食糧에 關한 事務를 管理한다

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9、商工部長은商業、工業、貿易、電氣、化學、鑛業及度量衡에關한事務를管理한다
10、勞働部長은勞働組織、勞働爭議、勞働保險에關한事務를管理한다
11、文敎部長은敎育、學藝及編修에關한事務를管理한다
12、厚生部長은保健厚生及救護에關한事務를管理한다
13、交通部長은鐵道、海運、航空 其他國營運輸事業에關한事務를管理한다
14、遞信部長은郵便、電信、電話에關한事務를管理한다
15、各長은主管事務에關하야大統領及國會에對하야責任을진다

(라) 行政及立法職務를遂行할機關의內閣員及重要任員의選擧或은任命及更迭

1、大統領及副大統領은全國을한選擧區로하야普通均等直接秘密投票의方法으로選擧한다
大統領及副大統領의任期는二年으로하되連續三選을못한다
2、國務總長及國務委員은大統領이任命하되國會의認准을要하며그任期는大統領과같이한다
3、國務委員이執行할行政各部의指定은大統領이하되國會의認准을要한다
4、法制委員長考試委員長監察委員長은大統領이任命하되國會의認准을要한다
5、以上의모ㅡ든國家機關은任期滿了또는辭任이되여도그後任者가就任할때까지그職務를遂行할義務가있다
6、國會의議長副議長其他國會內部의任員은國會議員의選擧에依하야定한다

(마) 行政及立法權遂行의方法

1、行政權의遂行은大統領總括下에以上에記述한行政各機關에依하야遂行한다

行政各部長은그權限에屬한事務의一部를各其下級機關에委任할수있다
行政各機關은上下의系統을세워上命下從의秩序를維持케하여야한다
2、立法權은國會에依하야遂行한다
國會의議事는原則的으로公開하여야하며議事의決定은原則的으로總議員過半數의出席과出席議員過半數의議決로한다
國會에서制定한法律은大統領에게付送하야公布케하되大統領은理由를附한敎書로서一回에限하야拒否權을行使할수있다
大統領이拒否한法律은다시國會에서出席議員三分之二以上의多數로써可決한때에는大統領은그法律을公布하여야한다

四、地方政權體의構成組織權限及責務

(가) 地方政權機構의設立方法

1、朝鮮은地域이狹少하고民族이單一하므로美國式또는蘇聯式의聯邦體는採擇하지않고確實한單一國家形態를取한다
2、道府(市)郡(邑)面里는國家의行政區域인同時에道府(市)(邑)面은地方自治團體의單位가된다
3、道長은道議會에서選擧한二人의候補者中에서大統領이任命한다
府(市)長은府(市)議會에서選擧한二人의候補者中에서道長이任命한다
郡長은道長의推薦에依하야內務部長이任命한다
(邑)面長은面議會에서選擧한二人의候補者中에서郡長이任命한다
里(洞)長은里民이直接選擧한二人의候補者中에서面長이任命한다

(나) 道府(市)郡(邑)面里地方政務機關의組織構成及其他地方官公吏의名稱 權限 責務

1、道府(市)郡(邑)面里의行政執行機關最高責任者의名稱은各其道長、府長、郡長、邑長、面長、里長으로한다

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2、道의行政事務를分掌하기爲하야內務、保安、産業、勞働、財務、文敎、厚生의各局을두고局에局長을둔다局長의任
은道長이行하되道議會의認准을要한다
3、府邑面의事務를分掌하기爲하야課를두고課에課長을둔다
課長의任免은各其府長邑長面長이行하되府議會邑議會面議會의認准을要한다
4、里長에直屬하는公務員은里長의推薦에依하야面長이任命하고郡長에直屬하는職員은郡長의推薦에依하야道長이任命한
다
5、道長 府長、邑長 郡長、面長 里長은各其直屬上級機關의監督을받고法令을忠實히執行할義務가있다

(다) 地方政務機關의管轄範圍權限及責務

1、道市面里의區域은法律로서定하되當分間從前의區域에依하고從前의府는市로島는郡으로邑은面으로各其改稱한다
2、道市面은地方自治團體로서그議決機關으로道議會、市議會、面議會를두고各其住民의直接選擧로議員을選出한다
3、地方自治團體는그財産을管理하고事務를處理하며法律의範圍內에서條例를制定할權限이있다
4、司法檢察事務를執行하기爲하야各法院에檢察廳을附置하고檢察官의資格은法官과同等의資格이있어야된다

五、司法機關

(가) 司法機關의設置

1、司法權은法官으로組織된法院에서行使한다
2、法院은三審制度로採用하고法院의設置名稱組織을法律로서定한다
3、法官의資格과身分의保障은法律로서定한다

(나) 裁判所及其他司法機關의權限及責務

1、民事刑事行政其他一切의訴訟은法院에서裁判한다
2、法官은憲法及法令에만拘束되며獨立하야審判한다
3、最高法院은法令의適用에關하야法令이憲法에違反與否를審判할權限이있다
4、最高法院은訴訟에關한節次裁判所의內部規律其他司法事務處理에關한事項에關하야規則을制定할수있다
5、檢察官은最高法院의定한規則을遵守할義務가있다

(다) 司法官選出更迭

1、最高法院의長及法官은法律이定한法官의資格을具備한者中에서大統領이任命하되그任命後最初施行하는國會議員選擧
時에國民의審査에부치고그後每十年을經過한때마다國會議員選擧時에國民의審査에부친다
審査의結果投票者의過半數가그罷免을可라고한때에는그法官은罷免된다
審査에關한詳細한規定은法律로서定한다
2、最高法院以外의法院의法官은最高法院의指名에依하야大統領이任命한다그任期는十年으로하되原則으로再任된다
3、最高法院의法官은七十歲가되면退職되고其他의法官은六十五歲가되면退職된다

六、臨時憲章修正及添削은大統領(國務委員會의決議를要함)또는國會議員四分之一以上의提案에依하야國會議員四分之三以上의出席과出席議員三分之二以上의可決이있어야한다

七、其他

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一、日帝影響의 殘滓肅淸

長期에 亘한 日本의 朝鮮統治로 因하야 생긴 惡影響과 親日分子를 除去肅淸하는 對策如何?

1、日帝의 統治 近四十年間의 나타난 惡影響은 廣範圍에 浸透되여 있다고 할 것이므로 그 惡影響의 除去는 政治、經濟、文敎、厚生의 各方面으로 民主主義的 政策을 斷行하야 本決議各項에 規定하야 方案을 解答함에 漸進的으로 肅淸한다

2、特別裁判所를 設置하야 民衆의 怨聲의 主로 親日分子에 限하야 反民族的 正犯者를 嚴罰하며 正犯裁判後에 續하야 附隨犯罪에 對하야도 處罰한다

3、日帝殘滓 潛伏問題는 民族正氣의 비추어 一般多上의 政策을 取할 것이며 如何한 理由라도 階級、國籍、政略關係의 處罰을 排除한다

朝鮮人을 日本人과 協力하던 朝鮮人을 規定及處罰에 關한 朝鮮民主主義

朝鮮人에게 有罪케 한 日本人과 協力하던 朝鮮人을 規定及處罰하는 朝鮮民主主義臨時政府의 對策如何?

1、特別裁判所를 設置하야 民族正氣의 비추어 一年以內에 處斷한다

2、處罰의 對象은 日本에 阿附하야 惡質的으로 民族에게 害를 끼치고 民衆의 怨聲이 높은 者로 한다

特赦한다

3、道、府別로 特別調査委員會를 設置하야 處罰의 對象을 調査케 한다

4、特別裁判所 及 特別調査委員會의 構成 及 附則은 別途 法律로 規定한다

5、如何한 境遇라도 裁判을 하지 않고 處罰하거나 裁判에 依하지 않고 犯罪行爲를 先明하야 그 責任을 追及한다

三、公民權

朝鮮民主主義臨時政府 政綱에 朝鮮人 男女公民의 如何한 權利義務가 賦與될 것인가?

1、滿二十歲에 達한 國民은 性別、階級、財產、敎育、宗敎의 如何를 不問하고 平等의 公民權을 가진다

2、公民權이 있는 者는 國家機關 또는 地方團體의 機關을 選擧할 權利와 義務가 있다

3、國會議員의 被選擧資格은 二十五歲에 達하여야 하며 大統領 副大統領의 被選資格은 滿四十歲 以上이어야 한다

4、選擧에 依하야 國家機關에 被選된 者는 그 機關에 就任할 義務가 있다 正當한 理由없이 그 義務를 遂行하지 않을 때에는 五年間 公

가 國號及政體

1、國號는 大韓民國으로 한다

2、政體는 民主共和政體로 한다

3、國土는 北緯四十度 一分以南의 平地와 朝鮮半島及濟州島、鬱陵島를 包含한 沿海島嶼로 한다

나 外務

1、美蘇英中의 贊成을 爲始하야 世界各國에 大使、公使、領事를 交換하여 友好親善의 關係를 取한다

2、世界各國과 通商을 開始한다

3、UN에 加入한다

4、聯合國에 留學生과 政治經濟文化各方面에 使節團을 派遣한다

다 國防

1、滿二十歲에 達한 者는 原則으로 兵役의 義務가 있다

2、常備陸海軍의 志願兵을 募集하야 國家의 安全을 保衛하는 軍隊를 編成한다

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三、經濟及政治方面에 過度對抗 [illegible] 反動分子 [illegible] 民主主義臨時政府를 [illegible] 對策如何?

二、經濟及政治方面에 過度對抗 [illegible] 反動分子 [illegible] 民主主義臨時政府를 [illegible] 對策如何?

三、[illegible]

四、法律과 司法制?

ㄱ 如何한 政策에 基礎하여 朝鮮三典制定할것인가

1、政府에 法制委員會를 設置하고 朝鮮의 [illegible] 制度를 調査하고 [illegible] 先進聯合國의 法律制度를 調査研究하여 朝鮮의 進命 [illegible] 民主主義的 重要한 法案을 起草케 한다

2、輿論一切의 法案은 國家의 [illegible]

3、[illegible]

4、一切法令은 人民의 基本權의 確保와 經濟的、文化的、[illegible] 權의 平等向上을 爲하여 制定한다

ㄴ 法廷司法事務處理及訴訟手續進行에 關하여 朝鮮語를 如何히 制定할것인가?

朝鮮元來單一民族으로 優秀한 朝鮮語가 [illegible] 三典語를 制定할 必要가 [illegible] 日帝式 [illegible] 漢文式 [illegible]

用語만을 除去하고 平易한 한글을 基本으로 使用한다

ㄷ 司法民主化를 如何實施할것인가?

1、最高法院의 法官任命에 關하야 國民의 審査에 附하고 또 法官의 任期를 十年으로 하야 國民의 意思가 法官任命에 反映되게 한다

2、司法檢察官은 法院에 附置하고 人身의 自由를 拘束할때에는 반드시 權限있는 司法官의 令狀에 依하여야 한다

3、辯護人의 資格을 公認하는 制度를 採用하고 被疑者 또는 被告人은 언제든지 辯護人을 세울수 있게 한다

4、人民裁判制度는 採用하지 않으며 또 陪審制度는 그 利害得失을 充分히 研究한 後에 實施한다

五、朝鮮在住의 少數民族及公民이 안인 居留民에 關한 政策은 如何히 할것인가?

1、朝鮮은 元來固有한 單一民族이므로 朝鮮在住의 少數民族問題는 全然없다

2、外國居留民에 關하야는 國家機關에 參與하는 公民權은 說定하지 못하며 其外에는 一般朝鮮人과 原則的으로 同一한 權利義務를 가지나 土地所有權 鑛山權 其他國家的으로 重要한 企業權은 禁止 또는 制限한다

ㄴ 朝鮮民主主義臨時政府經濟政策

一、朝鮮民族의 生産及生活水準을 增强向上하려면 農業産業及運輸機關發展에 關하야 如何한 對策을 取할것인가?

1、農業

가 土地改革을 實施하야 農民本位의 土地再分配를 斷行하므로써 農民搾取의 弊害를 一掃한다

나 日帝時代의 農業關係團體인 農會、金融組合及産業組合을 解散하고 農民의 協同機關으로 農民會를 構成한다

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다 水利施設을擴充强化하고優秀한農機具를普及한다

다 土質調査、種子改良、農業技術의發達을圖謀하기爲하야各地方의農業試驗場을擴充强化한다

마 農民經濟의向上을爲하야農村副業의電化及農閑期를利用한小加工業의增大를期圖한다

2、產業

가 產業體制는計劃生產計劃分配를原則으로한다

나 土地改革에關聯하여農土資本을計劃的으로產業資本에轉位케한다

다 技術陣의强化養成策을講究하고必要에依하야聯合國의技術家를顧聘한다

라 日政植民地政策으로因하야計劃的으로造作된加工系列의空虛或은生產系統의跛行性을補强하야國內產原料의一貫加工作業을企圖한다

마 國內生產이全無한動力源或은重要原材料인燃料油、有煙炭、고무의輸入을期한다

바 勞働者의生產意欲을昂揚하고生產向上을期하기爲하야어느程度로生產에對한發言及利益에參與케하는方法을講究한다

3、運輸機關

가 國內產有煙炭의八割以上을鉄道가消費한從來의實績及發電能力一〇〇萬K·W·에對하야實消費五〇萬K·W·前後에不過하였든電力의餘裕에비추어鉄道의電化를期한다

나 日政의植民地政策에基因한海運及空輸의極端한貧困을時急히補强함을期圖한다

다 鐵道用機關車、炭化物自動車의國內生產을못할뿐만않이라部分品의生產도不可能한現實에鑑하야運輸用具의機械工業을確立하는同時에聯合國의友好的인援助를企圖한다

二、土地所有에關한政策

ㄱ 日本統治時代에있던土地利用과小作制에關한對策如何

日本國策本位의모ㅡ든植民地土地政策과地主本位의모ㅡ든法令及制度는全部撤廢하야朝鮮民族及農民本位의新土地政策을確立하고小作制는自耕自農의原則下에土地를農民에게適當히分與하므로써全面的으로廢止한다

ㄴ 土地所有에關한如何한政策을取할것인가

(一) 土地를農民에게私有식혀完全自由處分權賦與의與否

土地를農民에게最高限定面積(例컨데一戶當最高三町步)까지는私有식히되自由處分權는이를制限하야賣渡抵當의境遇에限하야는國家의許可或은國家가優先買上權을保留함이適當하다

(二) 土地는私有하나國家로부터賦與된時는賣渡或은抵當權은國家가制限함이如何

前項의原則에依하면國家로부터土地가農民에게賦與될時는當然히賣渡或는低當權는國家가(一)과如히制限한다

(三) 地主의土地를國有化하여農民에게無償으로永久히使用權을賦與함의與否

朝鮮經濟의現段階에있어서는土地를完全히國有로하야永久使用權만을賦與하고農民에게所有權을賦與치아니하면農業生產力의發達을期하기難하다고認定하므로不可하다

(四) 其他土地所有問題解決에關한提案

土地兼併及小作制의弊害에因한農業生產力의阻害를防止하고그發達及農民의生活水準을向上식히기爲하야는現朝鮮의實情에비취어볼때土地는最高限定面積以內에서農家의人口數、地種及地味를考慮한公平한點數制에依한分配를하야農

民의 所有權을 侵害하지 못하도록 國家가 保護하여야 할 것이다.

2 國民의 財産權은 公共必要에 依하여 法律로써 收用, 使用 또는 制限할 수 있으며 그에 對하여 正當한 補償을 支給하여야 한다.

3 農地는 農民에게 分配되어야 하며 그 分配의 基準, 方法 및 補償은 法律로써 定한다.

4 國家는 農地의 合理的인 經營과 農業의 生産力을 增大하기 爲하여 農地의 賃貸借와 委託經營은 法律이 定하는 바에 依하여 이를 制限하거나 또는 禁止할 수 있다.

5 國家는 農業生産과 農地改良을 爲하여 農民과 農民團體의 自助的 活動을 指導하고 奬勵하며 農業協同組合의 組織과 運營은 法律로써 定한다.

6 國家는 農地의 適正한 利用과 均衡있는 開發을 爲하여 必要한 計劃을 樹立하고 이를 實施한다.

7 國家는 農業生産力의 擴充과 農業構造의 改善을 爲하여 農業의 協同的 組織을 助長하며 農業의 科學化를 期한다.

8 國家는 農業生産力의 增大와 農家所得의 安定을 爲하여 農産物의 價格安定을 圖謀하며 農産物의 需給均衡과 農産物의 加工, 輸出 및 國內消費에 關하여 必要한 措置를 講한다.

9 國家는 農民의 團體活動을 保障하며 그 健全한 發達을 期하기 爲하여 農民團體에 對하여 國家의 財政範圍內에서 補助를 與할 수 있으며 또는 國家有財産의 無償讓與 또는 有利한 條件으로 讓渡 또는 貸付를 할 수 있다.

10 國家는 農民의 農業外 所得의 增大를 爲하여 農村工業을 奬勵하고 農村副業을 保護育成한다.

11 國家는 農業의 振興과 農村開發에 關한 基本計劃을 樹立하고 農業金融制度를 確立하여 農民의 負擔을 輕減하며 農業資材의 生産과 供給을 圓滑하게 하고 農産物의 價格을 維持하기 爲하여 農産物의 需給과 價格에 關한 調節을 行한다.

12 國家는 農業의 生産性을 向上하고 農業所得의 增大를 圖謀하기 爲하여 農業技術의 開發과 普及 및 農業教育의 振興에 努力하여야 한다.

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208 國家는 農業의 生産性을 向上하고 農業所

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銀行業은中央銀行을全部公有或은共有로하고國營으로할것이나普通銀行이必要한境遇에는國家의嚴重한監督下에私有私營을許할수있다

都賣業은業種에따라서公有國營으로할수있고國家의監督下에私有私營을許한다

鑛物(地下資源)은公有로한다

森林및農業所有의最高限定面積(例컨대十町步)以外에는公有로함을原則으로하나朝鮮現狀에있어서林業을奬勵할必要上一定한期間許可制로그經營에必要한面積의占有權을許한다

鐵道는公有國營으로한다

船舶會社는國際航路에있어서는共有私營으로하고其他는私有私營으로한다

保險業은公有國營으로하되必要한境遇에는委托經營을할수있다

漁業에있어서는沿岸漁業을原則的으로公有로하고經營權은許可制로서國家의監督下에私營으로한다

公利機關(例ー電力、水道、通信機關)은公有國營으로한다

小手工業은私有私營에放任한다

라 勞働賃金、社會保險

ㄱ 最低賃金、最高勞働時間及勞働條件에關한政策如何

1、最低賃金

勞働者와그家族의最小生活에必要한費用및健康과幸福을維持하기에足한費用을標準으로한最低賃金制度를實施한다

實施方法은中央地方에賃金委員會를設置하야各地方의生活費를調査決定케한다

2、最高勞働時間

가 一日八時間、一週四十八時間制를實施한다

나 被傭人의意思에依하야週六十時間을限度로作業함을容認하되四十八時間을超過하는作業時間에對하여는特別手當을加給하여야한다

다 每週二十四時間以上連續休息을認定하여야한다

3、勞働條件

賃金支拂方法、賃金控除罰金의監督과禁止、一般債權者에對한賃金의保護、解雇條件、衛生及災害豫防施設等勞働條件에關한團體的協定과勞働契約保護에關하야法令을制定한다

ㄴ 少年及女性勞働에關한政策如何

1、十二歲未滿及國民學校在籍兒童의就業을禁止한다

2、十八歲未滿의少年及女子의夜間作業과危險有害作業의就業을禁止한다

3、婦女의產前產後의就業을禁止한다

4、少年勞働者의教育施設을擴充한다

ㄷ 勞働者團體에關한政策如何

1、民主主義的勞働組合의發展을奬勵하기爲하야勞働組合法을制定한다

2、勞働組合의團體交涉權을保障한다

3、勞働組合의協定한勞働條約에違反하는雇傭者와組合員間의雇傭契約의條項을無効로하고協約으로써代치한다

ㄹ 社會保險에關한政策如何

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社會保險을制定하야勞働者의死亡、老衰、癈疾、疾病、傷害、失職等境遇에는生活을保障하는强制保險制를實施한다

ㅁ 勞働能率增進에關한政策如何

1、勞働者基本生活權의確保
最低賃金制의實施와食糧及生活必需品을一般人에比하야增加配給한다

2、生產利益의配當
成績이優秀한企業에있어서는賞與金、慰勞金等形態로利益金의一部를勞働者게給與한다

3、技術向上
各事業場에技術者의養成及訓練場을設置하며技術者를優待케한다

4、厚生及住宅施設
醫療、娛樂、敎養及住宅施設의擴充을期한다

5、優秀勞働者의表彰
能率及技術이優秀한勞働者는政府此를表彰奬勵한다

마 通商과物價

ㄱ 物資가不足할時는生活必需品配給制를繼續할것인가

生活必需品은반다시配給制度를强化繼續한다

ㄴ 主要食糧品收集에關한政策

主要食糧品의收集이必要할때에는左의政策을取한다

1、年度初에詳細하收集計劃을미리作成發表한다
2、收集品의生產費와一般物價等을考慮하야適當한價格을定한다
3、各部落別로耕作及作況의實態를正確히調査하기爲하야委員會를設置한다
4、收集量의割當을部落別로[illegible]部落이共同責任을지게한다
5、出穀者에게肥料、衣料其他生活必需品의補償制度를全的으로擴充强化한다
6、運輸保管機關의計劃的動員과配置를敏速히한다
7、地域別收集狀況保管運輸狀況을隨時發表하야民心의明朗을期한다
8、密輸、密酒를嚴禁한다

ㄷ 萬一必要하다면如何한形態의物價定安及統制方策을取할것인가

1、重要한生活必需品에對하야生活費를基礎로한公定價格制와配給制를取하되原材料의配給과公定價格制를一貫的으로採用한다
2、重要物資의計劃的增產과分配를期하는同時에緊急物資에對한輸入을期한다
3、資金의需給統制를全面的으로[illegible]施하야生活必需品과主要한生產財의資金供給을重点的으로圓滑히한다
4、統一健全한貨幣制度를設定하며稅金의[illegible]收와貯蓄의增强을企圖한다

ㄹ 謀利的投機와物資陰蔽에關한對策如何

謀利的投機와物資陰蔽行爲는此를徹底的으로團束하야發覺되는대로嚴罰에處하야이目的을爲하야經濟檢察陣을强化한다

ㅁ 外國貿易에關한政策如何

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七 左記諸項에關한政策如何

財政

(一) 所得稅

1、所得稅를內國稅의中心稅로한다

2、從前日帝式所得稅制度를一掃하고普通所得稅外大所得에對한加算附課의二元的所得稅制度를採用한다

3、普通所得稅는所得의種類에依한分類主義와源泉課稅主義를採擇하며比例稅率制度를採擇한다

4、附加所得稅에있어는所得稅制度의一大特色인徹底한累進制度를採擇하고同時에超過累進制度를大所得에加重한다

5、最低生活費는勿論、勤勞控除及扶養控除等의制度를可及的充實하야中小市民의勤勞人民層의基本生活權을保障하며同時에

6、法人의課稅에對하야는同族會社에對한超過利得累進稅를考慮하야適正課稅의精神을貫徹한다

7、所得의擔稅能力의忠實한把握에對하야特別한考慮를加하기爲하야特殊施設을設置한다

(二) 不動產稅

大邸宅、投資對象化住宅、別莊、個人所有의事務所及市街地基地等에對하야不動產稅를創設하야勤勞大衆의生活安定을破壞하는反面에中小市民層의動產인財產稅를課稅하야其의生活安定의基本을確保하기爲하야不動產稅를創設하야勤勞大衆의生活安定을期한다

(三) 販賣稅

奢侈品에對하야는販賣稅를課한다

(四) 輸出輸入稅

國際互惠通商航海條約에依하야適當한稅率을採用하야一般的으로는貿易의增進을圖한다

(五) 國營事業및專賣收入

國營事業은現下朝鮮의財政經濟의情勢에비추어그範圍를擴張하야可及的國民大衆의生活必需品을生産하는事業을國營으로하야國民大衆의生活安定을期한다

專賣制度는嗜好品에있어서財政收入의確保를目的으로하지않고社會政策的見地에서適當히考慮한다

(六) 相續稅

相續에있어서는土地가農民에分與된後에는土地相續稅를廢止하고其他財產相續稅는累進率에依하야課稅한다

(七) 其他諸稅

現下의財政的見地에서는消費稅、流通稅의三體系로하는所得稅의努力을하지않고現行의(例컨대資本利子稅、煙草、財產增價稅等)各種稅를收入을圖한다

朝鮮의統一的健全な貨幣制度設定에關한對策如何

現下의混亂한貨幣를南北의統一的으로整理하고物資의生產、物資의流通、信用關係의狀況을調査하야一般產業의發達에適應한貨幣의價値를安定한다

七 左記諸項에關한政策如何

財政

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1、所得稅를內國稅의中心稅로한다

2、從前日帝式所得稅制度를一掃하고普通所得稅外大所得에對한加算附課의二元的所得稅制度를採用한다

3、普通所得稅는所得의種類에依한分類主義와源泉課稅主義를採擇하며比例稅率制度를採擇한다

4、附加所得稅에있어는所得稅制度의一大特色인徹底한累進制度를採擇하고同時에超過累進制度를大所得에加重한다

5、最低生活費는勿論、勤勞控除及扶養控除等의制度를可及的充實하야中小市民의勤勞人民層의基本生活權을保障하며同時에

6、法人의課稅에對하야는同族會社에對한超過利得累進稅를考慮하야適正課稅의精神을貫徹한다

7、所得의擔稅能力의忠實한把握에對하야特別한考慮를加하기爲하야特殊施設을設置한다

(二) 不動產稅

大邸宅、投資對象化住宅、別莊、個人所有의事務所及市街地基地等에對하야不動產稅를創設하야勤勞大衆의生活安定을破壞하는反面에中小市民層의動產인財產稅를課稅하야其의生活安定의基本을確保하기爲하야不動產稅를創設하야勤勞大衆의生活安定을期한다

(三) 販賣稅

奢侈品에對하야는販賣稅를課한다

(四) 輸出輸入稅

國際互惠通商航海條約에依하야適當한稅率을採用하야一般的으로는貿易의增進을圖한다

(五) 國營事業및專賣收入

國營事業은現下朝鮮의財政經濟의情勢에비추어그範圍를擴張하야可及的國民大衆의生活必需品을生産하는事業을國營으로하야國民大衆의生活安定을期한다

專賣制度는嗜好品에있어서財政收入의確保를目的으로하지않고社會政策的見地에서適當히考慮한다

(六) 相續稅

相續에있어서는土地가農民에分與된後에는土地相續稅를廢止하고其他財產相續稅는累進率에依하야課稅한다

(七) 其他諸稅

現下의財政的見地에서는消費稅、流通稅의三體系로하는所得稅의努力을하지않고現行의(例컨대資本利子稅、煙草、財產增價稅等)各種稅를收入을圖한다

朝鮮의統一的健全な貨幣制度設定에關한對策如何

現下의混亂한貨幣를南北의統一的으로整理하고物資의生產、物資의流通、信用關係의狀況을調査하야一般產業의發達에適應한貨幣의價値를安定한다

七 左記諸項에關한政策如何

財政

(一) 所得稅

1、所得稅를內國稅의中心稅로한다

2、從前日帝式所得稅制度를一掃하고普通所得稅外大所得에對한加算附課의二元的所得稅制度를採用한다

3、普通所得稅는所得의種類에依한分類主義와源泉課稅主義를採擇하며比例稅率制度를採擇한다

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5、最低生活費는勿論、勤勞控除及扶養控除等의制度를可及的充實하야中小市民의勤勞人民層의基本生活權을保障하며同時에

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努力하되 歲入增加와 公債政策으로 通貨를 相當한 程度로 吸收한 後 自由本位制度를 採用하야 通貨를 管理하고 對外經濟에 있어서는 聯合諸國과 交涉하야 在外決濟資金을 借款備置하고 一方產金政策을 確立하야 一은 對借款弁濟用으로 하고 一은 必要한 境遇에는 金本位貨制度라도 確立할수 있도록 하는 手段으로 하다

ㄷ 豫算編成에 關한 對策

(一) 經常的 豫算의 收支均衡을 圖謀하고 豫算節減 特히 政府機構維持費節約에 있어서 徹底한 機構의 簡素化와 少數精銳主義를 斷行한다

(二) 收入의 基幹은 內外稅金及官業收入에 두고 起債는 內外債를 莫論하고 可及社業公債에 限定하며 償還計劃이 不分明한 漠然한 赤字公債의 發行은 삼가한다

(三) 支出의 中心은 必要最少限의 政府機構維持費、文化、敎育、社會保險等에 關한 施設費及經濟再建計劃及國營事業費에 둘것이고 日帝式生產奬勵金、產業補助金制度의 濫設은 原則的으로 此를 實行치 않는다

(四) 國庫의 充實을 期하고 建國事業의 推進을 强化하기 爲하야 敵產拂下의 合理化와 아울너 建國公債制度의 創設에 留意한다

(五) 特別會計의 濫設을 警戒하야 庫國統一의 徹底를 期한다

ㄹ 高利貸金業에 關한 對策

(一) 中小市民、勞働者、農民及一般勤勞人民에 對한 生活權確保에 必要한 資金供給의 圓滑을 圖謀하기 爲하야 中央、地方을 通하야 政府에서 特殊金融施設을 實行한다

(二) 利子制限條例、營業的貸金에 對한 免許와 取締를 爲하야 貸金業取締條例等의 特別法令을 制定한다

사 朝鮮民主主義臨時政府의 敎育文化政策

一、左記各項에 對하야 如何한 敎育案을 採擇하야 發展식힐것인가

ㄱ 成年層의 文盲退治

1、目的

學校敎育을 받지 못한 一般成人及適齡超過兒童에게 短期間啓蒙敎育을 實施하야 公民으로서의 資質向上을 圖한다

2、方法

가、政府는 中央廳에 成人敎育局을 置하고 地方行政機關을 通하야 學校校舍部落集會所等場所에서 啓蒙敎育을 積極實施케 한다

나、指導職員設置

道市及郡島邑面에 各其成人敎育指導職員을 設置한다

다、敎育機關

被啓蒙對象에 依하야 講習會移動敎育班公民學校民衆大學講座等을 널니 開放한다

라、敎職員

公私立學校敎員及民間啓蒙敎化團體의 協力으로 全面的動員을 實施한다

마、成人敎育協會

民間協會機關으로 成人敎育協會를 組織하고 物心兩面으로 成人敎育事業을 援助케 한다

ㄴ 初等義務敎育

1、敎育目標

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『弘益人間』의精神으로써初等敎育을베풀어愛國精神이透徹하고誠實有能한民主國家의公民을育成한다

2、敎育方針

가、個人의自由스러운成長과發展을圖謀하여有能한自由人을育成한다

나、個人과社會와의關係에對한理解를徹底이하여協調하는社會人을養成한다

3、年　限

國民學校는滿六歲로부터滿十二歲에至하기까지의六個年으로한다

4、實施目標(五個年國民皆學計劃)

가、適齡兒童(滿六歲)全員(每年平均七十萬名)을收容식일目標로國民學校의正規學級을(每年平均五、五〇〇學級)增設한다

나、適齡超過未就學兒童(自滿七歲至滿十一歲)志望者全員을收容식힐目標로國民學校의二部敎授制를全面的으로實施한다(總學級數約一一、五四〇)

增設學級과二部制度實施에伴하는敎員을養成하되每年度所要敎員數의約七〇%를各道에서師範學校其他適當한學校에臨時敎員養成所를設置하야養成但養成한다費全額을國庫補助로한다

ㄷ　中等敎育

1、敎育目標

『弘益人間』의精神으로서高等普通敎育又는實業敎育을實施하야愛國精神이透徹하고民主主義國家에有爲한中堅公民을育成식힌다

2、根本方針

民族的自尊의氣風과國際的友好協調의精神이具全한中堅國民의品性을陶冶한다

3、制　度

ㄱ　種類及名稱

1、初級中學校—(專修科)

2、中學校 {普通中學校(專攻科) / 實業中學校(〃)}

3、師範學校

ㄴ　學齡及修業年限

1、初級中學校　三年　(自十二歲　至十五歲)

2、中學校　六年　(自十二歲　至十八歲)

3、專修科　一年　(十六歲)

4、專攻科　一年　(十九歲)

5、師範學校　三年　(自十五歲　至十八歲)

ㄷ　中等敎育機關의計劃設立

1、普通中學校收容數와實業學校收容數의比率을七對三을原則으로한다

2、實業中學校收容數와各分科別比率은農業四〇%　工業三〇%　商業二〇%　水産一〇%으로한다

ㄹ　中等學校의設置

1、中等學校는國費又는私人의費用으로設置한다

2、國費中等學校는一郡一校以上을目標로設置한다

3、中等敎育의擴充策으로二部授業(夜間)을實施한다

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己 高等教育

1、教育目標

朝鮮教育의 根本理念은 「弘益人間의 建國理念에 立脚한 完全한 民主主義國家建設에 必要한 實踐的 人格을 陶冶함에 在함

2、根本方針

一、民族固有文化를 昂揚하고 科學과 技術의 教授에 力함

二、教育의 機會均等과 教育機關의 門戶를 開放함

三、學問의 對한 政治干涉을 排除하고 學問研究의 自由를 保障함

四、特殊有能者의 對한 國家教育을 施함

3、制度

ㄱ 年限	大學四年(醫學은 五年(大學院은 二年以上
ㄴ 學點制度	個性을 尊重하고 研究의 自由를 確保하기 爲하여 採用함
ㄷ 學位	學士·碩士·博士의 學位制度를 採用함
ㄹ 男女共學	
ㅁ 奬學制度	優秀한 學生의 國費로 奬學金을 給與함
ㅂ 教育開放	各種高等教育機關의 聽講生 및 特設科目 聽講生制를 設하고 널리 門戶를 公開함
ㅅ 大學通信	國立大學의 一般行政을 監督함
	私立大學의 理事會를 組織하고 通信制를 採用함

4、擴充目標

一、道一敎以上의 國立大學을 早速히 設立할 것

二、人文系統과 科學系統의 比率을 三對七의 原則으로 함

ㄴ 教授待遇를 確保함

ㄷ 外國人教授를 招聘함

二、訓練養成對策如何

○經濟及政治機關에 必要한 職位에 配置할 朝鮮人 專門家及技術者 訓練養成에 關한 對策如何

1、經濟及政治機關에 必要한 職位에 專門家及技術者를 配置하기 爲하야 政府는 左의 三種의 養成所를 設置함

ㄱ 政府職員養成所

優秀한 青年을 收容하야 中等學校 出身者는 二年 大學 出身者는 一年間 實務者 指導下에 行政實務를 訓練함

機關에 配置함

ㄴ 産業經濟要員養成所

政府는 主要한 銀行 會社 工場 農場 牧畜 等에 專門産業經濟要員養成所를 設置하고 優秀한 青年을 收容하야 中等學校出身者는 二年 大學出身者는 一年間 各其 現地에서 實地訓練을 받게 하야 國民經濟上 必要한 機關에 配置함

ㄷ 特殊技術者養成所

二年 大學出身者는 一年間 各其 現地에서 實地訓練을 받게 하야 國民經濟上 必要한 機關에 配置함

ㄹ 通信、運輸、航海、警察、電氣 等의 特殊技術者를 主로 中等學校出身者는 收容하야 二年以上 訓練養成한 後 交通方面 技術者로 配置함

ㅁ 先進國의 多數留學生 及 視察團을 派遣하야 政治制度의 專門技術을 體得케 하야 政治經濟機關에 配置함

三、民族文化

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ㄱ 民族文化發展促進에關한對策如何?

1、基本方針

ㄱ、祖國建設의道義的使命을體得케하며公民的品格을涵養하야民族發展의基礎를鞏固케한다

ㄴ 古來朝鮮文化의優秀性을自覺徹底케하며東西文化를攝取醇化하야向上發展케한다

ㄷ 政治、經濟、文化及民族에關한國家的綜合計劃을樹立하야各種施設을整備擴充함으로祖國文化를發展振興케한다

2、方策

ㄱ 民族文化를發展식히기爲하야綜合的敎化運動組織體를確立한다事業指導者訓練、中堅人物養成、機關誌發刊、巡廻敎化、講習、映畵實施

ㄴ 靑少年의組織的訓練을實施한다

ㄷ 婦女訓練의組織的訓練을實施한다

ㄹ 國民體育을向上식히기爲하야國民體育場과體育指導者養成機關을設置한다

ㅁ 圖書館、博物館、古文化保存機關을整備한다

ㅂ 各種民族文化研究調査機關을整備하고研究費는國家가補助한다

ㄴ 藝術發展促進에關한對策如何?

藝術의發展促進을爲하야左의施策을計(行)한다

1、國立藝術院을設置한다ㅣ美術館、文學館、音樂館、演劇館

2、國立劇場을設置한다

3、映畵製作을國營으로한다

4、民間藝術機關及團體를積極助成한다

5、藝術賞制度를創設한다

ㄷ、科學發展促進에關한對策如何?

科學發展促進을爲하야左의施策을實行한다

1、서울大學校에綜合學術研究院을設置한다

2、各種特殊研究試驗場을設置하고民間機關에研究費를補助한다

3、初中等學校敎育에對한理科敎育을改善한다 (理科敎授及實驗時間增加理科施設擴充)

4、高等敎育의理工系學校를增設하고職場敎育을實施한다

5、外國留學生을大量派遣한다 (敎授及技術者養成을爲한)

6、技術員을急速養成하고技術者를適正配置한다

7、科學博物館을設置한다

8、發明權의國家保護와國家表彰을實施한다

四、社會保健事業의計劃及對策何如?

國民保健을維持向上키爲하야左의施策을實行한다

1、保健行政의强化

保健行政의强化에關하야서는中央政府地方(道市郡邑及面)行政機關內의行政部門을獨立單一體로한다

2、社會保健에關한疾病의對策確立急性傳染病及慢性傳染病特히結核病、性病、癩病等과精神病에對한豫防及治療에關하

諸對策을確立한다

3、保健所의設置

保健所를一面一個所까지推進漸次設置한다

4、保健衛生統計의整備

5、公衆衛生施設의完備

上下水道及汚物處置等을改善한다

6、郡立病院設置

現在道病院의下部組織을郡立病院까지推進設立한다但官營又는郡單位의醫療共濟組合制度로實施한다

7、社會事業的醫療機關의擴充

健康保險法의實現化와慈善醫療機關을獎勵한다

8、公衆保健衛生敎育의徹底

ㄱ 文敎部를通하야中等、初等學校에까지保健衛生敎育의課目을多量取材케한다

ㄴ 一般市民及農民에對하야廣範圍로此에關한敎育及宣傳에努力한다

9、醫療機關의企畫化

上記諸般醫療機關은將來國家的企畫化를目標로하야漸進的으로推進케한다

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MEMORANDUM No. 5

24 October 1946

SUBJECT: Submission of a suggestion.

TO : The Korean-American Joint Committee.

FROM : The Liaison Committee of All workers for Korean Independence.

This committee is sincerely extending a wholeheartedly wish for the success of the Korean-American Joint Committee, which has been set up to meet the present emergency situation in South Korea. Further, this committee is submitting a suggestion for an immediate settlement of the current crisis because it is required at the present moment.

This suggestion of this committee is attached herewith.

(Sealed)

YOON, SI SUT

Representative
The Liaison Committee

EXHIBIT 4

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

I. Important Causes for Disturbances in Southern Korea.

1. The hopelessness of immediate organization of Korean Provisinal Government and the severe friction between the Rightists and Leftists.

2. In the midst of insufficiency of food, the rice collection is too cruel, the distribution unjust.

3. Many pro-Japanese personnel in both government organizations and police departments.

4. High price lure of things together with the low scaled salaries and wages which lead people to general doubts, despair and restlessness.

5. Some ambitious politicians, having taken advantage of this opportunity carried on the agitation among the public.

II. Remedies suggested.

1. Hasten the resumption of the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission.

2. Understand the general attitude of the population, and the rice collection of the new crops should be done only from the enemy property and land owners, and execute just distribution.

3. Carry out an immediate purge of pro-Japanese elements from the government organs and police force and replace them with patriots and others who have the personal history of independence movement behind them.

4. Control the price level of commodities, increase the production of daily necessities so as to safeguard the life of every workman.

5. Those directly responsible for the agitation of the disturbances should be severely dealt with in accordance with the law, and those who had been instigated to the disturbances should be dealt magnanimously.

6. Lend constructive assistance to Coalition Committee and give weighty considerations to the decisions of the committee.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

PRESS RELEASE

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

26 October 1946

To the Committee representing
the joint meeting of the
nine political parties:

I have carefully considered the requests submitted by you in the petition which you recently presented to me. I appreciate your offer of assistance in inquiring into the causes of the recent disturbances in south Korea. I have recently appointed a Korean-American Conference consisting of members of the Coalition Committee with American officers and civilian experts to inquire into the causes of the disturbances. Since the objective of your group is the same as the Conference appointed by me, I request that you select and submit to me the names of three members from your group for appointment by me as members of the Korean-American Conference. The enlarged Conference will thus have the benefit of the experience, advice and assistance of your group which will make the work of the Conference more effective.

Yours truly,

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

Political parties represented--

The Korean Communist Party,
The New Progressive Party,
The Korean Independence Party,
The Korean People's Party,
The Independent Laborers' & Farmers' Party,
South Korea New People's Party,
Korean National Revolutionary Party,
The Social Democratic Party,
The TCH'UNG OO DANG.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

29 October 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BROWN:

1. An illustration of some of the difficulties being placed in the way of the achievement of coalition will be provided by a review of the salient facts of the effort to obtain a house for WON, Sei Hoon.

2. WON, Sei Hoon has been the right-hand man and chief lieutenant of KIM, Kiusic over the period of the past six months. He has no local residence and is obliged to live in one room in the home of a friend. Dr. KIM requested the assistance of General Arnold in obtaining a house for Mr. WON last June. By General Arnold's direction, I obtained information as to a house which could be turned over to Mr. WON in accordance with the policy outlined by the Property Custodian's office. In order that there be no question whatever as to the propriety of obtaining the house, I asked Chief CHANG, Taik San of the Provincial Police to give me the circumstances on the worst possible case of illegal occupation that he could find. Chief Chang checked for several days and then called me in and told me of the case now being discussed. This was a case in which the President of the Choheung Bank had placed his mistress and sister in possession of a valuable property and the mistress had sold government-owned furnishings, for which she had been prosecuted. I was assured by both Chief Chang and the Property Custodian that there would be no difficulty whatever in getting immediate action to obtain this property for Mr. Won.

3. Meanwhile WON Sei Hoon's service to Dr. KIM Kiusic won him the intense antagonism of certain influences closely related both to the President of the Choheung Bank and to the Korean personnel of the Property Custodian's office. The bank president, CHUNG Oon Yong, made statements that his connections were such that there was no power in Korea which could turn his mistress out of the property. During the ensuing four months, Mr. Won states that he spent approximately twenty hours at various times on fruitless efforts to determine the status of his application. He has frequently been kept sitting in the Property Custodian's office for several hours at a time without being attended to by anyone. At no time has anyone informed him that the application (which he was told in June had been approved) was disapproved apparently in September.

4. The American officials of the Property Custodian's office had insisted that the case was clear cut and there was no reason

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for delaying action. The matter went to a Board of Review which apparently concluded that the claims of the embezzling mistress were superior to those of the second most helpful political figure in Korea.

5. In the face of the fact that General Arnold gave his personal promise to Mr. Won that he would try to secure him this house, and that this office, under the General's order, did prepare the case to secure it in accordance with the standard procedure of the Property Custodian's office, the manner in which this case has been handled involves embarrassment to the military in general.

6. Inquiry from various sources of information leaves it impossible to determine by whose decision this property was in fact denied to Mr. Won. Major Scott of the Reviewing Board has no recollection of the case. Captain O'Connell of the Property Office has stated that it was his understanding that the decision has been made by Captain Shute of the office of Major Weems. Captain Shute disclaims all knowledge of it and insists that the decision was thatof Major Nesbitt. Mr. Frisbie of the Property Office states that the decision ultimately reached was in opposition to his strong recommendation. It appears probable that the result was foisted upon the Americans by action of Koreans who did not actually disclose all the facts or who distorted them.

7. During the four weeks since the apparent final denial of Mr. Won's application, I have made three separate requests for information as to the status of the case in the Office of the Property Custodian. On each occasion I have been assured that the matter would be checked and I would be called back. I have never been called back.

8. A word about the character and background of CHUNG, Oon Yong, the President of the Choheung Bank, is germane to this discussion. Mr. CHUNG is an intimate of the leading figures in the Han Kook Democratic Party. As President of the Choheung Bank he has been strongly opposed by many of his stockholders. I cannot confirm the truth of this story, but it is widely repeated and believed that the stockholders have attempted to upset Chung's control of the bank and have had their action countermaned by Korean officials of the Department of Finance.

9. The ramifiaations of his interests appear to be very wide. From separate andpresumably authentic sources has come information to the members of the Coalition Committee in recent weeks that Mr. Chung has been soliciting donations from wealthy acquaintances who desire to be members of the Legislature. He is said to have stated that for 1,000,000 ¥ he could secure a seat for anyone.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Memo to General Brown. 29 October 1946

This report is included here only for general background. It is not believed that Mr. Chung claims to have influence with American officials.

10. It is respectfully recommended that this matter be reopened for investigation and for the punishment and removal of culpable parties. It is further recommended that the Commanding General direct some procedure whereby the need of Mr. Won for a residence can be immediately filled.

Leonard M. Bertsch

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lt., CMP

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 235

1 November 1946

MEMO

SUBJECT: Situation at Taegu as of 31 October 1946.

TO: Chief of Staff

FROM: Provost Marshal

1. A plan has now been worked out with Colonel Adair, Provincial Military Governor of Kyongsang Pukto Province, for a more rapid release of Koreans apprehended during the riot in Taegu and outlying Guns. The civilian police department of Taegu is now organized sufficiently to be able to dispose of confined natives without any further investigation by the Armed Forces. The result of this system should show the release of all people who might have been arrested without any serious charges being preferred.

2. At the present time the C.I.D. have approximately 200 more people to investigate for various crimes committed during the riot. There is a list of known individuals who had the leading part in some of the disturbances who have not yet been apprehended. Local police are on the lookout for these individuals.

3. The student who caused the start of this disturbance in Taegu, with the body from the hospital, has been apprehended. It is interesting to note that this student is a known communist and admits such, also he is the brother of a leader that we have in custody who very likely will be tied up with the murdering of five policemen. These are our next two Commission cases. There is one Commission case with approximately fifty defendants, of which twenty-five will probably be arraigned before the Military Commission. The drivers of the trucks and bus used in transporting policemen from the outlying Guns into Taegu have been apprehended. The present indications are that the bus and trucks were requisitioned by the Trade Unions and communists and that the drivers had no alternative but

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By NARS, Date

to obey their commands, particularly the driver of the bus as the mob seized the bus and caused all occupants of the bus to dismount and then gave instructions to the driver to proceed out to the Guns.

4. The condition at the Medical College is still being investigated. The investigation to date involves two doctors who are still in jail. The only thing that we can prove to date on these two doctors is that at the height of the riot they tried to encourage other members of the medical staff to go on strike for forty-eight hours until demands for more money, better living conditions and more food was obtained for the staff. Also there are indications that they had something to do with the none treatment of wounded policemen as they were brought to the hospital.

5. At present there is one Commission case now in session with two defendants being charged with murder. This case should be finished by the middle of next week. There has been hundreds tried before the Provost Court, of which at the present five are sitting in the Taegu area. It is my opinion that within two weeks the jails should be fairly well cleaned out with the exception of those to be held for major crimes.

6. Pertaining to some of the things that was noticeable, particularly to Commission and Provost Courts. It is my opinion that the largest percent of members of the Commission and the Provost Courts are not sufficiently legal minded to try these individuals for the type of crimes that were committed. I base this opinion on observations made while attending some of these courts. There was also a condition that perhaps could not be helped but it has made it inconvenient, particularly during the investigation and interrogations where C.I.D., Commission, Provost Courts, defense attorneys and judge advocates were allotted space in a wing of the Court House which was too small for all of this personnel and which resulted in defendants seeing, from time to time, the courts that would try them, which I do not consider good policy. Also it is unavoidable for members of the Commission to hear and know facts about the evidence before the case goes to trial due to this condition. It is suggested that in the future the Commission and Provost Courts be kept separate and apart from the locations where investigations are being conducted.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

7. There are some indications that a few members of the present Commission do not understand that certain introduction of evidence that might appear unnecessary is necessary. There have been some remarks made by members of the present Commission that in their opinion many of the introduction of various statements and questions are unnecessary. This may be true in many instances, but it is my opinion that no remarks should be made by the individuals during the time of trial.

8. Most of the personnel on the Provost Courts and Commission are individuals who have just arrived in Korea, and in my opinion do not understand the seriousness of the crimes that have been committed in this uprising. Also they are not sufficiently legal minded to understand the proper procedure of these trials.

9. There have been requests for additional civilian personnel which in my opinion was not necessary, particularly on the request for the last group that arrived. It is my opinion that there is sufficient civilian personnel now present to handle the needs of all concerned. It is also my opinion that within a few days some of this personnel can be released and returned to their permanent assignment. Before returning to Taegu I will talk this matter over with the Director of Civilian Personnel and will see that the persons he wishes released first are returned to Seoul.

JOHN E. BAIRD
Colonel CMP
Provost Marshal

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

The proposals made by the so-called Nine Political Parties are inspired by Communists.

Please reject them all at once and use your good judgement.

From Ma San
Nationalist Ass'n

Gen Brown.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

三 만원정 九 류 2

경성 미군정청 ㄴ

하ㅣ지중 상각하

46.10.31

금반구정당 이제 출한 폭 동사래에대 한외결서는
공상당을중 삼을한자 가보호외허 위로뒷고단
변히이를각 하하시는동 시에각하외 현명하신성
명구대로처 단하야주시 기를전정하 나이다마산
국민회

로구 ㅋ ㅇ

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

001. meeting

General meeting of the Chosun Water Utilization Association

Nov. I2, I946

Subject: Resolution

To : The Joint U. S. - Soviet Commission

The general meeting of the Chosun Water Utilization Association wants to take this opportunity to express its heart-felt thanks and profound gratitude to the Allied Powers and their nations for their help and assistence they have given to the Korean people in gaining its liberation from the ruthless oppression of the Japanese. It is the sincerest wish of the association that the unhappily interrupted Joint U. S. - Soviet Commission be promptly resumed in accordance with the fervent desire of the Korean people in order to hasten the establishment of a united democratic provisional government in Korea and to enable the Korean people to make its contribution to world peace.

General meeting of the Chosun Water Utilization Association

Chairman
Ju Luk Kyoon

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

~~SECRET~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 000.93 (16 Nov 45) GC-P 16 November 1945

SUBJECT: Manchurian and Northern Korean Weather Service

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.

1. To further meteorological support for military air transport operations in the North Pacific Area, it is highly desireable that complete weather reports are received from areas of Manchuria and Northern Korea.

2. Request that channels of communications be established, between the weather services of the Commanding General of the Soviet Armed Forces of Manchuria and Korea and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, for the rapid interchange of technical information concerning weather, broadcasting schedules, radio frequencies, codes and locations of reporting stations.

3. In order to have complete coverage on the weather maps prepared by the weather services in areas under control of CINCAFPAC, it would be highly desireable if weather reporting would be resumed by stations from or near the following specific locations which are now under Soviet control:

International Index Number	Name of Stations	Location	
		Latitude	Longitude
699	Gensen	N 39 11	E 127 26
700	Zyosin	40 40	129 12
701	Manchuria	49 40	117 45
702	Zikikar	47 28	124 05
703	Kharbin	45 45	126 38
704	Kirin	43 48	126 22
705	Kungahuling	43 31	124 48
706	Yuki	42 20	130 24
707	Mukden	41 48	123 23
708	Kalgan	40 48	114 29
709	Yinkow	40 43	122 09
710	Shan-hai Kuan	40 00	119 47
711	Anting	39 59	124 30
714	Helampo	50 20	127 32
736	Dairen	38 54	121 38
753	Myayzoocha	49 00	120 50
754	Kaiyun	42 41	124 09
755	Anshan	41 00	123 00

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State Dept. Instr. 12 Apr and 8 July 1976
NARS, Date APR 0 9 1977
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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

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BASIC: Ltr, GHQ, SCAP, file AG 000.93 (16 Nov 1945)GC-P, dtd 16 November 1945, subject: "Manchurian and Northern Korean Weather Services."

International Index Number	Name of Station	Location	
		Latitude	Longitude
-------	Kaisyu	N 38 10	E 126 00
-------	Heizyo	39 00	126 00
-------	Singisyu	40 00	125 00
-------	Nekka	41 00	118 00
-------	Chunganshine	42 00	127 00
-------	Cairo	43 00	121 00
-------	Botanko	44 00	130 00
-------	Chansuk	46 30	130 00
-------	Soron	47 00	122 00

4. Since agreements regarding interchange of weather information have been made initially on a governmental level, it is believed that action on this specific request will be more favorably expedited if it is forwarded through the same channels, rather than through the Soviet Military Mission to SCAP.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H.W. ALLEN
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General

Copies to:
COMGENFEAF ADVON
D C/S for Operations
G-2
C Sig O

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

Stanford E. Neice

STANFORD E. NEICE
1st Lt. Air Corps

SECRET
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DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By NARS, Date

SECRET

Dear General HODGE,

The Meteorological Service of the United States has at the present time a branch in the city of KHABAROVSK, through which you may regularly receive exhaustive meteorological data. Therefore, I, for my part, consider the present system of organization of meteorological service should be completely satisfactory to you.

Respectfully yours,

COMMANDER OF SOVIET FORCES IN KOREA
GUARD-COLONEL GENERAL

(CHISTIAKOV)

"13" November 1945

NOTE: City of KHABAROVSKI located on the Amur river northern boundary of MANCHURIA— approximately 400 miles north of VLADIVOSTOK.

CERTIFIED: A TRUE COPY

G. W. RYAN JR.
1st Lt. AGD
Asst Adj Gen

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept./Instr. 12 Apr and 8 July 1976
By FWB/Stan NARS, Date APR 02 1977

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

File

Joint Commission

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Provost Marshal
APO 235

21 November 1946

MEMO

SUBJECT: Report of Situation in Taegu as of 19 November.

TO: Chief of Staff

FROM: Provost Marshal

1. The Provost Court cases and Commission cases in the Taegu area are as follows:

PLACE	TRIED	CONVICTED	ACQUITTED
Taegu	161	90	71
Outlying Districts	251	247	4
Commission Cases	7	7	0
TOTAL	419	344	75

(All the Commission Cases tried received the maximum penalty to be hanged.)

2. At the present time there are 22 cases being investigated by the C.I.D., which is the total number of cases to be completed before removal of the C.I.D. from Taegu. Of the 22 cases there are two more positive Commission cases and the possibility of more Commission cases upon the completion of investigation.

3. The Military Government has two teams consisting of the following:- one trained military police officer, one civilian police official (with the equivalent rank of Lieutenant, Captain or Major), one interpreter and one translator who are touring the entire Province of Kyongsang Pukto for the purpose of passing on people who are now in jail who are to be discharged immediately, or arraigned before the Provost Court. It is anticipated that these

Carry out instr. - Let G-2 see copy. Also copy to Joint Commission.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

Report of Situation in Taegu as of 19 November 1946 continued.

teams will complete their work by the end of November.

4. The prisoners in the jails in Taegu, arrested during the riot, have been reduced to 136. Of this 136, 63 people are involved in the cases being investigated by the C.I.D. They should be completely through with the trials of Provost Court of the above balance by the end of November.

5. The Commission returned a verdict of guilty and sentenced to be hanged on the following five rioters:

Chai, Moon Hak	-	418 Chun Nai Dong, WhaWon Myun Talsung Goon
Lee, Jai Hai	-	43 Chon Nai Dong, Wha Won Myun " "
Lee, Kwang Yuel	-	No known address.
Lee, Sam Taik	-	Chung Nai Dung #3 Ku Wha Won Myun " "
Pak, Hak Ko	-	76 Chun Nai Dong, WhaWon Myun, Talsung Goon

At the present time these five are now in the 3rd Bn. 1st Inf. Stockade. It is requested that these five prisoners be removed to the Pungsong Stockade in KBC. The Commanding Officer of the 1st Infantry has requested that we remove them as soon as possible. The cases are now under review and will be completed on Saturday, according to Colonel Brown.

6. My trip to Taegu was made over the road in a jeep over Route No. 1. Mileage with detour was a total of 302 miles. This route is in fair condition but has many bridges out, but in most cases all of them are under construction or repair. In most all of them cement foundations are in. It is my opinion that this route is passable for heavy traffic, south. From Taejon (1040-1495) where the river bed is still being used as a roadway I turned south to Kumsan (1048-1380). From Kumsan to Karhyon-Ni (1045-1430), then turned north to Muju (1065-1455) to Yongdong (1076-1475). I made this trip over this road for the possibility of an alternate route south from Taejon. In my opinion this road is only capable of handling light traffic as there are many bridges out, many wash-outs and no indication of repairs.

7. It is strongly recommended that Route No. 1 be plainly marked as such in every village on this route. In many of the villages there are roads that could be taken for Route No. 1. There are road signs but they are all in Korean dialect. The large cities are poorly marked and in some cases not marked at all. South of Taejon the road is marked better but could be improved.

John E. Baird

JOHN E. BAIRD
Colonel CMP
Provost Marshal

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

R &

...ORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ... [illegible] ...ERAL C ISTIAKOV, ... I G ..., SOVIET ...OCS IN NORTH KOR..., AND ... GENERAL ... COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA, REGULATING THE ... OF CORRESPONDENTS ... IN KOREA, 26 NOVEMBER 1946 to ____ MARCH 1947.

S E C R E T

1. The Joint Commission must consult with those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow Decision on Korea. Signing the declaration in Communique No. 5 will be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will rate the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation.

2. A party or organization signatory to the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 has the right to appoint such a representative who in its opinion can best present to the Joint Commission its views regarding the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. However, if the appointed representative, for completely valid reasons, be considered antagonistic toward the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision or toward either of the Allied Powers, then the Joint Commission, following mutual agreement, may demand that the party having signed the declaration in Communique No. 5 should designate another representative in his place.

3. Parties and social organizations or their representatives invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in Communique No. 5 do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Gen Brown

Seoul, 29 Dec 1946

TO: General John R. Hodge,
The Commanding General of
the United States Army Forces
in Korea.

Honorable Sir:

The Seoul Citizens' Great Meeting celebrating the first anniversary of the Three Ministers' Decision at Moscow, the right line and concrete method for Korean Independence, estimate it a great honour to write, in the name of the one and half million citizens, to your Excellency.

Reviewing the last one year after the Moscow Decision, the people in South Korea have lived on in a tense situation full of regrettable occurances -- the worst shortage of provisions ever seen in our history, the ever bulging inflation, the hovering price, the putting-into-jails of thousands, tens thousands of patriots who have devoted themselves to the Korean Independence from the Jap-imperialistic time, the assaulting, murdering and lynching the people's leaders by terrorists connived at or in league with the police whose duty is to protect the lives and properties of the people and so on. To our regret, those were and are the miseries that we experienced and experience every day. Now the people in South Korea are on the verge of general collapse of their own livings.

But worse follows: the foreign goods far from necessaries of our lives... can, candy, corn and the likes... flood on the market; industry shows no sign of its revival; the living conditions of the people go to the extremity; and foreign debt exceeds, so far as announced, ten billion wons. There is the increasing danger of colonial enslavement. One who has any knowledge of our present situation and four thousand years old history will clearly perceive that every Korean, as member of civilized nation, has a keen sense against the actually colonizing policies in South Korea.

Dear General Hodge,

Permit us to point out to your Excellency the main two, out of various causes of such national emergency. One: the Moscow Decision, the only, right and shortest line for our democratic development and full independence, is not yet put into practice in South Korea. And the other: the political power in South Korea is usurped and abused by the pro-japs, National traitors and pro-fascists. Being the reactionaries in political power, the Decision is not still put into practice; and reciprocally, being the latter set aside, the former is rampant. To rescue the unhappy people in South Korea out of the darkness and to achieve the democratic development of Korea, the hope of your Excellency as well as your United States people, the first tasks are, therefore, above all, the faithful practice of the Decision also in South Korea and thorough liquidation of the reactionary influence in political power.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Letter to Gen Hodge Continued

DEAR General Hodge.

Let us be honoured to call your attention to the following steps in order to fulfill the above mentioned urgent tasks. In putting the Decision into practice, we must begin with the most earliest resumption of the U.S. Soviet Joint Commission and the establishment of the provisional democratic government. And being the purpose of its reopening the faithful practice of the Decision, the list of "democratic parties and social organizations" for "consultation" must be filled with political parties and socialorganizations with truly democratic platforms and activities, supported by the absolute majority of the people and supporting fully the Decision from the beginning, excluding parties, organizations and individuals which or who are opposing it, giving partial support to it or pretending to support it after the issue of the communique No 5 in order to undermine the successful carrying-out of the Decision in the provisional Government. And at the same time, thoroughly to oust the Pro-Japs, National traitors and pro-fascists, to liquidate the disastrous results of the Jap Imperialistic domination, the political power must be handed over to the people's committees formed with patriots, combatants for our national independence from the time of Jap-Imperialism, and given birth through the originality of this liberated people. Those two steps are requested to be immediately carried out in South Korea for the solution of its all problems.

Dear General Hodge!

We are by no means those who are captured by narrowish nationalism, rejecting well-wished helpings and ignoring our international situations. Nevertheless, we do not hesitate to make positive opposition against unrighteous policies. The poeple's resistance in the last September and October is merely a part of the democratic independence movement aiming to adjust the abnormal state of things in South Korea. Hereby, we cordially ask you excellency who has witnessed every occurance together, with us and made efforts jointly with us to solve the pressing problems, to pay attentions to what are mentioned in this letter.

Praying for your excellency's health and happiness, we remain,
Honorable Sir,

Yours respectfully,

Kim Won Bong,
The President of the Seoul
Citizens Meeting for Celebrating
the first Anniversary of the Moscow
Decision.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

G-IV P-1

D E C I S I O N S
At the Citizens' Great Meeting on the occasion of celebrating the first anniversary of the Moscow Decision, 29 Dec. 1946, in Seoul, Korea.

The Seoul Citizens' Great Meeting, 29 Dec. 1946, held to celebrate the first anniversary of the Moscow Decision, hearing the opening address of our great leader, Mr. Huh Huhn and celebrating speeches of other leaders, decides without a dissent voice as followings:

1. Reaffirming the decision on the Korean problems made at the Conference of three foreign ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the United States America and the United Kingdom held in December 1945 at Moscow as the only right course and only concrete method for the democratic development and full independence of our country, the Citizens' Great Meeting decides to support it as a whole and positively put it into practice.

2. The Seoul Citizens Great Meeting supports positively the democratic reforms in North Korea ---Handing over political powers to the People's Committee, effecting democratic land reform, enforcing progressive laws for labour and sexual equality, nationalising important industries, establishing taxation system in kind, abolishing all the Jap-Imperialistic laws, carrying out general election on democratic principles and so on -- which were faithfully performed after the spirit and direction of the Moscow decision, and at the same time, claims same democratic reforms to be instantly carried out in South Korea.

3. The Citizens Great Meeting points out the unhappiness and darkness in South Korea -- general collapse of the peoples' livings and the increasing danger of recolonization -- arise from the complete negligence of the decision as well as the usurpation of the political power by the pro-Japs, national traitors and pro-fascists who are against it. Therefore the most urgent tasks in South Korea are (1) handing over political powers to the People's Committee, and (2) reopening the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission for the earliest establishment of the provisional democratic government.

4. We witnessed throughout the last one year, the desperate opposition to the Moscow Decision and frantic plots against the U.S. - Soviet Joint Commission contrived by the reactionaries in South Korea. At the beginning, they were dead against the Decision, but after the issue of the communique No. 5 they attempted more cunningly and sinisterly to participate in the provisional government in order to hamper the practice of the decision. Their temporary support to the decision was merely their tactical camoflauge. It proved true with the mad opposition against it, which commenced with their so-called "National Grand Meeting For Attaining Independence", 12 May in Seoul, immediately after the adjournment of the Commission. The attempted establishment of a separated government for

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Decisions continued:

South Korea, Syngman Lee and his followers' too naive and a little presumptuous attempt to upset it, the actual, independent of all seeming announcements, political role of the Legislature are the good testimonies to reveal their trickish and impostrous verbal support to the decision.

5. The Citizens' Great Meeting comes to the conclusion that such reactionary parties, organisations and individuals must not be allowed to participate in the "consultation" of the Joint Commission which is charged with the duty to put the decision faithfully into practice, in order to solve the Korean problems without failure, and insists the list for the consultation must be made absolutely with democratic parties and social organizations which have sincerely supported the decision from the beginning and will do their every effort for its practice; and this conclusion and insistence shall be conveyed to commanding Generals of the U.S. Forces in South Korea and the Soviet Forces in North Korea and to the three ministers signed on the decision.

6. The Citizens' Great Meeting adopts the urgency motions proposed by Democratic combatants of every social stratum through their actual experiences and decides to trust the executive committee of this meeting to carry out them effectively.

a. The people's resistance all over the South Korea during the last September and October broke out to resist against starvation and tyrannous oppression, and to eliminate the danger of recolonizing our fatherland. It broke out owing to the persecution, illegal attacks-- arrests and murders -- of the police upon the labours who exercised their fundamental right, freedom of strike, for their reasonable demands, and upon the peasants, students and petty bourgeois who demonstrated peacefully what they demanded or aspired for. That is to say, the people resisted, unavoidably and justifiably, to protect their existence, to consolidate the independence of their fatherland, and to defend themselves from the murderous activities of the police. And that the leaders of the resistance were sentenced to death in mass and imprisioned by thousands. The reactionary opened their renewed attacks.

The Citizens' Great Meeting demands the instant and general release of the imprisoned leaders, and makes a resolution to express our opposition to the condemnation of death through a form of struggle.

b. There are other new attacks of the reactionaries -- the massacre of peaceful people in Chunchoo, the licenticus massacre of the imprisoned in Kwangchoo, the atrocities upon the imprisoned patriots in the West Gate Prison, the shut-out of the three colleges and other incidents.

The Citizens' Great Meeting hereby protest to the authorities

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Decisions Continued:

against such new attacks to demand their reconsideration, and urges them to punish severely the gang-leaders of the attacks.

c. Though we have often demanded to release the tens of thousand patriots who had been imprisoned since the August 15, through the Citizens meetings, to our indignation, it is not realized yet. We firmly demand once more the unconditional release of the imprisoned patriots and the cancel of the arrest writ against Mr. Pak Huhn Young, the highest leader of our democratic independence movement.

And at the same time, we make resolution to relieve the families of the imprisoned patriots.

d. We will support the good work initiated by social organizations for millions of refugees in great miseries, and will take part in the relief movement to attain a full success.

e. Besides the land reform like that in North Korea, we support the struggles of the peasants for 25% rent system including taxes and abolishment of all kinds of forced collection, in order to improve the livings of the peasants, whose lives are miseries themselves owing to the terrible collection and negligence of the 3.7 rent system.

f. Being almost all industries in the hand of pro-Japs and Profiteers, the number of the unemployed increases day by day, and even the employed get the lowest slave wages unsufficient to maintain their livings.

We demand the authority for the earliest solution of such stringency.

g. The astronomical inflation and hovering price shale the livings of the citizens from the root. Those who are in charge of them must take the responsibility on themselves and resign. We demand the authority to take necessary steps to depress the inflation and price.

h. The problems of provisions vital to our existence shows no sign of improvement even in the harvest time. The price of rice rose above five hundren wons and yet there is no gumsantee for a distribution of a hop per day. There shall be a more serious rice shortage than that of last summer. Therefore, we propose to the authorities to trust the collection and distribution of provisions to representatives of democratic parties, in order to meet with such emergency.

i. Citizens' Meetings is the best occasion to express the political wishes of the citizens, accordingly, a most important part of their lives. Therefore, the prohibition of use of the Seoul Athletic Grounds the only spacious place for mass meeting, is an oppression on the citizens politic lives. We request the ground to be open for political meetings.

(the end)

[illegible]

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EUROPEAN SECTION

USSR TRANSMITTERS

HOME SERVICE

U.S. GERMAN CARTEL TIE-UP EXCORIATED

Khabarovsk, in Russian to the USSR, Jan. 1, 1947, 4:20 p.m. EST--P

(TRUD Article by Linetsky: "The Policy of American Monopolists in Germany")

(Text)

"During the war the American cartels sought to consolidate their position in the economic life of the United States. The war was a profitable affai for them. They saw it as a means for the destruction of certain of their competitors in world markets and as a means of getting rich through Government orders. The American cartels were not disappointed in their expectations. They waxed rich on Government orders.

"According to a report published last summer by the Murray Senate Committee, a committee which conducted an investigation of the concentration of American industry, 100 of the largest corporations almost completely monopolized war orders during the war. They obtained 67.2 percent of all the war orders, involving a sum of 173 billion dollars. Of these 100 corporations the first place was held by the General Motors Corporation whic obtained orders amounting to 13 billion 813 million dollars.

"The Murray Committee recommended that by the end of 1945 250 large industrial enterprises were in control of plants and machinery having a productive capacity equal to the productive capacity of all the rest of American industry.... These figures dissipate the myth of free initiative and free competition in American industry during the war.

"The end of the war put an end to a considerable number of measures which permitted the U.S. Government to exert some control over the activities of industrial enterprises. This gave the companies the chance to seek an extension of their influence in the international arena. The attention of the cartel leaders was directed, first of all toward the resumption of the old connections which were disrupted by the war, particularly with concerns in the western occupation zones of Germany.

"In the course of the past 3 years the American newspapers (three names unintelligible--Ed.) have published data which revealed how the pre-war secret agreements between the American and German monopolies worked for the military and technical advantage of the fascist aggressor, and delayed the technical progress of the United States.

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"Industrial conditions which existed under the Japanese also remained intact. There exists no labor legislation. A sharp decline of the living standard of the masses, the suppression of all democratic freedoms, and reprisals against people's organizations and their leaders cause the legitimate indignation of the population of Southern Korea. In September and October of this year, it resolved into a powerful strike movement, which in some places took the shape of armed revolt.

"At present, it is quite clear that as long as the reactionaries rule Southern Korea, the needs of the people will not be satisfied. That is why the Korean people will never recognize imposed leaders like the profascist Syng Man Rhee or the traitor Seung Soo Kin. Having freed itself of the Japanese invaders' yoke, it also wants to get rid of their underlings (who are) continuing to lord it and enrich themselves in Southern Korea, being ready to sell their country to any imperialistic depredator.

"The Korean people are awaiting the creation of a truly democratic government which would serve their interests. Such a government can be created only on the basis of exact and full implementation of the Moscow Decision."

HOME OFFICE STAND ON FASCISTS SCORED

Moscow, TASS, Soviet Overseas Service, in English Morse to North America, Dec. 30, 1946, 7:54 a.m. EST--W

(Text)

"London--Commenting on the demand of Laborite M. P. Austin for a law against the fascists 'who again rear their heads in Britain,' REYNOLDS NEWS says that the answer given by Under Secretary for Home Affairs Oliver 'was unsatisfactory. Oliver believes that the British fascists should not cause alarm.'

"Oliver's answer means that the fascists have a right to spread their poison. REYNOLDS NEWS notes in this connection that fascists should not be allowed to prostitute the political rights which they ridicule and want to destroy. The newspaper says that a call for racial hatred should be regarded as a crime. The duty of democratic people, the newspaper goes on, is to defend themselves from the disgusting teaching which spread murder and destruction all over the world and which was destroyed only at the cost of millions of lives."

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"The Korean people warmly greeted the Moscow Decision, as eloquently proved by the mammoth solidarity demonstrations and speeches of the representatives of the democratic parties and political leaders, both in Northern Korea--the Zone of military responsibility of the USSR, and in Southern Korea -- the zone of the military responsibility of the United States. Only a few reactionaries met the Moscow Decision in a hostile manner. They rightly discerned in it threat to their political and economic power, acquired by means of collaboration with the Japanese invaders. Some reactionary emigrees with Syng Man Rhee and Kos Kim, who returned to Korea, came out as the champions of this bourgeois and the landowner clique. They resorted to every means, from slander to terrorism, in order to discredit and frustrate the Moscow decision.

U.S. Stand 'Strange'

"And strange as it may seem the American authorities in Southern Korea, whose mission it was to give effect to the Moscow Decision preferred to rely on the opponents of the Moscow Decision rather than on the truly democratic forces. Gen. Hodge still maintains the attitude of opposing the Moscow Decision.

"Undoubtedly the break of negotiations in the Joint Soviet-American Commission causes considerable damage to the national interests of Korea. A delay in the creation of a provisional Korean Democratic Government to the advantage of Korean reactionaries alone. They hasten to exploit the suspension of the work of the Joint Commission to consolidate their position and to suppress the truly democratic forces in Southern Korea. The constant internal political squabble in Southern Korea clearly proves that these antipopular elements cannot insure the political progress and national unity needed for achieving the full independence of Korea.

"The situation is different in Northern Korea where, in the very first days after its liberation by the Soviet Army, the Japanese administrative machine of colonial oppression was totally eliminated and the power passed into the hands of People's Committees elected by the people themselves, on the basis of universal suffrage.

"The political parties and public organizations of Northern Korea unite about 5 million members. Supported by this broad bloc of democratic parties and organizations, the Provisional People's Committee of Northern Korea, as the central authority, achieved great success in economic rehabilitation, improvement of the condition of the working people, and democratization of the whole life of the country.

"In Southern Korea such reforms can only be dreamed of by the people. The acutest agrarian problem has not yet been solved there. Sixty-five percent of the cultivated area still belongs to a few big landowners and the new Korean-American Joint Stock Company. As noted by the American journalist, Edgar Snow, the 'tenancy system is preserved on the Japanese land; in the peasants' opinion, they merely face American rent collectors in place of the Japanese.'

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EUROPEAN SECTION
USSR Overseas Service

Called 'Mockery'

"But according to latest reports, even this law, which the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in due time described as a 'mockery of the conception of democratic agrarian reform,' has not been carried out as yet, and is sabotaged in every way.

"Thus, DIE NEUE ZEITUNG, American newspaper for the German population, in its Dec. 23 issue, in an article entitled 'Opposition to the Agrarian Reform,' wrote: 'The open resistance of the German authorities to the plan of the creation of new settlements evokes grave concern. The measures involved in the implementation of the law on the creation of settlements are so complex that they might delay realization of this measure for a long time....'"

FRITZ MANDL REPORTED BACK IN EUROPE

Moscow, TASS, Soviet Overseas Service, in English Morse to North America, Dec. 31, 1946, 9:54 p.m. EST--P

(Text)

"Vienna--The OESTERREICHISCHE VOLKSTIMME reported that Fritz Mandl, notorious Austrian industrialist, banker, and patron of the Heimwehr Movement, has returned from Argentina to Europe. This large-scale businessman, who financed the chieftain of Austrian Fascism, Prince Starhemberg, accomplice of Mussolini and a man who profited from the arms traffic, is now near the Austrian frontier in Vadutz (Lichtenstein- Ed.) The newspaper declared that he is maintaining intimate contact with his former Heimwehr friends.

"'Is it that matters have gone so far,' the newspaper queried, 'that this behind-the-scenes leader of international fascism, fascist profiteer and organizer of disorders and putsches can once again cherish hopes and extend his tentacles to Austria?'"

USSR AND U.S. ZONES IN KOREA COMPARED

Moscow, TAS, Soviet Overseas Service, in English Morse to North America, Dec. 28, 1946, 11:20 a.m. EST--W

(Article in STALINSKY SOKOL dealing with the problem of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, by Smolensky.)

(Text)

"One year ago on Dec. 27, 1945, the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the United States, and Great Nritain adopted a historical decision on Korea, providing for the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

10 January 1947.

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDING GENERAL, XXIV CORPS.
(Through Chief Commissioner,
U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission)

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Old Men's Patriotic Society.

1. The undersigned attended the meeting of the Old Men's Patriotic Society held at 1100 today.

2. The program of the Society's meeting is shown by the attached tab (Tab "A".) Mr. Cho, interpreter of the Joint Commission, accompanied the undersigned and is responsible for the interpretation contained in Tab "A".

3. While the political color of the Society is right or extreme right, no radical statements were made at the meeting, according to Mr. Cho. One speaker, however, stated that a memorial was addressed to General Hodge recently emphasizing the anti-Trusteeship policy of the Society.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brig. General, USA.

Encl.
Tab "A"

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A resume of the program of the Old Men's Patriotic Society or (Old Men's National Grievance Society).

1. Call to order.

2. Salute to the flag.

3. Meditation upon martyrdom of Patriots.

4. Opening address by Mr. Kim Koo, Chairman of the Society.

   (He said that the world might think that they were too old to do anything but they did not think so. We have our duty to fulfil. Said he, "And if we do not fulfil it we may not escape the Hades, but Heaven would have places for us, if we do fulfil our duty for our posterity."

5. Announcement of Contributions.

   a. For Dr. Sygman Rhee - (¥1,000)
      (¥1,000)

   b. For war refugees - (¥1,000)
      (¥1,000)

6. Report on the things the Society did during the past one year including sending and receiving letters to and from President Truman.

7. Expression of impressions.

   a. Thanking the American Occupation Forces in Korea.

   b. The surprising amount of work done by the Society during the past one year.

   c. Appeal to the world, particularly to the U.S.A. for Korea's independence.

8. Address by General Weckerling, representing Genreal Hodge.

   a. Greetings from General Hodge.

   b. The youthful spirit and patriotic zeal of the members of the Society.

   c. Sympathy and friendship of the American people for the Korean people.

   d. Stand-by promise of American Government and American Forces

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in Korea even after the realization of the independence of Korea.

e. Reiteration of the greetings from General Hodge.

9. Responses by the representative members of the Society.

10. Closing of the Anniversary Program.

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

14 January 1947

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM NO. 3.

SUBJECT: Procedure for handling classified and limited distribution papers.

1. Secret or confidential papers received by the Joint Commission or file copies of such classified papers processed from the Commission to other agencies will be registered by the Administrative Officer (Mr. Hopkins) prior to circulation within the Commission. Inter-Office Routing Slips will not be placed on these papers until they have been so registered.

2. Certain papers received will be given a limited distribution. Such papers will be marked "LIMITED" and will be registered as such in the book in which classified papers are registered. LIMITED papers will (after being shown to the proper individuals) be filed in the office safe by the Chief Administrative Officer or the stenographer on duty in General Brown's office.

L. J. LINCOLN,
Colonel, CE.

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files

SOUTH KOREA TEACHERS'
GRAND MEETING

Jan. 24, 1947
Seoul, Korea

TO: Colonel Brown

Sir:

We, the educators in southern Korea, express our gratitude for your utmost effort to rehabilitate Korea. As we know that you are interested in the educational problems in Korea on which all our Korean educators pay attention great deal, so we should like to inform you concerning the South Korea Teachers' Grand Meeting.

The meeting was held on Jan. 1 at Y.M.C.A. building, where nearly thousand educator from elementary schools to higher institutions gathered to-gether at the same hall. Various programs were carried and sincere discussions from the stand-point of Korean educators concerning the urgent educational problems continued for many hours. Finally we reached the resolution at the meeting which will furnish references to you what you would like to know, as we believe. Please allow our deep and urgent wishes under your kind consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Chong Whan Choi
Chong Whan Chai

Chair-man of the South
Korea Teachers' Grand
Meeting

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TO: Col. Brown

RESOLUTION

The Korean Educational system, which was to rapidly clear away the poisonous effects of Japanese colonial education and to establish a democratic one, is taking the very reverse road. Pro-Japanese and Fascist elements, who are dominating the Board of Education and schools, have bureaucratically hindered democratic self-control of schools by continuously oppressing and discharging conscientious teachers. Text books are still filled with unscientific and Fascist teachings which is copied from the Japanese, and higher education is ruined by the enforcement ofthe National University Plan. The livelihood of teachers is so precarious and so much financial burden has been shouldered on to students' parents that democratic education has been thrown into utter chaos.

Against such state of affairs, the South Korean teachers' Grand Meeting, after series of debates, reached the following resolutions:

Resolved that:

1. Unreasonable dismissal of teachers be stopped; teacher's right of self-control be recognized; democratic and scientific material for teaching be used in text books; inspector system which is the remainder of slavery educational system be removed; police interferance with school be prohibited, by liquidating pro-Japanese, pro-Fascist and schools, cleaning up the feudal and colonial system of education, and building a democratic educational system.
2. The National University Plan, which has ruined higher education, be abolished; All the responsible authorities of the Board of Education resign.
3. Assure the teachers and students of food and necessary commodity ration, residence, and dormitory; lessen the burden of the parents, which was shouldered in the name of "fee of the supporter's association" and of "donation", by bettering living condition of teachers, so that the school gate will open equally to all students.

14 Jan. 1947

South Korea Teachers' Grand Meeting

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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
TAEJON DISTRICT OFFICE
CHONGJU SUB-OFFICE
A.P.O. 235

001 M

File No.
6 Febuary 1947

SUBJECT: NATIONAL PARTY BRANCH MEETING, IN CHONGJU.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

The following information was brought to this Office by an informant of this office.

1. The National Party sponsored a mass meeting for the Governmental employees after reading General Hodges note to the Soviet General in the newspapers. In that meeting they unanimously endorsed the National anti-trusteeship Movement.

2. The parts that the National Party will take are:
   a. To urge the Governmental employees to stage a strike.
   b. To take action to install independent minded police officers and transfer other police officers influenced by the Military Government.
   c. To select 12 persons and divide them into groups. These groups are to stage lecture tours through out farm villages, with the purpose of enlightening the people on the meaning of anti-trusteeship and the principle of self-determination; These resolution drafts were delivered to Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters told us to wait, pending further instructions.

3. It is a proven fact that anti-trusteeship is the nations desire. We are waiting for the instructions to fulfill the purpose of Anti-trusteeship we are prepared to do our utmost. We expected Government employees under Military Government to strike. The Trusteeship is the second misfortune to Korea.

4. There are increasing numbers of Communist returning here after being released from jail. They no longer have the prestige they enjoyed before October 7th 1946. At present they are making no move. We are constantly exercising vigilance over the Communist elements. The remaining Communist members are with us on the question of trustee-ship. In that we feel in ease.

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CONT'D

S/I dated 6 Feb. 1947, SUBJECT: NATIONAL PARTY BRANCH MEETING IN CHUNGJU.

5. One or two police officers are instigating the leftist to appeal to authority on the destructive action taken by the rightist. However, that is hardly worth worrying about. We are expecting the police force to give us cooperation and show goodwill. At the Provincial Police Chiefs meeting there were some who showed favor to the position taken by the leaders of anti-trusteeship movement.

6. After Dr. Rhees departure there are rumors of pro-trustee-ship. We are unhappy and angry. Dr. Rhees contributions are collected and remitted. Some event will turn soon. All prominent citizens in Chungju city are in favor of anti-trustee-ship.

7. Due to October 7, 1946 riots, we are suffering from material damage. Even if there are to be any demonstrations we will have some defensive measures against damage to property. If anti-trusteeship demonstrations are staged we feel assured that government officials will respond by calling a general strike. The officials are not satisfied with their salaries. Therefore they will come into anti-trusteeship movement as a matter of course. We feel sure that Chungju police chief and procurator KIM, who are mindful of public peace and safety will take neutral and upright attitudes. All the leftist have joined the National Party. There were many persons who escaped property damage on October 7, 1946, through the aid of some foresighted persons. These persons were well feasted and thanke d by the beneficiaries.

For the relief of refugees this city has her relief fund quota. To the refugees who are in dire need, we will show our sympathy, but there afe those who do not deserve any help. Their families and relatives are well to do. Under the pretext of being refugees they steal and rob the rich. They give us a headache. Some of them were in the October 7th riot.

8. If the Military Government shows favor to the trusteeship, the right wing will disappear. Generally American soldiers are gentlemen in contrast to Soviet soldiers. We appreciate the effort being made by the American Army to establish Koreas Independence and also their importation of foods and other items for their own use. We admire and look with wonder at the material improvement of the United States Covernment. The Military Covernment issue s rules and regulations and change them so often that they are hard to remember. If this process is continued long enough, it will be hard to escape conviction. American candies is being rationed out to school children. These children have no shoes, pencils or tablets and 60% of these childrens families cannot afford such luxury. The Military Government should change its methods.

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CONT'D

S/I dated 6 Feb. 1947, SUBJECT: NATIONAL PARTY BRANCH MEETING IN CHUNGJU.

Where do the grains go from Southern Korea? The people think that they are being shipped to Japan. Will the Military Government find some means to correct such misconception?

In the court trial of the October 7th riot, Kim Chang Sup (林昌燮) and YUN, Bak Yung were given comparatively heavy sentences for being chairman and diredtor of Min Chung Hoi (a society) but LO, Sang Yik (盧相翼) who was a leader and agitator and actual participant in the riot, was released. Can't the Military Government Court conduct itself more intelligently?

The Military Government should install a far reaching land law to regulate the farm land transactions. The Military Government should find means to provide farms to poor farmers within their ability to cultivate.

9. Before or after April of this year, the food situation will be serious in the farming section. The tenant farmers having about 1,000 pyung of rice land are not given rice rations. Those poor farmers will be in a sad condition. Due to this dissatisfaction and disappointment they will easily fall into the net of some political conspiracy and scheme.

Evaluation of source [illegible] of information 1

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None.

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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
SEOUL DISTRICT OFFICE
APO 235

DCIM

File No.
6 February 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

SUBJECT: LEE Yong Kem, meeting at the home of.

Investigation initiated by Commanding Officer, 971st CIC Detachment, XXIV Corps on 1 February 1947 to ascertain the validity of a report stating that LEE, Yong Kem, a former interpreter at the residence of General Hodge, had a meeting at his home which was attended by several persons from North Korea. The following information was obtained by this headquarters from a confidential informant on 4 February 1947.

1. On 30 January 1947 the following men met at the home of LEE, Yong Kem from 1900 to 2200 hours; LEE, Yong Kem, Mr. LEE, Pall (FNU) from Yenan, a Mr. HYUN, the informant, and a Mr. CHANG. Both LEE, Pall and Mr. HYUN came from North Korea whereas Mr. CHANG and the informant live in Seoul.

2. Mr. HYUN and LEE, Pall with the help of Mr. CHANG intend to organize an underground movement in South Korea.

3. Mr. HYUN graduated from a military academy in China after which he went to Russia and became an officer, Captain or Lieutenant. He then came to Seoul and collected information for the Russian Army concerning the Japanese occupation forces.

4. LEE, Yong Kem introduced Mr. CHANG and said that he had three missions to perform. The first, to collect information on Military Affairs; the second, to make connections with students in the schools; the third, to make connections with the South Korea Labor Party.

5. The informant, during the Japanese occupation, was a sergeant in the Kempai Tai and is now the leader of a group of thirty former members of the same organization. He was invited to this meeting in the hope of gaining his support in the organization of the aforementioned underground movement.

6. In the meeting LEE, Yong Kem stated that he was going to Kyong Sang on 2 February 1947 and return in two weeks.

AGENT'S NOTE: LEE, Yong Kem visited this headquarters on 3 February 1947 in relation to the raid made on his home on 1 February 1947.

7. Mr. HYUN stated that in late March or early April there would be widespread disturbances and rioting with much bloodshed.

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File, CIC-K, 2 copies

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

18 February 1947.

Memorandum to: General Weckerling.

SUBJECT: Radio Censorship.

1. Mr. CHO, Han Hyung visited me the afternoon of 18 February. Mr. CHO is a former central committeeman of the People's Front and is presently engaged in the effort to revive it on a non-communist basis. The purpose of his visit was to complain of what he regarded as unreasonable censorship of the radio speech he had prepared.

2. The speech dealt with the general plan for the revival of the People's Party, stating the general theme that most of its members felt that they could not find sufficient points of agreement to identify themselves with either of the existing disputing labor parties.

3. In touching upon the issue of trusteeship, the speech contained a paragraph which said, in digest: that certain rightist groups did not properly understand the Moscow Decision and were agitating the anti-Trusteeship cause at the wrong time and that by doing so they were setting back the cause of national independence and promoting internal discord.

4. This paragraph had been censored from the radio script by the Department of Public Information.

5. I called upon Dr. Clarence RHEE. The purpose of my visit was purely informal; it was designed to enable me to give proper answers to inquiries from my friends as to what were the radio censorship policies in force. I made particular reference to the radio speech of Mr. CHO in this connection.

6. Dr. RHEE read the script and stated that the deletion order had been caused by some subordinate misunderstanding the policy. He stated that he presumed that it had been deleted under a mistaken application of the order to prohibit personal vituperation on the radio. He gave directions that the speech be approved as presented.

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Memo to General Weckerling. 18 Feb. 1947

SUBJ; Radio Censorship.

7. This memorandum is for information and file.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH,
1st Lt., CMP.

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Gen. [illegible]

7 Mar 47

Memorandum for the Record:

SUBJECT: Interview Commanding General with Shin Il Yong.

Subject was interviewed March 6th. Subject is reported as second in command to Cho Bo Wang in the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. Subject stated:

a. That he personally, and the majority of the members of the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, did not favor the declaration of a provisional government for South Korea as contemplated in Proclamation No. 1, had not supported the proposal and had opposed it.

b. That he personally could not attend the meetings of the National Congress but that he had used representatives there to keep him fully informed of the various debates in that body on this matter.

c. That the National Congress, the new name for the Emergency National Congress, did in fact agree to the establishment of the provisional government in spite of the opposition of various groups within the organization to its creation.

d. That those responsible for this decision were the old men and the refugee group from North Korea.

e. That the bulk of the members of the Rapid Realization group did not grant nor take part in any attempt to bring this government into being nor in any disturbances resulting therefrom; that there were, however, certain irresponsible members and groups in the Rapid Realization membership which favored such a government and which might cause disorders.

f. That he had transmitted his views and had given such information as he had to Dr. Chough, Commissioner of Police, and Chief Chang Taik Sang.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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CONFERENCE HELD IN THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S OFFICE AT 061430 MARCH

PRESENT WERE: Major General Albert E. Brown
1st Lt Kenneth C. Althaus
Dr. M. K. Lee, Interpreter
Mr. Cho So Wang

Gen Hodge

MR. CHO SO WANG (Dr. Lee, Interpreter): He says that he is sorry for the fact that he cannot come and visit you as often as he wishes because he is tied up in something else. However, you will understand that both he and you are working for the same thing and there is something in common between you and him; so, although he may not call on you often, you must know what he is doing and he also knows what you are working for.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell him that I appreciate his coming in and I am always glad to see him.

MR. CHO SO WANG (Dr. Lee): He wishes you to tell him about the merits and demerits of the Korean people according to your observations.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell him I would like to talk with him first about another matter.

MR. CHO SO WANG:(Dr. Lee): He wants to know whether you have anything new and he assumes that you must have something.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell him that yesterday afternoon I had a conference with Mr. Kim Koo, Mr. Cho Wang Gyu, Mr. Yi Si Yung, and Mr. Yu Rim. At That conference I informed them that I had a copy of a Proclamation No. I, supposed to have been prepared by the Korean National Provisional Government. That Proclamation reads: "Whether our country continues to exist or is lost depends right on today. You, the Korean people, who are the sons of Tak Goon, let us not regret in the future. You are asked to keep this proclamation from the headquarters of the Special Action Group. In

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the event anyone violates the following articles, he will be punished severely. Pay special attention. One, any official of the present Military Government who violates the orders of the Korean National Provisional Government. Two, all people who use inflammatory language or inflammatory literature against the Korean National Provisional Government. Three, Those individuals who help perpetuate or anyone disturbing the public. Four, any profiteer who threatens the public livelihood. Five, any person performing any action hurting morals or anyone doing anything in bringing shame to the nation. Tai Han Nation 29th year, 3rd month, 3rd day. Korean National Provisional Government, Special Action Group Headquarters."

I also had information that the Provisional Government was preparing to declare a separate government over Korea under that Proclamation. In addition to that Proclamation, I had a paper that gave a program of ceremonial celebrations to be followed. This paper was headed: "Outline of Congratulatory Ceremonial Procedure." It covered amongst other things: One, date of Congratulatory Ceremony, seven days from the time that the cabinet is announced, designated Congratulation Week. It outlined twelve methods of celebration. Amongst those outlined were the ringing of bells and churches, schools, factories, public offices, etc., congratulation feasts, various ceremonies, including unauthorized assemblies and parades, the use of congratulatory cannon shots and fire-crackers, various lectures to be given in the schools to students and the churches and temples and other places, and other similar ceremonies.

I would like to ask Mr. Cho what he knows about those two documents. First, Proclamation No. One.

MR. CHO JO HANG (Dr. Lee): Mr. Cho says that he intended to call on you three or four days ago, but because of his poor health he couldn't do so. The purpose of his visit this afternoon is as follows: First, he wants to talk about ways and means of bringing about cooperation between the Korean leaders

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and American high officers who are working for the cause of Korea. That is one. The second purpose is to tell you this new phenomenon taken place after March 1st, he doesn't claim that he knows very much, but whatever he knows he wants to tell you.

GENERAL BROWN: Tell him I would appreciate it if he would.

MR. CHO SO WANG (Dr. Lee): He is going then to tell you what he knows of the activities going on after March 1st. He says that you must be aware of the fact that there are two different camps in Korea. The first one is to promote Communism in Korea. The other camp is a group of people who want to rehabilitate Korea by the means which is different from Communism. Then the outstanding act of the latter must be found in the National Society for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. And this Society has strong local organizations throughout the provinces in South Korea. The Spokesman of this Society presented a petition and appeal to the National Congress. The petition was signed by millions of people, asking the National Congress to set up something which will lead the people to the Korean Independence, and that appeal was really a manifestation and demonstration of the people's patriotism. And on their part they had also something in common with the petitioners and they were also working for the cause of Korea. Therefore, there was some sort of an affinity between the National Congress and the petitioners, millions of them, and they had no heart to turn down the request and appeal of millions of fellow-countrymen. So what the National Congress did was to reorganize the Provisional Government and fill up the gaps. He thinks that this is an act of patriotism and this is a way of responding to the request and demand of millions of Koreans.

At the outset he wants to make it clear that he and his associates have no intention to oppose the Military Government. He admits that they have

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no prep ration whatsoever to oppose the American Military Government in Korea; neither do they want to oppose it, even spiritually or mentally, because they know that Americans are friends of Korea, the best friend of Korea. In the second place he wants you to know that they have no intention of disturbing the law and order in South Korea. He is going to tell you why this movement started. First, the newspapers reported that by March 1st the transfer of administrative power from Americans to Koreans would be completed, and that sort of news came in from Washington, from men like General Hodge. So the Koreans were very jubilant over it, thinking they would have something different and something new. And in the second place, the second reason is that the United States--Soviet Joint Commission brought no tangible result whatsoever in implementing the Moscow Decision. It adjourned indefinitely and it hasn't met yet. In fact, the failure of the United States--Soviet Joint Commission was admitted by men like General Hodge. He said that he had tried everything in Korea. Now he had no way of doing anything further and he left the matter entirely with his higher authorities. The third reason is that the Provisional Government could and did exist in an alien land under a foreign government. If this kind of government could exist in a foreign land, they didn't see any objection of having this organization in their own land. ~~Whether~~ And whether you can name it, the people psychology or social psychology, whatever the name you may choose, it is true that the Koreen people are longing for a Provisional Government. Then, this Provisional Government is nothing but an organization, a tangible organization, which might be corresponding to the French People's Emancipation Committee. He remembers that during the war, when France was in adversity, the French people dispatched the so-called French People's Emancipation Committee to as far as Shanghai, China, even to Chung King, and he wants to make this Provisional Government as a domineering or leading force, thereby the Koreans could bring about their independence.

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This Provisional Government is not opposing the Military Government; neither does it oppose the United States of America. In fact, the much talked about setting up of a new government in Korea has been done by the Leftists. They once set up the People's Republic, but the Military Government dissolved it, and ever since the dissolution of the People's Republic, they have been attacking the Chung King Provisional Government. Therefore, he believes that they are maliciously propaganda really put undue importance to the so-called Provisional Government.

He says that he did not think that any previous permission to reorganize it or to fill up the gap was necessary, because he thought the American authorities left the provisional people to set up some sort of organization which will lead the people to the Korean independence. He says that the provisional Government is demanding demanded by the people and wanted by the people, and if you suppress the people by neglecting or oppressing the Provisional Government, then riots are bound to come and the people will complain and the people will feel restless, and in order to comfort them they had to do something. This is not a new organization. They had Provisional Government for the last 29 years. What they have done lately is to fill up the vacancies and reorganized the existing organization. And with the understanding or anticipation that the Military Government would approve all the things they have done, he did not come and take up this matter, to tell you that there would be some reshuffling and filling up the gaps in the Provisional Government.

The fourth reason is that some years ago the United Nations met at San Francisco. Dr. Rhee, Syngman attended that meeting, representing the Provisionnal Government. Mr. Cho and Dr. Kim Kiusic also wanted to attend the meeting, but Mr. Crow, the spokesman of the State Department, Washington, D.C., sent a letter to the Chung King Provisional Government. Mr. Crow made a

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statement saying that America could not allow the Korean representatives to attend this conference, representing the Chung King Provisional Government, because he feared that if the State Department recognized the Chung King Provisional Government as a Provisional Government, then in the latter date when the Koreans choose their own government in accordance with the general will of theirs, ther the recognition of the Provisional Government which existed in China would infring the right of the Koreans whereby they could set up their own government. And at that time, although they were not able to attend the meeting because of the statement, he and his associates accepted it very gracefully, because they interpreted that statement in this way: America is always believing in democracy and the respect for the will of the people, will of the Koreans, is really admired; therefore, although when the Chung King Provisional Government people may not attend this conference, it means that America would help the Provisional Government and Korean people to make their government grow. That was their interpretation and their hope, and even now he says that the Korean's psychology is such that they want to get American assistance, spiritually and materially, and they want to have their own government, meager as it is, and ther with the assistance of the United States they want to make their government grow, and this government is not going to oppose Military Government. He says that, unless you understand this Korean psychology longing for American assistance so that they could make their own government grow, you wouldn't be successful in working with the Koreans in Korea. He is telling it to you because you are working earnestly for the good of Korea and Koreans.

The fifth reason is that Koreans are fully aware of the fact that the Military Government is the sole government in South Koren, but they also see that the defeated Japanese has her own government. Korea is not an enemy of the United States. Korea tried to help the cause of the Allies, and after

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the victory of the Allies, the defeated Japanese empire still retained its own government, whereas liberated Korea has not. So they want to know why there couldn't be a Korean Agent, an agent representing the Korean people. He is fully aware of the fact that the United States--Soviet Joint Commission was adjourned indefinitely, but it doesn't necessarily mean the Moscow Decision is abrogated, so the United States Government Agent out here naturally wants to carry out the foreign policy and International Agreement known as the Moscow Decision. He knows that you have the duty to implement this International Agreement and to carry out the United States policy in Korea. On the other hand, he and other Korean leaders feel that they have their own duty to comply with the [illegible] aspirations of the people. In this respect there is a minor difference and conflict. You want to carry out your own mission and the Koreans likewise want to carry out their own mission, and if there is any way of making a happy compromise between the differences of these two, then that would be the best solution for Korea.

[illegible] wants to tell you why they have chosen Mr. Rhee as the Supreme Leader of the people. It has been an outstanding acquisition or criticism of the Chungking Provisional Government being Chinafied in many ways, because it was in China for a long period of time. In order to deal with this criticism they have chosen a man who worked as long in America. Then with the combination of Mr. Rhee, who was educated and worked in America, and Mr. Kim Koo, who was in China for a long while, may be able to bring some sort of democracy to Korea, which may answer the needs of Korea. He knows that the combination of Chinese-type democracy and American-type of democracy may not please the Russians, but at least he thinks that these two combinations of ideology and the leaders may help Korea a great deal. That is the reason why they have chosen Dr. Rhee

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as their leader, and according to this morning's paper, Dr. Rhee seems to be able to read their minds and he seems to acquiesce the existing conditions in Korea.

He says that he has taken much time to relay what he had in mind and if you have something to say, he will be delighted to hear it.

[illegible]: Ask him why they issued Proclamation No. I.

MR. CHO SC WANG (Dr. Lee): He hasn't read the original and he doesn't know the source of that document.

[illegible]: Ask him if he has seen it.

MR. CHO SC WANG (Dr. Lee): He hasn't seen it, he hasn't read it.

[illegible]: Tell him I just read it to him a while ago. Ask him if he recognized it.

MR. CHO SC WANG (Dr. Lee): He said they were told that this Proclamation No. I was posted on walls and buildings throughout the city, and when he learned that he simply took it and laughed himself, because he thought somebody was doing a mischievous play, and the one who had read this Proclamation told him the contents of it. However, he took it very lightly and laughed over it, thinking that somebody was playing a childish game.

[illegible]: Tell him we were not able to find any of those Proclamations on the walls; that, had we been able to find them, he would now have been in jail, because Proclamation No. I is inciting to revolution. Those who are responsible for it have violated General MacArthur's Order No. II and are liable to prosecution and imprisonment. That Proclamation shows that it was issued by the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea Headquarters. Ask him if he has seen or is familiar with the list of celebrations, the week of Celebrations that I read to him.

MR. CHO SC WANG (Dr. Lee): He doesn't know the existence of it.

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[illegible]: Tell him that that list of celebrations was also supposed to have been issued by the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea Headquarters.

[illegible] (Dr. Lee): He says that one of the delegates from the provinces came to him and told him that he would stay here until the celebration is over. He doesn't remember the name of that man. However, Mr. Cho told that delegate that he had nothing to celebrate over, there is no reason to celebrate any, and he also told the celebration talk altogether and advised that delegate to go back to his home town, and then with over two fellow-patriots, then some day the real independence for Korea will come. He says that if a Provisional Government is going to be set up that it must be different from the Provisional Government and cannot be run by one man. He honestly says that the Provisional Government should not follow any document like that, and the persons who affiliated with the Provisional Government are really sensible men and they couldn't do a concerted act like this. They have common sense and they have conscience enough to trust them.

[illegible]: Ask him what Mr. Rhee, Syngman means by saying that he won't accept the presidency of South Korea.

[illegible] (Dr. Lee): When he read that statement issued by Dr. Rhee, he really talked it over with his friends and he made his own interpretation, believing that Dr. Rhee is presenting the yearnings and aspirations of Korean people to the outside world by accepting the post that was offered to him.

[illegible]: Offered to him by whom ?

MR. CHO SU MANG (Dr. Lee): He says that he doesn't know who offered the Chairmanship to Dr. Rhee. He conjectures that the newspapers must have done it. The news reached Dr. Rhee and he accepted it and made the comments.

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MR. BALLINGER: Tell him let us not confuse the Chairmanship of the Provisional Government with the Presidency of Korea.

MR. CHO [illegible] (Dr. Lee): He raised the question, if anybody called Dr. Rhee President of South Korea, it is something that he does not know.

GEN. HODGE: Tell him that I am very happy to hear what he says because it indicates that he and the other leaders of the Provisional Government realize that the Provisional Government is in fact a political party and cannot and never will be the government of South Korea. It is perfectly proper for the Provisional Government to elect Dr. Rhee Chairman of the Provisional Government, but it would be highly improper for the Provisional Government to attempt to take over from the United States or to be the government of South Korea and to proclaim Dr. Rhee as President of South Korea. There can be but one government in South Korea and that is the government established by the United States of America. Any group of men who attempt to challenge that government established by the United States of America is in fact declaring war on the United States of America. It is the responsibility of the Commanding General set by the United States of America to see that that government established by the United States is maintained and that law and order is maintained in South Korea. If that government, the Military Government, established by the Commanding General, is challenged by any group, the Commanding General will have no recourse except to use all means at his disposal to maintain that government. The means available to the Commanding General are the local police force and constabulary, the United States Army troops in Korea, the United States troops in Japan, and the power of the United States standing back of those means. It would indeed be foolish for any group of Koreans to challenge the power of the United States in maintaining the government established by the United States in Korea. The only result would be failure for

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that group and injury to a great many Koreans and the injury to Korea in the eyes of the world. I am, therefore, directing the Provisional Government of Korea to be careful to maintain itself as a political party and not to challenge the authority of the Military Government in Korea.

DR. C K LEE (Dr. Lee): In conclusion he wants to express his appreciation for the enlightenment he received from you. He learned a good many things now, and he also understands what is in your mind, and he also assures that you have expressed full sympathy for the people; however, the condition is such that he and his associates should call on you more frequently in order to exchange views and then that would help a great deal.

GEN HODGE: You tell Mr. Cho that it is my opinion that if he and his associates will assist the United States in their honest effort to obtain the independence of Korea under the Moscow Agreement, that group will get their independence much more promptly and in a much more orderly manner and with less disturbance and injury to the Korean people.

DR. C K LEE (Dr. Lee): He says this conversation has been exchanged between two friends. He doesn't feel that he has been talking to the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Korea, neither has he been considering him as one of the members of the Provisional Government. He assumes that whatever talks you and he exchange are only friendly talks and it has no bearing on either formality or the position in which both of you are.

GENERAL HODGE: Tell him I have one last statement to make to him. As the head of the Rapid Realization Independence Group, he has in his organization a great many young man who were filled with the desire for independence for which I have every respect. I and my Government have the same desire to see Korea independent as those young men have. We are working and are going to continue to work until that independence is secured. Being young and full of

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enthusiasm, these young men often do things that are not well thought out and are not for the interests of their country. It is necessary that Mr. Cho and the other leaders of the Provisional Government restrain these young men and guide them along legal, proper lines.

[illegible] (Dr. Lee): He says that there are a good many young men who are controlled by Communists and he and his associates see the need of leading these young men to the right track, legal track, but in order to they have to have [illegible] power. If the young men notice that he and his associates are [illegible] and oppressed by the military Government, then the young men will [illegible] Communists in them and that means the, cannot do anything with these young men.

[illegible] (Dr. Lee): I see it the same way that I did I think he does, but the [illegible] organized as a movement; they could never be [illegible] recognized, as I stated previously, there can be but one government in South Korea and that is the government established by the United States of America.

[illegible] (Dr. Lee): He says that recognition is only a formality and he hopes to get some sort of support from you actually, not informally.

[illegible]: Tell him that I will assist the Provisional Government as a political party to the same extent that I will assist the Democratic Party, the Independence Party, or any legal political party that functions legally and within the law. Tell him I appreciate his coming very much.

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

11 March 1947.

MEMO FOR: General Weckerling.

SUBJECT: Estimated Funds Required for Journey to New Delhi of Four Koreans.

The following is an estimate of funds required to defray the cost of transporting four (4) Koreans to Delhi, India, and return covering a total period of about five (5) weeks.

a. Air Transportation *

(1) Seoul to Shanghai and return, @ $260 per person	$ 1040.
(2) Shanghai to Delhi, India (via Bangkok) and return, @ $888 per person	3552.

b. Other Expenses

(1) Subsistence, @ $10 per day per person for 35 days	1400.
(2) Lodging and incidentals, @ $7 per day per person for 35 days	980.
	$ 6972.

* Assuming U.S. Govt. transportation is not available.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS,
Lt. Col., AGD.

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Estimated Funds for Journey to Delhi of Four Koreans.

1	3/11/47	J.C.	C.G., XXIV Corps	1. The attached estimate of cost of transporting four Koreans to New Delhi by Colonel Edwards appears to be reasonable except as noted below.

2. Item a. (1) (transportation Seoul to Shanghai) may be absorbed by government.

3. Item a. (2) is an arbitrary figure, based on air mileage rate and probably is high. Time allowed for trip - 35 days - is more than ample.

4. On the other hand, there is no entertainment allowance included and it would be advisable to permit a small amount for unostentatious return of obligations.

5. On information available, I estimate reasonable total cost as about $5500 minimum to $6500 safe maximum.

6. All three proposed delegates are believed to be thoroughly honest.

7. Recommendations:

A. That Dr. HAR, Kyung Duk be entrusted with the financial arrangements and be given $6500 to finance the trip, plus $1000 to be used as in emergencies.

B. That the Joint Commission be entrust with the task of making the necessary final accounting of funds.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

15 March 1947.

Dr. George PAIK,
Chosen Christian College,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Dr. PAIK:

Your plane is scheduled to depart Monday morning. The time is still uncertain.

I will appreciate it if you will contact the office of Mr. Langdon sometime late Sunday afternoon, by which time it is hoped the information will be more definite.

Cordially,

LEONARD M. BERTSCH,
1st Lt., CMP.

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Ltr ltr to C. G.
on. 3/17.

LYUH, Woon Hyung.

1	3/17/47	J.C.	C.G., XXIV Corps	1. Attached memorandum from Lt. Bertsch on circumstances of LYUH, Woon Hyung's failure to go to India may be of interest. 2. Recommend reading paragraphs 5, 6 and 11, in which I concur. Recommend also copies be transmitted to G-2 and POLAD.

John Weckerling,
Brig. General, U. S. Army.

cc: Gen. Lerch,
Military Governor.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

17 March 1947.

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL WECKERLING.

SUBJECT: LYUH, Woon Hyung.

1. After considerable conversation with LYUH, Woon Hyung and with a number of his friends over the past few days, it is my definite impression that the desire to remain behind to do party organization work was not the sole or even the primary factor in the decision to remain.

2. In the party discussions the dominant role was taken by LEE, Yuh Sung and LEE, Im Soo. Both of these people are essentially anti-American, though apparently from different motivations.

3. LEE, Yuh Sung is the most powerful figure in the grop surrounding him. He is possibly not a Communist and he is certainly taking a line opposed to the current party line in the determination to revive the People's Party. None the less, he is both a Marxist and a totalitarian, and the possibility must be considered that he may be a plant of the Communists inside LYUH's ranks.

4. LEE, Im Soo is an oily character who has no apparent fixed political principles. He is chiefly concerned with financial opportunities. He has frequently demanded business preferences as the price for continued work "against the Communists." There is more than a slight basis to believe that he tried to use the creation of the Legislature as a means for making private profit. He resents the fact that his group has not been cut in on any financial rewards, and he is apparently determined to prevent any cooperation except on a strictly cash basis.

5. Probably the strongest motivation of all in the determination of the majority of LYUH's people to keep him at home was the almost pathological distrust of Americans and reluctance to be seen cooperating with them. This is a common factor among all Korean leftists with few exceptions. It stems in part from sympathy to the Soviet Union, even among those who are not actively its agents. In part it originates also from isolationist tendencies that are deep in the Korean character.

6. As for LYUH himself, I am convinced that he was in good faith in his desire to go but that the opposition of his friends won him over. He has a consuming fear of being left without following. This fear influences him to be responsive to each last

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SUBJ: LYUH, Woon Hyung

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viewpoint he has heard argued and that in fact prevents him from striking out with sufficient force to ever become a genuine leader.

7. The fact remains that LYUH, with all his vacilation and half-baked philosophy, has in his own personality many of the unbalances which are peculiarily characteristics of the Koreans as a whole, and in many ways it remains true that he is the distinctively Korean political leader just as truly as Gandhi is the distinctively Hindu leader.

8. This fact gives rise to the serious question whether the Korean character will be able to cope with the problems of nationhood in the near future.

9. The position of WHANG, Chin Nam was clear and honest. He argued consistently for LYUH to make the trip. He was shouted down by the majority, who hold the belief that WHANG has been in the Occident so long that he is no longer a sound Korean.

10. The peculiar distortions and ignorances common to the Koreans who have spent all their time in Korea give rise to the question whether there should not be some reconsideration of the policy of encouraging a purely stay-at-home leadership.

11. In general the conclusion would appear to be that we are not justified in regarding LYUH as having cast his lot definitely with our enemies, but on the other hand it will not be beneficial either to us or to the Korean future to build LYUH deliberately into greater prominence.

L. M. BERTSCH,
1st Lt., CMP.

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By NARS, Date

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Seoul, Korea

March 19, 1947

To: Commanding General, USAFIK

From: Political Advisor

Subject: KOREAN DELEGATES TO NEW DELHI CONGRESS

As there seems to be a tendency in some Korean circles to blame Military Government and others for their manner of choosing the delegation to the New Delhi Congress, the facts in the case are appended for the record in case the question comes up:

1. The size of the delegation was limited by our instructions to four persons.

2. As there was no time to refer the choice of delegates to any Korean representative group, and as our instructions specified the type of Koreans to be chosen, the American authorities in Korea proceeded to the choice and unanimously approved it.

3. Each selected person gladly accepted the invitation to go to India. With regard to Mr. Lyuh, Woom Hyung, the invitation was transmitted to him at Taegu on the 9th. As he was in the midst of an address there the invitation was conveyed to him by the CIC agent there. This invitation was dictated over the telephone to the agent by Mr. Langdon, with Mr. Whang, Chin Nam listening in, and in it were given all particulars, including the names of the associate delegates and the fact that Mr. Lyuh's name headed, and always would head, the list of delegates. The CIC agent read the message in person to Lyuh and later reported that Lyuh accepted the invitation and would come to Seoul the following evening, the 10th.

4. On the morning of the 11th Lyuh, accompanied by Whang, called on Mr. Langdon to thank him for the invitation and to ask about routes, dates, preparations, passports, etc. He seemed pleased and excited over the trip.

5. On the evening of the 12th Lyuh attended a dinner party at Lt. Bertsch's home by way of farewell to the delegation. General Brown and other American dignitaries were there to honor the delegation. Lyuh said nothing about not going to India in the course of the party.

6. <u>On the afternoon</u>

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

6. On the afternoon of the 14th the Executive Secretary of the Peoples Party, Mr. Lee, called on Mr. Langdon with an associate to state that the party committee had voted not to allow Mr. Lyuh to leave Korea at this critical time in the party's affairs. He added that the party feared for Lyuh's health, believed he should have a secretary on the trip if he went, and pointed out the party had not had enough time to arrange for Mr. Lyuh's expenses. Mr. Langdon advised that party vote was its own affair, but that the other objections could be met: arrangements could be made for a secretary to accompany Mr. Lyuh, Mr. Lyuh could be examined medically by our doctors, we were providing adequate American dollars for all Lyuh's expenses. Lee stated in any event the matter would again have to be referred to the committee. Mr. Langdon then asked point blank if the purpose of the visit was to report that Lyuh would not go under any circumstances. Mr. Lee admitted it was.

7. As the plane for the party was set up for the 17th and as the 15th was a Saturday, there was no time left to find a substitute for Lyuh. Moreover on the 15th Lt. Bertsch was still personally assured by Lyuh that he would go to India.

SUMMARY

Lyuh in Taegu accepted the invitation, knowing who his associates would be. He proceeded by first train to Seoul to prepare for the trip. He immediately called on Langdon and raised no objection either to his associates whom he said were suitable and representative, or to the fact that no secretary was provided him. He did mention his high blood pressure and wondered whether high altitudes would affect it. He accepted an invitation to a farewell party attended by the highest American officials in honor of the delegation. Offers were made to meet last-minute objections involving his "face" by willingness to arrange for a secretary of his choice to accompany him. The American authorities had no way of knowing under what conditions Lyuh would go to India, as neither he nor his party spokesmen at any time in the short week of preparation for the trip indicated what special treatment for Mr. Lyuh was wanted.

Copy to General Weckerling.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

INTERIM LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
OF SOUTH KOREA

20 March 1947

Office of the Chairman

Maj.Gen.Archer L.Lerch,U.S.Army
Military Governor,USAMGIK
The Capitol Building
Seoul,Korea

Dear General Lerch:

Less than a fortnight ago I was informed unofficially that the Military Government had received invitation from Dr,Pandit Nehru for four Korean delegated to attend the coming Pan-Asiatic Conference at New Delhi from 26 March to 4 April(?). At the same time,I was also informed of the personnel of the said delegation tentatively decided upon by the Military Government.

On receiving this news I expressed to my informant that if the said conference or congress is to be of an official nature the Korean Delegation should also be considered official,and in such case it might be well for you as Military Governor to inform the Interim Legislature and have the latter body concur upon the sending of the delegation as well as in the selection of the personnel.

If the above mentioned international gathering is of an official or semi-official nature,I and my colleagues of the Legislature consider it advisable to follow the usual parliamentary procedure in all countries.

This matter was again brought to the attention of the Legislature to-day when Dr,Hah Kyung-Duk's request for a leave of absence of three weeks came up for consideration.

Yours very sincerely,

Kiusic Kimm,Chairman
Interim Legislative Assembly
of South Korea

CC to:
Maj.Gen.Albert E.Brown
Brig.Gen.John Weckerling
Mr.Ahn,Chai-Hong

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

21 March 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Lerch.

SUBJECT: Alleged Illegality in Judiciary.

1. The memorandum attached hereto is the result of an unsolicited interview with Mr. CHO, Kyung Kyo, Chief Investigator of the Supreme Court. His motive for this report is unknown but may be imagined from the content of paragraph 5 of the attached memorandum.

2. Lt. Bertsch states that he is neither well acquainted with Mr. CHO nor connected with him in any official relationship.

3. From the content of this memorandum, the matter is of such great importance that I am sending it to you for your or General Helmick's eyes only. The Joint Commission is acting as a transmitter only.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Encl.
Memorandum from Lt. Bertsch
to Gen. Weckerling dtd. 3/20/47.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

20 March 1947

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL WECKERLING:

SUBJECT: Alleged Illegality in Judiciary

1. I was visited yesterday by Mr. CHO, Kyung Kyo, Chief Investigator of the Supreme Court, who brought the following complaint:

2. He alleges that one SOHN, U Kop, a refugee returned from China, entered into a deal on or about 23 December 1946, with Judge CHUNG, Yun Hwan. It is alleged that Judge Chung fraudulently pretended he had a large supply of leather available and that Sohn, a leather worker by trade, paid him ¥100,000 in advance.

3. It is further alleged this constituted the crime of obtaining money under false pretences, which crime Cho claims is punishable in Korean law by an average sentence of one year's imprisonment.

4. It is further alleged that this information was submitted by Cho in pursuance of his official duties to the Chief Justice, KIM, Yong Moo, on March 7.

5. It is further alleged that custom would have required the immediate dismissal of the judge or at least his suspension, and that the Chief Justice conceded the truth of the charges but refused to take any action because of political favoritism.

6. Mr. Cho professes to fear reprisals if his action in submitting this information is known and asks that his action be kept secret unless a formal investigation is required.

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lieutenant, C.M.P.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

COPY

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR
SEOUL, KOREA

Limited

24 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Brown, XXIV Corps.

1. There is attached a draft of a letter to Dr. Kimm Kiusic requesting that he serve as acting Chief of State until such time as the enactment by KILA of a general franchise law which will permit the elction of a President by popular vote. It is not intended that the draft should be made into a letter to Dr. Kimm at the present time. My purpose in drafting it was to present in concrete form a possible solution to a problem which may present itself to us suddenly in the near future. The plan contemplates that the powers of the Military Governor with proper limitations be delegated to Dr. Kimm, but that such delegation is not an appointment to office which would have to be referred to KILA for concurrence. The action outlined is designed to circumvent bills now pending in KILA, the purpose of which is undoubtedly to place less desirable leaders in control. If one of those bills should pass now, we would be in a position of having to accept the new leadership or to veto the legislation. If the outlined action is taker, Dr. Kimm, having been asked to serve until a popular election has taken place, would be in a much better position to exercise the power veto than would the Americans.

2. Mr. Ahn Chai Hong is rapidly acquiring real stature as a statesman. He makes decisions promptly and without hesitation. Instead of vacillating as has often been suggested to me, he shows real determination and character. Should anything happen to Dr. Kimm as acting President, Mr. Ahn could certainly fill the job. Dr. Chyung Yil Hyung, Director of Korean Civil Service, is an able administrator and has served as unofficial head of the Korean Directors for a year.

3. In the letter to Dr. Kimm it is stated that the action is one of delegation and not of abdication. Reservation is made of the right of the Military Governor to step in at any time to make void any action or policy which in his opinion might imperil the objectives of the occupation.

4. In case the passage of one of the proposed bills now pending in the Legislature is imminent before General Hodge arrives, I recommend that this action be taken. After General Hodge's arrival I recommend that it be considered in the light of whatever information he brings from Washington.

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Memorandum for: General Brown XXIV Corps 24 March 1947

5. There is attached a clipping from the Congressional Record, giving the remarks of Congressman Riehlman of New York, on the Korean situation. The placing of the entire Government in the hands of the Koreans would do much to stop the Rhee propaganda just now coming from the States.

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

Incls.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DRAFT SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR
SEOUL, KOREA

Dr. Kimm, Kiusic
The Capitol Building
Seoul, Korea

Dear Dr. Kimm:

1. As a final step in placing the government in the hands of the Korean people, I request that you serve as acting President (Chief of State) until such time as the enactment by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly of a general franchise law will permit the election of a Chief of State by the popular vote of the people.

2. It is my desire that you continue as Chairman of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, although it will be necessary for you to leave the duties and responsibilities of that office to one of the deputy chairmen.

3. If you agree to serve as acting Chief of State, such an agreement does not constitue an acceptance of a second office under the Government, nor does it constitute an appointment within the meaning of Ordinance No. 118 or Ordinance No. 135. It is merely a temporary measure whereby you act for me in carrying out most of my powers and duties until the people of Korea have had an opportunity to express their choice.

4. Immediatdy upon your concurrence in my request, there will be delegated to you full power to act for me, and in my stead, but in your own name and with title of President, pro tempore (or Chief of State, Pro Tem), in all matters in which, under ordinance of Military Government or laws enacted by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, action by me is, or may be, authorized or required. This includes the general powers of appointment now exercised by me, and the veto power reserved to me by Ordinance No. 118.

5. The objectives of the American occupation in Korea are (1) the establishment of a free, independent and sovereign democratic state, and (2) the rehabilitation of Korean industry and education. I know that you will agree with me that it is necessary that it be clearly understood that my present act is one of delegation of power, not an abdication; and that I most specifically reserve the right to step in at any time to void any action or policy which, in my opinion, might imperil the objectives of the occupation force or interfere with its operations. I assure you that this right will be used sparingly and that it is my earnest desire that Korean officials assume the full power and burden of government.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

6. Americans are being withdrawn from operational activities (except certain fiscal, civilian supply, and economic functions which Koreans and Americans must work out together) and will henceforth serve as advisors, inspectors and investigators. It is absolutely essential to the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupational force that the American advisors be kept fully informed, day by day, of what is going on. Unless this is done, fully and wholeheartedly, it will be necessary for me to exercise my prerogative of stepping in until the situation can be remedied.

7. No attempt can be made to define with any degree of particularity the powers and duties delegated. The success of the arrangment depends not on legalistic interpretation, but rather on our mutual understanding and good faith.

8. If you are willing to serve as outlined herein, I propose to ask Mr. Ahn Chai Hong to serve as Acting Vice-President and Mr. Chyung. Yil Hyung to serve as Acting Civil Administrator. The duty in all cases is temporary, is without additional emolument, and does not involve an appointment within the meaning of the law.

9. Because it would be inappropriate that a government, in which all offices are held by Koreans, should be designated as "Military Government" I suggest an ordinance changing the name to "South Korean Interim Government," a title which we have been using informally to a limited extent.

10. Immediately upon my being informed that you have concurred in this request, the powers outlined herein, subject to the limitations and conditions stated, are delegated to you.

Sincerely yours,

ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General, United States Army
Military Governor

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

3	25 Mar. 1947	J.C.	C.G., XXIV Corps	letter of 20 March did referred him to Mr. Langdon (see Enclosure "A").

3. One of the delegates - Dr. HAR, Kyung Duk, is a member of the Assembly and his official request for leave of absence from the Assembly has already been discussed by that body. The Assembly Rules provide for absences

(over)

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

25 March 1947

Honorable Kimsie Kimm, Chairman,
Interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea,
Seoul, Korea.

Dear Dr. Kimm:

With reference to your letter of March 20 addressed to General Lerch concerning the attendance of Koreans at the Asian Relations Conference being held at New Delhi, India, from March 23 to April 2, a copy of this letter was sent to me.

The conference is sponsored by the Indian Council on World Affairs, a private organization. On February 17 the chairman of its organizing committee, Mr. Sarojini Naidu, telegraphed the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, extending an invitation to Korean delegates to attend the conference and requesting him to provide full facilities to this delegation. The invitation was referred to Washington, which gave its whole-hearted approval to the project. As soon as all the necessary arrangements were completed, the American authorities in Korea offered travel facilities to India to four distinguished Koreans. The Koreans who went to New Delhi are observers and not official representatives of Military Government or the Korean people.

Yours very truly,

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Joint Comm.

Mailed 26 Mar 47

Dist:
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Palad
J-C
MG.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

26 March 1947.

Memorandum for: General Brown.

SUBJECT: Comments on General Lerch's Chief of State letter of 24 March.

1. The present political situation does not appear to warrant emergency action of the character proposed.

2. General Hodge has already told us to hold the appointment of a Chief of State in abeyance.

3. General Hodge is the only legal authority to delegate his executive power and then only in part and personally.

4. The proposed action commits General Hodge without his being consulted to the appointments of the proposed Vice President as well as a new administrator.

5. If you agree with the proposed action, I would recommend a complete re-writing of the proposed letter to Dr. KIMM which should be signed by the Commanding General.

6. Recommendations: I recommend that the proposed action be not acted upon by you.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

MEMO FOR RECORD. 26 March 1947

The entire file with the above comments was shown General Brown on 26 March. He stated that he had no intention of acting on General Lerch's recommendations but that he desired the Joint Commission to study this matter from the viewpoint of preparing recommendations for further action after the return of General Hodge. He returned the file to General Weckerling with these comments.

J.W.

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

29 March 1947.

Memorandum for: General Brown.

SUBJECT: Comments on General Lerch's Letter of 24 March.

1. The proposal of General Lerch in general is in accordance with a proper development of broad United States political objectives in South Korea to be implemented after General Hodge's return.

2. Much of the political policy approved by General Hodge on 4 February is still applicable. (See Enclosure "A")

3. In general, the Korean political problem remains the same:

A. Difficulty of securing effective political unity and cooperation.

B. Aggressive obstructionsim of the extreme left.

C. Similarly aggressive tactics of the extreme right to obtain power and to vitiate the Moscow Decision.

4. Prospective Political Situation:

A. Dr. RHEE will probably return in a very favorable atmosphere engendered by highly colored press reports from Washington. Many Koreans believe that his personal efforts have been responsible for:

(1) Extensive United States financial assistance for Southern Korea, and

(2) United States support of a RHEE-dominated separate government for South Korea and practical abrogation of the Moscow Agreement.

B. In this atmosphere he will be in position where he can at least block the naming of any candidate for Chief of State other than himself.

C. On his return, Dr. RHEE may and probably will be somewhat pleased over anticipated U.S. aid. He will probably

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SUBJ: Comments on Gen. Lerch's Letter of 24 March. 29 Mar. 1947

refrain from overt acts, initially at least, depending on the firmness of his belief that events are developing in his favor. This attitude may be expected to change rapidly, and attempts toward assumption of power, including legislative approval of his acts, may be reasonably anticipated.

5. The appointment of Dr. KIMM as Chief of State of an interim government should be made personally by the Commanding General (see para. 1. a. of M.G. Ordinance No. 135 for comparison - Enclosure "B") without asking Assembly consent or confirmation.

6. Definite and clear reservation of executive power should be made.

7. It would be inadvisable to have Dr. KIMM hold concurrently the post of chairman of the Interim Legislature as proposed by General Lerch in para. 2 of his letter to Dr. KIMM.

8. Because of the interim (and perhaps brief) character of the appointment, no vice president should be named.

9. General election should be held during July/August 1947 preceded by opportunity for election campaigns by all parties and educational programs for voters.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Enclosures
("A"
"B"

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

4 February 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps.

SUBJECT: Development of a Political Program.

The Problem Presented: To develop a political program for South Korea.

. . . . . (Excerpt)

III. Action Recommended.

1. That efforts be continued to develop representative democratic government in Southern Korea.

2. That the Interim Legislative Assembly be encouraged to reconvene under the leadership of Dr. KIMM, Kiusic as chairman and that the legislature be guided and persuaded into consideration of a constructive legislative program in order to convince the people of its usefulness.

3. That effort be made to strengthen and extend the prestige of the Coalition Committee in order to encourage, to the maximum extent, the formation of a real "middle of the road" political party.

4. That the power in government of the extreme rightist bloc be gradually reduced by replacement of the members of the bloc.

5. That the Coalition Committee be persuaded to enlarge and revise its "seven principles" to secure more general acceptance of its program for political unification.

. . . . . .

Encl. "A"

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor
Seoul, Korea

ORDINANCE)
NUMBER 135)

15 March 1947

1. Pending enactment of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly of a general franchise law which will prescribe the procedure to be followed in the election of officials under the provisions of Ordinance No. 126, dated 15 November 1946, and in the election of officials generally, the following instructions shall govern appointments:

a. Appointment of administrative officials of the rank of Civil Administrator and above shall be made by the Military Governor subject to confirmation by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly as provided in Section V, Ordinance No. 118, dated 24 August 1946.

b. Appointment of Directors of Departments and Offices, Provincial Governors, and the Mayor of the Independent City of Seoul, shall be made by the Military Governor upon recommendation of the Civil Administrator, who will submit the recommendation of the majority of the Korean Directors. The Civil Administrator will indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation of the majority of the Directors with such reasons as he may see fit to state. Such appointments by the Military Governor shall be subject to confirmation by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly as provided in Section V, Ordinance No. 118, dated 24 August 1946.

c. All appointments within the several Provinces shall be made by the respective Provincial Governors, subject to the approval of the Office of Korea Civil Service in those cases in which existing law requires such approval. This provision shall apply to the Mayor of the Independent City of Seoul with reference to appointments within that municipality.

d. Appointment of officials within the several departments shall be made by the Director of the Department concerned, subject to approval by the Office of Korea Civil Service in those cases in which existing law requires such approval.

2. Nothing in this Ordinance shall be held to interfere in any way with the duties and powers of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly to review, confirm and consent to certain appointments set forth in Section V of Ordinance No. 118, dated August 24, 1946; or to change the procedure in filling or vacating offices in those cases where such procedure is otherwise prescribed by law.

3. The provisions of this Ordinance shall continue in effect only until the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly shall have provided General Election laws or shall have otherwise enacted legislation governing election to the offices concerned.

Encl "B"

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission

ROUGH DRAFT

29 March 1947

MEMORANDUM

To: Brigadier General Weckerling

From: Minister Arthur C. Bunce

Subject: DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

1. The Problem

The basic problem is to establish an executive authority which will not be representative of the extreme right or the extreme left. To avoid action by the Interim Legislative Assembly which would either (a) veto the appointment of a person nominated by the Commanding General, or (b) to repudiate him later at the instigation of leading rightists politicians.

To establish the executive with sufficient power so that it can make the necessary changes in the present civil service and political appointment made by the Military Government in order that there will be real opportunity for a free election when it is held.

2. Discussion

It is almost certain that the rightists will attempt to nominate and have appointed as Chief Executive Dr. Syngman Rhee on his return from the United States. The suggestion that this be anticipated and that Dr. Kimm Kiu Sic be appointed as the executive has some merit, but it opens the following weaknesses.

a) It is doubtful if the Interim Legislative Assembly would confirm his appointment after Dr. Syngman Rhee has returned.

b) If his appointment was confirmed earlier, Dr. Rhee could organize opposition in the Assembly to pass a vote of nonconfidence.

c) Dr. Kimm Kiu Sic himself is not strong enough physically to carry this responsibility on his own shoulders.

d) The appointment of Dr. Kimm would set him apart from the rest of the Coalition Committee and subject him to attacks from the Right with the probable destruction of the Coalition Committee.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

3. Objectives

The basic objective of American policy in Korea is to avoid establishing one political group in control and to follow a middle-of-the-road policy which will prevent either the extreme left or the extreme right from seizing power. In order to achieve this objective it is essential that Syngman Rhee and his influence be restrained from seizing power through the political machine that he has been allowed to build.

The second basic policy of the United States is to establish a democratic, free election which will be representative of the will of the people. To achieve this objective a new framework must be established in order to eliminate the influence of the Rhee political machine. This action means that basic administrative reforms in Korean personnel appointed by Military Government must be made before the elections take place.

In order to build up a middle-of-the-road group for the coming elections, it is essential that means be used to coordinate the numerous groups into a harmonious coalition which will run one candidate against the candidates which will be put up by the extreme right and the extreme left. Failure to do this will result in a split vote of the center and moderate left with the result that either Rightists or Communists might win the election.

4. Recommendations

It is recommended that an Executive Council be appointed rather than a single person as a Chief Executive. It is suggested that this group represent the Coalition and that Dr. Kimm Kiu Sic and Mr. Lyuh Woon Hyung be the two key figures in the Council, possibly as alternating chairmen, with one right, one center, and one left representative working with them.

It is further recommended that upon the appointment of this Council all heads and chiefs of departments and all provincial governors and their deputies be asked to resign in order that they may either be reappointed or replaced by the Executive Council.

It is also recommended that the Executive Council be given the powers to make the above changes in administration and also establish an adequate system of electoral supervision before the general elections which are to be held. The appointments should be subject to confirmation by the Interim Legislative Assembly.

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By NARS, Date

(Rough Draft)
29 March 1947

5. **Results**

It is believed the recommendations outlined above will have the following beneficial results in South Korea.

a) It will place the Rightists in the position of opposing reforms publicly or of cooperating with the Coalition Committee.

b) It will give an opportunity for the Coalition Committee to build up a united center front and avoid the danger of splitting their votes.

c) It will eliminate or modify the political machine that has been established by the Rightists.

d) It will give some real hope of success for the announced and directed policy of the United States.

e) This pattern could be used at the same time as the basis for a corresponding change in the organization of Military Government.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

29 March 1947.

Memorandum for: General Brown.

SUBJECT: Development of Executive Authority of the Interim Government in South Korea.

1. Mr. Bunce has submitted a memorandum on the above subject.

2. In general his conclusions agree with those transmitted to you today. However, he recommends a somewhat novel departure - an "Executive Council" to be appointed rather than a Chief of State. See para. 4 (Recommendations) of his memorandum attached.

3. I do not agree with this conclusion for the following reasons:

(a) It resembles the Soviet "People's Committee" governing organ.

(b) It does not further efficient administrative control.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Encl.
Memo from Mr. Bunce to Gen. Weckerling, dtd. 29 March 1947.

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
G-2 Section
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

Gen Brown
Gen Weckerling
Lt Col Edwards
Lt Bertsch
Mr Bunce
Mr Sargent
Mr Kinney
Mr Prostov
Mr Rowe

1 May 1947 (Date)

CS/KO/ SEO/4265

Page 1 of [illegible]

From:
LEE No Chai
The Sabbath Church in district of Chawngyang-li, Seoul, Korea

To:
HONG Yong Hyawn
39, Dongui Chung,
Seoul, Korea

Distribution
AFPAC
~~OCD:THC~~
~~XXIV CORPS~~
G-2
CIC
Provost Mar.
~~USAMGIK~~
~~DC/S USAMGIK~~
D P I

Date of Communications:
7 Apr 47

Comment By:
G. F. Lyons

Type of Communication
Letter

Number of Inclosures:
None

Language:
Korean

Disposition Original Communication
Passed

Number of Previous Records
None

COMMENT

ORGANIZATIONS: ALL ASIATIC AID AND DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE PROPOSED AT PAN ASIATIC CONFERENCE BY KOREAN GROUP IN CHINA

331

Letter states:

"Our leader, LEE Chong Ko left Peiping (PX: North China) in order to attend the Pan Asiatic Conference. He was too late for the Conference due to financial circumstances, but the proposition enclosed herein was transmitted previously. He is now on his way to visit Mr. CHANDI and others. The enclosed proposition reads:

"Proposer: LEE Choong Ko
Date: 22 March 1947

"Proposition to the Pan Asiatic Conference.

The Conference should organize an all Asiatic aid alliance for the benefit of a permanent welfare among the Asiatic people.
(Cont'd)

"Distribution of the information contained in this document obtained from private communications will be confined solely to those officials, military and civilian, who are specifically authorized to receive such information."

Examiner: _____

Condemned or Detained communications are Retained in the Files of CCIG-K
Form No. CCIG-1/K

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

Confidential

"Aid Articles:

1. The alliance should be organized with all trustworthy representatives of each Asiatic race without any management and intervention from other powers.

2. The allied races should cooperate with each other in a national defense.

3. The alliance should arbitrate the problem arising between the allied races.

4. The remaining races should exterminate together a revolting race among the allies.

5. In economic problems, the allies should cooperate with each other in exchanging technique, developing resources, and building large factories and farms under a common interest.

6. With an organization of superior scholars in the allies, the alliance should establish a high scientific institution in Asia, and make them study the extreme arts and sciences in human society. The allies should take charge of the expenses of the institution on a ratio system.

7. The allies should open the borders and allow all allied races to travel and move freely among the allies with equal rights and duties.

8. The alliance should enact a constitution, and the limit of aid should depend upon it.

9. The races joined in the alliance should have equal rights.

10. The alliance should belong to the Pan Asiatic Conference, and no similar organizations should be recognized.

Sighed
KU Cha Sam
HANKOOK KAWN KOOK KANBU HOOIYAWN BAN
(Korean State Establishment Staff
Training Group), 14, Hutung, Hweijisu,
Peichang-ka, Peiping, North China."

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Copy for Mr. Sayre
(Chris file)

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
G-2 Section
Civil Communications Intelligence Group-Korea

From:
LEE No Chai
The Sabbath Church in district of Chawngyang-li, Seoul, Korea

To:
HONG Yong Hyawn
39, Dongui Chung,
Seoul, Korea

Date of Communications:
7 Apr 47

Number of Inclosures:
None

Comment By:
G. F. Lyons

Language:
Korean

Type of Communication
Letter

Disposition Orighal Communication
Passed

Number of Previous Records
None

COMMENT

ORGANIZATIONS: ALL ASIATIC AID AND DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE PROPOSED AT PAN ASIATIC CONFERENCE BY KOREAN GROUP IN CHINA

Writer states:

"Our leader, LEE Chonng Mo, left Peiping (EX: North China) in order to attend the Pan Asiatic Conference. He was too late for the Conference due to financial ciruumstances, but the proposition enclosed herein was transmitted previously. He is now on his way to visit Mr. GHANDI and others. The enclosed proposition reads:

"Proposer: LEE Choong Mo
Date: 22 March 1947

"Proposition to the Pan Asiatic Conference.

The Conference should organize an all Asiatic aid alliance for the benefit of a permanent welfare among the Asiatic people.
(Cont'd)

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"Aid Articles:

1. The alliance should be organized with all trustworthy representatives of each Asiatic race without any management and intervention from other powers.

2. The allied races should cooperate with each other in a national defense.

3. The alliance should arbitrate the problem arising between the allied races.

4. The remaining races should exterminate together a revolting race among the allies.

5. In economic problems, the allies should cooperate with each other in exchanging technique, developing resources, and building large factories and farms under a common interest.

6. With an organization of superior scholars in the allies, the alliance should establish a high scientific institution in Asia, and make them study the extreme arts and sciences in human society. The allies should take charge of the expenses of the institution on a ratio system.

7. The allies should open the borders and allow all allied races to travel and move freely among the allies with equal rights and duties.

8. The alliance should enact a constitution, and the limit of aid should depend upon it.

9. The races joined in the alliance should have equal rights.

10. The alliance should belong to the Pan Asiatic Conference, and no similar organizations should be recognized.

Signed
KU Cha Sam
HANKOOK KAWN KOOK KANBU HOOLYAWN BAN
(Korean State Establishment Staff
Training Group), 14, Hutung, Hweijisu,
Peichang-Ka, Peiping, North China."

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Desire of Korean Delegation to Asian Conference to Study Educational Reform in Japan (cont'd)

3	8 Apr 1947	Jt. Comm.	C.G., USAMGIK, ATTN: Dr. Johnson, Chief Adviser.

1. The Joint Commission was designated to coordinate the travel of the three Korean representatives to the New Delhi Conference.

2. The sending of these delegates was, however, a State Department matter, whose funds were used to pay the travel and other necessary expenses of the three Korean representatives.

3. In view of the above, the Joint Commission does not feel that it has any interest in the question of stop-over of these representatives in Tokyo. Mr. Langdon, the Political Adviser, has been consulted and from the viewpoint of the State Department he does not believe that any additional stop-over is advisable.

John Weckerling,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Acting Chief Commissioner.

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WPC/RPB/bm

Desire of Korean Delegation to Asian Conference to Study Educational Reform in Japan.

1.	4 Apr. 1947	CFA	OCA Joint Commission ATTN: Lt. Bertsch	1. The following extract from Memorandum USAMGIK Liaison Office, Tokyo, dtd 25 March 1947 is forwarded for your information: 2. "The three representatives to the Asia conference stopped in Tokyo on the way to Shanghai and held a brief conference with members of this office and Korean Division. During the brief visit the request was made that the three be allowed to stay for a few days in Japan, on the return trip, to check on the educational reforms instituted in Japan. Mr. Fielding pointed out that the request should properly originate in Korea and asked this officer to communicate with Korea to determine if this request coincided with Korea's wishes. USAMGIK should originate the request thru channels." 3. Please advise this office if you desire to take any action in request contained in paragraph 2. M. F. CHAPMAN Colonel AC Adviser
2.	7 Apr 1947	CFA	Jt. Commission Att: Lt. Bertsch.	What recommendations does the Joint Commission proffer? E. A. J. Johnson.

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT: Stopover in Tokyo of Korean Delegates to Indian Conference.

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
1	April 9, 1947	Polad	Joint Comm. Attn. Gen'l Weckerling	I do not favor the proposal that the delegates spend several days in Tokyo on their way back from India for the following reasons: 1. They have already spent more funds than allotted them--they called on the American Ambassador at New Delhi to request and were advanced $750 to meet their return expenses--and the proposed delay in Tokyo will mean a further outlay of funds. 2. I imagine the State Department wishes to have as early a report as possible on the results of their mission. 3. Their interest in educational reforms is private and not related to USAMGIK activity in this respect. 4. The pattern of educational reform in Japan has no relation to our program of reform in Korea, our general instructions being that Korea should be divorced completely from Japan in political, economic, and presumably cultural policies. W. R. L. rh
				MEMO FOR RECORD. 10 April 1947 M.G. was notified on 8 April 1947 that the Joint Commission had no primary interest in this matter as the three delegates went to New Delhi as part of a State Department program and using State Department funds. General Weckerling also informed Colonel Centner, Adviser to the Foreign Affairs Section, M.G., that Mr. Langdon, Political Adviser, did not favor the stopover in Tokyo. J.W.

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43 OVER 7773 18E

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Headquarters XXIV Corps

Inter-Staff Routing Slip

For use in all inter-office correspondence. Separate each Memorandum by a line and initial. *Memorandum will preferably be typewritten.*

SUBJECT:

Memo. No.	Date	From	To	Memorandum
	4 Apr47	Jt. Comm.	POLAD.	1. Please let me have your recommendation. The three delegates are living on State Department funds which when granted carried a notation from the State Department considering the amount requested ($10,000) exorbitant. 2. The Joint Commission sees no good reason why they should stop in Tokyo to make observations on Japanese educational reforms, but is not actually concerned in this matter. John Weckerling, Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Form Emerg. No. 172 (Revised) 17 June 43

OVER

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U. S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

4 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WECKERLING:

SUBJECT: Pan-Asiatic Delegates

1. Mr. Wagner of the Foreign Affairs Department of USAMGIK phoned the following oral message today:

2. The Foreign Affairs Office has received from the Japan Liaison Office the information that the delegates to the Delhi Congress left in Tokyo the request that they be permitted to spend several days in Japan on their return trip for the purpose of making observation of the educational reforms under way.

3. (It will be recalled that all three of the delegates have been professionally interested in education.) SCAP is inclined to view the request favorably but believes it should originate here. Foreign Affairs Office believes that the request should originate with the Commission.

Leonard M. Bertsch

LEONARD M. BERTSCH
1st Lieutenant, CMP

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FROM G-2

23 APRIL 1947

Heard on the 230700 April Stateside Newscast:

Soviet Foreign Secretary Molotov agreed today, (in a reply to Gen Marshall's recent note on Korea) to the early establishment of a united Korean nation. He suggested that the US-USSR Joint Commission reconvene in Seoul on 20 May for the purpose of effecting this end. Molotov also charged that the work of the Commission broke down last year because the US Delegation would not follow the Moscow agreement.

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Radio Script.

1	3 Apr 1947	Jt. Comm.	Mr. Stewart, PRO, XXIV Corps.	1. The attached draft of a radio script was submitted to Colonel Lincoln by Miss Elsie Fletcher on April 1. Colonel Lincoln pointed out to Miss Fletcher certain objections to the proposed script and she stated that she would substitute some other program in its place. 2. Colonel Lincoln has prepared recommendations on how such a subject should be presented and some further detailed pencil comments in the margin of the script itself for use if it should be released in the future. In that event, Colonel Lincoln believes that the entire script should be rewritten as only portions of the script are satisfactory. 3. Miss Fletcher and others involved in this project should be commended for the originality of the presentation and for the effort that has been put into its preparation. However, I do not consider that the present is altogether satisfactory for further expositions of trusteeship on our part. I believe that this view is also shared by General Brown. John Weckerling, Brigadier General, U.S.A. Encls. Memo of recommendations written by Col. Lincoln, Original radio script with comments.

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American Delegation
U.S. - SOVIET JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea

3 April 1947

MEMORANDUM ON PROPOSED RADIO SCRIPT:

1. The proposed subject of trusteeship is too narrow. The effort of the Joint Commission has been to focus the Korean public's attention on the Moscow Decision as a whole rather than on the trusteeship which is only a portion thereof and which does not arise in the deliberations of the Joint Commission until an advanced stage. Therefore it is suggested that the title of the subject should be "A Layman's Talk on the Moscow Decision". The script should emphasize the following points:

a. The Moscow Decision was conceived as an instrument for providing for the complete independence of Korea.

b. It envisions a Korea capable of standing on its own feet economically and politically.

c. It envisions that the Allies will give for a limited period some form of jointly supervised help and assistance to the new Korean nation, the exact nature of which will have to be worked out by the Joint Commission in consultation with the new Korean provisional Government after that government is established.

2. It is suggested that the initial part of the discussion could refer directly to the actual text of the Moscow Decision itself and use this reference to establish the fact that the initial phase of the work of the Joint Commission is to consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations on the establishment of a provisional government over all of Korea. It should be emphasized that a natural result of the establishment of such government should be the elimination of the 38th degree line and therefore the elimination of one of the greatest existing obstacles to economic recovery in Korea. It should be emphasized that until this Provisional Government has been established in accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Commission and after approval by the Great Powers, the trusteeship issue does not arise and will not be discussed in the Joint Commission or by the Joint Commission with Korean leaders.

3. The subject of trusteeship can be introduced by a reference to paragraph 3 of the Moscow Agreement. This paragraph clearly states that the Joint Commission in participation with the Korean Provisional Government and Korean democratic organizations will work out measures for helping and assisting Korea.

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It should be noted that the Provisional Government by that time is already in existence and is functioning. It will then be proper for the Joint Commission to take up with the Korean leaders the question of trusteeship. In this portion of the discussion it should also be emphasized that a complete definition of trusteeship cannot be formulated except by the Joint Commission during the consultations with the Provisional Government. However, a partial definition is contained in the Moscow Agreement itself. In General Brown's Press Releases, he partially defines the meaning as a guarantee for a limited period of the security and complete independence of Korea, and the assurance that the Allies will give some form of jointly supervised help and assistance to the new Korean nation. The exact nature of the aid will have to be worked out by the Joint Commission.

4. As to the freedom of expression question, note pencil comment or script on pages 3 and 4. The references to groups abstaining from signing Communique No. 5, top of page 5 to revoking a declaration, are very vague and will be meaningless to most listeners. Suggest that these be omitted or expressed in clear terms.

5. It is emphasized that an outright statement that trusteeship will not involve any impairment of Korean sovereign rights is dangerous. It may or may not be correct. Furthermore, I doubt the wisdom of "spiking" on the theme of "surrendering" to liberators as indicated on page 3. There does not seem to be any surrender involved but rather an acceptance of the good faith of the Great Powers in guaranteeing Korea's independence and in establishing a definite procedure (Moscow Decision) by which that independence can be obtained. Koreans who impede the implementation of this procedure are only impeding the progress of Korea toward independence.

6. Finally, it doesn't seem wise to put positive anti-trusteeship or anti-Moscow Decision statements in the mouth of Mr. Kim. While he is represented as being finally convinced by the arguments of Mr. Paik, the arguments may not convince even an open-minded listener. It would be better to give Mr. Paik his cue by an indirect reference, or at the most by having Mr. Kim ask a question rather than repeating a statement which has become almost a slogan or catch phrase of the people who are causing us all the trouble. (Example--Page 4, Kim says that General Hodge made a compromise.

7. It might be more effective to put all the quotations from General Brown's and General Hodge's statements in the mouth

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of Mr. Paik as his own statements rather than as quotations. Their use is effective.

L. J. LINCOLN
Colonel CE

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By NARS, Date

Col. Lincoln, [redacted]

This radio script was prepared at PRO, USAMGIK

Would appreciate an O.K. from you before putting it on tomorrow evening. We're sorry to have brought it at the last minute this way.

Could I pick it up about one-thirty this afternoon?

Elsie J Fletcher

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Meeting of Members of
Korean People's Civil Mobilization Union
at Duk Soo Palace
4 April 1947

U.S. PERSONNEL PRESENT

Brigadier Gene al Weckerling
Colonel Lincoln
Lt. Colonel Edwards

KOREAN PERSONNEL PRESENT

LEE, Yong Chik
KIM, Yong Keun
KIM, Yong Wan
PAK, Li Wan
KIM, Chong Whan
LEE, Min Koo
KANG, Whan Hak
CHUNG, Whan Sun
KIM, Kyung Lin
LEE, Chung Kwan
AHN, Kyu Whan
LEE, Byung Min
MOON, Tai Sup
KIM, Woo Chung
KIM, Syung Sup
YUN, Bong Ii
CHIN, Koo Sool
CHUNG, In Kwa
CHUN, Soo Cho
HWANG, Hak Su
CHO, Teuk Syung

INTERPRETER
Mr. CHO

Twenty-one members of the Korean People's Civil Mobilization Union, also known as the Renaissance Political Party or the University Club, headed by L E, Yong Chik, Chairman, called at the Duk Soo Palace at 1430, 4 April to inform the Joint Commission of the nature and purpose of their organization.

LEE, YONG CHIK: I am Chairman of this group. It is quite an honor and great privilege to have a conference with you this afternoon. I have many things to say in my mind but I want to express first of all our gratitude for what the American Forces have done for us. The American Forces have made trememdous sacrifices as liberators of Korea from the heel of the Japanese and also in coming out here to our corner of Asia--our little peninsula, and established Military Government. We are also thankful for all your support in economics, commerce, education and in the political field in conducting our affairs. You have a far reaching influence in the destiny of Korean history. I cannot express how grateful we are. Now, at this time, since the time of Korean emancipation, our group, members of the University Club, have been working for Military Government as chiefs of bureaus, Finance Department, etc. We don't belong to any political

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parties at all, but at this time we have decided to start some movement lik the Renaissance Movement. I don't need to explain what Renaissance means. In Italy the Renaissance movement started in 1400 and that movement spread all over Europe. We have the same situation but European countries had it in 1400. Now, during the last few months so many mad agitators are going around telling our people that the United States is trying to colonize Korea and set up monopolies on Korean economics and Korean resources, etc. So we are afraid if we don't stop those agitators from doing their propaganda it might cause trouble between America and Korea. We must do something.

You perhaps have heard of TONG, Haku Dang (literally "Eastern Learning"). (This group which was organized in the 1830's was the beach head of opposition to the Japanese.) About 50 years ago TONG, Haku Dang started out rebel movement against our old YI Dynasty. LI, Huang Chang (Premier of China) first brought troops to Korea trying to stop revolutionary movement and so Japanese brought their troops and consequently Japanese-Chinese war started. That group is still strong in the South. It has about two million members there. They have been planning for our good cause. Mr. KIM, Koo Chung is one of them. He came from the South sometime ago and our group, the University Group, started the Renaissance movement. Their ideas are the same so we united. Several other groups joined our group so all these gentlemen are in this organization. Today we came here to ask your advice. You know Korea is just like a little child. A little child always lives up to big brother for good character. New-born Korea has no one to live up to except "Uncle Sam". General, Colonel, we need your advice for our political ideas and for constructive work.

GENERAL WICKERLING: Would you mind telling me the name of your organization and the purpose of the organization?

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KIM, Woo Chung: My name is KIM, Woo Chung. I am not a politician but I know one thing: That through General Marshall, who is imbued with the spirit of justice, will settle all international problems and we do firmly believe that through him some sort of a solution will be achieved in our particular case. Therefore, we have great hopes in the personal theory of General Marshall. However, we cannot believe that through the guarantee of the United Nations alone, can be achieved our great purpose. While the security guarantee of the United Nations is greatly valuable for the realization of a permanent peace of the world, equally important is the fact that the establishment of security between nations is also greatly needed. For the peace of the world, Korea, it seems to us, occupies a very important position. I am inclined to go as far as to say that without complete independence of Korea, there will be no complete peace of the world. Believing that the key to the world peace is in the hands of the United States, so do we believe that the key to the solution of the Korean problem is in the hands of the United States. In the light of that fact, we are firmly determined to cooperate with the United States for the realization of our complete independence and security. At the present time of Korea's liberation, the necessity of reorganizing economic and social structure of the country is vitally important. Heretofore the Korean people have taken a sort of aimless attitude. By the power and the influence of one political party alone we cannot hope to achieve our political purposes. Only through the complete cooperation of the people can we hope to realize the complete independence of Korea. For such purposes, the spiritual unification of our people is vitally necessary. This organization comprises men who represent sort of a hidden and yet very influential organizations. At this time it is our desire to make known the true purposes of our organization. Some of the activities of this organization is aiming to achieve are:

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1. Since the liberation the political stage has crumbled down and the whole country has been characterized by chaos and uncertainty. Now we are trying to carry on cultural and educational work.

2. Time and again there have been many minunderstandings on the part of the people about the policies of the Military Government. That being the situation and being aware of such a situation, we are determined to cooperate with the Military Government in the way of interpreting the policies of the Milita Government to the people as they should be interpreted and made known.

3. The realization of complete independence of Korea being the absolute, we are trying to organize a unified organization comprising all lesser organizations.

4. We are going to strengthen the ties between the United States and Korea.

5. Since Communistic propaganda is rampant in every community in the country, we are going to educate the people as to enable them to understand what is good for them and what is not.

6. We are going to train the youth of the country under the genuine principles of democracy.

We may compare Korea to a child of three years old. As such it is very weak and at times stumbles along, but as time goes on we believe she will be able to stand on her feet. Since time is limited, I am going to stop. However, I will try to answer any questions you may have about our organization or plans. The first thing I wish to make known to you three gentlemen is that we have something like three million people belonging to our organization. All these three million men do not belong to any political party. They are waiting for the opportunity in which they can do the best for the country.

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GENERAL WECKERLING: I want to thank Mr. KIM for his statement. I am sure that all of us are delighted to hear the laudable objectives of the newly organized group. I think it is unnecessary now for me to tell of the objectives of the United States in Korea. General Hodge and higher officials in Washington, including the Acting Secretary of State, reaffirmed the intentions of the United States to see that Korea gets her complete independence and that when the United States leaves Korea she will be a country strong enough to maintain that independence. (Applause) May I ask a question Mr. KIM? Is this a recently formed organization?

LEE, Yong Chik: I, myself, was formerly a member of the Korean Mission to America and Europe in 1919. I used to work with Dr. RHEE, Dr. KIM, Kiusic, and Dr. Jaison. I had influential friends in the middle part of America--Kansas City ever since 1931, when I was Superintendent of the Korean Mission in Hawaii. There used to be 200,000 Japanese. At that time most Americans didn't know the internal situation and at that time quite a few Americans were pro-Japanese. They never thought this past war would come, but we knew. We were always interested in Oriental affairs. We were informed what was going on in Korea, Japan, China, Territory of Hawaii, and also America. We organized separate group of underground activities. I had several young men who didn't know Korean history. They were not interested in politics and such activities. I began to teach them about Korea and what the Japanese had done in Korea, etc. They were very much interested, so then we started underground activities ever since 1931. In 1933 we knew this war would occur. We thought that at the end of this was the little country Japan cannot stand against America and would surrender. That means Korea would be free and become independent in the future. We then decided what must be done--what we should do toward "Uncle Sam" and our country. Our little group, of course, could not go on the battle field to join the American Army, so we undertook secret service--sort of spy work. We investigated what the Japanese Navy, Army and the soldiers were doing in the Territory of Hawaii and America. Here,

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I simply say, you won't believe what we have done. (Mr. HWANG unfolds map taken from United States newspaper.) You may have seen this map before. Before this war started, the Japanese planned to take Midway, Hawaii, and all the islands--they would also attack the Panama Canal, etc. We made connection with young men who stayed in Korea and China. One boy who used to work on a Japanese ship stole this map from a Japanese Navy officer and sent it to our group. We took this map and gave it to American Army and Navy officers and they published this map. Then the Japanese published this book. Perhaps you've seen this book ("How Japan Plans to Win"). The Japanese published this book and distributed it among themselves, and they thought they would win the war. Fortunately our men saw to it that this copy, written in Japanese was translated and distributed to American officers. Of this kind of work, I have many documents. We made a big report of the Japanese population in Hawaii and sent it to the Chiefs of the Navy and Army in 1933. In 1935, I came to Korea, China, and Japan on a secret mission. I was arrested four times, once just before liberation in August 1945 and released August 16. So, I also prayed for those American citizens who invented the atomic bomb. All these gentlemen and I would be killed long ago so our group lent such service in America ever since 1931 underground activities. Since I came out here, I didn't know what was going on among my group over there. Just after liberation they sent me all these documents about what they had done. That is when I learned what they had done so I was grateful for those fellows continuing their work. So this group--these gentlemen, who used to work with me when we used to work in America, now since we came out here we started underground activities also. Our so-called "University Club" under Japanese censorship, we just acted as sort of information on international affairs for the Korean independence movement. Ever since August 15, date of liberation, most of the members are American students and couldn't stand those ideas and their work, so most of them came up here and we joined with quite a

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few American patriots here in Seoul, and they united in our group. We have started work in education already. I, as founder of Boy's Middle School, enlisted 30,000,000 to make high standard school and also Dr. CHO and another man who is Chief of the Food Administration; Dr. CHO and I started training young men--those who never had a college education before--during the time of Japanese rule. We have been waiting the opportunity to organize on a large scale. Fortunately leaders of various groups learned about our objectives, and they are interested, so they came to join our group. However, we haven't made our organization known to the public yet. Now, as Mr. KIM has said, we have a big organization down South, 3,000,000 men and they can get money enough to carry on our work. That is a little bit of the history of our group.

GENERAL HODGE: Thank you very much for your statement. It seems to be a very comprehensive explanation of the organization and its purposes.

KIM, Koo Chung: This is the declaration of the organization which is distributed among the people--particularly among those belonging to this organization.

GENERAL HODGE: When are you going to announce your new society?

KIM, Koo Chung: This organization is going through preliminary preparations, but the vitally important thing in this organization's work is the cooperation or support of the Military Government.

GENERAL HODGE: I won't presume to give this well-established and large organization any advice because I don't consider myself competent to do so. Very few of us soldiers can step gracefully from the soldier's role to the stateman's role as General Marshall did. However, I will bring to both General Brown and General Berch's attention the statements that you have made here today about the purposes and the aims of your society, and I am sure that they will be very much interested.

LEE, Yong Chik: Dr. CHUNG graduated from Korean Eastern College in Pyongyang and then went to Princeton and finished his master's degree

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and then since returning, he was in charge of the Sunday School Association of Korea and then he became secretary of the Korean Presbyterian Church. He was General Secretary for Korean Church for many years and also has been carrying on Christian literature work for many years.

CHUNG, In Kwa: These two gentlemen have explained fully the purpose and plans of this organization, so I have no word to add. As the Chairman introduced, I am one of the Christian leaders--one of the pastors in Korea. We have about 4,000 organized churches in Korea. We have 1,000,000 Christians, about 100,000 Sunday school teachers and four or five thousand church leaders. Korean Christians believe generally that God has sent American missionaries to Korea to prepare Korea for Korean independence. Christian people in Korea know principles of Christianity. We have experience in organizing Christian organizations. These organizations are the foundation of democratic organizations, we believe. Also, Korean Christians have faith in God and confidence in missionaries, so naturally we have confidence in American Christian brothers as well as American people as a whole. Therefore, one step forward, we believe in American policy for the Far East and the Near East. We Christians believe that we ought to have some patriotic movement, but we haven't started yet. In order to have the unity of Korean people, but now Korean Christians are beginning to understand that there is great difficulty between the Soviet Government and the American Government and of the Communist idea and the democratic idea. So Korean people are beginning to rise up to train our people. If we use Christian churches throughout the country--about 4,000 churches, why we 'll have a very easy time to train our people to understand democratic organization and democratic principles. We like this Good Citizenship Union, so we Christian people are out to lead this movement. We will have more than 4,000,000 members easily. First, we believe we must have faith in God and must have confidence in American people, and we must have a free country.

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I think we must have a meeting like this often so that we can have an understanding between American leaders and Korean leaders so that we understand American policy clearly and follow American policy in order to get our independence.

GENERAL WECKERLING: I am sure General Hodge, General Brown and General Lerch would welcome future meetings of any group that has such a patriotic motive as has been explained here today. It would be very much appreciated if you would in the future let us know of the progress that your organization is making and the status of the various stages of your formation.

HWANG, Su: General, as you said a little while ago, our meeting from time to time would be of immense value. It is really a good suggestion, and I do think that it would be of great help to the solution of our problems. After the first World War, when the late President Woodrow Wilson declared that Fourteen Point Program--particularly self-determination, all small countries looked up at him as their God. Since the last President Roosevelt promised the independence of Korea, we, the people of Korea, have been considering that such noble words came to us as from a savior, and we consider that after hearing such noble words, our deaths would not be in vain. I witnessed, while in Chungking, the congenial fellowship that existed between the American personnel there and the Chinese officers. During the war, we all thought that something like 30 provinces of China under the Japanese iron heel would never be free again, but then after the war the 30 provinces soon rejoined the integral part of the great nation, China. Then through whose grace such 30 provinces were returned to China--only through the grace of the United States. But coming back to the question of homeland, I am persuaded to say how and why this insignificant nation in size is divided into two when a great nation like China has completely regained her formerly lost territories? If the two opposing forces did not occupy this little country Korea and if the United States alone occupied this country, the independence of

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Korea would not have been so prolonged as today. About 47 years ago the Russians fortified Long Am Po (at mouth of Yalu River) with the biggest cannons they could muster. Judging from that, we are not elusive as to the aims of the Russian government here in Korea. It is my humble opinion that the question of a 38th parallel would never be solved only through fine words--either from the Korean people or from the American people. In the end, the solution of that problem will necessarily require action. Action alone will decide the issue. Some 39 years ago, our people shouted for the independence of Korea against the Japanese Government. At that time something like 200,000 people were shot down by the brutal guns of the Japanese Army, but that never killed the spirit of the Korean people. That spirit is stronger than ever. Right now when the Korean people are somewhat divided with regard to their action for fear that their action may jeopardize the good program and intentions and policies of the Military Government on behalf of us, so we are not getting into that sort of action. We are only waiting. I wish to add a few more words as to future policy of the Military Government. When General Hodge comes back, he need not, in my mind, be bothered by the 38th parallel. He can proceed to solve the problems of Korea in a different way. By this, of course, I do not imply a separate government to be established in South Korea. By all means, we must have unified government. Principally speaking, such a unified government should comprise delegations from both sides, but such a realization would be well nigh an impossibility, and, therefore, I am going to tell you gentlemen about my own plans. Those four words, "Provisional Korean Interim Government" seems to many minds to be a great problem, but we can solve the problem without those words. During the time when the independent movement was gotten up 29 years ago, many of our people shed blood. Innocent blood. But out of that blood was born new government which at that time, under the circumstances, could not exist within the limits of Japanese power, so I went to Shanghai.

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My implication in saying this is just this--That we can keep the same name of our government, but we can use new and strong blood; that is, we can use really competent leaders with that name of the government in exile, so it seems to me we need not another government with a different name.

The meeting adjourned at 1530 hours.

Distribution:
General Hodge
General Brown
General Lerch
General Helmick
Colonel Robinson
File

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By NARS, Date

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
U.S. - U.S.S.R. JOINT COMMISSION
AMO 235

6 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting of the American Delegation, U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, 5 May 1947.

1. Present: General Brown
General Heckerling
Dr. Bunce
Mr. Sergent
Mr. Langdon
Lt. Col. Edwards
Lieutenant Bertsch

2. Summary of the Discussion: General Brown said the purpose of the meeting was to consider preparatory plans and policies with regard to the anticipated reconvening of the Joint Commission. He said it was especially necessary to consider compilation of a list of political parties to be consulted and that Mr. Rowe should be directed to study the three political reports which he has prepared and list the principal parties on the basis of their respective memberships. This could also be compared to the population represented by each party. Lieutenant Bertsch and Mr. Kinney should then examine Mr. Rowe's list to determine the outstanding individuals associated with each group.

General Brown requested General Heckerling to call in political leaders and to tactfully inform them as follows:

a. Present indications are that the Joint Commission may reconvene at an early date;

b. That it is likely that agreement may be reached by the Joint Commission to accept Communique #5 as the starting point for development of the provisional government;

c. That failure to sign Communique #5 will in all probability bar the individual or political party refusing to sign from consultation with the Joint Commission;

d. That the American delegation to the Joint Commission must join the Russian delegation and as long as the Russians properly execute their part of the agreement proceed under the Moscow Agreement to evolve a provisional government; that if

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any material number of Rightist organizations or individuals place themselves in a position where the Commission is not able to get the benefit of their assistance in forming a provisional government, it would probably mean that those consulted would be predominantly Left and could conceivably lead to the formation of a Leftist government, which probably would be sympathetic towards, if not controlled by, the Russians.

General Brown said the Joint Commission must henceforth proceed on a definite basis and a determination must be made at once as to the precise nature of such basis.

General Heckerling, in response to an inquiry by General Brown, said he had extracted pertinent directives affecting the Joint Commission from the various papers on the subject and would circulate his draft today. He added that he would continue his present effort to condense important matter from the record of the former joint meetings.

General Brown said that he would like to have the question considered as to whether or not we will accept Communique #5 or should propose some alternative method for consultation of political parties and groups. Also, the form and structure on government to be established should be determined.

General Brown, in response to a question by Mr. Langdon, said the matter of the agenda would develop after plans for procedures and policies were agreed upon.

General Brown agreed to request the services of Mr. Bergler for the purpose of reviewing the questionnaire, which was prepared during the last joint sessions, for use in consultation with political leaders.

General Brown requested that the views of those present be prepared in sufficient time to permit discussion on Thursday, 8 May 1947.

WILLIAM H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
Secretary

Copies to:
Individuals indicated
in para 1
File

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
G-2 Section
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

19 May 1947 (Date)

SF 0/4405
CS/KO

From: KANG Ki Bong c/o PAK Tai Won's 108-5, 2-ka, Sawdaimoon-ro, Seoul, Korea	To: CHAWN Yawng Soo Onchawn-li, Ongjin-myun, Ongjin-kun, Kyonggi-do, Korea

Distribution HHS CCD GHQ XXIV CORPS G-2 CIC Provost Mar. US NGIK DC/S US NGIK D F I	Date of Communications: 15 May 47 Comment By: G. F. Lyons Type of Communication: Letter	Number of Inclosures: None Language: Korean Disposition Original Communication Passed

Number of Previous Records
None

COMMENT

POLITICAL ACTIVITY: MEETING PLANNED TO WELCOME JOINT US-USSR COMMISSION 25 MAY 1947

Writer states:

"A grand meeting to welcome the American-Soviet Joint Commission will be held on 25 May.

"In order to unify the seven or eight youngmen's organizations into one party under General LEE Chawng Chawn, we hold meetings every day."

"Distribution of the information contained in this document obtained from private communications will be confined solely to those officials, military and/or civilian, who are specifically authorized to receive such information."

Examiner: KDY

Condemned or Detained communications are Retained in the Files of CCIG-K

Form No. CCIG-1/k

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26-5-125

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By NARS, Date

COPY

HEADQUARTERS 32ND MILITARY GOVERNMENT CO
INFORM L
CHECK SLIP

SUBJECT: Mass Meeting Resolution.

1	23 May 1947	USAMGIK Liaison Office, Tokyo	OFA	1. Attached is a resolution made at the Youth Organization for Reconstruction of Korea Mass Meeting, held 1100, 20 May 1947. 2. Threats of trouble had been circulated by handbills about the mass meeting so Major Goff attended as a spectator. YORK estimated 3,000 persons attended, while Major Goff estimated 400 persons attended. 3. The meeting was adequately covered by CIC, CID, Provost Marshal and this office. The meeting was orderly and broke up without disturbance. s/ K.J. GOFF t/ K.J. GOFF Major FA Chief, USAMGIK Liaison Officer

---

		In Turn.	
2	6 June 1947	OFA 1.OCA 2.Joint US-USSR Comm.	Forwarded as a matter of interest to the Joint Commission.

2 CE
XXV
Corps

WM. F. CENTNER
Colonel AC
Adviser

1 Incl:
Resolution at the Meeting, fr.Korean Unification Mass Meet., 20 May 47, adressed to General Hodge.(with copy)

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

May 20, 1947

TO : Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge,
U.S. Commander in Korea.

FROM : Korean Unification Mass Meeting.

SUBJECT: Resolutions at the Meeting.

We are cordially glad and are very grateful for the fact that the U.S.-Soviet joint commission has come to be reconvened in Seoul, thanks to the sincere efforts on the part of your General and your Government. We deeply expect the commission's complete success which is going to play a decisive role in the unification of both southern and northern Korea and the realization of a provisional Korean government.

We strongly desire to your joint commission as follows:

1. All political parties and social organizations in Korea, irrespective of pro- or con-trusteeship, should be participated and the democratic will of Koreans should be wholly respected in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government and in its decision of policies.

2. By strictly carrying out the policies, decided in this way, through both zones alike, the strangulating 38th parallel whould be eradicated.

3. By holding wholly complete universal suffrage as soon as possible, a legislature should be established and a formal government should be set up.

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4. There is no need in Korea of trusteeship for four Powers.

These are desires of Korean race and the consistent and strong aspiration of our Korean residents.

We heartily desire their realization by the powerful assistance and efforts on the part of your General and your Government.

Korean Unification Mass Meeting,
held in Tokyo under the joint
auspieces of
Youth Organization for Reconst-
ruction of Korea.

Korean Residents Union in Japan.

Korean Association of Commerce
and Industry in Japan.

League of Korean Students in Japan.

Federation of Korean Cultural
groups in Japan.

Fuyo-Kai (Korean women's club)
other Korean Democratic Bodies.

Yi Yong Hyunk

Rojung Pakk,

Kun Se Pakk

Incl. 1, p. 2

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

K-E Translation No. 7
Translated by H.H.
Edited by
Date Translated May 26, 1947

24 May 1947

TELEGRAM

TO: General Brown

FROM: Chung Kukchin, Chairman of Educational Association,
Chung Chong Namdo

SUBJECT; Greetings to the American Delegation on the Reconvention of the Joint Commission.

We wish to express our hearty gratitude for your ceaseless efforts for reconvening the Joint Commission. We pray for your success in forming the United Korean Provisional Democratic Government. In addition, we pray for your health.

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By NARS, Date

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ㅇ五 대전

서울덕수궁내ㄴ
미소공동위원회ㄴ
폭하네리간합중국대표ㄴ
뿌란운소장

공동위원회
수고를감사
회가원간히
선의자주독
를回백경
ㄴ아울너각

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북동일의조
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發信

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부교육회장 중추전

受信

副印刷京・〇二和昭　　朝鮮總督府　　二三電

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7 June 1947

SUBJECT: Publicity Regarding Questionnaires

TO: American Delegates of the Joint Commission
Attn: Col. Edwards

Mr. Bunce raised the question this morning of the advisability of publicity regarding questionnaires in view of the fact that the Joint Commission is now committed to talking to everybody and his brother.

Previously it had been our thought that the widest possible publicity should be given to the fact of the distribution of the questionnaires and that a fairly extensive distribution be made of Decisions Nos. 4 and 6. There is no question but what the response (mostly directly to the Commission) will be tremendous. From the long-range point of view it seems to me such a response is highly desirable; yet from the practical standpoint if the response should be a cause of actually bogging down the Commission, then perhaps curtailment of the response must be considered. I feel that these are matters which must be settled by the American Delegation and would like to know the decision as soon as possible.

Our proposed publicity may be divided into two targets. First; to encourage all members of political parties to participate in the questionnaires. Second, to the Korean people at large to inform them that the Joint Commission is eagerly receiving the suggestions of the Korean people in order to establish not merely the finest possible of all governments for Korea but the very one that the Korean people themselves desire.

Publicity to target No. 1 would involve the actual printing of a certain number of questionnaires themselves. To target No. 2 we will refer to the questionnaires and perhaps describe them briefly but the main message will be in the form of slogans regarding the pure intentions of the Joint Commission.

It should be borne in mind that no matter how limited the number of questionnaires we print may be, republication in newspapers (which we absolutely cannot prevent) will be extensive and the printed form in the newspapers in the eyes of many politicals may constitute the real thing. Thus, there is no clear-cut way in which Subcommission No. 1 can avoid a tremendous amount of consultative work.

JAMES L. STEWART

FEB

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[illegible]

LJL

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235

9 June 1947

Major General Albert E. Brown
Chief, American Delegation
Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission
Seoul, Korea

Dear General Brown:

This is to confirm oral conferences concerning the future work of the Joint Commission.

The Moscow Decision is a broad directive, and despite the Soviet polemics concerning "exact fulfillment", it can only be completely fulfilled by the establishment of a government providing democratic freedoms with checks and balances to preserve the will of the Korean people. Under no consideration can the American Delegation consent to the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government that lends itself to the Soviet type of dictatorship and police controlled state.

There is little doubt but that the Soviet Delegation is operating under orders to establish a communist "People's Committee" type of one party government in Korea. The Communist Party is well organized in South Korea and Soviet stooges are in all important "front" control positions. The South Korea Labor Party is the Communist Party official group while all parties and organizations affiliated with the People's Democratic Front are communist controlled and operated and speak with the voice of the Communists.

Several other "moderate leftist" or "center-of-the-road" groups appear to be either strongly affected by communist propaganda, or infiltraded by communists in influential positions. In North Korea, there are no openly recognized political parties that are not under Soviet domination.

With this stage setting, it is to be expected that the Soviets will place great stress on tabulating opinions expressed in consultation by "democratic" political parties and organizations.

As you are well aware, the concentration of politicians and self-styled leaders of political parties is all in Seoul and Pyongyang. All are greedy for power and personal gain with a minimum consideration for the Korean people as a whole. I do not believe these would constitute a group truly representative of the Korean people, or that they would constitute an appropriate group for direct selection of members of the Korean Provisional Government.

It is, therefore, directed that the American Delegation work toward

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Maj Gen A. E. Brown 9 Jun 1947

the following goals, even to the point of stalemating the negotiations, if necessary:

a. A democratic form of government containing a truly representative legislative branch, [redacted] an appropriate executive branch and a judicial branch, so balanced as to provide the necessary checks and balances to prevent it going to a dictatorship.

b. Personnel of the Provisional Government to be selected through representative elective processes, preferably by representatives elected from all provinces on a per capita basis, who in turn may act as a legislative body in the new government.

JOHN H. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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ANALYSIS COMMITTEE
American Delegation
U.S.—Soviet Joint Commission

To:

June 10, 1947

Lt.Col. W. H. Edwards, U.S. Secretary

Subject: APPLICATIONS AND RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES

Applications for consultation and responses to questionnaires should be so handled as to produce the following:

1. Readily available information on:

   a. To whom applications and questionnaires are distributed by us, with dates.

   b. From whom (1) applications and (2) responses to questionnaires are received, with dates.

2. A document recording system wherein each submission by each party will be distinctly and separately coded for easy reference.

3. A central filing system whereby the submissions of each applicant may be readily located and properly controlled.

4. A controlled channel of submission to the Soviet Delegation of duplicates of documents received initially by us.

5. A controlled channel of receipt from the Soviet Delegation of duplicates of documents received initially by them.

6. A classification of submissions according to the claimed size of membership of the applicant party or group according to the following divisions:

A	over 100,000
	50,000 - 100,000
	10,000 - 50,000
	1,000 - 10,000
	under 1,000

This classification must be of such a nature as to give ready access to the files falling within any given category.

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7. Ready reference from name of applicant to applicants code number and vise versa.

8. Exact translation of all substantive material in each submission according to the following priority:

   a. All applications *

   b. Submissions from all parties listed in AMD 5 and from any other parties claiming 100,000 or more members.

   c. Submissions from all others in order of claimed size.

9. One copy of each translated document for central file, one copy for each sub-commission, ~~and one~~ copy for use by ~~consultative~~ committee, (total of 6).

ROBERT A. KINNEY
Chairman

M. S. JAFFE, Capt. U.S.Army

STEWART MEACHAM

* Translations of applications will include data listed in para 3-A and -B of Joint Commission Decision 4 and a statement that declaration in para 2 of Joint Commission 4 has been properly executed. The declaration itself need not be translated.

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11 June 1947

RECEIPT AND PROCESSING OF DECLARATIONS AND RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES SUBMITTED BY POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATION.

To: Messrs. Weems, Prostov, and Hopkins.

The following are my thoughts regarding the system to be followed:

1. All documents in the Korean language are received by Mr. Hopkins and delivered to Mr. Weem's section.

2. Mr. Weems will:

a. Sort the documents removing all matters not directly related to consultation and send them to Mr. Sargent.

b. Register all declarations and answers to questionnaires indicating date and hour of receipt.

c. Classify questionnaires in accordance with the policy prescribed (i.e., A, B, C, D, or E).

d. Separate duplicate copies and dispatch to the Soviet Delegation.

e. Begin translation of original documents in accordance with classification.

f. Prepare seven copies of English translation and distribute as follows:

(1) One for Central File.

(2) One for each Subcommission (1, 2 and 3).

(3) One for use by consultative committee.

(4) One for Mr. Prostov.

(5) One for Soviet Delegation.

g. File original documents with copy of translation by classification.

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3. Mr. Prostov, upon receipt of Russian translation of documents, will:

a. Locate corresponding English version.

b. Compare English and Russian versions.

c. If English and Russian versions require reconciliation, convene review group composed of:

(1) U.S.-Russian translator.

(2) Soviet-English translator.

(3) U.S.-Korean translator.

(4) Soviet-Korean translator.

d. Redistribute amended English version as required.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

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By NARS, Date

Dr. Bunce

S E C R E T

SOVIET PROPOSAL
17 June 1947

ORDER OF COMPILATION OF THE LIST OF PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS.

1. The applications for participation in consultation and signed copies of the declaration which are received by the representative of the American Secretariat in Seoul from the parties and organizations of South Korea shall be transmitted without delay as a copy or in translation to the Soviet Secretariat. The above mentioned documents received from the parties and organizations of Northern Korea by the representative of the Soviet Secretariat in Pyongyang shall be transmitted in the same manner to the American Secretariat.

2. The information submitted by the parties and organizations, after translation, will be forwarded to the respective chairmen of Subcommission No. 1 by the Secretariats.

3. The list of parties and organizations which had signed the declaration, as well as the list of their representatives, shall be discussed in Subcommission No. 1, and following agreement will be submitted for approval to the Joint Commission.

4. Following the approval of the list, the Joint Commission shall send to the parties and organizations included in the list a written notification of having been admitted to consultation, and also concerning the invitation extended to their representatives to attend the Joint meeting.

S E C R E T

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR SUBCOMMISSION I

18th June 1947.

SUBJECT: Organisations which have picked up applications for consultation through 16 June 1947.

To: All Concerned.

1. Attached is a breakdown by political categories of those organisations which have picked up applications through 16 June.

2/ Of the 217 organisations which have picked up applications through 16 June, 56 have been classified as rightist, 47 as leftist, 27 as moderate, and 87 remain unclassified.

3. Names and addresses of those organizations which cannot be classified through the files or personnel of this office have been submitted to C.I.C. which has promised prompt compilation of necessary information.

4. It is noted that the following major rightist organizations have not picked upapplications: National Society for Rapid Realization of Independence, the Patriotic Women's League for Rapid Realization of Independence, the Great Korean Youth League for Rapid Realization of Independence, the Independent Farmers and Laborers Party, Member Organizations of the United Cultural Association of Korea, Member Unions of the Great Korean Independent Labor League (NO CHONG), and the Independence Party.

5. As all known leftist organizations have already picked up their applications, it is impossible to predict at this time what leftist organizations may still pick up applications.

6. The following items of significance concerning those leftist organizations which have picked up applications are noted:

(a) All "dead" as well as "alive" member organizations of the Democratic Peoples Front have picked up applications.

(b) The Democratic Peoples Front as well as each one of its member organisations has picked up a separate application.

(c) The League of Cultural Association as well as each one of its member organisations has picked up a separqte application.

(d) "CHUN PYUNG" as well as its member unions has picked up a separate application.

7. It is planned that a file for each organization applying for consultation will be maintained and will contain a translation of the application, a brief sketch of the organization (as compiled by the PAG) and other pertinent information for use in consultation.

PHILIP C. ROWE
Subcommission I

Note: Under "Ord. 55 Registration" on attached breakdowns, "N" = registred at national level, "KD" = registred at Kyonggi-do, "S" = registered at Seoul City.

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Subcommission No. 1

RIGHTIST
KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING
on 12 June thru 16 June 1947

Number	Name of Organization	Ord.55 Regis-tration	Number Members	Leader
00002	Construction Youngmen's Society		3,100	Kyang, Yeun Chan
00005	Democratic Party of Korea		200,000	Kim, Kwang Ho
00006	Korean Political Economic Institute		125	Lee, Yoon Koo
00009	Industrial Patriotic Party		10,000	[illegible], Jai Han
00013	Holy Political Association		3,700	[illegible] Yun
00014	Korean Civil Engineers and Architects Association		174	Lee, Yon Sik
00018	Chosen Democratic Party		400,000 (Prel. S. Korea)	Cho, Han Sik
00022	New Progressive Association		22,000	Kim, Ori Chung
00026	Old Boys Patriotic Assn.		20,000	Lee, Kyung Kwan
00027	The Special Association of Korean Nation		400	Kim, Il Yur
00030	Korean Catholic Church		200,000	Reverend Paul Ro, Mr
00031	Catholic Youth Federation		1,000	Chang, Myun
00037	Han Min Society	S	31,500	Kim, Chon Tai
00041	Korean Popular Party	P	25,000	Lee, Doo Pan
00042	The Oriental Cultural Promotion Society	KD	13,670	Lee, Doo Pan Acting Lee, Young Goo
00044	Nationalist Socialist Party	N	45,000	Lyu, Pan
00048	Self-Realization Institute	S	2,700	Lee, Jong Il
00060	The Trader's Association of Korea		1,200	Kim, Do Yun
00062	Jai Woo Hoi		3,200	Kyang Je Tak
00068	Patriotic League		7,000	Chun, Kong Woo
00070	Korean-American Association		1,300	Lee, Yoon Koo
00082	Returned Countrymen's Assn.	N	376,800	Shin, Hook
00083	Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry		12,000	Lee, Dong Sun
00084	Korean Vested Property Managers Association		2,500	Chang, Hi Tai

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RIGHTIST
KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING

Number	Name of Organization	Ord. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00085	Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry		1,700	Lee, Se Hyun
00086	Korean Forestry Association		2,100	Kim, Wha Choon
00087	Korean Public Accountants Assn.		27	Yun, Chung Ha
00088	Korean Revolutionist Self-Government Association		3,300	Kang, Yoo Lim
00090	Popular Party		17,400	Shin, Yi Sung
00095	Philanthropist Institute		505	An, Sang Yul
00101	General Headquarters of National Cooperative Association		20,000	Nam, Sang Hoon
00104	Central Hq. of Korean Buddhists		5,000,000	Kim, Bup Rin
00107	Chosun Shinha Party	K	2,666	Koon, Yong Chai
00109	Korean Christian Young People's Federation		200,000	Kim, Kyu Sik
00111	New Korean Youngmen's Federation	N	2,400	Kim, Chin Tai
00112	Central Friends' Association	N	10,000	Shin, Hyun Chang
00115	Korean Kwangbok Student's and Ex-Soldiers' Association	N	1,470	Chun, Sung Chong
00119	Kwangbok Association	N	300,000	Lyu, Nam Soo
00125	Korean Young Men's Association	N	280,000	Kim, Tai Ho
00126	Korean Christian Goodwill Mission		3,000	Chung, In Sun
00137	Korean Laborer-Farmers' Party	KD	35,000	Choi, Yun Chong
00138	Anti-Trusteeship Fellowship Assn.		3,500	Kim, Sung Whan
00139	Korean Race Association	N	853,267	Pak, Yung Sun
00140	All Korean Anti-Trusteeship		3,450	Pak, Soo Hai
00152	Korean Youth Union	N	287,500	Lee, Sun Keun
00162	The Revolutionary Buddhist's Alliance	KD	1,300	Pak, Bong Suk
00166	Puk Ak North Mount Assn.	S	300	Kim, Il
00167	Taedong Association		2,500	Kim Sung Kyu
00168	Independent Labor Federation of Korea	N	1,000,000	Jin, Whan Jun

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RIGHTIST
KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING

Number	Name of Organization	Ord. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00169	New Life Association	S	1,500	Chai, Tai Yong
00175	League of National Free Laborers	S	6,000	Kim, San
00185	Buddhist Young Men's Party	S	18,000	Paik, Suk Ki
00187	Korea Educational Research		100	Ann, Ho Sang
00198	National Council of Kor a YMCA	S	3,000	Paik, Nak Hoon
00205	Association and Council Against Illegal Actions		2,000	Lee, Choong Chan
00212	Korean Newspaper Association		40 News-papers and News Agencies	Kim, Dong Sung

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LEFTIST KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING

Number	Name of Organization	Ord. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00120	Chosun Federation of Youth	N	650,000	Lee, Ho Je
00128	Seoul Lawyers' Association		130	Lee, Yong Chong
00129	Kyung Sung Law Institute		120	Chung, Koo Yung
00149	Union of all Korean Farmers' Committee		2,000,000	Lee, Yong Ki
00151	Anti-Fascist Fighting Committee	N		Chung, Kon Yung
00161	Central Headquarters of People's Committee		700,000	Kim, [illegible]
00163	Northern Korean Federation of Agricultural Unions League		300,000	Lee, Yung Choon
00172	Korean Academy of Liberal Arts and Sciences		5,000	Yun, [illegible] Chung
00178	Korean Pharmaceutical Assn.		500	Ko, [illegible] Tup
00181	Union of Conscientious		11,000	Yun, Ho Joo
00182	National [illegible]		500	[illegible], Ha Jin
00183	Soviet-Korean Cultural Assn.		2,500	[illegible], Yong Kun
00186	League of Local Scholars		5,000	Yu, Young Kun
00189	Democratic People's Front		4,000,000	Kim, Kun
00190	Korean Communication Labor Union		3,000	Leon, Choe Chong
00191	Korean Electric Workers' Union		12,000	Joo, Kun Sok
00192	Federation of Korean Scientists and Technicians	ND		Kim, Dong Jip
00196	Korean Chinese Doctors' Assn.		3,000	Paik, Ho Poong
00201	Railway Labor Union		30,981	Pak, Kun Kyung
00204	Seoul Committee of the League of Korean Residents in Japan	N	15,000	Pai, Chul
00208	Korean Fabric Worker's Union		23,252	Kim, Yen Too
00215	Koreans Electric Engineer's Assn.		1,200	Kim, Dong Jip
00216	People's Committee of Seoul City			Chai, Won Taik
00217	Cooperating Association of Seoul City			Ra, Tong Kook

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Subcommission No. 1

LEFTIST
KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING
on 12 June thru 16 June 1947

Number	Name of Organization	Ord. 55 Regis-tration	Number Members	Leader
00003	Young Friends Party of Chundo Kyo (Chongwee Dang)		60,000 (480,000 N. Korea	Lee, Pung Chin
00004	[illegible]		4,200,000 (U.S. S.Korea)	[illegible], Kwang Ho
00023	Anti Japanese Lovers Relief Assn	N	500,000	Suor, Chu Sik
00025	People's Republican Party		127,500	Pie, Hun Yong
00028	Working People's Party		170,000	Lynn, Woon Hyung
00032	Korean Industry Establishers [illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], Hong Kun
00045	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], Kuhn
00052	[illegible] Korea		[illegible]	[illegible] Soo
00054	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], Mok Il
00059	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible] Chan
00064	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible]
00072	Central Committee of Korean [illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], Chong
00073	Student [illegible]		1,500	[illegible], [illegible]
00075	[illegible] Union of Korean Cultural Association		40	[illegible], Jung Jai
00077	The Korean Literary Men's League		3,500	Kim, Nam Chun
00078	Korean Dramatists League		2,500	Lee, Su Hyang
00079	Christian Democratic Party		6,422	Kim, Chang Choon
00080	The Korean Federation of Confusians Association	N	10,517	Lim, Hang Sup
00091	Korean Art of Dancing Assn.		800	Cho, Sail [illegible]
00092	The Union of Korean Musical	KD	1,500	Kim, Je Hoon
00093	The South Korea Democratic Youngmen's League (Disbanded by Military Government)		790,000	Cho, Hi Young
00096	Korean Film Association	N	1,560	Yun, Sang Yul
00117	The Korean Democratic and Patriotic Youngmen's Assn.		780,000	Ko, Chan Ho

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MODERATE

KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING on 12 June 1947 THRU 16 JUNE

Subcommission No. 1

Number	Name of Organization	Political Category	Ord.55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00001	Socialist Democratic Party	M	N	150,000	[illegible]yuk, Won Hong
00007	New Progressive Party			3,000	Kim, Ho
00010	Democratic Labor			1,000	[illegible], Hyun Tuck
00012	People's Income			[illegible]	[illegible], Il Sak
00015	Korean [illegible] Party			175,500	[illegible], Pil Soo
00020	War R[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible], Hwasic
00021	Alliance for Democratic Unification Movement			21,000	[illegible], Hwasic
00024	Seoul [illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible]
00055	[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible]
00056	Committee of Political Parties and Social Organizations for Studying the Election on the U.N. Korean Commission			[illegible]	[illegible]
00069	Democratic Construction Youth			[illegible]	[illegible], Hwasic
00071	Right-Left Unification Promotion Assn.			5[illegible],000	[illegible], [illegible] Hang
00097	[illegible]			4,700	[illegible], Sun Kyong
00100	[illegible] Party			5,000,000	[illegible], Hwasic (Pres.)
00105	Socialist Popular Party			30,000	Yang, Woon
00106	Whole National Party			2,000	[illegible], Ho Kwan
00108	Korean Inventor's Assn.			1,000	Lee, [illegible] o
00124	Young Korean Party			567	Lee, Choon Yul
00131	Democratic Youth United Front			3,300,000	Lee, Sin Keun
00132	Democratic Korean Independence Party	M		45,000	Lee, Kin Nam
00135	Nam Nam Association		N	30,000	Kwan, Jai Suk
00136	Korean Democratic Union	M		120,000	Won, Se Hoon
00153	Korean Esperanto Society		N	32,000	Tai, Jai Ai
00162	Kankook General Farmers' Alliance	M		180	Lee, Keuk No
		M	N	50,000	Kim, Sang Duk

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KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING

Number	Name of Organization	Political Category	Ord.55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00202	Revolutionary Young Men's Union	M		12,000	Yu, Chin Sik
00207	Korea Football Assn.	[illegible]		15,300	[illegible]a, Kyung Duck
00214	Coalition Committee	M		30 partisan organizations	Kimr, Kiusic

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Subcommission No. 1

UNCLASSIFIED
KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING
on 12 June thru 14 June 1947

Number	Name of Organization	Sec. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00008	Women's Work Patron's Assn.		60	Lim, Yong Ae
00011	[illegible] (Buddhists)		1,000	[illegible]
00012	United People's Party		[illegible]	[illegible]
00017	[illegible] Institution		[illegible]	[illegible]
00018	[illegible] Female Association		2,700	[illegible]
00029	[illegible] Nationalist-Socialist Young Men's Assn.			[illegible]
00033	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
00034	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
00035	Association for Christian [illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
00036	The Society for the Study of [illegible]		1,000	[illegible]
00038	Committee Promoting the Korean Independent Democratic Government		20,000	[illegible]
00039	[illegible]		12,000	[illegible]
00040	[illegible] Political Institute		2,000	[illegible]
00043	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
00046	[illegible] Party		[illegible]	[illegible]
00047	[illegible] Party		5,000	[illegible]
00049	[illegible] Social Work Association		1,500	[illegible]
00050	Chang Yo Inchil Central Church		100,000	Shin, Hyung Hi
00051	North Korea Farmer's Union		3,000	Lee, Doo Yul
00053	Korean Farmer's Society		32,000	Lim, Koon Ho
00057	Tai Faith Friends Association		728	Ko, Chul Soo
00058	Korean Revolutionary Labor Party		3,000	Kim, Kyu Yung
00061	[illegible]'s League for South Sea Islands		3,673	Chang, Pyung Hoon
00063	Club of Fifteenth		4,500	O. K. Sang
00065	Reformation Comrade Association		4,500	Pak, Chan Hi
00066	Construction League		3,200	Pai, In Sik
00067	[illegible]am Nam Friend's Association		5,000	Cho, Chong Ko

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KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERING

Number	Name of Organization	Ord. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00074	Committee for War Refugees		1,000	[illegible], Tai Ho
00076	United Idea Association		9,0[illegible]	[illegible], Hong Jun
00081	Korean Confucianists Unification Assn.		7,[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible] Chun
00089	Korea Medical Doctors Assn.		3,[illegible]	[illegible], Ho Sup
00094	Korean [illegible] Union		7[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible] Sun
00098	[illegible] League of [illegible]		1,2[illegible]	[illegible], Chi Ho
00099	[illegible] Youth Associations		1,500	[illegible], Un
00102	[illegible] Patriotic [illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible], Jei Kuan
00103	Federation of Distributors and [illegible] of Korea		[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible]
00110	Peoples Party		40,[illegible]	[illegible], Ki Hak
00113	Korean [illegible] Federation		3,[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible]
00114	Origin of Youth Association		1,532	[illegible], Chu Pho
00116	Korean Civil Engineers and Architectures' League		1,221,[illegible]	Chun, Yeon Kyo
00118	Korean Engineers' Association		[illegible],736	[illegible], Chi Oo Yul
00121	[illegible] Unification Party		1,[illegible]	[illegible], [illegible] Han
00122	Korean Farmers' Association		2,000	Lee, Yu Keun
00123	National Construction Factory Society (Taegu)		1,500	Lee, [illegible]
00127	General Association of Blinds in Korea		10,000	Ch. Gyun Sang
00130	Sung Jong Youngmens' League	KP	1,600	Choi, Taik Keun
00133	General Union of Entire Country Laborer's Association		1,525,708	Kim, Yong Dam
00134	Central Union of Education		23	Cho, Dong Sik
00141	Great Korea Youngmens' League		1,700	Lee, Sung Min
00142	Research Association on Problems of Koreans residing Abroad		1,600	Kim, Yung Sam
00143	Repatriated Koreans from Manchuria Association		1,600	Su, Tun Suk
00144	Anam Dong Anti-Trusteeship Womens' Association		2,000	Kim, Nora
00145	Full Moon Meeting Society		1,430	Choi, Yung Soo
00146	Anam Youngmens' Association		1,100	Cho, Hi Chul

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Number	Name of Organization	Org. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00147	Anam Revolutionary Veterans' Association		2,250	Chun, Kil Sun
00148	National Club		24,000	[illegible], Hoon Yon
00150	[illegible] Life Society		67	[illegible], Tae Sun
00154	Korean Home Rule Separatist's League		70	Suh, Chang Seon
00155	National Culture Society		2,000	[illegible], Yul
00156	[illegible] Association		1,[illegible]	[illegible], Hyun Soo
00157	[illegible] Party		1,[illegible]	Lee, [illegible] Hyun
00158	[illegible] Club		2,[illegible]	[illegible], Chai Hak
00159	Yusin Association		3,000	[illegible], Chai Soon
00160	[illegible] Club		4,[illegible]	[illegible], Chang Sun
00164	[illegible] Popular Socialist Party for the Redistribution of the Nation's Land		[illegible]	[illegible], Sik Cha
00170	Industrial Ass. of Kyongsi-do		4[illegible]	Ahn, Young Han
00172	[illegible] Economic Association		12[illegible]	[illegible], Ki Yung
00173	Korean Dentists' Association		1,100	Kim, Yong Jin
00174	Korean Language Research Society		203	Chang, Ok Yong
00175	Korean Brieions' Association		37,015	Chung, Hyung Sun
00177	Self-Supporting Student Mutual Aid Assn.			Choi, Hyun
00179	Korean Practicing Chemists' Assn.		510	Han, Yu Tong
00180	Korean Internal Friendship Assn.		200	Lee, Chai Hak
00184	North-South Intimacy Assn.		2,000	Han, Tak Yul
00193	Union of Laboring Athletics of Whole Nation		30,000	Kim, Seun Pai
00194	Merchants' Association of Nana Tai Moon Market			Lee, Choo Hok
00195	Korean Educators Association		9,210	Paik, Joon Young
00197	Assn. for the Welfare of Korean Patriots		22	Choi, Jin
00199	General Headquarters of Self Governing		1,200	Yang, Chun Soo
00200	Wednesday Association		200	Won, Tahl
00203	Popular Party of Korea		24,988	Ka, Chun Koo
00206	Korean Mechanical Engineers' Association		1,210	Lee, Chai Ho

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KOREAN PARTIES AND SOCIAL
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Number	Name of Organization	Ord. 55 Registration	Number Members	Leader
00209	The Korean Handball Assn.		5,000	Cho, Young Ha
00210	Heung Sock Christian Brotherhood		3,200	Han, Tai Young
00211	Korean Law Research		102	Lee, Yun Seung
00213	Seuk Yong Farmers' Committee		5,000	Hong Chai Yun
00216	Sichi Young [illegible] Association		3,50[illegible]	[illegible]

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SECRET

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

23 June 1947

THE ORDER OF CONDUCTING ORAL INDIVIDUAL CONSULTATION WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS.

1. Representatives of parties and organizations who are included in the list, approved by the Joint Commission, will take part in the oral consultation.

2. In accordance with the Joint Commission Decision # 12, of 7 June 1947, for conducting of oral individual consultation, the following joint subcommittees will be established:

Joint Subcommittee #1.

Soviet representative_____

American representative_____

Joint Subcommittee #2.

Soviet representative_____

American representative_____

Joint Subcommittee # 3.

Soviet representative_____

American representative_____

3. The Soviet and American representatives will preside alternately, at the meetings of the Joint subcommittees, as provided by Joint Commission Decision #1.

4. At the meetings of the joint subcommittees, aside from the Soviet and American chairmen of Joint subcommittees, American and Soviet advisers, as well as experts, interpreters and secretaries, may be present, upon invitation of the chairmen of Joint subcommittees.

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5. Joint Subcommission #1 will break down into joint subcommittees the total number of parties and organizations included in the list (approximately an even number for each joint subcommittee).

6. The joint subcommitteeswill set up calendar plans of their work and will inform each representative of every party and organization of the time and place where he can appear for oral consultation.

7. Each joint subcommittee will keep brief minutes of the meetings in Russian and English languages. The minutes will be signed by the Soviet and American chairmen of the joint subcommittees.

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O.K. RM.

AMERICAN DELEGATION
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION

To: American Commissioners

21 June 1947.

From: Analysis Committee, Sub-Commissions 1, 2 & 3

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR INITIAL ORAL CONSULTATION

1. Five consultation subcommittees would be established in Seoul, with five members each for both the Americans and Russians as follows:-

a. Chairman
b. Alternate
c. Russian (or English) Interpreter
d. Korean Interpreter
e. Recorder

2. Each subcommittee would consult with five parties and social organizations every day at the following hours: 900, 1030, 1330, 1500 and 1630. This would enable the five subcommittees to consult 25 parties and social organizations per day, or 300 groups in 12 days of consultation.

3. In addition to the five subcommittees set up in Seoul, one subcommittee would probably be sufficient to conduct consultations in Pyongyang. Definite plans in this regard, however, cannot be made until the actual number of groups to be consulted in North Korea is ascertained.

4. A member of the American Delegation or an alternate should serve as chairman of each consultation subcommittee. Each subcommittee should also have an alternate chairman who would be able to serve as acting chairman at any time the chairman so desired. Following are names suggested for these subcommittees:

Chairman	Alternates	Russian Interpreters	Korean Interpreters
A.C. Bunce	Meacham	Pekarsky	Billings
Gen. Weckerling	Franckel	Antonaytis	Watts
Col Lincoln	Capt. Jaffe	Brajnikoff	Brannan
Owen Jones	Kinney	Mrs. Kogan	Underwood
Joseph Jacobs	Sturm	Mrs. Sadkovsky	Underwood Jr.
Clyde Sargent	Monaghan	Miss Guichuhin	Paik (Geo)
		Murphy (G-2)	Lew (Hyunggi)
			Kim (Roy)
			Lee (P.K.
			Scott

5. It is suggested that the respective American and Soviet chairmen of subcommittees serve as chairmen of the meetings on alternate days, with the Soviets serving as chairmen of the first day of consultations in Seoul, and an American serving as chairman the first day in Pyongyang.

ROBERT A, KINNEY, Chairman
STUART MEACHAM
CAPT. JAFFE

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AMERICAN DELEGATION
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ROBERT A, KINNEY, Chairman
STUART MEACHAM
CAPT. JAFFE

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1st Secret

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Pyongyang, Korea

2 July 1947.

Memorandum for the Record.

SUBJECT: Position taken by the Soviet Delegation at Joint Commission meeting, July 2nd, 1947.

Mr. Tounkin speaking for the Soviet Delegation members of Subcommission No. 1 proposed to eliminate from consultation:

(1) Non-social organizations,
(2) Purely local organizations,
(3) Organizations specifically organized to fight the Moscow Decision (primarily those parties which are members of the Anti-Trusteeship committee).

He proposed that in order not to defer the beginning of consultation that a list of those parties and organizations on which both delegations could agree be approved.

General Brown replied.

General Shtikov then stated that paragraph 3 of the Joint Commission Decision No. 16 specified that Subcommission No. 1 would prepare and approve a list of parties and organizations and they would submit it to the Joint Commission; that he has not yet seen such an agreed list; that the Joint Commission and he in conversation with General Brown have all agreed that the list prepared by the members of the American Delegation, which includes all parties and social organizations requesting consultation, is ineffectually a preliminary list that the Subcommission No. 1 must approve the list before it can be acted on by the Joint Commission; that the Soviet Delegation has objected to including in such a list such parties as:

(1) Those which are commercial in nature,
(2) Local organizations,
(3) Those opposed to the Moscow Decision.

General Brown replied.

General Shtikov stated:

(1) the Soviet Delegation is not endeavoring to change any decision which they have agreed to. Joint Commission Decision No. 16 does not contradict Joint Commission Decision No. 12 but merely establishes a strict order for preparation of the list.

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SUBJ: Position taken by the Soviet Delegation at Joint Commission meeting, July 2, 1947.

(2) He agreed to have the Joint Commission meeting with representatives of parties and organizations prior to approval of the list. This agreement, however, did not alter Joint Commission Decision No. 12 or 16.

(3) The Moscow Decision does not provide for consultation with either mercantile or local organizations. The Joint Commission Decision No. 12 states that parties and organizations will submit application through their central organization (the implication is therefore that those without central organization are not eligible for consultation).

(4) The Foreign Ministers, Marshall and Molotov, state that those who after signing the application foment and incite active opposition will be excluded from further consultation. How does the United States Delegation regard the demonstration of June 23rd in Seoul conducted by hoodlums? The Soviet Delegation demands that those responsible be excluded.

General Brown replied.

General Shtikov stated:

(1) He proposed to eliminate mercantile or producers' organizations such as Suwon Chamber of Commerce, Pusan Chamber of Commerce, Korean Industrial Medical Institute, Buddhist Research Institute and Associations for Coal Briquettes, 27 members of SOC Accountants, Anti-Japanese Aid Society, five societies for Study of Politics and Economics having 27 - 125, etc., members respectively, the Society of Women for Building the Future of Schunging, The Society of Social Workers in Inch'on. He states that if North Korean parties and organizations were that unserious in filing application, there would be thousands. We must have what the Moscow Decision provides for - such parties and organizations which can fully reflect the views of the Korean people concerning the formation of a representative provisional democratic government and its organs.

(2) General Brown criticized the Soviet Delegation for its refusal to set up a limit as a definition of a party and organization. The reality as shwon that establishment of a limit is not effective which could restrain certain parties and organizations from signing the declaration. Can the United States Delegation prove that in the course of establishing membership there would not be 70 million or even 159 million while South

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SUBJ: Position taken by the Soviet Delegation at Joint Commission meeting, July 2, 1947.

Korea has only 17 million population? The comedy played by some parties and organizations should be penalized; for instance, the important unions of Builders and Repair Association of Korea alleged over 1,200,000 while we both know that Korea has less than one million workers.

(3) As to the anti-trusteeship committee, the Soviet Delegation is guided by Joint Commission Decision No. 12 which states the conditions on the basis of which the Joint Commission was reconvened. The Soviet Delegation can show by a long series of published documents which nobody can prove otherwise that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee consisted of over 40 parties of South Korea and has not disbanded itself but has actually intensified its work against the Joint Commission and the Moscow Decision.

(4) On 17 June a convention of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee was open. Methods were discussed. Differences occurred over whether to participate in consultation. Those pro-Commission were invited to clear the room. The meeting was continued on 18 June. The decision was reached to continue the struggle against the Moscow Decision. On 20 June the newspaper reporting stated that the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had resolved to support Syngman Rhee and Kim, Koo; that during the meeting of the Commission those who signed the application for consultation would consult but would work against trusteeship.

(5) The chief proposal of the Democratic Party Committee on Current Events:

(a) Resolve to establish Korean government, to freely express their views, yet such government should not admit trusteeship or US intervention in its external affairs.

(b) That they would utilize the old Chungking Government, changing its name and institutions.

(c) Demanded liberation of political prisoners in North Korea imprisoned for anti-trusteeship.

General Shtikov asked can the Joint Commission believe the significance of those who subscribed to the above sentiment on applications for consultation. The United States Delegation refers to General Hodge's letter concerning freedom of expression. The Soviet Delegation has never forbid any organization from expressing its views, yet those who are antagonistic toward the Moscow Decision

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SUBJ: Position taken by the Soviet Delegation at Joint Commission meeting, July 2, 1947.

and the Joint Commission may not consult with them. The facts are here. What further proof is needed?

As to the 23 June demonstrations and the alleged innocence of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, even the declaration sent by Kim, Koo says that the demonstration was staged by the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and its members, the terrorists themselves (2,000) shows what prestige this organization has with the Korean people. He did not wish to cite Kim, Koo's declaration because it is well known to the US Delegation.

The Soviet Delegation feels it must get Subcommission No. 1 to meet tomorrow morning and compile a list of parties and organizations which arouse no doubt as to their right to be consulted and to begin consultation on 7 July. At meeting tomorrow Subcommission to adopt order of consultation with organizations. Subcommission No. 1 to review personally each party and organization concerned which are objected to and to present their recommendation, including whether or not others on the present list not immediately agreed on, shall be approved for consultation.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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SECRET

11 July 1947

To: Chief Commissioner, American Delegation

From: Analysis Committee

Subject: SOVIET LIST OF PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS TO BE CONSULTED

1. The list of organizations approved for consultation by the Soviets included all 38 groups on the North Korea list and 117 groups with more than 10,000 members from South Korea. Those groups above 10,000 excluded are as follows:

a) 22 Right and two Moderate Right parties, with a total membership of about 15,260,000.

271 b) Lyuh Woon Hyung's Working People's Party.

c) Three parties the American Delegation stated should be eliminated for fraud, including:

Korea Civil Engineers & Builders League (Mod.Right)	1,220,000 members;
Korean Democratic Youngmen's League (Left)	830,000 "
Chosun Federation of Youth (Left)	651,000 "

2. Following is a list of the Rightist parties suggested for exclusion (exclusion of these groups would eliminate slightly more than half of all Right and Moderate Right groups, figured on the basic of membership. Those groups marked with an asterisk were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee.)

Acc.No.	Name	Membership	Political Orientation
* 356	Union of All Women's Associations in Korea	4,525,150	Right
* 413	Women's Assn. for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence	3,281,724	Right
* 37	Young Korea Party	1,889,000	Right
412	Nat'l Patriotic Party of Chun Do Kyo	1,393,065	Right
* 357	Independent Laborers Federation of Korea	1,001,790	Right
* 369	Korean Restoration Youth Association	879,050	Right
* 354	Democratic Party of Korea	865,706	Right
* 326	Korean Nat'l Reconstruction Youth Association	387,000	Right
371	Korean Military Affairs Association	300,000	Right
* 372	Chosun Democratic Party	225,212	Right
331	Ass'n of People from South Hamgyong Province	125,000	Mod.Right
* 289	Korean Young Men's Association	102,300	Mod.Right
261	Popular Party	90,618	Right
31	Association of Descendants of Tan	31,560	Right
28	Large Mutual Society	28,363	Right
87	1919 Independence Movement Memorial Ass'n	26,400	Right
36	Popular Party of Korea	24,176	Right
7	Korean Popular Party	23,390	Right
60	Commodity Builders' Union of S.Cholla Province	23,000	Right
144	Federation of Distribution for Korea	15,970	Right
350	Korean Social Education Association	15,080	Right
179	Korean Patriotic Women's Union	10,642	Right
349	Light Revival Society	12,550	Right
302	Sam Mi Self-Strengthening Association	10,000	Right

SECRET

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

3. Shriet motive for excluding Lyuh Woon Hyung's Working People's Party is not clear, but it is a development of great potential value to the American side. If the Joint Commission breaks up, it is important that we don not appear to have fought to defend the Rightists, but rather for the right of free expression for all. Russian efforts to exclude not only the Right and Moderate Right, but also the non-Communist Left, greatly strengthens the American position. It appears most important that the Americans do nothing to challenge, or even to call attention to, this Soviet action at this time, but rather to maintain the strictest secrecy on the matter until we are ready to publicize it. Otherwise the Soviets may realize their strategic error and try to rectify it.

4. The Soviet list, if accepted as is, would give the South Korea consultation the following complexion:

	Political Orientation				
	Right	Mod.R.	Moderate	Moderate Left	People's Front
Number of Parties	42	17	10	5	38
Total Membership in thousands	9,620	6,046	2,808	4,200	14,158

5. Acceptance of the Soviet list for both North and South Korea would give consultations for all Korea the following complexion:

	Right	Mod.R.	Moderate	Mod.Left	People's Front
Number of Parties	42	17	10	5	76
Total Membership in thousands	9,620	6,046	2,808	4,200	27,458

6. As shown in paragraph 5, the communist-dominated groups would have an absolute majority in the consultations under this Soviet plan. This majority would be much greater than indicated in paragraph 5, because most non-Communist groups would drop out of consultations should the exclusion suggested by the Soviets be consummated.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

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14 July 1947

To: Chief Commissioner, American Delegation

From: Analysis Committee

Subject: TIME OF SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS FOR CONSULTATION OF GROUPS SUGGESTED FOR EXCLUSION BY THE SOVIETS.

The following list of Rightist groups of more than 10,000 members suggested for exclusion by the Soviets applied for consultation on the following dates: (on 23rd June those applying in the afternoon are marked p.m. Those groups who had membership in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee are marked with an asterisk.)

Acc.No.	Name	Membership	Date in June Applying
* 356	Union of All Women's Associations in Korea	4,525,150	23 June pm
* 413	Women's Association for Rapid Realization of Korean Independence	3,281,724	23 " pm
* 37	Young Korea Party	1,889,000	19 June
412	National Patriotic Party of Chun Do Kyo	1,393,065	23 " pm
* 357	Independent Laborers Federation of Korea	1,001,790	23 " pm
* 389	Korean Restoration Youth Association	879,050	23 " pm
* 354	Democratic Party of Korea	865,706	23 " pm
* 326	Korean Nat'l Reconstruction Youth Association	387,000	23 " pm
371	Korean Military Affairs Association	300,000	23 " pm
* 372	Chosun Democratic Party	225,212	23 " pm
331	Ass'n of People from South Hamgyong Province	125,000	23 " pm
* 289	Korean Young Men's Association	102,300	23 " am
261	Popular Party	90,618	23 " am
31	Association of Descendants of Tan	31,560	19 June
28	Large Mutual Society	28,363	19 June
87	1919 Independence Movement Memorial Association	26,400	21 June
38	Popular Party of Korea	24,178	20 June
7	Korean Popular Party	23,350	17 June
60	Commodity Dealers' Union of South Cholla Province	23,000	21 June
144	Federation of Distribution for Korea	15,570	21 June
350	Korean Social Education Association	15,080	23 " pm
369	Light Revival Society	12,550	23 " pm
179	Korean Patriotic Women's Union	10,642	21 June
302	Sam Ri Self-Strengthening Association	10,000	23 June am

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092.3

Projected at 1 1 Aug

16 July 1947

Memorandum for: General Brown

Subject : Exchange of Russian-English Translations of Questionnaires in the Secretariats.

1. Paragraph 5 of Joint Commission Decision No. 14, approved 11 June 1947, reads as follows:

> "To assure identical Russian and English translations of the documents sent in by Korean parties, an exchange of Russian and English translations should be established in the Secretariat."

2. In accordance with the foregoing 68 English translations of Questionnaires have been delivered to the Secretary of the Soviet Delegation. The Soviet Secretariat has not reciprocated and no Russian translations have been received from them.

3. Since this is a violation of agreed decision, instructions have been issued to discontinue forwarding English translations to the Soviet Secretariat.

4. It is recommended that this matter be placed on the Agenda of the 44th Meeting (not today's Meeting).

O.K.

W. H. EDWARDS
Lt. Col. AGD
U.S. Secretary

We have 100 more translations ready for delivery —

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

21 July 1947 (Date) CCIG-K SEO/TL/1542

From:	To:
Kwangchawn Women's Association of National Society For Acceleration of Korean Independence Sawnghwan Chungchong-namdo, Korea	Korean People's Representative Meeting Seoul, Korea

Distribution	Date of Communications:	Number of Inclosures:
AFPAC CCD GHQ XXIV CORPS G-2 CIC Provost Mar. USAMGIK DC/S DPI	16 July 1947 Comment By: Lt. E. Medford Type of Communication: Telegram	None Language: Korean Disposition Original Communication: Passed

Number of Previous Records

None

CONTENT

Request notification of positive results based on this C/S.

CIVIL AFFAIRS: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE SENT TO KOREAN PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVE MEETING.

"THANK YOU FOR YOUR EFFORTS. WE HOPE THAT THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR FATHERLAND BE ACQUIRED ACCORDING TO THE INTENTIONS OF DR. RHEE AND KIM KOO."

"Distribution of the information contained in this document obtained from private communications will be confined solely to those officials, military and/or civilian, who are specifically authorized to receive such information."

Examiner: _____

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237-489

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

25 July 1947 (Date)

CS#KO/ PUS/1743

Page 1 of 2 pages

From:	To:
Pusan Branch Party of Korean Independence Party, Pusan, Korea	SIN, Syawk Moon Hyawn-li, Pusan, Korea

Distribution	Date of Communications:	Number of Inclosures:
AFPAC CCD GHQ XXIV CORPS G-2 CIC Provost Mars. USAMGIK DC/S DPI	24 July 47	None
	Comment By: P.F.Pantek	Language: Korean
	Type of Communication: Letter	Disposition Original Communication: Passed
	Number of Previous Records: None	

COMMENT

POLITICAL ACTIVITY: KOREAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY OF PUSAN CALLS MEETING.

Writer States:

"You are hereby informed that you were appointed to the executive committee at our last meeting of 20 June.

"We have high hopes of accomplishing our mission of gaining independence, and we are requesting your attendance at the first executive committee meeting, to be held as follows:

Date: 1300, 25 July 1947
Place: Former Kolyaw Hotel, in front of the Kwangbok Young Mens Association, above the Korean Women's Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence Hall.

(over)

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"Subjects on the agenda will be as follows:

1.To determine the duties of chairman and other officials.

2.Matters of general importance.

3.Preparation of organizing a Kyongsong-namdo branch.

4.Construction of a firmer foundation of our party.

5.Financial affairs."

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AMERICAN DELEGATION, USSJC
TIME 1430

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By NARS, Date

(Confidential)

HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

22 July 1947 (Date) CCIG/KO SEO/4950

From: See Comment	To: See Comment
Distribution: AFPAC, CCD GHQ, XXIV CORPS G-2, CIC, Provost Mar., USAMGIK DC/S, DPI	Date of Communications: None
	Comment By: G. F. Lyons
	Type of Communication: Handbill
	Number of Inclosures: None
	Language: Korean
	Disposition Original Communication: Passed
	Number of Previous Records: None

COMMENT 0001

Request notification of positive results based on this C/S

POLITICAL ACTIVITY: MASS MEETING TO BE HELD 27 JULY

A hand bill picked up in the streets of Seoul on the evening of 21 July reads as follows:

"Let all patriots go to the Seoul Ground on 27 July to attend the mass meeting in celebration of the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Joint Commission."

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1-9-689

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

25 July (1947) CS#KO/ SEO/4945

From: HARK SEKP SA (Textbook Publishing Co.), 54, Doyawm Chung, Seoul, Korea

To: CHOI Sawng Hwan c/o Taegu Daily Press Co., Dongin Dong, Taegu, Korea

Page 1 of 2 Pages

Distribution	Date of Communications:	Number of Inclosures:
AFPAC CCD GHQ XXIV CORPS G-2 CIC Provost Mars. USAMGIK DC/S DPI	22 July 47	Language: None Disposition Original Communication: Korean
	Type of Communication: Letter	Passed
	Number of Previous Records	

COMMENT None

Request notification of positive results based on this C/S

POLITICAL ACTIVITY: UNIFICATION OF LEFT AND RIGHT WING PARTIES DISCUSSED

Writer states:

"It seems that Dr. KIM Kyu Sik (List KO 187) who has steadfastly maintained his neutrality and tried to unify the right and left wing is in much dispair on account of his friend, Mr. LYUH Woon Hyung's (List KO 196) death.

"CHWA U HAPCHAK CHOKSUNG HWAE (The Association for Promoting unification of Right and Left Wing) and its adherents have much expectation for the success of the Joint Commission. However, they seemed to be in dispair but the communique announced by the Russian delegate yesterday is likely to give them a gleam of hope. The adherents seem to be considerable in number, but they are nothing but Dr. KIM's satellites with no strong formation. Dr. KIM who lacks force has been propelled by them, and recently their movement seemed to advance a step. That is to say, Mr. [redacted] Kark No, who is a

(over)

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Form No. CCIG-1/K

4-8-1995 Declassified

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By NARS, Date

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leader of KUN MIN HWAE (Healthy People's Association) and seems to stand aloof from politics, began to try to unite all the neutral parties into a central party. But this movement will fail before long because the parties have hesitated for the unification judging from a good example shown by the HAN DOK DANG (Korean Independent Party). On the other hand Mr. AN Chai Hong (List KO 176), WON Sei Hoon (List KO 104), CHANG Chai Yil (List KO 392), KIM Ho (List KO 403), etc. have conference of six parties in order to present a united front and to promote the Joint Commission after the manner of Dr. KIM's movement, therefore it seems that a certain movement will commence in a few days instigated by them. Furthermore CHOSUN CHUNGNYUN CHONG YUNMAING (Korean Youngmen's General Union) and other youngmen's unions are trying positively to unite into a single youngmen's party which will have Dr. KIM Kyu Sik for the president. According to the above mentioned, these neutral parties and unions are taking aim at the same point. If their movement accomplishes the purpose, a great power will be brought into existence. And then the political situation will be stabilized among the leftists, rightists and neutrals. The neutral's object consists in establishing a democratic provisional government by aid of the Joint Commission, which is neither left or right."

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AMERICAN DELEGATION, SSJC
DATE 17 Aug TIME 1430

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231

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

File No.
28 July 1947

SUBJECT: CHANG IL DAN (LIGHT OF JUSTICE PARTY), alledged non-political organization

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

The inaugural meeting of the CHANG IL DAN (Light of Justice Party) was held on 1 March 1947 at their headquarters at [illegible]-2 Ka Chung-muro, Seoul.

The principle of Chang Il Dan is not concerned with politics, but chief KIM, Sang Koon (金 庠 坤) is a rightist, and has supported the right wing. Recently this organization supported Dr. RHEE, Syngman (李 承 晩). KIM, Sang Koon (金 庠 坤) made the following statements:

1. Now the national front has fallen into a crisis. We can conquer this crisis only by resolute practice. Now we must bring to our fast lips silence.

2. We do not clearly accuse for our own late self-independence. We are only afraid of justice as a means.

3. We, in relation to the crisis of [illegible] of political parties and social organizations which have realized [illegible] through the provisional interim government, and watch them.

4. We object that many of the leftist leaders could be released, and should check for them to riot again.

5. We watch for the vicious profiteers disrupting the economical field, and corrupt officials disrupting our Korean independence.

6. We request that all the leftists detained released who have been arrested in this anti-[illegible] movement.

The members of committees who have been re-elected are as follows:
Chairman: KIM, Sang Koon (甲 庠 坤) # 1-247 Nuk-Ah-Hyun-Dong Yeo-Ku, Seoul.
Secretary: KIM, Chong Paik (金 鍾 白) # 153-1 Ka Chi-moon Ig, Seoul
Chief of General Affairs Department: [illegible], Hung Cheol (洪 哲) # 1-[illegible] Nuk-Ah-Hyun-Dong
Chief of Organization Department: [illegible], Cho [illegible] (趙 [illegible]) 165 Dai-Hoong-Dong
Chief of Financial Department: [illegible], Kil Chai (吉 載) # 81-1 Kwan Hoon-Dong, Seoul
Chief of Business Department: [illegible], Chang [illegible] ([illegible]) # 205-5) Pin-Bul-Dong, Seoul
Chief of Information Department: [illegible], [illegible] ([illegible]) 97 Kyun Chi-Dong, Seoul
Chief of Propaganda Department: CHA, Chang Suk (車 昌 淑) # 1-239 Nuk-Ah-Hyun-Dong, Seoul
Chief of Special Duty Department: [illegible], Kyoo Nam (李 圭 甲)
Chief of Instruction Department: undecided.
Chief of Inspection Department: KIM, Ki [illegible] (金 [illegible]) # 19-20 Kyo-Ruk-Dong, Seoul

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S/I dtd 26 July 1947: SUBJECT: CHANG WI DAN (Light Of Justice Party)

Members Of Inspection Department:
PARK, Soon Chul (朴順哲) KIM, Chong Paik (金鍾白)
PARK, Hai Il (朴海一) PANG, Yung Choon (方泳準)

Executive Committee of Affairs:
MOON, Chong Tai (文鍾泰) # 5-2 Ka Myung-Dong
CHA, Chong Duk (車鎭德) # 1-239 Puk-Ah-Hyun-Dong

Committee Managing Business:
LEE, Chang Man (李章萬) # 205-59 Sin-sul-Dong
KIM, Je Yong (金濟龍) # 23 Nam-hak-Dong
SIM, Chong Hyun (沈鍾鉉) # 35-9 Kwan Chal-Dong
PARK, Sun Pong (朴善鳳) # 25-19 2 Ka Myung-Dong
MOON, Chong Tai (文鍾泰) # 5 2 Ka Myung-Dong

Evaluation
-of Source: Usually reliable -of Information: Possibly true

Previous Distribution:
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File

American Delegation
US-USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 July 1947.

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Members of the American Delegation.

SUBJECT: Speeches or Talks to Outside Agencies.

1. There have recently been numerous requests for members of the Joint Commission to give speeches or talks covering matters relating to the Joint Commission's work. Such requests originate from official sources, such as the Troop Information Program as well as from social organizations and societies.

2. No member of the American Delegation will take time out from his work to prepare or deliver any speech or talk without first obtaining permission of the Chief Commissioner. This applies irrespective of the source of the request, whether it is social or official.

3. Speeches or talks may be given outside of working hours without permission, provided there is no interference with duties. In this connection, the contents of Memo: "Disclosure of Information by Members of the American Delegation", dated 19 July 1947, is pertinent.

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 July 1947.

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Albert E. Brown,

ALBERT E. BROWN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief Commissioner.

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American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION

28th July 1947.

To: Chief Commissioner, American Delegation

From: Sub-Commission No.1

SUBJECT: PRESENTATION OF LIST OF PARTIES & ORGANIZATIONS OF SOUTH KOREA WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR POSSIBLE EXCLUSION FROM ORAL CONSULTATION

Sub-Commission No.1 unanimously agrees that the enclosed document be read into the minutes and presented to the Russians in English.

It is suggested that this step be taken before alternative methods of consultation are discussed in the Joint Commission.

1. The following tabulation of the number of groups recommended for elimination from oral consultation follows:-

Enclosure	Right	Moderate Right	Moderate	Moderate Left	Left	Total
A	40	3	8	2	10	63
B	5	-	1	-	9	15
C	1	-	2	-	4	7
D	16	-	-	-	4	20
E	-	-	-	-	4	4
F	8	2	1	-	7	18
TOTAL	70	5	12	2	36	127

2. The following tabulation of the membership of groups recommended for elimination from oral consultation follows:-

Enclosures	Right	Moderate Right	Moderate	Moderate Left	Left	Total
A	11,792	531	3,378	650	3,338	19,689
B	51,313	-	1,220,000	-	1,567,412	2,838,725
C	4,525,150	-	2,623,702	-	6,652,525	13,801,377
D	37,647	-	-	-	15,600	53,247
E	-	-	-	-	668,081	668,081
F	24,087	29,923	5,000	-	75,706	134,716
TOTAL	4,649,989	30,454	3,852,080	650	8,982,662	17,512,835

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ENCLOSURE A

28th July 1947.

SOUTH KOREA APPLICANTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH A CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP OF 1,000 OR LESS, WHICH MEMBER SO, AS LISTED BELOW:

Applic. No:	Name	Membership
13	Korean Political & Economical Society	125
20	Whang Hai Christian Friendship Association	567
24	Relief Association for Koreans in China	550
28	Korean Red Cross	300
32	Whole National Patriotic Association	129
36	Korean Young Men's Esperanto League	300
48	Korean Patriot's Relief Association	22
53	Korean Diligence and Saving Fraternity	250
71	Korean Industrial Medical Institute	500
76	Chosun Pharmacist Society	560
82	Korean Accountants Association	27
91	Korean National Academy	570
92	Base Culture Study Society	500
95	Politics & Economics Institute	25
99	Philanthropist Institute	505
124	Busan Chamber of Commerce	110
129	Korean Music Reconstruction League	707
133	Pusan Economic Institute	37
135	Women's Work Patrons Association	215
137	Eugenic Association of Korean Nation	453
143	Pusan Property Custodians' Association	249

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Acc.No:	Name	Membership
174	Korean Inventors Association	963
186	Kyongsung (Seoul) Lawyers' Society	120
193	Yosu Chamber of Commerce	480
196	Kum Hung Friends' Society	525
223	Hung Sa Dan (Righteous Young Men's Association)	400
235	Dong Dae Moon Market Merchants' Union	270
239	Taegu Oriental Herb Business Association	158
243	Korean Civil Liberty Union	500
244	Korean Legal Research	102
245	White Clad People's Association (Paik Min Asen)	200
252	National Cultural Association	45
257	Soen Chun Chamber of Commerce	450
264	Chamber of Commerce of Chonju	700
265	Chamber of Commerce in Iri	500
2 72	Seoul Midwife's Association	300
281	Seoul Lawyers' Association	199
293	Kyunggi Do Midwife's Association	110
297	Euyi Self Guarding Troop	226
301	The Merchant Associationof Nam Tai Moon Market, Seoul.	226
303	Great Korean Popular Socialist Party for the Redistribution of the National Land	200
316	Torch Club	86
317	Sinheunism Korea Society	357
320	Medical Doctors Association	706
325	Coalition Committee	65

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Ass.No:	Name	Membership
330	Korean Authors Association	730
332	Printing Committee of Left Wing Books	143
341	The Legal & Political Association	583
342	Kyongsang Pukto Medical Doctors' Association	309
346	North Mountain Association (Puk Ak Hoe)	300
347	Seoul Nurses Association	250
351	Korean Publishers Cultural Association	150
355	Council for Establishing Provisional Government	150
370	Korean Printing Cultural Association (Korean Printers Association)	270
375	Korean-American Cultural Society	200
381	International Politics & Diplomatic Association	230
385	Peoples Association of Sunchon Gun, Pyongan Namdo	365
390	Central Culture Association	40
396	Korean Musicians Association	35
397	Korean Patriots Union	280
398	Korean Veterinarians Association	925
404	Chang Dong Church Women's Association	110
405	Tankoo Fine Art Institute	30

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[redacted] 2. 28th July 1947

SOUTH KOREA APPLICANTS FOR CONSULTATION WHICH ARE FRAUDULENT EITHER BECAUSE THE ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT EXIST AS STATED, OR ARE INACTIVE:

App.No:	Name	Membership	Reason
11	New Korea Young Men's Federation	2,400	Inactive
19	Korea Civil Engineers Union	1,220,000	Fraudulent
29	Society for Making Korea Wealthy & Streng	17,580	"
104	Union of Conscription Workers	11,050	Inactive
154	Korean Democratic Young Men's Union	830,000	Fraudulent
157	Central People's Committee	20,207	Inactive
169	Soviet-Korean Cultural Association	1,500	"
175	Korean War Refugees Unemployed Association	25,510	"
177	Korean Student Soldiers' League	1,370	"
187	Student Soldiers' Refusers' Association	2,783	"
201	Anti-Fascist Fighting Committee	15 parties	"
212	Chosun Federation of Youth	651,000	Fraudulent
214	Central Council for Korean Social Problems	27,500	Inactive
359	National Art Society	1,050	"
373	Korean Public Opinion Society	1,775	"

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[redacted] 9

28th July 1947.

SOUTH KOREA APPLICANTS FOR CONSULTATION WHICH ARE DUPLICATIONS, THAT IS, ARE FEDERATIONS OF GROUPS ALSO APPLYING FOR CONSULTATION INDIVIDUALLY:

Acc.No.	Name	Membership
16	Democratic Independence Front	498,647
117	Korean Industrial Technicians Union	11,796
188	Council of All Korean Labor Union	354,417
218	Federation of Korean Cultural Associations	68,493
224	Democratic People's Front	6,217,819
356	Union of All Women's Associations in Korea	4,525,150
424	All Korea Political Parties and Social Organizations League for US-USSR Joint Commission	2,125,055

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

ENCLOSURE B 28th July 1947

SOUTH KOREA APPLICANTS FOR CONSULTATION OF OVER 1,000 CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED LOCAL IN NATURE AND EXTREMIST

Acc. No.	Name	Membership
6	Sungdong (Part of Seoul) Young Men's League	1,600
182	Ryesce Natien Construction Young Men's Ass'n.	2,100
183	Ryesco Y.M.C.A.	3,500
184	Kimhai Newspaper Association	1,863
189	Yongsan Social Work Association	1,500
202	Christian Youth Federation in Soon Chon	1,100
203	State Formation Women's Society in Shun Chón	6,800
207	Farmers-Laborers Cooperative Association	5,000
208	Farm Laborers' Association	6,000
226	Anam Revolutionary Young Men's Association	1,254
230	Korean Bamboo Lake Unit (Han Min Chuck Ho Dan)	2,763
273	Kyonggi Girl's School Alumnae Assn.((Kyung Woen Asen)	3,500
285	Yong San Trunk Business Association	1,517
306	Dokryong Friendship Association	2,300
307	Book Yang Christian Young Men's Association	1,500
313	Mai Yang Gun Peoples Association	3,000
323	Taegu Christian Young Men's Association	2,800
338	Tongnam Young Men's Association	1,050
344	Anam Young Men's Asen. (An An District of Seoul)	1,100
425	Seoul City & Town Young Men's Association	3,000

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

[redacted]

SOUTH KOREA APPLICANTS FOR CONSULTATION
UNDER [redacted] IS ALMOST [redacted] IN
JAPAN (SOUTH KOREAN GROUPS PREVALENT IN
MANCHURIA, RUSSIA, USA, CHINA, ETC.,
ARE NOT BEING CONSULTED CURRENTLY, IT DOES
NOT SEEM LOGICAL TO CONSULT WITH
ORGANIZATIONS OF KOREANS IN JAPAN):

App.No.	Name	Membership
116	Council of Committee Located in Korea of Union of Korean Scientists & Technicians in Japan	1,100
132	Pusan Central Head Office of Korean Young Men's Association in Japan	2,500
149	Seoul Committee of Residents in Japan Korean Assn. (all but 15,240 in Japan)	625,581
240	Korean Industrial Association in Japan (all but 10,900 in Japan)	38,900

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NND 760090
By NARS, Date

ENCLOSURE 2 26th July 1947.

SOUTH KOREA APPLICANTS FOR CONSULTATION
WHICH MAY BE TERMED "NON-SOCIAL" WITHIN
A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM.

Acc.No.	Name	Membership
14	Korean Esperanto Society	5,000
45	Society for the Study of Korean Language	1,200
50	Korean Manufacturing Chemists' Association	1,280
85	Korean Wrestlers' Institute	2 6,531
103	Korean Language Institute	3,392
105	National Music Institute	1,042
121	Peace & Light Institute (Hwa Kwang)	4,160
242	Renter's Association	20,100
286	Kyonggi-do Steam Engine Association	2,150
300	Korean Renters Association	45,800
315	Korean Industrial Club	1,500
324	Street Merchants Policy Committee	3,495
337	Korean Horse Association	3,000
379	Korean Industrial Labor Investigation Institute	2,489
383	Korean Fertiliser Society	7,415
384	Korean Aviation Development Association	1,200
388	Central Livestock Breeding Association	2,462
399	Federation of Korean Property Custodians	2,500

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of Adviser
GS USAFIK

29th July 1947.

To: General Brown

From: Robert A. Kinney

1. During the intermission of the Joint Commission this afternoon I was talking to Mr. Petuhov of Sub-Commission No.1, and during the course of the conversation which had been about the weather, Mr. Petuhov suddenly asked "Why is it that General Brown continues to refer to the elimination of 24 parties?" He stated that he checked the Soviet list and that the parties from South Korea excluded from the list by the Soviets numbered only 20.

2. The list as given to us on July 10th actually eliminated 28 South Korea parties, of over 10,000 membership, one of which, Lyuh Woon Heung's Working Peoples Party, was later put on the list with a statement that it was omitted in error. In addition there were 3 parties which were eliminated at our suggestion, because of fraud. The remaining 24 right and moderate right parties were all said to be omitted because of membership in the anti-trusteeship committee.

3. Mr. Petuhov's remark surprised me very much, but I replied in a non-committal vein, saying someone must be mistaken. He indicated he would check his list, write down the accession numbers of the 20 parties over 10,000 omitted from his list, and show this to me. He indicated vaguely there must be some error somewhere. At this point the Commission was about to reconvene and nothing more was said on this subject.

4. It is possible the Soviets are using this approach to get from 4 to 7 more groups back on their July 10th list for South Korea. Probably these groups will be those most remote from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. If the Commission is to break up on this point, they probably realize the desirability of strengthening their presently weak case.

5. If Petuhov tries to give me a list in the next few days, shall I accept it, or shall I tell him that any such matters should be presented through regular channels? The latter answer appears more advantageous to us, although it may be desired that I glance at Petuhov's list, in order to be able to report exactly what he has in mind. I feel certain his remarks were made at the prompting of the Soviet Delegation.

w.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

Jon. Brown

RECEIVED

NT 812
Translation-The Minjung Ilbo

FACTS OF THE BROADCASTING STATION CASE

It was reported that the case in the Central Broadcasting Station was being investigated by the Public Procurater's Office, and this case is now being investigated by the Metropolitan Police Division, which revealed the facts.

According to the direction of the South Korean Labor Party, Mr. KI' Ung Whan (age 24), an employee in the Broadcasting Station, made efforts to make broadcasting advantageous for the Leftists, and he obstructed anything disadvantageous for the Leftists in the broadcasting, under the plea of some trouble in the machine. Besides these designs, he extended the organization of the Labor Party in order to realize his first aim, and 14 other employees in the station joined in this organization.

These employees acted according to directions of Mr. Kwak Sol Ri and Mr. Kim Yon Bok, members of the Korean Writers' League, who had a secret mission of Bolshevisation in the broadcasting station. They had a quarterxof all the employees as spy agents for the Labor Party. They were putting the following into effect:

(1) Making propaganda for the good of the South Korean Labor Party and other Leftists.

(2) Purposely making some trouble in the machine lest anything advantageous for the Rightists should be broadcast when it is sent on the air.

(3) Complete Bolshevisation in the broadcasting station.

The employees arrested are as follows:

Forming Section:
Kim Ung Whan, Kim Yon Sik, Lee Yan Jai, Lee Bang Yon (female)

Broadcasting Section.
Cha Yong Dong, Sin Jin Chol, Jon Bo Il.

General Affairs Section
Kim Seon Wha, Paik Sang Kyun, Lee Sop.

(also three engineers and two acceptors).

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7-8-42

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to

[illegible] George C. [illegible]rshall, Secretary of [illegible]te of the
Government of the United States.

[illegible], the undersigned, have the honor of conveying to you
the following message; adopted at a mass meeting of citizens
[illegible]ity of Seoul in celebrating the second anniversary of
[illegible]liberation.

[illegible], the Korean people highly realizing [illegible]r friendship and
[illegible]ty in world affairs, the promoter [illegible] world peace,
[illegible] human freedom, lease accept our hearty [illegible]
[illegible] the sincerity and determination with [illegible] have
[illegible] the problems made by the [illegible] of Japan, liberator
[illegible] Korea, especially like sunrise on the [illegible] the
[illegible]. Although today we are [illegible] people [illegible]re
[illegible] contradictory at times of hope and disappointment.
[illegible] confidence in [illegible] patriot. [illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible] story of the [illegible]
[illegible] in the world. [illegible] the entire
[illegible] all not now [illegible] be done [illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible] all [illegible] fully and [illegible]
[illegible] before [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] people [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] united [illegible].

Respectfully [illegible]:

_____

_____

Respectfully [illegible]:

_____

_____

[illegible] 1947

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to

General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander
of the Allied Forces in the
Pacific Area.

In behalf of the Citizens of the City of Seoul, assembled here today celebrating the second anniversary of [illegible] liberation, we, the undersigned have the honor to convey to you a message adopted by the Citizens of this City.

Two years ago the General came to the Orient as the victor of justice and democracy. Still later in the unsettled and chaotic conditions following the end of the warwhile General with understanding, courage and true statesmanship always championed the cause for Korean democracy.

We write here to give to the General our heartfelt gratitude for the care and understanding with which [illegible] solved our many problems and guided us by your counsel and advice.

Today the dream people are liberated, still we live in moments of doubt and anxiety and fear for the [illegible] of democratic forces. We know that the General and this great nation will not forsake us. We know that in your heart you will always have foremost the interest of this weak and unfortunate nation, and do all humanly possible to enable the will of every good Korean to build Korea into a free, reformed and democratic nation.

For the General reference is made to which we have formed to the executive heads of the four allied powers. [illegible] good health and success.

Representing Citizens:

_____

_____

Representing Government:

_____

_____

16th August 1947

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

to

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General of American Army Forces in South Korea.

We, the undersigned, have the honor of conveying to you the full measure of our admiration and gratitude of the citizens of the city of Seoul in celebrating the second anniversary of Korean liberation.

[illegible] period of two years has elapsed since the general hatred [illegible] years of this land of the rising sun to contend with [illegible] have gained victory on all fronts.

[illegible] while in expressing our heartfelt gratitude for the sincerity, understanding and fierce [illegible] have consolidatingly striven to build the foundation of our people of freedom and prosperity. [illegible] have sacrificed sleep and military [illegible] have been untiring in your efforts to bring about a unified, democratic and independent [illegible]. We have overcome innumerable [illegible] and undergone many personal sacrifices on that [illegible] days. [illegible] the [illegible] cross roads. [illegible] we to have [illegible] or do at present [illegible] freedom or slavery? [illegible] affection or [illegible] never [illegible] all [illegible] at this [illegible] critical time we [illegible] forces in national [illegible] to [illegible] and [illegible] for [illegible] the [illegible] sketch to liberation, democracy and independence. [illegible] which we [illegible] to the [illegible] of the four Allied Powers. [illegible] and welfare and success.

[illegible] patriotic citizens:

_____

_____

[illegible] Provisional Government:

_____

_____

14th August 1947

DECLASSIFIED
NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

MESSAGE

to

His Excellency, Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States.

We, the undersigned, have the honor of conveying to you the following message; adopted at a mass meeting of the Citizens of the City of Seoul in celebrating the second anniversary of Korean Liberation.

We, thirty million Koreans, are profoundly grateful for the untold sacrifice of the Allied Powers in the late war by which our Nation was liberated from the yoke of Japanese Imperialism. We shall never forget the thousand upon thousands of Allied youth who have fallen and sacrificed their lives so that Korea may live.

For the past two years we of Korea have been living in a contradictory and confused state of hope and hopelessness. The flower of liberation is in full bloom and it needs but the nurture and culture of a united people to attain the beauty of an independent Korea. The present disunity between the North and South of Korea is indeed tragic. Contrary to General McArthurs directive the boundary line - 38 degree parallel appears to be utilized as an "iron veil" for political purposes, dispite the fact that the Allied Powers have disarmed and dispose of the Japanese Armed Forces.

An ancient and united Korea is now split into, and is developing two divergent systems of life. On the one hand minority dictatorship is enstrenched in the North, practising social and economic experiments of a novel nature that cannot be defended by human knowledge and experience. On the other hand, here in the South, true democracy is our foundation stone, based upon freedom of expression and majority rule. Such a geographical division, wrongfully propagated, has planted the seed of National seperation and political strife which makes it impossible to establish a united, democratic, and independent Korea. At present we are faced with political paralysis and economic bankruptcy. And, liberated from Japanese Imperialism, our Nation may be liable to be doomed to savagery and slavery.

We firmly believe that, in carrying out the declaration of Cairo for perfecting a truly free, democratic, and independent Korea, the following cardinal principles should be established:

1. The National condition of Korea, political, economic and geographical, should be restored to those existing prior to our liberation.

2. No other power under a democracy has the right to impose its political or economic systems upon the will of the Korean people. We believe in the cardinal principle of democracy; that the Korean people have the soverign right to make their own choice.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

3. We believe in full international cooperation based upon the desire for completing the unification and independence of Korea.

We feel that you as the interceptor of weak and small nations the defender of freedom and democracy will live up to our expectations.

We trust that you will faithfully fulfil your promise in recognition of the justice of our cause.

With fervent wishes for your continued health, success and happiness.

Representing Citizens:

_____

_____

Representing Government:

_____

_____

16th August 1947.

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

File No:
Date : 21 Aug 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

SUBJECT: Security Violation, Joint American Soviet Commission.

Investigation was predicated upon receipt of information that unauthorized persons had knowledge of an alledged proposal of the American Delegation of the JASC.

1. On 14 Aug 47 this agent and one other agent of this office examined the General's room of the American Delegation for mechanical listening devices. A small trapdoor was found ajacent to the conference table but no devices were located. A preliminary survey of the rooms of the first and second floors was made.

2. On 15 Aug 47 this agent and one other agent of this office examined the Press Room, Transportation Room, and Supply Room and found ~~the~~ holes ~~as shown in Exhibit A~~. A preliminary survey of the basement was made including examination of the lines, cables, and terminal stripts (in two terminal boxes) of the phones in the General's Room.

3. On 16 Aug 47 two agents of this office examined the holes found on 15 Aug 47 (see Par 2 above), the results were negative. Examination of the Korean sleeping quarters (which are under the first floor hallway) revealed that the chimney conducted sound from the General's Room and that normal conversation from the General's Room could be heard audibly at night.

4. On 16 Aug 47 two agents of this office examined the chimney of the fireplace in the Korean sleeping quarters up to the bend in the flue; the fireplace in the hallway of the first floor; the fan near the conference table of the General's Room; and the buzzer on General Brown's desk. The results were negative.

5. On 17 Aug 47 this agent and one other agent of this office examined the room above General Brown's room for conductivity of sound of the fireplace flue; the results were negative. Nothing in the room indicated the presence of mechanical listening devices.

6. On 18 Aug 47 this agent interviewed Col WATLINGTON, of the JASC, at the JASC. Col Warlington requested that an interview be made of Dr Lee the interpreter of General Hodge, XXIV Corps.

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

M/R, dtd 21 Aug 47, Subj: Security Violation, Joint American Soviet Commission (con't).

AGENT'S NOTES: Dr LEE was alledged to have told General Hodge the full details of a proposal of the American Delegation.

7. On 19 Aug 47 this agent and one other atent of this office interviewed Dr LEE, (李默) interpreter for General Hodge. He said that he could not remember anything that he had told General Hodge about the JASC last week; that it is normal for him to tell General Hodge directly concerning important news; that he remembered nothing about any proposals of the JASC of last week.

8. On 19 Aug 47 this agent interviewed Col Watlington of the JASC, at the JASC. Col Watlington saidthat he had talked to Dr LEE (see Par 7 above) andthat Dr LEE had remembered that he had been askedabout 12 Aug 47 by Mr RYEE, Clarence, DPI USAMGIK if he (Dr LEE) knew the provisions of a proposal made by the American Delegation of the JASC and if he knew whether or not the proposal was a compromise.

9. On 19 Aug 47 this agent and one other agent of this office interviewed Mr RYEE, Clarence C. ( ) of DPI USAMGIK at DPI USAMGIK. Mr RYEE saidthat he had talked to Dr LEE about 13 Aug 47 and had asked him of General Shtikov would have a meeting during the next week; that he had asked nothing about any compromises or proposals of the JASC.

10. On 19 Aug 47 this agent andone other agent of this office reinterviewed Dr LEE at the office of the Chief Clerk (fourth floor Bando Hotel). Dr LEE said that on 12 Aug 47 he had been asked by Mr RYEE, Clarence C if the 13 Aug 47 meeting of the JASC would be the last and was there a new American proposal andif so what was it and would it be a compromise on the part of the American Delegation.

11. On 19 Aug this agent and one other agent of this office re-interviewed Mr RYEE, Clarence C DPI USAMGIK, at DPI USAMGIK. Mr RYEE said that he had no recollection of a conversation with Dr LEE pertaining to 13 Aug 47 being the last day of the JASC or pertaining to any American proposals of compromises. Mr RYEE was requested to telephone Dr LEE to see of Dr LEE could refresh Mr RYEE's memory. After talking to Dr LEE (in Korean, whereas both men speak fluent English) Mr RYEE said that he remembered asling if the 13 Aug 47 meeting would be the last one of the JASC andif a proposal had been made by the US, what the contents of the proposal were andif there was any concession involved. Mr RYEE was then cross questioned for about twenty munutes as to where he had heard the proposal. At first Mr RYEE insisted he had no recolledtion of the source byt he finally admitted that he heard of the rumor about theproposal from Mr Steward, OCI USAFIK, on 9 Aug 47.

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M/R, dtd 21 Aug 47, SUBJ: Security Violation, Joint American Soviet Commission (con't).

12. On 20 Aug 47 Col Watlington and General Brown informed this agent that they would interview Mr Steward and that unless further developments occurred they considered the case closed from the CIC investigation phase.

Special Agent
CIC

Previous Distribution:

None

Distribution:

4 copies, G-2, USAFIK
2 copies, CIC, File

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

S E C R E T

American Delegation
US - USSR JOINT COMMISSION
Seoul, Korea.

28 August 1947.

MEMO TO: G-2.

Per oral conversation this date, request information in answer to following questions:

1. Does an underground People's Committee (Communist) government exist?

2. Does it plan to take over the government of South Korea as an equal of the present North Korea Government? Or, does it plan to take over only the government of the South Korean provinces, under a People's Committee government of all Korea?

3. To what extent have ministries or departments been delineated?

4. To what extent have personnel for the ministries been designated?

5. Who are the personnel designated?

6. How is PAK, Heun Yung involved?

7. What procedure will the government follow to gain power? In particular, what use will it make of the North Korea Army?

8. What countermeasures on our part does the underground government fear?

9. What are its relations with the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission?

10. What are its relations with the present North Korea Government?

11. What political party or parties serve as a cover? Do they serve knowingly or unknowingly?

12. How is it financed?

13. How widespread among Koreans is knowledge or suspicion of existence of this underground government?

S E C R E T

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

Memo to G-2. 28 Aug. 1947

It is further requested that a preliminary report be submitted at least by 2 September and that thereafter negative reports be submitted on Tuesdays and Saturdays of each week, and that positive reports be submitted without delay. Reports are to be delivered only to one of the following, in the order named:

Colonel Watlington,
Mr. Sargent,
General Brown.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

THOMAS M. WATLINGTON,
Colonel, FA.

SECRET

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NND 760090
By _____ NARS, Date _____

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

Circulate

File No:
29 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

SUBJECT: (SRC) [illegible], 1, 2, and 3.

Investigation was initiated by the Commanding Officer 971st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, APO 235, predicated upon instructions received from HQ of S, G-2 USAFIK on 23 August 1947 that information was desired as to whether or not the Russian delegates to the US-USSR Joint Commission were preparing to leave for Pyong Yang, North Korea.

1. A close surveillance through the medium of informants, detectives, and personal observation was started by agents of this organization on 23 August 1947 from the hours of 1300 until 0300. Further surveillance is being conducted during daylight hours by detectives, and informants of this organization. (See previous CIRs dated 24, 25, 26 August 1947, Subject: (SRC).

2. Surveillance of the Russian Consulate disclosed the following: At approximately 2030 hours 27 August 1947, Mr [illegible], a USSR member of the US-USSR Joint Commission accompanied by Mr [illegible], caretaker of the Russian Consulate walked out of the Consulate Compound, and from there walked to Russian Billet 1. They remained there long enough to climb in a Jeep, and with lights out drove rapidly down Chong Dong road past the police station [illegible], and thence out on Chong No street. The Russian Jeep was travelling at approximately 40 miles an hour when it passed the headquarters CIC-K, and went around Chong No circle several times before coming to a halt in front of the South Korea Hotel, a War Department Civilian Billet. Mr [illegible] dismounted from the vehicle, and rapidly walked down the street. An agent of this organization dismounted from the surveilling Jeep, and started after [illegible]. In the meantime the Russian Jeep had started out again, and after driving through a few side streets, and alleys, the Jeep pulled up in front of the South Korea BOQ Billet, and Mr [illegible] dismounted. As the surveilling Jeep pulled up the front bumper fell off, and while the driver retreived the bumper, Mr [illegible] disappeared in the vicinity of the South Korea Billet. This Billet is a block away from the headquarters of CIC-K. The surveilling vehicle then went back to its original position at the foot of the Chong Dong hill road.

At approximately 2140 hours Mr [illegible] with the surveilling agent appeared walking up Chong No street toward Chong Dong hill road leading up to Russian Billet 1. Mr [illegible] had travelled through practically all the side streets in Chong No, attempting to shake off the surveillant, and had finally decided to come back to Billet1. At approximately 2350 hours, Mr [illegible] returned to Billet 1 by Korean Taxi. The driver was questioned a short distance from the Billet, and stated that he had first noticed Mr [illegible] when the latter hailed a Taxi while standing in front of the South Korea BOQ Billet.

SF [illegible]

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By NARS, Date

SECRET

/n dtd 29 August 1947, Subject: (S.C)

3. Surveillance of Russian Billet 1 disclosed the following: Information received from an informant employed in Billet 1 indicates that by the number of cigarrette butts, and bottles found in the Quonset hut in rear of the Billet every morning that the place is being used at night as a club, or to hold meetings. Informant stated that only in the past week have the Russians soldiers left such a mess in the hut to be cleaned up in the morning. The usual procedure being, that each man cleaned up the area around his own bed.

Informant states that the Russian personnel are oiling their leather equipment, and handbags, cleaning gear, and mending uniforms. Informant stated that they had not done this since their arrival.

4. Surveillance of Russian Billet 2 disclosed the following: The Russian women occupying Billet 2, could be observed through the open windows sorting out clothing, and sewing. Whether this is usual procedure has not been determined as yet.

5. Surveillance of Russian Billet 3 disclosed the following: At approximately 2230 hours 27 August 1947 three members of the Russian delegation came walking out of the Billet, going to the garage across the street where the Liaison Jeep is ~~parked~~ kept. One of these individuals was definitely identified as being Mr PLYUSOV, listed as advisor, and expert on the Soviet delegation. These three were dressed in civilian clothing.

At approximately 2310 hours, two young Korean women came out of the Billet, dressed in Western style clothing. They were driven away in the Liaison Jeep.

Special Agent
CIC

Previous Distribution
None
Distribution:
1 copy to G-2 USAFIK
5 copies to file CIC-K

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GEN EXCISE
J-IC

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, FOR
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 23

File No:
2 September 1947

SUBJECT: (C)

SOURCE OF INFORMATION:

The following information was obtained by an informant employed in the Austrian Consulate, 2 August 1947.

The informant was told by a [illegible] woman employed by the Russians, that she had asked Miss, Tong Shun (崔竜煥) the chief gatekeeper of the Consulate; when were the Russians going to leave for Pyong Yang?

Later the translator of the Consulate was asked the same question by several other employees of the Consulate, their primary interest in asking was the fact that they would have to find other employment if the Russians were going to leave soon.

[illegible] 崔竜煥, [illegible] told all the [illegible] employees of the Consulate, that although it was originally intended to leave a few days ago, they had postponed it until sometime in October.

Miss, Tong Shun (崔竜煥) upon instruction from Russians, then notified all the foreign employees that their jobs were secure until October, and that before being given their notice, they would be permitted to seek employment elsewhere.

The informant stated that the foreign employees are checked in the morning, when they enter the building, by Russian guards, and again when they leave in the evening. The guards search their handbags, and might on occasion, briefcases, and documents, and look in their pockets. Russians bring their own lunches, and are served coffee, and tea at night.

The informant stated that the Russians have a machine which is used to [illegible] a [illegible] or [illegible] photographs. The machine is unpacked from a large box. The machine is approximately four by four by four feet in measurement.

Evaluation
of source
Fairly reliable

Evaluation
of information
Possibly true

Previous distribution
None
Distribution:
1 copy to [illegible]
4 copies to file [illegible]

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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, KOREA
HEADQUARTERS
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
APO 235

File No. 4-36
1 September 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WATLINGTON:

SUBJECT: People's Committees of the Korean People's Republic (IN MIN WEE WON HWEI).

Investigation initiated by Headquarters 971st CIC Detachment, APO 235, 29 August 1947, upon receipt of request for information, in form of 13 specific questions, from Colonel Watlington, U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission. Information contained in this report is a result of a file briefing and is not fully documented. As far as possible, the evaluation of each piece of information will be given.

1. DOES AN UNDERGROUND PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE (COMMUNIST) GOVERNMENT EXIST?

Yes, an underground People's Committee government exists in certain parts of South Korea. Such a government or underground organization is known to exist in Chulla Pukto, Chulla Namdo, Kyongsang Pukto, Kyongsang Namdo, Cheju Do, and in various isolated cities or districts in other provinces of South Korea, namely: Chunchon, Suwon, Samchook, Chuminjin, and most provincial capitols. Until 12 December 1945, the People's Committees existed as an open government. At this time the People's Committees were disolved by an order of the Commanding General, and neccessarily went underground in order to exist. In the more distant Guns and Myuns the People's Committees continued to control the government until middle January 1946. Contained in the files of this headquarters are long lists of leaders and members of the People's Committees throughout South Korea. The majority of these lists were prepared just before the organization was disbanded; however, several lists were prepared after that date, showing that the organization continued under the same leadership after it had been placed on the illegal list.

2. DOES IT PLAN TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH KOREA AS AN EQUAL OF THE PRESENT NORTH KOREA GOVERNMENT? OR, DOES IT PLAN TO TAKE OVER ONLY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PROVINCES, UNDER A PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE GOVERNMENT OF ALL KOREA?

According to an informant of unknown reliability who was interviewed by CIC on 19 October 1945, the Korean Rehabilitation Committee (CHOSUN KOON KUK WEE WON HWEI) was organized in Pyongyang, North Korea on or about 18 August 1945, following the surrender of the Japanese Military Forces; however, on 25

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August 1945, the People's Committees were formed by 30 persons, 15 of whom were former members of the Korean Rehabilitation Committee and were alleged communists. The informant stated that the People's Committees were not organized until after the Soviet Occupation Forces had arrived, but that the People's Committees were being organized and supported by the Soviet Forces in every area occupied, indicating that the People's Committees were under a central organization for North Korea.

On 8 October 1945, CIC interviewed RO, Bak Yong, Vice Chairman of the People's Committees of the Province of Kyongsang Namdo. The following excerpts from this interview are cited:

Question: For what purpose was the party founded?

Answer : To form a foundation for the independence of Korea which would come upon the removal of the U.S. Occupational forces.

Question: Is the party in a position to take over the government at any time?

Answer : We are ready to take over when the U.S. Forces leave.

Question: Does the party cover all of Korea or only the southern part?

Answer : It covers all Korea, both above and below the 38th parallel. Mr. LYUH, Woon Hyung is Chairman for all Korea, he has been in touch with Gen. Hodge's assistant.

Question: What action does the party recommend that the U.S. Forces take?

Answer : We wish that the U.S. Forces would entrust the Judicial administration (He explained this as meaning the Police Systems) to the People's Committees.

On 27 November 1945, a newspaper article appearing in the Central Times of Korea announces a list of provincial leaders of the People's Committees. This list includes all provinces, north and south, in Korea.

On 28 November 1945, an informant of unknown reliability stated to CIC that in North Korea, the People's Committees were recognized as the only authorized party, and were under the central control of LEE, Tai Choon in Pyongyang.

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According to the "Soviet Master Plan" information, there are no specific statements relating to whether the government would be "set up" using an existing People's Committee as its center. In fact, the plan indicates that the underground leadership would come directly from the Communist Party, which would seemingly be weakened by existing South Korean circumstances, but would be powerful enough to take over 5th column action.

The mere fact that in August 1946, a South Korea Labor Party was organized (NAM CHOSUN NO DONG DANG), following the organization of a North Korea Labor Party (BUK CHOSUN NO DONG DANG) indicated that the People's Committees of South Korea had not advanced as rapidly as those in the north, and for that reason as new plan of governmental groups must be followed. This may have been a further attempt to organize similar political organizations in both sectors in support of the People's Committees; however, the usual explanations were: (1) To centralize South Korean control, (2) To remove the Communist Party name from view (as a result of local party disgrace to the international party) and (3) To eliminate outward differences between leftist groups in North and South Korea.

By May of 1947, the Democratic People's Front in South Korea, had stopped for the most part the continual propaganda line calling for recognition of the People's Committees and turned to preparations for elections in South Korea. A document dated 27 March 1947 indicates plans for sending representatives to Seoul to prepare plans for elections, while another report dated 6 May 1947, states that the elections for the Legislative Assembly were undemocratic, but that the new plans for the election according to the Democratic People's Front, were very democratic. Another document, dated 28 May 1947, disclosed the political survey of the Democratic People's Front, in preparation for a coming election. As early as January 1947, the Democratic People's Front had sent petitions to Gen. Hodge concerning their methods of holding elections, while in March and June 1947, propaganda plans of the Democratic People's Front urged preparations for elections. In each case there is no evidence that the leftists have given up any thought of bringing the People's Committees into power; however, all of the emphasis is placed upon preparation for elections, not specifically stating that members of the People's Committee are the logical candidates.

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3. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE MINISTRIES OR DEPARTMENTS BEEN DELINEATED?

Several varying lists are on record in the files of this headquarters, which are specifically concerned with national leaders. About fifty such lists of local organization are on record in this headquarters. In each case, the local organizations follow completely the identical leadership of the People's Committees. In November, after the People's Committees realized that an "all leftist" government would not be recognized, the following delineation was made, and distributed:

President	RHEE, Syng Man
Vice President	LYUH, Woon Hyung
Prime Minister	HU, Hun
Secretary of Interior	KIM, Koo
Foreign Relations	KIM, Kyu Sik
Secretary of War	KIM, Won Bong
Secretary of Finance	CHO, Man Sik
Police Supervisor	CHOI, Young Dal
Provincial Minister	KIM, Byung No
Minister of Education	KIM, Sung Soo
Minister of Propaganda	LEE, Kwon Sul
Minister of Economics	HA, Pil won
Minister of Agriculture	KANG, Ki Duk
Minister of Sanitation	LEE, Moon Kyu
Minister of Transportation	HONG, Nam Pyo
Minister of Communication	SHIN, Ik Hi
Minister of Labor	LEE, Chu Sang
Head Clerk	CHOI, Ik Han
Charge of Plans	CHUN, Baik

Although this list contains the names of rightists, it is noticeable that the most strategic offices of control remain in leftist hands. The fact was confirmed at that time, 17 October 1945, that RHEE, Syng Man; KIM, Koo; and KIM, Sung Soo, had not authorized their names to be added to this list. CIC agents in the field expressed their belief that such a list was prepared to draw more support to the People's Committees, as well as to confuse the populace.

As late as 4 December 1945, the People's Committees attempted to solicit the assistance of KIM, Koo, and other rightist leaders. On 4 December 1945, KIM, Koo refused the last bid carried to him by HONG, Myung Hi and KIM, Chang Suk. KIM turned down the offer in the presence of LYUH, Woon Hyung and HU, Hun, in favor of the Chunking Provisional Government. At this time various reports indicated weakenings within the People's Committees, particularly when 19 youth groups transfered their allegiance to KIM, Koo on 3 December 1945.

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Propaganda leaflets and newspapers have shown in late 1945 and early 1946, systems of governmental organization, referring to the People's Committees; however, none of these have been of South Korean importance, and in each case follow the list shown above.

4. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE PERSONNEL FOR THE MINISTRIES BEEN DESIGNATED?

See paragraph (3) above. Since 1945, no lists have appeared except locally, which in each case outline a government wholly by leaders of the local People's Committees.

5. HOW IS PAK, HUN YOUNG INVOLVED?

On 1 November 1945, a report disclosed that PAK, Hun Young, along with CHO, Dong Woo; HONG, Nam Pyo; KWON, Oh Chik; HA, Pil Won; and several others were chairman at the People's Committee "pseudo election" of 8 September 1945. The cabinet members of the People's Committee included the following:

LYUH, Woon Hyung	HUH, Hun	KIM, Sei Chin
CHOI, Young Dal	LEE, Man Kyu	LEE, Kwon Sul
CHOI, Ik Han	CHUN, Baik	HA, Pil Won
KANG, Ki Duk	LEE, Kang Kook	HONG, Nam Pyo
LEE, Chun Sang		

All lists of cabinets or leaders of the People's Committee fail to include the name of PAK, Hun Young, although several reports from varying informants indicated that PAK, Hun Young was a member of the secret Central Committee of the People's Committees. Most lists indicate that LYUH, Woon Hyung was chairman and that HU, Hun was vice-chairman. Other reports disclose that PAK, Hun Young supported the People's Committees, the representative of the Communist Party. Several posters and handbills of the Communist Party, quoting speeches of PAK, Hun Young, show PAK's support of the People's Committees, as well as the support of his party.

Reports indicate that PAK, Hun Young took more interest in the People's Committees after LYUH, Woon Hyung organized the People's Party (IN MIN DANG), on 12 November 1945.

On 23 April 1946, during the second "Great Meeting" of the People's Committee representatives in Seoul, PAK, Hun Young and HU, Hun were the chief speakers. LYUH, Woon Hyung, feining illness, did not attend any of the three sessions. PAK stated at this time that he wanted full support of the People's Committees.

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People's Committees etc., 4-36, dated 1 September 1947, page 6.

7. WHAT PROCEDURE WILL THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOW TO GAIN POWER? IN PARTICULAR, WHAT USE WILL IT MAKE OF THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY?

According to the "Soviet Master Plan", after the withdrawal of the U.S. Occupational Forces, the underground in South Korea will cause disturbances to such a degree, that the North Korean People's Army will be forced to restore order. In which case it is assumed that the leftists will be put into power in South Korea. Again it is mentioned that the People's Committees are not specifically mentioned, and it is in fact believed that the Democratic People's Front or the South Korea Labor Party will undertake to organize a government, not the People's Committees, which will act only in local areas.

8. WHAT COUNTERMEASURES ON OUR PART DOES THE UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT FEAR?

The underground fears police supremacy, arrest of leftist leaders, and control on communication and transportation. The underground also fears any attempt to control or eliminate leftist propaganda organs, or screening upon the part of the U.S. Occupation Forces of personnel for strategic positions, either in Military Government or in control of factories etc.

9. WHAT ARE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE JOINT COMMISSION?

Large numbers of leading leftists continually contact the Soviet Delegation at the Russian Consulate and at the Russian Billetts throughout the city. Several reports of varying reliability indicate that there is extremely close liaison between the leftist groups and leaders and the Soviet Delegation. In this case the underground cannot be called a government, but is the normal leftist underground.

10. WHAT ARE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PRESENT NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT?

Numerous messengers have been arrested while on trips between north and south Korea. Espionage agents, sabotage specialists, and infiltrants have been schooled in North Korea, and automatically become a part of the South Korean leftists underground when they arrive in South Korea.

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11. WHAT POLITICAL PARTIES SERVE AS A COVER? DO THEY SERVE KNOWINGLY OR UNKNOWINGLY?

All of the organizations under the Democratic People Front serve the underground to some extent. The chief adherents to the underground systems are those who were schooled in the underground against the Japanese, and the majority of these are members of the South Korea Labor Party. Also the Women's Union, The All Korea Labor Union (CHUN PYUNG), The League of All Korean Farmers (NO DONG CHO HAP), The Democratic Patriotic Young Men's Association, and the Democratic People's Front are the chief organizers and workers in the underground as substantiated by confiscated documents.

Most of the other members of the Democratic People's Front, form the basis of cells neccessary for the expansion of the underground. All of the leftist cultural organizations, the readers societies, youth organizations, and even religious groups form legitimate societies, which are quickly infiltrated and controlled by tried underground workers and agitators, who find new material in new organizations.

12. HOW IS IT FINANCED?

The leftists use the normal methods of individual collection by donation, force, and promise. There are many wealthy followers who donate; however, the mass of leftist funds are allegedly received from benefits of North-South Korea trade. Only vague pieces of evidence exist which could prove this fact. Counterfeiting and other forms of finance have probably added to the leftist coffers; however, the chief source of revenue has never been clearly defined or found. Facts show that the leftists are much more in need of funds at the present time than in 1946.

13. HOW WIDESPREAD AMONG KOREANS IS KNOWLEDGE OR SUSPICION OF LEFTIST NCL OF THIS UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT?

Every Korean acquainted with basic politics realizes the existence of the leftist underground. Such an underground is "matter of fact" with most Koreans, since a similar underground has existed in this country for many years.

James K. Satchell
1st Lt Inf
Chief, Operations

Distribution:

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By NARS, Date

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HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
G-2 Section
Civil Communications Intelligence Group - Korea

5 September 1947 (Date)

CS#KO/SEO/5225

From:	To:
PARK Chang Hwa, 966 Hawangsip-li, Dong, Seoul, Korea	Mayor of Seoul, City Hall, Seoul, Korea

Distribution	Date of Communications:	Number of Inclosures:
AFPAC CCD GHQ XXIV CORPS G-2 CIC Provost Mar. USAMGIK DC/S DPI	3 Sept 47 Comment by: Type of Communication: Letter	Language: None Disposition Original Communication: Korean Number of Previous Records

COMMENT: SE0/5100

Request notification of positive results based on this C/S

POLITICAL ACTIVITY: PROPOSES MASS MEETING TO CELEBRATE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE LOVITT'S 29 AUGUST PROPOSAL

Writer states;

"I propose that you hold a city mass meeting at Seoul stadium on 8 September to celebrate the plan for establishing Koreen Interim Government, announced by Mr. LOVITT,,the Under Secretary of State, U. S. on 29 August. I think this plan may be called '2nd Liberation of Korea'. On that day we should try to mass all the people to welcome this plan while crushing the leftist's bad propaganda. On that day we should send our message to the four powers showing our burning desire for our independence with their aid."

"Distribution of the information contained in this document obtained from private communications will be confined solely to those officials, military and/or civilian, who are specifically authorized to receive such information."

Examiner:_____

Condemned or Detained communications are Retained in the Files of CCIG-K

Form No. CCIG-1/k

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Send to file in usual office file

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
APO 235

25 October 1947

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Preparation for Elections

TO: Dr. Philip Jaisohn
Dean Charles Bergler
Brigadier-General John Weckerling

1. You are hereby designated as a committee to confer with Acting Military Governor Brigadier General Charles G. Helmick and a similar committee of Koreans appointed by him for the purpose of making preliminary preparations for the holding of an election in South Korea either under Public Act No. 5, dated 3 September 1947, entitled "Law for the Election of Members of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly" or some other law or order which may become mandatory as a result of the Resolution which the United States Government has proposed in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

2. In carrying out this instruction, you will use as the basis of your work the general plan, dated October 17, 1947, for the supervision of an election in South Korea as prepared by the special group functioning under Major General Albert E. Brown.

3. It is my desire that, in your conferences with the Korean committee appointed by General Helmick, you endeavor to persuade that group that the supervisory measures and procedures laid down in the aforementioned memorandum are so necessary to guarantee a fair and impartial election in South Korea that they will adopt most of these measures and procedures as their own and thus avoid the necessity for me as the Commanding General to prescribe them under my own order and authority.

4. It is also my desire that you and General Helmick make it clear to the Korean Committee that your work and their work are purely preliminary in anticipation of the holding of an election in South Korea and that this instruction is not a date-setting order upon which the holding of an election is to be based. In other words, you are merely to carry on preliminary studies and work out drafts of the future election procedure and control measures so that when the date is announced everything can move along with greater rapidity toward the eventual holding of the election.

5. It is also my desire that for the present at least no publicity be given your activities in connection with this directive.

JOHN R. HODGE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

cc: General Brown
General Helmick

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By _____ NARS, Date _____

SECRET

American Delegation
US-USSR Joint Commission
APO 235

3 November 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, XXIV Corps

SUBJECT : Political Program, South Korea

The problem presented: To devise a political program for South Korea.

I. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Assumption: That the effort to resolve the Korean issue before the United Nations results in long delay or in failure and that the U.S. retains its present responsibility for governing South Korea for an indefinite period.

2. During the 1947 session of the Joint Commission, the following political situation in Korea became apparent:

a. The Soviets controlled a Communist-dominated north Korea.

b. The Soviets controlled the Democratic People's Front of South Korea which was affiliated with the Communist-dominated Democratic People's Front of North Korea.

c. The Rightist groups of South Korea which in general comprise all influential portions of the population other than members of the Democratic People's Front was divided as follows:

(1) The Rhee-Kim Koo faction refused to participate in the work of the Joint Commission.

(2) The Kim Sung Soo faction headed by the Democratic Party was permitted by the Rhee-Kim Koo leadership to give partial support to the Joint Commission, but were refused permission to give any support which would surrender their Anti-trusteeship stand.

(3) The American Delegation entered into negotiation practically without any Korean support.

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3. The Rhee-Kim Koo faction refuses cooperation with the policies of the United States for the government of South Korea.

4. All influential Rightist political parties follow the leadership of Rhee-Kim Koo on important national issues.

5. The Rhee-Kim Koo leadership insists that South Korea can only be governed under the following policy enunciated by them:

a. Complete sovereignty to be vested in the Korean government to be headed by Rhee-Kim Koo.

b. U. S. troops to remain in Korea to assure the security of the government established.

c. The motives impelling Rhee-Kim Koo to the decisions above expressed could well be Soviet-generated. The following facts and hearsay facts have some bearing on the matter:

a. Apparently upon orders from Moscow, the unanimous Anti-trusteeship view held by all Koreans prior to January 1, 1946, was broken and the Leftists surrendered their Anti-trusteeship stand and supported Trusteeship. The Anti-trusteeship stand became the political banner by which the Rhee-Kim Koo faction rallied Rightist support. This was the initial impulse which created the presently existing acute division of South Korea into two rival camps.

b. The leadership of the Chungking Provisional Government which had returned to Korea in the fall of 1945 has exercised continuing and successful influence over Rightist policies in South Korea.

c. Rhee Syngman has dominated this leadership. While there is periodic difference of opinion between the leaders of this faction, they appear to coalesce on any issue of major importance.

d. Rhee apparently has loyal support from all important Rightist leaders behind his policy to establish a government in South Korea completely independent of, and which diverges from, U. S. policy.

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e. Many Americans in Korea appear loyal to Rhee Syngman and apparently support his policies and oppose those of the U. S. The reason why such a condition exists should be explored.

f. There are a group of Americans in the U. S. (apparently in the pay of Rhee Syngman) who not only support, but who actively aid him to assure successful realization of his policies. It is likely that the motivating influence behind this group is the possibility of future exploitation of the economic potential of Korea.

g. The Soviet objective became clearly evident during the 1947 session of the Joint Commission. This objective is Soviet control of a Communist-dominated United Korea; that is, to make Korea a satellite of the Soviet Union.

h. While there is no presently available credible evidence that the Soviets exert influence over the policies of Rhee Syngman-Kim Koo, the policies presently followed by this faction further Soviet objectives. Mrs. Rhee Syngman continuously encourages her husband to follow policies contrary to U. S. interests.

7. a. U. S. troops can only be maintained in Korea at a great sacrifice to the American taxpayer. The probable cost over a three-year period will be in excess of two and a half billion dollars.

b. Few Americans have any knowledge of Korea. It is difficult for the editors of certain publications and for certain influential members of the American people, not to mention the great mass of the people, to understand why the U. S. should occupy Korea, a small, friendly, defenseless nation.

c. The present discord existing in South Korea could, if given wide publicity, and will most likely if materially increased, exert influence over U. S. policies which will influence demand for withdrawal of U. S. troops.

8. There seems little prospect that the Rhee-Kim Koo faction will change its policy. There is no prospect that the Soviets and the Democratic People's Front will change their policy.

9. U. S. policy for governing South Korea is in fact unsupported by any important political faction of South Korea. It is actively, in fact, opposed by the Democratic People's Front and by the Rhee faction of Rightists. It is ignored by

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the Kim Koo faction and is to a large extent ignored by other important Rightist factions. There are many individual Koreans who loyally support U. S. policy.

II. CONCLUSION

1. The mass of the Korean people are unelected. Their interests lie solely in their rice paddies. They follow blindly the policies of those political leaders whom they respect. They do not carefully consider the political policies of those leaders; they follow the individual. While there are many political leaders scrambling for power, they can be grouped into but two major factions, namely, the right and left. There is also a struggling but presently relatively unimportant faction, the Center. The dormant leader of the right is Rhee Syngman. He is followed almost exclusively by all Koreans who do not follow the Soviet-dominated Democratic People's Front. While the relative strength right-left in South Korea is not definitely known, it is estimated as three right to two left. But a very few Koreans understand the import of the policies followed by Rhee Syngman; however, practically no Korean will support the policies of the U. S. when in conflict with those of their great leader.

2. The Soviets have demonstrated an uncanny ability throughout the world to turn discord to their advantage. As a matter of fact, they have created discord in order to subsequently use it to their advantage. While it appears fantastic to conceive of the Soviets having created the present political situation in South Korea, it is most logical to suspect that they have had some part in creating this condition. In any event, it is axiomatic that they are encouraging it and are profiting from it.

3. The Commanding General, USAFIK, is the agent of the United States in Korea. It is his responsibility to enforce the policy of his government; it is his responsibility to maintain law and order in Korea. Should the machinations of the Rhee-Kim Koo faction or the subversive activities of the Democratic People's Front lead to disorder, it will be the responsibility of the Commanding General, USAFIK, to restore order. It may become necessary to use U. S. troops to accomplish this result, which may in turn result in injury to many Koreans.

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4. The Soviets have organized a strong Korean military force in North Korea. This force has been trained to hate the Americans and to believe that Soviet policy must prevail throughout a United Korea. There is constant threat of aggression by this force along the 38th parallel. It is known that certain political leaders of South Korea are in more or less constant contact with certain political leaders of North Korea. The extent to which this contact is carried and the ultimate purpose is not known.

5. The following lines of action appear open:

a. Support the policies of the Rhee Syngman-Kim Koo faction and place Rhee in power.

b. Select some other Korean leader and build him up.

c. The Commanding General, USAFIK, to be in effect the head of South Korea and to exert such pressure as will force all Koreans to render loyal support to his policies.

6. a. Every effort has been made to persuade Rhee Syngman to follow a reasonable line of action, but without success. It is quite evident that the U. S. cannot surrender to the policies of a stubborn, if not mentally unbalanced Korean.

b. No Korean leader of sufficient stature is presently available to justify an effort to build a Korean rival to Rhee Syngman.

c. It is believed that the only course presently available is for the Commanding General to in fact be the head and to force all Koreans to follow his policies.

7. While there appears to be no Korean of stature other than Rhee Syngman on the present horizon, there is no doubt but what others will arise as time goes on and the ultimate result will be of greater benefit to Korea.

III. CONCLUSION

1. That the Commanding General, USAFIK, in fact be the governing head of South Korea and demand loyal support from all Korean factions.

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2. That effort be made to discredit and destroy the political power of thse who actively oppose U. S. policy.

ALBERT E. BROWN
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief Commissioner

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