DISSENT, REPRESSION, AND REVOLUTION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY PHILIPPINES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE KATIPUNAN, 1892-1897

By

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Dedicated to my two wonderful albeit
VERY stubborn mentors who just would not give up on me

Prof. ALFRED W. McCOY and Dr. MIKE CULLINANE

ABSTRACT

Considered as the defining moment for the birth of the Filipino nation that serves as the basis for both myth-making and nation-building, the revolution of 1896 has remained the most studied albeit the least understood period in Philippine colonial history. Conventional narratives on the 1896 armed struggle continue to depict it as the 'revolt of the masses' led by 'the plebeian secret society' Katipunan (League) against Spanish rulers and native collaborators, generally referring to wealthy and educated Filipino reformers.

This study challenges the dominant nationalist narratives with a critique and revision of the revolution's historiography. Furthermore, this research inquiry offers new perspectives not only on the nature of this secret separatist movement but also the complex urban milieu of late nineteenth-century Manila and its hinterlands. What this critical analysis entailed is the close examination of both the proponents (Katipunan) and their opponents (Spanish state through its colonial institutions such as the Manila urban police force, *Guardia Civil Veterana*, and Spanish intelligence unit, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*) – by looking at the nature and development of each organization, their membership / recruitment process, and their motivation / *raison d'etre* – to better understand the 'anatomy of this revolution.'

The process of historical writing is not free from contention over public memory and knowledge production – indeed such critical interrogation of past writing, of received wisdom, is a key factor in scholarly, indeed intellectual progress. As long as the discourse of the 1896 revolution continues to dominate the study of Philippine history, the struggle for control over the past rages on, not in the battlefields but within the pages of history, making this study yet another shot fired.

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INTRODUCTION

The history of the Manila-based secret society Katipunan and its 1896 revolution has been considered as one of the most important albeit least understood historical events in Philippine nationalist historiography.[1] Indeed, there is no subject in the entire history of the Philippines that is more ubiqitous than the Katipunan uprising and yet, I chose to embark on a worn out path. What else is there left to say about this topic? My response echoes Philippine historian John Schumacher's own sentiment on the matter,

> Some writers consider the history of the Revolution to have overly dominated the attention of historians of the Philippines, to the detriment of more important subjects or of ones more relevant to contemporary concerns. . . .[r]ather than overworked, however, it would seem more accurate to say that the study of the Revolution has until recently scarcely been touched, because of the narrowness of the frameworks within which it has been studied, and the monolithic explanations of the course of events which have been advanced.[2]

While it is true that numerous studies have been conducted on the revolution of 1896, many of them do not offer new insights because they were bound to the same limitations encountered by other Philippine scholars such as scarcity of reliable sources;[3] problematic and loose class terminologies; inability to access Spanish documents (due to lack of Spanish language skills); too much reliance on perspectives and translations of established Philippine Revolution scholars such as Teodoro Agoncillo, Teodoro Kalaw,

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[1] Refer to Chapter One that focuses on examining the rich historiography of the 1896 revolution.

[2] John N. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," *Philippine Studies* 30 (1982), 445.

[3] See Glenn Anthony May, *Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996). For the huge controversy surrounding this book, see Bernardita Reyes Churchill (ed), *Determining the Truth: The Story of Andres Bonifacio: Being Critiques of and Commentaries on Inventing a Hero, The Posthumous Re-creation of Andres Bonifacio* (Manila; Quezon City: Manila Studies Association: National Commission for Culture and the Arts: Philippine National Historical Society, 1997).

Epifanio de los Santos, Reynaldo Ileto and others; strong attachment to nationalist perspective and binary approach (ie. revolutionaries vs. traitors; Filipinos vs. Spanish; elites vs. masses; 'the haves' vs. 'the have-nots'; 'revolt from below' vs. 'revolt from the middle'; propagandists/*ilustrados* vs. *Katipuneros*; Rizal vs. Bonifacio; Aguinaldo vs. Bonifacio; Manila/urban vs. Cavite/rural; Tagalog vs. the rest of the Philippines; national vs. regional history; reform vs. revolution); and the regurgitation of the same Katipunan information without verification.

Given all these obstacles to deal with, initially I was daunted by my choice of research inquiry. When I had decided to pursue this project I had wrongly assumed that I was in familiar territory, believing that I would not have any problems navigating this historical terrain. I have come to realize that I could not rely on my own knowledge (and my ten-plus years of History education in the Philippines) in uncovering the true nature of the Katipunan and its revolution. Moreover, it became more evident that the supposedly familiar historical actors were unrecognizable to me as I proceeded through this journey. And for the first time, I found my being a Filipino more of a liability rather than an asset in undertaking this research. My deeply ingrained state-sanctioned historical knowledge of Filipino national struggle, in which the Katipunan-led revolution remains prominent, was initially very difficult to ignore long enough to deconstruct the conventional narrative of what is regarded as the 1896 Philippine Revolution. However, before one can undertake such analytical endeavor one must know the dominant narrative of the 1896 Philippine Revolution and its significance in shaping the national psyche of Filipinos.

'There is no Philippine history before 1872'

To better understand the history of the rise of Filipino nation during the almost

400-year Spanish dominion eminent historian Teodoro A. Agoncillo offered this advice: "When one examines critically the texture and substance of our history under imperialist Spain one wonders, really, whether the Philippines had a history prior to 1872 or thereabouts. For what has been regarded as Philippine history before 1872 is not Philippine, but Spanish."[4] For Agoncillo, the Cavite Mutiny of 1872 marked the beginning of a difficult process towards national independence, culminating in the outbreak of the 1896 Philippine Revolution.[5]

It is important to point out that in the study of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines (1521-1898), the official historical narrative taught in Philippine schools has focused mainly on two significant time periods – (1) the arrival of Spanish colonizers in the archipelago (1521-1565); and (2) the rise of Filipino nationalism (1872-1897). Not surprisingly, the main emphasis in Philippine history classes is on the latter, which is then divided into the following: The rise of the Propaganda Movement (1872-1895); The rise of the Katipunan (1892-1896); and the first phase of the Philippine Revolution[6] (1896-1897). In this linear periodization the emphasis is on the transition from reform (led by educated and landed native elites such as Jose Rizal) to revolution (initiated by the poor masses such as Andres Bonifacio).

Starting with the significance of 1872, this year marked the outbreak of local uprising of Spanish mestizo officials and native military personnel at the Spanish arsenal in

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[4] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, "The Philippines Under Spanish Eyes," cited by Antonio C. Hila in *The Historicism of Teodoro Agoncillo* (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2001), 122.

[5] Notably, the hidden significance of the year 1872 was not lost on those who lived through the Martial Law period (1972-1981) under dictator Ferdinand Marcos. Being under a repressive state, the only way to criticize the Marcos regime was to write about a distant past when Filipinos rose up to revolt against an exploitative state.

[6] The second phase of the Philippine Revolution is the outbreak of Filipino-American War (1899-1901).

Cavite province, who resisted being subjected to paying personal taxes and doing forced labor, obligations which they were exempted before.[7] Known as the Cavite mutiny of 1872, this event became a pretext for the Spanish colonial state to persecute liberal natives and mestizos demanding political rights and the secularization of Philippine clergy (allowing native priests to take over parishes from Spanish friars such as the Augustinians, Dominicans, Recollects, Franciscans). The mutiny was immediately crushed but the blame was placed on Manila-based native elites and Filipino secular priests rather than the military personnel from the Spanish arsenal in Cavite province.

The repercussion was extreme that even the British consul in Manila could not comprehend why the Spanish state arrested about 120 prominent Filipinos including: secular priests (Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez, Jacinto Zamora, Agustin Mendoza, Mariano Sevilla, Jose Guevera, Miguel de Laza, Toribio H. del Pilar, and Vicente del Rosario); lawyers (Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, Jose Basa, Antonio Ma. Regidor, Bartolome Serra, Gervasio Sanchez, and Pedro Carrillo); 'civilians' (Enrique Paraiso, Jose Ma. Basa, Maximo Paterno, and Pio Ma. Basa); and businessmen (Maximo Inocencio, Crisanto de los Reyes, Vicente Zabala, and Balbino Mauricio).[8] According to the British consul's account in March 1872:

> We are unacquainted with the charges brought against the clergy and others who have been arrested and know nothing of the judicial proceedings instituted against

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[7] See the section 'A Mutiny and the Terror of 1872' for more detailed information about the Cavite Mutiny of 1872, in Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II* (Quezon City: AKLAHI Foundation Inc., 1989), 17-36. For copies of telegraph messages regarding the Cavite mutiny, see John N. Schumacher and Nicholas P. Cushner, "Documents Relating to Father Jose Burgos and the Cavite Mutiny of 1872," *Philippine Studies* vol. 17, no. 3 (1969), 457-529.

[8] The list of prisoners is from Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, *Los Sucesos de 1872*, *Reseña Histórica Bio-Bibliográfica*, Vol. III of *'Glorias Nacionales*' (Manila: Imp. de La Vanguardia, 1913), 115-117. Cited by O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II*, 21, 31-32.

> them, we are unable to discover the part played by them in the late disturbances; the origin of the same must therefore for the present be left more or less hidden in obscurity.
>
> But whatever may have been the motives that promoted this movement, it is evident that it was without organization and but very limited in its ramifications; for we find that the native troops sent from Manila fired on their brethren in arms at Cavite instead of assisting them as they might easily have done had they been so disposed; that no rumours of tumults were heard of in any of the towns or villages in the interiors; that no manifestations against the government took place among any portion of the native population at Manila; and that the people even of the town of Cavite remained throughout passive spectators of the scene.[9]

The aftermath of this event led to many Filipinos being deported to the Marianas or incarcerated in Bilibid military prison. As for the three priests (Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora) and another civilian named Francisco Saldua, the principal informer whose testimony was used to convict the three Filipino priests in exchange for lighter sentence, they were all charged with conspiracy and treason. Afterwards, they were all executed by garrote.[10]

According to historian Onofre Corpuz, "1872 left an indelible imprint and was an obsession to the next generation of Filipino leaders."[11] The outcry from this injustice believed to have awakened nationalist consciousness and galvanized young Filipinos like Jose Rizal (his older brother, Paciano, witnessed his mentor, Fr. Jose Burgos, executed) and Marcelo del Pilar (his older brother was deported to the Marianas) to challenge Spanish colonial rule and frailocracy in the Philippines.[12]

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[9] British consult report on March 10, 1872 from Horacio de la Costa, *Readings in Philippine History* (Manila: Bookmark, 1965), 179-180. Cited by O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II*, 20.

[10] O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II*, 31.

[11] O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II*, 36.

[12] O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II*, 36-37.

The aftermath of 1872 showed many young educated Filipinos becoming more politicized, with their families and friends fearing for their safety, had decided to send them to Europe to escape persecution. Surprisingly, these young Filipinos had more freedom to organize politically in Spain where they found support from Spanish liberals who were also anti-clerical. In addition, the prominent Filipinos who were deported in 1872 also provided financial assistance to these Filipino students and expatriates based in Europe campaigning for political reforms and expulsion of friars. The political mobilization of these educated Filipinos headed by Marcelo H. del Pilar and Jose Rizal became known as the Propaganda Movement.[13]

From the 1880s to 1892, the Propaganda Movement remained a formidable political force that attacked the repressive Spanish state and the abusive friars until the arrest of Rizal in Manila on some trumped up charges and his immediate exile to southern Philippines. Following Rizal's deportation, Spanish authorities criminalized the establishment of native associations and other political organizations. In addition, groups such as the newly- formed Filipino masonic lodges as well as the new separatist association, Katipunan, had to go underground. With Rizal in exile, the Propaganda Movement languished as financial support from other expatriates and wealthy Filipinos based in Manila declined for fear that they or their families might be arrested for associating with Rizal and others who were branded as subversives (*filibusteros*). As a result, the main newspaper of the Propaganda Movement, *La Solidaridad*, ceased publication in November 1895 due to lack of funds. By this time, the two leaders of the

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[13] Gregorio F. Zaide, *Manila during the Revolutionary period* (Manila: National Historical Commission, 1973), 33-41. Also see John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The Creation of Filipino Consciousness and The Making of the Revolution*, Rev. ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997).

Propaganda Movement could no longer direct the campaign efforts for political reforms and the expulsion of friars in the Philippines. Rizal was tucked away in the remote place in Dapitan while Del Pilar was suffering in Spain due to tuberculosis.

As the reformist Propaganda Movement and Rizal's short-lived La Liga Filipina declined by the mid-1890s, a new secret society emerged in July 1892 more inclined towards armed struggle. The revolutionary movement Katipunan was founded by individuals believed to be from lower social backgrounds. Adopting many Masonic practices such as having secret codes, arranging clandestine meetings, and using the triangle system to recruit members, the Katipunan remained a well-guarded albeit small association for four years.[14]

The sudden increase in membership (from 300 members to approx. several thousand members, depending on the chronicler)[15] on the eve of the revolution was attributed to the wide circulation of the first issue of *Kalayaan* ('Liberty'), Katipunan's newspaper published in early 1896. Strong ideas of nationalism and the desire to achieve independence from colonial rule spread across the Tagalog region outside Manila after copies of *Kalayaan* newspaper were circulated to other Filipinos.[16] As a result, thousands

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[14] Gregorio Zaide, *Manila during the Revolutionary Period*, 44.

[15] According to G. Zaide, 'By August, 1896, the eve of the Revolution, the total number of Katipunan members reached about 30,000. This was the estimate given by Dr. Valenzuela in his Memoirs. According to Manuel Sastron, Spanish author, the total members of the K.K.K. reached 123,500. James A. LeRoy, American historian, guessed the total membership to be between 190,000 and 400,000. Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera's estimate was 400,000. Nobody knows exactly the total members of the Katipunan because there is no official record of its membership." Cited from Zaide, *Manila during the Revolutionary Period*, 46. Zaide got his Katipunan membership numbers from Manuel Sastron, La *Insurreccion en Filipinas* (Madrid, 1897), 141; James A. LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I*, 85; *Report of the Philippine commission to the President, 1900, Vol. II* (Washington, D.C., 1900), 399.

[16] Arturo E. Valenzuela, *Dr. Pio Valenzuela and the Katipunan* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1992), 6. Also see Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), 101-102.

of common Filipinos (i.e. urban poor and rural peasants) joined the Katipunan few months prior to the outbreak of the revolution.

As part of the Katipunan's preparation, Bonifacio sent his delegate Dr. Pio Valenzuela to Dapitan to seek Rizal's advice and support to revolt against Spain in June 1896.[17] Despite Rizal refusing to give his support, Bonifacio and the Katipunan continued their preparation for the inevitable armed confrontation with the Spanish forces. No dates had been set yet but the Katipunan was already gathering strength in numbers and arms across the Tagalog region.

The sudden discovery of the Katipunan on 19 August 1896 resulted in mass arrest of suspected conspirators and masons, many of them were leading Filipino elites residing in Manila. Several days after the discovery of the secret revolutionary movement, the Philippine Revolution began with members of the Katipunan tearing their personal tax certificate (*cedulas personales*) and shouting "Long live the Philippines!" ("*Mabuhay ang Pilipinas!*"). This momentous event known as *Sigaw sa Pugad Lawin* (Cry of Pugad Lawin / *El grito de Pugad Lawin*) signaled the start of the revolution. By August 30, 1896 Governor General Ramon Blanco had placed eight Tagalog provinces including Manila, Cavite, Bulacan Laguna, Batangas, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Tarlac under martial law.[18]

Rizal, while on his way to Cuba, was arrested and immediately convicted of instigating the revolution that erupted in August 1896. On December 30, 1896 Jose Rizal was executed by firing squad in Bagumbayan. More executions followed as Spanish officials arrested and tortured more Filipinos into confession while being incarcerated in

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[17] Gregorio Zaide, *Manila during the Revolutionary Period*, 45-46.

[18] G. Zaide, *Manila during the Revolutionary Period*, 50-53.

Bilibid military prison.

In the meantime, the revolutionary battles raged on two years. During those times the revolutionary leadership shifted from Bonifacio to Emilio Aguinaldo, who led the more successful Cavite forces under the Magdalo branch of the Katipunan, following the Tejeros Convention which established the new provisional government under Aguinaldo.[19] In May 1897 Andres Bonifacio and his brother Procopio were summarily tried and executed by Aguinaldo's people for sedition and treason.[20] By December of 1897, hostilities between the Katipunan forces and the Spanish troops finally ended with the signing of Pact of Biak-na-Bato.

New Approaches to the study of Katipunan and its revolution

The main objective of this research inquiry is to analyze the outbreak of the 1896 revolution by identifying and examining both internal and external forces leading to the rise of the Manila-based secret society Katipunan and its path towards armed struggle. What this critical analysis entailed is the close examination of both the proponents (Katipunan) and their opponents (Spanish state through its colonial institutions such as the Manila urban police force, *Guardia Civil Veterana*, and Spanish intelligence unit, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*) – by looking at the nature and development of each organization, their membership / recruitment process, and their motivation / *raison d'etre* – to better understand the 'anatomy of this revolution.'[21]

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[19] Gregorio Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 126-131.

[20] Gregorio Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 133-136.

[21] Term derived from political scientist Crane Brinton's comparative work on revolutions entitled, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: A. Vintage, 1965, c1932)

During the course of this investigation, several key aspects in the study of the Katipunan and its path to armed struggle were revisited to offer new approaches to gain new perspectives. Among the key aspects about the Katipunan to be discussed are: (1) its 'plebeian' nature and composition; (2) its connection with the Propaganda Movement; (3) its revolutionary / radical nature; and (4) its spread from Manila to the surrounding provinces. What this research study offers are new approaches to examine the Katipunan and its 1896 revolution: (1) establishing stronger connection to Del Pilar and his Manila-based political organization, *Comité de Propaganda*; (2) emphasizing the significance of the rise of Philippine Masonry; (3) examining the escalation of Spanish state repression and its role in radicalizing the Katipunan; (4) focusing on the year 1895 as a critical turning point leading to the outbreak of the 1896 revolution; and (5) stressing the significance of the spread of the Katipunan from Manila to the Tagalog provinces.

One of these main aspects focuses on the popular depictions of the Katipunan as 'a plebeian association'[22] and its armed struggle as 'the revolt of the masses'[23] that became more prevalent during the 1970s (President Ferdinand Marcos' dictatorial regime) to drive a wedge between Filipino elites (ie. wealthy landowners, highly educated Filipinos, middle class) and the 'common people' (ie. urban workers, rural peasants, uneducated and illiterate Filipinos). However, there are other Philippine scholars who have argued that the Katipunan's origin was more from the middle element of society rather than 'the below.' Nonetheless, the official historical narrative still follows the dominant assumption

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[22] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* (Madrid: Tip. Lit. de J. Córrales, 1899).

[23] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan, 2002 edition* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2nd printing, 2005, c1956).

pertaining to the Katipunan and its revolution.

With the upcoming 120th anniversary of the Katipunan-led revolution of August 1896, emphasis will again be placed on the sacrifices of the poor and uneducated members of the Katipunan (*Katipuneros*) without acknowledging that those who actually started and spread the movement did not come from the lowest ranks of Philippine colonial society. In fact, several of these men and women had bourgeois background or came from propertied and politically influential families across the Tagalog region. And yet, the more conventional understanding of this Manila-based secret association is that it had always been a popular movement since its inception.

In building a case against the conventional notion of Katipunan's 'plebeian' nature and composition, we need to trace the origin of the secret society beyond Rizal's short-lived La Liga Filipina. This leads us to Marcelo H. del Pilar's political and anti-clerical organization, Comité de Propaganda. Close examination of Del Pilar and his political activism through this organization helps us establish a stronger connection between this early political movement and the Katipunan. In addition, by focusing on Del Pilar's link to the secret society new possibilities are made available to gain new perspectives on the nature and composition of the Katipunan, for example it highlights the important role of Masonry in tracing the Katipunan's path towards revolution.

The significance of Philippine Masonry to the rise of the Katipunan should not be underestimated because it is crucial to understanding the true nature of the separatist movement. Analyzing the rise of Filipino Freemasonry as well as the circumstances leading to intensification of state repression also provides further insights into the development of the Katipunan and its transition from a secret separatist organization to a

revolutionary movement. Contrary to popular depiction of Katipunan as a revolutionary organization from the beginning, the radical shift happened out of necessity rather than by design, in a much later date.

Following the conventional historical interpretation, the founding of the Katipunan in 1892 marked the immediate shift from reform to revolution, which then established a distinction between Rizal's and Del Pilar's Propaganda Movement, and Bonifacio's Katipunan. However, upon close examination of the early years of Katipunan, some of their activities were similar to Comité de Propaganda and Propaganda Movement in terms of disseminating information about the abuses of friars and state through pamphlets and their newspaper, *Kalayaan*. The only main difference was that Katipunan had to conduct their work underground.

By the year 1895, Katipunan was forced to undergo drastic changes as a direct result of intensification of colonial state repression. With the introduction in March 1895 of new intelligence unit, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia*, as well as the criminalization of Masonry and other native associations, the Katipunan needed to go deeper underground and be involved in more clandestine activities such as espionage to evade discovery. Another change for the Katipunan during 1895 was the effort to shift its recruitment activities beyond Manila and its hinterlands because it had become too dangerous to operate within the city limits. For the first time, Bonifacio encouraged provincial elite members to gather more members to establish Katipunan branches in the Tagalog provinces. This was a crucial move for the Katipunan because later on the provinces would play a critical role in sustaining and shaping the revolution. Manila might have been the urban crucible that led to the rise of the Katipunan, but it would take the combined forces from the surrounding

provinces in the Tagalog region such Cavite, Laguna, Batangas and Bulacan to transform a localized rebellion into a mass armed struggle.

Research outline

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter One "The Politics of Knowledge" examines the prevailing literature on the Katipunan and the 1896 Revolution. This chapter focuses on three groups of interpretations - Spanish, American and Filipino views.

Chapter Two "The Propaganda Movement and the rise of the Philippine Masonry, 1872-1892" traces the origin of the secret revolutionary movement, Katipunan, to two political groups steeped in liberal and reformist traditions. Chapter Three "Colonial Policing and Surveillance, 1872-1892" examines the colonial state's need to introduce institutionalized police force both in the rural areas (*Guardia Civil*) and in Manila (*Guardia Civil Veterana*). The beginning year for both chapters is 1872 because of its historical significance as the year of the beginning of Filipino nationalism.[24]

Chapter Four "The Katipunan in colonial Manila and its hinterlands, 1892-1895" focuses on the rise of the secret society and the various aspects of the movement. Three years prior to the outbreak of the revolution, the Katipunan was a close association with at least 300 members. During this time, there was no need to expand its membership beyond Manila. However, all of this changed in 1895.

Chapter Five "Repression and Revolution" analyzes correlation between increase

[24] Historian Teodoro Agoncillo even went so far as to claim that "There is no Philippine history before 1872" in his book, *History of the Filipino People*, 2nd edition (Quezon City: Malaya, 1967). This is the required college history textbook in the Philippines.

state repression and the radicalization of the secret society, Katipunan. The year 1895, I argue, was a pivotal year for the Katipunan because this was the beginning of its transition from a secret political association to a revolutionary movement. This was also the year when the Katipunan recognized that armed struggle was inevitable.

Conclusion

The outcome of this critical analysis has challenged many prevailing interpretations of the Katipunan and its armed struggle to offer different perspectives on a very complex period in colonial Philippines. Rather than adhering to the same old story of 'heroes and villains,' in this study there were no protagonist or antagonist to distract us from seeing the myriad of interests driving everyone's actions. The historical myth that the revolution of 1896 was a violent confrontation between two monolithic groups – the patriotic Katipuneros and the exploitative Spanish – has persisted long enough to warrant a more critical investigation.

The history of revolutionary struggle in late nineteenth-century Philippines will never be satisfyingly simple chronicle that Filipino nationalists might imagine. Rather than a simple bifurcation between oppressors versus nationalist or patriots versus traitors, we need to see past the labels and consider the *raison d'etre* of their respective actions. We can begin recognizing that the Spanish state post-1870 was part of the European liberal project and scientific governance involving sophisticated strategies for territorial consolidation – through centralized bureaucracy and coercive measures to curtail criminality or native dissidence. This, in turn, forces us to grasp that we are dealing with a powerful, penetrative apparatus that left a deep imprint on Filipino nationalism in general

and Katipunan in part. All this change represented a challenge that Katipunan had to either evade or confront.

CHAPTER 1

The Politics of Knowledge

Despite the rich tapestry of Philippine history, the study of the revolution of 1896 remains the focal point of the country's historiography.[25] Indeed, the historical figures and events of the 1896 Revolution continue to dominate the Philippine public discourse. This phenomenon was illustrated on November 30, 2013 by the nationwide commemoration of the 150th birth anniversary of Katipunan founder, Andres Bonifacio. Building on the theme of the celebration, "Bonifacio: Hero and Heroism," Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III invoked the patriotism of the "Great Plebeian" in his public address before the Bonifacio monument in Caloocan City. President Aquino stressed the hero's accomplishments despite the humble origins that he shared with the "ordinary Filipino [*karaniwang Pilipino*]," who was depicted as "barefoot, sleeves rolled up, and arms drenched in sweat [*nakayapak, nakarolyo ang manggas, at hitik sa pawis ang mga bisig*]"; "they are the ones," Aquino emphasized "who heeded the call of the Motherland for unity and to bring about meaningful renewal to the country [*sila ang tumugon sa panawagan ng Inang Bayan upang magkaisa at maghatid ng makabuluhang pagbabago sa bansa*]."[26]

The 2013 Bonifacio celebration, as always, prompted Filipino politicians and historians to reopen the long-standing and polarizing debate over who should be

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[25] John N. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," *Philippine Studies* vol. 30, no. 4 (1982), 445; Reynaldo C. Ileto, "The Revolution of 1896 and the Mythology of the Nation State," in *The Philippine Revolution and Beyond,* vol. I, edited by Elmer Ordonez (Manila: Philippine Centennial Commission NCCA, 1998), 61-62.

[26] De Jesus, Julliane Love, "Aquino honors Bonifacio heroism" in *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (November 30, 2013), PDI website - http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/537773/aquino-honors-bonifacio-heroism (Accessed on 9 April 2014).

recognized as the national hero of the Philippines – Jose Rizal or Andres Bonifacio – with some pushing for the declaration of Bonifacio as the first President of the Philippines instead of General Emilio Aguinaldo who, as President of the first Republic of the Philippines, led to long resistance struggle against American imperial conquest (1899-1901). The campaign to replace Rizal as the national hero even reached the Philippine Congress where three members of the House of Representative from the leftist political party *Bayan Muna* "filed House Bill 3431 declaring the leader of the revolutionary movement Katipunan [Bonifacio] the national hero."[27] On a similar note, well-known Filipino historians Zeus Salazar and Milagros Guerrero campaigned that Bonifacio also be recognized as the nation's first president, based on his designation as *Supremo* of the Katipunan.[28]

Given the enthusiasm that the Bonifacio celebration has generated, it is clear that the historical depiction of the Katipunan as a mass-based revolutionary movement still resonates among Filipinos as the basis for both myth making and nation-building.[29] Such engagement, however, demonstrates that Filipinos' understanding of the Katipunan is based on the prevailing idea that the 1896 Revolution was indeed a mass rebellion led by the "Great Plebeian" Andres Bonifacio – a thesis argued by Filipino historian Teodoro

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[27] Cabacungan Jr., Gil, "Bonifacio pushed as national hero" in *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (November 30, 2013), PDI website - http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/537375/house-bill-seeks-to-declare-bonifacio-national-hero (Accessed on 9 April 2014). The copy of the House Bill No. 3431 (30 November 2013) can be found in the Philippine Congress website - http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/basic_16/HB03431.pdf (Accessed on 9 April 2014)

[28] Martin, Sammy F. "Andres Bonifacio's 150th birth anniversary highlighted 2013 Independence Day celebration," *Zambo Times* website - http://www.zambotimes.com/archives/news/67741-Andres-Bonifacio146;s-150th-birth-anniversary-highlighted-2013-Independence-Day-celebration.html (Accessed 9 April 2014).

[29] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "The Revolution of 1896 and the Mythology of the Nation State," 61.

Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* nearly sixty years ago (1956) and first articulated by Filipino propagandist Isabelo de los Reyes in his *La sensacional memoria* over fifty years before that (1899).[30]

Given the central importance of both Bonifacio and the Katipunan in the origins of an event deemed critical to Filipino nationhood, interpretation of the multifaceted nature of this secret association remains a highly contested terrain for contemporary Philippine scholars. This historical exploration of the Katipunan must, therefore, examine the development of the historiography about the organization to gain further understanding of the complexity of the revolutionary movement by looking at the colonial (Spanish and American) and Filipino (early nationalist and post-independence) viewpoints. However, the main focus of this introductory exegesis is to determine how the dominant idea of the 1896 Revolution as 'the revolt of the masses' was constructed and how this class-oriented nationalist viewpoint has played a crucial role in shaping Filipino public memory about the Katipunan as the first anti-colonial revolutionary movement in Philippine history.

As noted above, the preoccupation with the rise of the Katipunan has produced numerous publications since the outbreak of the 1896 Revolution which can be divided into three distinctive viewpoints – Spanish colonial, US imperial, and Filipino national. In retrospect, each of these viewpoints is a prism, interpreting or reinterpreting the nature of the 1896 Revolution and its instigator, the Katipunan, through the politics and prejudices of each chronicler of this anti-colonial uprising. To approach something akin to Katipunan's original composition and context, we need to excavate the layered middens of

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[30] Teodoro Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan, 2002 edition* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2nd printing, 2005, c1956); Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* (Madrid: Tip. Lit. de J. Córrales, 1899).

Philippine historical writing to recover some shards of fact about the central actors in this foundational event.

The first viewpoint in "revolutionary historiography" did not include scholarly works but Spanish intelligence reports, official accounts and testimonies from suspected revolutionaries. By the end of the revolutionary struggle with Spain in 1898, first-hand accounts of *Katipuneros* and captive friars published in the Philippines and Spain, attributed the outbreak of armed rebellion to native struggle against colonial oppression and Masonic conspiracies.[31]

On the other hand, the second viewpoint involved contributions from both American officials and scholars who started writing about the Katipunan, using captured revolutionary documents and news clippings to better defeat General Aguinaldo's revolutionary army. After the end of the Filipino-American War in 1902, American scholars continued to write about the Katipunan to heighten the contrast between the supposedly backward Spanish colonial regime and the benevolent US imperial rule over the Philippines.

Between the late 1890s and 1940s Filipino nationalists produced some of the earliest accounts of the history writing of the 1896 Revolution, often as part of the myth-making process of nation-building. Among these early Filipino scholars were Isabelo de los Reyes, Epifanio de los Santos, Hermenegildo Cruz, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Gregorio Zaide who presented the Katipunan and its rebellion as a pivotal event in the progress towards Filipino nationhood. After independence in 1946, the resurgence of nationalist and leftist revolutionary sentiments among many Filipinos prompted the publication of still

[31] J. N. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," 447.

more works on the revolutionary movement. The first major work among them, Teodoro Agoncillo's book, came out in the midst of controversy prompted by a state effort to suppress its publication. Despite strong opposition to its 1956 release, Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* was soon considered the "new master-text of the revolution"[32] that paved way for the emergence of later contributions by Reynaldo C. Ileto, Renato Constantino, Milagros Guerrero, Isagani Medina, and Emmanuel Calairo. This scholarly debate also attracted contributions from foreign scholars, notably Fr. John N. Schumacher, Glenn A. May, Jim Richardson, and Michael Cullinane, among others.

Over the span of century, the entanglement of multiple forces and interests has produced a range of interpretations of the rise and composition of the Katipunan. Furthermore, the historical process of reconstructing what had happened not only reflects the complex nature of the revolution but also reveals a good deal about the motives behind the historical analysis of the anti-colonial movement. Given the diversity of interpretation, this study will interrogate the dominant view of the Katipunan as a mass-based organization led by Andres Bonifacio, the so-called "The Great Plebeian," hoping thereby to approach a more realistic portrayal of the precursors of the 1896 Revolution.

Spanish viewpoints

The earliest Spanish colonial accounts of the secret society Katipunan focused on its direct connection to a Freemasonry allegedly conspiring to overthrow the Spanish regime both in the colonies and the metropole. The documents highlighted two suspected characteristics of the Katipunan – its international Masonic association and its anti-friar

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[32] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "The Revolution of 1896 and the Mythology of the Nation State," 71.

stance. It is important to note that the initial Spanish writings about the Katipunan were confidential documents addressed to the governor-general of the Philippines as well as the Ministry of Colonies in Spain that were never meant to be widely distributed. Their sole purpose was to alert the colonial government about the possible threat of rebellion. Thus, one of the first Spanish accounts was an intelligence report compiled by the *Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila* (Manila's urban paramilitary police force) to identify and suppress dissidents conspiring to overthrow the Spanish regime.

As the revolutionary forces were first mobilizing in August 1896, Captain Olegario Diaz, the commanding officer of *Guardia Civil Veterana*, compiled a comprehensive intelligence report on the Katipunan for Governor-General Ramon Blanco. Since its conception in 1872, the *Guardia Civil Veterana* had been conducting surveillance of Filipinos who were suspected previously of instigating an uprising in the province of Cavite.[33]

The Cavite Mutiny of 1872 was a warning for the Spanish colonial regime to increase their vigilance against the threat of native uprisings emerging from clandestine organizations or societies led by Filipino liberal elites. After the public execution of three Filipino secular priests and the exile of many wealthy Filipinos, all charged with sedition and treason, the Spanish colonial government in Manila established the *Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila* to police the city and its surroundings.

Among those individuals under close surveillance were Katipunan members, even

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[33] "Statement of Captain Olegario Diaz - *'K.K.K.N.M.A.N.B.: Kataastaasang Kalagayan Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan*'" (signed in Manila, dated 28 October 1896), translated and annotated by Francis St. Clair in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune* (Manila: Tip. "Amigos del Pais", 1902); Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n44/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013). The 39-page copy of original Spanish report dated 28 October 1896 is part of the *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection at the National Commission of Culture and Arts.

though the Spanish authorities initially assumed that the secret society was a Masonic movement. By July 1896, however, the first Spanish official to begin to suspect the existence of a more seditious organization was Colonel Manuel Sityar, a creole officer of the *Guardia Civil* patrolling the *arrabales* (suburbs) of Mandaluyong and San Juan Del Monte at the outskirts of Manila.[34] He reported to the Civil Governor of Manila Manuel Luengo, that he believed that there might be "a formidable conspiracy against Spain [*la existencia* de *una formidable conjuración contra España*]" brewing within Manila and its surroundings. Sityar pointed out that there were clandestine gatherings happening in the areas of San Juan del Monte, Mandaluyong, San Felipe Neri and Pasig where men were "signing with their own blood [*firmasen con propia sangre*]."[35]

While Sityar did not emphasize the similarity in rituals between these secret meetings and the Masonic movement, Captain Diaz's report, written less than four months after Col. Sityar's warnings was explicit about the connection between the Freemasonry and the Katipunan. In sum, Captain Diaz attributed the establishment of the Katipunan to Filipino freemasonry under the guidance of anti-friar propagandist Marcelo del Pilar[36] –

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[34] Arnaldo Dumindin, "Philippine-American War, 1899-1902, *Philippine-American War* website - http://philippineamericanwar.webs.com/thephilippinearmy.htm (Accessed on 5 March 2014).

[35] Numero 20, Report of Colonel Manuel Sityar to Civil Governor of Manila, 5 July 1896, in *Archivo del bibliófilo filipino: recopilación de documentos históricos, cientificos, literarios y politicos, y estudios bibliográficos, Vol 3* by Wenceslao Emilio Retana (Madrid: *Imprenta de la viuda de Manuel Minuesa de los Rios*, 1897), 79-80.

[36] The 39-page copy of original Spanish report dated 28 October 1896 is part of the *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection at the National Commission of Culture and Arts.

Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

and in so doing propounded an argument that would remain central to the Spanish colonial writing on the 1896 Revolution.

In his account of the Katipunan's rise, Captain Diaz stated that "Marcelo H. del Pilar, [writing] from Madrid, in July 1892, advised the creation of another association, which was to be similar thereto, but which was to include the agricultural laborers and persons of little or no education and instruction, but who directed in the localities by the caciques and chiefs, were to form an enormous nucleus which should, at the proper time, give forth the cry of rebellion."[37] Although Captain Diaz's account should be taken with a grain of salt, it is still surprising that, as the colonial state prepared its sedition charges against Rizal in 1896, the official findings of the investigation on the Katipunan identified Del Pilar, not Rizal, as the leader of the revolutionary movement. In his report, Captain Diaz stressed on Del Pilar's extensive involvement in both Freemasonry and the Propaganda Movement while relegating Rizal to an essentially secondary role.[38]

Clearly, Captain Diaz recognized Del Pilar's influence within the revolutionary

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"Statement of Captain Olegario Diaz - *'K.K.K.N.M.A.N.B.: Kataastaasang Kalagayan Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan*'" (signed in Manila, dated 28 October 1896), translated and annotated by Francis St. Clair in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 38; Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n44/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

[37] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

"Statement of Captain Olegario Diaz - *'K.K.K.N.M.A.N.B.: Kataastaasang Kalagayan Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan*'" (signed in Manila, dated 28 October 1896), translated and annotated by Francis St. Clair in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune* (Manila: Tip. "Amigos del Pais", 1902), 38; Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n44/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

[38] Francis St. Clair, Note No. 70 in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 217, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n224/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

movement. Even British writer, Francis St. Clair (*nom de plume* of J. Brecknock Watson), who annotated Diaz's statement in his publication, *The* Katipunan*: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune* (1902), could not help but agree with Diaz's assessment that Del Pilar had more impact on the Katipunan than Rizal. In his annotations St. Clair argued: "The idea that the *Liga* was an introduction to the Katipunan is not borne out by the facts of the case. The *Liga Filipina* was a foundation of Rizal whilst the Katipunan was a conception of [del] Pilar."[39] St. Clair also made a distinction between the kind of movement Del Pilar had envisioned and what emerged under Bonifacio's leadership, saying that although "[Del] Pilar's plan was revolutionary; Bonifacio's truly anarchistic."[40]

Despite the assertions of Captain Diaz and St. Clair about Del Pilar's active role in the revolutionary movement, it still remains conjecture without more concrete evidence. It also did not help that St. Clair's publication was presumed to be part of friar propaganda to discredit the Freemasons through association with the Katipunan rather than a careful study of the revolutionary society. In his introduction, St. Clair clearly states that "the Katipunan [was] the bastard child of Filipino masonry" led by Marcelo Del Pilar who "conceived the plot of the Katipunan farsical-tragedy" to destroy the Church and overthrow

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[39] Francis St. Clair, Note No. 70 in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 217, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n224/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

[40] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

the colonial state.[41]

As a result, St. Clair's work attracted criticism from Masons in the Philippines and the United States, notably James A. Robertson, director of the Philippine National Library during the early American period. Robertson disparaged St. Clair and his understanding of the Katipunan when he responded to a query from a fellow Mason about the accuracy of St. Clair's annotated Diaz report on the Katipunan in *The Builder Magazine*, a well-known American Masonic publication. Robertson wrote that British author J. Brecknock Watson (aka Francis St. Clair) worked for the Dominican order, and therefore the pamphlet was "ultra anti-Masonic in character" that claimed, "the Katipunan has often been designated 'the fighting body of Masonry.' "[42] Robertson asserted that St. Clair's work was "utterly untrustworthy" and that the Katipunan "in no sense can the organization be said to be Masonry, nor did it have any connection with Masonry," despite some of its founding members being Masons.[43]

Perhaps the reason why both St. Clair and Captain Diaz were determined to link Del Pilar to the founding of Katipunan was his position as a high-ranking Mason. As the Worshipful Master of the Filipino lodge in Madrid, the *Logia Solidaridad*, Del Pilar helped establish Philippine Masonry in Manila and in the provinces – sufficient grounds for the Spanish to suspect him, along with the Masons in the Philippines, for instigating the

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[41] Francis St. Clair, Note No. 70 in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 9-10, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n224/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

[42] James A. Robertson, "The Katipunan," *The Builder Magazine*, Vol. II no. 2 (February 1916), Phoenix Masonry.org - http://www.phoenixmasonry.org/the_builder_1916_february.htm (Accessed on 10 October 2013).

[43] J. A. Robertson, "The Katipunan," *The Builder Magazine* (February 1916), http://www.phoenixmasonry.org/the_builder_1916_february.htm (Accessed on 10 October 2013).

Revolution. If Robertson's assumption of the Dominicans' involvement in St. Clair's work was accurate, then the annotated report was likely aimed towards alerting Americans about the danger of allowing Freemasonry to continue in the Philippines.

Other Spanish writers adopted Captain Diaz' conclusion about the nature of the revolutionary movement and the origins of the 1896 Revolution. Spanish journalist Wenceslao E. Retana compiled captured Katipunan and Masonic publications as well as Spanish documents pertaining to the revolution. In his annotated volume, Retana emphasized the *Katipuneros*' "plan to kill all friars and burn them rather than bury their bodies. . . . for all of the 'felonies that in life they committed against the noble Filipinos during three centuries of their nefarious domination'."[44] Although Retana's publication was not a study of the Katipunan, he basically points to the nefarious intention of the revolutionary movement by highlighting documents explicitly stating that "our [Katipunan's] main objective is to not leave any Spaniards alive for the future of the Philippine Republic [*nuestro principal objeto no dejar ningún castila vivo en toda la futura República filipina*]."[45]

Moreover, by establishing a connection between the Katipunan and the illegal Masonic societies, Retana ensured that his Spanish audience would have no doubt about the gravity of the situation for a Spanish empire already in decline. Realizing that Spain's attention was directed more toward the Cuban revolution, perhaps it was Retana's attempt

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[44] Wenceslao E. Retana, Document no. 54, *Archivo del bibliofilo Filipino*, vol. 3 (Madrid; Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1897), 156-158. Also cited and translated by Vicente L. Rafael, "*Conjuración*/Conspiracy in the Philippine Revolution of 1896" in *Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon* edited by Carol Gluck and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 227.

[45] W. E. Retana, Document no. 17, *Archivo del bibliofilo Filipino*, vol. 3, 71.

to redirect Spain's priorities to its Pacific colony and, thereby, pressure the Spanish metropole into sending military reinforcements to defend their position in the Philippines against the barbaric rebel group intent of mass murder of Spanish colonials.[46]

If one examines these Spanish works at face value, it would be easy to dismiss their worth as source materials for this volatile period of native uprising. Despite their obvious shortcomings, it is clear that both Captain Diaz and Retana were cognizant of the crucial connection of the Katipunan to both the Propaganda Movement and Freemasonry, thus forming a thesis that later Filipino nationalist scholars such as Epifanio de los Santos, Hermenegildo Cruz, Gregorio Zaide, and Teodoro Agoncillo would later reject in their effort to minimize the role of Filipino elites in the membership of the Katipunan.

American viewpoints

As long as the analysis of American imperial historians remained within the context of a localized anti-colonial effort against Spain, then their publications did not encounter opposition in Washington. Once the study of the Katipunan started to expose US imperial ambitions, then such writings, particularly those by Captain John Taylor, were suppressed for fear of undermining the US colonial position in the Philippines – providing yet another instance of a political regime shaping historical scholarship, albeit in this case through a crude coercion.

Adopting the same propaganda tactics used by Spaniards such as Wenceslao E. Retana, American writers and civil officials such as James LeRoy, secretary to Dean Worcester and advisor to Governor-General William Howard Taft, generally denigrated

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[46] Vicente L. Rafael, "*Conjuración*/Conspiracy in the Philippine Revolution of 1896," 227.

the Katipunan's reasons for starting a revolution. By presenting the *Katipuneros* as "quasi-political bandits"[47] and common thieves donning the guise of revolutionary patriots, Americans could justify maintaining order by crushing these "bloodthirsty Filipinos, both radical intellectuals and Katipunan masses."[48] LeRoy added that the Church "ignorantly regarded the Katipunan also as Masonic. This was simply an extension of the idea of secret association among the masses, copied after the Masonic organisations [sic] of the upper class by the new and more resolute, also bloodthirsty, leaders of the middle class, chief among them Andres Bonifacio."[49] By emphasizing the importance of the propaganda movement in demanding political and social reforms, LeRoy and other Americans were able to minimize the significance of the Filipinos' revolutionary struggle.[50]

As an ambitious civil servant identified with the US imperial project, LeRoy secured his privileged colonial position as an expert on the Philippines, and then used his connections to Worcester and Taft to dominate colonial knowledge of Philippine history – an ambition that drove him to take control of the bibliographical project of Emma Blair and James A. Robertson.[51] After pressing his 'suggestions' on Blair and Robertson not to rely on friar accounts in the first four of their fifty-four-volume series, LeRoy then took

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[47] See photo caption of revolutionary prisoner, Faustino Guillermo. LeRoy used the descriptor "quasi-political bandit chief" to refer to Guillermo, a Katipunero who rose to ranks and became one of the last revolutionary leaders to be captured and executed in 1903. James A. LeRoy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (New York, N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), see photo insert between pp. 156 and 157.

[48] LeRoy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country*, 158.

[49] LeRoy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country*, 157.

[50] James LeRoy letter to James A. Robertson, 18 February 1904, Robert, James Alexander, special correspondence, Box 5, Library of Congress. Cited by Gloria Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda," *Philippine Studies* vol. 56, no. 1 (2008), 31-32.

[51] G. Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda," 24-26.

over the project after the fifth volume, and henceforth limited documents pertaining to seminal events in Philippine history such as the 1863 Spanish reforms, the Cavite Mutiny of 1872, and the Katipunan-led revolution of 1896.[52] At the same time, LeRoy criticized the Spanish and Filipino scholars whom Robertson had earlier consulted for this multivolume work on Philippine history.[53]

One of LeRoy's targets was W. E. Retana, whom he accused of being a "hireling of the friars" and, thus, could not be considered as reliable source "as I [LeRoy] hold everything obtained from him [Retana] as suspicious" due to being "mentally despicable, a cheat, [and] a turncoat."[54] According to Gloria Cano's article on the Blair and Robertson volumes, LeRoy felt threatened by Retana's vast knowledge on the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines. At the same time, LeRoy criticized Filipino writers and intellectuals such as Isabelo de los Reyes and Pedro Paterno largely because of their political leanings.[55] LeRoy explained his strong objections to De los Reyes in an August 1904 letter to Robertson, stating that De los Reyes was "the merest superficial and facile user of words, a plagiarist, pretender and fakir in politics; one will hardly expect scholarly work from him in writing of other sorts."[56] However, his aversion to De los Reyes[57] and his works did not

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[52] G. Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898," 23-34.

[53] G. Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898," 27-28, 31-33.

[54] James LeRoy letter to James A. Robertson, 5 February1905, *James Alexander Robertson manuscripts*, Box 2, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. Cited by Gloria Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda," 27-28.

[55] Gloria Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda," 32.

[56] James LeRoy letter to James A. Robertson, 10 August 1904, Robert, James Alexander, special correspondence, Box 5, Library of Congress. Cited by Gloria Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda," 32.

[57] James A. LeRoy, *Philippine life in town and country*, 166.

stop LeRoy from contacting him directly to request a copy of his initial report to Governor-General Primo de Rivera on the 1896-97 Revolution, which LeRoy mistakenly thought was entitled "*Mi Participación en la Revolución Filipina*/My Participation in the Philippine Revolution."[58]

Leroy's effort to control knowledge-production about the Philippines did not stop with the Blair and Robertson project. In 1909, he turned his attention to Captain John M. Taylor's compilation of captured Philippine revolutionary documents and convinced both President Taft and his chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs, General Clarence Edwards, to suppress their publication. Relying on secondary sources, LeRoy was preparing his own work on the same subject, and may have been concerned that Captain Taylor's writing contradicted everything that LeRoy had earlier claimed about the "bloodthirsty" Katipunan in his book *Philippine Life in Town and Country* (1907).[59]

Providing ample reason for its suppression, at least from the US imperial perspective, Captain Taylor's chapter on Philippine insurrection begins with a surprisingly balanced summary. "The Filipino insurrection of 1896-97 was planned and carried out under the auspices of a society, local to the Philippines, called the 'Katipunan'," Taylor wrote, "formed by what afterwards became the revolutionary clique with the expressed purpose of securing reforms in the government of the Philippines, but whose unexpressed

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[58] James LeRoy letter to Isabelo de los Reyes, 13 October 1903, LeRoy, James Alfred, 1875-1909, personal letters, Box 1, Folder 1, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. Cited by Gloria Cano, " Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898: Scholarship or Imperialist Propaganda", 32.

[59] Renato Constantino, "Historical Truths from Biased Sources," in *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume I, 1571 to May 19, 1898* edited and annotated by John R. M. Taylor (Pasay City, Philippines: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), xi-xii.

and ultimate object was to obtain independence of the archipelago."[60] Though certain terms such as "clique" and "unexpressed" are slightly pejorative, Taylor's assessment is far more neutral than LeRoy's dismissive term "bandits."[61]

Filipino Viewpoints

Understandably, the writings of Filipino scholars have been the most influential in the construction of the Philippine national narrative of the 1896 uprising. Rather than being labeled as an organization of militant anti-friar Masons (the Spanish view) or as the "Tagalog uprising" that served as the background for the "insurgency" against the United States (the American view), Filipino scholars have (re)constructed the 1896 rebellion as a defining moment in the history of Filipino people[62] and designated it "the Philippine Revolution."[63] Nevertheless, the study of the 1896 Revolution remains contested and politicized within Filipino historiography.

Since the very first Filipino account of the key historical actors and events of the 1896 Revolution, the perception of its history has long been articulated along class lines even before the concept of class and class struggle took hold in the Philippines. Rather than concentrating on a nationalist discourse to explain the origin of the revolution, Filipino accounts have focused more on the rebellion as a struggle between a presumed mass-based Katipunan led by "The Great Plebeian" Andres Bonifacio and a body of elite

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[60] J. R. M. Taylor, " Chapter III: The Philippine Insurrection of 1896-97", in *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*, 61.

[61] J. R. M. Taylor, " Chapter III: The Philippine Insurrection of 1896-97", 61; J. LeRoy, *Philippine Life in Town and Country*, see photo insert between p. 156 and 157.

[62] Ileto, "The Revolution of 1896 and the Mythology of the Nation State," 61.

[63] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* (1899).

Filipinos, many linked to the Propaganda Movement and La Liga Filipina who are said to have "betrayed" the Revolution.[64] While there are efforts to deviate from the conventional approach by shifting to other analytical frameworks (as in the works of Reynaldo Ileto), nonetheless, the widely accepted Filipino narrative of the revolutionary era is still framed, through the method of 'history from below,' by the binary opposition of elites versus masses.

The origin of the dominant perception of the Katipunan as "a plebeian association" can be traced to 1897, when the *ilustrado* nationalist Isabelo de los Reyes published the first Filipino analysis of the revolutionary organization.[65] Given pervasive influence of the idea of Katipunan as mass-based movement in the study of 1896 Revolution, it is important to trace this interpretation back to its origins – that is, back to De los Reyes' investigative report, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* (1899). Although its circulation in the Philippines was limited after its Madrid publication in 1899, De los Reyes' analysis of the Katipunan, based on his personal interviews of society members who were his fellow cellmates in Manila's Bilibid prison, has placed a lasting imprint on the historiography of the movement, particularly, the efforts to define the true nature and composition of its membership. Though not widely acknowledged, careful analysis of this text leads to the inescapable conclusion that nearly all-subsequent efforts to profile the members of the Katipunan have been derived largely, if not entirely, from this 1899 *Memoria* by De los Reyes. Given its seminal place in the

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[64] T. Agoncillo, "Chapter VII: Betrayal" in *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan,* 2002 ed., 102-120.

[65] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97*, 12; Teodoro Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 1.

revolution's historiography, it is necessary to begin the discussion of "the Filipino viewpoint" with a close examination of Isabelo de los Reyes' work.

Isabelo's *Memoria*

Isabelo de los Reyes' *La sensacional memoria* (1899) is the pivotal source on the Katipunan for two important reasons: first, it is the earliest Filipino analysis of the society's membership; and, second, it was based on personal interviews with *Katipuneros* shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this *memoria* (account/report) would have a central place in the formation of subsequent Filipino narratives of the Revolution, beginning with earlier Filipino nationalists such as Epifanio de los Santos and Hermenegildo Cruz, and then later followed by Filipino historians Gregorio Zaide and his student Teodoro Agoncillo. As such, in the introduction to his *The Revolt of the Masses* (1956), Agoncillo wrote that the Katipunan was "a distinctly plebeian society" – words corresponding closely to the 1899 conclusion of De los Reyes that it "has been entirely a plebeian association" ["*ha sido una asociación puramente plebeya*"].[66]

De los Reyes' analysis of the nature and composition of the revolutionary movement led him to conclude that the Katipunan was first and foremost "a plebeian association [*una asociación plebeya*]" that was composed of "poor and ignorant / unlettered *katipuneros* [*los pobres é ignorantes katipuneros*]."[67] Significantly, he was the first Filipino scholar to attempt a characterization of the revolutionary movement and, from the outset, constructed it as "plebeian" in origin and composition. However, De los Reyes' generalization of the Katipunan membership was neither an exercise in scholarly analysis

[66] Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses, 2002 edition*, 1. Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 12.

[67] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 12, 79, 107.

nor an assertion of his commonality with fellow nationalists. In fact, De los Reyes' motives were understandably self-serving, under extraordinary circumstances of his own incarceration and possible execution, by pointing out that he had little in common with these revolutionaries.

As a well-known *ilustrado* nationalist and literary figure, De los Reyes' direct association with Rizal during the 1890s and his criticism of the Spanish colonial rule marked him as *filibustero* (subversive) by the Spanish authorities. Immediately after Rizal's execution in December 1896, De los Reyes was arrested along with many suspected subversives and spent four months in Manila's *Carcel y Presidio Correccional* (Old Bilibid Prison) along with a number of members of the Katipunan and La Liga Filipina. In a prison with maximum capacity for 1,127 prisoners (600 in the *carcel*/jail and 527 in the *presidio*/military prison), his four months of confinement resulted in intimate conversations with prisoners, potentially totaling some 2,000 waking hours during an incarceration devoid of any other distractions. De los Reyes and other suspected Katipunan members were detained awaiting trial, and for many, summary execution. Many of those who were immediately executed by January 1897 were well-known Filipino propagandists such as Moises Salvador and Domingo Franco. These men were never supporters of the revolutionary movement but were members of La Liga Filipina and therefore, associated with Jose Rizal, who had been executed a month before. As Masons, they were already marked as instigators of revolution. Even though De los Reyes was neither associated with the Filipino masonry nor with La Liga Filipina, he was a notorious personality to friars and other Spanish officials whose propaganda work marked him as a conspirator and placed him at risk of summary execution – circumstances that may well

have heightened his powers of observation and inclined him to bend his analysis in certain understandably self-serving directions.[68]

Incarcerated in Bilibid prison on sedition charges in January 1897, De los Reyes was part of the "300 political prisoners from various provinces detained in a single cell."[69] Under these circumstances, De los Reyes interviewed his fellow prisoners, in particular Ladislao Diwa and Valentin Diaz who were two of the founding members of Katipunan.[70] During his interactions with his fellow cellmates, De los Reyes began compiling his notes as part of the earlier draft of his *Memoria sobre de la Revolución*, which he submitted to the new governor-general, Fernando Primo de Rivera. According to Filipino scholar Resil Mojares, "[i]nitially the document took the form of a *Memoria de agravios de los Filipinos*, a list of complaints addressed to Primo de Rivera and meant to gain sympathy for the rebels by exposing the abuses of the friars that had caused the rebellion.... Many prisoners wanted to sign the *Memoria* but Isabelo decided to take sole responsibility. Several copies were made in prison (one of which was given to Luis Viza, S.J., Bilibid Jesuit chaplain, and eventually wound up in the Jesuit Archives in San Cugat, Barcelona). The original was said to have been smuggled out of Bilibid in the shoe of Isabelo's ten-

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[68] Resil B. Mojares, "Isabelo de los Reyes," in *Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de los Reyes and the Production of Modern Knowledge* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006), 261-263.

[69] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 38. Also see William Henry Scott, "Isabelo de los Reyes: Provinciano and Nationalist," *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain and Other Essays in Philippine History*, Foreword by Renato Constantino (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1982), 276; Resil B. Mojares, "Isabelo de los Reyes," in *Brains of the Nation*, 265.

[70] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional*, 107. Another founding member, Teodoro Plata, was detained and then later, executed in February 1897 along with Roman Basa, the second president of Katipunan, but De los Reyes could not speak with them since they were imprisoned in Fort Santiago.

year-old son Jose[71] and delivered to the governor-general on February 13, 1897."[72]

The *Memoria* itself was a handwritten document that underwent several revisions during the course of De los Reyes' four-month incarceration in Bilibid. As mentioned earlier, it started as simply a list of grievances that De los Reyes collected from his fellow cellmates. Given that he had nothing to do inside his crowded cell but wait for his sentence, De los Reyes began interviewing his cellmates about the Katipunan and writing a series of short articles based on the interviews that he planned to publish in Spain upon his release.[73] When De los Reyes was finally pardoned on May 17, 1897, he immediately revised his articles, compiled them along with the previous list of grievances, and added a bold ultimatum warning Governor-General Primo de Rivera that the falsely accused wealthy Filipinos, both bourgeoisie and *ilustrados*, might join the revolution if they were not granted "political rights as true Spanish citizens."[74] By the time *Memoria* was published two years later at Madrid in 1899, it also included another series of articles that De los Reyes wrote while incarcerated in Barcelona.

During his four-month confinement in Bilibid prison before his deportation to

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[71] The information regarding the smuggling of the list inside the shoes of Isabelo's son was mentioned in Miguel Morayta's prologue, "*... y ocultándose de sus guardianes, el <Memorial de agravios de los filipinos>, que, extendido en limpio, sacó dentro de sus zapatos uno de sus hijos para ser certificado en correos y llegar, como llegó, al Capitán general Primo de Rivera*." Cited from Miguel Morayta, "*Dos Palabras á propósito de este folleto*" in *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97*, iv.

[72] Mojares, "Isabelo de los Reyes," in *Brains of the Nation*, 265. According to W. H. Scott, "Its [*Memoria*'s] list of popular complaints was included in a footnote to Retana's *Vida y Escritos del Dr. Jose Rizal*, and is probably the *Memoria de agravios de los Filipinos*." Cited from W. H. Scott, "Isabelo de los Reyes: Provinciano and Nationalist," *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain and Other Essays in Philippine History*, 278.

[73] W. H. Scott, "Isabelo de los Reyes: Provinciano and Nationalist," *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain and Other Essays in Philippine History*, 276.

[74] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 33-34. Cited and translated by W. H. Scott, "Isabelo de los Reyes: Provinciano and Nationalist," 278.

Barcelona, De los Reyes' conversations with his fellow prisoners about the revolutionary movement led him to allege that the Katipunan "has been entirely a plebeian association" ["*ha sido una asociación puramente plebeya"*].[75] Initially, one would assume that De los Reyes' usage of the term '*plebeya*' (plebeian) was derived from the original Latin word '*plebeius*' to mean free citizens who were not from society's elite groups. In his analysis of the composition of Katipunan membership, De los Reyes listed the kinds of people who belonged in the movement, identifying specific groups as members based on their livelihoods (or *officios*) rather than their class (or social status), stating: "It [the Katipunan] has been entirely a plebeian association, composed of sharecroppers, lessees and tenants of friars, (who are) resentful of these (friars): peasants, ordinary soldiers without rank, clerks, laundrymen and other of this class" ["*Ha sido una asociación puramente plebeya, compuesta de los aparceros, arrendatarios é inquilinos de los frailes, resentidos de éstos: campesinos, militares sin graduación, escribientes, lavanderos y otros de esta clase*"].[76]

Furthermore, De los Reyes argued that the plebeian Katipunan was not, as the colonial government had concluded, comprised of the three social entities – "the aristocrats/rich, middleclass/bourgeoisie and popular" ["*aristocratico, burgués y popular"*],[77] De los Reyes pointed out that both "the country's wealthy element [*el elemento rico del pais*]" and "the middle element or bourgeoisie, as personified by those in La Liga Filipina" ["*el elemento medio ó burgués, personificado en* La Liga Filipina"] were not involved in the revolution because the Katipunan was a threat to the *status quo* and to the

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[75] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 12.

[76] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 12.

[77] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 79.

privileged positions of the two groups.[78]

As De los Reyes delved further into the origin of the Katipunan, he began referring to its members as "poor and unlettered Katipunan members" ["*los pobres é ignorantes katipuneros*"].[79] Even though initially stressed that the Katipunan was a socially diverse plebeian association drawn from multiple strata, he later added that "those associated (with the Katipunan), were almost all were poor people: clerks, private soldiers, laundrymen, unskilled workers, shoemakers and farmers. Most, he argued, did not rise above the status of clerks, noting only Dr. Pio Valenzuela, who was initiated in 1895, had an academic career" ["*los asociados, casi todos eran gente pobre: escribientes, soldados rasos, lavanderos, faginantes, zapateros y labradores. Los mas no pasaban de la clase de escribientes; solo el medico Pio Valenzuela, que se inicio en 1895, tenia carrera academia*"].[80]

Clearly, De los Reyes was emphasizing the social difference between the Katipunan members and those with a social background similar to his own who belonged to what he construed as the more distinguished La Liga Filipina. In fact, De los Reyes wanted his readers, particularly the governor general, to know that "the Katipunan is a total political organization, independent from the Masonry and the Filipino bourgeoisie of La Liga Filipina*"* ["*el* Katipunan *es un organismo politico completo, independiente de la masoneria y de la Liga de los burgueses filipinos* (La Liga Filipina)"].[81] Upon his

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[78] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 79-81.

[79] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 107.

[80] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 74.

[81] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 79-80.

release from Bilibid in May 1897, De los Reyes "rewrote parts of the *Memoria*. One item he wrote at this time was a document in Tagalog urging the revolutionary forces to shift tactics to 'the Cuban system of ambuscades and guerilla warfare' to prolong the war and wear out Spanish resources."[82] De los Reyes presented his *Memoria* to the governor-general in Malacañang on May 26, 1897. The next day, he was re-arrested and then, just a month later, shipped to Barcelona where he was incarcerated in notorious Montjuich Castle for six months.

At Montjuich Castle, De los Reyes shared a windowless cell with Spanish political radicals, communists and alleged anarchists. During his imprisonment, De los Reyes expanded his previous work on the Philippine revolution to argue that, "the ultimate aspiration of the Katipunan is [the creation of] a Communist republic" ["*El summum de las aspiraciones del* Katipunan *es una republica comunista*"].[83] While in prison, cellmates such as radical journalist Ignacio Bo y Singla helped him smuggle out his articles for publication in the radical Barcelona newspaper, *El Republicano in 1898*.[84] At the same time, De los Reyes was in contact with W. E. Retana, who offered his help to get him released from prison "if De los Reyes retracted his 'political errors'."[85] In his reply to Retana on September 14, 1897, De los Reyes explained writing his *Memoria*, *"*as a means to save my neck and to ensure the future of my sons" ["*para salvar mi cabeza y el porvenir*

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[82] R. Mojares, "Isabelo de los Reyes," in *Brains of the Nation*, 265-266.

[83] I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 78.

[84] W. H. Scott, "Isabelo de los Reyes: Provinciano and Nationalist" in *Cracks in the Parchment Curtain and other Essays in Philippine History*, footnote 21, 276, 279.

[85] Mojares, "Isabelo de los Reyes," in *Brains of the Nation*, 267.

de mis hijos"].[86]

After his release from Montjuich in January 1898, De los Reyes compiled his serialized articles and published them the year after in Madrid as a 128-page pamphlet entitled *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97*. Subsequent Filipino nationalist scholars writing on the Katipunan or its leader, Bonifacio, adopted, usually without attribution, De los Reyes' argument about a mass-based secret organization devoid of Filipino elite participation whose main objective was to free the Philippines from friar oppression.

Although the publication history of De los Reyes' work is now lost to us, it seems plausible that the pamphlet had reached the Philippines through friends, perhaps among them W. E. Retana, even before De los Reyes himself returned in 1903. The pamphlet was not reprinted in Manila so its circulation in the Philippines was presumably limited even though the influence of his ideas, via the writings of others, would become pervasive. There was, of course, a subtle contradiction imbedded in his work, one that would bedevil future Filipino historians, between his close empirical observations about the diverse social strata in the "plebeian" Katipunan and his self-serving distinction, made when threatened with summary execution, between that membership and society's educated elites such as himself.

In the Wake of De los Reyes' *Memoria*

It would take another twenty years, almost an entire generation, before other

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[86] Isabelo de los Reyes letter to W. E. Retana, Montjuich, Barcelona, dated 14 September 1897, original kept in Augustinian Archives in Valladolid. Reprinted and transcribed by Pedro S. de Achutegui and Miguel A. Bernad, *Documents Relative to the Religious Revolution in the Philippines, Part III: The Schism of 1902* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1972), 99.

notable works on the Katipunan and the 1896 Revolution – notably, those by Epifanio de los Santos in *Revista Filipina* / *The Philippine Review* (between 1917 and 1921); Hermenegildo Cruz' *Kartilyang Makabayan* (1922); Teodoro M. Kalaw's *The Philippine Revolution* (1925); Gregorio F. Zaide's *History of the* Katipunan (1939) and *The Philippine Revolution* (1954); and Teodoro A. Agoncillo's *Revolt of the Masses* (1956).[87]

Among these scholars, the former director of the Philippine National Library and Museum Epifanio De los Santos, writer and early labor leader Hermenegildo Cruz, and historian Gregorio Zaide appropriated De los Reyes' claim of a plebeian-based Katipunan to shape our current understanding of this revolutionary group. In addition to writing one of the first biographies of Bonifacio and his humble beginnings, De los Santos was also the first to refer to Bonifacio as "The Great Plebeian [*el Gran Plebeyo*]" in his 1917 *Revista*

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[87] Epifanio de los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio (Spanish)", *The Philippine Review*/*Revista filipina* vol. II, no. 11 (November 1917), 59-82, University of Michigan library website- http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/acp0898.0002.001/1080?page=root;size=100;view=pdf;q1=andres+bonifacio (Accessed on 16 April 2014); Epifanio de los Santos, "Emilio Jacinto (Spanish and English)", *The Philippine Review/Revista filipina* vol. III, no. 6 (June 1918), 412-430, University of Michigan library website - http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/ACP0898.0003.001/500?rgn=full+text;view=image;q1=The+Philippine+Review (Accessed on 16 April 2014); Epifanio de los Santos, "MARCELO H. DEL PILAR (1st installment)," *The Philippine Review*/*Revista filipina* vol. V, no. 3 (March 1920), 198-205, University of Michigan library website - http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=philamer;cc=philamer;q1=Philippine Review;rgn=full text;idno=ACP0898.0001.005;didno=ACP0898.0001.005;view=image;seq=00000238 (Accessed on 16 April 2014), "MARCELO H. DEL PILAR (Continued 1st Installment)," *The Philippine Review*/*Revista filipina* vol. V, nos. 4-5 (April-May 1920), 288-309, University of Michigan library website - http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/acp0898.0001.005/338?q1=Philippine+Review&view=image&size=100 (Accessed on 16 April 2014), "MARCELO H. DEL PILAR (Continued 1st Installment)," *The Philippine Review*/*Revista filipina* vol. V, no. 6 (June 1920), 386-394, University of Michigan library - http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/acp0898.0001.005/446?q1=Philippine+Review&view=image&size=100 ((Accessed on 16 April 2014); Hermenegildo Cruz, *Kartilyang Makabayan: Mga Tanong at Sagot ukol kay Andres Bonifacio at sa Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (Manila: S.P., 1922), Project Gutenburg website - http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14822/14822-h/14822-h.htm (Accessed on 06 May 2014); Gregorio F. Zaide, *History of the Katipunan* (Manila: Loyal Press, 1939); Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution* (Manila: The Manila Book Company, Inc., 1925); Gregorio Zaide, *The Philippine Revolution* (Manila, The Modern Book Company, 1954); and T. A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses* (1956).

filipina article.[88]

Hermenegildo Cruz' *Kartilyang Makabayan* (1922) is considered as one the earliest biographies of Andres Bonifacio, commissioned by the 1922 Bonifacio Day Committee that involved original *Katipuneros* such as Faustino Aguilar and Guillermo Masangkay.[89] Hermenegildo Cruz, one of the founding members of the *Unión Obrera Democrática Filipina* (Democratic Workers' Union of the Philippines) along with president Isabelo de los Reyes, characterized both Bonifacio as "a destitute individual [*isang taong mahirap*]" and other members of the Katipunan as those "who would never be admitted to the Masonry, [who] were laborers, impoverished and indigent [*m~ga taong hindi matatanggap sa 'Masoneria', na m~ga anak pawis, m~ga dukha't maralita*]."[90] Cruz did not include any sources for his work but we can infer that he could have gotten his information about Bonifacio and the Katipunan from former members who were part of the Bonifacio Day commission, as well as from De los Reyes himself.

Both De los Santos and Cruz, unlike their contemporary Teodoro Kalaw, represents the first generation of twentieth-century Filipino scholars to emphasize the significance of the lower class origins of the *Katipuneros* and their separation from their wealthier, more educated compatriots, the *Propagandistas*. In this endeavor, they followed, without acknowledging their source, the analysis of De los Reyes. On the other hand, Teodoro Kalaw's *The Philippine Revolution* (1925) is only devoid of any effort to depict the class

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[88] Epifanio de los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio," *Revista filipina* vol. 2 no. 11 (November 1917), 82.

[89] Hermenegildo Cruz, *Kartilyang Makabayan: Mga Tanong at Sagot ukol kay Andres Bonifacio at sa Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (1922) http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14822/14822-h/14822-h.htm (Accessed on 06 May 2014).

[90] H. Cruz, *Kartilyang Makabayan: Mga Tanong at Sagot ukol kay Andres Bonifacio at sa Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14822/14822-h/14822-h.htm (Accessed on 06 May 2014).

origins of the *Katipuneros*; his history, unlike that of De los Santos and Cruz, assumes, without much evidence that the Katipunan emerged from the Propaganda Movement.[91] As such, it can be argued that the first generation of twentieth-century Filipino historians – as reflected in the writings of De los Santos, Cruz and Kalaw – had not yet resolved the issue of whether the Katipunan*'s* membership reflected a discernible social cleavage or class consciousness.

On the other hand, in his 1939 *History of the* Katipunan, historian Gregorio Zaide only referred to De los Reyes' *Memoria* as a supplementary source, especially in the discussion of the discovery of the Katipunan.[92] Despite his lack of references to De los Reyes' work, Zaide's description of the composition of the Katipunan is clearly drawn from De los Reyes' 1899 *Memoria*. Indeed, paraphrasing De los Reyes, Zaide concludes: "Among them [Katipunan members] were clerks, native soldiers, peasants, shoe-makers, vendors, wood-cutters, fishermen, and laundrymen. The Katipunan was thus a plebeian organization."[93] By the 1930s, there was already a clear emphasis among the leading historians that Katipunan was founded by a group of Filipinos who did not share class or a level of education with the *ilustrados* of the Propaganda Movement. It was also clear that

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[91] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution* (Manila: Manila Book Company Inc., 1925). Kalaw did mention De los Reyes very briefly when he listed the grievances of the captured revolutionaries that De los Reyes had indicated in the first section of his *Memoria*. See Kalaw, "17: Isabelo de los Reyes and his Charges," in *The Philippine Revolution*, 54-56.

[92] Zaide explains that De los Reyes "cannot be directly quoted as he gives no definite information as the exact nature of the *Katipunan* discovery. He [De los Reyes] simply steers aside from the controversial subject of the discovery. Like a true historian, he refuses to fish in troubled waters." See Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 82.

[93] G. Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 11. There is no citation provided. See Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* -- "*ha sido una asociación puramente plebeya*" (p. 12) and "*Los asociados, casi todos eran gente pobre: escribientes, soldados rasos, lavanderos, faginantes, zapateros y labradores*" (p. 74).

these conclusions were, ultimately, derived from the writings of Isabelo de los Reyes published in Madrid in 1899. This derivative analysis was recapitulated and amplified by the most famous of Zaide's student, Teodoro A. Agoncillo.

In 1963, historian Teodoro Agoncillo was appointed to the National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP) board[94] whose mandate was to review primary sources and history books for publication and distribution. Among the texts being considered was *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97*. The NHCP board did decide to reprint this work but under a different title *The Religion of the Katipunan* (1900), in its original Spanish along with English and Filipino translations. The Tagalog version only became available to Filipino students in 2001, when the University of the Philippines Press, together with Program for Cultural Cooperation of Spain.[95]

Agoncillo's seminal study of the 1896 Revolution, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the* Katipunan, is based almost entirely on the analysis of De los Reyes, appropriating both key concepts and passages from his text. For the post-World War II generation, Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*, has been the most influential study on the Katipunan, arguing that the Katipunan's anti-colonial revolution was led by the poor and unlettered masses and was betrayed by Filipino elites, particularly the

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[94] Renato Perdon, "Filipino Historian Agoncillo in his Birth Centenary," *Bayanihan: Community Newspaper in Australia* (November 15, 2012), *Bayanihan* website - http://bayanihannews.com.au/2012/11/15/filipino-historian-agoncillo-on-his-birth-centenary/ (Accessed on 06 May 2014). Renato Perdon worked with Agoncillo during his tenure at the National Historical Commission until Agoncillo's death in 1985.

[95] Isabelo de los Reyes, *Memoria: Ang Madamdaming Alaala ni Isabelo de los Reyes. hinggil sa Rebolusyong Filipino ng 1896-97*, translated by Teresita Alcantara y Antonio (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press - Program for Cultural Cooperation of Spain, 2001, c1899).

"middle-class" intellectuals.[96]

By insisting that the Katipunan was both "proletarian in aim and composition," Agoncillo had effectively framed his narrative within the context of a struggle between the middle class (*bourgeoisie*) and the working class (*proletariat*).[97] Although his analysis of the Katipunan was considered ground-breaking in its focus on the 'inarticulate' masses epitomized by the "Great Plebeian" Andres Bonifacio, Agoncillo was, in fact, simply following the interpretation articulated by Isabelo de los Reyes back in 1899.

The primary difference between the original analysis of De los Reyes and Agoncillo's later account was their personal-cum-ideological perspectives on the two so-called "classes." Whereas De los Reyes was motivated to have Spaniards understand, midst the ongoing revolution, that he was an *ilustrado* and not a plebeian rebel, Agoncillo was motivated, in the decade of the national independence, to construct the plebeian rebels as both the enemies of Spain and of their own "middle class." Despite these differences, Agoncillo's characterization of the Katipunan was strikingly similar to that of De los Reyes.

It is important to stress that Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* is only one of several important works that have analyzed the nature of the Katipunan and its revolution. The influence and controversy surrounding Agoncillo's book, even before its publication in 1956, has obscured prior works on the Katipunan because they were either written by

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[96] Teodoro Agoncillo, "Chapter 7: Betrayal," in *The Revolt of the Masses*, 102-120. Even Reynaldo Ileto, author of the well-known publication on the study of the *Katipunan*, *Pasyon and Revolution* (1979), attested to the influence and inspiration of Agoncillo's magna opus. See Reynaldo C. Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* and the Politics of History," *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (December 2011), 499.

[97] Fernando N. Zialcita, "Hero or Villain? Notes on the Filipino Elite in 1896-1898", in *The Katipunan and the Revolution* edited by Bernardita Reyes Churchill and Francis A. Gealogo (Quezon City: Manila Studies Association, Inc., 1999), 17.

former colonial rulers (Spanish and Americans) or were supposedly produced by elite Filipinos who were influenced by Western thinking. As one of the leading nationalist historians in post-war Philippines, Agoncillo advocated writing Philippine history from a Filipino perspective free from colonial viewpoints. The resurgence of nationalist fervor as well as strong class-consciousness among Filipinos resulted in a historical discourse about the Katipunan dominated by Agoncillo's views and those in the works of Renato Constantino published during the 1970s.[98]

As noted above, Agoncillo was not the first to rely on De los Reyes' *Memoria* in concluding that the Katipunan was a plebeian association.[99] Like his mentor Gregorio Zaide and earlier Filipino scholars such as Epifanio de los Santos, Agoncillo adopted the analysis but also failed to acknowledge his scholarly debt to De los Reyes as the primary source of his interpretation.[100] Nonetheless, by a close comparison of the two works, it becomes quite clear that Agoncillo's work closely followed De los Reyes' *Memoria* (see **Appendix I** for more detailed information).

While self-preservation prompted De los Reyes' effort to establish class distinction between educated Filipino elites, such as himself and the "ignorant masses", however, the desire to incite anti-American imperialist sentiment compelled Agoncillo to modify De los

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[98] J. N. Schumacher, "Perspectives on the Revolution," *Philippine Studies*, 448-449. See Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City: 2009, c1975).

[99] E. de los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio," *Revista filipina* vol. 2 no. 11 (November 1917), 82; Gregorio F. Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 11. There is no citation provided. See Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* -- "*ha sido una asociación puramente plebeya*" (p. 12); and Hermenegildo Cruz, *Kartilyang Makabayan: Mga Tanong at Sagot ukol kay Andres Bonifacio at sa Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14822/14822-h/14822-h.htm (Accessed on 06 May 2014).

[100] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97*, 12; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses, 2002 edition*, 1; and Gregorio F. Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, c1939, 11.

Reyes' analysis. Despite Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*' apparent discussion of class conflict during the Revolutionary period against Spain, it did not conceal his sly condemnation of the unequal Philippine-US relations after the Second World War that only robbed Filipinos their true independence.

If we examine Agoncillo's preoccupation with the "middle class" represented by the educated and wealthy *ilustrados*, and the idea of freedom[101], we can infer that Agoncillo might have used the *ilustrados* as metaphor to the United States that betrayed the Filipinos (personified by "the unlettered masses") and denied them complete independence. By emphasizing that the mass-based Katipunan (Filipinos) did not need the guidance of the Filipino elite-based Propaganda Movement (US) to instigate a successful revolution, Agoncillo stressed strong Filipino historical agency without US interference.[102]

'History from Below'

While there are Philippine scholars who have attempted to introduce new perspectives and approaches for a better understanding of the Katipunan and its revolution; nonetheless, their efforts cannot escape the influence of a well-established nationalist discourse fraught with contradictions and binary oppositions. By engaging mainly in a nationalist analysis to understand the events leading to the Revolution of 1896, Philippine scholars as well as others are confronted with problems because, as Partha Chatterjee noted, "it [the nationalist approach] reasons within the framework of knowledge whose

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[101] "March 1976 *The Solidarity* Interview of Teodoro Agoncillo by Francisco Jose Sionil," in *Talking History: Conversations with Teodoro A. Agoncillo* compiled and edited by Ambeth R. Ocampo (Manila: De La Salle University Press Inc., 1995), 152-153, 160-165.

[102] "March 1976 *The Solidarity* Interview of Teodoro Agoncillo by Francisco Jose Sionil," in *Talking History: Conversations with Teodoro A. Agoncillo*, 165-167

representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power nationalist thought seeks to repudiate."[103] As a result, these scholars need to appropriate Western themes and categories, and then assign new meanings to these terms so that they resonate with Filipinos and their own experiences.

On the other hand, further complications emerged when the myth of national unity is confronted by the reality of colonial collaboration. For nationalist historians, one way to circumvent such quandary is to proceed along the lines of class or social strata.[104] In the case of the study of the Katipunan, Filipino scholars such as Teodoro Agoncillo and Renato Constantino focused on class conflict as the overarching theme in understanding the 1896 Revolution. These scholars emphasize the dichotomy between the Filipino elites/middle class and the masses to explain the social schism within what was presented as a national movement for independence.

Following the Filipino nationalist trend of tracing "history from below," leading scholars such as Reynaldo Ileto and Renato Constantino have attempted to break away from the dominant European meta-narrative of revolutionary struggle in search of a more authentic approach to constructing the Philippine past. These scholars drew their inspiration largely from Agoncillo's work.

Despite the book's derivative nature discussed above, which has long eluded scholars, there is no doubt that "Agoncillo's *Revolt* is considered a turning point in

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[103] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, c1986), 38.

[104] Same approach is employed by Korean nationalist scholars when dealing with the embarrassment of Japanese collaboration. See Henry Em's article "Between Colonialism and Nationalism: Power and Subjectivity in Korea, 1931-1950," *The Journal of the International Institute* vol. 9, Issue no. 1 (Fall 2001), Permalink http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0009.101 (Accessed on 9 April 2014).

Philippine historiography"[105] because it urged Filipino historians to search for Filipino viewpoint of the past amidst unreliable and self-serving narratives, from "certain *dramatis personae* to make themselves appear in good light."[106] The rising popularity of *The Revolt of the Masses*, and the appointment of Agoncillo as full professor in 1958 and then later, as chair of the History Department of the state-run University of the Philippines (1963-1969), reflected the historical consciousness of Filipino youth who would later lead the student movement in the 1960s and 1970s.[107] Galvanized by the idea of "revolt of the masses," university students from urban centers connected with the rest of the urban masses and rural peasantry.

There is no doubt that the effects of Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* were manifested not only in the form of social mobilization, but also, in the historical reconstruction of the Philippine past, in particular, the crucial period for the birth of the nation. In his recent reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*, Ileto indicated that he drew his inspiration directly from Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* after reading his analysis of the revolutionary struggle led by the plebeian-based Katipunan rather than the Hispanized Filipino elites and intellectuals.[108] Furthermore, Agoncillo's approach to addressing the problem of inadequate sources by consulting more Tagalog materials such as "Bonifacio's poems and letters, and interviewing his family and

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[105] Vernon R. Totanes, "History of the Filipino People and Martial Law: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of a History Book, 1960-2010," *Philippine Studies* Vol. 58, No. 3 (2010), 316.

[106] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* and the Politics of History," *Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. 49, No. 3 (December 2011), 497; Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses, 2002 ed*., xii.

[107] R. Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*," 499.

[108] R. Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*," 499.

associates in their language, Tagalog," also provided Ileto the means to expand Agoncillo's study of the Katipunan.[109] Ileto stresses that the "use of vernacular sources is one of the cues that I took from reading Agoncillo in 1969, which I applied to my own work."[110] Ileto's subsequent research followed this path while addressing "the limits of Agoncillo's treatment of the revolution: his imposition upon his data of reified concepts of 'revolution,' 'nationalism' and 'class struggle,' instead of describing how Filipinos in various strata of society actually perceived the events around them."[111]

As a result, Ileto's *Pasyon and Revolution* (1979) depicts the Katipunan as one of the Tagalog popular movements driven by the *Pasyon* (Passion of the Christ) tradition and folk religion.'[112] To articulate the voice of the revolutionary masses, Ileto depended on Tagalog texts and sources such as *awit* (song) and Katipunan's own newspaper *Kalayaan* (Independence), to decipher the 'hidden' meanings and motives of popular resistance, and to find alternative perspectives untainted by the elite and educated classes' worldview. At the same time, Ileto concurred with Agoncillo's earlier argument that *Kalayaan* newspaper "was responsible for the growth of the Katipunan and therefore prepared the people for a clash of arms."[113]

While Ileto's approach to Philippine popular movements was innovative in terms of

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[109] Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*," 497.

[110] Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*," 497 (Footnote no. 2).

[111] Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*," 499.

[112] Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*, 7th ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979).

[113] Teodoro Agoncillo, "The Katipunan Newspaper," *The Newspaperman* (November 1947 issue). Cited by R. Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*," 504. Also refer to Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses*, 100-101. The published essay was an extract from *The Revolt of the Masses* before the book was finally released in 1956. According to Ileto, the 1947-1948 issues of *The Newspaperman* are part of the Mauro Garcia collection kept at Sophia University library.

discovering other ways to unravel the psyche of Filipino masses conveyed through native culture and language, his reliance on the "Christ-like suffering and the transformation of the *loob* ['inner self']"[114] exhibits the same tendency as the *ilustrados* for conceptualizing the revolutionary past of the masses within the structured framework of Christian Europe. Even the tracing of the term '*Kalayaan*' from the Tagalog word '*layaw*' (literally means 'freedom to have whatever one desires') by no means suggests that the masses, in particular, the "rural and uneducated Filipinos who constituted the revolutionary base"[115] actually knew what the word was supposed to mean when they first encountered the Katipunan newspaper, *Kalayaan*, in March 1896.

Ironically, the scholar whom Ileto drew his inspirations from when he wrote *Pasyon and Revolution* was critical of both the work and its author. When asked about Ileto's *Pasyon and Revolution* during his October 1984 interview, Agoncillo was adamant that Ileto's work was, "in the first place it's not history." He then attacked Ileto's book by saying:

> Conjecture *iyon* [That's just conjecture]. What is history there? *Kung ako ang isa sa* examiners there [If I were one of the examiners there], it will flunk. *Hindi makakarating sa first base yan* [The dissertation would never even reach first base]. *Unang tatanungin ko* [My first question would be], 'what is you [sic] basis? Where are your documents to show [sic]?' Sinabi niya, halimbawa [Ileto argued, for example], that Bonifacio was influenced by the *Pasyon*. What is your basis for making that statement? Because you must have the basis for making the statement. Among the books found in the possession of Bonifacio after his execution, the *Pasyon* [book] was not there! (laugh) The *Pasyon* was not there.
> The *Pasyon* is not one of them. *Sabi nga ni* [According to] (La Salle University President) Brother Andrew (Gonzalez) when he was here – 'For all you know he [Bonifacio] had nothing but contempt for the Pasyon'.[116]

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[114] R. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*, 318.

[115] R. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*, 5.

[116] Teodoro Agoncillo interview (4 October 1984), in *Talking History: Conversations with Teodoro A. Agoncillo*, interviewed and transcribed by Ambeth R. Ocampo, 93.

If one read through the rest of Agoncillo's interview, one might be able to discern his prejudice against Ileto's education. The fact that Ileto was educated abroad (Cornell University under Oliver Wolters and D. G. E. Hall) in the late 1960s and examined by Americans who did not know either the Tagalog language or the *Pasyon* tradition, was enough for Agoncillo to dismiss his research.[117] Despite this harsh reception, Ileto still continues to cite Agoncillo and freely admit his impact on his own scholarship.[118]

While Ileto was only a graduate student when he first read Agoncillo, Renato Constantino was already a well-established diplomat in New York (1946-1949) and prolific writer by the time Agoncillo's book was released.[119] Upon returning to the Philippines, he held several teaching positions at Far Eastern University, Adamson University and then later the University of the Philippines.[120]

Although Constantino did not write about Agoncillo's influence on his work as historian, the nationalist stance in Agoncillo's works is sympathetic to Constantino's approach in his general histories, *The Philippines, Volume I: A Past Revisited* (1975) and *The Philippines, Volume II: The Continuing Past* (1978). Like Agoncillo, Constantino was also concerned that "[b]y training, Filipino historians were captives of Spanish and American historiography, both of which inevitably viewed Philippine history through the

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[117] Teodoro Agoncillo interview (4 October 1984), in *Talking History: Conversations with Teodoro A. Agoncillo*, 94.

[118] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "Reflections on Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* and the Politics of History," 496-520.

[119] "The Historian as a Diplomat" (4 April 2013), *Finding Felipe* website - http://findingfelipe.wordpress.com/2013/04/04/the-historian-as-diplomat/ (Accessed on 13 March 2014).

[120] "CONSTANTINO, Renato," Bantayog ng mga Bayani website - http://www.bantayog.org/node/79 (Accessed on 13 March 2014).

prism of their own prejudices."[121] Constantino's goal was to write Philippine history from the Filipino point of view with emphasis on 'the inarticulate in history'. What he means is "that the principal focus must be on the anonymous masses of individuals and on the social forces generated by their collective lives and struggles."[122]

In his analysis of the Katipunan and the 1896 revolution, Constantino did adhere to Agoncillo's "revolt of the masses." On the contrary, Constantino was not dismissive of the role of the propaganda movement in bringing about the Katipunan – arguing that "the reformism of the ilustrados gave way to the revolution of the masses."[123] Moreover, Constantino did not adopt Agoncillo's rigid social division between the elites/intellectuals vs. the masses. Instead, he was more receptive to the creation of "a number of transitional economic and social groups composed of creoles, Chinese mestizos and urbanized Filipinos" as a result of economic development and urbanization.[124] In addition, Constantino stressed that "[t]hese [groups] formed a fairly broad petty [sic] bourgeois stratum which occupied a social and economic position between the peninsulares and the masses."[125]

While Agoncillo refused to recognize the significant role of the 'middle element' of society in the formation of the Katipunan, Constantino emphasized the theme of class struggle "in more sophisticated and systematic form. . . [and] recognized that Bonifacio

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[121] Renato Constantino with collaboration of Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited, Pre-Spanish-1941*, 21st reprint (Quezon City: [n.p.], 2009, c1975), 3.

[122] Renato Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 5.

[123] R. Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 159.

[124] R. Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 159.

[125] R. Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 159.

was not of the proletariat but of the lower middle class."[126] Constantino argued that "[t]he original leadership of the Katipunan may be classified as lower-middle to middle-middle class."[127] Nonetheless, Constantino was also careful to link these individuals from the middle to the masses. He explains that:

> [c]oming as they did from the lower echelons of the middle class, Bonifacio and his companions instinctively identified with the masses. Although the early leadership of the Katipunan was essentially middle class, many members of this class could be considered almost plebian in social status . . . . It was therefore possible for the middle-class organization to become the triggering force that would galvanize the masses into action.[128]

If one wishes to better understand the Katipunan, one needs to re-evaluate the prevailing views of Agoncillo and subsequent scholars such as Reynaldo Ileto and Renato Constantino about the social composition of the revolutionary movement. Was the 1896 revolution the work of a group of poor and unlettered masses (De los Reyes/Agoncillo), "lower middle class" proletarians and rural peasants (Constantino), or millenarians (Ileto)? At the same time, it is also imperative to look beyond the Katipunan's link to the short-lived La Liga Filipina, by analyzing the rise of the Propaganda Movement and its pivotal role in the anti-friar crusades that later encouraged the rise of La Liga and the Katipunan. Of course, in the midst of all these movements, was Marcelo H. del Pilar, who was considered as a formidable political and legal force by both Filipino propagandists and Spanish opponents.

As previously argued earlier in this chapter, the Katipunan's link to the Propaganda

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[126] Schumacher, " Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," 448-449. Schumacher cited Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 162.

[127] Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 165.

[128] Constantino, *The Philippines, Vol. I: A Past Revisited*, 167.

Movement could be traced back even before Rizal and his La Liga Filipina. In fact, the connection between the Propaganda Movement and Del Pilar was much stronger and enduring than scholars have previously suggested. The Katipunan might have used a more effective means of indoctrinating and mobilizing the common Filipinos than the Propaganda Movement, but the beliefs that both movements were trying to disseminate were derived, more or less, from the same source – European liberalism. However, it is also important to point out that this idea was not the sole motivation behind the two movements. No matter how distasteful it might be for nationalist scholars to recognize that Western ideas played a part in the national formation in their former colonies, it cannot be denied the significance of the metropole's influence on colonial societies, and vice-versa.

Furthermore, one cannot dismiss the importance of the role of colonial cities such as Manila in nurturing and then, harnessing the emerging revolutionary consciousness of the Filipinos. The liberal flow of ideas, knowledge, goods and people within and without Manila transformed the colonial city into a labyrinth of loyalties, interests, ideologies and other contending forces that allowed for dynamic interactions and exchanges among Filipinos that cut across social boundaries. In fact, one significant result of such interactions culminated in the rise of the urban revolutionary movement Katipunan that led the 1896 Revolution.

Revolt from the Middle

Subsequent scholars on the revolution and the Katipunan "[took] up Constantino's characterization of the Katipunan and show[ed]. . . that its membership was essentially

middleclass."[129] However, instead of being obsessed with the issue of class struggle like Constantino, scholars such as Richardson, Schumacher, Guerrero and others examined the different factors that led to the rise of 'revolt from the middle'. That approach means also taking into consideration the influence and effects of the long Spanish colonial rule rather than outright dismissing them as insignificant or worse, the root of all problems for the Filipinos.

At the same time, many of these works also challenged the prevailing notion that the 1896 revolution was a "revolt of the masses" without elite participation that might link the Propaganda Movement with the Katipunan – a connection that many earlier scholars such as De los Reyes, De los Santos, Zaide, Agoncillo and Ileto had rejected. By adopting multifaceted approaches to understanding the revolution, the perspectives are no longer confined within a single-track narrative, thus, opening more opportunities for further study of one of the pivotal events in Philippine history.

One of the early works that critiques the previous interpretations of the Katipunan was Fr. John Schumacher's *The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1895* (c1973, revised ed. 1997) that focuses on the Philippine reform movement as well as emphasizing the strong correlation between ideas of the Propaganda Movement and the Katipunan.[130] Even though his main study was on the Propaganda Movement, Schumacher also extended his understanding of the period by examining the effects of the reform movement in Philippine society, emphasizing the transition between reform and revolution.

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[129] Schumacher, " Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," 449.

[130] John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The creation of a Filipino consciousness, the making of the revolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, revised edition 1997, c1973). Also see J. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," 451.

Unlike the earlier Filipino nationalist scholars, Schumacher did not reject the contributions of the Filipino elites and intellectuals in shaping the revolution. As such, Schumacher established his thesis about the Katipunan's philosophy "being essentially a bourgeois ideology, socially conservative, and as the title of the chapter on Katipunan ideology puts it: 'A Product of the Times.'"[131]

An important work that was derived from Schumacher's thesis that Katipunan ideology drew inspiration from the Propaganda Movement's liberal and bourgeois ideology is Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson's *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the 19th-century Philippines* (1979). This study offers a more in-depth analysis of the revolutionary movement by looking at how various aspects of Philippine society such as the Katipunan responded to the political and economic transformations of nineteenth-century Philippines. Fast and Richardson pointed out that "[d]espite the weight of historical opinion behind them [Philippine scholars], the interpretations of Katipunan composition and purpose. . . present a seriously distorted picture of the revolutionary association's character. Over-simplification and looseness of terminology have often compounded their error."[132]

In their chapter on the Katipunan leadership in the city and the provinces, Fast and Richardson are engaging the works of leading historians of the Katipunan, particularly Isabelo de los Reyes and Teodoro Agoncillo.[133] Significantly, Fast and Richardson noted

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[131] J. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," 451.

[132] Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson, *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the 19th-century Philippines* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1979), 68.

[133] Fast and Richardson, Chapter 9 "The Katipuneros: Revolutionary Leadership in City and Province," in *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the 19th-century Philippines*, 67-74.

that, in his narrative, "Agoncillo seems to be following the account given by Isabelo de los Reyes."[134] More broadly, Fast and Richardson addressed the prevailing notion that the revolution "was organized by 'the most ignorant element' of the Filipino people . . . [in] the figure of Andres Bonifacio" and countered that "[e]ven from the scanty information available on Bonifacio's life, it is certainly clear that the Katipunan Supremo was not of the 'lowest class' of Philippine society."[135]

On a similar note, Fast and Richardson studied the composition and purpose of the Katipunan by examining some of the leading members of the revolutionary society from Manila and its rural hinterlands. They found that "[Bonifacio and his associates] occupied a position closer to the centre of the social pyramid than to its base, closer to the petty-bourgeoisie than the proletariat. . . . [As for the *Katipuneros* in the provincial areas], again they belonged to intermediate social strata, and again they lived and worked at the interface between colonial power and the population."[136] As such, Fast and Richardson attributed the provincial Filipino elites' strong support of the Katipunan to their social similarities with the urban middleclass leaders of the revolutionary movement based on "their common proximity to the educational, economic or administrative aspects of Spanish sovereignty itself."[137]

Unfortunately, their close study of the Katipunan did not go beyond the

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[134] See footnote no. 32 for Chapter 9, in *Roots of Dependency*, 130. Fast and Richardson cited both De los Reyes and Agoncillo.

[135] Fast and Richardson, *Roots of Dependency*, 68.

[136] Fast and Richardson, *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the 19th-century Philippines*, 70-71.

[137] Fast and Richardson, *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the 19th-century Philippines*, 70.

composition of its leadership. Recently, however, Jim Richardson published a follow-up work on the short sections on the Katipunan in their 1979 study. In December 2013, Richardson released through Ateneo de Manila University Press a compilation of primary documents entitled *The Light of Liberty: Documents and Studies of the* Katipunan*, 1892-1897* aimed at uncovering the true nature of the secret society. Many of these documents have already been made available online in Richardson's website, Katipunan*: Documents and Studies*, which started in 2005.[138]

Meanwhile, it is imperative to augment the study of the Katipunan with an attempt to unravel the intricate social structure of nineteenth century colonial Philippines leading to the 1896 Revolution. To better understand the nature of the secret organization, we need to figure out how Philippine colonial societies developed.

In his comments on Fast and Richardson's assessment of the Katipunan, Ileto criticizes their (along with foreign scholars' and other "expert 'Tagalists'") misguided belief of the secret society's bourgeois origin and composition that tends to overlook the more important cultural dimension of the Katipunan that would actually unlock the movement's true nature. Ileto emphasizes that "[w]ithout a [cultural] sensitivity to the range of meanings that could be generated by words or ideas like *kalayaan* [liberty], *kasaganaan* [prosperity], *kaginhawaan* [comfort; well-being], *damayan* [mutual aid, support], *katuwiran* [reason] and *kaliwanagan* [enlightenment]," foreign scholars' understanding of the Katipunan has no depth. To Ileto, these scholars merely followed the trend of writing historical narratives rooted in Westernized dichotomies and interpretations drawn solely

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[138] See Jim Richardson's extensive website on the *Katipunan* - http://www.kasaysayan-kkk.info/ (Accessed on 25 May 2014).

from written records, and therefore, overlooked the more important elements of the revolution – the voiceless "Katipunan subalterns."[139]

On the other hand, Glenn May's controversial book *Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-Creation of Andres Bonifacio* (1996) painted a different picture of the various studies conducted of the revolutionary leader. Despite the book's clearly stated purpose to critique the methodology of the study of Bonifacio rather than Bonifacio himself, Filipino scholars rose in arms to protest against the perceived defamation of this revered 'plebeian' national hero.

For Filipino nationalist scholars, the fact that May is an American scholar *ipso facto* negates the validity of his critique. The concerted attacks of Filipino scholars against May and his book stress that, beneath the veneer of objectivity that historians have professed to maintain, strong nationalist sentiment can sometimes trump the search for an elusive historical truth.[140] Nonetheless, some of these scholars actually took May's criticisms as a challenge to re-examine the historical reconstruction of the Katipunan.

One of these scholars was Milagros C. Guerrero, who was already involved before in the re-examination of the Katipunan and its 1896 revolution beyond the narrow framework of binary class opposition beginning with her 1977 doctoral dissertation, "Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Revolutionary Mentality" followed by several essays derived from her early premise of active revolutionary involvement from the

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[139] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "History and Criticism: The Invention of Heroes," in *Filipinos and their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, c1998, 2003), 215-216.

[140] See *Determining the Truth: The Story of Andres Bonifacio*, edited by Bernadita Reyes Churchill (Manila: The Manila Studies Association Inc., The National Commission for Culture and the Arts – Committee on Historical Research and The Philippine National Historical Society, Inc., 1997)

municipal and provincial elites.[141] Furthermore, in Guerrero's 1998 article "*Pagtanaw sa Kasaysayan, Paghahanda sa Himagsikan: Mga Ideya ng* Katipunan*, 1892-1897*" ("Viewing History, Preparing for Revolution: Ideas of the Katipunan, 1892-1897"), she explores the "unsophisticated" legacy of Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto in ensuring the propagation of Katipunan's revolutionary ideas as the movement prepared for armed rebellion.[142] Here, she is referring to how other scholars perceived the inferiority of the Katipunan's methods of recruitment and organization compared to the more sophisticated Propaganda Movement's efforts.

Guerrero reproaches scholars who looked down on Bonifacio and Jacinto just because they were not well-educated *ilustrados* like Rizal and Del Pilar. Guerrero points out that if these scholars analyzed carefully the Tagalog writings of Bonifacio and Jacinto, they would appreciate the sophistication of Bonifacio's vision for the Tagalog people (referring to Filipinos) and the efficient way the Katipunan mobilized by using the Tagalog language to spread the ideas of the movement. Even the Propaganda Movement could not claim a widespread audience in the Philippines, in particular, in Manila due to the limited number of smuggled copies of propaganda materials in circulation.[143]

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[141] John N. Schumacher, "Socio-economic class in the Revolution,"*Budhi*, 2 (1998), 189-208, Ateneo de Manila University journals webpage - http://journals.ateneo.edu/ojs/index.php/budhi/article/viewFile/494/496 (Accessed on 13 February 2014). See Milagros C. Guerrero, *Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902* (Pasig City: Anvil Press, 2015), and "The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1898-1902," in Alfred W. McCoy and Edilberto de Jesus, eds., Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformation (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982), 155-190.

[142] Milagros C. Guerrero, "Pagtanaw sa Kasaysayan, Paghahanda sa Himagsikan: Mga Ideya ng Katipunan, 1892-1897," *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, Philippine Revolution 1*, vol. 14, no.1 (1998), 37-52, UP-Diliman webpage - http://journals.upd.edu.ph/index.php/kasarinlan/article/view/1407 (Accessed on 13 February 2014).

[143] Milagros C. Guerrero, "Pagtanaw sa Kasaysayan, Paghahanda sa Himagsikan: Mga Ideya ng Katipunan, 1892-1897," UP webpage - http://journals.upd.edu.ph/index.php/kasarinlan/article/view/1407 (Accessed pm 13 February 2014).

While scholars continue to emphasize the perspective of the 'revolt from below' in the teaching of Philippine national history, alternative approaches and interpretations also continue to spread in recent studies of the revolution and the Katipunan. One such approach is the proliferation of the studies of local histories in the Tagalog areas during the 1896 revolution spearheaded by Emmanuel Calairo and the Center for Cavite Studies as well as its Bulacan provincial counterpart. In addition, more in-depth studies of the Katipunan in both Manila and Cavite province emerged with the publication of works by the late Isagani R. Medina.[144]

At the same time, historical interest during the revolutionary period outside of the Tagalog region has also expanded to include other provinces outside Luzon. Michael Cullinane's recent study of the Cebuano elites' active participation in orchestrating a revolt against Spanish rule in Cebu, following the outbreak of the Katipunan uprising in the Tagalog area, also draws inspiration from scholars who traced the origin of the revolution not 'from below' but 'from the middle sector' of society. Through the opportunities afforded to them by education, social mobility and economic affluence, the Cebuano 'rebel conspirators,' within the confines of their *oficinas* and *casa tribunals*, used their close proximity to the colonial state apparatus making them privy to intelligence that allowed them to advance their cause.[145]

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[144] See Isagani R. Medina, *Cavite before the Revolution, 1571-1896*, Rev. edition (Quezon City: UP Press and Cavite Historical Studies, c1994, 2002); "The Katipunan Movement in the Provincia De Manila (Kamaynilaan) in *Centennial Papers on the Katipunan and the Revolution* edited by Bernardita Reyes Churchill and Francis A. Gealogo (Manila: Manila Studies Association, Inc and National Commission for Culture & the Arts, 1999), 1-13; and *May Tainga ang Lupa. . .: Espionage in the Philippines (1896-1902) and other Essays*, compiled and edited by Mirana Medina (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2002).

[145] Michael M. Cullinane, *Arenas of Conspiracy and Rebellion in the Late Nineteenth-Century Philippines: The Case of the April 1898 Uprising in Cebu* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014).

To better understand the Katipunan and its revolution one must acknowledge that, contrary to the previous assertion that the 1896 rebellion was a 'revolt of the masses,' this was indeed a ‘revolt from the middle.’ By shifting the focus from 'the below' to 'the middle,' one needs to interrogate information and sources without any *a priori* value judgment.

As indicated in the foregoing analysis, the literature on the Katipunan has, for nearly a century, overlooked valuable source materials such as De los Reyes' *Memoria* and Captain Diaz' intelligence report due to the prejudice against the chroniclers, thereby missing some useful empirical evidence in their accounts. Even though De los Reyes' *Memoria* is an invaluable source about the Katipunan written during the period of the revolution after extensive contact with the historical actors, few scholars who have written about the 1896 uprising actually acknowledged De los Reyes' contribution while simultaneously using, albeit uncritically and often ineptly, his 'plebeian' characterization of the revolutionary organization.

On the other hand, works such as Agoncillo's and Ileto's have been hailed as definitive sources due to their effort to incorporate into the narrative those deemed 'voiceless' (i.e. the masses, rural peasants), while at the same time taking up their cause against their perceived oppressors by criticizing both Filipino elites and colonial collaborators. Under the banner of nationalism, Agoncillo, Ileto, and other Filipino scholars reconstructed the revolutionary past to reflect their "imagined communities" which then adopted into the official narrative of the Philippines' history.

This review of the literature has led to a recognition that there is no one single track of narrative to follow nor one set of historical actors to interrogate in order to make sense

of the events leading to the uprising. The process of historical writing is not free from contention over public memory and knowledge production – indeed such critical interrogation of past writing, of received wisdom, is a key factor in scholarly, indeed intellectual progress. As long as the discourse of the 1896 revolution continues to dominate the study of Philippine history, the struggle for control over the past rages on, not in the battlefields but within the pages of history, making this study yet another shot fired.

CHAPTER 2

The Propaganda Movement and the rise of Philippine Masonry, 1872-1892

As the 1896 revolution continues to dominate nationalist discourse in Philippine historiography, the emphasis on the Katipunan as a peasant-based or mass-based revolutionary movement emerging from Manila remains the focal point of the history of Philippine nationalism. The historical depiction of the Katipunan as a mass-based secret society while focusing on certain individuals such as Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto and General Emilio Aguinaldo, only allows for narrow interpretation of the movement. As a result, many existing studies of the Katipunan focus only on its pivotal roles in fostering national consciousness and in taking up arms in defense of an emerging nation, rather than attempting to present the secret association as one of many social movements that emerged in Manila during a period of social turmoil and political upheaval, not only in the Philippines but across the world.

While it is important to connect the outbreak of the 1896 Revolution to the spread of nationalist sentiment among Filipinos, there are other significant contextual factors that contributed to the rise of the Katipunan that merit careful examination. To better understand the true nature of the revolutionary movement one has to forgo the binary oppositions (i.e. the masses vs. the elites; reformists vs. revolutionaries; patriots vs. traitors of the revolution), to see that the Katipunan was a product of dynamic encounters within a

complex urban social networks.[146] Therefore, our task is to navigate Manila's complex web of social networks to explain how various individuals and groups were connected and eventually, drawn into the Katipunan's sphere.

By shifting from the nationalist approach that emphasizes a division between 'the elite-based' reform movement and the 'mass-based' revolutionary movement, this chapter challenges the prevailing depiction of the Katipunan as a mass-based organization without any participation by the native elites, depicted in Philippine historiography as 'traitors to the Revolution'.[147] The strong connection between the early Propaganda Movement headed by Marcelo H. del Pilar and Jose Rizal (reform) and the Katipunan (revolution) would only confirm that neither group was homogeneous nor static and often driven by various contending interests.

At the same time, this chapter closely analyzes the great significance of the rise of the Philippine Masonry to the development and later, radicalization of the Katipunan. While the connection between the Filipino masons and the Katipuneros had already been established earlier on in the historiography due to their various similarities (ie. using secret codes and pseudonyms, practicing rituals, and employing selective recruitment process, etc.), the importance of such connection went beyond what Philippine revolutionary scholars perceived. Close examination of Philippine Masonry allows for better understanding as to why the Katipunan had adopted many masonic practices to fashion the secret society to appear like one of the masonic lodges. The fact that even the Spanish

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[146] Andy Merrifield, "Chapter Three: The Urban Consolidates: Centrality and Citizenship" and "Chapter Four: The Politics of Encounter," in *The Politics of the Encounter: Urban Theory and Protest under Planetary Urbanization* (Athens, GA and London: The University of Georgia Press, 2013), 35-72.

[147] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, "Chapter Seven: Betrayal" in *The Revolt of the Masses*, 2002 edition, 102-120.

authorities and the Church were fooled into believing that revolutionary movement was part of the brotherhood warrants further investigation.

From Reform to Revolution

The revolutionary group Katipunan's direct link with Jose Rizal's reformist movement La Liga Filipina has been overemphasized in Philippine nationalist discourse to establish a crucial historical progression from Rizal to Andres Bonifacio, one of Katipunan's founders and later its *Supremo* (Leader). Either it is an effort to legitimize Bonifacio and the Katipunan by directly connecting them to Rizal, or perhaps, to denigrate Rizal's position as the national hero by asserting his vehement objection to starting an armed rebellion against Spanish rule.

Nonetheless, it is evident to Philippine scholars the need to establish the transition from advocating reform to formenting revolution[148] because linking the rise of the Katipunan to the liberal reformist crusade known in Philippine historiography as the Propaganda Movement (1872-1896) asserts historical continuity in the nationalist narratives while emphasizes the secret society's direct connection to Rizal, despite his December 1896 public denunciation of the outbreak of the August 1896 revolution[149].

While it is important to recognize Rizal's contribution to the national cause, he was

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[148] First publications by Filipinos to focus on Bonifacio and the Katipunan were Isabelo de los Reyes' *La sensacional memoria sobre la revolucion filipina* (Madrid, 1899) and Epifanio de los Santos' articles "Andres Bonifacio", *The Philippine Review* (January-February 1918) and "Emilio Jacinto", *The Philippine Review* (June, 1918). The earliest works written by foreigners were Jose M. del Castillo y Jimenez' book *El Katipunan ó el filibusterismo en Filipinas* (Madrid, 1897) and Francis St. Clair's work *The Katipunan: Or the Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune* (Manila: Tip "Amigos del Pais," 1902).

[149] While he was incarcerated at Fort Santiago awaiting his trial, Jose Rizal released his "*Manifesto á algunos Filipinos*" ("Manifesto to Certain Filipinos") on December 15, 1896 asserting his innocence of instigating the outbreak of the August 1896 revolution and openly denouncing the violent course of action taken by Bonifacio and the Katipunan. Instead, Rizal advocated that Filipinos should strive to educate themselves to affect social change rather than to take up arms.

only one of many who made the ultimate sacrifice to free the nation from colonial bondage. Therefore, one needs to also look beyond Rizal and his short-lived La Liga Filipina to further understand not only the origin of the Katipunan but also the nature of late nineteenth-century urban milieu in Manila that spawned the 1896 revolution.

As historian John Schumacher has pointed out, "the Katipunan is correctly seen as a privileged heir of the Propaganda Movement" despite their differing methods of unifying all Filipinos "in the defense of a common motherland," because the ideas and writings of the Katipunan were clearly drawn from the leading propagandists' own works such as Rizal's.[150] But, as indicated earlier, Rizal was not the only influential propagandist in the formation of the Katipunan.

Rizal's close friend and rival, Marcelo Hilario del Pilar, a well-known Tagalog lawyer, anti-friar propagandist, and radical political activist from Bulacan province, had much stronger ties to the movement. As a leader of the Propaganda Movement between 1880s and early 1890s, Del Pilar, along with Rizal and fellow Bulakeño Mariano Ponce who were collectively known as the Triumvirate of the Propaganda Movement, was very active in coordinating the propaganda campaigns in both Manila and Madrid. Even before he fled to Spain in 1888, Del Pilar was already known for his strong political and anti-friar activism in Bulacan and Manila. In fact, Del Pilar was so prominent as a defender of native rights and published critic that the religious orders attributed any political or religious conflict in his home province or in Manila to him. By the late 1880s Del Pilar was already branded as subversive (*filibustero*) and had been threatened with arrest for his

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[150] John N. Schumacher, S.J. "Socioeconomic Classes in the Revolution" *Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture* 2, no. 2 (1998), 192-193.

seditious activities and writings before his timely escape to Europe.

Compared to Rizal, the pragmatic Del Pilar was more active in mobilizing Filipinos and their Spanish supporters in Spain by joining the *Asociación Hispano-Filipina*, a political coalition founded in January 1889 at Madrid by Miguel Morayta, a Spanish history professor and Grand Master of the Masonic Lodge *Grande Oriente de España*.[151] Del Pilar's political activism in Spain could be traced back to his radical campaigns in the Philippines demanding political reforms to give the Filipinos more autonomy over their affairs and more importantly, to expel the religious orders. Even though he used radical strategies to challenge the domination of both the colonial state and the Church, Del Pilar had never openly advocated the end of Spanish rule.

By focusing on Del Pilar and his political activities, we can trace the development of the Katipunan and how the multifaceted nature of the 1896 revolution was influenced by interactions among various internal and external forces, culminating in the outbreak of an armed urban uprising that became a struggle for independence. At the same time, this study also highlights the revolutionary tendencies of Del Pilar and his Manila-based Comité de Propaganda who advocated radical socio-political strategies to ensure political and religious changes. By tracing the nationalist struggle all the way back to Del Pilar and his early campaigns with the Comité de Propaganda, this chapter contends that the Katipunan that, at its inception, was first and foremost 'a revolt from the middle' of Manila's metropolitan society.[152]

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[151] Philippine Center for Masonic Studies, "History of Masonry in the Philippines," *PCMS* website - http://www.philippinemasonry.org/1856--1890.html (Accessed online on 18 September 2013).

[152] Although Philippine historians Milagros Guerrero and Reynaldo Ileto recognized the Katipunan leadership's middle-class background, they both do not subscribe to Agoncillo's generalization of the movement's membership. Ileto wrote that "[t]he Katipunan leadership's middle-class origins, urban or

The importance of Marcelo H. Del Pilar in the events leading to the outbreak of the 1896 Revolution should not be underestimated. Even in 1896, not just Filipinos but also Spanish colonial officials recognized his contribution to the national struggle. While the Spanish colonial government was preparing its sedition charges against Rizal, Captain Olegario Diaz, Commander of the Guardia Civil Vetarana de Manila, submitted his report on the origins of the Katipunan in October 1896, concluding that Marcelo H. del Pilar was indeed the brains behind the Katipunan.[153] Similarly, Governor-General Ramon Blanco paid Del Pilar the highest tribute after his death on July 4, 1896 when he stated that Del Pilar was "the most intelligent leader, the real soul of the separatists [movement in the Philippines]."[154]

The radicalism of Del Pilar

The year 1872 was a pivotal year for the young law student from Bulacan province (north of Manila), Marcelo Hilario del Pilar. His older brother who was a secular priest, Father Toribio H. del Pilar, was implicated in the 1872 Cavite Mutiny along with other

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provincial, are all too obvious" while Guerrero was more specific as to "[t]he leadership of the Katipunan from 1892 to May 1897 may be classified as lower to middle-middle class [emphasis mine]." Cited from Reynaldo C. Ileto, "Chapter 9: History and Criticism: The Invention of Heroes," in *Filipinos and their Revolution. Events, Discourse and Historiography* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003, c1998), 215; and Milagros Guerrero, "Chapter 6: Andres Bonifacio and The Katipunan," in *Kasaysayan: The History of the Filipino People, Volume Five* (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company Limited, 1998), 151.

[153] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

[154] Office of the President of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 320, "Creating A Special Committee To Take Charge Of The Preparations For The Centennial Of The Death Anniversary Of Marcelo H. Del Pilar," Gov.ph -http://www.gov.ph/downloads/1996/05may/19960514-EO-0320-FVR.pdf (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

Filipino priests and prominent liberal Spanish and Chinese *mestizos*, and then later deported to the Marianas Islands.[155] Even though his anti-friar sentiments were already strong even before the 1872 event, witnessing his brother being tried and convicted of sedition only intensified Del Pilar's anger towards the friars and their privileged position.

Apart from the religious abuses directed towards their parishioners, Del Pilar strongly opposed the friars' encroachment into the political and socio-economic affairs of the natives.[156] Between 1880 until October 1888 when he was forced into exile, Del Pilar was actively involved in subversive attempts to undermine the friars' assumed political authority. In 1882, Del Pilar and his friend Basilio Teodoro Moran founded Manila's first bilingual newspaper, *Diariong Tagalog*, that later published Jose Rizal's first essay "*El amor patrio*" ("Love of Country") in August 1882 under his *nom de plume*, *Laonglaan* (Always Ready).[157] Both Rizal's original Spanish article and its Tagalog translation appeared in the paper. Del Pilar also translated Rizal's Spanish articles from Barcelona to make them more accessible to majority of the indigenous population who did not know Spanish.

Despite Rizal's undeniable stature as a literary figure, many of his contemporaries

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[155] Luis Camara Dery, "Marcelo H. del Pilar: Ang Utak ng Paghihiwalay ng Pilipinas sa Espanya," in *Bantayog ni Inang Bayan. Panibagong Sulyap sa mga Bayani ng 1896 Himagsikan* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2012), 63; Jaime B. Veneracion, *Malolos: A Legacy of Its Past* (Baliwag, Bulacan: MSV Printers & Publishing, Inc., 2010), 81. According to Dery and Veneracion, Fr. Toribio H. del Pilar was both connected with Fr. Jose Burgos, one of the martyred priests of 1872 and Fr. Mariano Sevilla, who offered accommodation to Marcelo when he was studying law in Manila.

[156] John N. Schumacher, S.J., "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan: The History of the Filipino People*, Volume Five, 55; Conrado Benitez, *History of the Philippines. Economic, Social, Cultural, Political* (Manila; Boston; New York; Chicago: Ginn and Company,1954, c1929), 262.

[157] No. 2 - Letter to Rizal from his friend in Manila, Jose M. Cecilio, dated 28 August 1882, in Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists (1882-1896), Volume II, Book Three (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 4.

considered Del Pilar a superior writer because of his excellent command of both the Spanish and Tagalog languages. Even though Rizal was well-known across the archipelago as both doctor and writer, more Filipinos from different social strata had greater access to Del Pilar's works because they were more widely distributed as propaganda pamphlets, often scathing parodies written in simple Tagalog.

In 1887, Del Pilar, along with other educated and privileged individuals, opposed the influence of the religious orders, formed a political group, Comité de Propaganda. Some of its leading members would later become prominent figures in the rise of the Katipunan including Deodato Arellano (Katipunan's first President and also first President), Mariano Crisostomo (founding member of the Katipunan's chapters in Bulacan) and Gregorio del Pilar (Katipunan member and later, became the youngest revolutionary general), who were brother-in-law and nephews of Del Pilar, respectively.[158]

There were several instances when Del Pilar found himself in conflict with curates from various parishes in the provinces of Bulacan, Navotas and even, Manila. Such confrontations focused on issues involving increase in baptismal fees; morality of engaging in cockfighting and gambling (Del Pilar "ran his own cockpit with the Filipino coadjutor of Malolos, Father Rafael Canlapan"[159]); friars' interference on the the list of municipal tributes (*padron*) kept by a *cabeza de barangay*; the establishment of schools; and the manipulation of elections for town mayors (*gobernadorcillos*; after 1895 the position was

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[158] Other members of the group were Jose A. Ramos, Doroteo Cortes, and Juan Zulueta from Manila; Pedro Serrano Laktaw, Carlos Gatmaitan, Liberato Manuel, Gregorio Santillan, Deodato Arellano, and Gregorio del Pilar from Bulacan; Jose Ner of Cavite province; and Sotero Laurel of Batangas province. Cited from Luis Dery, "Marcelo H. del Pilar: Ang Utak ng Paghihiwalay ng Pilipinas sa Espanya," in *Bantayog ni Inang Bayan*, 63-64; and Schumacher, "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan*, 57.

[159] Schumacher, S.J., "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan*, 56; and Veneracion, *Malolos: A Legacy of Its Past*, 82.

called *capitan municipal*).[160]

As a highly regarded lawyer, Del Pilar represented numerous litigants against the Church and the Spanish colonial administration as well as preparing petitions. One example of such petitions involved Don Timoteo Lanuza, *gobernadorcillo de naturales* in the parish of Binondo in Manila, and the Binondo parish priest (*cura párroco*), Fray José Hevia Campomanes. In September 1887, Don Lanuza demanded that the native elites (*principales*) be given precedence over the Chinese *mestizos* and Chinese elites in the celebration of the feast of Our Lady of Rosary. In contrast to the rest of the Philippines, Binondo was the only parish where the Chinese *mestizos* took precedence in fiesta processions and celebrations because they financed the construction of the parish church. The petition addressed to the acting Civil Governor of Manila and a high-ranking Mason, Don José Centeno, was granted. However, Fray Campomanes forbid the fiesta to go on, thus forcing the liberal Governor-General Emilio Terrero y Perinat to intervene and allow the celebration to proceed as planned, even without Fray Campomanes. As a result, a formal decree was released guaranteeing precedence of the native elites over the Chinese and the Chinese *mestizos*. "In an unprecedented show of solidarity," all *gobernadorcillos de naturales* from Manila and its suburbs attended the fiesta.[161]

The result of the 1887 Binondo parish incident had only incited bolder political actions from the *gobernadorcillos* and *principales* of Manila suburbs and its rural environs,

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[160] L. Dery, "Marcelo H. del Pilar: Ang Utak ng Paghihiwalay ng Pilipinas sa Espanya," 63-64; and Schumacher, "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan*, 56-61.

[161] Luis Dery, Marcelo H. del Pilar," in *Bantayog ni Inang Bayan*, 63; Jaime Veneracion, *Malolos: A Legacy of Its Past*, 84; and John N. Schumacher, "Reforms and Representation," in Kasaysayan, 58.

often instigated or led by Del Pilar and the Comité de Propaganda.[162] On March 1, 1888 all *gobernadorcillos* of Manila and its suburbs as well their supporters held a demonstration in front of *Ayuntamiento de Manila* where the office of Manila's civil governor was located to present a manifesto with over seven hundred signatures[163] to Manila's acting civil governor, Jose Centeno –demanding the expulsion of the friars from the Philippines, the exile of the Archbishop, and the transfer of all parishes to Filipino priests. If their demands were not met and the government refused to take action, the Filipinos would, they said, resort to the use of force to expel the friars. "[I]f they [the friars] believe in bringing down the government," then, as indicated in the 1888 Manifesto, "the sons of the Philippines, who will end in not so distant time by expelling them forcibly, if the government does not do it beforehand" ["*con la que creen abatir al Gobierno. . . á los hijos de Filipinas que acabarán en dia no lejano por espulsarlos á viva fuerza si el Gobierno no lo hace antes*"].[164]

The repercussions following the release of the Manifesto of 1888 resulted in the suppression of liberalism and resurgence of reactionary sentiments in Manila. After the immediate resignation of acting Civil Governor Centeno and the departure of Governor-General Emilio Terrero in April 1888, all *gobernadorcillos* who had signed were removed

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[162] J. Veneracion, *Malolos: A Legacy of Its Past*, 87.

[163] Copy of "*La Manifestacíon Patriotica de 1 Marzo 1888*" in *Avisos y profecias por Wenceslao E. Retana* (Madrid: [Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios], 1892), 155-224, HaitiTrust.org - http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=miun.afj2145.0001.001;view=1up;seq=171 (Accessed online on 10 September 2013).

[164] Copy of "*La Manifestacíon Patriotica de 1 Marzo 1888*" in *Avisos y profecias por Wenceslao E. Retana*, 219, HaitiTrust.org - http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=miun.afj2145.0001.001;view=1up;seq=235(Accessed on 10 September 2013). Also cited by J. N. Schumacher, "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan*, 59-60; and J. Veneracion, *Malolos: A Legacy of Its Past*, 87-88.

from office and many were exiled to Guam. Even though none of them actually signed the manifesto, several members of Comité de Propaganda were still tried and convicted, notably Jose A. Ramos and Doroteo Cortes.[165]

In addition to the repressive measures implemented under Governor Terrero's successor, acting Governor-General Antonio Molto, the colonial authorities conducted a more thorough investigation on the signatories of the Manifesto of 1888, which Wenceslao E. Retana prepared and submitted to Madrid. In his 1892 report, Retana concluded that out of the 810 signatories only 592 individuals were actually of legal age, and a majority of them did not even understand Spanish, the language of the petition. According to Retana, the remaining 218 signatories were deceased, minors, unknown persons, or those with unrecognizable signatures.[166]

As for Del Pilar, he was "warned through his friend [the Director of Civil Administration, Benigno] Quiroga for him to leave the Philippines for Spain."[167] Although Del Pilar's name did not appear on the manifesto either as the author or one of the signatories, the Spanish authorities strongly suspected his involvement in this radical campaign based on his previous anti-friar activities. His involvement in the Hacienda Calamba dispute against the Dominican order as one of Rizal's legal advisors had already marked him for possible imprisonment or deportation.[168]

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[165] John N. Schumacher, "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan*, 59-60.

[166] W. E. Retana, "*Las Firmas – Recapitulación*" in *Avisos y profecias*, 297-308, HaitiTrust.org - http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=miun.afj2145.0001.001;view=1up;seq=313 (Accessed on 10 September 2013).

[167] J. Veneracion, *Malolos: A Legacy of Its Past*, 87; and J. N. Schumacher, "Reforms and Representation," in *Kasaysayan*, 57.

[168] J. Schumacher, "Chapter Five: Two Paths to Freedom" in *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 113-115.

The events of March 1888 had only exacerbated Del Pilar's situation. When the new governor general, Valeriano Weyler, assumed office in 1888, it became imperative for Del Pilar to leave the Philippines if he were to continue the struggle without fear of imprisonment. The remaining members of the Comité de Propaganda such as Pedro Serranno-Laktaw urged him to go to Spain and promised that the Manila-based propaganda movement would finance his work there. So by October 1888, Marcelo H. del Pilar and his friend Justo Trinidad, a former *gobernadorcillo* of the suburb of Sta. Ana and a signatory of the 1888 Manifesto, were bound for Europe.[169]

After Del Pilar left the Philippines, the Manila-based Comité de Propaganda continued to pursue his political agenda, albeit in a more limited capacity. With the actual propaganda campaign relocated to Europe under Del Pilar's leadership, the group in Manila assumed the financial aspect and the distribution of propaganda materials sent from Europe.

As a result, the historical focus shifted from what was happening in the Philippines to the mobilization of Filipino students in Europe under the tutelage of the leading reformists such as Rizal and Del Pilar. Unfortunately, the historical significance of the Propaganda Movement in Manila has been greatly overlooked by many scholars who were more preoccupied with more visible events in Europe. Furthermore, the Katipunan's important connection with Marcelo del Pilar and the Manila-based Comité de Propaganda is often neglected in the narratives of the Philippine Revolution despite some efforts to

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[169] Letter no. 100 - Jose Rizal's letter to his friend in Hong Kong, Jose Ma. Basa dated January 1889. *Mga Sinulat ni Jose Rizal - Pakikipagsulatan sa mga kasama niya sa pagpapalaganap, Ikalawang Tomo* (Manila: Pambansang Komisyon ng Ikasandaang Taon ni Jose Rizal, 1961), 274.

include them in the official history.[170]

Although Del Pilar's efforts can be considered equal to Rizal's contribution to the nationalist struggle, nonetheless, Rizal will always overshadow, obscuring Del Pilar and his stronger connection to the rise of the Katipunan. Although it is important to recognize the connection between Rizal's La Liga Filipina and Bonifacio's Katipunan, it is also necessary to analyze the influence of Del Pilar's nationalist activities that predated and even, influenced Rizal's own.

Composition of the Propaganda Movement

The membership of the Manila-based Comité de Propaganda was consisted of educated (some were lawyers or law students) young Filipinos who were either friends or family members of Marcelo de Pilar. The members were politically active either in Manila or in Bulacan, where Del Pilar's family was part of the provincial elites (*principales*), as well as take on a very anti-friar stance. The Comité de Propaganda was usually involved in litigation cases and class actions directed against the abuses of the state and Church. In addition, the Comité de Propaganda also disseminated pamphlets and other propaganda materials attacking the frailocracy in the Philippines as well as promoting native rights. After Del Pilar's exile in the late 1880s, the Comité de Propaganda continued their work while at the same time financially supporting Del Pilar in Spain. As the Propaganda Movement flourished in Europe, Del Pilar, Rizal and others relied on the Manila-based Comité de Propaganda to distribute their newspaper, *La Solidaridad* as well as to keep them appraised to what was happening in the Philippines.

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[170] John N Schumacher, S.J., "Chapter 3: Reforms and Representation" in *Kasaysayan: The History of the Filipino People,* 55-81.

The Comité de Propaganda attracted different individuals to join its cause. For example Teodoro Sandiko, a native of Pandacan district in Manila who came to Malolos in 1886 to start boys' primary and secondary schools, became known as the author of the petition submitted to Governor-General Weyler on December 12, 1888 requesting permission to open a night school for women.[171] This petition was signed by twenty young women from prominent families of Bulacan referred to as 'The Women of Malolos', in which one of the women was Sandiko's wife, Mercedes Reyes Tiongson. Eventually, Weyler granted the request with the condition that Sandiko not be allowed to teach the school because he "had been 'blacklisted' by the friar curate as one of the 'troublemakers' in Malolos."[172] Sandiko became as involved with other anti-friar activities in Malolos that, in May 1889, he was forced to leave the Philippines to escape arrest. He then joined Del Pilar in Madrid to continue supporting the propaganda movement and helped manage *La Solidaridad* from 1890 to 1896. Even though, Sandiko was not officially a Katipunan member prior to the revolution, he assisted the revolutionary council in Hong Kong until he returned to the Philippines in 1898.

Another well-known individual from Bulacan is Gregorio del Pilar (known as the 'Boy General'), who was Del Pilar's nephew, and later became the youngest general in the Philippine Revolutionary Army. Prior to his involvement in the revolution, Gregorio lived in Manila with his other uncle, Deodato Arellano, while studying at the Ateneo Municipal de Manila. At the same time, he was helping Marcelo H. Del Pilar and the Comité de Propaganda in distributing subversive materials in churches and other public places. The

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[171] Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 170-173.

[172] Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 173.

young Gregorio often devised daring strategies to disseminate propaganda materials.

One of the most famous stories of Gregorio del Pilar's exploits was the 1889 distribution of anti-friar pamphlet entitled *Dasalan at Tocsohan* ("Prayers and Mockery") in Malolos. The pamphlet contains parodies of common Catholic prayers that ridiculed friars' greed and lust through the 'revised' version of the "Ten Commandments" entitled "*Ang Manga Utos Nang Fraile*" ("The Friar's Commandments").[173]

Gregorio knew that after mass Malolos Church friar curate, Fray Felipe Garcia, handed out copies of Fray Rodriguez' pamphlet entitled *Caiingat Cayo* (Beware) that attacked Rizal and his satirical novel *Noli Me Tangere* (1887). So, Gregorio and his friends (who might be working in the parish church) as slipped copies of their own subversive materials inside the covers of Fray Rodriguez's pamphlet and then disposed the originals.[174] According to historian T. M. Kalaw,

> The next day, Fr. Felipe Garcia, follow his usual practice after mass, took the booklets from the sanctuary and distributed them to the faithful. 'Read these booklets, my brothers and sisters,' he advised them, "and pass them on to others who read them. You shall gain indulgences by reading them, and you shall be

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[173] Some examples of the revisions are the following:

> Fourth Commandment: Pawn / Sell your body to raise funeral fees for your father and mother
> Fifth Commandment: Do not die if you have no money for your funeral
> Sixth Commandment: Do not commit adultery with his wife {friar's querida/mistress}
> Seventh Commandment: Do not give him competition in stealing
>
> Ang ikapat: Isangla mo ang catauan mo sa papapalibing sa ama't ina
> Ang ikalima: Huag kang mamamatay kung uala pang salaping pang libing
> Ang ikanim: Huag kang makiapid sa kanyang asaua
> Ang ikapito: Huag kang makinakaw

From Rafael Enriquez and Pedro Serrano-Laktaw, *Dasalan at Tocsohan* (Barcelona, 1889). Cited from Magno Gatmaitan, *Marcelo H del Pilar 1850-1896* (Quezon City: Muñoz Press, 1966), 404-408 and translated by Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 77.

[174] Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 79-80.

good in the eyes of God." [Gregorio] Del Pilar was extremely pleased.[175]

Such covert tactics helped establish Gregorio's reputation as a military strategist when he joined the *Sanguniang balangay 'Apuy'* in Malolos in 1896 along with several of his Bulakeño school friends from Ateneo Municipal. When the revolution broke out in August 1896, the newly-appointed Captain Gregorio del Pilar and his men were charged with capturing Spanish garrisons and gathering arms through guerilla tactics and preventing Spanish reinforcements from entering Bulacan.

The rise of Philippine Masonry

Conspiracies and clandestine activities have long been associated with Masonry and Masonic lodges.[176] By upholding the ideals of the Enlightenment and secular humanism, Masonry soon acquired a powerful enemy in the Catholic Church because of its perceived anticlericalism. Whether or not Masonry is actually anticlerical is still debatable; nonetheless, since the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century, Masonic influence was strong behind the rise of anticlerical and liberal regimes in many traditional Catholic countries such as France, Portugal and Spain.[177]

During the late nineteenth century, Masonry and anticlericalism seemed to go together after the rise of Spanish Liberal state coinciding with the decline of the Spanish Conservatives, and the Catholic Church's power and wealth. Many high-ranking Spanish Liberals were Masons starting with Prime Minister Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, a prominent

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[175] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Life and Death of a Boy General* (Manila: National Historical Commission, 1974), 6-7. Cited by Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 80.

[176] John N. Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry," in *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The Creators of a Filipino consciousness, the makers of the Revolution* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1973), 154.

[177] John N. Schumacher, "Philippine Masonry to 1890," *Asian Studies*, 4 (1966), 328.

liberal politician and former member of the Spanish Cortes (Spanish parliament). Under Sagasta's regime, more liberal Masons were sent to the colonies as administrators to challenge the privileged positions of the Church in the colonies.[178] As Republican Spain moved towards further secularization and modernization, the reactionary Church became more marginalized and susceptible to attacks by both mobs on the street and delegates in the Cortes.

Historian Stanley Payne explained that this animosity was "rooted in the eighteenth and early centuries and socially based on the secularized portions of the middle classes, republicanism stressed political and cultural change in which enmity against the Church was as central as opposition to the monarchy."[179] Stanley even referred to the Spanish Catholic Church's paranoia against its perceived enemy, the Masons, as "Masonic psychosis."[180] It only intensified by the second half of the nineteenth century as many Spanish military officials and civil personnel immigrated to the colonies as part of Spain's attempt to centralize control over its remaining colonies. At the same time, other Spanish merchants wanted to take advantage of the growing economies in Cuba and the Philippines, and several of these would establish the first Masonic lodges in the Spanish colonies.[181]

In 1856, a young Spanish noble and naval officer named Jose Malcampo y Monje

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[178] Reynold S. Fajardo, "Chapter 1: Born in Blood," in *The Brethren: Masons in the Struggle for Philippine Independence* (Philippines: Enrique L. Locsin and the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the Philippines, 1998), 1-19.

[179] Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 125.

[180] Stanley G. Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview*, 127.

[181] Franklin W. Knight and K. O. Laurence (eds.), *General History of the Caribbean: The Long Nineteenth century, Nineteenth-century transformation* (UNESCO, 2011), 345.

founded the first Masonic lodge in the Philippines called *Primera Luz Filipina* (The First Philippine Light).[182] Malcampo would later become governor general of the Philippines from 1874 to 1877. In subsequent years, Masonry spread across the Philippines though remaining exclusively European in membership until 1891. According to Filipino scholar and Mason, Teodoro M. Kalaw, in 1884 there was a futile effort to invite "*all Indios and Mestizos* who knew how to read and write and had a responsible position, to join [the Masonic lodges] provided they pledged that *they loved Spain* and had a definite religion."[183] Schumacher contended that there was no other evidence that such invitation was ever made and that the only non-European listed as member of the lodge *Luz de Oriente* was Jose A. Ramos, identified as *español filipino*.[184]

As Franklin W. Knight pointed out that "though [nineteenth century Masonry was] predominantly an elite movement. . . men of the urban middle stratum also joined the lodges. . . relatively open and democratic [to some degree] in recruitment."[185] While Masonic lodges in Europe and in other European colonies were less concerned about the issue of race, Spanish Masonry in the Philippines was marked by a racial exclusivity. Before 1891 no *indio* [native Filipino] or Chinese *mestizo*, regardless of his social status and wealth, could gain membership into one of the Masonic lodges in the Philippines. As a result, many native elites considered being a Mason akin to upward social mobility,

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[182] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry: Its origin, development, and vicissitudes up to the present time*, Translated in English from original Spanish by Frederic Stevens (Manila, 1956, c1920), 9; and R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 21-23.

[183] T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 17.

[184] J. N. Schumacher, "Philippine Masonry to 1890," 330-331; “Filipino Masonry” in *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895*, 154-155.

[185] Franklin W. Knight and K. O. Laurence (eds.), *General History of the Caribbean*, 345.

offering access to important people and opportunities.

When Filipino students started coming to Europe by the mid 1880s, they were surprised to learn that they were allowed to join the Masonic lodges. Many Filipinos joined the Masonry soon after they arrived notably Del Pilar who joined immediately upon arriving in Madrid in 1889. He helped revived the *Logia Solidaridad* Lodge No. 53 with another Filipino student, Julio Llorente, after it was dissolved in 1887. Del Pilar, then, turned *Logia Solidaridad* into an all-Filipino Masonic lodge similar to the Barcelona-based lodge *Revolucion*.

Prior to Del Pilar's arrival in Spain, there were already two important lodges with substantial Filipino membership, *Logia Solidaridad* No. 53 (founded in 1886) and *Logia Revolucion* (established in1889 and then later affiliated with Grand Master Miguel Morayta's *Gran Oriente Español*). Aside from the great influx of new Filipino Masons, it is also important to point out that these men rose to the highest degree of Masonry within a short period of time; an astonishing feat, according to Schumacher.[186] One example was Del Pilar, who held the highest degree (33rd degree) by the early 1890s, thus becoming a member of the Supreme Council of *Gran Oriente Español* only few years after his initiation into Masonry.[187]

Schumacher attributed the Filipinos' rapid ascendency to Morayta's attempt to entice Filipinos to join his extreme anticlerical campaign to destroy Catholicism in the Philippines.[188] Furthermore, Schumacher stressed that Morayta's interest coincided with

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[186] John N. Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry," in *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895*, 156.

[187] J. N. Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry," in *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895*, 159.

[188] John N. Schumacher, "Chapter 3: Reforms and Representation" in *Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People*, Volume 5, edited by Milagros C. Guerrero and John N. Schumacher (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing

the Filipinos,' "particularly Del Pilar and [Mariano] Ponce, [who aspired] to rise to positions in the Masonry where they could make effective use of their Masonic contacts for their political purposes, particularly the destruction of friar influence in the Philippines."[189] However, only Del Pilar was willing to work closely with Morayta to advance the Propaganda Movement's political campaigns. Most Filipinos, including Rizal, refused to ally themselves with Morayta and his non-political group *Asociacion Hispano-Filipina* because they knew that Morayta was only using them to promote his own agenda.[190]

Nonetheless, Del Pilar saw the Masonry as a conduit to disseminate political and anti-friar objectives among other highly influential Masons within the Spanish Cortes. Despite lack of tangible results, Del Pilar continued to place faith in "the strength of Masonic influence in politics."[191] It is not surprising that Del Pilar was left with this lasting impression of the Masons' political clout, no matter how erroneous it might have been. Throughout his anticlerical and political activism in the Philippines, Del Pilar depended on liberal Spanish colonial officials, in particular, Governor-General Emilio Terrero (1885-1887), acting Civil Governor of Manila Jose Centeno, and Director General of Civil Administration Benigno Quiroga. These Spanish officials, who were also high-ranking Masons, helped Del Pilar in his anticlerical campaigns and protected him from friar retribution, allowing him to escape imprisonment.

Company Limited, 1998), 72-73. Also see Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry" in *The Propaganda Movement*, 156-157.

[189] J. Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry" in *The Propaganda Movement*, 157.

[190] J. Schumacher, "Chapter 3: Reforms and Representation" in *Kasaysayan*, 72-73; Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry" in *The Propaganda Movement*, 157.

[191] J. N. Schumacher, "Filipino Masonry" in *The Propaganda Movement*, 158.

Filipino historian Manuel Artigas y Cuerva referred to these men as the *Triangulo de 33°* (Triumvirate of 33 degree Masons) because they all held the highest positions in the colonial administration as well as the highest rank in Masonry.[192] In 1885, Spanish liberal prime minister Práxedes Mateo Sagasta appointed fellow Mason Emilio Terrero as the new governor general of the Philippines. A former conservative Carlist, Terrero had become more liberal and anticlerical after witnessing friars abuses in the Philippines.[193] Determined to suppress power and influence of the friars in political and civil affairs, Terrero appointed two close allies to key positions within the colonial state – Jose Centeno as acting Civil Governor of Manila and Benigno Quiroga Lopez Ballesteros as Director General for Civil Administration. Terrero, Centeno, and Quiroga supported, and to some extent, encouraged the subversive activities of Del Pilar and the Comite de Propaganda in Manila, angering both the friars and the Archbishop in Manila.[194]

At the same time, the *Triangulo de 33°* also initiated social reforms that directly affected the Church and its revenues. In one instance, Quiroga, the director general for civil administration, issued a decree prohibiting the bringing of corpses of individuals who died of infectious diseases inside churches. When the curates and the Archbishop refused to adhere to the new law, Centeno and other provincial governors deployed the troops to enforce the decree on funeral rites. Apart from addressing public health issue, perhaps this

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[192] R. Fajardo, in *The Brethren*, 45-46.

[193] R. Fajardo, in *The Brethren*, 45.

[194] Fajardo, "A Masonic Regime in the Philippines," in *The Brethren*, 43-64, 70-72.

might have been retaliation against the Church for refusing Masons proper burials. [195]

Another important reform was secularizing primary education. For the first time, the colonial government placed the management of schools in Malolos, Bulacan to laymen rather than ecclesiastical tutelage. This bold act by the colonial government directly defied Pope Leo XIII's Papal Bull, *Humanum Genus* (1884) that condemned Freemasonry's promotion of public education in which "the education of youth shall be exclusively in the hands of the laymen."[196]

When Rizal, a fellow Mason, returned home in August 1887 after publishing his subversive novel *Noli Me Tangere*, he met a surprising reception from the Spanish colonial administration. Instead of banning the novel and imprisoning Rizal, Terrero requested a copy from Rizal and provided him a bodyguard for his protection. After only six months in the Philippines, Terrero advised Rizal to leave the country again because his life was in danger.[197] Terrero's term was also ending so he would not be in the position to offer protection.

The events of March 1888, involving demonstration and petition signed mostly by *gobernadorcillos* from Manila to expel all friars from the Philippines, would abruptly end the liberal regime of the *Triangulo de 33°*. This anticlerical administration was replaced immediately by a more repressive colonial rule under acting Governor-General Antonio

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[195] J. Schumacher, "Chapter 3: Reforms and Representation" in *Kasaysayan*, 58. For more information about the 'Triangulo 33º (Terrero, Centeno and Quiroga) and their support of Del Pilar, see Fajardo, "A Masonic Regime in the Philippines," in *The Brethren*, 43-64.

[196] "Humanum Genus: Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Freemasonry," Vatican website - http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_18840420_humanum-genus_en.html (Accessed on 24 October 2013).

[197] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 57-58.

Molto. By the end of 1888, Del Pilar had no choice but to flee the Philippines.

Even though the regime of the *Triangulo de 33°* only lasted for two years, Del Pilar believed that much could have been accomplished if only they were allowed to continue their liberal work in the Philippines. By the time Del Pilar reached Spain, he was determined to establish extensive Masonic contacts to be used in advancing the reformist movement's cause.[198]

His pragmatic approach and his willingness to collaborate with the *Gran Oriente Español* Grand Master Miguel Morayta, gave Del Pilar a chance to redirect his efforts. Del Pilar was beginning to recognize the futility of the reformist movement in Spain. Threatened, moreover, by factionalism and the dwindling of financial support from Manila, Del Pilar knew that the only way to revive the struggle and foster unity was to directly involve Filipinos in the Philippines. Given the great importance placed by Del Pilar on the extensive Masonic network across the globe, he wanted the Filipinos back home to have access to those important contacts to further advance the Propaganda Movement's objectives. At the same time, Del Pilar also wanted to bring more Filipinos to their cause by inducting them into the brotherhood of Freemasons. As a result, Del Pilar deemed it necessary to establish Filipino Masonic lodges in the Philippines to challenge Spanish control over the colony.[199]

With the authorization from Grand Master Morayta, Del Pilar commissioned his friends and fellow members of Comité de Propaganda – Pedro Laktaw-Serrano, Moises Salvador, Timoteo Paez and Jose A. Ramos – to formally establish Masonry in the

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[198] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 70-75.

[199] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 86-89.

Philippines. Serrano and others had option to establish either a Masonic triangle or lodge in accordance to the Statutes and General Regulations of the *Gran Oriente Español*. According to Reynold Fajardo, a foremost Filipino Masonic historian and former Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of the Philippines, "[t]o organize a triangle three or more regular Masons, at least one of whom is a Master Mason, were needed. On the other hand, to put up a Lodge, seven or more Masons, at least three of whom are Master Masons, were required. A lodge so organized was called a 'provisional lodge' until it received its Charter from the Grand Council of the Order."[200]

During its initial stage, the Katipunan would also adopt these same methods of recruitment. The triangle method known as '*hasik*' would become the Katipunan's main recruitment tactic until it was replaced by a more efficient means to increase its membership.[201]

In establishing Masonry in the Philippines, Serrano and others started with the Masonic triangle and then shortly after, formed a lodge after initiating new Masons to meet the required number of seven founders.[202] In January 1892, the *Logia Nilad* No. 144, known as the Mother Lodge or *Logia Central y Delagada*, was established in Tondo, Manila.[203] The *Logia Nilad* Lodge was affiliated with the *Gran Oriente Español* with Jose A. Ramos as the Worshipful Master and Rizal as its Honorary Worshipful Master.[204]

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[200] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren: Masons in the Struggle for Philippine Independence*, 94.

[201] Teodoro Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*, 48.

[202] Reynold Fajardo, *The Brethren: Masons in the Struggle for Philippine Independence*, 94.

[203] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren: Masons in the Struggle for Philippine Independence*, 94-96.

[204] Masonic document appointing Rizal as Honorary Venerable of Logia Nilad signed by Pedro Serrano-Laktaw (*Panday Pira*) dated on 9 February 1892, *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists, National Heroes Commission edition* (1963), 657.

As the first Masonic lodge in the Philippines to admit native Filipinos, the *Logia Nilad* attracted many Filipinos. As Fajardo points out, "[t]the eager initiates were those who were indoctrinated with liberal ideas by the Spanish Masons during the progressive regime of Governor-General Terrero. Among the first initiates were the *gobernadorcillos* and *principales* who figures in the Manifestation of 1888, those who supported [liberal Director General for Civil Administration] Quiroga's decree on burials, the partisans of Del Pilar in Malolos, and the officers and members of the *Comité de Propaganda*."[205]

Immediately after the establishment of *Logia Nilad*, other Filipino lodges were created to accommodate the many more Filipinos who wished to join the Masonry.[206] "Masonry [in the Philippines] has progressed much [since its inception in January 1892]. . . . We count on 120 to 140 active members distributed in 19 [masonic] triangles and 9 to 10 lodges," wrote fellow Mason Timoteo Páez to Rizal in June 1892, prior to the latter's arrival in Manila.[207] A majority of the Filipino lodges were located in Manila but many were scattered across the archipelago like Central and Southern Luzon, Cebu, Iloilo, Davao, and Zamboanga. After the founding of *Nilad* a number of lodges were established within Manila including its surrounding areas such as *Balagtas* No. 149 in Sampaloc, Manila by Moises Salvador, Arcadio del Rosario and Bonifacio Arevalo; *Masala* No. 154 in San Fernando, Pampanga by Cecilio Hilario; *Bathala* No. 157 in Ermita, Manila by Ambrosio Flores; *Walana* No. 158 in Binondo, Tondo, Manila by Faustino Villarruel; *Lusong* No. 185 in Tondo, Manila by Timoteo Paez and Paulino Zamora; and *Taliba* No.

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[205] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 95.

[206] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 97-102.

[207] Letter of Timoteo Paez to Jose Rizal, dated 19 June 1892, *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists, National Heroes Commission edition* (1963), 696.

165 in Trozo, Tondo, Manila by Jose Dizon.[208] Among these Masonic lodges, all Manila-based in particular *Walana*, *Lusong* and *Taliba* lodges later would become significant in the founding of the Katipunan.

Despite being a secret organization, both Masonic officers and initiates were aggressive in their efforts to spread Filipino Masonry and its ideals of "Fraternity which considers all men as equals. . . [and] which erases all differences of race, nationality or color."[209] According to *Programa y Código Masónico* (Masonic Program and Code) candidates could not be accepted without undergoing rigorous admission process: "The doors of Masonry will never be open to an atheist or to those who deny the existence of the Supreme Creator. Masonry is not in need of the well-to-do, but it does not admit who does not have a profession, an art, a trade or an income that will enable him to support his family and in addition, to help to defray the expenses of Masonry and assist the needy. . . . The candidate who, after reading the foregoing and who feels capable of fulfilling his duty, will sign [the document]."[210] Aside from these requirements, there were other precautions set up to ensure that Masonic lodges were not infiltrated by agents of friars in the Philippines, who were becoming alarmed by the growth of Filipino Masonry.[211]

It is important to highlight the employment requirement for Masonic candidacy

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[208] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry: Its Origin, Development, and Vicissitudes up to the Present Time* (1920), translated from original Spanish by Frederic H. Stevens (Past Grand Master) and Antonio Amechazurra (Manila: McCullough Printing Company, 1956, c1924), 52-53. Cited in "Philippine Masonry from Barcelona to Manila, 1889-1896", Philippine Center for Masonic Studies website - http://www.philippinemasonry.org/philippine-masonry-from-barcelona-to-manila-1889-1896.html (Accessed on 24 October 2013).

[209] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 104.

[210] T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 46. Also cited by R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 106.

[211] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 55-56.

because this directly challenges the prevailing assumption that the Katipunan was mostly consisted of '*pobres y ignorantes*'[212]. This means that in order to become a Mason, one had to be employed as well as, to some extent, be literate in Spanish because the Masonic Program and Code was in Spanish.[213]

While not all Filipino Masons joined the Katipunan, many founding leaders and members of the Katipunan were Masons.[214] Starting with the six founders of the Katipunan, all were Masons and members of La Liga Filipina, including the three first '*hasik*'/triangle – Andres Bonifacio (*Sinukuan*[215]) of *Logia Taliba*, Ladislao Diwa (*Baguio*) of *Logia Taliba,* and Teodoro Plata (*Balany*) of *Logia Taliba*.[216] Other known *Katipuneros* were also Masons such as Emilio Aguinaldo (Colon) of *Logia Pilar* No. 203 and founder of *Logia Magdalo* No. 31, Emilio Jacinto (*Pingkian*) of *Logia Taliba*, and Guillermo Masangkay of *Logia Modestia* No. 199.[217]

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[212] Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre la revolución Filipina de 1896-1897*, 74.

[213] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 44-48.

[214] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 143-145.

[215] Sinukuan was Bonifacio's Masonic name. For his *nom de guerre* in *Katipunan*, Bonifacio chose *Maypagasa*.

[216] The other three founding members who belonged in the Masonry were Deodato Arellano (*Buan*) of Logia *Lusong* and secretary of *La Liga Filipina*; Jose Dizon (*Montgomery*), founder of Logia *Taliba* and Grand Fourth Vice-President of the Gran Consejo Regional de Filipinas; and Valentin Diaz (*Tupas*) of Logia *Taliba*. See R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 142, 144; "The Katipunan and Masonry," Philippine Center for Masonic Studies website - http://www.philippinemasonry.org/the-katipunan-and-masonry.html (Accessed on 20 November 2013).

[217] Other famous Masons in the *Katipunan* were Baldomero Aguinaldo of Logia *Pilar* No. 203, Pantaleon Garcia of Logia *Pilar* No. 203, Aurelio Tolentino (*Pangahas*) of Logia *Modestia* No. 199, Faustino Villarruel (*Ilaw*) founder of Logia *Walana*, and Jose Turiano Santiago (*Nero*) of Logia *Taliba*. These individuals were not the only ones involved in both the Katipunan and the Masonry. There were others who joined the Katipunan because some of their Masonic brothers recruited them into the movement. See Jim Richardson, "Table I: Katipunan activists in Manila, 1892-96", Katipunan: Documents and Studies website - https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=1jzzUC-L358HBwyAMP7JOCLsFXL-

Even the first women who joined the revolutionary movement were members of the first Masonic auxiliary lodge for women in the Philippines initially called *Logia de Adopción* then later given the name *La Semilla* No. 8 (established in July 1893 by the *Logia Walana*'s founder Faustino Villarruel).[218] Some of those women who later joined the Katipunan included Rosario Villarruel (*Minerva*), the first woman to be initiated to *Logia Semilla*; Marina Dizon, daughter of Jose Dizon, founder of *Logia Taliba*; her husband Jose Turiano Santiago; and her cousin of Emilio Jacinto; and Jose Rizal's sisters, Josefa (*Sumikat*) and Trinidad (*Sumibol*), both part of *Logia Semilla*.[219]

It is important to note that the Filipino Masons were not the first to allow women into the society. As early as 1740s, lodges of adoption were founded in France that allowed wives and female relatives of Freemasons to be admitted into the fraternity with their own lodges and rituals while still closely adhering to the original rites of the Masonry.[220] However, Filipino Masons were among the few in the world who welcomed women into the fraternity.

As mentioned earlier, Masonry in the Philippines continued to spread across the archipelago as Masons based in Manila and the Tagalog provinces were sent to other parts of the country to establish new lodges, such as Carlos Serrano-Laktaw from Bulacan who

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TvidFELnB2iG7a50 (Accessed on 20 November 2013); "Famous Masons", *Taga-ilog* Lodge No. 79 website - http://tagailog79.zymichost.com/Famous/famous1.htm (Accessed on 20 November 2013).

[218] T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 53-54; R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 140-143, 145.

[219] Other prominent women who joined the Masonry and the Katipunan were Trinidad Tecson, wife of Julian Alcantara, another Katipunero; and Rizal's nieces, Angelica Lopez y Rizal and Delfina Herbosa. See R. Fajardo, The Brethren, 143, 145; Rafaelita Hilario Soriano, ed., *Women in the Philippine Revolution* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1995), 33-35, 103-112, 146-151, 154-161.

[220] For further discussion on women and 18th century French Freemasonry, see Janet M. Burke and Margaret C. Jacob, "French Freemasonry, Women and Feminist Scholarship," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 1996), 513-549.

established Masonic triangle *Diwata* in Davao. Even Filipino Masons based in Spain were tasked to help spread Masonry in their hometown when they returned to the Philippines. Such were the case with Julio Llorente, who founded the *Triangulo Maktan* in Cebu and Sixto Lopez, who founded the *Triangulo Kumintang* in Batangas.[221]

Even Spanish Masons assisted in the propagation of Masonry in other parts of the Philippines. Moreover, Fajardo adds that "[i]n the Visayas and Mindanao maritime officials of the steamship vessels functioned as efficient purveyors of the Masonic movement."[222] Despite the success of the Filipino Masonry under the authority of the Mother Lodge, *Nilad*, discontent and mistrust spread among the new lodges, threatening the very spirit of fraternity that Filipino Masonry was trying to disseminate.

Within few months of the lodges' establishment, disputes erupted between the *Logia Nilad* and the others over attempts of its secretary, Pedro Serrano-Laktaw, to undermine their autonomy and prerogatives. At the same time the other lodges leveled accusations of improper use of funds against Serrano. Both *Balagtas* and *Walana* lodges headed the legal campaign to take action against *Logia Nilad* and Serrano by giving Del Pilar a power-of-attorney so he might represent their position to the *Gran Oriente Español* in Spain. The conflict escalated when Serrano started to attack both the Propaganda Movement and Del Pilar's character. Other lodges defended Del Pilar and his efforts against Serrano's slanderous attacks. Even though Del Pilar remained in Spain, he was very much involved in organizing these lodges, handling all internal disputes and legally

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221 R. Fajardo, *The Brethren,* 99.

222 R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 98.

representing their affairs.[223] At the same time, the Masons also sought Rizal's help in setting the escalating disputes when they learned that he was returning to the Philippines in June 1892.

In their attempt to address the problem of disunity and mistrust, various masonic lodges organized meetings and banquets in anticipation of Rizal's arrival. Apart from welcoming Rizal, according to Kalaw, the lodges also wanted him

> to intervene in an effort to settle the differences [among the Filipino Masons. As a result] Rizal summoned those interested to a meeting and after mutual statements promising adherence and fraternity it was decided that, in the future, Masonry would take charge of the work in Madrid, namely: (1) The fortnightly paper *La Solidaridad*; (2) the *Asociación Hispano-Filipina*; (3) the *Lodge Solidaridad*; (4) the meetings and (5) the pension of Graciano Lopez-Jaena.[224]

Despite Rizal's efforts to encourage a dialogue among Filipino Masons and promote common goals through forming the La Liga Filipina in July 1892, the Filipinos remained divided. Although La Liga was not solely geared towards addressing the issues of the Masonic lodges, it did achieve limited success in bringing them together. The situation for the Masonry only got worse immediately after the arrest and deportation of Rizal to Dapitan in July 1892.

After Rizal's arrival in the Philippines in June 1892, he was put under state surveillance. During his short stay in Manila, all of Rizal's activities were secretly monitored and all his contacts were monitored.[225] Immediately after the founding of La Liga Filipina, Spanish authorities such as the Manila police force, *Guardia Civil Veterana*,

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[223] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 57-59, 66-67.

[224] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 59.

[225] Surveillance report on Rizal and his family, A-6, Folder No. 1, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, National Commission of Culture and Arts.

raided the houses that Rizal visited in Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Tarlac. During the course of their searches, numerous Masonic documents were confiscated, leading to the arrest and exile of many leading Filipino Masons as well as the closure of several lodges. The other remaining lodges that were not shutdown by the colonial state were forced to suspend their activities.[226] Fellow Mason Moises Salvador wrote to Del Pilar on November 14, 1892 about their dire conditions, saying: "As regards Masonry, no lodge is working at present, because we are closely watched."[227]

With the removal of Rizal and his Mason friends from Manila, the colonial regime eventually allowed the Masonry to resume its works although the lodges remained under surveillance until the outbreak of the revolution in 1896. At the same time, suspicions arose among the Filipino Masons that there were traitors within their own ranks because many confidential documents would find their way to the Spanish authorities and eventually, to the newspapers.

In the face of colonial persecution and internal turmoil, the Filipino Masonic lodges continued to spread in remote areas where the exiled Masons were deported. Determined to defy the colonial rulers, these individuals established more lodges outside of Luzon. In Manila the early lodges resumed their activities, despite the on-going dispute between the *Logia Nilad* led by Pedro Serrano-Laktaw and the other lodges.

Eventually, the decline of *Logia Nilad* gave rise to a new and more democratic central organization, the *Gran Consejo Regional de Filipinas* headed by the *Logia Walana* and its founder Faustino Villarruel. Together with Apolinario Mabini, a young lawyer who

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[226] Reynold Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 115-117; Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 111-117.

[227] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 113.

was also a member of *Logia Balagtas*, officers of the Council from the Manila-based lodges prepared a constitution for approval from Spain. Despite opposition from *Logia Nilad* and its Spanish-born Mason supporters, Del Pilar was able to persuade Grand Master Morayta in Spain to approve the constitutional charter of *Gran Consejo Regional de Filipinas* in December 1893. Afterwards, both *Logia Nilad* and its only Filipino lodge supporter, *Logia Labong* from Serrano's hometown of Malabon, Bulacan, were dissolved.[228]

According to Masonic scholar and former Masonic Grand Master (1928-29) Teodoro M. Kalaw, the Grand Regional Council "assuming the direction of the symbolic national Masonry," helped increase the number of lodges across the Philippines, particularly in Manila, Cavite, and Bulacan where the Katipunan movement would later take hold and flourish.[229] Notable lodges were *Logia Modestia* No. 199 in Quiapo, Manila founded by Antonio Salazar (owner of *Bazar el Cisne* on Calle Carriedo where Katipunan members bought their printing press and limited number of types[230]), *Logia Pilar* No. 203 in Cavite founded by Father Severo Buenaventura (whose members included prominent *Katipuneros* Emilio Aguinaldo, Baldomero Aguinaldo and Pantaleon Garcia)[231], and *Logia Kupang* in Malolos, Bulacan founded by Vicente Gatmaitan (Del Pilar's relative who named the lodge after Del Pilar's Masonic name).[232]

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[228] Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 90-91, 101-102

[229] T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 102-103.

[230] Teodoro Agoncillo, *Revolt of the Masses*, 80.

[231] "History of Pilar Lodge No. 3", Pilar Lodge No. 3 Imus, Cavite, Philippines website - http://www.pilarlodge3freemasonry.freeservers.com/index_1.html (Accessed on 20 November 2013).

[232] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 102-103.

As the Masonic movement in the Philippines flourished, the Filipino propaganda movement in Spain languished from lack of support and, perhaps, interest on the part of the individuals involved in both groups. It also did not help that Serrano, who was one of the leading figures of the Comité de Propaganda, had antagonized a majority of the Filipino Masons in the Philippines. The conflict between the former members of *Logia Nilad* and other lodges caused a rift between the two movements resulting in a drastic decrease of financial support to the Comité de Propaganda that funded Del Pilar's propaganda campaign in Spain.[233]

To make matters worse, a second wave of persecution against the Masonry began in 1894 after the friars acquired crucial Masonic documents including "lists of Mason more or less correct, more or less extensive" and then later published in newspaper *La Politica de España en Filipinas*.[234] Grand Master Ambrosio Flores suspected, that, in the aftermath of a bitter internal feud, Serrano had betrayed Masonry and collaborated with the friars in bringing down the movement. The extreme reactionary measures of the state and Church only forced the Masons to go deeper underground. On April 14, 1894, Flores told Del Pilar of his suspicions, saying:

> As regards the installation of new lodges I must inform you that I have decided to limit to 30 the members of every lodge, not for the pride of thus showing a greater number of lodges, but for security reasons; with smaller groups it is easier to keep out persons likely to bring us into danger. This measure has become very necessary as it is well-known among us that the office of the Secretary of the Governor-General has a long list of Masons who are suspected of being engaged

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[233] Letter of Graciano Lopez Jaena to J. Rizal, dated 26 May 1892, *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists*, National Heroes Commission edition (1963), 690; Letter of M. H. del Pilar to Jose Reyes Tolentino and the members of *La Modestia* (lodge) dated 3 November 1894, *Philippine Review/Revista filipina* Vol. III no. 10 (1918) 801-803, reproduced in *Letters of Marcelo del Pilar* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2006, c1955), 239-244.

[234] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 115. Cited by Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 153.

> in revolutionary activities. It is also said that General Blanco [who was also a Mason[235]] is trying to intervene in this matter.[236]

To escape capture, Masons began devising creative schemes to deceive the provincial civil guards (Guardia Civil) and the Manila police force (Guardia Civil Veterana) whenever they conducted their raids of Masonic meetings. One example was having a gathering of dancing and singing youth (children of Masons) in the same house where a Masonic meeting was taking place so that authorities would not likely to barge in. Another example was ensuring that Masonic paraphernalia and furniture (such as triangular desks and coffins) used in the meeting could be hidden or quickly assembled into inconspicuous house furnishings.[237]

Other Masons used gambling such as playing card games ('*monte*' or '*panguingue*') in private houses to distract the Veterana or Guardia Civil from the 'real' activities happening in the houses. If caught, they knew that the Spanish authorities would only take down their names and penalize them for *juegos prohibidos* (illegal gambling).[238]

Apart from this report, there were other accounts of covert meetings supposedly organized by prominent citizens. The parish curates in Manila and its surroundings demanded that Governor-General Blanco immediately suppress the native elites who were corrupting the minds of the population. Blanco did try to address their concerns but his

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[235] Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 163-164.

[236] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 115. Also cited by Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 154.

[237] Manuel Camus, "Freemasonry in the Philippines in Times Past," *The Cabletow* (March 1925). Cited by R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 154-155.

[238] M. Camus, "Freemasonry in the Philippines in Times Past," *The Cabletow* (March 1925). Cited by R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 156. Later on, the *juegos prohibidos* would provide a good alibi for suspected Katipunan meetings such as the time when *capitan municipal* (town mayor) Emilio Aguinaldo almost got caught by the parish priest of his town, Kawit, in Cavite province.

efforts were not severe enough to appease the friars. It only got worse when Blanco further antagonized the Church by releasing his fellow Mason Rizal from his Dapitan exile in July 1896, with passage to Cuba as a field doctor for the Spanish military forces.[239]

When the Katipunan was discovered on August 19, 1896, Rizal was en route to Barcelona. Upon disembarking in Barcelona, Rizal was placed under arrest and detained in Montjuich prison before being sent back to the Philippines to stand trial on the charges of sedition, rebellion and conspiracy.

Immediately after the Revolution started in August 1896, Blanco placed the eight Tagalog provinces – Manila, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Tarlac, Batangas, Pampanga, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija – under martial law. At the same time, the first ones to be arrested and imprisoned at Fort Santiago and Bilibid Prison were wealthy Filipino masons, specifically the officers of the *Gran Consejo Regional*. Next were known officers and members of Masonic lodges, particularly those in Manila and closely associated with the Katipunan such as *Taliba*, *Walana*, *Modestia* and *Dalisay*.[240] Even their Spanish

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[239] Letter of Governor-General Blanco to Rizal dated 1 July 1896, from *The Life and Works of Jose Rizal*, National Historical Commission of the Philippines website - http://joserizal.nhcp.gov.ph/Writings/Letters/Miscellaneous/ltrs_miscel_1896.htm (Accessed in December 2013).

[240] "Among the principal targets of arrests were the Masons, especially the officers of the Gran Consejo Regional. The police rounded up Grand Master Ambrocio Flores (*Musa*), First Grand Vice-President Numeriano Adriano (*Ypil*), Second Grand Vice-President Faustino Villaruel (*Ilaw*), Third Grand Vice-President Paulino Zamora (*Terror*), Grand Treasurer Bonifacio Arevalo (*Harem*), Grand Orator Apolinario M. Mabini (*Katabay*), Grand Almoner Isidro Villaruel (*Gelano*), Grand Master of Ceremonies Timoteo Paez (*Raxa Matanda*), and Grand Accountant Sicto Celis (*Liwayway*). Orders were also issued for the apprehension of Grand Secretary Arcadio Flores (*Sosten*) and Crisanto de los Reyes, but they had already passed on to the next life. . . .

From Taliba Lodge the following were arrested: Modesto Español (*Agno*), Aniceto Avelino (*Cuvier*), Epifanio Cuisa (*Dagoberto*), Teodoro Plata (*Balany*), Alvaro Nepomuceno (*Juarez*), Valentin Polintan (*Bamboche*), Epifanio Saguil (*Tibu*), Isabelo Artacho (*Vikos*), and the Master of the Lodge, Jose Dizon (*Montgomery*).

counterparts, some of whom were officers of the Guardia Civil and Spanish military, were also arrested and incarcerated in Fort Santiago because they were Masons.[241]

The crackdown on many prominent individuals following the discovery of the Katipunan also led to the incarceration of Jose Rizal. Many of those arrested were friends of Rizal, such as Isabelo de los Reyes and Antonio Luna, who later testified that Rizal had indeed instigated the revolution. Others such as Dr. Pio Valenzuela, who was an integral Katipunan member until he surrendered to the Spanish authorities at the outbreak of the revolution in August 1896, implicated Rizal by disclosing his own trip to Dapitan to seek Rizal's advice and support. Even though evidence against Rizal was circumstantial at best, he was still charged with rebellion and treason. Apart from his being a Mason and a *filibustero* (subversive), the strong connection drawn by the Spanish government between the reformist La Liga Filipina and the revolutionary Katipunan became the basis for his

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From Modestia Lodge among those incarcerated were Worshipful Master Antonio Salazar (*Selabis*), Jose Reyes Tolentino (*Prim*), Romualdo Gramonte (*Progreso*), Aurelio Tolentino (*Pangahas*), and Vicente Lukban (*Victor Emmanuel*).

The officers of Dalisay Lodge who were apprehended included Felipe Barreto, Ramon Padilla (*Mendez Nuñez*), Ceferino de Leon (*Hanip*), Jose Turiano Santiago (*Nereo*), and Justo Guido (*Sumarap*).

From Walana Lodge those arrested, aside from its members who were grand officers, were Past Master Tranquilino Torres (*Iberico*), and Vicente Mariposque (*Talim*).

Some of the other prominent Masons from other lodges who were taken into custody were Gracio Gonzaga (*Camot*), Domingo Franco (*Felipe Leal*), Pedro Casimiro (*Saturno*), Juan Castañeda (*Langgam*), Dr. Ariston Bautista (*Balagtas*), Jose Engco (*Sumpac*), Pascual Poblete, Anastacio Alfonso, Ladislao Diwa (*Baguio*), Moises Salvador (*Araw*), Luis Enciso Villareal (*Balisa*), Venancio Reyes (*Kidlat*), Arcadio del Rosario (*Job*), Vicente Gatmaitan, Juan Ma. Fajardo, Severino Reyes, Hugo de Castro, Honorato Agrava (Makatwiran), Agustin de la Rosa (*Luz*), Estanislao Legaspi (*Azul*), Pedro Rodriguez, Matias Salamante, Dionisio Ferras (*Roeroy*), Gregorio de Jesus, Joaquin Molina, Felipe Noguera, Proceso Santos (*Numapukao*), Francisco Cordero, Canuto V. Cruz (*Carriedo*), Bartolome Paez (*Duhat*), Dionisio Bantin, Honorato Acosta (*Makatwiran*), Antonio Feliciano and Evaristo Dimalanta. Even the Luna brothers, Juan and Antonio (*Gay-Lussac*), who did not take part in the activities of the local lodges, were hauled to prison. Rosario Villaruel (*Minerva*), the first Filipina 'Masona' also spent time in Bilibid and felt the cruel lashes of her jailers.

Jose Rizal (*Dimasalang*) was also arrested although he had spent the past four year in exile in Dapitan and did not engage in any revolutionary activity." Cited from R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 183-185.

[241] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 185.

later conviction.

Rizal's *La Liga Filipina*

While this study emphasizes the strong connection between the Katipunan and the early Propaganda Movement led by Del Pilar, it is still important to acknowledge the influence of Rizal and his short-lived society *La Liga Filipina* (Philippine League) in forging the secret revolutionary group. However, instead of focusing on Rizal's La Liga Filipina as the crucial break between reform and revolution, it should be recognized for what it really was – an intermediary between the Propaganda Movement and the Katipunan. The creation of La Liga Filipina provided a public space where individuals from different social backgrounds converged to discover some common grievances and aspirations. In other words, La Liga became the linkage between reform and revolution.

To better understand the significance of La Liga Filipina in bridging the gap between the reform and revolutionary movements, we must first examine its brief history by tracing its conception to Rizal's disillusionment with the Filipino colony in Spain. Despite Rizal's prestige after the publication of his novel *Noli Me Tangere* ("Touch Me Not") in 1889, many Filipinos in Spain resented him for imposing his own morality on them. Appalled by the rampant gambling, drinking and womanizing of Filipino students in Spain, Rizal complained in his letters to family and friends that their conducts were morally reprehensible. According to Rizal, the Filipinos' actions only undermined their cause, pointing out that "'only virtues can redeem the slave; it is the only way to make the

tyrants respect us and to get foreigners to make common cause with us.'"[242]

On the other hand, "Del Pilar, the pragmatist. . . . accepted the situation in the Madrid colony as it was, and did not feel any compulsion to correct the conduct of the others."[243] As a result, many Filipinos gravitated towards Del Pilar. While Del Pilar was willing to overlook their vices to preserve unity among Filipinos, Rizal remained steadfast in upholding his idealism, even at the cost of losing support from his peers. The animosity towards Rizal worsen after he refused to buy the champagne with his own money as contribution to the New Year's Eve banquet and then, proceeded to lecture the Filipinos about their drinking habits.[244] This incident only exacerbated the already delicate situation in Madrid.

By 1891, the rivalry between Rizal and Del Pilar intensified even further when several Filipinos proposed to establish the Filipino colony under one leader known as *Responsable* (the responsible chief). Instead of uniting the Filipinos, the election process and its result only caused a rift between Rizal and Del Pilar, along with their supporters.[245] Apart from the issue of leadership, Rizal and Del Pilar also had conflicting views regarding the administration of the reformist organ, *La Solidaridad*.[246] Rizal wanted to place the newspaper under the control of the Propaganda Movement in Spain. On the other hand,

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[242] Letter of Rizal to Baldomero Roxas, Madrid (28 December 1889) in Jose Rizal, *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists* (Manila: National Heroes Commision, 1963), 414. Cited by Schumacher, *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 116.

[243] J. Schumacher, *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 116.

[244] J. Schumacher, *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 117-118.

[245] Benedict Anderson, *Under the Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anticolonial Imagination* (London: Verso, 2005), 101-103.

[246] No. 247 - Letter of Juan Zulueta [Secretario in Manila] to Jose Rizal, dated 6 April 1891 in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 548-549.

Del Pilar asserted that "*La Solidaridad* was a private enterprise;" therefore, it should remain independent.[247]

The issue over *La Solidaridad* would remain contested until its final publication in November 1895. Despite winning the election albeit not unanimously, as Rizal would have wanted[248], he resigned his position and left Madrid for Ghent in July 1891 to publish his second novel *El Filibusterismo* ("The Subversive"), leaving Del Pilar as the *de facto* leader of the Filipino colony in Spain.[249] After the publication of his novel, Rizal was more determined to return to the Philippines via Hong Kong to continue the nationalist struggle there.[250]

Before Rizal left for Hong Kong in October 1891, Del Pilar tried to convince him, at least, to consider working again with Filipinos in Spain and writing for *La Solidaridad*.[251] Rizal refused on the grounds that:

> I have marked out my norms of conduct, which is to leave to the Filipinos of Madrid the conduct of our politics, they who understand and know it so well. What can I do with my impatience and my despotic pretensions? I understand the desire of every Filipino to do what he pleases, and I renounce my idea of forming with my countrymen the close-ranked phalanx I dreamed of. Perhaps the iron of compressed molecules is inferior to the air-current of free-moving molecules; I was mistaken, and I present my resignation. Continue there, now that you are on top; make use of your power to put into practice your ideas, so that there may

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[247] No. 263 - Letter of Rizal to Juan Zulueta [Secretario in Manila], dated 14 April 1891; No. 280 - Letter of Rizal to Marcelo del Pilar, dated 7 October 1891 in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 579, 615.

[248] No. 282 - Letter of Rizal to Del Pilar, dated 13 October 1891 in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896*, 620.

[249] J. Schumacher, *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 120.

[250] J. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement*, 231; J. Schumacher, *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 117-120.

[251] No. 260 Letter of Marcelo H. del Pilar to Jose Rizal, dated 7 August 1891. *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896*, 572-573.

remain nothing untried. . .[252]

Furthermore, Rizal also began to recognize the futility of their struggle outside the Philippines. He wrote to his friend Ferdinand Blumentritt that, "The error all make in thinking we can help here, far away, is a great mistake indeed. The medicine must be brought near to the sick man. . . . The field of battle is the Philippines; there is where we should be."[253]

Recognizing the need to present a united front despite Rizal's refusal to work with the reformist movement in Spain, Del Pilar sought the help of his brother-in-law Deodato Arellano, who was part of Comite de Propaganda in Manila. Del Pilar asked Arellano to ensure that the crisis in Spain did not reflect badly on Rizal:

> . . . I am of the opinion that we must avoid at any cost a judgment unfavorable to our Rizal; I want to preserve intact the great name he enjoys here. You will remember that when he was insisting on returning there, I recommended to you specially to be on the watch for anything which could diminish his stature; well, it was precisely that I already foresaw in him acts such as I have now seen in actuality. The fact is that my man has been formed in libraries, and in libraries no account is taken of the atmosphere in which one must work.[254]

Despite disagreements between the two men, Del Pilar was willing to support Rizal's work in the Philippines if it meant advancing their cause.[255] Similarly, Rizal wrote to Del Pilar in October 1891, promising that "I will continue keeping my esteem and friendship for you, rather friendly than indifferent to *La Solidaridad*, and *you rest assured that never* will

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[252] See Epistolario Rizal, III and See No. 280 Letter of J. Rizal to Marcelo del Pilar, dated 7 October 1891. *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896*, 615. Cited and translated by J. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement*, 232 and footnote no. 25.

[253] *Epistolario Rizal*, III, 250, V, 626. Cited by J. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement*, 233.

[254] Letter of Del Pilar to Ka Dato (Deodato Arellano), dated 31 March 1891, *Epistolario Del Pilar*, I, 246. Cited by J. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement*, 234.

[255] J. Schumacher, *Kasaysayan: Reform and Revolution*, 120.

I join any plot or conspiracy to overthrow you or kill your periodical. For me to withdraw is not a wage war against you."[256]

After his eight-month stay in Hong Kong, Rizal returned to the Philippines in June 1892 in spite of warnings from his family and friends. Determined to proceed with his plans of "activat[ing] the propaganda again,"[257] Rizal traveled to various Tagalog provinces accompanied by Pedro Laktaw-Serrano, establishing networks and seeking support for his new reformist group in Manila. On July 3, 1892 at the home of Chinese mestizo Doroteo Ongjunco in Tondo, Rizal along with other Filipinos established La Liga Filipina. Among those who attended the first and only meeting of *La Liga* were Deodato Arellano (elected secretary of La Liga), Andres Bonifacio, Teodoro Plata, Ladislao Diwa, Jose Dizon and Valentin Diaz. These men would later form the core of the Katipunan.

Rizal envisioned La Liga Filipina as a civic organization geared towards unity and socio-political reforms. As stated in its constitution outlined by Rizal, the aims of *La Liga* were the following: (1) The unification of the whole Archipelago into a compact, vigorous, and homogeneous body; (2) Mutual protection in every want and necessity; (3) Defense against all violence and injustice; (4) Promotion of instruction, agriculture, and business; and (5) The study and application of reforms.[258]

Even before the organization could expand beyond its initial membership, its founder Rizal was arrested and immediately deported to Dapitan three days after *La Liga*'s

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[256] No. 282 - Letter of Rizal to Del Pilar, dated 13 October 1891 in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896*, 622.

[257] *Epistolario Rizal*, III, 338. Cited by J. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement*, 248. See No. 313 - Letter of Rizal to Del Pilar, dated 23 May 1892 in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896*, 682. ("And here again I want to assure you: I enter the campaign but I will not attack you or any other Filipino. I will reactivate the campaign and strengthen the Liga")

[258] *Vida*, Wenceslao E. Retana, 236-241. Cited by J. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement,* 250-251.

first meeting. Without Rizal, La Liga Filipina languished and its original membership divided into two distinct groups – the *Cuerpo de Compromisarios* and the Katipunan. The Compromisarios wanted to continue Rizal's original plan while the Katipunan, acknowledging the futility of seeking reforms from a reactionary colonial state, took on a more revolutionary stance.

Connection between La Liga and Katipunan

The fact that many of Katipunan's founding members were part of La Liga Filipina was already sufficient evidence to link Rizal to the outbreak of the 1896 rebellion, despite the report of the commanding officer of Guardia Civil Veterana that said otherwise. Captain Diaz identified Del Pilar as the instigator of the revolution, not Rizal. Nonetheless, Rizal was tried for conspiracy and sedition. Even though Rizal was unjustly executed for a crime he did not commit, however, he underestimated the role of La Liga in the formation of the Katipunan.

During his trial in Manila in December 1896, Rizal continued to refute the presumed link between La Liga Filipina and the Katipunan, stressing that:

> [t]he 'Liga' was not a society with harmful tendencies and the proof is the fact that the radicals had to leave it, organizing the Katipunan which was what answered their purposes. Had the 'Liga' lacked only a little of being adapted for rebellion, the radicals would not have left it but simply would have modified it; besides, if, as some allege, I am the chief [*supremo*], out of consideration for me and for the prestige of my name, they would have retained the name of 'Liga'. Their having abandoned it, name and all, proves clearly that they neither counted me nor did the 'Liga' serve their purposes, otherwise they would not have made another society when they had one already organized.[259]

[259] Jose Rizal, "Data for my defense", in *Jose Rizal's Political & Historical Writings* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2007), 350-354; cited in The Life and Writings of Jose Rizal website - http://joserizal.info/Writings/Other/additions_to_my_defense.htm (Accessed December 2013).

Even though Rizal's defense was compelling about the revolution, his argument had problems. To exonerate himself from subversion charges, Rizal ensured that his La Liga was different from the Katipunan even though there were strong links between the two groups, beginning with their respective names. According to Rizal, "out of consideration for me and for the prestige of my name, they [Katipunan] would have retained the name of '*Liga*'. Their having abandoned it, name and all, proves clearly that they neither counted me nor did the '*Liga*' serve their purposes."[260]

Furthermore, Bonifacio also modified the concept of La Liga and its constitution to include the necessity of ensuring social justice and equality. In addition, Bonifacio even used Rizal's very first published article "*Amor Patrio*" ("Love for Motherland"), that appeared in Del Pilar's bilingual newspaper *Diariong Tagalog* in 1882, as an inspiration to his own poem, "*Ang Pag-ibig sa Tinubuang Lupa*" ('Love for Motherland') published in the only issue of Katipunan's official organ, *Kalayaan* (Liberty) in March 1896. Furthermore, Bonifacio's 1896 *Kalayaan* article "*Ang Dapat Mabatid ng mga Tagalog*" ("What the Tagalog should know"), discussing the conditions in the Philippines before and after Spanish colonization, was also derived from Rizal's annotated version of Antonio de Morga's *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, which described the Philippines' flourishing civilization prior to the arrival of Spanish colonizers.

Finally, Rizal's La Liga Filipina distinguished itself from Del Pilar's propaganda movement, as well as the other group derived from La Liga called Cuerpo de Compromisarios by focusing its reform efforts on the Philippines rather than Spain. Other

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[260] Jose Rizal, "Data for my defense", in *Jose Rizal's Political & Historical Writings*, cited in The Life and Writings of Jose Rizal - http://joserizal.info/Writings/Other/additions_to_my_defense.htm (Accessed December 2013).

members of La Liga opted to establish the Katipunan rather than join the Cuerpo de Compromisarios because they realized that support should be directed towards the colony itself rather than the propaganda campaign in Europe. When Rizal realized that the actual battleground was the Philippines, he decided it was time for him to return to the motherland to continue the struggle.[261] Despite Rizal's assertion that these societies were two completely different movements, at least one prominent historian asserts "the Katipunan of Bonifacio was a direct continuation of the Liga Filipina of Rizal."[262]

[261] See Schumacher's *Propaganda Movement*, 233.

[262] John N. Schumacher, "Chapter 5: Two Paths to Freedom," in *Kasaysayan*, 132.

CHAPTER 3

Colonial Policing and Surveillance, 1872-1892

The year 1872 marked the period when colonial Manila ceased to be Spain's "very noble and ever loyal city" ("*la muy noble y siempre leal ciudad*") and became, a crucible for the growth of Filipino nationalism. Following the brutal suppression of a local mutiny by native military personnel at the Cavite arsenal in January 1872, Governor Rafael de Izquierdo y Gutierrez (1871-1873) ordered massive arrests, deportations, and summary executions of Filipino liberals across Manila. Far more conservative than his predecessor Carlos Maria de la Torre (1869-1871), Governor Izquierdo immediately suspected that the real conspirators behind the Cavite uprising were Manila's native elites.[263] With only their wealth and education to protect them, both mestizo and native elites had much to gain politically if the mutineers had overthrown the colonial administration.

At the same time, the growing activism of Filipino secular priests and liberal intellectuals caused anxiety among both Spanish friars and colonial officials.[264] According to historian John N. Schumacher, "[f]rom Izquierdo's point of view, the more distinguished, intelligent, and respected the Filipino priests were, the more they were a threat to Spain."[265] That is why, prior to the 1872 mutiny, Father Jose Burgos, one of the two curates of Manila Cathedral and an advocate of the secularization of parishes, posed

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[263] C. Benitez, *History of the Philippines*, 254.

[264] John N. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan: The Story of the Filipino People, Reform and Revolution, vol. 5* edited by Milagros C. Guerrero and John N. Schumacher (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company Ltd., 1998), 16-17.

[265] J. N. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," 16.

the greatest threat, not only was he an ordained priest, but because he had also "obtained his doctorate in canon law in addition to the doctorate he already had in theology and his licentiate in philosophy."[266]

Determined to suppress all suspected liberal conspirators, Izquierdo established the Guardia Civil de Veterana, an urban paramilitary force responsible for the policing and surveillance of Manila and its surrounding areas. The Veterana started on July of 1872 and continued until the end of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. By 1894 the *Veterana* force had "413 members, part infantry and part cavalry, but all with the military organization proper to the civil guard [*Guardia civil*], and under the orders of a commander and six lieutenants, in charge, respectively, of six subdivisions."[267] Instead of trying to secure the city from outside threats, the Veterana's main responsibility was internal security for Manila and its hinterland since the colonial state suspected this cosmopolitan city was becoming a nest of native subversion.

The containment and suppression of indigenous radicalism became paramount for the continuation of Spanish rule by the late nineteenth century. Exemplified by the establishment of Manila's own police force, the growing fear of 'threat from within' galvanized the Spanish colonial administration to develop a rudimentary urban surveillance system under the jurisdiction of the Veterana. As a result, the colonial authorities needed greater native participation to build a more extensive information network. Only when the sheer number of suspected agitators overwhelmed the Veterana in

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[266] J. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan*, 17.

[267] Elihu Root, "Paper No. XIII - Health, Hygiene, Police, and Public Order under Spanish Sovereignty" in *Report Of the Philippine Commission to the President, Vol. IV* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 33. Also see O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volume II* (Quezon City: AKLAHI Foundation Inc., 1989), 57.

1895 that the colonial state finally created the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila, a separate government unit focused solely on urban intelligence collection to uncover revolutionary conspiracies brewing within Masonic lodges and native quarters.[268] At the same time, the outbreak of the Katipunan uprising in August 1896 compelled the colonial state to mobilize both Spaniards and Filipinos to form voluntary militias in Manila and its environs while awaiting military reinforcements from Spain. Despite all the Spanish firepower and countermeasures, it is clear that the decisive factor in the survival of colonial state control was native involvement in the counter-revolutionary campaign.

To understand the rise of the Katipunan as a secret revolutionary movement and its path towards revolution, we need to recognize that the turbulent political circumstances of the late nineteenth century made it necessary for the Katipunan to adapt secrecy and later, to resort to uprising. The establishment of the Spanish colonial police and surveillance agencies depended on native involvement, and the enforcement of state terror thorough excessive measures forced the Katipunan to carry out their activities clandestinely.

A Path less traveled

The complex relationship between the Spanish state and colonized Filipinos remains an unchartered territory in Philippine historiography. According to nationalist historian Teodoro Agoncillo, "[w]hen one examines critically the texture and substance of

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[268] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

our history under imperialist Spain one wonder, really, whether the Philippines had a history prior to 1872 or thereabouts. For what has been regarded as Philippine history before 1872 is not Philippines, but Spanish."[269] Following Agoncillo's lead, many scholars also discounted Spanish influence in shaping Filipino history unless focusing on the instruments of Spanish colonial domination – the friar (*prayle*) and the Guardia Civil (*guwardiya sibil)*. This perspective, of course, overlooks the fundamental fact that the *Guardia Civil* was predominantly composed of native constables.

Even in his two well-known novels, *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891), Rizal focused only on corrupt Spanish Guardia Civil officers such as the head of the civil guards in the fictitious town of San Diego, known only as *El Alférez*. In the eyes of Rizal and other Filipinos, both the friars and the Guardia Civil were bane of Filipino aspirations, and association with either group would be considered traitorous.

To break away from this Manichean perspective, it is of paramount importance to understand the power dynamics and constant negotiation between the imperial state and the native populace. The consequences of these negotiations indeed manifested themselves in the forms of collaboration or resistance that have been woven into narratives to establish the *raison* d′etre for Filipino nationalism. However, in the relentless "sifting and winnowing"[270] over the past century that has produced the great Philippine narratives of collective struggle against colonial rule, much had been cast aside that seemed to undermine the national project – above all, the indigenous involvement in Spanish

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[269] Teodoro Agoncillo, "A Reinterpretation of Our History Under Spain," *Sunday Times Magazine*, 21 September 1958, 6-9. Original reprinted and appeared as Appendix A in Antonio C. Hila, *The Historicism of Teodoro Agoncillo* (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2001), 122.

[270] A phrase associated with the University of Wisconsin referring to academic freedom.

repression. Including this contestation between loyalty and resistance in a national historical narrative focused largely on the Katipunan, offers new dimensions of our understanding of the 1896 armed struggle, examining not only the complexity of Manila's society on the eve of the revolution but also the shifting power dynamics between the Spanish state and its Filipino subjects.

One way to deal with indigenous collaboration during the Spanish period, exemplified by the active participation of native *guardia civiles*, has been to circumnavigate this delicate issue. Another has been to simply downplay the importance of native involvement in the continuance of colonialism, providing a selective Philippine past filled only with heroes and villains. As Agoncillo pointed out, "[historical interpretation from Filipino viewpoint] must be inclusive to encompass within its fold the active role played by the Filipinos in carving out their destiny. [At the same time, i]t must be exclusive in the sense that matters not pertinent to the development of our policy should be ruthlessly deleted to make the role of the Filipinos positive."[271]

The issue of Filipino collaboration under colonial rule has been an embarrassment that Philippine scholars tend to gloss over in an attempt to excise it from public memory. But in doing so, this process of selective memory has created a partial, even a disjointed perspective on the past. Moreover, by adopting such approach also denies historical agency to the many individual Filipinos who remained loyal to Spain. In our attempt to offer a new perspective of events leading to the 1896 revolution, it is prudent to tackle the complicated issue of native involvement with colonial repression. Understanding the

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[271] T. Agoncillo, "A Reinterpretation of Our History Under Spain," reprinted in *The Historicism of Teodoro Agoncillo*, 128.

complex interaction between the Spanish state and the native populace might help disentangle us from the constraints of the nationalist standpoint, moving us beyond Agoncillo's call for a selectively inspirational history in the first decade after independence to a fuller analytic history a half-century later.

Indigenous participation was crucial in the continuation of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. Prior to the mass influx of Spanish into the colony in the late nineteenth-century, the colonial state greatly depended on Filipinos to govern and police themselves locally. The shift to direct Spanish rule had only entrenched this three-century tradition of collaboration while, at the same time, altering the power dynamics between the colonial state and its native subjects.

By exploring the complexities of Spanish imperial control we can gain a deeper understanding of methods the colonial state deployed to contain the threat of native revolution in the capital city in a desperate attempt to maintain dominion over its only Asian colony. Given Spain's long history of indirect rule in the Philippines, a complex socio-political dynamic that nurtured direct native involvement in the governance of the colony had emerged since the seventeenth century. This system of colonial collaboration had, in turn, protected Spanish colonial rule for three centuries until Spain finally introduced a more direct administration, starting in the mid-nineteenth century.

The transition from Spanish indirect to direct colonial rule of the Philippines is crucial in understanding the myriad of Filipino responses that eventually led to the outbreak of revolution. Such drastic change in the system of colonial governance disrupted the established social dynamics within the colony by shifting the balance of power between the natives and colonizers. During the earlier period of indirect rule, native

authorities were empowered to handle their own affairs without much interference from the colonial state. However, once Spain assumed direct control of the Philippines, through centralization of colonial bureaucracy and mass influx of Spanish officials, it threatened the status quo that had ensured the local autonomy of indigenous authorities across the archipelago.

Even under direct rule, native participation was critical for effective intelligence gathering by the three main appratuses of colonial policing and surveillance – the colonial *gendarmerie* force *Guardia Civil* (established in 1868) and its urban paramilitary force *Guardia Civil de Veterana* (1872) as well as the intelligence-gathering agency *Cuerpo de Vigilancia y Seguridad* (1895). Therefore, we need to determine the motives behind native involvement in the Spanish repression to grasp the full range of Filipino response to waning Spanish power.

Colonial policing

For much of the Spanish colonial period, native local officials belonging to the *principalia* (local elite class) assumed the responsibility of maintaining law and order as well as tax collection within their respective jurisdictions. Since the sixteenth-century the Spanish system of indirect rule had afforded them judicial authority and autonomy over their municipality. However, by the mid-nineteenth century Spain, having lost most of its colonial territories in Latin America, finally consolidated its rule over its remaining colonies through more centralized governance rooted in modern liberal tradition.

Spanish liberalism during the second half of the nineteenth century had already diverged from the more classical liberalism centered on humanistic ideals. Instead of emphasis on guaranteeing liberty and human rights for all, Spanish liberals were, to

varying degrees, more drawn to ensuring the separation of Church and state, centralization of the Spanish government, and creating modern liberal institutions overseeing public health, education, and order.

Following the loss of its lucrative territories in Latin America during the early nineteenth century, the once-mighty Spanish empire was reduced to only three remaining colonies – Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Simultaneously, Spain went through a series of violent uprisings instigated by militant urban workers and federalists that eventually led to the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1868 that deposed Queen Isabella II and installed a constitutional monarch. While Spanish federalists were preoccupied with setting up their new republic, they also deployed liberal officials to secure the rest of the Spanish empire.

As the new liberal administrators introduced social and political reforms to the colonies, they also established new institutions in preparation for direct rule. In the Philippines, Governor Carlos de la Torre established the Guardia Civil in 1868 as a paramilitary police force deployed to the countryside to consolidate colonial state power and integrate local elite authorities into its new colonial bureaucracy. Initially, the Guardia Civil started with one division comprised of about 1,400 men assigned in Manila province and central Luzon.[272] By "1888, it had a force of 3,342 men exclusive of officers."[273] With the creation of two additional divisions (one for the Visayas and Mindanao, and another for Nueva Ecija and northern Luzon) by 1897 "the total number of the Civil Guard in the

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[272] See *España-Guardia Civil Tercio de las Islas Filipinas*, *Reglamento para la organización, régimen y servicio de la Guardia Civil de las Islas Filipinas: Aprobado por Real Orden de 24 de marzo de 1868* (Manila: Imprenta Amigos del Pais, 1880).

[273] O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, 57.

Philippines amounted to 3,561 individuals, according to the Official Guide [*Guia oficial de Espana*] of 1898."[274] Each member of the Guardia Civil (known as '*guardia*' or '*agente*') formed a two-agent patrol unit called *pareja* (pair) assigned to monitor any law disturbances or banditry in the rural areas as well as to protect the towns (*poblacions*), and the haciendas of wealthy Filipino landowners and friars.

Although depicted as the most liberal Spanish administrator in the Philippines, Governor De la Torre also employed reactionary measures to assert Spanish rule such as introducing the Guardia Civil. However, De la Torre's approach was different from other Spanish colonial officials because he managed to lull the Filipinos into false sense of security by implementing some social reforms to gain their trust. While encouraging Filipino liberals to fight for their rights, De la Torre remained suspicious of them and monitored their activities closely through privately gathered information, friar denunciations, and rumors.[275]

Apart from deploying the Guardia Civil to monitor the countryside, De la Torre also formed the *Cuerpo de vigilancia publica de Manila* to oversee public order and security of the colonial city.[276] Modeled on the Madrid's police force, this unit was a precursor to the Guardia Civil Veterana. Not much has been written about this Cuerpo de vigilancia publica but one can infer that this rudimentary police unit took on the responsibility of monitoring suspected Filipinos in the city. At the same time, De la Torre

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[274] Elihu Root, "Paper No. XIII - Health, Hygiene, Police, and Public Order under Spanish Sovereignty" in *Report Of the Philippine Commission to the President, Vol. IV*, 34. Information about the Guardia Civil was taken from *Guia oficial de Espana* (1898).

[275] J. N. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," 13, 16, and 18.

[276] Decree of Governor General Rafael de Izquierdo y Gutierrez (11 June 1872), *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila* (Manila, 1872), 1.

employed other means such as depending on friars for information about suspected individuals – gathered through confessions and from the friars' own spy network. Unlike his successor, De la Torre did not act irrationally based on unsubstantiated information about native subversion, plots and suspicions. In his reports to the overseas minister in Spain, De la Torre wrote that "'in spite of my efforts and the exquisite care I dedicate to this matter, I have not been able to find out anything concrete about their projects.'"[277]

On the other hand, his successor Governor General Rafael de Izquierdo was not easily placated. The sudden shift in the political atmosphere in Spain by 1871 resulted in the liberal governor being replaced with a more conservative Governor Izquierdo who was determined to restore the *status quo* in the colony.[278] When the Cavite mutiny erupted in 1872, Izquierdo became anxious because Manila did not have a centralized police agency to protect the colonial city, thus leaving it vulnerable to insurgency. Suspecting Manila's elites and Filipino clergy of conspiring against the colonial state, Izquierdo was more determined to suppress any dubious activities by any means necessary.[279]

Governor Izquierdo's strong mistrust of liberal reformists intensified after witnessing the social and political turmoil threatening the Spanish metropole. The coalition of Spanish liberals and republicans leading to the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1868 that deposed the reigning monarch had unleashed political and economic instability in Spain for the reminder of the late nineteenth century, exacerbated by the outbreak of the Cuban uprising in 1868 and another major revolution in 1895. Although Spain was

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[277] Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan*, 18.

[278] Nicholas Tarling, *Nationalism in Southeast Asia: If the People Are With Us* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 90.

[279] O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, 109-110.

undergoing political shift to a more liberal regime advocating separation of Church and state, such change was not adapted in the colonies. In fact, in the Philippines the colonial regime became even more reactionary in its effort to maintain the *status quo* and to protect Church's authority.

Determined to reassert Spanish dominion in the Philippines, Governor Izquierdo immediately implemented reactionary measures to curtail any native advocacy of political and social reforms as well as restoring press censorship. In addition, Izquierdo depended on the friars to suppress Filipino campaigns for secularization of the parishes, even though, as a Mason, he was anti-clerical back in Spain.[280] While reversing the liberal policies of De la Torre, Izquierdo continued his predecessor's practice of spying on suspected Filipinos.

Having already felt vindicated that the Manila native elites and intelligentsia were conspiring against Spain, Izquierdo's response to the 1872 uprising was swift and excessive.[281] His first course of action was to remove those who allegedly posed the greatest threat to Spanish rule. Izquierdo subjected many of Manila's prominent Filipino liberals to persecution and deportation, branding them agitators and enemies of the state.[282] To forestall further attempts to overthrow the colonial government, Izquierdo ensured that prominent Filipino liberals such as lawyer Antonio Maria Regidor and Manila merchants,

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[280] Reynold Smith Fajardo, "Masonry and the Philippine Revolution," http://www.mastermason.com/urdaneta302/home_files/readings_files/revo.html (Accessed on 25 October 2014). This article was reprinted from the official organ of the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the Philippine Islands, *The Cabletow*, Vol. 73, No. 2. Also see J. N. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism" in *Kasaysayan*, 16.

[281] O. D. Corpuz, *The Roots of the Filipino Nation*, 109-110.

[282] Charles Burke Elliott, *The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Publishers, 1916), 185.

Jose Ma. Basa and Maximo Paterno, were exiled to the Marianas Islands and Guam. Other Filipino priests and supporters were also either imprisoned or sent into exile, including Father Toribio del Pilar, older brother of propagandist Marcelo del Pilar.[283]

After eliminating all perceived threats, Izquierdo proceeded to strengthen the security and surveillance of the city and its suburbs by establishing, in June 1872, a militarized and more organized urban police force, Guardia Civil Veterana.[284] This internal security force replaced the two existing groups protecting Manila – a Guardia Civil division assigned in Manila; and the inadequate Cuerpo de vigilancia pública de Manila, originally composed of a Superintendent (*Comisario*), ten guards (*celadores*) and twenty watchmen (*vigilantes*).[285]

Deeming the prevailing police system inefficient, Governor Izquiedo adopted the 1859 Madrid police structure when the Guardia Civil was still involved in urban policing.[286] Under this reorganization, the Guardia Civil Veterana had both an infantry unit comprised of "a captain, six lieutenants, six second lieutenants, three sergeants 1st class, nine sergeants 2nd class, twelve corporals, seventy-two constable 1st class and two

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[283] J. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan*, 26.

[284] According to Izquierdo, "*Reconocida la ineficacia del Cuerpo de vigilancia pública de esta Capital y sus arrabales así como la necesidad de organizar este servicio con una fuerza reglamentada que responda á la conservacion del órden y orbservancia de los reglamentos de policia y vigilancia.*" Cited from *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 1.

[285] "*Articulo 1: Para fin del presente mes queda suprimido el Cuerpo de vigilancia publica de Manila compuesto de un Comisario, diez Celadores y veinte vigilantes, que se declaran cesantes por reforma*." *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 1.

[286] Martin Turrado Vidal, *La Policia en la Historia Contemporanea de España, 1766-1986* (Madrid: Din Impresores, 1995), 135.

hundred fifty constable 2nd class," and a cavalry unit with "a sergeant 2nd class, a corporal and twelve cavalry guards."[287]

The potential recruits to the Guardia Civil Veterana were limited by the requirement of having prior military service with either the Guardia Civil or the Spanish colonial army. Preferred recruits were those who voluntarily enlisted while still active in the Guardia Civil or had been recently discharged or retired from the Guardia Civil or the colonial army, no more than three years before applying. Other requirements were the applicants should be in excellent health, had good record with the Guardia Civil or the army, and should be at least 5 feet or 1.623 m. tall.[288]

Since the Veterana recruits were part of the Guardia Civil, there were other requirements such as the age limit (between 24 to 40 years of age), literacy requirement, and absence of any criminal record. In addition, those individuals who wished to join the Guardia Civil had to have served in the army or the reserve (in good standing) for at least four years prior to applying.[289]

Despite its limited manpower, this urban police force offered a wide range of services to the Spanish regime.[290] Apart from policing and surveillance, the Vetarana "was also in charge of maintaining order in the markets and cleanliness in the city, granting permits for house construction, supervising traffic, registering house servants, and ensuring

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[287] *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 1, 5.

[288] "*Capitulo 2: Recrutamiento y Reemplazo*" in *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 6-7.

[289] *España-Guardia Civil*, "*Capitulo II: Recluta y remplazo*" *Reglamento para la organización, regimén y servicio de la Guardia Civil de las Islas Filipinas: aprobado por Real Orden de 24 de marzo de 1868* (Manila: Imprenta Amigos del Pais, 1880), 4-5.

[290] "*Capitulo 9: Del Servicio*" in *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 20; and Elihu Root, "Paper No. XIII - Health, Hygiene, Police, and Public Order under Spanish Sovereignty," 33-34.

proper attire and behavior in public places."[291] Moreover, the *Vetarana* also had a separate division for fire-fighting.[292]

The *Veterana* also oversaw the security of the colonial administration building (*la Casa-Cabildo*) in Intramuros as well as its own headquarters and six garrisons (*las Casas Cuarteles*) scattered across Manila and its suburbs. One corporal and four constables were assigned to handle security of the *Casa Cabildo* located near Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. On the other hand, the Veterana headquarters and three of its six garrisons were located in Tondo, Binondo, and Santa Cruz districts while the remaining three were in Intramuros, Sampaloc and Malate districts. Each *Casa-Cuartel* had two watchmen (*vigilantes*) at the door and then eight in the barracks during daytime. However, at nighttime there were only one corporal and four constables to guard each garrison while the rest of the working constables conducted night patrols in their respective districts.[293]

It is understandable that majority of the Veterana's activities were concentrated on these areas because of their socio-economic significance. The districts of Santa Cruz and Binondo were important for trade and commerce, while neighboring district of Tondo had the highest concentration of native residents in the province of Manila. The Veterana headquarters on *Calzada del* General Crespo was located near the Sta. Cruz town plaza where the closest garrison on *Calle de* Enrile was only five blocks away. By contrast, the two garrisons in the Tondo and Binondo districts were one block apart and separated only

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[291] Cristina Evangelista Torres, *The Americanization of Manila, 1898-1921* (Quezon City: The University of the Philippines Press, 2010), 46-47.

[292] "*Capitulo 9: Del Servicio*," *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 20; and Elihu Root, "Paper No. XIII - Health, Hygiene, Police, and Public Order under Spanish Sovereignty," 33-34.

[293] "*Capitulo 9: Del Servicio*," *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 19-20.

by the Binondo bridge. The location of the *Veterana* in Tondo is the most significant not only because it was quartered in a court building on *Calle* Ilaya but also on the same street as the house where La Liga Filipina was founded.[294] Then, only five blocks west of *Calle* Ilaya towards Manila Bay was the house of Del Pilar's brother-in-law Deodato Arellano, considered as the birthplace of the Katipunan. Arellano's house was located at the corner of *Paseo de* Azcarraga (present day C. M. Recto Avenue) and *Calle* Elcano.

The Veterana's jurisdiction covered the city and its suburbs which were divided into six districts – (1) Manila / Intramuros; (2) Santa Cruz, Quiapo and San Jose; (3) Binondo and San Nicolas; (4) Tondo; (5) Sampaloc, San Sebastian and San Miguel; and (6) Hermita (also known as Ermita), Malate, San Fernando de Dilao (or Paco) and Concepcion. Each district had one Veterana subdivision assigned to it consisted of "one lieutenant, one second lieutenant, two corporals, and a number of constables."[295] Aside from native constables conducting foot patrols in pairs, each subdivision also had few cavalry guards. Due to the limited number of cavalry guards, they were often assigned to various districts depending on the circumstances.[296] Given the extensive responsibilities of the Guardia Civil Veterana, it would be difficult for this urban paramilitary force to do all of its duties effectively, especially during the chaotic period leading to the 1896 revolution.

By tracing the scope of patrolling responsibilities covered by the six Veterana offices reveals a security border that snakes around Manila's patchwork settlements amidst

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[294] *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 2-3, 19. Wenceslao E. Retana mixed the *Calle de* Ilaya address of La Liga Filipina with the Katipunan address in *Calle de* Elcano in his book *Vida y escritos del Dr. Jose Rizal* (1907), 266.

[295] "*Capitulo 8: Distribucion de la Fuerza*" in *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 19.

[296] "*Capitulo 8: Distribucion de la Fuerza*" in *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 19.

estuaries (*esteros*) and rice paddies – from the port of Tondo on the west extending north to *Hospital de San Lazaro* (northern border of the Franciscan property, *Hacienda Mayhaligue*[297]); all the way east to Sampaloc and San Miguel districts, crossing the Pasig River to Paco district to meet Manila Bay again due south of Malate and Ermita. Within this settled zone of extensive maze of narrow laneways was the grey zone of Manila's labyrinth.

The establishment of civilian forms of colonial policing and surveillance derived from the Guardia Civil such as Manila's Vetarana and then later, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia necessitated further native involvement that required a more meticulous recruitment process. Instead of simply depending on local recruits to oversee the policing of their own towns or communities, the colonial state sought out "the trustworthy stranger to police other strangers" and began deploying native police units whose members had no ties to the areas they were assigned.[298] Such practice was a trend among various colonial police forces[299] that emerged during the nineteenth century that "had more to do with the

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[297] *Hacienda of Mayhaligue* had the "following limits: Bounded on the South by Calzada de Bilibid; on the East by Calle Cervantes; on the West by an Estero; and on the North by the said walls of San Lazaro. . . . the entire Hacienda, according to the latest plans, contains 161 hectares." Cited from *Senate Documents 60th Congress, 1st Session* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908), 102. According to the Annual Reports of the War Department, "The Hacienda of Mayhaligue, to-day known as San Lazaro, and which constitutes part of the property of the Hospital of that name, was originally an ecclesiastical benefice belonging to the Parish of Quiapo, to which Parish said Hacienda had belonged since its creation, its products serving for the proper maintenance of said parish. In this Hacienda there were a large number of Chinese settlements, similar to those of in the old Parian, whose evangelization was in charge of the Dominican Fathers of San Gabriel." Cited from the "Report of the Secretary of War on the Philippines," in *Annual Reports of the War Department (1907), Volume 9, Report of the Philippine Commission Volume III* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908), 328.

[298] David Anderson and David Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control," in *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940* edited by David M. Anderson and David Killingray (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1991), 7.

[299] D. Anderson and D. Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control," 4.

protection of property of the propertied classes, and with the maintenance of social order. . . , than with the prevention or detection of crime."[300]

The decision to have strangers, albeit Filipino, policing strangers had indeed lulled the Spanish state into a false sense of security. According to the Guardia Civil regulations, the civil guards "were forbidden to intermarry or associate on friendly terms with local inhabitants."[301] For example, native gendarmerie from the Tagalog region was deployed to the Visayas and Mindanao, while recruits from other regions were brought to the Tagalog areas.[302] When the Veterana was created to police the colonial city, its members came from the more experienced natives, recruited from across the archipelago and previously served under the Guardia Civil patrolling the countryside.

As the colonial police force took on more responsibilities in maintaining internal security for the islands by the 1880s, so many more natives were needed that the state finally allowed constables recruited locally to police their own areas. Such reform indeed proved to be beneficial because these individuals would not be considered as outsiders, therefore, they could easily gather intelligence without raising suspicions.

In the case of the Veterana its recruits came from all over the Philippines because, as mentioned earlier, one of its main requirements was serving under the Guardia Civil or the colonial army for at least three years to be eligible, regardless of where they came from. As part of the urban police force, these men's duties ranged from patrolling the city and its suburbs, monitoring vagrants (*indocumentados*) and prostitutes (*mujeres publicas*),

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[300] D. Anderson and D. Killingray, "Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control," 6.

[301] R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*,

[302] Carlos Quirino, "The Spanish Colonial Army: 1878-98," *Philippine Studies* 36 (1988), 381.

apprehending individuals for illegal gambling (*juegos prohibidos*) and fraud (*estafa*), to firefighting and dealing with public works projects.[303]

The Veterana's daily interactions with urban residents also, made it possible, to some extent, to monitor activities of suspected individuals. However, the fact that these men wore distinguishable uniforms and maintained patrol schedules in pairs did not allow effective intelligence gathering, as illustrated by their inability to discover the existence of a secret organization within its midst. Since July 1892 one of the Katipunan's main meeting places was at the corner of *Paseo de* Azcarraga and *Calle* Elcano (formerly *Calle* Sagunto), located few blocks south of the Vetarana's cuartel at *Calle* Ilaya in the district of Tondo.[304] Out of the six Veterana cuartels, three of them were located where the Katipunan had been active in recruiting – Binondo, San Nicolas, Tondo, Sta. Cruz and Quiapo.[305] Such proximity indicates that the native constables had no idea whom to target apart from the elite Filipino masons. Clearly, the native urban police unit was not capable of uncovering a secret society such as the Katipunan. Despite the Veterana's obvious ineffectiveness, the colonial state strongly depended on its intelligence reports to proceed with repression of suspected native agitators.

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[303] Greg Bankroff, "Chapter 2: Intramuros, Binondo, and Tondo" and "Chapter 5: The Police" in *Crime Society, and the State in the Nineteenth Century Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), 34-58, 129-154.

[304] Appendix "*Noticia de la situacion que tienen las Casas-Cuarteles de las seis Subdivisiones de la Seccion,"* in *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, page sheet with no page number (located between page 32 and the section on *Formularios*).

[305] Appendix "*Noticia de la situacion que tienen las Casas-Cuarteles de las seis Subdivisiones de la Seccion,"* in *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*.

Manila under surveillance

With the creation of the Guardia Civil Veterana in 1872 as an auxiliary of the Guardia Civil to patrol the city, Izquierdo ensured that the Veterana was, first and foremost, a reaction force committed to protecting Spanish dominion in the Philippines.[306] Immediately after its establishment, Izquierdo put the Veterana to work by ordering surveillance of families and friends of those who were convicted of instigating the Cavite mutiny. Initially, due to their limited resources, the Veterana only conducted surveillance of individuals within the Manila area. Once they left Manila, it was difficult for the Veterana to keep track of them. Suprisingly, there was no coordination between the Veterana and the Guardia Civil in monitoring suspected individuals once they crossed jurisdictional boundaries, as shown in the case of Paciano Mercado, Jose Rizal's older brother.

Despite his close association with the martyred Filipino secular priest Fr. Jose Burgos, the Veterana or Guardia Civil never monitored Paciano Rizal because he was able to evade authorities after he left Manila. One contributing factor was Paciano's aversion to being photographed. According to his granddaughter Eugenia Lopez Villaruz, "Paciano did not want to be photographed because his reason was he was a wanted man in the past and if there were no photographs of him, then it would be hard for authorities to arrest him."[307] Even though he lived and worked closely with Fr. Jose Burgos up until the

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[306] Decree of Governor General Rafael de Izquierdo y Gutierrez (11 June 1872), *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 1-3.

[307] From an oral interview in 1988 conducted by historian Ambeth R. Ocampo at Paciano Rizal's home in Los Baños, Laguna. Cited from Ambeth R. Ocampo, "The Other Rizal," in *Rizal Without the Overcoat* (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc., c1990), 33.

priest's arrest[308], Paciano and his family were left alone. When his younger brother was preparing to study in Manila, Paciano, worried that the Vetarana might harass him, urged Jose to use the second family name Rizal instead of Mercado.[309] Obviously, this made an impression on Rizal when later in his life he mentioned it in his letter to his friend Ferdinand Blumentritt:

> After the sad catastrophe [of 1872] [Paciano] had to leave the university because he was a liberal and because he was disliked by the friars for having lived in the same house as Burgos. I had to go to school in Manila at that time and he advised me to use our second surname, Rizal, to avoid difficulties in my studies. . . My family never paid much attention [to our second surname] but now I had to use it, thus giving me the appearance of an illegitimate child."[310]

Ironically, during his years in Manila Jose Rizal gained more notoriety than Paciano. When Jose applied for a passport to travel to Europe, he had to use his real name, Jose Mercado, so not to alert the authorities about his departure.

Even after Izquierdo's term, the Veterana continued to monitor Manila's residents who were associated with those implicated in the 1872 mutiny, as well as those involved in activist movements such as *La Juventud Escolar Liberal*, a Filipino student organization campaigning for secularization of parishes and education.[311] The suppression of student activism as well as liberal campaigns for political and social reforms in Manila between the late 1870s and the 1880s forced many wealthy Filipinos to establish themselves abroad. Many of exiled Filipinos such as Jose Ma. Basa and Antonio Ma. Regidor chose not to

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[308] Leon Ma. Guerrero, *The First Filipino*, *A Biography of Jose Rizal* (Manila: National Historical Commission, 1974), 13; and J. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan*, 26.

[309] L. Guerrero, *The First Filipino*, 38; Ocampo, "The Other Rizal," 32.

[310] Letter of Rizal to F. Blumentritt, from *Epistolario Rizaliana, Vol. V* edited by Teodoro M. Kalaw (Manila, 1938), 468. Cited and translated by Leon Ma. Guerrero, *The First Filipino*, 38.

[311] J. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan*, 26.

return to the Philippines even after they were pardoned by Spain. Others like Maximo Paterno returned to Manila but sent their children to Spain to continue their studies without fear of persecution.[312]

Aftermath of the 1870s-1880s Spanish repression

The exodus of many Filipino students to Europe was one of the consequences of the oppressive conditions in Manila, exacerbated by the growing political influence of the Church.[313] This repression, in turn, only intensified anticlericalism among Filipinos living inside and outside the Philippines. Those who were fortunate enough to settle in Spain were astounded to learn that the Church did not have the same political and social clout as it had back home.[314] Galvanized by the knowledge that many influential Spanish officials and educators also opposed the Church's effort to intervene politically, Filipino students, led by Jose Rizal and Marcelo H. del Pilar, organized themselves to challenge the power of the friars in the Philippines and to lobby for political reforms in the Spanish Cortes. With the financial support of Manila-based Comité de Propaganda and the patronage of leading Spanish liberals such as Miguel Morayta (university professor and Masonic Grand Master) and Francisco Pi y Margall (second president of the First Spanish Republic, 1873-74), the Propaganda Movement flourished in Spain.

The young Filipinos' association with Spanish liberals and academics also helped established their connection with the Freemasonry. Led by Del Pilar, who forged a strong

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[312] Resil B. Mojares, *Brains of the Nation: Pedro Paterno, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, Isabelo de los Reyes and the Production of Modern Knowledge* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2006), 8.

[313] J. Schumacher, "The Rise of Nationalism," in *Kasaysayan*, 34.

[314] J. Schumacher, *Kasaysayan*, 33-34.

link with Masonic Grand Master Morayta and attained the highest degree in the Order, many Filipinos were initiated into the Masonic brotherhood. Gaining access to the Freemasonry's international connection was one of the main attractions for Filipino nationalists. The other was its strong liberal tradition that sometimes perceived as anticlericalism in Catholic Spain.

The secret societies and rituals associated with modern Freemasonry since the early eighteenth century made it a primary target for persecution by Church and state across Europe. With its libertarian views and strong belief in the separation of Church and state, the Freemasonry posed, by the mid-nineteenth century, a threat to Church and European monarchies determined to hold on to their absolute power by divine right. This struggle was more pronounced in Catholic countries such as Spain where many liberal-minded individuals strongly opposed to Church interference in political affairs were attracted to Masonry.

As social and political unrest continued to threaten the precarious Spanish Republic, conservatives directed their anger towards the Masons and the conspiracies surrounding them. Even though the political power of both Catholic Church and the Spanish monarchy was drastically reduced after the 1868 Revolution, both still wielded sufficient influence to force the Spanish state to implement repressive measures against the perceived enemies of the government, starting with the Freemasons.

Incidents involving attempts to blow up the Spanish Cortes in April 1892, and kill high state, military and ecclesiastical delegates during the festival of Corpus Christi in Barcelona in June 1896, only forced the Spanish authorities to expand their own underground network to infiltrate these anarchist groups, while resorting to even more

"indiscriminate, illegal and extremely harsh repression."[315] Apart from the "special legislation passed in July 1894 giving them [Spanish authorities] extraordinary powers to prosecute terrorists," the Cortes also passed an anti-terrorism legislation in September 1896 that "gave the military sweeping powers in cases involving explosives."[316] Under this 1896 bill, subversive propaganda and activities were punishable by death. Headed by General Despuyols of the Seventh Army Corps and one of the intended victims of the 1896 Barcelona bombing, the military campaign of repression was augmented by torture and summary executions of Montjuich prisoners.

The escalation of state repressive measures from the period of 1892-1896 did not deter these individuals but rather incite more people to take on the cause of destabilizing the Spanish government for whatever purpose. At some point, Spanish colonial subjects such as Puerto Rican nationalist Dr. Ramon Betances helped finance subversive activities in Spain to advance their own anti-colonial cause. As a delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in Spain, Betances paid Italian anarchist Miguel Angiolillo 500 francs to assassinate prime minister Antonio Canovas del Castillo in August 1897 as retribution for statewide terror, and torture inflicted on alleged enemies of the state imprisoned in Montjuich fortress.[317]

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[315] Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 173, 191; Angel Lopez, "Anarchist Sociability in Spain in Times of Violence and Clandestinity," 157.

[316] Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 190, 193.

[317] Hugh Thomas, *Cuba, Or, The Pursuit of Freedom, Updated edition* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998, c1971), 350.

CHAPTER 4

The rise of the secret separatist movement, 1892-1895

The belief in the inevitable ascent of the nation state has effectively limited our understanding of the tentative, even contingent course of modern history in shaping the rise of nations. Unless we break out of these analytic confines, our perception of the past will always be blinkered – a restraint exemplified by recent Philippine historians' depiction of the 1896 armed struggle and its catalyst, known as the Katipunan or, more formally the *Kataastaasang, Kagalanggalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (Supreme and Venerable League of the Sons and Daughters of the Country). By focusing on few certain individual "heroes" such as Andres Bonifacio, Dr. Pio Valenzuela, Emilio Jacinto and Emilio Aguinaldo, the consequent treatment of the Katipunan as a monolithic entity allows only a narrow interpretation of the movement and its historical significance in forging national unity against colonial rule.

As every Filipino student should know, the Katipunan-led revolution of 1896 is considered the defining moment in Philippine national history, serving as the basis for both myth-making and nation-building.[318] The historical significance placed upon the Katipunan is dependent largely on its role as the spark for the 1896 armed rebellion; thus, existing studies focus mostly on it as a catalyst for national consciousness among Filipinos and their decision to take up arms for an emerging nation.

Examining the Katipunan within a broader context can yield further insights not

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[318] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "The Revolution of 1896 and the Mythology of the Nation State," *The Philippine Revolution and Beyond, Vol. 1*, edited by Elmer Ordonez (Manila: Philippine Centennial Commission of National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 1998), 61.

only into the nature of the revolutionary movement but also the complex urban milieu of late nineteenth-century Manila and its environs. Instead of attempting to unravel the Katipunan and the 1896 Revolution solely within the ideological context of nationalism and anti-colonialism, this chapter deviates from the dominant narrative, as defined by the sources critiqued in Chapter One. By treating the rise of the Katipunan and the start of its armed struggle as the culmination of complex processes rather than a catalyst for socio-political transformation, this study provides an alternative approach to understanding this period of great upheaval. More specifically, by simply setting aside the strictures of nationalist discourse, we can recognize the Katipunan rebellion as a social phenomenon forged by the complex interactions among contending forces rather than the product of binary oppositions – nation vs. empire, oppressed vs. oppressor.

This chapter analyzes the development of the Katipunan as an urban-based secret association, comprised mostly of individuals from the middle strata of Philippine colonial society who later advocated complete separation from Spain. This study focuses on Katipunan's first three years (1892-1895) because these were formative period for the movement before it became radicalized in response to intensified colonial repression. It is important to understand that the urban secret society that emerged in July 1892 was significantly transformed by the start of the revolution in August 1896 – not only in terms of its political goals but also its social composition. What had started initially as an urban secret society comprised mostly of members from the middle strata of Philippine society had, by 1896, become a broad-based revolutionary movement drawing forces mostly from provinces surrounding Manila, particularly Cavite and Bulacan. These two provinces would later serve as major strongholds for the Filipino revolutionary forces and

government under Emilio Aguinaldo.

If the Katipunan was not revolutionary when Bonifacio and others first founded the organization, what was it? What kind of movement was the Katipunan prior to the 1896 uprising?

Contrary to conventional view that this secret society was a revolutionary movement from its inception, there has been no concrete evidence indicating that as early as its beginning in July 1892, the Katipunan advocated rebellion against Spain. Bonifacio and the other Katipuneros did not even consider the possibility of an armed struggle until early 1896, several months before the sudden outbreak of the revolution. That it took four years for Bonifacio to seek out Rizal's advice for an uprising showed urgency and, perhaps, desperation on the part of the Katipunan, suddenly being forced to take drastic measures against the colonial state.

By examining the Katipunan's initial aims, language, membership, and mode of operation we can better understand this secret society. Shifting the analysis of the Katipunan to focus on these important aspects of the movement allows for a more insightful interpretation not bound, as Ileto himself put it, to "dichotomies [such as] primitive versus modern, superstitious versus rational, religious versus secular, backward versus forward, or even regional versus national."[319] Such approach will help us unravel the labyrinthine of networks of loyalties, interests, ideologies and other contending forces that reflect the complexity of this secret society on the eve of the revolution.

Katipunan's connection with Del Pilar and the Propaganda Movement

If one wishes to better understand the Katipunan, one needs to re-evaluate the

[319] Reynaldo C. Ileto, "History and Criticism" in *Filipinos and their Revolution*, 216.

prevailing views of De los Reyes and Agoncillo, and subsequent scholars such as Renato Constantino and Reynaldo Ileto about the social composition of the revolutionary movement. We need to ask whether the 1896 revolution the work of a group of unlettered masses (De los Reyes/Agoncillo), 'lower middle class' proletarians and rural peasants (Constantino), or rural Tagalog millenarians (Ileto)? At the same time, it is also imperative to look beyond the Katipunan's link to the short-lived La Liga Filipina by analyzing the rise of the Propaganda Movement and its pivotal role in the political and anti-friar crusades that later influenced the rise of Rizal's La Liga and Bonifacio's Katipunan. Of course, in the midst of all these movements was Marcelo H. del Pilar.

Indeed, there are several aspects of the Katipunan that could be linked to Del Pilar and the early 1880s propaganda group in Manila in terms of membership, its official organ *Kalayaan*, and recruitment methods. If one closely examines the known leaders and members of this revolutionary movement and compares them with Del Pilar's cohorts in the Comité de Propaganda, several individuals seemed active in both movements.

In fact, one founding member of the Comité de Propaganda was also the first appointed president of the Katipunan, Deodato Arellano, husband of Del Pilar's sister Hilaria H. del Pilar. Moreover, Arellano was also the elected secretary of Rizal's La Liga Filipina before it was dissolved to be replaced by two opposing groups, the Katipunan and the more conservative, Cuerpo de Compromisarios, a small group that pledged to support the propaganda movement in Spain and its official organ, *La Solidaridad* edited by Del Pilar.

In addition to Arellano, many family members and friends of Del Pilar, involved in

political and anti-friar campaigns in the Tagalog region during the 1880s and early 1890s[320] joined the Katipunan and recruited more members from Bulacan, Del Pilar's home province. Among these well-known Katipunan members were Dr. Pio Valenzuela (fiscal of the Katipunan), siblings Luis and Victorino Gatmaitan (from Del Pilar's maternal side of the family), siblings Father Gregorio, Mariano and Edilberto Crisostomo (Del Pilar's nephews), Teodoro Sandiko (Del Pilar's friend), and the future general, Gregorio del Pilar (Del Pilar's nephew and official of the Katipunan's Malolos chapter).[321] Not only were all these individuals active in the anti-friar campaigns led by Del Pilar before he was forced to flee the Philippines in 1888, but these men also had important positions within the Katipunan such as Dr. Pio Valenzuela. Every Filipino child knows Dr. Valenzuela as the one assigned by Bonifacio to go to Dapitan in southern Philippines in June 1896 to inform Rizal about the Katipunan's impending armed rebellion. According to Dr. Valenzuela's account of his meeting with Rizal, he asked for his endorsement of the movement and its imminent revolution, but Rizal refused because he believed that it would be a futile and fatal undertaking without arms and sufficient financial support.[322]

In the case of the Gatmaitan and Crisostomo brothers, their families along with the Del Pilars, were prominent political families who wielded considerable influence in various towns in Bulacan, particularly in the provincial capital of Malolos. Members of

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[320] Nicanor G. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2004), 56-61.

[321] Jaime Salvador Corpuz and Erlinda Dungo Lalic, eds., *Ang Malulos sa mga dahon ng Kasaysayan, Mga ulat ni Don Antonio Batista na isinaayos at Isiniaklat ni Jose P. Santos* (Bulacan: Bulacan State University's Center for Bulacan Studies, 2000, c1934).

[322] Arturo E. Valenzuela, Jr., *Dr. Pio Valenzuela and the Katipunan* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1992), 9-16.

these families held the highest local positions of either *gobernadorcillo* (town mayor) or *cabeza de barangay* (head of the barangay), and also, had extensive kinship and social ties across the province and beyond.[323]

Prior to the revolution, the Katipunan depended on social networks and kinship ties for recruiting new members. Because the movement was initially a secret society, the recruitment process was selective and tedious. Therefore, Gatmaitan and Crisostomo brothers were tasked to establish various Katipunan chapters (*balangay*) across Bulacan. Together with other Bulakeño Katipuneros, membership in Bulacan was large enough to warrant the creation of a Katipunan branch (*sanggunian*) called '*Apuy*' (fire) to oversee all the different chapters.[324] In the *Sangguniang Apuy* ('*Apuy*' branch), both Luis and Victorino Gatmaitan held high offices, secretary and treasurer, respectively, while Dr. Edilberto Crisostomo became an official of one of the chapters.[325]

Despite the Spanish insistence on Rizal's direct involvement in instigating the Katipunan-led revolution, the official report submitted to Governor-General Ramon Blanco indicated otherwise. As mentioned earlier, the 1896 account of Captain Diaz, Commander of the Guardia Civil Vetarana de Manila, explicitly pointed to "Marcelo H. del Pilar, [who was writing] from Madrid, in July 1892, advised the creation of another association, which was to be similar thereto, but which was to include the agricultural laborers and persons of little or no education and instruction, but who directed in the localities by the caciques and chiefs, were to form an enormous nucleus which should, at

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[323] Nicanor G. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 55.

[324] Corpuz and Lalic, eds., *Ang Malulos sa mga dahon ng Kasaysayan,* 3-6, 9-10, 13, 56-57.

[325] Corpuz and Lalic, eds., *Ang Malulos sa mga dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 13.

the proper time, give forth the cry of rebellion."[326] Apart from this correspondence, Captain Diaz based his charge of Del Pilar's active participation in the creation of the Katipunan upon his connection with the anti-friar campaigns and his role in the establishment of Filipino Freemasonry. By associating the rise of the Katipunan with the spread of Filipino Masonic movement in the Philippines, Captain Diaz effectively traced the revolutionary movement back to Del Pilar.

On the other hand, the July 1892 letter that Del Pilar supposedly wrote outlining his 'project' with specific instructions for the creation of a new association, alluded in Captain Diaz's report above, has yet to appear in any of Del Pilar's published writings. The only available Del Pilar letter dated July 20, 1892 was addressed to Rizal, focusing on the misunderstanding between these two friends. In this letter, Del Pilar tried to appease Rizal because of the publication of the satirical article "*Redentores de perro chico*"[327] ('Redeemers of the underdog') in the April 15, 1892 issue of *La Solidaridad*. Rizal had taken offense and assumed that the author, Eduardo de Lete, at the behest of Del Pilar[328], was attacking him through the allusions of a revolutionary prophet who was just full of words but lacking in action. In the article, Lete referred to

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[326] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

[327] Literally means 'Redeemers of small dog'. In the article, that Rizal kept referring in his letters as entitled '*Iluso*' (Visionary), the author Eduardo de Lete wanted to highlight the ridiculousness of someone's folly over his own destiny as a revolutionary dreamer.

[328] No. 313 - "Lete's Explanation of his Article" dated June 1929 attached to Letter of Rizal to Del Pilar, dated 23 May 1892 in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformist, 1882-1896* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 683.

> the great patriot of Villailusa [an imaginary city], who urges the people to rise against the tyrants and to procure liberty. To the objection that they lack arms, money, organization, he replies with disdain that none of these are necessary to the true patriot, but as for himself, 'I ought not to fight! My life is sacred and my mission of a higher nature! If they do not go forth, he proclaims, '... I will curse your love for the soil which gave you birth; I will call you voluntary slaves; I will spit in your faces and retire to a solitary wilderness to bewail in deeply-felt elegies the misfortunes of my enslaved country.' When a few deluded wretches take him at his word, they end up on the gallows or in exile while he, who was shown his patriotism by orating, sits in solitary grandeur, proclaiming: ' I am reserved for greater enterprises! I am the only prophet, the only one who loves his country as it should be loved!'[329]

Furious at the perceived slight, Rizal wrote Del Pilar and others in the Propaganda Movement expressing his anger at this underhanded attack on his character. Curiously, Rizal never wrote to the author Lete, who was his friend and fellow propagandist.[330] As the animosity between Rizal and Del Pilar was beginning to cause a rift within reform movement in Manila and in Europe, Del Pilar sent that letter to Rizal on July 20, 1892 explaining his rationale for commissioning Lete to write the article. At the same time, the

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[329] Translated from original Spanish article of Eduardo de Lete in *La Solidaridad* (15 April 1892 issue) and cited by John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement: 1880-1885* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1973), 247.

[330] Eduardo de Lete only learned about Rizal's anger through other people who received letters from Rizal about the article. Eventually, he was able to comment on the incident in June 1929: "[Marcelo del Pilar] personally and with his own lips entrusted to me the drafting of the article which under the title of Iluso was published in one of the issues of La Solidaridad. He explained to me his wish; he suggested that I stress the comical aspect (as I did later on in another work of the same kind in defense of [Rizal's Austrian friend, Ferdinand] Blumentritt, which the hated Retana announced to the Spanish government), and so I made it thus, caricaturing a type of revolutionary dreamer who had no practical means for action. And we said so successively in copious letters, as Marcelo and I swear by our honor. . . . Do not we all know that Rizal never made any declaration in favor of violence? Could we attribute to him any of this? How, knowing him intimately, loving him dearly, the three having pursued the same policy publicly, could we justly and logically attack him in that sense? . . . His letter [to Del Pilar dated 23 May 1892] created a most profound impression on us and we deeply regret his error that we hasten to remove. And I think that the end we had the luck to achieve it through a letter of later date that he sent to Marcelo H. del Pilar. Luckily, our conscience was clean, we were at peace knowing the absolute honesty of our purpose. And an extraordinary fact: None of the Ilusos (perhaps one) considered himself alluded to. . . . Such was the origin of that article inspired with the best intention by our sublime politician [Del Pilar] and which was so unfortunately interpreted by our national hero [Rizal]." Cited from the commentary of Eduardo de Lete dated June 1929 attached to Rizal's letter to Marcelo del Pilar dated 23 May 1892, in R*izal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists, Vol. II Book 3 of Rizal Correspondence series* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1963), 683-685.

letter also sheds light on Del Pilar's own views about the Katipunan even though he did not explicitly refer to it. In his reply to Rizal, Del Pilar wrote:

> Whether my words be of value or not, I would like to enlighten you about this affair. But first, be assured that Lete's article was inspired by the news which arrived on that date from Manila about the active and effective campaign intended to destroy every instrument of our propaganda: Destroy *La Solidaridad*, destroy the committee, destroy finally all means for the preparation of further solutions, in order not to think of anything more but of these. Although there is bad faith on the part of the hidden agitator of this movement, those who follow him are undoubtedly working in good faith, believing that they are serving their country. For that reason Lete thought of issuing a call to reflection and the medicine that he used was not opium but a caustic substance. But believe me, he did not allude to you, for you had nothing to do with that campaign.[331]

Admittedly, Del Pilar did write to Rizal, speaking about an emerging movement in Manila, well before the inception of the Katipunan. However, it was a mere coincidence that the circumstances that Del Pilar described to explain Lete's article of April 1892 would reflect the actual situations in Manila at the time that Del Pilar was writing in late July 1892.

From the role of several former members of La Liga Filipina, including Del Pilar's close brother-in-law Deodato Arellano, in founding the Katipunan on July 7, 1892, one can infer that Del Pilar might be referring to the Katipunan, rather than to some unknown movement, as posing threat to the propaganda cause. Given that Del Pilar was in constant communication with his brother-in-law Arellano, who became the first president of the Katipunan, it would not be surprising if he were well aware of the existence of the secret movement. As to whether or not Del Pilar actually felt his own cause threatened by the emergence of the revolutionary Katipunan, as he pointed out in his letter to Rizal, it is still open for debate because source materials pertaining to both Del Pilar and the Katipunan

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[331] Marcelo H. del Pilar's letter to Jose Rizal dated 20 July 1892, in *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists, 706; and in A Collection of Letters of Marcelo H. del Pilar, Volume I, reprinted ed.* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2006, c1955), 237.

are scarce.

In fact, the most important evidence for Del Pilar's involvement in the Katipunan, cited by the commander of the *Guardia Civil Veteran de Manila* in his October 1896 report, is nowhere to be found. In his meticulous account on the Katipunan, Captain Diaz did not deem it important to include the content of the letter in its entirety, even if that correspondence had outlined Del Pilar's plans for the organization that Bonifacio followed.

Even Del Pilar's letters to Deodato Arellano after the founding of the Katipunan are difficult to find. Although scholars such as Epifanio de los Santos, Leon Ma. Guerrero, Teodoro Agoncillo, and Renato Constantino have referred to Del Pilar's letters to and from Andres Bonifacio, their existence is questionable because no one has actually reproduced their contents. Despite their obvious importance, no one seems to worry about the 'missing' letters between Del Pilar and Bonifacio. Despite their obvious importance, no one seems to worry about the 'missing' letters between Del Pilar and Bonifacio. Apart from Captain Diaz, who actually identified the date of Del Pilar's letter without indicating the recipient, no other scholar has ever provided any specific details about the elusive letters between Bonifacio and Del Pilar that would establish Del Pilar's role in founding the Katipunan.[332]

Even without concrete evidence to support Captain Diaz's views on Del Pilar's involvement, historian Epifanio de los Santos tried to address the issue of whether or not

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[332] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

Del Pilar was an instigator or simply an inspiration for the Katipunan. In his three- part article titled "Marcelo H. del Pilar" for a 1918 edition of *The Philippine Review/Revista Filipina*, De los Santos asserted that Del Pilar remained an inspiration to the Katipunan even though "Andres Bonifacio, who venerated Del Pilar to the point of copying affectionately all his letters addressed to Deodato Arellano in order to preserve them like relics, convinced of the futility of the [propaganda] efforts of Del Pilar and his men, founded the Katipunan with Deodato Arellano and others."[333] His only proof that the Katipunan members recognized Del Pilar as an inspiration, was the naming the official organ *Kalayaan* (Liberty) with Del Pilar's name as its editor.[334]

Katipunan's short-lived official organ, *Kalayaan* was printed in the Tagalog language and distributed between January 18 to March 1896. As discussed in Chapter Two, Del Pilar and Moran established in Manila the first Spanish-Tagalog newspaper, *Diariong Tagalog*. As literacy continued to grow in the Philippines since introduction of compulsory primary education, Del Pilar had considered a bilingual newspaper as the best means to disseminate political reforms and anti-friar sentiments – an example the Katipunan followed.

At the same time, by having newspaper articles written in both Spanish and Tagalog, Del Pilar was able to remove the invisible social barrier that separated many natives who did not know Spanish from those who did. In a very subtle move on Del Pilar's part, he had created a conduit to promote dialogue across social strata. Suddenly,

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[333] Translated from original Spanish texts, "*Andres Bonifacio que veneraba a Del Pilar al grado de copiar con verdadero 'amore' las cartas de éste dirigidas a Deodato Arellano para conservarlas luego como reliquias, convencido de la inutilidad de los esfuerzos de Del Pilar y los suyos, fúndo con Deodato Arellano y otros el Katipunan...*" Cited from Epifanio de los Santos, "Marcelo H. del Pilar, *Continuación*," in *The Philippine Review/Revista Filipina*, volume III, no. 11 (November 1918), 869.

[334] E. de los Santos, "Marcelo H. del Pilar," 869.

the use of vernacular language such as Tagalog in print media had become an effective mode of disseminating ideas to the native population.[335]

In *Pasyon and Revolution* (1979), Ileto went deeper in his analysis of the Katipunan's Tagalog newspaper by focusing on the class/status-value of the use of Tagalog in the *Kalayaan* newspaper that confirmed Katipunan's popular composition inspired by a folk Catholic ideology, implying that because Tagalog was the language of the unlettered, it is safe to assume that the Katipunan was mainly a popular movement with little elite participation.

Concerning the Katipunan's use of the word '*kalayaan*,' it is important to point out that when Del Pilar translated Rizal's Spanish essay "*El Amor Patrio*" into Tagalog and printed it in *Diariong Tagalog*, the word '*libertad*' that Rizal used in his texts had no Tagalog equivalent so Del Pilar had to come up with the word '*kalayaan*'[336]. This usage is significant because the Katipunan's official organ would later be named *Kalayaan*.

Even though the editor of *Kalayaan* was Emilio Jacinto (Bonifacio's trusted advisor and Katipunan's secretary) and it was published in Manila, the actual masthead of the newspaper identified Marcelo H. del Pilar as editor and Yokohama, Japan as the place of publication. This was clearly a ruse to avoid Spanish detection; and perhaps, also

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[335] Refer to chapters on 'Print capitalism' and the use of vernacular language in Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised ed.* (London: Verso Books, 2006, c1983).

[336] In his letter to his brother Paciano (dated 12 October 1886), Rizal was trying to figure out the best Tagalog word to use that would mean '*Freiheit*' ('liberty' or 'freedom' in German) because he was translating Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* in Tagalog for his nephews and nieces. He mentioned that Del Pilar used the word '*kalayaan*' when he translated Rizal's 1882 essay "*El amor patrio*". Rizal asked his brother, who was more proficient in Tagalog than Rizal, if the word '*kalayaan*' was accurate. Cited by Virgilio Almario, *Kung Sino ang Kumatha kina Bagongbanta, Ossorio, Herrera, Aquino de Belen, Balagtas, atbp. Mga imbestigasyon sa panitikan ng kolonyalismo* (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1992), 155-156; Virgilio Almario, *"Tumula ba si Rizal sa Tagalog?"* in *Rizal: Makata* (Mandaluyong City: Anvil Publishing Inc., 2011),123-124.

Jacinto and Bonifacio's homage to the man who first articulated the idea of freedom in Tagalog.

Apart from its connection to the Propaganda Movement, the Katipunan also drew its inspiration and membership from the Filipino Masonry – its establishment was part of the indefatigable campaign of Del Pilar in advancing the reformist cause in the Philippines. By linking Filipinos to the extensive global network of the Freemasonry, Del Pilar hoped to utilize the vast resources and influence of the Brotherhood to challenge Spanish rule in the Philippines. To achieve this goal, Del Pilar needed to filipinize the Masonry.

Katipunan's connection to Philippine Freemasonry

In Philippine historiography, the narrative of the Katipunan's inception has always been traced back to La Liga Filipina to emphasize the perceived dichotomy of these two movements in terms of their approach towards the Spanish colonial rulers. According to this prevalent narrative, Rizal's deportation in July 1892 was the turning point for Bonifacio and others upon realizing the futility of political reform, and shifted towards advocating revolution. The shift from reform to revolution signified the transition from an elite-based to a more popular-based movement demanding complete independence from colonial rule. Such interpretation has been deeply imbedded in the national consciousness making it difficult to go beyond the binary oppositions drawn along class lines -- the native elites versus the '*masa*' (common people).

The problem with this simplistic and divisive approach is the erroneous presumption that Philippine colonial society could be reduced to two or three social elements of historical importance, without realizing there were other individuals or groups who did not fall under these categories. As a result, narratives of these people were

stricken out from history because they did not follow the nationalist trajectory. In the case of the study of the Katipunan, many stories have been left unexplored such as the true nature of the Katipunan as being, first and foremost, an urban clandestine association at a period when secret societies were criminalized and suppressed by the state, not only in the Philippines but across the world. It is important to recognize that before it became a revolutionary movement, the Katipunan was a secret society in Manila.

The key to understanding the Katipunan as a secret society was the Philippine Freemasonry and its founder, propagandist Marcelo H. Del Pilar. Even though the connections between the Katipunan and the Masonry have been mentioned in the extant literature, these discussions only focus on the secret codes, hand signals, initiation rites, pseudonyms, and the coincidental association between the founders of the Katipunan and the Masons. Such discussions are significant in knowing to what extent the Katipunan would go to protect itself, but this analysis does not extend beyond highlighting fascinating tidbits about Katipunan's secret rituals and codes derived from masonic practices.

As a result, the link between the Masonry and the Katipunan has often been trivialized rather than treated as a key to unlocking the character of this secret society. Only historian Gregorio Zaide was able to offer a brief but thoughtful viewpoint on the Masonry and the Katipunan:

> To evade the dragnet of Spanish law, the founders shrouded the new society in utmost secrecy. They patterned it along the Masonic lines so that the Spanish authorities were misled to think of it as Freemasonry. The mystery and mysticism of Masonic formulas were shown in the bizarre initiation rites, the grotesque masks, the secret passwords and countersigns, and the secret session and symbolic names. But the Katipunan was not a Masonic lodge; it was a secret patriotic society.[337]

[337] Gregorio F. Zaide, "The Rise of the Katipunan," in *History of the Katipunan*, 2-3.

However, Zaide did not explain why the Katipunan opted to disguise itself as one of the Masonic lodges during the same period when Filipino Masons were being persecuted. What was the Katipunan's rationale behind this seemingly irrational course of action? If the Katipunan wanted to remain undetected, why did it fashion itself as one of the colonial regime's targeted groups?

The introduction of Philippine Masonry in January 1892, discussed in Chapter Three, had greatly alarmed the Catholic Church. Even the branding of Masons as enemies of the Church and state, the Spanish authorities would then have to contend with native Masons who had both global connections and liberal ideals. Clearly, the last thing the colonial government wanted was the possibility of anarchist attacks and armed rebellions erupting across the Philippine archipelago.

On July 6, 1892, several days after La Liga Filipina (Philippine League) was founded, the nationalist leader Jose Rizal was arrested during his last meeting with the liberal Governor Eulogio Despujol (1891-1893) on trumped up charges of possessing anti-friar leaflets titled "¡*Pobres Frailes!*" ("Poor Friars!"). By the order of the governor, Rizal was imprisoned in Fort Santiago for a week and then deported to Dapitan in southern Philippines where he would remain for four years.[338]

The sudden arrest and deportation of Rizal in 1892 marked the end of the short-lived La Liga Filipina and the beginning of the end of the Propaganda Movement. As the Spanish colonial regime intensified its hunt for native elites known for their liberalism and masonic connections, many of La Liga's original members decided to disassociate from the

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[338] Governor Despujol's decree of Rizal's deportation to Dapitan was published in *Gaceta de Manila* on July 7, 1892, along with the story of Rizal's arrest during his audience with the governor.

Propaganda Movement for fear of being persecuted like Rizal. Recalling the escalation of Spanish repression following the 1872 uprising, several prominent Filipino reformists were reluctant to antagonize an already suspicious colonial state. However, there were those who continued their political activism, but opted to do so covertly – thus, amplifying the reach of Manila's clandestine labyrinth. As the Spanish state criminalized Filipino Masonry and placed liberal native elites under surveillance, other activists managed to escape detection and were able to organize secretly by entering what would later become a revolutionary underground.

After Rizal's exile to Dapitan, the Spanish authorities gradually tempered their policies towards Philippine Masonic lodges thought to be the hotbed of native subversion, believing that without Rizal the Propaganda Movement and their political activism no longer posed threat to the colonial system. Another possible reason for the decrease in state repression can be attributed to the arrival of the new governor-general, Ramon Blanco y Eranas (1893-1896). Unbeknownst to many colonial and Church officials, Governor Blanco was a 32° Mason with the Masonic pseudonym *Barcelona*.[339] For both Spanish and Filipino Masons in the colony, Blanco's appointment was a much-needed reprieve from state persecution.

Rationalizing the Katipunan's choice to adopt Masonic rituals and customs reveals a tactical gambit on the part of Bonifacio that would, under normal circumstances, have kept the Katipunan hidden. Since the beginning of the Katipunan, Bonifacio and other founding members ensured that the secret society followed the Masonic model of clandestine organization, rituals and practices not only as a precaution but also as a way to

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[339] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 125.

attract more members from diverse social groups. In the colonized Philippines joining a Masonic lodge increased one's social standing since membership required both literacy in Spanish and a steady income to pay the monthly dues.[340]

Whether it was by design, other *Katipuneros* used the attraction of being a Mason to recruit new members. In fact, Emilio Aguinaldo depended on the prestige of belonging to a Masonic lodge to draw more people to the Katipunan. As both Mason and Katipunero, Aguinaldo made sure that he recruited for both organizations. According to Aguinaldo: "We were able to get in almost everybody who had the means to become Mason. . . [as for those who could not afford to pay dues] I tried to urge all those who could not join Masonry to affiliate with the Katipunan."[341] This led Fajardo to conclude that "[t]o Aguinaldo, the Katipunan was the poor man's Masonry."[342]

Preoccupied with monitoring the native elites in Manila, the colonial administration ignored a significant segment of the population, particularly those who belonged in the middle strata of Philippine colonial society such as government workers, teachers, lawyers, university students, and provincial elites (*principalia*). The Katipunan, by contrast, took advantage of this neglect and recruited its early members from these social groups.

Relying on close kinship connections and other social networks for recruitment, the Katipunan was able to slowly expand its membership while remaining undetected for four years. This was an impressive feat since the Katipunan operated in the midst of Manila's expanding urban surveillance unit under the *Veterana* before the newly-established *Cuerpo*

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[340] Copy of 'Masonic Program and Code' in *The Brethren*, 104-107.

[341] Cited by Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 171.

[342] Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 171.

de Vigilancia took over in March 1895. Even after the outbreak of the revolution, Spanish authorities still insisted that the Katipunan was part of a much larger conspiracy orchestrated by Filipino Masonry led by Del Pilar and Rizal, who were still both in exile.[343] Determined to crush the Masons, the colonial state had allowed itself to be blinded by its own prejudices. The Katipunan used the state's paranoia to cloak itself from detection.

While the colonial Church and state pursued the Masonic lodges, the Katipunan was gradually expanding its membership. At the outset, the Katipunan was able to elude the authorities because it was able to use the Masonry as a legal cover while pursuing its own agenda. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the Katipunan benefitted from its close association with Masonry and its rituals.

The colonial state's failure to identify the real threat to its authority only highlights the fact that colonizers had underestimated the indigenous people's ability to organize and mobilize effectively from within. Believing that only external forces such as the Masonry were capable enough to mount a rebellion to overthrow the Spanish government in the Philippines, the colonial authorities had unwittingly allowed seditious native groups like the Katipunan to grow and flourish under their watch.

While it is convenient to blame the Spanish for their incompetency in dealing with the escalating tension in the Philippines, it is also important to recognize the Katipunan's shrewdness in outmaneuvering its more powerful opponent. The Katipunan's lack of

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[343] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

resources did not deter its leaders from expanding the secret movement's reach across Manila and its hinterlands. Instead, Katipuneros relied heavily on their strong kinship and social ties for both support and access. By analyzing how this secret association had managed to increase its membership during the period of intensified state repression, we can better understand the development of the Katipunan into a formidable threat to Spanish rule.

The rise of an urban secret society

On the same night of Rizal's arrest in July 1892, several members of La Liga Filipina met at secretary Deodato Arellano's house on Paseo de Azcarraga in barrio San Nicolas, Binondo district to discuss the formation of another organization separate from Rizal's political league. The public release of Governor Despujol's decree of Rizal's deportation to Dapitan prompted the establishment of a secret society called *Kataastaasang, Kagalanggalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* or simply, the Katipunan. Among those present were Andres Bonifacio, Ladislao Diwa and Teodoro Plata, who formed the first *hasik* ('triangle' or a three-person cell) of the Katipunan, as well as Arellano, Valentin Diaz, and Jose Dizon.[344]

Contrary to popular belief, the reason for forming a new group was not a sudden

[344] There are so many variations in the narrative of the founding of the Katipunan (i.e. the founding date; exact address of where the first Katipunan meeting was held; individuals who were present during the movement's inception; etc.). I have only included information that appeared consistent in some of the leading works on the Katipunan such as Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, *Glorias Nacionales, Vol. II, Andres Bonifacio y El* Katipunan (Manila: Imp. de "*La Vanguardia*," 1911), 23-28; Milagros C. Guerrero, "Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan" in *Kasaysayan: The History of the Filipino People, Vol. Five – Reform and Revolution* (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company Limited, 1998), 149-151; Isagani R. Medina, "The Katipunan Movement in the Provincia de Manila (Kamaynilaan)" in *The Katipunan and the Revolution* edited by Bernardita Reyes Churchill and Francis A. Gealogo (Diliman, Quezon City: Manila Studies Association Inc. and National Commission for Culture and Arts, 1999), 1-2; Jim Richardson, *The Light of Liberty, Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2013), 22-25; and Gregorio F. Zaide, *History of the* Katipunan (Manila: Loyal Press, 1939), 1-4.

shift from reformist to revolutionary stance but rather to the existence of informal factions formed along socioeconomic lines. According to Guillermo Masangkay, Bonifacio's close friend and fellow Katipunero, Bonifacio wanted a more unified group unencumbered by social divisions. After noticing the formation of "La Liga's informal [economic] division into two sectors called Liga Alta (high league) and Liga Baja (low league)" [345] right after the organization's inception, perhaps, Bonifacio had realized that the problem inherent in La Liga Filipina was not its reformist approach but rather its own members' preoccupation with social hierarchy.

When Rizal founded La Liga, he was more preoccupied with its overall political mission than the actual organization. Rizal had no patience with internal politics, as shown in his previous involvement with Del Pilar and many Filipino propagandists in Europe before returning to the Philippines. Rizal's idealism had clashed with Del Pilar's pragmatism because Rizal insisted on seeing the world in black or white terms. Believing that those who joined La Liga would only have altruistic motives, Rizal did not even consider the possibility of schism within the organization.

Bonifacio and other La Liga members, by contrast, were aware of this issue and determined to talk to La Liga's secretary Arellano about it. Hence, an informal meeting was called prior to Rizal's sudden exile to Dapitan. Since the Katipunan was established only after the official release of Despujol's decree deporting Rizal, Bonifacio and others had good reason to reconsider their course of action at their first meeting. In effect, Rizal's exile to Dapitan provided them the opportunity to start again. But this time they would

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[345] Milagros Guerrero, "Chapter Six: Andres Bonifacion and the Katipunan" in *Kasaysayan: The History of the Filipino People, Vol. Five – Reform and Revolution* (Hong Kong: Asia Publishing Company Limited, 1998), 149.

proceed with clear organizational guidelines to address the issue of social hierarchy by adopting the more liberal, egalitarian ideals of Freemasonry. During the early stages of its development, the Katipunan still adhered to Rizal's original vision, if we are to judge the organization by its initial objectives. As Filipino historian Gregorio Zaide pointed out:

> Ostensibly, the aims of the Katipunan were to teach the ideals of patriotism and democracy, to foster the highest type of brotherhood among the members, and to promote chivalry and civic virtues for the glory of their race. These aims were enunciated in all of doctrines and writings of Bonifacio and Jacinto. Nothing was mentioned about separation from Spain by means of a revolution nor the general massacre of all Spaniards and friars.[346]

Even though he indicated that Bonifacio himself had never referred to revolution as one of the Katipunan's goals, Zaide still chose to abide by what Dr. Pio Valenzuela wrote in his affidavit after voluntarily surrendering to Spanish officials at the outbreak of the rebellion. In Zaide's account, Valenzuela stated that "[t]he true aims of the Katipunan were (1) to unite all Filipinos into one nation, (2) to win Philippine independence from Spain by means of a revolution, and (3) to establish a communistic republic under the protection of the Japanese Empire."[347] In making sense of Bonifacio's 'omission' of the Katipunan's revolutionary mission in any of his writings, Zaide cited another well-known Filipino historian Leandro H. Fernandez who offered a possible motive. According to Fernandez:

> With respect to the idea of separation by means of revolution, there appears nothing absolutely definite in the writings of the founders of the association which have been preserved. The omission was probably not accidental; it may well have been dictated by prudence. By this omission the leaders of the association could hope to

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[346] Gregorio F. Zaide, "Chapter II: Katipunan Aims and Katipuneros" in *History of the Katipunan* (Manila: Loyola Press, 1939), 11.

[347] Vide 'Affidavits of Pio Valenzuela et al' in *Archivo del bibliofilo filipino*, Vol. III, compiled by W. E. Retana, 201. Cited by Zaide, "Chapter II: Katipunan Aims and Katipuneros" in *History of the Katipunan*, 12. Also see footnote no. 2 in Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 12.

> gain the sympathy at least, if not the support, of those who would naturally recoil from the violence of a revolution, and the uncertainty of political separation, and at the same time, lessen the risk of furnishing documentary proofs of sedition in case of discovery.[348]

The separatist movement's founding documents in August 1892 do not indicate that the Katipunan advocated armed rebellion as a means to gain independence, despite Dr. Valenzuela's claim of its revolutionary aims. In fact, the documents are vague as to exactly how the Katipunan would want to pursue its goal of separating from Spain. As stated at the beginning of the "*Pinag-kasundoan*" (Covenant), the Katipunan calls upon God to give its members strength and guide them to act within reason.[349] However, towards the end of the document, Katipunan members must pledge "for the fulfillment of this sacred cause [separation from Spain], we shall respond with our bodies, lives and wealth, now and in the future."[350]

As a secret association, the immediate assumption about the Katipunan is it was created for one sole purpose -- to destabilize the government through revolution. If we examine the literature on secret societies and brotherhoods, the common historical characterization of these clandestine organizations is their connection with illegal and dissident activities threatening the long-standing establishment. Often times, various states

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[348] Leandro H. Fernandez, *The Philippine Republic* (New York: Columbia University Publications, 1926), 16. Cited from footnote no. 1, in "Chapter II: Katipunan Aims and Katipuneros" in *History of the Katipunan*, 11.

[349] "Upanding kamtan namin ang mabuting hanga nang panukalang ito na lubhang mabigat, at malake sa taglay naming lakas, aming isinasakdal sa mataas na Hukuman nang Dios na Maykapal at kami humihinging tulungan nang kaniyang dakilang lakas at kapangyarihan, tuloy kami ay sumusukob at napasasaklolo sa matapat na katoiran." Deciphered from Katipunan code to Tagalog text by Jim Richardson, "Pinag-kasundoan," in *The Light of Liberty, Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897*, 27.

[350] "Sa pag ganap nang aming manga banal na hangad ay isinasagot namin ang aming katawan, buhay at manga kayamanang hinahawakan at hahawakan pa." Deciphered from Katipunan code to Tagalog text by Jim Richardson, "Pinag-kasundoan," in *The Light of Liberty, Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897*, 27.

and religious institutions responded severely in their effort to discover and destroy these perceived enemies, like the persecutions of 'free' thinkers and freemasons in Europe, or the criminalization of Chinese brotherhood/mutual aid association (*Kongzi*) and secret society (*Hui*) under Qing dynasty from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century. However, by analyzing the circumstances that gave rise to these clandestine groups, we can see that the creation of secret societies was actually a response to the draconian practices legalized by the state to impose social control and order. As a survival strategy, individuals were forced to conduct their political, ideological, social or economic activities underground. The use of violence was often seen as a last resort.

In the case of the Katipunan, its founders initially belonged to the short-lived La Liga Filipina established to advocate reforms and education through political means. When the Spanish government arrested Rizal, La Liga members became vigilant with how they conducted their affairs. The prominent and elite members had reason to be more cautious because they were monitored closely by the secret police, as clearly indicated in the Spanish intelligence reports.[351] As for other members of La Liga like Arellano, Bonifacio and Diwa, the colonial authorities did not deem them significant enough to warrant surveillance, being mere office employees (*empleados*) and civil service employees (*oficiales*). They would form the core of the new urban secret society,

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[351] *Copia fechada Manila 28 de octubre de 1896, Olegario Diaz - Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-2, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see St. Clair, Note No. 72 in *The Katipunan: The Rise and Fall of the Filipino Commune*, 228, Archive.org - http://archive.org/stream/katipunanrisean01claigoog - page/n238/mode/2up (Accessed on 18 September 2013).

Katipunan.[352]

From July 1892 up to the eve of the revolution in August 1896, the Katipunan had remained a well-hidden secret at the time of extreme state repression. This was a clear testament to the effectiveness of covert tactics devised by Bonifacio and others to elude detection. The fact that this underground society had flourished in the midst of increased colonial urban policing and surveillance could be attributed to the Katipunan leaders' shrewdness and audacity as well as the Spanish colonial state's incompetence.

As the popular saying goes, "The best place to hide something is out in the open. Nobody ever thinks to look there,"[353] the Katipunan seemed to have put into practice. Instead of staying as far away from the urban police, the Katipunan founders had decided to establish their original headquarters within close proximity of two Veterana garrisons (*cuarteles de Veterana*) in Tondo and Binondo districts.[354] Furthermore, even when the secret organization was in danger of being discovered, Bonifacio and others only moved to a different street but remained within the Tondo and Binondo areas.

Despite their precarious situation, the Katipunan leaders seemed to relish the fact that their secret society was operating right under the colonial authorities' noses. The Spanish state had no clue what it was up against based on its inability to correctly identify its opponents. According to several secret police reports, there were sightings of native men with cuts on their arm who also used secret mundras (hand gestures) to communicate with one another.

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[352] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 118-119.

[353] Saying usually attributed to American novelist Robert Anton Wilson.

[354] "*Capitulo 9: Del Servicio*," *Reglamento para la Guardia Civil Veterana de Manila*, 19-20.

The colonial state had immediately assumed these suspicious individuals were members of the Masonry involved in a conspiracy against Spanish rule; therefore, the next logical step for the government was to increase surveillance of urban Filipino elites due to their close association with the secret brotherhood. Paranoia was a detriment to the effectiveness of Spanish capability to identify and apprehend the subversives. Even after the discovery of the Katipunan, the Spanish authorities remained adamant about the direct involvement of Filipino masons in the outbreak of the August 1896 rebellion.

Despite the increased in surveillance and policing around the Manila area by 1895, and the threat of discovery loomed over the movement, the Katipunan flourished as it went deeper into the underground. By remaining clandestinely active in Manila and surrounding areas while expanding its recruitment to the countryside, the Katipunan had effectively challenged the escalation of state repression.

The Katipunan had recognized the state's weakness and proceeded to use it against the colonial ruler. As a result, the gambit of passing the secret society off as a masonic lodge by enshrouding it with masonic-like rituals and practices was a successful move on the part of Bonifacio since the Katipunan remained hidden for four years. Rather than alerting Spain to a new enemy, the Katipunan had used the colonial government's own Freemasonry paranoia against itself.

In the event of Katipunan's sudden discovery, the Spanish state would simply assume that it was just one of the many masonic lodges without realizing that there was a greater threat lurking underground than the Masons. In August 1896, this was exactly what happened. After the revolution broke out, the confidential report from the head of the Veterena to Governor Blanco insisted that the Katipunan was part of the Masonry, and that

Marcelo del Pilar, rather than Andres Bonifacio, was the key instigator of the revolution.

The use of secret codes, hand signals and passwords was not only for concealment but, more importantly, served as a deliberate attempt at political camouflage. If we examine the Katipunan cipher and other secret practices, they were not as essential to the Katipunan's operations. For example, Philippine scholar Jim Richardson surmised that the Katipunan cipher was seldom used "mainly because it was less laborious to write in regular Tagalog, but there also seems to have been a recognition that the cipher was too simple, and therefore served little purpose."[355] Most Katipunan members only use the cipher when signing their Katipunan names on a document. Even Bonifacio and other high-ranking Katipuneros did not often use the cipher in their personal or official writings.

Nonetheless, there were several instances that the cipher was used in longer texts – the first of the few was the Katipunan's founding documents. Written in the Tagalog language but using entirely the Katipunan cipher, the founding documents dated August 1892 state that the Katipunan, apart from its moral and civic aims, did seek to separate from Spain. This aim was indicated clearly in its 'Principal Orders' ('*Manga daquilang cautosan*'):

> Let it be known that from this day forth this Archipelago is separating from Spain, and is not recognizing and will not be recognizing any other authority except the Supreme Katipunan (translation mine)
>
> Ysñllzszyszy vzg bxfzt sz zrzc llz ñtc llz zllg vzllgz Kzpxjczllg ñtc zy fxvllfllwzjzy sz Qspzllnz zt wzlzllg kñllñkñjzjz zt kñkñjzlljñllg Pzvxvxllc kxllg dñ ñtcllg Kztzzstzzszllg Kztñpxllzll.
>
> *Ysinaysay mag buhat sa arao na ito na ang manga Kapuloang ito ay humihiwalay sa Espania at walang kinikilala at kikilalaning Pamumuno kung di itong*

[355] J. Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, xxi.

Kataastaasang Katipunan[356]

The key to the cipher was found among the captured Katipunan documents in late 1896.[357] Notably, the letter 'A' is the only one with two corresponding letters ('N' or 'Z') assigned to it. Because Tagalog words are riddled with the letter 'A,' it would be too easy to figure out the key if there were only one corresponding letter for the letter 'A.'

According to Richardson, there were only five documents from the *Archivo General Militar de Madrid* (AGMM) that were completely written in cipher, dated from 1892 to 1895.[358] Given the scarcity of ciphered documents among the captured files, one can infer that the Katipunan cipher was intended for different use. If its function were to hide information, then all Katipunan documents should have been written entirely in cipher. However, this was not the case.

As Richardson has pointed out, most of the Katipunan documents that he found in the AGMM were not enciphered, which was in clear violation of one of the principal orders of the Katipunan. According to the secret society's founding document of August 1892, "Orders and information that must be communicated to the whole Katipunan down to the different affiliated provinces and towns will be written in the script of a new alphabet, and will be despatched by post in the Spanish manner and be endorsed by the Secretary ("*Ang mga bagay na kailangang matalastas ng boong* Katipunan *hangang sa iba at ibang probinsia at manga bayang sakop ang utos ay isusulat nang letra sa bagong*

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356 "Kasaysayan; Pinagkasundoan; Manga dakuilang kautusan" (August 1892), *Archivo General Militar de Madrid*: Caja 5677, leg.1.34. Cited by Jim Richardson as part of the introductory texts for Document 1.2, *The Light of Liberty, Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897*, 20-21.

357 For the cipher see the following: Jose P. Santos, *Los alfabetos del Katipunan* (Manila, 1935), 3. Cited by Gregorio Zaide, *History of the Katipunan* (Manila: Loyola Press, 1939), 9; Cipher also discussed in J. Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, xxii.

358 Jim Richardson, "About the Documents" in *The Light of Liberty*, xxi.

alpabeto, na pararaanin sa Korreo sa kaugaliang Kastila at may katunayan ng Kalihim")."[359] Despite this directive mandating the adoption of the cipher, all Katipuneros, including Bonifacio, reverted to using regular Tagalog. Perhaps, the Katipunan members found the secret writing system too cumbersome.

It is also plausible that these documents were meant to stand out when discovered. Faced with the possibility of being uncovered by the secret police (*secreta policia*), Bonifacio and others would need to have a contingency plan to protect the secret society. Planting evidence could be a course of action to deflect further scrutiny, and to mislead the Spanish authorities into believing that they were only dealing with an already known threat.

In addition, passing off the Katipunan as a masonic lodge can also be considered as a means of social control within the organization to compel members to abide by their vows of silence. If Katipunan members, who were not part of the core group, were led to believe that they belonged to the Masons then they would know that secrecy was paramount; otherwise, they would lose their membership.

The perceived reputation of the Masonry as a secretive and exclusive organization had enticed many Filipinos to join despite the looming threat of excommunication from the Catholic Church. While other Filipinos gravitated towards the secret brotherhood because of their anti-clerical sentiments, others considered it as a way to elevate one's social standing. Counting on the notion of being a mason as a status symbol, the Katipunan leaders could ensure that their new members would abide by the rules of the secret society

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[359] Doc. no. 1.2, "*Kasaysayan; Pinag-kasundoan; Manga dakuilang kautusan*," August 1892, *Archivo General Militar de Madrid*: Caja 5677, leg.1.34. Deciphered to Tagalog and translated to English by Jim Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 31 (Tagalog texts), 37 (English texts).

in order to remain as masons. Furthermore, new Katipuneros could not talk about belonging to what they believed to be a masonic lodge for fear of state persecution and Church's excommunication. On the other hand, if members did decide to leave or were expelled from the secret society, then they could not reveal anything about the organization except it being affiliated with the Freemasonry.

Surprisingly, from 1892 to 1896, none of those who were expelled and branded as traitors by the Katipunan revealed anything damaging that led to the organization's discovery. Even high-ranking officials who were expelled from the Katipunan, like Jose Turiano Santiago (*Tiktik*) and his half-brother Restituto Javier (*Mapangahas*) who were accused of betraying the secret society to a parish priest in 1895, they did not divulge anything to the Spanish authorities despite being branded as traitors and shunned from the society. Perhaps, the brothers' bond to Bonifacio was too strong to break, given that both brothers and their wives served as wedding sponsors to Bonifacio and his wife, Gregoria de Jesus. Moreover, their wives also had familial ties with Bonifacio and his second-in-command, Emilio Jacinto. Restituto's wife, Aurelia de Jesus, was believed to be related to Bonifacio's wife, while Jose's wife, Marina Dizon, was Jacinto's close cousin.

Conversely, those who were caught passing information to the secret police and were sentenced to death by the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, like Marcelo Badel and Eleutrio de Guzman,[360] they did not divulge anything that could help the colonial state to

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[360] Katipunan's Supreme Council Meeting, Minutes of Meetings of November 30 and December 1, 1895 prepared by Emilio Jacinto (December 1, 1895), Caja 5377, leg. 1.41 bis, *Archivo General Militar de Madrid*. Transcribed in original Tagalog by Jim Richardson, *Katipunan* documents website - https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=16RNPq4Mh_T08u3JkCi5vfoT5wgDMaQXPouXr5Tu32dc (Accessed on March 4, 2015).

uncover the secret society. No one who was directly linked to the Katipunan revealed anything to the authorities. It would take someone who was not part of the society to unveil its secrets.

Empleados and *officiales* by day, Katipuneros by night

Contrary to nationalist perspective that the Katipunan was solely a lower class movement, evidence indicates that the Katipunan's founders belonged to the middle strata of Manila's urban society and the upper strata (*principalia*) of rural communities even before the movement became widespread in 1896. Indeed, there were several prominent Katipuneros who could not be categorized as part of the 'masses,' the lowest social classes: notably Deodato Arellano (a wealthy urban property owner from Bulacan and former secretary of La Liga Filipina); Ladislao Diwa (a University of Santo Tomas law student from Cavite province who also worked as *official de mesa*/office clerk in Quiapo district in Manila); Teodoro Plata (also worked as *official de mesa* in Binundok); and Pio Valenzuela (a medical doctor and owner of several urban properties in the commercial Binondo district).[361] Even 'The Great Plebeian' himself, Andres Bonifacio, worked for various foreign companies as office clerk (*escribiente*), sales agent (*agente de ventas*), commercial broker (*corredor*) and then warehouse supervisor (*bodeguero*) – all posts far removed from the brute labors of workers and peasants.

Moreover, a number of early members of the Katipunan from rural areas belonged

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[360] Transcribed in original Tagalog by Jim Richardson, Katipunan documents website - https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=16RNPq4Mh_T08u3JkCi5vfoT5wgDMaQXPouXr5Tu32dc (Accessed on March 4, 2015). Also see Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, pp. 54-57.

[361] Isagani R. Medina, "*Ang Pagsibol at Paglaganap ng* Katipunan *sa Maynila*," in *1896* edited by Bernard L.M. Karganilla (Quezon City: Publication Program, Information, Publication and Public Affairs Office UP-Manila, 1996), 25, 28.

to the native political and economic elites in their respective provinces. In fact, the participation of the peasantry could be attributed to the active recruitment into the Katipunan conducted by rural native elite members from influential rural families such as the Aguinaldos and Alvarezes of Cavite as well as the Gatmaytans and Del Pilars of Bulacan. Their privileged positions as wealthy landowners or tenants on friars estates (*inquilinos*),[362] as local high officials such as head of the smallest administrative unit for tax collection purposes (*cabeza de barangay*), or as town mayor (*gobernadorcillo*), gave them the opportunity to recruit people from among their own *kasama* (sharecroppers) and their own local communities.

By the eve of the revolution, the Katipunan had taken on a more popular composition when the secret group started accepting members of lower social strata in both urban and rural areas, superseding the familial, education, employment and other social connections employed as part of the Katipunan's early, covert recruitment strategies. Even so, the movement was still far from either being solely "the revolt of the masses" as historian Teodoro Agoncillo asserted in his 1956 seminal work or from a Tagalog popular movement driven by 'the *Pasyon* (Passion of the Christ) tradition' as stressed in Reynaldo Ileto's *Pasyon and Revolution* (1979).[363] There were too many ancillary variables and factors that comprised the Katipunan to accept either mono-causal depiction of this secret organization.

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[362] For more information about *inquilinos* from Cavite province, see Soledad Borromeo-Buehler, "The 'Inquilinos' of Cavite: A Social Class in Nineteenth-Century Philippines," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1985), pp. 69-98.

[363] Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the* Katipunan (1956); and Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*, 7th ed. (2008, c1979).

When the Katipunan was first established in July 1892, Bonifacio and others had begun covertly recruiting within their social circles, starting with La Liga Filipina and their respective Masonic lodges. Out of the six original Katipunan founders only Deodato Arellano (*Buan*), the former La Liga secretary, belonged to a different masonic lodge in Tondo, *Logia Lusong* No. 185. Andres Bonifacio (*Sinukuan*), Ladislao Diwa (*Baguio*), Teodoro Plata (*Balany*), Valentin Diaz (*Tupas*), and Jose M. Dizon (*Montgomery*) belonged to *Logia Taliba* No. 165 in Trozo district.[364] Founded by the Master Mason Dizon in November 1892, the Taliba triangle (later received its charter as a lodge) had become the center for early Katipunan recruitment.[365]

The organizational structure of the Katipunan evolved as the secret society expanded beyond Manila. The Supreme Council (*Kataastaasang Sanggunian*) governed over the Katipunan that included a president (*pangulo*), secretary (*kalihim*), fiscal (*taga-usig*), treasurer (*taga-ingat yaman*), and six councilors (*mga kasanguni*). Once Katipunan membership spread outside Manila, a new organizational structure was expanded. The Provincial Council (*Sanguniang Bayan*) oversaw the operations of various Popular Councils (*mga Sanguniang Balangay*) that governed over smaller branches of the Katipunan. The legislative body of the Katipunan was "composed of the members of the Supreme Council, along with the presidents of the popular and provincial councils. Judicial power rested in the *sanguniang hukuman* [Judicial Council], which were

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[364] Along with Dizon, the Taliba lodge in Trozo was founded by Eustacio Javier (*Tagalog*), Jose Reyes Tolentino (*Prim*), and Modesto Espanol (*Agno*). Cited from R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 97.

[365] The pseudonyms indicated here were these men's masonic names. Once they were part of the Katipunan, each indiviidual would take on a new pseudonym. Cited from http://www.philippinemasonry.org/philippine-masonry-from-barcelona-to-manila-1889-1896.html; and http://www.philippinemasonry.org/the-katipunan-and-masonry.html (Accessed on 28 October 2015). Dizon's daughter Marina Dizon, his son-in-law Turiano Santiago, and nephew Emilio Jacinto, were also active members of the Katipunan.

provincial courts that decided on internal matters; however, judgment on grave matters (such as betraying the Katipunan or committing acts penalized by the organization's laws) were meted by the 'Secret Chamber,' composed of Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto, and Dr. Pio Valenzuela."[366]

The Katipunan followed a three-tier membership system. Each individual was ranked accordingly: (1) *katipon* (member) - new recruits; (2) *kawal* (soldier) - established members; and (3) *bayani* (patriot) - officer of the Katipunan.[367] Each tier paid different monthly dues. In terms of recruitment, the Katipunan adopted the masonic practice of 'establishing a triangle' as a method of expanding membership for the secret society. Contrary to popular notion that the Katipunan triangle (or '*hasik*') system was the actual recruitment process, this method merely established the cores of soon-to-be created Katipunan branches. Similar to Masonic triangles and lodges established across the archipelago in accordance to the Statutes and General Regulations of *Gran Oriente Español*, the Katipunan triangles (*mga hasik*) also served the same purpose of gathering members for the secret society. Once these Katipunan triangles, composed of three individuals, were formed they were deployed to various areas in Manila and its hinterlands to help spread the Katipunan and its separatist ideas.[368]

Not every Katipunan member was part of a *hasik* or had participated in the

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[366] "The Founding of the Katipunan". http://malacanang.gov.ph/4304-the-founding-of-the-katipunan/. (Accessed on March 9, 2016).

[367] Katipunan membership structure - ref. "The Founding of the Katipunan". http://malacanang.gov.ph/4304-the-founding-of-the-katipunan/. (Accessed on March 9, 2016).

[368] According to Fajardo, "[u]nder the Statues and General Regulations of the Gran Oriente Espanol, [other Masons] could establish either a Masonic triangle or a lodge. To organize a triangle three or more regular Masons, at least one of whom is a Master Mason, were needed. On the other hand, to put up a Lodge, seven or more Masons, at least three or whom are Master Masons, were required." Cited from R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 94.

elaborate rituals of initiation in Manila. Once new Katipunan branches were established in both urban and rural areas, the use of the *hasik* system did slow down by late 1892. However, the Katipunan did not abandon the practice completely. In March 1895 Bonifacio had inducted Emilio Aguinaldo, the young *capitan municipal* (municipal position formerly known as *gobernadorcillo*) of the town of Cavite el Viejo (present-day Kawit), into the society as part of a hasik.[369] Aguinaldo's close friend and Bonifacio's cousin by marriage, Santiago Alvarez, sponsored both Aguinaldo and fellow Caviteño elite, Raymundo Mata.

Based on the known individuals who were part of a *hasik*, we can infer that they were either deemed trustworthy by Bonifacio and other founders, or well-connected enough to bring potential members into the organization. These individuals would be invited to establish a Katipunan triangle, and then take on the responsibility of spreading the Katipunan to their hometowns.

Aside from Masonic connections, the Katipunan also depended on familial, kinship, and other social networks to increase their membership – an elemental form of security for a clandestine organization. Since the survival of this secret society greatly depended on covert recruitment, Bonifacio and others also started getting their own families and close friends involved in the Katipunan. As evident in the early membership roster, familial and close social connections played an important role in recruiting trustworthy members. One main example is the first *hasik* that included Bonifacio, his brother-in-law and cousin by marriage Teodoro Plata, and his friend Ladislao Diwa, who

[369] Aguinaldo provided this date in his memoir when he first joined the Katipunan. Other scholars such as Emmanuel Calairo used the same date in their works. Only few referred to different dates such as Santiago Alvarez, who attested in his own memoir that Aguinaldo was initiated in March 1896, a year later. In the meantime, historian Gregorio Zaide wrote down January 1, 1894 as the date of Aguinaldo's initiation into Katipunan.

also boarded at Bonifacio's house in Tondo while studying law at the University of Sto. Tomas.

Without the support of close family, friends and the Masonic brotherhood, the Katipunan would have languished. The core members of the secret association were all related to one another through family, work, school or other social groups such as the Masonry. All members of hasiks would then have to sponsor two other people to form new Katipunan triangles. Bonifacio invited his co-worker from Fressell & Co. and wedding sponsor, Restituto Javier, and his baptismal godfather, Vicente Molina.[370] Diwa approached his previous landlord in Manila, Roman Basa, who was also from Diwa's hometown of San Roque in Cavite, and a lawyer friend who studied at UST, Teodoro Gonzales.[371] As for Plata, he invited his co-worker, Valentin Diaz, a fellow *oficial de mesa del juzgado* of Binondo, and Briccio Pantas, who worked as the *Secretario del juzgado* of Quiapo.

These new members, together with Bonifacio and others, began recruiting more family members and close friends to form Katipunan's main governing body, the Supreme Council (*Kataastaasang Sanggunian*), to oversee all the affairs of the movement. Provincial Councils (*Sangguniang Bayan*), and Popular Councils (*Sangguniang Balangay*) were later formed after new Katipunan branches and chapters in various provinces and principal towns surrounding Manila had been created. By this time, the Katipunan

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[370] http://pinoyhistory.proboards.com/thread/1895/restituto-javier (Accessed on 28 October 2015); Vicente Molina - http://pinoyfolktales.blogspot.com/2013/01/filipino-martyr-vicente-molina.html (Accessed on 29 October 2015).

[371] Jim Richardson, Katipunan Notes - "Table 1: Katipunan activists in Manila, 1892-1896" - https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=1jzzUC-L358HBwyAMP7JOCLsFXL-TvidFELnB2iG7a50 (Accessed in 2012).

membership had grown slowly but steadily.[372]

In an August 2013 interview, Bonifacio's great-great-grandnephew, Attorney Gary Bonifacio, stated that Bonifacio's younger siblings – namely Procopio, Ciriaco and Espiridiona (wife of Plata) – had joined the secret society and were active until the brothers were executed by Aguinaldo's men in 1897, and Espiridiona was forced to go into hiding in Ternate to evade Aguinaldo's men. "My great-great-grandfather Procopio Bonifacio was one of the founders of the Katipunan in Mindoro," said Gary Bonifacio. "He was sent there by Andres Bonifacio. Procopio's wife, Juana, was from Mindoro."[373] However, before heading to Mindoro, Procopio and his younger brother, Ciriaco, who worked for the British-owned Tutuban-Dagupan railway, recruited co-workers to join the secret society. Gary Bonifacio also mentioned the Bonifacio family's connection to the railway, saying: "[Bonifacio's] mother's family used to own the present-day Tutuban property in Tondo, Manila. His mother Catalina de Castro, one of her uncles was *cabeza de barangay* of Tayuman. That property [where the Tutuban railway station is located] was not productive, so it was sold to the railway."[374]

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[372] According to Zaide, "The number of estimate members varies between 20,000 and 400,000. It is impossible to give the exact number because even the katipuneros themselves did not know their total numerical strength. Dr. [Pio] Valenzuela [Katipunan treasurer and physician], in his **Affidavit**, to the Spanish authorities in 1896, testified that the Katipunan members reached 20,000. But in his **Memoirs** written in 1914, he said there were 30,000. . . . [insisting that] with the publication pf the **Kalayaan** and the inspired drive for more members, the 300 affiliates increased to 30,000 in August, 1896." See Gregorio Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 52-53. According to Benitez, Katipunan members were up tp 123,000. Cited from Benitez, 274.

[373] Interview of Bonifacio's great-great grandnephew, Attorney Gary Bonifacio, "The Untold Story of Andres Bonifacio and his Family," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (August 18, 2013) - http://www.philstar.com/sunday-life/2013/08/18/1101741/untold-stories-andres-bonifacio-and-his-family (Accessed on 29 October 2015).

[374] Interview of Bonifacio's great-great grandnephew, Attorney Gary Bonifacio, "The Untold Story of Andres Bonifacio and his Family," *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (August 18, 2013) - http://www.philstar.com/sunday-life/2013/08/18/1101741/untold-stories-andres-bonifacio-and-his-family (Accessed on 29 October 2015).

The Bonifacio family's level of commitment to the Katipunan was not an exception but rather a norm among founding members of the movement. For example, the family of Bonifacio's second wife, Gregoria de Jesus, was active in the spread of the organization beyond the urban confines of Manila.

After Bonifacio replaced Roman Basa as the new leader (*supremo*) in 1894, Gregoria helped in expanding the Katipunan membership, beginning with her own family. Her father Nicolas de Jesus, a carpenter and *gobernadorcillo* of the town of Caloocan in Morong province, joined the movement and established a Katipunan chapter in Caloocan. Meanwhile, Gregoria also sought out other relatives from other provinces. Gregoria's mother, Balthazara Alvarez Francisco, was a native of the town of Noveleta in Cavite. She was also a niece of Mariano Alvarez, a teacher and *gobernadorcillo* of Noveleta. Gregoria encouraged her grand-uncle, Mariano, to join the secret society and to establish a Noveleta chapter of the Katipunan known as *Magdiwang*. Santiago, Mariano's only son who was studying in Manila to become a teacher, also joined the Katipunan in 1895.[375]

Santiago's cousin, Pascual Alvarez, was also recruited into the secret society. Pascual was the son of Noveleta natives, Sebastian Alvarez, a horse carriage driver (*cochero*), and his wife, Juana de Jesus, a dressmaker. Even though he lacked formal education, Pascual worked as office clerk at Noveleta's municipal hall (*casa tribunal*) and then, as *cabeza de barangay*. From 1893 to 1894, Pascual served as *gobernadorcillo* of Noveleta. In 1896, he was initiated into the Katipunan by his uncle Mariano and then,

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[375] Gregoria De Jesus, *Autobiography of Gregoria de Jesus*, Trans. Leandro H. Fernandez. *Philippine Magazine* 27.1 (June 1930),16-18, 65-68. http://bonifaciopapers.blogspot.com/2005/09/de-jesus-gregoria.html (Accessed on 29 October 2015). Santiago Alvarez studied under Don Macario Hernandez in his school in Camba Street in Tondo. After the revolution, Alvarez continued his studies at UST and San Juan de Letran.

appointed as secretary of the Magdiwang Council (*Sangguniang bayan ng Magdiwang*) of Noveleta.[376]

While familial and masonic ties were vital to the establishment of Katipunan's core membership, the organization also depended heavily on other urban networks and kinships to gather more members. The various workplaces, schools, residential areas, churches and other social spaces across the city made it more convenient for Katipunan members to recruit. With more people migrating to the urban center in search of education and work, Manila became a nexus for people, goods and ideas. As a result, there was a constant flow of potential Katipuneros.

By looking at the social backgrounds of some of the members, it is easy to identify key areas of recruitment. Apart from specific workplace, schools and social groups, locations of residence also provide valuable insights as to how Katipuneros targeted potential members. Neighbors, along with family members and friends from work or school, seem to be among the preferred and trusted candidates for membership. It also helped if a Katipunan member were a *cabeza de barangay*, like Francisco Carreon of Santa Cruz district and his brother Nicomedes from Trozo, because he would recruit those who were under his jurisdiction along with his own family.[377] Many members lived not just within the same district but on the same streets such as *Calle* Lemery, *Calle* Sande and *Calle* Azcarraga in Tondo; *Calle* Dulumbayan and *Calle* Oroquieta in Santa Cruz; *Calle* Elcano and *Calle* Soler (formerly *Calle* Salinas) in San Nicolas; and, *Calle* Magdalena and

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[376] "Pascual Alvarez (1861-1923)" - http://www.reocities.com/kabitenyo1/kabite2-1alvarespa.htm (Accessed on 24 November 2015). Source cited E. A. Manuel, *Dictionary of Philippine Biography, vol .2*; *Talambuhay ng Magigiting na Lalaki ng Kabite*, Jimenez Collection; and *"History of Noveleta"*.

[377] *Vecindario* (Sta. Cruz, 1893), Philippine National Archives. One of the lists indicated Francisco Carreon as *cabeza de barangay* of cabecera no. 32 in Santa Cruz district.

Calle Jose in Trozo. The two main districts in Manila with a huge concentration of Katipunan members were Tondo and Santa Cruz where the families of both Bonifacio and Jacinto lived.

In addition, San Felipe Neri (present day Mandaluyong), located at the outskirts of Manila, had the distinction of the most overall number of Katipunan members. One possible explanation is that a Filipino rope factory owner named Sancho Valenzuela recruited all his employees to join the Katipunan. His factory was located in Sta. Mesa, right next to Mandaluyong. There were not many known Katipunan members from Sta. Mesa so it is possible most of his employees had lived in Mandaluyong, who then ended up recruiting more people in their area to join the movement.

From 1892 to 1895, most of the recruitment focused on Manila and its immediate surrounding in an effort to strengthen the movement before expanding to the rural areas. The only early members from the provinces were those who studied or worked in the city. Because many of these individuals were likely to belong to the provincial elites, they were assigned to manage the recruitment process in their respective hometowns. It is important to note that active recruitment in the provinces did not begin until late 1895. In fact, prior to February 1896, there had been no Katipunan branches or councils outside the province of Manila even though there had been many members who were from various provinces.

While the spread of the Katipunan to the rural areas was important to its leaders, it was not a priority during the early years of the movement. Initially, the main concern was to ensure that the secret society had a stronghold of Manila and its surrounding areas. Due to the clandestine nature of this organization, recruitment was a slow but necessary process in the midst of intensified state repression. By late 1892, the excruciatingly slow *hasik*

system was abandoned for a more rapid recruitment in which members could recruit more than two people at a time. However, potential candidates still had to undergo careful screening before being allowed to take the initiation. According to the Katipunan's "Principal Orders" (*Manga dakuilang kautusan*"), "Before the supreme head authorizes a person's admission, a group three must be persuaded that he is worthy of being received into the Katipunan [and given a new name]" ("*ayon sa manga subok ma gagawin ng sa kanya'y humihikayat kung may karapatang tangapin ipagbibigay alam sa* Katipunan *ng kakatlo nito, upang magbigay utos ang pinaka Ulo sa binyagan nang bagon pangalan*").[378]

Careful control over its recruitment and membership was crucial to the survival of the Katipunan. Furthermore, it strongly suggested that the secret society was not gearing towards rebellion at this moment, but rather, establishing itself in the urban center to effectively conduct its political, and social functions as a mutual aid association, looking after its dues-paying members.

The Katipunan functioning as a mutual aid association is often neglected in the narratives but it is equally important in our understanding of the nature of the movement and its members. As mentioned before, we cannot assume that not all who joined the secret society had nationalistic intentions. More often than not, they were driven by personal and social interests rather than a strong desire to separate from Spain. Being part of an association, or something believed to be a Masonic lodge, improved one's social status because one had to be able to pay the dues. In the case of the Masons, the Masonic Program and Code specifies that "it does not admit one who does not have a profession, an art, a trade or an income that will enable him to support his family and in addition, to help

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[378] Doc. 12 - Foundational Documents. Cited from Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 35.

to defray the expenses of Masonry and assist the needy."[379]

Compared to monthly dues paid to regular Filipino masonic lodges, the Katipunan's membership fee and monthly dues were significantly lower which then attracted new members to the society.[380] As stated in the Katipunan's "Principal Orders" ("*Manga dakuilang kautusan*"), " Everyone in the Katipunan has a strict duty to pay their contributions: 80 kualta from every head, councilor, and assistant; 60 kualta from each of the lieges; 40 kualta from each partisan; and 16 from each follower. . . ." ("*Ang lahat ng tawo sa* Katipunan *ay may katungkulang mahigpit na umambag nang manalape ang balang Ulo, Tagasanguni at manga Katulong; tigatlong bahagui ang manga Pinulo; mangahati ang mga alagad at tig lalabing anim sa kualta ang mga kabig*").[381] Like any other fraternal societies, the Katipunan funds were allocated to help members and their families with financial assistance for unemployment, retirement, and other personal expenses (child birth, medical and funeral expenses). Many of its members came to depend on the organization for assistance as well as guidance.

Problems from within

As the Katipunan membership grew, the organization started encountering several internal security problems as well as disputes involving the handling of Katipunan funds

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[379] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 106.

[380] Katipuneros paid (25 centavos for membership fee and 12 centavos for monthly due
Ref: http://malacanang.gov.ph/4304-the-founding-of-the-katipunan/

1. *Katipon* - one real fuerte, or 12.5 centimos/ 20 cuartos
2. *Kawal* - 20 centavos
3. *Bayani* - 2 real fuertes (25 centimos / 40 cuartos)

Entrance fee - one real fuerte (1/8 of a silver real peso)

[381] Doc. 12 - Foundational Documents. Cited from Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 28, 35.

and spying within the society that led to mass purging of long-time members. One such dispute involved Bonifacio and other members of the Supreme Council of misappropriation of funds in late 1895. According to the December 1,1895 minutes of meeting, several Katipuneros from the *Dimasalang* branch including its president Restituto Javier (*Mapangahas*), who was recruited early on by his co-worker Bonifacio from Fressel & Co., accused Bonifacio, Emilio Jacinto and the rest of the Supreme Council of embezzlement. After an investigation was conducted, it was found that both Javier and his secretary Doroteo Lopez (*Silang*) were conspiring to oust Bonifacio. Despite objection from Javier's half-brother Jose Turiano Santiago (*Tiktik*), who was a close friend of Bonifacio and served as his wedding sponsor, both men were branded as traitors ('*taksil*') and immediately expelled from the Katipunan.[382]

To keep the organization intact, the Supreme Council had implemented measures to purge the Katipunan of unwanted members. In an unprecedented effort, the Katipunan expelled more than 45 members in 1895 when the total number of members was estimated to be only around three hundred.[383] Many of the expelled individuals came from specific Katipunan branches -- namely *Laong Laan* branch in Sta. Cruz, and *Ilog Pasig* branch in Binondo district. Both had been considered by Bonifacio and Jacinto as "the main hotbeds of dissent within the society, and [had become] the prime targets of the purge."[384] Furthermore, those who belonged in the inner core of the Katipunan were not spared that "included Bonifacio's predecessor as supreme president, Roman Basa (*Liwanag*); the

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[382] Doc. 29 - Supreme Council dated November 30 and December 1, 1895. Cited from Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 69-72.

[383] Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 60.

[384] Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 61.

existing supreme secretary, Jose Turiano Santiago; and five others thought to have been sometime members of the Supreme Council -- Teodoro Gonzalez (*Lathala*), Restituto Javier, Faustino Mañalac (*Mayon*), Tomas Remigio (*Toremige*), and Teodoro Vedua (*Kalasag*)."[385]

The expellees were categorized according to their alleged misdeed. Those deemed to be 'separated or distanced from society' ('*itiwalag*' / '*ilayu'*) were found lacking in commitment; however, they could still return to the fold if they were willing to change. On the other hand, those who were branded as traitor ('*taksil*') had committed acts of treachery or thievery, and therefore, could never be allowed to return, or interact with other active members of the Katipunan. In another case, a member named Teodoro Vedua was expelled for committing adultery.[386]

The possible repercussion of this mass purge could lead to security breach resulting in the implementation of several changes in the Katipunan's organizational structure as well as the general conduct of affairs. One significant change was the establishment of the 'Secret Council' with "three members, whose identities would be known to only one person. This person would select the three members, and he would also be the one to communicate between the Secret Council and the Katipunan." The Secret Council was empowered to defend the organization from both internal and external threats by any means necessary.[387] Another change was the introduction of new secret signals and passwords. The following secret signals were adopted by the Katipunan in December

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[385] J. Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, 61.

[386] Doc. 29 in *The Light of Liberty*, 60-76.

[387] Doc. 29 in *The Light of Liberty*, 71.

1895:

> - If there is a stranger present, touch your ear with one hand and your mouth with the other as a signal that someone might be listening and that it is not safe to speak.
> - If everything is in order, place your right hand on your left shoulder.
> - If a member is tied up, and wants to be recognized as a member, he should clench his fist but leave the little finger straight.
> - When shaking hands, rub the tip of your index finger just below the other's wrist.
> - Upon greeting a fellow member, lift your *kalu* [hat] and place it in front of your heart, with the inside facing outwards.
> - The questions to be asked, and their answers, are as follows: "What day was it yesterday? Peace. What day is it today? Slavery. What day will it be tomorrow? Freedom."
> - The password will be *Na La Anak Bayan* [With the Sons of the People].[388]
>
> ("*Ipinakilala ng p. ang pagkakailangang halinhan ang mga hudiatan, dahil sa makapal na nangatiwalag at napagkayarian ng lahat ng itong mga sumusunod: kung may nakaharap na dik. hahawakan ng nakatalastas ang kaniyang tainga, na nangangahuluga'y may makaririnig, at ang iba sa bibig ang hawa, tanda na sila'y di magsasalita. Kung sasaayus ay ilalagay ang kanang kamay, liban ang kalingkingan na iuunat – Sa pagkakamayan ay ihahagut ang hintuturo sa dakong ibaba ng galangalangan. Sa pagbabatian o pagpupugayn ay alilinin ang kalu (sombrero) at ilalagay ng patihaya sa tapat ng pusu. Sa mga tanungan ay ito "¿Anong araw kahapun (sagut) – Kapayapaan. ¿Anong araw ngayon? (sagut) Kaalipinan – ¿Anong araw bukas?(sagut) Kalayaan." – Ang mga lihim na wika ay "Na-La-Anak-Bayan".*)[389]

Despite the danger of exposure after the purge in late 1895, the Katipunan remained hidden until August 1896.

Moving towards revolution

Worried that the same urban terrorism wreaking havoc across Europe, particularly in Spanish cities, would descend upon colonial Manila, the colonial government's immediate response to Rizal's challenge was to consider all Filipinos as threats to Spanish

[388] Doc. 29 in *The Light of Liberty*, 73-74.

[389] Doc. 29 in *The Light of Liberty*, 67.

dominion. However, the Spanish state focused mainly on liberal Filipino elites for their alleged involvement during the 1872 Cavite Mutiny, and for their association with the Filipino Masonry. Apart from conducting close surveillance of suspected individuals and their families, the Spanish state monitored native groups and associations for any activities with the intent to overthrow the government. Such was the extent of Spanish paranoia in the Philippines, exacerbated by reports of bombings and assassination attempts in the metropolis, at the height of anarchist movement in Spain between 1892 and 1897,[390] that even innocent Filipino social or ritual gatherings were suspected as a ruse to conduct secret meetings. By eliminating any peaceful avenues for Filipinos to engage the colonial administration, the Spanish state had forced Filipinos to seek alternative and more radical means to express their grievances.

The shift from a secret society to a revolutionary movement was done reluctantly out of necessity as oppose to popular assumption that it was deliberate on the part of the Katipunan founders. Even as late as March 1896 when the Katipunan's newspaper *Kalayaan* was released, Bonifacio and his second-in-command Emilio Jacinto were careful not to refer to armed struggle in their writings. Instead, Bonifacio's poem "*Pag-ibig sa Tinubuan Lupa*" ("Love of Motherland") and Jacinto's essay "*Liwanag at Dilim*" ("Light and Darkness") focus on love for motherland and the right of every man to be treated as equal in accordance to the principles of the 1789 French Revolution and the codes of the Freemasonry.[391] Furthermore, Bonifacio and Jacinto's writings emphasize the need to

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[390] George Richard Esenwein, "Chapter X: Terrorism and Anarchist Movement, 1892-94" and "Chapter XI: The Aftermath of Repression, 1894-1898" in *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; Oxford: University of California Press, 1989), 166-188, 189-204.

[391] Letter of Timoteo Paez to Jose Rizal, dated 19 June 1892, *Rizal's Correspondence with Fellow Reformists, National Heroes Commission edition* (1963), 696; Also see Jim Richardson, "Preface" in *The*

achieve freedom through fraternity and equality rather than advocating violent means to achieve these goals.

One of the first documentations of the Katipunan's shift to revolutionary aims was the meetings between Dr. Pio Valenzuela and Jose Rizal in June 1896. Both men chronicled this meeting when Valenzuela revealed to Rizal his true mission to Dapitan.[392] Under the guise of seeking medical treatment for a patient, Valenzuela sought Rizal's advice on instigating a revolution against Spain. Rizal condemned the revolutionary plans because he believed that the Filipinos were not yet ready. Moreover, he pointed out that the Katipunan would need political support and financial backing of Manila's elites to ensure success. Without them, the Katipunan would not be able to sustain their armed struggle against the colonial state.

The fact that the Katipunan was ill-prepared to fight the Spanish by the end of August 1896 indicates that starting a revolution was not part of the secret society's agenda at its founding in July 1892. For almost four years the movement had grown beyond the confines of Manila without being detected by the Spanish authorities. Yet for four years, the Katipunan had failed to plan for armed struggle because it was initially a separatist, not a revolutionary, movement. What finally pushed the Katipunan to resort to violence to achieve independence was Spain's escalating repression to save its declining empire.

Light of Liberty, Documents and Studies on the Katipunan, 1892-1897 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2014), xvi.

[392] See Rizal's letters to his family and journal entries regarding his encounter with Valenzuela.

CHAPTER 5

Repression and Revolution: Descent into Manila's 'Dark Labyrinth'

The transformation of nineteenth-century Manila into a cosmopolitan city under Spanish colonial rule left an indelible imprint on the nature of the 1896 revolution that erupted at the zenith of Spanish imperial control. Analyzing Manila's complex social matrix and the subversive underground networks within this urban milieu allows for a clearer understanding of the Katipunan and its path towards revolution. Without the burden of nationalism limiting our perspectives on the Katipunan, more factors can be taken into account in examining the secret organization's radical shift to advocating armed rebellion.

Contrary to popular historical interpretation, the Katipunan was not intended to be a revolutionary organization from the outset. Rather, the Katipunan's radical transformation was a direct response to intensified state repression that threatened the precarious Spanish hold on the Philippines. The year 1895 marked an escalation of state terror against suspected native opposition in Philippines, particularly the Filipino masons, that came with unintended consequences – most importantly, the emergence of a radicalized clandestine organization now more inclined toward mass armed struggle.

This chapter, I argue that Katipunan's move towards revolution was not a choice but a necessity. The passing of the 1894 anti-anarchism / anti-revolutionary legislation in Spain was aimed of countering anarchist terrorism in the metropole as well as revolutionary agitation in the colonies. As a result, the Spanish authorities introduced an

elite intelligence-gathering unit Cuerpo de Vigilancia in Manila, while at the same time criminalizing Filipino Freemasonry and native political mobilization. While the Katipunan remained hidden, its leaders recognized their precarious position. When the state resorted to a newly established secret police agency that only answered to the governor general and wielded indiscriminate power over suspected enemies of the state, the Katipunan was forced to go deeper underground to evade discovery and capture. Furthermore, no longer able to agitate openly for political separation from Spain, suddenly the Katipunan was left with no other option but to prepare for a revolution.

As the colonial authority fortified its hold on Manila and its environs, the Katipunan was forced to expand its membership to the rural areas by first actively recruiting the provinces' native elites (*principales*), who then attracted more Katipunan members from the rural populations. The shift of active recruitment from Manila to the nearby Tagalog-speaking provinces such as Cavite and Bulacan transformed the secret society into a popular revolutionary movement. As the Katipunan inside Manila continued its cloak-and-dagger tactics to undermine Spanish efforts to uncover its enemies, the Katipunan forces outside the urban areas grew in strength and numbers. Eventually the clandestine operations of the Spanish authorities and the Katipunan culminated in the outbreak of the 1896 revolution.

The conjuncture of Spanish policing and covert surveillance with the formation of the secret revolutionary organization created the essential elements of a clandestine political underworld in Manila that I refer to as the 'dark labyrinth.' This political underworld would become the birthplace of the revolutionary Katipunan. As the colonial state descended into the underworld of espionage, manipulation, and deception in search of

its unknown enemies, so too did their revolutionary antagonists, the Katipunan, to ensure its survival. Drawing from McCoy's view of "an invisible interstice. . . inhabited by criminal and clandestine actors with both the means and the need to operate outside the conventional channels,"[393] this dark labyrinth had, in fact, incubated the Katipunan revolution both by fostering organized subversion and intensified state repression.

Anarchist Bombings and Assassinations in Spain

To better understand the roots of Spanish state paranoia that eventually led to the use of extreme measures to crush oppositions in its colonies, first we need to examine a decidedly dark period in nineteenth-century Spanish history when European societies were being attacked from within. The rise of political and social upheavals across Europe fostered by the emerging nation-states and rapid industrialization, with concomitant rise of an urban working class, had created instability throughout the region. With the decline of traditional institutions such as Church and monarchies, new political and social groups attempted to challenge the modernizing nation-states to either affect change or to overthrow the old order.

Following the pattern across Europe after the 1848 revolution, Spanish authorities suspended all liberal reforms and adopted a more repressive policy to impose order on their remaining colonies. Similarly, after the revolutionary outbreaks in 1848, every metropolitan European state restricted freedom of speech, assembly, and association to check political forces arising from the growth of urbanization and a rapid increase in mass

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[393] Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 48.

politicization.[394] Instead of suppressing dissidence, European repression only succeeded in creating semi-clandestine and clandestine dissident groups that were more radical, with some advocating socialism and anarchism.[395] As these underground groups continued to evade and even taunt authorities, European states institutionalized the use of brutal repression enforced by secret police countermeasures.[396]

When extreme acts of violence escalated in major European cities like Paris, their governments responded in kind. In the early 1890s wave after wave of anarchist bombings terrorized the City of Lights, resulting in "the French. . . [being] the first on the continent to be forced to develop an anti-terrorist/anti-anarchist policy. . . . Domestically, France pursued increasingly ruthless policies of spying on, searching, rounding up, imprisoning, and executing anarchists."[397] Consequently, the French state deported foreign-born anarchists, "without any concern as to whether or not individual anarchists were nationals of the countries to which they were being sent and without any prior notification being given to the authorities of those countries."[398] Britain was able to stop the influx of 'subversives' from France even though no law was in place to bar entry.[399]

Unfortunately, neighboring countries with little political clout like Spain had to absorb these political exiles without prior knowledge that these individuals, many educated

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[394] Robert J. Goldstein, "Restrictions on Freedom of Expression and Organizations" in *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe* (London; Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), 34-79.

[395] R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 50-51.

[396] R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 63-74.

[397] Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878-1934* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 75.

[398] R. B. Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism*, 79.

[399] R. B. Jensen, *The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism*, 113.

and with means, had been forcefully removed from France for their radical activities. As an added consequence, some of those deported found more reasons to exact revenge on governments on behalf of others who suffered the same injustice. With the displacement of these radicals, their struggle widened from the national to the global; and their methods, shifted from disseminating ideas through propaganda to violence through bombing and assassination, actions known to the anarchist circle as 'propaganda by the deed.'

As more and more radicals crossed Spanish borders, anarchist groups across Spain became better organized while the government responded by institutionalizing the use of police and *Guardia Civil* brutality, and torture, against potential enemies of the state.[400] The February 1892 public execution by garrote of four anarchist leaders, who had instigated a peasant workers uprising in the Andalusian town of Jerez de la Frontera a month before,[401] sparked a riot in Barcelona against the Church and the Spanish government. According to *New York Times* report of February 1892, the violence that resulted between the police and rioters in Barcelona forced "the authorities to adopt more stringent measures for the suppression of the lawless characters in this city. All the streets are to-day patroled [sic] by gendarmes, who closely watch every person to whom attaches a suspicion of Anarchistic tendencies."[402] As a result, "Barcelona workers who rose up in defense of the Jerez victims were themselves incarcerated and tortured in Montjuich fortress. Between 1892 and 1893, over twenty thousand Spaniards were held for a

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[400] Temma Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 179-183

[401] Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936* (New York, N.Y: Free Life Editions Inc., 1977), 118-119; Temma Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903*,172-181.

[402] "Garrote for Anarchists," *The New York Times* (February 11, 1892).

considerable time under preventive arrest."[403] Instead of crushing subversion in Barcelona, the wholesale use of state terror against its citizens only inflamed desire for long-term retribution through violent defiance by individual anarchists, both Spanish and foreign-born.[404]

By the late nineteenth century, the most reactionary and repressive among the European states was Spain. As major cities across Europe experienced an increase in political violence against both the state and general populace, none was more tumultuous than Barcelona, "a city considered by the experienced French police as the most important anarchist center in Europe."[405] Branded as the most radical and revolutionary city in Europe for its numerous anarchist bombings and assassinations throughout the 1890s, Barcelona was known in the anarchist world as the "Rose of Fire" (*'La Rosa de Fuego/ La Rosa de Foc'*) or "the city of bombs."[406] Led mostly by foreign anarchists, some of these individuals worked autonomously and had no connection to any anarchist movements. Driven by the idea of "propaganda by the deed," these anarchists felt justified in promoting radical political change through acts of violence.[407]

Throughout the 1890s, anarchy thus reigned in Spain. In September 1893, a young

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[403] T. Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903*,184.

[404] Angel Smith, *Anarchism, Revolution and Reaction, Catalan Labour and the Crisis of the Spanish State, 1898-1923* (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 207), 108; T. Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903*,184-185; and, Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, 119-123.

[405] Angel Herrerin Lopez, "Anarchist Sociability in Spain in Times of Violence and Clandestinity," *Bulletin for Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies* Volume 38, Issue 1, Article 9 (2013), 157.

[406] Angel Lopez, "Anarchist Sociability in Spain in Times of Violence and Clandestinity," 158; Oriol Nello, "Urban dynamics, public policies and governance in the metropolitan region of Barcelona," in *Transforming Barcelona: The Renewal of a European Metropolis* edited by Tim Marshall (London: Routledge, 2004), 27. Also see "The Rose of the Fire has returned: The Struggle for the Streets of Barcelona," http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/recentfeatures/rosefire.php (Accessed on March 31, 2016).

[407] R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 169-173.

Andalusian lithographer named Paulí Pallàs exacted justice for the four garroted anarchists by attempting to assassinate the captain general of Catalonia, Arsenio Martinez de Campos, during a military parade in Barcelona. Campos managed to survive the bomb blast that killed his horse, a civil guard, and several civilian bystanders. Pallàs was immediately captured and sent to the military fortress at Montjuich, where he was tried and executed by firing squad in October 1893. Before he was shot, Pallàs' last words were "*La venganza será terrible*."[408]

Indeed, it was one month after the execution of Pallàs, his friend Santiago Salvador bombed the famous Barcelona opera house, *Gran Teatre del Liceu*, killing twenty-two people and injuring fifty audience members.[409] The authorities arbitrarily arrested more than 250 known anarchists, and imprisoned 128 of these individuals in the Montjuich fortress. The prisoners were tortured to extract confession from all of them. The police detained those who eventually confessed under duress on trumped up charges of being accomplices of the anarchist Pallàs, and they were then sentenced to death.[410]

In February 1894, the real perpetrator was finally captured. Santiago Salvador tried to escape torture by first attempting suicide when he was arrested and then by pretending to repent. Salvador's effort did buy him time until his death sentence was carried out a year later. As Salvador "stood on the scaffold, he abandoned his deception and died with

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[408] Robert Hughes, *Barcelona* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993, c1992), 419; Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, 120.

[409] See the November 25, 1893 issue of *Le Petit Journal* for the cover and article on the Liceu bombing in Barcelona. Also refer to Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe* (London & Carberra: Croom Helm; Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983), 294; and, Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, 120.

[410] Michael Fredholm (ed.) "Introduction: Lone Actor and Autonomous Cell Terrorism" in *Understanding Lone Actor Terrorism: Past Experience, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies* (London: Routledge, 2016), [n.p.] and Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, 120.

the cry: *'Viva la anarquia*'."[411]

The November 1893 Liceu bombing only heightened the Spanish state's fear of violence from the urban lower classes led by Spanish and foreign anarchists. State repression worsened in 1895 following the declaration of martial law in Madrid and Barcelona, which was "[b]acked by special legislation passed in July 1894 giving them extraordinary powers to prosecute terrorists, the authorities had some success in curbing the bomb-throwing elements in the anarchist movements."[412] Consequently, there were more mass arrests and summary executions in Barcelona's Montjuich fortress, where all suspected anarchists in Spain and high-profile subversives from the colonies were detained and tortured. As such, many anarchists across Europe such as Italy and France were drawn to Barcelona to protest violently against the oppression of Spanish state and Church. Even though there were also acts of violence perpetuated in other parts of Spain, many were concentrated in Barcelona as well as Madrid. For every act of repression from the state, there was always violent retribution from anarchist groups, or a lone individual, with each side trying to outdo the other.[413]

As the whole of Europe was engulfed in social and political turmoil, Barcelona became the center of violent subversion by both Spanish and foreign anarchist movements to foment a worldwide social revolution. Consequently, the Spanish authorities responded with extreme repression to destroy state enemies. As a countermeasure, the government

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[411] Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, 120.

[412] George Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898* (Berkeley; Los Angeles; Oxford: University of California Press, 1989), 190.

[413] See George Esenwein, "Chapter X: Terrorism and the Anarchist Movement, 1892-1894" and "Chapter XI: The Aftermath of Repression, 1894-1898" in *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class Movement in Spain, 1868-1898*, 166-188, 189-204.

formed a new secret police unit in Barcelona called *Brigada Social* in 1895 for the sole purpose of destroying the anarchist movement by any means necessary.[414] The *Brigada Social* conducted clandestine operations, and condoned the use of 'dirty tricks' by their *agents provocateurs* to infiltrate opposition groups as well as instigate acts of terror against the government and the general public providing pretext for state-sanctioned violence directed towards anarchists, labor unions, masons, and other political opponents.[415]

As anarchists continued to terrorize Spanish cities, the colonial authorities feared that revolutionary terrorism would become manifest in the Spanish colonies. When the Cuban revolution erupted in February 1895, the Spanish government was already anticipating that Manila would be next, thus making it crucial to uncover the native conspiracy before it was too late.

Establishment of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila

With the Guardia Civil Veterana struggling to undertake the surveillance of Manila and its surroundings, the Spanish administration established the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila (Spanish intelligence bureau) under *Inspector Jefe* Federico Moreno in March 1895. For the next two years until July 1897, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia remained an independent administrative unit that reported directly to the Civil Governor of Manila and the Governor General of the colony.

The Cuerpo de Vigilancia was created following the passage of a Spanish metropolitan legislation in 1894 to combat terrorism after an escalation of anarchist

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414 Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 68.

415 See Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936*, 120-121; and Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 69-74.

bombings in urban areas such as Madrid and Barcelona which had then spread rapidly to agricultural regions such as Andalusia.[416] At the same time, the Spanish government also had to contend with the outbreak of the Cuban War of Independence in February 1895. The Spanish-Cuban War (1895-1898) forced Spain to face the possibility of fighting two simultaneous anti-colonial revolts if it failed to uncover any possible native conspiracy brewing within Manila and its environs.

During this same period of terror and repression at home and abroad, Spain's aggressive policies against potential subversive activities were also implemented forcefully in the Philippines because of the rise of Filipino Masonry. Mired in political and social turmoil, both in the metropole and its remaining territories, Spain extended its surveillance system to the colonies as part of its determined effort to retain what was left of its dwindling overseas possessions, requiring, as it did in Manila, native involvement in intelligence gathering at this twilight of the Spanish empire.

Before 2011 when the Cuerpo manuscript collection was finally made available to Philippine scholars,[417] the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila and its intelligence agents

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[416] Robert J. Goldstein, "Terrorism and the Anarchist Movement, 1892-1894," in *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 166-188.

[417] The Philippine government's acquisition of what is now known as the *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* manuscript collection on the centennial of the 1896 revolution should have been the turning point for the study of the Katipunan uprising from a Filipino point of view. Instead, it took almost two decades for majority of Filipino scholars to even know the existence of this rich Cuerpo collection in the Philippines. However, due to the collection's physical and language inaccessibility, many Filipino scholars are deterred from using these manuscripts. The Cuerpo documents are currently in the vault of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts instead in the Philippine National Archives where Spanish colonial documents are usually kept and can be accessed easily. Access to the Cuerpo collection is very limited because scholars are not allowed to handle the actual documents, only their photocopies. For a more comprehensive guide of the *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, see Bernardita Reyes Churchill's edited volume, *The Movement for Independence in the Philippines, 1896-1898: Calendar of Documents in the Archives of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila, volume 2* (Manila: National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 2011).

(*agentes*) were invisible in the conventional narratives of the 1896 revolution. What little information we had about the nature and conduct of Manila's secret police (*policia secreta*) could be cobbled together from disparate sources focused more on the Katipunan than those who tried to repress it. Even the use of the generic term *'policia secreta*' reduced Spain's complex system of colonial policing and intelligence gathering to a mono-dimensional, almost invisible antagonist within collective Filipino memory.

The recently accessible Cuerpo collection offers a wealth of data for a better understanding of the interactions between the colonial rulers and their imperial subjects, within a dark labyrinth in late Spanish Manila that became the main arena for contestation between the dying empire and an emerging nation. As the documents clearly show, the introduction of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia, with its active recruitment of native *agentes* or spies, further complicated the colonial politics in late nineteenth century Philippines.

Indeed, the mere presence of Filipinos who served the colonial state in opposition to the Katipunan movement challenges extant nationalist historiography, rendering the revolution more contingent than inevitable. With the discovery of this documentation, we can now move beyond mere mention of the *policia secreta* to discover that these individuals were indeed important actors within the 1896 revolution whose outcome was far more contested and contingent than once imagined. We can, moreover, now see, how the clandestine context of secret policing and urban underground left a deep imprint on the Katipunan, allowing a fuller history of this important organization.

So, who were these native *agentes* and why did they join the Cuerpo de Vigilancia? Unlike the Filipino natives who joined the colonial army, Guardia Civil, or the Vetarana

with the promise of financial security and social mobility,[418] those who opted to become Cuerpo *agentes* were required to submit documentation indicating strong political motivation and loyalty to Spain.

The rich information found in the Cuerpo documents reveals the multiplicity of forces influencing the decision of would-be agents, both creoles and natives, to get involved in colonial surveillance. There was the obvious attraction of social mobility and 250 pesos per annum for a second-class *agente* compared to an average annual wage for a native Veterana at less than 100 pesos.[419] There were also other possible motivations, such as exemption from persecution at the time when the colonial state was targeting native elites and suspected Filipino Masons, exacting retribution for any sign of subversion.

In an effort to attract diverse native recruits, the Cuerpo's recruitment was open to all adult males, whether or not they had served in the colonial army or Guardia Civil. Indeed, to be eligible all applicants must have no connection with the military or police at the time of their appointment, meaning they were required to retire from their military service before entering the Cuerpo de Vigilancia. These requirements did not discourage Filipino participation. Out of the forty-five men of the newly-formed Cuerpo unit, thirty-two second-class agents were either mestizos or *indio naturales*.[420]

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[418] Berriz (1890), 293-294. Cited by Bankroff, 144.

[419] "Report of Lt. General commanding the Army," in *Elihu Root Collection of United States documents relating the Philippine Islands, Vol 14* compiled by Elihu Root (Government Printing Office, 1901), 471. For *Veterana* police and agent wages, see Bankoff's *Crime, Society, and the State in the Nineteenth-century Philippines*, pp. 145-146.

[420] Two-page list of names of *Cuerpo* agents as well as information about their professions and assignments, (n.d.), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-9, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

Close analysis of early roster of native agents from the Cuerpo de Vigilancia collection reveals diverse social backgrounds.[421] Indeed, these personnel dossiers show that its native recruits came from three broad levels of colonial society – elite-, middle- and lower-strata. The success of the Spanish surveillance operation depended heavily on the ability of the Cuerpo *agentes* to infiltrate all kinds of dissident groups and uncover conspiracies against the colonial regime. Therefore, it was imperative that native agents were drawn from various social groups so that they could easily blend in.

Contrary to common misconception, the native informants were not predominantly elite members of Philippine society. While there were a few wealthy native *agentes* such as Don Antonio Cabangis of Tondo, the middle elemnt of society was more heavily represented, as indicated by the occupations (*oficios*) of the second-class agents. Almost half were in the military service (*servicios*); three were clerks (*escribientes*) such as Toribio Gatbonton; two were assistants (*asistentes*), including an assistant to the governor-general; one telephone operator (*telefonista*); and the office administrator (*mayordomo*) of the civil governor.[422] On the other hand, there were also Cuerpo *agentes* drawn from the lower social stratum such as Ramon Tolentino who was a day worker (*jornalero*), and a young servant (*serviente*) from the Laguna province named Florencio Bande.[423]

While majority of the Filipinos who joined the Cuerpo came from the lower social strata, there were few from wealthy Filipino families, notably Don Antonio Cabangis who

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[421] Two-page list of names of *Cuerpo* agents as well as information about their professions and assignments, (n.d.), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-9, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[422] Two-page list of names of *Cuerpo* agents as well as information about their professions and assignments, (n.d.), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-9, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[423] *Expedientes personal de* Ramon Tolentino, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12232 - Bundle T (1896-1897); *Expedientes personal de* Florencio Bande, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia*, SD# 12230 - Bundle B (1875-1898), Philippine National Archives.

belonged to a prominent land-owning family of Tondo. Born in 1861, Antonio was the oldest son of Don Pedro Cabangis and Cristeta S. Andres. His youngest brother was Tomas Cabangis, a medical student studying in Barcelona who boarded with Jose Rizal when the latter first arrived in Spain in 1882.[424] When the Cuerpo began its recruitment, Cabangis was one of the first to apply for the position of second-class intelligence agent and remained in that position until the end of the Spanish regime in 1898. Cabangis' reputation as a ruthless native agent was so well-known that even a Cuerpo *Inspector*, Manuel Garcia, commented in his report that Cabangis was the "most hated" *agente*, the subject of plots to harm him.[425]

In his November 1897 intelligence report Cabangis claimed that he had been targeted for abduction. When he and his family went to the theater along *Calle* Rosario in Binondo, a carriage driver kept following them and enticing them to ride his *quilez*[426] (one horse-drawn four-seater carriage) until they reached their destination.[427] Aware of the disappearance of his fellow *agentes*, Cabangis became so alarmed for his family's safety that he alerted his superiors.[428] Given that Cabangis survived his three-year service as a

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[424] No. 15 - Letter of Rizal to his family dated 23 June 1882 in *Letters between Rizal and Family Members, Volume II, Book One* (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1964), 20-28.

[425] Inspector Manuel Garcia's intelligence report (Manila, January 28, 1898), Manuscrito B-16, *Informé* # 17, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts. Also see Don Antonio Cabangis' intelligence reports (dated October 29, 1897 to April 30, 1898) for mentions of attempts in his life and his fellow agents, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, NCCA.

[426] Michael D. Pante referred to the *quilez* as "the 'middle class' of carriages" in his article "The *Cocheros* of American-occupied Manila: Representations and Persistence," *Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints* 60, no. 4 (2012), 431.

[427] Don Antonio Cabangis' intelligence report (Manila, November 2, 1897), Manuscrito B-26, *Informé* # 4, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[428] See the surveillance reports of second-class agent Don Antonio Cabangis from October 29, 1897 to April 30, 1898. Many entries refer to his fellow native agents who had suddenly gone missing or had been known

Cuerpo *agente*, the Veterana would likely have provided him the necessary protection once the Cuerpo de Vigilancia was transferred under its jurisdiction in 1897.

It is also important to note that Cabangis' service record with the Cuerpo de Vigilancia was exemplary enough that he was not immediately placed under suspicion, or even detained after his younger brother Tomas joined the revolutionary movement. In fact, Cabangis even indicated in one of his reports that his own brother was a rebel.[429] Tomas' name and his activities also appeared in other native agents' reports. Possibly, Cabangis himself was passing information about Tomas' whereabouts to prove that his loyalty was beyond reproach.[430]

After his discharge from the Cuerpo in 1898, Cabangis and his family remained influential in Tondo. In fact, during the American period his family was involved in several litigation cases pertaining to land disputes and tenants' unpaid rents in *sitio Bancusay*, a fishing village in Tondo. This tract of land in the island of Balot near Gagalangin district of Tondo had long been a contested property between the Cabangis family and the City of Manila.[431] Today, it is a residential area separate from Tondo district known as Cabangis.

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to be abducted. *Manuscrito* B-26, "Agente Don Antonio Cabangis," *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[429] Don Antonio Cabangis' intelligence report (Manila, December 6, 1897), *Manuscrito* B-26, *Informé* # 14, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[430] Don Victoriano Pimentel's intelligence report (Manila, June 10, 1898), *Manuscrito* B-23, *Informé* # 19, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[431] G. R. No. L-28379, "Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Consorcia Cabangis *et al*" (March 27, 1929), The LawPhil Project, Arellano Law Foundation, Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence Databank website - http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1929/mar1929/gr_l-28379_1929.html (Accessed on March 1, 2015); and G. R. No. L-3898, "The City of Manila vs. Tomas Cabangis" (February 18, 1908), The LawPhil Project - http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1908/feb1908/gr_l-3898_1908.html (Accessed on March 1, 2015).

On the other hand, many new native recruits joined the Cuerpo de Vigilancia could be categorized from the middle strata of society. Those who joined earlier included several clerks (*escribientes*) such as Felipe Arrista and Don Mateo Alas, although the latter was also the town mayor (*gobernadorcillo*) of Binondo. Others included several students (*estudiantes*) such as Ignacio Aguinaldo y Aguinaldo; a mechanic (*mecanico*) Isidro Aguirre; a carpenter (*carpintero*) Bibiano Jose; and numerous individuals who served in the colonial army and Guardia Civil.[432] These native recruits were more likely enticed by the privileges that the Cuerpo *agente* position commanded, such as acquiring the honorific title '*Don*' previously reserved for natives who were either local officials such as *gobernadocillos*/*capitan municipal* and *cabezas de barangay*, the indigenous elites that comprised the *principalia*.

By joining this intelligence unit that had direct access to the governor-general and the civil governor of Manila, some Filipinos had the possibility for further career advancement and social mobility. At the same time, being part of this elite group also made one privy to confidential information about colonial state counter-measures against native subversion, useful for survival during a time of capricious repression. As for those Filipinos who already held mid-level official positions within the colonial bureaucracy, it is reasonable to assume that they considered the Cuerpo as a step to furthering their political careers. Since Filipinos were not allowed to take on government positions higher than *gobernadorcillo*, then perhaps, if they proved themselves to be loyal colonial subjects, Spain might grant them higher distinction or a title. While it is easy to dismiss such

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[432] *Expedientes personales*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12230 – Bundle A (1869-1896); *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12231 – Bundle A (1895-1897), Philippine National Archives.

expectations as vanity, it is also plausible that these individual would consider these rewards as validation for their dedication, manifest, in several documented cases, by long years of loyal service to the Spanish colonial state.

The life and career of Don Mateo Alas, who joined the Cuerpo de Vigilancia in 1895, reveals the professional profile of a man who had risen through the ranks after years of hard work to middle status in colonial society. Born a Spanish *mestizo* in Binondo, Alas served the Spanish colonial army for eight years until he was promoted to first corporal (*cabo primero*) with the 72nd Visayan Provincial Regiment. During his eight years of military service (1885-1892), Alas was assigned to remote areas such as Capiz, Sarangani, Cotabato, and Zamboanga. After being discharged in 1892, he eventually returned to Manila where he settled in his hometown, working as an *escribiente* while serving as *gobernadorcillo* of the commercial district of Binondo. When the Cuerpo de Vigilancia began its recruitment in 1895, Alas joined immediately.[433]

Apart from local officials and professionals, many native recruits such as Francisco Arocha had long and distinguished careers with the colonial army or the Guardia Civil prior to joining the Cuerpo de Vigilancia. Born in December 1858 in Zamboanga province, Francisco Antonio Arocha volunteered at the age of 21 to join the *Regimento no. 2* of the Guardia Civil in March 1879 and was sent to Manila for training. Afterwards, he returned to Zamboanga in 1880 before heading to Cotabato. Just a year later, Arocha was awarded the Cross of Military Merit with white distinction ("*la Cruz blanco sencilla del Merito Militar*") for distinguished military service in the Guardia Civil. In just five years,

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[433] *Expedientes personal de* D. Mateo Alas, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12230 – Bundle A (1869-1898), Philippine National Archives.

Arocha had quickly risen through the ranks to first corporal (*cabo primero*). In 1884, he was transferred to Luzon where he served in the province of Batangas until 1887. When Arocha joined the Cuerpo in 1895 or 1896, he was a bachelor living in Manila's Quiapo district and working as a watchman (*celador*).[434]

Even though majority of native recruits came from the middle strata, there were also several Cuerpo agents who belonged to the lower social stratum such as day workers (*jornaleros*) and domestic servants (*servientes*). Despite their lack of wealth and social status, these people were invaluable through their employment that afforded them easy access to targeted individuals. One such individual was Ramon Tolentino y Cruz, a Binondo native and a resident of San Fernando de Dilao. He was a day worker (*jornalero*) when he joined the Cuerpo in August 1895.[435] Another Cuerpo *agente* from the lower stratum was 19 year-old Florencio Bande. He was a native of the town of Pila in Laguna province who worked as a servant (*serviente*) in Manila.[436]

Given the importance of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia in protecting colonial dominion in the Philippines, one might imagine the recruitment process to be rigorous and selective. Unlike the uniformed duty in Guardia Civil and the Guardia Civil Veterana, being able to blend in with the target communities was necessary qualification of Cuerpo applicants if they were to become effective *agentes*. For this reason, preferred native applicants were

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[434] *Expedientes personal de* Francisco Antonio Arocha, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12230 – Bundle A (1869-1898), Philippine National Archives.

[435] *Expedientes personal de* Ramon Tolentino y Cruz, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12232 – Bundle T (1896-1897), Philippine National Archives.

[436] *Expedientes personal de* Florencio Bande, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12230 – Bundle B (1875-1898), Philippine National Archives.

long-standing Manila residents, or those who had strong city connections through work, school, or other social associations.[437]

However, the quality and commitment of its agents indicates the recruitment process was conducted poorly. While there were native agents who remained with the Cuerpo until 1898, there were also numerous instances when the Cuerpo had to purge its undesirable members for either incompetence, or treason as a double agent.

Since the applicant's eligibility was not based on skills or even aptitude for intelligence-gathering, the Cuerpo had to often replace some of its agents because of unsuitability. In his April 1897 report to Manila Civil Governor Manuel Luengo, Cuerpo chief Moreno recommended that Teodoro Patiño be fired because he lacked the necessary intelligence and drive to be an effective agent.[438] Moreover, Patiño's excessive drinking as well as his incorrigible behavior had caused problems with his fellow agents.[439] It is ironic that the same Patiño, who achieved notoriety for exposing the Katipunan in August 1896, would eventually be rejected by the Cuerpo de Vigilancia. Without Patiño's revelation to his younger sister Honoria, the Cuerpo and the colonial state would never have discovered the existence of the Katipunan until it decided to surface through armed resistance.[440]

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[437] For more details about Cuerpo second-class agent eligibility, see the 37-page dossier on the creation of the *Cuerpo de Vigilancia*, Document # 1 (Manila, March1, 1895), Manuscrito A-9, *Cuerpo de Vigiliancia* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[438] Report of *Inspector Jefe* Federico Moreno to Civil Governor of Manila dated April 4, 1897, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD# 12232 – Bundle T (1896-1897), Philippine National Archives.

[439] Report of *Inspector Jefe* Federico Moreno to Civil Governor of Manila dated April 4, 1897, *Manuscrito* A-7, *Documento* # 37, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, NCCA.

[440] For a historiographical analysis of different accounts on the discovery of the Katipunan, see Gregorio F. Zaide, "Chapter VII: Conflicting Versions of the K.K.K. discovery" in *History of the Katipunan* (Manila: Loyola Press, 1939), 69-87. Also Zaide offered his own interpretation refuting other historical accounts of the discovery in his chapter "True Story of the Discovery: New Revelations" in *History of the Katipunan*, 88-102. According to Zaide, he accused historians for being gullible for believing the lies of the Augustinian

Aside from incompetence, other agents were relieved of their duties because they were found to be gathering intelligence for the Katipunan. It is clear that even though the Cuerpo was designed to be a small independent intelligence unit to ensure internal security, the original recruitment and selection process was soon proven inadequate.

While the Cuerpo was conscientious in accepting native recruits from various social backgrounds, the fact that most of its recruits belonged in the middle strata clearly identifies this as the main target group of the Spanish surveillance apparatus. Since the 1872 Cavite uprising, the colonial regime had been obsessed with its fear of the wealthy and educated Filipinos orchestrating an uprising against Spain. This obsession, in turn, had blinded the colonial state to other possible sources of subversion, resulting in its failure to recognize its true enemies until it was too late.

Hunting down the *filibusteros*

In the eyes of the Spanish authorities, anarchists, and masons were one and the same.[441] So when colonial government began hunting down potential enemies of the state, the Filipino masons were the main targets. When rumors of possible rebellion brewing in Manila started to spread in January 1895, the Spanish immediately assumed that the Masonry was preparing to destroy the government and Church through armed revolution. In his letter to Del Pilar dated January 22, 1895, fellow Mason and propagandist Apolinario Mabini was worried that:

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friar, Mariano Gil, who insisted that Teodoro Patiño made a confession to him about the Katipunan revolutionary plot. Zaide argued that Patiño's sister Honoria was the one who revealed the existence of the Katipunan to the Madre Portera (portress of the Augustinian Orphanage of Mandaluyong), thus it was Honoria not Teodoro Patiño who betrayed the Katipunan.

[441] Susana Cuartero Escobes, "Spanish Masonry in the Philippines," in *Unknown Aspects of the Philippine Revolution* edited by Jose Arcilla, S. J. (Makati, Philippines: St. Pauls, 2006), 24.

> [r]umors of an approaching rebellion are starting again to circulate here [Manila] and the government is trying to forestall it by giving secret orders to the police to raid any meeting of the Freemasons and arrest the people they come upon as if they were gamblers. For this reason, the workshops here, which will never be found guilty of audacity because they have learned enough prudence, have suspended their work to avoid criminal complaint for unlawful assembly. In truth, I do not know how Freemasonry, being a lawful association in Spain, could be unlawful in the Philippines, where it is practiced exactly as Spanish Freemasonry.[442]

Consequently, numerous individuals in Manila and surrounding areas were put under surveillance and even "arrested on the mere suspicion that they were Masons" under the pretext that they were engaging in illegal gambling.[443] As paranoia and panic reached fever pitch among the Spanish colony, the colonial state, with the insistent demands from the Church, responded with force against its perceived enemy in its futile effort to restore order.[444] This attempt was a major miscalculation on the part of the authorities because it forced those who might have remained ambivalent towards this whole affair, both Filipino and Spanish Masons, to consider greater involvement.

Instead of containing the threat of rebellion, the Spanish colonial state only made it worse by going after anyone it deemed a threat to the *status quo*. Consequently, the persecutions did not stop with the campaigns against the Masonry. The Church pushed the government to include those who were involved in the early anti-friar and reform movements across the Tagalog region, particularly in Manila and Bulacan where Del Pilar exerted influence. All Filipino liberal elites who were unjustly linked to the 1872 Cavite Mutiny were the first on the list of people of interest for both the Veterana's secret police

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[442] Letter of Apolinario Mabini to Marcelo del Pilar, dated 22 January 1895, in *The Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, compiled and translated by National Heroes Commission (Manila: National Heroes Commission, 1965), 25.

[443] Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 172.

[444] T. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 139-140; and T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 117.

and then later, for the Cuerpo agents. Moreover, the former *gobernadorcillos* of Manila who were involved in the March 1888 demonstration to expel the friars were immediately identified as possible subversives (*filibusteros*) and placed under surveillance by the Veterana's secret police.[445]

Simultaneously in March 1895 during an effort to suppress subversion in the Bulacan town of Malolos, known as the 'Mecca of the dissidents', the friar curate filed an administrative complaint with the central government against municipal officials for refusing to pay for a thanksgiving mass, propagating acts against the Church, and allowing "the existence of a Masonic lodge (*Kupang*) in the town."[446] To convince the Archbishop of Manila of the immediate threat posed by the Malolos municipal officials, the friar curate denounced all of them as Masons and, therefore, should not be allowed to govern Malolos. Fray Moises Santos added in his *denuncio*: "[The Malolos tribunal c]omposed in the majority of individuals who my conscience tells me belong to a Masonic lodge; I state this although it is difficult to prove categorically, [because] it is seen in the effects they create, in the works of propaganda, in the way said individuals comport themselves and in the confidences brought to the attention of the parish priest."[447] In his communication to Governor-General Ramon Blanco, Archbishop Bernardino Nozaleda insisted that he should eliminate such associations because they aimed "to trample upon all religious and

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[445] See *Seccion de la Guardia Civil Veterana, Apuntes sobre la organización y desarrollo de la insurrección filipina 1896*, Manuscrito A-2, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* collection, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[446] N. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 89; T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 120.

[447] *Masoneria (1859-1897)*, SDS 14451, S-127, S134b, Philippine National Archives. Cited by N. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 87.

political discipline, spreading everywhere the spirit of revolution."[448]

Fearing a possible uprising in Malolos led by its prominent residents, the governor-general ordered the arrest and deportation of all municipal officials including Del Pilar's relatives – including town mayor (*capitan municipal*) Manuel Crisostomo, municipal secretary (*directorcillo*) Juan Pilar, delegate (*delegado*) Vicente Gatmaytan, and prosecutor (*procurador*) Luis H. Del Pilar from Bulacan, Bulacan.[449] These arrests were celebrated as Spanish triumph over liberalism and Masonry because these individuals were active members of Del Pilar's Comité de Propaganda. In his article on the Malolos arrests, Spanish writer Wenceslao E. Retana claimed that, "since then [the exile of Malolos municipal officials], not a fly moves in the famous town of Malolos. Peace has been restored."[450]

This claim was, of course, far from the truth. Contrary to Retana's report, the town of Malolos became radicalized after the deportation of the Malolos officials and the closure of *Logia Kupang*, as more prominent family members and other townspeople joined the local Katipunan chapters. Moreover, family members of the deportees were prominent among those who later established branches of the Katipunan across the Bulacan province.[451]

Throughout the nineteenth century, the colonial government responded to the

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[448] T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 120.

[449] Letter of Apolinario Mabini to Marcelo del Pilar, dated 27 May 1895, in *The Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 32-33; N. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 89; Corpuz and Lalic (eds.), *Ang Malulos: Sa mga dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 55-56.

[450] W. E. Retana, "*Lo de Malolos*," *La Politica de Espana en Filipinas* 5, no. 119 (August 27, 1895), 217-219; Cited by N. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 90.

[451] Corpuz and Lalic (eds.), *Ang Malulos: Sa mga dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 56-58.

threats of radical changes – whether the peaceful political campaigns of Spanish creoles in 1820s[452] or the violent 1872 Cavite mutiny – by suppressing the elites through imprisonment or banishment. Each time, a different group emerged with its own agenda to challenge Spanish dominion. Meanwhile, the colonial state continued to pursue the native elites on the assumption that they were determined to oust Spanish rule through armed revolution. As much as the native elites had to gain if they succeeded, they also had a great deal more to lose if they failed. Even though they wanted political reforms, native elites still maintained some kind of *modus vivendi* with the Spanish state to protect their privileged status.

Nonetheless, their combined liberal education, wealth and connection with the Masonry only made these Filipino elites appear more formidable and therefore, posed greater threat to the Church and the more reactionary Spanish administration in the Philippines. Having endured the humiliation of being stripped of their privilege, prestige, and wealth in Spain, the religious orders in the Philippines were determined to stop the spread of liberalism and anticlericalism by destroying their main antagonist, Masonry. At the same time, the government had "declared the [Masonic] lodges to be separatist societies and Masons enemies of the law and state."[453] Though all these diverse circumstances, the colonial government under Governor-General Blanco and the Catholic Church under Archbishop Nozaleda waged war against Filipino Masonry, in accordance with the orders of the *Ministro de Ultramar* (Minister of Colonies) Tomas Castellano from

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[452] Ruth de Llobet, "Orphans of Empire: Bourbon Reforms, Constitutional Impasse, and the Rise of the Filipino Creole Consciousness in an Age of Revolution" (Ph.D dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011).

[453] T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 117.

Madrid.

As this repression heightened in April 1895, Minister Castellano sent Governor Blanco a telegram instructing that the Spanish Masonry was not to be targeted or harassed by the government or Church: "Alarm is felt here [in Spain] about a separatist movement carried on in that archipelago by means of Masonic propaganda, which excludes Spaniards and is being directed exclusively by natives. . . . **should there be any grounds for said alarm, please carry your vigilance to the extreme** [emphasis mine] and give the necessary instructions to provincial governors."[454] Since Spaniards were not persecuted for being Masons, they were able to offer assistance and some protections to their Filipino Masonic brothers. Some Spanish Masons continued the work of the lodges while others, including the politico-military governor of Mindoro, criticized the religious orders' zeal to crush Filipino Masonry.[455]

As the campaign against Masonry intensified, Governor Blanco received a Royal Decree on July 2, 1896 ordering him "to take the most severe measures in the capital of that archipelago, where probably most of the members of Masonry as well as the High Hierarchies and important leaders of that infamous sect, also the most clever and shrewdest conspirators, all of them responsible for the evils were are trying to correct, have their residence."[456] Moreover, for the first time this royal decree invoked the full force of law to ban Masonry in the Spanish colonies. According to the text of that decree, Masonry was

> by the mere fact of being secret. . . [therefore considered] harmful in every state

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[454] Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 122,

[455] Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 123-124.

[456] Article no. 7, Royal Decree (July 1896), cited by T. M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 232; The articles of the Royal Decree are included as endnotes of "Chapter V: Persecution and Depression".

> and the source of insidious evil in a territory like the Philippines. . . It is, therefore, absolutely necessary and most advisable to prosecute with diligence and constancy the campaign so wisely and effectively started by Our Excellency, until the evil is rooted out or at least until those who still persist in that wicked enterprise, in the face of all measures heretofore taken, are made powerless and harmless.[457]

The reign of terror against Filipino Masonry only intensified as house searches and raids on Masonic meetings, followed by mass arrests of suspects, became more frequent. However, not everyone in the Spanish community advocated the repression of Filipino Masons. There were some Spanish officials assigned to persecute them who undermined the colonial efforts of suppression. These officials warned the Masons of possible raids or provided alibis for the assemblies being held in someone's house "either because they were Masons themselves or because their sympathies were with the [Masonic] Order or because they recognized the injustice that was being done."[458]

In the January 1938 issue of *The Cabletow*, the official organ of Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons in the Philippine Islands, managing editor Leo Fischer referred one such incident. Spanish Mason and civil servant Victoriano R. Onrubia, recalled an anecdote involving Spaniards caught in one of the secret police raids in the Manila district of San Nicolas:

> The meeting was held in the upper story of a long building located in the corner of Calle San Fernando and Plaza del Conde, with clothing stores on the ground floor. An officer of the Spanish Navy was about to be raised [to a higher Masonic status] and the admiral had come to witness the ceremony. The police had been tipped off that Masons were meeting in the building and there was a raid. As customary, arrangements had been made beforehand to get all incriminating evidence out of the way, and the admiral faced the police and told them that the assemblage was there for lawful purposes and that he vouched for all. But after the police had left, he warned the Brethren to choose another meeting place as he might not be able to

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[457] Cited by R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 180-181.

[458] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 155.

do anything for them if they should be again raided by the police.[459]

As the colonial Church and state continued with their relentless attack against the Filipino Masonry, Governor Blanco, himself a Spanish Mason,[460] nonetheless implemented Spain's official orders to crush Filipino Masonry for fear of an armed rebellion. Prior to 1895, Blanco's effort to ignore friars' warnings of subversive Masonic affairs had shielded members from religious attacks.[461] However, the persistence of rumors about a separatist movement in Manila finally forced Blanco to take drastic measures to placate growing discontent among the Spanish community, exacerbated by Jose Marti's armed revolution in Cuba.[462] If the Philippine archipelago suddenly succumbed to separatism, Spain's resources would not be able to sustain its military campaigns on both fronts. Repression was the only way for the liberal administration under Blanco to prevent this impossible circumstance. Ironically, the same approach that the government adopted to suppress an armed rebellion would only serve to inflame it.

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[459] Leo Fischer, "Places of Masonic Interest in and Near Manila," *Far Eastern Freemason* (January 1938). Cited by R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 156-157.

[460] In his biography of Rizal, *Vida y Escritos del Dr. Jose Rizal* (Madrid: V. Suarez, 1907), 301, Retana wrote about Blanco: "It was said about him that in his youth he had been a mason." Also in his footnote no. 379, he added "Inaccurate: Blano (sic) was never a mason; so he affirmed to whom is writting (sic) these lines.- See booklet of D. Nicolas M. Serrano, *Dos palabras de justicia debidas al General Blanco.* Madrid, 1897"

Also see Rafael Palma's book on Rizal, *Pride of the Malay Race*: A Biography of Jose Rizal, Translated to English by Roman Ozaeta (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1949), 258**.** Palma wrote "Blanco was always undecided, even though he was a **freemason,** who had been asked by a Manila lodge to place Rizal at liberty and and permit him to to go abroad.**"**

Another reference to Blanco being a mason is "The Trip to Cuba that ended in Luneta" by VW Bro. Bernardino L. Saplaco Jr. (Past Grand Pursuivant) published in Masonic magazine *The Cable Tow* vol. 73, no. 5.

[461] T. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 139.

[462] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 163-164; Letter of Apolinario Mabini to Marcelo del Pilar, dated 22 January 1895, in *The Letters of Apolinario Mabini*, 25.

The intelligence gathered by the secret police force across Manila and its surrounding areas was used to persecute a number of individuals accused of the seditious spread of Masonic and liberal propaganda. But, preoccupied with campaign against the Masonry, neither the government nor the colonial Church considered the possibility of another secret movement with actual revolutionary tendencies. Even though the government officials had learned the Katipunan was a separate organization, they mistakenly identified it as a Masonic affiliate. In his July 5, 1896 confidential account to the Civil Governor of Manila, Guardia Civil Lieutenant Manuel Sityar reported that:

> individuals from the capital and the neighboring towns of the province, especially Mandaloyon [sic] and San Juan Del Monte, were enlisting men for an unknown purpose, making those who joined sign, with their own blood taken from a small wound in one arm, a pledge not to reveal the aim and purpose of the association or designs, under oath and warning that he who would betray the secret would pay for such act with his life.[463]

As Kalaw points out, "the error of the government consisted in indiscriminately confusing Masonry with insurrection. By that time the spirit of rebellion had permeated the masses, especially in the Tagalog provinces, due to the abuses and persecutions of the government."[464] In other words, the colonial state's repression contributed to the rise of the Katipunan-led revolution and the end of the Spanish rule in the Philippines.

The reactionary response of the Church and state only further exacerbated the already volatile situation in the colony. Most importantly, the repression exposed the Spanish regime's incompetence in addressing the social turmoil that enveloped Manila and

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[463] Manuel Sityar's report to Civil Governor of Manila dated 5 July 1896, from W. E. Retana, "*Documentos Politicos de Actualidad*" in *Archivo del Bibliofilo Filipino*, Vol. 3 (Madrid, 1897), 79-84; Cited by T. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 141.

[464] T. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry*, 117.

its surroundings during the 1880s and 1890s.[465] So engrossed were the colonial state and Church authorities in their campaign against the Masonry and the native elites that they never suspected the existence of the Katipunan until it was exposed in August 1896.[466]

From secret society to revolutionary movement

The year 1895 was the turning point for the Katipunan because it marked the period when the urban-based secret society underwent radical transformation into a more popular revolutionary movement. As repression mounted inside Manila, it was becoming more dangerous for the Katipunan to conduct its clandestine activities within the city. Their only options were to go deeper underground in the capital and simultaneously, expand the Katipunan's membership in the surrounding Tagalog provinces. To achieve the latter, Bonifacio had to rely on the active participation of the municipal elites (*principales*) to recruit new Katipunan members from their respective provinces.

In examining the spread of the Katipunan in the Tagalog provinces such as Cavite and Bulacan, it is important to note the *principales*' role in attracting rural people to join the Katipunan. Using the same strategy that he had earlier used for recruitment in Manila, Bonifacio relied on the *principales*' extensive social networks to draw in more members. The influential positions of the municipal elites in the provinces allowed them more freedom to conduct Katipunan business because they basically controlled the municipalities and towns.

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[465] Alfred W. McCoy, "Capillaries of Empire - Spanish Imprint," in *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 29-33.

[466] R. Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 163; Susana Escobes, "Spanish Masonry in the Philippines," in *Unknown Aspects of the Philippine Revolution*, 24-25.

Such active recruitment in the rural areas did not begin until 1895. Even though there were several members of the Katipunan who were municipal officials (*principales*) such as Mariano Alvarez of Noveleta, Cavite Province, and Mariano Crisostomo from Malolos, Bulacan Province, had joined earlier, they only recruited within their family. One possible explanation was that there was no immediate need to expand Katipunan membership to the countryside, where it could be more difficult to maintain its secrecy. Prior to 1895, keeping the Katipunan a secret was still a priority that was why membership was closely guarded. The decision to recruit more actively from the provinces could be attributed to the change in circumstances that forced the Katipunan to expand in the rural areas, and forgo the slow and tedious process of the *hasik* system.

With the introduction of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia in March 1895 and the concentration of state repression in Manila and its suburbs, the Katipunan needed to expand beyond the urban areas. The January 1895 implementation of the liberal Maura Law,[467] that gave more autonomy to native local governments outside of Manila as well as the re-organization of municipal jurisdictions in the provinces, made it possible for the *principales* to wield more influence and control over their own local affairs.

Coincidentally, the Katipunan also underwent reorganization in January 1895 with the election of the Third Supreme Council. For the first time since the establishment of the secret organization, Bonifacio assumed the position of its president and took the honorary title of *Supremo* (leader).[468] From then on, Bonifacio would lead the Katipunan until the outbreak of the revolution. Once Bonifacio took over the Katipunan in 1895, there was a

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[467] The Maura Law was promulgated on May 19, 1893 but took two years to be implemented n the Philippines. See Benitez, 267.

[468] G. Zaide, *History of the Katipunan*, 4-5.

sudden shift in the recruitment process as well as the point of operation for the secret society.

By 1895 as well, Bonifacio was actively recruiting newly elected municipal elites who were not aware of the Katipunan. In Cavite El Viejo, the largest town in Cavite Province, Bonifacio needed to recruit its *principales*, particularly the one who held the highest local office. In January 1895, the town of Cavite El Viejo elected its new *capitan municipal* Emilio Aguinaldo, a member of prominent local landholding family. Aguinaldo's father, Carlos Aguinaldo y Jamir, and his brother Crispulo both held the position of *gobernadorcillo*, the term used for 'town mayor' position before the Maura Law changed it to *capitan municipal*.

The task of recruiting Aguinaldo to the Katipunan was assigned to Santiago Alvarez, who was both Bonifacio's relative by marriage (cousin of his wife Gregoria de Jesus) and a good friend of Aguinaldo. Alvarez also belonged to a prominent family in the nearby Cavite town of Noveleta. His father, Mariano Alvarez, was the *gobernadorcillo* of the town from 1881 to 1896 as well as an early member of the Katipunan. On March 7, 1895 Aguinaldo was initiated into the Katipunan with Bonifacio presiding over the ceremony and Alvarez as his sponsor to the Katipunan.[469]

When Aguinaldo returned to his hometown, he established a local Katipunan

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[469] "Emilio Aguinaldo, 1869-1964" in *Mga Pilipino ng Kasaysayan*, Vol. I, compiled by the National Historical Institute (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2008), 36; O. D. Corpuz, 214; Augusto V. De Viana, The Philippines: A Story of a Nation (Manila: REX Bookstore, 2011), 166. However, according to Santiago Alvarez, Aguinaldo joined the Katipunan in March 1896. According to L. Fernandez, the year Aguinaldo joined was 1894. See Leandro Fernandez, A Brief History of the Philippines, Revised edition with 1950 Supplement (Boston; New York; Chicago: Ginn and Company, 1951, c1919), 250.

Also a membership receipt of Aguinaldo from the Archivo Militar indicated the date March 1896. However, it could also be possible that this was a membership renewal receipt. Document posted by Jim Richardson on his Facebook page (Accessed on August 26, 2016).

chapter called *Sangguniang Magdalo* in June 1895[470], and immediately recruited his relatives and friends, notably a cousin, Baldomero Aguinaldo, who became chapter president. Baldomero Aguinaldo also held various positions in the municipal office under his cousin. At various points, Baldomero served as municipal secretary (*directorcillo*), registrar of deeds (*registrador de titulos*), and justice of peace (*juez de paz*).[471] In addition, Emilio Aguinaldo also recruited fellow municipal officials in Cavite El Viejo like councilmen (*delegados*) Candido Tria Tirona and Santiago Daño.[472] Tirona and Daño, in turn, encouraged their next of kin and close friends to join the Katipunan.

Through the *Katipuneros*' control of the municipal halls (*casas tribunales*) of Cavite El Viejo and Noveleta, both Aguinaldo and Alvarez were able to conduct their Katipunan affairs at their respective workplaces, in broad daylight. Unlike the usual secretive methods of both the Masons and the Katipunan in Manila, "Aguinaldo had the audacity to initiate new Masons and Katipuneros right inside the municipal tribunal under the very noses of the parish priest and the Guardia Civil. . . . One afternoon while an initiation ceremony was going on, the parish priest, who was in a nearby store, inquired of Aguinaldo why there were so many people in the tribunal. Aguinaldo's quick reply was that the men were caught gambling."[473] As both a Mason and *Katipunero*, Aguinaldo made sure that he recruited for both organizations. According to Aguinaldo: "We were able to

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[470] Arturo E. Valenzuela, *Dr. Pio Valenzuela and the Katipunan* (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1992), 4.

[471] "Baldomero Aguinaldo, 1869-1915" in *Mga Pilipino ng Kasaysayan*, Vol. I, compiled by the National Historical Institute (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2008), 32.

[472] "Candido Tiron, 1862-1896" in *Mga Pilipino ng Kasaysayan*, Vol. I, compiled by the National Historical Institute (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2008), 452.

[473] Cited by Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 171.

get in almost everybody who had the means to become Mason. . . . [as for those who could not afford to pay dues] I tried to urge all those who could not join Masonry to affiliate with the Katipunan."[474] This led Reynold Fajardo, freemasonry scholar and past Grandmaster of the MW Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of the Philippines, to conclude that "[t]o Aguinaldo, the Katipunan was the poor man's Masonry."[475]

By contrast, the *principales* of Malolos in Bulacan province were persecuted for openly defying the parish priest (*cura paroco*) and the authority of the Church over local affairs.[476] While some of the leading municipal elites from this town were early members of the Katipunan, they were not actively recruiting members in their town. However, recruitment for Katipunan began after deportation of eight prominent municipal officials and sixteen native elites of Malolos, including the town mayor Manuel Crisostomo, in May 1895 recruitment for Katipunan began.[477] According to Tiongson, "an early evidence of the KKK, or Katipunan, in Bulacan appears around September 1895."[478] Following the discovery of documents listing members of a secret organization called Katipunan, the Civil Governor of Bulacan Manuel Baldasano alerted Governor Blanco to the existence of a subversive group operating in the province. Among those listed were:

> 1. Father Agustin Tantoco, coadjutor of Calumpit (another Bulacan town), president of said Katipunan; has relatives suspected of being subversives; his conduct leaves much to be desired, according to the cura of the parish where he serves.

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474 Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 171.

475 Fajardo, *The Brethren*, 171.

476 Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 81-83, 86-87.

477 Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 56-59, 89-90.

478 Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 94.

> 2. Gabino Tantoco, landowner of Malolos, relative of the first and without unfavorable antecedents.
>
> 3. Aguedo Velarde, lawyer of Bulacan [capital], is identified as a subversive and a gambler both in the confidential records of the civil governor and in those of the Guardia Civil.
>
> 4. Ambrosio Delgado, lawyer of Bulacan [capital], present justice of peace.[479]

However, the most dramatic increase in the province's Katipunan membership happened in March 1896 after several Bulacan residents became more active in getting people to join the organization. Those who were directly involved in expanding membership were "Isidro Torres, Ramon de Leon, Luis Gatmaytan, and Doroteo Karagdag – [who] were authorized by the central KKK leaders to establish a Katipunan branch [*Balangay Apuy*] in Bulacan. Torres was a founding member of the first Masonic lodge *Kupang* in Malolos, Ramon de Leon was the son of Anastacio de Leon who was then still exiled in Cotabato, Luis Gatmaytan was the son of Vicente Gatmaytan who was exiled in Iligan, and Doroteo Karagdag was from the cabecera of Bulacan."[480]

Again, Spanish repression played a catalytic role in the Katipunan's provincial expansion. These young men all joined the Katipunan in May 1895 following the arrest and deportation of prominent provincial and municipal elites from Malolos, including Anastacio de Leon (*delegado*) and Vicente Gatmaytan (founder of Masonic lodge 'Kupang' and *delegado* of the Malolos tribunal).[481] They continued to recruit more members prompting the creation of more branches across the province. By August 1896, there were

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[479] *Sediciones y Rebeliones* (1895-1898), Book 2, Philippine National Archives. Cited by Nicanor Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 94-95.

[480] Corpuz and Lalic (eds.), *Ang Malulos sa Dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 57. Cited by N. Tiongson, *The Women of Malolos*, 95.

[481] Corpuz and Lalic (eds.), *Ang Malulos sa Dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 4-9.

already sufficient Katipunan branches to warrant the establishment of Katipunan chapter in Malolos called *Sangguniang Lalawigang Apuy*.[482] Just a few days after, however, the Katipunan in Manila was discovered by Tondo parish priest Mariano Gil leading to mass arrests of Katipuneros including the chapter president Ramon de Leon. Subsequently, Isidro Torres was elected to replace Ramon de Leon and to mobilize about three thousand members for armed struggle.[483]

Cloak and Dagger

With the broad boundaries of Guardia Civil Veterana's security perimeter in Manila and its suburbs, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia was assigned to target high priority zones for close surveillance. Through the limited resources of the Cuerpo prior to the 1897 police consolidation under the Veterana, the actual surveillance zone of Cuerpo agents was determined more by the targeted individuals rather than by geography alone. In the distribution of patrol units, the Veterana had, more or less, deployed equal number of constabularies within any given geographical area of Manila and its suburbs unless circumstances arose that would require re-assigning human resources. By contrast, the Cuerpo did not have the manpower to conduct extensive surveillance of various assigned districts unless certain areas had a huge concentration of suspected individuals.

Reviewing assignments of the Cuerpo native agents, it is significant that, among the thirty-two second-class agents, many were assigned to the predominantly Spanish and mestizo residential areas of Ermita and Malate, with at least seven agents covering each district. Following the migration of Spanish residents out of Intramuros in the 1880s after

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[482] Corpuz and Lalic (eds.), *Ang Malulos sa Dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 56-57.

[483] Corpuz and Lalic (eds.), *Ang Malulos sa Dahon ng Kasaysayan*, 58.

the devastating earthquake in July 1880 that left many colonial buildings destroyed, new suburbs in Malate and Ermita (or Hermita) were established to accommodate the influx of residents 'outside the walls' of Manila (*extramuros*). Meanwhile, the more important commercial districts of Binondo and Sta. Cruz had only five agents assigned – four agents for Binondo and one for Sta. Cruz. On the other hand, Paco district (also known as San Fernando Dilao) had two agents while just one each was assigned to the Sampaloc and Trozo districts. The other remaining agents such as Antonio Cabangis did not have a specific area assigned to them so they were free to conduct their surveillance anywhere.[484]

Earlier intelligence reports between April to August 1896 show that Cuerpo agents were establishing lists of individuals targeted for close monitoring and property searches. The Cuerpo agents based their recommendations on rumors and unsubstantiated claims concerning certain individuals' social connections with Masonry, Propaganda Movement, La Liga Filipina, or to Rizal's family and friends. Past involvement in the 1872 Cavite Mutiny, or the event surrounding the March 1888 manifesto calling for the expulsion of friars was also deemed suspicious.[485]

The majority of the available Cuerpo reports for 1896 focused on identifying Filipino Masons as well as those who participated in the 1888 anti-friar protest. In the report dated April 17, 1896 an unnamed agent suggested investigating the personal letters of Justo Trinidad, an employee of wealthy mestizo Don Pedro P. Rojas and a former *gobernadorcillo* of Sta. Ana who had gone into exile with Del Pilar after signing the 1888

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[484] Two-page list of names of *Cuerpo* agents as well as information about their professions and assignments, (n.d.), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-9, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[485] *Copia de las Informaciones Secretas de abril á agosto de 1896*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-4, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

Manifesto.[486] Another report dated June 23, 1896 details the activities of anti-Spanish businessman involved in selling of arms in provinces such as Batangas, Camarines Sur and Norte, and Negros Oriental and Occidental. The most significant information in this report, which the Spanish authorities somehow overlooked was the recommendation "to monitor an individual named Andres Bonifacio, an employee of Fressell & Company believed to be a mason and [involved in] producing subversive propaganda [materials] for the districts of Tondo, Trozo, and Sta. Cruz ("*vigilar á un individuo llamado Andrés Bonifacio, personero de la casa de los Senores Fressell y Co, que se sabe por bien conducto que es masón y que hace gran propaganda filibustera por los arrabales de Tondo, Trozo y Sta. Cruz*").[487]

While the Cuerpo agents were preoccupied with gathering as much data to uncover native conspiracies to topple the Spanish regime, occasionally the agents would stumble upon some odd intelligence such as the information about a nun from the *Monasterio de Santa Clara* in Intramuros who could foretell the future. According to this report dated July 24, 1896, Governor Blanco visited the nun to consult with her who then told him that a higher being ("*Ser Superior*") would soon appear to free the oppressed.[488]

The combination of the Veterana's security patrols and the Cuerpo's more focused surveillance zones delineated the fluid boundaries of Manila's dark labyrinth. After the outbreak of the August 1896 rebellion, the contents of the reports shifted to uncovering the

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[486] *Información Secreta # 1* (Manila, April 17, 1896), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-4, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[487] *Información Secreta # 14* (Manila, June 23, 1896), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-4, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[488] *Información Secreta # 21* (Manila, July 24, 1896), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-4, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

backgrounds of individuals arrested and gathering information on the revolutionary movement Katipunan. The Cuerpo reports clearly indicate how much the Spanish authorities did not know about this secret society and its clandestine activities. For the first time, both the Cuerpo and the Veterana were confronted with reality of their failure to detect enemies within their midst. To compensate for this failing, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia now under the supervision of the Veterana, intensified their surveillance.[489]

The Cuerpo reports during the last two years of Spanish rule were extensive. Heightened paranoia had contributed to the Cuerpo agents' detailed reports that included intelligence on the rebels as well as other Cuerpo agents. In a series of reports from June 13 to August 10, 1897, *Agente* Gregorio Francisco Ignacio reported on the social and religious activities in the house on Calle de Madrid, num. 23 in Binondo that he believed to be a ruse to hide the illegal gatherings. Among those visitors he identified was Cuerpo *agente* Toribio Gatbonton.[490] Similarly, there was a report of *Inspector* Manuel Garcia dated January 29, 1898 alerting *Inspector Jefe* Federico Moreno of Cuerpo infiltration.[491]

As for 'the most hated *Agente,*'[492] Don Antonio Cabangis was more pre-occupied in either proving his loyalty to the Spanish colonial state by betraying his own brother

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[489] "*Comprende esta Carpeta 163 documentos, bien conservados, correspondientes á la insurrección filipina, hasta el Pacto de Biac-na-bato 1897. Cada copia lleve estampado, como signo de autencidad de sello official en tinta que dice 'Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila'"* dated January 1897-December 1897, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-7, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[490] *Documento # 102* (Manila, June 13-August 10, 1897), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-7, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[491] *Informe # 18* (Manila, January 29, 1898), *Inspector Manuel Garcia 6.12.97 al 4.8.98. 77 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-16, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[492] *Informe # 17* (Manila, January 28, 1898), *Inspector Manuel Garcia 6.12.97 al 4.8.98. 77 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-16, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

Tomas[493], or obsessing over kidnapping and assassination attempts on fellow agents and other colonial officials.[494] Concerning the latter, Cabangis spent at least a month trying to investigate the events surrounding *Teniente* Jose Cortes' suicide which he later speculated was done to escape unknown assassins.[495]

In addition to reports on possible threats and revolutionary campaigns, there were also other interesting information included in the agents' accounts such as street fires; a fight over a woman[496]; and conducting a background check on an alleged Filipina concubine of a *Padre* Manuel Roxas.[497] There were also reports on curious events such as complaints about Jose Ceide who pretended to be the *Jesús Nazareno de Quiapo* to scam people into giving him money[498], and another was a series concerning the hiding of stolen carabaos in the Trozo and Binondo districts because of a meat shortage in the city.[499]

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[493] *Informe # 14* (Manila, December 6, 1897), *Agente Don Antonio Cabangis 29.10.97 al 30.4.98. 72 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-26, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[494] See *Informe # 1* (Manila, October 29, 1897), *Informe # 2* (Manila, October 31, 1897), *Informe # 4* (Manila, November 2, 1897), *Informe # 5* (Manila, November 3, 1897), *Informe # 15* (Manila, December 9, 1897), and *Informe # 18* (Manila, December 16, 1897) *Agente Don Antonio Cabangis 29.10.97 al 30.4.98.72 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-26, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[495] See *Informe # 8* (Manila, November 17, 1897), *Informe #9* (Manila, November 19, 1897), and *Informe # 15* (Manila, December 9, 1897), *Agente Don Antonio Cabangis 29.10.97 al 30.4.98.72 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-26, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[496] *Informe #24* (Manila, January 10, 1898), *Agente Don Antonio Cabangis 29.10.97 al 30.4.98.72 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-26, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[497] *Informe # 2* (Manila, August 7, 1896), *Agente Gregorio Ignacio, Inspector Don Juan Sanchez y agentes señores Segundo Sebastian López, Gregorio Ignacio y Francisco, Federico Romero, Santiago Maniquíz, Gregorio Guerrero, Jose Ruiz, Antonio Cruz, Alejandro Blanco y un aspirante 4.2.96 al 10.8.98. 11 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-18, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[498] *Documento # 103* (Manila, August 12, 1897), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-7, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

[499] See *Informe # 31* (Manila, July 26, 1898), *Informe # 33* (Manila, July 27, 1898), *Informe # 34* (Manila, July 28, 1898), *Informe # 35* (Manila, July 31, 1898), and *Informe # 36* (Manila, August 4, 1898), *Informe # 37* (Manila, August 6, 1898), *Informe # 38* (Manila, August 7, 1898), and *Informe # 39* (Manila, August 7, 1898), *Agente Don Juan Mendida 21.5.98 al 7.8.98. 41 Informes*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito B-28, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

Compared to the Veterana's systematic patrol coverage designed to maintain a security perimeter, the Cuerpo agent assignments clearly showed inefficient allocations of limited manpower that greatly impacted its ability to detect the epicenter of native subversion. By assigning more than one-third of the Cuerpo native agents to Ermita and Malate where majority of the residents were Spaniards and wealthy Filipinos, the Cuerpo had clearly neglected other areas of interest such as Tondo and San Nicolas where the natives lived and worked. Even Binondo, Sta. Cruz and Quiapo commercial districts seemed to be low priority. If the Cuerpo were actually concerned with uncovering native subversion, then these latter areas should have been the most logical places to watch closely.

Since the Katipunan had operated in these same areas undetected for almost four years, we should probably attribute this major oversight to the Cuerpo's incompetence as an intelligence agency. On the other hand, it is also difficult to ignore the possibility that Governor General Blanco was secretly undermining the Cuerpo's ability to perform its duties by imposing restrictions on what the agents could do and ensuring that the agency only answer to him and to the Civil Governor of Manila. When Governor Blanco was relieved of his duty in December 1896, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia immediately underwent changes, starting with its transfer under the direct control of the Veterana. As part of the Veterana, the Cuerpo agents now had the power to arrest as well as the authority to deploy police manpower to assist in their intelligence-gathering activities.

Subverting the colonial state

From all that we know through these documents, the creation of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila in March 1895 had improved the existing native surveillance network as the colonial state intensified its campaigns against perceived enemies. With native uprisings threatening the precarious Spanish hold over the Philippines, the colonial regime had no choice but to depend on native support for its survival. However, for all its precautions the Spanish authorities did not suspect that another threat to its hegemony would be emerging from the highest echelon of colonial power.

As the Spanish colonial authorities hunted down alleged enemies of the state, some of those directly involved in establishing Manila's Cuerpo de Vigilancia apparently had a hidden agenda. Supposedly, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia was to monitor all kinds of suspected individuals and "to hunt down [all] secret societies" ("*para perseguir a la sociedades secretas*").[500] However, from the perspective of the reactionary Spanish state and the Catholic Church, only one group was clearly determined to organize a revolution to topple Spanish rule in the Philippines – the Masons.[501]

When Governor General Ramon Blanco founded the Cuerpo in March 1895, its main objective was solely to gather intelligence on "subversives, anti-friars and masons" ("*filibusteros, ante religiosos y masones"*).[502] Designed as an autonomous civil administrative unit, the Cuerpo had no ties to the military, Guardia Civil or the Veterana,

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[500] Jose M. del Castillo y Jimenez, *El Katipunan o El filibusterismo en Filipinas: cronica ilustrada con documentos, autografos y fotograbados* (Imp. del Asilo de Huerfanos del S. C. de Jesus, 1897), 382.

[501] J. Castillo y Jimenez, *El Katipunan o El filibusterismo en Filipinas*, 393-395.

[502] "*Copia de la Moción del Gobierno civil de Manila para la creación del Cuerpo de Vigilancia*" (1895), *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila*, Manuscrito A-9, National Commission for Culture and the Arts.

and was subordinate only to Blanco and the civil governor of Manila, who at that time was Antonio Dominguez Alfonso and then later in 1896, Manuel Luengo.[503]

Interestingly, both Blanco and Alfonso's immediate successor, Manuel Luengo, were high-ranking Masons who were overseeing the persecution of fellow Masons. At the same time, the Spanish prime minister during this intense repression of Freemasonry was Práxedes Mateo Sagasta,[504] who was also a leading Mason in Spain. So, how do we account for the seeming contradiction of a liberal Mason such as Governor Blanco setting up a surveillance apparatus in the Philippines to suppress his own Masonic brotherhood? And why was Blanco so adamant that the Cuerpo de Vigilancia and anyone involved have no links with established security agencies such as the military and the police force? What exactly was the purpose of the Cuerpo?

Although explanations of Blanco's motivations are speculative, there are indications that his creation of the Cuerpo was driven by some subtle political maneuvers. Despite the nominal breadth of its repression, the Cuerpo's authority was circumscribed. Moreover, Blanco himself was under political pressure to demonstrate suppression of subversives since the Liberal government that appointed him was immediately replaced by rival liberal conservatives under Prime Minister Antonio Canovas del Castillo.

Even though the Cuerpo de Vigilancia was supposed to be, first and foremost, a

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[503] Bernardita Reyes Churchill, "Foreword," in *Batis ng Kasaysayan 2011, The Movement for Independence in the Philippines (1896-1898): Calendar of Documents in the Archives of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila, National Commission for Culture and the Arts* edited by Bernardita Reyes Churchill (Manila: National Commission of Culture and the Arts, and Philippine National Historical Society, 2011), iii.

[504] Liberal leader Sagasta served as prime minister of Spain seven times (1871-1872; 1874; 1881-1883; 1885-1890; 1892-1895; 1897-1899; and 1901-1902) during the period of government rotation between the Liberal Party and the Liberal-Conservative Party led by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (known as *el turno pacifico*) in an effort to politically stabilize Spain after the Restoration of the monarchy under Alfonso XII. R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 287-289.

colonial intelligence unit, in reality, it seems politically driven, focusing as much on placating the Spanish metropole as securing the Philippines. By the 1890s, the political atmosphere in Spain was tumultuous, at best, with a constant threat of social upheaval and anarchism. The adoption of a political system of rotation (*turno pacífico*) of governments between the Liberal Party[505] and the Liberal-Conservative Party with seven cabinet changes between 1871 and 1902 only resulted in a more unstable and corrupt system of governance. Since the Liberal-Conservatives had the support of the Church, the constitutional monarchy, and the Spanish army, this conservative opposition constantly criticized the Liberals under Prime Minister Sagasta, particularly about its inability to restore law and order in both Spain and its remaining colonies.[506]

To ensure the survival of the liberal government in Spain against attacks from the conservatives and the Catholic Church, the liberal officials in the metropole and colonies had to be aggressive in dealing with subversion and violent uprisings. The Church was particularly vocal in pressuring the liberal government in Spain to force the Philippine governor general to address perceived threats from the Filipino Masons. The introduction of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia marked a turning point in shifting colonial governance and its policing from military to civilian control. However, such a shift only highlighted the problems inherent in Spanish institutions, not only in the colonies but, more importantly, in the metropole.

In his assessment of the capacity of the *Cuerpo*, historian Alfred W. McCoy argues

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[505] The Liberal Party ruled during the following years: 1871-1872; 1874; 1881-1883; 1885-1890; 1892-1895; 1897-1899 and 1901-1902. See R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 287-289.

[506] See Temma Kaplan, *Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 123.

that "the Cuerpo de Vigilancia generally failed in its mission to penetrate subversive groups and preempt sedition."[507] Indeed, the Cuerpo's failure can be attributed to its inability to apprehend any suspect or suppress the illegal activities witnessed by its *agentes*. The intelligence agents were only meant to observe and then report back to *Jefe Inspector* Federico Moreno. Until the intelligence unit was finally placed under the control of the Veterana in 1897, the Cuerpo had no police jurisdiction in the city. This re-organization happened immediately after Governor Blanco was relieved of his position and replaced by his more conservative second-in command, Lieutenant General Camilo Polavieja (December 1896 - April 1897). Under Governor General Polavieja's short tenure, the Cuerpo de Vigilancia became an extension of the Veterana, producing a surge in arrests of alleged subversives. Many Filipinos were also executed, based largely on information gathered by the Cuerpo agents.

Without a doubt the Cuerpo's agents were not up to the task of uncovering native conspiracies that later erupted into a full-blown urban armed struggle. But, what if the Cuerpo de Vigilancia were meant to fail, or at least not succeed, in the first place? Perhaps, the Cuerpo's mere organization, rather than its actual performance, had already served its political purpose by allowing Blanco to claim he was doing everything to address the threat of Filipino subversion while covertly protecting his fellow Masons.

Based on the number of native *agentes* who had worked directly for both Governor Blanco and Manila Civil Governor Luengo, it seems possible that these Spanish officials had planted their own spies within the *Cuerpo* to protect brother Masons, thus muting

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[507] Alfred W. McCoy, "Capillaries of Empire" in *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*, 31.

Blanco's capacity, should he care to exercise it, for repressive measures against these perceived enemies of the Church and state. After Blanco was relieved of his position, both his assistant Roberto Salvante, and Luengo's *mayordomo* Gil Miye continued as Cuerpo *agentes* until 1898.[508]

In addition to placing his own people within the Cuerpo ranks during the period of intense state repression in both Spain and the colonies, Blanco had also attempted to shield some Filipino masons from his own regime's repressive measures. Prior to the revolt of August 1896, Blanco's attempts were, to some extent, successful. In early September 1896, Governor Blanco sent Rizal a letter granting his request, pending for the past year, to leave Dapitan to serve as military doctor for the Spanish army in Cuba.

In his letter to Blumentritt dated September 28, 1896 en route to Spain, Rizal was surprised to receive Blanco's permission to finally go to Cuba, along with his two letters of endorsement to the Minister of the Colonies, and the Minister of War.[509] Rizal included the texts of the two identical letters of introduction in his letter to Blumentritt to show that Blanco believed him to be innocent,

> The Captain General of the Philippines
>
> *Personal*
>
> Manila, 30 August 1896
>
> Most Excellent Marcelo de Azcárraga
> My esteemed General and distinguished Friend,
>
> I recommend to you with genuine interest Dr. José Rizal who is departing fur the

[508] *Expediente personal de 2a clase Agente Roberto Salvante*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* A (1869-1896), SD-12230; and *Expediente de Gil Miye*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* A (1895-1897), SD-12231, Philippine National Archives.

[509] Rizal's letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt en route to Spain dated 28 September 1896, in *The Rizal-Blumentritt Correspondence* (Manila: Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission, 1961), 535-537.

> Peninsula at the disposal of the Government, ever desirous of rendering his services as physician to the Army in Cuba.
>
> His conduct during the four years that he was an exile in Dapitan has been exemplary, and he is, in my opinion, the more worthy of pardon and benevolence as he is in no way involved either in the chimerical attempt that we are lamenting these days or in any conspiracy or secret society, that they have been plotting.
>
> With this object I have the pleasure to remain,
> Your most affectionate friend and colleague who kisses your hand,
>
> Ramón Blanco[510]

The dates of Blanco's endorsement letters are very telling – August 30, 1896 – the very day the Katipunan armed uprising started. One might wonder whether Blanco really wanted Rizal out of the country to save him, or to entrap him. The moment Rizal's ship docked in Singapore, he was suddenly placed under arrest. Rizal was not allowed to embark and he had to stay in his cabin until the ship reached Barcelona. En route to Spain, Rizal immediately sent a letter to Blumentritt to let him know what had just happened to him:

> With these two letters [of reference] I have come, confident that I would go to Cuba to win a name and undo calumnies. Now they tell me that they sending me to Ceuta [in Spanish Morocco]!
>
> I cannot believe this for it would be the greatest injustice and the most abominable infamy, unworthy not of a military official but of the last bandit. I have offered to serve as a physician, risking life in the hazards of war and abandoning all my business. I am innocent and now in reward they are sending me to prison!!!
>
> I cannot believe it! This is infamous, but if it turns out to be true, as everybody assures me, I am communicating to you this news so that you may appraise my situation.[511]

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[510] Rizal's letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt en route to Spain (dated 28 September 1896) in *The Rizal-lumentritt Correspondence* (Manila: Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission, 1961), 535-537.

[511] Rizal's letter to Ferdinand Blumentritt en route to Spain (dated 28 September 1896) in *The Rizal-Blumentritt Correspondence* (Manila: Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission, 1961), 535-537.

Rizal was briefly incarcerated in Montjuich prison in October 1896 before he was sent back to Manila to await his trial. By then, Governor Blanco was replaced by his second-in-command, Camilo Garcia de Polavieja, who later signed Rizal's death sentence.

Blanco and his fellow liberals were not the only ones playing double game within this dark labyrinth that had become, since 1895, the main arena for Philippine colonial politics. When we insert the Katipunan into this mingled matrix of Spanish colonial repression, we enter a "grey area," a clandestine underworld of social control through policing and surveillance that shaped the unfolding of events and left a sharp impression on the complex nature of 1896 revolution – forcing us, in effect, to recast our understanding of the Katipunan and those who opposed it. Since the Cuerpo's inception there had been at least four Katipuneros – Bibiano Jose, Marcelo Badel,[512] Julio Navarro, and Bartolome Andaya – who effectively infiltrated the Cuerpo until they were finally discovered in September 1896.[513] So who were these men who chose to lead a double life?

Bibiano Jose y Jose was a young carpenter from Binondo and who had served as *carabinero de segunda clase* in the Spanish colonial army. Before joining the Cuerpo, Jose had served in the military since he was a 19-year old when he enlisted with the medical corps in 1883. Jose was posted in Palawan and Manila's military hospitals until 1891. After he married Petrina, Jose opted to stay in Manila to serve as a *carabinero* until

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[512] Badel's name was included among the prisoners under the custody of the Civil Government of Manila. See the 12-page document "*Antecedentes de sospechosos y complicados que obran en poder del Gobierno Civil de Manila*" (n.d.), *Manuscrito* A-10, *Documento* # 21, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, NCCA.

[513] Report of *Jefe Inspector* Federico Moreno to Manila Civil Governor Manuel Luengo dated September 9, 1896, *Manuscrito* A-6, *Documento* # 37, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, NCCA; Governor Blanco's report about the arrest of suspected double agents and printed version of report on *Gaceta de Manila*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* SD # 12232 - Bundle V (1869-1898), Philippine National Archives.

his discharge from service in July 1894. Afterwards, he joined the Katipunan's Tondo chapter. In 1895, Jose also joined the Cuerpo along with other Katipuneros such as Julian Navarro. After he was discovered in September 1896, Bibiano Jose was immediately deported to Balabac, Palawan along with other suspected Filipino elites and Katipuneros.[514]

Similarly, Julian Navarro y Luquina, who held a *cedula personal de decimo clase*, the lowest economic stratum, had served in the Spanish military for more than fourteen years as first sergeant (*sargento primero licenciado del Ejercito*) and *guardia major de Montes*. Navarro lived in the province of Capiz and Bulacan before settling in Manila where he joined the Katipunan and then the Cuerpo in 1895.[515] By contrast with these two cases above, there was not much information about Bartolome Andaya, apart from the fact that he served as first corporal in the army (*cabo primero licenciado del Ejercito*) before joining the Katipunan and the Cuerpo de Vigilancia in 1895.[516]

As these cases illustrate so clearly, most of these men had served either in the colonial army or the Guardia Civil before joining the Cuerpo as double agents. Perhaps, that obvious sign of loyalty to Spain was the main reason why these men were assigned by the Katipunan to infiltrate the Cuerpo. The Katipunan leaders were counting on these men's military service to help conceal their real agenda long enough to remain undetected until the outbreak of the revolution. If that were the case, then the Katipunan's own

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[514] *Expedientes personales*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* A (1895-1897), SD-12231, Philippine National Archives. G. Bankroff, *Crime, Society and the State in the Nineteenth Century Philippines*, 144-145.

[515] *Expedientes personales*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* A (1869-1898), SD-12230, Philippine National Archives.

[516] *Expedientes personales*, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia* A (1869-1898), SD-12230, Philippine National Archives. Andaya's dossier in the National Archives did not include his military service record. Report of *Jefe Inspector* Federico Moreno to Manila Civil Governor Manuel Luengo dated September 9, 1896, *Manuscrito* A-6, *Documento* # 37, *Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila* collection, NCCA.

preparation for armed uprising, and their skill with counter-intelligence, was more strategic than the scholars would lead us to believe.

While Jose, Navarro, and Andaya were ordered to spy for the Katipunan, Marcelo Badel joined the Cuerpo without the knowledge of the Katipunan Supreme Council. According to captured minutes of Katipunan meetings held on November 30 and December 1, 1895, "regarding member Marcelo Badel, who joined the secret police without divulging his action to his fellow (Katipunan) brothers, will be expelled [from the movement] and will be monitored by (Katipunan brothers) Subiang and Igmidio Tolentino; and if he was found to have bad intention, he will be summarily executed" ("*Tungkol sa kapisan ditong si Marcelo Badel, na napasuk sa pagka policia secreta, at di umiimik man sa mga k. tungkol sa pagkapasuk niyang ito, ay ititiwalag, at titiktikan ng kap. na Subiang at Igmidio Tolentino; at kung makilalang masamang talaga ay papatain*.").[517]

At the same meeting, another Katipunero was immediately sentenced to death for treason. Eleuterio de Guzman, a master tailor (*maestro sastre*) from Caloocan and who also served as a Katipunan treasurer, was found to be passing along information back to the Cuerpo de Vigilancia, through we have no record if he actually suffered expulsion and execution.[518] If we reflect on these cases, both Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila and

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[517] Katipunan's Supreme Council Meeting, Minutes of Meetings of November 30 and December 1, 1895 prepared by Emilio Jacinto (December 1, 1895), Caja 5377, leg. 1.41 bis, *Archivo General Militar de Madrid*. Transcribed in original Tagalog by Jim Richardson, *Katipunan* documents website - https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=16RNPq4Mh_T08u3JkCi5vfoT5wgDMaQXPouXr5Tu32dc (Accessed on March 4, 2015).

[518] Transcribed in original Tagalog by Jim Richardson, *Katipunan* documents website - https://docs.google.com/document/preview?hgd=1&id=16RNPq4Mh_T08u3JkCi5vfoT5wgDMaQXPouXr5Tu32dc (Accessed on March 4, 2015). Also see Richardson, *The Light of Liberty*, pp. 54-57.

Katipunan were playing the dangerous game of intelligence/counter-intelligence, with concomitant fears of penetrative and violent response to the slightest sign of betrayal.

As the political climate in the metropole became more volatile, colonial state repression intensified in the Philippines, thus forcing Filipinos and their associations to go underground for survival. And in the process, some of them would emerge later more radicalized and more susceptible to armed struggle as the only answer to colonial repression.

Katipunan's discovery leading to the outbreak of revolution

On August 23, 1896 *El Diario de Manila* published an article entitled "*El Velo descorrido*"[519] ("The veil was lifted") announcing the discovery of the existence of a native masonic group conspiring to revolt. In its effort to make its allegiance known, *El Diario Manila* proclaimed:

> The place where the origin of this infernal machination [Katipunan] was this very edifice where the *Diario de Manila* is printed, a periodical which from one day to the other for about half a century has shown its unconditional, undebatable loyalty to the institutions, the government officials, to everything, in a word, that in this isolated region makes it Spanish.[520]

After four years the secret society Katipunan was finally 'unveiled;' not by the Veterana's secret police nor the Cuerpo's agents, but by one the Katipuneros by the name of Teodoro Patiño, a *Diario de Manila* typesetter (*cajista*), and his sister, Honoria, who

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[519] This was derived from a pamphlet published by French abbot Jacques François Lefranc in 1791 entitled "*Le Voile levé pour les curieux, ou le Secret de la Révolution*" blaming the Freemasonry for inciting a revolution.

[520] "*El Velo descorrido,*" *El Diario de Manila* (23 August 1896), *Archivo de la Provincia de Agustinos Filipinos* [APAF], *legajo* 262/2-a. Cited and translated by Isacio Rodriguez, O.S.A. in "The Discovery of the Katipunan, The Augustinians, and the Philippine Revolution (1896-1897)," in *Unknown Aspects of the Philippine Revolution* edited by Jose Arcilla, S. J. (Makati, Philippines: St. Pauls, 2006), 45, footnote no. 21.

lived in an Augustinian orphanage in Mandaluyong area. According to a well-known account of the discovery, in early August 1896 Patiño visited his sister and told her that they needed to flee the city before the outbreak of a rebellion. His sister became hysterical, prompting the Mother Portess of the orphanage to ask what was wrong. Patiño had to inform her about his plans, thus divulging the existence of the secret society. The nun told him to go to the Tondo parish priest, Father Mariano Gil, and denounce the Katipunan.

On August 19, 1896 Teodoro Patiño revealed the Katipunan's revolutionary plot to Father Gil. That same day, the Veterana, along with Father Gil, raided the office of Diario de Manila and confiscated Katipunan documents and paraphernalia.[521] During the legal proceedings following the raid and mass arrests, Lt. Commander of the Veterana, Jose Pique Castello, reported his findings about the Katipunan:

> In virtue of the discovery, it remains patently clear in the declarations that the initiates were divided into three classes: the 'Supreme Council,' made up of people in the highest position of authority and influence; La Liga Filipina, or *Compromisarios*, who formed the middle group; and the Katipunan *Bayan*, the people or the workers or farmers. This happy discovery clearly established the role each of the accused has played before and after the armed uprising which has just then been overcome.
>
> The action began on 22 August of the year 1896 by the Judge of the First Instance of Tondo, Don Alberto Cancello, on order of the Fiscal of the Territorial Audiencia, expressed on folio 6, copying the Governor General's order of the previous day in reference to the denunciation by Father Mariano Gil that there is a society of Masonic characteristics subversive of Institutions, and whose members thereof belong to the same. These have been imprisoned and, on checking their

[521] See Isacio Rodriguez, O.S.A. "The Discovery of the Katipunan, The Augustinians, and the Philippine Revolution (1896-1897)," in *Unknown Aspects of the Philippine Revolution*, 37-51; Gregorio Zaide, "Chapter VI: The Discovery of the Katipunan," Chapter VII: Conflicting Versions on the K.K.K. Discovery," and "Chapter VIII: True Story of the Discovery: New Revelations," in *History of the Katipunan*, 61-102; Teodoro Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution*, 17-18; and John N. Schumacher, "Two Paths to Freedom," *Kasaysayan*, 145-146.

houses, there were found papers and books with things corroborative of the existence of the same society.[522]

On August 26, 1896, first shots were fired in the hills of Balintawak in the town of Caloocan (north of Manila), signaling the start of the Katipunan revolution. By the 30th of August, Katipunan members from the eight provinces in the Tagalog region[523] – Manila, Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac – rose up in arms. That same day, Governor Blanco declared a state of war in the Tagalog region.

In keeping with nationalist historiography elsewhere, the literature about the Katipunan makes no reference to the Spanish colonial state's significance in shaping Filipino response to changes in colonial governance.[524] However, such omission only allows fragmentary understanding of the historical figures involved as well as the socio-political conditions surrounding the revolution of 1896. Through this oversight, the

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[522] *Archivo de la Provincia de Agustinos Filipinos* [APAF], *legajo* 237/2, 1-2. Cited and translated by Isacio Rodriguez, O.S.A. in "The Discovery of the Katipunan, The Augustinians, and the Philippine Revolution (1896-1897)," in *Unknown Aspects of the Philippine Revolution*, 48-49.

[523] These eight Tagalog provinces and their sacrifices during the early stages of the 1896 Revolution were commemorated in the form of eight rays of the sun on the Philippine flag.

[524] Notable sources on the 1896 Revolution are the following - Isabelo de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* (1899); Hermenegildo Cruz, *Kartilyang Makabayan: Mga Tanong at Sagot ukol kay Andres Bonifacio at sa Kataastaasan, Kagalanggalang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (1922); Gregorio F. Zaide, *History of the Katipunan* (Manila: Loyal Press, 1939); Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution* (1925); Gregorio Zaide, *The Philippine Revolution* (1954); Teodoro Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (1956); Reynaldo C. Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (1979); Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson, Chapter 9 "The Katipuneros: Revolutionary Leadership in City and Province," in *Roots of Dependency: Political and Economic Revolution in the 19th-century Philippines* (1979); John N. Schumacher, "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," *Philippine Studies* vol. 30, no. 4 (1982); Isagani R. Medina, *Cavite before the Revolution, 1571-1896* (1994); *Determining the Truth: The Story of Andres Bonifacio*, edited by Bernadita Reyes Churchill (1997); Milagros C. Guerrero, "Pagtanaw sa Kasaysayan, Paghahanda sa Himagsikan: Mga Ideya ng Katipunan, 1892-1897," in *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, Philippine Revolution* 1, vol. 14, no.1 (1998), 37-52; *The Katipunan and the Revolution edited by Bernardita Reyes Churchill and Francis A. Gealogo* (1999); and Michael M. Cullinane, *Arenas of Conspiracy and Rebellion in the Late Nineteenth-Century Philippines: The Case of the April 1898 Uprising in Cebu* (2014).

Katipunan uprising has been reduced to a Manichean struggle between the oppressed natives and their colonial masters. But, was it really that simple?

In nationalist historiography, contending forces often viewed in Manichean terms, emphasizing a dualistic struggle between the oppressors (Spanish) and the oppressed (native Filipinos). There was no such thing as good Spaniard or a bad Filipino in these narratives, except perhaps wealthy Filipino hispanophiles. Philippine-born Spaniards (*insulares*) are not considered Filipino, and thus can be categorized as enemies. In a striking contrast to the Philippine mindset, in the former Spanish colonies of Latin America creoles (locally-born Spanish) were considered Mexicans or Cubans, not Spaniard.

Understandably within this Manichean perspective of Philippine nationalist historiography, there has not been much interest in examining the nature and extent of native involvement with the colonial state during the late nineteenth century. To do so would mean encountering a 'grey area' in Philippine history that can challenge official narratives rooted on national heroes and traitorous villains. By traversing this unchartered path, we can gain a better understanding of the rationale behind conflicted or divided loyalties, not only of native collaborators but also revolutionaries.

It is important to recognize the contingency, even the ambiguity of the past. As clearly illustrated in the analysis of Filipino involvement in colonial policing and surveillance, nothing could be taken at face value when the very nature of their work demanded that these ‘clandestine actors’ transcend the realm of legality and legibility to

crush the 'invisible' enemies of the state.[525] Despite intensified levels of repression through the use of urban secret police and native agents, by the 1890s the Spanish dominion in the Philippines continued to decline as the metropole devolved into chaos and anarchy.[526]

Driven by fear of anarchist forces terrorizing the colony to overthrow Spain, the colonial regime's countermeasures were brutal and swift against the wealthy and educated segments of Filipino society while completely missing the one revolutionary group until it was too late. In the end, both the colonial state and its indigenous collaborators had proven to be incapable of navigating Manila's underground labyrinth against the revolutionary movement. More importantly, without the unrelenting political repression of the colonial state Manila's underground labyrinth in which the Katipunan had thrived until being forced to reveal itself in 1896, would not have existed.

Despite all efforts to uncover the root of native conspiracy to revolt, the Spanish colonial state was simply incapable of handling the combined political and social turmoil in Manila and its environs on the eve of the 1896 revolution. General frustration among the Spanish residents was summed up in the words of "[a]n official in the Board of Civil Administration and, later, captain of the First Volunteer Battalion of Manila. . . [who] wrote: 'It is sad and painful to admit that the insurrection in the Philippines which drains the almost exhausted Spanish treasury, pours unstinting Spanish blood on the battlefields,

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[525] A. W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 48. Also see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Conditions Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[526] R. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 294-295.

is the work of ignorance, lack of foresight, and the neglect of what concerns the dominion and sovereignty of Spain'."[527]

[527] Javier Bores y Romero, *La insurrección filipina, Cuatro verdades* (Madrid, 1897). Cited by Isacio Rodriguez, O.S.A., "The Discovery of the Katipunan, The Augustinians, and the Philippine Revolution (1896-1897)," in in *Unknown Aspects of the Philippine Revolution* edited by Jose Arcilla, S. J. (Makati, Philippines: St. Pauls, 2006), 39.

CONCLUSION

Undertaking this research inquiry on one of the most studied albeit least understood events in Philippine colonial history has shaken the very foundation of my Philippine education. Despite being accustomed to viewing history from a broader lens, it was a struggle earlier on to see past the nation when studying the Katipunan due to strong feeling of national pride (*Tagalog* and *Manileña* pride, in my case) as well as the compulsion to uphold the established past. Nonetheless, this project has been a liberating intellectual endeavor that left me with a better understanding and appreciation of the Katipunan as well as the politics behind knowledge-production of this organization as complex products of their time.

In this study I endeavored to offer different ways of unraveling the complexity of the Katipunan and its path towards revolution. By revisiting conventional narratives and popular knowledge about this secret separatist organization, significant connections were established to help expand the scope of this inquiry for a more in-depth analysis of the Katipunan.

Starting with a careful review of existing literature and source materials on the revolutionary period, my discovery shifted my focus to the first chronicler of the Katipunan, Isabelo de los Reyes, and his desperate attempts to distinguish himself from his fellow inmates who belonged to the secret society. While his assessment of the nature and composition of the instigators of the 1896 revolution provided a distorted interpretation of the past, the circumstances that forced De los Reyes to write such an account revealed more about the kind of social milieu that would create and foster revolutionaries. In

subsequent chapters, I examined various factors that greatly affected the rise of the Katipunan and its transformation into a revolutionary movement.

Guided by the important works on Propaganda Movement and the rise of Philippines Masonry,[528] I broadened the analysis of their connections with the Katipunan. Contrary to popular views, Marcelo del Pilar and his Comité de Propaganda were more influential in the formation of the Katipunan than Rizal and his La Liga Filipina because the latter group did not exist long enough to make a significant impact. However, La Liga Filipina was instrumental in strengthening the link between the Propaganda Movement and Katipunan, both employed political means to achieve their respective goals – political reforms and expulsion of friars, and complete separation from Spain. As Schumacher pointed out "the Katipunan of Bonifacio was a direct continuation of the Liga Filipina of Rizal."[529] One main aspect that distinguished the Katipunan from the Propaganda Movement was its decision to go underground. This was only done out of necessity following Rizal's arrest and deportation to Dapitan in July 1892. For almost three years, the Katipunan conducted its political activities clandestinely while slowly expanding its membership in Manila and surrounding areas.

The Katipunan was, first and foremost, a political association whose main objective was complete separation from Spain. However, it was not a revolutionary movement from the very beginning. Katipunan's transition from reform to revolution happened only later, in 1895 when Spanish authorities increased state repression as preemptive measure to

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[528] John N. Schumacher's *The Making of a Nation: Essays on Nineteenth-century Filipino Nationalism* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), and *The Propaganda Movement, 1880-1895: The Creation of Filipino Consciousness and The Making of the Revolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997); and Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Philippine Masonry: Its Origin, Development, and Vicissitudes up to Present time (1920)* (Manila: [McCullough], 1956).

[529] J. N. Schumacher, "Chapter 5: Two Paths to Freedom," in *Kasaysayan*, 132.

crush potential terrorist threats by Filipino masons. This fear of anarchist and revolutionary threats stemmed from the chaos happening within Spain. For most of 1890s Spanish cities were terrorized by Spanish and foreign anarchists, so it was only a matter of time when the same problem spread to the colonies.

Rather than averting crisis in the Philippines, the escalation of state-sanctioned repression only succeeded in fermenting a revolution. By placing Manila under martial law, introducing new surveillance unit, and criminalizing native political associations, the Spanish state forced the Katipunan to consider other options to protect itself and its goals.

By late 1895 until the eve of the revolution, Katipunan proceeded with its preparation for the inevitable armed confrontation. First, the Katipunan resorted to espionage to subvert the efforts of the new Cuerpo de Vigilancia. Second, Katipunan recruitment was moved to rural provinces and was facilitated by provincial elite members to strengthen its forces. Lastly, Dr. Pio Valenzuela met with Rizal in Dapitan to ask for his advice and support to start a revolution.

Because it only started its preparation about a year prior to the outbreak of the revolution in August 1896, the Katipunan was ill-prepared to fight against the Spanish troops and voluntary militias. As a result, revolutionaries fighting in Manila were defeated easily or forced to retreat to the provinces because the city was heavily fortified. On the other hand, Katipunan forces in the rural areas such as Cavite and Bulacan provinces were more successful in securing and holding their positions compared to Bonifacio's troops in Manila. This prompted the head of the Cavite forces, Emilio Aguinaldo, to challenge Bonifacio's leadership which then led to schism between two factions of Katipunan – *Magdalo* faction (Aguinaldo supporters) and *Magdiwang* faction (Bonifacio supporters).

When a new provisional government under Aguinaldo was established in early 1897 while battles were still raging, Bonifacio and his supporters formed their own government.[530] Aguinaldo, as the head of the new provisional government, charged Bonifacio and his younger brother with treason and sentenced them to death.[531] In May 1897 Aguinaldo's troops executed the Bonifacio brothers. Few weeks later, Aguinaldo officially disbanded the Katipunan. In December 1897 Aguinaldo signed the peace negotiation, Pact of Biak-na-Bato, officially ending the 1896 revolution.

Further studies needed on Manila

Revolutions as well as counter-revolutions are products of interactions of multiple internal and external social forces that have spanned through a long period of time. If we consider cities as revolutionary junctions where such interactions take place, then it is imperative to examine these cities as "the places of articulation of globalization, national integration and localization."[532] As Henri Lefebvre pointed out in his seminal work on urban revolution (1970), "The structures of space. . . . are the result of history that has to be understood as a creation of social agencies or actors, generally of collective subjects. From their interactions, their strategies, success and failures, derive the qualities and characteristics of urban space."[533]

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[530] Emilio Aguinaldo, *Mga Gunita ng Himagsikan* ([n.p.], 1964), 177-211.

[531] Chapter XLIV: "Hinatulan ng Kamatayan ang magkapatid na Bonifacio," in Emilio Aguinaldo, *Mga Gunita ng Himagsikan*, 225-227.

[532] Hans-Dieter Evers and Rüdiger Korff, "Introduction: Modernisation and the Global City," in *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space* (New York, N.Y: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 2.

[533] Henri Lefebvre, *Die Revolution der Städte* (Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1976, c1970), 137. Cited and translated from German by Evers and Korff in "Introduction: Modernisation and the Global City," in *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space*, 6.

During the nineteenth century the capital city's complex synthesis of modernity and innovation juxtaposed with the constant upheaval of political and social unrest, stirred *avant-garde* whose ferment could inspire an outbreak of revolution. Consequently, revolution as a social phenomenon emerging from its urban crucible helped transform and shape the socio-economic landscape and political consciousness not only of the city but also its surrounding countryside.

As capital cities across the globe experienced rapid changes throughout the nineteenth century, they were gradually integrated into diverse global networks dominated by capital and culture that nurtured stronger linkages between European metropoles and their colonial cities. International mobility of commodities and people had increased steadily while at the same time, helped establish a more symbiotic albeit disparate relationship between the metropolis and colonies.

The impacts of globalization on rapid urbanization of capital cities were increase heterogenization of their urban societies as well as the cities' legitimization as the centre of emerging nation-states.[534] At the same time, these capital cities came to monopolize the political, social and economic institutions that helped them in consolidating power and influence over territories and people beyond the city limits while "prohibit[ing] the emergence of any competitive centre, or even of cities of larger size, as this would endanger the position of those elites associated with the capital."[535]

Just as capital cities' rapid growth and global integration effected the mass influx of migration worldwide, so too, was the steady increase in urban-rural migration which only

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[534] Evers and Korff, *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space*, 2-3.

[535] Evers and Korff, *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space*, 3.

resulted in the capital cities' population growth. This aspect of urban expansion only stimulated further economic development with "the shift from agricultural to non-agricultural" industries such as manufacturing goods and rendering services. Moreover, the urban-rural social linkages became even more pronounced as both cities and rural environs depended on each other for services, labor, and provisions.[536] Simultaneously, these same urban-rural linkages served as an effective conduit for the dissemination of ideas among the rest of the population that would prove crucial in the process of organization and mobilization of both urban and rural societies.

As capital cities experienced both demographic growth and economic expansion, they also underwent radical "social change on a vast scale. . . . that alter[ed] all sectors of society".[537] Thus, such development created new social structures that would have great impact on urban society and beyond – the urban working-class (proletariat), and the middleclass (*bourgeoisie*) that included the *haute bourgeoisie* (i.e. capitalists, industrialists – referred to those who controlled the means of production) and the *petite bourgeoisie* (i.e. white-collar employees, self-employed craftspeople and small businessmen).

Despite the fact that both European metropoles and their colonial cities shared, to some degree, the same pattern of urban development, it is important to recognize the existence of different social dynamics and structures within any given urban space. In the

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[536] Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," in *Scientific American, Cities* (New York, 1967), 3-24. Cited by T. G. McGee, "The Urbanization Process: Western Society and Southeast Asian Experience," paper presented at the Southeast Asia Development Seminar at East-West Center, Honolulu (March 24-25, 1969) and published as part of *SEADAG Papers on the Problems of Development in Southeast Asia, no. 59* (New York, N.Y.: The Asia Society, 1969), 3-5. Available online - http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABI058.pdf

[537] L. Reissman, *The Urban Process, Cities in Industrial Societies* (Glencoe, Ill: 1964), 154. Cited by T. G. McGee, "The Urbanization Process: Western Society and Southeast Asian Experience," 5.

case of colonial cities, the cities themselves had to contend with both external and internal forces, the former being the rapidly changing European metropoles while the latter in the form of growing resistance from the rural hinterlands asserting their autonomy from colonial control manifested through colonial cities.

Such precarious position placed colonial cities in the midst of political and social tensions threatening to erupt anytime. The very heterogeneous nature of colonial cities that served as an asset could also be considered as a liability because it could foster fragmentation within a diverse society, "where each social group occupie[d] its own spaces and parts more or less demarcated from others."[538] Any forms of encroachment or assertion of power/rights might result in confrontation among the different social groups.

One possible manifestation of such social conflict was revolution. However, within the context of national history, a revolution erupting within a colonial urban milieu takes on a different meaning as it becomes appropriated and included in the nationalist narratives. Suddenly, this social conflict becomes an anti-colonial struggle between two opposing forces – the colonizers and the oppressed people. Such simplified approach to a more complex and dynamic colonial interactions is a concern that needs to be addressed closely.

Late nineteenth-century Manila was a contested space for those involved in the nationalist movement as well as the counter-revolutionary movement against the growing threat of urban-based native uprisings. The spread of native discontent in Manila coincided with the socio-economic and political transformation of this cosmopolitan colonial city during the period of high colonialism marked by rapid urbanization and direct

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[538] Evers and Korff, *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space*, 20.

Spanish colonial engagement in the Philippines. After almost three centuries of indirect rule through *Nueva España* (present-day Mexico), Spain's shift from indirect to direct colonial rule had disrupted the social order and *status quo* existing not only in Manila, but also, in other places across the Philippines. Furthermore, as late nineteenth-century colonial Manila underwent drastic transformation through the process of urbanization, its demographic and geographic landscape was altered through socio-economic and political changes across the Philippines.

While the overall focus of this research project is understanding the nature of the Katipunan, it is also imperative to examine late nineteenth-century Manila to better understand the urban milieu for this violent uprising against Spanish colonial rule that expose Manila's labyrinth of contending loyalties, interests, ideologies and other social forces that clearly depicted the dynamics and complexity of a colonial society on the verge of national awakening. As colonial Manila underwent the process of urbanization and more direct Spanish colonial engagement during the nineteenth century, it set the stage for the inevitable clash between proponents and opponents of anti-colonial revolution.

APPENDIX I

Text Comparison between Isabelo de los Reyes' *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes sobre La Revolucion Filipina de 1896-97* (1899) and Teodoro Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* (2002 edition).

Close examination of Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* indicates that not only his central thesis but also key portions of his text were derived from the earlier *La sensacional memoria de Isabelo de los Reyes*. In the second sentence of his first chapter "Night Over the Philippines," Agoncillo wrote "[t]he Katipunan, a distinctively plebeian society," using the same phrase De los Reyes first articulated to define the revolutionary group in 1899, saying "[Katipunan] has been entirely a plebeian association" ["*Ha sido una asociación puramente plebeya*"].[539] Other similarities between two texts are even more pronounced in Agoncillo's discussions of the nature and social composition of the Katipunan, notably "Chapter Four: Militant Nationalism - 2" and "Chapter Seven: Betrayal".[540]

In chapter 4, which contains an analysis of the Katipunan that is the conceptual core of Agoncillo's work, at least 50 percent of this chapter is simply a translation or paraphrasing of De los Reyes' original text.[541] Although Agoncillo cited De los Reyes ten times within these twenty pages of Chapter 4, the surrounding text – in five out of thirteen derivative paragraphs – was largely a translation, loose or verbatim, without quotation

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[539] T. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses* (2002 ed., 2005 reprint), 1; I. de los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 12.

[540] See the following references from both Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* and De los Reyes' *Memoria*: Agoncillo, 47 / De los Reyes, 70; Agoncillo, 52 / De los Reyes, 70-71; Agoncillo, 109-111 / De los Reyes, 80. Also see Agoncillo, 1 / De los Reyes, 12.

[541] Out of the twenty pages (pp. 45-65) in Chapter 4 only ten pages (pp. 45-56) contained De los Reyes' texts.

marks and, in most cases without any acknowledgement.

Here are the list of the thirteen derivative passages from Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* and their matching texts in De los Reyes' *Memoria*:

a. "The political object was to separate from the mother country if the government of Spain continued to resist the clamor for the expulsion of the friars.... seldom was there a Katipunero who did not know the art of fencing and of making arms and explosives." (Agoncillo, p. 46; Agoncillo only cited De los Reyes' footnote no.1 – "*Es raro el katipunero que no sea diestro en la escrima*." – but not the rest of his texts),

"*El objeto politico es el separatismo, si el Gobierno español no expulsa á los frailes.... y confección de materias explosicas*." and the passage's footnote, "*Es raro el katipunero que no sea diestro en la escrima*." (De los Reyes, p. 46);

b. "The civic or social aim.... temerity to do so." (Agoncillo, p. 47),
"*El objeto civil o social.... si los deseaban*." (De los Reyes, pp. 74-75);

c. "On the other hand, the moral objective.... taught by the French Revolution." (Agoncillo, p. 47),

"*El objeto moral.... los derechos del hombre de la Revolución francesa*."(De los Reyes, p. 75);

d. "The *Katipunan* was thus the idea of the plebeian Andres Bonifacio.... hamper the work of the Liga." (Agoncillo, p. 47),

"*El Katipúnan fue ideado y fundado por Andrés Bonifacio.... y empezaron siguiendo su sentido común.*" (De los Reyes, p. 70);

e. "The Katipunan adopted the principles of Masonry.... original member who took him in." (Agoncillo, pp. 47-48),

"*Adoptaron al principio las fórmulas de la masonería.... y sólo se entendian con el iniciador*." (De los Reyes, pp. 70-71);

f. "Every member, as his obligation, had to take active part in the propaganda and in the catechizing... presented to the society for the initiation rites." (Agoncillo, p. 49),

"*Cada asociado tiene la obligacion de hacer activa propaganda y de catequizar.... presenta al iniciado*." (De los Reyes, p. 75)

g. "With his *padrino* or sponsor, the neophyte, in black habiliments.... will not be opened to thee." (Agoncillo, p. 50; See footnote 13, Agoncillo only referred to Manuel Artigas Cuerva's *Andres Bonifacio y El Katipunan* [1911] for the cited inscriptions but not credited De los Reyes for the rest of the texts in the passage),

"*A éste se le introduce en un gabinete de reflexión, tapizado de negro.... los Hijos del Pueblo se abrirán para ti.>>*" (De los Reyes, pp. 75-76);

h. "The neophyte is then seated near a small table dimly lighted.... What will be the condition in the future?" (Agoncillo, p. 50; See footnote 14, Agoncillo only referred to the printed sample questionnaire on p. 59 for the cited questions but not credited De los Reyes for the rest of the texts in the passage),

"*Sobre una mesita se ve á media luz....¿Qué porvenir le espera?*" (De los Reyes, 76);

i. "Coached previously by his sponsor, the neophyte.... iniquities of the Spanish authorities will be remedied in time and freedom will be redeemed." (Agoncillo, p. 50),

"*El iniciado, previamente instruído por su padrino.... se remediarán en lo porvenir todos estos males*." (De los Reyes, p. 76);

j. "The questions answered to the satisfaction of the members present, the *mabalasik*, or master of ceremonies.... made in the left forearm of the neophyte, and with his own blood he signs the oath of membership...." (Agoncillo, pp. 50, 52),

"*El hermano terrible, que viene á ser su maestro de ceremonias.... en su antebrazo ízquierdo, firma el iniciado la hoja del juramento*." (De los Reyes, pp. 76-77);

k. "The neophyte, so far from being intimidated by the physical ordeal, is moved to tears by deep emotion and enthusiasm.... national solidarity and emancipation." (Agoncillo, p. 52),

"*lloran de entusiasmo y de emoción al entrever.... su actual muy triste situacion*." (De los Reyes, p. 77);

l. "Those who belonged to the first grade, known as Katipon (Member), wore a black hood....

K.

K. K.

Z. Ll. B.

(Agoncillo, pp. 52-53),

"*Primer grado. Katípun, de los iniciados: en las reuniones llevaban careta negra.... y las letras Z. Ll. B.. que según su alfabeto especial, significa <<Hijo del pueblo>> (Anak ng Bayan)*." (De los Reyes, p. 71);

m. "The members paid an entrance fee of one peso.... to the Benefit Fund and collected every time there was a session or meeting." (Agoncillo, p. 54; Agoncillo cited De los Reyes [footnote no. 22] but the page number is incorrect - should be p. 75 from De los Reyes' *Memoria* instead of p. 71),

"*Los asociados pagaban un peso de entrada.... aparte la Bolsa de Beneficencia, que se hacía correr en todas las sesiones*." (De los Reyes, p. 75).

By comparing two excerpts from Agoncillo's work with De los Reyes's text, we can see the similarity of the two works, starting with a passage from page 70 of De los Reyes's original:

> *El* Katipunan *fue ideado y fundado por Andres Bonifacio, Deodato Arellano, Teodoro Plata, Ladislao Diua, y Valentin Diaz en el mismo momento de la deportación de Rizal en 1892*[.] *Bonifacio era, como he dicho, almacenero de una fabrica de ladrillos; Arellano, escribiente de la Maestranza, fue el primer presidente del Consejo Supremo; y los tres últimos eran ofiales de mesa o auxiliares de os secretarios judiciales o escribanos. Entre ellos no hay ni uno solo rico ni de carrera academica, y empezaron siguiendo su sentido común.*[542]

[542] De los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 70.

In my own English translation of this passage, De los Reyes work reads as follows:

> The Katipunan was envisioned and founded by Andres Bonifacio, Deodato Arellano, Teodoro Plata, Ladislao Diua and Valentin Diaz the same time as Rizal's deportation in 1892. Bonifacio was, as I have said, a warehouse supervisor of a brick factory; Arellano, Arsenal clerk, was the first president of the Supreme Council; and the latter three were office employees, court clerks or transcribers[543]. There is none among them who is wealthy or with professional career, and they began following their collective sentiment [or literally, 'common sense'].[544]

Though Agoncillo rearranged the order of the sentences and thus put Rizal at the end, there is still a close correspondence, not indicated with any quotation marks or citation, between his passage on page 47 of Chapter 4 and De los Reyes' text quoted above:

> The Katipunan was thus the idea of the plebeian Bonifacio, who became and remained to the last its spiritual leader. None of its charter members were of the middle or aristocratic class. Bonifacio was a laborer; while Arellano, Plata, Diwa and Diaz were court clerks. Diaz though not so ill-provided as the rest, was nevertheless a small merchant, belonging more to the masses than to the intellectual middle class. Coming as it did on the very day that Rizal was ordered banished to Dapitan, the Katipunan remained in the background and did not seriously hamper the work of the Liga.[545]

Our second comparison of the two works, starts with another passage from page 70 of De los Reyes's work, which reads as follows:

> *Adoptaron al principio las formulas de la masoneria, dero* [sic] *simplicaficándolas para adaptar el grado de cultura de los asociados, que pertenecian al proletariado y campesinos*.[546]

In my own English translation of this passage, De los Reyes' work reads as follows:

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[543] All three terms listed by De los Reyes – "*ofiales de mesa o auxiliares de os secretarios judiciales o escribanos*" – mean court clerks.

[544] Translation of excerpt from De los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 70.

[545] Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 47.

[546] See Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 47-48; De los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 70-71.

> At first, they [Katipuneros] adopted the Masonic ways [i.e. rituals and traditions], but simplified them to fit the cultural level of the members, who belonged to the proletariat and peasantry.

On page 48, Agoncillo's text is a direct, albeit somewhat shortened translation, again without any quotation marks or annotation, of De los Reyes' original:

> The Katipunan adopted the principles of Masonry in such a way as to be easily understood by the members who belonged to the lowest stratum of society.[547]

In the nineteen pages of Chapter 7, Agoncillo had three pages that included passages paraphrased from De los Reyes.[548] However, these pages are crucial to Agoncillo's thesis that makes the argument about the betrayal of revolution by the Filipino elites who rejected the Katipunan. The following excerpts from page 80 of the De los Reyes work highlight the similarities between the two works.

> *El elemento rico del pais es conservador y partidario del statu [sic] quo por interes propio, pues toda perturbación le perjudica y cree que nada positivo puede esperar, dado el estado actual de Filipinas; por eso no sólo era mirado con desdén, sino con verdadero enojo por los antifrailes y separatistas, los cuales decian que estos mestizos han heredado del chino sus sentimientos de timidez, pasado por todo con tal de no tocar sus intereses, pero no su virtud, que es el patriotismo. Y además, el* Katipunan*, como es comunista, atentaba contra los intereses de los ricos, como en pasados siglos atentasen* [sic] *los plebeyos contra los frailes y los principales unidos, y estos nada podrian ganar sumando sus propiedades con la miseria de los katipuneros.*
>
> *El elemento medio ó burgués, personificado en* La Liga Filipina*, era más enemigo aun del* Katipunan *por lo mismo que tenian inmediato contacto, quiero decir, que se rivalizaban y cada uno de ellos se creia el único que conseguiria resultados prácticos*.[549]

In my own English translation of this passage, De los Reyes' work reads as follows:

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[547] Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 48.

[548] See pp. 102-120 of *The Revolt of the Masses*. For comparison, see pp. 109-111 of the De los Reyes work, XXX.

[549] Both excerpts can be found in De los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 80

> The country's wealthy element is conservative and supporter of the status quo due to vested interest, thus, any disruptions is detrimental to it [the status quo] and, [the wealthy] believes that nothing positive can be expected given the current condition of the Philippines. For this reason, [the wealthy] was regarded not only with disdain but with genuine anger by anti-friars and separatists, which they [the anti-friars and separatists] said that these [Chinese] mestizos have inherited their feelings of timidity from the Chinese, [who] tolerated everything as long as their interests are not affected, but not their virtue which is patriotism. And furthermore, the Katipunan, as it is communist [in leaning], threatened the interests of the wealthy, as in the past centuries plebeians challenged the friars and all the principales. Nothing could be gained with their combined properties against the suffering of the katipuneros.
>
> The middle element or bourgeoisie, embodied in La Liga Filipina, was more of an adversary of the Katipunan even though they had immediate contact [with each other], what I want to say, that they were vying [against each other] and every one of them believed that [they were] the only one that could obtain practical outcome.[550]

In his text, Agoncillo presented the Filipino elites as a single social entity as opposed to De los Reyes' own categorization in which he clearly made a distinction between "the rich element" and "the middle element" of Filipino society.[551] Agoncillo did not make any distinctions between the wealthy Filipinos and the middle class that included the intellectuals, with the result that he merged De los Reyes' separate texts about the wealthy Filipinos and the middle class. The derivative sentences are scattered throughout different pages. On page 80, Agoncillo wrote:

> The wealthy Filipinos, who formed a segment of the middle class, were more conservative than the intelligentsia in asking for democratic rights, since they, among their countrymen, would be most affected by any disturbance of the status quo.[552]

Then in pages 110-111, Agoncillo continued this analysis, saying:

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[550] My gratitude to Philippine scholar Ruth de Llobet who verified the accuracy of my Spanish translation of De los Reyes's texts.

[551] De los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 80.

[552] Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 109.

> The attitude of the middle class toward the Katipunan was best reflected by the La Liga Filipina of Rizal, which was composed mostly of the intellectuals and middle-class businessmen. Its conservatism that still catered to the already lost idea of winning the sympathy of the Spanish Government for the purpose of introducing significant reforms in the administration, became the target of contempt of the radical elements of the masses, especially by the anti-friars and separatists who claimed that the rich were *mestizos* of Chinese origin and so had inherited the timidity of their celestial ancestors, letting things blow over if their interests were not affected. Their patriotism, on the other hand, had never been considered a virtue, for it was of dubious provenance. Moreover, the Katipunan, because of its socialistic leanings, was against vested interests.
>
> On the other hand, the middle class, as personified by the Liga, was opposed to the Katipunan for the simple reason that everyone of that class thought of nothing but the practical results of the present.[553]

Clearly, Agoncillo deviated from De los Reyes' three-tiered social structure. Moreover, Agoncillo merged the two upper classes of De los Reyes (the wealthy and middle class Filipinos and intellectuals) into a single "middle class" to support his argument that emphasized class struggle – with his "middle class" having betrayed his "masses," who were the central figures in the Katipunan.[554] With the exception of this modification, it is clear that crucial passages and key concepts in Agoncillo's chapters on the Katipunan were derivative from De los Reyes' *Memoria*.

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[553] Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 110-111.

[554] Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 110-111; De los Reyes, *La sensacional memoria*, 80.

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- El Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila contra la insurrección filipinas 9su creación, instrucciones a sus Inspectores y Agentes)

- Documentos, copias, impresos y otros papeles de Katipunan y de la insurreccion filipina, 1896-1897

- Seccion de la Guardia Civil Veterana. Apuentes sobre la organización y desarrollo de la insurrección filipina 1896

- Trata de los siguientes temas: 1º Masonería; 2º. La Propaganda y la Asociación Hispano-Filipina; 3º. La Liga Filipina; 4º K K K N M A N B (Kataastaasang Katipunan Nang Manga Anac Nang Bayan-Altisima sociedad de los hijos del pueblo) denuncia de la conjuración y su descubrimiento

- Copia de las Informaciones Secretas de la Inspección del Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila (1896-1897)

- Curiosas y rara colección de anónimos originales dirigidos al Gobernador General de Filipinas y Gobernador Civil de Manila y cartas interceptados por la policía (1896-1898)

Philippine National Archives (PNA)
Battalion de Leales Voluntarios (1861-1898)
Cuerpo de Vigilancia de Manila - Expedientes personales
Prestación Personal - Tondo (1891-1897)
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Varias Personajes, Book #2
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